3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 329

THE BHARATKHAND TEXTILE MFG. CO. LTD.

& OTHERS

THE TEXTILE LABOUR ASSOCIATION,

AHMED ABAD.

- (P. B. G.AJENDR.AG.ADK.AR and K. N. WANCHoo, JJ.)

Industrial Dispute-Claim of gratuity by workmen in textile industry-Framing of scheme in modification of previous award- V alidity-Gratuity, if in the nature of profit bonus-Applicability of Full Bench formula-Duty of Industrial Court-Bombay Industrial Relations Act, r946 (Bom. XI of r947), s. n6A-Employees' Provident Funds Act, r952 (XIX of r952), s. r7.

This was an appeal by certain textile mills of Ahmedabad against a scheme for gratuity awarded by the Industrial Court.

The Labour Association, the respondent, gave a notice of change under s. 42(2) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946- (Bom. XI of l9ll7), intimating the Mill Owners' Association that they wanted a scheme for gratuity and mentioned four categories of termination of service in the annexure. This demand was refused and so referred to the Industrial Court under s. 73A of the Act.

Pending the reference the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952 (19 of 1952), came into operation and the Industrial Court, on an objection by the Mill Owners' Association, held that it was inadvisable to proceed with the reference and that a fresh application should be made, if necessary, after the scheme envisaged by the Act is introduced and rejected the respondent's demand. Thereafter a fresh notice of change was given by the respondent and there were certain references to the Industrial , Court in respect of the demand. The parties came to an agreement to refer all their disputes to arbitration, the references were withdrawn and the disputes were referred to the Board of Arbitrators.

Before the Board the Mill Owners' Association took the objection that so long as the award of the Industrial Court dismissing the earlier reference subsisted, the claim for gratuity could :not be considered by it. That objection was uplield by the Board and it made no provision for gratuity. Thereupon the respondent applied for the modification of the award under s. n6A of the Act, and the Industrial Court by its award, which is the subject matter of the present appeal, framed a.scheme for gratuity on an industry-cum-region basis: Held, that the decision of the Industrial Court was correct and must be upheld.

Regard being had to the true nature of its earlier award and the scope of the application for its modification, it could not be said that the respondent was seeking to alter the framework or change any of the principles of that award and the application under s. n6A of the Act must be held to be competent. ·

Marek I].

z960

Bharatkhand Taxtile Mfg. Co.

Ltd. v. i extile Labou1 Association

A scheme for gratuity is by its nature an integrated scheme and covers all classes of termination of service where gratuity benefit can be legitimately claimed and the refusal of the Industrial Court in the earlier award amounted to a refusal to frame any scheme at all.

The statutory provident fund created by the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952, could be no bar to the respondent's claim for a gratuity scheme although there can be no doubt that in awarding such a scheme Industrial Courts must make due allowance for it. Provisions of s. 17 of the said Act clearly indicate that the statutory benefits under the Act are the minimum to which the employees are entitled and that they are no bar to additional benefits claimed by the employees. • Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, [1960] 2 S.C.R. 32, referred to.

It was not correct to say that the claim for gratuity was essentially similar to a claim for profit bonus and must always be considered on unitwise basis.

The benefit of gratuity .is in the nature of a retiral benefit and before framing such a scheme industrial adjudication has to take into account such relevant factors as the linancial condition of the employer, his profit-making capacity, the profits earned by him in the past, the extent of his reserves and the chances of his replenishing them as well as the claims for capital invested by him, and in evolving a long term scheme a long view of the employer's financial condition should be taken and on that basis alone the feasibility of a scheme and the extent of the benefit to be given should be determined.

Arthur Butler & Co. (Muzaffarpur) Ltd. and Arthur Butler Workers' Union, (1952) II L.L.J. 29 and Boots Pure Drug Co. (India) Ltd. v. Their Workmen, (1956) I L.L.J. 293, referred to.

Even assuming that gratuity is no part of deferred wage, it would not be reasonable to assimilate the scheme for gratuity to that of profit bonus or to apply the principles of the Full Bench formula applicable to the latter. A claim for gratuity is strictly not a claim to receive a share of the profits at all.

Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. v. The Union of India, [1959] S.C.R. 12_ and Indian Oxygen and Acetylene Co. Ltd.

Employees' Union v. Indian Oxygen and Acetylene Co. Ltd., (1956) r L.L.J. 435, referred to.

It was not correct to say that an industry-wise basis is wholly inappropriate in dealing with gratuity or that the Industrial Court was in error in adopting that basis. Although some hardship to the weaker units in the industry may not be avoided, there were several factors in its favour both from the point of view of employers and employees.

Since in the present state of economic development in the country the propriety of the adoption of an all-India basis for a scheme of gratuity may be open to doubt, no exception can on principle be taken to the industry-cum-region basis adopted in th.e .instant case.

.""' I

Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. v. The Union of India, r960 [1959] S.C.R. 12, applied.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Bharatkhand No. 1 of 1959. .

Textile Mfg. Co.

Appeal by special leave from the award dated

L;~· September "16, 1957, of the Industrial Cour, t, Bombay, Textile Labour in Misc. Application (IC) No. 20 of 1957.

Association M. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, I. M.

Nanavati, S. N. Andley, J.B. Dadach.anji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellants.

0. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, B. R. L.

Iyengar and K. L. Hathi, for the respondent.

0. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, H.J.

Umrigar and R. H. Dhebar, for the Intervener.

1960. March 17. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by G.AJENDR.AG.ADKAR, J.-This appeal by special leave Gajendragadkar J. is directed against the award passed by the Industrial Court, Bombay, by which a scheme for1 gratuity has been framed in favour of the workmen represented by the respondent, Textile Labour Association, Ahmedabad, who are employed by the textile mills in Ahmedabad including the twenty appellant mills before us.

In order to appreciate the points of law raised by the appellants in the present appeal we ought to state at the outset the material facts leading to the present dispute in which the impugned scheme for gratuity has been framed. On June 13, 1950, the respondent gave notice under s. 42(2) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (Born. XI of 1947) (hereinafter called the Act), intimating to the MiHOwners' Association at Ahmedabad (hereinafter called the Association) that it desired a change as specified in the annexure to the communication.

The annexure showed that the respondent wanted a change in that

a scheme for gratuity should be framed wherever services of an employee are teriniriated by the mills on grounds of old-age, invalidity, incapacity or natural death. It was further claimed that the pay-· ment of gratuity in the said cases should be at the rate of one month's wages (in..cluding dearness allowance). per every year of service.

Some incidental demands . were also specified in the a.nuexure. . T.b.e

r960 demand thus made was not accepted by the Associa. tion, and so it was referred to the Industrial Court.

Bharatkhand Pending the reference the Employees' Provident Funds Textile Mfg. Co. Act, 1952 (19 ofl952), came into operation on March 4, Ltd. v. 1952, and it was urged before the Industrl Court on T .. til, Labaur behalf of the Association that since the statutory Association scheme of provident fund would soon become compul- . - sory it would not be advisable to adjudicate upon the Gajendragadkar J. respondent's claim for the specified items of gratuity at that stage. This argument was accepted by the Industrial Court; it held that when the scheme envisaged by the new Act is introduced it would be possible to see from what date it would be operative, and that, if after the introduction of the said scheme it be found that a sufficient margin is left, it would then be open to the respondent and the Association to make a fresh application for the institution of a gratuity fund either for all the employees or for the benefit of such of them as will have to retire within the next few years.

It was on this ground that the demand made by the respondent was rejected on April 18, 1952.

It appears that the prescribed scheme under the Provident Funds Act came into operation on Octo. her 1, 1952. In June 1955, a fresh notice of change was given by the respondent to all the mills in respect of the demand for gratuity and the said demand became the subject-matter of certain references to the Industrial Court at Bombay under s. 73A of the Act.

At that time the asso.ciation and the respondent had entered into an agreement to refer all their disputes to arbitration, and in accordance with the spirit of the said agreement the references pending before the Industrial Court in respect of gratuity were withdrawn and referred to the Board of Arbitrators. Before the Board it was, however, urged by the Association that, so Jong as the award passed by the Industrial Court on the earlier reference was subsisting and in operation, a claim for gratuity which was the subject-matter of the said reference and award could not be properly or validly considered by the Board.

This objection was upheld by the Boa; rd, and so it made no provision for gratuity. The decision of the Board of Arbitrators . iu the said proceedings was published on July 25, 1957.

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...

After the said decision was made and before it was . rg6o published the respondent made the present application for modification of the earlier award under s. 116A of Bharatkhand Texlile Mfg. Co. the Act on July 6, 1957. In this application the res- Ltd. pondent alleged that there was sufficient justification v. for modifying the previous award and for introducing Te:rtile Labour a scheme of gratuity as claimed by it. In this applica- Association tion a demand for gratuity was made on the followingG . d-d,. 1 1. a; en raga ar • ines:~ ·(I) In the case of death while in service or becoming physically or mentally unfit for further service :

(2) On voluntary retirement or resignation of an employee:

(3) On terminatioh of service by the company:

One month's basic wages and average Dearness Allowance per completed year of service.

After 10 continuous years of service in the company same as in (1)

For less than 10 but more than 7 years at 3/4 rate of (I), For less than 7 years but 5 years or more than 5 years at the 1/2 rate of (I), For more than 10 years' continuous service as in (I) above.

It appears that in the application thus made a typing mistake had crept in which failed to type properly the third category of cases. The respondent applied on August 21, 1957, for amendment of the said typing mistake and the said amendment was naturally allowed. It is the demand made by this application that is the subject-matter of the present proceedings under s. 116A of the Act.

In the present proceedings the Association did not file a written statement and in fact withdrew leaving it open to each mill to file a separate written statement of its own. It appears that there was a difference of opinion amongst the constituents of the Association. Accordingly written statements were filed on

Bharatkhand Textile Mfg. Co.

Ltd. v.

behalf of the 65 constituent mills and the large majority of the said written statements raised some preliminary objections against the competence of the present proceedings and disputed the respondent's claim for gratuity also on the merits. The Industrial Textile Labour Court has overruled all the preliminary objections and Association h "t "t b f d h ,. t on t e men s I as rame a sc eme , or gra mty on

Gajendragadkar J. industry-cum-region basis. The award framing the said scheme was pronounced on September 16, 1957.

It is against this award that 21 out of the 65 mills have come to this Court by special leave.

One of the appellant mills has subsequently withdrawn from the appeal with the result that out of 65 mills 45 mills do not feel aggrieved by the award but 20 mills do; and the contentions raised by them fall to be considered in the present appeal.

Before dealing with the merits of the points raised by the appellants it would be relevant to refer very briefly to the relevant provisions of the Act. The Act has been passed by the Bombay Legislature because it thought that "it was expedient to provide for the regulation of the relations of employers and employees in certain matters, to consolidate and amend the law relating to the settlement of industrial disputes and to provide for certain other purposes". With this object the Act has made elaborate provisions for the regulation of industrial relationships and for the speedy disposal of industrial disputes. An" industrial dispute" under s. 3, sub-s. (17), means "any dispute or difference between an employer and employer, or between employers and employees, or between employees and employees and which is connected with any industrial matter ". The expression " industrial

matter" has been inclusively defined in a very wide sense. "Approved Union" in s. 3(2) means "a union on the approved list", "primary union" under s. 3(28) means " a union for the time being registered as a primary union under the Act ", " registered union " under s. 3(30) means " a union registered under the Act", while "representative union" under s. 3(33) means " a union for the time being registered as a Tepresentative union under the Act". Section 3(39)

defines "wages " as meaning "remuneration of all

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kinds capable of being expressed in terms of money z96o and payable to an employee in respect of his employ- Bh tkh nd mentor work done in such employment, and includes, Textii:'t; co. inter alia, any gratuity payable on discharge ". Sec- Ltd. tion 42, sub-s. (2), provides that an employee desiring v. a change in respect of an industrial matter not' Textile Laour

'fi d .

S h d 1 I II h 11 . t' .

Association spem e m c e u e or s a give no me m _ the prescribed form to the employer through the Gajendragadkar J. representative of employees but shall forward a copy of the same to the Chief Conciliator, the Conciliator of the industry concerned for the local area, the Registrar, the Labour Officer, and such other person as may be prescribed. Section 66(1) provides, inter alia, that if an employer and a representative union or ar.y other registered union which is the .representative of the employees by a written agreement agree to submit any present or future industrial dispute or class of such disputes to the arbitration of any person, whether. such arbitrator is named in such agreement or not, such agreement shall be called submission. We have already noticed that the Association and the respondent had entered into a submission in respect of several disputes which were referred to the Board of Arbitra. tors. Section 73A is important for our purpose; it deals with reference to arbitration by unions, and provides that "notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, a registered union which is a representative of employees, and which is also an approved union, may refer any industrial dispute for arbitration to the industrial court subject to the proviso prescribed under it." It is under s. 73A. that the reference was made on the earlier occasion to adjudicate upon the respondent's claim for a gratuity as specified in its notice of change.

That takes us to ss. 116 and 116A. Section 116 provides, inter alia, for the period during which an award would be binding. Section 116(1) lays down in regard to an award that it shall cease to have effect on the date specified therein, and if no such date is specified, on the expiry of the period of two months from the date on which notice in writing to terminate such an award is given in the prescribed manner by a.ny of the parties thereto to the other party, provided

Bharatkhand Textile Mfg. Co.

Ltd.

that no such notice shall be given till the expiry of three months after the award comes into operation; in other words, the award cannot be terminated at least for three months after it has come irito operav. tion; thereafter it may be terminated as prescribed Textile Labour bys. 116(1).

With the rest of the provisions of s.116 Association d h

1 S we are not concerne m t e present appea . ec-

Goj•ndragadkar J. tion 116A(l) prescribes, inter alia, that any party who und_er the provisions of s. 116 is entitled to give notice of termination of an award may, instead of giving such notice, apply after the expiry of the period specified in sub-s. (2) to the industrial court making the award for its modification. It is unnecessary to set out the other provisions of s. 116A.

The award under appeal has, been made by the industrial court on the application made by the respondent under s. 116A.

The first contention raised before us by the learned Attorney-General on behalf of the appellant is that the application for modification made by the respondent under s. 116A is incompetent, because what the respondent seeks is not any modification of the earlier award which is permissible under s. 116A, but a reversal and a revision of the said award which is not permissible under the said section. The expression "modification of the award" may include alteration in the details of the award or any other subsidiary incidental matters. In this connection it must be borne in mind that there is a radical difference between the meaning of the word " change " as distinguished from the meaning of the word "modification ".

Section 116(2) allows for a change or modification of the registered agreement, settlement or award in terms of the agreement, and that clearly brings out the difference between the two concepts of " change" and " modification ". In cases falling under s. 116(2) the agreements or settlements can be wholly revoked and fresh ones substituted in their place by consent, or by consent they may be modified in subsidiary or incidental details.

Where the Legislature wanted to provide for change it has expressly done so in s. 116(2) by using both the words " changed " or " modified ".

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Section 116A, however, is confined only to modifica- I96o tion of the award and not its change.

T • 1 d h £

I • Bharatkhand he same argument IS pace m anot er orm. t IS Textile Mfg.-co. contended that it was not the intention of the Legisla- Ltd. ture to permit the proceedings under s. l 16A for change v. of policy underlying the award or its essential frame- Textile Labour work. Such a result can be achieved only by terminating Association t.he award under s. 116(1) and raising an industrial G . - dispute as provided by the Act. In support of this a; endragadkar.J. contention reliance has been placed on the observations made by ; M:ukherjea, J., as he then was, in the case of Re: Delhi Laws Act, 1912(1) where the learned judge stated t, hat "the word ' modification ' occurring in s; 7 of the Delhi Laws Act did not mean or involve any change of policy but was confined to alteration of such a character which keeps the policy of the Act intact and introduces such changes as are appropriate to local conditions of which the executive government is made the judge". In the same case Bose, J. observed that " the power to restrict and modify does not import the power to make essential changes ".

On the other hand, the learned Solicitor-General ha.s contended that the context in which the word' modification' has been used in s. 116A does not justify the adoption of the limited meaning of the word " modify " for which the appellants contend. The policy of the Act and the reason why s. 116A has been enacted show that the word " modification" has been used in a sense larger than its ordinary meaning. The Legislature realised that the procedure prescribed bys. 116, sub-s. (I), for terminating the award which necessitates the other subsequent steps was apt to be dilatory and involved and so it has purported to provide for an effective alternative speedy remedy for the change of the award under s. 116A. In support of this argument reliance has been placed on the meaning assigned to 1; he word" modified" in "Words and Phrases" where it is stated that "though one of the primary meanings of the word ' modify ' is no doubt ' to limit ' or ' restrict' it also means' to vary', and there is authority that it may even mean 'to extend ' or ' enlarge ' " (2 ).

Bharatkhand Textile Mfg. Co.

Ltd. v.

Textile Labour Association

Gajendragadkar J.

SUPREME COURT HEPORTS [1960)

It is common ground that the modification permissible under s. 116A does not mean that the provisions of the award must always be reduced; it may mean even increasing the provisions, and so it is urged by the respondent that the word "modification" should receive a wider denotation in the context of s. 116A. This construction no doubt receives some support from the provision of s. 116A that , a party may apply for the modification of the award instead of giving notice for its termination ; and the latter clause tends to show that the procedure prescribed by s. 116A is ; i.n alternative to the procedure prescribed by s. 116. The industrial court was apparently inclined to put a wider denotation on the word " modification " used in s. 116A.

We do not think it is necessary to decide this larger question of the construction of s. 116A because, in our opinion, in the present case, even if the limited and narrow construction suggested by the appellant is put on the word "modification", the respondent's application cannot be said to be outside the purview of the said section. There is no doubt that the claim for gratuity made by the respondent in the earlier proceedings has been rejected by the industrial court and that is an award; but, whether or not the present application seeks for a modification of the said award within the meaning of s. l 16A would depend on what the industrial court had decided on the earlier occasion. It is clear that the industrial court did not then consider the merits of the claim at all. It upheld the Association's contention that the matter should not be decided then but may be considered later in view of the fact that the Employees' Provident Funds Act had already been passed and the statutory scheme for provident funds was about to come into force. It was on this ground alone that the industrial court rejected the claim as it was then made but it took the precaution of expressly adding that after the introduction of the provident funds scheme it would be open to the respondent or the Association to make a fresh application for the institution of a gratuity fund as it may deem expedient to claim. It would not be unreasonable, we think, to assume that when liberty was thus reserved

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to the parties to make a fresh application the in- :1960 dustrial court had presumably s. 116A in mind. In substance, the effect of the order then passed was that Bharatkhand Textile Mfg. Co. the application was regarded as premature and liberty Ltd. was reserved to the parties to renew the application if v. the statutory scheme was thought to be insufficient or Textile Labour unsatisfactory by either of them. In such a case, if Association the respondent applies to the industrial court for modi- . - k 1 fi t. f 't d 't d'ffi lt t t th Ga; endragad ar . : ca 10n o 1 s awar 1 IS I cu o accep e argument that the respondent seeks to alter the framework of the award or to change any principle decided in the award. The true position is that by the present :ipplication the respondent is asking the court to consider the demand now that the scheme has come into force and is, according to the respondent, insufficient to meet the workmen's grievance. What the industrial court then promised to consider after the

scheme came into force is brought before it for its decision again. That being the true nature of the award and the true scope of the prayer made by the respondent in its present application it is difficult to hold that the application is incompetent under s. 116A.

The next argument which is pressed before us by the learned Attorney-General is that the application for modification is incompetent in regard to matters not covered in the earlier proceedingR. We have already referred to the items 9overed in the earlier proceedings :is well as those which are the subject-matter of the present application. It is true that the notice served by the respondent prior to the earlier reference specifically set out the claim for gratuity in four categories -of cases of termination of services of the employees, whereas in the present proceedings some other categories are included. The objection raised a.gainst the competence of the present application purports to treat the earlier notice in a very technical way and confines the subsequent proceedings taken before the industrial court to the said four categories only. The argument is that the cases of termination of services which were not specified in the earlier notice cannot now be brought before the industrial . court under the guise of the modification of the <1.wa.rd.

'960 If the modification of the award can be claimed under

Bharatilhand s. 116A it must be claimed only in regard to the said Textile Mfg. co. four categories and no more.

This argument has Ltd. been rejected by the industrial court, and it has been v. held that in substance the earlier notice should be con- Textile Labour strued a.s constituting a claim for the scheme of gratuity A s.wciation _ in general. The validity of this conclusion has been

Gajendragadkar J. seriously challenged by the appellant.

There is no doubt that disputes in regard to industrial matters not covered by an award do not fall within the scope of s. 116 of the Act; and so if the claim for gratuity in regard to categories not specified in the earlier notice is deemed to be outside the said notice and the relevant reference proceedings, could the respondent have made a claim in that behalf and ask for industrial adjudication without terminating the a ward? It is difficult to answer this question in the affirmative.

It is well-known that a scheme for gratuity is an integrated scheme and it covers all classes of termination of service in which gratuity benefit can be legitimately claimed. Therefore, when the industrial court refused to frame a gratuity scheme in regard to the four categories brought before it on the earlier occasion, in substance its refusal amounted to a rejection of any scheme for gratuity at all; otherwise it is very difficult to assume that having rejected the claim for gratuity in respect of the said four categories it would still have entertained a claim for gratuity on behalf of other categories not included therein. That is why we are inclined to think that though in form the rejection of the demand for gratuity on the earlier occasion was in regard to the four categories specified in the notice, in effect it was rejection in regard to the claim for a gratuity scheme itself.

It cannot be disputed that if the earlier demand had been for a gratuity scheme pure and simple and no categories had been specified in connection therewith the present application for the modification of the award coupled with a claim for a gratuity scheme in respect of all the categories specified in the application . would.be.within the purview of s. 116 of the Act. That in substance is what has happened in this case

according to the finding of the industrial court on this i96o Point, and having regard to the unusual circumstan- Bharatkhand ces of this case we see no reason to interfere with it.

Textilt Mfg. Co.

Then it is urged that the industrial court has erred Ltd, in law in framing a gratuity scheme even though the v. statutory scheme under the Employees' Provident Te:rtilt Labour Funds Act has been in operation since 1952. The Association provident fund guaranteed by the statute under the G • -,. 1 h . k' d f . b fi a1en,.ragau,.ar , statutory sc eme is one m o retuement ene t and since this retirement benefit is now available to the workmen it was not open to the industrial court to provide an additfonal gratuity scheme ; that in substance is the contention. This contention has been frequently raised before the industrial courts and has been generally rejected. The Employees' Provident Funds Act has no doubt been passed for the institution .of provident funds £or employees covered by it; and the statutory scheme for provident funds is intended to afford to the employees some sort of a retirement benefit; but it cannot be ignored that what the statute has prescribed in the scheme is the minimum to which, according to the Legislature, the employees are entitled; and so in all cases where the industrial courts are satisfied that a larger and higher benefit can be afforded to the employees no bar can be pleaded by virtue of tJhe Provident Funds Act. It is true that after the Act came into force, the industrial courts would undoubtedly have to bear in mind the benefit of the statutory scheme to which the employees may be entitled ; and it is only after bearing tha, t factor in mind and making due allowance for it that any additional scheme for gratuity can and must be framed by them; but it is not open toan employer to contend that the Act excludes the jurisdiction of industrial courts to frame an additional scheme.

In this connection it may be pertinent to point out tiha, t s. 17 of the Employees' Provident Funds Act empowers the appropriate government to exempt from the operation of all or any of the provisions of the statutory scheme to establishments as specified in. s. 17(l)(a) and (b).

Under s. 17(1)(b), for instance, any establishment may apply for exemption if its employees are in enjoyment of benefits in the na.ture of

Bharatkhand Textile _""'1fg. Co.

Ltd. v. 1'extile LabouY

Association

Gajendragadkar ].

provident fund, pension or gratuity which, in the opinion of the appropriate government, are on the whole not less favourable to such employees than the benefits provided under the Act or any scheme in rela;

tion to employees in any other establishment of a similar character. This provision brings out two points very clearly. If the benefits provided by the employer are not less favourable than the statutory benefits he may apply for exemption and the appropriate government may grant him such exemption. If, on the other hand, the benefits conferred by him are less favourable than the statutory benefits he may not be entitled to any exemption, in which case both the benefits would be available to the employees. These provisions clearly indicate that the statutory benefits which in the opinion of the L.(lgislature are the minimum to which the employees are entitled, cannot create a bar against the employees' claim for additional benefits from their employers.

In this connection we may incidentally refer to the decision of this Court in the case of Indian Hume Pipe Go. Ltd. v.

The Workmen (1) where this Court has held that the statutory provision for the payment of retrenchment compensation under s. 25F is no bar to a claim for gratuity. The argument urged that the statutory retrenchment partook the character of gratuity and thus constituted a bar for the additional claim for gratuity was rejected. We must accordingly hold that the Industrial Court was right in rejecting the appellants' contention that the statutory provision for provident fund under the Employees' Provident Funds Act is a bar to the present claim for a gratuity scheme.

The learned Attorney-General has then challenged the validity of the scheme on the ground that the Industrial Court was in error in dealing with the problem on industry-wise rather than unit-wise basis. He contends that the claim for gratuity is more allied to a claim for bonus and must, therefore, be dealt with on unit-wise basis. It is not disputed that the benefit of gratuity is in the nature of retiral benefit and there can be no doubt that before framing a scheme for gratuity industrial adjudication has to take into

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account several relevant facts ; the financial condition r96~ of the employer, his profit-making capacity, the profits Bharatkhand earned by him in the past, the extent of his reserves Textile Mfg. co. and the chances of his replenishing them as well as Ltd. ' the claims for capital invested by him, these and other v. ma.terial coQsiderations may have to be borne in mind Textile Labour in determining the terms -0f the gratuity scheme. This Association position has always been recognised by industrial G . d::-:-:dk 1 . a1en raga ar . courts (V1de: Arthur Butler & Go. (Muzaffarpur) Ltd.

And Arthur Butler Workers' Union( 1). It appears also to be well recognised that though the grant of a claim for gratuity must depend upon the capacity of the employer to stand the burden on a long-term basis it would not be permissible to place undue emphasis either on the temporary prosperity or the temporary adversity of the employer. In evolving a long-term scheme a long-term view has to be taken of the employer's financial condition and it iS"on such a basis alone that the question as to whether a scheme should be framed or not must be decided, and if a scheme has to be framed the extent of the benefit should be determined (Vide: Boots Pure Drug Go. (India) Ltd. And Their Workmen (2) ).

For our present purpose it is really not necessary to embark upon the academic question as to whether gratuity is a part of deferred wage or not; we will assume that it is not. Even so it would not be reasonable to assimilate the character of 1; he scheme for gratuity to that of a profit bonus and to seek to import the considerations of the Full Bench formula which governs the grant of bonus. A claim for profit bonus is based on the assumption that the employees contribute at least partially to the profits made by the employer and that they are entitled to ask for a share in the said profits in order to bridge the gulf between the wages actually received by them and a living wage to which they are ultimately entitled.

A claim for gratuity is a claim for retiral benefit and it is strictly not a claim to receive a share of the profits at all; and so there would be no scope for importing the several considerations which are relevant in determining the claim for profit bonus. That is the view taken by the Labour Appellate Tribunal in Indian

(t) [1952] JI L.L.J. 29.

(2) [1956] I L.L.J. 293.

1960 Oxygen and Acetylene Co. Ltd. Employees' Union And Indian Oxygen and Acetylene Co. Ltd. (1) and the said Bharatkhand Textile Mfg. co. decision has been cited with approval by this Court in Ltd.

Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. v. The Union of v.

India (2).

Therefore, we are not prepared to accept Textile Labou• the argument that the claim for gratuity is essentially Association similar to a claim for profit bonus, and like profit bonus

G . d-dk 1 it must always be considered on unit-wise basis. Incia; en raga ar . d 11 dd h 1 . ,_. fi b enta y we may a t at even a c aim ior pro t onus can and often is settled on industry-wise basis.

That still leaves the larger question to be considered whether the industrial court was in error in dealing with the claim for gratuity on industry-wise basis. It is urged for the appellants that an industry.wise basis is wholly inappropriate in dealing with gratuity and it should not have been adopted by the industrial court.

It may be conceded that when an industry-wise basis is adopted in dealing with a claim like gratuity often enough stronger units of the industry get a benefit while the weaker units suffer a disadvantage. Take the case of a gratuity scheme. If such 11 scheme is based on industry wise basis employees working under the stronger units do not get that amount of benefit of gratuity which they would have got if the question had been considered unit-wise, whereas employees working in weaker units get a better scheme than they would have got if the matter had been considered unit-wise. Such a result is inevitable in an industrywise approach. This possible mischief can, however, be mitigated by taking a fair cross-section of the industry or by working on a rule of averages after collecting the relevant facts of all the constituent units of the industry. Even eo, if some of the units of the industry are very weak they are apt to suffer a disadvantage just as the very strong units in the industry are likely to get an undue advantage in the process; but the question which calls for our decision is: does this possible result mean that a scheme for gratuity should on principle not be framed on an industry. wise basis but must always be framed on a unit-wise basis?

There are several factors which militate against the appellants' suggestion that unit-wise basis is the only

(I) [1~56] l L.L J. 435•

(2) [1959] S.C.R. ti at p. 156.

....

basis which should be adopted in such a case. Equality r960 of competitive conditions is in a sense necessary from t}ie point of view of the employers themselves ; Bharatkhand Textile Mfg. Co. that in fact was the claim made by the Association Ltd. which suggested that the gratuity scheme should be v. framed on industry-wise basis spread over the whole Textile Labour of the country. Similarly equality of benefits such as Association gratuity is likely to secure contentment and satisfac- G . - tion of the employees and lead to industrial peace and a1endragadkar f. ha.rmony. If similar gratuity schemes are framed for all the units of the industry migration of employees from one unit to another is inevitably checked, and industrial disputes arising from unequal treatment in that behalf are minimised. Thus, from the point of vi.ew of both employers and employees industry-wise approach is on the whole desirable. It is well-known that the Committee on Fair Wages which had examined this problem in all its aspects had come to the definite conclusion that "in determining the capacity of an industry to pay it would be wrong to take the capacity of a particular unit or the capacity of all the industries in the country. The relevant criterion should be the capacity of a particular industry in a specified region", and it recommended that as far as possible the same wages should be prescribed for all units of that industry in that region. This approach has been approved by this Court in the case of Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. (1) (p. 19). What is true about the wa.ges is equally true about the gratuity scheme. In the present economic development of our country we think industrial adjudication would hesitate to adopt an all-India basis for the decision of an industrial dispute like that of gratuity ; and so, on principle, it would be difficult to take exception to the approach adopted by the industrial court in dealing with the present dispute.

In this connection it may be relevant to take notice of the fact that the wages of textile employees have been standardised on an industry-wise basis. Similarly, dearness allowance has been fixed on the same basis, and unsubstituted holidays have been prescribed on a like basis.

The Employees' State Insurance

(I) [1959] S.C.R. i2 at p. 156.

SUPHEME COURT REPORTS [1960)

z960 Scheme (Act 34 of 1948) is industry-wise and retrenchment compensation has been statutorily standardised Bharatkhand S f A IV f Textile Mfg. Co. on the same basis ( ection 25F o ct X o 1947).

Ltd.

What is more remarkable is the fact that the Associa- •· tion and the respondent had entered into an agree- Textile Labour ment regarding bonus for a period of five years and Association the gratuity scheme for the clerical and supervisory

G . d --dk 1 staff between the said parties is also based on the

a1n raga ar . . d . 1 b b same m ustry-w1se approac I y agreement etween them. The Associatfon and the respondent can justly claim with some pride that in the past most of their disputes had been amicably settled. It is only on the present occasion that owing to a difference of opinion amongst its constituent members that the Association withdrew from the proceedings and left it to the members to appear individually before the industrial court.

Even so 45 out of the 65 mills have accepted the award. Under these circumstances the question which we have to decide is: Did the industrial court err in law in adopting an industry-wise basis in deciding the present proceedings? It would no doubt have been open to the industrial court to deal with the dispute unit-wise just as it was open to the court to deal with it on an industry-wise basis. As we have already indicated there are several factors in favour of adopting the latter approach though it may be conceded that by adopting the said course some hardship may conceivably be caused to the weakest units in the industry. Having carefully considered this question in all its aspects we are, however, not prepared to hold that the scheme of gratuity under appeal should be set aside on the ground that the industrial court ought to have adopted a unit-wise approach. In this connection it may not be out of place to observe that the cotton textile industry is the premier industry of our country and there is a concentration of a large number of mills in Ahmedabad. A good many of them have capit1J, lised large portions of reserves and documents produced in the present proceedings show that the production has steadily increased and has found a responsive market. There is a gratuity scheme framed on an industry-wise basis in operation in Bombay and a similar scheme ~.ppears to have been extended to

l.. -

Nadiad and Khandesh. In fact an award for gratuity x96o has been made on an industry-wise basis even in res- Bharatkhand pect of the textile industry at Coimbatore.

Having Textile Mfg. co. regard to these facts we think the industrial court was ua. rightin observing that "there was no justification why v. an important textile centre like Ahmedabad should. Textile La.bour not have a gratuity scheme when the needs of the Association labour require it and the industry can afford it".

Gajendragadkar ).

It is true that in dealing with industrial disputes on - industry-cum-region basis, if the region covers the whole of the country industrial adjudication sometimes takes resort to the classification of the constituent units of the indust; ry in question.

Industrial adjudication in regard to the fixation of wage-structure in respect of newspapers and banks in the country. is an illustration in point.

The need for such a classification is not as great when the region happens to be limited in area, though, even in respect of a limited area, in a proper case industrial adjudication may adopt the course of classification. In the present case the industrial court took the view that classification was not possible and would be inexpedient. No classification was made in dealing with the textile mills in Bombay, and the industrial court did not feel called upon to make a departure in respect of Ahmedabad. We do not think that this conclusion suffers from any infirmity.

The scheme has been further attacked on the ground that before framing it the industrial court has not considered the extent of the liabilities already imposed on t, he indust.ry. It has been strenuously argued before us that in assessing the extent of the liabilities the acutual liabilities accrued as the result of the scheme has not been taken into account and the serious strain imposed on the industry by the imposition of excise duty has also been overlooked;

on the other hand, undue importance has been attached to bonus shares and no account has been taken of tlie industry's obligation to contribute to the State Insurance Scheme.

We are not impressed by these arguments. The argument about the aqtual liability accrued is really theorPtir.a.I and cannot have much practical significance. If it is suggested. that in

1 960 framing a scheme of gratuity the capacity to pay should be determined only if the employer can set Bharatkhand apart a fund to cover the whole of the liability Textile Mfg. Co. theoretically accrued, then gratuity schemes can be

L~. very rarely framed.

Such schemes are long-term Textile Labour schemes and a fund to cover the total liability in that

hsociation behalf must inevitably be built up in course of time . -- year by year. In regard to the excise duty the indus- Ga1endragadkar J. trial court has rightly pointed out that the imposition of a higher duty was the consequence of the excessive increase in prices of mill cloth and in fact it was levied " to mop off those extra profits ''. When the prices fall down it is not unlikely that the excise duty may be reduced. In any case the obligation to pay excise duty or to contribute to the insurance scheme, though perhaps relevant, may not have a material bearing on the framing of the scheme of gratuity.

Then, as to the bonus shares, it is not right to contend that the industrial court has attributed undue importance to them. All that it has observed is that the issue of bonus shares by a large majority of the mills in addition to good dividends during the war and post-war period is an index to the prosperity enjoyed by the cotton textile industry in Ahmedabad. In our opinion, no criticism can be made against this statement. In this connection it may perhaps be pertinent to observe that the statutory ceiling placed on the agent's commission may in due course assist the mills to some extent in meeting their liability under the scheme.

The last argument urged against the validity of the scheme is based on the assumption that in working out the preliminary figures before framing the scheme the industrial court has committed an error. What the industrial court has done is to take the information collected by the Association on the earlier occasion, to compare it with the statement prepared by the respondent, and to make a rough estimate about the extent of the industry's liability under the scheme.

In considering these statements it is important to emphasise that the Association's calculations have been made not on the basis of basic pay but on the basis of pay including dearness allowance, and that

na.tura.lly has made considerable additions to the

--·

' -

amounts involved. The scheme framed is by reference z960 to the basic wages. This position is not disputed. d Bharalkhand The other material point which eserves to be men- Textile Mfg. co. tioned is that the calculations made by the Associi:ttion Lid. proceed on the assumption that most of the employees Textilev.Labour would seek to retire from employment as soon as they Associaliw complete fifteen years' service.

Such an ssumption Gajendragadkar J. seems to us to be not warranted at all. It 1s common ground that employees generally seek employment in textile industry between 18 and 20 years and the age of superannuation is 60. On an average each employee would work 35 to 40 years and so it would be unrealistic to make calculation on the basis that each one of the employees retires as soon as he completes 15 years of service. In the absence of better employment in Ahmedabad it is quite likely thatmost of the employees would stick on to their jobs until the age of superannuation.

The figures collated are in respect of the years 1953, 1954 and 1955. They are collated in seven different columns, and ultimately the percentages of persons who retired during the three respective years a.re worked out as at 3·13%, 4'13% and 3·84%. The industrial court has observed that the largest number of persons retired voluntarily on payment of gratuity because there was an agreement between the Association and the respondent whereby the respondent agreed to rationalisation which involved retrenchment of staff on condition that the surplus staff retrenched would be given gratuity.

It also appears that the retired workmen included a number of employees who voluntarily resigned because they had not completed 15 years of service and were not entitled to gratuity. It is on a consideration. of all the relevant facts that the industrial court came to the conclusion that the number of -persons who would have been entitled to gratuity under a normal gratuity scheme would probably not have exceeded 2% of the labour force. If it is assumed, as we think it can be safely assumed, that on an avetage an employee works 35 to 40 years with his employer the said percentage deduced by the indu:itrial court cannot be said to be erroneous.

Even so the scheme framed by the industrial court has provided1 inter alia1 one month's basic

r960

Bharatkhand Textile Mfg. Co.

Ltd.

wage for each completed year of service for the period before the coming into force of the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952, and half-a-month's basic wage for each completed year of service thereafter, v. subject to a maximum of fifteen months' basic wages Textile Labour to be paid to the employee or his heirs or executors or nominees as the case may be. This provision which Association

Gajendragadkar ]. amounts to a departure from the Bombay scheme of

r¢o

March a2.

gratuity brings out the fact that the provisions made by the Employees' Provident Funds Act have been duly taken into account by the industrial court. We are, therefore, satisfied that the scheme framed by the industrial court does not suffer from any infirmities as alleged by the appellants.

The result is the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed.

M/S. NEW INDIA MOTORS (P) LTD.

(P. B.

NEW DELHI v.

K. T. MORRIS

G .. UENDRAGADKAR, K. N. W ANCHOO and K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)

Jndu, strial Dispute-"; rv ork1nen concerned in such dispute," Meaning of-Industrial Disputes Act, r947 (r4 of r947), as amended by Act 36 of r956, ss. 33(r)(a), 33A.

The respondent workman was dismissed by his employer, the appellant, pending adjudication of an:industrial dispute, and without the permission of the Industrial Tribunal, relating to the discharge of 7 other employees working as apprentices under (he appellant. The respondent raised a dispute before the Industrial Tribunal under s. 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, r947, and his case was that he was concerned in the dispute relating to the said 7 employees and gave evidence on their behalf and that his dismissal \Vas solely due to the interest he took in their cause.

The Tribunal found in his favour and passed an award directing his reinstatement. The appellant contended that the respondent was incompetent to raise the dispute •:mder s. 33A of the Act.

The question for decision, therefore, was one relating to the construction of s. 33(r)(a) of the Act:

K. N. WANCHoo, JJ.

Provident Funds Act

Ahmedabad

s. 42(2)

Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946

s. 73A

Provident Funds Act, 1952

Provident Funds Act, 1952

s. 17

[1960] 2 S.C.R. 32

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Textile Mfg. Co.

I. M.

Nanavati

S. N. Andley

J.B. Dadach.anji

Rameshwar Nath

P. L. Vohra

K. Daphtary

B. R. L.

Iyengar

K. L. Hathi

H.J.

Umrigar

R. H. Dhebar

G.AJENDR.AG.ADKAR

Gajendragadkar

June 13, 1950

s. 42(2)

Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946

April 18, 1952

Provident Funds Act

Octo. her 1, 1952

s. 73A

July 25, 1957

s. 116A

August 21, 1957

s. 116A

Bharatkhand Textile Mfg

Industrial Textile Labour Court

September 16, 1957

s. 3

s. 3(2)

s. 3(28)

s. 3(30)

s. 3(33)

Section 3(39)

Section 66(1)

Section 73A

s. 73A

ss. 116 and 116A

Section 116

Section 116(1)

Bharatkhand Textile Mfg. Co.

Ltd.

Goj•ndragadkar

s. 116

s. 116A

s. 116A

s. 116A

s. 116A

Section 116(2)

s. 116(2)

s. 116(2)

Section 116A

s. 116(1)

endragadkar

ukherjea

Delhi Laws Act, 1912

Bose

s. 116A

s. 116A

s. 116A

s. 116A

s. 116A

s. 116A

s. 116A

s. 116

s. 116A

s. 116A

Provident Funds Act

s. 116A

Bharatkhand Textile Mfg. Co.

s. 116A

s. 116A

s. 116

s. 116

Textilt Mfg. Co.

Labour Funds Act

Provident Funds Act

Jhe Provident Funds Act

s. 17

Provident Funds Act

s. 17(l)(a)

s. 17(1)(b)

s. 25F

Provident Funds Act

Bharatkhand

Arthur Butler Workers' Union

Boots Pure Drug Go. (India) Ltd.

Bharatkhand Textile Mfg. co.

Textile Labou•

Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd.

Bharatkhand S f A IV f Textile Mfg. Co.

Bombay

Nadiad

Khandesh

Coimbatore

Gajendragadkar

Bharatkhand

Provident Funds Act, 1952

Gajendragadkar

Provident Funds Act

NEW INDIA MOTORS (P) LTD

UENDRAGADKAR

K. N. W ANCHOO

K. c. DAS GUPTA

Meaning of-Industrial Disputes Act

ss. 33(r)(a), 33A

s. 33A

Industrial Disputes Act

s. 33A

s. 33(r)(a)


r960

Bharatkhand Textile Mfg. Co.

Ltd.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [Hl60)

wage for each completed year of service for the period before the coming into force of the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952, and half-a-month's basic wage for each completed year of service thereafter, v. subject to a maximum of fifteen months' basic wages Textile Labour to be paid to the employee or his heirs or executors or nominees as the case may be. This provision which Association

Gajendragadkar ]. amounts to a departure from the Bombay scheme of

r¢o

March a2.

gratuity brings out the fact that the provisions made by the Employees' Provident Funds Act have been duly taken into account by the industrial court. We are, therefore, satisfied that the scheme framed by the industrial court does not suffer from any infirmities as alleged by the appellants.

The result is the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed.

M/S. NEW INDIA MOTORS (P) LTD.

(P. B.

NEW DELHI v.

K. T. MORRIS

G .. UENDRAGADKAR, K. N. W ANCHOO and K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)

Jndu, strial Dispute-"; rv ork1nen concerned in such dispute," Meaning of-Industrial Disputes Act, r947 (r4 of r947), as amended by Act 36 of r956, ss. 33(r)(a), 33A.

The respondent workman was dismissed by his employer, the appellant, pending adjudication of an:industrial dispute, and without the permission of the Industrial Tribunal, relating to the discharge of 7 other employees working as apprentices under (he appellant. The respondent raised a dispute before the Industrial Tribunal under s. 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, r947, and his case was that he was concerned in the dispute relating to the said 7 employees and gave evidence on their behalf and that his dismissal \Vas solely due to the interest he took in their cause.

The Tribunal found in his favour and passed an award directing his reinstatement. The appellant contended that the respondent was incompetent to raise the dispute •:mder s. 33A of the Act.

The question for decision, therefore, was one relating to the construction of s. 33(r)(a) of the Act:

' A

Held, that the expression "workmen concerned in such dis- 1960 pute" occurring in s. 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as amended, by Act 36 of 1956, includes not merely such M/s. New India workmen as are directly or immediately concerned with the dis- Motors (P) Ltd. pute, but also those on whose behalf the dispute is raised as well v. as those who, when the award is made, will be bound by it.

K T. Morris Eastern Plywood Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Eastern Plywood Mfg.

Workers' Union, (1952) L.A.C. 103 and Newtone Studios Ltd. v.

Ethirajula (T.R.), (1958) I L.L.J. 63, approved.

The New ]ehangir Vakil Mills Ltd., Bhavnagarv. N. L. Vyas & Others, A.LR. 1959 Born. 248, disapproved.

CIVIL

APPELLATE

JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 124of1959. - Appeal by special leave from the Award dated February 8, 1957, of the Additional Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, in Misc. I. D. Case No. 422 of 1956.

Jawala Prasad Chopra and J. K. Haranandani, for the appellants.

0. K. Daphtary, SolicitQr-General of India, H. J.

Umrigar, M. K. Ramamurthi, V. A. Seyid Muhamad and M. R. rishna Pillai, for the respondent.

1960. March 22.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal by special leave Gajendragadkar ]. is directed against the order passed by the Additional Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, directing the appellant, M/s. New India Motors Private Ltd., to reinstate its former employee, K. T. Morris, the respondent, in his original post as field service representativt"l and to pay him his back wages from the date of his dismissal till the date of his reinstatement. This award has been made on a complaint filed by the respondent against the appellant under s. 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act XIV of 1947 (hereinafter called the Act). It appears that before joining the appellant the respon~ dent was working with a firm in Calcutta; prior to that he was field service representative of M/s. Premier Automobiles Ltd., Bombay. The respondent joined the services of the appellant sometime in May 1954 as Works Manager. Before he joined the services of the appellant he had been told by the appellant by its letter dated March 27, 1954, that the appellant would be willing to pay him Rs. 350 per month and something more by way of certain percentage on business. He was, however, asked to interview th~

r9~0 appellant; an interview followed and the respondent was given a letter of appointment on May 6, 1954. ill /s. New India W k h M Moiv" (P) Ltd. By this letter he was appointed as or s op r anager v. in the appellant's firm on three months' probation K: r. Mo,, is subject to the terms and conditions specified in the . -- . letter of appointment (Ex. W-2). The respondent Ga; endragadk., J. continued in this post till February 28, 1955, when he was given the assignment of the appellant's field service organiser with effect from March 1, 1955.

A letter of appointment given to him on 28 - 2 - 1955 set forth the terms and conditions of his new assignment. It appears that on April 18, 1956, the management of the appellant called for an explanation of the respondent in respect of several complaints. An explanation was given by the respondent. It was, however, followed by another communication from the appellant to the respondent setting forth specific instances of the respondent's conduct for which explanation was demanded. The respondent again explained and disputed the correctness of the charges.

On June 30, 1956, the respondent's services were terminated on the ground.that the appellant had decided to abolish the post of field service representative. It is this order which gave rise to the respondent's complaint under s. 33A of the Act.

The complaint was filed on July 18, 1956. The respondent invoked s. 33A because his case was that at the time when his services were terminated an industrial dispute was pending between the appellant and 7 of its employees and the respondent was one of the workmen concerned in the said industrial dispute.

The said industrial dispute had reference to the termination of the services of the said 7 employees who were working with the appellant as apprentices. On their behalf it was alleged that their termination of service was improper and illegal and that was referred to the industrial tribunal for its adjudication on August 20, 1955. The said dispute was finally decided on January 2, 1957.

With the merits of the said dispute or the decision thereof we are not concerned in the present appeal.

According to the respondent, since he was a workman concerned in the said dispute s. 33(l)(a) applied and it was not open to the appellant to terminate his

services save with the express permission in writing 1960 of the authority before which the said dispute was 111 /s. New India pending. It was on this basis that he made his Motors (PJ ua. complaint under s. 33A of the Act. v.

Before the tribunal the appellant urged that the K. T r::_orris respondent was not a workman as defined by the Gajeniragadkar 1.

Act, and on the merits it was contended that the appellant had to abolish the post of the field service organiser owing to the fact that a part of the agency work of the appellant had been lost to it. On the other hand, the respondent contended that he was a workman under the Act and the plea made by the appellant about the necessity to abolish his post was not true and genuine. His grievance was that his services were terminated solely because he had taken interest ..., in the complaint of the 7 apprentices which had given rise to the main industrial dispute and had in fact given evidence in the said dispute on behalf of the said apprentices. 'l'he tribunal has found that the respondent is a workman under the Act, that there was no evidence to justify the appellant's contention that it had become necessary for it to abolish the respondent's post, and that it did appear that the respondent

~ had been discharged because the appellant disapproved of the respondent's conduct in supporting the 7 apprentices in the main industrial dispute. As a result of these findings the tribunal has ordered the appellant to reinstate the respondent. 'l'he question as to whether the respondent is a workman as defined by s. 2(s) of the Act is a question of fact and the finding recorded by the tribunal > on the said question, after considering the relevant evidence adduced by the parties, cannot be successfully challenged before us in the present appeal. The respondent has given evidence as to the nature of the work he was required to do as field service organiser . . The letter of appointment issued to him in that behalf expressly required, inter alia, that the respondent had, if need be, to check up and carry out necessary adjustments and repairs of the vehicles sold by the appellant to its customers and to obtain signatures of responsible persons on the satisfactien

T96o forms which had been provided to him. The respondent swore that he looked after the working of the At, s. New India Moto" (P) Ltd. workshop and assisted the mechanics and others in

v. their jobs.

He attended to complicated work himself K. 1'. Morris and made the workmen acquainted with Miller's special . - tools and equipment needed for repairs and servicing Ga; cndrngadkar J. of cars. He denied the suggestion that he was a member of the supervisory staff. On this evidence the tribunal has based its finding that the respondent was a workman under s. 2(s), and we see no reason to interfere with it.

Then, as to the appellant's case that it had to abolish the post of the respondent as it had lost the agency of DeSoto cars from Premier Automobiles, there is no reliable evidence to show when this agency was actually lost.

Besides, the fact that the appellant has appointed a Technical Supervisor after discharging the respondent is also not without significance.

Furthermore, the appellant is still the agent for Plymouth and Jeeps and the tribunal is right when it has found that it still needed a field representative to look after servicing of sold cars at outside stations. On the other hand, the evidence of the respondent clearly shows that he supported the case of the 7 apprentices and that provoked the appellant to take the step of terminating his services. The process of finding fault with his work appears to have commenced after the appellant disapproved of the respondent's conduct in that behalf. We are, therefore, satisfied that the tribunal was right in coming to the conclusion that the dismissal of the respondent is not supported on any reasonable ground, and in fact is due to the appellant's indignation at the conduct of the respondent in the main industrial dispute between the appellant and its 7 employees. If that be the true position the industrial tribunal was justified in treating the dismissal of the respondent as mala fide.

It has, however, been urged before us by the appellant that the complaint made by the respondent under s. 33A is not competent. It is common ground that a complaint can be made under s. g3A only ifs. 33 has been contravened, and so the appellant's argument is that s. 33(l)(a) is inapplicable because the respoudent

was not a workman concerned in the main indus'trial z96o dispute, and as such his dismissal cannot be said to Mfs. New India contravene the provisions of the said section. Indeed Motors (P) Ltd. the principal point urged before us by the appellant v. is in regard to the construction of s. 33(1)(a) of the l{, T. Morris Act. Was the respondent a workman concerned with . - the main industrial dispute? That is the point of Ga1endragadkar J. law raised for our decision and its decision depends upon the construction of the relevant words used in s. 33(1)(a).

Section 33(l){a) as it stood prior to the amendment of 1956 provided, inter alia, that during the pendency of any proceedings before a tribunal, no employer shall alter to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in the said dispute the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the commencement of the said proceedings, save with the express permission in writing of the tribunal. Section 33 has been modified from time to time and its scope has been finally limited by the amendment made ):>y Act 36 of 1956.

With the said amendments we are, however, not concerned. The expression "the workmen concerned in such dispute " which occurred in the earlier section has not been modified and the construction which we would place upon the said expression under the unamended section would govern the construction of the said expression even in the amended section.

What does the expression " workmen concerned in such dispute" mean ? The appellant contends that the main dispute was in regard to the discharge of 7 apprentices employed' by the appellant, and it is only the said 7 apprentices who were concerned in the said dispute. The respondent was not concerned in the said dispute, and so the termination of his services cannot attract the provisions of s. 33(l)(a). Prima facie the argument that " workmen concerned in such

dispute" should be limited to the workmen directly or actually concerned in such dispute appears plausible, but if we examine the scheme of the Act and the effect of its material and relevant provisions this limited construction of the clause in question qannot be accepted.

z960

A1 /s. New India 1\1 otors (P) Ltd. v.

K. T. Morris

 Gajendragadkar ].

Let us first consider the definition of the industrial dispute prescribed by s. 2(k). It means, inter alia, any dispute or difference between employers and workmen which is connected with the employment or non-employment, or the terms of employm(mt, or with the conditions of labour, of any person. It is wellsettled that before any dispute between the employer and his employee or employees can be said to be an industrial dispute under the Act it must be sponsored by a number of workmen or by a union representing them. It is not necessary that the number of workmen of the union that sponsors the dispute should represent the majority of workmen. Even so, an individual dispute cannot become an industrial dispute at the instance of the aggrieved individual himself. It must be a dispute between the employer on the one hand and his employees acting collectively on the other. This essential nature of an industrial dispute must be borne in mind in interpreting the material clause in s. 33( 1 )(a).

Section 18 of the Act is also relevant for this purpose. It deals with persons on whom awards are binding. Section 18(3) provides, inter alia, that an award of a tribunal which has become enforceable shall be binding on (a) all parties to the industrial dispute, (b) all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute unless the tribunal records the opinion that they were so summoned without proper cause; and (c) where a party referred to in cl. (a) or cl. (b) is composed of workmen all persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute, and all persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part. It is thus clear that the award passed in an industrial dispute raised even by a minority union binds not only the parties to the dispute but all employees in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, at the date of the dispute and even those who may join the establishment or part subsequently. Thus the circle of persons bound by the award is very much wider than the parties to the industrial dispute. This aspect of the

..1'

matter is also relevant in construing the material

I96° words in s. 33(1)(a).

M/s. New Intlia In this connection the object of s. 33 must also he Motors (P) Ltd. borne in mind. It is plain that by enacting s. 33 the v.

Legislature wanted to ensure a fair and satisfactory K. T. Morris enquiry of the industrial dispute undisturbed by any . -- action on the part of the employer or the employee Ga; endragadkar J. which would create fresh cause for disharmony between them. During the pendency of an industrial dispute status quo should be maintained and no further element of discord should be introduced. That being the object of s. 33 the narrow construction of the material words used in s. 33{l)(a) would tend to defeat the said object. If it is held that the workmen concerned in the dispute are only those who are directly or immediately concerned with the dispute it would leave liberty to the employer to alter the terms and conditions of the remaining workmen and 'that would inevitably introduce further complications which it is intended to avoid. Similarly it would leave liberty to the other employees to raise disputes and that again is not desirable. That is why the main object underlying s. 33 is inconsistent with the narrow construction sought to be placed by the appellant on the material words used in s. 33(1)(a).

Even as a matter of construction pure and simple there is no justification for assuming that the workmen concerned in such disputes must be workmen directly or immediately concerned i:a the said disputes. We do not see any justification for addingthe further qualification of direct. or immediate concern which the narrow construction necessarily assumes. In dealing with the question as to which workmyn ca.n be said to be concerned in an industrial dispute we have to bear in mind the essential condition for the. raising of an industrial dispute itself, and if an industrial dispute can be raised only by a group of workmen acting on their own or through. their union then it would be difficult to resist the . conclusion that all those who sponsored the dispute are concerned in it. As we have

already pointed out this construction is harmonious with the definition prescribed by s. 2(s) and with the provisions contained in s. 18 of the Act. Therefore,

z96o we are not prepared to hold that the expression "workmen concerned in such dispute" can be limited M/s. New India Motors (P) Ltd. only to such of the workmen who are directly conv. cerned with the dispute in question. In our opinion, R. T. Morris that expression includes all workmen on whose behalf . - the dispute has been raised as well as those who would Ga; endrngadkar f. be bound by the award which may be made in the

March 23.

said dispute.

It appears that the construction of the relevant clause had given rise to a divergence of opinion in industrial courts, but it may be stated that on the whole the consensus of opinion appears to be in favour of the construction which we are putting on the said clause. In Eastern Plywood Manufaeturing Co. Ltd. v.

Eastern Plywood Manufacturing Workers' Union (1 ) the appellate tribunal has referred to the said conflict of views and has held that the narrow construction of the clause is not justified. The High Court of Madras appears to have taken the same view (Vide: N ewtone Studios.Ltd. v. Ethirajulu (T.R.) (')).On the other hand, in The New Jehangir Vakil Mills Ltd., Bhavnagar v.

N. L. Vyas & Ors.('), the Bombay High Court has adopted the narrow construction ; but for reasons which we have already explained we must hold that the Bombay view is not justified on a fair and reasonable construction of the relevant clause.

In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed.

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BANKURA

MUNICIPALITY

LALJI RAJA AND SONS. ( K. C. DAs GUPTA and J. C. SHAH, JJ.) Municipality-Unwholesome food-Seized 11nder warrant-If can be directed to be destroyed-Bengal Municipal Act, r932(Ben. Act. XV of.r932), ss. 430, 43r(2).

The respondents were the owners of an oil seed pressing factory situated within the limit of amunicipality.

They used to import mustard seeds from different areas and they also held a

(1) (1952) L.A.C. rn3.

(2) (1958) I L.L.J. 63.

(3) A.I.R. 1959 Born. 248

Bharatkhand Textile Mfg. Co.

Ltd.

Provident Funds Act, 1952

Gajendragadkar

Provident Funds Act

M/S. NEW INDIA MOTORS (P) LTD. NEW DELHI

K. T. MORRIS

K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.

Meaning of-Industrial Disputes Act

ss. 33(r)(a), 33A

s. 33A

Industrial Disputes Act

s. 33A

s. 33(r)(a)

s. 33(1)(a)

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

Jawala Prasad Chopra

J. K. Haranandani

K. Daphtary

H. J.

Umrigar

M. K. Ramamurthi

V. A. Seyid Muhamad

M. R. rishna Pillai

GAJENDRAGADKAR

Additional Industrial Tribunal, Delhi

New India Motors Private Ltd.

K. T. Morris

s. 33A

Disputes Act XIV of 1947

Calcutta

M/s. Premier Automobiles Ltd.

Bombay

March 27, 1954

May 6, 1954

New India W k h M Moiv" (P) Ltd.

endragadk

February 28, 1955

March 1, 1955

28 - 2 - 1955

April 18, 1956

June 30, 1956

s. 33A

July 18, 1956

s. 33A

August 20, 1955

January 2, 1957

s. 33(l)(a)

s. 33A

s. 2(s)

Morris

Miller

cndrngadkar

s. 2(s)

Plymouth

s. 33A

s. 33(l)(a)

New India

Indeed Motors (P) Ltd.

s. 33(1)(a)

s. 33(1)(a)

Section 33(l)

Section 33

s. 33(l)(a)

s. 2(k)

s. 33( 1 )(a)

Section 18

Section 18(3)

s. 33(1)(a)

s. 33

s. 33

endragadkar

s. 33

s. 33

s. 33

s. 33(1)(a)

s. 2(s)

s. 18

New India Motors (P) Ltd.

R. T. Morris

High Court of Madras

Bombay High Court

CHAIRMAN OF THE BANKURA

MUNICIPALITY

LALJI RAJA

K. C. DAs GUPTA

J. C. SHAH

ss. 430, 43


SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960)

z96o we are not prepared to hold that the expression "workmen concerned in such dispute" can be limited M/s. New India Motors (P) Ltd. only to such of the workmen who are directly conv. cerned with the dispute in question. In our opinion, R. T. Morris that expression includes all workmen on whose behalf . - the dispute has been raised as well as those who would Ga; endrngadkar f. be bound by the award which may be made in the

March 23.

said dispute.

It appears that the construction of the relevant clause had given rise to a divergence of opinion in industrial courts, but it may be stated that on the whole the consensus of opinion appears to be in favour of the construction which we are putting on the said clause. In Eastern Plywood Manufaeturing Co. Ltd. v.

Eastern Plywood Manufacturing Workers' Union (1 ) the appellate tribunal has referred to the said conflict of views and has held that the narrow construction of the clause is not justified. The High Court of Madras appears to have taken the same view (Vide: N ewtone Studios.Ltd. v. Ethirajulu (T.R.) (')).On the other hand, in The New Jehangir Vakil Mills Ltd., Bhavnagar v.

N. L. Vyas & Ors.('), the Bombay High Court has adopted the narrow construction ; but for reasons which we have already explained we must hold that the Bombay view is not justified on a fair and reasonable construction of the relevant clause.

In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed.

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BANKURA

MUNICIPALITY

LALJI RAJA AND SONS. ( K. C. DAs GUPTA and J. C. SHAH, JJ.) Municipality-Unwholesome food-Seized 11nder warrant-If can be directed to be destroyed-Bengal Municipal Act, r932(Ben. Act. XV of.r932), ss. 430, 43r(2).

The respondents were the owners of an oil seed pressing factory situated within the limit of amunicipality.

They used to import mustard seeds from different areas and they also held a

(1) (1952) L.A.C. rn3.

(2) (1958) I L.L.J. 63.

(3) A.I.R. 1959 Born. 248

licence for selling mustard seed.

On a report of the Sanitary r960 Inspector of the Municipality, the Sub-Divisional Officer issued a search warrant directing seizure of a large quantity of " rotten Chairman of the

and decomposed mustard seed " from the possession of the res- Bankura pondents. The Chairman of the Municipality applied, to the MunicipalftY District Magistrate for action under s. 43r and s. 432 of the v, Bengal Municipal Act.

The proceedings started on the petition Lalji Raja & Sons • of the Chairman of the Municipality had a chequered career.

Ultimately the District Magistrate found that the mustard seed was unwholesome and unfit for human consumption on the date of seizure and directed, in exercise of the powers under s. 43r(2) of the Act, that the same be made over to the Commissioners of the Municipality for disposal either as manure or as cattle feed.

The High Court in revision set aside the order of the District Magistrate holding that s. 43r of the Act under which the order was made did not apply to a case of seizure of unwholesome food under a warrant issued under s. 430.

On appeal by the Municipality by special leave: Held, that the powers under s. 431(2) of the Bengal Municipal Act (XV of r932), were expressly directed to be exercised by the Magistrate in respect of articles seized under s. 428, and there was nothing in s. 43r(2) which might justify the view that those powers could also be exercised in respect of articles seized under a warrant issued under s. 430.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 119 of 57.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 24th August, 1955, of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Revision No. 596 of 1955.

0. B. Agarwala and Sukumar Ghose, for the appellant.

B. Sen and S.N. Mukherjee, for the respondents.

1960. March 23. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SHAH, J.-M/s. Lalji Raja & Sons-who will herein- Shah J. after be referred to as the respondents-are the owners of an oil seed pressing factory known as the Gouranga Oil Mill situated within the limits of the Bankura Municipality in the State of West Bengal. For extracting oil, the respondents import mustard seed from different areas. The respondents also hold a license for the sale of mustard seed.

On the application of the Sanitary Inspector of the Ba.nkura Municipality, the Sub-Divisional Officer, Bankura, issued a search warrant directing seizure of

900 bags of "rotten and decomposed mustard seed",

600 bags stored in the mill godown and 300 bags stored

z96o in the court-yard of the rice mill at Hanseswar l\faji.

Pursuant to the search, a large quantity of mustard Chairman of the

Bankur• seed spread out for drying in the Gouranga Oil Mill Municipalily was seized, and certain bags lying in the rice mill were v. also seized. On the report made by the Sanitary Lalji Raja & Sons Inspector, the Chairman of the Municipality applied

Shah 1 to the District Magistrate of Bankura on March 10, 1950, for action under ss. 431 and 432 of the Bengal Municipal Act, No. XV of 1932, alleging that the mustard seed seized was " in a highly decomposed state and gave out an offensive stench" and that the same was unwholesome and unfit for human consumption.

The proceedings started on the petition of the Chairman of the Municipality had a chequered career. It is unnecessary to set out for the purposes of this appeal the diverse orders which were made from time to time by the District Magistrate and which were set aside by the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta. It may be sufficient to state that on May 26, 1950, the District Magistrate ordered restoration of the mustard seed bags to the respondents and that order was set aside by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in revision. Another order passed by the District Magi strate in April 1951 directing that the contents of the bags be disposed of as " manure or fodder " was set aside by the Calcutta High Court and the proceedings were directed to be re-tried. The District Magistrate again held an enquiry and by his order dated November 10, 1954, held that the mustard seed was lawfully seized in accordance with the provisions of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, that it was unwholesome and unfit for human consumption on the date of seizure and directed in exercise of the powers under s. 431(2) of the Act that the same be made over to the Commissioners of the Bankura Municipality for disposal either as manure or as cattle feed.

The High Court at Calcutta by order dated August 24, 1955, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, set aside the order of the District Magistrate holding thats. 431 of the Bengal Municipal Act under which the order was made, had no application to a case of seizure of unwholesome food seized under a warrant issued under s. 430.

Against the order of the High Court, this appeal is z95o filed with special leave.

Chairman of the The only question which falls to be determined in Bankura this appeal is whether articles of food seized under a Municipality warrant issued by a Magistrate in exercise of the v. . powers under s. 430 of the Bengal Municipal Act may Lalji Raja & Sons be ordered to be destroyed under s. 431(2) of the Act;.

Sha;).

In order to determine this question, it is necessary to , refer to certain provisions of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932. .

Section 421 prohibits, amongst other acts, selling or storing for sale of unwholesome articles to be used for human _consumption. Section 427 (in so far as it is material) authorizes the Commissioners and certain other officers of a Municipality to enter upon and inspect any place in which any article of food is deposited for the purpose of sale or preparation for sale or to which any article of food intended for human consumption is brought for such purpose, and also to inspect the articles of food which may be found in tlie place inspected. Clause (I) of s. 428 confers upon the Commissioners and the officers designated in s. 427 power to seize articles of food intended for human consumption if, in the course of inspection, it appears that the same are unwholesome or unfit for human consumption. Section 429 provides that the articles of food referred to in s. 428 which have been seized under that section may, with the written consent of the owner or the person in whose possession they are found, be ordered to be destroyed. If the consent of the owner or the person in possession is not obtaineq and the articles are of a perishable nature, the officer seizing the same may take them before a Magistrate who may, if it appears to him that the articles are unsound or unwholesome -or unfit as human food, condemn the same or order hem to be destroyed.

Section 430 (in so far as it is material) provides that if any Magistrate is satisfied on the application of the Commissioners, Health Officer, Sanitary Inspector or any other officer authorized by the Commissioner in this behalf tliat there is just cause to believe that any food which is unsound, unwholesome or unfit for human food is in the possession of any person for the

purpose of being sold or offered or exposed for sale within the limits of the Municipality for such consump- Chainnan of the h Banhura tion, e may grant a warrant authorizing entry upon Municipality the premises of such person and search for and seizure v. of such articles of food.

Section 431 by the 1st sub- Lalji Raja.,,_ Sons section (in so far as it is material) provides that where

Shah ]. any article of food, seized under s. 428 is not destroyed by consent under sub-s. 1 of s. 429 or when an article of food so seized which is perishable is not dealt with under sub-s. 2 of that section, it shall be taken before a Magistrate as soon as may be after such seizure.

Sub-s. 2 provides that if it appears to the Magistrate that any such food is unsound, unwholesome or unfit for human food, he shall cause the same to be destroyed or to be otherwise disposed of by the Commissioners so as not to be capable of being used as human food.

It is evident from this resume of the relevant legislative provisions that the municipal authorities are entitled to enter upon and inspect places where articles of food are stored or prepared for sale. If the municipal authorities find that any article of food stored or prepared for sale is unwholesome or unfit for human food, they may seize them and destroy the same with the written consent of the owner or person in possession, and if such consent is not forthcoming and the articles are perishable, destroy them under the orders of a Magistrate. But s. 428 is not the only . procedure under the Act authorizing seizure of articles of food which are unwholesome or unfit for human food.

The municipal authorities may move a Magistrate for the issue of a warrant for seizure of articles of food which are unsound, unwholesome or unfit for human food, and under the authority of the warrant, such articles may be seized.

Articles of food seized under s. 428(1) which are not disposed of unuer s. 429 are required to be taken before a Magistrate as soon as may be after seizure and under sub-s. 2 of s. 431, the Magistrate is authorized, if it appears to him that the articles of food are unsound or unwholesome or unfit for human food to order destruction or disposal thereof. Evidently, the expression "such" used in sub-s .2 of s. 431 refers to the articles of food described in sub-s. 1 of

·~,

- -

that section ; and s. 431(1) only deals with articles

I96° seized under s. 428.

There is no express provision h Chairman of the made by the legislature either in s. 431 or elsew ere Bankura in the Act authorizing destruction or disposal of Municipality articles of foqd which are seized under a warrant v. issued under S. 430.

Lalji Raja & Sons - Counsel for the Municipality contends that the Shah J. legislature intended that _all articles seized, whether on inspection under s. 428 or under a warrant issued under s. 430 must be dealt with under s. 431 and the High Court was in error in holding that the authority of the Magistrate to order destruction or disposal of articles of food could be exercised only in respect of articles seized under s. 428. But the words used in s. 431(2) clearly authorize the Magistrate to order destruction or disposal of articles seized under s. 428 and not deaH with under s. 429, and it is difficult to uphold the plea that the legislature intended, even though it did not so expressly provide, that the articles seized under a warrant issued under s. 430 may also be dealt with under sub-s. 2 of s. 431. Counsel for the Municipality submits that it could not even have been the intention of the legislature that the Magistrate can order seizure of unwholesome food but cannot order its destruction, though he may order destruction of unwholesome articles of food seized by the officers of the Municipality. It appears, however, that a person storing unwholesome articles of food may be prosecuted for infraction of the provisions of s. 421 and in the course of or on the conclusion of those proceedings, it would certainly be open to the Magistrate, having seizin of the complaint, to pass an appropriate order under the Code of Criminal Procedure for destruction ofthe articles seized. In view of this, we are not prepared to say that the absence of an express provision relating to the disposal of articles seized under s. 430 is not deliberate ; but even if we are constrained to hold that there is a lacuna ins. 431, we do not think that we would be justified contrary to the plain words used by the legislature, in attempting to remedy the same by holding that a Magistrate exercising power under sub-s. 2 of s. 431 has authority to

r 96o order destruction of articles seized in pursuance of a warrant issued under s. 430.

Chairman of the The argument advanced by counsel for the Municipal- Bankura ity that the seizure was in exercise of the powers under 1~1 unicipality - v. s. 428 and not under s. 430 has, in our judgment, no Lalji Raja & San' force. The report of the Chairman of the Municipality dated March 10, 1950, makes it abundantly clear that Shah J. the search warrant was issued by the Sub-Divisional Officer in exercise of his authority under s. 430 of the Bengal Municipal Act.

Any admission by the respondents that the seizure was under s. 428 of the Act in proceedings for resisting the order which the Municipality claimed to obtain against them can have no value.

z960

March 23.

Section 428 does not contemplate a seizure of articles of food which are unwholesome, under the authority of a Magistrate, and s. 430 is expressly the proviRion which authorises a Magistrate to issue a warrant, for such seizure. The powers under s. 431(2) are expressly directed to be exercised by the Magistrate in respect of articles seized under s. 428, and there is nothing in the former provision which may justify the view that those powers can also be exercised in respect of articles seized under a warrant issued under s. 430. In our opinion, the High Court was right in its conclusion.

The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.

M/S. NORTH BROOK JUTE CO. LTD.

AND ANOTHER

THEIR WORKMEN (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO and

K. C. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)

Ind1tstrial Dispute-Rationalisation scheme objected to by worknien~Scheme put into operation pending reference to Tribitnal~ Workmen's refusal to work-Lock-out-Claim for wages for the period of lock-out-Industrial Disputes Act, I947 (I4 of I947), ss. 3(2),

9A, 33, 33A.

A rationalisation scheme in the mills of the appellant companies was agreed to by the Works Committee and a notice under s. 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was given to the

New India Motors (P) Ltd.

R. T. Morris

High Court of Madras

Bombay High Court

LALJI RAJA AND SONS

C. DAs GUPTA

J. C. SHAH

ss. 430, 43

s. 43

s. 432

Bengal Municipal Act

Lalji Raja

s. 43

s. 43

s. 430

s. 431(2)

s. 428

s. 43

s. 430

Calcutta High Court

B. Agarwala

Sukumar Ghose

B. Sen

S.N. Mukherjee

SHAH

Shah

Ba.nkura Municipality

Bankura

Lalji Raja & Sons

District Magistrate of Bankura

March 10, 1950

ss. 431 and 432

High Court of Judicature at Calcutta

May 26, 1950

November 10, 1954

Bengal Municipal Act, 1932

s. 431(2)

Bankura Municipality

High Court at Calcutta

August 24, 1955

s. 430

Bankura

s. 430

Lalji Raja & Sons

s. 431(2)

Bengal Municipal Act, 1932

Section 421

Section 427

s. 428

s. 427

Section 429

s. 428

Section 430

Section 431

s. 428

s. 1

s. 429

s. 2

s. 2

s. 428

s. 428(1)

s. 429

s. 2

s. 431

s. 431

s. 1

s. 431(1)

s. 428

s. 431

S. 430

Lalji Raja

s. 428

s. 430

s. 431

s. 428

s. 431(2)

s. 428

s. 429

s. 430

s. 2

s. 431

s. 421

Code of Criminal Procedure

s. 430

s. 2

s. 431

s. 430

s. 428

s. 430

s. 430

s. 428

Section 428

s. 430

s. 431(2)

s. 428

s. 430

NORTH BROOK JUTE CO. LTD

P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR

K. N. WANCHOO

K. C. DAS GUPTA

ss. 3(2),

9A, 33, 33A

s. 9A

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947