{"document_id": "1960_2_982_989_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "February 12\n\n• •\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960 (2)]\n\nTHE BIJAY COTTON MILLS LTD. v.\n\nTHEIR WORKMEN & ANOTHER (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR AND K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)\n\nIndustrial Dispu.te-Minimu.m basic wage fixed by Tribunal- M odiflcation by Labou.r Appellate Tribunal according to stati/.fory 1 notification issteal against acqu.ittal-Appearancc by Counsel for accused in appeal-Non-service of notice on accused, ifkvitiates conviction-Code of Criminal Procedure, I898 (Act v of I898,) s. 422.\n\nThe appellant was tried by the Special Judge Tiruchirappalli under s. r65A of Indian Penal Code for attempting to bribe K, a Deputy Superintendent of Police.\n\nThe prosecution case was that in connection with the investigation by the Inspector of Police of a case involving the appellant, the latter went to K's bungalow and presented to him a closed envelope, that when °K found that it contained currency notes he threw it away which the appellant picked up, that thereupon K asked the appellant to produce the currency notes and the appellant complied with the demand that K then gave information to a Magistrate about the attempt made by the appellant to offer him a bribe. The Special Judge acquitted the appellant. On appeal, the High Court accepted the prosecution case and convicted the accused. In the High Court Counsel for the appellant entered appearance before notice of appeal under s. 422 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was issued to the appellant and when the appeal was ready for hearing intimation was given under therulestotheSpecial judge to communicate to the appellant about the appeal filed against him. The questions for determination-were (1) \\vhether the protection under Art. 20(3) of the Constitution of India had been violated by asking the accused to produce the currency notes, and (2) whether the provisions of s. 422 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, had not been complied \\Vi th because notice of the appeal had not been served on the appellant.\n\nHeld, (r) that there was no contravention of Art. 20(3) as the appellant v.1as not in the position of a person accused of an offence \\vhen he v.'as asked to produce the currency notes and that, in any case, on the facts proved the appellant was not compelled to be a witness against him.\n\nM. P. Sharma v. SatishChandra and others,[r954]S.C.R. ro77. considered.\n\n(2) that in an appeal under s. 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure under s. 422 notice of the appeal has to be given to the accused, but where, as in the present case, the High Court\n\nfound on the facts that the appellant was fully apprised of the time and place at which the appeal would be heard, and counsel\n\nappeared on his behalf and argued the appeal the fact that a forr960 mal notice of the appeal was not served on him would not vitiate - the conviction.\n\nMohamed Dastagir CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal v.\n\nAppeal No. 137 of 1957.\n\nState of Madras Appeal from the judgment and order dated October 31, 1956, of the Madras High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 20/1956. C. B. Aggarwala, S. N. Andley, J.: B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellant.\n\nR. Ganapathy Iyer and T. M. Sen, for the respondent.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, H.J.\n\nUmrigar_ and T. M. Sen, for the Intervener (Union of India). 1960, February, 26.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by IMAM, J.--This is an appeal on a certificate granted by the High Court of Madras.\n\nThe appellant was tried by the Special Judge of Tiruchirappalli under s. 165A of the Indian Penal Code for attempting to bribe Mr. Kaliyappan, Deputy Superintendent of Police of Ramanathapuram. The Special Judge came to the conclusion that the charge framed against the accused had not been established.\n\nHe, accordingly, acquitted the appellant. Against the order of acquittal the State of Madras appealed to the High Court of Madras under s. 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court came to the conclusion that the evidence established that the appellant had attempted to bribe the aforesaid Deputy Superintendent of Police. It accordingly convicted the appellant under s. 165A, Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to 6 month's rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. l ,000, in default, to undergo further rigorom1 imprisonment for 6 months.\n\nAccording to the prosecution case, the appellant attempted to bribe Mr. Kaliyappan, the Deputy superintendent of Police, by offering him a sum of money contained in an envelope at his bungalow in the morning of June 14, 1954. In order to appreciate the circumstances in which the bribe was offered, reference to certain events which led to the incident\n\nImam].\n\n118 SUPREME COURT Rl~PORTS [1960]\n\nr96o on June 14 at the bungalow of the Deputy Superin-\n\nM h d D . tendent of Police becomes necessary. In village o ame aslagir I d\" h . v rwa I t ere are two fact10ns one headed by the State of Madras appellant and his brother and the other headed by the village munsif. On June 3, 1954, two complaints Imam J. reached the Keelakarai Police Station, one by the appellant against the village munsif and the other by the village munsif against the appellant. According to the appellant on June 3, 1954 after prayers in the mosque the village munsif had abused him and had attemphid to murder him with a knife. Some persons intervened but he managed to escape but was chased by the village munsif to his house. 'The version of the village munif was that he was busy that day preparing the receipt for the release of the appellant's impounded cattle when the latter abused him, beat him with his shoe and kicked him in the stomach causing minor injuries. On June 5, 1954, the appellant met Mr. Kaliyappan at the Central Bus-stand at Madurai and handed over to him a petition, Ext. P-1 in which he complained against the village munsif.\n\nMr. Kaliyappan made an endorsement on this petition directing the Inspector of Ramanathapuram Circle to send for both the parties and warn them against doing acts which would create a breach of the peace in the village and that this petition was not to be sent to the Sub-Inspector (P. W. 8) as .it was alleged that he was siding against the appellant. On June 12, 1954, Mr. Kaliyappan sent a memo (Ext. P-2) to the Inspector of Ramanathapuram Circle directing him to take steps to see that peace was preserved in the village. This Police Officer was also asked to take action against the offenders with respect to whom there was evidence in connection with the occurrence of June 3, 1954. Mr. Kaliyappan also, in view of the situation, had directed this Police Officer to see whether steps should not be taken to seize the revolver of the appellant's brother Rashid for which he had a licence. The Inspector of Ramanathapuram Circle thereafter prepared a detailed report (Ext. P-7) of the result of his enquiry and handed it over to Mr. Kaliyappan on June 13, 1954. On the night of June 13, 1954, at about 10 p.m. the appellant went to the\n\nbungalow of Mr. Kaliyappan, the Deputy Superinz960 tendent of Police, at Ramanathapuram and com- M h - .. l • d . t th I . t f p l\" fR th o amedDastagzrp ame agams e nspec or o o rne o _ amana av. puram circle and the Sub-Inspector requesting the State of Madras Deputy Superintendent of Police to look into the matter personally and not to leave the investigation Imam .I. exclusively in the hands of the Inspector. Mr. Kaliyappan told the appellant that he knew nothing about the case and could not say or do anything off hand and that the appellant should see him about a week later by which time he would have perused the record and would be in a position to look into his grievances. According to the appellant, however, the Deputy Superintendent of Police had asked him to come to him next morning.\n\nOn June 14, 1954, according to the prosecution, the appellant went to Mr. K!tliyappan's bungalow at about 7-15 a.m. who was at that time looking ip.to certain papers. He was informed that a visitor had come to see him. The appellant accordingly entered his office room when he again complained to the Deputy Superintendent of Police against the village_ - munsif. At the same time he presented to this Police Officer a closed envelope. Mr. Kaliyappan thought that the envelope contained a petition but on opening it he found that it contained currency notes. He was annoyed at the conduct of the appellant. He threw the envelope at the appellant's face, but the envelope fell down on the floor and the appellant picked it up. The Deputy Superintendent of Police called his office orderly but as there was no response he went out of the office room and told his milk-maid to get the camp clerk. By that time the orderly turned up. The appellant had in the meantime remained in the office room and on the appearance of the orderly Mr. Kaliyappan asked the appellant to produce the envelope which he had thrown down and which the appellant had picked up. The appellant_ after taking out of his pocket some currency notes placed them on the table without the envelope.\n\nSubsequently,. during the police investigation, torn bits of paper were collected from near the office winqow and it is alleged that those torn bits of paper\n\n120 SUPREME COURT l~EPORTS [1960)\n\nz960 were the pieces of the envelope in which the currency\n\n~ h -;;-;; . notes were presented to Mr. Kaliyappan. Thereafter, .fo ame v. astag\" Mr .. Kaliyappan asked his orderly to put office rubber\n\nState of Madras stamp date seal on the notes and the same was done.\n\nBy .that time the camp clerk, P.W. 2 had arrived.\n\nImam J.\n\nMr. Kaliyappan asked the camp clerk to note down the numbers of the currency notes which he did. The list so. prepared is Ext. P-4. Mr. Kaliappan then dictated the memo. Ext. P-5 to the local Sub-Magistrate informing the latter that the appellant had offered him Rs. 500 in currency notes requesting him to \"drop action\" registered against the appellant at Keelakarai Police Station. Mr. Kaliyappan informed the Magistrate in this connection that he had seized the currency notes and his office rubber stamp seal had been placed on them and that he would be grateful to the Magistrate if he would come to his office and record the statement of the appellant whom he had detained in his office.\n\nThe case of the appellant, as would appear from his statement to the Special Judge, was that he had been to Mr. Kaliyappan, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, in the night of June 13, 1954, and in the morning at 7-15 a.m. on June 14, 1954. He had gone to Mr. Kaliyappan's bungalow in the morning of June 14 as he had been requested to do so.\n\nHe had told the Deputy Superintendent of Police that he had been humiliated by his Police Officers who had arrested him and had searched his house and that Mr. Kaliyappan should redress his grievances.\n\nMr. Kaliyappan showed him scant courtesy and insulted him upon which the appellant told Mr. Kaliyappan not to insult him and that he should tell the appellant whether he would redress the grievances of the appellant or not and that if he was not prepared to redress the grievances, the appellant would take the matter to the higher authorities. On this Mr. Kaliyappan got up from his chair and enquired of the appellant what could he do by going to the higher authorities and threatened to beat the appellant. The appellant also got up and said something to him upon which Mr. Kaliyappan called out for his orderly.\n\nThe orderly came and was told by Mr. Kaliyappau\n\n...\n\n3 S, Q.R. SUPREME COURT RRPO-RTS 121\n\nthat he was going to be beaten by the appellant and z96o . therefore he should catch hold of the appellant whichM , -d. -D- 1 . . • . 011ame as agir the orderly did. Then Mr. Kahyappan told the orderly v. that there was money in the appellant's pocket and State of.Madras\n\nthat he should remove it. The orderly accordingy removed the money from the appellant's pocket and Imam f. gave it to Mr. Kaliyappan. The money in his pocket was Rs. 500.\n\nMr. Kaliyappan then directed his orderly to put his seal on the notes.\n\nThe Special Judge gave various teasons for not accepting the uncorroborated testimony of Mr. Kaliyappan and held that the presumption of the innocence of the accused had not been displaced by his solitary testimony. The High Court did not coneider\n\nthe grounds given by the Special Judge for discarding the testimony of Mr. Ka.liyappan as at all justified and was of the opinion that the Special Judge had taken a perverse view of his evidence and of the other evidence in the case.\n\nIn the main three points were urged in support of the plea that the conviction of the appellant should he set aside. The first . point urged was that the provisions of s. 422 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had not been complied with. Accordingly the High Court judgment setting aside the acquittal of the appellant was vitiated. The second point urged )Vas that there had been violation of the provisi6ns of Art. 20(3) of the Constitution which vitiated the conviction. The third point urged was that the appellant having been acquitted by .the Special Judge the High Court should not have set aside the acquittal unless there were compelling reasons. The several grounds .stated by the Special Judge in distrusting the evidence of Mr. Kaliyappan had not been specifically considered by the High Court and without those grounds being displaced the High Court erred in setting aside the order of acquittal passed by the Special Judge. Lastly, it was urged that in the circumstances of the present case the sentence passed by the High Court was severe. The circumstances relied upon in this connection will be stated in due course.\n\nRegarding the first point a few facts have to be stated, The State's appeal agsiiinst the acquittal of\n\ntmt to the Magistrate he had made no mention of money being offered tohim in an\n\ni96o envelope and tl:\\.at the torn bits of paper found out-\n\nM , d 0 1 . side the window of Mr. Kaliyappan's office were not • Mame as agir d b f h 1 . h\" I h b . b v. prove to e part o t e enve ope m w IC 1 t e r1 e State of Madras had been offered and that it was also not at all clear that the Rs. 500 found on the person. of the appellant Imam 1: were actually the currency notes offered to Mr. Kaliyappan as bribe. It seems to us, however, that too much emphasis has been laid on all this. Mr. Kaliyappan had certainly alleged in his information to the Magistrate that the appellant had offered him a bribe of Rs. 500.\n\nWhether that. was the sum in the envelope or whether it had been offered in an envelope was beside the l)oint. The important question for consderation was whether Mr. Kaliyappan had been offered a bribe by tho appellant. For that purpose it was a relevant circumstance that in fact on his person the appellant had a sum of Rs. 500 and that if Mr.\n\nKaliyappan's story was true that; it was offered in an envelope, no envelope was produced with the currency notes of Rs. 500 which were placed on the table. On the other hand, torn bits of paper which could form an envelope were found outside the window of the room where the bribe had been offered. It seems to us on a careful reading of Mr. Kaliyappan's evidence that he had substantially told the truth and that there was no real reason for him to eonoct a false case against the appellant. Having regard to the circumstances in which the hribe was offered, corroboration of his evidence in that respect could hardly be expected. His conduct, however, throttghout showed that he had acted in a bona ft& manner. After a careful consideration of his evidence and of the circumstances established in the case we entirely agree with the High Court that there was no ma! grol'lnd upon which his evidence could he disbelieved. In the drcumstances, the High Court was entirely justified iu acting upon it and setting aside the order of acquittal m[tde by the Special Judge.\n\nLastly, on the question of sentence, it may be mentioned at once that on the second day of the hearing of this appeal, learned Advocate for the appellant stated that his client threw himself at the mercy of Court l!>nd apologized for what had happened. Tho\n\n,..\n\n. \"\"\n\nlearned Advocate further urged that the appellant, rg6o though an Indian citizen, .was carrying on business in M A d D • Burma and had a visa from the Burmese Govern-\n\n0 iame astagir ment for permanent residence and that unless he State olMadras returned to Burma by the 2nd of March he would lose the benefit of the visa and would no longer be allowed Imam J. to reside in Burma. as a perma.nent resident. Consequently, he would lose his entire business and property in that country which would be a severe penalty ifhis sentence of imprisonment was upheld.\n\nIt is also pointed out that on two occasions this Court on this very ground1 on the appellant furnishing security and giving an undertaking to return to this country, had allowed him to go to Burma in order that he might not contravene the conditions of his visa. It was further pointed out that the incident took place in June, 1954, some 5 years and eight months ago. Even a substantial fine in Iieu of the sentence of imprisonment would be sufficient punishment and a deterrent to the appellant. We have given the matter of sentence our anxious consideration. It seems, prima facie, that a sentence of 6 months' imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000 could nGt be sajd to be severe for an offence of the kind established against the appellant. The circumstanctis mentioned above, if correct, in plea of mitigation of sentence may attract attention but so far as a court of law is concerned, judioially, it is impossible to say that the sentence imposed by the High Court is severe in a case where there had been an\n\nattept to corrupt a responsible pqblic servan~,\n\nThe appeal is accordingly dismissed.\n\nAppeal dismissed .", "total_entities": 97, "entities": [{"text": "MOHAMED DASTAGIR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 48, "end_char": 64, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MOHAMED DASTAGIR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF MADRAS (B. P. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF MADRAS (B. P. SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAFER IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 110, "end_char": 120, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SYED JAFFER IMAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 159, "end_char": 166, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 377, "end_char": 398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 400, "end_char": 407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 541, "end_char": 567, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 422", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 591, "end_char": 597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Tiruchirappalli", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 645, "end_char": 660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was tried by the Special Judge Tiruchirappalli under s. r65A of Indian Penal Code for attempting to bribe K, a Deputy Superintendent of Police."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 678, "end_char": 695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 422", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1496, "end_char": 1502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1510, "end_char": 1536, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1800, "end_char": 1810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1818, "end_char": 1839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 422", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1945, "end_char": 1951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1959, "end_char": 1985, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2129, "end_char": 2139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2474, "end_char": 2480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2488, "end_char": 2514, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 422", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2521, "end_char": 2527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mohamed Dastagir", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2913, "end_char": 2929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohamed Dastagir CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal v.\n\nAppeal No.", "canonical_name": "MOHAMED DASTAGIR"}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3001, "end_char": 3016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Madras Appeal from the judgment and order dated October 31, 1956, of the Madras High Court in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "C. B. Aggarwala", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3133, "end_char": 3148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Aggarwala, S. N. Andley, J.: B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. N. Andley", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3150, "end_char": 3162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Aggarwala, S. N. Andley, J.: B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. Dadachanji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3168, "end_char": 3181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Aggarwala, S. N. Andley, J.: B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3183, "end_char": 3197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Aggarwala, S. N. Andley, J.: B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. L. Vohra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3202, "end_char": 3213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Aggarwala, S. N. Andley, J.: B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3235, "end_char": 3252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Ganapathy Iyer and T. M. Sen, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "T. M. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3257, "end_char": 3266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Ganapathy Iyer and T. M. Sen, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3289, "end_char": 3303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, H.J.\n\nUmrigar_ and T. M. Sen, for the Intervener (Union of India)."}}, {"text": "H.J.\n\nUmrigar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3333, "end_char": 3346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, H.J.\n\nUmrigar_ and T. M. Sen, for the Intervener (Union of India)."}}, {"text": "IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3464, "end_char": 3468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by IMAM, J.--This is an appeal on a certificate granted by the High Court of Madras.", "canonical_name": "Imam J."}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3524, "end_char": 3544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by IMAM, J.--This is an appeal on a certificate granted by the High Court of Madras."}}, {"text": "Special Judge of Tiruchirappalli", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3578, "end_char": 3610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was tried by the Special Judge of Tiruchirappalli under s. 165A of the Indian Penal Code for attempting to bribe Mr. Kaliyappan, Deputy Superintendent of Police of Ramanathapuram."}}, {"text": "s. 165A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3617, "end_char": 3624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3632, "end_char": 3649, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Kaliyappan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3678, "end_char": 3688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was tried by the Special Judge of Tiruchirappalli under s. 165A of the Indian Penal Code for attempting to bribe Mr. Kaliyappan, Deputy Superintendent of Police of Ramanathapuram.", "canonical_name": "K!tliyappan"}}, {"text": "Ramanathapuram", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3725, "end_char": 3739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was tried by the Special Judge of Tiruchirappalli under s. 165A of the Indian Penal Code for attempting to bribe Mr. Kaliyappan, Deputy Superintendent of Police of Ramanathapuram."}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3929, "end_char": 3944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against the order of acquittal the State of Madras appealed to the High Court of Madras under s. 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure."}}, {"text": "s. 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3988, "end_char": 3994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4002, "end_char": 4028, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 165A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4232, "end_char": 4239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4241, "end_char": 4258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "June 3, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5078, "end_char": 5090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 3, 1954, two complaints Imam J. reached the Keelakarai Police Station, one by the appellant against the village munsif and the other by the village munsif against the appellant."}}, {"text": "Keelakarai Police Station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5127, "end_char": 5152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 3, 1954, two complaints Imam J. reached the Keelakarai Police Station, one by the appellant against the village munsif and the other by the village munsif against the appellant."}}, {"text": "June 5, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5758, "end_char": 5770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 5, 1954, the appellant met Mr. Kaliyappan at the Central Bus-stand at Madurai and handed over to him a petition, Ext."}}, {"text": "Madurai", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5833, "end_char": 5840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 5, 1954, the appellant met Mr. Kaliyappan at the Central Bus-stand at Madurai and handed over to him a petition, Ext."}}, {"text": "June 12, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6293, "end_char": 6306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 12, 1954, Mr. Kaliyappan sent a memo (Ext."}}, {"text": "Rashid", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6797, "end_char": 6803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Kaliyappan also, in view of the situation, had directed this Police Officer to see whether steps should not be taken to seize the revolver of the appellant's brother Rashid for which he had a licence."}}, {"text": "Ramanathapuram Circle", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6849, "end_char": 6870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Inspector of Ramanathapuram Circle thereafter prepared a detailed report (Ext."}}, {"text": "June 13, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6989, "end_char": 7002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-7) of the result of his enquiry and handed it over to Mr. Kaliyappan on June 13, 1954."}}, {"text": "June 14, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7888, "end_char": 7901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 14, 1954, according to the prosecution, the appellant went to Mr. K!tliyappan's bungalow at about 7-15 a.m. who was at that time looking ip.to certain papers."}}, {"text": "K!tliyappan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7959, "end_char": 7970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 14, 1954, according to the prosecution, the appellant went to Mr. K!tliyappan's bungalow at about 7-15 a.m. who was at that time looking ip.to certain papers.", "canonical_name": "K!tliyappan"}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9545, "end_char": 9560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, .fo ame v. astag\" Mr .. Kaliyappan asked his orderly to put office rubber\n\nState of Madras stamp date seal on the notes and the same was done."}}, {"text": "Imam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9665, "end_char": 9669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Imam J.\n\nMr. Kaliyappan asked the camp clerk to note down the numbers of the currency notes which he did.", "canonical_name": "Imam J."}}, {"text": "Kaliappan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9810, "end_char": 9819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Kaliappan then dictated the memo.", "canonical_name": "K!tliyappan"}}, {"text": "Kaliyappau", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11571, "end_char": 11581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The orderly came and was told by Mr. Kaliyappau\n\n...\n\n3 S, Q.R. SUPREME COURT RRPO-RTS 121\n\nthat he was going to be beaten by the appellant and z96o .", "canonical_name": "K!tliyappan"}}, {"text": "Kahyappan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11801, "end_char": 11810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then Mr. Kahyappan told the orderly v. that there was money in the appellant's pocket and State of.", "canonical_name": "K!tliyappan"}}, {"text": "Ka.liyappan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12467, "end_char": 12478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court did not coneider\n\nthe grounds given by the Special Judge for discarding the testimony of Mr. Ka.liyappan as at all justified and was of the opinion that the Special Judge had taken a perverse view of his evidence and of the other evidence in the case.", "canonical_name": "K!tliyappan"}}, {"text": "s. 422", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12795, "end_char": 12801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12809, "end_char": 12835, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 20(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13038, "end_char": 13048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "V. L. Ethiraj", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14092, "end_char": 14105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The advo-\n\nState 0; adras cates for the appellant were M/s. V. L. Ethiraj and\n\nS. M. Cassim.", "canonical_name": "V. L .. Ethiraj"}}, {"text": "S. M. Cassim", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14111, "end_char": 14123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The advo-\n\nState 0; adras cates for the appellant were M/s. V. L. Ethiraj and\n\nS. M. Cassim."}}, {"text": "R. Santanam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14133, "end_char": 14144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Mr. R. Santanam, an advocate Imam J. who worked ."}}, {"text": "V. L .. Ethiraj", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14220, "end_char": 14235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in the office of the partnership of M/s. V. L .. Ethiraj & V. T. Rangaswami Ayyangar, wrote to the High Court office on February 27, 1956, requesting that summons need not be issued and compliance with rule 240A, Criminal Rules of Practice, might be dispensed with, in view of the appearance for the appellant having been filed on February 24,\n\n1956.", "canonical_name": "V. L .. Ethiraj"}}, {"text": "V. T. Rangaswami Ayyangar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14238, "end_char": 14263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in the office of the partnership of M/s. V. L .. Ethiraj & V. T. Rangaswami Ayyangar, wrote to the High Court office on February 27, 1956, requesting that summons need not be issued and compliance with rule 240A, Criminal Rules of Practice, might be dispensed with, in view of the appearance for the appellant having been filed on February 24,\n\n1956."}}, {"text": "s. 422", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14641, "end_char": 14647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14655, "end_char": 14681, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "March 5, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14709, "end_char": 14722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As appearance had been entered on behalf of the appellant even before the issue of notice to him, notice under s. 422 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was issued by the Court on March 5, 1956,."}}, {"text": "Ethiraj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14732, "end_char": 14739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to M/s Ethiraj and Cassim, advocates for the appellant on the records of the High Court."}}, {"text": "Cassim", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14744, "end_char": 14750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to M/s Ethiraj and Cassim, advocates for the appellant on the records of the High Court."}}, {"text": "September 4, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14907, "end_char": 14924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the appeal was ready for hearing the usual intimation under rule 240A was also sent on September 4, 1956, to the Special Judge, Tiruchirappalli for being communicated to the appellant as it was the practice of the High Court not to dispense with altogether the issue of such intimation under any circumstance."}}, {"text": "Special Judge, Tiruchirappalli", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14933, "end_char": 14963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the appeal was ready for hearing the usual intimation under rule 240A was also sent on September 4, 1956, to the Special Judge, Tiruchirappalli for being communicated to the appellant as it was the practice of the High Court not to dispense with altogether the issue of such intimation under any circumstance."}}, {"text": "s. 422", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15395, "end_char": 15401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 422", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15669, "end_char": 15675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "13th of November, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15873, "end_char": 15895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "86 of 1952, Hanumat v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (unreported) decided on the 13th of November, 1952, this Court set aside the order of the High Court converting the acquittal of the accused into one of conviction without serving a notice on him as provided by s. 422 of the Code of Criminal Procedure."}}, {"text": "s. 422", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16056, "end_char": 16062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16070, "end_char": 16096, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mohamed DastagiY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16241, "end_char": 16257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l c d b h Mohamed DastagiY opportumty to contest an appea preierre y t e State Government in the High Court.", "canonical_name": "MOHAMED DASTAGIR"}}, {"text": "6th of October, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16840, "end_char": 16860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l of 1950) (:unreported) decided on the 6th of October, 1950."}}, {"text": "s. 422", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16893, "end_char": 16899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16907, "end_char": 16933, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Dwarkaprasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17886, "end_char": 17898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It said:\n\n\"There is, however, no power or authority given by the accused Dwarkaprasad to the learned Advocate and the Advocate himself does not say in his affidavit that he received any instructions from the accused."}}, {"text": "Ram Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18083, "end_char": 18090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was instructed, he says, to appear in the case by Ram Lal, the father of the accused, and on the materials before us we are not in a position to say that it was the accused who really instructed the Advocate through his fatpei'; it may be that the father havfog got information of the appeal\n\nMohamed Dastagir v.\n\nState of Madras\n\n'Imam]."}}, {"text": "s. 422", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19620, "end_char": 19626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Imam J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20993, "end_char": 21000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Madras It is impossible to accept the suggestion that the brother-in-law of the appellant kept the appellant in .. Imam J. the dark.", "canonical_name": "Imam J."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21115, "end_char": 21120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However much the appellant's brothe:r-inlaw may have been looking after the affairs of the appellant in India, he could not _have failed to inform the appellant of the appeal filed by the State agaijlst his acquittal because if the acquittal was set aST'de , and the appellant was sentencei'l irregularity and can satisfy the Tribunal that the deparfure from the rule was justified by sound and valid reasons; otherwise the departure from the rule could be treated as being malafide or amounting to unfair. Jabour practice. _ Held, further that once it was found that retrenchment was unjustified and improper it is for the Tribunal to consider to what relief the retrenched workmen will be entitled; ordinarily retrenched workmen would be entitled to claim reinstatement, and the fact that in the meantime the employer has engaged other workmen would not necessarily defeat the claim for reinstatement, nor would the fact that protracted litigation in regard to the dispute has inevitably meant delay defeat such a claim for reinstatement. Therefore the conclusion that 15 workmen were improperly retrenched cannot be sucessfully challenged. •\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 483of1958.\n\nAppeal by speoial leave from the decision dated March 20, 1956, of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Madras, in Appeal No. Bow. 90 of 1952 arising\n\nout of the Award dated December 28, 1951, of the r96o Industrial Tribunal, Madras, in Industrial Dispute Swadesamilran Ltd.\n\nNo. 48 of 1951. .\n\nMadras\n\n1960. February 11, 12.\n\nM. 0. Setalvad, Attorneyv; General of India, R. Ganapathy Iyer and G. Gopal- Their Workmen krishnan, for the appellants. This appeal arises from an Industrial Dispute between M/s. Swadesamitran and their workmen. Three items of dispute were referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal at Madras. One of them being whether the retrenchment of 39 workmen affected by the appellant in May 1951, was justified, and if not, what relief the retrenched workmen were entitled to. The modified award directed the reinstatement of 15 of the retrenched workmen and the question is whether such direction is correct. It has to be remembered that the direction was given on March 28, 1956, in respect of retrenchment made in May 1951, with half their back wages. The Tribunal erred in applying the rule \"last come first go \" as if it were an inflexible rule. The management is the best Judge as to who were fit to be retained and who should be sent out. No doubt, if the selection of persons disclosed that the management was guilty of any unfair labour practice, that would have been ground for interference. Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal found that the action of management in selecting the personnel was not at all malafide. It cannot be said to be unreasonabl~ if persons are selected for discharge because they had reached an age which would affect their efficiency and so fit for being retrenched. It cannot be the rule that once a workmen is entertained he should be kept on for ever. Moreover, the evidence shows that a committee of three sat for the purpose of making a selection and they applied their minds to the problem and took into account all factors, viz. length of service, efficiency, defect in eye-sight with regard to very small types and general aptitude for the new kind of work on lino machines. Further, the workmen had themselves settled accounts with the management and drawn whatever was due t.o them and their claims having been satisfied it was unfair\n\nr96o and unjust to direct that they should be reinstated in - their old jobs with back wages. The others were Swadesamitran Ltd. f d ffi t d 1 tt d d M d 5 oun me cien an irregu ar m a en ance an ::• therefore the selection by the management should Their Workmen not have been interfered with at all by the Tribunal.\n\nPrinciples of social justice do not compel an employer to keep an inefficient or unsuitable and superannuated workman in his service. The principle of ' last come first go' should not have been so strictly applied on the facts of this case. The Labour Appellate Tribunal erred in law in directing reinstatement when it did not differ from the conclusion of the Industrial Tribunal that the strike of the respondents\n\n\\W1S unjustified and that the appellants had acted bona fide in coming to the conclusion that retrenchment of 39 workmen was necessary. It is only if the Industrial Tribunal was satisfied that in retrenching its employees the appellant had acted malafide that it would be open to the Tribunal to interfere with the order of retrenchment passed by the appellant. The order of reinstatement in substance is inconsistent with the findings about the bona fides of the appellant.\n\nThe Tribunal further erred in preparing a pooled seniority list to determine the seniority.\n\nThe management must be given the discretion to run the business in its best interests and it is not for the Tribunal to say that the work done in the several sub-sections of composing department was similar and the workmen can be inter-shifted. Merely because no' record was maintained as to the fitness or otherwise of each individual worker prior to the retrenchment, it was not right to infer that there was no material for the management to judge of the comparative fitness of the workmen under it. In entertaining the grievan!Je of the workmen against their order of retrenchment the Labour Appellate Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction. Retrenchment is and must be held to be a normal management function and privilege, and as soon as a case for retrenchment has been made out liberty and discretion must be left to the employer to select which employee should in fact be retrenched. In holding an enquiry about the validity of reasonableness of retrenchment of certain\n\n\"\"\" .\n\nspecified persons the appellate tribunal had trespassed x960 on the management function and as such exceeded - 't · d' t' -Swadesamitran Ltd. l S JUflS lC 10n.\n\nM d\n\n0. Anthoni. Pillai, (President, City Printing Press a;, as Workers' Union), for the respondents was not called Their Workmen upon to reply. .\n\n1960. March, I. The Judgment of the Court was Gajendragadkar J . • delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal by special leave arises from an industrial dispute between Messrs.\n\nSwadesamitran Ltd., Madras (hereinafter called the appellant) and their workmen (hereinafter called the respondents). On November 3, 1951, three items of dispute were referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal at Madras by the Madras Government under s. lO(l)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947) (hereinafter called the Act). One\n\nof these items was whether the retrenchment of 39 workmen effected by the appellant in May 1951 was\n\njustified~ and if not, what relief the retrenched workmen were entitled to. It would be relevant to mention briefly the material facts leading to this dispute. It appears that on August 26, 1950, the respondents addressed a charter. of demands to the appellant in which eleven demands were made, and they intimated to the appellant that, if the said demands were not\n\ngranted, they would go on . strike. The appellant pointed out to the respondents that it was working at a loss and that proposals for retrenchment and rationalisation were then under its active considera- tion. It promised the respondents that as soon as its financial condition improved their de!llands would be sympathetically considered. Thereupon the demands were withdrawn; but on January 24, 1951, another communication was addressed by the respondents making as many as thirteen demands coupled with the same threat that if the said demands were not granted the respondents would go on strike. A copy of this communication was sent to the State Government which was requested to refer the said demands for adjudication to the industrial tribunal. The Government, however referred the matter to the Conciliation Officer who found that the demands were\n\nx960 not justified. He accordingly made a report on - February 22, 1951.\n\nImmediately thereafter the\n\nSwade~=~::, n Ltd\"respondents wrote to the .Governmen_t repeating their v. request for reference, but on April 24, 1951, the Their Workmen Government ordered that no case for reference had\n\nbeen made.\n\nGajendragadkar J.\n\nMeanwhile the appellant was taking steps to effect retrenchment in. the staff owing to the steep rise in the prices of newsprint and scarcity of supplies, the imposition by the Government of India of a pricepage schedule and the progressive introduction of mechanisation in the composing section by installation of lino-type machines. When the respondents came to know about this their Union called for a strike ballot and as a result of the ballot the respondents decided to go on strike. A notice in that behalf was issued on May 9, 1951. The appellant then appealed to the respondents not to precipitate matters, promised to consider their demands as soon as its financial position improved and warned them that, if they refused to report for work in accordance with the strike notice, it would deem to amount to resignatiOn of each one of the strikers of his job. The Conciliation Officer who was approached by the appellant also advised the respondents not to go on strike. Nevertheless the respondents went on strike on May 30, 1951.\n\nBefore the rspondents thus went on strike services of 39 members of the staff had been terminated by a notice as a measure of retrenchment witli effect from May 18, 1951. It is the retrenchment of these 39 workmen which led to the industrial dispute with which we are concerned in tlie present appeal.\n\nBefore this dispute was thus referred for adjudication the respondents had filed a writ petition in the Madras High Court asking for a writ calling upon the Government to make a reference under s. lO(l)(c) of the Act. This writ application was allowed; but on . appeal the Court of Appeal modified the order issued by the original court by substituting a direction that the Government should discharge its duties under s. 12(5) of the Act. On June 12, 1951, the strike was called off by the respondents and they offered to resume work ; but by then the appellant had engaged\n\n-,._)\n\nnew hands and so it was able to re-engage only some r960 of the respondents who offered to resume work. The - failure of the appellant to take into service all its Swades;:mtran Ltd. workmen is another item of dispute between the ::as parties; but with the said dispute the present appeal Their Workmen is not concerned. It was as a result of the order passed by the Madras High Court that the present Gajendragadkar J. dispute was ultimately referred for adjudication to the industrial tribunal. .\n\nThe tribunal held that the strike declared by the respondents was not justified. and that the appellant was justified in retrenching 39 workmen in question.\n\nAccording to the tribunal, though in retrenching 39 workmen the principle qf 'last 9.ome first go' was not strictly followed, the appellant was justified in departing from the said principle. because it was entitled to give preference to \"persons mechanically inclined and having good eyesight.\" Thatis why the tribunal rejected the respondents' plea that in effecting retrenchment the appellant had indulged in any unfair labour practice .. Since the tribunal was satified that the retrenchment of39 workmen was effected in the usual course for good and sufficient reasons it ordered that the said retrenched workmen were not entitled to any relief. The respondents challenged this award by an appeal before the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The appellate tribunal was satisfied that the impugned finding about .the. bona fides and the validity of the _retrenchment was not justified. It, therefore, remanded the proceedings to the industrial tribunal for df)ciding afresh the four points formulated by it. Two of these points are relevant for our purpose. One was whether the formula 'last com:e first go' had been complied with; and if it was not, the tribunal was asked to scrutinise in relation to each individual whether the reasons for breaking the said rule were sufficient in his case ; and the other was whether the management was motivated by any unfair labour practice or victimisation.\n\nPursuant to this order of remand the industrial tribunal allowed an opportunity to the appellant to lead evidence, and, on considering the evidence, it came to the conclusion that the appellant had made\n\n'960 out a case of necessity for retrenchment and that it\n\n5 d -.1 Ltd had justified the extent of retrenchment as pleaded by\n\nwa '';;;;,,:• it. No mala jides in that behalf had been established v. according to the tribunal. It, however, held that the Their Workmen principle of' last come first go' had not been observed . - in selecting the personnel for retrenchment; and it Ga; endragadkar J. rejected the explanation given by the appellant in retrenching 15 out of the said 39 workmen. That is why it ordered the appellant to reinstate the said 15 workmen without any back wages. In regard to the remaining 24 workmen no order was made by the tribunal in respect of any compensation payable to them. .\n\nOn receipt of the fi._ndings recorded by the tribunal the matter went back to the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Both parties had filed objections against the findings in question. The appellate tribunal considered these objections and held that the appellant had made out a case for retrenching 39 of its employees; but it agreed with the industrial tribunal that the principle of' last come first go' had not been observed and that no case had been made out to depart from the said principle. That is why it confirmed the finding of the tribunal that the 15 named employees should be reinstated and added that they should be given half the amount of their back wages. In regard to the remaining 24 workmen who had been retrenched, the appellate tribunal directed that they should be awarded compensation at the rate of half a month's wages including dearness allowance for each year of service. It is against this decision that the present appeal has been preferred by special leave.\n\nThe first point which the learned Attorney-General has raised before us in this appeal on behalf of the appellant is that the Labour Appellate Tribunal erred in law in directing reinstatement when it did not differ from the conclusion of the industrial tribunal that the strike of the respondents was unjustified and that the appellant had acted bona fide in coming to the conclusion that retrenchment of 39 workmen was necessary.\n\nIt is urged that it is only if the industrial tribunal is satisfied that in retrenching its employees the appellant had acted mala fide that it would be open to the\n\n\\,---:\n\n3 S.C.R. SUPRE¥E COURT REPORTS 151\n\ntribunal to interfere with the order of retrenchment r960 passed by the appellant; and the argument is that -. L d h d f . t t t . b t . . . t t Swadesamitran\n\nI • t e or er o reins a emen In su s ance IS Inconsis en Madras with the findings about the bona fides of the appellant. v.\n\nIn our opinion this argument is misconceived. There Their Workmen are two aspects of the question with which the appel- -- late tribunal was concerned in the present proceedings : Gajendragadkar I Was the appellant justified in coming to the conclusion in exercise of its management function and authority that 39 workmen had to be retrenched ; if yes, .has the retrenchment been properly carried out ? The first question has been answered in favour of the appellant by both the tribunals below. It has been found that the respondents' strike was unjustified and that for the reasons set out by the appellant retrenchment to the extent pleaded by it was also called for and justified. It is in regard to this aspect of the matter that the appellant's bonafides have no doubt qeen found; but the bona fides of the appellant in coming to the conclusion that 39 workmen had to be retrenched have no material bearing nor have they any. relevance in fact with the question as to whether the appellant ated fairly or reasonably in selecting for retrenchment the 39 workmen in question. It is in regard to this latter aspect of the matter that concurrent findings have been recorded against the appellant that it acted without justification and the retrenchment of the 15 workmen in question amounts to an unfair labour practice. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the argument that there is any inconsistency in the two findings. They deal with two different aspects of the matter and so they cannot be said to conflict with each other at all.\n\nIt is then urged that in entertaining the grievance of the respondents against their order of retrenchment the Labour Appellate Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction. The case presented before us on this ground assumes that retrenchment is . and must be held to be a normal management function and privilege, and as soon as a case for retrenchment had been made out liberty and discretion must be left to the • employer to select which employees should in fact be retrenched. In holding an enquiry about the valiQ.iy\n\n 1960 or reasonableness .of retrenchment of certain specified - persons the appellate tribunal has trespassed on the Swadesamitran Ltd. t f t• d h h d d •t M d managemen unc 10n an as sue as excee e 1 s ::•s jurisdiction. We are not impressed by this argument.\n\nTheir Workmen It may be conceded that if a case for retrenchment is made out it would normally be for the employer to Gajendragadkar J. decide which of the employees should be retrenched; but there can be no doubt that the ordinary industrial rule of retrenchment is 'last come first go', and where other things are equal [this rule has to be followed by the employer in effecting retrenchment. We must, however, add that when it is stated that other things being equal the rule 'last come first go' must be applied, it is not intended to deny freedom to the employer to depart from the said rule for sufficient and valid reasons. The employer may take into account considerations of efficiency 0.nd trustworthy character of the employees, and if he is satisfied that a person with a long service is inefficient, unreliable or habitually irregular in the discharge of his duties, it would be open to him to retrench his services while retaining in his employment employees who are more efficient, reliable and regular though they may be junior in service to the retrenched workmen. Normally, where the rule is thus departed from there should be reliable evidence preferably in the recorded history of the workmen concerned showing their inefficiency, unreliability or habitual irregularity. It is not as if industrial tribunals insist inexorably upon compliance with the industrial rule of retrenchment; what they insist on is on their being satisfied that wherever the rule is departed .from the departure is justified by sound and valid reasons. It, therefore, follows that, wherever it is proved that the rule in question has been departed from, the employer must satisfy the industrial tribunal that the departure was justified ; and in that sense the onus would undoubtedly be on the employer. In dealing with cases of retrenchment it is essential to remember that the industrial rule of 'last come first go' is intended to afford a very healthy • safeguard against discrimination of workmen in the matter of retrenchment, and so, though the employer may depart from the rule, he s.hould be able to justify\n\n- '\n\nthe departure before the industrial tribunal whenever r960 an industrial dispute is raised by retrenched workmen . - d h h . . d h Swadesamitran Lid. on the groun .t at t eir ni; ipgne . rtenc. ment Madras amounts to unfair labour practice or victimisat10n. v.\n\nIt appears that in 1946 the Government of India, TlieirWorkmm in its Department of Labour, formulated certain rules . - . for retrenchment and commended them to the atten- Gajendragadkar l tion of all employers of labour and trade unions so that disputes on that score may be minimised. Rule 4 amongst the said rules was that as a rule discharge of personnel who are still surplus to requirements should be in accordance wft; h the principles of short service, that is to say, last man engaged should be the first man to be discharged. Due notice or wages in lieu thereof should be given. The same principle has been accepted and applied by industrial tribunals on several occasions (Vide: Indian Navigation & Industrials, Alleppey And Certain Workmen (1); Outtack Electric Supply Go. Ltd. And Their Workmen (2); and Shaparia Dock and Steel Company And Their Workers (3) ). We ought to add that the same principle has now been statutorily recognised by s. 25(g) of the Act.\n\nThis section provides inter alia that where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of India, is to be retrenched, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in the same category, unless, for reasons to be recorded, the employer retrenches any other workman; in other words, by this section a statutory obligation is imposed on the employer to follow the rule, and if he wants to depart from it to record his reason for the said departure.\n\nIn support of his contention that the Labour Appellate Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction in examining the merits of the retrenchment effected by the appellant, the learned Attorney-General has relied upon certain observations made by this Court in the case of J. K. Iron & Steel Go. Ltd. v. Its Workmen (4).\n\nDealing with the argument of the appellant that the order of retrenchment should be left to the management and that the decision by the management that\n\n(r) (1952) II L.L.J. 6n.\n\n(2) 1954 I L.L.J. 723.\n\n(3) (1954) II L.L.J. 208.\n\n(4) Civil Appeal No, 2Q6 of 1958 decidd on u-a-1960.\n\nr960 some, employees are better qualified than others should\n\nS -. not be questioned by the adjudicator unless he came wadesamitran Ltd. h l . h h\n\n.I' • l Madras to t e cone us10n t at t e _Pre1erentra treatment was v. deemed to be mala: fide, this Court observed that the Their Workmen proposition involved in the argument was unexception- . - able, it was added, that, if the preferential trea.t- Ga1endrag•dkar J. ment given to juniors ignores the well recognised principles of industrial law of' first come last go' without any acceptable or sound reasoning a tribunal or an adjudicator will be well justified _to hold that the action of the management is not bona fide.\n\nWe do not see how either of the two propositions set out in this judgment can support the appellant's argument before us.\n\nThe position under the industrial law seems to us to be fairly clear. The management has the right to retrench the workmen provided retrenchment is justified.\n\nIn effecting retrenchment the management normally has to adopt and give effect to the industrial rule of retrenchment. For valid reasons it may depart from the said rule. If the departure from the said rule does not appear to the industrial tribunal as valid or satisfactory, then the action of the management in so departing from the rule can be treated by the tribunal as being mala fide or as amounting to unfair labour practice ; in other words, departure from the ordinary industrial rule of retrenchment without any justification may itself, in a proper case, lead to the inference that the impugned retrenchment is the result of ulterior considerations and as such it is mala fide and amounts to unfair labour practice and victimisation.\n\nThat is precisely what this Court has held in the case of J. K. Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. (').\n\nWe are, therefore, satisfied that there is no substance in the appellant's contention that the tribunals below have exceeded their jurisdiction in enquiring into the validity of the retrenchment of the 39 workmen in question.\n\nThere is one more point which may briefly be mentioned in this connection. After the matter was remanded the industrial tribunal has carefully considered the evidence given by the appellant. In fact it is clear from the record that at the original enquiry no evidence had been led by thl appellant to justify tI) Civil Af.ipeal No. :266 of 1958 decided on 11:.2-6~.\n\n... -\n\nthe departure from the rule even though it was. con-\n\nI960 ceded that the rule had not be.en followed.\n\nThe 5 d -. L d . l £ . wa esamitran t • Labour Appellate Tribuna, therefore, airly gave a Madras chance to the appellant to justify the said departure, v. and accordingly evidence was led by the appellant.\n\nTheir Workmen This evidence consists of the testimonv of Mr. Lakshminarasimhan, who has been working ith the appellant Gajendragadkar J •. for 32 years. He works as an Assistant Editor, and in addition attends to press work. He stated that he was having a personal supervision of the entire work and that when retrenchment was actually effected a committee was appointed consisting of himself, the Manager Mr. Ayyangar and the Press Manager Mr.\n\nRajagopala Ayyangar. At the time of the enquiry the Manager was dead. According to the witness the committee took the advice of the Foremen of various sections in deciding which workmen should be retained and which should be retrenched. The witness gave evidence about the defects in the cases of the 39 workmen who were retrenched; and in support . of his oral testimony he filed two statements T-1 and T-2 giving material particulars in respect of all the said workmen. It is admitted that no records were made at the time when the cases of these workmen were examined, and so the witness was driven to give . evidence merely from memory. The tribunal has held that having regard to the nature . of the defects attributed to the several workmen to which the witness deposed it was impossible to accept his testimony as satisfactory, and the tribunal was also not satisfied that it was likely that the witness should have any personal knowledge in regard to the said defects. In the 'result the tribunal rejected this testimony. It also examined some cases 'in detail, and it was satisfied that the reasons given for retrenching them were demonstrably unsatisfactory. It is on these findings that the tribunal came to the conclusion that the appellant had not shown any valid or rea.sonable ground for departing from the usual rule, and thie. finding has been accepted by the Labour Appellate Tribunal. In such a case we do not see how in .the present appeal the appellant can successfully challenge the correctness of the conclusion that in substance the retrenchment\n\nz960 of the 15 workmen amounts to an unfair labour practice and victimisation.\n\nSwad'5amitran Ltd.· That leaves two minor questions which were formu- M\":/.\"s lated for our decision by the learned Attorney-General.\n\nTheir Workmen He contended that, even if the impugned retrenchment of the 15 workmen in question was not justified, Gajendragadkar J. reinstatment should not have been directed; some compensation instead should have been ordered; and in the alternative he argued that the order directing compensation to the remaining 24 retrenched workmen was also not justified. We do not see any substance in either of these two contentions. Once it is found that retrenchment is unjustified and improper it is for the tribunals below to consider to what relief the retrenched workmen are entitled. Ordinarily, if a workman has been improperly and illegally retrenched he is entitled to claim reinstatement. The fact that in the meanwhile the employer has engaged other workmen would not necessarily defeat the claim for reinstatement of the retrenched workmen ; nor can the fa\n\n0ct that protracted litigation in regard to the dispute has inevitably meant delay, defeat such a claim for reinstatement. This court has consistently held that in the case of wrongful dismissal, discharge or retrenchment, a claim for reinstatement cannot be defeated merely because time has lapsed or that the employer has engaged fresh hands (Vide: The Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. The All-India Punjab National Bank Employees' Federation (1); and National Transport and General Co. Ltd. v. The Workmen (2).\n\nThen as to the compensation awarded to the 15 and 24 workmen respectively, it is a matter of discretion and as such is not open to challenge in the present appeal.\n\nIn the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed\n\n(t) t196o] I S.C.R. 806.\n\n(t) Civil Appeal No. 312 of 1956 decided on januaty 22, 1937,\n\n___ ,", "total_entities": 38, "entities": [{"text": "S. SW ADESAMlTRAN LIMITED, MADRAS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 74, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M/S. SW ADESAMlTRAN LIMITED, MADRAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THEIR WORKMEN (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SuBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 116, "end_char": 128, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 133, "end_char": 153, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2729, "end_char": 2746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorneyv; General of India, R. Ganapathy Iyer and G. Gopal- Their Workmen krishnan, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "G. Gopal-", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2751, "end_char": 2760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorneyv; General of India, R. Ganapathy Iyer and G. Gopal- Their Workmen krishnan, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Swadesamitran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2864, "end_char": 2877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This appeal arises from an Industrial Dispute between M/s. Swadesamitran and their workmen."}}, {"text": "March 28, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3354, "end_char": 3368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has to be remembered that the direction was given on March 28, 1956, in respect of retrenchment made in May 1951, with half their back wages."}}, {"text": "Swadesamitran Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4779, "end_char": 4797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The others were Swadesamitran Ltd. f d ffi t d 1 tt d d M d 5 oun me cien an irregu ar m a en ance an ::• therefore the selection by the management should Their Workmen not have been interfered with at all by the Tribunal."}}, {"text": "Anthoni. Pillai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7129, "end_char": 7144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anthoni."}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7315, "end_char": 7329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March, I. The Judgment of the Court was Gajendragadkar J . •", "canonical_name": "Gajendragadkar"}}, {"text": "GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7349, "end_char": 7363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal by special leave arises from an industrial dispute between Messrs.\n\nSwadesamitran Ltd., Madras (hereinafter called the appellant) and their workmen (hereinafter called the respondents).", "canonical_name": "Gajendragadkar"}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7468, "end_char": 7474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal by special leave arises from an industrial dispute between Messrs.\n\nSwadesamitran Ltd., Madras (hereinafter called the appellant) and their workmen (hereinafter called the respondents)."}}, {"text": "November 3, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7569, "end_char": 7585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 3, 1951, three items of dispute were referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal at Madras by the Madras Government under s. lO(l)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947) (hereinafter called the Act)."}}, {"text": "Madras Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7685, "end_char": 7702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 3, 1951, three items of dispute were referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal at Madras by the Madras Government under s. lO(l)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947) (hereinafter called the Act)."}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7728, "end_char": 7757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "August 26, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8091, "end_char": 8106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that on August 26, 1950, the respondents addressed a charter."}}, {"text": "January 24, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8666, "end_char": 8682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon the demands were withdrawn; but on January 24, 1951, another communication was addressed by the respondents making as many as thirteen demands coupled with the same threat that if the said demands were not granted the respondents would go on strike."}}, {"text": "February 22, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9193, "end_char": 9210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He accordingly made a report on - February 22, 1951."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9639, "end_char": 9658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the staff owing to the steep rise in the prices of newsprint and scarcity of supplies, the imposition by the Government of India of a pricepage schedule and the progressive introduction of mechanisation in the composing section by installation of lino-type machines."}}, {"text": "May 9, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9990, "end_char": 10001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A notice in that behalf was issued on May 9, 1951."}}, {"text": "May 30, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10488, "end_char": 10500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nevertheless the respondents went on strike on May 30, 1951."}}, {"text": "May 18, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10660, "end_char": 10672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the rspondents thus went on strike services of 39 members of the staff had been terminated by a notice as a measure of retrenchment witli effect from May 18, 1951."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10910, "end_char": 10927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before this dispute was thus referred for adjudication the respondents had filed a writ petition in the Madras High Court asking for a writ calling upon the Government to make a reference under s. lO(l)(c) of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 12(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11225, "end_char": 11233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "June 12, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11249, "end_char": 11262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 12, 1951, the strike was called off by the respondents and they offered to resume work ; but by then the appellant had engaged\n,._)"}}, {"text": "endragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14030, "end_char": 14041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in selecting the personnel for retrenchment; and it Ga; endragadkar J. rejected the explanation given by the appellant in retrenching 15 out of the said 39 workmen."}}, {"text": "Indian Navigation & Industrials, Alleppey", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21661, "end_char": 21702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same principle has been accepted and applied by industrial tribunals on several occasions (Vide: Indian Navigation & Industrials, Alleppey And Certain Workmen (1); Outtack Electric Supply Go."}}, {"text": "Outtack Electric Supply Go. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21728, "end_char": 21760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same principle has been accepted and applied by industrial tribunals on several occasions (Vide: Indian Navigation & Industrials, Alleppey And Certain Workmen (1); Outtack Electric Supply Go."}}, {"text": "Shaparia Dock and Steel Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21788, "end_char": 21819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd. And Their Workmen (2); and Shaparia Dock and Steel Company And Their Workers (3) )."}}, {"text": "s. 25(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21924, "end_char": 21932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22054, "end_char": 22059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This section provides inter alia that where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of India, is to be retrenched, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in the same category, unless, for reasons to be recorded, the employer retrenches any other workman; in other words, by this section a statutory obligation is imposed on the employer to follow the rule, and if he wants to depart from it to record his reason for the said departure."}}, {"text": "J. K. Iron & Steel Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24817, "end_char": 24844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is precisely what this Court has held in the case of J. K. Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. (')."}}, {"text": "Lakshminarasimhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25824, "end_char": 25841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Their Workmen This evidence consists of the testimonv of Mr. Lakshminarasimhan, who has been working ith the appellant Gajendragadkar J •. for 32 years."}}, {"text": "Ayyangar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26173, "end_char": 26181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He stated that he was having a personal supervision of the entire work and that when retrenchment was actually effected a committee was appointed consisting of himself, the Manager Mr. Ayyangar and the Press Manager Mr.\n\nRajagopala Ayyangar."}}, {"text": "Rajagopala Ayyangar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26209, "end_char": 26228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He stated that he was having a personal supervision of the entire work and that when retrenchment was actually effected a committee was appointed consisting of himself, the Manager Mr. Ayyangar and the Press Manager Mr.\n\nRajagopala Ayyangar."}}, {"text": "Swad'5amitran Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27860, "end_char": 27878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Swad'5amitran Ltd.· That leaves two minor questions which were formu- M\":/.\"s lated for our decision by the learned Attorney-General."}}, {"text": "januaty 22, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29685, "end_char": 29701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "312 of 1956 decided on januaty 22, 1937,\n\n ,"}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_157_167_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 157\n\nTHE ASSOCIATED CEMENT COMPANIES LTD. v.\n\nTHEIR WORKMEN\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,' A. K. SARKAR AND K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)\n\nIndustrial, Dispute-Award-Notice of Termination-Whether can be given by minority union-Industrial, Disputes Act, I947, (I4 of I947), ss.'I8, I9(6). - The appellant's workmen were represented by a Union called Kamdar Mandal Cement Works, Porbandar. The registration of the said union was cancelled and that led to the formation of two Unions, the Cement Kamdar Mandal and Cement Employees Union. The Cement Kamdar Mandal gave two notices one after another to the appellant, purporting to terminate two previous awards, wherein the defunct union represented the workmen.\n\nThereafter the Mandal presented fresh demands and the dispute was referred to the Tribunal. The second union, the Cement\n\nEmployees' Union which represented the majority of the appellant's workmen at Porbandar had been impleaded in the proceedings. The appellant raised preliminary objections before the Tribunal against the competency of the reference inter alia on the ground that the award in question by which the parties were bound had not been duly terminated under s. r9(6) of the Act in as much as the union which purported to terminate the said award represented only a minority of workmen bound by it. The Tribunal by its interlocutary judgment found against the appellant.\n\nThe dispute between the parties centres round the question as to who can issue the notice terminating the award on behalf of workmen who are bound by the award as a result of s. rS of the Act. The question therefore for decision is whether a registered trade union representing a minority of workmen governed by an award can give notice. to the other party intimating its intention to terminate the award under s. r9(6) of the Industrial Disputes tr~~ .\n\nHeld, that the effect of s. rS is that an award properly made by an industrial tribunal governs the employer and all those who represent him under s. rS(c) and the employees who are parties to the dispute and all those who are included ins. rS(b) and (d). On\n\na fair and reasonable reading of s. r9(6), the true position is that, though the expression \"any party bound by the award\" refers to all workmen bound by the award, notice to terminate the said award can be given not by an individual workman but by a group of workmen acting collectively either through their union or otherwise, and it is not necessary that such a group of workmen acting coJlectively either through their union or otherwise, should represent the majority of workmen bound by the award. Thus it is open to a minority of workmen or a minority union to terminate\n\nr960\n\nMarch 3\n\nI960 the award by which they, along with other employees, are bound just as much as it is open to them to raise an industrial dispute Associated under the Act.\n\nCement Companies The Central Provinces Transport Services Limited v. Raghunath Ltd.\n\nGopal Patwardhan, [1956] S.C.R. 956 and The Newspapers Limited , v.\n\nv. The State Industrial Tribunal, U. P., [1957] S.C.R. 754, refer- Their Workmen red to.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 404 of 1958.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the decision dated March 10, 1958, of the Industrial Tribunal, Rajkot, in Adjudication Case No. 67 of 1955.\n\nM. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, R. J.\n\nKolah, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellants.\n\nJanardan Sharmii, for respondent No. 2.\n\n1960. March, 3.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Gajendragadkar ].\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-Can a registered trade union representing a minority of workmen governed by an award give notice to the other party intimating its intention to terminate the award under s. 19(6) of the Industrial Disputes Act XIV of 194 7 (hereinafter called the Act)? That is the short question which arises for decision in the present appeal. In answering the said question it would be necessary to examine the scheme of the Act and to ascertain the true meaning and effect of s. 19(6) on its fair and reasonable construction. The controversy thus raised undoubtedly lies within a narrow compass; but before addressing ourselves to the merits of tbe dispute, it is necessary to state the material facts which led to the present proceedings.\n\nThe present appeitl has been brought before this Court by the Associa.ted Cement Companies Limited (hereinafter called the appellant) against their workman (hereinafter called the respondents), and it arises from an industrial dispute between them which was referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal for the State of Saurashtra by the Saurashtra Government under s. 10(1) of the Act. Several items of demand presented by the respondents constituted the subject-matter of the reference.\n\nWhen the tribunal began its proceedings the appellant raised four preliy\n\nr-.\n\n'i -\n\nminary objections against the competence of the z96o reference itself. The tribunal heard parties on these A . 1 a preliminary objections, and by its interlocutory judgcemens~;~; anies ment delivered on March 10, 1958, it has found Ltd. against the appellant on all the points. In the result v. it set down the reference for further hearing on the Their Workmen merits. It is against this interlocutory judgment and G . d--dk ]. d h h\" C a1en raga ar . or er that the appellant as come to t is ourt . by special leave. Out of the four points urged by the appellant as preliminary objections we are concerned with only one in the present appeal, and that relates to the 'incompetence of the reference on the ground that the award in questionby which the parties were bound has not been duly terminated under s. 19(6) of the Act inasmuch as the union which purported to terminate the said award represents only a minority of workmen bound by it.\n\nThe circumstances under which this contention was raised must now be stated in some detail. The appellant is a limited company and owns and runs a number of cement factories spread ou.t in different States in India as well as in Pakistan. It has a factory at Porbandar in Saurashtra. The factory is known as the Porbandar Cement Works. An industrial dispute arose between the appellant and the respondents in 1949 and it was referred for adjudication to the industrial tribunal on March 22, 1949.\n\nThis reference ended in an award made on September 13, 1949. Thereafter the said award was terminated by the appellant; and on disputes arising between it and the respondents another reference was made to the same tribunal for adjudication of the said disputes.\n\nA second award was made on July 24, 1951, by which the earlier award with slight modifications was ordered to continue in operation. In the proceedings in respect of both the references the appellant's workmen were represented by their Union called Kamdar Mandal, Cement Works, Porbandar. It appears that the registration of the said u_nion was cancelled on July 2, 1954, and that led to the formation of two unions of the appellant's workmen, the Cement Kamdar Manda! whic.h was registered on\n\nz960 July 7, 1954, and the Cement Employees' Union which was registered on September 18, 1954.\n\nAssociated Th C K d M d 1 h Cement Companies e ement am ar an a gave notice to t e Ltd. appellant's manager on September 23, 1954, purportv. ing to terminate the first award pronounced on Their Workmen September 13, 1949, at the expiration of two months' -- notice from the date of the said communication. By Gajendragadkar J. another letter written on December 20, 1954, the same union purported to terminate the second award pronounced on July 24, 1951, in a similar manner.\n\nOn November 22, 1954, the said Manda! presented fresh demands most of which were covered by the two previous awards. The said demands were referred to the Conciliation Officer for conciliation but the efforts at conciliation failed, and on receiving a failure report from the officer the Saurashtra Government made the present reference purporting to exercise its jurisdiction under s. lO(l)(c) of the Act. The appellant's case is that the Cement Kamdar Manda! was not authorised to terminate either of the two awards under s. 19(6) of the Act, that the second award is thus still in operation, and so the reference is invalid.\n\nMeanwhile it appears that the Cement Employees' Union, which represents the majority of the appellant's workmen at Porbandar, instead of giving notice of termination under s. 19( 6 ), raised disputes with the appellant and the same were referred to the Conciliation Officer.\n\nEfforts at conciliation having failed the conciliation officer made a failure report to the Government of Saurashtra; the Saurashtra Government, however, did not refer the said dispute for adjudication. In the present proceedings this Union has been impleaded and it haK supported the demands made by the Cement Kamdar Mandal; in other words, notwithstanding the rivalry between the two Unions, the demands made by the minority union were supported by the majority union, and in fact, in the appeal before us, it is th_e latter union that has appeared to contest the appeal. The tribunal has dealt with the point of law raised by the appellant under s. 19(6) on the assumption that the Cement\n\nKamdar Manda! which purported to terminate the awards under the said section represents the minority\n\n< -\n\n' )\n\nof_ the workmen employed at Porbandar, and we 1960 propose to deal with the point raised in the appeal on . the same assumption.\n\nAssociated .\n\nTh . t' b' h .e ll t b 'd d . Cement Companie~ e mam sec 10ns w 10 1a o e cons1 ere m Ltd •. dealing with the dispute are ss. 18 and 19 as they k . W k stood in 1954. Section 18 provides, inter alia, that T cir ,. or .me'! a? a; ward which has _become enorceabe shll be Gajeridrf'gadk_ar J. bmdmg on (a) all parties to the mdustr1al dispute, ·\n\n(b) all other partis summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the Board or tribunal, as the case may be, records the opinion that they were so summoned without proper cause,\n\n(c) where a party referred to in cl. (a) or cl. (b) is an employer, .his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates, and\n\n(d) where a party referred to in cl. (a) or cl. (b) is composed of workmen, all persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute, and all persons who subsequently became employed in that establishment or part. It is thus clear that though an industrial dispute may be raised by a group of workmen who may not represent all or even the majority of workmen, still, if the said dispute is referred to the industrial tribunal for adjudication and an award is made, it binds not only the parties to the dispute or other parties summoned to appear but. all persons who were employed in the establishment or who would be employed in future are also governed by the award ; in other words, the + effect of s. 18 is that an award properly made by an industrial tribunal governs the employer and all those who represent him under s. 18(c) and the employees who are parties to the dispute. and all those who are included ins. 18(b)_and (d). .\n\nSection 19' prescribes the period of operation of settlements and awards. Section 19(3) provides that an award shall, subject to the provisions of this section, remain in operation for a period of one year.\n\nThis is subject to the provisos to sub-s. (3) as well as to subs. (4) but we are not concerned with the said provisions.\n\nSection 19(6) provides that notwithstanding the expiry of the period of operation under\n\n'96° sub-s. (3) the award shall continue to be binding on\n\nA . d the parties until a period of two months has elapsed ssoctate f th d t h' h th ' b Cement Companies rom e a e on w IC e notice 1s given y any Ltd. party bound by the award to the other party or v. . parties intimating its intention to terminate the Their Workmen award. The effect of this sub-section is that unless\n\nG . d -dk the award is duly terminated as provided by it it •Je• raga ar J. shall continue to be binding notwithstanding the expiration of the period prescribed by sub-s. (3). This position is not in dispute. The dispute between the parties centres round the question as to who can issne the notice terminating the award on behalf of workmen who are bound by the award as a result of s. 18 of the Act. What the sub-section requires is that a notice shall be given by any party bound by the award to the other party or parties. To whom the notice should be given may not present much difficulty. Where the award is sought to be terminated on behalf of the employees the notice has to be given to the employer and that is the party entitled to receive notice. Then, as to \"the parties\" to whom also notices are required to be given, it may per haps be that the parties intended are those joined under s. 10, sub-s. (5) or under s. 18, sub-s. (2) or are .otherwise parties to the dispute; but with that aspect of the question we are not concerned in the present appeal, because notice has been given to the appPllant and all the workmen concerned in the dispute have appeared before the tribunal through the two respective unions. The question with which we are concerned and which is not easy to determine is tlie true interpretation of the word \"any party bound by the award\". We have already noticed the effect of s. 18, and we have seen how wide is the cir.ole of persons who are bound by the award as a result of the said section. Literally construed, any party bound by the award may mean even a single employee who is bound by the award, and on this literal construction even one dissatisfied employee may be entitled to give notice terminating the award. On the other hand, it may be possible to contend that any party in the context must mean a party that represents the majority of the persons bound by the award.\n\n\"\"'\".\n\nTerminating the award is a serious step and such a z96o • step can be taen by a pary nly if it can c.laim to Associated represent the will of the maJority on that pomt. It Cement Companies .. is for this construction that the appellant contends Ltd .. v. before US.\n\nTheir Workmen In construing this provision it would be relevant __ to remember that an industrial dispute as defined by Gajendrngadkar): s. 2(k) of the Act means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen which is connected with the employment or non-employment, or the terms of employment, or with the conditions of labour of any person. This definition emphatically brings out the essential characteristics of the dispute with which the Act purports to deal.\n\nThe disputes must relate to the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour and they must arise, inter alia, between workmen and their employer.\n\nOrdinarily, an individual dispute which is not sponsored by the union or is otherwise not supported by any group of workmen is not regarded as an industrial dispute for the purposes of the Act. A provision like that contained in s. 33A is of course an exception to this rule.\n\nThe basis of industrial adjudication recognised by the provisions of the Act clearly appears to be that disputes between employers and their employees would be governed by the Act where such disputes have assumed the character of an industrial dispute. An element of collective bargaining which is the essential feature of modern trade union movemenl' is necessarily involved in industria1 adjudication.\n\nThat is why industrial courts deal with disputes in relation to i, ndividual eases only where such disputes -assume the character of an industrial dispute by reason of the fact that they are sponsored by the union or have otherwise been taken up by a group or body of employees. In The Central Provinces Transport Services Limited v. Raghunath Gopal Patwardhan\n\n( 1) this Court has observed that\" the preponderence of judicial opinion is clearly in favour of the view. that an individual dispute cannot per se be an industrial dispute but may become one if taken up by a\n\n[1) {1956JS.C, R. 956,\n\nr960 trade union or a number of persons\". These observations have been cited with approval by this Court in Associated f Th N L · d Th S Cement Companies the cas.e o . e ewspapers irni_te v. e tae Ltd. lrulustrial Tribunal, U. P. (1 ).\n\nHavmg regard to this v. aspect of the matter it would be difficult to hold that Their Workmen \"any party bound by the award\" can include an . . - individual workman, though speaking literally he is Ga; endragadkar ]. b d b h d I · h a party oun y t e awar . n our opm10n, t erefore, \"the said expression cannot include an individual workman. We ought to add that this position is fairly conceded by Mr. Sharma for the respondents.\n\nThat takes us to the question as to whether the expression \" any party bound by the award \" must mean a union representing the majority of the workmen bound by it or a group of workmen constituting such majority acting otherwise than through the union. The expression •· aGy party bound by the award\" obviously refers to, and includes, all persons bound by the award under s. 18. The learned Attorney- General has urged before us that we should construe s. 19(6) so . as to preclude a minority of workmen bound by the award from disturbing the smooth working of the award and thereby creating an industrial dispute. When an award is made it binds the parties for the statutory period under s. 19(3); and even after the expiration of the said period it continues to be binding on the parties under s. 19(6) unless it is duly terminated. The policy of the Act, therefore, appears to be that the smooth working of the award even after the prescribed statutory period should not be disturbed unless the majority o'f the workmen bound by it feel that it should be terminated and fresh demands should be made. If a minority of workmen or a minority union is allowed to terminate the award it would lead to the anomalous result that despite the willingness of the majority of workmen to abide by the award the minority can create disturbance and raise an industrial dispute and that cannot be within the contemplation of the Legislature when it enacted s. 19(6) of the Act.\n\nThat in substance is the argument urged before us ; thus presented the argument no doubt appears prima facie attractive;\n\n(1) [1957] S.C.R. 754\n\n' -\n\n. ..,\n\n3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT B.EPORTS 165\n\nbut, in our opinion, it would be unreasonable to z960 accept this construction and impose the limitation of . d the majority vote in the matter of the termination of Cem::is~;:; anies the award.\n\nLtd.\n\nThe effect of imposing such a limitation would, in v. our opinion, seriously prejudice the interests of the Their Workmen e; nployees. It is well-known that the trade union - t th\" t t t l t Gajendtagadkar ]. movemen m 1s coun ry canno ye c aim o cover all employees engaged in several branches of industry.\n\nMembership of the important trade unions no doubt shows an appreciable increase and progress, but the stage when trade unions can claim to have covered all employees or even a majority of them has still not been reached. If the majority rule for which . the appellant contends is accepted ands. 19(6) is accordingly construed, termination of the award would, we apprehend, become very difficult, if not impossible, in a very large number of cases. It is in this context that the effect of s. 18 has to be borne in 1 mind. As we have already indicated the class of employees bound by the award under s. 18 is very much wider than the parties to the industrial dispute in which the award is made; the said class includes not only all the persons employed in the establishment at the date of the award but it covers even the subsequent employees in the said establishment. It is, therefore, obvious that if the majority rule is adopted very few awards, if any, could be terminated.because very few unions would be able to claim a majority of members on their rolls, and in their present stage of organisation in very few cases would a majority of workmen be able to meet, decide . and act together otherwise than through their unions. That is why the majority rule would very seriously prejudice the rights of employees to terminate awards when they feel that they need to be modified or changed. That is one aspect of the matter which cannot be ignored in construing the material words in s. 19(6).\n\nThere is another aspect of the question which is also relevant and which, in our opinion, is against the . construction suggested by the appellant. We have already noticed that an industrial dispute can be raised by a. group of workmeri or by . a union even\n\nr96o though neither of them represent the majority of the . workmen concerned; in other words, the majority\n\nCem::, s~~::;:nies rule on which the appellant's construction of s. 19(6) Ltd. is based is inapplicable in the matter of the reference v. of an Industrial dispute under s. 10 of the Act. Even Their Workmen a minority group of workmen can make a demand -- and thereby raise an industrial dispute which in a Gajendragadkar J. proper case would be referred for adjudication under s. 10. It is true that an award pronounced on such reference would bind all the employees under s. J 8; but logically, if an industrial dispute can be raised by a minority of workmen or by a minority union why should it not be open to a minority of workmen or a minority union to terminate the award which is passed on reference made at their instance? The anomaly to which the learned Attorney-General refers has no practical significance. If the majority of workmen bound by the award desire that the award should continue and needs no modification, they may come to an agreement in that behalf with their employer, and adopt such course as may be permissible under the Act to make such agreement effective.\n\nHowever that may be, we are satisfied that both logic and fairplay would justify the conclusion that it is open to a minority of workmen or a minority union to terminate the award by which they, along with other employees, are bound just as much as it is open to them to raise an industrial dispute under the Act.\n\nThat is the view taken by the industrial tribunal in the present case and we see no reason to differ from it.\n\nIt appears that when this question was argued before the tribunal the appellant strongly relied on rule 83 framed by the Government of Bombay under s. 38 of the Act; and it was urged that the said rule is consistent with the construction sought to be placed by the appellant on s. 19(6). It is conceded that at the relevant time this rule was not in force; and so it is strictly not applicable to the present proceedings.\n\nThat being so, we do not propose to consider the argument based on the said rule and to examine the question as to whether the rule really supports the appellant's construction, and, if yes, whether it would be valid. The question raised before us must obvi-\n\n.....\n\nously be decided on a fair and reasonable construction r960 of s. 19(6) itself, and the rule in question, even if Associated applicable would not be material in that behalf. We Cement companies accordingly hold that, on a fair and reasonable Ltd. construction of s. 19(6), the true position is that, v. though the expression \"any party bound by the Their Workmen award\" refers to all workmen bound by the award, G . d-dk 1 , . h 'd d b . a; en raga ar . notice to termmate t e sa1 awar can e given not by an individual workman but by a group of workmen acting collectively either through their union or otherwise, and it is not necessary that such a group or the union through which it acts should represent the majority of workmen bound by the award.\n\nIn the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nJAMES ANDERSON, ADMINISTRATOR OF\n\nTHE ESTATE OF THE\n\nLATE HENRY GANNON, BOMBAY . . v .\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nBOMBAY\n\n(S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR AND\n\nM. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.)\n\nIncome-tax-Distribution of capital assets-Whether distribution mu.st be in specie-Sale of capital assets by administrator for distribution amongst legatees-Profit on such sales, if amounts to capital gains liable to tax-Income-tax Act, r922 (XI of r922), s. I2B(I), third proviso.\n\nThe appellant was the administrator of the estate of one Henry Gannon, a resident of British India, who left for the\n\n~ United Kingdom in 1944 and died there in 1945 In the course of administration the appellant sold certain shares and securities belonging to the deceased for the purpose of distributing the assets amongst the legatees and thereby realised more than their cost price. The excess of sale price over the cost price was treated by the Income-tax Officer as capital gain under s. 12B\n\nMarch 4", "total_entities": 92, "entities": [{"text": "157\n\nTHE ASSOCIATED CEMENT COMPANIES LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 71, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE ASSOCIATED CEMENT COMPANIES LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THEIR WORKMEN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 77, "end_char": 90, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THEIR WORKMEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. K. SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 116, "end_char": 128, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.K. SARKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 133, "end_char": 153, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Kamdar Mandal Cement Works, Porbandar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 365, "end_char": 402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant's workmen were represented by a Union called Kamdar Mandal Cement Works, Porbandar."}}, {"text": "Cement Kamdar Mandal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 502, "end_char": 522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The registration of the said union was cancelled and that led to the formation of two Unions, the Cement Kamdar Mandal and Cement Employees Union."}}, {"text": "Cement Employees Union", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 527, "end_char": 549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The registration of the said union was cancelled and that led to the formation of two Unions, the Cement Kamdar Mandal and Cement Employees Union."}}, {"text": "Cement\n\nEmployees' Union", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 840, "end_char": 864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second union, the Cement\n\nEmployees' Union which represented the majority of the appellant's workmen at Porbandar had been impleaded in the proceedings."}}, {"text": "Porbandar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 926, "end_char": 935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second union, the Cement\n\nEmployees' Union which represented the majority of the appellant's workmen at Porbandar had been impleaded in the proceedings."}}, {"text": "March 3\n\nI960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2711, "end_char": 2724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus it is open to a minority of workmen or a minority union to terminate\n\nr960\n\nMarch 3\n\nI960 the award by which they, along with other employees, are bound just as much as it is open to them to raise an industrial dispute Associated under the Act."}}, {"text": "M. 0. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3326, "end_char": 3340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. 0."}}, {"text": "R. J.\n\nKolah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3370, "end_char": 3382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, R. J.\n\nKolah, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "S. N. Andley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3384, "end_char": 3396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, R. J.\n\nKolah, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "J. B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3398, "end_char": 3414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, R. J.\n\nKolah, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3416, "end_char": 3430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, R. J.\n\nKolah, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "P. L. Vohra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3435, "end_char": 3446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, R. J.\n\nKolah, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Janardan Sharmii", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3469, "end_char": 3485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Janardan Sharmii, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3570, "end_char": 3584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Gajendragadkar ].", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3589, "end_char": 3603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-Can a registered trade union representing a minority of workmen governed by an award give notice to the other party intimating its intention to terminate the award under s. 19(6) of the Industrial Disputes Act XIV of 194 7 (hereinafter called the Act)?", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "s. 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3778, "end_char": 3786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3794, "end_char": 3817, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4071, "end_char": 4079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Associa.ted Cement Companies Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4398, "end_char": 4434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present appeitl has been brought before this Court by the Associa.ted Cement Companies Limited (hereinafter called the appellant) against their workman (hereinafter called the respondents), and it arises from an industrial dispute between them which was referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal for the State of Saurashtra by the Saurashtra Government under s. 10(1) of the Act."}}, {"text": "Industrial Tribunal for the State of Saurashtra", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4627, "end_char": 4674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present appeitl has been brought before this Court by the Associa.ted Cement Companies Limited (hereinafter called the appellant) against their workman (hereinafter called the respondents), and it arises from an industrial dispute between them which was referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal for the State of Saurashtra by the Saurashtra Government under s. 10(1) of the Act."}}, {"text": "Saurashtra Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4682, "end_char": 4703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present appeitl has been brought before this Court by the Associa.ted Cement Companies Limited (hereinafter called the appellant) against their workman (hereinafter called the respondents), and it arises from an industrial dispute between them which was referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal for the State of Saurashtra by the Saurashtra Government under s. 10(1) of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 10(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4710, "end_char": 4718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 10, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5122, "end_char": 5136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 a preliminary objections, and by its interlocutory judgcemens~;~; anies ment delivered on March 10, 1958, it has found Ltd. against the appellant on all the points."}}, {"text": "s. 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5726, "end_char": 5734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6073, "end_char": 6078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is a limited company and owns and runs a number of cement factories spread ou.t in different States in India as well as in Pakistan."}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6093, "end_char": 6101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is a limited company and owns and runs a number of cement factories spread ou.t in different States in India as well as in Pakistan."}}, {"text": "Saurashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6136, "end_char": 6146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has a factory at Porbandar in Saurashtra."}}, {"text": "Porbandar Cement Works", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6176, "end_char": 6198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The factory is known as the Porbandar Cement Works."}}, {"text": "March 22, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6345, "end_char": 6359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An industrial dispute arose between the appellant and the respondents in 1949 and it was referred for adjudication to the industrial tribunal on March 22, 1949."}}, {"text": "September 13, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6403, "end_char": 6421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This reference ended in an award made on September 13, 1949."}}, {"text": "July 24, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6652, "end_char": 6665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A second award was made on July 24, 1951, by which the earlier award with slight modifications was ordered to continue in operation."}}, {"text": "Kamdar Mandal, Cement Works, Porbandar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6874, "end_char": 6912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the proceedings in respect of both the references the appellant's workmen were represented by their Union called Kamdar Mandal, Cement Works, Porbandar."}}, {"text": "July 2, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6983, "end_char": 6995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the registration of the said u_nion was cancelled on July 2, 1954, and that led to the formation of two unions of the appellant's workmen, the Cement Kamdar Manda!"}}, {"text": "Cement Kamdar Manda", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7073, "end_char": 7092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the registration of the said u_nion was cancelled on July 2, 1954, and that led to the formation of two unions of the appellant's workmen, the Cement Kamdar Manda!"}}, {"text": "July 7, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7125, "end_char": 7137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "whic.h was registered on\n\nz960 July 7, 1954, and the Cement Employees' Union which was registered on September 18, 1954."}}, {"text": "Cement Employees' Union", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7147, "end_char": 7170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "whic.h was registered on\n\nz960 July 7, 1954, and the Cement Employees' Union which was registered on September 18, 1954."}}, {"text": "September 18, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7195, "end_char": 7213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "whic.h was registered on\n\nz960 July 7, 1954, and the Cement Employees' Union which was registered on September 18, 1954."}}, {"text": "September 23, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7327, "end_char": 7345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Associated Th C K d M d 1 h Cement Companies e ement am ar an a gave notice to t e Ltd. appellant's manager on September 23, 1954, purportv."}}, {"text": "December 20, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7569, "end_char": 7586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By Gajendragadkar J. another letter written on December 20, 1954, the same union purported to terminate the second award pronounced on July 24, 1951, in a similar manner."}}, {"text": "November 22, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7697, "end_char": 7714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 22, 1954, the said Manda!"}}, {"text": "s. 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8218, "end_char": 8226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19( 6 )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8495, "end_char": 8505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of Saurashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8691, "end_char": 8715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Efforts at conciliation having failed the conciliation officer made a failure report to the Government of Saurashtra; the Saurashtra Government, however, did not refer the said dispute for adjudication."}}, {"text": "s. 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9249, "end_char": 9257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9602, "end_char": 9608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 18 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9671, "end_char": 9684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9716, "end_char": 9726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11071, "end_char": 11076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11193, "end_char": 11201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11306, "end_char": 11316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 19(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11380, "end_char": 11393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11636, "end_char": 11649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12491, "end_char": 12496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13006, "end_char": 13011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13033, "end_char": 13038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13521, "end_char": 13526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gajendrngadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14423, "end_char": 14437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Their Workmen In construing this provision it would be relevant to remember that an industrial dispute as defined by Gajendrngadkar): s. 2(k) of the Act means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen which is connected with the employment or non-employment, or the terms of employment, or with the conditions of labour of any person.", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14440, "end_char": 14447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15230, "end_char": 15236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16919, "end_char": 16925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We ought to add that this position is fairly conceded by Mr. Sharma for the respondents."}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17321, "end_char": 17326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17402, "end_char": 17410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17638, "end_char": 17646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17745, "end_char": 17753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18394, "end_char": 18402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.C.R. SUPREME COURT B.EPORTS 165", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18575, "end_char": 18608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT B.EPORTS 165\n\nbut, in our opinion, it would be unreasonable to z960 accept this construction and impose the limitation of ."}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19610, "end_char": 19615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19720, "end_char": 19725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20608, "end_char": 20616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21052, "end_char": 21060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21156, "end_char": 21161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21364, "end_char": 21369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22622, "end_char": 22642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that when this question was argued before the tribunal the appellant strongly relied on rule 83 framed by the Government of Bombay under s. 38 of the Act; and it was urged that the said rule is consistent with the construction sought to be placed by the appellant on s. 19(6)."}}, {"text": "s. 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22649, "end_char": 22654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22779, "end_char": 22787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23254, "end_char": 23262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23454, "end_char": 23462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "JAMES ANDERSON", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24024, "end_char": 24038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JAMES ANDERSON, ADMINISTRATOR OF\n\nTHE ESTATE OF THE\n\nLATE HENRY GANNON, BOMBAY . ."}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nBOMBAY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24116, "end_char": 24151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nBOMBAY\n\n(S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR AND\n\nM. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "S. K. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24154, "end_char": 24163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nBOMBAY\n\n(S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR AND\n\nM. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "L. KAPUR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24168, "end_char": 24176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nBOMBAY\n\n(S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR AND\n\nM. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24182, "end_char": 24197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nBOMBAY\n\n(S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR AND\n\nM. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24425, "end_char": 24439, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Henry Gannon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24544, "end_char": 24556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was the administrator of the estate of one Henry Gannon, a resident of British India, who left for the\n\n~ United Kingdom in 1944 and died there in 1945 In the course of administration the appellant sold certain shares and securities belonging to the deceased for the purpose of distributing the assets amongst the legatees and thereby realised more than their cost price."}}, {"text": "British India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24572, "end_char": 24585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was the administrator of the estate of one Henry Gannon, a resident of British India, who left for the\n\n~ United Kingdom in 1944 and died there in 1945 In the course of administration the appellant sold certain shares and securities belonging to the deceased for the purpose of distributing the assets amongst the legatees and thereby realised more than their cost price."}}, {"text": "United Kingdom", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24607, "end_char": 24621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was the administrator of the estate of one Henry Gannon, a resident of British India, who left for the\n\n~ United Kingdom in 1944 and died there in 1945 In the course of administration the appellant sold certain shares and securities belonging to the deceased for the purpose of distributing the assets amongst the legatees and thereby realised more than their cost price."}}, {"text": "s. 12B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24978, "end_char": 24984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_167_177_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 167\n\nously be decided on a fair and reasonable construction r960 of s. 19(6) itself, and the rule in question, even if Associated applicable would not be material in that behalf. We Cement companies accordingly hold that, on a fair and reasonable Ltd. construction of s. 19(6), the true position is that, v. though the expression \"any party bound by the Their Workmen award\" refers to all workmen bound by the award, G . d-dk 1 , . h 'd d b . a; en raga ar . notice to termmate t e sa1 awar can e given not by an individual workman but by a group of workmen acting collectively either through their union or otherwise, and it is not necessary that such a group or the union through which it acts should represent the majority of workmen bound by the award.\n\nIn the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nJAMES ANDERSON, ADMINISTRATOR OF\n\nTHE ESTATE OF THE\n\nLATE HENRY GANNON, BOMBAY . . v .\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nBOMBAY\n\n(S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR AND\n\nM. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.)\n\nIncome-tax-Distribution of capital assets-Whether distribution mu.st be in specie-Sale of capital assets by administrator for distribution amongst legatees-Profit on such sales, if amounts to capital gains liable to tax-Income-tax Act, r922 (XI of r922), s. I2B(I), third proviso.\n\nThe appellant was the administrator of the estate of one Henry Gannon, a resident of British India, who left for the\n\n~ United Kingdom in 1944 and died there in 1945 In the course of administration the appellant sold certain shares and securities belonging to the deceased for the purpose of distributing the assets amongst the legatees and thereby realised more than their cost price. The excess of sale price over the cost price was treated by the Income-tax Officer as capital gain under s. 12B\n\nMarch 4\n\n•960 of the Income-tax Act and the appellant was assessed to tax on such capital gain for the assessment years r947-48 and r948-49 . .fames Anderson The appellant contended that there had been a distribution of v. capital assets by him under the will of Henry Gannon and there- Commissioner of fore he came under the protection of the third proviso to s. r2B(r) Inc:ime-tax, Bombay and was not liable to tax.\n\nHeid, that the appellant was not protected by the third proviso to s. 12B(1) as the expression \"distribution of capital assets\" in that proviso meant distribution in specie and not distribution of sale proceeds of the capital assets. So long as there was distribution of the capital assets in specie and there was no sale, there was no transfer for the purposes of s. r2B, but as soon as there was a sale of the capital assets and profits or gains arose therefrom, the liability to tax also arose, whether the sale was by the administrator or by the legatee.\n\nSri Kannan Rice Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras, (r954) 26 I.T.R. 35r; Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay North v. Walji Damji, (r955) 28 I.T.R. 9r4 and Gowri Tile Works v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras, (r957) 3r I.T.R. 250, referred to.\n\nCrvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 335 ofl956.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 25, 1954, of the Bombay High Court in Income-tax Reference No. l of 1954.\n\nN. A. Palkhivala, S. N. Andley, and J. B. Dadachanji, for the appellant.\n\nK. N. Rajagopal Sastri and D. Gupta, for the respondent.\n\n1960. March, 4. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by s. K. Das J.\n\nS. K. DAS, J.-This appeal by special leave is from the decision of the Bombay High Court dated August 25,\n\n1954', in Income-tax Reference No. 1 of 1954. The only question which falls for decision in the appeal is the true scope and effect of the third proviso to old S. 12B(l) of the Indian Income Tax Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act.\n\nThe facts relevant to the appeal are these : one Henry Gannon was a resident of British India, who used to be assessed to income-tax under the Incometax law of this country. He left India in 1944 for the United Kingdom where he died on May 13, 1945. He left a will dated November 18, 1942 by which the National Bank of India Ltd., in London was appointed Executor of his estate. Ou October 1, 1945, probate\n\n~- ....\n\n...\n\n·-..\n\n. ,,\n\nof the will was granted to the said Bank by 'a Court z96o of competent jurisdiction in the United Kingdom. 1 A d On October 25, 1945, a power of attorney was given am•s v n erson by the Bank to James Anderson, who is now the commis; ioner of appellant before us. He made an application to the Ino.-ta,,, Bombay High Court of Bombay under s. 241 of the Indian Succession Act and on that application obtained s. K. Das J.\n\nLetters of Administration with a copy of the will annexed. In the course of administration of the estate of Henry Gannon, the appellant sold certain shares and securities belonging' to the deceased for the purpose of distributing the assets amongst the legatees.\n\nThe sale of these shares and securities realised more than their cost Pl'.ioe. The excess of the sale price over the cost price was treated by the Income Tax Officer as capital gain under s. 12B of the Income Tax Act. For the assessment year 1947-48 the capital gain was computed by the Income Tax Officer at Rs. 20,13,738 and for the assessment year 1948-49 at Rs. 1,51,963. These amounts of capital gain were brought to tax for the assessment year 194 7-48 and 1948-49 along with certain dividend and interest inc@me which had accrued or had been received in the relevant years of account. Not satisfied with these assessments, the appellant preferred two appeals to the Appellate Tribunal, Bombay. These two appeals were consolidated. -The appellant urged three points in support of his contention that the assessments were invalid: firstly, that s. 12B imposing a tax on capital gains was ultra vires the Government of India Act, 1935; secondly, that under s. 24B of the Act, the appellant was only liable to pay tax which the testator would have been liable to pay and as these capital assets were not sold by the testator, there was no liability upon the appellant: and thirdly, that the sale of the shares and securities by the appellant under the will of Henry Gannon came within the purview of the third proviso to s. 12B(l) and, therefore, was not to be treated as a sale of capital assets under s. 12B(l).\n\nThe Appellate Tribunal repelled the first two contentions, but accepted the third as correct and in that view allowed the two appeals in part. It directed the Income Tax Officer to delete from the assessed income\n\nz96o the capital gains made by the sale of shares and\n\nA , securities. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay ames nr.i.erson C\" . v. 1ty, then moved the Appellate Tribunal to refer to Commissioner of the High Court of Bombay the question which arose Inc.-tax, Bombay out of the third contention, naely, tbe true scope and effect of the third proviso t, o old s. 12B(l) of the 5 K. Das J, Act.\n\nThe Appellate Tribunal thereupon referred the following question of law to the Bombay High Court:\n\n\"Whether the sale of the shares and securities by the administrator of the estate of late Mr. Gannon is not a sale for the• purpose of Section 12B(l) in view of the third proviso to section 12B(l) of the Indian Income Tax Act.\" At the instance of the assessee the other two questions which were decided against him were also referred to the High Court. The High Court of Bombay considered all the three questions in Income-tax Reference No. 1 of 1954 and by its decision appealed from answered all the three questions against the assessee. The appellant then moved this Court for special leave which \"was granted on October 7, 1955.\n\nThe question whether the levy of capital gains under section 12B is ultra vires no longer survives by reason of the decision of this Court in N avinchandra M afatlal v. Commissioner of Income-tax(').\n\nThis question was not therefore pressed before. us. The question under s. 24B was also not seriously pressed. The view of the Bombay High Court that s. 24B does not limit the liability of the Administrator or Executor to the cases referred to under that section is correct; because the appellant is as much an assessee under the Act as any other individual and ifhe makes capital gains, he is as much liable to pay tax as any other individual. This position has not been seriously contested before us. We are, therefore, left only with the question which turns on the true scope and effect of the third proviso to old s. 12B(l) of the Act. Capital gains were charged for the first time by the Income-tax and Excess Profits Tax (Amendment) Act, 1947, which inserted s. 12B in the Act. It taxed capital gains arising after March 31,\n\n1946. The levy was virtually abolished by the Indian\n\n(I) [1954) 26 I.T.R. 758; [1955) 1. S.C.R. 829.\n\n...\n\n.... -,-Jo\n\nFinance Act, 1949, which confined the operation of\n\nI960 the ection to ?pital ains arising before pril l, 1948; James Anderson but it was revived with effect from April 1, 1957, by v.. the Finance {No. 3) Act, 1956, which substituted the Co111missione1 of present 3ection. We are concerned in this appeal Ino.-tax, Bo111baJ. with the old section. That section, leaving out those parts which are not relevant for our purposes, ran as S.K Das f .. follows:\n\n\"S. 12B Capital gains-(1) The tax shall be payable by an assessee under the head \"capital gains\" in respect of any profits or gains arising from the sale, exchange or transfer of a capital asset effected after the 31st day of March, 1946, and. before the 1st day of April, 1948; and such profits and gains shall be deemed to be income of the previous year in which the sale, exchange or transfer took place: ' ..................................................................................\n\n. Provided further that any transfer of capital assets by reason of the compulsory acquisition thereof under any law for the time being in force relating to the compulsory acquisition of property for public purposes or any distribution of capital assets, on the total or partial partition of a Hindu undivided family, or on the dissolution of a firm or other association of persons, or on the liquidation of a company, or under a deed of gift, bequest, will OT transfer on irrevocable trust shall not, for the purposes of this section, be treated as sale, ex9hange or transfer of the capital assets:\n\n(2) The amount of a capital gain shall be computed after making the following deductions from the full values of the consideration for which the sale, exchange or transfer of the capital asset is made, namely:-\n\n(i) expenditure incurred solely in connection with such sale, exchange or transfer;\n\n(ii) the actual cost to the assessee of the capita 1 asset, including any expenditure of a capital nature incurred and borne by him in making any additions or altera.tiop.s thereto but excluding any expenditure\n\nJames Anderson v.\n\nCommissioner of ln&.-tax, Bombay\n\nS. K. Das].\n\n172 SUPRElVIE COURT REPORTS [1960]\n\nin respect of which any allowance is admissible under any provisions of sections 8, 9, 10 and 12.\n\n(3) Where any capital asset became the property of the assessee by succession, inheritance or devolution or under any of the circumstances referred to in the third proviso to sub-section (1), its actual cost allowable to him for the purposes of this section shall be its actual cost to the previous owner thereof and the provisions of sub-section (2) shall apply accordingly ; and where the actual cost to the previous owner cannot be ascertained, the fair market value at the date on which the capital asset became the property of the previous owner shall be deemed to be the actual cost thereof. \" \"Capital asset\" is defined in s. 2(4A) of the Act, and it was not disputed before us that the shares and securities which the appellant sold constituted capital asset within the meaning of that definition. We may shortly state here the scheme of sub-ss. (1), (2) and (3) of s. 12B of the Act. Sub-section (1) is the substantive provision which levies a tax in respect of profits or gains arising from the sale, exchange or transfer of a capital asset effected during a specified period. The admitted position in this case is that the appellant sold the shares and securities, which constituted capital asset, within that period and thus clearly came within sub-s. (1) of s.12B. Sub-s. (2) states how the amount of capital gain shall be computed, and it allows certain deductions from the full value of the consideration for which the sale, exchange or transfer of capital assets is made. As nothing turns upon the deductions allowed under sub-s. (2), we need not refer to them. Sub-section (3) refers to a capital asset which became the property of the assessee by succession, inheritance or devolution or under any of the circumstances referred to in the third proviso to sub-s. (1), and states what deductions the assessee is then entitled to. In one case, the assessee may be the administrator or executor who has himself sold the capital\n\n\\ J\n\n. .,\n\n...\n\nassets ; in another case the assessee may be the person r960 who has got the capital assets by succession etc. or - under any of the circumstances referred to in the Jams Anderson third proviso to sub-s. (1), and if in the latter case the Commi;; ioner of assessee sells the capital assets, he brings himselfwith- Inc.-tax, Bombay in sub-s. (1) but is entitled to a deduction of the actual cost to the previous owner in accordance with the s. K. Das J. provisions of sub-s. (2); where, however, the actual cost to the previous owner cannot be determined, he is entitled to a deduction of the fair market value at\n\nthe date on which the capital assets became the property of the previous owner. This in effect is the scheme of the three sub-sections. Manifestly, the intention of the legislature is to tax the profits made by the sale, exchange or transfer of capital assets and . the incidence of the taxation falls at the time of the transfer. If the sale is made by the administrator or executor, the liability under sub-s. (1) falls on him; if, however, the sale is made by a person who got the capitalassets inter alia in any of the ways mentioned in sub-s. (3), he becomes liable to tax as and when he sells the capital assets and makes profits therefrom. Now, the question is what bearing the third proviso to sub-s. (1) has on the aforesaid scheme.\n\nThis proviso states in effect that under certain circumstances mentioned therein a transfer of capital assets shall not be treated as a. transfer for the purposes of the section. The circumstances enumerated are: (a) compulsory acquisition of property for public purposes, (b) distribution of oapital assets on the total or partial partition of a Hindu undivided family, (o) distribution of capital assets on the dissolution of a firm or other association of persons, or on the liqaidation of a company, and (d) distribution of capital assets under a deed of gift,. bequest, will or transfer on irrevocable trust. In the present case we are concerned with the question whether there has been a distribution of capital assets by the appellant under a will so as to bring him within the ambit of the third proviso. If the appellant comes within that ambit, then th_e sales which he made of the shares and securities will not be treated as transfer within the meaning of sub-s. (1).\n\nThe contention of the appellant\n\nr96o is that there has been a distribution of capital assets by him under the \"Viii of Henry Gannon and therefore James Anderson h d h v. e comes un er t e protection of the third proviso.\n\nCommissioner of The High Court took the view that the expression Ino..tax, Bombay \"distribution of capital assets\" in the third proviso can only mean such distribution in specie; it cannot s. K. Das J. and does not mean distribution of the sale proceeds of the capital assets. The High Court, therefore, held that the appellant did not come within the protection of the third proviso, as he did not distribute the ca pita! assets in specie.\n\nOn behalf of the appellant it has been contended before us that the High Court came to an erroneous conclusion with regard to the scope and effect of the third proviso. Mr. N. A. Palkhivala who has argued the case on behalf of the appellant has put his argument in the following way. He has submitted that normally the purpose of a proviso is to carve out an exception from the substantive provision. Sub-section\n\n(1) of s. 12B, which is the substantive provision, imposes the liability to tax on an assessee in respect of profits or gains arising from the sale, exchange or transfer of a capital asset. Leaving out the case of compulsory acquisition of property for public purposes which may result in capital gains, Mr. Palkhivala has submitted that the other cases earlier .enumerated as (b), (c) and (d) in the proviso caµnot result in any capital gains by a mere distribution in specie ; because on a distribution in specie upon a partition or upon a testamentary gift or gift inter vivos, no capital gain can possibly be made by the person who owned the assets before the distribution and who alone can be liable to tax under the section. If, therefore, the correct interpretation of the third proviso is distribution of ca pita! assets in specie, the proviso.'. does not serve any -purpose.\n\nTherefore, Mr. Palkhivala has argued that the expression \" distribution of ca pita! assets \" must be given a meaning which will fulfil a purpose and correlate the proviso to the substantive provision in sub-s. (1).\n\nThat meaning, according to him, is distribution of sale proceeds of capital assets.\n\nWe are unable to accept the argument as correct.\n\nFirstly, having regard to the definition of the expres-\n\n• y\n\n..... .\n\nsion \"capital assets\" it would be wrong to read\n\nI960 \"distribution of eapital asset~\" as meaning \"ditribu~ James Anderson tion of sale proceeds of capital assets\". Obv10usly, v. there is a clear and vjtal distinction between \"capi- Commissioner of tal assets\" and their \"sale proceeds\". If capital Inc.-tax, Bombay assets are sold first and a distr:ibution of the sale proceeds is made afterwards, then the sale precedes diss. K. Das .I tribution and what is distl'ibuted is not capital assets but the sale proceeds thereof. Secondly, we do not agree that the third proviso serves no purpose if the expression \"distribution of capital assets\" is given its o natural and plain meaning, viz. distribution in specie.\n\nThe High Court expressed the view that by the proviso the legislature might have intended to protect an assessee from a possible argument by the Revenue that when (to take an example appropriate to the case) an executor or administrator transferred the -estate or part of the estate to the person entitled to it, there was a transfer within the meaning of sub-s. (1) of s. 12B. To us it seems that the purpose of the proviso is abundantly clear ifthe scheme of sub-ss. (1),\n\n(2) and (3) is kept in mind. Assume that there is a distribution of capital assets in specie amongst the legatees, and one of the legatees sells the capital assets which he got in one of the ways mentioned in the third proviso ; he at once becomes liable to tax on the profits made on the sale. Sub-section (3) makes that position clear and if the proviso is read in the context of the substantive provisions o~ s. 12B its purpose is quite clear. The purpose is this: aB long as there is distributfon of the capital assets in specie and no sale, there is no transfer for the purposes of the section ; but as soon as there is a sale of the capital assets and profits or gains arise therefrom, the liability to tax arises, whether the sale be by the administrator or the legatee. It is significant that the proviso uses the words \" for the purposes of this section \" . and not merely sub-s. (1). Indeed, Mr. Palkhivala was forced to concede that in view of the provisions of sub-s. (3) of s. 12B, the expression \"distribution of capital assets\" must also mean distribution in specie because under sub-s. (3) it is the capital asset which becomes the property of the assessee under any of the circumz960 stances mentio11ed in the third proviso. He then contended that the expression meant both distribution James Anderson in specie and distribution of sale proceeds.\n\nWe do\n\nC .v\". ' not see why an unnatural or forced meauing should ommissioner o1 b . h . h b . . h lno.-tax. Bombay e gtven to t e expression, w en y g1vmg t e expres- - sion its plain and natural meaning the third proviso s. K. Das J. fits in with the scheme of sub-ss. (1), (2) and (3) of s. 12B of the Act. It is necessary to point out here that on the interpretation sought to be placed on the third proviso on behalf of the appellant, the adminiso trator will escape paying tax if he sells the capital assets; but the legatee will not escape if he sells the capital assets after having received them in specie from the administrator. This is an anomaly which is against the scheme of s. 12B of the Act.\n\nWe are accordingly of the view that the High Court rightly held that the expression \"distribution of capital assets\" in the third 11roviso to sub-s. (1) of s. 12B of the Act means distribution in specie and not distribution of sale proceeds.\n\nIn the High Court an alternative argument was also presented on behalf of the assessee to the effect that the third proviso contemplated involuntary transfers.\n\nThis argument was based on the use of the expression ' by reason of' in the proviso, and the proviso was soughtto be read as follows (omitting words not relevant to the case) :\n\n\"Provided further that any transfer of capital assets by reason of any distribution of capital assets under a ........................................ will .............. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . shall not for the purposes of this . section be treated as sale, exchange or transfer of the capital assets.\" The argument was that inasmuch as the administrator sold the shares and securities for the purpose of distributing the sale proceeds to the legatees, the sale was involuntary and was necessitated ' by reason of' the terms of the will; therefore, he was protected under the third proviso. The High Court repelled this argument and for good reasons. Firstly, the question whether the sale was voluntary or involuntary is not germane to the scheme of section 12B.\n\nSecondly, on a proper reading of the proviso, the\n\n.... 4 - expression 'by reason of' goes with the clause relatz96o ing to compulsory acquisition of property and not James Anderson with the distribution of capital assets.\n\nThe position seems to us to be so clear that it is un- Commi';; ioner of necessary to labour it or to refer to decided cases. Inc.-tax, Bombay Such decisions of the High Courts as have been -- brought to our notice are all one way and they take s. K. Das J. the same view as was taken by the High Gourt in the decision.under appeal (see Sri Kannan Rir, e Mills Ltd.\n\nv. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras (1); Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay North v. Walji Damji (2); and Gowri Tile Works v. Commissioner of income-tax, Madras (3).\n\nFor the reasons given above, we see no merit in the appeal and we dismiss it with costs.\n\nAppea:l dismissed.\n\nTHE PARBHANI TRANSPORT CO-OPERATIVE\n\nSOCIETY LTD.\n\nTHE REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY,\n\nAURANGABAD AND OTHERS\n\n(B. P. SINHA, c. J., JAFER IMAM, A. K. SARKAR,\n\nK. N. W ANCHOO AND J. 0. SHAH, JJ.)\n\nMotor Vehicles-Grant of stage carriage permit to Government under Ch. IV-Constitutional validity--Motor Vehicles Act, I939 (4 of I9J9), as amended by Act IOO of I956, ch. IV. ss. 42, 47, ch, IV A, s. 68F(I)-Constitution of India, Arts. I9(L)(g), I4.\n\nThe petitioner, a registered co-operative societ; r, carrying on the business of plying motor buses as stage carriages, had permits for four routes which were due to expire. The State applied for permits for all these routes under Ch. IV of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as amended by Act roo of 1956, and the petitioner applied for renewal of its own permits. The Regional Transport Authority rejected the petitioner's applications and granted those of the State. The petitioner's appeal to the State Transport Authority was rejected. But the High Court quashed the said orders under Art. 226 and directed a\n\n(I) [1954] 26 I.T.R. 3.~I.\n\n(.?) (1955] 28 I.T.R. 914.\n\n(3) [I9,57] 3I I. T.R. 250. 2J\n\nz960\n\nMatch 7", "total_entities": 86, "entities": [{"text": "s. 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 299, "end_char": 307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "JAMES ANDERSON, ADMINISTRATOR OF\n\nTHE ESTATE OF THE\n\nLATE HENRY GANNON, BOMBAY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 869, "end_char": 947, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JAMES ANDERSON, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE HENRY GANNON, BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nBOMBAY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 957, "end_char": 996, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. K. DAS, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 999, "end_char": 1012, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. K. DAS, J.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "L. KAPUR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1013, "end_char": 1021, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.L. KAPUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1027, "end_char": 1047, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1270, "end_char": 1284, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Henry Gannon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1389, "end_char": 1401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was the administrator of the estate of one Henry Gannon, a resident of British India, who left for the\n\n~ United Kingdom in 1944 and died there in 1945 In the course of administration the appellant sold certain shares and securities belonging to the deceased for the purpose of distributing the assets amongst the legatees and thereby realised more than their cost price."}}, {"text": "s. 12B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1823, "end_char": 1829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1852, "end_char": 1866, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 12B(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2317, "end_char": 2326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CrvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3072, "end_char": 3100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CrvIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "N. A. Palkhivala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3272, "end_char": 3288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. A. Palkhivala, S. N. Andley, and J. B. Dadachanji, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. N. Andley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3290, "end_char": 3302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. A. Palkhivala, S. N. Andley, and J. B. Dadachanji, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "J. B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3308, "end_char": 3324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. A. Palkhivala, S. N. Andley, and J. B. Dadachanji, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3346, "end_char": 3368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and D. Gupta, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "D. Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3373, "end_char": 3381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and D. Gupta, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "s. K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3463, "end_char": 3472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by s. K. Das J.\n\nS. K. DAS, J.-This appeal by special leave is from the decision of the Bombay High Court dated August 25,\n\n1954', in Income-tax Reference No.", "canonical_name": "S. K. DAS, J."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3548, "end_char": 3565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by s. K. Das J.\n\nS. K. DAS, J.-This appeal by special leave is from the decision of the Bombay High Court dated August 25,\n\n1954', in Income-tax Reference No."}}, {"text": "S. 12B(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3744, "end_char": 3753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "British India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3901, "end_char": 3914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts relevant to the appeal are these : one Henry Gannon was a resident of British India, who used to be assessed to income-tax under the Incometax law of this country."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4003, "end_char": 4008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He left India in 1944 for the United Kingdom where he died on May 13, 1945."}}, {"text": "United Kingdom", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4025, "end_char": 4039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He left India in 1944 for the United Kingdom where he died on May 13, 1945."}}, {"text": "May 13, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4057, "end_char": 4069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He left India in 1944 for the United Kingdom where he died on May 13, 1945."}}, {"text": "National Bank of India Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4123, "end_char": 4150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He left a will dated November 18, 1942 by which the National Bank of India Ltd., in London was appointed Executor of his estate."}}, {"text": "London", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4155, "end_char": 4161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He left a will dated November 18, 1942 by which the National Bank of India Ltd., in London was appointed Executor of his estate."}}, {"text": "October 25, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4371, "end_char": 4387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 A d On October 25, 1945, a power of attorney was given am•s v n erson by the Bank to James Anderson, who is now the commis; ioner of appellant before us."}}, {"text": "James Anderson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4449, "end_char": 4463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 A d On October 25, 1945, a power of attorney was given am•s v n erson by the Bank to James Anderson, who is now the commis; ioner of appellant before us.", "canonical_name": "James Anderson"}}, {"text": "s. 241", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4593, "end_char": 4599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4607, "end_char": 4628, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 12B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5128, "end_char": 5134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Appellate Tribunal, Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5613, "end_char": 5639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Not satisfied with these assessments, the appellant preferred two appeals to the Appellate Tribunal, Bombay."}}, {"text": "s. 12B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5790, "end_char": 5796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5849, "end_char": 5878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 24B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5901, "end_char": 5907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 12B(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6264, "end_char": 6273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 12B(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6346, "end_char": 6355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6647, "end_char": 6681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay ames nr.i.erson C\" ."}}, {"text": "s. 12B(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6932, "end_char": 6941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gannon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7160, "end_char": 7166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appellate Tribunal thereupon referred the following question of law to the Bombay High Court:\n\n\"Whether the sale of the shares and securities by the administrator of the estate of late Mr. Gannon is not a sale for the• purpose of Section 12B(l) in view of the third proviso to section 12B(l) of the Indian Income Tax Act.\""}}, {"text": "Section 12B(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7201, "end_char": 7215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12B(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7248, "end_char": 7262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7423, "end_char": 7443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Bombay considered all the three questions in Income-tax Reference No."}}, {"text": "October 7, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7682, "end_char": 7697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant then moved this Court for special leave which \"was granted on October 7, 1955."}}, {"text": "section 12B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7753, "end_char": 7764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7972, "end_char": 7978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8050, "end_char": 8056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12B(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8519, "end_char": 8528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8666, "end_char": 8672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 31,\n\n1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8722, "end_char": 8737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It taxed capital gains arising after March 31,\n\n1946."}}, {"text": "Finance Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8853, "end_char": 8870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S.K Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9286, "end_char": 9293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That section, leaving out those parts which are not relevant for our purposes, ran as S.K Das f .. follows:\n\n\"S. 12B Capital gains-(1) The tax shall be payable by an assessee under the head \"capital gains\" in respect of any profits or gains arising from the sale, exchange or transfer of a capital asset effected after the 31st day of March, 1946, and.", "canonical_name": "S. K. DAS, J."}}, {"text": "S. 12B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9310, "end_char": 9316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jo\n\nFinance Act, 1949", "statute": "Jo\n\nFinance Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "31st day of March, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9523, "end_char": 9546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That section, leaving out those parts which are not relevant for our purposes, ran as S.K Das f .. follows:\n\n\"S. 12B Capital gains-(1) The tax shall be payable by an assessee under the head \"capital gains\" in respect of any profits or gains arising from the sale, exchange or transfer of a capital asset effected after the 31st day of March, 1946, and."}}, {"text": "1st day of April, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9564, "end_char": 9586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "before the 1st day of April, 1948; and such profits and gains shall be deemed to be income of the previous year in which the sale, exchange or transfer took place: ' ..................................................................................\n\n."}}, {"text": "sections 8, 9, 10 and 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11087, "end_char": 11111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(4A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11744, "end_char": 11752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11988, "end_char": 11994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.12B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12385, "end_char": 12390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jams Anderson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13239, "end_char": 13252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "or - under any of the circumstances referred to in the Jams Anderson third proviso to sub-s. (1), and if in the latter case the Commi;; ioner of assessee sells the capital assets, he brings himselfwith- Inc.-tax, Bombay in sub-s. (1) but is entitled to a deduction of the actual cost to the previous owner in accordance with the s. K. Das J. provisions of sub-s. (2); where, however, the actual cost to the previous owner cannot be determined, he is entitled to a deduction of the fair market value at\n\nthe date on which the capital assets became the property of the previous owner.", "canonical_name": "James Anderson"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13397, "end_char": 13403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "or - under any of the circumstances referred to in the Jams Anderson third proviso to sub-s. (1), and if in the latter case the Commi;; ioner of assessee sells the capital assets, he brings himselfwith- Inc.-tax, Bombay in sub-s. (1) but is entitled to a deduction of the actual cost to the previous owner in accordance with the s. K. Das J. provisions of sub-s. (2); where, however, the actual cost to the previous owner cannot be determined, he is entitled to a deduction of the fair market value at\n\nthe date on which the capital assets became the property of the previous owner."}}, {"text": "K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15826, "end_char": 15832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Commissioner of The High Court took the view that the expression Ino..tax, Bombay \"distribution of capital assets\" in the third proviso can only mean such distribution in specie; it cannot s. K. Das J. and does not mean distribution of the sale proceeds of the capital assets."}}, {"text": "s. 12B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16497, "end_char": 16503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Palkhivala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16798, "end_char": 16808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Leaving out the case of compulsory acquisition of property for public purposes which may result in capital gains, Mr. Palkhivala has submitted that the other cases earlier .enumerated as (b), (c) and (d) in the proviso caµnot result in any capital gains by a mere distribution in specie ; because on a distribution in specie upon a partition or upon a testamentary gift or gift inter vivos, no capital gain can possibly be made by the person who owned the assets before the distribution and who alone can be liable to tax under the section."}}, {"text": "s. 12B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18883, "end_char": 18889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19400, "end_char": 19406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19975, "end_char": 19981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20644, "end_char": 20650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21042, "end_char": 21048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21218, "end_char": 21224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22422, "end_char": 22433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kannan Rir", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23001, "end_char": 23011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Inc.-tax, Bombay Such decisions of the High Courts as have been -- brought to our notice are all one way and they take s. K. Das J. the same view as was taken by the High Gourt in the decision.under appeal (see Sri Kannan Rir, e Mills Ltd.\n\nv. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras (1); Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay North v. Walji Damji (2); and Gowri Tile Works v. Commissioner of income-tax, Madras (3)."}}, {"text": "PARBHANI TRANSPORT CO-OPERATIVE\n\nSOCIETY LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23310, "end_char": 23354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE PARBHANI TRANSPORT CO-OPERATIVE\n\nSOCIETY LTD."}}, {"text": "REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY,\n\nAURANGABAD AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23361, "end_char": 23413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY,\n\nAURANGABAD AND OTHERS\n\n(B. P. SINHA, c. J., JAFER IMAM, A. K. SARKAR,\n\nK. N. W ANCHOO AND J. 0."}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23416, "end_char": 23427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY,\n\nAURANGABAD AND OTHERS\n\n(B. P. SINHA, c. J., JAFER IMAM, A. K. SARKAR,\n\nK. N. W ANCHOO AND J. 0."}}, {"text": "JAFER IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23436, "end_char": 23446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY,\n\nAURANGABAD AND OTHERS\n\n(B. P. SINHA, c. J., JAFER IMAM, A. K. SARKAR,\n\nK. N. W ANCHOO AND J. 0."}}, {"text": "A. K. SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23448, "end_char": 23460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY,\n\nAURANGABAD AND OTHERS\n\n(B. P. SINHA, c. J., JAFER IMAM, A. K. SARKAR,\n\nK. N. W ANCHOO AND J. 0."}}, {"text": "K. N. W ANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23463, "end_char": 23477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY,\n\nAURANGABAD AND OTHERS\n\n(B. P. SINHA, c. J., JAFER IMAM, A. K. SARKAR,\n\nK. N. W ANCHOO AND J. 0."}}, {"text": "0. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23485, "end_char": 23492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY,\n\nAURANGABAD AND OTHERS\n\n(B. P. SINHA, c. J., JAFER IMAM, A. K. SARKAR,\n\nK. N. W ANCHOO AND J. 0."}}, {"text": "IV-Constitutional validity--Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23570, "end_char": 23616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 42, 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23675, "end_char": 23685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IV-Constitutional validity--Motor Vehicles Act", "statute": "IV-Constitutional validity--Motor Vehicles Act"}}, {"text": "s. 68F(I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23697, "end_char": 23706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IV-Constitutional validity--Motor Vehicles Act", "statute": "IV-Constitutional validity--Motor Vehicles Act"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23707, "end_char": 23728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "IV of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23986, "end_char": 24020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24336, "end_char": 24344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IV of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "IV of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_177_189_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "3 S.O.R.- SUPREME COURT REPORTS 177\n\n.... 4 - expression 'by reason of' goes with the clause relatz96o ing to compulsory acquisition of property and not James Anderson with the distribution of capital assets.\n\nThe position seems to us to be so clear that it is un- Commi';; ioner of necessary to labour it or to refer to decided cases. Inc.-tax, Bombay Such decisions of the High Courts as have been -- brought to our notice are all one way and they take s. K. Das J. the same view as was taken by the High Gourt in the decision.under appeal (see Sri Kannan Rir, e Mills Ltd.\n\nv. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras (1); Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay North v. Walji Damji (2); and Gowri Tile Works v. Commissioner of income-tax, Madras (3).\n\nFor the reasons given above, we see no merit in the appeal and we dismiss it with costs.\n\nAppea:l dismissed.\n\nTHE PARBHANI TRANSPORT CO-OPERATIVE\n\nSOCIETY LTD.\n\nTHE REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY,\n\nAURANGABAD AND OTHERS\n\n(B. P. SINHA, c. J., JAFER IMAM, A. K. SARKAR,\n\nK. N. W ANCHOO AND J. 0. SHAH, JJ.)\n\nMotor Vehicles-Grant of stage carriage permit to Government under Ch. IV-Constitutional validity--Motor Vehicles Act, I939 (4 of I9J9), as amended by Act IOO of I956, ch. IV. ss. 42, 47, ch, IV A, s. 68F(I)-Constitution of India, Arts. I9(L)(g), I4.\n\nThe petitioner, a registered co-operative societ; r, carrying on the business of plying motor buses as stage carriages, had permits for four routes which were due to expire. The State applied for permits for all these routes under Ch. IV of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as amended by Act roo of 1956, and the petitioner applied for renewal of its own permits. The Regional Transport Authority rejected the petitioner's applications and granted those of the State. The petitioner's appeal to the State Transport Authority was rejected. But the High Court quashed the said orders under Art. 226 and directed a\n\n(I) [1954] 26 I.T.R. 3.~I.\n\n(.?) (1955] 28 I.T.R. 914.\n\n(3) [I9,57] 3I I. T.R. 250. 2J\n\nz960\n\nMatch 7\n\nz960 reconsideration of the matter. The State published a scheme under s. 68C, Ch. IV A, of the Act. The scheme was not however Pat; bhani Transpo1t finalised. Thereafter the Regional Transport Authority, purpor- Co-op. ting to reconsider the matter as directed by the High Court, Society Ltd. rejected the petitioner's applications for rene\\val and granted v. those of the State for permits. It was contended on behalf of\n\nR. T. A. the petitioner that in view of Ch. IV A of the Act, the State had Aurangabad no right to apply for pern1its except thereunder and the grant of permits on applieations made under Ch. IV was, therefore, illegal and infringed the petitioner's fundamental rihts under Ans. rg(r)(g) of the Constitution. It was further contended that the order violated Art. r4 as well.\n\nHeld, that both the contentions were without substance and must fail. ' The Motor Vehicles Act, r939, as amended by Act roo of r956, Jays down two independent sets of provisions relating to running of buses by the Government, one under Ch. IV and the other Ch. IV A of the Act. The latter chapter by s. 68F(r) confers a special advantage on the Government when it proceeds under that chapter and entitles it to the necessary permits as a matter of right.\n\nUnder Ch. IV of the Act, however, the Government cannot claim any such advantage. It has to compete with other applicants. The powers conferred by the two chapters being thus not one but two different powers, the principle enunciated in Nazir Ahmad's case has no application.\n\nSince, therefore, the Government had a distinct right to apply for permits under Ch. IV of the Act, no question of applying for permits without the right to do so and thereby infringing the petitioner's fundamental right under Art. r9(r)(g) could arise.\n\nNazir Ahmad v. King Emperor, (r936) L.R. 63 I.A. 372, held inapplicable.\n\nTaylor v, Taylor, (r876) r Ch. D. 426, distinguished.\n\nNor could the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alter£us be ()f any help to the petitioner. That maxim has its utility in ascertaining the intention of the legislature. Since s. 42(3)(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act leaves no manner of doubt as to that intention by its clear indication that the Government cannot run buses as a commercial enterprise without first obtaining permits under s. 42(r) of the Act, that maxim cannot operate so as to imply a prohibition against applying under Ch. IV of the Act.\n\nThere was therefore, no reason for holding that Ch. IV A of the Act contained the only provision under which the Government could be allowed to ply stage carriages.\n\nViscountess Rhondda's claim, (r922) 2 A.C. 339 and Motilal v.\n\nGovernment of Uttar Pradesh, (r955) r I.L.R. AIL 269, considered.\n\nIt was not correct to say that the State was not intended to compete with private citizens in obtaining permits under Ch. IV of the Act.\n\nSection 47 of the Act lends no support to such a proposition and Art. r9(6) of the Constitution indicates that the Government can enter -into such competition without infringing any of the fundamental rights.\n\n. \"\n\n., __ .....\n\nThe Regional Transport Authority in granting permits acts r960 in a quasi-judicial capacity. If its decision was in any way erroneous having regard to the proviso to s. 47(1) of the Act, Parbhani Transport that could not amount to a violation of Art. 14 of the Constitu- Co-op. ·. tion.\n\nThe petitioner had other remedies open to him. Nor Society Ltd. could Ch. IV of the Act be said, in view of Art. 19(6) of the v.\n\nConstitution, to offend that Article by permitting open corftpeti-\n\nR. T. A. tion between the State and a private' citizen. _Aurangabad\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petition No. 110 of 1959.\n\nWrit Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of Fundamental rights.\n\nB. R. L. Iyengar and Shankar Anand, for the petitioners.\n\nM. 0. Setalvad, Attorney General for India, B. Sen, R. Gopalakrishnan R. H. Dhebar and T. M. Sen, for the respondents. ·\n\n1960. March, 7. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKAR, J.-The petitioner is a co-operative society Sarkar J. duly registered and it carries on the business of plying motor buses as stage carriages on the public highways in the State of Bombay. Its case in this petition is that it has been deprived of its right to crry on this business and has also been subjected to discriminatory treatment in the matter of the grant of permits to run its buses. It complains of the infringement of its fundamental rights under arts. 19(l)(g) and 14 of the Constitution. The questions raised in this matter turn on some of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as amended by Act 100of1956. These provisions have to be examined before proceeding to discuss the questions that arise. We are concerned only with Chapters IV and IV A of the Act. Chapter IV comprises ss. 42 to 68 and Chapter IVA, which was in its entirety introduced by the amending Act, consists of ss. 68A to 68I.\n\nTaking Chapter IV first, we find that s. 42(1) provides that no owner of a transport vehicle shall use or permit t:\\le use of the vehicle in any public place save in accordance with the conditions of a permit granted under the Act. A \" transport vehicle \" is defined in 's. 2(33) as a public service vehicle or a goods vehicle.\n\nClause (a) of sub-sec. (3) of s. 42 as it originally stood\n\nr960 provided that sub-sec. (1) of that section would not --:- apply to any transport vehicle owned by or on behalf Parbham Transport of the Central Government or a State Government\n\n50,7,~otd. other than a vehicle used in connection with the busiv. ness.of a railway. So under it the Government could\n\nR. T. A. ply stage carriages on the public highways without Aurangabad having to obtain permits in respect of them. The\n\nSarkar]. amending Act of 1956 substituted a new clause (a) in s. 42(3) for the old clause. The new cl. (a) provides that sub-sec. (1) shall not apply to any transport vehicle owned by the Central Government or a State Government and used for Government purposes unconnected with any commercial enterprise. Since the amendment, therefore, the Government cannot run stage carriages on the public highways without a permit, just as a private owner of stage carriages cannot do, because such use of the vehicles will not be for a purpose unconnected with a commercial enterprise.\n\nSection 44 authorises a State Government to constitute a State Transport Authority aI)d Regional Transport Authorities for different areas in that State to carry out the duties specified. Section 45 provides that every application for a permit shall be made to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which it is proposed to use the vehicle. Section 47 specifies the matters to which a Regional Transport Authority shall have regard in considering an application for the grant of a permit.\n\nWe now come to Chapter IVA. Section 68A(b) defines a \" State transport undertaking \" for the purpose of the Chapter to mean an undertaking providing road transport service, carried on, among others, by a State Government. Section 68B provides that the provisions of Chapter IV A shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in Chapter IV. Section 68C is in these terms:\n\n680.\n\nWhere any State transport undertaking is of opinion that for the purpose of providing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated road transport service, it is necessary in the public interest that road transport services in genPral or any particu Jar class of such service in relation to any area or route or portion thereof\n\n•.\n\nshould be run and operated by the State transport r960 undertaking, whether to the exclusion, complete or - 1 f h h • h S Parbhani Transport partia , o ot er persons or ot erw1se, t e tate c _ P transport undertaking may prepare a scheme giving soci~; Ltd. particulars of the nature of the services proposed to v. be rendered, the area or route proposed to be\n\nR. T. A. covered and such other particulars respecting there- Aurangabad to as may be prescribed, and shall cause every such scheme to be published in the Official Gazette and also in such other manner as the State Government may direct. ' Section 68D provides for°the preferring of objections to the scheme published under s. 68C, consideration of such objections and final approval of the so.heme by the State Government. The terms of s. 68F(l) are as follows :-\n\n8. 68F. (1) Where, in pursuance of an approved scheme, any State transport undertaking applies in the manner specified in Chapter IV for a stage carriage permit or a public carrier's permit or a contract carriage permit in respect of a notified area or notified route, the Regional Transport Authority shall issue such permit to the State transport under. taking, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in Chapter IV.\n\nThe respondents to this petition are (1) The Regional Transport Authority, Aurangabad, (2) The State Transport Authority; Bombay, (3) The. Divisional Controller of State Transport, Marathwada and (4) The State of Bombay. Aurangabad and Marathwada are both in the State of Bombay. The first and second respondents are the authorities set up under s. 44 of the Act by the Government of Bombay.\n\nIt is the duty of the first respondent to consider applications for and to grant, permits for stage carriages to be plied in Aurangabad region and the, second respondent hears apJleals from the decisions of the first respondent. The third respondent is the head of a department of the Government of the State of Bombay and is in charge of public transport work in Marathwada.\n\nIt appears that the petitioner had permits to run buses on four routes in Aurangabad and that these\n\nSarkar].\n\nr96o permits were due to expire on October 1, 1958. The\n\nP bh -:--T third respondent who really represents the Governar ani ransport f h S f h co-op. ment o t e tate o Bombay \\lld w. o may be con- Society Ltd. veniently referred to as the State of Bombay, had v. permits for two of these routes.\n\nOn J\\fay 19, 1958,\n\nR. T. A. the State of Bombn, y applied for permits for all these Aurangabad four routes under Chapter IV of the Act.. On May 27, Sarkar]. 1958, the petitioner applied for renewal of its existing permits. The first respondent rejected the application of the petitioner and granted those of the State of Bombay. The petitioner appealed to the second respondent but its !\\ppeal was rejected. In the meantime on some date which does not n, ppear on the record, the petitioner had been granted temporary permits up to December 31, 1958.\n\nOn the expiry of its temporary permits on December 31, 1958, the petitioner would have been unable to run any of its buses and it therefore moved the High Court at Bombay under art. 226 of the Constitution and the High Court quashed the oders of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and directed the applications of the petitioner and the State of Bombay for the permits to be reconsidered. With the reasons of this order of the High Court we are not concerned. Respondent No. l, however, without re-considering the applications as directed by the High Court, granted temporary permits to the Stn, te of Bombay. The petitioner again moved the High Court which thereupon quashed the order of respondent No. 1 granting temporary permits to the State of Bombay. Thereafter, on March 20, 1959, the respondent No. 1 granted temporary permits to the petitioner which were later extended to July 20,\n\n1959.\n\nOn June l, 1959, the State of Bombay published a scheme under s. 680 in Chapter IV A of the Act.\n\nVarious objections were filed against the scheme and nothing further appears to have been done to make \"the scheme final.\n\nOn July 18, 1959, respondent No. 1 purporting to carry out the directions of the High Court, recfmsidered the petitioner's applications for renewal and the applications of the State of Bombay for permits and rejected the petitioner's applications while allowing those of the State of Bombay. On\n\nJuly, 20, 1959, t.he petitioner's temporary permits\n\n...\n\n.. -\n\nhaving expired, it ceased to operate its buses. On 1960 August 27, 1959, the petitioner filed the present peti- P lh -:--T 1 • . h' C d 32 f h C . t' i.\" ar' ani ranspor t10n m t is ourt un er art, o t e onst1tu 10n .LOr Co-op. appropriate writs quashing the order of respondent Society Ltd.\n\nNo. 1 dated July 18, 1959, restraining the Sate of v.\n\nBombay from applying for permits save under the\n\nR. TA. provisions of Chapter IVA 'and respondent No. 1 from A1t.angabad entertaining any application by the State of Bombay Sarkar J. under Chapter IV and directing respondent N:o. 1 to hear the petitioner's applications for permits according to law. Various grounds have been advanced in support of the petition and these will now be discussed.\n\nThe petitioner first contends that in view of Chapter.IV-A the State of Bombay had no right to apply for permits under Chapter IV of the Act as it had done. It says that the order of the first respondent granting permits to the State of Bombay under Chapter IV was therefore illegal and affected its fundamental rights under art. 19(1) (g).\n\nThe first question then is whether the State of Bombay was entitled to apply for permits under Chapter IV. The petitioner says that special provisions having been made in Chapter 1 VA to enable the Government to run its buses the Government's right to run buses was restdcted to those provisions and the Government was not entitled to resort to the other provisions of the Act .. In support of this contention reference was made to the case of Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor(1) where it was observed that \"where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done i~ that way or not at all.\" But this principle can apply only where one power is given and has no application where more powers than one are conferred. If a statute contains . provisions giving more than one power, then the rule cannot be applied so as to take away the powers conferred by anyone of these provisions. As pointed out in Taylor v. Taylor( 2 ) referred to by the Judicial Committee in Nazir Ahmad's case (1) \"When a statutory power is conferred for the first time upon a Court, and the mode of exercising it is pointed out, it means that no other mode is to be adopted.\"\n\nz. ( 1936) L, R, 63 I.A. 372. 381,\n\n(2) ((1876) 1'Ch. D. 426, 431.\n\n'960 Now the position here is different.\n\nThe Govern- Parbha;;; y; ansport ment has of course the power to do any business it Co-op. likes and therefore the business of running stage\n\nsocfrty Ltd. carriages. We have earlier dmwn attention to the v. change made in cl. (a) of s. 42(3) by the amendment\n\nR. T. A. of 1956. Previously, it was not necessary for the Au1angabad Government to obtain permits under s. 42(1) for buses Sarkar J. that it intended to run as stage carriages. Since the amendment the Government can no longer run transport vehicles for commercial purposes without obtaining permits under s. 42(1).\n\nNow the plying of buses as stage carriages is a commercial enterprise and for such buses, therefore, under the sections as they stand, the Government would require permits as any one else. That being so, the sections clearly contemplate that the Government may apply for and obtain permits for its buses run as stage carriages.\n\nThe rule applied in Nazir Ahrnad' s case (') does not permit the ordinary meaning of s. 42, sub-s. (1) and sub-s. (3), cl. (a) to be cut down because of the provisions of Chapter IV A.\n\nThe Act lays down tw\" independent sets of provisions in regard to the running of buses by the Government, one nnder Chapter IV and the other under Chapter IVA. Chapter IVA was intended to give the Government, a special advantage.\n\nWhen the Government chooses to proceed under that chapter, it becomes entitled as a matter of right under s. 681<' (1) to the necessary permits. Under Chapter IV the Government does not have any_ such advantage; it has to compete with other applicants, to secure permits to be able to run its buses. The powers under the two Chapters are therefore _different.\n\nTo such a case the principle of Nazir Ahrnad's case(') cannot be applied.\n\nThe learned counsel for the petitioner also referred to the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius and contended that since the Act by Chapter IVA provided that the Government would be entitled to run buses under a scheme it impliedly prohibited the running of buses by the Government otherwise. It does not seem to us that this maxim carries the mat t<>r further. It is a maxim for ascert(l, ining the\n\n(1) [1936J L.R. 63 I.A. 37z, ~81\n\n•' .\n\nintention of .the legislature. Where the statutory z960 language is plain and the meaning clear, there is no .-. - scope for applying the rule. Section 42(3) (a) appears Parbh~'- ansport to us to be perfectly plain in its terms. It contem- Soci:,; Ltd. plates that the Government has to apply for permits v. under s. 42(1) to run buses as a commercial enterprise.\n\nR. T. A.\n\nThat being so, the maxim cannot, be resorted to for / Aurangabad ascertaining the intention of the legislature and .Sarkar .f, implying a prohibition against the Government apply- ing for permits under Chapter IV.\n\nThe learned counsel then referred to the case of Viscountess Rhondda's claim (1), where it was observed at p. 365 that \"The words of the statute are to be construed so as to ascertain the mind of the Legislature from the natural and grammatical meaning of the words which it has used,· and in so construing them the existing state of the law, the mischiefs to be remedied, and the defects to be amended, may legitimately be looked at together with the general scheme of the Act.\" His point is that Chapter IV A was introduced by the amendment of 1956 to meet the observations made in Moti Lal v. Government of Uttar Pradesh (2) and some other cases that s. 42(3)(a) was discriminatory in that it exempted the Government from the requirement of a permit and was hence void as offending art. 14 of the Constitution. It is said that Chapter IV A must, therefore, be construed as containing the only provisions enabling the Government to run a stage carriage. It is difficult to appreciate this contention. The observations in the cases referred to, had been made in regard to cl. (a) of s. 42(3) as it stood before its amendment in 1956.\n\nThat section has been amended and as it now stands it is not discriminatory. The evil pointed out no more exists and no question of reading the Act keeping in view that evil of discrimination, arises. We find nothing in Moti Lal's rose (2) or any other case which points to an evil nor ha~ the learned counsel drawn our attention to any, which the Act can be said to have intended to remedy. We, therefore, find no justification for reading Chapter IVA as containing\n\n(I) (1922) 2 A.C. 339,\n\n~ .. •\n\n1960 the only provisions under which the Government can\n\nbh --:-T ply stage carriages. , Par am ransport\n\nI \"d 42 1 t h ,. c _ P t is next sa1 s. contemp a es t e owner Oi a Soci:t; i.td. transport vehicle obtaining a permit and a \"State v. transport undertaking\" cannot apply for a permit\n\nR. T. A. under Chapter IV as it cannot be such owner. But Aurangabad here we are not concerned with a State transport undertaking for that comes into existence for the Sarka• J. purposes of Chapter IV A and that Chapter has not been resorted to by the Government yet. Here the Government applied for the permits under Chapter IV.\n\nThe Government can of course be the owner of tra.nsport vehicles. We have earlier said that in view of\n\ncl. (a) of s. 42(3) the Government has to apply for permits under s. 42(1) as any other owner.\n\nTherefore the Act contemplates the Government as owner of transport vehicles. Further, under s. 68A a \"State\n\ntransport undertaking\" has. been defined as an undertaking providing road transport service carried on by a state Government. Such an undertaking is really a department of a Government and in order to be able to provide transport service, it must be able to own transport vehicles. In fact s. 68F(l) requires the State transport undertaking to apply for permit.s under Chapter IV and therefore contemplates it as an owner of a transport vehicle for the purposes of s. 42 which is contained in that Chapter.\n\nThe learned counsel then referred to the concluding portion of s. 47(1) which makes it incumbent on the authority considering applications for permits to take into consideration the representations made by the persons therein mentioned. He said that the persons there mentioned did not include the Government and therefore the intention is clear that applications for permits by the Government were not intended to be considered under s. 47 and if Government could not come under s 47, it could not come under Chapter IV a't all. But assume that representations by the Goverment are not contemplated bys. 47. That does not show that applications for permits by the Government are also not contemplated by that section.\n\nIt is also said that the matters to which the authority granting the permits is required to have regard in\n\n•' .\n\n\" .\n\n- ·-r\n\nconsidering applications for permits under s. 47 are r960 such that if the State enters into competition with -- • · c h f h S Parbkani Transport 01t1ens ior t e grant o permts .t e ate mut neces- Co-op. sarily get them. Therefore, it is said that it could society Ud. not have been intended that the State would compete v. with the citizens in the matter of obtaining permits .\n\nR. T. A. under Chapter IV. We are unable to assent to this A1trangabad contention. There is nothing.in s. 47 which leads to the conclusion that whenever the Government applies along with private citizens for permits, the Government must get. them. Indeed, if that were so, then it would not hav<:i been necessary to provide by s. 68F (1) that when the Government, that is, its State transport undertaking, applied in . pursuance of an approved scheme for a permit, the authority concerned would be bound to grant such permit. Section 68F (1) clearly contemplates that . without the provision made therein it may so happen that the authority acting under s. 47 may think it fit to grant the permit to a private operator in preference to the Go.vernment. It also seems to us that there is nothing in our law to prevent the Government from (;!ntering a business in competition with private citizens.\n\nIndeed, Art. 19(6) by providing that nothing in art. 19(l}(g) shall affect the application of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to the carrying on by the State of any trade, business, industry or service whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or , otherwise, would seem to indicate that the State may\n\ncarry on any business either as a monopoly, complete or partial, or in competition with any citizen and that would not have the effect of infringing any fundamental rights of such citizen. Our attention was then drawn to the proviso to s. 47(1) under which other things being equal a cooperative society is entitled to preference over individual owners in the matter of grants of permits. It is said that the Government is not an individual owner and therefore it is not contemplated as an applicant for a permit under s. 47. It seems to us that if the Government is not an individual owner-as to which we are not called upon to say anything--, it does not\n\nSarkar].\n\n188 SUPI'tEME COURT REPORTS [1960]\n\nr960 follow that that section does not contemplate the - .\n\nGovernment as an applicant for permit. If Govern- Porbh\"; iT; onsport ment is not an individual owner, then all that will\n\n50,;:,; Ltd. happen in view of the proviso to s. 47(1) will be that a v. co-operative society will not be able to claim any pre-\n\nR. T. A. ference over the Government.\n\nAll that the proviso Au.angobad does is to give a co-operative society a preference over individual owners. It is not concerned with stating Sarllar ]. who can apply for permits.\n\nIt seems to us therefore that the petitioner's contention that the Government cannot apply for a permit under Chapter IV of the Act is unsustainable. The petitioner cannot complain of the GovernIL1nt having applied under that Chapter. We are not Cb!led upon, therefore, to discuss the further question, whether any fundamental right of the petitioner under art.19(l)(g) would have been affected by the Government having appliedfor and obtained permits under Chapter IV without having the right to do so. This disposes of the contentions concerning the infringement of the petitioner's fundamental rights under art. 19(l)(g) of the Constitution.\n\nWe will now consider the question of the violation of art. 14 of the Constitution. The first contention in this regard was based on the proviso to s. 47(1). It is said that in the circumstances of this case, as a cooperative society the petitioner was entitled to preference over the Government, considered as an individual owner, and had not been given that preference. It is contended that respondent No. I relying on various promises made by the State of Bombay to repair roads and to give other facilities to the travelling iJUblic had held that the other conditions were not equal while under the proviso, it was entitled to rely only on the existing conditions. It is contended that thereby the provisions of Art. 14 had been infringed. This contention is in our view clearly untenable. The decision of respondent No. 1 may have been right or wrong and as to that we say nothing, but we are unable to see that that decision offends Art. 14 or any other fundamental right of the petitioner. The respondent No. 1 was acting as a quasi judicial body and ifit has made any mistake in its decision there are appropriate\n\nremedies available to the petitioner for obtaining i96o relief.· It cannot complain of a breach of Art 14.\n\nP b'- r Th h . f th . . . th if ar 'ni rampo•l e ot er contention o e peht10ner IS at.\n\nC. Co. Ltd.\n\nKozhikode\n\nTheir Work1nen\n\nDas Gupta .f.\n\nMarh 9.", "total_entities": 38, "entities": [{"text": "S. PEIRCE LESLIE & CO., LTD., KOZHIKODE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 43, "end_char": 82, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M:;S. PEIRCE LESLIE & CO., LTD., KOZHIKODE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THEIR WORKMEN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THEIR WORKMEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100, "end_char": 120, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SuBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 122, "end_char": 134, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S.C.R. SUPB", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2732, "end_char": 2743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "...\n\n3 S.C.R. SUPB, EME COURT REPORTS 195\n\nsary that the company's capital fund remained intact."}}, {"text": "Leslie & Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3051, "end_char": 3068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The basis Leslie & Co. Ltd. of the prior charge was the assumption that rehabilitation was a Kozhikode continuing process and needed allotment from year to year."}}, {"text": "Associated Cement Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3363, "end_char": 3388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Associated Cement Company's case, [1959] S.C.R. 925, relied on."}}, {"text": "September 16, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3530, "end_char": 3548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the Award dated September 16, 1957 ofthe Industrial Tribunal No."}}, {"text": "G. B. Pai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3633, "end_char": 3642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. B. Pai and Sardar Bahadur, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Sardar Bahadur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3647, "end_char": 3661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. B. Pai and Sardar Bahadur, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "A. V. Viswanatha Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3684, "end_char": 3707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and M. S. K. Sastri, for l the respondents."}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3712, "end_char": 3727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and M. S. K. Sastri, for l the respondents."}}, {"text": "DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3815, "end_char": 3824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The J udginent of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAS GUPTA, J.-The appellant-M/s. Peirce Leslie & Co., Ltd., is a private limited company engaged in various enterprises mainly in South India.", "canonical_name": "DAS GUPTA"}}, {"text": "Peirce Leslie & Co., Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3848, "end_char": 3873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The J udginent of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAS GUPTA, J.-The appellant-M/s. Peirce Leslie & Co., Ltd., is a private limited company engaged in various enterprises mainly in South India.", "canonical_name": "Peirce Leslie &- Co. Ltd Rozhikode"}}, {"text": "South India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3945, "end_char": 3956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The J udginent of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAS GUPTA, J.-The appellant-M/s. Peirce Leslie & Co., Ltd., is a private limited company engaged in various enterprises mainly in South India."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4044, "end_char": 4051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It started business in this country over a century ago and though it is registered in England almost ll.ll its activities appear to be carried on in this country ."}}, {"text": "Africa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4289, "end_char": 4295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The principal activities that require mention are the business in cashew nuts which the Company sells after roasting raw cashew nuts purchased in this country and in Africa, and business in coir products and several other country produce like ginger, lemon grass oil etc."}}, {"text": "Das Gupta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4996, "end_char": 5005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\nDas Gupta].", "canonical_name": "DAS GUPTA"}}, {"text": "Peirce Leslie & Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5015, "end_char": 5039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Peirce Leslie & Co. Ltd.\n\nJ{ozhikode v.\n\nTheir Workmen\n\nDas Gupta ]."}}, {"text": "Coimbatore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5660, "end_char": 5670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The industrial dispute thus raised was referred by the Government to the Industrial Tribunal sitting at Coimbatore."}}, {"text": "pany", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7336, "end_char": 7340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• •\n\npany's claim for higher return than usual on paid up z960 capital and reserves used as working capital."}}, {"text": "Peirce Leslie & Co. Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13946, "end_char": 13970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Peirce Leslie & Co. Ltd.\n\nKczJ.ikode\n\nTheir Workmen\n\nDas Gupta].", "canonical_name": "Peirce Leslie &- Co. Ltd Rozhikode"}}, {"text": "Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14392, "end_char": 14397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the appellant's Thefr Workmen expert himself bas stated the value he has given as\n\nDa-< Gupta J. the rehabilitation cost for any particular building is on the basis of what would be required to construct a similar building if the existing building was pulled down in 1955."}}, {"text": "Das Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16763, "end_char": 16772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das Gupta ].", "canonical_name": "DAS GUPTA"}}, {"text": "Kozhikode", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20990, "end_char": 20999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "h t s. eirce company s o cer no c a enge as to t e correc ness Leslie & co. Ltd. of the statement made therein was made in cross-· Kozhikode examination."}}, {"text": "Das Gupta", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 21228, "end_char": 21237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though no direct challenge to the v. correctness of the statements appearing in the balance- Their Workmen sheets about the value of the different assets appears to have been made it is important to notice that the Das Gupta f ."}}, {"text": "June 30, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22679, "end_char": 22692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It arrives at the figure of £6,05,564 as the working capital by deducting from the current assets as per balance-sheet as on June 30, 1955, six out of nine items under \"Current liabilities & provisions'',-3 items not deducted are those under (1) liability for taxation other than U.K. Income-tax,\n\n(2) proposed dividend on deferred ordinary shares and\n\n(3) capital profits on proposed distribution."}}, {"text": "Peirce Leslie &- Co. Ltd Rozhikode", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23080, "end_char": 23114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The obvious reason for deducting the six items from the c:mrrent assets to arrive at the working capital is tha, t\n\nIg6o\n\nM/s. Peirce Leslie &- Co. Ltd Rozhikode ·\n\nv. 1'heir Worlmen\n\nDas Gupta ].", "canonical_name": "Peirce Leslie &- Co. Ltd Rozhikode"}}, {"text": "Das Gupta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23137, "end_char": 23146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The obvious reason for deducting the six items from the c:mrrent assets to arrive at the working capital is tha, t\n\nIg6o\n\nM/s. Peirce Leslie &- Co. Ltd Rozhikode ·\n\nv. 1'heir Worlmen\n\nDas Gupta ].", "canonical_name": "DAS GUPTA"}}, {"text": "Leslie & co.:Ltd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25482, "end_char": 25498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'\\\n\n\"But the fortune of the 11,247 workers depend upon the trading results of the department in which M/s. Peirce they are working; the bonus of the workers is Leslie & co.:Ltd."}}, {"text": "Kozhikode", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27497, "end_char": 27506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kozhikode v.\n\nTheir Workmen\n\nDas Gupta]."}}, {"text": "Peirce Leslie Co., Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30612, "end_char": 30635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We therefore allow the appeal in part and in modification of the award made by the Industrial Tribunal award to the staff of M/s. Peirce Leslie Co., Ltd., bonus equivalent to 3 months' basic wages in addition to the amount already voluntarily paid by the company."}}, {"text": "TEA DISTRICTS LABOUR ASSOCIATION,\n\nCALCUTTA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30807, "end_char": 30850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TEA DISTRICTS LABOUR ASSOCIATION,\n\nCALCUTTA ;;\n\nEX-EMPLOYEES OF T~A DISTRICTS LABOUR\n\nASSOCIATION AND ANOTHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR AND K. N. WANCHOO, .JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30944, "end_char": 30957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TEA DISTRICTS LABOUR ASSOCIATION,\n\nCALCUTTA ;;\n\nEX-EMPLOYEES OF T~A DISTRICTS LABOUR\n\nASSOCIATION AND ANOTHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR AND K. N. WANCHOO, .JJ.)"}}, {"text": "ss.22,\n\n23, 25F(C)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31156, "end_char": 31174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Koraput", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31332, "end_char": 31339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As there was appreciable decline in the activities and business of the appellant it decided, by means of a resolution, to close down two local agencies at Koraput and Berhampur\n\n{Ganjam) by May 31, 1957."}}, {"text": "Berhampur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31344, "end_char": 31353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As there was appreciable decline in the activities and business of the appellant it decided, by means of a resolution, to close down two local agencies at Koraput and Berhampur\n\n{Ganjam) by May 31, 1957."}}, {"text": "Peirce Leslie Q>. Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31615, "end_char": 31641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An industrial dispute having arisen as a result of the said closure and\n\nM/s. Peirce Leslie Q>."}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_1_37_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "THE ~UPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nSMT. NAGINDRA BALA MITRA\n\nAND ANOTHER v.\n\nSUNIL CHANDRA ROY AND ANOTHER\n\n(S. K. DAs, A. K. SARKAR AND M. HrnAYATULLAH. JJ.}\n\nTrial by Jury-Charge to the Jury-Duty'of Judge-Misdirection-Verdict of the jury, when could be interfered with-Code of Criminal Procedure, I898 (Act V of I898). ss. I62, 297, 323, 325.\n\nIn a trial by jury, the judge should in his charge to the jury be careful to lead them to a correct appreciation of the evidence so that the essential issues in the case rriay be correctly determined by them after understanding the true import of the evidence on the rival sides. Since a verdict of the jury depends upon the charge, if it fails to perform this basic purpose it cannot be regarded as a proper charge and if it contains also misdirections as to law, the verdiCt cannot be upheld; but if, upon the general view taken, the case has been fairly left within the jury's province, the verdict cannot be set aside unless something gross amounting to a complete misdescription of the whole bearing of the evidence has ocCJJrred.\n\nMushtak Hussein v.The State of Bombay, [1953] S.C.R. 809, Ramkrishan Mithanlal Sharma v. The State of Bombay, [1955]\n\nl S.C.R. 903 and Arnold v. King Emperor, (1914) L.R. 41 I.A, 149, relied on.\n\nPer S. K. Das and Sarkar,-JJ.-Though the charge to the jury in.the present case was lengthy, the length was due in part to a protracted narrative of facts and the many disputed questions of fact to which the attention of. the jury had to be drawn, and as the Judge did state the several disputed points arising therefrom and their bearing on the main questions at issue, the jury were not misled.\n\nHeld, that there was no misdirection and that the verdict of -.t, the jur.y could not be interfered with.\n\nPer Hidayatullah, J.-In his charge to the jury, in the present case, (1) the judge took each' witness, turn by turn, paraphrased his evidence, sentence by sentence and read out those portions which he did not paraphrase, without trying to.draw the atten- . tion of the jury to the relevancy or materiality of the various\n\nFebruary, rz\n\nz96o parts ; and did not make any difference between the testimony of the eye witnesses and of the formal witnesses in the Smt. Nagindra matter of t.reatment, (2) while telling the jury that they Bala Mslra could give the benefit of the doubt on proof of any individual . v. fact if they felt 'any doubt about the proof, the judge did Sunil Chandra Roy not at the same time caution them that the totality of facts must be viewed in relation to the offence charged and that the benefit resulting in acquittal could be given only if they felt that when all was seen and considered; there was doubt as to whether the accused had committed the crime or not, (3) the judge while explaining the ingredients of the offence of grievous hurt under s. 325 of the Indian Penal Code failed to tell the jury that grievous hurt was only an aggravated form of hurt and that even if they held that the accused did not cause a grievous injury it would be open to them to hold that he caused a simple injury which would bring the matter within s. 323 of the Code, and (4) omissions \\Vere treated as contradictions and placed before the jury in complete disregard of s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Held, that these defects amounted to misdirections and that the verdict could not be accepted.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 170 of 1956.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated June 14, 1954, of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 13 ofl954, arising out of the Judgment and order dated January 13; 1954, of the said High Court in Case No, 55 of 1953.\n\nPurshottam Tricumdas, H.J. Umrigar and B. P.\n\nMaheshwari, for the appellants.\n\nN. C. Chatter.iee, R. L. Anand and D, N .. Mukherjee, for respondent No. I.\n\nA. C. Mitra, A. M. Pal and P. K. Bose, for respondent No. 2.\n\n1960. February 12. The Judgment of S. K. Das and Sarkar, JJ., was delivered by S. K. Das, J.\n\nHidayatullah, J., delivered a separate.Judgment. s. K. Das J.\n\nS. K.\"DAs J.-This is an. unfortunate case in more than one sense. So far back as August II, 1950, there was some incident in premises No. 18, Bondel Road in Calcutta in the course of which one Col. S. C. Mitra; a Gynaecologist arid Surgeon, lost his life. Col. Mitra was the husband of petitioner No. l and father of petitioner No. 2. In connection with the Colonel's death, Sunil Chandra Roy, at present respondent No. 1, and his two brothers were placed on their trial for offences under ss. 302, 323 and 44 7 of the Indian Penal\n\n- ..\n\nCode.\n\nVery shortly put, the case against them was z960 that they had trepassed into 18, Bondel Road, following upon a quarrel regarding the supply of water to Sm~. 1Nr; J'.ndra premises No. 17, Bonde! Road which belonged to a av •tra petitioner No. 2 and consisted of several flats one of sunil Ch; ndra Roy which on the second floor was in occupation of Sunil as a tenant; thttt they had attacked Col. Mitra and s. K. Das J. petitioner No. 2; that Sunil had inflicted a blow or blows on the Colonel wnich caused his death and that one of his brothers Satyen had inflicted some minor injuries on the person of petitioner No. 2. There was also a charge a, gainst Sunil for an assault alleged to have been committed on Mrs. Sati Mitra, wife of petitioner No. 2.\n\nThe accused persons were, in the first instance, tried by the Additional Sessions Judge of Alipur with the result, that Sunil was convicted under ss. 325 and 447 and Satyen under ss. 323 and 447, Indian Penal Code. So far as the third brother Amalesh was concernd, his case was referred to the High Court as the learned Judge did not agree with the jury's verdict of not guilty.\n\nSunil and Satyen appealed to the High Court against their convictions and sentences ; the State of West Bengal obtained a Rule for enhancement of the sentences passed on Sunil and Satyen. The appeal, the Rule and Reference were heard together. The appeal was allowed, anroµght -Ur. &chin Bose who exa, mined the\n\nSUPREME COU~T REPORTS [1960]\n\n'96° Colonel and found him already dead. On receipt of\n\nSmt. Nagina,• the telephone message from Nirmal, Pushpa Pal,\n\nBalaMitra Officer-in-charge, Karaya Police Sta\"tion, deputed a v.\n\nHead-cmrntable named lVIathura Singh, to go to No.18 sunilChandmRoy but when the constable arrived, the incident was over. The Officer-in-charge, Pushpa Pal, soon follows. K. Das J. ed and after obtaining from Nirmal a brief oral statement as to his version of the incident, proceeded to No. 17, Bonde! Road. On the staircase of the house at No. 17, Bondel Road, Puspha Pal met one Sarat Banerji, said to be a priest of a neighbourhood called Shitalatala. Pushpa Pal then went up and arrested the accused Sunil.\n\nThe post-mortem examination of the Colonel's body revealed that he had sustained a linear fracture of his left temporal bone, vertical in character, an abrasion laid obliquely across the middle of the left half of his forehead, a lacerated wound bone deep laid vertically across the middle of the eye-brow, an abrasion on the left cheek and one small lacerated wound near the left ear. There was some clotted blood on the top of the membrane over the fracture of the bone and some on the inner surface of the scalp. In the opinion of Dr. Majumdar who carried out the post-mortem examination as recorded in his report, the death of the Colonel was due to shock caused by the head injury, on top of senile changes, and the head injury which was ante-mortem must have been caused by a fall on some hard substance_.\n\nThe post-mortem report was not signed till the 2nd September, 1950, and not until the pathological report and the chemical report had been obtained.\n\nThe defence of Sunil was that he did not strike or assault the Colonel, either by a fist blow or a blow with a l'Od like substance. The defence further was that the fist blow on the left tern pie of the Colonel was not specifically mentioned by any material witness until after the post-mortem report showed a linear fracture of the left temporal bone and it was suggested by the \"defence that the fist blow was invented to make a case that such blow fractured the left temporal bone of the Colonel. The main suggestion on beha.lf of the defence was that the Colonel\n\n...\n\nwas an old man with heart trouble and 'his pathor96o logical condition was such that he was excited at the Smt. Nagindra time of the incident and fell down on a rough surface, Bala Mitra either on the passage or on the masonry letter box, v. and hurt himself. The injury was such that it could Sunil Chandra Roy not be caused by one blow of a rod or rod-like substance. The defence against the charge of criminal s. K. Das f. trespass was that Sunil entered the com pound of No. 18, Bondel Road at the invitation of Purna Mali, who asked Sunil to come and see if the pump was working, the pump being within the compound of No. 18, Bondel Road. Sunil did not, however, assault the Colonel in any way.\n\nIt is in the context of the aforesaid two versions that we have to consider the charge to the jury and examine the criticisms made thereto. We must make it clear that we are not called upon at this stage to give our findings on any of the disputed questions of fact. That was the function of the jury, and the jury had given their verdict. The limited question before us is whether that verdict is vitiated by reason of any serious misdirection by the , Judge or of any misunderstanding on the part of the jury of the law laid down by him, which in fact has occasioned a failure of justice. This Court said in Mushtak Hussein v. The State uf Bombay (1): \"Unless therefore it is established in a case that there has been a serious misdirection by the Judge in charging the jury which has occasioned a failure of justice and has misled the jury in giving its verdict,· the verdict of the jury cannot be set aside.\" In a subsequent decision, Ramkishan Mithanlal Sharma v. The State of Bombay(2) this Court observed that s. 297, Criminal Procedure Code, imposed a duty on the Judge in charging the jury to sum up the evidence for the prosecution and defence and to lay down the law by which the jury were to be guided; but summing up for the prosecution and defence did not mean that the Judge should give merely a summary of the evidence; he must marshall the evidence so as to give proper assistance to the jury who are required to decide which view of the facts is true. This Court\n\nIt) [1953] S.C.R. 809 at 815.\n\n(2) (1955] I S.C.R. 903 at 930. 2\n\nSUPREME CQURT REPORTS [1960)\n\nr960 referred with approval to the following observations made by the Privy Council in Arnold v. King Em- Smt. N•gindra peror (') : .\n\nBala Milra\n\nv. \"A charge to a jury must be read as a whole. If Sunil Chandra Roy there are salient propositions of law in it, these will,\n\nof course, be the subject of separate analysis. But in s. K. Das J. a protracted narrative of facts the determination of which is ultimately left to the jury, it must needs be that the view of the Judge may not coincide with the view of others who look upon the whole proceedings in black type. It would, however, not be in accordance with usual or good practice to treat such cases as cases of misdirection, if, upon the general view taken, the case has been fairly left within the jury's province. But in any case in the region of fact their Lordships of the Judicial Committee would not interfere unless something gross amounting to a complete misdescription of the whole bearing of the evidence has occurred.\"\n\nBearing the aforesaid principles in mind, we proceed now to consider the criticisms made on behalf of the petitioners against the learned Judge's charge to the jury. We had earlier classified the criticisms under five different heads, and we shall deal with them one by one. We shall refer to the main points urged under each head, avoiding a detailed reference to the evidence on minor points which do not advance the case of the petitioners any further.\n\nThe first criticism is that the charge to the jury, read as a whole, is nothing but a summary of the evidence witness. by witness and a summary of the arguments of counsel which the jury had already heard; that the learned Judge did not state the points for decision under separate heads, nor did he oollate and marshall the evidence topic-wise so as to assist the jury to come to their conclusion one way or the other, but left the jury with a mass of unnecessary details which was mor~ likely to confuse than to help them.\n\nLearned counsel for the petitioners has pointed out that in the appeal from the judgment of Mitter, J., in an earlier stage of this very case,\n\n(1) [1914] L.R. 41 I.A. 149.\n\n........ !\n\nChakravarti, C. J., had said in Sunil Chandra RO]J and Another v. The State (1):\n\n\"But I feel bound to say that the function of a Smt. Nagindra 'Bala Mitra \\ charge is to put the jury in a position to weigh and v. \\ assess the evidence properly in order that they may Sunil Chandra Roy J come to a right decision on questions of fact which, - . under the law, is thei~ resposibiity.\n\nTe .charge s. K. Das J.\n\n. must therefore address itself pnmanly to pomtmg out what the questions of fact are, what the totality of the evidence on each of the questions is, how the different portions of that evidence, lying scattered in -the depositions of several witnesses, fit with one another, what issues or subsidiary questions they raise for decision and what the effect will be according f as one part or another of the evidence is believed or dis believed.\"\n\nIt was argued that what was condemned in an earlier stage of this case has happened again.\n\nWe are unable to accept this line of criticisms as substantially correct. It is, indeed, true that the learned Judge followed the method of placing the evidence witness-wise rather than topic-wise. He started his summing-up by stating: \"I now propose to take up the prosecution witnesses.individually with a view to sum up the evidence of each witness and the suggestions made to each by the counsel for the accused.\" But the real point for consideration is not whether the learned Judge followed one method rather than another : the real point is-did he properly discharge his duty under s. 297, Criminal Procedure Code by giving the jury the help and guidance to which they were entitled ? Did he marshall the evidence in such a way as to bring out the essential points for decision and the probabilities and improbabilities bearing on the disputed questions of fact on which the jury had to come to their conclusion? The learned Judge gave a lengthy charge to the jury ; and in summing up the , evidence of each witness, he did state the disputed \"'- points arising therefrom and their bearing on the main questions at issue, viz. whether Sunil had trespassed into 18, Bondel Road and had assaulted the Colonel in the manner alleged by the prosecution.\n\n\\1) 57 C, W.N. 962 at 1001.\n\nr960 The length of the charge was due in part to a protracted narrative of facts and the many disputed Snit. Nag; ndra questions of fact to which the attention of the J\n\n0ury Bala Mitra\n\nv. had to be drawn. The principle laid down by the sunilChandraRoy Privy Council in Arnold's case (3) and accepted by this\n\nCourt as correct is that it would not be in accordance s. K. Das J. with good practfoe to trertt a case.as a case of misdirectiolil if, upon the general view taken, the case has been fairly left within the jury's province, and this Court will not interfere unless something gross amounting to a complete misdescription of the whole bearing of the evidence has occurred. Learned counsel for the petitioners has taken us through the entire charge to the jury and while we may agree that some unnecessary details (e.g. how the spectacles of Mrs.\n\nSati Mitra fell down) -could have been avoided by the learned Judge, we are unable to say that the method followed by the learned Judge did not focus attention of the jury to the questions of fact which they had to decide or did not give help and guidance to the jury to arrive at their conclusion on those questions.\n\nWe are far less satisfied that anything amounting to a complete misdescription of the whole bearing of the evidence has occurred in' this ca.se. As to the observations which Chakravarti, C.J.; had made, it is well to remember that they were made in respect of an earlier charge to the jury which, to use the words of the learned Chief Justice, was \" all comment or mere comment in the main.\" Having carefully perused the present charge to the jury, we think, on a general view, that the case has been fairly left within the jury's province, in spite of the criticism so strenuously made that the charge to the jury contained a mass of details which need not have been placed before the jury. In a protracted narrative full of details, it is perhaps easy to find fault with a charge to the jury on the ground of prolixity. The question before us is not whether the charge to the jury is perfect in all respect : the question is-has something gross occurred amounting to a complete misdescription of the whole bearing of the evidence? We are unable to say that there has been any such gross misdirection by the learned Judge.\n\n(t) [1954) L.R. 4' I.A. 149\n\n' ..\n\nThe second criticism relates to certain misdirec- I96o tions alleged to have been committed by the learned Judge in placing.the evidence of the eye-witnesses as Smt. Nagimba Bala Mitra also of medical witnesses. No useful purpose will be v. served by referring to each and every example given Sunil Chandra Roy before us ; we shall confine ourselves to some of the salient points and state the general impression we 5 I<. Das J. have formed. In placing the evidence of ech eyewitness, the learned Judge referred to the suggestions made by the defence. The comment is that he placed the suggestions in such a way as to create the impression in the. minds of the jury that they were true, even though they had been repudiated or explained by the witness. We may give some examples. Nirmal telephoned to his brother Dr. Lalit Mitra immediately after Col. Mitra was pronounced to be dead. The suggestion to Nirnial was that he had not told his doctor brother then that his father had been beaten,· but had said only that his father had \" fainted \".\n\nThis suggestion was placed before the jury with reference to Nirmal's deposition before the committing Magistrate. Nirmal said before the committing Magistrate that he did not Ul'le the English word ' fainted' but had said in Bengali that ' father has become unconscious'. The complaint of the petitioners is that Nirma.I's explanation has not been properly placed ?efore the jury. But the learned Judge says in his charge that the jury had seen the earlier deposition qf Nirmal, and if that is so, the distinction between ' fainting ' and ' becoming unconscious ' in explanation of the suggestion made to Nirmal does not assume any great importance. It was next suggested to Nirmal that he had told the Police that his father - had heart trouble. This suggestion was put before the jury in the following way:\n\n\"The case was put by the defence that the Colonel had heart trouble and that Nirmal was confronted with, contradiction that he told the Magistrate and the police that his father had heart trouble. Nirmal had denied it.\" Nirmal's explanation was that he did not tell the Magistrate or the police that his father had heart\n\nz960 trouble; he merely said that his father used to have occasional palpitation of heart when he ate too much Smt. Nagindra or took irregular meals. Pushpa Pal, the investigating Bala Mitr~\n\nv. police officer, understood this to mean heart trouble sunil Chand.a Roy and he recorded \"heart trouble \" in Nirmal's statement. Pushpa Pal admitted that even if Nirmal had s. K. Do• J. stated that Col. Mitra had palpitation of heart, he would ha.ve recorded it as heart trouble. This part of the evidence of Pushpa Pal also the learned Judge placed before the jury. It cannot, therefore, be said that the learned Judge misled the jury iu any way or left the jury with the impression that Nirmal had admitted that his father had heart trouble.\n\nSimilar comments were made with regard to the placing of the evidence of other eye-witnesses, but their general effect is the same. They do not, in our view, establish that the jury were misled on any of the points in dispute.\n\nWe must, however, mention two more points, one in connection with a person called Sarat Banerji and the other with regard to Mrs.\n\nNagendra Bala Ghose. SaratBanerji, it appears, was a priest who brought some holy water, and there was some evidence to show that such water was sprinkled on the Colonel soon after the incident. Sarat Banerji was not examined in the case, and the question naturally arose whether he was present at the time of the incident and if so, when did he come. to 18, Bonde!\n\nRoad? A number of prosecution witnesses were crossexamined on this point, and the learned Judge repeatedly referred to this matter in summing up the evidence of those witnesses.\n\nWe do not agree with learned counsel for the petitioners that the learned Judge committed any misdirection in drawing the attention of the jury to this matter.\n\nAs to Mrs. Nagendra Bala Ghose, the criticism was that the learned Judge usurped the function of the jury. About this witness the learned Judge said:\n\n\"Now, gentlemen, in cross-examination she was cross-examined on her eyesight.\n\nShe did succeed in pointing out to an old man in Court. That is in answer to Q. 30. But further ahead she could not see properly. She is far too old a woman on whom any reliance can be placed having regard to her state of\n\nhealth and having regard to her state of vision and\n\n.I960 her power of memory. She was called by the prosecu- Smt. Nagindra tion only to meet the defence suggestion that she was Bala Misra there at the time of the incident in Prof. Mahanti's v. place and was being kept back.\" .\n\nSwnilChandra Roy It was submitted before us that Mrs. Ghose was no doubt old, but she was a respectable and reliable wits. K. n,., f. ness who was staying in a neighbouring house from the verandah of which the place ofincident was visible t . therefore, it was argued that the learned Judge was not justified in expressing himself so strongly against this witness, and in doing so, he improperly dissuaded the jury from forming their own opinion about her evidence. Having examined her evidence, we are unable to hold that the comments of the learned Judge were unjustified or that he wrongly influenced the jury against the witness. It must be stated here that the learned Judge had cautioned the jury that they were not bound by his opinion on a question of fact and were free to act on their own opinion.\n\nThis brings us to the medical evidence. The two doctors of importance who were examined in the case were Dr. Majumdar, who made the post-mortem examination, and Dr. Kabir Hussain,· Professor of Forensic and State Medicine in the Calcutta Medical College. Those two doctors expressed widely divergent views as to the probable cause of the injuries sustained by Col. Mitra and also of his death. The learned Judge rightly placed before the jury these divergent views.\n\nDealing with the evidence of Dr. Majumdar, the learned Judge said:\n\n\"Suggestions were made to Dr. Majumdar in cross. examination.that in case a fist blow was given on the left temporal region whether any external injury was to be expected. He said that external injury was expected and there was no external injury mentioned in the post-mortem report in this case. Then Dr.\n\nMajumdar's opinion is that such a man cannot be expected to talk. It is also Dr. Majumdar's .. .opinion that the injury was due to a fall and he does not think that the injuries Nos. 1, 2 and 3 could be ca.used by a lathi blow or a blow by a .rod. .A, v9oriqg t9 M.s 9tUQ.i9P., ~4~ fr{l;9tnr~ Wt'l-.1' P.liSP 4.l.l~ to a f11ll.. \"\n\nx96o It, is contended that this must have misled the jury in\n\nSmt. N•gimlra thinking that there was no external injury on the site\n\nBala Mitro of the fracture on the left temporal region and therev. fore it could not have been ca.used by a fist blow. Our Suni!Chandra Roy attention was drawn to the evidence of Dr. Kabir Hussain, who opined that the haemorrhage on the s. K. Das f. inner urface of the scalp near the site of the fracture was an external injury. The point to be noticed in\n\nthi~ connection is that the learned Judge did not omit to place before the jury what Dr. Kabir Hussain had said regarding what he thought to be the presence of an external injury at the site of the fracture; he placed in extenso the questions put to Dr. Kabir Hussain and the answers given by him on this point.\n\nThe jury were, therefore, properly placed in possession of the views of both the doctors, and it was for them to decide which view should be accepted.\n\nBoth the doctors were asked questions as tow hether the injuries sustained by Col. Mitra could be caused by a fall on a rough substance like a masonry box or by a blow of a hard weapon like a flexible rod. On this point again the two doctors disagreed ; the learned Judge did place before the jury the different views expressed by the two doctors.\n\nA-grievance has been made before us that in summing up the evidence of Dr.-Kabir Hussain the learned Judge failed to draw the attention of the jury to the answers given toquestions 73, 74 and 75 by which the doctor categorically negatived the suggestion of the defence that a fracture of the temporal bone of the kind sustained by the Colonel could be caused by a fall on a hard substance.\n\nIt is true that the answers to questions 73, 74 and 75 were not specifically placed before the jmy, but reading the charge relating to the medical evidence as a whole, we find that the learned Judge sufficiently indicated to the jury the disagreement between the two doctors on the main questions of fact and the reasons which each doctor gave for his opinion. It was the province of the jury to accept one opinion or the other. The learned Judge concluded his summing up of the medical evidence in these words:\n\n''Now, gentlemen, when a medical witness is called in as an expert he is not a witness of . fact ... Medical\n\n--J. ..\n\nevidence of an expert is evidence of opinion, not of z96o fact.\n\nWhere there are alleged eye-witnesses of h d h Smt. Nagindra physical violence whic is sai to ave caused the Bala Mitra hurt, the value of medical evidence by prosecution is v. only corroborative. It proves that the injuries could Sunil ChandraRoy have been caused in the manner alleged and nothing more. The use which the defence can make of the s. K. Das f. medical evidence, or any medical evidence which the defence might itself choose to bring, is to prove that the injuries could not possibly have been caused in the manner alleged and thereby discredit the eye-witnesses. Therefore, you must remember this particular point of-view that if you believe the eye-witnesses, t.Q.en there is no question of having it supported by medical evidence; unless the medical evidence again in its turn goes so for that it completely rules out all possibility that such injuries could take place in the manner alleged by the prosecution and that is a point which you should bear in mind, because if you accept the evidence of the eye-witnesses, no question of further considering the medical evidence arises at all. The only question in that case when you consider the medical evidence is to test the eye-witnesses' version as to whether any of the particular injuries shown in the report can be caused in the manner alleged by the prosecution. But if you don't believe the eye-witnesses, then consideration of the medical evidence in any manner becomes unnecessary. \"\n\nWe do not think that any exception can be taken to the observations made above in the context of the two versions which the jury had to consider. One version was that the Colonel had been assaulted and thereby sustained the injuries; the other version was that he had sustained the injuries by a fall on a rough surface like the masonry letter box. None of the two doctors were giving direct evidence of how the injuries were caused ; they were merely giving their opinion as to how in all probability they were caused. The learned Judge was, therefore, right in directing the jury in the way he did about\" the medioal evidence in the case. We may also point out here that the learned Judge drew the attention of the jury also to the evidence of Dr. Suresh Sinha, who said that the\n\nSUPREME COURT REJ?ORTS [1960]\n\n. 196o fracture on the .temporal region could be the indirect effect of the other injuries sustained by the Colonel.\n\nSmt. Nagindra\n\nBala Mit•a We now go on to third head of criticism viz., the\n\nS .1 Chv.d R learned Judge's exposition of the Ja.w relating to the \"uni an ra oy 'l • T h two charges on which Sum was tned. hese c argcs s. K. Das J. the learned Judge correctly explained with reference to the relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nBut he made one error. Dealing with the word 'voluntarily' in s. 325, he said: \"The word 'voluntarily' means what it says; it means 'of one's free will'.\" Perhaps, the learned Judge forgot that the word is defined in s. 39, Indian Penal Code, and that definition should have been placed before the jury.\n\nWe do not, however, think that this minor lapse misled the jury in any way or occasione-d a failure of justice. There is one more point in this connection.\n\nThe learned Judge did not tell the jury that it was open to them to return a verdict of guilt.y for an offence under s. 323, Indian Penal Code, if they came to the conclusion that Sunil gave a blow to the Colonel with a flexible rod, but did not cause the fracture. In the circumstances of the case, however, we do not think that the failure to direct the jury that it was open to them to return a verdict of guilty on a minor offence occasioned any failure of justice. If the eye-witnesses for the prosecution were believed, it would be undoubtedly a case under s. 325 Indian Penal Code ; if on the .contrary, the eye-witnesses were not believed and the defence version was a.ccepted that the Colonel sustained the injuries by a fall, then there would be no case even under s. 323 Indian Penal Code.\n\nA grievance was made before us under the fourth head of criticism_ that admissible evidence was shut out and inadmissible evidence was let in. It was submitted that Nirmal's statements to Pushpa Pal on\n\n...\n\nhis arrival at No. 18, Bonde! Road or at least his state- ... ments to the Head Constable Mathura Singh, before the arrival of the investigating officer, were not hit by s. 162 Criminal Procedure Code and were clearly admissible in evidence. The learned Judge said in this connection :\n\n\" I would like to remind you that if any person z960 makes any statement to the police, that is not admissible evidence as a rule unless in the case of s..u, Nagindra Bala Mitra contradietions which are formally proved, as you v. have seen the counsel for the accused has proved Sunil ChaHdra Roy contradictions in some cases; but you must bear in mind that except such cases, this is no evidence.\" 5 K. Das J • In the opinion which we have formed it is unnecessary to consi9.er whether the learned Judge was right or wrong : because we are of the opinion that even if those statements of Nirmal were admissible, they would not be substantive evidence of the facts stated therein ; and if Nirmal's evidence in Court was not accepted, his statements to the police officers concerned would hardly make any difference.\n\nAs to the admission of inadmissible evidence, learned counsel for the petitioners placed before us those parts of the charge to the jµry which dealt with the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses on their police statements. He submitted that a large part of that cross-examination was inadmissible in view of thE.t decision of this Court in Tahsildar Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (1). That decision dealt exhaustively with s. 162 Criminal Procedure Code and laid down certain propositions to explain the scope of that section; it was, however, observed that the examples given therein were not exhaustive and the Judge must decide in each case whether the recitals intended to be used for contradiction satisfied the requirements of the law. We agree that on th.e principles laid down in Tahsildar Singh's decision (1) some of the statements put to the prosecution witnesses were not really contradictions and did not, therefore, fall within what is permissible under s. 162 Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nWe may take, by way of example, what was put to Nirmal. The learned Judge placed the following contradictions in Nitmal's evidence to the jury:\n\n\"He was also cross-examined on his statement to the police. The main point made in his cross-examination on his statement to the police, are firstly, that the fist blow on the left temple was not mentioned by him and then he only said assault with blows before\n\n(I) A.I.R. 1959 S.C, IOU\n\nthe police and that he also said that the Colonel was hit near about the gate of the house and not beside Smt. Nagindra the boundary wall. It was also suggested to him in Bala Mitra v. defence that the Colonel did not fall on the lawn at\n\nSunil Chandra Roy all but fell on the letter box.\n\nThe further suggestion to him was that the fist blow was a. false invention s. K. Das J. and it was intended only after the post-mortem report was out. He was also told that he did not mention to the police that the Colonel was lying on his back.\n\nHe was also criticised for not having mentioned the names of persons who carried his father after he had fallen down. Nirmal's answer was that he was not asked and that it was physically impos'sible for him alone to carry his father. Then there was crossexamination as to whether the fist blow was before or a'fter Sati Mitra had clasped the Colonel.\"\n\nNow, on the principles laid down in Tahsildar Singh's decision (1 ) Nirmal's failure to mention bef9re the police that his father was lying on his back was not a contradiction; but his failure to mention that a fist blow on the left temple was given to his father was a contradiction. Therefore, the point before us really is this: assuming that some of the statements admitted in evidence were not really contradictions, do they materially affect the verdict? In our opinion, they do not. By and large, the important statements made before the police were admissible under s. 162 Criminal Procedure Code; but some minor statements were not. We do not think that the verdict of the jury Qll>n be said to have been vitiated on this ground.\n\nLastly, we come to the defence evidence. Here the complaint is that the learned Judge has su.mmed up the defence evidence qy adopting a different standard.\n\nWe are unable to agree. Even with regard 'to the prosecution witnesses, the learned Judge had emphasised points in favour of the prosecution. For example, dealing with the evidence of Purna Mali, the learned Judge said:\n\n\"Now, gentlemen, these questions are important because he does not improve the case or try to improve the case by suggesting that he saw a fist blow on the left temple and it is a mater for you to\n\n. '••· ' ' .. ' ~\n\n(1) A.l.K 1959 S.C. 1012\n\n- -J\n\nconsider in this connction whether this is a witness z96o whom you would consider a liar because you will have h Smt. Nagindra to consider the suggestion that if he were then e Bala Mitra would have probably tried to improve the case by v. suggestiQg to say that he did see a fist blow on the Sunil Chandra Roy temple.\"\n\nDealing with the evidence of Push pa Pal, the learned Judge pointedly drew attention of the jury to a circumstance which was partly in favour of the prosecution and partly of the defence :\n\n\"You also remember that Pushpa Pal held an inquest at about 9 a.m. on the 11th August, 1950. He says that he examined the compound, the lawn, the boundary wall, the gate, the masonry letter box, the bricks on edge and the whole spot of 18, Bondel Road including the pathway, but he found no blo6d marks anywhere.\"\n\nWe have examined the charge to the jury arefully ; it may suffer from a plethora of details and also perhaps a meticulous statement of the divergent views of the two doctors; but we have found no trace of the\n\nadopton of a double standard, or of a serious misdirection on any question of fact or law.\n\nWe have, therefore, come to the conclusion that on the prineiples which this Court has adopted for inter~\n\nference with a jury verdict, no case for interference has been made out in this case.\n\nThe appeal is accordingly dismissed.\n\nHIDAYATULLAH, J.-I have had the advantage of Hidayatullah J. reading the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, S. K. Das, J. He is of the opinion that the charge to the jury by the learned trial Juqge was proper. Since I have the misfortune to iffer from hiin in this conclusion, I am delivering a separate judgment. In my opinion, the charge to the jury was defective for several reasons, particularly misdirections in lawand absence of any guidance while setting forth at enormous length, without comment, the evidence in the case.\n\nMy learned brother has pointed out that this is.an unfortunate case, and I agree with him that it is so,\n\nn. vierof th~ ey:ents , th.a~ pave happened. .TP:e acts of t1fe case were siriiplicity 'itself. Tue offence alleged\n\n22 SUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS (1960]\n\nZ960 to have been committed as far back as August 11, 1950, has been the subi\"ect of three trials. It was first Smt, Nagindra Bala Mitra tried before the Additional Sessions Judge, Alipur v. who convicted the present respondent, Sunil, under Su•il Ckandra Roy BS. 325 and 44 7 of the Indian Penal Code, agreeing with the verdict of the jury. On appeal, t-he High Hitiayatullah J. Court of Calcutta set aside the conviction, and ordered a retrial at the Criminal Sessions of the High Court. The case was then tried by Mitter, J. with a special jury. The jury brought in an unanimous verdict of guilty against Sunil under the two sections, with which the learned Judge agreed. Sunil was sentenced to a long term of imprisonment, but the appellate side of the Calcutta High Court, on appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, and ordered a retrial.\n\nThe third trial was conducted by P. B. Mukherjee J. Before the trial, the State Government withdrew the case against Sunil's brother, Satyen, who was tried along with him in the previous trials, and was also convicted. This, withdrawal of the case was on the somewhat unusual ground that his health was bad. Sunil himself, it appears, was defended at Government cost by one of the Government advocates. The trial dragged through a weary course, in which prolonged cross-examination of the witnesses took place, and alleged contradictions between their previous versions were put to them in detail. After the arguments were over, the learned Judge charged the jury at considerable length. I have estimated that the charge is a document of some 50,000-60,000 words. How much of it was of any real guidance to the jury is a matter, to which I shaU address myself in the sequel; but it appears at the outset that the length of the charge was somewhat extraordinary, regard being had to the plain facts, to which I now refer.\n\nOn August 11, 1950, Sunil and his brothers were occupying a flat in No. 17 Bonde! Road, which belonged to Nirmal, son of the late S. C. Mitra, a very well-known Gynaecologist and Surgeon of Calcutta.\n\nIt• appears that the water supply to the flat was irregul_ar and intermittent, and Sunil had, in common with the other tenants, a complaint against the landlord, Nirmal. Incidents had taken place previously, and Sunil had taken the matter to the :rent eontrol Smt. Nagi; ulra authorities, and, it is alleged, had even threatened the- Bala Mitra landlord with dire consequences, if the water supply v. was not impro-ved. Under an alleged agreement, the Sunil Chandra Roy water supply was regulated by working the electric pump during certain hours of the day; but nothing Hidayatullah .J turns upon it. It appears that the water supply did not improve, and often enough, an exaspexating situation arose in so far as the tenants of No. 17, Bondel Road, including the present respondent, Sunil, were concerned.\n\nOn the fateful morning, matters came to a head,\n\n!'~ because the water supply, as was frequent, failed in the flat.\n\nEvidence has been led in the case to show that Sunil was angry and started abusing and expostulati.ng in a loud manner. He followed up his expostulations by entering the compound of No. 18, Bondel Road, whether to see to the working of the pump himself, as he contended, or to remonstrate more effectively with the landlord, as is the prosecution case.\n\nHowever it be, Nirmal's father, Col. Mitra, happened to be present that morning, and he came out to talk the matter over with Sunil, who apparently was quite loud in his remonstrances. Whether the\n\nColonel gave any offence to Sunil by rebuking him is not much to the present purpose, because I am not determining:the true faQts in this order. The case for\n\n). the prosecution is that Sunil grappled with the Colonel, and gave him a blow upon the head with what is described as a 'rod-like' object, and also hit him on the temple with his fist.\n\nThe Colonel, it is alleged, fell down, while Sunil chunbered the parapet wall, and made good his escape, because the Colonel had previously ordered that the gates be shut. Mea.nwhile, the Colonel was taken and laid on a cot, where he expired. A phone call having been made to the police, the Investigating Officer arrived on the scene, and after taking some statements including one from • Sunil, he went and arrested him and also his two brothers. Post-mortem examination revealed a linear fracture of the temporal bone with a haematoma under the su!'face. On the forehead of the Colonel\n\nr96o was a mark of the injury alleged to have been given with t.he 'rod-like ' object, though over the seat of Smt. N agindra - bl h Bola Mifra the fracture no outward visi e injury was seen. T e v. doctor who performed the autopsy also found certain Sunil Chandra Roy pathological defects in the liver and the gall bladder, and he asked the Chemical Examiner to examine the Hidayatullah J, viscera for possible p6ison_ing.\n\nHe gave the opinion that death was \"due to shock consequent to head injury, i.e., injuries on the top of senile changes and pathological liver and gall bladder as well as to inhibition.\" With regard to the head injury which was certified to be ante-mortem, the doctor was of opinion that it was likely to have been caused by a fall on some hard substance.\n\nT!ie charge against Sunil, in the first instance, was under s. 302, but the ca, se proceeded in the subsequent trials only under s. 325 read with a further charge under s. 44 7 of the Indian Penal Code for house trespass, with intention to intimidate, insult or annoy the owner.\n\nThe above facts clearly show that the essence of the case lay in a very narrow compass. The questions which the jury had to determine were whether Sunil trespassed into the premises of No. 18, Bonde! Road with the intention of insulting, intimidating or annoying the owner and further, whether Sunil struck one or more blows either with a ' rod-like ' object or his fist or'l the head of Col. Mitra, thereby causing him injuries, simple or grievous.\n\nAlternatively, the jury had to determine whether Col. Mitra suffered these injuries not at the hands of Sunil but by a fall, which was the defence.\n\nNo doubt, the case involved a very lengthy cross-examination of the_witnesses for the prosecution, who alleged that they had witnessed the entire occurrence. The issues to be decided were simple. One would have expected that the learned Judge in charging the jury would have, at least, pointed out to the jury what were the points for determination after weighing the evidence, pro and con, in the case ; but the learned Judge did not, in spite of the voluminous charge, put these simple points b\\)fore the jury. The attention of the jury was never directed to thes.e simple matters,, but, on the\n\nother hand, it was directed to almost everything z96o else.\n\nSmt. Nagindra No doubt, a verdict of the jury is entitled to the Bala Mitra greatest weight, not only before the Court of trial but v. in all appeals including that before this Court. The Sunil Chandra Roy law does not allow an appeal against the verdict, except only if the Judge in his charge to the jury is Hidayatullah f. guilty of a wrong direction in law or of a substantial misdirection. Since the verdict of the jury depends upon the charge, the charge becomes a most vital document in judging whether the verdict be sustained or not. It is the charge which one pas to examine, to find out whether the verdict is defective or not. Such - an important stage in the trial requires that the Judge should be careful to lead the jury to a correct appreciation of the evidence, so that the essential issues in the case may be correctly determined by them, after understanding the true import of the evidence on the rival sid(;)s.\n\nA charge which fails to perform. this basic purpose cannot be regarded as a proper charge, and if it contains also misdirections as to law, it cannot be upheld. The learned Judge in his charge to the jury began by telling the jury in a sentence or two each, what were the essential things they had to remember, before making up their minds as to the verdict. He told the jury that tl).ey were the judges of fact, and that it was their function to determine all issues of fact, without accepting any view which he might feel disposed to express upon the credibility or otherwise of the witnesses. These observations in black and white do read quite well; but, in view of the fact that the Judge expressed almost no opinion as to the credibility or otherwise of the witnesses, it lost in practical application all its point. Then, the Judge stated that every accused was presumed to be innocent, until the contrary was proved, and further, that the jury should convict only if the facts were compatible with his guilt. So far as this direction went, nothing can be said against it. The Judge next proceeded to explain what was meant by the expression \"fact proved\". He paraphrased the definition of \" proved \" from the Evidence Act. In dealing with\n\nzg6o this topic, he omitted to explain also the expressions \" disproved\" and \"not proved \"; but that too cannot Smt. Nagindra Bala Mitra be said to be a serious defect.\n\nHe then expatiated on , v. reasonable doubt, the benefit of which, according to Sunil Chandra Roy him, must go to the accused. In dealing with this\n\nsubjeet, he observed as follows: Hidayatullah j.- \"The law further says, if you have any reasonable doubt, then the fact is not proved and the verdict you bring would be a verdict of not guilty.\n\nIf you have no reasonable doubt, then the verdict\n\nyou are to give is the verdict of guilty.\n\nA further question that you should bar in mind is that you may be in a state where you cannot decide. That is a case of benefit of doubt and if you reach such a stage, then the law says that you will give the benefit of doubt to the accused. That means that if you have a kind of doubt which makes you unable to decide, then the accused is not guilty.\n\nAgain, if you have no such doubt, then the accused is guilty. These are the main principles of criminal -trial which I think, you should bear in mind while you are approaching the evidence in this case.\" This statement of the law is partly true but not wholly true. The learned Judge, with due respect, did not make it clear to the jury that the prosecution case is built up of numerous facts, though the fact to be determined ls the guilt of the accused, and that a reasonable doubt may arise not only in conpection with the whole oft.he case but also in relation to any one or more of the numerous facts, which the prosecution seeks to establish. Every individual fact on which doubt may be entertained may be held against the prosecution; but it does not mean that if the jury entertained a doubt about any individual fact, the benefit of that doubt must result in their bringing in a verdict 'of not guilty'.\n\nThis, however, seems to be the effect of this direction which incidentally is almost the only direction on the point of law which the learned Judge, apart from what I have stated earlier, has chosen to give. In my opinion, the learned Judge should have told the jury that they could give the benefit of the doubt on proof of any individual fat, if they felt any doubt\n\nabout the proof. But he should have cautioned them z960 that the totality of facts must be viewed in relation - to the offence charged, and the benefit resulting in Smt .. Na'ginba Bala Mitra acquittal could be given only if they felt that when v. all was seen and considered, there was doubt as to Sunil Chandra Ro:Y whether the accused had committed the crime or not. ·· -· ·· The direction on the point of law contained in the flid .. yatulla~ { above passage was too attenuated, and, in my opinion misleading, al!l.d led to the inference, possibly, that if the jury felt a doubt about even one circumstance, they must bring in a verdict of not ' guilty'.\n\nHaving laid down the law to the extent indicated above, the learned Judge next explained the ingredients of Ii. 325 of the Indian Penal Code. He explained thii; i wit:b. reference only to grievous hurt, drawing the attention of the jury to ' fracture of bone ' or injury endangering life ' in the definition.\n\nHe failed to say that grievous hurt was only an aggravated form of . hurt, a.nd that the liability of the aecused did noti\n\noea.se, if he committed an act which resulted in a simple hurt. Ind@ed, the learned Judge did not tell the jury that even if they held that the accused did not cause a grievous injury, i.t would be open to them to hold that he caused a simple injury, which would bring the matter within s. 323 of the Indian Penal Code. I may further point out tha.t after the verdict of 'not guilty' under s. 325, the learned Judge did not question the jury whether they thought that the accused was guilty of causing at least simple hurt.\n\nThe jury gave no reasons; they only answered the query whether they thought that the accused was quilty of the offence of causing grievous hurt. But they were noti questioned whether they thought, on the facts of the case, that the accused had committed the lesser offence of causing simple hurt. It must be remembered that the prosecution case was that two blows were given, one causing the injury to the temple resulting in a fracture of the temporal bone and the other, causing an. injury on the forehead of of Col. Mitra. One of them was grievous; the other was not. Of course, the jury were perfectly entitled to hold that the accused caused neither of these injuries; but it is possible that the jury, if questioned,\n\n•960 would have answered that they thought that the accused had caused the simple injury but not the one Smt. Nagindra l · h f f h 1 b T Bala Mitra resu tmg m t e racture o t e tempora one. he v. failure to question the jury with regard to the lesser Sunil Chandra Roy offence completely ruled out that aspect of the case from the minds of the jury, with the result that the Hidayatullah J. jury were limited to a case of grievous hurt and not lesser offence.\n\nThese defects in the charge to the jury on matters of law are heightened by the manner in which the facts have been laid before them.\n\nThe charge to the jury, as I havj'l stated, ran the course of 50,000- 60,000 words. The matter I have so far discussed is contained in 1,000-1,500 words.\n\nThereafter, the learned Judge did nothing more than paraphrase the evidence of each single witness in detail, or read out extracts from it. Throughout the course of this reading and paraphrasing, he made no attempt to connect the evidence with. the fact to be tried.\n\nAll that he ever said-and he said it with monotonous iteration-was that it was for the jury to decide whether they believed the witnesses or not. No doubt, a Judge in charging the jury is neither compelled nor required to express his opinion on the evidence, except on a matter of law. But Judges marsha.11 facts and evidence to draw the attention of the jury to what is relevant and what is not. They do not try to place everything that a witness states, before the jury. It must be remembered that a charge is a vital document, and the Judge's summing up is only needed, because the minds of the jury must be directed to the salient points in the evidence, so that they may avoid the irrelevant or immaterial parts thereof.\n\nThe learned Judge before dealing with the evidence, prefaced his remarks by saying this :\n\n\"I now propose to take up the prosecution witnesses individually with a view to sum up the evidence of each witness and the suggestions made to each by the counsel for the accused.\" This represents a very fair and adequate summary of what the Judge really did, except that he did not sum up the evidence but placed it in its entirety.\n\nAs I have statecl, he took each witness, turn by turn\n\n. -\n\n....\n\nparaphrased his evidence Sentence by Sentence, and\n\nI960 read out those portions whichhe did not paraphrase, . d h . f h .\n\nSmt. Nagindra without trymg to raw t e attent10n o t e Jury to Bala Mitra the relevancy or materiality of the various parts. v.\n\nThe document is composed of a series of narrations Sunil Chandra Roy with regard to the testimony of the witnesses, each portion beginning with the words, \" Then there is the Hidayatullah J• . evidence of witness so and so ... \" and ending with\n\n\"This is the evidence .of witness so and so ... \" In between is a voluminous account of everything that each witness stated. Not only this; no difference was made between the testimony of the eye-witnesses and of the formal witnesses in the matter of treatment.\n\nI quote verbatim from the charge what the learned Judge said with regard to one of the police witnesses.\n\n\" Then comes the evidence of Head Constable Mathura Singh. He reached No. 18; Bondel Road in a lorry and he was' accompanied by a constable.\n\nYou remember he was first sent by Pushpa Pal.\n\nThis Head Constable l\\'lathura Singh posted another constable at the gate so as not to allow a crowd to gather. He also saw Col. Mitter lying unconscious like a dead person covered with a blanket. He also had talk with Nirmal. I would like to remind you that if any person makes any statement to the police, that is not admissible evidence as a rule unless in the case of contradictions which .. are formally proved as you have seen the Counsel for the accused has proved contradictions in some cases but you must bear in mind that ex:cept such cases, this is no evidence.\n\nThen thisConstableMathuraSingh went to No. l7 with the other constable and posted that other\n\nconstable at No. 17 to control the crowd so as 1ro prevent any one eoming out of No.17 and then while he was coming back to No. 18 to find out if he could telephone the officer in charge, the constable found the officer in charge at the gate ofNo.18. After Pushpa Pal, the Officer in charge came out ofNo. 18, Bondel Road, he went to No. 17 and brought down the accused. That is the evidence of Constable Mathura Singh also. This Constable took charge of the accused and left for the thana with the accus-\n\n30 SUPREl'lE COURT REPORTS [1960]\n\nx960 ed at about 9 O'clock in the morning on the 11th . August, 1950. Mathura Singh was cross-examined 5\"'1 Nagindra and he said in cross-examination that he did not Bala Mitra v. note down the names of the persons forming the Sunil Chaud.a Roy crowd at No. 18. He did not go and find any article at No. 17.\n\nHis evidence is that he was there to Hiday•tullah J. guard No. 17 s'o that no one escaped from there. \" It needs no argument to apprehend that all this was not only a waste of the Court's time but was also likely to obliterate the impression which the jury had gathered with regard to the other material evidence in the case.\n\nThis is only one passage quoted from the evidence of one witness. Not only were several such witnesses brought to the notice of the jury; but even in the evidence of those that were relevant and material, there was no attempt ma.de to extricate the relevant from the irrelevant, the material from the immaterial, the ore from the dross. The learned Judge, as he had indicated, followed the pattern of putting ' all the.evidence before the jury without any .attempt to focus their attention on the salient parts of it, and without expressing his opinion either for or against the accused.\n\nThere were only two passageB in the entire charge, in which the learned Judge expressed his opinion.\n\nOne was with regard to an old lady who was an eyewitness and who viewed the incident from the upper storey of a neighbouring hou3e. That lady was the one person about whom it could be said that she was entirely disinterested and whose respectability was above reproach.\n\nShe was old and had weak eyesight.\n\nShe had stated that she saw the quarrel going on, then she asked for her spectacles and saw properly. Whether she saw correctly or not was the question. The learned Judge told the jury that the lady was too old and unreliable to be a proper witness, without warning them this time that his opinion was not binding on them. The other comment is with regard to the medical evidence, where the learned Judge in one part promised the jury that he would give them adequate guidance how to weigh the conflicting medical testimony, which, it appears, he forgot to do at the end, and in another portion, he gave this direction :\n\n... : -\n\n\"'Now, gentlemen, when a medical witness is z96o called as an expert he is not a witness of fact. .\n\nSmt. Nagindra Medical evidence of an expert is evidence of opinion, Bala Mitra not of fact.\n\nWhere there are alleged eye-witness of v. . physical violence which is said to have caused theS>itter by clasping he Colonel, and also on the point whether\n\nthe Colonel was dragged by his shirt. I will read r96o out the relevant questions and answers: <.5\n\n1 N . d.h fi d f h h h d . m . agin •~ Q. Do you n urt er t at you ave state m BalaMitra the next paragraph after that' I also saw another v. tall person stated to be the second brother was SunilChandra Roy dragging the old man holding his wearing shirt'? . - A. I saw that person dragging the Colonel by lfidayatullah .] holding his genji and when a fist blow was given to the Colonel, Sati Mitter came and clasped him from a side.\n\nQ. 161. Do you find here that all that is written is that you saw the Colonel being dragged and nothing is mentioned about the fist . blow and Mrs. Sati Mitter clasping her father-in-law and being pulled away by the hair ?\n\nA. I do not know how the police had recorded my .. statement. But I am telling you that (what) I saw.\n\nI saw that when a fist blow was\"given to the Colonel Sa ti Mitter came and clasped the Colonel from a side and she was thrown down by being caught by her hair.\n\nQ. 164. Forget about the gnji and the shirt.\n\nYou find here that nothing is mentioned about your evidence that you saw the Colonel being given a fist blow by the accused on the left temple and then Sati Mitter coming and clasping the Colonel round his waist,-you find that is not mentioned ?\n\nA. On my being repeatedlylasked about the lathi blow I: denied to the police that I had seen any lathi blow being given to him, but I said that I had seen a fist blow being given.\"\n\nThe second passage is even more significant. This is how it runs : • \"She makes it clear that she saw the incident at different stages having been to the kitphen in the meantime and come back. She saw the Colonel after\n\nhr return from the kitchen. She does not r.emember the dress of the assailant. She also says that the gate of No. 18 was closed. Her evidence has been criticised also for contradiction between her evidence here and her statement to the police first. It is said that she. said before the police that she heard the hulla herself; here she says that it was the children's cries s\n\nr960 which attracted her attention. Secondlv, she said to . , the police that she came first to the dawing room ; Smt. Nagindra here she savs that she came first to the verandah.\n\nBala Mitra .J v.\n\nThirdly, she also said to the police that she saw the Sunil Chandro Roy person wearing Choti or pants and blue shirts.\n\nFourthly, before the police she said that she saw t.he Hidayatullah J. three persons leaving Nirmal and started arguing.\n\nHere she says that she did not see them arguing.\n\nFifthly, it is said she told the police she saw the Colonel once go near the pillar of the gate on the western side but she does not say so here. Then again, it is said that she told the police that she saw the assailant bring out a black looking object from somewhere in his waist and she subsequently saw the old man fallen down. She said here that she did not see the old man falling down.\n\nGentlemen, you will again weigh these contra.dictions and see whether they are such as to discredit the witness or are such for which you can niake allowance. In fact, she said in cross-examination that ' something' was brought out by the assailant from his right side. I think, gentlemen of the jury, you also asked her some questions.\n\nDuring the examination it a.ppears that you have told us that you saw Colonel Mitter being drawn towards 17, Bonde! Road?\n\nHe was being dragged in the direction of the Mansion House.\n\nQ. ll 1. That is, towards the west of the path ?\n\nYes.\n\nQ. ll2. How far was he from the boundary walls abutting the Bonde! Road ?\n\nI would not be able to tell you that because I was seeing this from above, from a height.\n\nThen the last question to her was this:\n\nQ. 113.\n\nYou have just given us more or less what you saw. Could you also tell us exactly on what part of the lawn, was it at the central portion of the lawn or was it on the side of the lawn that you saw that one person who was with the Colonel was bringing out something from his side ? At what position were the Colonel and that gentleman standing ?\n\nA. It is difficult for me to describe the position. x960 But I can say that he was neither in the exact centre 1 1 Smt. Nagind•a of the lawn nor was he abso ute y on an extreme side Bala Mitra of the lawn. He was somewhere about 4 or 5 cubits v. away from the gate of the boundary wall.\" Sunil Chandra Roy In the previous trials, the Calcutta High Court rejected the verdict of the jury, because in the opinion .r of Chakravarti, C.J. (Sarkar, J. concurring), it was all comment and no evidence. It may be said that this time it was all evidence and no comment or arrangement. The Calcutta High Court has laid down in a series of cases what the charge to the jury should be, and I shall refer only to the Calcutta cases.\n\nThere is no settled rule or practice as to what a\n\n'1f. charge should or should not contain.\n\nThat is dictated by the circumstances of each case. Sir James Fitz-James Stephen in his History of Criminal Law of England, Vol. I, pp. 455-456 (quoted in Trial by Jury and Misdirection by Mukherji, 1937 Edn., at p. 237)says:\n\n\"The slimming up again is a highly characteristic part of the proceedings, but it is one on which I feel it difficult to write. l think however that a Judge who merely states to the Jury certain propositions of law and then reads over his notes does not discharge his duty. This course was commoner in former times than it iS now ...... I also think that a Judge who forms a decided opinion before he has heard the whole case or who allows himself to be in any degree actuated by an advocate's feelings in regulating the proceedings; altogether fails to discharge his duty, but I further think that he ought not to conceal his opinion from the Jury, nor do I see how it is possible for him to do so, if he arranges the evidence in the orderjin which-it strikes his mind. The mere effort to see what is essential to a story, in what order the important events happened, and in what relation they stand to each other must, of necessity, point to a conclusion. The act of stating for the Jury the questions which they have to answer and of stating the evidence bearing on those questions and in showing in what respect it is important, generally goes a considerable way\n\nH idayatullah J.\n\n1960 towards suggesting an answer to them, and .if a Judge does not do as much at least as this, he does Smt. Nagindra h Bala Mura almost not ing.'.' v.\n\nAs pointed out by Mukerji (ibid p. 253): SunilChandraRoy \"Where the charge to the Jury was little more\n\nH idayat ullah J. than a rambling statement of the evidence as it came from the mouths of the several witnesses who were called and no attempt was made to sift the releva.nt and important matters from the irrelevant and unimportant facts, held that the charge was defective a, nd the trial was vitiated on that account. (J abed Silcdar) (1 ). It is not sufficient for the Judge simply to point out this peaca of evidence and that, this presumption and that, this bit of Jaw and that.\n\nIt is his duty to help and guide the Jury to a proper conclusion. It is his duty to direct the attention of the Jury to the essential facts. It is his duty to point out to them the weight to be attached to the evidence and to impress upon them that if there is any doubt in their minds they must give the benefit of the doubt to the accused. It is not enough that the Judge has said something on each of these matters somewhere in the charge. It is the manner of saying it, the arrangement and the structure of his charge which will make it either of value or valueless to the Jury. (Molla Khan)(') ...\n\nIt is not enough to read out the evidence in extenso; it is incumbent on the Judge to analyse it and place it succinctly before the Jury (Rajab Ali) (')'.\" The charge in this case goes manifestly against these directions, It is no more than ; a recital of the entire evidence in the case almost as detailed as the evidence itself, and there is no attempt whatever to give any guidance to the Jury.\n\nNo doubt, the Privy Council in Arnold v. King Emperor(') stated that:\n\n\"A charge to a Jury must be read as a whole. If there are _salient propositions of law in it, these will, of course be the subject of separate analysis.\n\nBut in a protracted narrative of fact, the determination of which is ultimately left to the jury, it must\n\n(1) (1931) 35 C.W.N. 835.\n\n(3) A.LR. 1927 Cal. 631.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1934 Cal. 169 (S.B.)\n\n(4) (1914) L.R. 41 I.A. 149\n\nneeds be that the view of the Judge may not z960 coincide with the view.of others who look upon the whole proceedings in black type. It would however, Smt. Nagindra Bala Mitra not be in accordance with usual or good practice to v. treat such cases as cases of misdirection, if, upon Sunil Chandra Roy the general view taken, the case has been fairly left within the Jury's province.\" Hidayatullah J.\n\nThese observations apply only if the matter has been fairly left to the jury. When this charge is read through its vast length, the most astute person is left guessing as to where it waslall driving the jury to. It is a protracted narrative no doubt, but it is so amorphous as to give no indication of its real purport and import, and leaves the matter not in the hands of the jury, but, if I may so ay with great respect, in the air.\n\nI think that this was a case for the exercise of the powers of this Court under Art. 136.\n\nAs was laid down in Ramlcrishan Mithanlal Sharma v. The State of Bombay (1), the Judge in summing up for the prosecution and defence should not give merely .a summary of the evi<;}ence; he must marshall the evidence so as to give proper assistance to the jury, who a.re requiredto decide which view of the facts is true.\n\nI am, therefore, of opinion that the charge to the jury cannot be s.aid to be a proper charge on any principle or precedent, and that the verdict cannot be accepted. Though this case has taken already almost ten. years, there is prima f acie reason to think that justice has failed. Since the matter is now before the highest Court, there is no likelihood of any further delay in the case, and what is just therein can be done.\n\nI would, therefore, proceed to hear the case on merits.\n\nBy Court : In accordaince with the opinion of the majority, this appeal is dismissed.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n(1) (1955] I S.C.R. 903, 930.", "total_entities": 194, "entities": [{"text": "NAGINDRA BALA MITRA\n\nAND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 64, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NAGINDRA BALA MITRA\n\nAND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SUNIL CHANDRA ROY AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 98, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUNIL CHANDRA ROY AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. K. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 110, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. K. DAs", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. K. SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112, "end_char": 124, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.K. SARKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 263, "end_char": 289, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Per Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1776, "end_char": 1792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Hidayatullah, J.-In his charge to the jury, in the present case, (1) the judge took each' witness, turn by turn, paraphrased his evidence, sentence by sentence and read out those portions which he did not paraphrase, without trying to.draw the atten- .", "canonical_name": "Per Hidayatullah"}}, {"text": "Nagindra", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 2240, "end_char": 2248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nagindra matter of t.reatment, (2) while telling the jury that they Bala Mslra could give the benefit of the doubt on proof of any individual ."}}, {"text": "Sunil Chandra Roy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2447, "end_char": 2464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. fact if they felt 'any doubt about the proof, the judge did Sunil Chandra Roy not at the same time caution them that the totality of facts must be viewed in relation to the offence charged and that the benefit resulting in acquittal could be given only if they felt that when all was seen and considered; there was doubt as to whether the accused had committed the crime or not, (3) the judge while explaining the ingredients of the offence of grievous hurt under s. 325 of the Indian Penal Code failed to tell the jury that grievous hurt was only an aggravated form of hurt and that even if they held that the accused did not cause a grievous injury it would be open to them to hold that he caused a simple injury which would bring the matter within s. 323 of the Code, and (4) omissions \\Vere treated as contradictions and placed before the jury in complete disregard of s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Held, that these defects amounted to misdirections and that the verdict could not be accepted.", "canonical_name": "SUNIL CHANDRA ROY AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "s. 325", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2851, "end_char": 2857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2865, "end_char": 2882, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 323", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3138, "end_char": 3144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3260, "end_char": 3266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3274, "end_char": 3300, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3545, "end_char": 3564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated June 14, 1954, of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Purshottam Tricumdas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3709, "end_char": 3729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Tricumdas, H.J. Umrigar and B. P.\n\nMaheshwari, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "H.J. Umrigar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3731, "end_char": 3743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Tricumdas, H.J. Umrigar and B. P.\n\nMaheshwari, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "B. P.\n\nMaheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3748, "end_char": 3765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Tricumdas, H.J. Umrigar and B. P.\n\nMaheshwari, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatter.iee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3788, "end_char": 3805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatter.iee, R. L. Anand and D, N .. Mukherjee, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "R. L. Anand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3807, "end_char": 3818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatter.iee, R. L. Anand and D, N .. Mukherjee, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "N .. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3826, "end_char": 3840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatter.iee, R. L. Anand and D, N .. Mukherjee, for respondent No.", "canonical_name": "P. B. Mukherjee"}}, {"text": "A. C. Mitra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3865, "end_char": 3876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nA. C. Mitra, A. M. Pal and P. K. Bose, for respondent No.", "canonical_name": "A. C. Mitra"}}, {"text": "A. M. Pal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3878, "end_char": 3887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nA. C. Mitra, A. M. Pal and P. K. Bose, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "P. K. Bose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3892, "end_char": 3902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nA. C. Mitra, A. M. Pal and P. K. Bose, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Sarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3976, "end_char": 3982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of S. K. Das and Sarkar, JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4021, "end_char": 4033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by S. K. Das, J.\n\nHidayatullah, J., delivered a separate.", "canonical_name": "Per Hidayatullah"}}, {"text": "s. K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4070, "end_char": 4079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s. K. Das J.\n\nS. K.\"DAs J.-This is an.", "canonical_name": "S. K. DAs"}}, {"text": "S. K.\"DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4084, "end_char": 4093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s. K. Das J.\n\nS. K.\"DAs J.-This is an.", "canonical_name": "S. K. DAs"}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4241, "end_char": 4249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "18, Bondel Road in Calcutta in the course of which one Col."}}, {"text": "S. C. Mitra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4282, "end_char": 4293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Mitra; a Gynaecologist arid Surgeon, lost his life.", "canonical_name": "A. C. Mitra"}}, {"text": "Mitra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4345, "end_char": 4350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mitra was the husband of petitioner No.", "canonical_name": "Mitra"}}, {"text": "ss. 302, 323 and 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4574, "end_char": 4593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sunil", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4979, "end_char": 4984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 and consisted of several flats one of sunil Ch; ndra Roy which on the second floor was in occupation of Sunil as a tenant; thttt they had attacked Col.", "canonical_name": "Sunil"}}, {"text": "Satyen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5176, "end_char": 5182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2; that Sunil had inflicted a blow or blows on the Colonel wnich caused his death and that one of his brothers Satyen had inflicted some minor injuries on the person of petitioner No."}}, {"text": "Sati Mitra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5346, "end_char": 5356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was also a charge a, gainst Sunil for an assault alleged to have been committed on Mrs. Sati Mitra, wife of petitioner No.", "canonical_name": "Sa ti Mitter"}}, {"text": "Additional Sessions Judge of Alipur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5447, "end_char": 5482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The accused persons were, in the first instance, tried by the Additional Sessions Judge of Alipur with the result, that Sunil was convicted under ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 325 and 447", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5531, "end_char": 5546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 323 and 447", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5564, "end_char": 5579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5581, "end_char": 5598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Amalesh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5628, "end_char": 5635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as the third brother Amalesh was concernd, his case was referred to the High Court as the learned Judge did not agree with the jury's verdict of not guilty."}}, {"text": "Sunil", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5765, "end_char": 5770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sunil and Satyen appealed to the High Court against their convictions and sentences ; the State of West Bengal obtained a Rule for enhancement of the sentences passed on Sunil and Satyen.", "canonical_name": "Sunil"}}, {"text": "State of West Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5855, "end_char": 5875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sunil and Satyen appealed to the High Court against their convictions and sentences ; the State of West Bengal obtained a Rule for enhancement of the sentences passed on Sunil and Satyen."}}, {"text": "High Court of Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6042, "end_char": 6064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal was allowed, anroµght -Ur. &"}}, {"text": "chin Bose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15898, "end_char": 15907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "chin Bose who exa, mined the\n\nSUPREME COU~T REPORTS [1960]\n\n'96° Colonel and found him already dead."}}, {"text": "Pushpa Pal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16063, "end_char": 16073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nagina,• the telephone message from Nirmal, Pushpa Pal,\n\nBalaMitra Officer-in-charge, Karaya Police Sta\"tion, deputed a v.\n\nHead-cmrntable named lVIathura Singh, to go to No.18 sunilChandmRoy but when the constable arrived, the incident was over.", "canonical_name": "Push pa Pal"}}, {"text": "Karaya Police Sta\"tion", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16105, "end_char": 16127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nagina,• the telephone message from Nirmal, Pushpa Pal,\n\nBalaMitra Officer-in-charge, Karaya Police Sta\"tion, deputed a v.\n\nHead-cmrntable named lVIathura Singh, to go to No.18 sunilChandmRoy but when the constable arrived, the incident was over."}}, {"text": "lVIathura Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16164, "end_char": 16179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nagina,• the telephone message from Nirmal, Pushpa Pal,\n\nBalaMitra Officer-in-charge, Karaya Police Sta\"tion, deputed a v.\n\nHead-cmrntable named lVIathura Singh, to go to No.18 sunilChandmRoy but when the constable arrived, the incident was over.", "canonical_name": "l\\'lathura Singh"}}, {"text": "Puspha Pal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16506, "end_char": 16516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "17, Bondel Road, Puspha Pal met one Sarat Banerji, said to be a priest of a neighbourhood called Shitalatala.", "canonical_name": "Push pa Pal"}}, {"text": "Sarat Banerji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16525, "end_char": 16538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "17, Bondel Road, Puspha Pal met one Sarat Banerji, said to be a priest of a neighbourhood called Shitalatala.", "canonical_name": "Sarat Banerji"}}, {"text": "Shitalatala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16586, "end_char": 16597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "17, Bondel Road, Puspha Pal met one Sarat Banerji, said to be a priest of a neighbourhood called Shitalatala."}}, {"text": "Majumdar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17194, "end_char": 17202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the opinion of Dr. Majumdar who carried out the post-mortem examination as recorded in his report, the death of the Colonel was due to shock caused by the head injury, on top of senile changes, and the head injury which was ante-mortem must have been caused by a fall on some hard substance_."}}, {"text": "2nd September, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17516, "end_char": 17535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The post-mortem report was not signed till the 2nd September, 1950, and not until the pathological report and the chemical report had been obtained."}}, {"text": "Nagindra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18304, "end_char": 18312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nagindra time of the incident and fell down on a rough surface, Bala Mitra either on the passage or on the masonry letter box, v. and hurt himself."}}, {"text": "s. K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18605, "end_char": 18614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defence against the charge of criminal s. K. Das f. trespass was that Sunil entered the com pound of No.", "canonical_name": "S. K. DAs"}}, {"text": "s. 297", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19910, "end_char": 19916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19918, "end_char": 19941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bala Milra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20606, "end_char": 20616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bala Milra\n\nv. \"A charge to a jury must be read as a whole.", "canonical_name": "Bala Milra"}}, {"text": "L.R. 41 I.A. 149", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 22598, "end_char": 22614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chakravarti", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22629, "end_char": 22640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chakravarti, C. J., had said in Sunil Chandra RO]J and Another v. The State (1):\n\n\"But I feel bound to say that the function of a Smt."}}, {"text": "s. 297", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24163, "end_char": 24169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24171, "end_char": 24194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "0ury Bala Mitra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25030, "end_char": 25045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nag; ndra questions of fact to which the attention of the J\n\n0ury Bala Mitra\n\nv. had to be drawn."}}, {"text": "Arnold", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25131, "end_char": 25137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The principle laid down by the sunilChandraRoy Privy Council in Arnold's case (3) and accepted by this\n\nCourt as correct is that it would not be in accordance s. K. Das J. with good practfoe to trertt a case.as a case of misdirectiolil if, upon the general view taken, the case has been fairly left within the jury's province, and this Court will not interfere unless something gross amounting to a complete misdescription of the whole bearing of the evidence has occurred."}}, {"text": "Nagimba Bala Mitra", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 27360, "end_char": 27378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nagimba Bala Mitra also of medical witnesses."}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27616, "end_char": 27619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das J. have formed."}}, {"text": "Lalit Mitra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28011, "end_char": 28022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nirmal telephoned to his brother Dr. Lalit Mitra immediately after Col."}}, {"text": "Nirnial", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28097, "end_char": 28104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suggestion to Nirnial was that he had not told his doctor brother then that his father had been beaten,· but had said only that his father had \" fainted \"."}}, {"text": "Nirma.I", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28554, "end_char": 28561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The complaint of the petitioners is that Nirma.", "canonical_name": "Nirma.I"}}, {"text": "sunil Chand.a Roy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29622, "end_char": 29639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pushpa Pal, the investigating Bala Mitr~\n\nv. police officer, understood this to mean heart trouble sunil Chand.a Roy and he recorded \"heart trouble \" in Nirmal's statement.", "canonical_name": "SUNIL CHANDRA ROY AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Pushpa Pal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 29876, "end_char": 29886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This part of the evidence of Pushpa Pal also the learned Judge placed before the jury."}}, {"text": "Nagendra Bala Ghose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30471, "end_char": 30490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We must, however, mention two more points, one in connection with a person called Sarat Banerji and the other with regard to Mrs.\n\nNagendra Bala Ghose."}}, {"text": "SaratBanerji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30492, "end_char": 30504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SaratBanerji, it appears, was a priest who brought some holy water, and there was some evidence to show that such water was sprinkled on the Colonel soon after the incident.", "canonical_name": "Sarat Banerji"}}, {"text": "Bala Misra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31810, "end_char": 31820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nagindra tion only to meet the defence suggestion that she was Bala Misra there at the time of the incident in Prof. Mahanti's v. place and was being kept back.\" .", "canonical_name": "Bala Milra"}}, {"text": "Mahanti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31864, "end_char": 31871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nagindra tion only to meet the defence suggestion that she was Bala Misra there at the time of the incident in Prof. Mahanti's v. place and was being kept back.\" ."}}, {"text": "SwnilChandra Roy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31912, "end_char": 31928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SwnilChandra Roy It was submitted before us that Mrs. Ghose was no doubt old, but she was a respectable and reliable wits.", "canonical_name": "SUNIL CHANDRA ROY AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Ghose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31966, "end_char": 31971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SwnilChandra Roy It was submitted before us that Mrs. Ghose was no doubt old, but she was a respectable and reliable wits."}}, {"text": "Majumdar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 32830, "end_char": 32838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The two doctors of importance who were examined in the case were Dr. Majumdar, who made the post-mortem examination, and Dr. Kabir Hussain,· Professor of Forensic and State Medicine in the Calcutta Medical College."}}, {"text": "Kabir Hussain", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 32886, "end_char": 32899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The two doctors of importance who were examined in the case were Dr. Majumdar, who made the post-mortem examination, and Dr. Kabir Hussain,· Professor of Forensic and State Medicine in the Calcutta Medical College."}}, {"text": "Calcutta Medical College", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32950, "end_char": 32974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The two doctors of importance who were examined in the case were Dr. Majumdar, who made the post-mortem examination, and Dr. Kabir Hussain,· Professor of Forensic and State Medicine in the Calcutta Medical College."}}, {"text": "s 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33828, "end_char": 33831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Suni!Chandra Roy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34150, "end_char": 34166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Our Suni!Chandra Roy attention was drawn to the evidence of Dr. Kabir Hussain, who opined that the haemorrhage on the s. K. Das f. inner urface of the scalp near the site of the fracture was an external injury.", "canonical_name": "SUNIL CHANDRA ROY AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Kabir Hussain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34474, "end_char": 34487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The point to be noticed in\n\nthi~ connection is that the learned Judge did not omit to place before the jury what Dr. Kabir Hussain had said regarding what he thought to be the presence of an external injury at the site of the fracture; he placed in extenso the questions put to Dr. Kabir Hussain and the answers given by him on this point."}}, {"text": "Sunil ChandraRoy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36518, "end_char": 36534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It proves that the injuries could Sunil ChandraRoy have been caused in the manner alleged and nothing more.", "canonical_name": "SUNIL CHANDRA ROY AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Suresh Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38499, "end_char": 38511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may also point out here that the learned Judge drew the attention of the jury also to the evidence of Dr. Suresh Sinha, who said that the\n\nSUPREME COURT REJ?ORTS [1960]\n\n."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REJ?ORTS [1960]\n\n. 196o", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 38532, "end_char": 38569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may also point out here that the learned Judge drew the attention of the jury also to the evidence of Dr. Suresh Sinha, who said that the\n\nSUPREME COURT REJ?ORTS [1960]\n\n."}}, {"text": "Judge correctly explained with reference to the relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38922, "end_char": 39014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 325", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39079, "end_char": 39085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Judge correctly explained with reference to the relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Judge correctly explained with reference to the relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39234, "end_char": 39239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Judge correctly explained with reference to the relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Judge correctly explained with reference to the relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39241, "end_char": 39258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 323", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39596, "end_char": 39602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39604, "end_char": 39621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 325", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40042, "end_char": 40048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40049, "end_char": 40066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 323", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40254, "end_char": 40260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40261, "end_char": 40278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Mathura Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40579, "end_char": 40592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Road or at least his state- ... ments to the Head Constable Mathura Singh, before the arrival of the investigating officer, were not hit by s. 162 Criminal Procedure Code and were clearly admissible in evidence.", "canonical_name": "l\\'lathura Singh"}}, {"text": "s. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40659, "end_char": 40665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40666, "end_char": 40689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sunil ChaHdra Roy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 41055, "end_char": 41072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judge said in this connection :\n\n\" I would like to remind you that if any person z960 makes any statement to the police, that is not admissible evidence as a rule unless in the case of s..u, Nagindra Bala Mitra contradietions which are formally proved, as you v. have seen the counsel for the accused has proved Sunil ChaHdra Roy contradictions in some cases; but you must bear in mind that except such cases, this is no evidence.\"", "canonical_name": "SUNIL CHANDRA ROY AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "s. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42028, "end_char": 42034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42035, "end_char": 42058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tahsildar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 42393, "end_char": 42408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We agree that on th.e principles laid down in Tahsildar Singh's decision (1) some of the statements put to the prosecution witnesses were not really contradictions and did not, therefore, fall within what is permissible under s. 162 Criminal Procedure Code."}}, {"text": "s. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42573, "end_char": 42579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42580, "end_char": 42603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Nitmal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 42719, "end_char": 42725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judge placed the following contradictions in Nitmal's evidence to the jury:\n\n\"He was also cross-examined on his statement to the police.", "canonical_name": "Nirma.I"}}, {"text": "s. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44504, "end_char": 44510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44511, "end_char": 44534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Purna Mali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45011, "end_char": 45021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For example, dealing with the evidence of Purna Mali, the learned Judge said:\n\n\"Now, gentlemen, these questions are important because he does not improve the case or try to improve the case by suggesting that he saw a fist blow on the left temple and it is a mater for you to\n\n. '••· ' ' .. '", "canonical_name": "Purna Mali"}}, {"text": "Bala Mitra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 45474, "end_char": 45484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nagindra to consider the suggestion that if he were then e Bala Mitra would have probably tried to improve the case by v. suggestiQg to say that he did see a fist blow on the Sunil Chandra Roy temple.\"", "canonical_name": "Bala Milra"}}, {"text": "Push pa Pal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45647, "end_char": 45658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dealing with the evidence of Push pa Pal, the learned Judge pointedly drew attention of the jury to a circumstance which was partly in favour of the prosecution and partly of the defence :\n\n\"You also remember that Pushpa Pal held an inquest at about 9 a.m. on the 11th August, 1950.", "canonical_name": "Push pa Pal"}}, {"text": "11th August, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45882, "end_char": 45899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dealing with the evidence of Push pa Pal, the learned Judge pointedly drew attention of the jury to a circumstance which was partly in favour of the prosecution and partly of the defence :\n\n\"You also remember that Pushpa Pal held an inquest at about 9 a.m. on the 11th August, 1950."}}, {"text": "HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 46657, "end_char": 46669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HIDAYATULLAH, J.-I have had the advantage of Hidayatullah J. reading the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, S. K. Das, J. He is of the opinion that the charge to the jury by the learned trial Juqge was proper.", "canonical_name": "Per Hidayatullah"}}, {"text": "August 11, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 47502, "end_char": 47517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tue offence alleged\n\n22 SUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS (1960]\n\nZ960 to have been committed as far back as August 11, 1950, has been the subi\"ect of three trials."}}, {"text": "Nagindra Bala Mitra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 47576, "end_char": 47595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was first Smt, Nagindra Bala Mitra tried before the Additional Sessions Judge, Alipur v. who convicted the present respondent, Sunil, under Su•il Ckandra Roy BS.", "canonical_name": "NAGINDRA BALA MITRA\n\nAND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Additional Sessions Judge, Alipur v.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 47613, "end_char": 47649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was first Smt, Nagindra Bala Mitra tried before the Additional Sessions Judge, Alipur v. who convicted the present respondent, Sunil, under Su•il Ckandra Roy BS."}}, {"text": "Sunil", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 47688, "end_char": 47693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was first Smt, Nagindra Bala Mitra tried before the Additional Sessions Judge, Alipur v. who convicted the present respondent, Sunil, under Su•il Ckandra Roy BS.", "canonical_name": "Sunil"}}, {"text": "Su•il Ckandra Roy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 47701, "end_char": 47718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was first Smt, Nagindra Bala Mitra tried before the Additional Sessions Judge, Alipur v. who convicted the present respondent, Sunil, under Su•il Ckandra Roy BS.", "canonical_name": "SUNIL CHANDRA ROY AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47743, "end_char": 47760, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "High Hitiayatullah J. Court of Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 47817, "end_char": 47856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal, t-he High Hitiayatullah J. Court of Calcutta set aside the conviction, and ordered a retrial at the Criminal Sessions of the High Court."}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52791, "end_char": 52797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 325", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52860, "end_char": 52866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52900, "end_char": 52905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 52915, "end_char": 52932, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Na'ginba Bala Mitra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 58868, "end_char": 58887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But he should have cautioned them z960 that the totality of facts must be viewed in relation - to the offence charged, and the benefit resulting in Smt .. Na'ginba Bala Mitra acquittal could be given only if they felt that when v. all was seen and considered, there was doubt as to Sunil Chandra Ro:Y whether the accused had committed the crime or not. ·· -· ··", "canonical_name": "NAGINDRA BALA MITRA\n\nAND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Sunil Chandra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 58995, "end_char": 59008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But he should have cautioned them z960 that the totality of facts must be viewed in relation - to the offence charged, and the benefit resulting in Smt .. Na'ginba Bala Mitra acquittal could be given only if they felt that when v. all was seen and considered, there was doubt as to Sunil Chandra Ro:Y whether the accused had committed the crime or not. ·· -· ··", "canonical_name": "SUNIL CHANDRA ROY AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 59479, "end_char": 59496, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 323", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60077, "end_char": 60083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 60091, "end_char": 60108, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 325", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60180, "end_char": 60186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mathura Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 64190, "end_char": 64203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\" Then comes the evidence of Head Constable Mathura Singh."}}, {"text": "l\\'lathura Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 64355, "end_char": 64371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Head Constable l\\'lathura Singh posted another constable at the gate so as not to allow a crowd to gather.", "canonical_name": "l\\'lathura Singh"}}, {"text": "Mitter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64464, "end_char": 64470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mitter lying unconscious like a dead person covered with a blanket.", "canonical_name": "Mitter"}}, {"text": "11th . August, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 65594, "end_char": 65613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Constable took charge of the accused and left for the thana with the accus-\n\n30 SUPREl'lE COURT REPORTS [1960]\n\nx960 ed at about 9 O'clock in the morning on the 11th ."}}, {"text": "Hiday•tullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65891, "end_char": 65903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His evidence is that he was there to Hiday•tullah J. guard No.", "canonical_name": "Per Hidayatullah"}}, {"text": "Hidayatullak", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68218, "end_char": 68230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It proves that the injudes Hidayatullak J. coukl have been caused in the manner alleged and nothing more.", "canonical_name": "Per Hidayatullah"}}, {"text": "Sunil Chandra Roy", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 70336, "end_char": 70353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tures of bones, depth and size of the wounds would Sunil Chandra Roy show the nature of the weapon used."}}, {"text": "Hidayatullab", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 70462, "end_char": 70474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is wrong to say that it is only opinion evidence; it is often direct Hidayatullab J. evidence of the facts found upon the victim's person.", "canonical_name": "Per Hidayatullah"}}, {"text": "s. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70780, "end_char": 70786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 70794, "end_char": 70820, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "SunilChandra Roy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 72516, "end_char": 72532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "agin •~ Q. Do you n urt er t at you ave state m BalaMitra the next paragraph after that' I also saw another v. tall person stated to be the second brother was SunilChandra Roy dragging the old man holding his wearing shirt'? . -", "canonical_name": "SUNIL CHANDRA ROY AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Sati Mitter", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 72713, "end_char": 72724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "holding his genji and when a fist blow was given to the Colonel, Sati Mitter came and clasped him from a side.", "canonical_name": "Sa ti Mitter"}}, {"text": "Sa ti Mitter", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 73140, "end_char": 73152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I saw that when a fist blow was\"given to the Colonel Sa ti Mitter came and clasped the Colonel from a side and she was thrown down by being caught by her hair.", "canonical_name": "Sa ti Mitter"}}, {"text": "Sunil Chandro Roy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 74573, "end_char": 74590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bala Mitra .J v.\n\nThirdly, she also said to the police that she saw the Sunil Chandro Roy person wearing Choti or pants and blue shirts.", "canonical_name": "SUNIL CHANDRA ROY AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 74694, "end_char": 74706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fourthly, before the police she said that she saw t.he Hidayatullah J. three persons leaving Nirmal and started arguing."}}, {"text": "James Fitz-James Stephen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 77216, "end_char": 77240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sir James Fitz-James Stephen in his History of Criminal Law of England, Vol."}}, {"text": "Mukherji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 77349, "end_char": 77357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "455-456 (quoted in Trial by Jury and Misdirection by Mukherji, 1937 Edn.,", "canonical_name": "Mukherji"}}, {"text": "H idayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78555, "end_char": 78568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The act of stating for the Jury the questions which they have to answer and of stating the evidence bearing on those questions and in showing in what respect it is important, generally goes a considerable way\n\nH idayatullah J.\n\n1960 towards suggesting an answer to them, and .if a Judge does not do as much at least as this, he does Smt.", "canonical_name": "Per Hidayatullah"}}, {"text": "Mukerji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78745, "end_char": 78752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nAs pointed out by Mukerji (ibid p. 253): SunilChandraRoy \"Where the charge to the Jury was little more\n\nH idayat ullah J. than a rambling statement of the evidence as it came from the mouths of the several witnesses who were called and no attempt was made to sift the releva.nt and important matters from the irrelevant and unimportant facts, held that the charge was defective a, nd the trial was vitiated on that account. (", "canonical_name": "Mukherji"}}, {"text": "SunilChandraRoy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78768, "end_char": 78783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nAs pointed out by Mukerji (ibid p. 253): SunilChandraRoy \"Where the charge to the Jury was little more\n\nH idayat ullah J. than a rambling statement of the evidence as it came from the mouths of the several witnesses who were called and no attempt was made to sift the releva.nt and important matters from the irrelevant and unimportant facts, held that the charge was defective a, nd the trial was vitiated on that account. (", "canonical_name": "SUNIL CHANDRA ROY AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "H idayat ullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78831, "end_char": 78845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nAs pointed out by Mukerji (ibid p. 253): SunilChandraRoy \"Where the charge to the Jury was little more\n\nH idayat ullah J. than a rambling statement of the evidence as it came from the mouths of the several witnesses who were called and no attempt was made to sift the releva.nt and important matters from the irrelevant and unimportant facts, held that the charge was defective a, nd the trial was vitiated on that account. (", "canonical_name": "Per Hidayatullah"}}, {"text": "J abed Silcdar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79152, "end_char": 79166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J abed Silcdar) (1 )."}}, {"text": "Molla Khan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 79900, "end_char": 79910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Molla Khan)(') ...\n\nIt is not enough to read out the evidence in extenso; it is incumbent on the Judge to analyse it and place it succinctly before the Jury (Rajab Ali) (')'.\""}}, {"text": "Rajab Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80058, "end_char": 80067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Molla Khan)(') ...\n\nIt is not enough to read out the evidence in extenso; it is incumbent on the Judge to analyse it and place it succinctly before the Jury (Rajab Ali) (')'.\""}}, {"text": "(1914) L.R. 41 I.A. 149", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 80741, "end_char": 80764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81683, "end_char": 81691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_207_214_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "-~ .\n\n.,.; .\n\n,.. .\n\n3 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 207\n\nsurplus the Tribunal omitted to take into account the important fact that a sum of no less than £1,10,000/- has been capitalised out of the reserves at the beginning of the year. The second error was that the Tribunal in saying thal after paying 8 months' bonus there is a balance of £34,397 with the employer, omitted to take into consideration the fact that the company would also have the benefit of a large amount as income-tax rebate in respect of the bonus paid to its clerical staff .\n\nTaking all these facts into oonsideration we a!'e of opinion that a fair order would be to award to the staff bonus equivalent to 3 months' basic wages in addition to the amount already paid voluntarily .\n\nWe therefore allow the appeal in part and in modification of the award made by the Industrial Tribunal award to the staff of M/s. Peirce Leslie Co., Ltd., bonus equivalent to 3 months' basic wages in addition to the amount already voluntarily paid by the company. There will be no order as to costs.\n\nAppeal partly allowed.\n\nTEA DISTRICTS LABOUR ASSOCIATION,\n\nCALCUTTA ;;\n\nEX-EMPLOYEES OF T~A DISTRICTS LABOUR\n\nASSOCIATION AND ANOTHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR AND K. N. WANCHOO, .JJ.)\n\nIndustrial Dispute-Closure of business centres held mala fide- If no closure in the eye of law in spite of actual closure-Industrial.\n\nDisputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, r950 (XLVII ofr950),ss.22,\n\n23, 25F(C).\n\nAs there was appreciable decline in the activities and business of the appellant it decided, by means of a resolution, to close down two local agencies at Koraput and Berhampur\n\n{Ganjam) by May 31, 1957. About the same time the appellant also thought of retrenching its employees and decided to retrench ten of its employees with effect from December r, 1956. An industrial dispute having arisen as a result of the said closure and\n\nM/s. Peirce Leslie Q>. Co. Ltd.\n\nKozhikode\n\nTheir Work1nen\n\nDas Gupta .f.\n\nMarh 9.\n\n'960 retrenchment it was referred to the industrial tribunal for adjudication.\n\nBefore the Industrial Tribunal it was conceded on behalf Tea Distrts. of the appellant that the retrenchn1ent of ten employees was in- La]!ou' Association valid as the statutory notice required by s. 25F(c) of the Indusv.. trial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act had not been served. It Thm was also stated afterwards that the statutory compensation had Ex-Employees been paid to the retrenched workmen. As regard\"s the question of closure the tribunal came to the conclusion that the closure was not bona fide, and it held that the legal consequence was that there was not a real closure. Accordingly it directed the appellant to reinstate the ten retrenched workmen and to pay all its workmen employed at the two centres as though the centres had not been closed and were actually working. On appeal by special leave: Held, that when the two agencies had in fact been closed the finding about malafides could not justify the conclusion that the said two agencies should be deemed to continue and the tribunal was not entitled to make an award on that basis.\n\nBanaras Ice Factory Ltd. v. Its Workmen, [r957] S.C.R.\n\n143, explained and distinguished.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 169 of 1959.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Award dated June 26, 1958, of the Industrial Tribunal, Orissa, at Cuttack in Reference No. 2 of 1957.\n\nM. 0. Setalvad, Attorney.General for India, Vidya Sagar and B. N. Ghosh, for the appellants.\n\nM. S. K. Sastri and R. Patnaik, for respondent No. 1.\n\nR. Patnaik, for respondent No. 2.\n\n1960. March 9. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGajendragadkar ].\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal by special leave arises from an industrial dispute between the appellant, the Tea Districts Labour Association, and the respondents the ex-employees of the appellant and another.\n\nThe dispute which was referred to the industrial tribunal for its adjudication consisted of two items:-\n\n\" (a) Whether the retrenchment of ten workers of Kora put and Ganjam Agencies of Tea Districts Labour Association effected on the 30th November, 1956, was justified, if not, to what relief those workers are entitled?\n\n(b) Whether the closure of the Koraput and Ga.njam Agencies contemplated by Messrs. Jardine Henderson Ltd., Secretaries, Tea Districts Labour\n\n. ~.\n\nAssociation with effect from the 31st May, 1957, is\n\nI96° bona fide: If so, whether the affected workers are T . . t'tl d t th It t' I t . ea D1st11cts en 1 e o some o er a erna ive emp oymen m Labour Association any other establishment under the same managev. ment. If not bona fide, to what relief those workers Their are entitled ? \" Ex-Employees On this reference the award which was passed by the - Tribunal directs the appellant to pay to the ten retren- Gajendragadkar f. ched workmen all the pay and allowances to which they were entitled from November 30, 1956, to May 31, 1957, and it further orders the appellant to pay all its employees of the Berhampur and Kora put agencies, including the said ten retrenched workmen, all their pay and allowances from May 31, 1957, till one month after the publication of the award within which time the Management, if it so chooses, may close down the agencies, and in that event there would be no necessity for further notice of retrenchment to those ten retrenched workmen. The award has further added that if no bona fide closure is effected the ten retrenched workmen would be entitled to statutory notice if the Management still wants to retrench them. In regard to the other employees the award provides that they shall be entitled to all their pay and allowances as before and the agencies will in the eye of law be continuing agencies. The validity of the latter portion of the award in particular is challenged before us by the appellant in the present appeal by special leave.\n\nThe appellant is a Company Limited by .Guarantee of performance of service only for its members and was formed in 1917. The appellant's members are the owners of several tea gardens in West Bengal and Assam and its chief object is to recruit labour from different parts of India and to supply it to the said tea gardens according to their requirements. Jardine Henderson Ltd. have since 1953 been and still are the Secretaries of the appellant. The appellant had a number of establishments in different parts of India which were known as Local Agencies, Local Forwarding Agencies and Forwarding Agencies. The function of Local Agencies and Local Forwarding Agencies was mainly to recruit labour and the function of\n\nr960 Forwarding Agencies was mainly to accommodate and feed labour while in transit to and from tea gardens.\n\nTea Districts\n\nT d h d f h 11 ' fi 1 L b A . ,. owar st e en o t e appe ants na11c1a year a our ssocia ion • . v. 1955-56, the appellant's Secretary received estimates Their from the constituent members regarding their esti- Ex-Employees mated requirements of labour for the seasons from --\n\n- 1956 to 1959, and it appeared that these estimates Gajendragadharf. were between 6,000 to 10,000 adults per annum, whereas in the past the appellant'R organisation catered for the recruitment of about 30,000 labourers per annum. . This appreciable decline in the activities and business of the appellant raised the problem of closing some of its agencies. In or about the beginning of March, 1957, it became apparent to the appellant that the requirement of labour was rapidly falling and that it would. be necessary to close some of its agencies. Thereupon, the question was considered by the appellant's general committee held on March 7, 1957, and it was decided inter alia that the two local agencies at Koraput and Berhampur (Ganjam) should be closed, if possible by April 1, 1957. It was in pursuance of this resolution that the appellant ultimately decided to close down the said two agencies by May 31,\n\n1957. One of the points referred to the Industrial Tribunal is in regard to this closure.\n\nAbout the same time the appellant also thought of retrenching its employees and in pursuance of its decision in that behalf ten employees were retrenched with effect from December 1, 1956. This retrenchment is the other issue referred to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication.\n\nBefore the Industrial Tribunal it was conceded on behalf of the appellant that the impugned retrenchment of ten employees was invalid in view of the fact that the statutory notice required bys. 25F(c) had not been served, and the appellant agreed that the said ten persons would therefore be entitled to the same pay and privileges that they were getting on the date of retrenchment until May 31, 1957, which was the date of the closure. Thus the position with regard to the impugned retrenchment was not in doubt.\n\nIn regard to the question of closure the tribunal has observed that what it had to consider was wheth13r\n\n...\n\n...\n\n.. .\n\nthe clOsure was real and bona fide. It considered the x960 evidence and it was inclined to hold that the apprehen- . . sions entertained by the appellant in regard to the fall Tea Distr'.c15. . . . . . d k . t\"fi d d th t Labour A; sociation m its act1v1t1es an wor were not JUS i e an a v. the appellant could have carried on with the two Their agencies in question. The tribunal also considered Ex-Employees the fact that soon after the closure of Kora put and - Berhampur agencies the appellant opened another Gajendragadkar J. agency at Vizianagaram, which is a place in Andhra Pradesh but is at some distance from Koraput in Orissa. The tribunal was not satisfied that the explanation given by the appellant for reopening of the Vizianagaram agency, which had been closed on the 6th September, 1956, was satisfactory. In the result the tribunal came to the conclusion that the closure was not bona fide, and it held that th.e legal consequence was that it was not a real closure. It is on the basis of this conclusion that it issued a direction to the appellant to reinstate the ten retrenched workmen and to pay all its workmen employed at the two centres as though the centres had not been closed and were actually working. In reaching this conclusion the tribunal has relied on the observations made by this Court in Banaras Ice Factory Ltd. v. Its Workmen {1). . .\n\nIt is common ground that the compensation, due to the employees on the footing that the closure was not justified, has been duly paid to all the employees. concerned, and the learned Attorney General has stated to us that so far as the ten retrenched workmen are concerned they have also been paid the statutory compensation. On behalf of the appellant the learned Attorney General had made it perfectly clear that even if the appeal were to succeed the appellant would not claim any amount back from any of its employees concerned though it would be entitled in law to do so.\n\nThe main grievance made before us by the appellant is about the direction of the tribunal that the closure must be treated as non est and that the agencies must be held to be continuing and must continue to function despite their factual closure. The argument is\n\n\\1) (1957J S.C.R. 143\n\nI960 that even if the closure may not be bona fide it does\n\nT . . not follow that the closure in fact has not taken place.\n\nL b ea AD\" 1\"~ 1 '. It is not a case where closure is a pretence or the plea a our ssociation f . l . . v. o closure is unrea m the sense that havmg purported\n\nThefr to close the agencies, the same agencies have been Ex-Employees functioning all the time, under a different garb. In . - fact the agencies have been closed even according to Ga1end, agadka, l the finding of the tribunal. It is contended that the finding about the rnala fides of the closure is open to serious doubt because the said finding is not supported by any legal evidence, and in a sense is opposed to the weight of the evidence on the record.\n\nWe are inclined to think that there is considerable force in this contention. But assuming that the closure is not shown to be bona fide, does it necessarily follow that the closure is a fiction and it is unreal in the sense that the agencies can be treated to be in existence in the eye of the law? That is the very narrow point which arises for our decision in the present appeal.\n\nAs we have already indicated the conclusion of the tribunal on this point is based on the observations of this Court in the case of Banaras Ice Factory Ltd.\n\nv. I ts W orkrnen (1 ). It will, therefore, be necessary to examine those observations and decide whether they really justify the conslusion of the tribunal. In that case this Court was dealing with the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal on a complaint filed before it under s. 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act (Act No. XL VIII of 1950), hereafter called the Act. It appears that during the pendency of an appeal before the Labour Appellate Tribunal the appellant Company decided to close down its business and gave notice to all the workmen that their services would be terminated upon the expiry of 30 days from July 16, 1952. That led to the complaint under s. 23 of the Act on the allegation that s. 22 of the said Act had been contravened. The Labour Appellate Tribunal had found that the closure was bona fide. It conceded that the appellant had the right to close its business for bona fide reasons ; but nevertheless it took the view that permission should have been obtained before the said closure. That is why acco.rding to it the appellant was guilty of contra- (tJ [1957] S.C.R. t43.\n\n. ~\n\n...\n\nvening s. 22(b) of the Act. This decision was reversed ry6o by this Court. In doing so, the true scope and effect . . of ss. 22 and 23 of the Act were considered and it was Tea Distri.cts. h d h 'f h d 1 b fid h Labour Association el t at I t e unpugne c osure was ona e t en v. neither of the two sections came into operation. Thus Their the position was that the closure was bona fide and Ex-Employees that the appellant had committed no breach ofs. 22(b) - of the Act. In dealing with the scope and eftect of G11jendragadkar J. s. 23 this Court observed : \" There is hardly any occasion for praying for permission to lift tbe ban imposed bys. 22, when the employer has the right to close his business and bona fide does so, with the result that the industry itself ceases to exist\". Then i~ was added : \" If there is no real closure but a mere pretence of a closure or it is mala fide, there is no closure in the eye of the law and the workmen can raise an industrial dispute and may even claim under s. 23 of the Act\". It is on this latter observation that the Tribunal has founded its decision. With respect we do not read the observations as laying down an unqualified and categorical proposition of law that wherever a closure is mala fide it must be deemed to be unreal and non-existent. What this Court has said is that in cases of pretence of closure no closure in fact has taken place and for the purpose of s. 23 of the Act with which the Court was dealing a mala fide closure may conceivably be treated as falling in the same class as a pretence of closure. But in the present case the facts are not in dispute. There has been a closure and the agencies have been closed and their business has been wound up. If it is found that the closure was not bona fide the consequences would be the liability of the employer to pay the higher compensation under s. 25-FFF of the Industrial Dis- . putes Act, 1947. But it is difficult to see how when the two agencis have in fact been closed the finding about mala fides can justify the conclusion that the said two agencies should be deemed to continue and how the award can make an order on that basis.\n\nBesides, as we have already indicated even the finding about the mala fides of the closure is itself open to serious doubt. In our opinion the said finding is\n\nz960 based on mere surmises and is entirely opposed to the . . . weight of evidence adduced in this case.\n\nTea D\"'''.'1'.\n\nThe result is that that portion of the award which Labou1' Association . d. . . v. issues irect10ns to the appellant on the basis that Their the closure, in the eyes of law, had not taken place is Ex-Employees set aside. The appeal succeeds to that extent and must be allowed. There will be no order as to costs in . ,.\n\nGojendragadkar J. the circumstances.\n\nz960\n\nMarch 9.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nMANAGEMENT OF VISHNU SUGAR MILLS\n\nLIMITED, HARKHUA, DISTRICT\n\nSARAN, BIHAR v.\n\nTHEIR WORKMEN° REPRESENTED BY CHINI\n\nMILL MAZDOOR UNION, HARKHUA, DIST.\n\nSARAN, BIHAR\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR ANDK. N. WANCHOO, JJ.)\n\nIndustrial Dispute-Reference by State Governmcnt-Competence-C ontrolled industry - \"Appropriate Government,\" meaning of-Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, r95r (65 of r95r). -Industrial Disputes Act, I947 (r4 of r947), s. z (a) (i).\n\nA dispute relating to a workman in the appellant sugar mill, situate in Bihar, was raised by the Workers Union and a reference was made by the State Government. Under s. 2 (a) (i) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, \"'Appropriate Government' means in relation to any industrial dispute concerning any industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government.: .... or concerning any such controlled industry as may be . specified in this behalf by the Central Government.. .... the Central Government\". The question was whether the State Government was competent to make the reference, as sugar was a controlled industry under the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 195I.\n\nHeld, that in order that the appropriate government under s. 2 (a) (i) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, may be the\n\nCentral Government for a controlled industry it is necessary that such controlled industry should be specified by the Central Government, and that in the absence of a notification for the\n\n.....", "total_entities": 57, "entities": [{"text": "Peirce Leslie Co., Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 887, "end_char": 910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We therefore allow the appeal in part and in modification of the award made by the Industrial Tribunal award to the staff of M/s. Peirce Leslie Co., Ltd., bonus equivalent to 3 months' basic wages in addition to the amount already voluntarily paid by the company."}}, {"text": "TEA DISTRICTS LABOUR ASSOCIATION,\n\nCALCUTTA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1082, "end_char": 1125, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "TEA DISTRICTS LABOUR ASSOCIATION, CALCUTTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "EX-EMPLOYEES OF T~A DISTRICTS LABOUR\n\nASSOCIATION AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1130, "end_char": 1191, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "EX-EMPLOYEES OF TEA DISTRICTS LABOUR ASSOCIATION AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1194, "end_char": 1214, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1219, "end_char": 1232, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss.22,\n\n23, 25F(C)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1431, "end_char": 1449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Koraput", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1607, "end_char": 1614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As there was appreciable decline in the activities and business of the appellant it decided, by means of a resolution, to close down two local agencies at Koraput and Berhampur\n\n{Ganjam) by May 31, 1957."}}, {"text": "Berhampur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1619, "end_char": 1628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As there was appreciable decline in the activities and business of the appellant it decided, by means of a resolution, to close down two local agencies at Koraput and Berhampur\n\n{Ganjam) by May 31, 1957."}}, {"text": "Peirce Leslie Q>. Co. Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1890, "end_char": 1916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An industrial dispute having arisen as a result of the said closure and\n\nM/s. Peirce Leslie Q>."}}, {"text": "s. 25F(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2246, "end_char": 2255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. 0. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3400, "end_char": 3414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. 0."}}, {"text": "Vidya Sagar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3444, "end_char": 3455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "General for India, Vidya Sagar and B. N. Ghosh, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "B. N. Ghosh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3460, "end_char": 3471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "General for India, Vidya Sagar and B. N. Ghosh, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3494, "end_char": 3509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. S. K. Sastri and R. Patnaik, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "R. Patnaik", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3514, "end_char": 3524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. S. K. Sastri and R. Patnaik, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3643, "end_char": 3657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGajendragadkar ].", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3662, "end_char": 3676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal by special leave arises from an industrial dispute between the appellant, the Tea Districts Labour Association, and the respondents the ex-employees of the appellant and another.", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "November 30, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4897, "end_char": 4914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ex-Employees On this reference the award which was passed by the - Tribunal directs the appellant to pay to the ten retren- Gajendragadkar f. ched workmen all the pay and allowances to which they were entitled from November 30, 1956, to May 31, 1957, and it further orders the appellant to pay all its employees of the Berhampur and Kora put agencies, including the said ten retrenched workmen, all their pay and allowances from May 31, 1957, till one month after the publication of the award within which time the Management, if it so chooses, may close down the agencies, and in that event there would be no necessity for further notice of retrenchment to those ten retrenched workmen."}}, {"text": "May 31, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4919, "end_char": 4931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ex-Employees On this reference the award which was passed by the - Tribunal directs the appellant to pay to the ten retren- Gajendragadkar f. ched workmen all the pay and allowances to which they were entitled from November 30, 1956, to May 31, 1957, and it further orders the appellant to pay all its employees of the Berhampur and Kora put agencies, including the said ten retrenched workmen, all their pay and allowances from May 31, 1957, till one month after the publication of the award within which time the Management, if it so chooses, may close down the agencies, and in that event there would be no necessity for further notice of retrenchment to those ten retrenched workmen."}}, {"text": "Berhampur and Kora", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5001, "end_char": 5019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ex-Employees On this reference the award which was passed by the - Tribunal directs the appellant to pay to the ten retren- Gajendragadkar f. ched workmen all the pay and allowances to which they were entitled from November 30, 1956, to May 31, 1957, and it further orders the appellant to pay all its employees of the Berhampur and Kora put agencies, including the said ten retrenched workmen, all their pay and allowances from May 31, 1957, till one month after the publication of the award within which time the Management, if it so chooses, may close down the agencies, and in that event there would be no necessity for further notice of retrenchment to those ten retrenched workmen."}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6067, "end_char": 6078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant's members are the owners of several tea gardens in West Bengal and Assam and its chief object is to recruit labour from different parts of India and to supply it to the said tea gardens according to their requirements."}}, {"text": "Assam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6083, "end_char": 6088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant's members are the owners of several tea gardens in West Bengal and Assam and its chief object is to recruit labour from different parts of India and to supply it to the said tea gardens according to their requirements."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6155, "end_char": 6160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant's members are the owners of several tea gardens in West Bengal and Assam and its chief object is to recruit labour from different parts of India and to supply it to the said tea gardens according to their requirements."}}, {"text": "Jardine Henderson Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6235, "end_char": 6257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jardine Henderson Ltd. have since 1953 been and still are the Secretaries of the appellant."}}, {"text": "Gajendragadharf", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7053, "end_char": 7068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. 1955-56, the appellant's Secretary received estimates Their from the constituent members regarding their esti- Ex-Employees mated requirements of labour for the seasons from --\n1956 to 1959, and it appeared that these estimates Gajendragadharf."}}, {"text": "March 7, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7634, "end_char": 7647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon, the question was considered by the appellant's general committee held on March 7, 1957, and it was decided inter alia that the two local agencies at Koraput and Berhampur (Ganjam) should be closed, if possible by April 1, 1957."}}, {"text": "Ganjam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7733, "end_char": 7739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon, the question was considered by the appellant's general committee held on March 7, 1957, and it was decided inter alia that the two local agencies at Koraput and Berhampur (Ganjam) should be closed, if possible by April 1, 1957."}}, {"text": "April 1, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7774, "end_char": 7787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon, the question was considered by the appellant's general committee held on March 7, 1957, and it was decided inter alia that the two local agencies at Koraput and Berhampur (Ganjam) should be closed, if possible by April 1, 1957."}}, {"text": "December 1, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8176, "end_char": 8192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "About the same time the appellant also thought of retrenching its employees and in pursuance of its decision in that behalf ten employees were retrenched with effect from December 1, 1956."}}, {"text": "Kora", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9374, "end_char": 9378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The tribunal also considered Ex-Employees the fact that soon after the closure of Kora put and - Berhampur agencies the appellant opened another Gajendragadkar J. agency at Vizianagaram, which is a place in Andhra Pradesh but is at some distance from Koraput in Orissa."}}, {"text": "Vizianagaram", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9465, "end_char": 9477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The tribunal also considered Ex-Employees the fact that soon after the closure of Kora put and - Berhampur agencies the appellant opened another Gajendragadkar J. agency at Vizianagaram, which is a place in Andhra Pradesh but is at some distance from Koraput in Orissa."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9499, "end_char": 9513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The tribunal also considered Ex-Employees the fact that soon after the closure of Kora put and - Berhampur agencies the appellant opened another Gajendragadkar J. agency at Vizianagaram, which is a place in Andhra Pradesh but is at some distance from Koraput in Orissa."}}, {"text": "Orissa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9554, "end_char": 9560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The tribunal also considered Ex-Employees the fact that soon after the closure of Kora put and - Berhampur agencies the appellant opened another Gajendragadkar J. agency at Vizianagaram, which is a place in Andhra Pradesh but is at some distance from Koraput in Orissa."}}, {"text": "6th September, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9708, "end_char": 9727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The tribunal was not satisfied that the explanation given by the appellant for reopening of the Vizianagaram agency, which had been closed on the 6th September, 1956, was satisfactory."}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12731, "end_char": 12736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 16, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13092, "end_char": 13105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that during the pendency of an appeal before the Labour Appellate Tribunal the appellant Company decided to close down its business and gave notice to all the workmen that their services would be terminated upon the expiry of 30 days from July 16, 1952."}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13139, "end_char": 13144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13179, "end_char": 13184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13593, "end_char": 13601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 22 and 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13707, "end_char": 13720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "G11jendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14098, "end_char": 14113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In dealing with the scope and eftect of G11jendragadkar J. s. 23 this Court observed : \" There is hardly any occasion for praying for permission to lift tbe ban imposed bys.", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14117, "end_char": 14122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14590, "end_char": 14595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15005, "end_char": 15010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15451, "end_char": 15456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gojendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16348, "end_char": 16362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gojendragadkar J. the circumstances.", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "MANAGEMENT OF VISHNU SUGAR MILLS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16419, "end_char": 16451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MANAGEMENT OF VISHNU SUGAR MILLS\n\nLIMITED, HARKHUA, DISTRICT\n\nSARAN, BIHAR v.\n\nTHEIR WORKMEN° REPRESENTED BY CHINI\n\nMILL MAZDOOR UNION, HARKHUA, DIST."}}, {"text": ". N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16611, "end_char": 16623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SARAN, BIHAR\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR ANDK.", "canonical_name": "K. N. WANCHOO"}}, {"text": "Industries (Development and Regulation) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16751, "end_char": 16794, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16816, "end_char": 16839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16947, "end_char": 16952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A dispute relating to a workman in the appellant sugar mill, situate in Bihar, was raised by the Workers Union and a reference was made by the State Government."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17042, "end_char": 17046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17062, "end_char": 17091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17231, "end_char": 17249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under s. 2 (a) (i) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, \"'Appropriate Government' means in relation to any industrial dispute concerning any industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government.: ...."}}, {"text": "Industries (Development and Regulation) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17523, "end_char": 17566, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17633, "end_char": 17637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17653, "end_char": 17682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_214_220_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960]\n\nz960 based on mere surmises and is entirely opposed to the . . . weight of evidence adduced in this case.\n\nTea D\"'''.'1'.\n\nThe result is that that portion of the award which Labou1' Association . d. . . v. issues irect10ns to the appellant on the basis that Their the closure, in the eyes of law, had not taken place is Ex-Employees set aside. The appeal succeeds to that extent and must be allowed. There will be no order as to costs in . ,.\n\nGojendragadkar J. the circumstances.\n\nz960\n\nMarch 9.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nMANAGEMENT OF VISHNU SUGAR MILLS\n\nLIMITED, HARKHUA, DISTRICT\n\nSARAN, BIHAR v.\n\nTHEIR WORKMEN° REPRESENTED BY CHINI\n\nMILL MAZDOOR UNION, HARKHUA, DIST.\n\nSARAN, BIHAR\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR ANDK. N. WANCHOO, JJ.)\n\nIndustrial Dispute-Reference by State Governmcnt-Competence-C ontrolled industry - \"Appropriate Government,\" meaning of-Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, r95r (65 of r95r). -Industrial Disputes Act, I947 (r4 of r947), s. z (a) (i).\n\nA dispute relating to a workman in the appellant sugar mill, situate in Bihar, was raised by the Workers Union and a reference was made by the State Government. Under s. 2 (a) (i) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, \"'Appropriate Government' means in relation to any industrial dispute concerning any industry carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government.: .... or concerning any such controlled industry as may be . specified in this behalf by the Central Government.. .... the Central Government\". The question was whether the State Government was competent to make the reference, as sugar was a controlled industry under the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 195I.\n\nHeld, that in order that the appropriate government under s. 2 (a) (i) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, may be the\n\nCentral Government for a controlled industry it is necessary that such controlled industry should be specified by the Central Government, and that in the absence of a notification for the\n\n.....\n\npurposes of s. 2 (a) (i) of the Act, the State Government was. competent to make the reference. .\n\nThe Bijoy Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Their Workmen and Another [1960] 2 S.C.R. 982, followed.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 402 of 1958.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Award dated January 29, 1957, of the Industrial Tribunal, Bihar, at Patna in Reference No. 7 of 1956.\n\nSukumar Ghose, for the appellant.\n\nM. K. Ramamurthi, R. K. Garg, A. N. Nag and Buresh Aggarwal, for the respondents.\n\nS. P. Varma, for the intervener (State of Bihar).\n\n1960. March 9. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nWANCHOO, J.-This is an appeal by special leave against the award of the Industrial Tribunal, Patna.\n\nThe appellant is a Sugar Mill in District 8aran in the State of Bihar. One Ramkrishna Prasad was appointed as clerk in this mill in 1933. Gradually, he work\" ed his way up an:d was drawing Rs. 140 per month in October 1952. The mill created a new post of store in-charge about that time as the work in the Stores Department of the Mill had increased. On October 4, 1952, Babulal Parekh was appointed to this new post on a consolidated salary of Rs. 180 per mensem. A letter of appointment was issued to him on that. date and he was told that he would be on probation for one year. He was also asked by another letter to. take charge immediately. He took charge on October 7,\n\n1952. On November 28, 195,2, an order was passed by the mill distributing the duties between the various clerks employed in the Stores Department and it was stated therein that all the staff of the Stores Department would work as subordinate to Babula! Parekh.\n\nOn December 2, 1952, another order was passed by which Ramkrishna Prasad was ordered to hand over the keys of the stores to Babula! Parekh. Thereafter Ramkrishna Prasad made a representation against his being made subordinate to the stores in-charge . . This representation was rejected. A dispute was then raised by the union and a reference was made by th~.\n\nGovernment of Bihar on May 9, .1956, in which the\n\nVishnu Sugar\n\nMills Ltd. v.\n\nTheir W orkinen\n\nWanshoo ].\n\nVishnu Sugar\n\nMills Ltd. v.\n\nTheir Workmen\n\nWanchoo ].\n\nfollowing three matters were referred to the tribu- nal:- 1.. Whether the status of workman, Sri Ramkrishna Prasad, Store-keeper, and the nature of the job performed by him has been changed to his prejudice with the appointment of a separate store incharge;\n\n2. Whether in view of the satisfactory performance of duties of store-keeper for the last 20 years by the above-named workman, it was at all necessary to appoint a separate store in-charge over him with higher emoluments and whether Shri Ramkrishna Prasad is entitled to be appointed to the post of store in-charge; and\n\n3. Whether the claim of the above-named workman for promotion to higher grades has been overlooked by the management, and 'if so, what relief the workman is entitled to.\n\nWhen the matter came up before the tribunal, the main contention on behalf of the mill was that it was exclusively the management function to decide its labour strength, both qualitatively and quantitatively, and that so far as Ramkrishna Prasad was concerned his position had not been prejudicially affected by the creation of the new post of a store in-charge. The workmen on the other hand contended that Babula!\n\nParekh was first appointed as a mere clerk under Ramkrishna Prasad to begin with and it was only on November 28, 1952, that he was promoted over the head of Ramkrishna Prasad as a store in-charge, thus superseding Ramkrishna Prasad. This stand of the workmen was controverted by the mill and its case was that Babula! Parekh was from the very beginning appointed as store in-charge.\n\nThe tribunal came to the conclusion after a consideration of the evidence produced that Babula! was first appointed as an ordinary clerk in the Stores Department and was subsequently made a store incharge. It held that this caused reasonable heart burning to Ramkrishna Prasad. The tribunal was conscious of the principle that promotion to a higher post was the exclusive fnnction of the management and should not ordinarily be interfered with.\n\nBut\n\n. ,•\n\n.. ..\n\nJ ' ,\n\n' t /\n\nin spite of that it was of the view that. this was a fit case for interference ; but on other considerations which were not specified in the order by the tribunal it held that it would not interfere with the arrangement made by the mill; it instead granted an increment of Rs. 30 per month from the date of its order to Ramkrishna Prasad to meet the ends of justice. It is this order which is being challenged before us.\n\nTwo points have be.en urged before us on behalf of the appellant. In the first place it is urged that the reference was incompetent as sugar was a controlled industry and only the Central Government could have made the reference and not the State Government.\n\nSecondly, it is urged that the order of the tribunal granting an increment of Rs. 30 per month to Ramkrishna Prasad was patently perverse and that there was no change in the status or emoluments of Ramkrishna Prasad by the creation of the new post and the employment of Babula! Parekh on it.\n\nSo far as the question of the. competence of the reference is concerned, we are of opinion that there is no force in it. A similar question was raised before this Court in The Bijoy Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Their Workmen and Another (1) and it was held there on the language of s. 2(a)(i) of the .Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, that before tl; i.at provision could apply to a controlled industry there must be a notification by the Central Government for the purposes of s. 2(a)(i) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Section 2(a)(i) is in these terms- \"' Appropriate Government' means in relatipn to any industrial dispute concerning any industry carried o:ri by or under the authority of the Central Government or by a railway company or concerning any such controlled industry as may be specified in this behalf by the Central Government, or in relation to an industrial dispute concerning a banking or an insurance company, a mine, an oil-field or a major port, the Central Government. \" The argument is that as sugar is a controlled industry under the Schedule to the Industries (Development and Regulation} Act, No. 65 of 1951, the appropriate\n\n(1) [196o] 2 S.C.R. 982.\n\nrg6o\n\nVishnu Suga,\n\nMills Ltd. v.\n\nThefr Workmen\n\nWanchoo ].\n\nr960\n\nVishnu Sugar\n\nMills Ltd.\n\nv. - Their Workmen\n\nWanchoo ].\n\nGovernment fw the purposes ofs. 2(a)(i) with reference to the sugar Industry is the Central Government.\n\nReliance is placed on the words \"concerning any such controlled industry as may be specified in this behalf by the Central Government\" appearing in s. 2 (a)(i).\n\nIt is true that sugar is a controlled industry under the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, but that in our opinion does not conclude the matter. In order that the appropriate government under s. 2(a)(i) may be the Central Government for a controlled industry, it is necessary that such controlled industry should be specified by the Central Government for the purposes of s. 2(a)(i).\n\nThis in our opinion is obvious from the words \"controlled industry as may be specified in this behalf by the Central Government\" appearing in s. 2(a)(i). It is not enough that an industry should be a controlled industry to attract this provision of s. 2(a)(i); it is further necessary that it should be specified in this behalf, namely for the purposes of s. 2(a)(i), as a controlled industry by the Central Government, before the Central Government can become the appropriate government within the meaning of s. 2(a)(i). We may in this connection refer to Firebricks and Potteries Ltd., etc. v.\n\nFirebricks and Potteries Ltd. Workers Union Ltd. (1) where the same view has been taken. We are of opinion that that is the correct meaning of these words appearing in s. 2(a)(i), as already held in The Bijoy Cotton Mills Ltd. ('). The objection that the reference was not competent therefore fails.\n\nWe next come to the contention raised on behalf of the mill that there was in fact no prejudice w hatsoever so far as the status and emoluments of Ramkrishna Prasad were concerned by the creation of the new post and the appointment of Babula] Parekh on it, and that the tribunal was not justified in any case in granting an increment of Rs. 30 per mensem to Ramkrishna Prasad. The main consideration which influenced the tribunal in passing the order which it did was that in the view of the tribunal Ramkrishna Prasad was superseded by Babula! Parekh who was first appointed as a clerk under him. This view of\n\n(1) I.L.R. [1955] Mys. 546.\n\n\n. ~\n\n...\n\nthe tribunal in our opinion is patently erroneous. The appointment order dated October 4, 1952, clearly\n\nshows that Babula! Parekh was appointed as store incharge from the very beginning at Rs. 180 per month.\n\nThe tribunal referred to certain entries in the attendance register to hold that Babula! Parekh w0rked as clerk to begin with. It appears from the attendance register for the months of October, November and December that Babula! Parekh was marked present from October 7 to November 9. Thereafter from November II to the end of December he signed the attendance register. The statement of Chaudhari, Labour Welfare Officer, of the mill was that the practice in the mill was that officers used to be marked present in the attendance register while clerks used to sign it themselves.\n\nThe tribunal has concluded from the fact that Babulal\n\nParekh signed the register in November that. he must have been a clerk to begin with. The tribunal, however, completely overlooked that from October 7 to November 9, Babulal Parekh was marked present which would show that he was not a clerk. The tribunal also overlooked that even from November 28 to the end of December when Babulal Parekh admittedly was not a clerk but store in--charge he still signed the register, though he should have been marked present. Chaudhari was unable to explain how this happened, but he was hardly the person to explain thif'!. It is, however, clear from this confusion that no importance can be attached to whether Babula! Parekh was marked present in the register or signed it. The real thing which determined the status of Babula! Parekh was the appointment order dated October 4, 1952, which the tribunal has accepted as correct. A question was certainly put to Chaudhari at the end of his cross-examination that he had manufactured the statements put in by him only the night before but he denied it. We cannot accept the suggestion on behalf of the respondents that the appointment order was ante-dated, for no suchsuggestion was made to Chaudhari and the tribunal itself does not find so. It is clear therefore that the finding of the tribunal that Babula! Parekh was appointed as\n\nz960\n\nVishnu Sugar\n\nMills Ltd. v.\n\nTheir Workmen\n\nWanchoo ].\n\nVishnu Suga1'\n\nMills Ltd. v.\n\nTheir Workmen\n\nWanchoo J.\n\nclerk uuder Ramkrishna Prasad to begin with is patently perverse and it must be held that Babulal Parekh was from the very beginning working as store in-charge. Now in so far as Ramkrishna Prasad was concerned his work and emoluments remained the same after the appointment of Babulal Parekh. If a higher post was created in the Stores Department because of the increase in work, Ramkrishna Prasad could not claim promotion to it merely because he was working as a store-keeper before. There is of course no question of supersession in this case and therefore there is no reasonable cause for any heart burning. As the learned tribunal itself points out, \"promotion to higher post was the exclusive function of the management\" and if a new post is created and a new man appointed, as in this case, it cannot be said that Ramkrishna Prasad's status was in any way prejudicll-lly affected.' It is also remarkable that after saying all that it could in favour of Ramkrishna Prasad the tribunal did not interfere with the arrangement made by the mill for reasons which were not specified by it in the order.\n\nAs such there was no reason for granting an increment of Rs. 30 per mensem to Ramkrishna Prasad, for even the workmen did not' claim that he was entitled to any compensation in the shape of an increment in his pay because of the appointment of Babula! Parekh. The order of the tribunal therefore is patently unsupportable and must be set aside. We therefore allow the appeal and set aside the order of the tribunal and hold that no relief is due to Ramkrishna Prasad. In the circumstances we pass no order as to costs.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n. ~", "total_entities": 56, "entities": [{"text": "MANAGEMENT OF VISHNU SUGAR MILLS\n\nLIMITED, HARKHUA, DISTRICT\n\nSARAN, BIHAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 545, "end_char": 619, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MANAGEMENT OF VISHNU SUGAR MILLS LIMITED, HARKHUA, DISTRICT SARAN, BIHAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THEIR WORKMEN° REPRESENTED BY CHINI\n\nMILL MAZDOOR UNION, HARKHUA, DIST.\n\nSARAN, BIHAR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 624, "end_char": 709, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THEIR WORKMEN REPRESENTED BY CHINI MILL MAZDOOR UNION, HARKHUA, DIST. SARAN, BIHAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR ANDK. N. 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K. Ramamurthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2438, "end_char": 2454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthi, R. K. Garg, A. N. Nag and Buresh Aggarwal, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2456, "end_char": 2466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthi, R. K. Garg, A. N. Nag and Buresh Aggarwal, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "A. N. Nag", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2468, "end_char": 2477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthi, R. K. Garg, A. N. Nag and Buresh Aggarwal, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Buresh Aggarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2482, "end_char": 2497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthi, R. K. Garg, A. N. Nag and Buresh Aggarwal, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "S. P. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2521, "end_char": 2532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Varma, for the intervener (State of Bihar)."}}, {"text": "WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2631, "end_char": 2638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nWANCHOO, J.-This is an appeal by special leave against the award of the Industrial Tribunal, Patna."}}, {"text": "Ramkrishna Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2807, "end_char": 2824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Ramkrishna Prasad was appointed as clerk in this mill in 1933.", "canonical_name": "Ramkrishna Prasad"}}, {"text": "October 4, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3086, "end_char": 3101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 4, 1952, Babulal Parekh was appointed to this new post on a consolidated salary of Rs."}}, {"text": "Babulal Parekh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3103, "end_char": 3117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 4, 1952, Babulal Parekh was appointed to this new post on a consolidated salary of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Babulal\n\nParekh"}}, {"text": "October 7,\n\n1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3396, "end_char": 3412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He took charge on October 7,\n\n1952."}}, {"text": "November 28, 195,2", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3417, "end_char": 3435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 28, 195,2, an order was passed by the mill distributing the duties between the various clerks employed in the Stores Department and it was stated therein that all the staff of the Stores Department would work as subordinate to Babula!"}}, {"text": "Babula! Parekh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3653, "end_char": 3667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 28, 195,2, an order was passed by the mill distributing the duties between the various clerks employed in the Stores Department and it was stated therein that all the staff of the Stores Department would work as subordinate to Babula!", "canonical_name": "Babulal\n\nParekh"}}, {"text": "December 2, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3673, "end_char": 3689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 2, 1952, another order was passed by which Ramkrishna Prasad was ordered to hand over the keys of the stores to Babula!"}}, {"text": "Government of Bihar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4031, "end_char": 4050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A dispute was then raised by the union and a reference was made by th~.\n\nGovernment of Bihar on May 9, .1956, in which the\n\nVishnu Sugar\n\nMills Ltd. v.\n\nTheir W orkinen\n\nWanshoo ]."}}, {"text": "May 9, .1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4054, "end_char": 4066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A dispute was then raised by the union and a reference was made by th~.\n\nGovernment of Bihar on May 9, .1956, in which the\n\nVishnu Sugar\n\nMills Ltd. v.\n\nTheir W orkinen\n\nWanshoo ]."}}, {"text": "Ramkrishna Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4293, "end_char": 4310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "following three matters were referred to the tribu- nal:- 1.. Whether the status of workman, Sri Ramkrishna Prasad, Store-keeper, and the nature of the job performed by him has been changed to his prejudice with the appointment of a separate store incharge;\n\n2.", "canonical_name": "Ramkrishna Prasad"}}, {"text": "Babula", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5355, "end_char": 5361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The workmen on the other hand contended that Babula!"}}, {"text": "Parekh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5364, "end_char": 5370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Parekh was first appointed as a mere clerk under Ramkrishna Prasad to begin with and it was only on November 28, 1952, that he was promoted over the head of Ramkrishna Prasad as a store in-charge, thus superseding Ramkrishna Prasad."}}, {"text": "November 28, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5464, "end_char": 5481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Parekh was first appointed as a mere clerk under Ramkrishna Prasad to begin with and it was only on November 28, 1952, that he was promoted over the head of Ramkrishna Prasad as a store in-charge, thus superseding Ramkrishna Prasad."}}, {"text": "s. 2(a)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7475, "end_char": 7485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7494, "end_char": 7523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 2(a)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7668, "end_char": 7678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7686, "end_char": 7709, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 2(a)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7711, "end_char": 7726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Vishnu Suga,\n\nMills Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8376, "end_char": 8400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rg6o\n\nVishnu Suga,\n\nMills Ltd. v.\n\nThefr Workmen\n\nWanchoo ].", "canonical_name": "Vishnu Suga,\n\nMills Ltd."}}, {"text": "Thefr Workmen\n\nWanchoo ].\n\nr960", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8405, "end_char": 8436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rg6o\n\nVishnu Suga,\n\nMills Ltd. v.\n\nThefr Workmen\n\nWanchoo ]."}}, {"text": "Vishnu Sugar\n\nMills Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8438, "end_char": 8462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "r960\n\nVishnu Sugar\n\nMills Ltd.\n\nv. - Their Workmen\n\nWanchoo ].", "canonical_name": "Vishnu Suga,\n\nMills Ltd."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8749, "end_char": 8753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8820, "end_char": 8869, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 2(a)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8972, "end_char": 8982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(a)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9152, "end_char": 9162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(a)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9307, "end_char": 9317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(a)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9414, "end_char": 9424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(a)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9521, "end_char": 9531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(a)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9675, "end_char": 9685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(a)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9930, "end_char": 9940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bijoy Cotton Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9965, "end_char": 9988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are of opinion that that is the correct meaning of these words appearing in s. 2(a)(i), as already held in The Bijoy Cotton Mills Ltd. (')."}}, {"text": "Babula] Parekh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10298, "end_char": 10312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We next come to the contention raised on behalf of the mill that there was in fact no prejudice w hatsoever so far as the status and emoluments of Ramkrishna Prasad were concerned by the creation of the new post and the appointment of Babula] Parekh on it, and that the tribunal was not justified in any case in granting an increment of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Babulal\n\nParekh"}}, {"text": "Chaudhari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11313, "end_char": 11322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The statement of Chaudhari, Labour Welfare Officer, of the mill was that the practice in the mill was that officers used to be marked present in the attendance register while clerks used to sign it themselves."}}, {"text": "Babulal\n\nParekh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11553, "end_char": 11568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The tribunal has concluded from the fact that Babulal\n\nParekh signed the register in November that.", "canonical_name": "Babulal\n\nParekh"}}, {"text": "October 7 to November 9", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11703, "end_char": 11726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The tribunal, however, completely overlooked that from October 7 to November 9, Babulal Parekh was marked present which would show that he was not a clerk."}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_221_227_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nYELLAPPAGOUDA SHANKARGOUDA PATIL v.\n\nBASANGOUDA SHIDDANGOUDA PATIL\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR and K. N. W ANCHOO, JJ.)\n\nHereditary Office-Decree for partition of Watan land upheld by Privy Council in appeal-Abolition of Privy Council's jurisdiction-Issue of certificate by Collector-Application for cancellation of decree, if can be entertained by the Supreme Court-Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, r874 (Bom. III of r874), s. IO-Abolition of Privy Council jurisdiction Act, r949 (V of I949), ss. 5, 8-Constition of India, Arts. 374(2), r35.\n\nT.he respondent brought a suit for partition against the petitioner in respect of certain Watan lands. The trial court decreed\n\n- the suit but the High Court of Bombay reversed that decree in appeal. The Privy Council restored the decree of the trial court and an Order-in-Council was drawn ('hp accordingly. Execution of the said decree was resisted by the petitioner on the ground that the lands in suit being admittedly remuneration attached to the office of the Patil and as such governed by the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, r874 (Born. III of r874) were not liable to partition. A certificate under s. IO of the Act was issued by the Collector at the instance of the petitioner and the executing Court cancelled the execution case. The respondent appealed to the High Court and that court following its own Full Bench decision in Rachapa v. Amingouda, (I88r) V Born. 283, held the certificate to .be invalid since it was not addressed to the Privy Council which had passed the. decree and set aside the order of the executing court. Thereafter a fresh certificate under s. IO of the Act was issued by the Collector and addressed to this Court and the petitioner applied to this Court under that section for the cancellation of the said decree granted by the Order-in-Council, the Privy Council having ceased to have any jurisdiction in the meantime. The question for decision was whether as a result of • the constitutional changes this court could be said to have passed the decree and could entertain the petition.\n\nHeld, that the petition must be allowed. The combined effect of ss. 5 and 8 of the Abolition of the Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, r949, and Arts. 374(2) and I35 of the Constitution was that this petition which lay to the Privy Council before it ceased to exercise its jurisdiction, could be presented to the Federal Court before the commencement of the Constitution and thereafter to this Court.\n\nThe certificate issued by the Collector and addressed to this t:ourt was, therefore, valid and must be given effect to.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Misc.\n\nPetition No. 530 of 1959. •\n\nMatch 9.\n\nr960 Petition for cancellation of the decree dated\n\nYella;;, ouda N oveber 25, 1_9~9, gr:'1nted to te Respondent by the Shankargouda PalilOrder-m-Counml m Privy Counml Appeal No. XI of v. 1948 . . Basangouda .\n\nG. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India and Shiddangoudu Patil B. R. L. Iyengar, for the petitioner.\n\nK. R. Bengeri and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the respondent.\n\n1960. March 9. delivered by The Judgment of the Court was\n\nGajendragadkar ].\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This petition has been made under s. 10 of the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874 (hereinafter called the Act), for cancellation of the decree granted to the respondent by the Order-in- Council dated November 25, 1949, in so far as the said decree purports tp operate on or include any right to the office of the Patilki and 11 Watan lands attached thereto. These lands are situated at Kirtgeri in the Taluk of Gadag. They form part of a Watan and, according to the revenue records, they have been assigned as remuneration to the. officiator for the time being under s. 23 of the Act. The petitioner has obtained a certificate prescribed under s. 10, and he contends that as a result of the said certificate this Court should cancel the decree as claimed by him in the petition.\n\nIt appears that the respondent had filed a suit against the petitioner in the Court of the First Class Sub Judge at Dharwar (Civq Suit No. 18 of 1934) and in the said suit he had claimed partition and possession of the properties as an adopted son of Shiddangouda. These properties were and are in the possession of the petitioner. The trial court passed a decree in favour of the respondent. The petitioner then preferred an appeal, No. 182 of 1935, in the High Court of Bombay. His appeal was allowed and the decree passed by the trial court was reversed. The respondent then challenged the High Court decree and went up to the Privy Council in Appeal No. 11 of 1948. His appeal was allowed, and the PriVl;.\n\nCouncil held that the decree passed by the trial court should be restored.\n\nAccordingly an Order-in-Council was drawn up on November 25, 1949; underthis order\n\n.. ' -\n\nthe respondent was entitled to recover by partition a I96o half share in the properties in. suit. He was also . fi d f 'll h Yellappagouda entitled to mesne pro ts, past an uture, ti t e Shankargouda Patil recovery of possession or three years and an enquiry v. was directed in that behalf. Amongst the properties Basangouda . in which the respondent had thus become entitled to Shiddangouda Patil claim a share are the 11 lands in question .\n\nIn due course the respondent filed an execution Gajendragadkar l application Darkhast No. 41 of 1950, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Dharwar. The petitioner then contended that the 11 lands in question 'were governed by the provisions of the Act, they were assigned as remuneration to the office of the Patil., and as such they could not be partitioned. rt was also urged on his behalf that in the original suit the respondent had not claimed any. declaration that he was entitled to the office of Patil and that without such a claim the 11 lands in question could not be claimed by the respondent. In support of these pleas the petitioner relied upon the provisions of the Act contained in ss. 7, 10, 11, 13, 24, 25 and 36.\n\nPending the m;:ecution proceedings the petitioner applied for the grant of the prescribed certificate under s. 10 of the Act, and a certificate was accordingly issued by the Collector addressed to the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Dharwar. Thereupon the said court acted upon the certificate and cancelled the execution process which had been issued against the Patilki-a.ssigned property of Kirtgeri. The respondent challenged the said order before the Bombay High Court and his challenge was upheld by the said High Court. The High Court fo1lowed its own earlier Full Bench decision in Rachapa v. Amingouda(1) and held that the certificate issued by the Collector under s. 10 was invalid in that it was addressed not to the Privy Council which was the court which passed the decree but to the Civil Judge at Dharwar. In the result the order cancelling the execution process which had been • passed by the executing court was set aside and a direction was issued that the execution proceedings should proceed according to law.\n\nThereafter the petitioner applied for a reissue of a certificate under s. 10 and prayed that the certificate\n\n(1) (1881) V Bom. 283,\n\nz96o should be addressed to this Court as in the meanwhile the Privy Council had ceased to have any jurisdiction\n\nShYekllappagdouPda 1.1and this Court had become its successor. A certificate on argou a ai , 8 v. has accordingly been ISsued on January 13, 195 , Basangouda addressed to this Court. The certificate says that the Shiddangouda Patil property in question has been assigned as remunera- - tion to the office of Patil and as such it is inalienable Gajendragadkar ]. d t ) \" bl t f 1 t d th an no la e o process o c1 v1 cour an so e process of attachment levied against the said property should be removed and the decree in so far as it relates to the said property should be cancelled. It appears that after this certificate was issued by the Assistant Commissioner, Gadag Division, the respondent filed an appeal to the Deputy Commissioner, Dharwar. His appeal, however, failed and the certificate issued by the Assistant Commissioner has been confirmed. It is with this certificate that the petitioner has moved this Court for the cancellation of the decree in question in regard to the 11 properties at Kirtgeri.\n\nOn behalf of the respondent it has been urged before us that the decision of the Bombay High Conrt operates as res jud, icata and so, in view of the said decision, the present certificate also should be held to be invalid. The argument is that the effect of the decision of the Bombay High Conrt is that the certificate should have been addressed to the Privy Council, and since it is addressed to this Court it is in valid.\n\nWe are not impressed by this argument. What the Bombay High Court has, held is that the certificate must be issued to the court which passed the decree, and if in law this Court can be said to be in effect and in substance the Court that passed the decree, then the certificate must be hel -\n\nentered into an agreement of merger with the Government of India and that Government took over the administration of Cooch-Behar which was ultimately merged with West Bengal on January I, 1950, so as to form a part of it. It was found that certain areas which belonged to the State of Cooch-Behar became enclaves in Pakistan after the partition, and similarly certain Pakistan enclaves fell in India.\n\nIn order to remove the tension and conflict caused thereby the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan entered into an agreement, called the Indo-Pakistan Agreement on September IO, 1958, and items 3 and 10 of that agreement provided for a division of Berubari Union half and half between India and Pakistan and for an exchange of Cooch-Behar Enclaves in Pakistan and Pakistan Enclaves in India.\n\nDoubts having subsequently arisen regarding the implementation of the said items, the President of India referred the matter to the Supreme Court under Art. 143(1) of the Constitution: Held, that item No. 3 of the Agreement leaves no manner Of doubt that the parties to it were thereby seeking-to settle the dispute apart from the Award, amicably, and on ad hoc basis by dividing the territory half and half. There is absolutely no indication in it that they were seeking to interpret the Award and determine the boundary on that basis. The question relating to Berubari must, therefore, be considered on the basis that it involves cession of a part of India's territory to Pakistan and this applies with greater force to the agreement relating to the exchange of the enclaves.\n\nThere can be no doubt that the implementation of the Agreement would alter the boundary of West Bengal and affect Entry 13 in the First Schedule to the Constitution, since as a matter of fact Berubari was treated as a part of West Bengal and governed as such from the date of the Award and was thus comprised th, erein before the commencement , of the Constitution.\n\nAny argument to the contrary cannot be accepted.\n\nThe State of Australia v. The State of Victoria, (19n) 12 C.L.R. 667 and The State of South Australia v. State of Victoria, (1914] A.C. 283, distinguished and held inapplicable.\n\nAlthough it may be correct to describe the preamble as a key to the mind of the Constitution-makers, it forms no part of the Constitution and cannot be regarded as the source of any substantive power which the body of the Constitution alone can confer on the Government, expressly or by implication. This is equally true of prohibitions and limitations. It was not, therefore, correct to say that the preamble could in.any way limit the power of Parliament to cede parts of the national territory. Nor was it correct to say that Art. 1(3)(c) did so.\n\nArticle 1(3)(c) correctly construed, confers no power to acquire foreign territories but merely recognises automatic absorption of such territories as may be acquired by India in its sovereign right and, consequently, does not exclude by implication, the power to cede national territory. Moreover, the power to amend\n\nIn re: Bernbari Union &- Exchange of Enclaves\n\n...\n\n1960 the Constitution under Art. 368 gives the Parliament the power to amend Art. 1(3)(c) so as to include the power to cede national In re. territory as well. It was, therefore, incorrect to suggest that Berubari Union the sovereign State of India lacked the t\\VO essential attributes\n\n& Exchange of of sovereignty, namely, the power to acquire foreign territory\n\nE1iclaves and the powerto cede national territory, and that no process of legislation could validate the Agreement in question.\n\nAlthough such cession of territory, which amounts in la\\v to a transfer of sovereignty must cause great hardship from the human point of view, the right of a sovereign State to do so in the exercise of its treaty-making power and subject to such Jimitations as the Constitution may, expressly or by necessary implication, impose, can never be in doubt and the question as to whether the treaty can be implemented by ordinary legislation or by constitutional amendment must depend on the provisions of the Constitution itself.\n\nIt may be assumed in construing Art. 3 that the Constitution contemplated changes of the territorial limits of the constituent States and there was no guarantee of their territorial integrity. Broadly speaking, that Article deals with the territorial adjustment inter sc of the Constituent States of India, and not merely their reorganisation on linguistic or other basis.\n\nArticle 3(c) deals with the diminution of the area of a State and it is unreasonable to suggest that it is wide enough to cover cession of national territory. The t.rue position is that the Constitution does not expressly provide either for acquisition of foreign territory or for cession of national territory; powers are inherent in that behalf in every sovereign State.\n\nConsequently, the Agreement cannot be implemented by a law relatable to Art. 3 and legislation relatable to Art. 368 would be inevitable.\n\nIt follows, therefore, that the Parliament acting under Art. 368 can make a law to give effect and implement the Agreement in question covering both Berubari and the Enclaves or pass a law amending Art. 3 'so as to cover cases of cession of the territory of India and thereafter make a law under the amended Art. 3 to implement the Agreement.\n\nADVISORY JURISDICTION : Special Reference o. 1 of 1959. • Reference by the President of India under Article 143(1) of the Constitution of India on the implementation of the Indo-Pakistan Agreement relating to Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves.\n\nThe circumstances which led to this Reference by the President and the questions referred appear from the full text of the Reference dated April 1, 1959, which is reproduced below :-\n\nWHEREAS the Boundary Commission appointed under the Chairmanship of Sir Cyril Radcliffe in\n\n... r\n\n\"i .\n\naccordance with sub:section (3) of section 3 of the Itidian Independence Act, 1947, made an Award, hereinafter referred to as \"the Radcliffe Award\", a copy whereof is annexed hereto as Annexure I, determining the boundaries of the Province of East Bengal and the Province of West Bengal constituted by clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 3 of the said Act; AND WHEREAS certain boundary disputes having arisen out of the interpretation of the Radcliffe Award, the Dominion of India and \"the Dominion of Pakistan set up, by agreement, a Tribunal under the Chairmanship of the Hon'ble Lord Justice Algot Bagge for the adjudication and final settlement of the. said boundary disputes and for demarcating the boundary accordingly ; AND WHEREAS the said Tribunal gave decisions on the said boundary disputes, such decisions being hereinafter referred to as \"the Bagge Awards'', a copy . whereof is annexed hereto as Annexure II ; AND WHEREAS, with respect to the District of Jalpaiguri, the demarcation of the boundary line between the Province of West Bengal and the Province of East Bengal i8 described in paragraph 1 of the Schedule forming Annexure A to the Radcliffe Award as follows:-\n\n\"A line shall be drawn along the boundary between the Thana of Phansidew a in theDistrict of 'Darjeeling and the Thana Tetulia in the District of Jalpaiguri from the point where that boundary meets the Province of Bihar and then along the boundary between the Thanas of Tetulia and Rajganj; the Thanas of Pachagar and Rajganj, and the Thanas of Pachagar and Jalpaiguri, and shall then continue along the northern corner of the Thana Debiganj to the boundary of the State of Cooch- Behar. The District of Darjeeling and so much of the District of Jalpaiguri as lies north of this line shall belong to West Bengal, but the Thana of Patgram and any other portion of Jalpaiguri District which lies to the east or south shall belong to East Bengal\" ;\n\n~3 ,\n\nIn re: Berubari Union\n\n&- Exchange of\n\nEnclav' E:>:chang• of under Art. 2.\n\nSuch territories may be admitted into Enclaves the Union or may be constituted into new States on .- such terms and conditions as Parliament may thinkGajendragadkar f. fit; and as we shall presently point out such territories can also be dealt with by law under Art. 3(a) or (b).\n\nThe expression \"by law\" used in Arts. 2 and 3in this connection is significant. The acquisition of foreign territory by India in exercise of its inherent right as a sovereign State automatically makes the said territory a part of the territory of India.\n\nAfter such territory is thus acquired and factually made a part of the territory of India the process of law may assimilate it either under Att. 2 or under Art. 3 (a) or (b).\n\nAs an illustration of the procedure which can be adopted by Parliament in making a law for absorbing newly acquired territory we may refer to the Chandernagore Merger Act, 1954 (Act XXXVI of 1954), which\n\nwas passed on September 29, 1954, a.nd came into force as from October 2, 1954.\n\nChandernagore, whicih was a French possession, was declared a free city, and in June 1946'the French Government, in agreement with the Government oflndia, stated that it intended to leave the people of the French establishments in India a right to pronounce on their future fate and future status. In pursuance of this declaration a referendum was held in Chandernagore in 1949, and in this referendum the citizens of Chandernagore voted in favour of the merger of the territory with India.\n\nConsequently, on May 2, 1950, the President of the French Republic effeted a de facto transfer of the administration of Chandernagore to India, and as from that date the Government of India assumed control and jurisdiction over Chandernagore under s. 4 of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1947 (Act 47 of 1947). Relevant notification was issued by the Government of India under the said section as a result of which certain Indian laws were made applicable to it. The said notification also provided that the corresponding\n\nSUPREME COVRT R.EPORTS [1960]\n\n1~6° French laws would cease to apply with effect from In \", May 2, 1950.\n\nThis was followed by the treaty of ces- Beruba.i Union sion which was signed at Paris and in due course on .,. Exchange of June 9, 1952, Chandernagore was transferred de jure\n\nEnclav\" to the Government of India on the ratification of the - said treaty. The result was Chandernagore ceased to Gojn•d•agadkar J. be a French territory and became a part of the territory of India ; and the Foreign Jurisdiction Act was no longer applicable to it. Article 243(1) which was then in operation applied to Chandernagore as from June 9, 1952, and in exercise of the powers conferred under Art. 243(2) the President promulgated a regulation for the administration of Chandernagore which came into force from June 30, 1952.\n\nThe Government of India then ascertained the wishes of the citizens of Chandernagore by appointing a commission of enquiry, and on receiving the commission's report that the people of Chandernagore were almost unanimously in favour of merging with \\Vest Bengal, the Government introduced in Parliament the Chandernagore Merger Act in question. After this Act was passed Chandernagore merged with the State of West Bengal as from October 2, 1954. This Act was passed by Parliament under Art. 3 of the Constitution. As a result of this Act the boundaries of 'Vest Bengal were altered under Art. 3(d) and bys. 4 the First Schedule to the' Constitution was modified. \\Ve have thus briefly refel'l'ed to the history of the acquisition and absorption of Chandernagore and its merger with West Bengal because it significantly illustrates the operation of Art. l(3)(c) as well as Art. 3{b) and (d) of the Constitution.\n\nThat takes us to Art. 3 which deals with the topic of formation of new States and alteration of areas, boundaries or names of existing States; but before we construe Art. 3 it would be convflnient to refer to Art. 4.\n\nArticle 4 reads thus :-\n\n\" 4. (1) Any law referred to in article 2 or article 3 shall contain such provisions for the amendment of the First Schedule and the Fourth Schedule as may be necessary to give effect to the provisions of the law and inay also contain.such supplemental, incidental and consequential provisions (including provisions as to representation in Parliament and\n\nin the Legislature or Legislatures of the State or States affected by such law) as Parliament may deem necessary.\n\n(2) No such law as aforesaid shall be deemed to be an amendment of this Constitution for the purposes of article 368. \"\n\nIn Ye: Berubari Union\n\n&- Exchange of Enclaves\n\nThe effect of Art. 4 is that the laws relatable to Art. 2 Gajmdragadkar J. or Art. 3 are not to be treated as constitutional amendments for the purpose of Art. 368, which means that if legislation is competent under Art. 3 in respect of the Agreement, it would be unnecessary to invoke Art.\n\n368. On the other hand, it is equally clear that if legislation in respect of the relevant topic is not competent under Art. 3, Art. 368 would inevitably apply.\n\nThe crux .of the problem, therefore, is : Can Parliament legislate in regard to the Agreement under Art. 3 ?\n\nLet us now read Art. 3. It reads as follows :-\n\n\" Art. 3. Parliament may by law- ( a) form a new State by separation of territory from any State or by uniting two or more States or parts of States or by uniting any territory to a part of any State ;\n\n(b) increase the area of any State; ( c) diminish the area of any State;\n\n(d) alter the boundaries of any State;\n\n(e) alter the name of any State; Provided that no Bill for the purpose shall be introduced in either House of Parliament except on the recommendation of the President and unless, where the proposal contained in the Bill affects the area, boundaries or name of any of the states ... the Bill has been referred by the President to the Legislature of that State for expressing its views thereon within such period as may be specified in the reference or within such further period as the President may allow and the period so specified or allowed has expired.\" Prima facie Art. 3 may appear to deal with the problems which would arise on the reorganisation of the constituent States of India on linguistic or any other basis; but that is not the entire scope of Art. 3.\n\nBroadly stated it deals with the . internal adjustment inter se of the territories of the constituent States of\n\nIn re: Be\"rubari Union\n\n©- Exchtuige of\n\nEnclaves\n\nGajendragadkar J\n\nIndia.\n\nArticle 3(a) enables Parliament to form a new State and this can be done either by the separation of the territory from any State, or by uniting two or more States or parts of States, or by uniting any territory to a part of any State. There can be no doubt that foreign territory which after acquisition becomrs a part of the territory of India under Art. 1(3)(c) is included in the last clause of Art. 3(a) and that such territory may, after its acquisition, be absorbed in the new State which may be formed under Art. 3(a).\n\nThus Art. 3(a) deals with the problem of the formation of a new State and indicates the modes by which a new State can be formed.\n\nArticle 3(b) provides that a Jaw may be passed to increase the area of any State. This increase may be incidental to the reorganisation of States in which case what is added to one State under Art. 3(b) may have been taken out from the area of another State.\n\nThe increase in the area of any State contemplated by Art. 3(b) may also be the result of adding to any State any part of the territory specified in Art. 1(3)(c).\n\nArticle 3(d) refers to the alteration of the boundaries of any State and such alteration would be the consequence of any of the adjustments specified in Art. 3(a),\n\n(b) or (c).\n\nArticle 3(e) which refers to the alteration of the name of any State presents no difficulty, and in fact has no material bearing on the questions with which we are concerned.\n\nWe have yet to consider Art. 3(c) the construction of which will provide 1he answers to the questions under reference; but before we interpret Art. 3(c) we would like to refer to one aspect relating to the said Article considered as a whole.\n\nIt is significant that Art. 3 in terms does not refer to the Union territories and so, whether or not they are included in the last clause of Art. 3(a) there is no doubt that they are outside the purview of Art. 3(b ), (c), (d) and (e).\n\nIn other words, if an increae.e or diminution in the areas of the Union territories is contemplated or the alteration of their boundaries or names is proposed, it cannot be effected by law relatable to Art. 3.\n\nThis position would be of considerable assistance in intcrpreUng Art. 3(o).\n\n- '\n\n.....\n\nArticle 3(c) deals with the problem of the diminution\n\nI960 of the area of any State. Such diminution may occur In re.: where the P!trt of the area of a State is taken out and Beruba•i Union added to another State, and in that sense Arts. 3(b) &- Exchange of and 3( c) may in some cases be said to be co-related ; Enclaves but does Art. 3(c) refer to a case where a part of the G . --dk area of a State is taken out of that State and is not a; endraga \"' J. added to any other State but is handed over to a foreign State? The learned Attorney-General contends that the words used in Art. 3(c) are wide enough to include the case of the cession of national territory in favour of a foreign country which causes the diminution of the area of the State in question. We are not impressed by this argument.\n\nPrima facie it appears unreasonable to suggest that the makers of the Constitution wanted to provide for the cession of national territory under Art. 3(c).\n\nIf the power tci acquire foreign territory which is an essential attribute of sovereignty is not expressly conferred by the Constitution there is no reason why the power to cede a part of the national territory which is also an essential attribute of sovereignty should have been provided for by the Constitution.\n\nBoth of these essential attributes of sovereignty are outside the Constitution and can be exercised by India as a sovereign State.\n\nTherefore, even if Art. 3(c) receives the widest interpretation it would be difficult to accept the argument that it covers a case of cessfon of a part of national territory in favour of a foreign State. The diminution of the area of any State to which it refers postulates that the area diminished from the State in question should and must continue to be a part of the territory of India ; it may increase the area of any other State or may be dealt with in any other manner authorised either by Art. 3 or other relevant provisions of the Constitution, but it would not cease to be a part of the territory of India. It would be unduly straining the language of Art. 3(c) to hold that by implication it provides for cases of cession of a part of national territory. Therefore, we feel no hesitation in holding that the power to cede national territory cannot be read in1Art. 3(c) by implication.\n\n292 SUPREME COURT Rh:PORTS [1960)\n\n1960 There is another consideration which is of considerable importance in construing Art. 3(c).\n\nAs we have\n\n8,,,,~;,;~;.,0• already indicated Art. 3 does not in terms refer to the\n\n& Exchange of Union territories, and there can be no doubt that\n\nEnclaves Art. 3( c) does not cover them; and so, if a part of the Union territories has to be ceded to a foreign State no Gaj,,, drnpadkar .f. law relatable to Art. 3 would be competent in respect of such cession If that be the true position cession of a part of the Union territories would inevitably have to be implemented by legislation relatable to Art 368; and that, in our opinion, strongly supports the construction which we are inclined to place on Art. 3(c) even in respect of cession of the area of any State in favour of a foreign State. It would be unreasonable, illogical and anomalous to suggest that, whereas the cession of a part of the Union territories has to be implemented by legislation relatable to Art. 368, cession of a part of the State territories can be implemented by legislation under Art. 3.\n\nWe cannot, therefore, accept the argument of the learned Attorney-General that an agreement which involves a cession of a part of the territory of India in favour of a foreign State can be implemented by Parliament by passing a law under Art 3 of the Constitution. We think that this conclusion follows on a fair and reasonable construction of Art. 3 and its validity cannot be impaired by what the learned Attorney-General has described as the special features of the federal Constitution of India.\n\nIn this connection the learned Attorney -General has drawn our attention to the provisions of Act XL VII of 1951 by which.the boundaries of the State of Assam were altered consequent on the cession of a strip of territory comprised in that State to the Government of Bhtan. Section 2 of this Act provides that on and from the commencement of the Act the territories of the State bf Assam shall cease to comprise the strip of territory specified in the Schedule which shall be ceded to the Government of Bhutan, and the boundaries of the State of Assam shall be deemed to have been altered accordingly. Section 3 provides for the consequential amendment of the first. paragraph in Part A of the First Schedule to the Constitution relating to the territory of Assam.\n\nThe argument is\n\nthat when Parliament was .dealing with the cession of ry6• a strip of territory which was a part of the State of In,.: Assam in favour of the Government of Bhutan it has Berubari Union purported to pass this Act under Art. 3 of the Constitu- .i;. Exchange of tion. It appears that the strip of territory which was Enclaves thus ceded consisted of about 32 sq. miles of the - territory in the Dewangiri Hill Block being a part of Gajemtragadkar J.\n\nDewangiri on the extreme northern boundary of Kamrup District. This strip of territory was largely covered by forests and only sparsely inhabited by Bhotias. The learned Attorney-General has not relied on this single statute as showing legislative practice.\n\nHe has only cited this as an instance where the Parliament has given effect to the cession of a part of the territory of Assam in favour of the Government of Bhutan by enacting a law relating to Art. 3 of the Constitution. We do not think that this instance can be of any assistance in construing the scope and effect of the provisions of Art. 3.\n\nTherefore our conclusion is that it would not be competent to Parliament to make a law relatable to Art. 3 of the Constitution for the purpose of implementing the Agreement.· It is conceded by the learned Attorney-General that this conclusion must inevitably mean that the law necessary to implement the Agreement has to be passed under Art. 368.\n\nArt. 368 reads thus:-\n\n\"Art. 368. An amendment of this Constitution may be initiated only bythe introduction of a Bill for the purpose in either House of Parliament, and when the Bill is passed in each House by a majority .... of the total membership of that House and by a\n\n/ -\n\n. majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that House prsent and voting, it shall be presented to the President for his asslilnt and upon such assent being given to the Bill, the Comititution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill : Provided that if such amendment seeks to make any changein-\n\n(a) article 54, article 55, article 73, article 162 or article 241, or\n\nIn f't: Berubari Union\n\n1!i- E:rchange of Enclaves\n\nGajendtagadkar J.\n\n(b) Chapter IV of Part V, Chapter V of Part VI, or Chapter I of Part XI, or\n\n(c) any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, or\n\n(d) the representation of States in Parliament, or ( e) the provisions of this article, the amendment shall also require to be ratified by the Legislatures of not less than one-half of the States•*• by resolutions to that effect passed by those Legislatures before the Bill making provision for such amendment is presented to the Presidnt for assent.\" We have already held that the Agreement amounts .to a cession of a part of the territory of India in favour of Pakistan; and so its implementation would naturally involve the alteration of the content of and the consequent amendµient of Art. 1 and of the relevant part of the First Schedule to the Constitution, because such implementation would necessarily lead to the diminution of the territory of the Union of India.\n\nSuch an amendment can be made under Art. 368.\n\nThis position is not in dispute and has not been challenged before us ; so it follows that acting under Art. 368 Parliament may make a law to give effect to, and implement, the Agreement in question covering the cession of a part of Bernbari Union No. 12 as well as some of the Cooch-Behar Enclaves which by exchange are given to Pakistan. Parliament may, however, if it so chooses, pass a law amending Art. 3 of the Constitution so as to cover cases of cession of the territory of India in favour of a foreign State. If such a law is passed then Parliament may be competent to make a law under the amended Art. 3 to implement the Agreement in question.\n\nOn the other hand, if the necessary law is passed under Art. 368 itself that alone would be sufficient to implement the Agreement.\n\nIt would not be out of place to mention one more point before we. formulate our opinion on the questions referred to us.\n\nWe have already noticed that under the proviso to Art. 3 of the Constitution it is prescribed that where the proposal contained in the Bill affects the area, boundaries or name of any of the States, the Bill has to be referred by the President to\n\n.w.\n\n> --\n\nthe Legislature of that State for its views thereon z960 within such period as is therein prescribed. . It has In re: been urged before us by the learned Attorney- Berubari Union General that if it is held that Parliament must act & Exchang• of under Art. 368 and not under Art. 3 to implement the Enclaves Agreement, it would in effect deprive the Legislature -··· of West Bengal of an opportunity to express its views Gajendragadkar J. on the cession of the territory in question. That no doubt is true; but, if on its fair and reasonable construction Art. 3 is inapplicable this incidental consequence cannot be avoided. On the other hand, it is clear that if the law in regard to the implementation of the Agreement is to be passed under Art. 368 it has to satisfy the requirements prescribed by the said Article; the Bill has to be passed in each House by a majority of the total membership of the House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the House present and voting; that is to say~ it should obtain the concurrence of a substantial section of the House which may normally mean the consent of the major parties of the House, and that is a safeguard provided by 'the Article in matters of this kind.\n\nIn this connection it may incidentally be pointed out that the amendment of Art. 1 of the Constitution consequent upon the cession of any part of the territory of India in favour of a foreign State does not attract the sateguard prescribed by the proviso to Art. 368 because neither Art. 1 nor Art. 3 is included in the list q_f entrenched provisions of the Constitution enumerated in the proviso. It is not for us to enquire or consider whether it would not be appropriate to include thesaid two Articles under the proviso. That is a matter for the Parliament to consider and decide,\n\nWe would accordingly answer the three questions referred to us as follows :-\n\nQ. 1.\n\nYes. , Q. 2. (a) A law of Parliament relatable to Art. 3 of the Constitution would be incompetent ; _\n\n(b) A law of Parliament relatable to Art. 368 , Qf the Constitution is competent and necessary;\n\n(c) A law of Parliament relatable to both Art. 368 and Art. 3 would be necessary only if Parliament chooses first to pass it 111.w amending Art. 3\n\nIH fd.' B1rt4bori Union c£. E#changd of\n\nEncloues\n\nz960\n\nMllrch .15.\n\nas indicated above ; in that case Parliament may have to pass a law on those lines under Art. 368 and then follow it up with a law relatable to the amendeJ Art. 3 to implement the agreement.\n\nQ. 3.\n\nSame as answers (a), (b) and (c) to Question 2.\n\nReference answered accordingly.\n\nCHARANDAS HARIDAS AND ANOTHER\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nBOMBAY NORTH, KUTCH, SAURASHTRA\n\nAND AHMEDABAD & ANOTHER (S. K. DAB, J. L. KAPUR and M. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.)\n\nIncome-tax-Income from managing agency-Karla of Hindu undivided family becoming partner of managing agency firm-Income therefrom assessed as family income-Subsequent partition of managing agency comtnission-Claim for assessnzen-t as 1\"11dividual income of divided members.\n\nC, who was the Karta of the Hindu undivided family consisting of his \\\\'ifC, three sons and himself, was a partner in six managing agency firms in six Mills, and the income received by him as partner was being assessed as that of the Hindu undivided family for the purposes of income-tax. On December 31, 1945, C, acting for his three minor sons and himself, and his wif~ entered into an oral agreement for a partial partition, \\Vi'.th effect fron1 January 1, 1946, by which C gave a certain share to his daughter in the managing agency commission from two of the six managing agencies held by the family and the balance together with the shares in the other managing agencies was divided into five equal shares between C, his wife and sons.\n\nThe agreement was subsequently recorded in a document were convicted of offences .. under s. 409 read with s .. 34 of the Indian Penal Code.· Jaikmhnadas . . • • Manohardas Desai The Add1t10nal Sess.ions Judge sentenced the first v. appellant to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years state of Bombay and the second appellant to suffer rigorous imprisonment for four years. In appeal, the High Court of Shah .f.\n\nBombay reviewed the evidence, because in the view of the Court, the verdict of the jury was vitiated on account of a misdirection on a matter of substantial importance, but held tha, t the conviction of the two appellants for the offence under s. 409 read withs. 34 of the Indian Penal Code was, on the evidence, not liable to be set aside. The High Court accordingly confirmed the conviction of the two appellants but reduced the sentence pa.ssed upon the first appellant to rigorous imprisonm€mt for three years and the sentence against the second appellant to rigorous imprisonment for one year. Against the order of conviction and sentence, the appellants have appealed to this court with special leave.\n\nThe facts which gave rise to the charge against the two appellants are briefly these:\n\nOn June 15, 1948, the Textile Commissioner invited tenders for dyeing Pugree Cloth. The Parikh Dyeing and Printing Mills Ltd., Bombay-hereinafter to be referred to as the company-of which the first appellant was the Managing Director and the second appellant was a Director and technical expert, submitted a tender which was accepted on July 27, 1948, subject to certain general and special conditions. Pursuant to the contract, 2,51,059! yards of cloth were supplied to the company for dyeing. The company failed to dye the cloth within the stipulated period and there was correspondence in that behalf between the company and the Textile CommisHioner. Approximately 1,11,000 yards out of the cloth were dyed and delivered to the Textile Commissioner. On March 25, 1950, the company requested the Textile Commissioner to cancel the contract and by his Itter dated April 3, 1950, the Textile Commissioner corop.iied with the request, and cancelled the contract in respect of 96,128 yards. On November 20, 1950, the contract was cancelled by the\n\ni96o Textile Commissioner in respect of the balance of cloth\n\nJ .k . h d and the company was called upon to give an account ainsnaas . f h di d.\n\nManohardas Desai without any urt er e ay of the balance un ehvered v. and it was informed that it would be held responsible State of Bombay for \"material spoiled or not accounted for\". On\n\nDecember 4, 1950, the company sent a statement of Shah f. account setting out the quantity of cloth actually delivered for dyeing, the quantity of cloth returned duly dyed and the balance of cloth, viz., 1,32,160 yards remaining to be delivered. Against the cloth admitted by the company remaining to be delivered, it claimed a wastage allowance of 2,412 yards and admitted liability to deliver 1,29,748 yards lying with it on Government account.\n\nIt appears that about this time, the company was in financial difficulties. In December 1950, the first appellant left Bombay to take up the management of a factory in Ahmedabad and the affairs of the company were managed by one R. K. Patel. In June 1952, an application for adjudicating the two appellants insolvents was filed in the Insolvency Court at Ahmedabad. An insolvency notice was also taken out against the two appellants at the instance of another creditor in the High Court at Bombay. Proceedings for winding up the company were commenced in the High Court at Bombay. In the meantime, the mortgagee of the machinery and factory of the company had entered into possession under a covenant reserved in that behalf, of the premises of the factory of the company.\n\nThe. Textile Commissioner made attempts to recover the cloth remaining undelivered by the company. A letter was posted by the Textile Commissioner on April 16, 1952, calling upon the company to deliver 51,756 yards of cloth lying with it in bleached condition to the Chief Ordnance Officer, Ordnance Depot, Sewri, but the letter was returned undelivered. It was ultimately served with the help of the police on the second appellant in October 1952. Thereafter on November 7, 1952, another letter was addressed to the company and the same was served on the second appellant on November 25, 1952. By this letter, the company was reminded that 1,35,726! yards of cloth\n\n!< •\n\nwere lying with it on account of the government ai1d z960 the same had to be accounted for, and that the 1\n\n.k . h d instructions to deliver 51,756 yards to the Chief Manh;; a~\"n~:ai Ordnance Officer, Ordnance Depot, Sewri, had not been v. attended to. The Textile Commissioner called upon State of Bombay the company to send its representatives to \"clarify the position\" and to account for the material.\n\nAfter Shah 1 receiving this letter, the second appellant attended at the office of the Textile Commissioner and on November 27, 1952, wrote a letter stating that \"the main factors involved in not delivering the goods in finished state was that the material was very old \", was \" dhobihleached in different lots\", was \"bleached under different conditions and therefore unsuitable for vat colour dyeing in heavy shades'', that it varied in length, weight, and finiBh and had \" lost affinity for .vat colour dyeing\". It was also stated that the company had in dyeing the basic material, suffered \"huge losses\" estimated at Rs .. 40,000. It was then stated: \"We are, therefore, however prepared to.co-operate with the Government and are willing to make good the government's bare cost. Please let us know the detail and the actual amount to be deposited so that we may do so at an early date. We shall thank you if we are given an appointment to discuss the rnatter as regards the final amount with respect to the balance qm1.ntity of the basic material.\"\n\nOn December 29, 1952,, the premises of the company and the place of residence of the appellants were raided, but no trace of the cloth was found. A complaint was then filed with the police charging the two appellants with criminal breach of trust in respect of 1,32,404! yards of cloth belonging to the Government.\n\nThere is no dispute that approximately 1,30,000 yards out of the cloth entrusted to the company by the Textile Commissioner for dyeing has not been returned. Bv its letter dated December 4, 1950, the company admitted liability to deliver 1,29,748 yards of cloth, but this cloth has not been returned to the .Textile Commissioner in spite of repeated demands.\n\nThat the appellants, as directors of the company ha.d dominion over that cloth was not questioned :in the . trial.court. The plea that there wer(f.Qthe, r: Dif.eqtqrs\n\nx96o of the company besides the appellants who had\n\n1 .k . h d dominion over the cloth has been negatived by the Ma\":•h;;:i,,';'v::.i High Court and in our judgment rightly. Direct v. evidence to establish misappropriation of the cloth State of Bombay over which the appellants had dominion is undoubtedly lacking, but to establish a charge of criminal Shah J. breach of trust, the prosecution is not obliged to prove the precise mode of conversion, misappropriation or misapplication by the accused of the property entrusted to him or over which he has dominion.\n\nThe principal ingredient of the offence being dishonest misappropriation or conversion which may not ordinarily be a matter of direct proof, entrustment of property and failure in breach of an obligation to account for the property entrusted, if proved, may in the light of other circumstances, justifiably lead to an inference of dishonest misappropriation or conversion.\n\nConviction of a person for the offence of criminal breach of trust may not, in all cases, be founded merely on his failure to account for the property entrusted to him, or over which he has dominion, even when a duty to account is imposed upon him, but where he is unable to account or renders an explanation for his failure to account which is untrue, an inference of misappropriation with dishonest intent may readily be made.\n\nIn this case, on a search of the factory on December 29, 1952, the cloth remaining to be delivered by the company was not found. At the trial, the appellants sought to explain the disappearance of the cloth from the factory premises where it was stored, on the plea that it was old and was eaten up by white-ants and moths, and had been thrown away as rubbish.\n\nThis plea of the appellants was not accepted by the High Court and we think rightly. No information was given at any time to the Textile Commissioner after December 4, 1950, that the cloth had been eaten up by white-ants and moths, and was therefore thrown away or otherwise destroyed. Nor was any evidence led in support of the plea by the appellants.\n\nIn this court, counsel for the first appellant con~ tended that failure to return the cloth may give rise to a civil liability to make good the loss occasioned\n\n3 S.C.R. SUPREME COUR'f REPORTS 325\n\nthereby, but in the circumstances of the case, the first r960 appellant cannot be found guilty of the offence of 1 .k •\n\n11 d criminal breach of trust. Counsel submitted that the Man:a~a:aD:m first appellant had left Bombay in 1950 and had v. settled down in Ahmedabad and was attending to a State of Bombay factory in that town, that thereafter the first appellant was involved in insolvency p:r_oceedings and was unable to attend to the affairs of the company in Bombay, and if, on account of the pre\"occupation of the first appellant at Ahmedabad, he was unable to visit Bombay and the goods were lost, no criminal misappropriation can be attributed to him. But the case pleaded by the appellant negatives this submission. The first appellant in his statement before the trial court admitted that he often went to Bombay even after he had migrated to Ahmedabad and that he visited the mill premises and got the same opened by the Gurkha watchman itnd he found that the heap of cloth lying in the mill was getting smaller every time he visited the mill and on inquiry, he was told by the watchman that e'ery day one basketful of sweepings was thrown away. He also stated that he was shown several placeB in the compound of the factory where pits had been filled up with these sweepings, and that he found a Bmall heap lying by the side of the \"Tulsipipe gutter\" and also in the warehouses in the mill premises. It is clear from this statement and other evidence on the record that even after he migrated to Ahmedabad, the first appellant was frequently visiting the factory at Bombay. The evidence also discloses that meetings of Directors were held from time to time, but the minutes of the Directors' meetings have not been produced. The books of account of the company evidencing disbursements to the Directors of remuneration for attending the meetings and the expensea for the alleged collection and throwing away of the sweepings have not been pr9duced. It is admitted by the first appellant that the letter dated November 27, 1952, was written by the second appellant under his instructions. In his statement at the trial, the first appellant stated that he was informed of the letter dated November 26, 1952, .from the Textile Commissioner and that he\n\nShah].\n\n'960 could not attend the office of that officer because he\n\nJaikrishnadas was busy attending to the insolvency proceedings and Manohardas Desai that he deputed the second appellant to attend the v. office and to explain and discuss the position. He State of Bombay then stated, \"We had informed the Commissioner\n\nShah ]. that the company was prepared to pay for the cloth remaining after deducting the amount claimed as damages\". The letter dated November 27, 1952, was evidently written under the direction of the first appellant and by that letter, liability to pay for the cloth after certain adjustments for losses alleged to be suffered by the company in carrying out the contract was admitted. By the letter dated December 4, 1950, liability to deliver the cloth was admitted and by the letter dated November 27, 1952, liability to pay compensation for the loss occasioned to the Government was affirmed.\n\nThe appellants who were liable to account for the cloth over which they had dominion have failed to do so, and they have rendered a false explanation for their failure to account.\n\nThe High Court was of the opinion that this false defence viewed in the light of failure to produce the books of account, the stock register and the complete absence of reference in the correspondence with the Textile Commissioner about the cause of disappearance established misappropriation with criminal intent.\n\nCounsel for the first appellant contended that probably the goods passed into the possession of the mortgagees of the assets of the company, but on this part of the submission, no evidence was led in the trial court. Counsel for the first appellant, relying upon the observations in Shreekantiah RamayyaMunipalli v. The State of Bombay (1), also contended that, in any event, a charge under s. 409 read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code cannot be established against the first appellant unless it is shown that at the time of misappropriation of the goods, the first appellant was physicalty present.\n\nBut the essence of liability under s. 34 is to be found in the existence of a common intention animating the offenders leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of the\n\n(l) [1955] 1 s.c R. 1177.\n\ncommon intention and presence of the offender sought z96o to be rendered liable under s. 34 is not, on the words 1 .k . h d of the statute, one of the conditions of its applic- Manh;; an:'D:ai ability. As explained by Lord Sumner in Barendra v.\n\nKumar Ghose v .The King Emperor(1) the leading feature State of Bombay of s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code is ' participation ' in action. To establish joint responsibility for an offence, it must of course be established that a criminal act was done by several persons; the participation must be in doing the act, not merely in its planning. A common intention-a meeting of minds-to commit an offence and participation in the commission of the offence in _furtherance of that , common intention invite the application of s. 34. But this participation need not in all cases be by physical presence. In offences involving physical violence, normally presence at the scene of offence of the offenders sought to be rendered liable on the principle of joint liability may be necessary, but such is not the case in respect of other offences where the offence consists of diverse acts which may be done at different times and places.\n\nIn Shree Kantiah's case (supra), misappropriation was committed by removing goods from a Government depot and on the occasion of t, he removal of the goods, the first accused was not present. It was therefore doubtful whether he had participated in the commission of the offence, and this court in those circumstances held that participation by the :first accused was not established.\n\nThe observations in Shree Kantiah's case\n\n(supra) in so far as they deal with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code must, in our judgment, be read in the ligh~ of the facts established and are not intended to lay down a principle of universal application.\n\nThe High Court has found that the two appellants were liable to account for the cloth over which they had dominion and they failed to account for the same and therefore each had committed the offence of criminal breach of trust. The High Court observed: \"Iri such a case, if accused Nos. 1 and 2 (Appellants 1 & 2) alone were concerned with the receipt of the goods, if they were dealing with the goods all the time, if they were receiving communications from the Textile Commissioner's office and sending replies to\n\n(1) [1924) L.R. 52 I.A, 40, 52,\n\nShah].\n\nz960 them, and if the part played by each of them is appal .k . h d rent from the manner in which they are shown to have ai \"' na as d It h h\" t t h \"t ft Manohardas Desai ea wit t lB con rac , t en I IS a case o wo persons v. entrusted with the goods and a breach of trust Slate of Bombay obviously being committed by both of them\".\n\nIt was submitted that the High Court erred in Shah f. finding the appellants guilty of offences 'under s. 409 of the Indian Penal Code when the charge framed against them was one under s. 409 read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code. A charge framed against the accused person, referring to s. 34 is but a convenient form of giving notice to him that the principle of joint liability is sought to be invoked.. Section 34 does not create an offence ; it merely enunciates a principle of joint liability for criminal acts done in furtherance of the common intention of the offenders. Conviction of an accused - person recorded, relying upon the principle of joint liability, is therefore for the offence committed in furtherance of the -common intention and if the reasons for conviction establish that the accused was convicted for an offence committed in furtherance of the common _intention of himself and others, a reference in the order recording conviction to s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code may appear to be a surplusage. The order of the High Court recording the conviction of the appellants for the offence under s. 409 of the Indian Penal Code is therefore not illegal.\n\nIt was submitted for the first appellant that the sentence passed against him was unduly severe, and that, in any event, no distinction should have been made between him and the second appellant in the ' matter of sentence. It is evident on the findinge\n\naccepted by us that property of considerable value has been misappropriated by the first appellant. He -was the Managing Director of the company and primarily, he had dominicm over the property entrusted to the company. The second appellant was, though a Director, essentially a technician. Having regard to these circumstances, if the High Court has made a distinction between the two appellants, we ought not to interfere with the sentence, which by itself cannot be said to be excessive. .\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n.. -", "total_entities": 77, "entities": [{"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 229, "end_char": 239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may also be observed v. that the Parliament has, by the Constitution (1st State of Hyderabad\n\nAmendment) Act, included the Abolition and the _ -· -· - Commutation Regulations in the ninth schedule, and Shah]."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 398, "end_char": 402, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Shah", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 418, "end_char": 424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "JAIKRISHNADAS MANOHARDAS\n\nDESAI AND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 911, "end_char": 954, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JAIKRISHNADAS MANOHARDAS DESAI AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 956, "end_char": 975, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAFER IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 978, "end_char": 988, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SYED JAFFER IMAM*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 990, "end_char": 1003, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Meaning of-Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1083, "end_char": 1111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 409, 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1126, "end_char": 1137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Meaning of-Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Meaning of-Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Parikh Dyeing and Printing Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1278, "end_char": 1315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first appellant was the Managing Director and the second appellant a Director and technical expert of a cloth dyeing concern known as Parikh Dyeing and Printing Mills Ltd. The company entered into a contract with the Textile Commissioner undertaking to dye a large quantity of cloth which was supplied to the company for'i:hat purpose."}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1848, "end_char": 1854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Meaning of-Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Meaning of-Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1865, "end_char": 1870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Meaning of-Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Meaning of-Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1878, "end_char": 1895, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "M anohardas Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2179, "end_char": 2196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I960 In appeal the High Court reviewed the evidence on the gronnd of misdirection to the jury but found that the two appellants were Jaikrishnadas liable to account for the cloth over which they had dominion, and M anohardas Desai having failed to do so each of them was guilty of the offence of v. criminal breach of trust.", "canonical_name": "M anohardas Desai"}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2328, "end_char": 2343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court refused to accept the State of Bombay appellants' plea that the cloth was old and was eaten up by white ants and moths."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3172, "end_char": 3177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3185, "end_char": 3202, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3443, "end_char": 3448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "L.R. 52 I.A. 40", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3594, "end_char": 3609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Purshottam Tricumdas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4086, "end_char": 4106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Tricumdas, B. K. B. Naidu and I. N.\n\nShroff, for appellant No."}}, {"text": "B. K. B. Naidu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4108, "end_char": 4122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Tricumdas, B. K. B. Naidu and I. N.\n\nShroff, for appellant No."}}, {"text": "I. N.\n\nShroff", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4127, "end_char": 4140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Tricumdas, B. K. B. Naidu and I. N.\n\nShroff, for appellant No."}}, {"text": "H. J. Umrigar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4197, "end_char": 4210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. J. Umrigar, R. H. Dhebar and T. M. Sen, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4212, "end_char": 4224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. J. Umrigar, R. H. Dhebar and T. M. Sen, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "T. M. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4229, "end_char": 4238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. J. Umrigar, R. H. Dhebar and T. M. Sen, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4321, "end_char": 4325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHAH, J.-At a trial held with the aid of a common jury in Case No.", "canonical_name": "Shah"}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4544, "end_char": 4550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4576, "end_char": 4593, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Manohardas Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4616, "end_char": 4632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Manohardas Desai The Add1t10nal Sess.ions Judge sentenced the first v. appellant to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years state of Bombay and the second appellant to suffer rigorous imprisonment for four years.", "canonical_name": "M anohardas Desai"}}, {"text": "High Court of Shah .f.\n\nBombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4848, "end_char": 4878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In appeal, the High Court of Shah .f."}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5116, "end_char": 5122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5145, "end_char": 5162, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "June 15, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5671, "end_char": 5684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts which gave rise to the charge against the two appellants are briefly these:\n\nOn June 15, 1948, the Textile Commissioner invited tenders for dyeing Pugree Cloth."}}, {"text": "Parikh Dyeing and Printing Mills Ltd., Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5756, "end_char": 5801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Parikh Dyeing and Printing Mills Ltd., Bombay-hereinafter to be referred to as the company-of which the first appellant was the Managing Director and the second appellant was a Director and technical expert, submitted a tender which was accepted on July 27, 1948, subject to certain general and special conditions."}}, {"text": "July 27, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6005, "end_char": 6018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Parikh Dyeing and Printing Mills Ltd., Bombay-hereinafter to be referred to as the company-of which the first appellant was the Managing Director and the second appellant was a Director and technical expert, submitted a tender which was accepted on July 27, 1948, subject to certain general and special conditions."}}, {"text": "March 25, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6424, "end_char": 6438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 25, 1950, the company requested the Textile Commissioner to cancel the contract and by his Itter dated April 3, 1950, the Textile Commissioner corop.iied with the request, and cancelled the contract in respect of 96,128 yards."}}, {"text": "April 3, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6533, "end_char": 6546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 25, 1950, the company requested the Textile Commissioner to cancel the contract and by his Itter dated April 3, 1950, the Textile Commissioner corop.iied with the request, and cancelled the contract in respect of 96,128 yards."}}, {"text": "November 20, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6660, "end_char": 6677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 20, 1950, the contract was cancelled by the\n\ni96o Textile Commissioner in respect of the balance of cloth\n\nJ .k ."}}, {"text": "Manohardas Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6860, "end_char": 6876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "f h di d.\n\nManohardas Desai without any urt er e ay of the balance un ehvered v. and it was informed that it would be held responsible State of Bombay for \"material spoiled or not accounted for\".", "canonical_name": "M anohardas Desai"}}, {"text": "December 4, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7049, "end_char": 7065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On\n\nDecember 4, 1950, the company sent a statement of Shah f. account setting out the quantity of cloth actually delivered for dyeing, the quantity of cloth returned duly dyed and the balance of cloth, viz.,"}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7099, "end_char": 7103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On\n\nDecember 4, 1950, the company sent a statement of Shah f. account setting out the quantity of cloth actually delivered for dyeing, the quantity of cloth returned duly dyed and the balance of cloth, viz.,", "canonical_name": "Shah"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7616, "end_char": 7622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In December 1950, the first appellant left Bombay to take up the management of a factory in Ahmedabad and the affairs of the company were managed by one R. K. Patel."}}, {"text": "Ahmedabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7665, "end_char": 7674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In December 1950, the first appellant left Bombay to take up the management of a factory in Ahmedabad and the affairs of the company were managed by one R. K. Patel."}}, {"text": "R. K. Patel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7726, "end_char": 7737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In December 1950, the first appellant left Bombay to take up the management of a factory in Ahmedabad and the affairs of the company were managed by one R. K. Patel."}}, {"text": "Insolvency Court at Ahmedabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7832, "end_char": 7861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In June 1952, an application for adjudicating the two appellants insolvents was filed in the Insolvency Court at Ahmedabad."}}, {"text": "High Court at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7973, "end_char": 7993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An insolvency notice was also taken out against the two appellants at the instance of another creditor in the High Court at Bombay."}}, {"text": "April 16, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8421, "end_char": 8435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A letter was posted by the Textile Commissioner on April 16, 1952, calling upon the company to deliver 51,756 yards of cloth lying with it in bleached condition to the Chief Ordnance Officer, Ordnance Depot, Sewri, but the letter was returned undelivered."}}, {"text": "November 7, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8734, "end_char": 8750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter on November 7, 1952, another letter was addressed to the company and the same was served on the second appellant on November 25, 1952."}}, {"text": "November 25, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8847, "end_char": 8864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter on November 7, 1952, another letter was addressed to the company and the same was served on the second appellant on November 25, 1952."}}, {"text": "November 27, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9465, "end_char": 9482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After Shah 1 receiving this letter, the second appellant attended at the office of the Textile Commissioner and on November 27, 1952, wrote a letter stating that \"the main factors involved in not delivering the goods in finished state was that the material was very old \", was \" dhobihleached in different lots\", was \"bleached under different conditions and therefore unsuitable for vat colour dyeing in heavy shades'', that it varied in length, weight, and finiBh and had \" lost affinity for .vat colour dyeing\"."}}, {"text": "December 29, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10406, "end_char": 10423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 29, 1952,, the premises of the company and the place of residence of the appellants were raided, but no trace of the cloth was found."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11600, "end_char": 11604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Direct v. evidence to establish misappropriation of the cloth State of Bombay over which the appellants had dominion is undoubtedly lacking, but to establish a charge of criminal Shah J. breach of trust, the prosecution is not obliged to prove the precise mode of conversion, misappropriation or misapplication by the accused of the property entrusted to him or over which he has dominion.", "canonical_name": "Shah"}}, {"text": "November 26, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15730, "end_char": 15747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his statement at the trial, the first appellant stated that he was informed of the letter dated November 26, 1952, .from the Textile Commissioner and that he\n\nShah]."}}, {"text": "Jaikrishnadas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15862, "end_char": 15875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'960 could not attend the office of that officer because he\n\nJaikrishnadas was busy attending to the insolvency proceedings and Manohardas Desai that he deputed the second appellant to attend the v. office and to explain and discuss the position."}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17602, "end_char": 17608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17619, "end_char": 17624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17632, "end_char": 17649, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17850, "end_char": 17855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18109, "end_char": 18114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sumner", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18246, "end_char": 18252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As explained by Lord Sumner in Barendra v.\n\nKumar Ghose v .The King Emperor(1) the leading feature State of Bombay of s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code is ' participation ' in action."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18343, "end_char": 18348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18356, "end_char": 18373, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18789, "end_char": 18794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shree Kantiah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19199, "end_char": 19212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Shree Kantiah's case (supra), misappropriation was committed by removing goods from a Government depot and on the occasion of t, he removal of the goods, the first accused was not present."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19660, "end_char": 19665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19673, "end_char": 19690, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20829, "end_char": 20835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20843, "end_char": 20860, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20911, "end_char": 20917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20928, "end_char": 20933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20941, "end_char": 20958, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21017, "end_char": 21022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21136, "end_char": 21146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21690, "end_char": 21695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21703, "end_char": 21720, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21845, "end_char": 21851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21859, "end_char": 21876, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_329_350_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 329\n\nTHE BHARATKHAND TEXTILE MFG. CO. LTD.\n\n& OTHERS\n\nTHE TEXTILE LABOUR ASSOCIATION,\n\nAHMED ABAD.\n\n- (P. B. G.AJENDR.AG.ADK.AR and K. N. WANCHoo, JJ.)\n\nIndustrial Dispute-Claim of gratuity by workmen in textile industry-Framing of scheme in modification of previous award- V alidity-Gratuity, if in the nature of profit bonus-Applicability of Full Bench formula-Duty of Industrial Court-Bombay Industrial Relations Act, r946 (Bom. XI of r947), s. n6A-Employees' Provident Funds Act, r952 (XIX of r952), s. r7.\n\nThis was an appeal by certain textile mills of Ahmedabad against a scheme for gratuity awarded by the Industrial Court.\n\nThe Labour Association, the respondent, gave a notice of change under s. 42(2) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946- (Bom. XI of l9ll7), intimating the Mill Owners' Association that they wanted a scheme for gratuity and mentioned four categories of termination of service in the annexure. This demand was refused and so referred to the Industrial Court under s. 73A of the Act.\n\nPending the reference the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952 (19 of 1952), came into operation and the Industrial Court, on an objection by the Mill Owners' Association, held that it was inadvisable to proceed with the reference and that a fresh application should be made, if necessary, after the scheme envisaged by the Act is introduced and rejected the respondent's demand. Thereafter a fresh notice of change was given by the respondent and there were certain references to the Industrial , Court in respect of the demand. The parties came to an agreement to refer all their disputes to arbitration, the references were withdrawn and the disputes were referred to the Board of Arbitrators.\n\nBefore the Board the Mill Owners' Association took the objection that so long as the award of the Industrial Court dismissing the earlier reference subsisted, the claim for gratuity could :not be considered by it. That objection was uplield by the Board and it made no provision for gratuity. Thereupon the respondent applied for the modification of the award under s. n6A of the Act, and the Industrial Court by its award, which is the subject matter of the present appeal, framed a.scheme for gratuity on an industry-cum-region basis: Held, that the decision of the Industrial Court was correct and must be upheld.\n\nRegard being had to the true nature of its earlier award and the scope of the application for its modification, it could not be said that the respondent was seeking to alter the framework or change any of the principles of that award and the application under s. n6A of the Act must be held to be competent. ·\n\nMarek I].\n\nz960\n\nBharatkhand Taxtile Mfg. Co.\n\nLtd. v. i extile Labou1 Association\n\nA scheme for gratuity is by its nature an integrated scheme and covers all classes of termination of service where gratuity benefit can be legitimately claimed and the refusal of the Industrial Court in the earlier award amounted to a refusal to frame any scheme at all.\n\nThe statutory provident fund created by the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952, could be no bar to the respondent's claim for a gratuity scheme although there can be no doubt that in awarding such a scheme Industrial Courts must make due allowance for it. Provisions of s. 17 of the said Act clearly indicate that the statutory benefits under the Act are the minimum to which the employees are entitled and that they are no bar to additional benefits claimed by the employees. • Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, [1960] 2 S.C.R. 32, referred to.\n\nIt was not correct to say that the claim for gratuity was essentially similar to a claim for profit bonus and must always be considered on unitwise basis.\n\nThe benefit of gratuity .is in the nature of a retiral benefit and before framing such a scheme industrial adjudication has to take into account such relevant factors as the linancial condition of the employer, his profit-making capacity, the profits earned by him in the past, the extent of his reserves and the chances of his replenishing them as well as the claims for capital invested by him, and in evolving a long term scheme a long view of the employer's financial condition should be taken and on that basis alone the feasibility of a scheme and the extent of the benefit to be given should be determined.\n\nArthur Butler & Co. (Muzaffarpur) Ltd. and Arthur Butler Workers' Union, (1952) II L.L.J. 29 and Boots Pure Drug Co. (India) Ltd. v. Their Workmen, (1956) I L.L.J. 293, referred to.\n\nEven assuming that gratuity is no part of deferred wage, it would not be reasonable to assimilate the scheme for gratuity to that of profit bonus or to apply the principles of the Full Bench formula applicable to the latter. A claim for gratuity is strictly not a claim to receive a share of the profits at all.\n\nExpress Newspapers (Private) Ltd. v. The Union of India, [1959] S.C.R. 12_ and Indian Oxygen and Acetylene Co. Ltd.\n\nEmployees' Union v. Indian Oxygen and Acetylene Co. Ltd., (1956) r L.L.J. 435, referred to.\n\nIt was not correct to say that an industry-wise basis is wholly inappropriate in dealing with gratuity or that the Industrial Court was in error in adopting that basis. Although some hardship to the weaker units in the industry may not be avoided, there were several factors in its favour both from the point of view of employers and employees.\n\nSince in the present state of economic development in the country the propriety of the adoption of an all-India basis for a scheme of gratuity may be open to doubt, no exception can on principle be taken to the industry-cum-region basis adopted in th.e .instant case.\n\n.\"\"' I\n\nExpress Newspapers (Private) Ltd. v. The Union of India, r960 [1959] S.C.R. 12, applied.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Bharatkhand No. 1 of 1959. .\n\nTextile Mfg. Co.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the award dated\n\nL;~· September \"16, 1957, of the Industrial Cour, t, Bombay, Textile Labour in Misc. Application (IC) No. 20 of 1957.\n\nAssociation M. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, I. M.\n\nNanavati, S. N. Andley, J.B. Dadach.anji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellants.\n\n0. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, B. R. L.\n\nIyengar and K. L. Hathi, for the respondent.\n\n0. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, H.J.\n\nUmrigar and R. H. Dhebar, for the Intervener.\n\n1960. March 17. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by G.AJENDR.AG.ADKAR, J.-This appeal by special leave Gajendragadkar J. is directed against the award passed by the Industrial Court, Bombay, by which a scheme for1 gratuity has been framed in favour of the workmen represented by the respondent, Textile Labour Association, Ahmedabad, who are employed by the textile mills in Ahmedabad including the twenty appellant mills before us.\n\nIn order to appreciate the points of law raised by the appellants in the present appeal we ought to state at the outset the material facts leading to the present dispute in which the impugned scheme for gratuity has been framed. On June 13, 1950, the respondent gave notice under s. 42(2) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (Born. XI of 1947) (hereinafter called the Act), intimating to the MiHOwners' Association at Ahmedabad (hereinafter called the Association) that it desired a change as specified in the annexure to the communication.\n\nThe annexure showed that the respondent wanted a change in that\n\na scheme for gratuity should be framed wherever services of an employee are teriniriated by the mills on grounds of old-age, invalidity, incapacity or natural death. It was further claimed that the pay-· ment of gratuity in the said cases should be at the rate of one month's wages (in..cluding dearness allowance). per every year of service.\n\nSome incidental demands . were also specified in the a.nuexure. . T.b.e\n\nr960 demand thus made was not accepted by the Associa. tion, and so it was referred to the Industrial Court.\n\nBharatkhand Pending the reference the Employees' Provident Funds Textile Mfg. Co. Act, 1952 (19 ofl952), came into operation on March 4, Ltd. v. 1952, and it was urged before the Industrl Court on T .. til, Labaur behalf of the Association that since the statutory Association scheme of provident fund would soon become compul- . - sory it would not be advisable to adjudicate upon the Gajendragadkar J. respondent's claim for the specified items of gratuity at that stage. This argument was accepted by the Industrial Court; it held that when the scheme envisaged by the new Act is introduced it would be possible to see from what date it would be operative, and that, if after the introduction of the said scheme it be found that a sufficient margin is left, it would then be open to the respondent and the Association to make a fresh application for the institution of a gratuity fund either for all the employees or for the benefit of such of them as will have to retire within the next few years.\n\nIt was on this ground that the demand made by the respondent was rejected on April 18, 1952.\n\nIt appears that the prescribed scheme under the Provident Funds Act came into operation on Octo. her 1, 1952. In June 1955, a fresh notice of change was given by the respondent to all the mills in respect of the demand for gratuity and the said demand became the subject-matter of certain references to the Industrial Court at Bombay under s. 73A of the Act.\n\nAt that time the asso.ciation and the respondent had entered into an agreement to refer all their disputes to arbitration, and in accordance with the spirit of the said agreement the references pending before the Industrial Court in respect of gratuity were withdrawn and referred to the Board of Arbitrators. Before the Board it was, however, urged by the Association that, so Jong as the award passed by the Industrial Court on the earlier reference was subsisting and in operation, a claim for gratuity which was the subject-matter of the said reference and award could not be properly or validly considered by the Board.\n\nThis objection was upheld by the Boa; rd, and so it made no provision for gratuity. The decision of the Board of Arbitrators . iu the said proceedings was published on July 25, 1957.\n\n~: -\n\n...\n\nAfter the said decision was made and before it was . rg6o published the respondent made the present application for modification of the earlier award under s. 116A of Bharatkhand Texlile Mfg. Co. the Act on July 6, 1957. In this application the res- Ltd. pondent alleged that there was sufficient justification v. for modifying the previous award and for introducing Te:rtile Labour a scheme of gratuity as claimed by it. In this applica- Association tion a demand for gratuity was made on the followingG . d-d,. 1 1. a; en raga ar • ines:~ ·(I) In the case of death while in service or becoming physically or mentally unfit for further service :\n\n(2) On voluntary retirement or resignation of an employee:\n\n(3) On terminatioh of service by the company:\n\nOne month's basic wages and average Dearness Allowance per completed year of service.\n\nAfter 10 continuous years of service in the company same as in (1)\n\nFor less than 10 but more than 7 years at 3/4 rate of (I), For less than 7 years but 5 years or more than 5 years at the 1/2 rate of (I), For more than 10 years' continuous service as in (I) above.\n\nIt appears that in the application thus made a typing mistake had crept in which failed to type properly the third category of cases. The respondent applied on August 21, 1957, for amendment of the said typing mistake and the said amendment was naturally allowed. It is the demand made by this application that is the subject-matter of the present proceedings under s. 116A of the Act.\n\nIn the present proceedings the Association did not file a written statement and in fact withdrew leaving it open to each mill to file a separate written statement of its own. It appears that there was a difference of opinion amongst the constituents of the Association. Accordingly written statements were filed on\n\nBharatkhand Textile Mfg. Co.\n\nLtd. v.\n\nbehalf of the 65 constituent mills and the large majority of the said written statements raised some preliminary objections against the competence of the present proceedings and disputed the respondent's claim for gratuity also on the merits. The Industrial Textile Labour Court has overruled all the preliminary objections and Association h \"t \"t b f d h ,. t on t e men s I as rame a sc eme , or gra mty on\n\nGajendragadkar J. industry-cum-region basis. The award framing the said scheme was pronounced on September 16, 1957.\n\nIt is against this award that 21 out of the 65 mills have come to this Court by special leave.\n\nOne of the appellant mills has subsequently withdrawn from the appeal with the result that out of 65 mills 45 mills do not feel aggrieved by the award but 20 mills do; and the contentions raised by them fall to be considered in the present appeal.\n\nBefore dealing with the merits of the points raised by the appellants it would be relevant to refer very briefly to the relevant provisions of the Act. The Act has been passed by the Bombay Legislature because it thought that \"it was expedient to provide for the regulation of the relations of employers and employees in certain matters, to consolidate and amend the law relating to the settlement of industrial disputes and to provide for certain other purposes\". With this object the Act has made elaborate provisions for the regulation of industrial relationships and for the speedy disposal of industrial disputes. An\" industrial dispute\" under s. 3, sub-s. (17), means \"any dispute or difference between an employer and employer, or between employers and employees, or between employees and employees and which is connected with any industrial matter \". The expression \" industrial\n\nmatter\" has been inclusively defined in a very wide sense. \"Approved Union\" in s. 3(2) means \"a union on the approved list\", \"primary union\" under s. 3(28) means \" a union for the time being registered as a primary union under the Act \", \" registered union \" under s. 3(30) means \" a union registered under the Act\", while \"representative union\" under s. 3(33) means \" a union for the time being registered as a Tepresentative union under the Act\". Section 3(39)\n\ndefines \"wages \" as meaning \"remuneration of all\n\n• ..\n\nkinds capable of being expressed in terms of money z96o and payable to an employee in respect of his employ- Bh tkh nd mentor work done in such employment, and includes, Textii:'t; co. inter alia, any gratuity payable on discharge \". Sec- Ltd. tion 42, sub-s. (2), provides that an employee desiring v. a change in respect of an industrial matter not' Textile Laour\n\n'fi d .\n\nS h d 1 I II h 11 . t' .\n\nAssociation spem e m c e u e or s a give no me m _ the prescribed form to the employer through the Gajendragadkar J. representative of employees but shall forward a copy of the same to the Chief Conciliator, the Conciliator of the industry concerned for the local area, the Registrar, the Labour Officer, and such other person as may be prescribed. Section 66(1) provides, inter alia, that if an employer and a representative union or ar.y other registered union which is the .representative of the employees by a written agreement agree to submit any present or future industrial dispute or class of such disputes to the arbitration of any person, whether. such arbitrator is named in such agreement or not, such agreement shall be called submission. We have already noticed that the Association and the respondent had entered into a submission in respect of several disputes which were referred to the Board of Arbitra. tors. Section 73A is important for our purpose; it deals with reference to arbitration by unions, and provides that \"notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, a registered union which is a representative of employees, and which is also an approved union, may refer any industrial dispute for arbitration to the industrial court subject to the proviso prescribed under it.\" It is under s. 73A. that the reference was made on the earlier occasion to adjudicate upon the respondent's claim for a gratuity as specified in its notice of change.\n\nThat takes us to ss. 116 and 116A. Section 116 provides, inter alia, for the period during which an award would be binding. Section 116(1) lays down in regard to an award that it shall cease to have effect on the date specified therein, and if no such date is specified, on the expiry of the period of two months from the date on which notice in writing to terminate such an award is given in the prescribed manner by a.ny of the parties thereto to the other party, provided\n\nBharatkhand Textile Mfg. Co.\n\nLtd.\n\nthat no such notice shall be given till the expiry of three months after the award comes into operation; in other words, the award cannot be terminated at least for three months after it has come irito operav. tion; thereafter it may be terminated as prescribed Textile Labour bys. 116(1).\n\nWith the rest of the provisions of s.116 Association d h\n\n1 S we are not concerne m t e present appea . ec-\n\nGoj•ndragadkar J. tion 116A(l) prescribes, inter alia, that any party who und_er the provisions of s. 116 is entitled to give notice of termination of an award may, instead of giving such notice, apply after the expiry of the period specified in sub-s. (2) to the industrial court making the award for its modification. It is unnecessary to set out the other provisions of s. 116A.\n\nThe award under appeal has, been made by the industrial court on the application made by the respondent under s. 116A.\n\nThe first contention raised before us by the learned Attorney-General on behalf of the appellant is that the application for modification made by the respondent under s. 116A is incompetent, because what the respondent seeks is not any modification of the earlier award which is permissible under s. 116A, but a reversal and a revision of the said award which is not permissible under the said section. The expression \"modification of the award\" may include alteration in the details of the award or any other subsidiary incidental matters. In this connection it must be borne in mind that there is a radical difference between the meaning of the word \" change \" as distinguished from the meaning of the word \"modification \".\n\nSection 116(2) allows for a change or modification of the registered agreement, settlement or award in terms of the agreement, and that clearly brings out the difference between the two concepts of \" change\" and \" modification \". In cases falling under s. 116(2) the agreements or settlements can be wholly revoked and fresh ones substituted in their place by consent, or by consent they may be modified in subsidiary or incidental details.\n\nWhere the Legislature wanted to provide for change it has expressly done so in s. 116(2) by using both the words \" changed \" or \" modified \".\n\n• -\n\n.. ;.\n\n..../.\n\nSection 116A, however, is confined only to modifica- I96o tion of the award and not its change.\n\nT • 1 d h £\n\nI • Bharatkhand he same argument IS pace m anot er orm. t IS Textile Mfg.-co. contended that it was not the intention of the Legisla- Ltd. ture to permit the proceedings under s. l 16A for change v. of policy underlying the award or its essential frame- Textile Labour work. Such a result can be achieved only by terminating Association t.he award under s. 116(1) and raising an industrial G . - dispute as provided by the Act. In support of this a; endragadkar.J. contention reliance has been placed on the observations made by ; M:ukherjea, J., as he then was, in the case of Re: Delhi Laws Act, 1912(1) where the learned judge stated t, hat \"the word ' modification ' occurring in s; 7 of the Delhi Laws Act did not mean or involve any change of policy but was confined to alteration of such a character which keeps the policy of the Act intact and introduces such changes as are appropriate to local conditions of which the executive government is made the judge\". In the same case Bose, J. observed that \" the power to restrict and modify does not import the power to make essential changes \".\n\nOn the other hand, the learned Solicitor-General ha.s contended that the context in which the word' modification' has been used in s. 116A does not justify the adoption of the limited meaning of the word \" modify \" for which the appellants contend. The policy of the Act and the reason why s. 116A has been enacted show that the word \" modification\" has been used in a sense larger than its ordinary meaning. The Legislature realised that the procedure prescribed bys. 116, sub-s. (I), for terminating the award which necessitates the other subsequent steps was apt to be dilatory and involved and so it has purported to provide for an effective alternative speedy remedy for the change of the award under s. 116A. In support of this argument reliance has been placed on the meaning assigned to 1; he word\" modified\" in \"Words and Phrases\" where it is stated that \"though one of the primary meanings of the word ' modify ' is no doubt ' to limit ' or ' restrict' it also means' to vary', and there is authority that it may even mean 'to extend ' or ' enlarge ' \" (2 ).\n\n\nBharatkhand Textile Mfg. Co.\n\nLtd. v.\n\nTextile Labour Association\n\nGajendragadkar J.\n\nSUPREME COURT HEPORTS [1960)\n\nIt is common ground that the modification permissible under s. 116A does not mean that the provisions of the award must always be reduced; it may mean even increasing the provisions, and so it is urged by the respondent that the word \"modification\" should receive a wider denotation in the context of s. 116A. This construction no doubt receives some support from the provision of s. 116A that , a party may apply for the modification of the award instead of giving notice for its termination ; and the latter clause tends to show that the procedure prescribed by s. 116A is ; i.n alternative to the procedure prescribed by s. 116. The industrial court was apparently inclined to put a wider denotation on the word \" modification \" used in s. 116A.\n\nWe do not think it is necessary to decide this larger question of the construction of s. 116A because, in our opinion, in the present case, even if the limited and narrow construction suggested by the appellant is put on the word \"modification\", the respondent's application cannot be said to be outside the purview of the said section. There is no doubt that the claim for gratuity made by the respondent in the earlier proceedings has been rejected by the industrial court and that is an award; but, whether or not the present application seeks for a modification of the said award within the meaning of s. l 16A would depend on what the industrial court had decided on the earlier occasion. It is clear that the industrial court did not then consider the merits of the claim at all. It upheld the Association's contention that the matter should not be decided then but may be considered later in view of the fact that the Employees' Provident Funds Act had already been passed and the statutory scheme for provident funds was about to come into force. It was on this ground alone that the industrial court rejected the claim as it was then made but it took the precaution of expressly adding that after the introduction of the provident funds scheme it would be open to the respondent or the Association to make a fresh application for the institution of a gratuity fund as it may deem expedient to claim. It would not be unreasonable, we think, to assume that when liberty was thus reserved\n\n\\..\n\n- . ..!\n\n.... -\n\nto the parties to make a fresh application the in- :1960 dustrial court had presumably s. 116A in mind. In substance, the effect of the order then passed was that Bharatkhand Textile Mfg. Co. the application was regarded as premature and liberty Ltd. was reserved to the parties to renew the application if v. the statutory scheme was thought to be insufficient or Textile Labour unsatisfactory by either of them. In such a case, if Association the respondent applies to the industrial court for modi- . - k 1 fi t. f 't d 't d'ffi lt t t th Ga; endragad ar . : ca 10n o 1 s awar 1 IS I cu o accep e argument that the respondent seeks to alter the framework of the award or to change any principle decided in the award. The true position is that by the present :ipplication the respondent is asking the court to consider the demand now that the scheme has come into force and is, according to the respondent, insufficient to meet the workmen's grievance. What the industrial court then promised to consider after the\n\nscheme came into force is brought before it for its decision again. That being the true nature of the award and the true scope of the prayer made by the respondent in its present application it is difficult to hold that the application is incompetent under s. 116A.\n\nThe next argument which is pressed before us by the learned Attorney-General is that the application for modification is incompetent in regard to matters not covered in the earlier proceedingR. We have already referred to the items 9overed in the earlier proceedings :is well as those which are the subject-matter of the present application. It is true that the notice served by the respondent prior to the earlier reference specifically set out the claim for gratuity in four categories -of cases of termination of services of the employees, whereas in the present proceedings some other categories are included. The objection raised a.gainst the competence of the present application purports to treat the earlier notice in a very technical way and confines the subsequent proceedings taken before the industrial court to the said four categories only. The argument is that the cases of termination of services which were not specified in the earlier notice cannot now be brought before the industrial . court under the guise of the modification of the <1.wa.rd.\n\n'960 If the modification of the award can be claimed under\n\nBharatilhand s. 116A it must be claimed only in regard to the said Textile Mfg. co. four categories and no more.\n\nThis argument has Ltd. been rejected by the industrial court, and it has been v. held that in substance the earlier notice should be con- Textile Labour strued a.s constituting a claim for the scheme of gratuity A s.wciation _ in general. The validity of this conclusion has been\n\nGajendragadkar J. seriously challenged by the appellant.\n\nThere is no doubt that disputes in regard to industrial matters not covered by an award do not fall within the scope of s. 116 of the Act; and so if the claim for gratuity in regard to categories not specified in the earlier notice is deemed to be outside the said notice and the relevant reference proceedings, could the respondent have made a claim in that behalf and ask for industrial adjudication without terminating the a ward? It is difficult to answer this question in the affirmative.\n\nIt is well-known that a scheme for gratuity is an integrated scheme and it covers all classes of termination of service in which gratuity benefit can be legitimately claimed. Therefore, when the industrial court refused to frame a gratuity scheme in regard to the four categories brought before it on the earlier occasion, in substance its refusal amounted to a rejection of any scheme for gratuity at all; otherwise it is very difficult to assume that having rejected the claim for gratuity in respect of the said four categories it would still have entertained a claim for gratuity on behalf of other categories not included therein. That is why we are inclined to think that though in form the rejection of the demand for gratuity on the earlier occasion was in regard to the four categories specified in the notice, in effect it was rejection in regard to the claim for a gratuity scheme itself.\n\nIt cannot be disputed that if the earlier demand had been for a gratuity scheme pure and simple and no categories had been specified in connection therewith the present application for the modification of the award coupled with a claim for a gratuity scheme in respect of all the categories specified in the application . would.be.within the purview of s. 116 of the Act. That in substance is what has happened in this case\n\naccording to the finding of the industrial court on this i96o Point, and having regard to the unusual circumstan- Bharatkhand ces of this case we see no reason to interfere with it.\n\nTextilt Mfg. Co.\n\nThen it is urged that the industrial court has erred Ltd, in law in framing a gratuity scheme even though the v. statutory scheme under the Employees' Provident Te:rtilt Labour Funds Act has been in operation since 1952. The Association provident fund guaranteed by the statute under the G • -,. 1 h . k' d f . b fi a1en,.ragau,.ar , statutory sc eme is one m o retuement ene t and since this retirement benefit is now available to the workmen it was not open to the industrial court to provide an additfonal gratuity scheme ; that in substance is the contention. This contention has been frequently raised before the industrial courts and has been generally rejected. The Employees' Provident Funds Act has no doubt been passed for the institution .of provident funds £or employees covered by it; and the statutory scheme for provident funds is intended to afford to the employees some sort of a retirement benefit; but it cannot be ignored that what the statute has prescribed in the scheme is the minimum to which, according to the Legislature, the employees are entitled; and so in all cases where the industrial courts are satisfied that a larger and higher benefit can be afforded to the employees no bar can be pleaded by virtue of tJhe Provident Funds Act. It is true that after the Act came into force, the industrial courts would undoubtedly have to bear in mind the benefit of the statutory scheme to which the employees may be entitled ; and it is only after bearing tha, t factor in mind and making due allowance for it that any additional scheme for gratuity can and must be framed by them; but it is not open toan employer to contend that the Act excludes the jurisdiction of industrial courts to frame an additional scheme.\n\nIn this connection it may be pertinent to point out tiha, t s. 17 of the Employees' Provident Funds Act empowers the appropriate government to exempt from the operation of all or any of the provisions of the statutory scheme to establishments as specified in. s. 17(l)(a) and (b).\n\nUnder s. 17(1)(b), for instance, any establishment may apply for exemption if its employees are in enjoyment of benefits in the na.ture of\n\nBharatkhand Textile _\"\"'1fg. Co.\n\nLtd. v. 1'extile LabouY\n\nAssociation\n\nGajendragadkar ].\n\nprovident fund, pension or gratuity which, in the opinion of the appropriate government, are on the whole not less favourable to such employees than the benefits provided under the Act or any scheme in rela;\n\ntion to employees in any other establishment of a similar character. This provision brings out two points very clearly. If the benefits provided by the employer are not less favourable than the statutory benefits he may apply for exemption and the appropriate government may grant him such exemption. If, on the other hand, the benefits conferred by him are less favourable than the statutory benefits he may not be entitled to any exemption, in which case both the benefits would be available to the employees. These provisions clearly indicate that the statutory benefits which in the opinion of the L.(lgislature are the minimum to which the employees are entitled, cannot create a bar against the employees' claim for additional benefits from their employers.\n\nIn this connection we may incidentally refer to the decision of this Court in the case of Indian Hume Pipe Go. Ltd. v.\n\nThe Workmen (1) where this Court has held that the statutory provision for the payment of retrenchment compensation under s. 25F is no bar to a claim for gratuity. The argument urged that the statutory retrenchment partook the character of gratuity and thus constituted a bar for the additional claim for gratuity was rejected. We must accordingly hold that the Industrial Court was right in rejecting the appellants' contention that the statutory provision for provident fund under the Employees' Provident Funds Act is a bar to the present claim for a gratuity scheme.\n\nThe learned Attorney-General has then challenged the validity of the scheme on the ground that the Industrial Court was in error in dealing with the problem on industry-wise rather than unit-wise basis. He contends that the claim for gratuity is more allied to a claim for bonus and must, therefore, be dealt with on unit-wise basis. It is not disputed that the benefit of gratuity is in the nature of retiral benefit and there can be no doubt that before framing a scheme for gratuity industrial adjudication has to take into\n\n\n.- -\n\naccount several relevant facts ; the financial condition r96~ of the employer, his profit-making capacity, the profits Bharatkhand earned by him in the past, the extent of his reserves Textile Mfg. co. and the chances of his replenishing them as well as Ltd. ' the claims for capital invested by him, these and other v. ma.terial coQsiderations may have to be borne in mind Textile Labour in determining the terms -0f the gratuity scheme. This Association position has always been recognised by industrial G . d::-:-:dk 1 . a1en raga ar . courts (V1de: Arthur Butler & Go. (Muzaffarpur) Ltd.\n\nAnd Arthur Butler Workers' Union( 1). It appears also to be well recognised that though the grant of a claim for gratuity must depend upon the capacity of the employer to stand the burden on a long-term basis it would not be permissible to place undue emphasis either on the temporary prosperity or the temporary adversity of the employer. In evolving a long-term scheme a long-term view has to be taken of the employer's financial condition and it iS\"on such a basis alone that the question as to whether a scheme should be framed or not must be decided, and if a scheme has to be framed the extent of the benefit should be determined (Vide: Boots Pure Drug Go. (India) Ltd. And Their Workmen (2) ).\n\nFor our present purpose it is really not necessary to embark upon the academic question as to whether gratuity is a part of deferred wage or not; we will assume that it is not. Even so it would not be reasonable to assimilate the character of 1; he scheme for gratuity to that of a profit bonus and to seek to import the considerations of the Full Bench formula which governs the grant of bonus. A claim for profit bonus is based on the assumption that the employees contribute at least partially to the profits made by the employer and that they are entitled to ask for a share in the said profits in order to bridge the gulf between the wages actually received by them and a living wage to which they are ultimately entitled.\n\nA claim for gratuity is a claim for retiral benefit and it is strictly not a claim to receive a share of the profits at all; and so there would be no scope for importing the several considerations which are relevant in determining the claim for profit bonus. That is the view taken by the Labour Appellate Tribunal in Indian\n\n(t) [1952] JI L.L.J. 29.\n\n(2) [1956] I L.L.J. 293.\n\n1960 Oxygen and Acetylene Co. Ltd. Employees' Union And Indian Oxygen and Acetylene Co. Ltd. (1) and the said Bharatkhand Textile Mfg. co. decision has been cited with approval by this Court in Ltd.\n\nExpress Newspapers (Private) Ltd. v. The Union of v.\n\nIndia (2).\n\nTherefore, we are not prepared to accept Textile Labou• the argument that the claim for gratuity is essentially Association similar to a claim for profit bonus, and like profit bonus\n\nG . d-dk 1 it must always be considered on unit-wise basis. Incia; en raga ar . d 11 dd h 1 . ,_. fi b enta y we may a t at even a c aim ior pro t onus can and often is settled on industry-wise basis.\n\nThat still leaves the larger question to be considered whether the industrial court was in error in dealing with the claim for gratuity on industry-wise basis. It is urged for the appellants that an industry.wise basis is wholly inappropriate in dealing with gratuity and it should not have been adopted by the industrial court.\n\nIt may be conceded that when an industry-wise basis is adopted in dealing with a claim like gratuity often enough stronger units of the industry get a benefit while the weaker units suffer a disadvantage. Take the case of a gratuity scheme. If such 11 scheme is based on industry wise basis employees working under the stronger units do not get that amount of benefit of gratuity which they would have got if the question had been considered unit-wise, whereas employees working in weaker units get a better scheme than they would have got if the matter had been considered unit-wise. Such a result is inevitable in an industrywise approach. This possible mischief can, however, be mitigated by taking a fair cross-section of the industry or by working on a rule of averages after collecting the relevant facts of all the constituent units of the industry. Even eo, if some of the units of the industry are very weak they are apt to suffer a disadvantage just as the very strong units in the industry are likely to get an undue advantage in the process; but the question which calls for our decision is: does this possible result mean that a scheme for gratuity should on principle not be framed on an industry. wise basis but must always be framed on a unit-wise basis?\n\nThere are several factors which militate against the appellants' suggestion that unit-wise basis is the only\n\n(I) [1~56] l L.L J. 435•\n\n(2) [1959] S.C.R. ti at p. 156.\n\n....\n\nbasis which should be adopted in such a case. Equality r960 of competitive conditions is in a sense necessary from t}ie point of view of the employers themselves ; Bharatkhand Textile Mfg. Co. that in fact was the claim made by the Association Ltd. which suggested that the gratuity scheme should be v. framed on industry-wise basis spread over the whole Textile Labour of the country. Similarly equality of benefits such as Association gratuity is likely to secure contentment and satisfac- G . - tion of the employees and lead to industrial peace and a1endragadkar f. ha.rmony. If similar gratuity schemes are framed for all the units of the industry migration of employees from one unit to another is inevitably checked, and industrial disputes arising from unequal treatment in that behalf are minimised. Thus, from the point of vi.ew of both employers and employees industry-wise approach is on the whole desirable. It is well-known that the Committee on Fair Wages which had examined this problem in all its aspects had come to the definite conclusion that \"in determining the capacity of an industry to pay it would be wrong to take the capacity of a particular unit or the capacity of all the industries in the country. The relevant criterion should be the capacity of a particular industry in a specified region\", and it recommended that as far as possible the same wages should be prescribed for all units of that industry in that region. This approach has been approved by this Court in the case of Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. (1) (p. 19). What is true about the wa.ges is equally true about the gratuity scheme. In the present economic development of our country we think industrial adjudication would hesitate to adopt an all-India basis for the decision of an industrial dispute like that of gratuity ; and so, on principle, it would be difficult to take exception to the approach adopted by the industrial court in dealing with the present dispute.\n\nIn this connection it may be relevant to take notice of the fact that the wages of textile employees have been standardised on an industry-wise basis. Similarly, dearness allowance has been fixed on the same basis, and unsubstituted holidays have been prescribed on a like basis.\n\nThe Employees' State Insurance\n\n(I) [1959] S.C.R. i2 at p. 156.\n\nSUPHEME COURT REPORTS [1960)\n\nz960 Scheme (Act 34 of 1948) is industry-wise and retrenchment compensation has been statutorily standardised Bharatkhand S f A IV f Textile Mfg. Co. on the same basis ( ection 25F o ct X o 1947).\n\nLtd.\n\nWhat is more remarkable is the fact that the Associa- •· tion and the respondent had entered into an agree- Textile Labour ment regarding bonus for a period of five years and Association the gratuity scheme for the clerical and supervisory\n\nG . d --dk 1 staff between the said parties is also based on the\n\na1n raga ar . . d . 1 b b same m ustry-w1se approac I y agreement etween them. The Associatfon and the respondent can justly claim with some pride that in the past most of their disputes had been amicably settled. It is only on the present occasion that owing to a difference of opinion amongst its constituent members that the Association withdrew from the proceedings and left it to the members to appear individually before the industrial court.\n\nEven so 45 out of the 65 mills have accepted the award. Under these circumstances the question which we have to decide is: Did the industrial court err in law in adopting an industry-wise basis in deciding the present proceedings? It would no doubt have been open to the industrial court to deal with the dispute unit-wise just as it was open to the court to deal with it on an industry-wise basis. As we have already indicated there are several factors in favour of adopting the latter approach though it may be conceded that by adopting the said course some hardship may conceivably be caused to the weakest units in the industry. Having carefully considered this question in all its aspects we are, however, not prepared to hold that the scheme of gratuity under appeal should be set aside on the ground that the industrial court ought to have adopted a unit-wise approach. In this connection it may not be out of place to observe that the cotton textile industry is the premier industry of our country and there is a concentration of a large number of mills in Ahmedabad. A good many of them have capit1J, lised large portions of reserves and documents produced in the present proceedings show that the production has steadily increased and has found a responsive market. There is a gratuity scheme framed on an industry-wise basis in operation in Bombay and a similar scheme ~.ppears to have been extended to\n\nl.. -\n\nNadiad and Khandesh. In fact an award for gratuity x96o has been made on an industry-wise basis even in res- Bharatkhand pect of the textile industry at Coimbatore.\n\nHaving Textile Mfg. co. regard to these facts we think the industrial court was ua. rightin observing that \"there was no justification why v. an important textile centre like Ahmedabad should. Textile La.bour not have a gratuity scheme when the needs of the Association labour require it and the industry can afford it\".\n\nGajendragadkar ).\n\nIt is true that in dealing with industrial disputes on - industry-cum-region basis, if the region covers the whole of the country industrial adjudication sometimes takes resort to the classification of the constituent units of the indust; ry in question.\n\nIndustrial adjudication in regard to the fixation of wage-structure in respect of newspapers and banks in the country. is an illustration in point.\n\nThe need for such a classification is not as great when the region happens to be limited in area, though, even in respect of a limited area, in a proper case industrial adjudication may adopt the course of classification. In the present case the industrial court took the view that classification was not possible and would be inexpedient. No classification was made in dealing with the textile mills in Bombay, and the industrial court did not feel called upon to make a departure in respect of Ahmedabad. We do not think that this conclusion suffers from any infirmity.\n\nThe scheme has been further attacked on the ground that before framing it the industrial court has not considered the extent of the liabilities already imposed on t, he indust.ry. It has been strenuously argued before us that in assessing the extent of the liabilities the acutual liabilities accrued as the result of the scheme has not been taken into account and the serious strain imposed on the industry by the imposition of excise duty has also been overlooked;\n\non the other hand, undue importance has been attached to bonus shares and no account has been taken of tlie industry's obligation to contribute to the State Insurance Scheme.\n\nWe are not impressed by these arguments. The argument about the aqtual liability accrued is really theorPtir.a.I and cannot have much practical significance. If it is suggested. that in\n\n1 960 framing a scheme of gratuity the capacity to pay should be determined only if the employer can set Bharatkhand apart a fund to cover the whole of the liability Textile Mfg. Co. theoretically accrued, then gratuity schemes can be\n\nL~. very rarely framed.\n\nSuch schemes are long-term Textile Labour schemes and a fund to cover the total liability in that\n\nhsociation behalf must inevitably be built up in course of time . -- year by year. In regard to the excise duty the indus- Ga1endragadkar J. trial court has rightly pointed out that the imposition of a higher duty was the consequence of the excessive increase in prices of mill cloth and in fact it was levied \" to mop off those extra profits ''. When the prices fall down it is not unlikely that the excise duty may be reduced. In any case the obligation to pay excise duty or to contribute to the insurance scheme, though perhaps relevant, may not have a material bearing on the framing of the scheme of gratuity.\n\nThen, as to the bonus shares, it is not right to contend that the industrial court has attributed undue importance to them. All that it has observed is that the issue of bonus shares by a large majority of the mills in addition to good dividends during the war and post-war period is an index to the prosperity enjoyed by the cotton textile industry in Ahmedabad. In our opinion, no criticism can be made against this statement. In this connection it may perhaps be pertinent to observe that the statutory ceiling placed on the agent's commission may in due course assist the mills to some extent in meeting their liability under the scheme.\n\nThe last argument urged against the validity of the scheme is based on the assumption that in working out the preliminary figures before framing the scheme the industrial court has committed an error. What the industrial court has done is to take the information collected by the Association on the earlier occasion, to compare it with the statement prepared by the respondent, and to make a rough estimate about the extent of the industry's liability under the scheme.\n\nIn considering these statements it is important to emphasise that the Association's calculations have been made not on the basis of basic pay but on the basis of pay including dearness allowance, and that\n\nna.tura.lly has made considerable additions to the\n\n--·\n\n' -\n\namounts involved. The scheme framed is by reference z960 to the basic wages. This position is not disputed. d Bharalkhand The other material point which eserves to be men- Textile Mfg. co. tioned is that the calculations made by the Associi:ttion Lid. proceed on the assumption that most of the employees Textilev.Labour would seek to retire from employment as soon as they Associaliw complete fifteen years' service.\n\nSuch an ssumption Gajendragadkar J. seems to us to be not warranted at all. It 1s common ground that employees generally seek employment in textile industry between 18 and 20 years and the age of superannuation is 60. On an average each employee would work 35 to 40 years and so it would be unrealistic to make calculation on the basis that each one of the employees retires as soon as he completes 15 years of service. In the absence of better employment in Ahmedabad it is quite likely thatmost of the employees would stick on to their jobs until the age of superannuation.\n\nThe figures collated are in respect of the years 1953, 1954 and 1955. They are collated in seven different columns, and ultimately the percentages of persons who retired during the three respective years a.re worked out as at 3·13%, 4'13% and 3·84%. The industrial court has observed that the largest number of persons retired voluntarily on payment of gratuity because there was an agreement between the Association and the respondent whereby the respondent agreed to rationalisation which involved retrenchment of staff on condition that the surplus staff retrenched would be given gratuity.\n\nIt also appears that the retired workmen included a number of employees who voluntarily resigned because they had not completed 15 years of service and were not entitled to gratuity. It is on a consideration. of all the relevant facts that the industrial court came to the conclusion that the number of -persons who would have been entitled to gratuity under a normal gratuity scheme would probably not have exceeded 2% of the labour force. If it is assumed, as we think it can be safely assumed, that on an avetage an employee works 35 to 40 years with his employer the said percentage deduced by the indu:itrial court cannot be said to be erroneous.\n\nEven so the scheme framed by the industrial court has provided1 inter alia1 one month's basic\n\nr960\n\nBharatkhand Textile Mfg. Co.\n\nLtd.\n\nwage for each completed year of service for the period before the coming into force of the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952, and half-a-month's basic wage for each completed year of service thereafter, v. subject to a maximum of fifteen months' basic wages Textile Labour to be paid to the employee or his heirs or executors or nominees as the case may be. This provision which Association\n\nGajendragadkar ]. amounts to a departure from the Bombay scheme of\n\nr¢o\n\nMarch a2.\n\ngratuity brings out the fact that the provisions made by the Employees' Provident Funds Act have been duly taken into account by the industrial court. We are, therefore, satisfied that the scheme framed by the industrial court does not suffer from any infirmities as alleged by the appellants.\n\nThe result is the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nM/S. NEW INDIA MOTORS (P) LTD.\n\n(P. B.\n\nNEW DELHI v.\n\nK. T. MORRIS\n\nG .. UENDRAGADKAR, K. N. W ANCHOO and K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)\n\nJndu, strial Dispute-\"; rv ork1nen concerned in such dispute,\" Meaning of-Industrial Disputes Act, r947 (r4 of r947), as amended by Act 36 of r956, ss. 33(r)(a), 33A.\n\nThe respondent workman was dismissed by his employer, the appellant, pending adjudication of an:industrial dispute, and without the permission of the Industrial Tribunal, relating to the discharge of 7 other employees working as apprentices under (he appellant. The respondent raised a dispute before the Industrial Tribunal under s. 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, r947, and his case was that he was concerned in the dispute relating to the said 7 employees and gave evidence on their behalf and that his dismissal \\Vas solely due to the interest he took in their cause.\n\nThe Tribunal found in his favour and passed an award directing his reinstatement. The appellant contended that the respondent was incompetent to raise the dispute •:mder s. 33A of the Act.\n\nThe question for decision, therefore, was one relating to the construction of s. 33(r)(a) of the Act:", "total_entities": 124, "entities": [{"text": "329\n\nTHE BHARATKHAND TEXTILE MFG. CO. LTD.\n\n& OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 83, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE BHARATKHAND TEXTILE MFG. CO. LTD. & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE TEXTILE LABOUR ASSOCIATION,\n\nAHMED ABAD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 128, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE TEXTILE LABOUR ASSOCIATION, AHMED ABAD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHoo, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 163, "end_char": 181, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. N. WANCHoo, JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Applicability of Full Bench formula-Duty of Industrial Court-Bombay Industrial Relations Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 358, "end_char": 450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Provident Funds Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 494, "end_char": 513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ahmedabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 590, "end_char": 599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was an appeal by certain textile mills of Ahmedabad against a scheme for gratuity awarded by the Industrial Court."}}, {"text": "s. 42(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 734, "end_char": 742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provident Funds Act", "statute": "Provident Funds Act"}}, {"text": "Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 750, "end_char": 787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 73A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1031, "end_char": 1037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946", "statute": "the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "Provident Funds Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1088, "end_char": 1113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Provident Funds Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3089, "end_char": 3114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3306, "end_char": 3311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provident Funds Act, 1952", "statute": "Provident Funds Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "[1960] 2 S.C.R. 32", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3559, "end_char": 3577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5783, "end_char": 5811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Bharatkhand No."}}, {"text": "Textile Mfg. Co.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5856, "end_char": 5872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Textile Mfg."}}, {"text": "I. M.\n\nNanavati", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6095, "end_char": 6110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, I. M.\n\nNanavati, S. N. Andley, J.B. Dadach.anji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "S. N. Andley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6112, "end_char": 6124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, I. M.\n\nNanavati, S. N. Andley, J.B. Dadach.anji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "J.B. Dadach.anji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6126, "end_char": 6142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, I. M.\n\nNanavati, S. N. Andley, J.B. Dadach.anji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6144, "end_char": 6158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, I. M.\n\nNanavati, S. N. Andley, J.B. Dadach.anji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "P. L. Vohra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6163, "end_char": 6174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, I. M.\n\nNanavati, S. N. Andley, J.B. Dadach.anji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6200, "end_char": 6211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, B. R. L.\n\nIyengar and K. L. Hathi, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "B. R. L.\n\nIyengar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6241, "end_char": 6258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, B. R. L.\n\nIyengar and K. L. Hathi, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "K. L. Hathi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6263, "end_char": 6274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, B. R. L.\n\nIyengar and K. L. Hathi, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "H.J.\n\nUmrigar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6341, "end_char": 6354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, H.J.\n\nUmrigar and R. H. Dhebar, for the Intervener."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6359, "end_char": 6371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, H.J.\n\nUmrigar and R. H. Dhebar, for the Intervener."}}, {"text": "G.AJENDR.AG.ADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6453, "end_char": 6470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by G.AJENDR.AG.ADKAR, J.-This appeal by special leave Gajendragadkar J. is directed against the award passed by the Industrial Court, Bombay, by which a scheme for1 gratuity has been framed in favour of the workmen represented by the respondent, Textile Labour Association, Ahmedabad, who are employed by the textile mills in Ahmedabad including the twenty appellant mills before us.", "canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*"}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6504, "end_char": 6518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by G.AJENDR.AG.ADKAR, J.-This appeal by special leave Gajendragadkar J. is directed against the award passed by the Industrial Court, Bombay, by which a scheme for1 gratuity has been framed in favour of the workmen represented by the respondent, Textile Labour Association, Ahmedabad, who are employed by the textile mills in Ahmedabad including the twenty appellant mills before us.", "canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*"}}, {"text": "June 13, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7067, "end_char": 7080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 13, 1950, the respondent gave notice under s. 42(2) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (Born."}}, {"text": "s. 42(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7115, "end_char": 7123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7131, "end_char": 7168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 18, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9058, "end_char": 9072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was on this ground that the demand made by the respondent was rejected on April 18, 1952."}}, {"text": "Provident Funds Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9123, "end_char": 9142, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Octo. her 1, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9166, "end_char": 9183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the prescribed scheme under the Provident Funds Act came into operation on Octo."}}, {"text": "s. 73A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9415, "end_char": 9421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 25, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10229, "end_char": 10242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "iu the said proceedings was published on July 25, 1957."}}, {"text": "s. 116A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10412, "end_char": 10419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "August 21, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11525, "end_char": 11540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent applied on August 21, 1957, for amendment of the said typing mistake and the said amendment was naturally allowed."}}, {"text": "s. 116A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11731, "end_char": 11738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bharatkhand Textile Mfg", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12068, "end_char": 12091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly written statements were filed on\n\nBharatkhand Textile Mfg."}}, {"text": "Industrial Textile Labour Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12354, "end_char": 12385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Industrial Textile Labour Court has overruled all the preliminary objections and Association h \"t \"t b f d h ,."}}, {"text": "September 16, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12614, "end_char": 12632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The award framing the said scheme was pronounced on September 16, 1957."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13629, "end_char": 13633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13947, "end_char": 13954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(28)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14015, "end_char": 14023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(30)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14133, "end_char": 14141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(33)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14220, "end_char": 14228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3(39)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14317, "end_char": 14330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15139, "end_char": 15152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 73A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15718, "end_char": 15729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 73A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16103, "end_char": 16109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 116 and 116A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16276, "end_char": 16292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16294, "end_char": 16305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 116(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16383, "end_char": 16397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bharatkhand Textile Mfg. Co.\n\nLtd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16735, "end_char": 16769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 116(1) lays down in regard to an award that it shall cease to have effect on the date specified therein, and if no such date is specified, on the expiry of the period of two months from the date on which notice in writing to terminate such an award is given in the prescribed manner by a.ny of the parties thereto to the other party, provided\n\nBharatkhand Textile Mfg."}}, {"text": "s.116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17097, "end_char": 17102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Goj•ndragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17171, "end_char": 17185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ec-\n\nGoj•ndragadkar J. tion 116A(l) prescribes, inter alia, that any party who und_er the provisions of s. 116 is entitled to give notice of termination of an award may, instead of giving such notice, apply after the expiry of the period specified in sub-s. (2) to the industrial court making the award for its modification."}}, {"text": "s. 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17270, "end_char": 17276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 116A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17544, "end_char": 17551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 116A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17664, "end_char": 17671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 116A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17841, "end_char": 17848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 116A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17971, "end_char": 17978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 116(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18401, "end_char": 18415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 116(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18654, "end_char": 18663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 116(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18922, "end_char": 18931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 116A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19006, "end_char": 19018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 116(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19470, "end_char": 19479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "endragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19566, "end_char": 19577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of this a; endragadkar.", "canonical_name": "UENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "ukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19649, "end_char": 19657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. contention reliance has been placed on the observations made by ; M:ukherjea, J., as he then was, in the case of Re: Delhi Laws Act, 1912(1) where the learned judge stated t, hat \"the word ' modification ' occurring in s; 7 of the Delhi Laws Act did not mean or involve any change of policy but was confined to alteration of such a character which keeps the policy of the Act intact and introduces such changes as are appropriate to local conditions of which the executive government is made the judge\"."}}, {"text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19698, "end_char": 19718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20102, "end_char": 20106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the same case Bose, J. observed that \" the power to restrict and modify does not import the power to make essential changes \"."}}, {"text": "s. 116A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20347, "end_char": 20354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "s. 116A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20506, "end_char": 20513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "s. 116A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20922, "end_char": 20929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 116A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21463, "end_char": 21470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 116A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21704, "end_char": 21711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 116A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21784, "end_char": 21791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 116A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21967, "end_char": 21974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22027, "end_char": 22033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 116A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22143, "end_char": 22150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 116A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22239, "end_char": 22246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Provident Funds Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23089, "end_char": 23108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 116A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23758, "end_char": 23765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provident Funds Act", "statute": "Provident Funds Act"}}, {"text": "Bharatkhand Textile Mfg. Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23834, "end_char": 23862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In substance, the effect of the order then passed was that Bharatkhand Textile Mfg."}}, {"text": "s. 116A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24946, "end_char": 24953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 116A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26095, "end_char": 26102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26655, "end_char": 26661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28284, "end_char": 28290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Textilt Mfg. Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28539, "end_char": 28555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Textilt Mfg."}}, {"text": "Labour Funds Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28727, "end_char": 28743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Provident Funds Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29241, "end_char": 29260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Jhe Provident Funds Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29797, "end_char": 29820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30358, "end_char": 30363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jhe Provident Funds Act", "statute": "Jhe Provident Funds Act"}}, {"text": "Provident Funds Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30382, "end_char": 30401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 17(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30558, "end_char": 30569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provident Funds Act", "statute": "Provident Funds Act"}}, {"text": "s. 17(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30586, "end_char": 30597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provident Funds Act", "statute": "Provident Funds Act"}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32027, "end_char": 32033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Provident Funds Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32403, "end_char": 32422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bharatkhand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33131, "end_char": 33142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not disputed that the benefit of gratuity is in the nature of retiral benefit and there can be no doubt that before framing a scheme for gratuity industrial adjudication has to take into\n\n.- -\n\naccount several relevant facts ; the financial condition r96~ of the employer, his profit-making capacity, the profits Bharatkhand earned by him in the past, the extent of his reserves Textile Mfg."}}, {"text": "Arthur Butler Workers' Union", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33609, "end_char": 33637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Muzaffarpur) Ltd.\n\nAnd Arthur Butler Workers' Union( 1)."}}, {"text": "Boots Pure Drug Go. (India) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34248, "end_char": 34280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In evolving a long-term scheme a long-term view has to be taken of the employer's financial condition and it iS\"on such a basis alone that the question as to whether a scheme should be framed or not must be decided, and if a scheme has to be framed the extent of the benefit should be determined (Vide: Boots Pure Drug Go. ("}}, {"text": "Bharatkhand Textile Mfg. co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 35524, "end_char": 35552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1960 Oxygen and Acetylene Co. Ltd. Employees' Union And Indian Oxygen and Acetylene Co. Ltd. (1) and the said Bharatkhand Textile Mfg."}}, {"text": "Textile Labou•", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35721, "end_char": 35735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, we are not prepared to accept Textile Labou• the argument that the claim for gratuity is essentially Association similar to a claim for profit bonus, and like profit bonus\n\nG ."}}, {"text": "Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 39353, "end_char": 39386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This approach has been approved by this Court in the case of Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. (1) (p. 19)."}}, {"text": "Bharatkhand S f A IV f Textile Mfg. Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 40300, "end_char": 40339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPHEME COURT REPORTS [1960)\n\nz960 Scheme (Act 34 of 1948) is industry-wise and retrenchment compensation has been statutorily standardised Bharatkhand S f A IV f Textile Mfg."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 42503, "end_char": 42509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is a gratuity scheme framed on an industry-wise basis in operation in Bombay and a similar scheme ~.ppears to have been extended to\n\nl.. -\n\nNadiad and Khandesh."}}, {"text": "Nadiad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 42573, "end_char": 42579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is a gratuity scheme framed on an industry-wise basis in operation in Bombay and a similar scheme ~.ppears to have been extended to\n\nl.. -\n\nNadiad and Khandesh."}}, {"text": "Khandesh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 42584, "end_char": 42592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is a gratuity scheme framed on an industry-wise basis in operation in Bombay and a similar scheme ~.ppears to have been extended to\n\nl.. -\n\nNadiad and Khandesh."}}, {"text": "Coimbatore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 42726, "end_char": 42736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact an award for gratuity x96o has been made on an industry-wise basis even in res- Bharatkhand pect of the textile industry at Coimbatore."}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43061, "end_char": 43075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gajendragadkar ).", "canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*"}}, {"text": "Bharatkhand", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 44994, "end_char": 45005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that in\n\n1 960 framing a scheme of gratuity the capacity to pay should be determined only if the employer can set Bharatkhand apart a fund to cover the whole of the liability Textile Mfg."}}, {"text": "Ga1endragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45372, "end_char": 45386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In regard to the excise duty the indus- Ga1endragadkar J. trial court has rightly pointed out that the imposition of a higher duty was the consequence of the excessive increase in prices of mill cloth and in fact it was levied \" to mop off those extra profits ''.", "canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*"}}, {"text": "Provident Funds Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49731, "end_char": 49756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 50024, "end_char": 50038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gajendragadkar ].", "canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*"}}, {"text": "Provident Funds Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50180, "end_char": 50199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "NEW INDIA MOTORS (P) LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 50488, "end_char": 50512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/S. NEW INDIA MOTORS (P) LTD."}}, {"text": "UENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50556, "end_char": 50568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(P. B.\n\nNEW DELHI v.\n\nK. T. MORRIS\n\nG .. UENDRAGADKAR, K. N. W ANCHOO and K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "UENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "K. N. W ANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50570, "end_char": 50584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(P. B.\n\nNEW DELHI v.\n\nK. T. MORRIS\n\nG .. UENDRAGADKAR, K. N. W ANCHOO and K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "K. N. WANCHoo, JJ."}}, {"text": "K. c. DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50589, "end_char": 50604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(P. B.\n\nNEW DELHI v.\n\nK. T. MORRIS\n\nG .. UENDRAGADKAR, K. N. W ANCHOO and K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Meaning of-Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50675, "end_char": 50709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 33(r)(a), 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50760, "end_char": 50777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Meaning of-Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Meaning of-Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "s. 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51111, "end_char": 51117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Meaning of-Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Meaning of-Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51125, "end_char": 51148, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51527, "end_char": 51533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Meaning of-Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Meaning of-Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "s. 33(r)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51625, "end_char": 51636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Meaning of-Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Meaning of-Industrial Disputes Act"}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_350_358_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "r960\n\nBharatkhand Textile Mfg. Co.\n\nLtd.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [Hl60)\n\nwage for each completed year of service for the period before the coming into force of the Employees' Provident Funds Act, 1952, and half-a-month's basic wage for each completed year of service thereafter, v. subject to a maximum of fifteen months' basic wages Textile Labour to be paid to the employee or his heirs or executors or nominees as the case may be. This provision which Association\n\nGajendragadkar ]. amounts to a departure from the Bombay scheme of\n\nr¢o\n\nMarch a2.\n\ngratuity brings out the fact that the provisions made by the Employees' Provident Funds Act have been duly taken into account by the industrial court. We are, therefore, satisfied that the scheme framed by the industrial court does not suffer from any infirmities as alleged by the appellants.\n\nThe result is the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nM/S. NEW INDIA MOTORS (P) LTD.\n\n(P. B.\n\nNEW DELHI v.\n\nK. T. MORRIS\n\nG .. UENDRAGADKAR, K. N. W ANCHOO and K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)\n\nJndu, strial Dispute-\"; rv ork1nen concerned in such dispute,\" Meaning of-Industrial Disputes Act, r947 (r4 of r947), as amended by Act 36 of r956, ss. 33(r)(a), 33A.\n\nThe respondent workman was dismissed by his employer, the appellant, pending adjudication of an:industrial dispute, and without the permission of the Industrial Tribunal, relating to the discharge of 7 other employees working as apprentices under (he appellant. The respondent raised a dispute before the Industrial Tribunal under s. 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, r947, and his case was that he was concerned in the dispute relating to the said 7 employees and gave evidence on their behalf and that his dismissal \\Vas solely due to the interest he took in their cause.\n\nThe Tribunal found in his favour and passed an award directing his reinstatement. The appellant contended that the respondent was incompetent to raise the dispute •:mder s. 33A of the Act.\n\nThe question for decision, therefore, was one relating to the construction of s. 33(r)(a) of the Act:\n\n' A\n\nHeld, that the expression \"workmen concerned in such dis- 1960 pute\" occurring in s. 33(1)(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as amended, by Act 36 of 1956, includes not merely such M/s. New India workmen as are directly or immediately concerned with the dis- Motors (P) Ltd. pute, but also those on whose behalf the dispute is raised as well v. as those who, when the award is made, will be bound by it.\n\nK T. Morris Eastern Plywood Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Eastern Plywood Mfg.\n\nWorkers' Union, (1952) L.A.C. 103 and Newtone Studios Ltd. v.\n\nEthirajula (T.R.), (1958) I L.L.J. 63, approved.\n\nThe New ]ehangir Vakil Mills Ltd., Bhavnagarv. N. L. Vyas & Others, A.LR. 1959 Born. 248, disapproved.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 124of1959. - Appeal by special leave from the Award dated February 8, 1957, of the Additional Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, in Misc. I. D. Case No. 422 of 1956.\n\nJawala Prasad Chopra and J. K. Haranandani, for the appellants.\n\n0. K. Daphtary, SolicitQr-General of India, H. J.\n\nUmrigar, M. K. Ramamurthi, V. A. Seyid Muhamad and M. R. rishna Pillai, for the respondent.\n\n1960. March 22.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal by special leave Gajendragadkar ]. is directed against the order passed by the Additional Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, directing the appellant, M/s. New India Motors Private Ltd., to reinstate its former employee, K. T. Morris, the respondent, in his original post as field service representativt\"l and to pay him his back wages from the date of his dismissal till the date of his reinstatement. This award has been made on a complaint filed by the respondent against the appellant under s. 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act XIV of 1947 (hereinafter called the Act). It appears that before joining the appellant the respon~ dent was working with a firm in Calcutta; prior to that he was field service representative of M/s. Premier Automobiles Ltd., Bombay. The respondent joined the services of the appellant sometime in May 1954 as Works Manager. Before he joined the services of the appellant he had been told by the appellant by its letter dated March 27, 1954, that the appellant would be willing to pay him Rs. 350 per month and something more by way of certain percentage on business. He was, however, asked to interview th~\n\nr9~0 appellant; an interview followed and the respondent was given a letter of appointment on May 6, 1954. ill /s. New India W k h M Moiv\" (P) Ltd. By this letter he was appointed as or s op r anager v. in the appellant's firm on three months' probation K: r. Mo,, is subject to the terms and conditions specified in the . -- . letter of appointment (Ex. W-2). The respondent Ga; endragadk., J. continued in this post till February 28, 1955, when he was given the assignment of the appellant's field service organiser with effect from March 1, 1955.\n\nA letter of appointment given to him on 28 - 2 - 1955 set forth the terms and conditions of his new assignment. It appears that on April 18, 1956, the management of the appellant called for an explanation of the respondent in respect of several complaints. An explanation was given by the respondent. It was, however, followed by another communication from the appellant to the respondent setting forth specific instances of the respondent's conduct for which explanation was demanded. The respondent again explained and disputed the correctness of the charges.\n\nOn June 30, 1956, the respondent's services were terminated on the ground.that the appellant had decided to abolish the post of field service representative. It is this order which gave rise to the respondent's complaint under s. 33A of the Act.\n\nThe complaint was filed on July 18, 1956. The respondent invoked s. 33A because his case was that at the time when his services were terminated an industrial dispute was pending between the appellant and 7 of its employees and the respondent was one of the workmen concerned in the said industrial dispute.\n\nThe said industrial dispute had reference to the termination of the services of the said 7 employees who were working with the appellant as apprentices. On their behalf it was alleged that their termination of service was improper and illegal and that was referred to the industrial tribunal for its adjudication on August 20, 1955. The said dispute was finally decided on January 2, 1957.\n\nWith the merits of the said dispute or the decision thereof we are not concerned in the present appeal.\n\nAccording to the respondent, since he was a workman concerned in the said dispute s. 33(l)(a) applied and it was not open to the appellant to terminate his\n\nservices save with the express permission in writing 1960 of the authority before which the said dispute was 111 /s. New India pending. It was on this basis that he made his Motors (PJ ua. complaint under s. 33A of the Act. v.\n\nBefore the tribunal the appellant urged that the K. T r::_orris respondent was not a workman as defined by the Gajeniragadkar 1.\n\nAct, and on the merits it was contended that the appellant had to abolish the post of the field service organiser owing to the fact that a part of the agency work of the appellant had been lost to it. On the other hand, the respondent contended that he was a workman under the Act and the plea made by the appellant about the necessity to abolish his post was not true and genuine. His grievance was that his services were terminated solely because he had taken interest ..., in the complaint of the 7 apprentices which had given rise to the main industrial dispute and had in fact given evidence in the said dispute on behalf of the said apprentices. 'l'he tribunal has found that the respondent is a workman under the Act, that there was no evidence to justify the appellant's contention that it had become necessary for it to abolish the respondent's post, and that it did appear that the respondent\n\n~ had been discharged because the appellant disapproved of the respondent's conduct in supporting the 7 apprentices in the main industrial dispute. As a result of these findings the tribunal has ordered the appellant to reinstate the respondent. 'l'he question as to whether the respondent is a workman as defined by s. 2(s) of the Act is a question of fact and the finding recorded by the tribunal > on the said question, after considering the relevant evidence adduced by the parties, cannot be successfully challenged before us in the present appeal. The respondent has given evidence as to the nature of the work he was required to do as field service organiser . . The letter of appointment issued to him in that behalf expressly required, inter alia, that the respondent had, if need be, to check up and carry out necessary adjustments and repairs of the vehicles sold by the appellant to its customers and to obtain signatures of responsible persons on the satisfactien\n\nT96o forms which had been provided to him. The respondent swore that he looked after the working of the At, s. New India Moto\" (P) Ltd. workshop and assisted the mechanics and others in\n\nv. their jobs.\n\nHe attended to complicated work himself K. 1'. Morris and made the workmen acquainted with Miller's special . - tools and equipment needed for repairs and servicing Ga; cndrngadkar J. of cars. He denied the suggestion that he was a member of the supervisory staff. On this evidence the tribunal has based its finding that the respondent was a workman under s. 2(s), and we see no reason to interfere with it.\n\nThen, as to the appellant's case that it had to abolish the post of the respondent as it had lost the agency of DeSoto cars from Premier Automobiles, there is no reliable evidence to show when this agency was actually lost.\n\nBesides, the fact that the appellant has appointed a Technical Supervisor after discharging the respondent is also not without significance.\n\nFurthermore, the appellant is still the agent for Plymouth and Jeeps and the tribunal is right when it has found that it still needed a field representative to look after servicing of sold cars at outside stations. On the other hand, the evidence of the respondent clearly shows that he supported the case of the 7 apprentices and that provoked the appellant to take the step of terminating his services. The process of finding fault with his work appears to have commenced after the appellant disapproved of the respondent's conduct in that behalf. We are, therefore, satisfied that the tribunal was right in coming to the conclusion that the dismissal of the respondent is not supported on any reasonable ground, and in fact is due to the appellant's indignation at the conduct of the respondent in the main industrial dispute between the appellant and its 7 employees. If that be the true position the industrial tribunal was justified in treating the dismissal of the respondent as mala fide.\n\nIt has, however, been urged before us by the appellant that the complaint made by the respondent under s. 33A is not competent. It is common ground that a complaint can be made under s. g3A only ifs. 33 has been contravened, and so the appellant's argument is that s. 33(l)(a) is inapplicable because the respoudent\n\nwas not a workman concerned in the main indus'trial z96o dispute, and as such his dismissal cannot be said to Mfs. New India contravene the provisions of the said section. Indeed Motors (P) Ltd. the principal point urged before us by the appellant v. is in regard to the construction of s. 33(1)(a) of the l{, T. Morris Act. Was the respondent a workman concerned with . - the main industrial dispute? That is the point of Ga1endragadkar J. law raised for our decision and its decision depends upon the construction of the relevant words used in s. 33(1)(a).\n\nSection 33(l){a) as it stood prior to the amendment of 1956 provided, inter alia, that during the pendency of any proceedings before a tribunal, no employer shall alter to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in the said dispute the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the commencement of the said proceedings, save with the express permission in writing of the tribunal. Section 33 has been modified from time to time and its scope has been finally limited by the amendment made ):>y Act 36 of 1956.\n\nWith the said amendments we are, however, not concerned. The expression \"the workmen concerned in such dispute \" which occurred in the earlier section has not been modified and the construction which we would place upon the said expression under the unamended section would govern the construction of the said expression even in the amended section.\n\nWhat does the expression \" workmen concerned in such dispute\" mean ? The appellant contends that the main dispute was in regard to the discharge of 7 apprentices employed' by the appellant, and it is only the said 7 apprentices who were concerned in the said dispute. The respondent was not concerned in the said dispute, and so the termination of his services cannot attract the provisions of s. 33(l)(a). Prima facie the argument that \" workmen concerned in such\n\ndispute\" should be limited to the workmen directly or actually concerned in such dispute appears plausible, but if we examine the scheme of the Act and the effect of its material and relevant provisions this limited construction of the clause in question qannot be accepted.\n\nz960\n\nA1 /s. New India 1\\1 otors (P) Ltd. v.\n\nK. T. Morris\n\n Gajendragadkar ].\n\nLet us first consider the definition of the industrial dispute prescribed by s. 2(k). It means, inter alia, any dispute or difference between employers and workmen which is connected with the employment or non-employment, or the terms of employm(mt, or with the conditions of labour, of any person. It is wellsettled that before any dispute between the employer and his employee or employees can be said to be an industrial dispute under the Act it must be sponsored by a number of workmen or by a union representing them. It is not necessary that the number of workmen of the union that sponsors the dispute should represent the majority of workmen. Even so, an individual dispute cannot become an industrial dispute at the instance of the aggrieved individual himself. It must be a dispute between the employer on the one hand and his employees acting collectively on the other. This essential nature of an industrial dispute must be borne in mind in interpreting the material clause in s. 33( 1 )(a).\n\nSection 18 of the Act is also relevant for this purpose. It deals with persons on whom awards are binding. Section 18(3) provides, inter alia, that an award of a tribunal which has become enforceable shall be binding on (a) all parties to the industrial dispute, (b) all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute unless the tribunal records the opinion that they were so summoned without proper cause; and (c) where a party referred to in cl. (a) or cl. (b) is composed of workmen all persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute, and all persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part. It is thus clear that the award passed in an industrial dispute raised even by a minority union binds not only the parties to the dispute but all employees in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, at the date of the dispute and even those who may join the establishment or part subsequently. Thus the circle of persons bound by the award is very much wider than the parties to the industrial dispute. This aspect of the\n\n..1'\n\nmatter is also relevant in construing the material\n\nI96° words in s. 33(1)(a).\n\nM/s. New Intlia In this connection the object of s. 33 must also he Motors (P) Ltd. borne in mind. It is plain that by enacting s. 33 the v.\n\nLegislature wanted to ensure a fair and satisfactory K. T. Morris enquiry of the industrial dispute undisturbed by any . -- action on the part of the employer or the employee Ga; endragadkar J. which would create fresh cause for disharmony between them. During the pendency of an industrial dispute status quo should be maintained and no further element of discord should be introduced. That being the object of s. 33 the narrow construction of the material words used in s. 33{l)(a) would tend to defeat the said object. If it is held that the workmen concerned in the dispute are only those who are directly or immediately concerned with the dispute it would leave liberty to the employer to alter the terms and conditions of the remaining workmen and 'that would inevitably introduce further complications which it is intended to avoid. Similarly it would leave liberty to the other employees to raise disputes and that again is not desirable. That is why the main object underlying s. 33 is inconsistent with the narrow construction sought to be placed by the appellant on the material words used in s. 33(1)(a).\n\nEven as a matter of construction pure and simple there is no justification for assuming that the workmen concerned in such disputes must be workmen directly or immediately concerned i:a the said disputes. We do not see any justification for addingthe further qualification of direct. or immediate concern which the narrow construction necessarily assumes. In dealing with the question as to which workmyn ca.n be said to be concerned in an industrial dispute we have to bear in mind the essential condition for the. raising of an industrial dispute itself, and if an industrial dispute can be raised only by a group of workmen acting on their own or through. their union then it would be difficult to resist the . conclusion that all those who sponsored the dispute are concerned in it. As we have\n\nalready pointed out this construction is harmonious with the definition prescribed by s. 2(s) and with the provisions contained in s. 18 of the Act. Therefore,\n\nz96o we are not prepared to hold that the expression \"workmen concerned in such dispute\" can be limited M/s. New India Motors (P) Ltd. only to such of the workmen who are directly conv. cerned with the dispute in question. In our opinion, R. T. Morris that expression includes all workmen on whose behalf . - the dispute has been raised as well as those who would Ga; endrngadkar f. be bound by the award which may be made in the\n\nMarch 23.\n\nsaid dispute.\n\nIt appears that the construction of the relevant clause had given rise to a divergence of opinion in industrial courts, but it may be stated that on the whole the consensus of opinion appears to be in favour of the construction which we are putting on the said clause. In Eastern Plywood Manufaeturing Co. Ltd. v.\n\nEastern Plywood Manufacturing Workers' Union (1 ) the appellate tribunal has referred to the said conflict of views and has held that the narrow construction of the clause is not justified. The High Court of Madras appears to have taken the same view (Vide: N ewtone Studios.Ltd. v. Ethirajulu (T.R.) (')).On the other hand, in The New Jehangir Vakil Mills Ltd., Bhavnagar v.\n\nN. L. Vyas & Ors.('), the Bombay High Court has adopted the narrow construction ; but for reasons which we have already explained we must hold that the Bombay view is not justified on a fair and reasonable construction of the relevant clause.\n\nIn the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nTHE CHAIRMAN OF THE BANKURA\n\nMUNICIPALITY\n\nLALJI RAJA AND SONS. ( K. C. DAs GUPTA and J. C. SHAH, JJ.) Municipality-Unwholesome food-Seized 11nder warrant-If can be directed to be destroyed-Bengal Municipal Act, r932(Ben. Act. XV of.r932), ss. 430, 43r(2).\n\nThe respondents were the owners of an oil seed pressing factory situated within the limit of amunicipality.\n\nThey used to import mustard seeds from different areas and they also held a\n\n(1) (1952) L.A.C. rn3.\n\n(2) (1958) I L.L.J. 63.\n\n(3) A.I.R. 1959 Born. 248", "total_entities": 86, "entities": [{"text": "Bharatkhand Textile Mfg. Co.\n\nLtd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6, "end_char": 40, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "r960\n\nBharatkhand Textile Mfg."}}, {"text": "Provident Funds Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 174, "end_char": 199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 467, "end_char": 481, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Gajendragadkar", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Provident Funds Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 623, "end_char": 642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "NEW INDIA MOTORS (P) LTD.\n\n(P. B.\n\nNEW DELHI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 931, "end_char": 975, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M/S. NEW INDIA MOTORS (P) LTD. NEW DELHI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. T. MORRIS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 980, "end_char": 992, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. T. MORRIS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1032, "end_char": 1052, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Meaning of-Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1118, "end_char": 1152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 33(r)(a), 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1203, "end_char": 1220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Meaning of-Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Meaning of-Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "s. 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1554, "end_char": 1560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Meaning of-Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Meaning of-Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1568, "end_char": 1591, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1970, "end_char": 1976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Meaning of-Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Meaning of-Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "s. 33(r)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2068, "end_char": 2079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Meaning of-Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Meaning of-Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "s. 33(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2180, "end_char": 2191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2199, "end_char": 2228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Jawala Prasad Chopra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3003, "end_char": 3023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jawala Prasad Chopra and J. K. Haranandani, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "J. K. Haranandani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3028, "end_char": 3045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jawala Prasad Chopra and J. K. Haranandani, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3071, "end_char": 3082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, SolicitQr-General of India, H. J.\n\nUmrigar, M. K. Ramamurthi, V. A. Seyid Muhamad and M. R. rishna Pillai, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "H. J.\n\nUmrigar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3112, "end_char": 3126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, SolicitQr-General of India, H. J.\n\nUmrigar, M. K. Ramamurthi, V. A. Seyid Muhamad and M. R. rishna Pillai, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "M. K. Ramamurthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3128, "end_char": 3144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, SolicitQr-General of India, H. J.\n\nUmrigar, M. K. Ramamurthi, V. A. Seyid Muhamad and M. R. rishna Pillai, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "V. A. Seyid Muhamad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3146, "end_char": 3165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, SolicitQr-General of India, H. J.\n\nUmrigar, M. K. Ramamurthi, V. A. Seyid Muhamad and M. R. rishna Pillai, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "M. R. rishna Pillai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3170, "end_char": 3189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, SolicitQr-General of India, H. J.\n\nUmrigar, M. K. Ramamurthi, V. A. Seyid Muhamad and M. R. rishna Pillai, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3272, "end_char": 3286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal by special leave Gajendragadkar ].", "canonical_name": "Gajendragadkar"}}, {"text": "Additional Industrial Tribunal, Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3382, "end_char": 3419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "is directed against the order passed by the Additional Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, directing the appellant, M/s. New India Motors Private Ltd., to reinstate its former employee, K. T. Morris, the respondent, in his original post as field service representativt\"l and to pay him his back wages from the date of his dismissal till the date of his reinstatement."}}, {"text": "New India Motors Private Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3451, "end_char": 3480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "is directed against the order passed by the Additional Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, directing the appellant, M/s. New India Motors Private Ltd., to reinstate its former employee, K. T. Morris, the respondent, in his original post as field service representativt\"l and to pay him his back wages from the date of his dismissal till the date of his reinstatement."}}, {"text": "K. T. Morris", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3516, "end_char": 3528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "is directed against the order passed by the Additional Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, directing the appellant, M/s. New India Motors Private Ltd., to reinstate its former employee, K. T. Morris, the respondent, in his original post as field service representativt\"l and to pay him his back wages from the date of his dismissal till the date of his reinstatement.", "canonical_name": "K. T. MORRIS"}}, {"text": "s. 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3790, "end_char": 3796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Disputes Act XIV of 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3815, "end_char": 3839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3959, "end_char": 3967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that before joining the appellant the respon~ dent was working with a firm in Calcutta; prior to that he was field service representative of M/s. Premier Automobiles Ltd., Bombay."}}, {"text": "M/s. Premier Automobiles Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4022, "end_char": 4051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that before joining the appellant the respon~ dent was working with a firm in Calcutta; prior to that he was field service representative of M/s. Premier Automobiles Ltd., Bombay."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4053, "end_char": 4059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that before joining the appellant the respon~ dent was working with a firm in Calcutta; prior to that he was field service representative of M/s. Premier Automobiles Ltd., Bombay."}}, {"text": "March 27, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4253, "end_char": 4267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before he joined the services of the appellant he had been told by the appellant by its letter dated March 27, 1954, that the appellant would be willing to pay him Rs."}}, {"text": "May 6, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4530, "end_char": 4541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was, however, asked to interview th~\n\nr9~0 appellant; an interview followed and the respondent was given a letter of appointment on May 6, 1954."}}, {"text": "New India W k h M Moiv\" (P) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4551, "end_char": 4583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "New India W k h M Moiv\" (P) Ltd. By this letter he was appointed as or s op r anager v. in the appellant's firm on three months' probation K: r. Mo,, is subject to the terms and conditions specified in the . -- ."}}, {"text": "endragadk", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4816, "end_char": 4825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent Ga; endragadk.,", "canonical_name": "endragadkar"}}, {"text": "February 28, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4859, "end_char": 4876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. continued in this post till February 28, 1955, when he was given the assignment of the appellant's field service organiser with effect from March 1, 1955."}}, {"text": "March 1, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4971, "end_char": 4984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. continued in this post till February 28, 1955, when he was given the assignment of the appellant's field service organiser with effect from March 1, 1955."}}, {"text": "28 - 2 - 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5027, "end_char": 5040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A letter of appointment given to him on 28 - 2 - 1955 set forth the terms and conditions of his new assignment."}}, {"text": "April 18, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5118, "end_char": 5132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that on April 18, 1956, the management of the appellant called for an explanation of the respondent in respect of several complaints."}}, {"text": "June 30, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5553, "end_char": 5566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 30, 1956, the respondent's services were terminated on the ground.that the appellant had decided to abolish the post of field service representative."}}, {"text": "s. 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5777, "end_char": 5783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 18, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5824, "end_char": 5837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The complaint was filed on July 18, 1956."}}, {"text": "s. 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5862, "end_char": 5868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "August 20, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6421, "end_char": 6436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On their behalf it was alleged that their termination of service was improper and illegal and that was referred to the industrial tribunal for its adjudication on August 20, 1955."}}, {"text": "January 2, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6478, "end_char": 6493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said dispute was finally decided on January 2, 1957."}}, {"text": "s. 33(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6683, "end_char": 6694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6963, "end_char": 6969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(s)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8337, "end_char": 8344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Morris", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9248, "end_char": 9254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Morris and made the workmen acquainted with Miller's special . -"}}, {"text": "Miller", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9292, "end_char": 9298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Morris and made the workmen acquainted with Miller's special . -"}}, {"text": "cndrngadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9370, "end_char": 9381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tools and equipment needed for repairs and servicing Ga; cndrngadkar J. of cars."}}, {"text": "s. 2(s)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9558, "end_char": 9565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Plymouth", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10028, "end_char": 10036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Furthermore, the appellant is still the agent for Plymouth and Jeeps and the tribunal is right when it has found that it still needed a field representative to look after servicing of sold cars at outside stations."}}, {"text": "s. 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11079, "end_char": 11085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11241, "end_char": 11252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "New India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11408, "end_char": 11417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "New India contravene the provisions of the said section."}}, {"text": "Indeed Motors (P) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11465, "end_char": 11487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indeed Motors (P) Ltd. the principal point urged before us by the appellant v. is in regard to the construction of s. 33(1)(a) of the l{, T. Morris Act."}}, {"text": "s. 33(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11580, "end_char": 11591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ga1endragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11716, "end_char": 11730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is the point of Ga1endragadkar J. law raised for our decision and its decision depends upon the construction of the relevant words used in s. 33(1)(a).", "canonical_name": "Gajendragadkar"}}, {"text": "s. 33(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11839, "end_char": 11850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11853, "end_char": 11866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12251, "end_char": 12261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13126, "end_char": 13137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13631, "end_char": 13638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33( 1 )(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14543, "end_char": 14556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14559, "end_char": 14569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14666, "end_char": 14679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15837, "end_char": 15848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15900, "end_char": 15905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15979, "end_char": 15984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "endragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16172, "end_char": 16183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "action on the part of the employer or the employee Ga; endragadkar J. which would create fresh cause for disharmony between them.", "canonical_name": "endragadkar"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16405, "end_char": 16410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16465, "end_char": 16470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16979, "end_char": 16984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17097, "end_char": 17108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(s)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17996, "end_char": 18003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18041, "end_char": 18046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "New India Motors (P) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18180, "end_char": 18205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore,\n\nz96o we are not prepared to hold that the expression \"workmen concerned in such dispute\" can be limited M/s. New India Motors (P) Ltd. only to such of the workmen who are directly conv."}}, {"text": "R. T. Morris", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18310, "end_char": 18322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In our opinion, R. T. Morris that expression includes all workmen on whose behalf . -", "canonical_name": "K. T. MORRIS"}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19037, "end_char": 19057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Madras appears to have taken the same view (Vide: N ewtone Studios."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19246, "end_char": 19263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Bombay High Court has adopted the narrow construction ; but for reasons which we have already explained we must hold that the Bombay view is not justified on a fair and reasonable construction of the relevant clause."}}, {"text": "CHAIRMAN OF THE BANKURA\n\nMUNICIPALITY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19548, "end_char": 19585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BANKURA\n\nMUNICIPALITY\n\nLALJI RAJA AND SONS. ("}}, {"text": "LALJI RAJA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19587, "end_char": 19597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BANKURA\n\nMUNICIPALITY\n\nLALJI RAJA AND SONS. ("}}, {"text": "K. C. DAs GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19610, "end_char": 19625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. C. DAs GUPTA and J. C. SHAH, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ."}}, {"text": "J. C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19630, "end_char": 19640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. C. DAs GUPTA and J. C. SHAH, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "ss. 430, 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19784, "end_char": 19795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_358_364_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960)\n\nz96o we are not prepared to hold that the expression \"workmen concerned in such dispute\" can be limited M/s. New India Motors (P) Ltd. only to such of the workmen who are directly conv. cerned with the dispute in question. In our opinion, R. T. Morris that expression includes all workmen on whose behalf . - the dispute has been raised as well as those who would Ga; endrngadkar f. be bound by the award which may be made in the\n\nMarch 23.\n\nsaid dispute.\n\nIt appears that the construction of the relevant clause had given rise to a divergence of opinion in industrial courts, but it may be stated that on the whole the consensus of opinion appears to be in favour of the construction which we are putting on the said clause. In Eastern Plywood Manufaeturing Co. Ltd. v.\n\nEastern Plywood Manufacturing Workers' Union (1 ) the appellate tribunal has referred to the said conflict of views and has held that the narrow construction of the clause is not justified. The High Court of Madras appears to have taken the same view (Vide: N ewtone Studios.Ltd. v. Ethirajulu (T.R.) (')).On the other hand, in The New Jehangir Vakil Mills Ltd., Bhavnagar v.\n\nN. L. Vyas & Ors.('), the Bombay High Court has adopted the narrow construction ; but for reasons which we have already explained we must hold that the Bombay view is not justified on a fair and reasonable construction of the relevant clause.\n\nIn the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nTHE CHAIRMAN OF THE BANKURA\n\nMUNICIPALITY\n\nLALJI RAJA AND SONS. ( K. C. DAs GUPTA and J. C. SHAH, JJ.) Municipality-Unwholesome food-Seized 11nder warrant-If can be directed to be destroyed-Bengal Municipal Act, r932(Ben. Act. XV of.r932), ss. 430, 43r(2).\n\nThe respondents were the owners of an oil seed pressing factory situated within the limit of amunicipality.\n\nThey used to import mustard seeds from different areas and they also held a\n\n(1) (1952) L.A.C. rn3.\n\n(2) (1958) I L.L.J. 63.\n\n(3) A.I.R. 1959 Born. 248\n\nlicence for selling mustard seed.\n\nOn a report of the Sanitary r960 Inspector of the Municipality, the Sub-Divisional Officer issued a search warrant directing seizure of a large quantity of \" rotten Chairman of the\n\nand decomposed mustard seed \" from the possession of the res- Bankura pondents. The Chairman of the Municipality applied, to the MunicipalftY District Magistrate for action under s. 43r and s. 432 of the v, Bengal Municipal Act.\n\nThe proceedings started on the petition Lalji Raja & Sons • of the Chairman of the Municipality had a chequered career.\n\nUltimately the District Magistrate found that the mustard seed was unwholesome and unfit for human consumption on the date of seizure and directed, in exercise of the powers under s. 43r(2) of the Act, that the same be made over to the Commissioners of the Municipality for disposal either as manure or as cattle feed.\n\nThe High Court in revision set aside the order of the District Magistrate holding that s. 43r of the Act under which the order was made did not apply to a case of seizure of unwholesome food under a warrant issued under s. 430.\n\nOn appeal by the Municipality by special leave: Held, that the powers under s. 431(2) of the Bengal Municipal Act (XV of r932), were expressly directed to be exercised by the Magistrate in respect of articles seized under s. 428, and there was nothing in s. 43r(2) which might justify the view that those powers could also be exercised in respect of articles seized under a warrant issued under s. 430.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 119 of 57.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 24th August, 1955, of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Revision No. 596 of 1955.\n\n0. B. Agarwala and Sukumar Ghose, for the appellant.\n\nB. Sen and S.N. Mukherjee, for the respondents.\n\n1960. March 23. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHAH, J.-M/s. Lalji Raja & Sons-who will herein- Shah J. after be referred to as the respondents-are the owners of an oil seed pressing factory known as the Gouranga Oil Mill situated within the limits of the Bankura Municipality in the State of West Bengal. For extracting oil, the respondents import mustard seed from different areas. The respondents also hold a license for the sale of mustard seed.\n\nOn the application of the Sanitary Inspector of the Ba.nkura Municipality, the Sub-Divisional Officer, Bankura, issued a search warrant directing seizure of\n\n900 bags of \"rotten and decomposed mustard seed\",\n\n600 bags stored in the mill godown and 300 bags stored\n\nz96o in the court-yard of the rice mill at Hanseswar l\\faji.\n\nPursuant to the search, a large quantity of mustard Chairman of the\n\nBankur• seed spread out for drying in the Gouranga Oil Mill Municipalily was seized, and certain bags lying in the rice mill were v. also seized. On the report made by the Sanitary Lalji Raja & Sons Inspector, the Chairman of the Municipality applied\n\nShah 1 to the District Magistrate of Bankura on March 10, 1950, for action under ss. 431 and 432 of the Bengal Municipal Act, No. XV of 1932, alleging that the mustard seed seized was \" in a highly decomposed state and gave out an offensive stench\" and that the same was unwholesome and unfit for human consumption.\n\nThe proceedings started on the petition of the Chairman of the Municipality had a chequered career. It is unnecessary to set out for the purposes of this appeal the diverse orders which were made from time to time by the District Magistrate and which were set aside by the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta. It may be sufficient to state that on May 26, 1950, the District Magistrate ordered restoration of the mustard seed bags to the respondents and that order was set aside by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in revision. Another order passed by the District Magi strate in April 1951 directing that the contents of the bags be disposed of as \" manure or fodder \" was set aside by the Calcutta High Court and the proceedings were directed to be re-tried. The District Magistrate again held an enquiry and by his order dated November 10, 1954, held that the mustard seed was lawfully seized in accordance with the provisions of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, that it was unwholesome and unfit for human consumption on the date of seizure and directed in exercise of the powers under s. 431(2) of the Act that the same be made over to the Commissioners of the Bankura Municipality for disposal either as manure or as cattle feed.\n\nThe High Court at Calcutta by order dated August 24, 1955, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, set aside the order of the District Magistrate holding thats. 431 of the Bengal Municipal Act under which the order was made, had no application to a case of seizure of unwholesome food seized under a warrant issued under s. 430.\n\nAgainst the order of the High Court, this appeal is z95o filed with special leave.\n\nChairman of the The only question which falls to be determined in Bankura this appeal is whether articles of food seized under a Municipality warrant issued by a Magistrate in exercise of the v. . powers under s. 430 of the Bengal Municipal Act may Lalji Raja & Sons be ordered to be destroyed under s. 431(2) of the Act;.\n\nSha;).\n\nIn order to determine this question, it is necessary to , refer to certain provisions of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932. .\n\nSection 421 prohibits, amongst other acts, selling or storing for sale of unwholesome articles to be used for human _consumption. Section 427 (in so far as it is material) authorizes the Commissioners and certain other officers of a Municipality to enter upon and inspect any place in which any article of food is deposited for the purpose of sale or preparation for sale or to which any article of food intended for human consumption is brought for such purpose, and also to inspect the articles of food which may be found in tlie place inspected. Clause (I) of s. 428 confers upon the Commissioners and the officers designated in s. 427 power to seize articles of food intended for human consumption if, in the course of inspection, it appears that the same are unwholesome or unfit for human consumption. Section 429 provides that the articles of food referred to in s. 428 which have been seized under that section may, with the written consent of the owner or the person in whose possession they are found, be ordered to be destroyed. If the consent of the owner or the person in possession is not obtaineq and the articles are of a perishable nature, the officer seizing the same may take them before a Magistrate who may, if it appears to him that the articles are unsound or unwholesome -or unfit as human food, condemn the same or order hem to be destroyed.\n\nSection 430 (in so far as it is material) provides that if any Magistrate is satisfied on the application of the Commissioners, Health Officer, Sanitary Inspector or any other officer authorized by the Commissioner in this behalf tliat there is just cause to believe that any food which is unsound, unwholesome or unfit for human food is in the possession of any person for the\n\npurpose of being sold or offered or exposed for sale within the limits of the Municipality for such consump- Chainnan of the h Banhura tion, e may grant a warrant authorizing entry upon Municipality the premises of such person and search for and seizure v. of such articles of food.\n\nSection 431 by the 1st sub- Lalji Raja.,,_ Sons section (in so far as it is material) provides that where\n\nShah ]. any article of food, seized under s. 428 is not destroyed by consent under sub-s. 1 of s. 429 or when an article of food so seized which is perishable is not dealt with under sub-s. 2 of that section, it shall be taken before a Magistrate as soon as may be after such seizure.\n\nSub-s. 2 provides that if it appears to the Magistrate that any such food is unsound, unwholesome or unfit for human food, he shall cause the same to be destroyed or to be otherwise disposed of by the Commissioners so as not to be capable of being used as human food.\n\nIt is evident from this resume of the relevant legislative provisions that the municipal authorities are entitled to enter upon and inspect places where articles of food are stored or prepared for sale. If the municipal authorities find that any article of food stored or prepared for sale is unwholesome or unfit for human food, they may seize them and destroy the same with the written consent of the owner or person in possession, and if such consent is not forthcoming and the articles are perishable, destroy them under the orders of a Magistrate. But s. 428 is not the only . procedure under the Act authorizing seizure of articles of food which are unwholesome or unfit for human food.\n\nThe municipal authorities may move a Magistrate for the issue of a warrant for seizure of articles of food which are unsound, unwholesome or unfit for human food, and under the authority of the warrant, such articles may be seized.\n\nArticles of food seized under s. 428(1) which are not disposed of unuer s. 429 are required to be taken before a Magistrate as soon as may be after seizure and under sub-s. 2 of s. 431, the Magistrate is authorized, if it appears to him that the articles of food are unsound or unwholesome or unfit for human food to order destruction or disposal thereof. Evidently, the expression \"such\" used in sub-s .2 of s. 431 refers to the articles of food described in sub-s. 1 of\n\n·~,\n\n- -\n\nthat section ; and s. 431(1) only deals with articles\n\nI96° seized under s. 428.\n\nThere is no express provision h Chairman of the made by the legislature either in s. 431 or elsew ere Bankura in the Act authorizing destruction or disposal of Municipality articles of foqd which are seized under a warrant v. issued under S. 430.\n\nLalji Raja & Sons - Counsel for the Municipality contends that the Shah J. legislature intended that _all articles seized, whether on inspection under s. 428 or under a warrant issued under s. 430 must be dealt with under s. 431 and the High Court was in error in holding that the authority of the Magistrate to order destruction or disposal of articles of food could be exercised only in respect of articles seized under s. 428. But the words used in s. 431(2) clearly authorize the Magistrate to order destruction or disposal of articles seized under s. 428 and not deaH with under s. 429, and it is difficult to uphold the plea that the legislature intended, even though it did not so expressly provide, that the articles seized under a warrant issued under s. 430 may also be dealt with under sub-s. 2 of s. 431. Counsel for the Municipality submits that it could not even have been the intention of the legislature that the Magistrate can order seizure of unwholesome food but cannot order its destruction, though he may order destruction of unwholesome articles of food seized by the officers of the Municipality. It appears, however, that a person storing unwholesome articles of food may be prosecuted for infraction of the provisions of s. 421 and in the course of or on the conclusion of those proceedings, it would certainly be open to the Magistrate, having seizin of the complaint, to pass an appropriate order under the Code of Criminal Procedure for destruction ofthe articles seized. In view of this, we are not prepared to say that the absence of an express provision relating to the disposal of articles seized under s. 430 is not deliberate ; but even if we are constrained to hold that there is a lacuna ins. 431, we do not think that we would be justified contrary to the plain words used by the legislature, in attempting to remedy the same by holding that a Magistrate exercising power under sub-s. 2 of s. 431 has authority to\n\nr 96o order destruction of articles seized in pursuance of a warrant issued under s. 430.\n\nChairman of the The argument advanced by counsel for the Municipal- Bankura ity that the seizure was in exercise of the powers under 1~1 unicipality - v. s. 428 and not under s. 430 has, in our judgment, no Lalji Raja & San' force. The report of the Chairman of the Municipality dated March 10, 1950, makes it abundantly clear that Shah J. the search warrant was issued by the Sub-Divisional Officer in exercise of his authority under s. 430 of the Bengal Municipal Act.\n\nAny admission by the respondents that the seizure was under s. 428 of the Act in proceedings for resisting the order which the Municipality claimed to obtain against them can have no value.\n\nz960\n\nMarch 23.\n\nSection 428 does not contemplate a seizure of articles of food which are unwholesome, under the authority of a Magistrate, and s. 430 is expressly the proviRion which authorises a Magistrate to issue a warrant, for such seizure. The powers under s. 431(2) are expressly directed to be exercised by the Magistrate in respect of articles seized under s. 428, and there is nothing in the former provision which may justify the view that those powers can also be exercised in respect of articles seized under a warrant issued under s. 430. In our opinion, the High Court was right in its conclusion.\n\nThe appeal therefore fails and is dismissed.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nM/S. NORTH BROOK JUTE CO. LTD.\n\nAND ANOTHER\n\nTHEIR WORKMEN (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO and\n\nK. C. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)\n\nInd1tstrial Dispute-Rationalisation scheme objected to by worknien~Scheme put into operation pending reference to Tribitnal~ Workmen's refusal to work-Lock-out-Claim for wages for the period of lock-out-Industrial Disputes Act, I947 (I4 of I947), ss. 3(2),\n\n9A, 33, 33A.\n\nA rationalisation scheme in the mills of the appellant companies was agreed to by the Works Committee and a notice under s. 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was given to the", "total_entities": 104, "entities": [{"text": "New India Motors (P) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 139, "end_char": 164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "z96o we are not prepared to hold that the expression \"workmen concerned in such dispute\" can be limited M/s. New India Motors (P) Ltd. only to such of the workmen who are directly conv."}}, {"text": "R. T. Morris", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 269, "end_char": 281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In our opinion, R. T. Morris that expression includes all workmen on whose behalf . -"}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 996, "end_char": 1016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Madras appears to have taken the same view (Vide: N ewtone Studios."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1205, "end_char": 1222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Bombay High Court has adopted the narrow construction ; but for reasons which we have already explained we must hold that the Bombay view is not justified on a fair and reasonable construction of the relevant clause."}}, {"text": "LALJI RAJA AND SONS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1546, "end_char": 1565, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LALJI RAJA AND SONS", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "C. DAs GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1572, "end_char": 1584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. C. DAs GUPTA and J. C. SHAH, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA*"}}, {"text": "J. C. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1589, "end_char": 1599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. C. DAs GUPTA and J. C. SHAH, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "ss. 430, 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1743, "end_char": 1754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2419, "end_char": 2424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 432", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2430, "end_char": 2436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bengal Municipal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2447, "end_char": 2467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Lalji Raja", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2510, "end_char": 2520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The proceedings started on the petition Lalji Raja & Sons • of the Chairman of the Municipality had a chequered career.", "canonical_name": "LALJI RAJA AND SONS"}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2771, "end_char": 2776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bengal Municipal Act", "statute": "Bengal Municipal Act"}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2998, "end_char": 3003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bengal Municipal Act", "statute": "Bengal Municipal Act"}}, {"text": "s. 430", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3131, "end_char": 3137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bengal Municipal Act", "statute": "Bengal Municipal Act"}}, {"text": "s. 431(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3216, "end_char": 3225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bengal Municipal Act", "statute": "Bengal Municipal Act"}}, {"text": "s. 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3362, "end_char": 3368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bengal Municipal Act", "statute": "Bengal Municipal Act"}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3395, "end_char": 3400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bengal Municipal Act", "statute": "Bengal Municipal Act"}}, {"text": "s. 430", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3535, "end_char": 3541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3697, "end_char": 3716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 24th August, 1955, of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Revision No."}}, {"text": "B. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3759, "end_char": 3770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Agarwala and Sukumar Ghose, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Sukumar Ghose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3775, "end_char": 3788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Agarwala and Sukumar Ghose, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3810, "end_char": 3816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen and S.N. Mukherjee, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "S.N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3821, "end_char": 3835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen and S.N. Mukherjee, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3919, "end_char": 3923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHAH, J.-M/s. Lalji Raja & Sons-who will herein- Shah J. after be referred to as the respondents-are the owners of an oil seed pressing factory known as the Gouranga Oil Mill situated within the limits of the Bankura Municipality in the State of West Bengal.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3968, "end_char": 3972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHAH, J.-M/s. Lalji Raja & Sons-who will herein- Shah J. after be referred to as the respondents-are the owners of an oil seed pressing factory known as the Gouranga Oil Mill situated within the limits of the Bankura Municipality in the State of West Bengal.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "Ba.nkura Municipality", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4375, "end_char": 4396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the application of the Sanitary Inspector of the Ba.nkura Municipality, the Sub-Divisional Officer, Bankura, issued a search warrant directing seizure of\n\n900 bags of \"rotten and decomposed mustard seed\",\n\n600 bags stored in the mill godown and 300 bags stored\n\nz96o in the court-yard of the rice mill at Hanseswar l\\faji."}}, {"text": "Bankura", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4426, "end_char": 4433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the application of the Sanitary Inspector of the Ba.nkura Municipality, the Sub-Divisional Officer, Bankura, issued a search warrant directing seizure of\n\n900 bags of \"rotten and decomposed mustard seed\",\n\n600 bags stored in the mill godown and 300 bags stored\n\nz96o in the court-yard of the rice mill at Hanseswar l\\faji."}}, {"text": "Lalji Raja & Sons", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4900, "end_char": 4917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the report made by the Sanitary Lalji Raja & Sons Inspector, the Chairman of the Municipality applied\n\nShah 1 to the District Magistrate of Bankura on March 10, 1950, for action under ss.", "canonical_name": "LALJI RAJA AND SONS"}}, {"text": "District Magistrate of Bankura", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4985, "end_char": 5015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the report made by the Sanitary Lalji Raja & Sons Inspector, the Chairman of the Municipality applied\n\nShah 1 to the District Magistrate of Bankura on March 10, 1950, for action under ss."}}, {"text": "March 10, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5019, "end_char": 5033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the report made by the Sanitary Lalji Raja & Sons Inspector, the Chairman of the Municipality applied\n\nShah 1 to the District Magistrate of Bankura on March 10, 1950, for action under ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 431 and 432", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5052, "end_char": 5067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5561, "end_char": 5597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is unnecessary to set out for the purposes of this appeal the diverse orders which were made from time to time by the District Magistrate and which were set aside by the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta."}}, {"text": "May 26, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5637, "end_char": 5649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be sufficient to state that on May 26, 1950, the District Magistrate ordered restoration of the mustard seed bags to the respondents and that order was set aside by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in revision."}}, {"text": "November 10, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6130, "end_char": 6147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The District Magistrate again held an enquiry and by his order dated November 10, 1954, held that the mustard seed was lawfully seized in accordance with the provisions of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, that it was unwholesome and unfit for human consumption on the date of seizure and directed in exercise of the powers under s. 431(2) of the Act that the same be made over to the Commissioners of the Bankura Municipality for disposal either as manure or as cattle feed."}}, {"text": "Bengal Municipal Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6237, "end_char": 6263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 431(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6389, "end_char": 6398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932", "statute": "the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "Bankura Municipality", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6465, "end_char": 6485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The District Magistrate again held an enquiry and by his order dated November 10, 1954, held that the mustard seed was lawfully seized in accordance with the provisions of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, that it was unwholesome and unfit for human consumption on the date of seizure and directed in exercise of the powers under s. 431(2) of the Act that the same be made over to the Commissioners of the Bankura Municipality for disposal either as manure or as cattle feed."}}, {"text": "High Court at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6540, "end_char": 6562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court at Calcutta by order dated August 24, 1955, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, set aside the order of the District Magistrate holding thats. 431 of the Bengal Municipal Act under which the order was made, had no application to a case of seizure of unwholesome food seized under a warrant issued under s. 430."}}, {"text": "August 24, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6578, "end_char": 6593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court at Calcutta by order dated August 24, 1955, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, set aside the order of the District Magistrate holding thats. 431 of the Bengal Municipal Act under which the order was made, had no application to a case of seizure of unwholesome food seized under a warrant issued under s. 430."}}, {"text": "s. 430", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6861, "end_char": 6867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932", "statute": "the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "Bankura", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7020, "end_char": 7027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chairman of the The only question which falls to be determined in Bankura this appeal is whether articles of food seized under a Municipality warrant issued by a Magistrate in exercise of the v. ."}}, {"text": "s. 430", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7164, "end_char": 7170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932", "statute": "the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "Lalji Raja & Sons", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7203, "end_char": 7220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "powers under s. 430 of the Bengal Municipal Act may Lalji Raja & Sons be ordered to be destroyed under s. 431(2) of the Act;."}}, {"text": "s. 431(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7254, "end_char": 7263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932", "statute": "the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "Bengal Municipal Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7379, "end_char": 7405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 421", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7410, "end_char": 7421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932", "statute": "the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "Section 427", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7540, "end_char": 7551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932", "statute": "the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "s. 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7973, "end_char": 7979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932", "statute": "the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "s. 427", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8042, "end_char": 8048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932", "statute": "the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "Section 429", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8218, "end_char": 8229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932", "statute": "the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "s. 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8280, "end_char": 8286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932", "statute": "the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "Section 430", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8778, "end_char": 8789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 431", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9441, "end_char": 9452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9590, "end_char": 9596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9635, "end_char": 9639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 429", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9643, "end_char": 9649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9735, "end_char": 9739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9838, "end_char": 9842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10660, "end_char": 10666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 428(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11060, "end_char": 11069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 429", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11102, "end_char": 11108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11200, "end_char": 11204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 431", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11208, "end_char": 11214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 431", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11439, "end_char": 11445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11494, "end_char": 11498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 431(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11532, "end_char": 11541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11586, "end_char": 11592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 431", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11677, "end_char": 11683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 430", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11834, "end_char": 11840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lalji Raja", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11843, "end_char": 11853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lalji Raja & Sons - Counsel for the Municipality contends that the Shah J. legislature intended that _all articles seized, whether on inspection under s. 428 or under a warrant issued under s. 430 must be dealt with under s. 431 and the High Court was in error in holding that the authority of the Magistrate to order destruction or disposal of articles of food could be exercised only in respect of articles seized under s. 428.", "canonical_name": "LALJI RAJA AND SONS"}}, {"text": "s. 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11994, "end_char": 12000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 430", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12033, "end_char": 12039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 431", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12065, "end_char": 12071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12265, "end_char": 12271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 431(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12295, "end_char": 12304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12396, "end_char": 12402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 429", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12427, "end_char": 12433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 430", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12604, "end_char": 12610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12644, "end_char": 12648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 431", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12652, "end_char": 12658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 421", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13089, "end_char": 13095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13277, "end_char": 13303, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 430", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13478, "end_char": 13484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13762, "end_char": 13766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 431", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13770, "end_char": 13776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 430", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13877, "end_char": 13883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14040, "end_char": 14046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 430", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14061, "end_char": 14067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 430", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14321, "end_char": 14327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14418, "end_char": 14424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14566, "end_char": 14577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 430", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14693, "end_char": 14699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 431(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14812, "end_char": 14821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14915, "end_char": 14921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 430", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15094, "end_char": 15100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "NORTH BROOK JUTE CO. LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15233, "end_char": 15257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/S. NORTH BROOK JUTE CO."}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15288, "end_char": 15308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AND ANOTHER\n\nTHEIR WORKMEN (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO and\n\nK. C. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15310, "end_char": 15323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AND ANOTHER\n\nTHEIR WORKMEN (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO and\n\nK. C. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15329, "end_char": 15344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AND ANOTHER\n\nTHEIR WORKMEN (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO and\n\nK. C. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Lock-out-Claim for wages for the period of lock-out-Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15503, "end_char": 15578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 3(2),\n\n9A, 33, 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15599, "end_char": 15621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Lock-out-Claim for wages for the period of lock-out-Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Lock-out-Claim for wages for the period of lock-out-Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "s. 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15745, "end_char": 15750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Lock-out-Claim for wages for the period of lock-out-Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Lock-out-Claim for wages for the period of lock-out-Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15758, "end_char": 15787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_364_371_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960]\n\nr 96o order destruction of articles seized in pursuance of a warrant issued under s. 430.\n\nChairman of the The argument advanced by counsel for the Municipal- Bankura ity that the seizure was in exercise of the powers under 1~1 unicipality - v. s. 428 and not under s. 430 has, in our judgment, no Lalji Raja & San' force. The report of the Chairman of the Municipality dated March 10, 1950, makes it abundantly clear that Shah J. the search warrant was issued by the Sub-Divisional Officer in exercise of his authority under s. 430 of the Bengal Municipal Act.\n\nAny admission by the respondents that the seizure was under s. 428 of the Act in proceedings for resisting the order which the Municipality claimed to obtain against them can have no value.\n\nz960\n\nMarch 23.\n\nSection 428 does not contemplate a seizure of articles of food which are unwholesome, under the authority of a Magistrate, and s. 430 is expressly the proviRion which authorises a Magistrate to issue a warrant, for such seizure. The powers under s. 431(2) are expressly directed to be exercised by the Magistrate in respect of articles seized under s. 428, and there is nothing in the former provision which may justify the view that those powers can also be exercised in respect of articles seized under a warrant issued under s. 430. In our opinion, the High Court was right in its conclusion.\n\nThe appeal therefore fails and is dismissed.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nM/S. NORTH BROOK JUTE CO. LTD.\n\nAND ANOTHER\n\nTHEIR WORKMEN (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO and\n\nK. C. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)\n\nInd1tstrial Dispute-Rationalisation scheme objected to by worknien~Scheme put into operation pending reference to Tribitnal~ Workmen's refusal to work-Lock-out-Claim for wages for the period of lock-out-Industrial Disputes Act, I947 (I4 of I947), ss. 3(2),\n\n9A, 33, 33A.\n\nA rationalisation scheme in the mills of the appellant companies was agreed to by the Works Committee and a notice under s. 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was given to the\n\n..,\n\nUnion of their workmen. The workmen, however, objected to the introduction of the scheme and the dispute was referred by the Government to the Tribunal on December r3, r957. On December r6, the management of the companies put the rationalisation scheme into operation but the workmen refused to do the additional work placed on them by the scheme. Later, the same day, the mills declared a lock-out.\n\nWork was, however, resumed a few days later as a result of a settlement, and a dispute arose as to whether the workmen were entitled to the payment of wages for the period during which the mills were closed: Held, (r) that the workmen's representatives on the Works Committee represented the workmen only for the purpose of the functions of the Works Committee and that the approval of the scheme of rationalisation by the Works Committee was not binding on the workmen or their Union.\n\nKemp and Company Ltd. v. Their Workmen, [r955] I L.L.J. 48, approved.\n\n(2) that the introduction of a rationalisation scheme was an alteration of' conditions of service to the prejudice of the workmen.\n\n(3) that the alteration of conditions of service was made not when notice under s. gA of the Industrial Disputes Act was given but on December r6, when the rationalisation scheme was put into operation, and that as it was done when the reference was pending before the Tribunal, it wa~ a contravention of s. 33 of the Act.\n\n(4) that the closure of the mills in the circumstances of this case by the employer amounted to an illegal lock-out and that the workmen unable to work in consequence of the lock-out were entitled to wages for the period of absence caused by such lock-out.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 141 of 1959.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Award dated July 19, 1958, of the Fourth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, in Case No. VIII-240 (166)/57.\n\n0. K. Daphtary, Soli.citor-General of India, Vidya Sagar and B. N. Ghosh, for the appellants.\n\nP. K. Sanyal and P. K. Ohakravarty for R. 0.\n\nDatta, for the respondents.\n\n1960. March 23. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nNor th Brook f utd\n\nCo. Ltd. v.\n\nTheir Workmen\n\nDAS GUPTA, J.-On December 13, 1957, the Govern- Das Gupta J. ment of West Bengal referred under s. 10 of the Industrial Disputes' Act the following dispute between M/s. Northbrook Jute Co., Ltd., and Dalhousie Jute Mills who are appellants before us and, their workmen:-.\n\nNorth Brook jute Co. Ltd. v.\n\nTheir Workmen\n\nDas Gtpta J.\n\n\"Do the proposals of rationalisation in the above two mills involve any increase in workload ? If so, what relief the workmen are entitled to?\" Almost a month before this the proposal of introducing a rationalisation scheme in the mills of these companies had been considered at an extraordinary meeting of the Works Committee and the Committee had agreed to the proposal. A notice under s. 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act was then given by the companies to the Unions of their workmen and it was because the workmen objected to the introduction of the rationalisation scheme that the dispute arose and was referred by the Government to the Tribunal. On December 16 when the above reference was pending before the Tribunal the management of these mills put the rationalisation scheme into operation but the workmen refused to do the additional work placed on them by the scheme. Later the same day the mills declared a lock-out.\n\nWork was however resumed again in all departments excepting the weaving and finishing departments on December 20, and in these two departments on December 21, as a result of a settlement arrived at between the workmen represented by their Unions and rthe Mills as regards the introduction of the rationalisation scheme.\n\nBut a dispute arose as regards the payment of wages to workmen for their dues during the period when the mills were closed, viz., 16th December to 20th December in the weaving and finishing departments and 16th December to 19th December in all other departments.\n\nThis dispute was also referred to the Tribunal by an order of the Government dated February 1, 1958.\n\nThe earlier issue as regards the proposed introduction of the rationalisation scheme was also amended in view of what had happened in the meantime by substituting therefor :-\"Have the rationalisation effected, in the above two mills since 16th December, 1957, involved any increase in the workload?\n\nTo what relief the workers are entitled to?\" We are no longer concerned with this issue as the decision of the Tribunal thereon which is against the workmen is no longer disputed.\n\nAs regards the other two disputes the Tribunal has made an award in favour of the\n\n• • ...\n\n• -\n\nworkmen that they are entitled to wages for the period of absence above-mentioned.\n\nOn this question the workmen's case before the Tribunal was that the reason that workmen could not do any work on the days in question was the illegal lock-out by the employers; the employer's case was that the workmen had struck work illegally, and so, the closure of the mills on the 16th of December after such strike was not illegal or unjustified. The Tribunal was of opinion that the employer's attempt to put the rationalisation scheme into effect on the 16th December was a contravention of s. 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, and so, the workmen's refusal to work in accordance with that scheme was not an illegal strike and the employer's closure of the mills was illegal.\n\nLearned counsel for the employer-mills has tried to convince tis that they had acted in accordance with law, in introducing the rationalisation scheme on the 16th December.\n\nHe pointed out that the Works Committee duly constituted under the Act had considered the scheme and approved of it, and argued that as the workmen's representatives on the Works Committee had agreed to the scheme, the workmen themselves should be taken to have agreed to it. That the workmen's representatives on the Works Committee agreed to the introduction of the scheme by the companies\" whenever they desired\" is established by a copy of the resolution of the Works Committee.\n\nIt has to be noticed however that the workmen's representatives on the Works Committee do not represent the workmen for all purposes, but .only -for the purpose of the functions of the Works Committee.\n\nSection 3(2) of the Act sets out the functions of the Works Committee in these words :\n\n\" It shall be the duty of the Works Committee to promote measures for securing and preserving amity and good relations between the employer and workmen' and, to that end to comment upon matters of their common interest or concern and endeavour to compose any material difference of opinion in respect of such matters.\"\n\nNorth Brook Jute Co. Ltd. v.\n\nTheir Workmen\n\nDas Gupta j.\n\nNorth Brook ] ute\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nTheif' Workmen\n\nDas Gupta].\n\nThe language used by the Legislature makes it clear that the Works Committee was not intended to supplant or supersede the Unions for the purpose of collective bargaining; they are not authorised to consider real or substantial changes in the conditions of service; their task is only to smooth away frictions that might arise between the workmen and the management in day-to-day work.\n\nBy no stretch of imagination can it be said that the duties and functions of the Works Committee included the decision on such an important matter as the alteration in the conditions of service by rationalisation. \"To promote measures for securing and preserving amity and good relations between the employer and workmen \" is their real function and to that end they are authorised to \" comment upon matters of their common concern or interest and endeavour to compose any material difference of opinion in respect of such matters.\" The question of introduction of rationalisation scheme may be said to be a matter of common interest between the employers and workmen; but the duty and authority of the Works Committee could not extend to anything more than making comments thereupon and to endeavour to compose any ma.terial difference of opinion in respect of such matters.\n\nNeither \" comments\" nor the \"endeavour\" could be held to extend to decide the question on which differences have arisen or are likely one way or the other. It was rightly pointed out by the Labour Appellate Tribunal in Kemp and Company Ltd. v. Their Workmen(') that:\n\n\"the Works Committees are normally concerned with problems arising in the day to day working of the concern and the functions of the Works Committee are to ascertain the grievances of the employees and when occasion arises to arrive at some agreement also. But the function and the responsibility of the works committee as their very nomenclature indicates cannot go beyond recommendation and as such they are more or less bodies who in the first instance endeavour to compose the differences and the final decision rests with the union as a whole.\" The fact tlrnt the workmen's representatives on the Works Committee agreed to the introduction of the\n\n(I) (1955] I L, L.J. 48,\n\n.....\n\n... ..\n\nrationalisation scheme is therefore in no. way binding on the workmen or their Union.\n\nThe next argument was that whatever alteration was effected in the conditions of service, was made, on the date when notice under s. 9A was given and that being before the 13th December there was no contravention of s. 33. .There is in our opinion no substance in this contention, Section 9A in accordance with which the notice was given provides that \"No employer who proposes to effect any change in the conditions of service applicable to any workmen in respect of any matter specified in the Fourth Schedule, shall effect such change- _\n\n(a) without giving to the workmen likely to be affected by such a notice in the prescribed manner of the nature of the change proppsed to be effected; or\n\n(b) within twenty-one days of giving such notice;\".\n\nWith the proviso to the section we are not concerned.\n\nWhat is important to notice is that in making this provision for notice the Legislature was clearly contemplating three stages. The first stage is the proposal by the employer to effect a change; the next stage is when he gives a notice and the last stage is when he effects the change in the conditions of service on the expiry of 21 days from the date of the notice. The conditions of service do not stand changed, either when the proposal is made or the notice is given but only when the change is actually effected. That actual change takes place when the new conditions of service are actually introduced.\n\nIt necessarily follows that in deciding for the purpose of s. 33 of the Act, at what point of time the employer \"alters\" any conditions of service, we have to ascertain the time when the change of which notice under s. 9A is given is actually effected. If at the time the change is effected, a proceeding is pending before a Tribunal, s. 33 is attracted and not otherwise. The point of time when the employer proposes to change the conditions of service and the point of time when the notic~ is given are equally irrelevant.\n\nIt was further contended that in any case, the alteration was not to the prejudice of the workmen. How such a contention can be seriously made is difficult to\n\nNorth Brook jute Co. Ltd. v.\n\nTheir Workmen\n\nDas Gupta ] .\n\nr960 understand. The whole basis of the scheme was so to\n\nN -- allocate the machines to workmen, as to enable fewer orth Brook jute k k th h' h h b co. Ltd wor men to wor e mac mes t an t e num er prev. viously required so that surplus workmen could be Their Workmen discharged. The object was to decrease the cost of production. The method adopted for attaining the Das Gupta J object was to obtain more work from the workmen for approximately. the same wages. However laudable the object be, it cannot be doubted for a moment that the scheme prejudiced the workmen seriously. Mr. Fraser, the company's witness, stated in his evidence that while previously for every machine in the batching department, there were two hands, now there are two hands for two machines. In giving the reasons for the introduction of the scheme, he said \"we had surplus labour in both the mills.\n\nThe company was losing heavily. Till then we depended on natural wastage and did not think of rationalisation; in November last year, the decision was taken to take action on rationalisation. \"\n\nRationalisation which was introduced had therefore two effects-first that some workers would become surplus and would face discharge ; and secondly, the other workmen would have to carry more workload.\n\nThe introduction of the rationalisation scheme was therefore clearly an alteration of conditions of service to the prejudice of the workmen.\n\nThe alteration was made on the 16th December, when reference as regards the scheme had already been made and was pending before the Industrial Tribunal.\n\nThe Tribunal has therefore rightly held that this introduction was a contravention of s. 33.\n\nLastly it was contended that even if the introduction of the rationalisation scheme was a contravention of s. 33 the workmen's remedy lay in applying under s. 33A, and that they were not entitled to strike work.\n\nSection 33A no doubt gives the workmen aggrieved by the contravention by the employer of s. 33 to apply to the Tribunal for relief; but the existence of this remedy does not mean that the workmen were bound to work under t'3.e altered conditions of service, even though these were in clear contravention of law. When they refused to do the additional work which the\n\nrationalisation scheme required them to do, they refused to do work, which the employer had no right in law to ask them to do. It is difficult to say that this amounted to a \"strike\" by the workmen ; but even if it could be said to be a \" strike \" such strike was certainly not illegal or unjustified.\n\nOur conclusion therefore is that the Tribunal was right in its opinion that the closure of the mills by the employer amounted to an illegal lock-out, and the workmen, unable to work 'in consequence of the lockout, are entitled to wages for the period of absence, caused. by such lock-out.\n\nThe appeal is therefore dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nMANAGEMENT OF KAIRBETTA ESTATE,\n\nKOTAGIRI\n\nRAJ AMANICKAM AND OTHERS.\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR and K. 0. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)\n\nI ndu.strial Dispute-Lay-off compensation-Closure of division due to disturbances by workers-Lock-out-Subsequent reopening of division-Claim for lay-off compensation-Lock-out and lay-off, Distinction-Industrial Disputes Act, z947-(I4 of z947), ss. 2(l), 2 (kkk), 25C, 25E(iii), 33C.\n\nThe appellant's manager was violently attacked by its workmen as a result of which he sustained serious injuries.\n\nThe workers in the lower division also threatened the appellant's staff working in that division that they would murder them if they worked there. The appellant was therefore compelled to notify that the division would be closed until further notice.\n\nSubsequently as a result of conciliation before the labour officer, the division was opened again. The workers made a claim for lay-off compensation under s. 25C of the Industrial Disputes Act, r947, for the period during which the lower division was closed on the footing that :the management for their own reasons did not choose to run the division during that period.\n\nThe appellant's answer was, inter alia, that the closure of the division amounted to a lock-out which under the circumstances was perfectly justified and as such the workers were not entitled to claim any lay-off compensation : Held; (r) that the concept of a lock-out is essentially different from that of a lay-off and where the closure of business amounts to a lock-out under s. 2(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act,\n\nNor th Brook ] ute Co. Ltd. v.\n\nTheir Workmen\n\nDas G\"pta ].\n\nMarch z4.", "total_entities": 69, "entities": [{"text": "s. 430", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112, "end_char": 118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 275, "end_char": 281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 430", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 296, "end_char": 302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lalji Raja", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 328, "end_char": 338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chairman of the The argument advanced by counsel for the Municipal- Bankura ity that the seizure was in exercise of the powers under 1~1 unicipality - v. s. 428 and not under s. 430 has, in our judgment, no Lalji Raja & San' force."}}, {"text": "March 10, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 406, "end_char": 420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The report of the Chairman of the Municipality dated March 10, 1950, makes it abundantly clear that Shah J. the search warrant was issued by the Sub-Divisional Officer in exercise of his authority under s. 430 of the Bengal Municipal Act."}}, {"text": "s. 430", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 556, "end_char": 562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 653, "end_char": 659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 801, "end_char": 812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 430", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 928, "end_char": 934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 431(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1047, "end_char": 1056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1150, "end_char": 1156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 430", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1329, "end_char": 1335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M/S. NORTH BROOK JUTE CO. LTD.\n\nAND A", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1463, "end_char": 1500, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M/S. NORTH BROOK JUTE CO. LTD. AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THEIR WORKMEN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1508, "end_char": 1521, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THEIR WORKMEN", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1523, "end_char": 1543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AND ANOTHER\n\nTHEIR WORKMEN (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO and\n\nK. C. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1545, "end_char": 1558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AND ANOTHER\n\nTHEIR WORKMEN (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO and\n\nK. C. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1564, "end_char": 1579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AND ANOTHER\n\nTHEIR WORKMEN (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO and\n\nK. C. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "K. C. DAS GUPTA"}}, {"text": "Lock-out-Claim for wages for the period of lock-out-Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1738, "end_char": 1813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 3(2),\n\n9A, 33, 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1834, "end_char": 1856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Lock-out-Claim for wages for the period of lock-out-Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Lock-out-Claim for wages for the period of lock-out-Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "s. 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1980, "end_char": 1985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Lock-out-Claim for wages for the period of lock-out-Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Lock-out-Claim for wages for the period of lock-out-Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1993, "end_char": 2022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "December r3, r957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2202, "end_char": 2219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The workmen, however, objected to the introduction of the scheme and the dispute was referred by the Government to the Tribunal on December r3, r957."}}, {"text": "December r6,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2224, "end_char": 2236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December r6, the management of the companies put the rationalisation scheme into operation but the workmen refused to do the additional work placed on them by the scheme."}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3231, "end_char": 3254, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3443, "end_char": 3448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3924, "end_char": 3935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Soli.citor-General of India, Vidya Sagar and B. N. Ghosh, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Vidya Sagar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3966, "end_char": 3977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Soli.citor-General of India, Vidya Sagar and B. N. Ghosh, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "B. N. Ghosh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3982, "end_char": 3993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Soli.citor-General of India, Vidya Sagar and B. N. Ghosh, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "P. K. Sanyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4016, "end_char": 4028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. K. Sanyal and P. K. Ohakravarty for R. 0."}}, {"text": "P. K. Ohakravarty", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4033, "end_char": 4050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. K. Sanyal and P. K. Ohakravarty for R. 0."}}, {"text": "DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4199, "end_char": 4208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nNor th Brook f utd\n\nCo. Ltd. v.\n\nTheir Workmen\n\nDAS GUPTA, J.-On December 13, 1957, the Govern- Das Gupta J. ment of West Bengal referred under s. 10 of the Industrial Disputes' Act the following dispute between M/s. Northbrook Jute Co., Ltd., and Dalhousie Jute Mills who are appellants before us and, their workmen:-.", "canonical_name": "DAS GUPTA"}}, {"text": "Govern- Das Gupta J. ment of West Bengal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4239, "end_char": 4279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nNor th Brook f utd\n\nCo. Ltd. v.\n\nTheir Workmen\n\nDAS GUPTA, J.-On December 13, 1957, the Govern- Das Gupta J. ment of West Bengal referred under s. 10 of the Industrial Disputes' Act the following dispute between M/s. 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Northbrook Jute Co., Ltd., and Dalhousie Jute Mills who are appellants before us and, their workmen:-.", "canonical_name": "Northbrook Jute Co., Ltd."}}, {"text": "Dalhousie Jute Mills", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4399, "end_char": 4419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nNor th Brook f utd\n\nCo. Ltd. v.\n\nTheir Workmen\n\nDAS GUPTA, J.-On December 13, 1957, the Govern- Das Gupta J. ment of West Bengal referred under s. 10 of the Industrial Disputes' Act the following dispute between M/s. Northbrook Jute Co., Ltd., and Dalhousie Jute Mills who are appellants before us and, their workmen:-."}}, {"text": "North Brook jute Co. Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4472, "end_char": 4497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "North Brook jute Co. Ltd. v.\n\nTheir Workmen\n\nDas Gtpta J.\n\n\"Do the proposals of rationalisation in the above two mills involve any increase in workload ?", "canonical_name": "Northbrook Jute Co., Ltd."}}, {"text": "Das Gtpta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4517, "end_char": 4526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "North Brook jute Co. Ltd. v.\n\nTheir Workmen\n\nDas Gtpta J.\n\n\"Do the proposals of rationalisation in the above two mills involve any increase in workload ?", "canonical_name": "DAS GUPTA"}}, {"text": "s. 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4919, "end_char": 4924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4932, "end_char": 4955, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "February 1, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6131, "end_char": 6147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This dispute was also referred to the Tribunal by an order of the Government dated February 1, 1958."}}, {"text": "16th December, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6389, "end_char": 6408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The earlier issue as regards the proposed introduction of the rationalisation scheme was also amended in view of what had happened in the meantime by substituting therefor :-\"Have the rationalisation effected, in the above two mills since 16th December, 1957, involved any increase in the workload?"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7311, "end_char": 7316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7324, "end_char": 7347, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "pointed out that the Works Committee duly constituted under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7675, "end_char": 7742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8359, "end_char": 8371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "He pointed out that the Works Committee duly constituted under the Act", "statute": "He pointed out that the Works Committee duly constituted under the Act"}}, {"text": "North Brook Jute Co. Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8767, "end_char": 8792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "North Brook Jute Co. Ltd. v.\n\nTheir Workmen\n\nDas Gupta j.\n\nNorth Brook ] ute\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nTheif' Workmen\n\nDas Gupta].", "canonical_name": "Northbrook Jute Co., Ltd."}}, {"text": "Labour Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10338, "end_char": 10363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was rightly pointed out by the Labour Appellate Tribunal in Kemp and Company Ltd. v. Their Workmen(') that:\n\n\"the Works Committees are normally concerned with problems arising in the day to day working of the concern and the functions of the Works Committee are to ascertain the grievances of the employees and when occasion arises to arrive at some agreement also."}}, {"text": "s. 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11327, "end_char": 11332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11413, "end_char": 11418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11478, "end_char": 11488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Fourth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11693, "end_char": 11708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12673, "end_char": 12678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12830, "end_char": 12835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12949, "end_char": 12954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Fraser", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13942, "end_char": 13948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Fraser, the company's witness, stated in his evidence that while previously for every machine in the batching department, there were two hands, now there are two hands for two machines."}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15017, "end_char": 15022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15132, "end_char": 15137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15181, "end_char": 15187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15238, "end_char": 15249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15327, "end_char": 15332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "MANAGEMENT OF KAIRBETTA ESTATE,\n\nKOTAGIRI", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16264, "end_char": 16305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MANAGEMENT OF KAIRBETTA ESTATE,\n\nKOTAGIRI\n\nRAJ AMANICKAM AND OTHERS."}}, {"text": "RAJ AMANICKAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16307, "end_char": 16320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MANAGEMENT OF KAIRBETTA ESTATE,\n\nKOTAGIRI\n\nRAJ AMANICKAM AND OTHERS."}}, {"text": "K. 0. DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16360, "end_char": 16375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR and K. 0.", "canonical_name": "K. C. DAS GUPTA"}}, {"text": "Distinction-Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16571, "end_char": 16606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 2(l), 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16627, "end_char": 16638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Distinction-Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Distinction-Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "s. 25C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17189, "end_char": 17195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Distinction-Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Distinction-Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17203, "end_char": 17226, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17785, "end_char": 17792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17800, "end_char": 17823, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_371_377_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 371\n\nrationalisation scheme required them to do, they refused to do work, which the employer had no right in law to ask them to do. It is difficult to say that this amounted to a \"strike\" by the workmen ; but even if it could be said to be a \" strike \" such strike was certainly not illegal or unjustified.\n\nOur conclusion therefore is that the Tribunal was right in its opinion that the closure of the mills by the employer amounted to an illegal lock-out, and the workmen, unable to work 'in consequence of the lockout, are entitled to wages for the period of absence, caused. by such lock-out.\n\nThe appeal is therefore dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nMANAGEMENT OF KAIRBETTA ESTATE,\n\nKOTAGIRI\n\nRAJ AMANICKAM AND OTHERS.\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR and K. 0. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)\n\nI ndu.strial Dispute-Lay-off compensation-Closure of division due to disturbances by workers-Lock-out-Subsequent reopening of division-Claim for lay-off compensation-Lock-out and lay-off, Distinction-Industrial Disputes Act, z947-(I4 of z947), ss. 2(l), 2 (kkk), 25C, 25E(iii), 33C.\n\nThe appellant's manager was violently attacked by its workmen as a result of which he sustained serious injuries.\n\nThe workers in the lower division also threatened the appellant's staff working in that division that they would murder them if they worked there. The appellant was therefore compelled to notify that the division would be closed until further notice.\n\nSubsequently as a result of conciliation before the labour officer, the division was opened again. The workers made a claim for lay-off compensation under s. 25C of the Industrial Disputes Act, r947, for the period during which the lower division was closed on the footing that :the management for their own reasons did not choose to run the division during that period.\n\nThe appellant's answer was, inter alia, that the closure of the division amounted to a lock-out which under the circumstances was perfectly justified and as such the workers were not entitled to claim any lay-off compensation : Held; (r) that the concept of a lock-out is essentially different from that of a lay-off and where the closure of business amounts to a lock-out under s. 2(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act,\n\nNor th Brook ] ute Co. Ltd. v.\n\nTheir Workmen\n\nDas G\"pta ].\n\nMarch z4.\n\n1960 it woulrl be impossible to bring it within the scope of a lay-off under s. z (kkk) of the Act.\n\nManagement of ·(z) that the expression \"any other reason \" ins. z (kkk) Kairbetta Estate means any reason which is allied or analogous to reasons already v. specified in that section.\n\nRajamanickam ]. J{. Hosiery Factory v. Labour Appellate Tribunal of India & Anr, A.LR. 1956 All. 498, approved.\n\n(3) that the lock-out which was justified on the facts of the case, \\vas not a lay-off and therefore the 'vorkmen \\Vere not entitled to claim any lay; off compensation.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 91 of 1959.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the decision dated March 24, 1958, of the Labour Court, Coimbatore, in R. P. No. 35 of 1958.\n\nG. B. Pai and Sardar Bahadur, for the appellant.\n\nM. K. Ramamurthi and T. S. Venkataraman, for the respondents.\n\n1960. March 24.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGajendragadkar ].\n\nGA.TENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal by special leave iR directed against the order passed by the Labour Court, at Coimbatore directing the appellant, the Management of the Kairbetta Estate, Kotagiri, to pay lay-off compensation to its workr; nen, the respondents, for the period between July 28, 1957, to September 2,\n\n1957. This order was passed on a complaint filed by the respondents before the Labour Court under s. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, XIV of 1947 (hereinafter called the Act).\n\nThe material facts leading to the respondents' complaint must be set out briefly at the outset. On July 26, 1957, Mr. Ramakrishna Iyer, the appellant's Manager, was assaulted by some of the workmen of the appellant. He suffered six fractures and had to be in hospital in Coouoor and Madras for over a month. The appellant's staff working in the division known as Kelso Division was also threatened by the workmen.\n\nAs a result of these threats three members of the staff wrote to the appellant on July 27, 1957, that they were afraid to go down to the lower division and it was impossible for them to work there becaue their lives were in danger. , They added that tho workers in the lower division were threatening them\n\n• -\n\nthat they would murder them if they worked in the 1960 .lower division. On receiving this communication f ff h II fi d h Management of rom its sta t e appe ant noti e on t e same day J(airbetta Estate that the Kelso Division would be closed from that v: day onwards until further notice. This notice referred Rajamanickam to.the brutalassault on theManager and to the threat . - .. held out against the field staff who were reluc'tant to Ga1endragadkar ], face the risk of working in the lower division. It appears that the Kelso Division continued to be closed until September 2, 1957, on which date it was opened, as a result of conciliation before the labour officer, when the respondents gave an assurance that there would not be any further trouble. The claim for layoff is made for the said period during which the division remained closed between July 28 to September 2, 1957. ' Soon after the division was closed the respondents made a complaint to the Labour Court (No. 43of1957) under s. 33A of the Act in which they , alleged that they had been stopped from doing their work without notice or enquiry and claimed an order of reinstate- 4 ment with back wages and continuity of service.\n\nAt the hearing of the said complaint the appellant raised a preliminary objection that the closure in question was a lock-out and that it did not amount either to an alteration of conditions of service to the prejudice of the workmen nor . did it constitute discharge or punishment by dismissal or otherwise under els. A and B of s. 33 respectively, and so the petition was incompetent. This preliminary objection was upheld by the Labour Court and the complaint was accordingly dismissed on November 30, 1957.\n\nThereafter the present complaint was filed by the respondents on January 31, 1958, under s. 330 of the Act. In this complaint it was stated that the respondents were refused work from July 28 to September 2, 1957, \"by declaring a lock-out of a division of the estate \" and the claim :inade was that, as the management for their own reasons did not choose to run the division during the said days and laid-off the respondents, the respondents were entitled to claimlay-off compensation under s. 250 of the Act.\n\nAgainst this pqmplaint. the appellant raised several contentions .\n\n..s\n\n1960 It was urged on it.s behalf that the complaint was incompetent under s. 330 and that the Labour Court Management of Kairbetta Estate had no jurisdiction to deal with it. It was also conv. tended that the closure of the division amounted to a llajamanicham lock-out which under the circumstances was perfectly . - justified and as such the respondents were not entitld Ga; endragadkar J. to claim any lay-off compensation. 'l'he Labour Court\n\nrejected the preliminary objection as to want of jurisdiction and held that the complaint was competeut under s. 33C. On the merits it found in favour of the respondents and so it directed the appellant to pay to the respondents the lay-off compensation for the period in question. It is this order which is challenge< I before us in the present appeal; and the same two questions are raised before us.\n\nFor the purpose of deciding this appeal we will assume that the complaint filed by the respondents under s. 33C was competent and that the Labour Court\n\ncould have entertained a claim for lay-off compensation if the respondents were otherwise entitled to it. •On that assumption the question which we propose to decide is whether the closure of the appellant's divisi011 during the relevant period which amounts to a lock-out can he said to fall within the definition of lay-off.\n\nWe have already pointed out that in the earlier complaint by the respondents under s. 33A it has been held by the Labour Court that the closure in question was a lock-out and as such the appellant had not contravened the provisions of s. 33 of the Act.\n\nEven in the present application the respondents have admitted that the said closure is a leek-out but they have added that a lock-out falls within the definition of Jay-off and that is the basis for their claim for layoff compensation. The question which thus arises for our decision is: Does a lock-out fall under s. 2(kkk) which defines a Jay-off?\n\nSection 2(kkk) defines a lay-off as meaning the failure, refusal or inability of an employer on account of shortage of coal, power or raw materials or the accumulation of stocks or the breakdown of machinery or for any other reason to give employment to a workman whose name is borne on the muster rolls of his industrial establishment and who has not been\n\n• - -\n\nt ..\n\nretrenched. There is an explanation to the definition. z960 which it 'is unnecessary to set out. It is clear that the M anageme11t of lay-off takes place for one or more of the reasons J.\n\n'- -\n\n• -\n\n' -\n\n' . --\n\nlock-out means \" & refusal by the employer to furnish r960 work to the operatives except on conditions to be 11 . l , Management of accepted by the latter co ect1ve y '.\n\nKairbetta E; tate Stated broadly lay-off generally occurs in a continuv. ing business, whereas a lock-out is the closure of the Rajainanickam business. In the case of a lay-off, owing tp the reasons . .\n\nSpecified in S. 2(kkk) the employer is unable to give Ga; ondragadkar ]. employment to one or more workmen. In the case of a lock-out, the employer closes the business and locks out the whole body of workmen for reasons which have no relevance to causes specified in s. 2(kkk).\n\nThus the nature of the two concepts is entirely different and so are their consequences. In the case of a . lay-off the employer may be liable to pay compensaj; ion as provided by s. 25(C), (D) and (E) of the Act; but this liability cannot be invoked in the case of a lock-out. The liability of the employer in cases of lock-out would d_epend upon whether the lock-outwas justified and legal or not; but whatever the liability, the provisions applicable to the payment of lay-off compensation cannot be applied to the cases of lockout.\n\nTherefore, we hold that the lock-out in the present case was not a lay-off, and as such the respondents are not entitled to claim any lay-off compensation from the appellant. Incidentally we would like to add that the circumstances of this case clearly show that the lock-out was fully justified. The appellant's Manager had been violently attacked and the other members of the staff working in the lower division were threatened by the respondents. In such a case if the appellant locked out his workmen no grievance can be made against its conduct by the respondents.\n\nIn the result the appeal is allowed, the order passed by the Labour Court is set aside and the complaint filed by the respondents under s. 330 is dismissed.\n\nThere would be no ordsr as to costs.\n\nAppeal allowed .", "total_entities": 59, "entities": [{"text": "MANAGEMENT OF KAIRBETTA ESTATE,\n\nKOTAGIRI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 695, "end_char": 736, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MANAGEMENT OF KAIRBETTA ESTATE, KOTAGIRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAJ AMANICKAM AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 738, "end_char": 762, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAJ AMANICKAM AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 766, "end_char": 786, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. 0. DAS GUPTA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 791, "end_char": 811, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Distinction-Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1002, "end_char": 1037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 2(l), 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1058, "end_char": 1069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Distinction-Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Distinction-Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "s. 25C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1620, "end_char": 1626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Distinction-Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Distinction-Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1634, "end_char": 1657, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2216, "end_char": 2223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2231, "end_char": 2254, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Rajamanickam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2615, "end_char": 2627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajamanickam ].", "canonical_name": "Rajamanickam"}}, {"text": "G. B. Pai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3081, "end_char": 3090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. B. Pai and Sardar Bahadur, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Sardar Bahadur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3095, "end_char": 3109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. B. Pai and Sardar Bahadur, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. K. Ramamurthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3131, "end_char": 3147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthi and T. S. Venkataraman, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "T. S. Venkataraman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3152, "end_char": 3170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthi and T. S. Venkataraman, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3255, "end_char": 3269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGajendragadkar ].", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "GA.TENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3274, "end_char": 3289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GA.TENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal by special leave iR directed against the order passed by the Labour Court, at Coimbatore directing the appellant, the Management of the Kairbetta Estate, Kotagiri, to pay lay-off compensation to its workr; nen, the respondents, for the period between July 28, 1957, to September 2,\n\n1957.", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "s. 33C(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3687, "end_char": 3696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3704, "end_char": 3727, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "July 26, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3871, "end_char": 3884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 26, 1957, Mr. Ramakrishna Iyer, the appellant's Manager, was assaulted by some of the workmen of the appellant."}}, {"text": "Ramakrishna Iyer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3890, "end_char": 3906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 26, 1957, Mr. Ramakrishna Iyer, the appellant's Manager, was assaulted by some of the workmen of the appellant."}}, {"text": "Coouoor", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4043, "end_char": 4050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He suffered six fractures and had to be in hospital in Coouoor and Madras for over a month."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4055, "end_char": 4061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He suffered six fractures and had to be in hospital in Coouoor and Madras for over a month."}}, {"text": "July 27, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4269, "end_char": 4282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result of these threats three members of the staff wrote to the appellant on July 27, 1957, that they were afraid to go down to the lower division and it was impossible for them to work there becaue their lives were in danger. ,"}}, {"text": "Rajamanickam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4808, "end_char": 4820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This notice referred Rajamanickam to.the brutalassault on theManager and to the threat . - ..", "canonical_name": "Rajamanickam"}}, {"text": "September 2, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5067, "end_char": 5084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the Kelso Division continued to be closed until September 2, 1957, on which date it was opened, as a result of conciliation before the labour officer, when the respondents gave an assurance that there would not be any further trouble."}}, {"text": "July 28 to September 2, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5353, "end_char": 5381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The claim for layoff is made for the said period during which the division remained closed between July 28 to September 2, 1957. '"}}, {"text": "s. 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5494, "end_char": 5500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6027, "end_char": 6032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 30, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6189, "end_char": 6206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This preliminary objection was upheld by the Labour Court and the complaint was accordingly dismissed on November 30, 1957."}}, {"text": "January 31, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6274, "end_char": 6290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter the present complaint was filed by the respondents on January 31, 1958, under s. 330 of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 330", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6298, "end_char": 6304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 250", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6700, "end_char": 6706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s\n\n1960", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6790, "end_char": 6797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 330", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6867, "end_char": 6873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Labour Court Management of Kairbetta Estate", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6887, "end_char": 6930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "..s\n\n1960 It was urged on it.s behalf that the complaint was incompetent under s. 330 and that the Labour Court Management of Kairbetta Estate had no jurisdiction to deal with it."}}, {"text": "endragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7170, "end_char": 7181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "justified and as such the respondents were not entitld Ga; endragadkar J. to claim any lay-off compensation. '"}}, {"text": "s. 33C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7350, "end_char": 7356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7749, "end_char": 7755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8208, "end_char": 8214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8360, "end_char": 8365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(kkk)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8694, "end_char": 8703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(kkk)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8730, "end_char": 8744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gajemiragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9525, "end_char": 9539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Any other Gajemiragadkar J. reason\" to which the definition refers must, we thillk, be a reason which is allied or analogous to reasons already specified.", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "s. 25E(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9980, "end_char": 9991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 25E", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9993, "end_char": 10004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25E(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10169, "end_char": 10180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(kkk)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10508, "end_char": 10517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11257, "end_char": 11277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in J. K. Hosiery Factory v. Labour Appellate 1'ribunal of India & Anr.(_!);"}}, {"text": "Section 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11480, "end_char": 11492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11830, "end_char": 11837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Trade Disputes Act, 1929", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11845, "end_char": 11869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11934, "end_char": 11941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Trade Disputes Act, 1929", "statute": "the Trade Disputes Act, 1929"}}, {"text": "s. 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13338, "end_char": 13345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(kkk)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13415, "end_char": 13424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 2(kkk)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14133, "end_char": 14142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(kkk)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14387, "end_char": 14396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25(C)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14579, "end_char": 14587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 330", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15643, "end_char": 15649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_378_382_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "1y60\n\nA1arch 24.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[HJ60]\n\nBHARAT BARREL AND DRUM J\\H'G. 00.\n\nPRIVATE LTD.\n\n'V.\n\nGOVIND GOPAL \\VAGHMARE AND ANOTHEH,\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO and K. o. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)\n\nIndustrial Dispute-Full Bench formula-lncomc:tax payablehd. • The workmen of the appellant company claimed four months, \\vages including dearness allo\\vancc as bonus for the year 1952, and retrospective operation of the increased wage scale to be fixed by the Industrial Tribunal from March l, 1952.\n\nThe appellant agreed to the increased wage scale suggested by the Tribunal but wanted that it should be linked to some guaranteed production, and opposed its operation retrospectively on the ground that there had been eliberate slowing down of production by the workmen in the previous years. The Tribunal found that there was some justiffoation in the appellant's contention that there was considerable go-slow which had affected production and ordered that retrospective effect should be given to its order relating to increase in wages which was passed on May 13; 1957, from June r, 1956, and not March l, r952, as claimed by the workmen. The increased \\Vages \\Vere not linked to any guaranteed production but it \\vas made clear that the workers would give certain reasonable production to which the workmen agreed. The Tribunal granted five months' basic wages by way of bonus on the basis of the Full Bench .formula which is generally applied to these matters.\n\nOn appeal by the Appellant-company by special leave :\n\nHeld, that there was no reason for interfeience with the order of the Tribunal fixing the date as June l, 1956, from which the increased wages should come into force and that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to award five months' basic wag_es by way of bonus.\n\nFor the purpose of the Full Bench formula, the incometax payable has to be deducted on the figures worked out according to the formula and it is immaterial what the actual income-tax paid is-whether more or less.\n\nOrvrL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 93 of 1959.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Award dated May 13, 1957, of the Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, in H, eference (I.T.) No. 166 of 1955.\n\nR. J. Kolah, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vuhra, for the appellants.\n\nK. R. Ohaudhury and Janardan Shanna, for the respondents Nos. l and 2.\n\n• -\n\n...\n\n1960. March 24.\n\nThe , Judgment of the Court waf\\ delivered by\n\nWANOHOO, J.-This appeal by special leave raises two questions, namely, (i) bonus for the year 1952 and\n\n(ii) retrospective operation of the order of the Industrial Tribunal relating to increase in wages. The appellant is a company manufacturing barrels and drums at Bombay. There was a dispute between the appella1'lt and its workmen about a number of matters, which was referred to the tribunal by the Government of Bombay on November l 'l, 1955. In respect of the two matters which are now raised in appeal the workmen claimed (i) four months' wages including dearness allowance as bonus for the year 1952 and (ii) retrospective operation of the wage-scale to be fixed by the tribunal from March 1, 1952.\n\nSo far as the increase in wages is concerned, the appellant agreed to the scale suggested by the tribunal but it opposed the grant of the increased scale retrospectively and also wanted that the increased wages should he linked to some guaranteed production. The reason for this was that the appellant felt that there had been deliberate slowing down of production by the workmen in the previous years. The tribunal was qf opinion that there was some justification in the appellant's contention that there had beell consider~ able go-slow which had affected production. Taking that into account it ordered that retrospective effect should be given to its order which was passed on May 13, 1957 from June 1, 1956. As to the linking of the increased wages to a certain guaranteed production it found it difficult to lay down any norm itself; but it made it clear that the increase in wages was made by it on the basis that the workers would give a certain reasonable production and noted that the workers were agreeable to do that. It, however, recommended that immediately after the award had been given, 'an expert should be appointed by agreement, if possible, to go into this question. It also said that in case it was not possible to appoint an expert by agreement it would be op({n to the appellant to appoint one. ·\n\nBharat Barrel &\n\nDrum Mfg .. Co. (P) Lid. v.\n\nGovind G opal\n\nWaghmare\n\nWanchoo ] .\n\n, 96o The appellant's contention before us is that the - tribunal having found some justification in its conten- Bharat Barrel & tion that there had been considerable go-slow should\n\nDru; tZ~· co. not have given retrospective effect at all to the order\n\nv. relating to the increase in wages. This matter has Govind Gopal been considered fully by the tribunal and it came to Waghma\" the conclusion that increase in wages should be granted from June 1, 1956.\n\nThis could hardly be called Wanchcn f. retrospective considering that the reference was made in November 1955; in any case the tribunal rejected the claim of the workmen for retrospective operation for the period of over four years from March 1952 to May 1!:156 and a good deal of go-slow was practised during this period. In the circumstances we see no reason for interference with the order of the tribunal fixing the date as June 1, 1956, from which the increased wages should come into force.\n\nThis brings us to the next question relating to bonus.\n\nThe tribunal has awarded five months' basic wages by way of bonus. The first contention in this connection is that the workmen had only claimed four months' basic wages and the tribunal could not have awarded anything more than what the workmen claimed. This in our opinion is incorrect. The workmen had claimed four months' wages including dearness allowance as bonus.\n\nFive months' basic wages which the tribunal has allowed are admittedly less than the claim put forward (namely, four months' wages including dearness allowance). In the circumstances the tribunal certainly had jurisdiction to award what it has awarded to the workmen.\n\nThe next question is whether the tribunal was justified in awarding as much as five months' basic wages on the basis of the Full Bench formula, which is generally applied to these matters. The gross profit found by the tribunal is not challenged, namely, Rs. 5·05 lacis.\n\nThe tribunal bas then allowed Rs. I 36 lacs as depreciation, leaving a balance of Rs. 3·69 lacs.\n\nDeducting income-tax from this at seven annas in a rupee (i.e., Rs. l 61 lacs), we are left with a balance of Rs. 2·08 lacs. Six per cent. per annum interest on the paid-up capital along with four per cent. interest on the working capital comes to Rs. 16,000, leaving an avai!a, ble\n\n·~ ....\n\n• - -\n\nsurplus of Rs. l 92 lacs. Out of this, the tribunal has allowed five months' basic wages as bonus which according to its calculations comes to Rs. 91,000, leaving Rs. l Ol lacs. There will be a rebate of Rs. 40, QOO on this sum, leaving a total of Rs. l 41 lacs with the appellant. On these figures, the bonus awarded by the tribunal cannoli be interfered with.\n\nThe appellant, however, draws our attention to two\n\nircumstances in this connection. In the first place it urges that the tribunal has not taken into account anything for rehabilitation. But it may be mentioned that the appellant had proved no rehabilitation amount as such. What it had done was to appropriate Rs. 3·16 lacs towards depreciation, which of course was not the proper amount of notional normal depreciation, which is allowable under the formula. Our attention is drawn, however, to the figures filed by the workmen in Ex. U-4 in which Rs. 40,000 has been allowed towards rehabilitation. Even accepting this concession by the workmen and deducting it from the figures given by us above, the appellant would still be left with Rs. l Ol lacs after paying five months' basic wages as bonus. There is thus no reason to interfere with the award of bonus on this ground.\n\nLastly it is urged that according to the income-tax assessment which was actually made in this case sometime after the order of the tribunal, the appellant has been assessed to income-tax amounting to Rs. 2·35 lacs. The appellant claims that it should be allowed this entire amount and not the notional figure calculated by us, namely, Rs. l 61 lacs as incoine-tax. We are of opinion that for the purpose of the Full Bench formula, the income-tax payable has .to be deducted on the figures worked out according to the formula and it is immaterial what the actual income-tax paid is-whether more or less. In this particular case, the income-tax appears to be more because certain items which were challenged by the workmen but were allowed as proper expense by the tribunal have apparently not been allowed as proper expense by the income-tax department. The industrial tribunal, however, is not concerned directly with what the income\n\nI960\n\nBharat Barrel &\n\nDrum Mf:. Co.\n\n(P) Ltd. v.\n\nGovind Gopal\n\nWaghmare\n\nWanchoo j .\n\nBharat Barrel &\n\nDrum Mfg. Co.\n\n(P) Ltd. ..\n\nGovind Gopal Waghmare\n\nWanchoo ].\n\nr960\n\ntax authorities assess as actual income-tax in a particular year; it is concerned with working out the Full Bench formula in accordance with its notional calculations and this is what has been done in this case.\n\nThere is no ground therefore for interference with the award of bonus for this reason either.\n\nWe therefore dismiss the appeal, but in the circumstances pass no order as to costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nB. N. ELIAS AND CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES'\n\nUNION AND OTHERS\n\nB. N. ELIAS & CO., LTD., AND OTHERS.\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. w ANOHOO\n\nand K. C. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)\n\nIndustrial Dispute-Bonus-Implied term of agreement or condition of service-Ex gratia payments-Cttstomary bonus- -Pnja\n\nbonus.\n\nSince 1942 the respondents had been making ex gratia payments to their employees (appellants) in addition to wages and salaries, bnt these were not regular and in 1956, no ex gratia payments were made at all. The appellants claimed that their right to be paid bonus had become an implied term of agreement or a condition of service and, at any rate, it should be paid as customary bonus, and relied on the case of The Graham Trading Co. (India) Ltd. v. Its Workmen, [1960] l S.C.R. 107. The evidence showed that though the payments were made from 1942 to 1952 it was made clear every time that the payments were made as ex gratia: Held, (1) Where payments are made to workers ex gratia and are accepted as such, it is not possible to imply a term of service on the basis of an implied agreement to pay bonus.\n\n(2) that there cannot be a customary payment of bonus between employer and employee where terms of service are governed by contract, express or implied, except where the bonus may be connected with a festival, whether Puja in Bengal or some other equally important festival in any other part of the country.\n\nThe Graham Trading Co. (India) Ltd. v. Its Workmen, [1960] l S.C.R. 107, explained.\n\n(3) that for the year 1956 one month's basic wage should be paid as Puja bonus to the subordinate staff as it has become customary and traditional in the respondents' concerns.\n\n• -", "total_entities": 28, "entities": [{"text": "BHARAT BARREL AND DRUM J\\H'G. 00.\n\nPRIVATE LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 49, "end_char": 95, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHARAT BARREL AND DRUM MFG. CO PRIVATE LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GOVIND GOPAL \\VAGHMARE AND ANOTHEH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 137, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GOVIND GOPAL \\VAGHMARE AND ANOTHEH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 141, "end_char": 161, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 163, "end_char": 176, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. N. w ANOHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. o. DAS GUPTA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 181, "end_char": 201, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. o. DAS GUPTA, JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 13; 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1064, "end_char": 1076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal found that there was some justiffoation in the appellant's contention that there was considerable go-slow which had affected production and ordered that retrospective effect should be given to its order relating to increase in wages which was passed on May 13; 1957, from June r, 1956, and not March l, r952, as claimed by the workmen."}}, {"text": "R. J. Kolah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2194, "end_char": 2205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. J. Kolah, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vuhra, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "S. N. Andley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2207, "end_char": 2219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. J. Kolah, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vuhra, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "J. B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2221, "end_char": 2237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. J. Kolah, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vuhra, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2239, "end_char": 2253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. J. Kolah, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vuhra, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "P. L. Vuhra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2258, "end_char": 2269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. J. Kolah, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vuhra, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "K. R. Ohaudhury", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2292, "end_char": 2307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. R. Ohaudhury and Janardan Shanna, for the respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Janardan Shanna", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2312, "end_char": 2327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. R. Ohaudhury and Janardan Shanna, for the respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "WANOHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2438, "end_char": 2445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The , Judgment of the Court waf\\ delivered by\n\nWANOHOO, J.-This appeal by special leave raises two questions, namely, (i) bonus for the year 1952 and\n\n(ii) retrospective operation of the order of the Industrial Tribunal relating to increase in wages."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2704, "end_char": 2710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is a company manufacturing barrels and drums at Bombay."}}, {"text": "Government of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2841, "end_char": 2861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was a dispute between the appella1'lt and its workmen about a number of matters, which was referred to the tribunal by the Government of Bombay on November l 'l, 1955."}}, {"text": "November l 'l, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2865, "end_char": 2884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was a dispute between the appella1'lt and its workmen about a number of matters, which was referred to the tribunal by the Government of Bombay on November l 'l, 1955."}}, {"text": "March 1, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3130, "end_char": 3143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In respect of the two matters which are now raised in appeal the workmen claimed (i) four months' wages including dearness allowance as bonus for the year 1952 and (ii) retrospective operation of the wage-scale to be fixed by the tribunal from March 1, 1952."}}, {"text": "May 13, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3827, "end_char": 3839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Taking that into account it ordered that retrospective effect should be given to its order which was passed on May 13, 1957 from June 1, 1956."}}, {"text": "June 1, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3845, "end_char": 3857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Taking that into account it ordered that retrospective effect should be given to its order which was passed on May 13, 1957 from June 1, 1956."}}, {"text": "Govind Gopal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4860, "end_char": 4872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This matter has Govind Gopal been considered fully by the tribunal and it came to Waghma\" the conclusion that increase in wages should be granted from June 1, 1956.", "canonical_name": "GOVIND GOPAL \\VAGHMARE AND ANOTHEH"}}, {"text": "Bharat Barrel &\n\nDrum Mf:. Co.\n\n(P) Ltd. v.\n\nGovind Gopal\n\nWaghmare\n\nWanchoo", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9058, "end_char": 9134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The industrial tribunal, however, is not concerned directly with what the income\n\nI960\n\nBharat Barrel &\n\nDrum Mf:."}}, {"text": "Govind Gopal Waghmare", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9185, "end_char": 9206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Co.\n\n(P) Ltd. ..\n\nGovind Gopal Waghmare\n\nWanchoo ].", "canonical_name": "GOVIND GOPAL \\VAGHMARE AND ANOTHEH"}}, {"text": "B. N. ELIAS AND CO., LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9639, "end_char": 9663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. N. ELIAS AND CO.,"}}, {"text": "B. N. ELIAS & CO., LTD", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9696, "end_char": 9718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "EMPLOYEES'\n\nUNION AND OTHERS\n\nB. N. ELIAS & CO.,"}}, {"text": "K. N. w ANOHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9757, "end_char": 9771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. w ANOHOO\n\nand K. C. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "K. N. w ANOHOO"}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9777, "end_char": 9792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. w ANOHOO\n\nand K. C. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "K. o. DAS GUPTA, JJ."}}, {"text": "Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10963, "end_char": 10969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) that there cannot be a customary payment of bonus between employer and employee where terms of service are governed by contract, express or implied, except where the bonus may be connected with a festival, whether Puja in Bengal or some other equally important festival in any other part of the country."}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_382_387_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "Bharat Barrel &\n\nDrum Mfg. Co.\n\n(P) Ltd. ..\n\nGovind Gopal Waghmare\n\nWanchoo ].\n\nr960\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960]\n\ntax authorities assess as actual income-tax in a particular year; it is concerned with working out the Full Bench formula in accordance with its notional calculations and this is what has been done in this case.\n\nThere is no ground therefore for interference with the award of bonus for this reason either.\n\nWe therefore dismiss the appeal, but in the circumstances pass no order as to costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nB. N. ELIAS AND CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES'\n\nUNION AND OTHERS\n\nB. N. ELIAS & CO., LTD., AND OTHERS.\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. w ANOHOO\n\nand K. C. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)\n\nIndustrial Dispute-Bonus-Implied term of agreement or condition of service-Ex gratia payments-Cttstomary bonus- -Pnja\n\nbonus.\n\nSince 1942 the respondents had been making ex gratia payments to their employees (appellants) in addition to wages and salaries, bnt these were not regular and in 1956, no ex gratia payments were made at all. The appellants claimed that their right to be paid bonus had become an implied term of agreement or a condition of service and, at any rate, it should be paid as customary bonus, and relied on the case of The Graham Trading Co. (India) Ltd. v. Its Workmen, [1960] l S.C.R. 107. The evidence showed that though the payments were made from 1942 to 1952 it was made clear every time that the payments were made as ex gratia: Held, (1) Where payments are made to workers ex gratia and are accepted as such, it is not possible to imply a term of service on the basis of an implied agreement to pay bonus.\n\n(2) that there cannot be a customary payment of bonus between employer and employee where terms of service are governed by contract, express or implied, except where the bonus may be connected with a festival, whether Puja in Bengal or some other equally important festival in any other part of the country.\n\nThe Graham Trading Co. (India) Ltd. v. Its Workmen, [1960] l S.C.R. 107, explained.\n\n(3) that for the year 1956 one month's basic wage should be paid as Puja bonus to the subordinate staff as it has become customary and traditional in the respondents' concerns.\n\n• -\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal z96o No. 121 of 1959. .\n\nB. N. Elias & Co.\n\nAppeal by spemal leave from the A ward dated Ltd. Employees' June 3, 1957, of the Second Iudustrial Tribunal, West Union.\n\nBengal. v.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee, D. L. Sen Gupta and Dipak Datta B. N. Elias & Co.\n\nChoudhri, for the appellants. l.td.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, H. N.\n\nSanyal, Additional SoUcitor-General of India and S. N. Mukherjee, for the respondents.\n\n1960. March 24.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n\"VANCHOO, J.-This appeal by special leave raises Wanclwo J. the question of bonus. There was a dispute between the workmen of B. N. Elias & Co. Ltd. (hereinafter called the appellants) and their employers, B. N. Elias . and Co. Ltd. and others (hereinafter called the respondents) with respect to bonus for the years 1954, 1955 and 1956. The case of the appellants was that they were entitled to bonus as a condition of service irrespective of profit or loss on the following scale :-\n\nI-Clerical staff. 1 month's basic pay as bonus in April, 1 month's basic pay as bonus in August, 1 month's basic pay as bonus in December.\n\nII-Subordinate staff. 1 month's basic wages as bonus in April, 1 month's basic wages as bonus in August, 1 month's basic wages as bonus at Puja time, 1 month's basic wages as bonus in December.\n\nAccording to the appellants this bonus was always paid from 1942 to 1952. Later as there were some disputes between the appellants and the respondents, the respondents wanted to stop the payment of bonus from 1953, though something less was paid that year.\n\nIn 1954 the amount of bonus was further reduced.\n\nConsequently, a dispute was raised which was referred by the Government of West Bengal in May 1956.\n\nSubsequently another dispute was raised with respect to the bonus for the years 1955 and 1956 and this time it was claimed as a customary bonus or as a condition of service payable at regular intervals of four\n\nmonths and at a uniform rate. Thereupon a consolidated reference was made by the Government of West\n\nBi.~: i~;;0~~~· Bengal in September 1956 with respect to all the Union three years, i. e., 1954, 1955 and 1956, to the same v. tribunal. ·\n\nB. N. Elias<>- Co.\n\nWhen the matter came up before the tribunal, the\n\nLtd. respondents contended that they were not in a pro\n\nWanchoo j. sperous condition and were unable to pay any further bonus besides what had already been paid for the years in dispute. It was admitted that since about 1942 the respondents had been making ex gratia payments to their employees in addition to wages and salaries. These payments were made at the , rate of one month's basic wage each time but their number in the course of one year used to vary. At one time four ex gratia payments were made to clerical and subordinate staff but later the number of ex gratia payments was reduced for the clerical staff to three per year but it remained at four for the subordinate staff until the year 1952.\n\nAs, however, the trading result in 1952 deteriorated as compared with the previous years, the respondents made only two ex gratia payments to clerical staff and three to subordinate staff for the year 1953. A dispute was then raised by the workmen with regard to that year but the Government refused to make a reference to the tribunal. In 1954 and 1955 two ex gratia payments were made to clerical staff and two to the subordinate staff. In 1956, no ex gratia payments were made at all.\n\nThe respondents denied that these payments were made as a condition of service or as an implied term of agreement irrespective of profit or loss. They also denied that these were customary payments irrespective of profit and loss. It was alleged that they were truly and strictly ex gratia payments made by the respondents voluntarily out of goodwill in circumstances in which no tribunal would award a bonus. The respondents .therefore resisted the claim for any further payment as bonus for these three years.\n\nBefore thE! tribunal, the appellants abandoned their claim for bonus on the basis of the Full Bench formula. They however pressed t.heir claim on the\n\n' • .. -\n\n3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 385 ·-'\"' ..,. ground that bonus was payable all an implied condiz96o\n\ntion of service and had also acquired the status of B N ;;:- & c customary bonus. The tribunal, however, negatived Ltd.' E~; oyees?· the contention that the payment of bonus as claimed Union had become an implied condition of service. It also v held that the case of the employees based on custom B. N. Elias & Co. was not tenable. In consequence it refused to grant Ltd. any further bonus for the years 1954 and 1955 beyond wanchoo J.\n\n~ what the appellants had been already paid and rejectis ed the claim for 1956 altogether.\n\nShri N. C. Chatterjee for the appellants has mainly pressed the claim for bonus on the ground that it is a customary bonus and relies on The Graham Trading Co. (India) Ltd.v.Its Workmen( 1).\n\nBefore we deal i with this aspect of the matter we may shortly dispose\n\nof the claim based on an implied agreement or condition of service. The evidence shows that though payment was made uninterruptedly from 1942to 1952 three times a year to the clerical staff and four times a year to the subordinate staff, it was made clear every time the payment was made that it was an ex gratia payment. Further the receipts given by the employees, a sample of which was produced, show\n\n~ that the bonus was accepted as ex gratia bonus.\n\nAs is\n\n~ pointed in The Graham Trading Co. (1) it would not be possible to imply a term of service on the basis of an implied agreement when the payment was clearly made ex gratia and had even been accepted as such, as in this case. Therefore, the contention of the appel- 1ants that the bonus.claimed by them has become an implied term of agreement or a condition of service '\" must fail.\n\n' Our attention in this connection was drawn to a letter of appointment -issued to one 0. V. Thomas in which under the head \"other allowance\", the following appears-\n\n\" Equivalent to a month's salary every 4th month will be allowed after your confirmation in employment.\" \" ....,.. x That is, however, an express term in the contract between the National Tobacco Company of India Limited (which is one of the respondents before us)\n\n(I) [1960] I S.C.R. 107.\n\n.,.\n\nI960 and Thomas and cannot be a basis for a finding of an - implied term of agreement to give bonus three times a B. N. Elias & Co.\n\nTh h\n\nJ • th b f th Ltd. Employees' year. f omas mayb ave a ch~1m ond eh as1s o 1s Unio,,. term o agreement etween 1m an t e company, v. about which we say nothing. Another letter of appoint- B. N. Elias & Co. ment also of National Tobacco Co. of India Limited\n\nLtd. with respect to one Ram Shankar Misra was referred to. In that letter, however, among the terms we find a Wanchoo ]. term relating to bonus at the rate of Rs. 15 per month > after confirmation. That is again an express term between that employee and the National Tobacco Co. of India Limited and cannot support the case of an implied term of agreement by which a month's bonus is paid thrice a year in April, August and December.\n\nThe tribunal was therefore right in rejecting the \" contention based on the implied term of agreement or condition of service.\n\nTurning now to the case of customary bonus which has been pressed before us on the authority of The Graham Trading Co. (1 ) we may point out that that was a case of a customary and traditional bonus payable at Puja which was a special festival of particular importance in Bengal. That case cannot be -. held to have laid down that there can be customary bonus as such unconnected with some festival. It is difficult to introduce a customary payment of bonus between employer and employee where terms of service are governed by contract, express or implied, except where the bonus may be connected with a festival whether Puja in Bengal or some other equally important festival in any other part of the country. -., The principles laid down in that case for governing customary and traditional bonus connected with a festival cannot in our opinion'be extended to what may be called a customary bonus unconnected with any festival.\n\nWe are therefore of opinion that the appellants having failed to prove (except in one matter with which we shall .deal presently) that there was an implied agreement or condition of service for payment of bonus, they cannot ask for payment of any bonus _,\"' on the basis of any customary payment unconnected with any festival.\n\n( !) [1960] I S.C.R. 107\n\nThis brings us to one of the payments to subz96o ordinate staff which was\" one month's basic wages as B N El-:- & c bonus at Puja time \". It will be noticed that this Ltd: E~;:oyees?·\n\npayment to the subordinate staff at Puja time is in Union. addition to the other payments which are common v. between the clerical and the subordinate staff. This B. N. Elias & Co. payment of one month's basic wage as bonus at Puja Ltd. appears to have continued uninterrupted from the wanchoo J. time it started in 1942 or thereabout upto the time the dispute arose in 1954. The payment was invariably of one month's basic wage and it appears that it was paid even in a year of loss, vide Ex. E. We are therefore of opinion that the principles laid down in The Graham Trading Co. (1) apply to one month's Puja bonus payable to the subordinate staff and it should be held that this payment has become customary and traditional in the respondents' concerns when the dispute was raised for the first time in 1954. We' have no doubt that if the judgment in The Graham Trading Co. (1) was available to the tribunal it would have held that one month's basic wage as bonus at Puja time o subordinate staff had become customary and traditional in the respondents' concerns. We therefore partly allow the appeal and hold that one month's basic wage as Puja bonus to the subordinate staff has become customary and traditional in the respondents' concerns and we order the respondents to pay that for the year 1956 for which no bonus whatsoever has been paid.' The rest of the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. In the circumstances we order the parties to bear their own costs. ·\n\nAppeal allowed in part.\n\n(1) [196oJ 1 s.c.R. 107,", "total_entities": 28, "entities": [{"text": "Bharat Barrel &\n\nDrum Mfg. Co.\n\n(P) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 40, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bharat Barrel &\n\nDrum Mfg."}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 75, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Wanchoo", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. N. ELIAS AND CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES'\n\nUNION AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 529, "end_char": 584, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B. N. ELIAS AND CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES' UNION AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. N. ELIAS & CO., LTD., AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 586, "end_char": 621, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B. N. ELIAS & CO., LTD., AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 625, "end_char": 645, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS GUPTA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 667, "end_char": 687, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1853, "end_char": 1859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) that there cannot be a customary payment of bonus between employer and employee where terms of service are governed by contract, express or implied, except where the bonus may be connected with a festival, whether Puja in Bengal or some other equally important festival in any other part of the country."}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2426, "end_char": 2442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee, D. L. Sen Gupta and Dipak Datta B. N. Elias & Co.\n\nChoudhri, for the appellants.", "canonical_name": "N. C. Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "D. L. Sen Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2444, "end_char": 2459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee, D. L. Sen Gupta and Dipak Datta B. N. Elias & Co.\n\nChoudhri, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Dipak Datta B. N. Elias", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2464, "end_char": 2487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee, D. L. Sen Gupta and Dipak Datta B. N. Elias & Co.\n\nChoudhri, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2532, "end_char": 2546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, H. N.\n\nSanyal, Additional SoUcitor-General of India and S. N. Mukherjee, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "H. N.\n\nSanyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2576, "end_char": 2589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, H. N.\n\nSanyal, Additional SoUcitor-General of India and S. N. Mukherjee, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "S. N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2632, "end_char": 2647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, H. N.\n\nSanyal, Additional SoUcitor-General of India and S. N. Mukherjee, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "VANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2733, "end_char": 2740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n\"VANCHOO, J.-This appeal by special leave raises Wanclwo J. the question of bonus.", "canonical_name": "Wanchoo"}}, {"text": "Wanclwo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2781, "end_char": 2788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n\"VANCHOO, J.-This appeal by special leave raises Wanclwo J. the question of bonus."}}, {"text": "B. N. Elias & Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2858, "end_char": 2880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was a dispute between the workmen of B. N. Elias & Co. Ltd. (hereinafter called the appellants) and their employers, B. N. Elias ."}}, {"text": "B. N. Elias . and Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2938, "end_char": 2964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was a dispute between the workmen of B. N. Elias & Co. Ltd. (hereinafter called the appellants) and their employers, B. N. Elias ."}}, {"text": "Government of West Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3922, "end_char": 3947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Consequently, a dispute was raised which was referred by the Government of West Bengal in May 1956."}}, {"text": "Government of West\n\nBi.~: i~;;0~~~· Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4254, "end_char": 4296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon a consolidated reference was made by the Government of West\n\nBi.~: i~;;0~~~· Bengal in September 1956 with respect to all the Union three years, i. e., 1954, 1955 and 1956, to the same v. tribunal. ·"}}, {"text": "B. N. Elias<>-", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4414, "end_char": 4428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. N. Elias<>- Co.\n\nWhen the matter came up before the tribunal, the\n\nLtd. respondents contended that they were not in a pro\n\nWanchoo j. sperous condition and were unable to pay any further bonus besides what had already been paid for the years in dispute.", "canonical_name": "B. N. Elias<>-"}}, {"text": "S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 385", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6359, "end_char": 6391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They however pressed t.heir claim on the\n\n' • .. -\n\n3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 385 ·-'\"' ..,."}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6993, "end_char": 7009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri N. C. Chatterjee for the appellants has mainly pressed the claim for bonus on the ground that it is a customary bonus and relies on The Graham Trading Co. (India) Ltd.v.", "canonical_name": "N. C. Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "Graham Trading Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7732, "end_char": 7750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As is\n\n~ pointed in The Graham Trading Co. (1) it would not be possible to imply a term of service on the basis of an implied agreement when the payment was clearly made ex gratia and had even been accepted as such, as in this case."}}, {"text": "B. N. Elias", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8888, "end_char": 8899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another letter of appoint- B. N. Elias & Co. ment also of National Tobacco Co. of India Limited\n\nLtd. with respect to one Ram Shankar Misra was referred to.", "canonical_name": "B. N. Elias<>-"}}, {"text": "Ram Shankar Misra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8983, "end_char": 9000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another letter of appoint- B. N. Elias & Co. ment also of National Tobacco Co. of India Limited\n\nLtd. with respect to one Ram Shankar Misra was referred to."}}, {"text": "National Tobacco Co. of India Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9217, "end_char": 9254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is again an express term between that employee and the National Tobacco Co. of India Limited and cannot support the case of an implied term of agreement by which a month's bonus is paid thrice a year in April, August and December."}}, {"text": "Puja", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9732, "end_char": 9736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Turning now to the case of customary bonus which has been pressed before us on the authority of The Graham Trading Co. (1 ) we may point out that that was a case of a customary and traditional bonus payable at Puja which was a special festival of particular importance in Bengal."}}, {"text": "Puja Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11219, "end_char": 11228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This B. N. Elias & Co. payment of one month's basic wage as bonus at Puja Ltd. appears to have continued uninterrupted from the wanchoo J. time it started in 1942 or thereabout upto the time the dispute arose in 1954."}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_388_397_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "Ig6o\n\nMarch 25.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960]\n\nR. P.KAPUR v.\n\nTHE STATE OF PUNJAB\n\n( P .B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO and K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)\n\nCriminal Trial-Quashing of proceedings-Inherent power of High Court-When to be exercised-Code of Criminal Procedure, r898 (V .9f I898), s. 56I-A.\n\n• One S lodged a first information report against K. When K found that no action was taken on the report for several months he filed a criminal complaint against S contending that the report lodged by S was false. At the instance of S the magistrate ordered K's complaint to stand adjourned till the police made its final report on the first information report.\n\nThereupon K moved the High Court under s. 56r-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings initiated by the first information report.\n\nPending the hearing the police submitted its report under s. r73 of the Code. Subsequently the High Court dismissed the petition.\n\nK obtained special leave and appealed: Held, that no case for quashing the proceedings was made out.\n\nThe inherent jurisdiction of the High Court could be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The following are some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction could and should be exercised to quash proceedings:\n\n(i) where there was a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the proceedings;\n\n(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint did not make out the offence alleged ; and .\n\n(iii) where either there was no legal evidence adduced in support of the charge or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly failed to prove the charge.\n\nIn exercising its jurisdiction under s. 56r-A of the Code the High Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in the case is reliable or not.\n\nIn the present case there was no legal bar to the institution of the proceedings or to their continuance; the allegations made in the first information report did constitute the offences alleged and it C?uld not be contended that on the face of the record the charge was unsustainable.\n\nIn re: Shripad G. Chandavarkar, A.LR. r928 Born. r84, Jagat Chandra Mozu.mdar v. Queen Empress, (r899) LL.R. 26 Cal. 786, Dr. Shankar Singh v. The State of Punjab, (1954) 56 Punj. L.R. 54, Nripendra Bhusan Ray v. Govind Bhandhu Majumdar, A.LR. r924 Cal. ro18 and Ramanathan Chettiar v. K. Sivarama Subrahmanya Ayyar, (1924) LL.R. 47 Mad. 722, referred to.\n\nS.P. faiswal v. The State, (r953) 55 Punj. L.R. 77, distinguished.\n\n• ..\n\nCRIMINAL APPELJ, ATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 217of1959.\n\nR. P. Kapur Appeal by special leave from the judgment and v. order dated September 10, 1959 of the Punjab High state of Punjab -Court in Criminal Misc. No. 559 of 1959.\n\nAppellant in person.\n\nS. M. Sikri, Advocate-General for the State of Punjab, Mohinder Singh Punnan, T. M. Sen and D .. Gupta, for the respondent.\n\n1960. March 25. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-On December 10, 1958, Mr. Gajendragadkar ], M. L. Sethi lodged a First Information Report against • the appellant Mr. R. P. Kapur and alleged that he and - • his mother-in-law Mrs. Kaushalya Devi had committed offences under ss. 420-109, 114 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. When the appellant found that for several months no further action was taken on the said First Information Report which was hanging like a sword over his head he filed a crimihal complaint on April 11, 1959, against Mr. Sethi under ss. 204, 211 and /385 of\n\n..,,..\n\n,. . -~\n\nthe Indian Penal Code and thus took upon himself the onus to prove that the First Information Report lodged by Mr. Sethi was false.\n\nOn the said complaint Mr. Sethi moved that the proceedings in question should be stayed as the police had not made any report on the First Information Report lodged by him and that the case started by him was still pending with the police. After hearing arguments the learned Magistrate ordered t_hat the appellant's complaint should stand adjourned.\n\nThereupon the appellant moved the Punjab High Court under s. 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the proceedings - initiated by the First Information Report in question. Pending the hearing of the said petition. in the said High Court the police report was submitted under s. 173 of the Code on July 25, 1959. Subsequently, on September 10, 1959, Mr. Justice Capoor heard the appellant's petition and held that no case had been made out for quashing the proceedings under s. 561-A. In the result the petition was dismissed. It is against this order that the appel- Ia.nt has come to this Court by special leave.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [Hl60) • x96o The material facts leading to the proceedings against the appellant lie within a very narrow com1mss.\n\nIt, R. P. Kapur\n\nv. appears that in January 1957 the mother.in.Jaw of the State of Punjab appellant and his wife entered into an agreement with the owners of certain lands in village Mohammadpnr Gajendmgadkar ]. Munirka to purchase lands at Rs. 5 per sq. yd.\n\nEarnest money was accordingly paid to the vendors and it was agreed that the sale had t? be completed by April 13, 1957; by consent this period was extended to , June 13, 1957. Meanwhile, on March 8, 1957, not ifications were issued by the Chief Commissioner under ss. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for acquiring considemble area of land which included the lands belonging to the vendors; this acquisition was intended for the housing scheme of the Ministry of Vil or ks, Housing and Supply in the Government of India. The proposed acquisition was treated as one of urgency and so under s. 17 of the Acquisition Act possession of the land was taken by the Collector on June 8, 1957. Some of the persons concerned in thp, said lands filed objections against the validity of the action taken under s. 17. It was under these circumstances that the sale deeds were executed by the vendors in favour of Mrs. Kaushalya Devi and certain other vendees on June 12, 1957. It appears that the vendees presented their claim before the Land Acquisition Collector and an award has been made in September 1958 by which Mrs. Karnihalya Devi has been allowed compensation at Rs. 3-8·0 per sq. yd.\n\nThat, is how the title of the lands in question passed to Mrs.\n\nKaushalya Devi.\n\nThe First Information Report filed by Mr. Sethi alleges that he and the appellant were friends and that on January 4, 1958, the appellant dishonestly and fraudulently advised him to purchase 2,000 sq. yds. of land in Khasra Nos. 22, 23, 24 and 25 in the aforesaid village Mohammadpur Munirka on the representation that as owner of the land in the area Mr. Sethi would get a plot of desired dimensions in the same area developed by the Ministry under its housing scheme.\n\nThe appellant also represented to Mr. Sethi, according to t.he First Information Report, that since under the scheme no person would be allotted more than one\n\n• -\n\n.. • - - •\n\nplot he would have to surrender a part of his land; 1960 that is why as a friend , he was prepared to give to Mr. h h d b R. P. Kapur Sethi one plot at the price at w ich it a een purv. chased.\n\nAccording to Mr. Sethi the appellant dictated State of Punjab an application which he was advised to send to the Secretary of the Ministry of Works and he accordingly Gajendragadkar J. sent it as advised. _ The First Information Report further .alleges that the appellant had assured Mr .\n\nSethi that the land had been purchased by his motherin-law at Rs. 10 per sq. yd. Acting on this representation Mr. Sethi paid Rs. 10,000 by cheque drawn in favour of Mrs. Kaushalya Devi on January 6, 1958.\n\nThis cheque has been cashed. Subsequently a draft of the sale deed was sent by.the appellant to Mr. Sethi in the beginning of March 1958 and on March 6, 1958, a further sum of Rs. 10,000 was paid by cheque. The draft was duly returned to the appellant with a covering letter in hich Mr. Sethi stated that he would have liked to add one clause to the deed to the effect that in the event of the authorities not accepting the sale for the purpose of allotment, the amount of Rs. 20,000 would be refunded to him; and he expressed the hope that even if the said clause was not included in the document the appellant would accept it.\n\nThe sale deed in favour of Mr. Sethi was registered on March 21, 1958. It is this transaction which has given rise to the First Information Report in question.\n\nBroadly stated the First Information Report is based on four material allegations about fraudulent misrepresentation. It is alleged that the appellant fraudulently misrepresented to Mr. Sethi that the land had been purchased at Rs. 10 per sq. yd.; that the appellant fraudulently concealed from Mr. Sethi the pendency of the proceedings before the Land Acquisition Collector, Delhi, and of the acquisition of the said property under s. 17 of the said Act; he also made similar fraudulent misrepresentations as regards the scheme of housing to which he referred.\n\nAs a result of these misrepresentations Mr. Sethi entered into the transaction and parted with Rs. 20,000. That in brief is the nature of the complaint made by Mr. Sethi in his First Information Report. The appellant urged before the Punjab High Court that the case started aai.nst\n\ni96o him by the First Information Report should be quashed under s. 561-A of the Code. The Punjab High R.P. J(apur v.\n\nCourt has rejected the appellant's contention. The state of Punjab question which arises for our decision in the present - appeal is: Was the Punjab High Court in error in Gajmdragadka. J. refusing to exercise its inherent jurisdiction under s. 561-A of the Code in favour of the appellant?\n\nBefore dealing with the merits of the appeal it is necessary to consider the nature and scope of the inherent power of the High Court under s. 561-A of the Code. The said section saves the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. There is no doubt that this inherent power cannot be exerQised in regard to matters specifically covered by the other provisions of the Code. In the present case the magistrate before whom the police report has been filed under s. 173 of the Code has yet not applied his mind to the merits of the said report and it may be assumed in favour of the appellant that his request for the quashing of the proceedings is not at the present stage covered by any specific provision of the Code. It is well-established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash prnceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.\n\nOrdinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage.\n\nIt is not possible, desirable or expedient to la.y down any inflexible rule which would govern tho exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some _categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings.\n\nThere may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of\n\n• -\n\n( •\n\n.. .\n\n,' ,, 'y\n\n-.,,,\n\nj; stice. If the criminal proceeding in question is in ;960 respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that R. P. Kapur there is a legal bar against the institution or continu- State 0/I'unjab ance of the said proceeding the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceeding on that ground. Gajendragadkar ].\n\nAbsence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do nqt\n\nconstitute the offence alleged ; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter_~/ merely of looking at the complaint or the First Infor- (' mation Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support -of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove. the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in questiop. In exercising its jurisdiction under s. 561-A the High Court would nqt embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained. Broadly stated that is the nature and scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under s. 561-A in the matter of quashing •\n\n;!94 SUPREME COUJ{'f Rll'ORTS LlU6U J\n\nz960 criminal proceedings, and that is the effect of the - judicial decisions on the point (Vide: In Re: Shri- R. P.:-Co.\n\nKapur].\n\nz960\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncome Tax,\n\nBombay v.\n\nChandHlal Keshavlal 6- Co.\n\nKapur],\n\nThe amount of commission was to be credited in the account of the Managing Agent every six months and it was entitled to interest at the rate of six per cent. per annum on the amount so credited. There were other conditions in the Agency Agreement which are not necessary for the purposes of this case. The tota, l commiMion for the accounting year 1950 was a sum of Rs. 3,09,114. Sometime during the accounting year, at the oral request of the Board of Directors of the Managed Company, the Managing Agent agreed to accept a sum of Rs. 1,00,000 only as its commission which was credited to the account of the Managing Agent in the books of the company at the end of the year 1950. The Income-tax Officer and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that the amount which accrued as commission to the Managing Agent was Rs. 3,09,114 and that amount was taxable.\n\nAn appeal was taken to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal by the Managing Agent. By an order dated February 26, 1953, the Appellate Tribunal held that the amount which accrued to the Managing Agent as commission was Rs. 3,09,114 but it accepted Rs. 1,00,000 as taxable income and Rs. 2,09,114 was held to be au allowable expenditure withins. 10(2)(xv) of the Act and it was therefore allowed. The Tribunal in its order said that in the past also the Managing Agent had, in the interest of the Managed Company, waived a portion of the Commission and then made the following observation:\n\n\"The Tribunal has also held that if the Managing Agency Commission or. a part thereof is foregone in the interest of the Managed Company, it would be allowed as an expenditure under Section 10(2)(xv) of the Act. We allow the amount foregone under Sectiori 10(2)(xv).\" Against this order, at the instance of the appellant, a case was sta.ted to the Bombay High Court for its opinion on the following two questions :\n\n(i) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the sum of Rs. 2,09,114 was assessable in the hands of the assessee as its income.\n\n(ii) If the answer to question (i) is in the affirmative whether the said sum is an allowable\n\ndeduction from the assessee's income under Section 10(2)(xv) of the Act. .\n\nThe judgment of the High Court shows that it was inclined to decide the questions in favour of the appellant, but at the instance of the Managing Agent the Appellate Tribunal was directed to submit a supplementary Statement.\n\n No fresh evidence was led before the Tribunal but it appears that some emphasis was laid on a letter of the Managing Agent dated September 18, 1951, sent to the Income-tax Officer. In this letter the Managing Agent had stated that the only commission which accrued to it was a sum of Rs. 1,00,000 and nothing had been foregone from out of 1Jhe commission or relinquished. It is also stated that the amount.of Rs. 1,00,000 accrued because of the variation of the terms of the Managing Agency Agreement. Reference was also made in the letter to the Balance Sheet of the Managed Company ending December 31, 1950, showing that the paid up capital was rupees 30 lacs, depreciation fund rupees 14 lacs, totalling rupees 44 lacs. As against this sum the Block Account showed a debit of over rupees 48 lacs and it was with the object of strengthening the financial position of the Managed Company and in its interest that the\n\nChairman of the Board of Directors had requested and the Managing Agent had agreed to accept rupees 1 lac as commission. The Income-, tax Appellate Tribunal submitted a supplementary Statement of\n\nCase dated May 3, 1954, in which it said (l} that there was no oblique motive in accepting Rs. 1,00,000 instead of rupees 3 lacs odd as commission and that the remission was bona fide. It was also remarked that it was not even faintly suggested by the Department that what was given up by the Managing Agent from the commission was done with some dishonest motive; (2) the amount foregone by the Managing Agent was an expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business of the.\n\nManaging Agent; (3) that when the appeal was decided by the Appellate Tribunal it did not have tP, e slightest doubt in its mind that the commission was foregone for business considerations; and (4) that the 6\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncome-Ta:r,\n\nBombay v.\n\nChandulal Keshavlal & Co.\n\nKapur].\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncome-Tax,\n\nBombay v.\n\nChandulal Keshaulal a;. Co.\n\nKapur].\n\namount was given up or expended for reasons of commercial expediency. A very significant paragraph in the supplementary Statement of the Case was paragraph 4 which stated:\n\n\"It was assumed that what was in the Interest of the managed company was in the interest of the managing agent. The interests of the managing agent and the managed company are, so to say, linked up. If the managed company is put on a sounder position, not only the shareholders of the managed company benefit, but also the managing agent, inasmuch as the managing agent would get a larger commission in future.\" Tl; te basic facts which arise out of the Statement of the Case and the documents which were produced by the Managing Agent are: (1) the rather unsatisfactory financial position of the Managed Company as shown by the Balance Sheet ; (2) in the pa; st also the Managing Agent had been remitting a part or whole of the commi5sion whenever the profits of the Managed Company were unsatisfactory; (3) in the year of account the profits of the managed company as per profit and loss account were Rs. 5,72,192. This was after paying to the Managing Agent a commission of Rs. 1,00,000 and if the whole of the accrued commission had been deducted then the profits would have been Rs. 3,63,078 which would be the lowest amount since 1940 and the amount of commission would have been the highest; (4) it was not a bounty by the Managing Agent to the Managed Company;\n\n(5) the business of the Managing Agent was so linked up with the Managed Company that if the latter was put on a sounder position the Managing Agent would also get a larger commission in future ; and (6) the Managing Agent had accepted Rs. 1,00,000 at the instance of the Chairman of the B@ard of Direqtors of the Managed Company. This was the material on which the Tribunal gave a finding in its supplementary Statement 'that what was given up by the assessee was an expenditure for the purpose of the assessee's business'. On this statement the High Court by its judgment dated February 15, 1955, held\n\nthe finding of the Appellate Tribunal to be one of x96o fact. It said : Commissioner of \"Now this is a finding of fact and unless it can Income-Tax, be suggested that there was no evidence to sup- Bombay port the finding of fa0t we are concluded by this v. finding of fact.\" Chandulal Therefore the question in regard to s. 10(2)(xv) was Ke•havlal & Co. answered in favour of the Managing Agent. It is' Kapur J. against this judgment and order that the appellant has come in appeal to this Co-µrt by special leave.\n\nFor the appellant it was argued that there was no evidence in support of the finding that the amount of about rupees 2 lacs which was foregone by the Managing Agent was wholly and exclusively laid out for the purpose of the Managing Agent's business and emphasis\" was laid.'on the finding of the Appellate Tribunal in its order dated February 26, 1953, that in the past the Commission had been given up by the Managing Agent in the interest of the Managed Company and that if the Managing Agent's commission or part thereof was foregone in the interest of the Managed Company it was not an allowable expenditure under s: 10(2)(xv).\n\nTb was also argued that there was no evidence in support of the finding that the amount was expended for the benefit of the Managing Agent and that even if as a result of the _amount being foregone the Managing Agent was helped because it benefited the Managed Company, then s. 10(2)(xv) would not be attracted; in other words the question had to be looked at from the point of view of the direct concern of the Managing Agent and not of remoter or indirect result which may flow as a result of the benefit to the Managed Company and in each case the question on each set of facts is whether the benefit is to the assessee i.e., the Managing Agent or to some one else.\n\nIn his argument the learned Solicitor General referred to the following cases : Tata Sons Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay (1 ).\n\nThere the assessee was the Managing Agent of another company and was entitled to receive commission on the net profits of the Managed Com.\n\n(I) [1950) IS I.T.R. 460.\n\nCommissioner of Income-Tax, Botnbay v. .Chandulal Keshavlal & Co.\n\nKapu• ].\n\npany. During the relevant year the assessee voluntarily paid a sum of money towards the bonus which the Managed Company paid to some of its officrs and claimed it a.s a deductible expenditure under s. 10(2)(xv) of the Act. This deduction was allowed on the ground that the object of the payment from the point of view of commercial principles was to increase the profits of the Managed Coni.pany and thereby the Commission of the Managing Agent. It was argued there also that the payment was entirely gratuitous but that contention was repelled, because the object of the payment from the point of view , of commercial principles was to increase the efficiency of the Managed Company and thereby to increase the profits of the Martaged Company and the commission of tho Managing Agent .. And thus there was an important nexus between the Managed Company and the Managing . Agent. It was also held that the question whether money was wholly expended or laid out for the purpose of the business of the asses.see company must be determined upon principles of ordinary commercial trading.\n\nThe second case was Union Cold Storage Company Ltd. v. Jones (1 ). There a British company transferred its foreign cold storage business carried on by it directly or through subsidiary companies to an American Company for a term of years in consideration of certain annual payments to the subsidiary companies and ofa guarantee of any sum necessary to meet its fixed charges and maintain its dividends.\n\nThe property remained the property of the British Company but it was placed under the sole control of and was used by the American Company for its own business.\n\nThere was no demise or lease to the American Company and no rent was payable but the American Compa.ny was to keep it in proper repair and working order. The British Company paid fire insurance premiums in respect of the premisesmachinery etc., and claimed deductions for the sums so paid out of its profits and for wear and tear of the machinery and plant of the transferred business. It was held that the insurance premiums did not\n\n(1) 8 T.C. 725.\n\n3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 45 --t represent money wholly and exclusivly laid out for z96o the purpose of trade of the assessee company as the c -. -. ,,\n\n- . ommissioner OJ machmery and plant were not used for those purposes Income-Tax, and the deductions claimed were therefore not Bombay admissible. It was argued in that case that by the v. agreement the assessee company had secured not 01; ly Chandutal h fi b I Keshavlal & Co. the right to receive upto t e sum speci ed ut a so -'- that the American company would have an incentive to send business to the assessee company in order that its profits should rech that specified figure and therefore the expenditure was deductible. But it was held that in order to be so deductibie it had to be for the benefit of the trade which immediately concerned the assessee company. It was also held that if it was\n\n>' of such a nature then the deduction was prima facie a proper one even though it might inure to the benefit of a third party and the matter had to be tested from the point of view of the assessee company ..\n\nThe learned Solicitor General relied upon a passage in the judgment at p. 741 :\n\n\" ............ they (the Commissioners) find that there was a reflex result of'this Agreement which inured to the benefit of the Appellant Company but I think in terms they indicate that that result was not a direct result but a reflex result.\n\nIn their reasons in which they cameto their conclusion they say the arrangements with regard to the stores and machinery and plant were not of an ordinary nature and they did not extend the Appellant Company's market. They also say that the machinery and plant in question is used primarily for the purposes of the trade of the National Company. With those findings before us I think it is quite clear as a matter of fact that the facts so found differentiate this case wholly from Usher's case.\" From this it was sought to be argued that what one is to look at is the direct result to' the assessee and -14 not remoter or indirect results. What the court found in that case was that insurance premiums were paid by the British Company as owners and not in the course of business and that the assets were used not for its business but for the business of another.\n\nJ{apur ].\n\nCommissioner (If\n\nJne(}ttfe-T a~.\n\nBombay\n\nChandulaf Keshavlal & Cu.\n\nKapur].\n\n46 SUPREME COUR'l' REJ?ORTS\n\n[19GO]\n\nThe real test laid down after reference to Usher's\n\nWiltshire Brewery Ltd. v. Bruce (1 ) was that deduction may be allowed in eases where the payment or expenditure is incurred for the P.Urpose of the trade of the subject making the return and it does not matter that this payment may inure to the benefit of a third party.\n\nAnother case relied on was Eastern Investments Ltd.\n\nv. The Oomm, issioner of Income-tax, West Bengal(2 ) where a private limited company had a share capital of rupees 250 lacs of which shares of the value of rupees 50 lacs were held by A and the remaining by his nominees.\n\nThe company was in need of money and with the consent of A it resolved to reduce the share capital by rupees 50 lacks by the oompany taking over rupees 50 lacs worth of shares and issuing to A debentures of the face value of rupees 50 lacs ea, rrying interest at 5%. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and the High Court held that the interest on debentures was not an allowable expenditure under s. 12(2) of the Act. This Court, on appeal, was of the opinion that the transaction was of a commercial nature from the point of view of the assessee company and on a review of all the facts it came to the c9nclusion th11t the tra.nsaction was voluntarily entered into in order indirectly to facilita, te the carrying on of the business of the company and so made on the ground of commercial expediency. The argument that the debentures were held by the shareholder was rejected on the ground that it made no difference whether the debentures were held by the share4older or by an outsider. The test laid down by this case therefore was that in the absence of fraud or an oblique motive and if a transaction is of a nature which is entered into in the course of business of the assessee and is commercially expedient then it does become a deductible allowance. If as a result of the transaction the assessee benefits it is immaterial that a third party also benefits thereby. At page 599, Bose J., observed; ''In the absence of a suggestion of a fraud this is not televant ; i.t all for giving effct to the provi-\n\n(•) 6 T.C. 399.\n\n(2) [1951] S.C, R, 594.\n\nsions of section 12(2) of the Income\"tax Act. Most z960 commercial transactions are entered into for the - ·.' l b fi f b h \"d Commissioner OJ mutua ene t o ot s1 es, or at any rate each In ome-Ta:r side hopes to gain something for itself. The test . ombay ' for present purposes is not whether the other party v. benefited, nor indeed whether this was a prudent Chandulal transaction which resulted in ultimate gain to tlie Keshavlal ~Co. appellant, but whether it was properly entered into as a part of the appellant's legitimate commercial undertaking in order indirectly to facilitate the carrying on of its business.\" In Odhams Press Ltd. v. Oook(1) the assessee company had acquired all the shares in a subsidiary company and printed and published a periodical for the subsidiary company. The subsidiary company made a loss during the ac9ounting year and the assessee company wrote off that amount of loss from the amounts due to it from the subsidiary company and claimed a deduction of that loss from its profits on trading account or as money laid out or expended for the purpose of its trade. The Special Commissioners found that the sum was not written off wholly or exclusively for the purpose of their trade or business and therefore it was an inadmissible deduction. This question was held to be one of fact and that there was evidence to justify that conclusion. Viscount Caldecote L.C., said that the trade or the business of one Company even though it may affect very closely the trade or business of another w.as not the same thing as that other's trade or business. Iu computing the profits and gains of the assessee, it is his trade that is to beTegarded. At page llO, Viscount Maugham observed:\n\n\"My Lords, the question thus put answers itself.\n\nThere were beyond dispute, the two Telationships, between the Company and the Coming Fashions Ltd., already referred to. The allowance of the £2927 5s. 8d. to Coming Fashions Ltd., might have been ' laid out or expended for the purpose of the trade' of Coming Fashions Ltd., or to some extent for both purposes and it is plain that these facts\n\nalone were sufficient to show that there was evi.dence\n\n(r) 23 1\". C. 233.\n\nKap1!1Y J.\n\nCommissioner of\n\nJncorne-Tax,\n\nBombay v.\n\nChandulal Keshavltil 6\" Co.\n\nKapur J.\n\nto justify the conclusion of the Commissioner that the sum written off was not written off wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the trade or business of the Appellants.\" The connection between the assessee company and the subsidiary company, apart from the holding of shares, was that the assessee company did printing for the subsidiary company. The effect of the transaction was debiting of another entity's loss to the assessee company but there was no direct connection between the profits of the assessee company with that of the amount claimed. The real. point in that case was that the amount was not wholly and exclusively written off for the purpose of the assessee company.\n\nViscount Maugham said :\n\n\"ls there any real ground for contending on the evidence that one reason for writing off the sum was not to enable Coming Fashions Ltd., to continue to carry on its .business as compiler and vendor of 'Everywoman's' ?\" The cases we have discussed above show that it is a\n\nquestion of fact in each case whether the amount which is claimed as a deductible allowance under s. 10(2)(xv) of the Income Tax Act was laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of such business and if the fact.finding tribunal comes to the conclusion on evidence which would justify that conclusion it being for them to find the evidence and to give the finding then it. will become an admissible deduction. The decision of such questions is for the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and the decision must be sustained if there is evidence upon which the Tribunal could have arrived at such a conclusion.\n\nAnother fact that emerges from these cases is that if the expense is incurred for fostering ; the business of another only or was made by way of distribution of profits or was wholly gratuitous or for some improper or oblique purpose outside the course of business then the expense is not deductible. In deciding whether a payment ofmoncy is a deductible expenditure one has to take into consideration questions of commercial expediency and the principles of ordinary commercial trading. If the payment or expenditure\n\nl r\n\nis 'incurred for the purpose of the trade of the assessee it does not matter that the payment may inure to the benefit of a third party (Usher's Wiltshire Brewery Ltd. v. Bruce(1) ).\n\nAnother test is whether the transaction is properly entered into as a part of the assessee's legitimate commercial undertaking in order to facilitate the carrying on of its business; and it is -I immaterial that a third party also benefits thereby (Eastern Investments Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal (2) ).\n\nBut in every case it is a question of fact whether the expenditure was expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of trade or business of the assessee. In the present case the finding is that it was laid out for the purpose of .- the assessee's business and there is evidence to support this finding. Mr. Palkhivala referred in this connection to Atherton v. British Insulated & Helsby Cables Ltd. (3) where, at page 191, Viscount Cave L. C., observed:\n\n\"Lt was made clear in the above cited cases of\n\nUsher~ Wiltshire Brewery v. Bruce (1) and Smith v.\n\nIncorporated Council of Law Reportinq (4) that a sum of money expended, not of necessity and with a view to a direct and immediate benefit to the trade, but voluntarily and on the grounds of commercial expediency and in order indirectly to facilitate the aarrying. on of the business may yet be expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the trade; and it appear's to me that the findings of the Commissioners in the present case bring the payment in question within that description. They found (in words which I have already quoted) that the payment was made for the sound commercial purpose of enabling the Company to retain the services of existing and future members of their staff and of increasing the efficiency of the staff; and after referring to the contention of the Crown that the sum of £31,784 was not money wholly and exclusively laid out for the purposes of the trade under the Rule above referred to, they found that the deduction was admissible-thus in effect, although\n\n(r) 6 T.C. 399\n\n(2) [r95rl S.C.R. 594\n\n(3) Io T.C. r55\n\n(4) 6 T.C. 477\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncome-Ta:i:,\n\nBombay v.\n\nChandulal Keshavlal &- Co.\n\nKapur].\n\nI960\n\nCommissionsr of\n\nIncome-Tax,\n\nBombay v.\n\nChandulal Keshavlal & Co.\n\nKapuy ].\n\nF 6bruary. il9\n\nnot in terms, negativing the Crown's contention. I think that there was ample material to support the findings of the Commissioners, and accordingly that this prohibition does not apply.\" Thus in cases like the present one in order to justify deduction the sum must be given up 'for reasons of commercial expediency ; it may be voluntary, but so long as it is incurred for the assessee's benefit the deduction would be claimable.\n\nThe Income-tax Appel.late Tribunal has found in favour of the Managing Agent that the amount was expended for reasons of commercial expediency, it was not given as a bounty but to strengthen the Managed Company and if the financial position of the Managed Company became strong the Managing Agent would benefit thereby. Th>l.t. finding is one of fact.\n\nOn that finding the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal rightly came to the conclusion that it was a deductible expense under s. 10(2)(xv).\n\nIn our OJ>inion the judgment of the High Court was right and we would dismiss this appeal with costs . • Appeal dismissed. 1-\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nBOMBAY NORTH & OTHERS.\n\nM/S. HARIV ALLABHDAS KALIDAS AND CO.,\n\n(S. K. DAs, J. L. KAPUR AND M. HrnAYATULLAH. JJ.)\n\nIncome-tax-Managing Agent's Commission payable at the end of the year-Rate of Cm1late o om ay . . bl t\" 1 d f h b v. agam as an excrna e ar 10 e passe rom t e ended s. s. Miranda Ltd. warehouse to the wholesaler, from the wholesaler to the retailer and from the retailer to the consumer ?\n\nWanchoo J.\n\nIt is true that it was competent for the legislature to make such a provision; but the question is whether the three provisions which we have set out above, amount to making such a provision. Sri Umrigar for the appellant fairly admits that if the rate of duty had not been changed there would not have been any demand of any further duty on any sale by the respondent which might have resulted in transport and that the practice was not to charge the same duty over again on sale by the wholesaler to the retailer or by the retailer to the consumer even though these sales resulted in transport except where the Exp7anation to s. 19 applies. If this practice is in accordance with law when there is no change in duty we cannot see how the excisable article which had been subjected to duty once will be liable to further duty equal to the difference when there is increase in the rate, (except of course where the Explanation to s. 19 applies).\n\nWe see nothing in s. 10 which lays down that every time there is transport, duty must be paid even though the duty has already been paid when the first transport of an excisable article takes place. What s. 10 prohibits is the transport of excisable article unless the duty has been paid thereon.\n\nOnce the duty has been paid the prohibition under s. 10 no longer applies, unless the case is covered by the Explanation to s. 19.\n\nHowever wide may be the definition of \" transport \", what has to be seen is whether the prohibition under s. 10 is to apply even to those excisable articles on which duty has been paid. On a plain reading of s. 10, the prohibition under that section cannot apply to transport of excisable articles on which duty has been paid. Section 19, which is the charging section, provides for levying of duty on transport in accordance with the provisions of s. 10.\n\nThis brings us back to s. 10 and the question again is whether the prohibition having been removed by payment of duty once, there fa anything in s. 10 which\n\n' . \" r\n\n> r\n\nrequires that the duty should be paid again for transr960 porting the goods on which dutJ has been paid.\n\nAs Stale of Bombay we reads. 10 we find nothing in it which requires that v. duty should be paid again for transport once the duty s. s. Mfranda Ltd. has been paid and the prohibition removed subject __ always to the Expl, anation to s. 19. Under that Expla- Wanckoo J. nation if there are different duties in different regions and the excisable article which has paid duty of one region is rem111ved to another region where the duty is different the excess will have to be paid in order that prohibition of transport in that region may be removed. But apart from the cases covered by the Explanation we can see no justification for reading s. 10 as giving power to impose duty m the same excisable article again and again as it moves in the course of trade from, say, the bonded warehouse to the wholesaler and from the wholesaler to the retailer and from the retailer to the consumer.\n\nPlainly, therefore, once the duty has been paid and the prohibition under s. 10 is removed the transport of the duty-paid excisable artjcle can take place free from any further imposition, except where it is tra.nsported to a region where the duty is different from the region where the duty is paid.\n\nNor do we find any power in the State Government to impose a duty at every movement during the course of trade in the words of s. 19.\n\nAll that s. 19 em. powers the State Government to do is to fix the rate of duty on transport in accordance with s. 10. There ia no delegation to the State Government anywhere in the Act of the power to impose duty from stage to stage during themovement of excisable articles in the course of trade. It is true that the legislature has the power if it so chooses,' to levy duty on every movement; but as we read the three provisions on whibh reliance has been placed we do not find any exercise of that power by the legislature. Nor do we find any delegation by the legislature of any such power to the State Government. The view therefore ta.ken by the Division Bench that once the duty mentioned ins. 19'has been paid the prohibition contained ins. 10 must disappea.r, (subject always to the Expl, anation to s.,,.19), and tba.t there is nothing in\n\n~ .\n\n1960 s. 19 delegating any power to the Siate Government of levying excise duty more than once and at more State of Bombay I t d • th f th ' bl v. t ian one porn urmg e progress o o exmsa e s. s. Miranda Ltd. goods from the time they leave the bonded warehouse till the time they reach the consumer is in our opinion Wanchoo J. correct.\n\nIt is not in dispute in this case that the Explanation to s. 19 does not apply.\n\nTurning now tothe first proviso:to s. 19-A, it may be noticed that that section deals with the manner of levying duty. But the first proviso goes further and lays down that where the duty is levied on issue from a bonded warehouse it will be at the rate in force on the date of issue.\n\nWe agree with the Division Bench that this proviso has no logical connectiqn with s. 19-A and would more properly be a proviso to s. 19. It has nothing to do with the manner of payment but is concerned with the liability to pay at the rate prevalent on the date of issue from the bonded warehouse.\n\nIf that is so, the quantum of tax is once for all determined by this proviso subject always to the Explanation to s. 19 and cannot be increased thereafter.\n\nReference in this connection was made to s. 15-A also.\n\nBut that section seems to have been inserted as a measure of abundant caution and does not appear to go further than s. 10. It seems to determine the time and manner of payment in cases where excisable articles are kept in a distillery or brewery or warehouse or other place of storage established or licensed under the Act where duty may not have been paid before such storage. It is .not the charging section and cannot be read to go beyond s. 19 which is the charging section. We are therefore of opinion that on this ground also no additional duty could be charged from the respondent in this case as the Explanation to s. 19 bas admittedly no application here.\n\nThe appeal therefore fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed .", "total_entities": 85, "entities": [{"text": "I d R. P. Kapur to consider the evidence ourse ves an to appreciate v. it before we pronounce any opinion on the validity or State of Punjab otherwise of the argument. It is not a case where the - appellant can justly contend that on the face of the re- Gajendragadkar J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 152, "end_char": 423, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1062, "end_char": 1070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pµnjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1119, "end_char": 1136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "136 of the Constitution against the decision of the Pµnjab High Court; and the High Court has refused to exercise its inherent jurisdiction in favour of the appellant."}}, {"text": "s. 561", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1346, "end_char": 1352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1532, "end_char": 1540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1716, "end_char": 1735, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "M/S. S. S. MIRANDA LIMITED", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1737, "end_char": 1763, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M/S. S. S. MIRANDA LIMITED", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1765, "end_char": 1785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY\n\nM/S. S. S. MIRANDA LIMITED (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR and K. N. WANCHOO, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1790, "end_char": 1803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY\n\nM/S. S. S. MIRANDA LIMITED (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR and K. N. WANCHOO, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "K. N. WANCHOO"}}, {"text": "Mimnda Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2378, "end_char": 2389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nThe respondent paid the duty, got the transport permits and s. s. Mimnda Ltd. took over the liquor, some of which it sold."}}, {"text": "December 16, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2438, "end_char": 2455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 16, 1948, the appellant issued a notification doubling the duty on foreign liquor and called upon the respondent to pay the additional duty on the liquor which was still lying in its godown."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3017, "end_char": 3023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants' case was that the respondent was bound to pay the duty prevailing on the transport of liquor at the time of transporting the same from its premises to another place within the State of Bombay:\n\nWanchoo ]."}}, {"text": "H.J. Umrigar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3886, "end_char": 3898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H.J. Umrigar, N. N. Keswani and R. H. Dheba1, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "N. N. Keswani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3900, "end_char": 3913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H.J. Umrigar, N. N. Keswani and R. H. Dheba1, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dheba1", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3918, "end_char": 3930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H.J. Umrigar, N. N. Keswani and R. H. Dheba1, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3952, "end_char": 3966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, S. M.\n\nDubash and G. Gopalakrishnan, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "S. M.\n\nDubash", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3995, "end_char": 4008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, S. M.\n\nDubash and G. Gopalakrishnan, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "G. Gopalakrishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4013, "end_char": 4030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, S. M.\n\nDubash and G. Gopalakrishnan, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4115, "end_char": 4122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nWANCHOO, J.-This is an appeal on a certificate granted by the Bombay High Court.", "canonical_name": "WANCHOO"}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4177, "end_char": 4194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nWANCHOO, J.-This is an appeal on a certificate granted by the Bombay High Court."}}, {"text": "S. S.\n\nMiranda Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4258, "end_char": 4277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Messrs. S. S.\n\nMiranda Ltd. (hereinafter called the respondent) is a company and was holding a trade and import licence of foreign liquor as well as a vendor's licence under the Born bay Abkari Act (Born."}}, {"text": "April 2, 1 9 d . c d b h S f State", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4591, "end_char": 4625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 2, 1 9 d ."}}, {"text": "s. s. Miranda Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4735, "end_char": 4753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c d b h S f State o Bombay 1 48, the respon ent was m1orme y t e tate o v. Bombay (hereinafter called the appellant) to remove s. s. Miranda Ltd. the liquor from the bonded warehouse after paying the necessary excise duty."}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4860, "end_char": 4867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance of this letter, Wanchoo J. the respondent paid the duty and got transport permits from the appellant.", "canonical_name": "WANCHOO"}}, {"text": "April 5, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5217, "end_char": 5230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The transport permits were issued on April 5, 1948, and thereafter the respondent took over the liquor and some of it was sold."}}, {"text": "s. 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5874, "end_char": 5879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5883, "end_char": 5910, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6323, "end_char": 6328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 10 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7793, "end_char": 7806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7861, "end_char": 7866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7912, "end_char": 7917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7963, "end_char": 7968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8009, "end_char": 8015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8051, "end_char": 8056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 3(10), 10 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8587, "end_char": 8607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8878, "end_char": 8888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Abkari Act, 1878", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8901, "end_char": 8924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9275, "end_char": 9295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant portion of the Notification is in these terms:-\n\n\"In exercise of the powers conferred by section 19 r960 of the Bombay Abkari Act, 1878 (Bombay V of 5 b 1878), and in partial supersession of all previous tate\n\n0~.Bom ay\n\nordes and notifications issued thereunder, that is to s. s. Miranda Ltd. say, m so far as they relate to the imposition of excise and countervailing duties charged on the Wanchoo J. excisable articles specified in column 1 of Schedules A a.nd B hereto annexed, the Government of Bombay is pleased to direct that- ."}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9631, "end_char": 9640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Abkari Act, 1878", "statute": "the Bombay Abkari Act, 1878"}}, {"text": "Trade and Import license under the said Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9828, "end_char": 9871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sea Customs Act, 1878", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10107, "end_char": 10128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Mfranda Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11150, "end_char": 11162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second\n\nproviso, however, provides that where some excise duty has already been paid in connection with trans- State of Bombay port, the amount of duty to be imposed under the\n\nNotification would be the difference between the duty\n\nI960\n\n5 5 Mfranda Ltd. 1 bl d th N t•fi t• d th d t l d ev1a e un er e o l ca 10n an e u y a rea y\n\nwamhoo J. paid."}}, {"text": "wamhoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11240, "end_char": 11246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second\n\nproviso, however, provides that where some excise duty has already been paid in connection with trans- State of Bombay port, the amount of duty to be imposed under the\n\nNotification would be the difference between the duty\n\nI960\n\n5 5 Mfranda Ltd. 1 bl d th N t•fi t• d th d t l d ev1a e un er e o l ca 10n an e u y a rea y\n\nwamhoo J. paid."}}, {"text": "Sec. 3(10)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11463, "end_char": 11473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11715, "end_char": 11720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12140, "end_char": 12145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12480, "end_char": 12484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12555, "end_char": 12560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12645, "end_char": 12655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12659, "end_char": 12669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12765, "end_char": 12770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lastly, we come to s. 19 which is the charging section and is in these terms-\n\n\" An excise duty or countervailing duty, as the case may be, at such rate or rates as the State Government shall direct may be imposed either generally or for any specified local area, on any excisable article- ( a) imported in accordance with the provision of sub-section (1) of s. 9; or\n\n(b) exported or transported in accordance with the provisions of s. 10 ; or ( c) manufactured under a license granted in accordance with the provisions of section 14 or section 15; Provided that--\n\n(i) duty shall not be so imposed on any article which has been imported into India and was liable on such importation to duty under the Ind.ian Tariff Act, 1894 or the Sea Customs Act, 1878 :\n\n\"\" -\n\n,..\n\nT. <\n\n\" ."}}, {"text": "Tariff Act, 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12832, "end_char": 12848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sea Customs Act, 1878", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12856, "end_char": 12877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13919, "end_char": 13924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Miranda Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15416, "end_char": 15428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "bl t\" 1 d f h b v. agam as an excrna e ar 10 e passe rom t e ended s. s. Miranda Ltd. warehouse to the wholesaler, from the wholesaler to the retailer and from the retailer to the consumer ?"}}, {"text": "Umrigar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15743, "end_char": 15750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Umrigar for the appellant fairly admits that if the rate of duty had not been changed there would not have been any demand of any further duty on any sale by the respondent which might have resulted in transport and that the practice was not to charge the same duty over again on sale by the wholesaler to the retailer or by the retailer to the consumer even though these sales resulted in transport except where the Exp7anation to s. 19 applies."}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16175, "end_char": 16180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16477, "end_char": 16482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16512, "end_char": 16517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16698, "end_char": 16703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16842, "end_char": 16847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16916, "end_char": 16921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17030, "end_char": 17035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17132, "end_char": 17137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17251, "end_char": 17261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17373, "end_char": 17378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17404, "end_char": 17409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17526, "end_char": 17531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17893, "end_char": 17898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18300, "end_char": 18305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18621, "end_char": 18626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18976, "end_char": 18981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18993, "end_char": 18998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19096, "end_char": 19101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ia no delegation to the State Government anywhere in the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19109, "end_char": 19169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19845, "end_char": 19850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There ia no delegation to the State Government anywhere in the Act", "statute": "There ia no delegation to the State Government anywhere in the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20235, "end_char": 20240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20293, "end_char": 20298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20626, "end_char": 20631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20674, "end_char": 20679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20957, "end_char": 20962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21041, "end_char": 21046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21173, "end_char": 21178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21499, "end_char": 21504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21680, "end_char": 21685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_407_416_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "- ,,\n\n3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 407\n\nKALINbI & OTHERS\n\nKalindi TA'.l'A LOCOMOTIVE.& ENGINEERING CO., LTD. \"· Tata Locomotive .:;,. (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO and Eng. Co. Ltd.\n\nK. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)\n\nIndustrial Dispute-Enquiry by management into misconduct of workman-Representation by representative of Union-Whether workman entitled to.\n\nA workman against whom an enquiry is being held by the management has no right to be represented at such enquiry by a representative of his union, though the employer in his discretion, can and may allow him to be so represented. In such enquiries fairly simple questions of fact as to whether certain acts of misconduct were committed by a workman or not fall to be considered and the workman is best suited to conduct the case.\n\nOrdinarily, in enquiries before domestic tribunals a person accused of any misconduct conducts his own case and so it cannot be said that in any enquiry .against a workman natural justice demands that he should be represented by a representative of his Union.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 101 of 1960.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Award dated 2nd March, 1959, of the Labour Court, Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi, in Misc. Cases Nos. 73, 76, 77, 79-82,\n\n84-90 of 1958.\n\nN. G. Chatterjee, A. K. Dutt and B. P. Maheshwari for the appellants.\n\nSohrab D. Vimadalal, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the respondents.\n\n1960. March 25. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAS GUPTA, J.-When the management of -an industry holds an enquiry into . the charge!'! against a\n\nworkma:µ for the purpose uf deciding what action if any, should be taken against him, has the workman a right to be repre8ented by a representative of his Union at the enquiry? That is the principal question raised in this appeal. The 14 appellants, all workmen in Mfs. Tata Locomotive & Engineering Co., Ltd., Jamshedpur, were dismissed under the orders of the company's management on the result of an enquiry held\n\nDas Gupta].\n\nr96o against them. As industrial .IHsputes between these . . workmen and the company were at that time pending K\":;•d• before the Industrial Tribunal,· Bihar, the company Tata Lo,; motive & filed applications purporting to be under s. 33 of the Eng. co. Ltd.\n\nIndustrial Disputes Act praying for approval of the action taken by it against the workmen. Workmen Das Gupta J also filed applications under s. 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act complaining of the action taken against them by the company. The applications of the company under s. 33 were however ultimately held to have become infructuous and the applications under s. 33A were only considered and disposed of by the Labour Court. The applications of these 14 appellants were however dismissed.\n\nAgainst that order the appellants have preferred this appeal after having obtained special leave for the purpose.\n\nThe common contention urged on behalf of the appellants was that the enquiry on the results of which the orders of dismissal were based was not a proper_ and valid enquiry inasmuch as the workmen were not allowed to be represented at the enquiry by a representative of the J amshedpur Union to which these workmen belonged. It has been urged that fair play demands that at such an enquiry the workman concerned should have reasonable assistance for examination and cross-examination of the witnesses and for seeing that proper records are made of the proceedings. It has been argued that a representative of the workmen's Union is best suited to give such assistance and in the absence of such assistance the workman does not get a fair chance of making his case before.the Enquiry Officer. It appears that when on June5, 1953, requests were made on behalf of the several workmen that they shoulc; l be allowed to be represented by a representative of the Jamshedpur Mazdoor Union at the enquiry to conduct the same on workmen's behalf, the management rejected this request but informed the workmen that they could, if they so desired, be represented by a co-worker from the workmen's own department at the enquiry. The question which arises therefore is whether this refusal of the workmen's request to be represented at the\n\n~· '\n\n• -r . \"\n\nenquiry by a representative of their Union vitiated the I96o enquiry.\n\nK r d' Accustomed as we are to the practice in the courts a:~ • of law to skilful handling of witnesses by lawyers Tata Locomotive e;. specially trained in the art of examination and croes- Eng. Co. Ltd. examination of witnesses, our first inclination is to think that a fair enquiry demands that the person Das Gupta J. accused of an act should have the assistance of some person, who even if not a lawyer may be expected to examine ap.d cross-examine witnesses with a fair amount of skill.\n\nWe have to remember however in the first place that these are riot enquiries in a court of law. It is necessary to remember also that in these enquiries, fairly simple questions of fact as to whether certain acts of misconduct were committed by a workman or not only fall to be considered, and straightforward questioning which a person of fair intelligence _ and knowledge of conditions prevailing in the industry will be able to do will ordinarily help to elicit the truth. It may often happen that the accused workman will be best suited, and fully able to cross-examine the witnesses who have spoken against hiru and to examine witnesses in his favour. _ It is helpful to consider in this connection the fact that ordinarily in enquiries before domestic tribunals the person accused of any misconduct conducts his own case. Rules have been framed by Government as regards the procedure to be followed in enquiries against their own employees. No provision is made in these rules that the person against whom an enquiry is held may be represented by anybody else.\n\nWhen the general practice adopted by domestic tribunals is that the person accused conducts his own case, we are unable to accept an argument that natural justice demands that in the case of enquiries into a chargesheet of misconduct against a workman he should be represented by a member of his Union.\n\nBesides it is necessary to remember that if any enquiry is not otherwise fair, the workman concerned can challenge its validity in an indust.rial dispute.\n\nOur conclusion therefore is that a workman against whom an enquiry is being held by the management'has no right to be represented at such enquiry by a ,\n\nIg6o representative of his Union; though of course an\n\nHalindi employer in his discretion can and may allow his v. employee to avail himself of such assistance.\n\nTata Locomotive , i;, On behalf of the appellants, Charan Singh, Parma- Eng. Co. Ltd. nand and K. Ganguli, it was urged that the orders of\n\nDas Gupta]. dismissal were bad inasmuch as they were based on a finding of guilt of misconduct not mentioned in the charge-sheet. Each of these appellants it appears, was accused in the charge-sheet of four different acts of misconducts:-\n\n\" I. Participating in a.n illegal strike;\n\n2. Leaving your appointed place of duty;\n\n3. Inciting other employees to strike work;\n\n4. Threatening and intimidating other workers. \" The Enquiry Officer found each of them guilty of the first three charges. He, however, recorded no findings as regards the fourth charge but instead found these workmen guilty of a misconduct not mentioned in the charge-sheet, viz., \"Behaving in a riotous and disorderly manner !Jy shouting slogans on the shop floor\". On behalf of the appellants it is urged that as it is not possible to ascertain as tQ how this finding of guilt as regards misconduct not mentioned in the charge-sheet affected the decision of the manager, the order of dismissal must be set aside.\n\nThe record however discloses three oases in which the manager made orders of dismissal on a finding of guilt of only of the acts of misconduct alleged in these three charges, namely, (i) participating in an illegal strike;\n\n(ii) leaving the appointed place of duty; and (iii) inciting other employees to strike work. There is no reason to think therefore that he would have discriminated in favour of these appellants, Charan Singh, Parmanand and K. Ganguli. The conclusion .that necessarily follows is that leaving out of account the misconduct not mentioned in the charge-sheet, viz., \"behaving in a riotousand disorderly manner by shouting slogans m the shop floor '', the manager would have made the order of dismissal. The fact that this act of misconduct not mentioned in the charge-sheet was also mentioned as one of the items on which the order of dismissal was based does not therefore affect the validity of the order.\n\nThe c.harge-sheet against S. B. Nath accused him of four acts of misconduct:-\n\n\" 1.\n\nParticipating in an illegal strike; 2.\n\nLeaving your appointed place of duty;\n\n3. Inciting other employees to strike work; 4.\n\nThreatening and intimidating other workers.\"\n\nThe relevant portion of the order of dismissal is in these words :-\n\n\" He has been found guilty of the following acts of misconduct :- .\n\nFor entering the works when not on duty and inciting other employees to strike work.\n\nHe is therefore dismissed from the service of the company ... \".\n\nIt is argued that as he has not been accused in the charge-sheet \"for entering the Works when not on duty \" but this had been taken into consideration in deciding on his punishment the order is bad. It has to be noticed however that \"entering the Works when not on duty \" is not a misconduct under the com-\n\n~ pany's standing orders.\n\nIt is quite clear that the statement in the dismissal order as regards \"entering the Works when not on duty\" was really intended ·.to state the manner and occasion in which the misconduct of \"inciting other employees to strike work \" was committed. The unnecessary and indeed slightly erroneous mention that he had been found guilty of \"entering the Works !- when not on duty \" does not justify the conclusion that this fact of ·\"entering the works when not on duty \" played any part in the mind of the punishing authority in determining his punishment. A statement in the dismissal order \"that he has been found guilty of entering the Works when not on duty\" as an act of misconduct is obviously erroneous. The act of misconduct of which this appellant was found guilty was \"inciting other employees to strike work\" and that is the only misconduct which weighed with the punishing authority. The contention that the mention in the dismissal order of \" entering the Works when not on duty\" as an act of misconduct of which he had\n\nKalindi v.\n\nTata Locomotiva &\n\nEng. Co. Ltd.\n\nDas (fupta ].\n\nr960 been found guilty, vitiates the order of dismissal cannot therefore be accepted.\n\nKalindi On behalf of the appellant M. R. Ghosh it was urged\n\nTata Loc:;,,01ive & that the alleged misconduct of \"deliberately prevent-\n\nEng. Co. Ltd. ing the man in charge of the Compressor in the repair shop from carrying out his duty\" of which he is Das Gnpta J said to have been found guilty in the order of dismissal was not alleged in the charge-sheet. This is really a misreading of the charge-sheet. Against this appellant four acts of misconduct were alleged in the charge-sheet :-\n\n\" 1. Participation in an illegal strike ; 2.\n\nInciting other employees in the other sections of the Auto Division to strike work ; 3.\n\nLeaving your appointed place of duty or work without permission ; 4.\n\nThreatening and intimidating the other workers in the Repair Shop.\" \"The dismissal order after mentioning that he was found guilty of the first three charges further states that he was found guilty of the following acts of misconduct: \"threatning and intimidating the workers in the Re_pair Shop and deliberately preventing the man in charge of the Compressor in the Repair Shop from carrying out his duty.\" The argument is that the charge as set out in the charge-sheet does not mention this act of \"deliberately preventing the man in charge of the Com-pressor in the Repair Shop from carrying out his duty.\" This is obviously erroneous.\n\nThe charge-sheet after alleging the four acts of misconduct went on to' give particulars of these charges.\n\nAs regards the fourth charge, viz., \" threatening and intimidating the other workers in the Repair Shop \" the particulars were in these words: \" By threatening and intimidating others in the repair shop you stopped them from working and ; i, lso you took the Compressor man by his hand and got the Compressor stopped.\" The statement in the dismissal order as regards his being guilty of \"deliberately preventing the man in charge of the Compressor in the Repair Shop from carrying out his duty \" has in fact been mentioned in the charge-sheet, though in slightly different words.\n\nThere is no ubstance therefore in the contention th; i, t\n\n.. -\n\nthe acts of misconduct on which the dismissal order r96o was based included one not mentioned in the charge- K 1. a a in i sheet. v.\n\nThe four acts of misconduct alleged in the charge- Tata Locomotive.S. sheet against Gurbux Singh were :-· Eng. co. Ltd.\n\n1. Participating in an illegal strike ; 2.\n\nLeaving your appointed place of duty; Das Gupta J.\n\n3. Inciting other employees to strike work ; 4.\n\nThreatening and intimidating other workers.\n\nThe Enquiry Officer's report fom:id him guilty of the following acts :- ·\n\n1. Participating in an illegal strike;\n\n2. Leaving his place of duty without permission;\n\n3. Inciting other employees to strike work and 4.\n\nThreatening and intimidating Mr. Charan\n\nSingh to stop work.\n\nThe manager's order Qn these is in these words :-\n\n\"I have gone through the findings of the Enquiry Officer as well as the proceedings of the Inquiry.\n\nThough Mr. Gurubux Singh created a scene on the 11th June, 1958, and left the place of enquiry, still he was given a chance and the enquiry was held at a later date.\n\nHaving gone through the evidence recorded against him during the enquiry,. I agree with the findings of the C. P. 0.. The charges being of a very serious nature, I order that he be dismissed from the services of the company with effect from the date of the charge-sheet.\" .\n\nThe formal dismissal order that was drawn up on the basis of this finding and served on him after stating that he was found guilty of the first three charges stated that he was found guilty of threatening and intimidating Mr. Chakravarty, chargeman, who was compelled to stop work on 21-5-58. On his behalf it has been urged that though the enquiry officer's report says that he was guilty of \" threatening and intimidating Charan Singh \" the General Manager misled himself into thinking that he had threatened and intimidated Mr. Chakravarty, Chargeman. There being no finding by the Enquiry Officer that Gurubux .. Singh was guilty of threatening and intimidating\n\n.1960\n\nMr. Chakravarty, Chargeman, the General Manager was not entitled to take such a misconduct into consi- Kalindi deration. v.\n\nTata Locomotive .i;.\n\nOn an examination of the Enquiry Officer's report Eng. co. Ltd. it is however obvious that there is a clerical error in\n\nDas Gupta ]. the concluding portion of the report in stating the finding as regards the fourth charge as \"threatening and intimidating Charan Singh to stop work\".\n\nCharan Singh was really one of the striking workers and there was no question of intimidating him. It is abundantly clear from the report that the case that was sought to be made as regards the fourth charge was that Chakravarty had been intimidated and that this allegation was found proved. There could not have been and was not any allegation of Charan Singh being intimidated. It is quite clear that the name of Charan Singh was accidentally mentioned in the concluding portion of the report instead of the correct name Chakravarty. There is no justification for thinking that the General Manager who had gone through the evidence and report of the Enquiry Officer could possibly have been misled by this clerical mistake. The relevant charge was threatening and intimidating other workers, whether Charan Singh or Chakravarty was intimidated would not be of any consequence. In fact however the allegation against this appellant clearly was that Chakravarty had been intimidated by him. The body of the report shows that that was what the Enquiry Officer found proved.\n\nIt is reasonable to think that that conclusion and not the wrong statement that Charan Singh was threatened and intimidated-which was nobody's casewcighed with the General Manager in determining the punishment. In ou.r opinion, there is no substance in the contentjon urged on his behalf that the finding that Charan Singh was threatened and intimidated as an act of misconduct instead of Chakravarty was wrongly relied upon.\n\nOn behalf of the appellant S. K. Dhanda it has been urged that in making the dismissal order the General Manager wrongly thought that he had been found\n\nguilty of all the four acts of misconduct which were against him in the charge-sheet though in fact he was\n\nfound guilty only of three and the fourth charge was not proved. The four acts of misconduct alleged in the charge-sheet were :-\n\n ri;6d\n\nKalindi\n\nV,\n\n(1) Participation in an illegal strike;\n\n(2) Leaving his place of duty without Tata Locomotive & permis- Eng. Co. Ltd. sion;\n\n(3) Inciting other employees in the Paint Shop, Das Gupta].\n\nPropeller Shaft Section, Rear Axle Section and Press Section of the Auto Division to stop work;\n\n(4) Behaving in a riotous and disorderly manner \\tnd threatening and intimidating another coworker.\n\nThe formal order of dismissal that was drawn up stated that he had been found guilty of the following acts of misconduct :-\n\n\" (1) Participating in an illegal strike;\n\n(2) Leaving his place of duty without permission;\n\n(3) Inciting other employees in the Paint Shop, Propeller Shaft Section, Rear Axle Section and Press Section of the Auto Division to stop work.\n\n(4) Threatening and intimidating another employee by name Mr. T. S. N. Rao, T. No. 6610/60205/1, and stopping him fr01µ doing his work.\n\nHe is therefore dismissed from the service of the\n\n\" company ......... .\n\nThe Enquiry Officer's report states the conclusions reached by him thus :-\n\n\" From the statement of the witnesses, it has been conclusively proved that Mr. Dhanda:\n\n(1) participated in an illegal strike;\n\n(2) left his place of duty without permission ;\n\n(3) incited other employees to stop work.\n\nIt can be said that the charge of threatening and intimidating has not been proved beyond doubt.\" If one looks at the formal order of dismissal only it seems that though the charge of threatening and intimidating other employees was not proved against him the order of dismissal was partially based on it.\n\nIf there was nothing else this might be a serious infirmity in the order. We find however that the General Manager recorded his order on the formal Report itself in these words :- •\n\nx960\n\nKalindi v.\n\nTata Loaomotive &\n\nEng. Co. Ltd.\n\nDas Gupta j.\n\n''I have gone through the findings of the Enquiry Officer and the proceedings of the enquiry. Even though the charge of threatening and intimidating other workers has not been proved against Mr.\n\nDhanda the other charges are also of a serious nature. In the circumstances, I order that he be dismissed from the service of the company with effect from the date of the charge-sheet.\" This was dated July 3, 1958, and the formal order also bears the same date. Reading the two together it is quite clear that the General Manager in passing the order of dismissal proceeded on the basis that the charge of threatening and intimidating other employees had not been proved against Mr. Dhanda but a mistake crept into the formal order that was drawn up and among the acts of misconduct mentioned as those of which Dhanda had been found guilty and on which the dismissal order was based the fourth charge as regards threatening and intimidating other employees was also mentioned. It is proper to hold that this was an accidental clerical mistake and that in fact the General Manager did not proceed on the wrong basis that Dhanda had been found guilty on this fourth charge a !so.\n\nThe mere fact that such a clerical error appears in the formal order does not affect the validity of the order in any way.\n\nWe have therefore come to the conclusion that the separate contentions pressed on behalf of seven of the appellants that the Tribunals below did not consider certain infirmities in the order cannot also be sustained.\n\nThe appeal is accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances we make no order as to costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n' . ,_ .", "total_entities": 48, "entities": [{"text": "407\n\nKALINbI & OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 37, "end_char": 58, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KALINDI & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "l'A LOCOMOTIVE.& ENGINEERING CO., LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "TATA LOCOMOTIVE & ENGINEERING CO., LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 137, "end_char": 157, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 159, "end_char": 172, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 192, "end_char": 212, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. G. Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1277, "end_char": 1293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. G. Chatterjee, A. K. Dutt and B. P. Maheshwari for the appellants."}}, {"text": "A. K. Dutt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1295, "end_char": 1305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. G. Chatterjee, A. K. Dutt and B. P. Maheshwari for the appellants."}}, {"text": "B. P. Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1310, "end_char": 1326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. G. Chatterjee, A. K. Dutt and B. P. Maheshwari for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Sohrab D. Vimadalal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1348, "end_char": 1367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sohrab D. Vimadalal, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "S. N. Andley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1369, "end_char": 1381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sohrab D. Vimadalal, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "J. B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1383, "end_char": 1399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sohrab D. Vimadalal, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1401, "end_char": 1415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sohrab D. Vimadalal, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "P. L. Vohra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1420, "end_char": 1431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sohrab D. Vimadalal, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1515, "end_char": 1524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAS GUPTA, J.-When the management of -an industry holds an enquiry into .", "canonical_name": "DAS GUPTA"}}, {"text": "Tata Locomotive & Engineering Co., Ltd.,", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1884, "end_char": 1924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tata Locomotive & Engineering Co., Ltd., Jamshedpur, were dismissed under the orders of the company's management on the result of an enquiry held\n\nDas Gupta]."}}, {"text": "Jamshedpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1925, "end_char": 1935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tata Locomotive & Engineering Co., Ltd., Jamshedpur, were dismissed under the orders of the company's management on the result of an enquiry held\n\nDas Gupta]."}}, {"text": "Das Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2031, "end_char": 2040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tata Locomotive & Engineering Co., Ltd., Jamshedpur, were dismissed under the orders of the company's management on the result of an enquiry held\n\nDas Gupta].", "canonical_name": "DAS GUPTA"}}, {"text": "Industrial Tribunal,· Bihar", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2174, "end_char": 2201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "workmen and the company were at that time pending K\":;•d• before the Industrial Tribunal,· Bihar, the company Tata Lo,; motive & filed applications purporting to be under s. 33 of the Eng."}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2276, "end_char": 2281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2304, "end_char": 2327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Das Gupta", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 2404, "end_char": 2413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Workmen Das Gupta J also filed applications under s. 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act complaining of the action taken against them by the company."}}, {"text": "s. 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2446, "end_char": 2452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2460, "end_char": 2483, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2583, "end_char": 2588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "s. 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2672, "end_char": 2678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "J amshedpur Union", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3190, "end_char": 3207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The common contention urged on behalf of the appellants was that the enquiry on the results of which the orders of dismissal were based was not a proper_ and valid enquiry inasmuch as the workmen were not allowed to be represented at the enquiry by a representative of the J amshedpur Union to which these workmen belonged."}}, {"text": "June5, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3732, "end_char": 3743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that when on June5, 1953, requests were made on behalf of the several workmen that they shoulc; l be allowed to be represented by a representative of the Jamshedpur Mazdoor Union at the enquiry to conduct the same on workmen's behalf, the management rejected this request but informed the workmen that they could, if they so desired, be represented by a co-worker from the workmen's own department at the enquiry."}}, {"text": "Jamshedpur Mazdoor Union", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3873, "end_char": 3897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that when on June5, 1953, requests were made on behalf of the several workmen that they shoulc; l be allowed to be represented by a representative of the Jamshedpur Mazdoor Union at the enquiry to conduct the same on workmen's behalf, the management rejected this request but informed the workmen that they could, if they so desired, be represented by a co-worker from the workmen's own department at the enquiry."}}, {"text": "Das Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4639, "end_char": 4648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Co. Ltd. examination of witnesses, our first inclination is to think that a fair enquiry demands that the person Das Gupta J. accused of an act should have the assistance of some person, who even if not a lawyer may be expected to examine ap.d cross-examine witnesses with a fair amount of skill.", "canonical_name": "DAS GUPTA"}}, {"text": "hiru", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5436, "end_char": 5440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may often happen that the accused workman will be best suited, and fully able to cross-examine the witnesses who have spoken against hiru and to examine witnesses in his favour."}}, {"text": "Charan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6719, "end_char": 6731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tata Locomotive , i;, On behalf of the appellants, Charan Singh, Parma- Eng.", "canonical_name": "Charan\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Parma- Eng. Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6733, "end_char": 6753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tata Locomotive , i;, On behalf of the appellants, Charan Singh, Parma- Eng."}}, {"text": "K. Ganguli", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6763, "end_char": 6773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Co. Ltd. nand and K. Ganguli, it was urged that the orders of\n\nDas Gupta]."}}, {"text": "Parmanand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8228, "end_char": 8237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no reason to think therefore that he would have discriminated in favour of these appellants, Charan Singh, Parmanand and K. Ganguli."}}, {"text": "S. B. Nath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8751, "end_char": 8761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The c.harge-sheet against S. B. Nath accused him of four acts of misconduct:-\n\n\" 1."}}, {"text": "M. R. Ghosh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10822, "end_char": 10833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kalindi On behalf of the appellant M. R. Ghosh it was urged\n\nTata Loc:;,,01ive & that the alleged misconduct of \"deliberately prevent-\n\nEng."}}, {"text": "Das Gnpta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11039, "end_char": 11048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Co. Ltd. ing the man in charge of the Compressor in the repair shop from carrying out his duty\" of which he is Das Gnpta J said to have been found guilty in the order of dismissal was not alleged in the charge-sheet.", "canonical_name": "DAS GUPTA"}}, {"text": "Gurbux Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13095, "end_char": 13107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. sheet against Gurbux Singh were :-· Eng.", "canonical_name": "Gurubux .. Singh"}}, {"text": "Charan\n\nSingh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13571, "end_char": 13584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Threatening and intimidating Mr. Charan\n\nSingh to stop work.", "canonical_name": "Charan\n\nSingh"}}, {"text": "Gurubux Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13763, "end_char": 13776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though Mr. Gurubux Singh created a scene on the 11th June, 1958, and left the place of enquiry, still he was given a chance and the enquiry was held at a later date.", "canonical_name": "Gurubux .. Singh"}}, {"text": "11th June, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13800, "end_char": 13815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though Mr. Gurubux Singh created a scene on the 11th June, 1958, and left the place of enquiry, still he was given a chance and the enquiry was held at a later date."}}, {"text": "Chakravarty", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14420, "end_char": 14431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The formal dismissal order that was drawn up on the basis of this finding and served on him after stating that he was found guilty of the first three charges stated that he was found guilty of threatening and intimidating Mr. Chakravarty, chargeman, who was compelled to stop work on 21-5-58."}}, {"text": "21-5-58", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14478, "end_char": 14485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The formal dismissal order that was drawn up on the basis of this finding and served on him after stating that he was found guilty of the first three charges stated that he was found guilty of threatening and intimidating Mr. Chakravarty, chargeman, who was compelled to stop work on 21-5-58."}}, {"text": "Gurubux .. Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14800, "end_char": 14816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There being no finding by the Enquiry Officer that Gurubux .. Singh was guilty of threatening and intimidating\n\n.1960\n\nMr. Chakravarty, Chargeman, the General Manager was not entitled to take such a misconduct into consi- Kalindi deration.", "canonical_name": "Gurubux .. Singh"}}, {"text": "S. K. Dhanda", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16829, "end_char": 16841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the appellant S. K. Dhanda it has been urged that in making the dismissal order the General Manager wrongly thought that he had been found\n\nguilty of all the four acts of misconduct which were against him in the charge-sheet though in fact he was\n\nfound guilty only of three and the fourth charge was not proved."}}, {"text": "T. S. N. Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18025, "end_char": 18037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(4) Threatening and intimidating another employee by name Mr. T. S. N. Rao, T. No."}}, {"text": "Dhanda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18330, "end_char": 18336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Enquiry Officer's report states the conclusions reached by him thus :-\n\n\" From the statement of the witnesses, it has been conclusively proved that Mr. Dhanda:\n\n(1) participated in an illegal strike;\n\n(2) left his place of duty without permission ;\n\n(3) incited other employees to stop work."}}, {"text": "July 3, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19424, "end_char": 19436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was dated July 3, 1958, and the formal order also bears the same date."}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_417_423_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "3 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 417\n\nMRS. KUSUMBEN D. MAHADEVIA v.\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nBOMBAY.\n\n(S. K. D.As, J. L. KAPUR and M. HIDAY.A.TULL.AH, JJ.)\n\nIncome-tax-Reference-High Court's jurisdiction-If can decide a question not decided by the Tribunal-Indian Income-tax Act, I922 (XI of I922), s. 66-The States (Taxation Concessions) Order, I949, para. 4.\n\nThe appellant was a shareholder of a company known as Mafatlal Gagalbhai and Co., Ltd. The Company with its registered office at Bombay was at all material times resident in British India. It was also doing business in the former Baroda State and used to keep its profits derived in that State with Mafatlal Gagalbhai Investment Corporation, Navsari. In the year 1949 Mafatlal Gagalbhai and Co. Ltd. declared dividends out of profits which had accrued partly in British India and partly in the Indian State. , The appellant was assessed to income-tax on the dividends earned by her. She did not bring those dividends into British India and claimed the benefit' of para. 4 of the Merged States (Taxation Concessions) Order. The Tribunal held that the income did not accrue to the appellant in the Baroda State but it did not decide the question whether she was entitled to the bene:fits of the Taxation Concessions Order. The High Court on a; reference to it held that para. 4 of the Taxation Concessions Order did not apply to the assessee but it did not decide the other question as to where the income had accrued to the assessee. On appeal by special leave the appellant contended, inter alia, that since the Tribunal had not gone into the question of the applicability to the assessee of the Concessions Order and had not expressed any opinion thereon, the High Court could m>t raise the question on its own and decide it : ' Held, that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in going outside the point of law decided by the Tribunal and deciding a different point of law.\n\nSection 66 of the Income-tax Act which confers jurisdiction upon the High Court only permits a reference of a question of law arising out of the order of the Tribunal. It does not confer jurisdiction on the High Court to decide a different question of law not arising out of such order.\n\nNew f ehangir Vakil Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1959] 37 I.T.R. II, .Scindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1954] 26 I.T.R. 686, Commissioner of Incometax v. Breach Candy Swimming Bath Trust, [1955] 27 I.T.R. 279 and Ismailia Grain Merchants Association v. Commissioner of Incometax, [1957] 31 I.T.R. 433, distinguished, Mash Trading Co. v. Commissioner of Income-taxi [1956] 30 I.T.R. 388, considered.\n\nMarch 30.\n\nMrs. /( 1'su1nben\n\nD. JYI hadevia\n\nComniissioner of\n\nInco1netax,\n\nBombay\n\nH ida yatullah J.\n\nSUPREME COURT HEPORTS [1960]\n\nC1v1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 507 of 1957.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the order and judgment dated September 28, 1955, and February 20, 1956, of the Bombay High Court in Income-tax Refer ence No. 28 of 1955. . R. J. Kolah and I. N. Shroff, for the appell11nt.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Solicitor . GenP-ral of India, R. Ganapathy Iyer and D. Gupta, for the respondent.\n\n1960. March 30.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by HIDAYATULLAH, J.-This is an appeal with the special leave of this Court, and is directed against an order dated tieptember 28, 1955, and a judgment dated February 20, 1956, of the High Court of Bombay. By the order, the High Court reframed a question referred to it by the Appellate Tribunal at Bombay, which it answered by its judgment.\n\nMrs. Kusumben D. Mahadevia (hereinafter referred to as the assessee) who has filed this appeal, was, at all material times, residing in Bombay. She was a shareholder, holding 760 shares of Mafatlal Gagalbhai & Co., Ltd., Bombay.\n\nFor the assessment year 1950-51 (the previous year being the calendar year 1949), she was assessed to income-tax on a total income of Rs. 1,50,765 which included a grossed-up dividend income of Rs. 1,47,026. In the latter income was included a sum of Rs. 47,120 being the dividends declared by Mafatlal Gagalbhai & Co., Ltd., Bombay.\n\nMafatlal Gagalbhai & Co., Ltd., is a private limited\n\nCompany with its registered office at Bombay. It was, at all mater-ial times, 'resident and ordinarily resident' in British India. It was also doing business in the former Baroda State, and used to keep its profits derived in that State with Mafatlal Gagalbhai Investment Corporation, Navsari. In the year 1949 Mafatlal Gagalbhai & Co., Ltd., declared dividends out of these accumulated profits by three resolutions, which are reproduced : 25-3-1949. \"That a further dividend of Rs. 17 per ordinary share free of income-tax for the year 1947 be and is hereby declared absorbing Rs. 4,29,250\n\n- -\n\nand the same be payable in Navsari out of the profits of the year I 947 lying at Navsari.\" ·\n\n24-9-1949. \"That a further dividend of Rs. 24 per ordinary share free of income-tax for the year 1948 be and is hereby declared absotbing Rs. 6,06,000 and the same be payable in N avsari out of the profits of the year 1948 lying at Navsari with Messrs. M.G.\n\nInvestment Corporation Ltd. on or after 30th April,\n\n1949.\"\n\n24-9-1949. \"Resolved that an Ad-interim dividend.of Rs. 21 per ordinary share free of income-tax absorbing Rs. 5,30,250 be and is hereby declared for the year 1949 out of the income of the Company for the year 1949 remaining unbrought with Messrs.\n\nM. G. Investment Corporation Ltd., Navsari, and that the same be payable in Nvsari on or after 30th April, 1949.\" .\n\nThe assessee did not bring these dividends into British India. She claimed the benefit of para. 4 of the Merged States (Taxation Concession(?) Order, 1949 (hereinafter referred to briefly as the Concessions Order) ; but the Tribunal held that the income did not accrue to her in the Baroda State. The Tribunal pointed out that the dividends were declared by Mafatlal Gagalbhai & Co., Ltd., out of its profits which had accrued partly in, what was then called, British India and partly in the Indian State. The dividend was thus declared out of 'composite profits'. It further pointed out that the assessee had paid for and acquired the shares of a Company in British India and was thus holding an asset in British India, and that the income was from that asset. The Tribunal, however, at the instance of the assessee drew up a statement of the case under s. 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, ana referred the following question to the High Court :\n\n\"Whether the net dividend income of Rs. 47,120 accrued to the assessee in the former Baroda State, or whether it is income accrued or deemed to have accrued to the assessee in British India ?\"\n\nWhen the reference was heard, the High Court was of the opinion that the Tribunal ought to have decided 'and referred also the question whether the.Concessions\n\nMrs. Kusumben D. M ai1adevia\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncome-tax,\n\nBombay\n\nHidayat1tllah ].\n\nMrs. J(usumben D. Mahadtvia v.\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncome-tax,\n\nBombay\n\nHidayatullah ].\n\nOrder applied to the assessee.\n\nThe High Court recognised the grievance of the assessee that no such point was raised before the Tribunal. The High Court, however, by its order dated September 28, 1955, decided that there was no need to send the case back for a supplemental statement, since all tho facts necessary to decide the two questions were before the High Court. The High Court then reframed the question, as it said, to comprehend the two points of law in the following words :\n\n\" Whether the assessee is entitled to any concession under the Merged States (Taxation Concessions) Order, 1949, with regard to the net dividend income of Rs. 47,120_?\" The reference then came up for final disposal on February 20, 1956, and the High Court answered the question in the negative, holding that para. 4 of the Concessions Order did not apply to the assessee.\n\nThe High Court did not decide where the income had accrued to the assessee. Leave to appeal to this Court was refused by the High Court, but the assessee applied to this Court for special leave against both the order and the judgment and obtained it, and the present appeal has been filed.\n\nAt the very outset, the assessee has questioned the jurisdiction of the High Court to frame and deal with a question of law not arising out of the order of the Tribunal. The assessee points out that the Tribunal had decided that the income had accrued in British India. The assessee had challenged this part of the decision, and if the Commissioner felt it necessary, he should have obtained the decision of the Tribunal and asked for a reference on the other point also.\n\nSince the Tribunal had not gone into the question of the applicability to the assessee of the Concessions Order\n\nand had not expressed any opinion thereon, the\n\nassesee contends that the High Court could not raise the question on its own, and decide it. The assessee strongly relies upon a decision of this Court in New Jehangir Vakil Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Incometax ('). In that case, the Bombay High Court had\n\n(r) [19,9J 37 I.T, R. II,\n\ndirected the Tribunal to submit a supplementary statement of the case on points not arising from the. order of .the Tribunal, and this Court held that the High Court had no jurisdiction to do so. The learned counsel for the Commissioner, on the other hand, contends , that the question was the assessability of the assessee, who claimed the benefit of the Concessions Order.\n\nThe main question was thus the applicability of the\n\nConcessions Order, and the question of the accrual of the income, whether in British India or in Baroda, was merely ancillary. The latter question was, according to the respondent, included in the first . question, and the High Court was right when it framed a comprehensive question and answered it in the sequence it did. The respondent points out that the High Court having held that the Concessions Order did not apply, was not required to decide the other limb of the question, as it became unnecessary to do so.\n\nIn our opinion, the objection of the assessee is wellfounded.\n\nThe Tribunal did not address itself to the question whether the Concessions Order applied to the assessee. It decided the question of assessability on the short ground that the income had not arisen in Baroda but in British India. That aspect of the matter has not been touched by the Bombay High Court.\n\nThe latter has,. on the other hand, considered whether the Concessions Order applies to the assessee, a matter not touched by the Tribunal. Thus, though the result is the same so far as the assessment is concerned, the grounds of decision are entirely different.\n\nThe High Court felt that the question framed by it comprehended both the aspects and, perhaps it did.\n\nBut the two matters were neither co-extensive, nor was the one included in the other. The question of accrual of income has to be decided under the Incometax Act, and has but little to do with the Concessions Order. That question can be adequately decided on the facts of this case without advertence to the Concessions\n\nOrder. It cannot; therefore, be said to be either coextensive with or included in the decision of the question actually considered by the High Court to wit, whether the Oonceesione Order applied or not. If thi!i\n\n~· I\n\nKusumben D. Mahadevia v.\n\nCommissioner of I ncome-ta:r,\n\nBomb4y\n\nH idayatullah J.\n\nI960\n\nKusumben D. Mahadevia v.\n\nCcmmissioner of Income-tax, Bombay\n\nHidayatullah ).\n\nbe so, it is manifest that the Tribunal decided something which stawls completely outside the decision of the Bombay High Court. The High Court also decided a matter which was not considered by the Tribunal even as a step in the decision of the point actually decided. The two decisions are thus strangers to each other, though they lead to the same result.\n\nSection 66 of the Income-tax Act which confers jurisdiction upon the High Court only permits a reference of a question of law arising out oft he order of the Tribunal. It does not confer jurisdiction on the High Court to decide a different question of law not arising out of such order. It is possible that the same question of law may involve different app. roaches for its solution, and the High Court may amplify the question to take in all the approaches.\n\nBut the question must still be one which was before the Tribunal and was decided by it. It must not be an entirely different question which the Tribunal never considered.\n\nThe respondent attempted to justify the action taken by contending that the decision of the question of the accrual of the income with reference to the place of accrual implied the applicability of the Concessions Order.\n\nWe do not agree. If this were so, there would be no necessity to frame the question again. Indeed, the High Court itself felt that there were two limbs of the question of assessability, and reframed the question to cover both the limbs.\n\nWhere the High Court went wrong was in not deciding both the limbs but one of them and that too, the one not decided by the Tribunal. The resulting position can be summed up by saying that the High Court decided something which the Tribunal did not, and the Tribunal decided something which the High Court did not. This is clearly against the provisions of s. 66.\n\nThe respondent referred to Scindia Steam Navigation Go. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax('), Commissioner of Income-tax v. Breach Gandy Swimming Bath Trust (') and I smailia Grain Merchants Association v. Commissioner of Income-tax (3). They\n\n(1) [1954] 26 I.T.R. 686.\n\n(2) [1955) 27 I.T.R. 279.\n\n(3) [19,57) l' l.T.R. 43\"\n\n....\n\nwere all decisions of the same Court, and arose in different circumstances. In two of them, the question was wide enough to take in a fine of reasoning not. adopted by the Tribunal, and in the third, the question was widened by deleting a reference to a section, when another section was also material. They were not cases where the issues of law as decided by the Tribunal and the High Court were entirely different, which is the case here. The Punjab High Court has taken a contrary view in Mash Trading Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax (1 ).\n\nFor the reasons given above, we are of opinion that theHigh Court exceeded its jurisdiction in going outside the point of law decided by the Tribunal and deciding a different point of law. The order of the High Court will, therefore, be set aside, and the case -will be remitted to the High Court to decide the question framed by the Tribunal. In view of the fact that both the assessee and the Commissioner pointed out the anomaly to the : High Court and the question was reframed in spite of this, the costs of this appeal shall be costs in the reference to be heard by the High Court, and will abide the result.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nCase remitted.\n\nM/S. BURN & CO. LTD. & OTHERS v.\n\nTHEIR EMPLOYEES. (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. W ANCHOO and K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.) Industrial Dispute-Incentive bonus-Scheme-Eclusion of clerical and subordinate staff-Propriety-Power of Industrial Tribunal.\n\nThere can be no doubt from the point of view of Economics that the clerical and subordinate staff of an industry like its' manual workers contribute to its production and there can, therefore, be no reason for exciuding them wholly from the benefits of a scheme of incentive bonus.\n\nThe fact that the clerical staff are paid dearness allowance at a higher scale can be no reason for their exclusion. '\n\n(1) [1956] 30 I.T.R. 388.\n\nKusumben. .D. Mahadevia v.\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncome-tax,\n\nBombay\n\nH idayatullah J.\n\nr960\n\nMarch30.", "total_entities": 46, "entities": [{"text": "417\n\nMRS. KUSUMBEN D. MAHADEVIA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 63, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MRS. KUSUMBEN D. MAHADEVIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nBOMBAY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "L. KAPUR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 126, "end_char": 134, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.L. KAPUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 272, "end_char": 286, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 307, "end_char": 312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mafatlal Gagalbhai and Co., Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 424, "end_char": 456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was a shareholder of a company known as Mafatlal Gagalbhai and Co., Ltd. The Company with its registered office at Bombay was at all material times resident in British India."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 499, "end_char": 505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was a shareholder of a company known as Mafatlal Gagalbhai and Co., Ltd. The Company with its registered office at Bombay was at all material times resident in British India."}}, {"text": "Baroda", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 600, "end_char": 606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also doing business in the former Baroda State and used to keep its profits derived in that State with Mafatlal Gagalbhai Investment Corporation, Navsari."}}, {"text": "Mafatlal Gagalbhai Investment Corporation, Navsari", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 669, "end_char": 719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also doing business in the former Baroda State and used to keep its profits derived in that State with Mafatlal Gagalbhai Investment Corporation, Navsari."}}, {"text": "Mafatlal Gagalbhai and Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 738, "end_char": 769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the year 1949 Mafatlal Gagalbhai and Co. Ltd. declared dividends out of profits which had accrued partly in British India and partly in the Indian State. ,"}}, {"text": "British India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 832, "end_char": 845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the year 1949 Mafatlal Gagalbhai and Co. Ltd. declared dividends out of profits which had accrued partly in British India and partly in the Indian State. ,"}}, {"text": "Indian", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 864, "end_char": 870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the year 1949 Mafatlal Gagalbhai and Co. Ltd. declared dividends out of profits which had accrued partly in British India and partly in the Indian State. ,"}}, {"text": "Baroda State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1166, "end_char": 1178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal held that the income did not accrue to the appellant in the Baroda State but it did not decide the question whether she was entitled to the bene:fits of the Taxation Concessions Order."}}, {"text": "Section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1950, "end_char": 1960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1968, "end_char": 1982, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "D. JYI hadevia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2714, "end_char": 2728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mrs. /( 1'su1nben\n\nD. JYI hadevia\n\nComniissioner of\n\nInco1netax,\n\nBombay\n\nH ida yatullah J.\n\nSUPREME COURT HEPORTS [1960]\n\nC1v1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "R. J. Kolah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3048, "end_char": 3059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. J. Kolah and I. N. Shroff, for the appell11nt."}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3064, "end_char": 3076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. J. Kolah and I. N. Shroff, for the appell11nt."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3099, "end_char": 3113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor ."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3146, "end_char": 3163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GenP-ral of India, R. Ganapathy Iyer and D. Gupta, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "D. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3168, "end_char": 3176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GenP-ral of India, R. Ganapathy Iyer and D. Gupta, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3259, "end_char": 3271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by HIDAYATULLAH, J.-This is an appeal with the special leave of this Court, and is directed against an order dated tieptember 28, 1955, and a judgment dated February 20, 1956, of the High Court of Bombay."}}, {"text": "February 20, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3413, "end_char": 3430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by HIDAYATULLAH, J.-This is an appeal with the special leave of this Court, and is directed against an order dated tieptember 28, 1955, and a judgment dated February 20, 1956, of the High Court of Bombay."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3439, "end_char": 3459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by HIDAYATULLAH, J.-This is an appeal with the special leave of this Court, and is directed against an order dated tieptember 28, 1955, and a judgment dated February 20, 1956, of the High Court of Bombay."}}, {"text": "Appellate Tribunal at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3532, "end_char": 3560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By the order, the High Court reframed a question referred to it by the Appellate Tribunal at Bombay, which it answered by its judgment."}}, {"text": "Kusumben D. Mahadevia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3603, "end_char": 3624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mrs. Kusumben D. Mahadevia (hereinafter referred to as the assessee) who has filed this appeal, was, at all material times, residing in Bombay.", "canonical_name": "J(usumben D. Mahadtvia"}}, {"text": "Mafatlal Gagalbhai & Co., Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3787, "end_char": 3817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She was a shareholder, holding 760 shares of Mafatlal Gagalbhai & Co., Ltd., Bombay."}}, {"text": "25-3-1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4657, "end_char": 4666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the year 1949 Mafatlal Gagalbhai & Co., Ltd., declared dividends out of these accumulated profits by three resolutions, which are reproduced : 25-3-1949. \""}}, {"text": "24-9-1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4908, "end_char": 4917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "24-9-1949. \""}}, {"text": "M.G.\n\nInvestment Corporation Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5161, "end_char": 5194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6,06,000 and the same be payable in N avsari out of the profits of the year 1948 lying at Navsari with Messrs. M.G.\n\nInvestment Corporation Ltd. on or after 30th April,\n\n1949.\""}}, {"text": "M. G. Investment Corporation Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5477, "end_char": 5510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5,30,250 be and is hereby declared for the year 1949 out of the income of the Company for the year 1949 remaining unbrought with Messrs.\n\nM. G. Investment Corporation Ltd., Navsari, and that the same be payable in Nvsari on or after 30th April, 1949.\" ."}}, {"text": "Navsari", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5512, "end_char": 5519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5,30,250 be and is hereby declared for the year 1949 out of the income of the Company for the year 1949 remaining unbrought with Messrs.\n\nM. G. Investment Corporation Ltd., Navsari, and that the same be payable in Nvsari on or after 30th April, 1949.\" ."}}, {"text": "Nvsari", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5553, "end_char": 5559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5,30,250 be and is hereby declared for the year 1949 out of the income of the Company for the year 1949 remaining unbrought with Messrs.\n\nM. G. Investment Corporation Ltd., Navsari, and that the same be payable in Nvsari on or after 30th April, 1949.\" ."}}, {"text": "30th April, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5572, "end_char": 5588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5,30,250 be and is hereby declared for the year 1949 out of the income of the Company for the year 1949 remaining unbrought with Messrs.\n\nM. G. Investment Corporation Ltd., Navsari, and that the same be payable in Nvsari on or after 30th April, 1949.\" ."}}, {"text": "s. 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6449, "end_char": 6457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6472, "end_char": 6486, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Kusumben D. M", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6905, "end_char": 6918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Concessions\n\nMrs. Kusumben D. M ai1adevia\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncome-tax,\n\nBombay\n\nHidayat1tllah ].", "canonical_name": "J(usumben D. Mahadtvia"}}, {"text": "J(usumben D. Mahadtvia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6991, "end_char": 7013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mrs. J(usumben D. Mahadtvia v.\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncome-tax,\n\nBombay\n\nHidayatullah ].", "canonical_name": "J(usumben D. Mahadtvia"}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9097, "end_char": 9114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case, the Bombay High Court had\n\n(r) [19,9J 37 I.T, R. II,\n\ndirected the Tribunal to submit a supplementary statement of the case on points not arising from the."}}, {"text": "Section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11897, "end_char": 11907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11915, "end_char": 11929, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13347, "end_char": 13352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14133, "end_char": 14150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Punjab High Court has taken a contrary view in Mash Trading Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax (1 )."}}, {"text": "K. N. W ANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14957, "end_char": 14971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. W ANCHOO and K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. c. DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14976, "end_char": 14991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. W ANCHOO and K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "idayatullah", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15622, "end_char": 15633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".D. Mahadevia v.\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncome-tax,\n\nBombay\n\nH idayatullah J.\n\nr960\n\nMarch30."}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_423_427_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "....\n\n3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 423\n\nwere all decisions of the same Court, and arose in different circumstances. In two of them, the question was wide enough to take in a fine of reasoning not. adopted by the Tribunal, and in the third, the question was widened by deleting a reference to a section, when another section was also material. They were not cases where the issues of law as decided by the Tribunal and the High Court were entirely different, which is the case here. The Punjab High Court has taken a contrary view in Mash Trading Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax (1 ).\n\nFor the reasons given above, we are of opinion that theHigh Court exceeded its jurisdiction in going outside the point of law decided by the Tribunal and deciding a different point of law. The order of the High Court will, therefore, be set aside, and the case -will be remitted to the High Court to decide the question framed by the Tribunal. In view of the fact that both the assessee and the Commissioner pointed out the anomaly to the : High Court and the question was reframed in spite of this, the costs of this appeal shall be costs in the reference to be heard by the High Court, and will abide the result.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nCase remitted.\n\nM/S. BURN & CO. LTD. & OTHERS v.\n\nTHEIR EMPLOYEES. (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. W ANCHOO and K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.) Industrial Dispute-Incentive bonus-Scheme-Eclusion of clerical and subordinate staff-Propriety-Power of Industrial Tribunal.\n\nThere can be no doubt from the point of view of Economics that the clerical and subordinate staff of an industry like its' manual workers contribute to its production and there can, therefore, be no reason for exciuding them wholly from the benefits of a scheme of incentive bonus.\n\nThe fact that the clerical staff are paid dearness allowance at a higher scale can be no reason for their exclusion. '\n\n(1) [1956] 30 I.T.R. 388.\n\nKusumben. .D. Mahadevia v.\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncome-tax,\n\nBombay\n\nH idayatullah J.\n\nr960\n\nMarch30.\n\nr960 Where, as in the instant case, the company had already introduced a scheme of incentive bonus for the inajority of its Burn & Co. Ltd. workmen, there could be no reason why the Industrial Tribunal\n\n\"· should not be able to extend that scheme to the clerical and Their Employees subordinate staff.\n\nM/s. Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, [1959] Supp. z S.C.R. rorz, considered.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JumsmoTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 195 and 196 of 1959.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the Award dated April 15, 1957, of the Third Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, in Case No. VIII-7 of 1956.\n\nB. Sen, P. K. Ghakravarty and B. N. Ghosh, for the appellants (in C. A. No. 195 of 59) and respondents (in C. A. No. 196 of 59).\n\nN. G. Chatterjee, D. L. Sen Gupta and B. P. Maheshwari, for the respondents (in C. A. No. 195 of 59) and appellants (in C. A. No. 196 of 59). •\n\n1960. March 30. Tho Judgment of the Court was delivered by Wanchoo ].\n\nWANCHOO, J.-These are two appeals by special leave against the same award of the Third Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal and shall be disposed of by this judgment.\n\nAppeal No. 195 is by Messrs. Burn and Co. Limited (hereinafter called the company) and Appeal No. 196 is by t.he workmen of Messrs. Burn and Co. Limited (hereinafter called the workmen).\n\nThere were disputes between the company and the workmen on various matters, which were referred to the tribunal for adjudication. Of these disputes, only two now survive in the two appeals. The company's appeal is with respect to that part of the award which deals with incentive bonus to the clerical and subordinate staff while the workmen's appeal is with respect to that part of the award which deals with the ca8h benefit of Annas eight per head per working day for the period the canteen was not in operation.\n\nWe shall first take up the company's appeal. The company has introduced incentive bonus for manual workers including Sarkars and Checkers but there is no provision for inceJ!tive bonus to the clerical and subordinate staff.\n\nThe workmen therefore claimed that these two categories should also be given incel)- tive bonus like the manual workers and pointed out\n\n' A\n\nthat in other concerns this was done. The company z96o resisted the claim on two grounds: (i) that the clerical Burn & Co. Ltd. staff got what is known as the Bengal Chamber of v.\n\nCommerce dearness allowance, which is higher than Their Employees the dearness allowance paid to the manual workers and (ii) that the clerical staff and the subordinate Wanchoo J. staff do not actually produce anything and if they are given incentive bonus it will mean that they would be paid on the production of others, namely, the manual workers.\n\nThe tribunal was of the view that the fact that the clerks got the Bengal Chamber of Commerce dearness allowance was no reason for their .total exclusion from the benefit of the incentive bonus scheme. It also pointed out that the subordinate staff did not get the Bengal Chamber of Commerce dearness allowance and there was no difference between their dearness allowance and the dearness allowance of the manual workers. Further the tribunal was conscious of the fact that the clerical staff and the subordinate staff do not directly produce goods but that in its opinion was no }ustification for their total exclusion, particularly when other comparable concerns like the Indian Iron 1 and Steel Co. Ltd. at Burnpur, Bridge and Roof Co. (India) Limited, Howrah, and Tatas were paying incentive bonus to the clerical and subordinate staff also. It therefore ordered that the company should extend the scheme of incentive bonus to the clerical and subordinate staff also and lay down the rates and conditions for the same.\n\nThe main contention of the company before us is that as the clerical staff and the subordinate staff have no part in actual production they should not be given any incentive bonus, particularly as their work does not increase at all because of the increased production. It is, however, difficult to accept that there will be no increase in the work of the clerical staff in particular and also of the subordinate staff because of higher production, though it may be accepted that the increase 'may not be in proportion to the increase of production. It is also true that the clerical staff and the subordinate staff do not directly produce goods like manual workers arid thatmy be a reason\n\nBwrn b Co. Ltd. v.\n\nTheir Employees\n\nTVanchoo ].\n\nfor treating them somewhat differently in the matter of incentive bonus and that is what the tribunal seems to have done, for it has directed the company to extend the scheme of incentive bonus to the clerical and subordinate staff and to lay down the rates and conditions of the same and has not said that exactly the same rates and conditions should apply to the clerical and subordinate staff as apply to the manual workers.\n\nBut there can be nu doubt that economically speaking the clerical staff and. the subordinate staff also take part in the production and there is no reason therefore for excluding them altogether from the scheme of incentive bonus. Besides, as the tribunal has pointed out, in other comparable concerns incentive bonus is being paid to the clerical and subordinate staff.\n\nThe fact that dearness allowance was paid to the clerical staff at a higher scale is also, in our opinion, no reason for depriving them altogether of the benefits of the incentive bonus scheme.\n\nIt is also urged on behalf of the company that the introduction of incentive bonus is a management function and the tribunal should not impose it on the management and reference in this connection has been made to Messrs. Titaghur Paper Mills Go. Ltd. v. Their Workmen (1). In the present case, however, the incentive bonus scheme has already been introduced by the company for the major part of its workmen and all that is now asked for is that the benefit of the scheme should be extended to the remainder of the workmen.\n\nThis prayer is, in our opinion, very different from asking a tribunal to impose an incentive bonus scheme for the first time in a concern.\n\nWe can see no reason why where an incentive bonus is in force in a concern for the majority of its workmen, the tribunal should not be able to extend the same to the remainder of the workmen.\n\nWe therefore see no reason to interfere with the order of the tribunal in this behalf.\n\nTurning now to the appeal of the workmen with respect to eight a.nnas tiffin allowance during the period the canteen was not working, it is enough to say that this matter was examined at length by the\n\n\\I} [1959] Supp, 2 S.C.R. 101._\n\n...\n\ntribunal. It has dealt with the history relating to this tiffin allowance and exhaustively considered all the points raised on behalf of the.workmen. Nothing has been brought to our notice which would induce us to interfere with the considered order of the tribunal in this behalf.\n\nAll the points that Srl Chatterjee has raised on behalf of the workmen have been dealt with by the tribunal and the conclusion it has reached is that having regard to the circumstances, the workmen were not eligible to the tiffin allowance of annas eight per head per working day. All that we need say is that the correspondence between the workmen and the company shows that though the workmen were keen on the provision of a canteen before the tiffin allowance was granted by the award dated July 24, 1953, their keenness disappeared after the award. The company seems to have taken steps even before the award to start a canteen and pursued the matter vigorously after the award; but the workmen started objecting to the arrangements made and some of the objections were fantastic. It seems that having been given the tiffin allowance they preferred to have it rather than go to the canteen. In the circumstances we are of opinion that the conclusionof the tribunal is correct and there is no reason for interference.\n\nThe appeals are hereby dismissed, but in the circumstances we pass no ord_er as to costs. ·\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\nTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH • v.\n\nKHUSHI RAM ( JAFER IMAM and A. K. SARKAR, JJ.) Criminal Trial-Magistrate empowered to impose sentence provided-Commitment under impression of not being so empowered- Trial by Court of Session on such commitment-Validity-Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, I954 (37 of r954), ss. 7, I6 and 2I.-Code of Criminal Procedure, r898 (V of r898), ss. 32, 207 and 347.\n\nThe respondent was prosecuted for offences under s. 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The Magistrate found the offences proved and he further found that the respondeut had\n\nBurn 0- Co. Ltd.\n\nTheir Employees\n\nWanchoo ].\n\nApril I.", "total_entities": 32, "entities": [{"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 488, "end_char": 505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Punjab High Court has taken a contrary view in Mash Trading Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax (1 )."}}, {"text": "M/S. BURN & CO. LTD. & OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1238, "end_char": 1267, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M/S. BURN & CO. LTD. & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THEIR EMPLOYEES. (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1272, "end_char": 1310, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1331, "end_char": 1351, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2613, "end_char": 2619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, P. K. Ghakravarty and B. N. Ghosh, for the appellants (in C. A. No."}}, {"text": "P. K. Ghakravarty", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2621, "end_char": 2638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, P. K. Ghakravarty and B. N. Ghosh, for the appellants (in C. A. No."}}, {"text": "B. N. Ghosh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2643, "end_char": 2654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, P. K. Ghakravarty and B. N. Ghosh, for the appellants (in C. A. No."}}, {"text": "N. G. Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2743, "end_char": 2759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. G. Chatterjee, D. L. Sen Gupta and B. P. Maheshwari, for the respondents (in C. A. No."}}, {"text": "D. L. Sen Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2761, "end_char": 2776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. G. Chatterjee, D. L. Sen Gupta and B. P. Maheshwari, for the respondents (in C. A. No."}}, {"text": "B. P. Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2781, "end_char": 2797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. G. Chatterjee, D. L. Sen Gupta and B. P. Maheshwari, for the respondents (in C. A. No."}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2947, "end_char": 2954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tho Judgment of the Court was delivered by Wanchoo ].", "canonical_name": "Wanchoo"}}, {"text": "WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2959, "end_char": 2966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "WANCHOO, J.-These are two appeals by special leave against the same award of the Third Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal and shall be disposed of by this judgment.", "canonical_name": "Wanchoo"}}, {"text": "Third Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3040, "end_char": 3078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "WANCHOO, J.-These are two appeals by special leave against the same award of the Third Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal and shall be disposed of by this judgment."}}, {"text": "Burn and Co. Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3152, "end_char": 3172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "195 is by Messrs. Burn and Co. Limited (hereinafter called the company) and Appeal No."}}, {"text": "clerical Burn & Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4298, "end_char": 4322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The company z96o resisted the claim on two grounds: (i) that the clerical Burn & Co. Ltd. staff got what is known as the Bengal Chamber of v.\n\nCommerce dearness allowance, which is higher than Their Employees the dearness allowance paid to the manual workers and (ii) that the clerical staff and the subordinate Wanchoo J. staff do not actually produce anything and if they are given incentive bonus it will mean that they would be paid on the production of others, namely, the manual workers."}}, {"text": "Bengal Chamber of Commerce dearness allowance", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4795, "end_char": 4840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The tribunal was of the view that the fact that the clerks got the Bengal Chamber of Commerce dearness allowance was no reason for their .total exclusion from the benefit of the incentive bonus scheme."}}, {"text": "Indian Iron 1 and Steel Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5402, "end_char": 5434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further the tribunal was conscious of the fact that the clerical staff and the subordinate staff do not directly produce goods but that in its opinion was no }ustification for their total exclusion, particularly when other comparable concerns like the Indian Iron 1 and Steel Co. Ltd. at Burnpur, Bridge and Roof Co. (India) Limited, Howrah, and Tatas were paying incentive bonus to the clerical and subordinate staff also."}}, {"text": "Burnpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5438, "end_char": 5445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further the tribunal was conscious of the fact that the clerical staff and the subordinate staff do not directly produce goods but that in its opinion was no }ustification for their total exclusion, particularly when other comparable concerns like the Indian Iron 1 and Steel Co. Ltd. at Burnpur, Bridge and Roof Co. (India) Limited, Howrah, and Tatas were paying incentive bonus to the clerical and subordinate staff also."}}, {"text": "Bridge and Roof Co. (India) Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5447, "end_char": 5482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further the tribunal was conscious of the fact that the clerical staff and the subordinate staff do not directly produce goods but that in its opinion was no }ustification for their total exclusion, particularly when other comparable concerns like the Indian Iron 1 and Steel Co. Ltd. at Burnpur, Bridge and Roof Co. (India) Limited, Howrah, and Tatas were paying incentive bonus to the clerical and subordinate staff also."}}, {"text": "Howrah", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5484, "end_char": 5490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further the tribunal was conscious of the fact that the clerical staff and the subordinate staff do not directly produce goods but that in its opinion was no }ustification for their total exclusion, particularly when other comparable concerns like the Indian Iron 1 and Steel Co. Ltd. at Burnpur, Bridge and Roof Co. (India) Limited, Howrah, and Tatas were paying incentive bonus to the clerical and subordinate staff also."}}, {"text": "Tatas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5496, "end_char": 5501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further the tribunal was conscious of the fact that the clerical staff and the subordinate staff do not directly produce goods but that in its opinion was no }ustification for their total exclusion, particularly when other comparable concerns like the Indian Iron 1 and Steel Co. Ltd. at Burnpur, Bridge and Roof Co. (India) Limited, Howrah, and Tatas were paying incentive bonus to the clerical and subordinate staff also."}}, {"text": "Srl Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8978, "end_char": 8992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All the points that Srl Chatterjee has raised on behalf of the workmen have been dealt with by the tribunal and the conclusion it has reached is that having regard to the circumstances, the workmen were not eligible to the tiffin allowance of annas eight per head per working day."}}, {"text": "July 24, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9452, "end_char": 9465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All that we need say is that the correspondence between the workmen and the company shows that though the workmen were keen on the provision of a canteen before the tiffin allowance was granted by the award dated July 24, 1953, their keenness disappeared after the award."}}, {"text": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10097, "end_char": 10119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH • v.\n\nKHUSHI RAM ( JAFER IMAM and A. K. SARKAR, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "KHUSHI RAM", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10126, "end_char": 10136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH • v.\n\nKHUSHI RAM ( JAFER IMAM and A. K. SARKAR, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "JAFER IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10139, "end_char": 10149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH • v.\n\nKHUSHI RAM ( JAFER IMAM and A. K. SARKAR, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "A. K. SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10154, "end_char": 10166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH • v.\n\nKHUSHI RAM ( JAFER IMAM and A. K. SARKAR, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "ss. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10402, "end_char": 10407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10420, "end_char": 10446, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 32, 207 and 347", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10466, "end_char": 10485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10537, "end_char": 10541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10549, "end_char": 10590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_427_431_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "...\n\n3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 427\n\ntribunal. It has dealt with the history relating to this tiffin allowance and exhaustively considered all the points raised on behalf of the.workmen. Nothing has been brought to our notice which would induce us to interfere with the considered order of the tribunal in this behalf.\n\nAll the points that Srl Chatterjee has raised on behalf of the workmen have been dealt with by the tribunal and the conclusion it has reached is that having regard to the circumstances, the workmen were not eligible to the tiffin allowance of annas eight per head per working day. All that we need say is that the correspondence between the workmen and the company shows that though the workmen were keen on the provision of a canteen before the tiffin allowance was granted by the award dated July 24, 1953, their keenness disappeared after the award. The company seems to have taken steps even before the award to start a canteen and pursued the matter vigorously after the award; but the workmen started objecting to the arrangements made and some of the objections were fantastic. It seems that having been given the tiffin allowance they preferred to have it rather than go to the canteen. In the circumstances we are of opinion that the conclusionof the tribunal is correct and there is no reason for interference.\n\nThe appeals are hereby dismissed, but in the circumstances we pass no ord_er as to costs. ·\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\nTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH • v.\n\nKHUSHI RAM ( JAFER IMAM and A. K. SARKAR, JJ.) Criminal Trial-Magistrate empowered to impose sentence provided-Commitment under impression of not being so empowered- Trial by Court of Session on such commitment-Validity-Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, I954 (37 of r954), ss. 7, I6 and 2I.-Code of Criminal Procedure, r898 (V of r898), ss. 32, 207 and 347.\n\nThe respondent was prosecuted for offences under s. 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The Magistrate found the offences proved and he further found that the respondeut had\n\nBurn 0- Co. Ltd.\n\nTheir Employees\n\nWanchoo ].\n\nApril I.\n\nState of Uttar Pradesh v. /( hushi Rani\n\nSarkar].\n\n428 SUPREME COUltT REPORTS [1960]\n\ncommitted the offence for the third time for which he was liable to be awarded a sentence of imprisonment for not less than two years and to a fine of not less than Rs. 3,000. Section zr of the Act specifically empowered the Magistrate to impose this sentence, but as he was under the impression that s. 32 of the Code of Criminal Procedure limited his power to impose sentences he committed the respondent to stand his trial before the Court of Session.\n\nThe Court of Session found the respondent guilty and convicted him. On appeal the High Court held that the Magistrate had no power to commit and that the Sessions Judge had no jurisdiction to try the case, set aside the conviction and sentence and remanded the case for re-trial to the Magistrate : Held, that the commitment was not illegal and that the Sessions Judge had jurisdiction to try the case. Section zr of the Act vvas not a disabling provision and it did not make commitment by a Magistrate competent to award the full sentence prescribed by the Act, a nullity; it did not take away the power of the Magistrate to commit. The Magistrate had both the power and the territorial jurisdiction to commit, and the comn1itment was good.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 160 of 1959.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 30, 1958, of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) at Lucknow in Criminal Appeal No. 105of1957, arising out of the judgment and order dated February 12, 1957, of the Second Temporary Civil and Sessions Judge at Barabanki in Criminal Sessions Trial No. 102 of 1956.\n\nG. 0. Mathur and 0. P. Lal, for the appellant.\n\nThe respondent did not appear.\n\n1960. April 1.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKAR, J.-The respondent was prosecuted before the Judicial Magistrate, Barabanki, for offences under els. (i) and (iii) of s. 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, for selling adulterated milk and for selling milk without a licence.\n\nThe learned Magistrate found that the offences had been proved and further that, the respondent had committed the offences for the third time.\n\nUnder cl. (a) (iii) of subsec. (i) of s. 16 of the Act, in the absence of special and adequate reasons to the contrary, for a third offence the imprisonment to be awarded cannot be for less than two years and the fine to be imposed not less than three thoueand rupees.\n\nSection 32 of the\n\nCriminal Procedure Code however provides that a Magistrate of the first class shall not have power to impose sentence of fine exceeding rupees two thou- .sand. Under the impression that bis power as a Magistrate of the first class to impose sentence was limited by s. 32 of the Code the learned Judicial Magistrate committed the respondent to stand his trial before the Court of Session, presumably acting under s. 34 7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nThe respondent was thereupon tried by a learned Sessions Judge of Barabanki who found him guilty of the offences with which he had been charged. The learned Sessions Judge however came to the conclusion that the offences had been commited by the respondent for the second time and not the third. He observed that the learned Judicial Magistrate was competent to award the minimum punishment prescribed by the Act for a second offence and should not have committed the case to the Court of Session at all. He however convicted the respondent and awarded the minimum sentence prescribed by the Act for a second offence, namely, rigorous imprisonment for one year and a fine of rupees two thousand and, in default, rigorous imprisonment for a further period of six months for each of the offences and directed the sentences of imprisonment to run concurrently.\n\nThe respondent then ap_pealed to the High Court at Allahabad. Mulla, J., who heard the appeal pointed out that the learned Judicial Magistrate had overlooked the provisions ofs. 21 of the Act which provides that notwithstanding anything contained in s. 32 of the Code it shall be lawful for a Magistrate of the first class to pass any . sentence authorised by the Act in excess of his powers under s. 32 of the Code. The learned Judge observed that the learned Magistrate was therefore quite competent to award all punishments that the law required and had no reason to commit the respondent to a Court of Session. 'He took the viewthat a Court of Session could try only those cases which were legally and properly committed to it by a, MB.gistra, te a, nd tha, t s. 21 of the Act was not only an enabling provision but also a disabling one., He held that s. 21 of the Act prevented a commitment to\n\nState of Uttar\n\nPradesh v.\n\nKhushi Ram\n\nSarkar].\n\nr960\n\nState of Uttar\n\nPradesh\n\nI< hushi Ra1n\n\nSarkar].\n\nthe Court of Session by a Magistrate of the first class.\n\nHe observed, \"Where a special Act has made a special provision for punishment to be awarded by a Magistrate irrespective of the limitations placed upon .hi5! powers under the Criminal Procedure Code, it amounts to an abrogation of the general law and the provisions of s. 347 of the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be applied to such a case.\" In this view of the matter he held that the learned Judicial Magistrate had no power to commit the respondent to the Court of Session for trial and the learned Sessions Judge had no jurisdiction to try t!he case.\n\nHe thereupon set aside the order of conviction and the sentence passed against the respondent and remanded the case to the District Magistrate of Barabanki to be transferred by him to the Court of a competent Magistrate for trial and disposal. The State has appealed to this Court against the judgment of Mulla, J.\n\nWe are unable to agree with the view of Mulla, J., that the learned Sessions Judge had-no jurisdiction to try the case.\n\nWe do not think that s. 21 of the Act is a disabling provision. All that it does is to authorise a Magistrate of the first clas~ to award a sentence beyond the limits prescribed for him under s. 32 of the Code. It does not affect the provisions of ss. 207 and 347 of the Code, nor has it anything to do with the jurisdiction of a Court of Session. The section does not make commitment by a Magistrate competent to award the full sentence prescribed by the Act, a nullity; nor does the section interfere with the jurisdiction of a Court of Session to deal with a matter committed to it in spite of its provisions.\n\nThe jurisdiction of a Court of Session depends upon the Code. It has jurisdiction to try .any case which is committed to it. The case against the respondent had been committed to a Court of Session by a Magi-· strate having power to cominit. Further, the Magi- 3trate did not laCgistrate has no concern with personalities who are parties to the case b'efore him but only with its merits.\n\nAfter carefully going through the entire record, we are satisfied that the appellant was not given full opportunity to establish his case in the manner prescribed by law. We should not be understood to have expressed any opinion on the merits of the case ; they fall to be considered on the entire evidence which may be produced by the appellant in the presence of the respondent or his pleader, as the case may be.\n\nIn the result, the iJrder of the High Court is set aside and the reference made by the Sessions Judge is accepted and the application is remanded to the Court\n\nof the Magistrate, First Class, Allahabad, for disposal according to law.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 75, "entities": [{"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 145, "end_char": 149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 295, "end_char": 300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N AND LAL MISRA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 780, "end_char": 795, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N ANDLAL MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. L. 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SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 874, "end_char": 880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 888, "end_char": 914, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 997, "end_char": 1023, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1184, "end_char": 1190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1496, "end_char": 1502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1504, "end_char": 1527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2037, "end_char": 2050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court rejected the Sessions Court's reference and refused to certify that the case was a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "J{hushi Ram", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2220, "end_char": 2231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Uttar\n\nPradesh\n\nJ{hushi Ram\n\nSarkar]."}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2292, "end_char": 2301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• April I.\n\nNandlal Misra v. 11, L. 11-1 is,, a\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nSection 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate a preliminary enquiry before issuing a notice but lays down that all evidence under that section should be taken in the presence of the respondent or his pleader indicating thereby that one enquiry only should be held after notice.", "canonical_name": "Subba Rao"}}, {"text": "Section 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2306, "end_char": 2317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2325, "end_char": 2351, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2625, "end_char": 2631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter XXXVI of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2861, "end_char": 2886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3375, "end_char": 3395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated December 3, Hl56, of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Reference No, 159 of 1956."}}, {"text": "N. 0. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3436, "end_char": 3445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. 0."}}, {"text": "K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3470, "end_char": 3481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, Purshottam Tricumdas, G. 0."}}, {"text": "G. 0. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3533, "end_char": 3545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, Purshottam Tricumdas, G. 0."}}, {"text": "P. Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3553, "end_char": 3559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Lal, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "SuBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3642, "end_char": 3651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The J'udgment of the Court was delivered by SuBBA RAo, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad rejecting the reference made by the learned Sessions Judge under s. 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.", "canonical_name": "Subba Rao"}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3725, "end_char": 3762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The J'udgment of the Court was delivered by SuBBA RAo, J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad rejecting the reference made by the learned Sessions Judge under s. 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure."}}, {"text": "s. 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3828, "end_char": 3834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XXXVI of the Code", "statute": "Chapter XXXVI of the Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3842, "end_char": 3868, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Gita Basu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3950, "end_char": 3959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gita Basu."}}, {"text": "s. 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4047, "end_char": 4053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4061, "end_char": 4087, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "September 20, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4412, "end_char": 4430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Without gving notice to the respondent, the Magistrate posted the petition for evidence on September 20, 1955."}}, {"text": "s. 202", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4676, "end_char": 4682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 26, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4759, "end_char": 4777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ", -\n1\n\nAfter she was examined, the Magistrate directed her to produce any further evidence she might like to lead under s. 202 of the Code and, for that purpose, he adjourned the petition for hearing to September 26, 1955, on which date one police constable was examined and the learned Magistrate made the endorsement that the applicant said that she would examine no other witness."}}, {"text": "September 27, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4943, "end_char": 4961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 27, 1955, the appellant filed a petition before the Magistrate stating that s. 200 of the Code had no application and that no enquiry need be made before_ issuing notice to the respondent."}}, {"text": "s. 200", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5029, "end_char": 5035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "6, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5435, "end_char": 5442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 6, 1955, the guardian of the appellant examined one more witness."}}, {"text": "October 10, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5637, "end_char": 5653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 10, 1955, the learned Magistrate made an order dismissing the application."}}, {"text": "ss. 200 to 203", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5768, "end_char": 5782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nand Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6120, "end_char": 6128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He then proceeded to consider the evidence and came to the conclusion that he was not satisfied that the respondent was the father of Nand Lal, and on that finding he refused to issue notice of the application to the respondent, and dismissed the application."}}, {"text": "Sessions Judge, Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6330, "end_char": 6355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Magistrate to the Sessions Judge, Allahabad."}}, {"text": "s. 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6584, "end_char": 6590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High CDurt Df Judicature at Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6636, "end_char": 6673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He submitted the record to the High CDurt Df Judicature at Allahabad recommending that the order passed by the Magistrate be set aside and that the Magistrate be ordered to.,"}}, {"text": "Nandlal Misra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6899, "end_char": 6912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reference\n\nNandlal Misra came up for hearing before Chowdhry, J., who, on the v. analogy of other sections of the Code held that the\n\nI<."}}, {"text": "Chowdhry", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6940, "end_char": 6948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reference\n\nNandlal Misra came up for hearing before Chowdhry, J., who, on the v. analogy of other sections of the Code held that the\n\nI<."}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8435, "end_char": 8461, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9165, "end_char": 9173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the learned Magistrate followed a procedure not contemplated by the Code", "statute": "Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the learned Magistrate followed a procedure not contemplated by the Code"}}, {"text": "s. 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9427, "end_char": 9433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the learned Magistrate followed a procedure not contemplated by the Code", "statute": "Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the learned Magistrate followed a procedure not contemplated by the Code"}}, {"text": "s. 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9651, "end_char": 9657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 200 to 203", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9705, "end_char": 9719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 200", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9734, "end_char": 9745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 202", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9842, "end_char": 9853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10371, "end_char": 10377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11130, "end_char": 11136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 200 to 203", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11203, "end_char": 11217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 488(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11295, "end_char": 11304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11402, "end_char": 11404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter XXXVI of the said Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11417, "end_char": 11447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 200", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11557, "end_char": 11563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XXXVI of the said Code", "statute": "Chapter XXXVI of the said Code"}}, {"text": "ss. 200 to 203", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11827, "end_char": 11841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter XXXVI of the said Code", "statute": "Chapter XXXVI of the said Code"}}, {"text": "s. 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13324, "end_char": 13330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13537, "end_char": 13543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13735, "end_char": 13746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 489", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14625, "end_char": 14636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14688, "end_char": 14694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 490", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14700, "end_char": 14706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15293, "end_char": 15299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. L. Misra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15668, "end_char": 15679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It 'is suggested thi:tt unless the child is admitted by the putative father to be his illegitimate child1 the\n\nz960\n\nNandlal Misra\n\nK. L. Misra\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nN and/al Misra v.\n\nJ(.", "canonical_name": "K. L. MISRA"}}, {"text": "s. 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16414, "end_char": 16420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 200 to 203", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16988, "end_char": 17002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17052, "end_char": 17058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 2Q", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19987, "end_char": 19993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 202", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20105, "end_char": 20111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 200 to 203", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21105, "end_char": 21119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21603, "end_char": 21629, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_441_450_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nTHE CHARTERED BANK, BOMBAY v.\n\nTHE CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES' UNION.\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K.N. W ANCHOO and K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)\n\nIndustrial Dispute -Chief Cashier of Bank withdrawing guarantee in respect of Assistant Cashier-Termination of service of Assistant Cashier by Bank without holding enquiry-Validity of-All India Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes) Award, I95J, paras. 52I,\n\n522(I).\n\nThe system of working in the cash department of the appellant Bank was that there was a Chief Cashier and there were about thirty Assistant Cashiers under him.\n\nThe Chief Cashier had to give security for the work of the cash department; the Assistant Cashiers were employed upon being introduced by the Chief Cashier who guaranteed each such employee. There was long standing practice in the Bank that at the end of the day when the cash was locked up under the supervision of the Chief Cashier, all the assistant cashiers had to be present so that the cash could be checked before being locked up. In spite of reminders C, an Assistant Cashier, had been leaving the Bank without the permission of the Chief Cashier for some time before the cash was checked and locked up. The Chief Cashier reported the matter to the management, withdrew his guarantee in respect of C and stated that unless the services of C were dispensed with his conduct would affect the security of the cash department. The Bank terminated the services of C in accordance with the provisions of para. 522(1) of the All India Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes) Award, 1953, without holding any enquiry against C.\n\nThe Industrial Tribunal to which the dispute was referred held that this was in fact and in reality a case of termination of services for misconduct and the Bank ought to have followed the procedure laid down in para. 521 of the Bank Award for taking disciplinary action, that the termination of service was. illegal and improper and that C was entitled to reinstatement with full back wages and other benefits: Held, that the services of the Assistant Cashier were properly terminated by the Bank. There was no doubt that an employer could not dispense with the services of a permanent employee by mere notice and claim that the industrial tribunal had no jurisdiction to inquire into the circumstances of SJ!ch termination. Even in a case of this kind the requirement of bonafides was essential and if the termination of service was a colourable exercise of the power or as a result of victimisation or unfair h.bour practice the tribunal had jurisdiction to interfere. Where the termination of service was capricious, arbitrary or unnecessarily harsh that may be cogent evidence of victimisation or unfair labour practice. In the present case the security of the\n\nApril 4.\n\nr960 Bank was involved and if the Bank decided that it would not go into the squabble between the Chief Cashier and C and would use Chartered Bank, para. 522(1) of the Bank Award to terminate the, services of Cit\n\nBoinbay could not be said the Bank was exercising its power under para. v. 522(1) in a colourable manner. It was not necessary that in Chartered Bank every case where there was an allegation of misconduct the Eniptoyees' Union procedure under para. 52r for taking disciplinary action should be followed.\n\nBuckingham and Carnatic Company Ltd. v. Workers' of the O!mpany, 1952 L.A.C. 490, approved.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 14 of 1959.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Award dated February 21, 1958, of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Nagpur at Bombay, in Reference CGIT No. 12of1957.\n\nSachin Ghaudhury, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant.\n\nA. S. R.Chariand Y. Kumar, fortherespondents.\n\n1960. April 4. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nwanc/100 J.\n\nWANCHOo,_J.-This is an appeal by special leave in an industrial matter. , The appellant is The Chartered Bank, Bombay (hereinafter called the Bank). There was a dispute between the Bank and its workmen regarding the termination of the service of one Colsavala (hereinafter called the respondent) who was working as an assistant cashier in the Bank. The system of working in the cash. department of the Bank is that there is a chief cashier and under him are about thirty assistant cashiers. The Chief Cashier has to give security for the work of the cash department.\n\nConsequently all assistant cashiers are employed upon the introduction of the Chief Cashier who guarantees each such employee.\n\nBy virtue of this guarantee the Chief Cashier alone is unconditionally responsible to the Bank for any shortage which might occur in the cash department and no security is taken from the assistant cashiers working therein. In view of this guarantee by the Chief Cashier there has been a longstanding practice in the Bank that at the end of the day when the cash is locked up under the supervision of the Chief Cashier, all the assistant cashiers have to be present so that the cash may be checked before\n\n• -\n\nbeing locked up. Assistant Cashiers therefore can only r960 leave the Bank before the locking up of the cash after Chartered Bank, obtaining permission of the Chief Cashier.\n\nBombay On January 4, 1957, the Chief Cashier reported to v • the management that the respondent had been leaving Chartered Bank the Bank without his permission for some time past Employees' Union before the cash was checked and locked up in spite of the issue of a departmental circular in that behalf on Wanchoo J.\n\nDecember 24, 1956, by which all assistant cashiers (including the respondent) were reminded of the long~\n\nstanding practice that no assistant cashier should leave the Bank without the permission of the Chief\n\nCashier before the cash was checked and locked up.\n\nThe Chief Cashier therefore stated that he was unable to continue to guarantee the respondent and that unless the respondent's service was dispensed with his conduct will affect the security of the cash department.\n\nAs the Bank was not prepared to change the system in force in the cash department, the management decided to dispense with the service of the respondent in accordance with the mode of termination prescribed by paragraph 522(1) of the All India Industrial ribunal (Bank Disputes) Award of March, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the Bank Award). The Bank was also unable to employ the respondent in any other department. It therefore informed the respondent on March 29, 1957, that as the guarantee covering his employment had been withdrawn by the Chief Cashier the Bank was unable to con:tinue to employ him. The notice required under paragraph 522(1) was given and the amount due to the respondent including retrenchment compensation was paid to him and his service was terminated. Thereupon a dispute was raised by the workmen of the Bank and a reference was made by the Cel1tral Government to the Industrial Tribunal with respect to the \"alleged wrongful termination of the services of Shri N. D. Colsavala by the Chartered Bank, Bombay, and the relief, if any, to which he is entitled.\"\n\nThe case on behalf of the -respondent was that he. had been working in the Bank since September I, 1937, honestly and efficiently as an assistant cashier in the cash department. The previous Chief Cashier who\n\nr960 was the father of the preent Chief Cashier however became hostile to him since 1943, because he claimed Cha, tered Bank, his legitimate dues for over-time work and leave\n\nBo\"':_ay which the then Chief Cashier was not prepared to Cha, tmd Bank allow. Further the respondent's letter of appointment Employees' Union did not oblige him to give any security or to procure any guarantee and if the Chief Cashier had given any Wanchoo J. guarantee to the Bank, the respondent was not concerned with it and had even no knowledge of it. He\n\nW!).S given no opportunity to contest the reasons for the withdrawal of the guarantee by the Chief Cashier; nor was he asked to furnish security or give a fidelity bond, even if the Chief Cashier had withdrawn the guarantee. In consequence the discharge of the respondent from service on the ground given by the Bank was entirely illegal, wrongful and unjustified and he was entitled to reinstatement or in the alternative to full compensation for loss of employment.\n\nThe case of the Bank was that it was entitled to terminate the service of the respondent under paragraph 522(1) of the Bank Award and it was not incumbent on it to state the reasons for such termination and the reasons could not be inquired into or examined by the tribunal. In the alternative it was submitted that if the tribunal was of the opinion that it was open to it to inquire into the reasons, the Bank's case was that the respondent was not dismissed or discharged by way of punishment for any misconduct and that the Bank merely terminated his service under paragraph 522(1) of the Bank Award, as his guarantee had been withdrawn by the Chief Cashier and it was impossible to continue to employ him in the circumstances, the Bank being unprepared to change its system of working which has already been mentioned above. It was also said that the Bank was not bound to transfer the respondent to another department and in any case the respondent's training, experience, ability or record did not fit him for work in any other department of the Bank.\n\nThe tribunal held that even though the Bank had chosen to follow the procedure laid down in paragraph 522(1) of the Bank Award which provides for termination of employment \"in cases not involving\n\n...\n\ndisciplinary action for misconduct, by three months' x96o notice or on payment of three months' pay and allow- Chartered Bank, ances in lieu of notice\", this did not preclude it from Bombay inquiring into the reasons for the termination of v .. service and into the legality and/or propriety of the Chartere~ Ball action taken by the bank and that paragraph 522(1) Employees Union did not give a free hand to the Bank to dispense with wa:; hoo 1. the service of a permanent employee at will. It also held that it was always open to the tribunal to inquire info the bona fides as well as justifiability of the action taken. It then went into the circumstances in which' the termination of service took place andwas of opinion that this was in fact and in reality a case of termination of service for misconduct, and that it was the duty of the Bank to follow the procedure for taking disciplinary action for the alleged insubordination and persistent disobedience of the orders of the\n\nChief Cashier by the respondent with respect to leaving the Bank without his prior permission before the cash. was checked and locked up and -inasmuch as the Bank failed to follow the requisite procedure as was laid down in paragraph 521 of the Bank Award, the termination of the service of the respondent was illegal and imprope~ and he was entitled to reinstatement with full back wages and other benefits.\n\nIt is this order which is being challenged before us by the Bank.\n\nThe main contention on behalf the Bank is that theview taken by the tribunal that in every case where there may be some misconduct the Bank is bound to take disciplinary action under paragraph 521 of the Bank Award makes.paragraph 522( l) completely otiose and is erroneous. Further it is contended that in the peculiar position obtaining in the cash department of the Bank whereby the Chief Cashier guarantees all the assistant cashiers working under him, the Bank did not want to go into the squabble between the Chief Cashier and the respondent_ and as the Chief Cashier had withdrawn the guarantee of the respondent, the Bank decided without apportioning any blame between the Chief Cashier and the respondent to act under paragraph 522(1) of the Bank Award.\n\nIt is urged that paragraph 522(1) of the Bank Award is\n\nr960 particularly meant to meet situations like this which\n\nmay arise in a banking concern.\n\nChartered Bank, h fi h f ' h T e rst question that arises t ere ore is t e scope Bombay v. of the power of the Bank to act under paragraph Chartered Bank 522(1) of the Bank Award, particularly in the peculiar fanployees' Union situation prevailing in the cash department of the Bank. The position in the cash department of the Wanchoo J. banks was considered by the Bank Award in Chapter XXI with respect to giving of security.\n\nIn paragraphs 417 and 418, the existing practice in various banks is summarised and it takes one of three forms, na.mely-(i) every member of the sta.ff is to give security, (ii) the head cashier gives a guarantee on behalf of all the cashiers working under him, and (iii) where the treasurer system prevails, the treasurer enters into a contract with the bank and recommends the employees for emplC?yment in the cash department and guarantees their fidelity and they are thereupon appointed by the bank. The tribunaL was not right in saying that the system which was prevailing in the Bank was peculiar to it and was not mentioned in the Bank Award. It will be seen that the system in the Bank is of the second kind noticed in the Bank A ward where the Chief Cashier guarantees all those working under him. It is also mentioned in the Bank Award that the Chief Cashier generally takes security deposits from persons working under him but that did not appear to be the invariable rule, and in the Bank the Chief Cashier does not take any security from his subordinates. In such a system the Bank has to depend upon the security given by the Chief Cashier and his guarantee of the employees working under him. It is impossible to accept that this way of working was not known to the respondent. The Bank has produced the respondent's application for employment and it is significaht that it is addressed to the Chief Cashier and not to the management of the Bank and this bears out the contention of the Bank that the subordinates in the cash department are employed on the recommendation of the Chief Cashier who gives guarantee for them. Nor does the Bank's contention that no one employed in the cash department leaves without permission till the cash is checked and locked up appears\n\nimprobable, for the practice seems necessary for the r960 security of the cash department. Therefore when the Chartered Bank, Bank was faced with the report of the Chief Cashier Bombay dated 4-1-1957, it had to decide in the special circumv. stances of this case what action should be taken on that Chartered Bank report. Two courses were open to it: it could have Employees' Union taken disciplinary action under paragraph 521 of the Wanchoo].\n\nBank Award or it could have acted under paragraph 522(1). The submission on behalf of the Bank is that it did not want to go into the squabble between the\n\nChief Cashier and the respondent and as the Chief Cashier had withdrawn his guarantee with respect to the respondent it acted bona fide in proceeding under paragraph 522(1) and thus no question arose of its taking disciplinary action against the respondent.\n\nThere is no doubt that an employer cannot dispense with the services of a permanent employee by mere notice and claim that the industrial tribunal has no jurisdiction to inquire into the circumstances in which such termination of service simpliciter took place.\n\nMany standing orders have provisions similar to paragraph 522(1) of the Bank Award, and the scope of the power of the employer to act under such provisions has come up for consideration before labour tribunals many a time. In Buckingham and CarnatiC\n\nCompany Ltd., Etc., v. Workers of the Company, etc. {1), the Labour Appellate Tribunal had occasion to consider this matter relating to discharge by notice or in lieu thereof by payment of wages for a certain period without assigning any reason. It was of opinion that even in a case of this kind the requirement of bona fides is essential and if the termination of service is a colourable exercise of the power or as a result of victimisation or unfair labour practice the industrial tribunal would have the jurisdiction to intervene and set aside such termination. Further it held that where the termination of services is capricious, arbitrary or unnecessarily harsh on the part of the employer judged by normal standards of a reasonable man that may be cogent evidence of victimisation or unfait la.bour practice. We are of opinion that this correctly lays down the scope of the powei of the tribunal to (I) [195a] LA.C. 490,\n\nr960 interfere where service is terminated simpliciter under the provisions of a contract or of standing orders or Chartered Bank, Bombay of some award like the Bank Award.\n\nIn order to v. judge this, the tribunal will have to go into all the Chartered Bank circumstances which led to the termination simpliciter Employees' Union and an employer cannot say that it is not bound to - disclose the circumstances before the tribunal.\n\nThe Wanchoo ]. form of the order of termination is not conclusive of the true nature of the order, for it is possible that the form may be merely a camouflage for an order of dismissal for misconduct. It is therefore always open to the tribunal to go behind the form and look at the substance; and if it comes to the conclusion, for example, that though in form the order amounts to termination simpliciter it in reality cloaks a dismissal for misconduct it will be open to it to set it aside as a colourable exercise of the power.\n\nIt is on these principles therefore that we have to judge the action taken by the Bank in this case.\n\nIn tho statement of claim put in by the workmen there was no allegation of victimisation or unfair labour practice. An affidavit•was filed by the respondent later before the tribunal in which it was said that the Bank had acted mala fide in removing him from service. But in this affidavit nothing was said as to how the management of the Bank as distinct from the Chief Cashier had any reason to act mala fide against the respondent.\n\nThe tribunal also has not recorded any finding that the action of the Bank in terminating the service of the respondent was mala fide or amounted to unfair labour practice or was a case of victimisation. It ordered reinstatement on the ground that this was a case where disciplinary action must and should have been taken and that was not done. In one part of the award the tribunal has remarked that if it is found that the Bank has merely in colourable exercise of the power made the order under paragraph 522(1) of the Bank Award, the order would not be sustainable.\n\nBut there is no finding that the action taken in this case was a colourable exercise of the power under paragraph 522(1). It is, however, urged on behalf of the respondent that even though there is no such find. ing by the tribunal a perusal of the entire award seems\n\nto show th11t this was what the tribunal thought inas~ r960 much as it has said that this was a case in which • d h ld h b k Chartered Bank, disciplinary act10n must an s ou ave een ta en.\n\nBombay However, as we read the award of the tribunal, the v. impression that we get is that its view was that where Chartered Bank there is an allegation which may amount to misconduct Employees' Unio\" against an employee of a bank, the procedure under paragraph 521 must always be followed and that the Wanchoo J. procedure under paragraph 522(1) can never be followed; and that is why the tribunal did not give any finding that the action of the Bank was a colourable exercise of the power under 1paragraph 522(1).\n\nBut as learned counsel for the respondents has urged before us that the action in this case is in any case a colourable exercise of the power under paragraph 522(1) we propose to look into this aspect of the matter ourselves.\n\nIt is true that there was some kind of allegation by the Chief Cashier which may amount to misconduct in this case and if we were satisfied that the termination of service of the respondent was due to that misconduct and that the form of the order was merely a cloak to avoid holding a proper enquiry under paragraph 521, no doubt there would have l:ieen no case for interference with the order of the tribunal. But this is a peculiar case depending upon a peculiar system prevalent in the cash department of the Bank. That system is that the Chief Cashier gives security for the entire working of the cash department and is unconditionally responsible for any loss that might be occasioned to the Bank in that department. The appointments . in that department are made on the recommendation of the Chief Cashier and he gives a guarantee about each employee and is unconditionally responsible to the Bank for any shortage which might occur. It is in these circumstances that the Bank was faced with the report of the Chief Cashier by which for the reason given by him he withdrew the guarantee so far as the respondent was concerned. The security of the cash department was thus involved and ifthe 'Bank decided as it seems to have done in this case that it would not go into the squabble betweenhe Chief Cashier and the respondent and would use paragraph 522(1) of the\n\nr96o Bank Award to terminate the servjce of the respondent it cannot be said that the Bank was exercising Chartered Bank,\n\nBombay its power under paragraph 522(1) in a colourable manv. ner. It may have honestly come to the conclusion Chartered Bank that in this situation, as it was not possible for it to Employ\"s' Union change its system in the cash department, there was no option for it but to dispense with the service of the Wanahoo ]. k A d respondent under paragraph 522(1) of the Ban war without going into the rights and wrongs of the dispute between the Chief Cashier and the respondent.\n\nIn the peculiar circumstances therefore obtaining in the cash department of the Bank it cannot in our opinion be said that the use of the power under paragraph 522(1) by the Bank in the present case was a colourable exercise of that power. Nor do we think . that the failure of the Bank to provide alternative employment for the respondent would lead to any such inference, for the Bank may very well be right when it says that it is a specialised institution and considering th:at the respondent has been working in one department for the last twenty years he was not fit to be absorbed in another department. In the circumstances of this case therefore we are not prepared to hold that the termination of the service of the respondent was a colourable exercise of the power under pamgraph 522(1) of the Bank Award. The mention of the fact that the service was being terminated because the Chief Cashier had withdrawn the guarantee of the respondent in the notice of discharge will not change the nature of the termination, for the reason was given obviously to avoid the charge that the termination was entirely capricious or arbitrary, and therefore n..ot bona fide.\n\nWe therefore allow the appeal and set aside the order of the tribunal by which the respondent was ordered to be reinstated with full back wages and other benefits. In the circumstances we pass no order as to costs.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 24, "entities": [{"text": "THE CHARTERED BANK, BOMBAY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 58, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE CHARTERED BANK, BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES' UNION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 63, "end_char": 98, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102, "end_char": 122, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 162, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Chartered Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2925, "end_char": 2939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "r960 Bank was involved and if the Bank decided that it would not go into the squabble between the Chief Cashier and C and would use Chartered Bank, para."}}, {"text": "Boinbay", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3007, "end_char": 3014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "522(1) of the Bank Award to terminate the, services of Cit\n\nBoinbay could not be said the Bank was exercising its power under para."}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3405, "end_char": 3433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Sachin Ghaudhury", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3627, "end_char": 3643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sachin Ghaudhury, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. N. Andley", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3645, "end_char": 3657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sachin Ghaudhury, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3662, "end_char": 3675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sachin Ghaudhury, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3680, "end_char": 3694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sachin Ghaudhury, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "A. S. R.Chariand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3716, "end_char": 3732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. R.Chariand Y. Kumar, fortherespondents."}}, {"text": "Chartered Bank, Bombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3930, "end_char": 3952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is The Chartered Bank, Bombay (hereinafter called the Bank)."}}, {"text": "Colsavala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4085, "end_char": 4094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was a dispute between the Bank and its workmen regarding the termination of the service of one Colsavala (hereinafter called the respondent) who was working as an assistant cashier in the Bank."}}, {"text": "January 4, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5226, "end_char": 5241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bombay On January 4, 1957, the Chief Cashier reported to v • the management that the respondent had been leaving Chartered Bank the Bank without his permission for some time past Employees' Union before the cash was checked and locked up in spite of the issue of a departmental circular in that behalf on Wanchoo J.\n\nDecember 24, 1956, by which all assistant cashiers (including the respondent) were reminded of the long~\n\nstanding practice that no assistant cashier should leave the Bank without the permission of the Chief\n\nCashier before the cash was checked and locked up."}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5521, "end_char": 5528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bombay On January 4, 1957, the Chief Cashier reported to v • the management that the respondent had been leaving Chartered Bank the Bank without his permission for some time past Employees' Union before the cash was checked and locked up in spite of the issue of a departmental circular in that behalf on Wanchoo J.\n\nDecember 24, 1956, by which all assistant cashiers (including the respondent) were reminded of the long~\n\nstanding practice that no assistant cashier should leave the Bank without the permission of the Chief\n\nCashier before the cash was checked and locked up."}}, {"text": "December 24, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5533, "end_char": 5550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bombay On January 4, 1957, the Chief Cashier reported to v • the management that the respondent had been leaving Chartered Bank the Bank without his permission for some time past Employees' Union before the cash was checked and locked up in spite of the issue of a departmental circular in that behalf on Wanchoo J.\n\nDecember 24, 1956, by which all assistant cashiers (including the respondent) were reminded of the long~\n\nstanding practice that no assistant cashier should leave the Bank without the permission of the Chief\n\nCashier before the cash was checked and locked up."}}, {"text": "March 29, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6470, "end_char": 6484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It therefore informed the respondent on March 29, 1957, that as the guarantee covering his employment had been withdrawn by the Chief Cashier the Bank was unable to con:tinue to employ him."}}, {"text": "Cel1tral Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6884, "end_char": 6903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon a dispute was raised by the workmen of the Bank and a reference was made by the Cel1tral Government to the Industrial Tribunal with respect to the \"alleged wrongful termination of the services of Shri N. D. Colsavala by the Chartered Bank, Bombay, and the relief, if any, to which he is entitled.\""}}, {"text": "N. D. Colsavala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7005, "end_char": 7020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon a dispute was raised by the workmen of the Bank and a reference was made by the Cel1tral Government to the Industrial Tribunal with respect to the \"alleged wrongful termination of the services of Shri N. D. Colsavala by the Chartered Bank, Bombay, and the relief, if any, to which he is entitled.\""}}, {"text": "Chartered Bank, Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7028, "end_char": 7050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon a dispute was raised by the workmen of the Bank and a reference was made by the Cel1tral Government to the Industrial Tribunal with respect to the \"alleged wrongful termination of the services of Shri N. D. Colsavala by the Chartered Bank, Bombay, and the relief, if any, to which he is entitled.\""}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9765, "end_char": 9771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The tribunal held that even though the Bank had chosen to follow the procedure laid down in paragraph 522(1) of the Bank Award which provides for termination of employment \"in cases not involving\n\n...\n\ndisciplinary action for misconduct, by three months' x96o notice or on payment of three months' pay and allow- Chartered Bank, ances in lieu of notice\", this did not preclude it from Bombay inquiring into the reasons for the termination of v .. service and into the legality and/or propriety of the Chartere~ Ball action taken by the bank and that paragraph 522(1) Employees Union did not give a free hand to the Bank to dispense with wa:; hoo 1."}}, {"text": "Wanchoo J. banks", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12284, "end_char": 12300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The position in the cash department of the Wanchoo J. banks was considered by the Bank Award in Chapter XXI with respect to giving of security."}}, {"text": "4-1-1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14364, "end_char": 14372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore when the Chartered Bank, Bank was faced with the report of the Chief Cashier Bombay dated 4-1-1957, it had to decide in the special circumv."}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_451_457_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 451\n\nTHE MANAGEMENT OF CHANDRAMALAI\n\nESTATE, ERNAKULAM\n\nITS WORKMEN AND ANOTHER. ( P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,, K. N. W ANCHOO and K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ. )\n\nIndustrial Dispute-Failure of conciliation-Union to take prroper and. reasonable course before calling a strike.\n\nThe management having refused to comply. with some of the demands raised by workmen, the matter was referred for conciliation. Efforts at conciliation failed on November 30, 1955 On the very next day the unionfgave:a strike.notice and actually went on strike with effect from December 9, 1958. On January 3, 1956, the Government referred the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal and the strike was called off on January 5, 1956. The question as to whether the workmen were entitled to get wages for the period of the strike was along with some ofher grounds referred to the Tribunal. The Tribunal took the view that both the parties were to blame for the strike and that the workmen\n\nere entitled to get 50% of the emoluments for the period of strike: Held, that on the facts of the case the strike was unjustified and that the workmen were not entitled to any wages for the period.\n\nWhen conciliation attempts failed it was reasonable for the union to take the normal and reasonable course provided by law to settle the dispute by asking :the Government to make a reference to the Industrial Tribunal before it decided to strike.\n\nA strike which is a legitimate weapon in the hands of the workmen would not be ordinarily justified if hastily resorted to without exhausting reasonable avenues for peaceful achievement of the object.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 347/1959.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Award dated October 17, 1957, of the Industrial Tribunal No. II, Ernakulam, in Industrial Disputt:i No. 63 of 1956.\n\nS. Govind Swaminadhan and P. Ram Reddy, for the appellant. .\n\nJacob A. Chakramakal and K. Sundararajan, for respondent No. 1.\n\nK. R. Ghoudhry, for respondent No. 2.\n\n1960. April 4.\n\nThe Judgment of. the Court . wa; s delivered by\n\nApril 4.\n\nJtf anagement of\n\nChandranialai\n\nEstate, Ernakulam\n\nIts Workmen\n\nDas Gupta ].\n\nSUPREME COURT R~JPORTS (1960)\n\nDAS GUPTA, J.-On August 9, 1955, the Union of the workmen of the Chandramalai Estate submitted to the Manager of the Estate a memorandum containing fifteen demands. Though the management agreed to fulfil some of the demands the principal demands remained unsatisfied. On August 29, 1955, the Labour Officer, Trichur, who had in the meantime been \"'P prised of the position by both the management of the Estate as well as the Labour Union advised mutual negotiations between the representatives of the management and workers. Ultimately the matter was recommended by the Labour Officer to the Conciliation Officer, Trichur, for conciliation. The Conciliation Officer's efforts proved in vain. The last meeting for Conciliation appears to have been held on November 30, 1955. On the following day the Union gave a strike notil:le and the workmen went on a strike with effect from December 9, 1955. The strike ended on January 5, 1956. Prior to this, on January 5, the Government had referred the dispute as regards five of the demands for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, Trivandrum. Thereafter by an order dated June 11, 1956, the dispute was withdrawn from the Trivandrum Tribunal and referred to the Industrial Tribunal, Ernakulam. By its award dated October 17, 1957, the Tribunal granted the workmen's demands on all these issues. The present appeal has been preferred by the management of the Chandramalai Estate against the Tribunal's award on three of these issues. These three issues are stated in the reference thus:\n\n\" 1.\n\nW .as the price realised by the management for the rice 8uld to Lhe workers after decontrol excessive; and if so, are the workers entitled to get refund of the excessive value so collected? • 2.\n\nAre the workers entitled to get cumbly allowance with retrospective effect from the date it was stopped and what should be the rate of such allowance? 3.\n\nAre the workers entitled to get wages for the period of the strike ? \"\n\nOn the first issue the workmen's case was that after the control on rice was lifted by the Travancore- Cochin Government in April, 1954, the iuanagement\n\nwhich continued to sell rice to the workmen, charged at the excessive rate of 12 annas per measure for -rice bought in excess of a quota for l t measure per head. This according to the workmen was improper and unjustified and they claimed refund of the excess which they have been made to pay. The manage. ment's case was that the workmen were not bound to buy rice from the Estate's management and secondly, that only the actual cost price and not any excess had been charged. The tribunal held on a consideration of oral and documentary evidence that the management b, ad charged more than the cost price and held that they were b .. whether in the circumstances of this case it wou e N'ew Delhi appropriate to direct an order of reinstatement ? v.\n\nThe appellant company is chiefly engaged in search- Its . .Workme11 ing for and refining crude oil and it has a refinery at c . d dL 1.\n\nD. b . . A\n\nA N D lh' h II .ffi a; en raga \"a' • ig 01 m ssam. t ew e I it as a sma o ce ·· with 3 or 4 employees. Miss Scott was originally in the employment of M/s. Burmah-Shell, New Delhi, as a lady secretary. Her services were lent to the Delhi representative of the appellant company sometime in January, 1954. In September, 1954, the appellant set 1lp its own gffice at New Delhi and then offered Miss Scott direct employment on the same terms and condition& that governed her employmet with M/s.\n\nBurmah-Shell. Miss Scott then resigned her service from M/s. Burmah-Shell and joined the appellant as a regular employee in October, 1954.\n\nHer appointment was subsequently confirmed on September 1, 1955, on terms and conditionswhich were communicated to her and which she accepted. One of the terms was that the appointment in question may be terminated on one month's notice on either side.\n\nDuring the course of her employment Miss Scott did not give satisfaction to the appellant and on many occasions she was verbally warned to iprove her work and not to repeat her lapses. On ; February 26, 1957, Mr. Gowan, the Delhi. representative of the • appellant, warned Miss Scott in writing about her lapses and added that he did not , consider her work satisfactory. He told her to strive to improve her work and mend matters failing which he would have to consider whether she was suitable to continue in the appellant's employment. On February 28, 1957, the services of Miss Scott were terminated by Mr. Gowan and she was told that the faultf! pointed. out to her had not been corrected and that her performance during her service had not matched up to the standard -required. Miss Scott was given one month's pay in\n\nlieu Of notice and she accepted it. At the time when her services were terminated Miss Scott used to receive the total remuneration of Rs. 535 per month.\n\nAssam Oil Co.,\n\nNew Delhi\n\nIts Wo,.kmen\n\nGajendf'agadkaf' J.\n\nOn March 13, 1957, Miss Scott made a representation to the Conciliation Officer, New Delhi, against the termination of her services, and it is out of the proceedings taken by the Conciliation Officer on this representation that the present dispute ultimately came to be referred to the industrial tribunal for adjudication. The union of the appellant's workmen which sponsored her case alleged before the tribunal that the termination of Miss Scott's services was wrongful and illegal and she was entitled to reinstatement.\n\nIt was urged on her behalf that no enquiry was held by the appellant before terminating Miss Scott's services and that made the impugned termination illegal and unjustified.\n\nA claim for bonus for the years 1955 and 1956 was also made on her behalf.\n\nThe appellant resisted this claim. It was urged by the appellant that the dispute was an individual dispute and as such the reference was incompetent. It was alleged that Miss Scott was not a workman under s. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7 (hereinafter called the Act), and so the tribunal had no jurisdiction - to deal with the dispute. On the merits the appellant's case was that it had purported to terminate the services of Miss Scott in terms of the contract after paying her one month's wages in lieu of notice, and that the industrial tribunal would not be justified in interfering with such an order.\n\nThe tribunal has held that Miss Scott was a workman under s. 2(s) and since the union had sponsored her cause the dispute was an industrial dispute under s. 2(k) of the Act. According to the tribunal the termination of Miss Scott's services in substance amounted to dismissal for misconduct, and since no enquiry had been held it was illegal and unjustified.\n\nOn the merits the tribunal took the view that even if Miss Scott had been guilty of some negligence tbe punishment of dismissal was unduly severe. The tribunal also observed that in dismissing her Mr. Gowan was influenced by the consideration that Miss Scott\n\nhad become a member of the union and that was substantially responsible for her dismissal. It is on these findings that the tribunal has passed an order of reinstatement.\n\n...\n\nIn the present appeal the learned Addition.al Solici-\n\nI960 tor-General has raised two points before us.\n\nHe Assam oil Co. contends that the appellant has terminated the services v. of Miss Scott in pursuance of the terms of the contract Its Workmm and an order of discharge passed strictly according to . - the contract cannot be questioned before the ind us- Ga; endragadkar J. trial tribunal. Alternatively he argues that even if the order of discharge is found to be unjustified because no enquiry was held the whole evidence relating to the alleged misconduct of Miss Scott has been led before the tribunal and in the light of the said evidence the order of discharge should not have been interfered with and reinstatement should not have been ordered.\n\nAt the. highest it may be a case for awarding compensation and no more. The other findings recorded by the tribunal against the appellant have not been challenged in the present appeal. , The wide scope of the jurisdiction of industrial tribunals is now well established. As early as 1949 it was held by the Federal Court in Western India' Automobile Association v. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay (1) that the argument based upon th.e sanctity and the validity of contracts between the employer and the employees \"overlooks the fa.pt , that when a dispute arises about the employment df/a person at the instance of a trade union or a trade union objects to the employment of a certain person, the definition of industrial dispute would cover both those cases. In each of those cases, ' although the employer may be unwilling to do so, there will be jurisdiction in the tribunal to direct the employment or non-employment of the person by the employer. / This is the same thing as making a contract of employment when the employer is unwillingto enter into such a contract with a particular person\". It_ was also observed that the industrial tribunal \"can direct in the case of dis:rnissal that an employer or employee shall have the relation, of employment with the other party, although one of them is unwilling to have such relation \" (p. 337). In other words, the jurisdiction of the industrial tril; mnal to direct reinstatement of a discharged or dismissed employee is no longer in doubt. That being the nature ad extent of the juris-\n\n(1) [1949] F.C.R. 321, 3~6,\n\nz96o diction of the industrial tribunal it is too late now to contend that the contractual power of the emrJloyer to Assam oil Co. v. discharge his employee under the terms of the con-\n\nTts workmen tract cannot be questioned in any case.\n\nIf the contract gives the employer the power to Gajendragadkar J. terminate the services of his employee after a month's notice or subject to some other condition it would be open to him to take recourse to the said term or condition and terminate the services of his employee ; but when the validity of such termination is challenged in industrial adjudication it would be competent to the industrial tribunal to enquire whether the impugned discharge has been effected in the bona fide exercise of the power conferred by the contract. If the discharge has been ordered by the employer in bona fide exercise of his power then the industrial tribunal may not interfere with it ; but the words used in the order of discharge and the form which it ma, y have 'taken are not conclusive in the matter and the industrial tribunal would be entitled to go behind the words and the form and decide whether the discharge is a discharge simpliciter or not. If it appears that the purported exercise of the power to terminate the services of the employee was in fact the result of the misconduct alleged against him then the tribunal will be justified in dealing with the dispute on the basis that despite its appearance to the contrary the order of discharge is in effect an order of dismissal. The exercise of the power in question to be valid must always be bona fide. If the bona fides of the said exercise of power are successfully challenged then the industrial tribuns, l would be entitled to interfere with the order in question. It is in this context that the industrial tribunal must consider whether the discharge is mala fide or whether it amounts to victimisation or an unfair labour practice, or is so capricious or unreasonable as would lead to the inference that it has been passed for ulterior motives and not in bona fide exercise of the power conferred by the contract.\n\nIn some cases the employer may disapprove of the trade union activities of his employee and may purport to discharge his services under the terms of the contract. In such cases, if it appears that the real reason\n\n... -\n\n...\n\nand motive for discharge is the trade union activities z96o of the employee that would be a case where the indus- Assam oil Co. trial tribunal can justlyhold that the discharge is unv. justified and has been niade mala fide. It may also Its workmen appear in some cases that though the order of discharge is couched in words which do not impute any Gajendrogadka\" J. misconduct to the employee, in substance it is based on misconduct of which, according to the employer, the employee has been guilty ; and that would make the impugned discharge a punitive dismissal. In such a case fairplay and justice require that the employee shou.ld be given a chance to explain the allegation\n\nweighing in the mind of the employer and that would necessitate a proper enquiry. Whether or not the termination of services in a given case is the result of the bona fide exercise of the power conferred on the employer by the contract or whether in substance it is a punishment for alleged misconduct would always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.\n\nIn this connection it is important to remember that just as the employer's right to exercise his option in terms of the contract has to be recognised so is the employee's right' to expect security of tenure to be taken into account. These principles ha_ve been consistently followed by industrial tribunals and we think rightly (Vide : Buckin'gham and Garnatic Company Ltd. v. Workers of the Company (2). Therefore we are not prepared to accede to the argument urged before us by the learned Additional Solicitor-General that whenever the employer purports to terminate the services of his employee by virtue of the power conferred on him by the terms of contract, industrial tribunals cannot question its validity, propriety or legality. , - In the present case there is no doubt that the order of discharge passed against Miss Scott proceeds on the basis that she was guilty of a misconduct. As we have already pointed out Mr. Gowan communicated to her what he thought were grave defects in her work and in the letter of discharge itself the same allegations are made against her. That being so, it must be held that the discharge in the present case i~\n\n{a) [1952) f..A.C. ~90,\n\nr¢o punitive. It amounts to a punishment for alieged\n\nAssam oil Co. misconduct and so the tribunal was right in holding v. that the appellant was not justified in discharging Its wo, kmen Miss Scott without holding a proper enquiry.\n\nIt, however, appears that evidence has been led by Gajend,.gadkar J. the appellant before the tribunal in support of its case that Miss Scott was guilty of dereliction of duty on several occasions which justified her dismissal. Mr.\n\nGowan has given evidence about the quality and standard of Miss Scott's work and he has sworn that a long series of instances of bad work and failure to carry out orders, insolence and untruthfullness had come to his notice. On one occasion the letter typed from a draft had been incorrectly typed and more than a complete paragraph had been omitted, and in addition Miss Scott told him that she had checked the letter. According to Mr. Gowan she was disobedient to him and he had occasion to warn her verbally several times in the past. It is true that Mr. Gowan has also stated that he knew that Miss Scott had become a member of the union and he thought that a person who was holding a confidential position in his office should not have become a member of the union.\n\nThe evidence given by Mr. Gowan on the whole appears to be straightforward and it leads to two conclusions: (1) that Mr. Gowan was thoroughly dissatisfied with the work of Miss Scott, and (2) that he did not approve of Miss Scott's conduct in joining the union. Since the latter circumstance has at least partially weighed in the mind of Mr. Gowan in terminating the services of Miss Scott it must be held that the said termination is not justified. It would not be open to an employer to dismiss his employee solely or principally for the reason that he or she had joined a trade union. That is a fundamental right guaranteed to every citizen in this country and it would be idle for anybody to contend that the mere exercise of the said right would incur dismissal from service in private employment. Therefore we are prepared to accept the finding of the tribunal that the dismissal of Miss Scott is not justified.\n\nThat raises the question as to whether reinstatement can be ordered in the present case.\n\nThere is no doubt\n\nthat the normal rule is that in cases of wrongful dis- ·\n\nI960 missal the dismissed employee is entitled to reinstate- ' Assam oil Co. ment; but there can be cases where it woulil not be v. expedient to follow ,, this normal rule and to direct Its Wo•kmen reinstatement. In the present case the appellant's - office is very small .an.d Miss Scott undoubtedly occu. Gajendragadkar J. pied a position of some confidence with Mr. Gowan.\n\nThe warnings given by Mr. Gowan to Miss Scott from time to time clearly bring out his dissatisfaction with her work, and if Mr. Gowan has sworn that he has lost confidence in Miss Scott it would be unfair to hold that the loss of confidence is due solely or substantially because Miss Scott joined the union of the appellant's workmen. It i.s no doubt true that the effect of the employer's plea that he has lost confidence in the dismissed employee cnnot ordinarily be exaggerated; but in the special circumstances of this case we are inclined to hold that it would not be fair either to the employer or to the employee to direct reinstatement. It appears that subsequent to her dismissal and in spite of it Miss Scott found employment with Parry & Company and Nestles Products (India) Ltd., between May 19, 1958 to October 31, 1958 and December 1, 1958 to November 30, 1959, respectively. The first of the said two companies paid her Rs. 500 per month except for October when she was paid Rs. 525 and the latter company has paid her Rs. 500 per month except for November when her salary was Rs. 525 and for December and January when she was paid Rs. 15 per day. Besides she has received from the appellant Rs. 2, 700 as subsistence allowance during the pendency of. the present appeal. We are, therefore, satisfied that it would be fair and just to direct the appellant to pay a substantial amount of compensation to her. The learned Additional Solicitor-General has agreed to pay Rs. 12,500 in addition to Rs. 2, 700 which have been already paid to her as subsistence allowance.\n\nWe think that in the circumstances of this case the amount of Rs. 12,500 represents a fair amount of compensation on the payment of which the order of reinstatement passed by the tribunal should\n\nAssam oil Co. v.\n\nIts TV 0rk1nen\n\nGajendragadkar } .\n\nApril 6.\n\nbe set aside. We would accordingly set aside the order of reinstatement and direct that the appellant should pay to Miss Scott Rs. 12,500 as compensation. The order in respect of bonus has n!it been challenged and is confirmed. There will be no order as to costs.\n\nAppeal partly allowed.\n\n•THE STANDARD.VACUUM REFINING CO.\n\nOF INDIA LTD. v.\n\nITS WORKMEN AND OTHERS. (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO and K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.) Industrial Dispute-Abolition of contract system of labour- Dispute raised by regular workmen of company-Reference to Tribunal, if competent-Industrial Dispu.tes Act, r947 (r4 of r947), SS. 2 (k), IO.\n\nA dispute was raised by the respondents, the workmen of the appeJlant company, with respect to contract labour employed by it for cleaning maintenance work at the refinery including premises and plant belonging to it. They made a demand for abolition of the contract system and for absorbing the workmen employed through the contractors into the regular service of the company.\n\nThe matter was referred to the Tribunal under s. IO of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 The company objected to the reference on the grounds (1) that it was incompetent inasmuch as there was no dispute between it and the respondents and it was not open to them to raise a dispute with respect to the workmen of some other employer, viz., the contractor, and (2) in any case, it was for the company to decide what was the best method of carrying on its business and the Tribunal could not interfere with that function of the management.\n\nThe Tribunal held that the reference was competent and on the merits it was of opinion that the work which was being done through the contractor was necessary for the company to be done daily, that doing this work through annual contracts resulted in the deprivation of security of service and other benefits, privileges, leave, etc., of the.workmen of the contractor and that therefore the contract system with respect to this work should be abolished: Held, (1) that the dispute in the present case was an industrial dispute within the meaning of s. 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as interpreted in Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. The Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate, [1958),\n\n\\..", "total_entities": 49, "entities": [{"text": "ASSAM. OIL COMP ANY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 280, "end_char": 299, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ASSAM. OIL COMP ANY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ITS WORKMEN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 303, "end_char": 314, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ITS WORKMEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GUPTA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 353, "end_char": 363, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "[1949] F.C.R. 321", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2350, "end_char": 2367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Management of Ckandramalai Estate, Ernakulam", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2382, "end_char": 2426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Western India Automobile Association v. Industrial Tribunal, 8omba)I, [1949] F.C.R. 321, followed ..\n\nManagement of Ckandramalai Estate, Ernakulam,\n\nIts Workmen\n\nDas G1kmen whether the work which is perennial and must go on from day to day and which is incidental and Wanchoo ].\n\nApril 7.\n\nnecessary for the work of the refinery and which is sufficient to employ a considerable number of wholetime workmen and which is being done in most concerns through regular workmen should be allowed to be done by contractors. Considering the nature of the work and the conditions of service in the present case we are of opinion that the tribunal's decision is right and no interference is called for, except that the date .should now be changed, for such a direction cannot be put into force with retrospective effect from November l, 1958. It appears that a few months remain before the present contract will come to an end. We think that for these few months the present system may continue.\n\nW' e therefore dismiss the appeal with this modification that the order of the tribunal will be carried into effect from such date on which the present contract in force in the company comes to an end. The respondents will get their costs from the company.\n\nAppeal dismissed subject to modification..\n\nMADHYA PR.ADESH MINERAL INDUSTR.Y\n\nASSOCIATION\n\nTFIE REGIONAL LABOUR COMMISSIONER\n\nJABALPUR AND OTHERS (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. w ANCHOO\n\nand K. C. DAS GUP'l'A, JJ.) Minimum Wages, Fixation of-Notification by State Government prescribing minimum rates for stone-breaking or stone-crushing in mines-Validity-Minimum Wages Act, r948 (II of r948), ss. 5 (2), 27, Sch., Part I item 8.\n\nThe Madhya Pradesh Government issued a notification under s. 5 (2) of the Minimu!Il Wacs Act, 1948 (rr of 1948), prcscribin(j", "total_entities": 59, "entities": [{"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 48, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Scott", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 216, "end_char": 221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We would accordingly set aside the order of reinstatement and direct that the appellant should pay to Miss Scott Rs."}}, {"text": "THE STANDARD.VACUUM REFINING CO.\n\nOF INDIA LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 385, "end_char": 431, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STANDARD.VACUUM REFINING CO. OF INDIA LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ITS WORKMEN AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 437, "end_char": 459, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ITS WORKMEN AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 484, "end_char": 497, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. N. w ANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 502, "end_char": 522, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SS. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 709, "end_char": 714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IO of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1153, "end_char": 1192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2191, "end_char": 2198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IO of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "IO of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2206, "end_char": 2235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "India Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2730, "end_char": 2740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the.workmen of the contractor and that therefore the contract system with respect to this work should be abolished: Held, (1) that the dispute in the present case was an industrial dispute within the meaning of s. 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as interpreted in Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. The Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate, [1958),\n\n\\..\n\n3 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPO~TS 467\n\nS.C.R. n56, because (i) the respondents had a community of r960 interest with the workmen of the contractor, (ii) they had also a substantial interest in the subject-matter of the dispute in Standard Vacuum the sense that the class to which they belonged, namely, work- Refining Co. of\n\nmn, was substantially affected thereby, and (iii) the company India Ltd. could give relief in the matter."}}, {"text": "APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3132, "end_char": 3154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "K. Daphtary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3330, "end_char": 3341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, G. B. Pai and Sardar Bahadur, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "G. B. Pai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3371, "end_char": 3380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, G. B. Pai and Sardar Bahadur, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Sardar Bahadur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3385, "end_char": 3399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, G. B. Pai and Sardar Bahadur, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "H. R. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3422, "end_char": 3435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokhale, S. B. Naik and K. R. Ohaudhury, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. B. Naik", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3437, "end_char": 3447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokhale, S. B. Naik and K. R. Ohaudhury, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "K. R. Ohaudhury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3452, "end_char": 3467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokhale, S. B. Naik and K. R. Ohaudhury, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "W ANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3551, "end_char": 3559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by W ANCHOO, J.-This is an appeal by special leave in Wanchoo J. an industrial matter.", "canonical_name": "W ANCHOO"}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3602, "end_char": 3609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by W ANCHOO, J.-This is an appeal by special leave in Wanchoo J. an industrial matter.", "canonical_name": "W ANCHOO"}}, {"text": "Standard\n\nVacuum Refining Company of India Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3656, "end_char": 3706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is The Standard\n\nVacuum Refining Company of India Limited (hereinafter called the company)."}}, {"text": "October 1 to September 30.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4084, "end_char": 4110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The system in force in the company is that this work is given to contractors for a period of one year from October 1 to September 30."}}, {"text": "Ramji Gordhan and Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4174, "end_char": 4199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the time when the reference was made the contract was with Ramji Gordhan and Company for the period from October 1, 1957, to September 30, 1958."}}, {"text": "October 1, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4220, "end_char": 4235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the time when the reference was made the contract was with Ramji Gordhan and Company for the period from October 1, 1957, to September 30, 1958."}}, {"text": "September 30, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4240, "end_char": 4258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the time when the reference was made the contract was with Ramji Gordhan and Company for the period from October 1, 1957, to September 30, 1958."}}, {"text": "April 27, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4264, "end_char": 4278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 27, 1957, the respondents made a demand for abolition of the contract system that prevailed in the company and for a)Jsorbing the workmen employed through the contractors into the regular service of the company with retrospective effect from the date of their employment in the company through the ."}}, {"text": "Government of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6059, "end_char": 6079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When conciliation failed, the Government of Bombay made the following reference on May 13, 1958."}}, {"text": "May 13, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6112, "end_char": 6124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When conciliation failed, the Government of Bombay made the following reference on May 13, 1958."}}, {"text": "Standard Vacuum Refining Company of India Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6315, "end_char": 6364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as workers of the Standard Vacuum Refining Company of India Limited, Bombay, and wage-scales, conditions of service, etc.,"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6366, "end_char": 6372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as workers of the Standard Vacuum Refining Company of India Limited, Bombay, and wage-scales, conditions of service, etc.,"}}, {"text": "Stanvac refinery", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6613, "end_char": 6629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Past service of these workers should be counted and they should be treated as continuously in the service of the Stanvac refinery from the date of their entertainment.\""}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6795, "end_char": 6800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6808, "end_char": 6831, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "November 1, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8616, "end_char": 8632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the result the company was directed with effect from November 1, 1958, to discontinue the practice of getting this work done through contractors and to have it done through workmen engaged by itself."}}, {"text": "Ramji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9219, "end_char": 9224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The company was further directed fo engage regular workmen for this work and_ in so doing it was to give preference to the workmen employed by Ramji\n\ntlo\n\n470~\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTR [1960]\n\nr95o Gordhan and Company."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10144, "end_char": 10148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10322, "end_char": 10326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11175, "end_char": 11179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S 471", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11449, "end_char": 11454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India Ltd. company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11716, "end_char": 11734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "h l tan ardacuunt contract basis will not make the dispute any t e ess, Refining co. of a real or substantial dispute between them and the India Ltd. company as to the manner in which the work of the v. company should be carried on."}}, {"text": "Dimakuchi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12144, "end_char": 12153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Dimakuchi case (1) to which reference has been made, the dispute was relating to an employee of the tea estate who was not a workman."}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12643, "end_char": 12650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12888, "end_char": 12900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13238, "end_char": 13245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13535, "end_char": 13542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Statidard Vacuum", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13783, "end_char": 13799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Statidard Vacuum\n\nRefining Co. of\n\nIndia Ltd.\n\nv. /Is Workmen\n\nWanchoo ]."}}, {"text": "Gokhale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16431, "end_char": 16438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nBesides it is contended by Mr. Gokhale for the respon- Its Workmen dents that even if preJ\"udicial effect on the interest of Wanchoo /. the workmen espousing the cause is necessary, this is a case where the respondents' interest may be prejudicially affected in future in case the contract system of work is allowed to prevail in this branch of the work of the company."}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16525, "end_char": 16532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nBesides it is contended by Mr. Gokhale for the respon- Its Workmen dents that even if preJ\"udicial effect on the interest of Wanchoo /. the workmen espousing the cause is necessary, this is a case where the respondents' interest may be prejudicially affected in future in case the contract system of work is allowed to prevail in this branch of the work of the company.", "canonical_name": "W ANCHOO"}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17783, "end_char": 17790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Macropollo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22205, "end_char": 22215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Macropollo case (1), this Court held that the reorganisation had been adopted by the employer for reasons of economy and convenience a.nd was bona fide."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22627, "end_char": 22635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1946 there were communal riots in Calcutta and therefore the concern took over the salesmen in its direct employment in ortler to reorganise them on communal basis in the then prevailing circumstances."}}, {"text": "MADHYA PR.ADESH MINERAL INDUSTR.Y", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24558, "end_char": 24591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal dismissed subject to modification..\n\nMADHYA PR.ADESH MINERAL INDUSTR.Y\n\nASSOCIATION\n\nTFIE REGIONAL LABOUR COMMISSIONER\n\nJABALPUR AND OTHERS (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. w ANCHOO\n\nand K. C. DAS GUP'l'A, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. N. w ANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24684, "end_char": 24698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal dismissed subject to modification..\n\nMADHYA PR.ADESH MINERAL INDUSTR.Y\n\nASSOCIATION\n\nTFIE REGIONAL LABOUR COMMISSIONER\n\nJABALPUR AND OTHERS (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. w ANCHOO\n\nand K. C. DAS GUP'l'A, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "K. N. w ANCHOO"}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS GUP'l'A", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24704, "end_char": 24721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal dismissed subject to modification..\n\nMADHYA PR.ADESH MINERAL INDUSTR.Y\n\nASSOCIATION\n\nTFIE REGIONAL LABOUR COMMISSIONER\n\nJABALPUR AND OTHERS (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. w ANCHOO\n\nand K. C. DAS GUP'l'A, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ."}}, {"text": "Minimum Wages Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24869, "end_char": 24886, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24907, "end_char": 24912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Fixation of-Notification by State Government prescribing minimum rates for stone-breaking or stone-crushing in mines-Validity-Minimum Wages Act", "statute": "Fixation of-Notification by State Government prescribing minimum rates for stone-breaking or stone-crushing in mines-Validity-Minimum Wages Act"}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24948, "end_char": 24973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Madhya Pradesh Government issued a notification under s. 5 (2) of the Minimu!Il Wacs Act, 1948 (rr of 1948), prcscribin(j"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25002, "end_char": 25006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Fixation of-Notification by State Government prescribing minimum rates for stone-breaking or stone-crushing in mines-Validity-Minimum Wages Act", "statute": "Fixation of-Notification by State Government prescribing minimum rates for stone-breaking or stone-crushing in mines-Validity-Minimum Wages Act"}}, {"text": "Il Wacs Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25025, "end_char": 25042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_476_487_EN", "year": 1960, "text": ". 476\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960]\n\nz96o and if it resulted in retrenchment that was\n\n51 d -:;-;:; inevitable. These facts would show that in that\n\n;~;; n; c\":.\"0/\"' case there was reorganisation of the business result.\n\nIndia Ltd. ing in retrenchment. In the present case no such v. thing arises and the only question for decision is Its Wa>kmen whether the work which is perennial and must go on from day to day and which is incidental and Wanchoo ].\n\nApril 7.\n\nnecessary for the work of the refinery and which is sufficient to employ a considerable number of wholetime workmen and which is being done in most concerns through regular workmen should be allowed to be done by contractors. Considering the nature of the work and the conditions of service in the present case we are of opinion that the tribunal's decision is right and no interference is called for, except that the date .should now be changed, for such a direction cannot be put into force with retrospective effect from November l, 1958. It appears that a few months remain before the present contract will come to an end. We think that for these few months the present system may continue.\n\nW' e therefore dismiss the appeal with this modification that the order of the tribunal will be carried into effect from such date on which the present contract in force in the company comes to an end. The respondents will get their costs from the company.\n\nAppeal dismissed subject to modification..\n\nMADHYA PR.ADESH MINERAL INDUSTR.Y\n\nASSOCIATION\n\nTFIE REGIONAL LABOUR COMMISSIONER\n\nJABALPUR AND OTHERS (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. w ANCHOO\n\nand K. C. DAS GUP'l'A, JJ.) Minimum Wages, Fixation of-Notification by State Government prescribing minimum rates for stone-breaking or stone-crushing in mines-Validity-Minimum Wages Act, r948 (II of r948), ss. 5 (2), 27, Sch., Part I item 8.\n\nThe Madhya Pradesh Government issued a notification under s. 5 (2) of the Minimu!Il Wacs Act, 1948 (rr of 1948), prcscribin(j\n\n3 S.C.R. SUPREME. COURT RF..A?ORTS 477\n\nthe minimum rates of wages for employment in stone breaking x960 and stone crushing operations carried on in mines in exercise of the authority delegated to it by the President by a notification :Vladhya Pradesh under Art. 258 of the Constitution. The appellant company, lVIineral I nduslry Association engaged in manganese mining industry, challenged the validity v. of the said notification by a writ petition filed in the High Court Regional Labour and its case was that the said notification was ultra vires s. 5(2) Commissioner of the Act.\n\nThe High Court found against the appellant and rejected the petition. The question for determination in the appeal, therefore, was whether item 8 in Part l of the Schedule to the Act, properly construed, included stone breaking and stone crushing operations in a mining industry: Held, that item 8 in Part l of the Schedule to the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, was not intended to cover the breaking or crushing of stones incidental to mining operations and must be limited to stone breaking and stone crushing employment in quarries. The impugned notification was, therefore, ultra vires s. 5(2) of-the Act and could not be enforced.\n\nIt would, however, be open to the Government, if it so desired, to achieve the object it had in view in issuing the impugned notification by adding appropriate items to the Schedule in exercise of its power under s. 27 of the Act : Held, further, that it was not necessary for the appellant to challenge the vires of the Presidential notification in the first instance in order that he might impugn the notification in question.\n\nA. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. M. Venkitachalam Patti, [1955] 2 S.C.R. n96, referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 389 of 1959. - Appeal from the judgment and order dated October 25, 1957, of the Bombay High Court at Nagpur in Misc. Petition No. 476 of 1956.\n\nA. S. Bobde and Ganpat Rai, for the appellant.\n\nH. J. Umrigar K. L. Hathi and R.H. Dhebar, for respondent No. 2; ·\n\n1960. April 7.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal arises from a Gajendragadkar J. writ petition filed by the appellant, Madhya Pradesh Mineral Industry Assoiation, in whch the appellant challenged the validity of the notification issued by the Madhya Pradesh State Government on March 30, 1952, under s. 5(2) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (11 of 1948) (hereinafter called the Act).\n\nThe High Court of Bombay at Nagpur dismissed the appellant's petition but has granted the appellant\n\nr960 a certificate of fitness under Art. 133(l)(c) of the Constitution. It is with the said certificate that the Madhya Pradesh Mineral Industry present appeal has been brought to this Court.\n\nAssociation The appellant is a non-pr_ofit making company limited by guarantee and registered under s. 26 of the Regional Labour v.\n\ncommissioner Indian Companies Act, 1913. It has been formed with the object of protecting and promoting the Gajendragadkar J. interest of its members-shar_eholders who are engaged in the mining industry by all legitimate and constitutional means. It appears that under Art. 258 of the Constitution the President of India by Notification No. S.R.O. 2052 published on December 11, 1951, entrusted Governments of certain States including Madhya Pradesh with their consent the functions of the Central Government under the Act in so far as such functions relate to the fixation of minimum rates of wages in respect of employees employed in stonebreaking or in stone-crushing operations carried on in mines situated within their respective States. Pursuant to the said delegation the Madhya Pradesh Government issued the impugned notification purporting to act under s. 5(2) of the Act.\n\nThis notification has prescribed the minimum rates of wages for employment in stone-breaking or in stone-crushing operations carried on in mines. The rates thus prescribed were inclusive of dearness allowance or compensatory cost of living allowance.\n\nThe Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Nagpur, Respondent 1, wrote to the appellant for the first time on June 20, 1956, stating that the State of Madhya Pradesh, Respondent 2, had considered the question whether the Act was applicable to the manganese mining industry and had come to the conclusion that it was so applicable; that is why the appellant's members were asked by respondent 1 to implement the Act within a fortnight from the receipt of his letter. The appellant made several representations to respondent 1 urging that the Act was inapplicable to the manganese mining industry; nevertheless respondent 1 threatened large-scale prosecution of the appellant's members on the basis that the Act applied to them, and its provisions had been contravened by them. The appellant was thus driven to file the\n\n......\n\npresent petition because it alleged that it had no .alternative remedy, at any rate equally speedy and efficaeix960\n\nM adhya Pradesh ous, and so it was urged on its behalf that the High Mineral Industry Court should issue a writ quashing the impugned Association v. notification as ultra vires. In its petition the appelh II d h h fi . . d b h Regional Labqur _ lant ad also a ege t at t e noti ca.t10n issue y t e commissioner President of India under Art. 258 cannot fasten upon the manganese mining industry the character of Gajendragadkar J. employment in stone-breaking or stone-crushing and if that was the object of the said notification it was invalid.\n\nThe respondents disputed the correctness of the appellant's contention that the impugned notification is invalid. It was urged on their behalf that any industry wherein the workers are employed in operations involving stone-breaking or stone-crushing is governed by the Act. In their written statement they described the details about the mining operations and contended that the mining of manganese ore mainly consists of development work or the removal of overburden, breaking of big mineral stones like boulder ore or bed ore to manageable sizes, dressing of ores to remove impurities, etc. According to the respondents, having regard to the nature of the manganese mining industry the Act applied to the stone-breaking or :'!tone-crushing operations connected with it.\n\nThe High Court has accepted the respondent's plea and has rejected the appellant's prayer that a writ ghould be issued in its favour prohibiting the respondents from enforcing the provisions of the Act against its members. Unfortunately, on two important points the High Court has misdirected itself. It appears to havi; i assumed that the impugned notification has added an entry in the Schedule to the Act, ; ind has observed that as a result of the said addition the provisions of the Act came to be applied to the employment in stone-breaking or in stone-crushing operations carried on in the mines.\n\nThe High Court has made this observation in setting out the appellant's case.and it is on the basis of this observation that the High Court has proceeded to examine the validity of the appellant's contention. It is, however, clear that the impugned notification does not purport to add any\n\n'960 item in Schedule I and that was also not the case of\n\nMadhya p, adesh th.e appellant. Thus the assi:impton ade by the Mine>al lndust'Y High Court on both the pomts IS, with respect,\n\nAssociation erroneous.\n\nRegiona~Labour In its jugment the igh Court as alo observed Commis.wer under s. 5(2). It is significant that the impugned notification has been issued by the Madhya Pradesh Government by virtue of the powers under s. 5(2) of the Act which have been delegated to it by the President irr exercise of his authority under Art. 258 of the Constitution. The main argument urged by Mr. Bobde is that the impugned notification is ultra vires s. 5(2) because stone-breaking and stone-crushing operations in manganese mines do not fall under any of the items in Part I of the Schedule. The dispute thu~ raised really lies within a very narrow compass : Does employment in stone-breaking or in stone-crushing operations carried on in mines ,.specified in the impugned\n\nnotifiction amount to employment in , atone-breaking\n\nx960 or stone-crushing which is item 8 in Part I of the ground that the under any other M d' -P d h Schedule to the Act? It is common a \"Y\" ra es 1 . t\" d .c ]] Mineral Industry emp oyment m ques 10n oes not ia\n\nAssodation item in Part I. v.\n\nRegional Labour It is true that the provisions of the Minimum Wages Commissioner Act are intended to achieve the object of doing social . -- justice to workmen employed in the scheduled em- Ga; endragadkar f ployments by prescribing minimum rates of wages for them, and so in construing the said provisions the court should adopt what is sometimes described as a beneficent rule of construction. If the relevant words are capable o(two constructions preference may be given to that construction which helps to sustain the validity of the impugned notification; but it is obvious that an occasion for showing preference for one construction rather than the other can legitimately arise only when two constructions are reasonably possible, not otherwise.\n\nNow, does employment in stone-breaking or stone-crushing as specified in Part I of the Schedule on a reasonable construction include stone-breaking or stone-crushing operations in a mining industry ? In answering this question it would be necessary to bear in mind that the scheduled employment under s. 2(g) covers the employment specified in the Schedule or any process or branch of work forming part of such employment. It is conceded before us by both the parties that the provisions of the Act aP.ply to the scheduled employments in all branches of their work which may be incidental to the main scheduled employments.\n\nThe impugned notification, on the other hand, applies only to the stone-breaking or stone-crushing operations carried on in mines and it does not cover other operations connected with the manganese mining works. This position is inconsiiitent with the scheme of the Schedule and that is a point which prima facie is in favour of the appellant's contention.\n\nIt is, however, urged by Mr. Umrigar, for the respondents, that the word \"employment\" as well as the word \"stone\" used in item 8 should receive their widest denotation, and that, according to him, would include stone-breaking or 13tone-orushing operation&\n\n.. ,.\n\ncarried on in mines. It is conceded that stone-breakr960 ing or stone-crushing operations have to be carried on in regard to the work in manganese mines. Mdhya Pradesh , Mineral Industry Stones are beaten . to small pieces by means of a Association hammer and they are washed and passed. through v •. sieves of different meshes before manganese is obtain- Regional. L_abour\n\ned. When the Schedule refers to the employment\n\nCommissioner of stone-breaking or stone-crushing does it referGajendragadkar J. to the incidental stone-breaking or stone-crushing in connection with manganese piine operations ?\n\nIn a chemical or a geological sense stones may include manganese and that is one of the meanings given to the word in the Short.er Oxford Dictionary. On the other hand, the word \"stone \" as popularly understood in ordinary parlance particularly when it is coupled with the word \"breaking\" or \" crushing \" would exclude manganese. When we speak of stone-breaking or stone-crushing normally we refer to stone in the sense of \" piece of rock \" and that would exclude manganese. Employment in stone-breaking or stonecrushing in this sense would refer to quarry operations. Thus whether or not the word \" stone \" should be understood in the wider sense or in a limited sense must depend upon the context in which the word is used. The intention which is reasonably deducible . from the context would decide whether it is the expanded meaning or the limited meaning of the word that can be accepted. The same consideration could apply to the denotation of the word \"employment\".\n\nWe have carefully considered all the items in the Schedule and have taken into account the general beneficent policy of the Act but we are unable to hold . that when item 8 refers to stone-breaking or stonecrushing it is intended to cover the breaking or the crushing of stones incidental to the manganese mining operations. The context seems to exclude the application of the wider meaning of the word \" stone \" used in item 8. Therefore, our conclusion is that the stonebreaking or stone-crushing operations which are carried on in mines are not included in item 8 in the Schedule; a.n:d if that be the true position the impugned notification issued by the State Government under s. 5(2) is ultra vires.\n\nCii\n\nr96o The High Court has referred to the fact that in describing some items in Part I the word \" any '' has Madhya Pradesh Mineral Indmtry been used whereas the said word has not been used in Association item 8. For instance, item 1 refers to employment in\n\nv. any woollen carpet making or shawl weaving establish- Regionaz Labour\n\nCommissioner ment, whereas item 8 merely refers to employment in stone-breaking and stone-crushing. The absence of Gajendragadkar J. the word\" any\" according to the High Court indicates that the wm:d \"stone\" as well as the word \"employment\" had been used in their wide denotation. We are not satisfied that this conclusion is right. In fact it appears to us that if the word \"auy\" had been used\n\nin item 8 it might have helped to make its scope wider; that is to say, if item 8 had read as \"employment in any stone-breaking or any stone-crushing operations\" it might have tended to make its scope wider.\n\nAs it stands the entry is, in our opinion, confined to stone-breaking and stone-crushing employment in quarries and not in mines.\n\nAs we have already pointed out a notification under s. 5(2) can be issued only in respect of employment.s which fall under the Schedule. We would, however, like to add that this conclusion merely helps to emphasise the fact that the appropriate government may, and can, act under s. 27 of the Act if it is desired that the employment in mines or in connection with any operations incidental to mining should be governed by the provisions of the Act.\n\nSection 27 empowers the appropriate government to add items to the Schedule and it would be open to the appropriate government to adopt such a course if it is intended to achieve the object with which the impugned notification has been issued.\n\nOne more point still remains to be considered.\n\nMr. Umrigar attempted to argue that the appellant cannot challenge the vires of the impugned notification without challenging the vires of the delegation of authority effected by the notification issued by the President of India under Art. 258 of the Constitution.\n\nThe argument is that if the notification of the President is valid then the State Government bas merely exercised its authority as a delegate and its validity cannot be challenged in isolation from the principal\n\nor parent notification _which conferred the authority z960 on the State Government. This contention has obvi- M dh--;, ously not been raised before the High Court. Besides, Mfne!a~ Tn~:~~:; if the State Government purports to take action on Association the strength of the impugned notification which is v. h 1 Regional Labour invalid it would be open tot e appe lant to resist the commissioner threatened action on the ground that the notification - is invalid and no action can be validly taken againstGajendragadkar J. the appellant for the contravention of the provisions of the Act. As this Court has observed in A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. M. Venkitachalam Potti(1 ), \"there can be no agency in the matter of a commission of a wrong. The wrong-doer would certainly be liable to be dealt with as a party directly responsible for his wrongful action\", and it was added that\" on the analogy of a civil wrong the tortfeasor could certainly not protect himself against the liability on the ground of having committed the tort under the directions of his principal, and so the agent could in no event exculpate himself from the liability for the wrongful act done by him and if he is amenable to the jurisdic tion of the High Court the High Court could certainly issue an appropriate writ against, him under Art. 226\".\n\nBy parity of reasoning it would follow that if the impugned notification issued by the State Government is ultra vires it cannot fall back upon the President's\n\nnotificatioi+ in support of the plea that the action which it proposes to take against the appellant would nevertheless be justified. We must accordingly hold that it is open to the appellant to claim a writ against the respondents even without challenging the vires of the Presidential notification.\n\nIn the result we hold that the impugned notification issued by respondent 2 is invalid and canno_t be enforced.\n\nThe appeal is accordingly allowed, the order\" passed by the High Court set aside and the application for a writ made by the appellant allowed with costs throughout.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n(1) (1955] 2 s.c.R, 1196, i:au,", "total_entities": 76, "entities": [{"text": "India Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 222, "end_char": 232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "India Ltd. ing in retrenchment."}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 443, "end_char": 450, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "November l, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 989, "end_char": 1005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Considering the nature of the work and the conditions of service in the present case we are of opinion that the tribunal's decision is right and no interference is called for, except that the date .should now be changed, for such a direction cannot be put into force with retrospective effect from November l, 1958."}}, {"text": "MADHYA PR.ADESH MINERAL INDUSTR.Y\n\nAS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1463, "end_char": 1500, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MADHYA PR.ADESH MINERAL INDUSTR.Y ASSOCIATION", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1567, "end_char": 1587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal dismissed subject to modification..\n\nMADHYA PR.ADESH MINERAL INDUSTR.Y\n\nASSOCIATION\n\nTFIE REGIONAL LABOUR COMMISSIONER\n\nJABALPUR AND OTHERS (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. w ANCHOO\n\nand K. C. DAS GUP'l'A, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "K. N. w ANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1589, "end_char": 1603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal dismissed subject to modification..\n\nMADHYA PR.ADESH MINERAL INDUSTR.Y\n\nASSOCIATION\n\nTFIE REGIONAL LABOUR COMMISSIONER\n\nJABALPUR AND OTHERS (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. w ANCHOO\n\nand K. C. DAS GUP'l'A, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS GUP'l'A", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1609, "end_char": 1626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal dismissed subject to modification..\n\nMADHYA PR.ADESH MINERAL INDUSTR.Y\n\nASSOCIATION\n\nTFIE REGIONAL LABOUR COMMISSIONER\n\nJABALPUR AND OTHERS (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. w ANCHOO\n\nand K. C. DAS GUP'l'A, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Minimum Wages Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1774, "end_char": 1791, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1812, "end_char": 1817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Fixation of-Notification by State Government prescribing minimum rates for stone-breaking or stone-crushing in mines-Validity-Minimum Wages Act", "statute": "Fixation of-Notification by State Government prescribing minimum rates for stone-breaking or stone-crushing in mines-Validity-Minimum Wages Act"}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Government", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1853, "end_char": 1878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Madhya Pradesh Government issued a notification under s. 5 (2) of the Minimu!Il Wacs Act, 1948 (rr of 1948), prcscribin(j\n\n3 S.C.R. SUPREME."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1907, "end_char": 1911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Fixation of-Notification by State Government prescribing minimum rates for stone-breaking or stone-crushing in mines-Validity-Minimum Wages Act", "statute": "Fixation of-Notification by State Government prescribing minimum rates for stone-breaking or stone-crushing in mines-Validity-Minimum Wages Act"}}, {"text": "Il Wacs Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1930, "end_char": 1947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S.C.R. SUPREME. COURT", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1978, "end_char": 1999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Madhya Pradesh Government issued a notification under s. 5 (2) of the Minimu!Il Wacs Act, 1948 (rr of 1948), prcscribin(j\n\n3 S.C.R. SUPREME."}}, {"text": "Art. 258", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2234, "end_char": 2242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Il Wacs Act, 1948", "statute": "Il Wacs Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "lVIineral I nduslry Association", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2287, "end_char": 2318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant company, lVIineral I nduslry Association engaged in manganese mining industry, challenged the validity v. of the said notification by a writ petition filed in the High Court Regional Labour and its case was that the said notification was ultra vires s. 5(2) Commissioner of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2528, "end_char": 2535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Il Wacs Act, 1948", "statute": "Il Wacs Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Part l of the Schedule to the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2711, "end_char": 2744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Part l of the Schedule to the Minimum Wages Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2863, "end_char": 2916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3146, "end_char": 3153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part l of the Schedule to the Minimum Wages Act, 1948", "statute": "Part l of the Schedule to the Minimum Wages Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3406, "end_char": 3411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part l of the Schedule to the Minimum Wages Act, 1948", "statute": "Part l of the Schedule to the Minimum Wages Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3711, "end_char": 3739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "A. S. Bobde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3903, "end_char": 3914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. Bobde and Ganpat Rai, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3919, "end_char": 3929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. Bobde and Ganpat Rai, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "H. J. Umrigar K. L. Hathi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3951, "end_char": 3976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. J. Umrigar K. L. Hathi and R.H. Dhebar, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "R.H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3981, "end_char": 3992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. J. Umrigar K. L. Hathi and R.H. Dhebar, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4078, "end_char": 4092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal arises from a Gajendragadkar J. writ petition filed by the appellant, Madhya Pradesh Mineral Industry Assoiation, in whch the appellant challenged the validity of the notification issued by the Madhya Pradesh State Government on March 30, 1952, under s. 5(2) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (11 of 1948) (hereinafter called the Act).", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4123, "end_char": 4137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal arises from a Gajendragadkar J. writ petition filed by the appellant, Madhya Pradesh Mineral Industry Assoiation, in whch the appellant challenged the validity of the notification issued by the Madhya Pradesh State Government on March 30, 1952, under s. 5(2) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (11 of 1948) (hereinafter called the Act).", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4360, "end_char": 4367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Minimum Wages Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4375, "end_char": 4398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay at Nagpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4447, "end_char": 4477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Bombay at Nagpur dismissed the appellant's petition but has granted the appellant\n\nr960 a certificate of fitness under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 133(l)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4580, "end_char": 4594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Minimum Wages Act, 1948", "statute": "the Minimum Wages Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Mineral Industry", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4657, "end_char": 4688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is with the said certificate that the Madhya Pradesh Mineral Industry present appeal has been brought to this Court."}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4837, "end_char": 4842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Minimum Wages Act, 1948", "statute": "the Minimum Wages Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Indian Companies Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4883, "end_char": 4909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4978, "end_char": 4992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has been formed with the object of protecting and promoting the Gajendragadkar J. interest of its members-shar_eholders who are engaged in the mining industry by all legitimate and constitutional means.", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "Art. 258", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5139, "end_char": 5147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "Indian Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "President of India", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5172, "end_char": 5190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "258 of the Constitution the President of India by Notification No."}}, {"text": "December 11, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5236, "end_char": 5253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.R.O. 2052 published on December 11, 1951, entrusted Governments of certain States including Madhya Pradesh with their consent the functions of the Central Government under the Act in so far as such functions relate to the fixation of minimum rates of wages in respect of employees employed in stonebreaking or in stone-crushing operations carried on in mines situated within their respective States."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5649, "end_char": 5674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pursuant to the said delegation the Madhya Pradesh Government issued the impugned notification purporting to act under s. 5(2) of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5732, "end_char": 5739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Governments of certain States including Madhya Pradesh with their consent the functions of the Central Government under the Act", "statute": "Governments of certain States including Madhya Pradesh with their consent the functions of the Central Government under the Act"}}, {"text": "Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Nagpur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6009, "end_char": 6055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Nagpur, Respondent 1, wrote to the appellant for the first time on June 20, 1956, stating that the State of Madhya Pradesh, Respondent 2, had considered the question whether the Act was applicable to the manganese mining industry and had come to the conclusion that it was so applicable; that is why the appellant's members were asked by respondent 1 to implement the Act within a fortnight from the receipt of his letter."}}, {"text": "June 20, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6116, "end_char": 6129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Nagpur, Respondent 1, wrote to the appellant for the first time on June 20, 1956, stating that the State of Madhya Pradesh, Respondent 2, had considered the question whether the Act was applicable to the manganese mining industry and had come to the conclusion that it was so applicable; that is why the appellant's members were asked by respondent 1 to implement the Act within a fortnight from the receipt of his letter."}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6148, "end_char": 6171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), Nagpur, Respondent 1, wrote to the appellant for the first time on June 20, 1956, stating that the State of Madhya Pradesh, Respondent 2, had considered the question whether the Act was applicable to the manganese mining industry and had come to the conclusion that it was so applicable; that is why the appellant's members were asked by respondent 1 to implement the Act within a fortnight from the receipt of his letter."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7274, "end_char": 7279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "d b h Regional Labqur _ lant ad also a ege t at t e noti ca.t10n issue y t e commissioner President of India under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 258", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7286, "end_char": 7294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9178, "end_char": 9188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ga1endragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9561, "end_char": 9575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "challenged in the petition, was not challenged before Ga1endragadkar J the High Court and so the only question that remained for its decision was one of interpretation of the relevant provisions of the entry introduced by the notification.", "canonical_name": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9959, "end_char": 9966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bobde", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10672, "end_char": 10677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the fact that the High Court has made a clear statement to the effect that the vires of the impugned notification had not been challenged before it we were at first not inclined to allow Mr. Bobde, for the appellant, to argue that point before us; however, after hearing him and after constdering the rest of tho record we are satisfied that the statement made in the judgment is not accurate."}}, {"text": "Art. 258", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11035, "end_char": 11043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 133(1)( c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12351, "end_char": 12366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14517, "end_char": 14529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15054, "end_char": 15066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15354, "end_char": 15366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15513, "end_char": 15522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15724, "end_char": 15733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15804, "end_char": 15816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16300, "end_char": 16305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17089, "end_char": 17101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17382, "end_char": 17392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17737, "end_char": 17742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17796, "end_char": 17803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17933, "end_char": 17940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 258", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18037, "end_char": 18045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18153, "end_char": 18160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Regional Labour It is true that the provisions of the Minimum Wages Commissioner Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18774, "end_char": 18858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19829, "end_char": 19836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Regional Labour It is true that the provisions of the Minimum Wages Commissioner Act", "statute": "Regional Labour It is true that the provisions of the Minimum Wages Commissioner Act"}}, {"text": "Umrigar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20540, "end_char": 20547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is, however, urged by Mr. Umrigar, for the respondents, that the word \"employment\" as well as the word \"stone\" used in item 8 should receive their widest denotation, and that, according to him, would include stone-breaking or 13tone-orushing operation&\n\n.. ,."}}, {"text": "referGajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21255, "end_char": 21274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the Schedule refers to the employment\n\nCommissioner of stone-breaking or stone-crushing does it referGajendragadkar J. to the incidental stone-breaking or stone-crushing in connection with manganese piine operations ?"}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23034, "end_char": 23041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We have carefully considered all the items in the Schedule and have taken into account the general beneficent policy of the Act", "statute": "We have carefully considered all the items in the Schedule and have taken into account the general beneficent policy of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24183, "end_char": 24190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24411, "end_char": 24416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24582, "end_char": 24592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 258", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25110, "end_char": 25118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "againstGajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25851, "end_char": 25872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Besides, Mfne!a~ Tn~:~~:; if the State Government purports to take action on Association the strength of the impugned notification which is v. h 1 Regional Labour invalid it would be open tot e appe lant to resist the commissioner threatened action on the ground that the notification - is invalid and no action can be validly taken againstGajendragadkar J. the appellant for the contravention of the provisions of the Act."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26663, "end_char": 26671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_488_499_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "April 7•\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960]\n\nMUIR MILLS CO. LTD., KANPUR\n\nITS WORKMEN. ( P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANOHOO and K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)\n\nIndustrial Dispute-Wage structure-Production bontbly reduced the wages of their workmen of Carding Department, given in the annexure? If so, to what relief are the workmen entitled and from what date ? \" By an order dated April 25, 1955, the Government amended this issue by substituting therefor the following :-\n\n\"Whether the employers have wrongfully and/or unjustifiably reduced the wages of their workmen of Carding Department, given in the annexure, by discontinuing the payment of production and/or special bonus, if so, to what relief are the workmen entitled and from what date? \"\n\nz96o It will be noticed that the issue as re-framed by the\n\nM . M-; l-C Ltd amendment indicated the manner in which the reducuir '/\n\n0 • • tion in the wages of these workmen had been alleged to Its workmen be made, viz., by \"discontinuing the payment of production and/qr special bonus\". To understand how Dos Gupta J the question of such a reduction arose and also the considerations which arise in deciding the question whether the reduction, if any, was wrongful and/or unjustifiable a few facts need to be mentioned: The appellant company is a textile mill employing in its Carding Department workmen known as Inter Tenters, Roving Tenters, Draw Frame Tenters and Slubbers.\n\nAll these workmen are paid wages on piece rate basis.\n\nBefore 1948 the rates in force per hank weri;> -/2/3/- for the Inter Tenters, -/2/3/- for the Slubbers and Draw Frame Tenters and -/2/5/- for the Roving Tenters. In addition to this these workmen were entitled to receive further emoluments if their production exceeded a certain norm. The rates for these further emoluments then in force were two annas per rupee of basic earnings of Rs. 15 to Rs. 25 per month and three annas per rupee for basic earnings above Rs. 25 per month. Apart . from these emoluments payment was also made at 9 pies per hank if the production on any day was 7 hanks .or more.\n\nThough both these additional emoluments were related to production the Tribunals below have described the first kind as production bonus and the second kind as incentive bonus and it will be convenient to adhere to that description here.\n\nThese two kinds of additional payments which the workmen would receive only iftheir production would reach and surpass certain standards had the result of increasing the total emoluments received' by some of the workmen much above what they would be getting under the fixed rate per hank. The right to receive these additional emoluments had become a part of the terms of service of these workmen. With effect from December 1, 1948, however the appellant-company stopped the system of paying such additional emoluments but instead raised the fixed rate per hank to -/3/9/- for Inter Tenters, -/3/6/- for Slubbers and Draw Frame Tenters and -/4/9/- for Roving Tenters. This was done immediately after an order had been made\n\n.. ,:...'\n\nby the Government under the provisions of s. 3 of the x960 U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, laying down the M . M-:-- 1 c r.. a d d f b . d d ll c uir i ls o. t ., stan ar s o asrn wages an _earness a owance .lOr v. . different industries in the Province. Clause 2 of this Its Workmen order fixed the minimum basic wage for cotton and woollen textile industries in Kanpur and certain other Das Gupta J. areas at Rs. 30 per month. Clause 3 provided for payment of dear food allowance.\n\nClause 5 provided that persons who are already employed on November 30, 1948, in any industrial textile concern shall receive wages at the increased rates mentioned therein.\n\nClause 7 provided that \"every employee of an industrial concern or undertaking to which this order applies, shall be paid wages including dear food allowance in accordance with the provisions of els. (2), (3), (5) and (6). \" There is a proviso to the clause which says that where the consolidated wage payable to an employee who was on the pay roll of the conaern or undertaking on November 30, 1948, is more than the consolidated wage payable in accordance wi_th the proviHions of the said clauses, the difference shall be paid to him as personal wage. Clause 8 defines \"basic wages \" as \"consolidated wages payable. to an employee on November 30, 1948, minus Dear Food Allowance calculated according to the rates prevalent in the concern on the said date. \"\n\nThe workmen's case is that by stopping the additional emoluments which they used to get on the basis of better production by extra efforts the employer had in fact reduced the wages to which they were entitled and the fact that higher piece-rate were introduced with effect from December 1, 1948, does not affect the question. The employer's contention is that by the Government order it was required to introduce new piece-rates after taking into consideration the amounts actually earned by workers including what had been earned by additional emoluments and so the stOppage of these additional emoluments did not amount to any reduction. The Adjudicator held that these additional emoluments payable as production bonus and incentive bonus had not been taken into consideration by the company while arriving at the revised piece-rates. He\n\nr960 held further that these could not be taken into consideration in law as the Government order did not Muir Mills Co. Ltd. contemplate these bonuses to be taken into considera-\n\nIts w:hmen tion in arriving at the appropriate figure fo: basic wages for the purpose of the order. In that view the Das Gupta J.\n\nAdjudicator held that there had been an unjustifiable reduction in the wages of the workmen and directed the management to restore with effect from December 1, 1948, \"the system of granting production and . incentive bonuses to such of the workmen who are entitled to it''. He also gave directions as to how the calculations should be made for the purpose of incentive bonus and production bonus.\n\nThe Appellate Tribunal thought it unnecessary to consider the question whether these bonuses had been actually taken into consideration while fixing new piece rates, being of opinion that if the Government order did not require or justify the employer's including these bonuses in the calculation of the new rates the company would be hound in law to restore these bonuses even if they had actually taken them into consideration. It held that the Government order did not require or justify the employer including these bonuses in the calculation of the rates of wages for the purposes of the Government order. In the result the appellate tribunal agreed with the first tribunal's decision that this system of granting production and incentive bonuses must be restored. In view of the fact however that for a long time after December 1, 1948, the workmen did not raise this question the appellate tribunal was of opinion that the restoration should be only with effect from February 1, 1954. As regards the rates at which these bonuses had to be calculated they also modified the directions given by the Tribunal.\n\nThe main contention raised before us on behalf of the appellant-company is that the appellate tribunal was wrong in thinking that the Government order did not require or justify the company in including the additional emoluments being paid by way of production bonus and the incentive bonus in the calculation of the rates of basic wages for the purpose of the order, ·\n\nBefore we proceed to consider this question it is z96o proper to mention a preliminary contention which M . M7c Ltd was sought to be raised by Mr. Pathak, on behalf of uir i s o. the appellant. Referring to a n,.ote made by the v.\n\nAdjudicator on August 27, 1955, he wanted to argue Its Workmen that it was not open to the tribunals below to consider Das Gupta 1. at all the question whether under the Government order the appellant could have included the incentive bonus in the calculation of the basic rayte.\n\nThe note is in these words :-\n\n- \" The parties are represented. The calculations have been filed by them which were made in the presence of the Adjudicator. There is no difference between the parties that while calculating the rates with effect from l-l!~-48 if production and incentive bonus have been considered the question of any relief does not arise,, and vice versa. The workers say that in the said. wages, these bonuses have nbt been included while the employers contend that they have been included.\n\nThe latter have not filed the required information. Proceedings closed.\" At first sight, this does seem to give a basis for an argument that the parties agreed before' the Tribunal to treat the matter as a question of fact only and that .the workmen did not want to raise any question that under the Government order these bonuses could not be included in the calculation of the rates. It is unnecessary however for us to examine the effect of such concession in view of'what transpired before the appellate tribunal. From the judgment of that Tribunal we find that on behalf of the workmen it was stated that they had not conceded any such position in the lower tribunal and that their contention was that such bohuses had not and could not be taken into consideration. It is also clear from the judgment that in view of this the parties argued their appeal before the appellate tribunal on both these contentions, viz., whether the Government order in question aillowed the employers to include the bonuses in questjon in the calculation of the new rates of basic wages in the case of the piece-rate workers like those concerned in this and if so, whether the employers have in\n\n(i3\n\nz960 fact taken these bonuses into account. It is clear\n\nM . M\"ll c Ltd that the contention that in view of the concession\n\n\"\" '/ o. made on August 27, 1955, it was not open to the Its wo, kmen appellate tribunal to go into the question whether the Government order required or authorised the em- Das Gupta f. ployer's including the bonuses in the calculation of the new rates was abandoned before the tribunal below.\n\nWhen it was pointed out to Mr. Pathak that in view of this, he should not be allowed to raise this contention Mr. Pathak fairly abandoned this contention here also.\n\nThe real question therefore is whether the Government order required or authorised the company to include the incentive bonus and the production bonus which they had been so long paying in fixing the new piece rate for the purpose of compliance with the directions given in the Government order as regards the basic wages. In finding the correct answer to this question it is necessary to examine the entire scheme of the Government order. The relevant clauses of the Government order have already been set out. The purpose of the scheme, on the face of it, is to make it obligatory on the employers in different industries to keep wages of workmen at a certain level. This purpose is sought to be achieved by laying down on the one hand the basic wages which must be paid and on the other hand the dearness allowance-called in the Government order dear food allowance-which must be paid. The concept of basic wage is familiar to employers and workmen and all who have to deal with the problems of labour's remuneration. It may be profitably remembered in this connection that the concept of a \"basic\" is not peculiar to wages alone. ]for instance, when any rationing system is introduced for any commodity, whether it is food, or coal, or petrol or some other commodity, it is usual to fix a quantum as the basic ration. The underlying idea is to fix some amount as what every individual coming under the system will get; while additional amounts _to be fixed in accordance with further directions will be allowed to some individuals, in view of their special claims as supplementary rations. \" Basic\" in all such cases is what is normally allowi.ble to all-irrespective\n\n-.\n\n. \"·\n\nof special claims. The phrase \" basic wages \" is also i96o ordinarily understood to mean that part of the price M . c L 4 of labour, which the employer mmit pay to all work-· \"\" '/\n\n0 • 1\n\n• men belonging to all categories. The phrase is used Its Workmen ordinarily in marked contra-distinction to \" dearness allowance\", the quantum of which varies from time Das Gupta J. to time, in accordance with the rise or fall in the cost of living.\n\nThus understood \" basic wage\" never includes the additional emoluments which some workmen may earn, on the basis of a system of bonuses related to the production. The quantum of earnings in such bonuses varies from individual to individual according to their efficiency and diligence ; it will vary sometimes from season to season with the variations of working conditions in the factory or other place where the work is done ; it will vary also with variations in the rate of supplies of raw material or in the assistance obtainable from machinery. This very element of variation, excludes this part of workmen's emoluments from the connotation of\" basic wages\". But, says the appellant, whatever may be ordinarily understood by the word \" basic wages\" hardly matters when the Government order itself contains a definition of \"basic wage\". Clause 8, which has already been referred to is in these words :-\"Basic Wages \" for the purposes of this order will mean consolidated wages payable to an employee on November 30, 1948, minus Dear Food Allowance calculated according to the rates prevalent in the concern on the said date.\" On behalf of the appellant Mr. Pathak concentrates on the words \"consolidated wage\", and argues that everything which answers to the description of wage must be included in this process of consolidation.\n\nContending next that the emoluments payable by way of production bonus and incentive bonus are\"' wages \" even if not ordinarily understood to be basic wages _ he argues that the result of the definition in cl. 8 is that basic wages for this order is the sum total of all emoluments answering to the description of wages thus including production and ineentive bonuses, but excluding by reason of the express words used \" dearness allowance \", .\n\n~ ..\n\n1960 In support of his argument that production or - incentive bonuses which used to be paid by the com- Muir Mills Co. Ltd. pany is also a kind of wage the learned advocate has\n\nIts ;/; rkmen placed strong reliance on some observations made by this Court in Titaghur Paper Mills Co., Ltd. v. Their Das Gupta f, Workmen (1 ) that a production bonus is in the nature of an incentive wage.\n\nWe will presently consider how far the fact that these bonuses are in the nature of an incentive wa.ge assists the appellant's contention that it has to be included in the \"consolidated wage\" within the meaning of cl. 8 of the order. But before we do that, it will be proper to see exactly what this Court said in the above case. A question had been raised as regards the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunals to go into the question of any production bonus claim at all, that being a matter of agreement between the employer and the employees. In considering thiS question this Court thought fit to consider first what a production bonus essentially is. In the course of that discussion the Court said :-\n\n\" Before we go into the question of jurisdiction of a tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act), we should like to consider what production bonus essentially is, The payment of production bonus depends upon production and is in addition to wages. In effect it is an incentive to higher production and is in the nature of a, n incentive wage.\" ............................................................... \"There is a base or standard above which extra. payment is made for extra production in addition to the basic wage. Such a plan typically guarantees time wage up to the time represented by standard performance and gives worker! a share in the savings represented by superior performance.\"\n\n............................................................... \" Therefore generally speaking, payment of production bonus is nothing more or less than a payment of further emoluments depending upon production as an incentive to the workmen to put in more than the standard performance. Production\n\n(I) [19;9) Supp. 2 s.c.R. IOl2.\n\n...\n\n3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORT~ 497.\n\nbonus in this case also is of this nature and is r960 nothing more than additional emolument paid as - an incentive for higher production. We shall later Muir Mills Co. Ltd. consider the argument whether in this case the pro- Its w:kmen duction bonus is anything other than profit bonus.\n\nIt is enough to say at this stage that the bonus Das Gupta ]. under the scheme in this case also depends essentially on production and therefore is in the nature of incentive bonus;\" It is important to notice that while the learned counsel is undoubtedly right in saying that a bonus related to production was described in this case as in the nature of an incentive wage, the Court was equally emphatic in laying down tliat such bonuses form no part of wages as ordinarily understood and again that these are in addition to basic wages.\n\nCan it be reasonably said that even such \"incentive wage \" though not forming part of basic . wage as . ordinarily understood was intended to be included in the consolidation of wages which cl. 8 speaks of? The answer must be in the negative. While it is true that the 'Yord \"consolidated wage\" taken away from the context would import the inclusion of every ki:id of wage, we have to remember that here it is basic wage which is being defined. It will be unreasonable to think that in defining basic wage the Government would include something which is always understood to be outside the ordinary concept of basic wage.\n\nRemembering as we must that it is basic wage which is being defined here it is reasonable to think that .only such emoluments which are receivable by the workmen generally, as a normal feature of their earnings and therefore satisfy the .characteristics of \"basic wage\", are intended to be covered by the consolidation.. It is because dear food allowance does not satisfy this charitcteristic that this has .been expressly excluded.\n\nMr. Pathak's argument that when in the case of dearness allowance an express exclusion has been made, everything else in the nature of wages has to be included would have been of great force but for the fact that when \"basic wage \" is being defined the presumption must be that anything which ii; i eseutially\n\n1960 different and distinct from basic wage was not intended to be included.\n\nMuir Mills Co. Ltd.\n\nIt . th t\" . 1 th t th t\"fi . v. 1s wor men 10mng a so a e no 1 cat10n Its workmen does not in terms refer to piece rate system of payment.· That itself is a , reason for thinking that Das Gupta J. production bonuses which are an essential feature of piece rate system but not of time rate system, were not in the contemplation of those who drafted the order.\n\nEqually pertinent is the consideration that when the Government is evolving a scheme to improve the wage structure of workmen it would not knowingly do anything which would have the effect of removing incentives to production. Such removal would harm labour by preventing workmen from earning more by extra efforts, harm capital by diminishing the return therefrom and harm the country as a whole at a time when higher production is the crying need of every branch of industry. An interpretation which would impute to Government such an unthinkable intention to harm all concerned, cannot be lightly accepted; but that would be the necessary result if \"consolidated wages\" in the definition of basic wages is interpreted to include even an incentive wage like bonus related to production. On every consideration it is therefore abundantly_clear that production bonus and incentive bonus were not within basic wages as defined in the Government order.\n\nIt was faintly arguedby Mr. Patlrak that the fact that the workmen did not for a number of years raise any objection to the stoppage of the old system of production bonus and incentive bonus shows that they themselves understood the Government order to mean that these bonuses would be included in fixing the basic wages for the purpose of the order. Whether that was so or not it is unnecessary for us to consider, for when the only reasonable interpretation of the words used in the order is that these are not to be included, it matters little how the employer or the workmen 1mderstood these words to mean.\n\nWe have therefore come to the conclusion that the Labour Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the Goverl!ment order did not require or justify the\n\n- '- .\n\n··-\n\nemployer including the production and incentive 1960 bonuses in the calculation of the rates of the basic . f h . d l h h kfutr lvlilis Co. Ltd. wage o t e worKer:s an consequent y t at t e v.\n\nGovernment order did not have the effect of .absolving lts Workmei: the comp.any from the duty of continuing to pay the. production and incentive bonuses to workmen as Das 0up1a J. before.\n\nNo objection has been raised before us as regards the directions given by the appellate tribunal for the calculation of these bonuses. • The appeal is accordingly cfomissed with costs.'\n\nAppeal dismised.\n\nIN RE: SANT RAM\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C. ]., ]AFER lMAM, ]. L. KAPUR,\n\nK. N. WANCHOO , and K. C. DAS GuPTA, JJ.)\n\nSupreme Court Rules-Publication of list of touts by \"Registrar -Rules, if ultra vires the powers of this Court-Supreme Court Rules, 1950 (as amended), 0. IVA, rr. 23, 24-Constitution of India, Ats. 14S(l)(a), 14, 19, 21.\n\nOn a complaint made by the Honorary Secretary of the Supreme Court Bar Association, . the Registrar of, the Supreme Court issued notices to the appellant and another under r. ;!4,\n\n0. IVA of the Supreme Court Rules to show cause why their names should not be included in the list of touts to be published by him thereunder.\n\nA preliminary objection was raised that rr. 23 and 24 were ultra vires the powers of this Court conferred by Art. 145(1)(a) of the Constitution and that e Registrar had, therefore, no jurisdiction to initiate the proceedings. The Registrar overruled the objection and on the: evidence adduced by the complainant found both the persons to be touts within the meaning of r. 23 of the said order and directed their names to be included in the list of touts to be hung up on the Court notice board.\n\nThe appellant appealed to the Chamber Judge and on his direction the matter was placed before the Constitution Bench: Held, that rr. 23 and 24 of 0. IVA of the Supreme Court Rules, 1950, as amended, are infra vires the rule-making powers of this Court. and the order of the Registrar must be upheld.\n\nThere can be no doubt that this Court has the inherent juris-' diction to regulate its proceedings relating to the conduct of persons appearing . before it, in and out of O; mrt, in so tar as it relates to the profession and its P.(.1ics.\n\nApart from such jurisdictim., Art. 145(l)(a) of the Constitution by using the expression \"the practice and procedure of the\n\nIA-6 SCI/ND/82\n\n.jJril 7.", "total_entities": 59, "entities": [{"text": "MUIR MILLS CO. LTD., KANPUR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 67, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MUIR MILLS CO. LTD., KANPUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ITS WORKMEN. ( P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 69, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 124, "end_char": 144, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 390, "end_char": 413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Government of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 767, "end_char": 794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1948 the Government of Uttar Pradesh with a view to make it obligatory on the employers in the different industries to keep the wages of workmen at a certain level, by its order under the provisions of s. 3 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, laid down the standard of basic wages and dearness allowance for different industries in the provinGe."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 960, "end_char": 964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 977, "end_char": 1006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "\\Vork1nen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1568, "end_char": 1577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he \\Vork1nen's\n\ncase was that by stopping the additional emoluments which they used to get on the basis of better production by extra efforts the employer had in fact reduced the wages to which they were entitled and the fact that higher piece rates were introduced did not affect the question."}}, {"text": "Muir Mills Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2996, "end_char": 3015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The phrase is used ordiz960 narily in marked contra.distinction to \" dearness allowance \" the quantum of which varies from.time to time, in accordance with Muir Mills Co. Ltd. the rise or fall in the cost of living."}}, {"text": "Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3467, "end_char": 3509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the Decision dated January 10, 1957, of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Bombay, in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "G. S. Pathak", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3543, "end_char": 3555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Pathak, S. P. Sinha and K. K. Sinha for G. N.\n\nDikshit, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "S. P. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3557, "end_char": 3568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Pathak, S. P. Sinha and K. K. 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Goyal, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3797, "end_char": 3806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAS GUPTA, J.-This appeal by the employer, the Das Gupta J.\n\nMuir Mills Co., Ltd., Kanpur, is against the decision of the Labour Appella'te Tribunal of India, Bombay, modifying an award of the Adjudicator, Kanpur, in a reference made by the Government of.", "canonical_name": "DAS GUPTA"}}, {"text": "Das Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3844, "end_char": 3853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAS GUPTA, J.-This appeal by the employer, the Das Gupta J.\n\nMuir Mills Co., Ltd., Kanpur, is against the decision of the Labour Appella'te Tribunal of India, Bombay, modifying an award of the Adjudicator, Kanpur, in a reference made by the Government of.", "canonical_name": "DAS GUPTA"}}, {"text": "Labour Appella'te Tribunal of India, Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3919, "end_char": 3962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAS GUPTA, J.-This appeal by the employer, the Das Gupta J.\n\nMuir Mills Co., Ltd., Kanpur, is against the decision of the Labour Appella'te Tribunal of India, Bombay, modifying an award of the Adjudicator, Kanpur, in a reference made by the Government of."}}, {"text": "Government of. U. P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4038, "end_char": 4058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAS GUPTA, J.-This appeal by the employer, the Das Gupta J.\n\nMuir Mills Co., Ltd., Kanpur, is against the decision of the Labour Appella'te Tribunal of India, Bombay, modifying an award of the Adjudicator, Kanpur, in a reference made by the Government of."}}, {"text": "ss. 3, 4 and 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4083, "end_char": 4097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4105, "end_char": 4134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "April 25, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4440, "end_char": 4454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an order dated April 25, 1955, the Government amended this issue by substituting therefor the following :-\n\n\"Whether the employers have wrongfully and/or unjustifiably reduced the wages of their workmen of Carding Department, given in the annexure, by discontinuing the payment of production and/or special bonus, if so, to what relief are the workmen entitled and from what date? \""}}, {"text": "Dos Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5115, "end_char": 5124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To understand how Dos Gupta J the question of such a reduction arose and also the considerations which arise in deciding the question whether the reduction, if any, was wrongful and/or unjustifiable a few facts need to be mentioned: The appellant company is a textile mill employing in its Carding Department workmen known as Inter Tenters, Roving Tenters, Draw Frame Tenters and Slubbers.", "canonical_name": "DAS GUPTA"}}, {"text": "December 1, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6800, "end_char": 6816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With effect from December 1, 1948, however the appellant-company stopped the system of paying such additional emoluments but instead raised the fixed rate per hank to -/3/9/- for Inter Tenters, -/3/6/- for Slubbers and Draw Frame Tenters and -/4/9/- for Roving Tenters."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7162, "end_char": 7166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7185, "end_char": 7214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7380, "end_char": 7388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Kanpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7489, "end_char": 7495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clause 2 of this Its Workmen order fixed the minimum basic wage for cotton and woollen textile industries in Kanpur and certain other Das Gupta J. areas at Rs."}}, {"text": "Clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7554, "end_char": 7562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7609, "end_char": 7617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "November 30, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7668, "end_char": 7685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clause 5 provided that persons who are already employed on November 30, 1948, in any industrial textile concern shall receive wages at the increased rates mentioned therein."}}, {"text": "Clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7784, "end_char": 7792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8338, "end_char": 8346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "February 1, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11072, "end_char": 11088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the fact however that for a long time after December 1, 1948, the workmen did not raise this question the appellate tribunal was of opinion that the restoration should be only with effect from February 1, 1954."}}, {"text": "Pathak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11731, "end_char": 11737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M7c Ltd was sought to be raised by Mr. Pathak, on behalf of uir i s o. the appellant."}}, {"text": "August 27, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11831, "end_char": 11846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Referring to a n,.ote made by the v.\n\nAdjudicator on August 27, 1955, he wanted to argue Its Workmen that it was not open to the tribunals below to consider Das Gupta 1."}}, {"text": "Das Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11935, "end_char": 11944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Referring to a n,.ote made by the v.\n\nAdjudicator on August 27, 1955, he wanted to argue Its Workmen that it was not open to the tribunals below to consider Das Gupta 1.", "canonical_name": "DAS GUPTA"}}, {"text": "Clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17344, "end_char": 17352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18044, "end_char": 18049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18893, "end_char": 18898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Before we go into the question of jurisdiction of a tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19391, "end_char": 19491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "cl. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21514, "end_char": 21519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patlrak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24132, "end_char": 24139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was faintly arguedby Mr. Patlrak that the fact that the workmen did not for a number of years raise any objection to the stoppage of the old system of production bonus and incentive bonus shows that they themselves understood the Government order to mean that these bonuses would be included in fixing the basic wages for the purpose of the order."}}, {"text": "SANT RAM", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25481, "end_char": 25489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IN RE: SANT RAM\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C. ]., ]"}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25492, "end_char": 25503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IN RE: SANT RAM\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C. ]., ]", "canonical_name": "S. P. Sinha"}}, {"text": "AFER lMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25513, "end_char": 25522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AFER lMAM, ]."}}, {"text": "L. KAPUR", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25527, "end_char": 25535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. KAPUR,\n\nK. N. WANCHOO , and K. C. DAS GuPTA, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25538, "end_char": 25551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. KAPUR,\n\nK. N. WANCHOO , and K. C. DAS GuPTA, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "K. N. WANCHOO"}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS GuPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25558, "end_char": 25573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. KAPUR,\n\nK. N. WANCHOO , and K. C. DAS GuPTA, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25581, "end_char": 25600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Court-Supreme Court Rules, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25686, "end_char": 25717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25751, "end_char": 25772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Supreme Court Bar Association", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25856, "end_char": 25885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On a complaint made by the Honorary Secretary of the Supreme Court Bar Association, ."}}, {"text": "IVA of the Supreme Court Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25987, "end_char": 26017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 145(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26237, "end_char": 26251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IVA of the Supreme Court Rules", "statute": "IVA of the Supreme Court Rules"}}, {"text": "Constitution Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 26722, "end_char": 26740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant appealed to the Chamber Judge and on his direction the matter was placed before the Constitution Bench: Held, that rr."}}, {"text": "IVA of the Supreme Court Rules, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26773, "end_char": 26809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 145(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27195, "end_char": 27209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IVA of the Supreme Court Rules, 1950", "statute": "IVA of the Supreme Court Rules, 1950"}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_499_508_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 499\n\nemployer including the production and incentive 1960 bonuses in the calculation of the rates of the basic . f h . d l h h kfutr lvlilis Co. Ltd. wage o t e worKer:s an consequent y t at t e v.\n\nGovernment order did not have the effect of .absolving lts Workmei: the comp.any from the duty of continuing to pay the. production and incentive bonuses to workmen as Das 0up1a J. before.\n\nNo objection has been raised before us as regards the directions given by the appellate tribunal for the calculation of these bonuses. • The appeal is accordingly cfomissed with costs.'\n\nAppeal dismised.\n\nIN RE: SANT RAM\n\n(B. P. SINHA, C. ]., ]AFER lMAM, ]. L. KAPUR,\n\nK. N. WANCHOO , and K. C. DAS GuPTA, JJ.)\n\nSupreme Court Rules-Publication of list of touts by \"Registrar -Rules, if ultra vires the powers of this Court-Supreme Court Rules, 1950 (as amended), 0. IVA, rr. 23, 24-Constitution of India, Ats. 14S(l)(a), 14, 19, 21.\n\nOn a complaint made by the Honorary Secretary of the Supreme Court Bar Association, . the Registrar of, the Supreme Court issued notices to the appellant and another under r. ;!4,\n\n0. IVA of the Supreme Court Rules to show cause why their names should not be included in the list of touts to be published by him thereunder.\n\nA preliminary objection was raised that rr. 23 and 24 were ultra vires the powers of this Court conferred by Art. 145(1)(a) of the Constitution and that e Registrar had, therefore, no jurisdiction to initiate the proceedings. The Registrar overruled the objection and on the: evidence adduced by the complainant found both the persons to be touts within the meaning of r. 23 of the said order and directed their names to be included in the list of touts to be hung up on the Court notice board.\n\nThe appellant appealed to the Chamber Judge and on his direction the matter was placed before the Constitution Bench: Held, that rr. 23 and 24 of 0. IVA of the Supreme Court Rules, 1950, as amended, are infra vires the rule-making powers of this Court. and the order of the Registrar must be upheld.\n\nThere can be no doubt that this Court has the inherent juris-' diction to regulate its proceedings relating to the conduct of persons appearing . before it, in and out of O; mrt, in so tar as it relates to the profession and its P.(.1ics.\n\nApart from such jurisdictim., Art. 145(l)(a) of the Constitution by using the expression \"the practice and procedure of the\n\nIA-6 SCI/ND/82\n\n.jJril 7.\n\n500 SUPREl\\IE COURT REPORTS [1960]\n\nCourt,\" which has to be construed in its widest sense, confers, on this Court the power to regulate not merely the. conduct of In r•: Sant Ra_m advocates appearing in Court buf' also of their assistants in\n\n. - - - relation to the business of this Court. Consequently, r. 23 which makes an advocate who ; tccepts engagement in legal business . through .a tout guilty of misconduct and r. 24 which lays down the procedure for including a person in the list of touts are clearly within the rule-making powers of this Court. No question as to r. 24 infringing Art. 14 of the Constitution . could arise since it does not discriminate within the class to which it applies, nor does it contravene Art. 19 or 21 of the Constitution and; it was futile to contend that the word •life' in Art. 21 included• livelihood'. No tout can claim any rights in relation to the business of the Court. This rule which seeks to maintain the purity of the legal profession'is no less in the interest of the -\n\n- general public and it is the duty of every -Court to see that toutism is completely eliminated; - - CivIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil l\\Iisc. Petition No. 928 of 1959.\n\nAppeal against the order dated l\\Iay 16, 1959, of the Registrar.\n\nM. G. Bhimasena Rao, for Sant Ram. -· . H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India, N. S. Bindra .and, R.H. Dhebar, for the Attorney- General of India. · \"1960. April 7. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sinha C. J.\n\nSINHA, C. J.-This matter was placed before the Constitution Bench by an order of the Chamber Judge --dated August 14, 1959, as it involved the vires of the rules framed under Art. 145 of the Constitutionwith\n\n. _,_,\n\n--- - - particular reference to Rule 24 of Order IV-A of the Supreme Court Rules (as Amended}.\n\n It appears that on receipt of a letter dated April 28, - 1959, from the Supreme Court Bar Association forward~ -mg a.copy ofa resolution which had been passed by -\n\nthe Executive Committee of that Association, the Registrar initiated proceedings and held an enquiry under R; 24(2} of Chap, IV-A. The enquiry was made against two persons named Sa, nt Ram and Budh Dev Sharma on a complaint made by the Honorary Secretary of the Supreme Court _Bar Association. 'The complaint against those persons-was to the effect that they were \" continuing their undesirable activities\" - and were seen _eyery day in the Court premises and\n\n3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 501\n\nin the verandah in front of the Bar Association r960 \"accosting clients\". On receipt of the Secretary's I t R letter the Registrar caused notices to be issued to the n re:__.:: am two persons aforesaid to show ca11se why their names Sinha c. J. should not be included in t.he \"list of touts\" to be kept hung up on the Court notice board according to R. 24 aforesaid. The R.egi; trnr fixed a date for holding the enquiry and called upon those persons to appear before him and to adduce such evidence as they may be ad vised, in showing cause against the inclusion of their names in s11ch a lisL.\n\nThe notice further called upon them to file their replies, if any, to the complaint on or before May 6, 1959, and to be ready with all their evidence and witnesses, if any, at the hearing on May 9, l!J59.\n\nC!opies of the complaint and other relevant papers were also sent to the Secretary of the Supreme Court Bar Association inviting him to take such part in the proceedings as the Association may be ad vised and requesting him to furnish particulars of the evidence in support of the complaint and to be ready with the evidence. In pursuance of the notice aforesaid Budh Dev Sharma alias B. D.\n\nPathak filed his reply on May 6, 1959, annexing thereto certain documents and praying that he may be allowed to continue eaming his livelihood. He also prayed that his employer Shri Dharam Bhushan, Advocate, may be accorded permission to have his name registered as a clerk in the Registry and also in the Bar Association. Ou May 8, 1959, Sant Ram filed his reply to the said notice annexing thereto a certificate of Mr. M. U. Bhimasena Rao, Advocate, and praying that the notice against him may be discharged and that he be \" allowed to make both ends meet in the service of hia present employer\", meaning thereby Mr. Bhimasena Rao, Advocate. The proceedings before the H, egistrar commenced on May 9, 1959, and were concluded on May 11, when evidence was recorded.\n\nA preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the persons proceeded against that the rules framed by the Supreme Court under which the proceedings had been initiated against them were ultra vires the powers of the Court conferred by Art. 145 of the Constitution.\n\nIn re : Sant Ram\n\nSinha C. ].\n\nSUPREME COURT RJvi th a view to enforcing that rule, a \"tout\" has to be defined, which is done by the explanation to\n\nR. 23.\n\nIt is equally clear that R. 24. which lays down the procedure for publishing lists of touts and for holding an enquiry to determine whether or not a particular person should be included in such a list must be equally within the purview of the rule-making power of this Court.\n\nIn our opm10n, therefore, it is futile to contend that R. 24 in question is ultra vires the rule-making power of this Court.\n\nIt is next contended that Art. 14 of the Constitution has been infririgecl by the prov1s1ons contained in\n\nR. 24.\n\nIt was cl iflicult for the appellant to indicate in 11:hat way the alleged discrimination occurs.\n\nIt was faintly suggested that there was some difference' between the provisions now impugned and those of s. 36 of the Legal Practitioners' Act (Act XVIII of 1879).\n\nAssuming that there is some difference between the two provisions. it cannot be said that ipso facto there is discrimina1 ion.\n\nAll persons who frequent the pre-- cincts of this Court shall be l.t. finding is one of fact.\n\nOn that finding the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal rightly came to the conclusion that it was a deductible expense under s. 10(2)(xv).\n\nIn our OJ>inion the judgment of the High Court was right and we would dismiss this appeal with costs . • Appeal dismissed. 1-\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nBOMBAY NORTH & OTHERS.\n\nM/S. HARIV ALLABHDAS KALIDAS AND CO.,\n\n(S. K. DAs, J. L. KAPUR AND M. HrnAYATULLAH. JJ.)\n\nIncome-tax-Managing Agent's Commission payable at the end of the year-Rate of Cm1 and 2006) the I ncomctax Oniccr . issued notices to the legal heirs of Balkrishna Purusl1011am Purani.\n\nPursuant to those notices, rcnti'ns were !lied under i-11e heading, \"Lcgal heirs ol' Balkrishna Purushottam Purani\", in one case\n\nJ •\n\n...\n\n\\ ~\n\n-..\n\n1960 and in the name of t:J1e estate of Balakrishna in the other; the status was shown as \"individual\"' in one case and ''association of persons\" in the other.\n\nThey were signed by Indira. one of the three widows.\n\nFor\n\n' Commissioner of\n\n' the assessment vear 19.'lO-:) l the total income was shown as under- , ·\n\nProperty Share from registered firm Dividends Interest Ground rent\n\nTotal\n\n...\n\nFor the assessment year 1951-52, was shown as--\n\nProperty\n\nShare from registered firm Dividends Interest on deposits Ground rent\n\nTotal\n\nthe\n\nRs. 11,011\n\n4,071 51,796 22,343 125 --- 69,346 ---- \\ total -income\n\nRs. 10,879\n\n460 80,426 536 125\n\n92,426\n\nFor both years the I ncorne-tax Officer took the status of the assessee as an \"association of. persons\" and on that footing made two assessment orders.\n\nThere was an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, and two of the points taken before him were-\n\n(a) that the three widows ought to have been assessed separately and not as an \"association of .persons\", and (b) that n any event, the income from property ought to have been assessed separately in the haiids. of the three widows by reason of the provisions in s. 9(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1922.\n\nThe Appellate Assistant Commissioner rejected point ·(a) but accepted , point (b).\n\nThen, there was a further appeal to' the\n\nIncomttax,\n\nBomba;•\n\nSmt. Indira Balkrislmn\n\nS. K: Da.< J.\n\nrommissioner n.f\n\nl11comt-tax,\n\nflmnba_f\n\n\\' Smt. l11riira\n\nBalakri slmfl\n\nS. K. D.m: J.\n\nI nco111c-1ax Appellate Tribun:d, Bombay. The Tribunal held that the entire estate of deceased Balkrishna\n\nPurushoitam Purani was inherited and possessed by the three widows as joint tenants and its income was liable 10 be assessed in their hands in the status of an associatio'n of persons.\n\nThe Tribun:il further held that the Appellate Assistanr Commissioner was wrong in holding that the shar<>s of the' three widows were definite and determinable and s. 9(3) was applicable.\n\nThe assessec then moved the Tribunal to refer certain questions of law which arose out of its orders to the High Court of Bombay.\n\nThe Tribunal referred four su.ch questions, but: we arc now concerned with only one of them, viz .. question No. 3 which was in the following terms :\n\n\"(.~) \"Whether on the facts and in the circum- - stances of the case the Tr, ibunal was right in holding that the assessment made on the three widows of Balakrishna Purushottam Purani in the status of\n\nan association of persons is legal and valid 111 Ia1,·?\" Two references were made 'to the High Court 111 respect of the orders passed for two assessment years and they gave rise to Income-tax References Nos. !\\2 and r, g of I !l:\"1T>.\n\nThe leading jmlgrnent was given in I. T. R. r,2 of I D!i5.\n\nThe 1-1 igh Comt held that the Tribunal 10s in en'or in coming to the conclusion that the three widows could be assessed in the status of an association of persons with regard to the income which thcv earned as-heirs of their deceased husband.\n\nTherefore: it answered question No. H in the negative.\n\nThe department represented by the Commissioner of:\n\nT ncorlie-tax, Bombay, then applied to this Court and obtained special leave to appeal from the judgment and orders of the High Court of Bombay in the two References.\n\nThese two appeals have been filed in pursuance of the special leave granted bv this Court.\n\nThe appellant is the Commissioner of Income-tax, B01nbay, and the assessee is the respondent.\n\nThe argument on behalf of the appellant is that the High Court was in error when it said that \"what: is required before an association of persons can he liable to tax is\"not that they should receive income hut that\n\n' ...\n\nthey should earn or help to earn income by reason of their association, and if the case of the Department stops short at mere receipt of income, then the Department rriust fail in bringing home the liability to tax of individuals as an asoci'ation o( persons.\" It is submitted that the High Court did not, in the statement quoted above, lay down the correct test for determining what is an \"association of persons\" for the purposes of the Income-tax Act.\n\nBefore we go on to discuss the argument presented on behalf of the appellant, it is necessary to clear the ground by stating what is the position of co-widows in Mitakshara, succession and what are the findings arrived at by the Tribunal. The position of co-widows is well-settled.\n\nThev succeed as co-heirs to the estate of their deceased h{1sband and take as joint tenants with rights of survivorship and equal beneficial enjoyment; they arc entitled as between themselves to. an equal share of the income. Though they take as joint tenants, no one of them has a right to enforce an absolute partition of the estate against the others so as to destroy their right of survivorship.\n\nBut they are entitled to obtain a partition of separate portions of the property so that each may enjoy her equal share of the income accruing therefrom. The Tribunal found that the widows in this case did not exercise their right to separate possession and enjoyment and \"they chose to manage the property jointly, each acting for herself and the others and receiving the income of the property which they were entitled to enjoy in equal shares.\" Learned counsel for the appellant has emphasised before us the aforesaid finding of the Tribunal and has contended that on the finding of joint management, the widows fulfilled even the test laid down by the High Court and constituted an \"association of persons\" for taxing purposes.\n\nThe High Court, however, rightly pointed out that lhe only property which. the widows could have managed jointly was the immovable property which fetched an income of about Rs. 11,000, and as to that property, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had held that s. 9(3) applied.\n\nThere was no appeal by the Department against that finding and it was not 'f-6 SCI/ND/82\n\nCommissioner of\n\nlncometax,\n\nBombay v.\n\nSmt. Indira Balkrishna\n\nS. K. Das J.\n\nC()mmi5siontr of\n\nlncorm-ta.-;,\n\nBomb4v\n\nSmt. Indira Balkrishna S. K. Das J.\n\nopen to !he Tribunal to go behind it.\n\nEven on merits the Tribunal was 1nong in thinking that the respective shares of the widows \"ere not definite and ascertainable.\n\nThey had an equal share in the income, viz., one-third each, and the provisions of s. 9(8) clearly applied in respect of the immovable property.\n\nv\\'ith regard to the shares, dividends and interest on deposits there was no finding of any act o( joint management. l ndeed, the main item consists of the dividends ancl it is difficult to understand what act of management the widows performed in respect thereof \"hich produced or helped to produce income. On the. Contrary, the statement of the case shows that the assessce filed lists of shares, copies. whereof arc marked annexed C and form part of the case. which showed that the shares stood separately in the name of each one of the three widows and I his was not denied by the Department.\n\n\"Ve now come to the main question in this appeal. \\\\That constitutes an \"association of persons\" within the meaning of the Income-tax Act' It has been repeatedly pointed out that the Act does not define\n\nwhat constitutes an association of persons, which under s. of the Act is an entity or unit of assessment.\n\nPrevious to the year 1924, the words of s. 3 were \"individual, company, firm and Hindu undivided family.\"\n\nBy the Indian Income-tax Amendment Act of 1924 (Act XI of 1924) the words \"individual; Hindu undivided family, company, firm and other association of individuals\" were substituted for the former words.\n\nBy the Income-tax Amendment Act of 1939 (Act VII of 1939) the section was again amended and it then said:\n\n'\"Where any Act of the Central Legislature enacts that income-tax shall be charged for any year at any rate or rates. tax at that rate or those rates shall be charged for that year in accordance with, and subject to the provisions of, this Act in respect of the total income of the previous year of every individual. Hindu undivided family, company and local authority, and of every firm and other associations of persons or the partners of the firms or members of the association in- (\\ividnally.\"\n\n•• . -\n\n,... '\n\n,,;. ..\n\nBy the same Amending Act (Act VII of 1939) subs. (3) of s. 9 was also added.\n\nNow, s. 3 imposes a tax \"in respect of the total income ........................ of every individual, Hindu undivided family, company and local authority, and of every' firm and other association of persons or the partners of the firm or members of the association individually.\" In the absence of any definition. as to what constitutes an association of persons, we must construe the 'vords in their plain ordinary meaning and we must also bear in mind that the words occur in a section which imposes a tax on the total income of each one of the units of assessment mentioned therein including an association of persons.\n\nThe meaning to be assigned. to the words must take colour from the context in which they occur.\n\nA number of decisions have been cited at the bar bearing on the question, and our attention has been drawn to the controversy as to whether the words \"association of individuals\" which occurred previously in the section should be read ejusdem generis with the word immediately preceding, viz., firm or with all the other groups of persons mentioned in the section.\n\nInto that controversy it is unnecessary to enter in the present case.\n\nNor d0 we pause to consider the widely differing characteristics of the three other associations mentioned in the section, viz., Hindu undiv}cled family, a company and' a firm, and whether , in view of the amendments made in 1939 the words in question can be read ejusdem generis with Hindu undivided family or company.\n\nIt is enough for our purpose to refer to three decisions: In re: B. N. Elias and Others ('); Commissioner of income-tax, Bombay v. Laxmidas Devidas and Another (2); and In re: Dwarakanath Harishchandra Pitale and Another ('); In re: B. N. Elias and Others(')\n\nPerbyshire, C. ]., rightly pointed out that the word ·\"associate\" means, according to the Oxford dictionary, \"to join in common purpose, or to join in an .action.\" Therefore, an association of persons must be one in which two or more persons join in a common purpose or common action, and as the words occur in\n\n(I) [1935] I.T.ll. 408\n\n(2) [19S7] .5 I.T.R. 484\n\n(3) [1937] 5 I.T.R. 716\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncometa, Y,\n\nBomba;\n\nV, Smt. India Balkrish11a\n\nS. K. Das].\n\nCommissioner of\n\nb1cometax,\n\nBombay\n\nSmt. Indira\n\nBalkrishna\n\nS. K. Das].\n\na section which imposes a tax on income, the association must be one the object of which is to produce income, profits or gains.\n\nThis was the view expressed by Beaumont, C.J., in Commissioner of Income-tax, Born bay v. Laxrnidas Devidas and A not her (') at page 589 and also in Re: Dwarakanatlt 1-iarishchandra Pi:tale and Another ('). In re: B. N. Elias (') Costello, .J., put the test in more forceful language. He said: \"It may well be that the intention of the legislature was to hit combinations of individuals who were engaged together in some joint enterprise but: did not in law constitute partnership........................... \\Vhen we find ........................ that there is a combination of persons formed for the promotion of a joint enterprise ...... then I think no diflio.dty arises in the way of saying that these persons did constitute an association .................. \".\n\n\\Ve think that the aforesaid decisions correctly lay down the crucial test for determining what is an association of persons within the meaning of s. 3 of the Income-tax Act, and they have been accepted and followed in a number of later decisions of different High Courts to all of which it is unnecessary to call attention.\n\nIt is, however, necessary to add' some words of caution here.\n\nThere is no formula of universal application as to what facts, how many of them and of what nature, arc necessary to come to a conclusion that there is an association of persons within the meaning of s. '3; it mu'st depend on Lhe particular facts and circumstances of each case as to whether the conclusion can be drawn or not.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellant has suggested that having regard to ss. :J and 4 of the Indian Income-Lax Act, the real test is the existence of a co1nrnon .so1Lrce of incon1e in v.'hich t'vo 01 n1ore per~ sons arc interested as owner or otherwise and it is immatericli whether their shares are specific and de!inite or whether there is any scheme of management or not. He has submitted that if the persons so interested come to an arrangement, express or tacit, by which they divide the income at a point of time before it emanates from the source, then Lhc association ceases; otherwise it continues to be :m associ:ition,\n\n:') [1937] 5 I.T.R. 481 (') [193715 l.T R. 716\n\n(') [1935] 3 I.T.R. 408.\n\n-- .,.\n\n. ,.\n\n• 1\n\nvVe have indicated above what is the crucial test in determining an association of persons within the meaning of s. 3, and we are of the view that the test suggested by lea1•ned counsel for the appellant are neither conclusive nor determinative of the question before us.\n\nCorning back to the facts found by the Tribunal, there is no finding that the three widows have corn_bined in a joint enterprise to produce income. The only finding is that they have not exercised their right to separate en joyrnent, and except for receiving the dividends and interest jointly, it has been found that they have clone no act which has helped to produce income 111 respect of the shares and deposits.\n\nOn these fmdings it cannot be held that the three widows had the status of an association of persons within the meaning of s. 3 of the Indian Income Tax Act.\n\nThe High Court correctly answered question No. 3 in the negative.\n\nAccordingly, the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs.\n\nThere will be one set of hearing fee in the two_ appeals.\n\nAppeals dismissed .\n\nDARBAR SHRI VIRA VALA SU RAG 'y ALA,\n\nCommission and 2006) the I ncomctax Oniccr ."}}, {"text": "s. 9(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5655, "end_char": 5662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5670, "end_char": 5690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indira Balkrislmn", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5845, "end_char": 5862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indira Balkrislmn\n\nS. K: Da.", "canonical_name": "Indira Balkrishna S. K. Das"}}, {"text": "S. K. D.m", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5954, "end_char": 5963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l11riira\n\nBalakri slmfl\n\nS. K. D.m: J.\n\nI nco111c-1ax Appellate Tribun:d, Bombay.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Das"}}, {"text": "Balkrishna\n\nPurushoitam Purani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6064, "end_char": 6094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal held that the entire estate of deceased Balkrishna\n\nPurushoitam Purani was inherited and possessed by the three widows as joint tenants and its income was liable 10 be assessed in their hands in the status of an associatio'n of persons."}}, {"text": "s. 9(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6425, "end_char": 6432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6558, "end_char": 6578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessec then moved the Tribunal to refer certain questions of law which arose out of its orders to the High Court of Bombay."}}, {"text": "Balakrishna Purushottam Purani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6885, "end_char": 6915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 which was in the following terms :\n\n\"(.~) \"Whether on the facts and in the circum- - stances of the case the Tr, ibunal was right in holding that the assessment made on the three widows of Balakrishna Purushottam Purani in the status of\n\nan association of persons is legal and valid 111 Ia1,·?\""}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8600, "end_char": 8614, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mitakshara", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8779, "end_char": 8789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before we go on to discuss the argument presented on behalf of the appellant, it is necessary to clear the ground by stating what is the position of co-widows in Mitakshara, succession and what are the findings arrived at by the Tribunal."}}, {"text": "s. 9(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10295, "end_char": 10302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indira Balkrishna", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10448, "end_char": 10465, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Indira Balkrishna S. K. Das", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "S. K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10467, "end_char": 10476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indira Balkrishna\n\nS. K. Das J.\n\nC()mmi5siontr of\n\nlncorm-ta.-;,\n\nBomb4v\n\nSmt.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Das"}}, {"text": "Indira Balkrishna S. K. Das", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10527, "end_char": 10554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indira Balkrishna S. K. Das J.\n\nopen to !", "canonical_name": "Indira Balkrishna S. K. Das"}}, {"text": "s. 9(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10810, "end_char": 10817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11594, "end_char": 11608, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11822, "end_char": 11826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12780, "end_char": 12784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12807, "end_char": 12811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "B. N. Elias", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14345, "end_char": 14356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is enough for our purpose to refer to three decisions: In re: B. N. Elias and Others ('); Commissioner of income-tax, Bombay v. Laxmidas Devidas and Another (2); and In re: Dwarakanath Harishchandra Pitale and Another ('); In re: B. N. Elias and Others(')\n\nPerbyshire, C. ].,", "canonical_name": "B. N. Elias"}}, {"text": "Dwarakanath Harishchandra Pitale", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14456, "end_char": 14488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is enough for our purpose to refer to three decisions: In re: B. N. Elias and Others ('); Commissioner of income-tax, Bombay v. Laxmidas Devidas and Another (2); and In re: Dwarakanath Harishchandra Pitale and Another ('); In re: B. N. Elias and Others(')\n\nPerbyshire, C. ].,", "canonical_name": "Dwarakanath Harishchandra Pitale"}}, {"text": "Perbyshire", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14540, "end_char": 14550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is enough for our purpose to refer to three decisions: In re: B. N. Elias and Others ('); Commissioner of income-tax, Bombay v. Laxmidas Devidas and Another (2); and In re: Dwarakanath Harishchandra Pitale and Another ('); In re: B. N. Elias and Others(')\n\nPerbyshire, C. ].,"}}, {"text": "S. K. Das", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14993, "end_char": 15002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "India Balkrish11a\n\nS. K. Das].", "canonical_name": "S. K. Das"}}, {"text": "Beaumont", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15242, "end_char": 15250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was the view expressed by Beaumont, C.J., in Commissioner of Income-tax, Born bay v. Laxrnidas Devidas and A not her (') at page 589 and also in Re: Dwarakanatlt 1-iarishchandra Pi:tale and Another (')."}}, {"text": "Costello", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15442, "end_char": 15450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In re: B. N. Elias (') Costello, .J., put the test in more forceful language."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16126, "end_char": 16130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16138, "end_char": 16152, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17531, "end_char": 17535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18231, "end_char": 18235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "DARBAR SHRI VIRA VALA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18475, "end_char": 18496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DARBAR SHRI VIRA VALA SU RAG 'y ALA,\n\nCommission of l'J'J!J).\n\nB. Sen, B. K. B. Naidu and J. N. S/irof], for the petitioner (In Petn. No. 106 of 57).\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, C. K.\n\nDajJ/itary, Solicilor-Genernl of India, B. R. L. Iyengar and R. H. Dhe!J11r, for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 (In Petn. No. 88 of 57) arnl the respondents (In Petn.\n\nNo. 103 of 59).\n\nC. K. DajJ!ttary, Solicitor-General of India, N. S.\n\nBindra and R H. D/11:/Jar, for respondent No. 1 (In Petn. No. I 03 of 59). ]ananlan Sharma, for respondent No. 2 (In Petn.\n\nNo. 103 of 59).\n\nP. A. Melita and G. GojJalahrishnan, for the Intervener.\n\nHIGO. April H. The Judgment of the Court was delivered bv\n\nSHAH, J.-' In these three petitions the validity of s. 25FFJ<° (l) of the Industrial Disputes Act No. XlV of 1947 as amended by Act ,18 of 1953 is impugned.\n\nPetition No. 88 of 1 %7 is by a company manufac- I tnrinocotton textiles in the town o[ Ahmedabacl. \" The machinery in the factory of the company was\n\n\"FFF(l) merely imposes liability rn give notice and to pay compensation on closure of an undertaking which results in termination of employment of the 1rnrkmen.\n\nUnder s. 2:iF, no workman employed in an industrial unclertaking can be retrenched by the employer until (a) the workman has been\n\ngi, en one month's not.ice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period has expired or the \"orkman has been paid salary in lieu of such\n\nnotice, (b) the workman has been paicl retrenchment compensation C<]uivalent to l :) days' average salary for every completed year of service ancl (e) notice in the prescribed manner is senccl on the appropriate Government .. Section iiFFFll) hnwcver enacts that the workman shall be entitled to notice and compensation in acconlance with the pro, ision of s. 2.'iF if the undertaking is closed for any reason, as if the workman has been retrenched.\n\nBy the plain intenclment of s. 2.'>FFF(I), the right to notice and compensation for termination of employment: Arrns from closure of the undertaking; the clause does not seek to make closure effective upon payment of compensation and upon service of notice or pavment of wages in lie11 of\n\n.....\n\n. -\n\n. '\n\n- '\n\nnotice.\n\nAn employer proposing to close his undertaking may serve notice of termination of employment and if he fails to do so, he becomes liable to pay wages for the period of notice.\n\nOn closure of an undertaking, the workmen are undoubtedly entitled to notice and compensation in accordance with s. 25F as if they had been retrenched, i.e., the workmen are entitled besides compensation to a month's notice or wages in lieu of such notice, but by the use of the words \"as if the workman had been retrenched\" the legislature has not sought to place closure of an undertaking on the same footing as retrenchment under s. 25F.\n\nBy s. 25F, a prohibition against retrenchment until the tonditions prescribed by that section are fulfilled is imposed; by s. 25FFF(l), termination of employment on closure of the undertaking without payment of compens:ttion and without either serving notice or paying wages in lieu of notice.,. is, not prohibited. Payment of compensation and payment of wages for the period of notice are not therefore conditions precedent to closure.\n\nI By Art. 19(1 )(g) of the Constitution freedom w carry on any trade or business is guaranteed to every citizen, but this freedom is not absolute.\n\nBy cl. 8 of Art. 19, operation of any existing law or any law which the State mav make in so far as such law imposes in the interest of the general public reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right is not affected.\n\nIn the interest of the general public, the law may impose restrictions on the freedom of the citizens to start, carry on or close their undertakings. vVhether an. impugned provision imposing a fetter on the exercise of the fundamerital right guaranteed by Art. 19(1 )(g) amounts to a reasonable restriction imposed in the interest of the general public must be adjudged not in the background of any theoretical standards or predeterminate patterns, but in the light of the nature and incident.s of the right the interest of the general public sought to be secured by imposing the restriction and the reasonableness of the quality and extent of the fetter upon the right.\n\nBy Act 18 of 19.57, employers who close their undertakings after November 27, 1958, are made liable to pay compensation under s. 25FFF(l) at the prescribed\n\nHalisivgh lvlfg.\n\nCo. Ltd. v.\n\nU11ion of India\n\nShah].\n\nHatifiiigh Mfg.\n\nCo. Ltd. v.\n\nUnion of India\n\nShah].\n\nrates, and this liability evidently arises even in respect of undertakings closed before the date of the enactment of the impugned section.\n\nA law which creates a civil liability in respect of a transaction which has taken place before the date on which the Act was enacted docs not jJer se impose an unreasonable restriction.\n\nIt was on November 27, 1956, tbat this court held that s. 25F did not support a claim for compensation for termination of employment arising out of closure of an undertaking. The Parliament, evidently, respected the interpretation put on s. 25F by this court and directed that in respect of closures etfected ou or before the date on which judgment was delivered by this court in Tlariprasad's case, no compensation for termination of ernployment on account of closure of an undertaking would be awarded.\n\nIt is not disputed that a number of industrial undertakings were closed down after the judgment in Hariprasad's case was delivered by this court and more than 25,000 workmen were thrown out of employment on account of such closures.\n\nThe Parliament, in view of these developments enacted s. ~,-, FFF(I) imposing liability for payment of compensation by employers who closed their undertakings since November, 27, 1968. ·\n\nClosure of an industrial undertaking involves termination of employment of many employees, and throws them into the ranks of the unemployed, and it is in the interest of the general public that misery resulting from unemployment should be redressed.\n\nIn Indian Hume Pipe Co Ltd. v. The Workmen (') this Court considered the reasom for awarding compensation under s. 2.5F (though not its constitutionality).\n\nIt was observed that retrenchment compensation was intended to give the workmen some relief and to soften the rigour of hardship which retrenchment brings in its wake when the retrenched workman is suddenly and without his fault thrown on the streets, to face the grim problem of unemployment.\n\nIt \\\\'as also observed that the workman naturally expects and looks forward to security of service spread over a long period, but retrenchment destroys his expectations.\n\nThe object of retrenchment compensation is therefore to give\n\n\n. -\n\n. '\n\npartial protection to the retrenched employee to enable him to tide over the period of unemployment.\n\nLoss of service due to closure stands on the same footing as loss of service due to retrenchment, for in both cases, the employee_ is thrown out of employment suddenly and for no fault of his and the hardships which he has to face are, whether unemployment is the resnlt of Tetrenchment or closure of business, the same. If the true basis of the impugned provisions is the achievel\n\n.,,, ment of social justice, it is immaterial to consider the motives of the employer or to decide whether the closure is bona fide or otherwise.\n\nWages in lieu of notice are normally inadequate compensation for loss of employment in an industrial undertaking.\n\nHaving regard to the prevailing condi- ' tions in the employment market, it would be difficult for the workman thrown out of empldyment to secure employment simi, lar to the one terminated within one month. and therefore the Parliament has thought it proper to provide for payment of additional ompen sation besides wages in lieu of notice.\n\nThe provision for payment of such compensation in addition to wages in lieu of notice cannot therefore be charac-\n\n.;.., terised as unreasonable.\n\nCompensation related to the length of service of the employee is also not unreasonable.\n\nAn employee remaining employed in an industry for an appreciable length of time acquires experience and some degree of aptitude in the branch in which he is employed and his experience in that branch qualifies him to pro-\n\n-~ motion and to receive . wages at a higher level.\n\nBy his continued employment, he reaches seniority in the cadre of employme11t, with chances of promotion, the\n\n1 bei; iefit of which he loses by sudden termination of employment.\n\nThe workman, on termination of employment, may have to compete for employment at\n\n~ a lower level in branches to which he may be by experience or aptitude, not' fitted, or to seek employment in a _job similar to the one terminated at a. lower ·) level.\n\nIf, in the light of these considerations, the legislature has related the compensation payable on termination of employment to the period of service of\n\nIiatisingh Mfg.\n\nCo. Ltd. v.\n\nUnion of lnaia\n\nSlzah ].\n\nHatisiugh .'1{/'g.\n\nC'o. Ltd. v.\n\nU11io11 of India\n\nShah].\n\n538 SUPRE:tvlE COURT REPORTS [1960]\n\nthe employee, the provision cannot be reganled as unreaso11able. ._..,, The plea of unreasonableness of the restriction imposed as flowing from the provision 11hich standardizes compensation and docs not leave it to be ascertained by a judicial tribunal in the light of the capacity of the employer and the loss suffered by the employees on termination of employment, cannot also be sustained.\n\nInstead of leaving the question to be decided in each individual case in the context of a v:iriety of ci1Tu111st:mc\"cs having a bearing on the amount of compensation to be awarclecl, the Parliament has standardized the compensation by relating it to the length of service of the employee, and thereby a definite standard for payment of rnmpensation related Lo readily ascertainable data is ptescribed .. , Standardization of compensation which dispenses with\n\nrecourse to a judicial tribunal for assessing the quantum is a recognized method of awarding compensation especially where large nnmbers of workmen are involved in a similar situation.\n\nAbsence of a provision for a judicial verdict on the quantum of compensation payable does not therefore make the law unreasonable.\n\nGratuity which is a kind of retiral benefit is essentially different from statutory compensation for termination of employmellt due to closure of an undertaking.\n\nThe objects intended to be achieved thereby are also distinct.\n\nTherefore the argument that it is unreasonable to awarrl statutory compensation under s. 2C>FFF(l) when gratuity is otherwise claimable uncle!' an award binding upon the employer must be rejected.\n\nThe impugned section providing for payment of compensation is evidently related to the. object sought to be achieved by the Parliament, viz.: securing social justice.\n\nThe right to receive compensation arises because the workman is exposed to undeserved \"''mt and the reasons for closure mav have no direct bearing thereon.\n\nPayment of co1;1pensation which ts clircctecl to he marlc at the rate of l!i clays wages for every complctccl year of service cannot agaiff be characterised as was sought t:o be done by one of the\n\n• t\n\n3 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREJVIE COURT REPORTS 539\n\nlearned counsel for the petitioriers as \"drastic in its scope and content\".\n\nDoes the impugner! provision impose an unreasonable restriction because it imposes liability to pay compensation which is not related to the capacity of the employer?\n\nBefore the impugned section was enacted, the industrial tribunals undoubtedly decided the individual claims for compensation for termination of employment submitted to them on their merits and sometimes, refused compensation if it was found that the closure was bona fide and was in part clue to irresponsible conduct of the workmen concerned.\n\nThe decisions of the industrial tribunals before the impugned. section was enacted again show that even where compensation was allowed, there was not fixed standard or principle on which the compensation was awarded. ' 1Vhere the business is continuing its capacity to meet the obligation to pay clearness allowance, gratuity and provident fund, etc., may have to be taken into account; the reason being that if the capacity to pay is not taken into account, the business itself may come to an end and the very purpose of industrial adjudication in the, matter of fixation of wages, payment of dearness allowance and the schemes of gratuity and provident fund which are intended for the amelioration of the conditions of labour may be frustrated.\n\nBut where a business is closed, the capacity to pay is not a relevant consideration.\n\nNormally, if the business is capable of meeting the obligation to pay the wages of the workmen a)1d to meet the other expenses necessary for its continuance, it would not be closed down.\n\nCapacity to pay has therefore to be taken into account in the case of a running business in assessing liability to fix wages or gratuity or clearness 'allowance.\n\nOnce the undertaking is closed and liability to p:1y compensation under the irn pugned section is not made a condition precedent, the amount which the workmen may be able to recover must depend upon the assets of the employer which may be available to meet the obligation.\n\nThe workmen would be entitled to recover compensation only if the employ.er is able to meet the obligation; otherwise they would have to rank pro\n\nHalis£1tgh Mfg.\n\nCo. Ltd. v.\n\nUnion of India\n\nShah}.\n\nf{atiJi11gh Alfi;.\n\nCo. Lt.f. v. [Jnfon of India\n\nSl1t1h J.\n\nrata 11it:h the other ordinary creditors of the employer.\n\nThe lcgisbture has imposed restricted liability in cases where closure is due to circumstances beyond the cont:rol of the employer.\n\nBy the proviso to sub-s. I of s. 2iiFFF, where the underwking is closed down on account of circumstances beyond the control of the employer, the compensation to be paid to the 11ork men is not to exceed his average pay for three months.\n\nIf the principal provision is not unconstitutional as imposing an unreasonable restriction, it is not suggested that: the proviso is on any independenl ground unconsti t:ntional.\n\nHowever, the explanation it is snbmirted, unreasonable. vides:\n\n9'FFF . . to s. _,, • proviso 1s, The explanation pro-\n\n\"An undertaking which is closed down hy reason merely of financial difTicnlties (including financial losses) or accumulation of undisposed of stocks shall not be deemed to have been closed down on account of unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the employer within rhe mem1ing of the proviso to this sub-section.\"\n\nThe .efl:cct of the impugned section along with the proviso is to classify the undertakings into two classes, viz., (I) those which are closed clown on account of una\\toiclable circumstances beyond the control of the employer and (2) the remaining. \\Vhen the closure of an undertaking is clue to circumstances beyond the control of the enrployer, the maximum limit of. compensation is average pay for three months, irrespective of the length of service of the workmen; in the residuary class, the liability is unrestricted. The explanation is in substance a definition clause which sets out what shall not be deemed to he closures on account of circumstances beyond .the control of the emp1oyer.\n\nBy this explanation, employers who had to close down their industrial undertakings merely because of financial difficulties including financial losses or accumulation of und is posed of stocks are excluded from the benefit of the proviso to s. 25FFF(l).\n\nThe proviso restricts the liability of employers who are compelled to close down their undertakings on account of unavoidable circnmstances beyond their control, but in\n\n' - ..\n\n3 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME GOUR T REPORTS 541\n\nthe view of the Parliament, in that category are not to be included employers compelled to close down their undertakings merely becau:; e of financial difficulties or accumulation of undisposed of stocks.\n\nClosure of an undertaking attributable merely to financial difficulties or accumulation of undisposed of stocks, is by the explanation, excluded from the benefit of restricted liability; but couplecl with other circumstances, financial difficulties or accumulation of undisposecl of stocks may justify the view that the closure is due to unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the employer, and attract the application of the proviso notwithstanding the explanation.\n\nV\\There an undertaking is closed down on account of persistent losses clue to no fault of the employer or due to accumulation of stocks having regard to persistent unfavourable market conditions, the closure may normally be regarded as clue to unavoidable circumstances beyond the , control of the employer.\n\nBy, the explanation, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal which may be called upon to ascertain whether in a given case, the closure was on account of circumstances beyond the control of the employer and whether on that account the employer was entitled to the benefit of the proviso may he restricted.\n\nBut it is not provided that in no case of financial difficulty or accumulation of stocks coupled with other circumstances, the closure is to be regarded as due to unavoidable circumstances beyond the control• of the employer.\n\nIt is only where the closure is \"merely\" on account of financial difficulties or accumulation of undisposed of stocks that the closure is not to be deemed due to circumstances beyond the control of the employer.\n\nA state of financial difficulties or accumulation of undisposed of stocks may be temporary, it may be brought about by past mismanagement directly attributable to the employer or may even be deliberately brought about.\n\nThe closure on account of financial difficulties or accumulation of undisposed of stocks is accordingly not necessarily the result of unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the employer.\n\nThat, in certain events, a statute may impose restrictions which will be irksome and may be so regarded\n\n7-6 SCI/ND/84\n\nHd!isingh Mfg.\n\nCo. Ltd. v.\n\nUnion of India\n\nShah].\n\nHatisi11gh M.fff.\n\n( 'o. f./d.\n\nUnion of India\n\nShah J.\n\nby cenain citizens as unreasonable, is not decisive of the question whether it imposes a reasonable restriction. As observed in Mohr!. Hanif Q11mf'shi and Othrrs\n\nv. Thi' Stat!' of Bihar (')by Das, C . .J.:\n\n\"In determining that question (the reasonableness of the restriction) the court we conceive, cannot proceed on a general notion of \"hat is reasonable in the abstract or even on a consideration of \"hat i.s reasonable from the point of view of rhe person or persons on whom the restrictions arc imposed.\n\nThe right conferred by sub-cl. (g) is expresser! in general languagc and if there had been no qm.lifyi11g provision like cl. (6), the right so conferred ; rnukl have been an absolute one. To the person \"-ho has this right, any rcst:riction will be irksome :rnd may well be regarded by him as unreasonable. But the\n\nquestion cannot he decided on that basis. \\\\'hat the court has to do is to consider whether the restrictions imposed are reasonable in the interest of the\n\ngncral public.\"\n\nAgain, as observed in Bijay Cotton Mills Uri. v.\n\nThi' Sl11fl' of A jmer ('):\n\n\"Individual employers might find it difficult to (arry on the business on the basis of the minimum wages fixer! under the Act hut this must he due entirely to the economic conditions of these particular employers.\n\nThat cannot be a reason for the striking dmrn the law itself as unreasonable\".\n\nBy the explanation, certain person., became of\n\n• -,\n\n...\n\n' -\n\n' .\n\npersistent: losses or accumulation of stocks, find them- -\" selves unable to carry on the business, and may still not be entitled to the benefit of the proviso, hut that \"'iii not be a gronrnl for holrling th; it the explanation is unreasonable.\n\nThe tribunal called upon to decide \"hcther the case of an employer is coverecl hv the proviso will certainly be entitled to look into the • causes which led to the financial losses or the accumulation of stocks and ascertain whether the closure was merely on account of financial losses or accumulation of stocks or was on ; iccoum of circumstances beyond the control of the employer, and in assessing whether the '\n\n(1) [1959] s.c.R, 629,\n\n(2) [19.>oJ J s.c.R. 7o2, 7os,\n\ncircumstances \"'ere beyond the control of the employer, the fact that the employer has suffered financial losses or there is accumulation of stocks is not required by the legislature to be excluded from consideration.\n\nThe procedure for enforcement of liability to pa) compensation, prescribed by s. 33( c) of the Act which makes the amounl recover; ible as arrears of land revenue cannot, ex fac£c, be regarded il.S unreasonable\n\nUndoubtedly, under certain State laws, (e.g., the. Bombay Land Revenue Code (Act V of 1879) for failure to pay land revenue, rhe defaulter may be imprisoned; but because of the special mode of recovery prescribed the law imposing a civil liability to pay compensation for termination of employment does not become unreasonable.\n\nOn a review of the relevant circumstances we are ol the view that the restrictions imposed. by the impugned provision including the proviso are not unreasonable restrict.ions on the exercise of fundamental right of the\n\nemployers to conduct and close their undertakings.\n\nThe provision requiring the employers to pay compensation to their employees though restrictive of the fundamental freedom guaranteed by Art. 19(1 )(g) is evidently in the interest of the general public, and is therefore saved by Art. 19(6) of the Constitution from the challenge that it infringes the fundamental right of the employers.\n\nRe. II: Art. 14 of the Constitution is not violated by making by law a distinction betwee.n employers who closed their undertakings on or before November 27, 1956, and those who close their undertakings after that date.\n\nThe State is undoubtedly prohibited from denying to any person equality before the law or the equal iro tection of the laws, but by enacting a law which applies generally to all persons who come within its ambit as from the date on which it becomes operative, no discrimination is practised. \\\\!hen Parliament enacts a law imposing a liability as flowing from certain transactions . prospectively, it evidently makes a distinction between\n\nthose transaclions 11hich are covered by the Act and those which are not covered by the Act, because they\n\nHatisin.h Alfg.\n\nCo. Ltd. v.\n\nUnion of India -- ' Shah J.\n\nHalisingh J.lfjg.\n\nCo. Ltd. v.\n\nUnion of India\n\nShah].\n\nwere completed before the dale 011 wliich the Act was enacted.\n\nThis differentiation, however, does not amount Lo discrimination which is liable Lo be struck clown under Art. 14. The power of the legislature to impose civil liability in respect 0£ transactions completed even before the date on 'd1ich the Act is eHacted does not appear to be restricted. If, as is conceclccland in our judgment rightly-by a statute imposing civil liability in respect of post enactment: transactions, no discrimination is practised, by a statute which imposes liability in respect 0£ t.r; insaction which have taken place after a date fixed by the statute, but before its enactment, it cannot be said that discrimination is practised.\n\nAn. 14 strikes at: discrimination in the application 0£ the laws bet\"cen persons similarly circumstanced; it docs not strike at a differentiation which may res11lt by the enactment 0£ a law betwee11 transacticms governed thereby and those which are not governed thereby.\n\nIf the argument that discrimination results when by statute a civil liability is imposed upon tramact ions which were otherwise not subject to such liability be accepted, every law which imposes civil liability will be liable to be struck down under Art. 14 even if it comes into operation on the date on which it is passed, because immediately on its coming into operation, discrimination will arise between transactions which will be covered by the law after its coming into force and transactions before the law came into force which \"'ill not naturally be hit by it.\n\nIf a statute creating a civil liability which is strictly prospective is not hit by Art:. l4, a law \"hich imposes liability on transactions which have taken place before the date on which it was enacted, cannot also be hit by An. 14.\n\nBy bringing \"ithin its fold transactions before rhc elate of its enactment, in truth, the date or the application of the Act is related back to a period anterior to the date on which the Act was enacted.\n\nRe. Ill: For reasons already set out:, payment of compensation and wages in lieu of notice under the impuf(nccl section are not made conditions precedent to effective\n\n. - ..\n\n...\n\ntermination of employment.\n\nThe section only creates a right in the employees; it does not enjoin the employers to do anything before closure.\n\nSection 31 (2) of the Act which imposes penal liability for contravention of the provisions of the Act can therefore have no application to failure to make payment of compensation and wages for the period of notice under s. 25FFF(l). The amending Act was, it is true, passed in June, 1957, and liability to pay compensation arises in respect of all undertakings dosed on or after November 26, 1956. But, if liability to pay compensation is. not a condition precedent to closures, by failing to discharge the liability to pay compensation and wages in lieu of notice, the employer does not contravene s. 25FFF( 1 ). A statute may prohibit or command an act and in either case, disobedience thereof will amount to contravention of the statute. lf the statute fixes criminal liability for contravention of the prohibition or the command which is made applicable to transactions which have taken place before the date of its enactment the protection of Art. 20(1) may be attracted.\n\nBut s. 25FFF(l) imposes neither a prohibition nor a command. Under s. 25F, there is a distinct prohibition against an employer against retrenching employees without fulfilling certain conditions. Similar prohibitions are found in ss. 22 and 23 of the Act. If this prohibition is infringed, evidently, criminal liability may arise. But there being no prohibition against closure of business without payment of compensation, s. 31(2) does not apply.\n\nBys. :J3(c), liability to pay compensation may be enforced by coercive process, but that again doe~ not amount to infringement of Art. 20( I) of the Constitution.\n\nUndoubtedly for failure ro discharge liability to pay compensation, a person may be imprisoned, under the statute providing for recovery of the amount, e.g., the Bombay Land Revenue Code, but failure to discharge a civil liability is not unless the statute expressly so provides, an offence.\n\nThe protection of Art. 20(1) avails only against punishment for :rn act which is tre;:itcd ;:is ;:in offence. which when rlone w;:is not an offence.\n\nHatisingh lvlfg.\n\nCo. Lt<(.\n\nUnion of Iudia\n\nShah J.\n\n196U\n\nJ-Ialisi11gh .1.\\lfg.\n\nCo. Lid. v.\n\nUnion of India\n\n196U\n\nApril 18.\n\nSUPRE.\\1E COURT REPORTS [1960]\n\nln our view, the impugned s. ~.'iFFF(I) indudiug the proviso and the explanation thereto are not 1111constillltional as infringing the freedom guaranteed by Art. 19(l)(g) of the Constitution or as infringing Arts. 14 or 20 of the Constitution. On that. view, the petitions fail and are dismissed \"ith costs.\n\nThere will univ be one hearing fee. '\n\nPe!.ilions dis111issed..\n\nQAMAR SHAFFI TYABJI\n\nTHE COi\\li\\JlSSlONER, EXCESS PROFITS TAX,\n\nHYDERABAD\n\n(S. K. DAs, J. L. KAPCR and 1\\I. 1-lmAYATCLLMI, Jj.)\n\nExcess Profits Tax-Managing Agency and Selling Agency agreements-Construction-Delegation of Agency-Delegate, whether agent or employee-Remuneration and commission derived by such delegate-Liability to tax-Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), s. 194.\n\nBy an order of the Ruler of the erstwhile State of Hyderabad an institution was formed for the development of industries on behalf of the Government, called the Industrial Trust Fund, to be managed by a committee called Trustees.\n\nIn 1934 the Trustees entered into agreements with two cotton mills situated in the\n\nState by virtue of which they were appointed secretaries, treasurers and agents of the said mills.\n\nThey were gi , en the general inanagement of the mills including the power to appoint employees and were also appointed selling agents of the mills.\n\nBy separate agreements the Trustees were -given power to delegate to other persons all or any of the powers under the agreements subject to the approval of the Board of Directors of the respective mills.\n\nOn December 6, 1938, the Trustes entered into an agreement with the appellant whereby they delegated their powers in his favour and appointed him as the managing agent of their business as secretaries, treasurers and agents, as also selling agent of the two mills, subject to their general control.\n\nThe appellant was to hold the office of managing agent and selling agent for the remaining period of the original' managing agency and. selling agency agreements.\n\nThe remuneration of the appellant for the managing agency was fixed at Rs. 2,000 per month and a commission of 21 per cent. out of the commission of 121per cent. per annum on the annual profits payable to the Trustees.\n\nFor the selling agency a separate commission was payable on the sale of different kinds of goods.\n\nClause 9 of the agreement provided\n\n. .", "total_entities": 143, "entities": [{"text": "Vira Vala Surag Vala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 107, "end_char": 127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Darbar Shri Vira Vala Surag Vala In that view of the matt.er the jJClitioner must be Vadia v. held to have failed to make oul any infringement of State\"!"}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 820, "end_char": 824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 865, "end_char": 890, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 894, "end_char": 905, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAFER IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 914, "end_char": 924, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SYED JAFFER IMAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. K. SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 926, "end_char": 938, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.K. SARKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 962, "end_char": 974, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1074, "end_char": 1103, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1148, "end_char": 1154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Closure of-Compensation to workmen -Constitutional validity of enactment-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "Closure of-Compensation to workmen -Constitutional validity of enactment-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1161, "end_char": 1182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1184, "end_char": 1192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1301, "end_char": 1307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1320, "end_char": 1349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 19(l)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1615, "end_char": 1628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "November 27, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1759, "end_char": 1776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19(l)(g), which included the right to close the business,\n\n(ii) discriminated between employers who closed their undertakings on or before November 27, 1956, and employers who closed thereafter and thus contravened Art, 14 and (iii) also penalised acts which were not offences when committed contrary to Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 20( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1924, "end_char": 1935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1987, "end_char": 2016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Arts. 19(l)(g), 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2109, "end_char": 2127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Hatisingh Mfg", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2356, "end_char": 2369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held, further, that the question whether a restriction imposed 1960 by a law on the exercise of the fundamental right guaranteed by Hatisingh Mfg."}}, {"text": "Art. 19( 1 )(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2372, "end_char": 2387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2448, "end_char": 2458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Indio", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2590, "end_char": 2595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tical standards or fixed patterns but in the light of the nature Union of Indio and incidents of the right, the interest of the general public sought to be secured and the reasonableness of the quality and extent of the restriction itself."}}, {"text": "[1960] 2 S.C.R. 32", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3818, "end_char": 3836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Hatisingh Afjg", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5235, "end_char": 5249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hatisingh Afjg,\n\nCo. LJd."}}, {"text": "(1955] 1 S.C.R. 752", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5400, "end_char": 5419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5565, "end_char": 5572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 31(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5786, "end_char": 5794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5799, "end_char": 5807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 20(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5845, "end_char": 5858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6041, "end_char": 6050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6061, "end_char": 6082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "G. S. Pathak", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6123, "end_char": 6135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Pathak, I. M. Nariavati, S. N. Andley, ]."}}, {"text": "I. M. Nariavati", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6137, "end_char": 6152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Pathak, I. M. Nariavati, S. N. Andley, ]."}}, {"text": "S. N. Andley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6154, "end_char": 6166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Pathak, I. M. Nariavati, S. N. Andley, ]."}}, {"text": "B.\n\nDadaclwnji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6171, "end_char": 6185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B.\n\nDadaclwnji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for petitioner No."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6187, "end_char": 6201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B.\n\nDadaclwnji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for petitioner No."}}, {"text": "P. L. Vohra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6206, "end_char": 6217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B.\n\nDadaclwnji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for petitioner No."}}, {"text": "I. M. Nmwvati", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6285, "end_char": 6298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. M. Nmwvati; S. N. Andley, ]."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6436, "end_char": 6442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, B. K. B. Naidu and J. N. S/irof], for the petitioner (In Petn."}}, {"text": "B. K. B. Naidu", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6444, "end_char": 6458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, B. K. B. Naidu and J. N. S/irof], for the petitioner (In Petn."}}, {"text": "J. N.", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6463, "end_char": 6468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen, B. K. B. Naidu and J. N. S/irof], for the petitioner (In Petn."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6524, "end_char": 6538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, C. K.\n\nDajJ/itary, Solicilor-Genernl of India, B. R. L. Iyengar and R. H. Dhe!J11r, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "C. K.\n\nDajJ", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6567, "end_char": 6578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, C. K.\n\nDajJ/itary, Solicilor-Genernl of India, B. R. L. Iyengar and R. H. Dhe!J11r, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "B. R. L. Iyengar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6614, "end_char": 6630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, C. K.\n\nDajJ/itary, Solicilor-Genernl of India, B. R. L. Iyengar and R. H. Dhe!J11r, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhe!J11r", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6635, "end_char": 6649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, C. K.\n\nDajJ/itary, Solicilor-Genernl of India, B. R. L. Iyengar and R. H. Dhe!J11r, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "C. K. DajJ!ttary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6753, "end_char": 6769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. DajJ!ttary, Solicitor-General of India, N. S.\n\nBindra and R H. D/11:/Jar, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "N. S.\n\nBindra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6799, "end_char": 6812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. DajJ!ttary, Solicitor-General of India, N. S.\n\nBindra and R H. D/11:/Jar, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "R H. D/11:/Jar, for respondent No. 1 (In Petn. No. I 03 of 59)", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6817, "end_char": 6879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. DajJ!ttary, Solicitor-General of India, N. S.\n\nBindra and R H. D/11:/Jar, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "ananlan Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6882, "end_char": 6896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ananlan Sharma, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "P. A. Melita", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6947, "end_char": 6959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. A. Melita and G. GojJalahrishnan, for the Intervener."}}, {"text": "G. GojJalahrishnan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6964, "end_char": 6982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. A. Melita and G. GojJalahrishnan, for the Intervener."}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7064, "end_char": 7068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April H. The Judgment of the Court was delivered bv\n\nSHAH, J.-' In these three petitions the validity of s. 25FFJ<° (l) of the Industrial Disputes Act No.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7116, "end_char": 7122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7138, "end_char": 7161, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "April 27, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7582, "end_char": 7596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The factory had, it is claimed by the petitioners, become, by the passage of time, an uneconomic unit and was closed on that account on April 27, 1957."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7826, "end_char": 7832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The company was incurring losses year after year and early in the year 1956, the Registrar of Companies, Bombay, requested the Central Government to authorise him to wind up the company."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7848, "end_char": 7866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The company was incurring losses year after year and early in the year 1956, the Registrar of Companies, Bombay, requested the Central Government to authorise him to wind up the company."}}, {"text": "April 28, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7977, "end_char": 7991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This authority was not given and the factory continued to work till April 28, 1957, on which date it was closed after notice of closure given in March, 1957."}}, {"text": "February 10, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8642, "end_char": 8659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner paid one month's salary to the monthly paid staff and 15 days' w;:iges to the weekly and daily rated staff, and closed the mine on February 10, 1957."}}, {"text": "February l, 19.57", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9031, "end_char": 9048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of these losses, the weaving department of the factory was closed on February l, 19.57, ; incl the entire factory was closed on April 24, 1957, after notice of closure to the employees."}}, {"text": "April 24, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9090, "end_char": 9104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of these losses, the weaving department of the factory was closed on February l, 19.57, ; incl the entire factory was closed on April 24, 1957, after notice of closure to the employees."}}, {"text": "s. 2S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9213, "end_char": 9218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9233, "end_char": 9262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Hatisingh Mfg. ro. Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9505, "end_char": 9528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To appreciate the contentions, a brief review of the relevant legislative history may be set out :\n\nHatisingh Mfg."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9530, "end_char": 9544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd.\n\nUnion of India\n\n.5/zah J.\n\nHatisingh -~!Jg.", "canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Parliament amended the Industrial Disputes Act, 1917", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9617, "end_char": 9669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9738, "end_char": 9743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Parliament amended the Industrial Disputes Act, 1917", "statute": "The Parliament amended the Industrial Disputes Act, 1917"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9967, "end_char": 9971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Parliament amended the Industrial Disputes Act, 1917", "statute": "The Parliament amended the Industrial Disputes Act, 1917"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10443, "end_char": 10447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Parliament amended the Industrial Disputes Act, 1917", "statute": "The Parliament amended the Industrial Disputes Act, 1917"}}, {"text": "27-11-1%6", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10840, "end_char": 10849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In f-fnriprasnrl Shivslwnlrnr S/111'1/a v. A. D. Divr:- lrnr (') decided on 27-11-1%6, it was held by this Court :\n\n\"The word 'retrenchment' as defined in s. 2(po) ancl the worcl 'retrenched' in s. 2.~F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1047, as amended by Act XL III of l 95n, have no wider meanin~ than the ordinary accepted connotation of those words and mean the discharge of surplus labour or staff by the employer for anv reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punish;,, cnt inflicted by way of disciplinary action, and do not include termination of services of all workmen on a bona fide closure of industry or on change of ownership or management thereof.\""}}, {"text": "s. 2(po)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10919, "end_char": 10927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10959, "end_char": 10963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1047", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10974, "end_char": 11003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "President of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11431, "end_char": 11449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The President of India on April 27, 19il7, promulgated Ordinance No."}}, {"text": "April 27, 19il7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11453, "end_char": 11468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The President of India on April 27, 19il7, promulgated Ordinance No."}}, {"text": "VA of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11527, "end_char": 11566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "June 6, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11933, "end_char": 11945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Orclinan<; e was latei' replaced with certain modifications by Act 1 S of 19:)7 which came into force on June 6, 1957, but with retrospective effect from November 28, 1956."}}, {"text": "November 28, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11982, "end_char": 11999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Orclinan<; e was latei' replaced with certain modifications by Act 1 S of 19:)7 which came into force on June 6, 1957, but with retrospective effect from November 28, 1956."}}, {"text": "Section 2S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12001, "end_char": 12011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "VA of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "VA of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12275, "end_char": 12279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "VA of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "VA of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Art. 19( I )(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13083, "end_char": 13098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13335, "end_char": 13342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13391, "end_char": 13398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13488, "end_char": 13499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14415, "end_char": 14419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14764, "end_char": 14768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14843, "end_char": 14847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14856, "end_char": 14862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 20F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14922, "end_char": 14928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15089, "end_char": 15093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15262, "end_char": 15266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15902, "end_char": 15906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16024, "end_char": 16028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16607, "end_char": 16613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16927, "end_char": 16933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16939, "end_char": 16945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17059, "end_char": 17065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1 )(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17379, "end_char": 17393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "cl. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17525, "end_char": 17530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17534, "end_char": 17541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1 )(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18004, "end_char": 18018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "November 27, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18485, "end_char": 18502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By Act 18 of 19.57, employers who close their undertakings after November 27, 1958, are made liable to pay compensation under s. 25FFF(l) at the prescribed\n\nHalisivgh lvlfg."}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18546, "end_char": 18552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19070, "end_char": 19076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19253, "end_char": 19259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tlariprasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19395, "end_char": 19406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Parliament, evidently, respected the interpretation put on s. 25F by this court and directed that in respect of closures etfected ou or before the date on which judgment was delivered by this court in Tlariprasad's case, no compensation for termination of ernployment on account of closure of an undertaking would be awarded.", "canonical_name": "Tlariprasad"}}, {"text": "Hariprasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19620, "end_char": 19630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not disputed that a number of industrial undertakings were closed down after the judgment in Hariprasad's case was delivered by this court and more than 25,000 workmen were thrown out of employment on account of such closures.", "canonical_name": "Tlariprasad"}}, {"text": "November, 27, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19920, "end_char": 19938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Parliament, in view of these developments enacted s. ~,-, FFF(I) imposing liability for payment of compensation by employers who closed their undertakings since November, 27, 1968. ·"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20306, "end_char": 20310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24717, "end_char": 24722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27929, "end_char": 27933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29701, "end_char": 29707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32301, "end_char": 32305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Union of India\n\nShah J.\n\nby cenain citizens as unreasonable, is not decisive of the question whether it imposes a reasonable restriction.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32503, "end_char": 32506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Bihar (')by Das, C ."}}, {"text": "s. 33( c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34769, "end_char": 34778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Land Revenue Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34954, "end_char": 34978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1 )(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35641, "end_char": 35655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Land Revenue Code", "statute": "Bombay Land Revenue Code"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35734, "end_char": 35744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Land Revenue Code", "statute": "Bombay Land Revenue Code"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35851, "end_char": 35858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Land Revenue Code", "statute": "Bombay Land Revenue Code"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36896, "end_char": 36903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37968, "end_char": 37975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39055, "end_char": 39065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39276, "end_char": 39282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 26, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39435, "end_char": 39452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The amending Act was, it is true, passed in June, 1957, and liability to pay compensation arises in respect of all undertakings dosed on or after November 26, 1956."}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39655, "end_char": 39661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 20(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40004, "end_char": 40014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40038, "end_char": 40044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40101, "end_char": 40107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 22 and 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40264, "end_char": 40277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40457, "end_char": 40465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 20( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40613, "end_char": 40624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 20(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40958, "end_char": 40968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(l)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41408, "end_char": 41421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41459, "end_char": 41467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "QAMAR SHAFFI TYABJI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41625, "end_char": 41644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pe!.ilions dis111issed..\n\nQAMAR SHAFFI TYABJI\n\nTHE COi\\li\\JlSSlONER, EXCESS PROFITS TAX,\n\nHYDERABAD\n\n(S. K. DAs, J. L. KAPCR and 1\\I. 1-lmAYATCLLMI, Jj.)"}}, {"text": "S. K. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41701, "end_char": 41710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pe!.ilions dis111issed..\n\nQAMAR SHAFFI TYABJI\n\nTHE COi\\li\\JlSSlONER, EXCESS PROFITS TAX,\n\nHYDERABAD\n\n(S. K. DAs, J. L. KAPCR and 1\\I. 1-lmAYATCLLMI, Jj.)"}}, {"text": "J. L. KAPCR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41712, "end_char": 41723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pe!.ilions dis111issed..\n\nQAMAR SHAFFI TYABJI\n\nTHE COi\\li\\JlSSlONER, EXCESS PROFITS TAX,\n\nHYDERABAD\n\n(S. K. DAs, J. L. KAPCR and 1\\I. 1-lmAYATCLLMI, Jj.)"}}, {"text": "lmAYATCLLMI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41735, "end_char": 41746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pe!.ilions dis111issed..\n\nQAMAR SHAFFI TYABJI\n\nTHE COi\\li\\JlSSlONER, EXCESS PROFITS TAX,\n\nHYDERABAD\n\n(S. K. DAs, J. L. KAPCR and 1\\I. 1-lmAYATCLLMI, Jj.)"}}, {"text": "Remuneration and commission derived by such delegate-Liability to tax-Indian Contract Act, 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41889, "end_char": 41984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 194", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41998, "end_char": 42004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Remuneration and commission derived by such delegate-Liability to tax-Indian Contract Act, 1872", "statute": "Remuneration and commission derived by such delegate-Liability to tax-Indian Contract Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 42058, "end_char": 42067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an order of the Ruler of the erstwhile State of Hyderabad an institution was formed for the development of industries on behalf of the Government, called the Industrial Trust Fund, to be managed by a committee called Trustees."}}, {"text": "December 6, 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42780, "end_char": 42796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 6, 1938, the Trustes entered into an agreement with the appellant whereby they delegated their powers in his favour and appointed him as the managing agent of their business as secretaries, treasurers and agents, as also selling agent of the two mills, subject to their general control."}}, {"text": "Clause 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43560, "end_char": 43568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_546_553_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "196U\n\nJ-Ialisi11gh .1.\\lfg.\n\nCo. Lid. v.\n\nUnion of India\n\n196U\n\nApril 18.\n\nSUPRE.\\1E COURT REPORTS [1960]\n\nln our view, the impugned s. ~.'iFFF(I) indudiug the proviso and the explanation thereto are not 1111constillltional as infringing the freedom guaranteed by Art. 19(l)(g) of the Constitution or as infringing Arts. 14 or 20 of the Constitution. On that. view, the petitions fail and are dismissed \"ith costs.\n\nThere will univ be one hearing fee. '\n\nPe!.ilions dis111issed..\n\nQAMAR SHAFFI TYABJI\n\nTHE COi\\li\\JlSSlONER, EXCESS PROFITS TAX,\n\nHYDERABAD\n\n(S. K. DAs, J. L. KAPCR and 1\\I. 1-lmAYATCLLMI, Jj.)\n\nExcess Profits Tax-Managing Agency and Selling Agency agreements-Construction-Delegation of Agency-Delegate, whether agent or employee-Remuneration and commission derived by such delegate-Liability to tax-Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), s. 194.\n\nBy an order of the Ruler of the erstwhile State of Hyderabad an institution was formed for the development of industries on behalf of the Government, called the Industrial Trust Fund, to be managed by a committee called Trustees.\n\nIn 1934 the Trustees entered into agreements with two cotton mills situated in the\n\nState by virtue of which they were appointed secretaries, treasurers and agents of the said mills.\n\nThey were gi , en the general inanagement of the mills including the power to appoint employees and were also appointed selling agents of the mills.\n\nBy separate agreements the Trustees were -given power to delegate to other persons all or any of the powers under the agreements subject to the approval of the Board of Directors of the respective mills.\n\nOn December 6, 1938, the Trustes entered into an agreement with the appellant whereby they delegated their powers in his favour and appointed him as the managing agent of their business as secretaries, treasurers and agents, as also selling agent of the two mills, subject to their general control.\n\nThe appellant was to hold the office of managing agent and selling agent for the remaining period of the original' managing agency and. selling agency agreements.\n\nThe remuneration of the appellant for the managing agency was fixed at Rs. 2,000 per month and a commission of 21 per cent. out of the commission of 121per cent. per annum on the annual profits payable to the Trustees.\n\nFor the selling agency a separate commission was payable on the sale of different kinds of goods.\n\nClause 9 of the agreement provided\n\n. .\n\n: -·\n\n... -\n\n3 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 547 . that the managing agent shall not assign the benefit of the agree-\n\nJ961J ment, the same being personal to himself.\n\nFor the accounting -- .. years 1941-42 and 1942-43 _the appe.llant was assessed to eXCss Q_am.n Sh1'jfi TyabJt profits tax, but he contended that the Trustees of the Industnal Commissiner, Trust Fund were the managing agents as also the selling agents Excess Profits Tnx, of the two mills, that the Trustees employed him on certain terms l{_rderabad and gave him certain powers, and that he was not carrying on an independent business of his own but was just carrying out the duties of an employee of the Trustees.\n\nHe claimed that his .remuneration under the agreement dated December 6, 1938, was merely salary and not income derived from business and therefore not liable to excess profits tax: Held, (1) that under the agreements of 1934 the Trustees as agents had express authority to name the appellant to act for the principal in the business of agency and that therefore the appellant was neither a servant nor a mere sub-agent, but an agent of the principal for such part of the business of agency as was entrusted to him, within the meaning of s. 194 of th.: Indian Contract Act, 1872 .\n\n(2) that on the true construction of the agreement dated December 6, 1938, the appellant was undertaking a business of his own in accepting the duties and responsibilities of a managing agent of the two mills under the general control of the Trustees, and that, therefore, the income derived by him as remuneration and commission was liable to excess profits tax.\n\nLakshminarayan Ram Gopal and Son Ltd. v. The Government of Hyderabad, [19551 1 S.C.R. 393 and J. K. Trust, Bombay v. The Commissioner of Income-tax/ Exce.s Profits Tax, Bombay, [1958]\n\nS.C.R. 65, relied on.\n\nC1v1L\n\nAPPELLATE JllRJSDJCT!ON: Civil Appeals Nos. 824 and 825 of 19.57.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated April 10, 19.58, of the former Hyderabad High Court in E.P.T. References Nos. 452/5 and 4.rJ8/5 of l %8 F.\n\nA. V. Viswnnatha Snstri, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachnnji, R11111eslrn•11r N nth and P. L. Vohrn, for the appellant.\n\nK. N. Raja go/Jal' Sastri an in such manner as they may from time to time determine and may delegate all or any of their powers, authorities and discretions as secretaries, treasurers and agents of the company lo such person or persons and on such terms and conditions as they may think fit:, subject to the approval of the Board of Directors of the company.\" The delegation in favour of the appellant was made under this clause.\n\nThe position was therefore this: the Trustees as agents had express authority to name another person to act for the principal in the business of the agency, and they named the appellant with the approval of the Board of Directors.\n\nTherefore, the appellant, was neither a servant nor a mere sub-agent.\n\nHe was an agent of the principal for such part of the business of the agency as was entrusted to him.\n\nThe position in law was as laid down in s. 194 of the Indian Contract Act.\n\nIn similar circumstances this Court has held that managing agency is business (sec L11/ishminamyan Rarn Gof1al and Son Ltd. v. The Gover11111ent of flyderabad (') and]. K. Trmt, Bombay v. The Commissioner of Income-tax Excess Profis Tax, Bombay (').\n\nA consideration of the terms of the agreement of December 6, 1938, also leaves no mctnner of doubt in the matter.\n\nFull powers of the Trustees as managing agents were delegated to the appellant under cl. 2 of the agreement, subject only to the general control of the Trustees and the clause stated that the appellant was to conduct and manage the business and affairs of the two mills.\n\nClause 3 relating to the tenure of the managing agency, cl. 4 rebting to remuneration, cl. 7 relating to tcrmiintion of business and i-he clauses\n\n(1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 393.\n\n(2) [1958] S.C.R, G5.\n\n' -\n\n...\n\n. .\n\nrelating to the eventuality of winding up of the mills -all these were appropriate to a business undertaking only and quite inappropriate to a relation of master and servant. The extent of the delegation of powers was also indicated by cl. 5 which said inter alia that the managing agent (meaning the appellant) must observe and perform all the terms and conditions of the earlier managing agency and selling agency agreements .in favour and on the part of the Trustees; in other words, the entire managing agency business was handed over to the appellant.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellant emphasised cl. 9 which we had quoted e; ulier and said that it showed that the appellant could not assign any of the benefits under the agreement, which was personal to himself. vVe do not think that\n\ncl. 9 changed the quality of the relation between the Trustees and the appellant.\n\nThe managing agency agreement must be read as a whole, and so read the conclusion which clearly emerges is that the appellant was undertaking a business of his own in accepting the duties and responsibilities of a managing agent of the two mills under the general control of the Trustees. The appellant was a man with previous business experience and held an agency of the Eastern Federal Union Insurance Co., which broqght him a substantial income.\n\nLearned counsel. for the , appellant has relied on the decision in lnderchand Bari Ram v. Commissioner of Income-tax, U.P. & C.P. ('), where the distinction between the definitions of managing agent and mM.\n\nAPPELLATE .Jt'RISDtCTJO:->: Criminal Appeal No. 55 of 1955.\n\nAppeal by special leave [rom the judgment and orcler dated August 26, l 967, of the 13ombay High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1208 of l 955, arising out of the judgment and order dated March 81, I 'l:)5, of the Sessions Juclgc, 13aroda, i1t Cri1ni11; tl Appeal No. 13 of 195:).\n\nM. I<. R11mm11111!11i and ]. 13. Dar/aclwnjl, for the appellant.\n\nR. Gr111af1_athy Tyer and R. f-1. Dhe/)(/r, for the respondent.\n\n1%0. April l!J. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKAR, J.-The appellant and two others were convicted by a Magistrate under s. 420 read with ss. !i l 1 and ~4 of the I nclian Penal Code and each \"as sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 12 months and a fine of Rs. -'iOO and in default: of payment, a further period of imprisonrnent for four months.\n\nOn appeal the accused persons were acyuittecl by a Sessions Judge.\n\nThe State then appealed to the High Court at Bombay and the High Court set aside the order of acquittal and restored the order passed by the learned Magistrate.\n\nAccused No. I alone has appealed against the order of the High Court to tbis Court.\n\nThe three accused persons approached one Rmnanlal and the third accused tokl Ramanlal that accused\n\n.. .,\n\n. -\n\n• '!'.\n\nNos. 1 and 2 were proficient in duplicating currency notes and they were prepared to do it for Ramanal who should take advantage of the offer.\n\nThe third accused then asked Ramanlal to think over the matter and promised to come again.\n\nRamanlal later men-, tionecl this matter to his friend Champaklal, the complainant, and the two decided to trap the accused persons disbelieving their\n\n(professed) power to duplicate notes.\n\nThe third accused again came as promised and met Ramanlal and Champaklal. Champakbl promised to find currency notes for Rs .. 20,000 for duplicating and a elate was fixed when it was lo be clone. Thereafter Ramanlal and Champaklal informed the police .. The police hid themselves -in the house of Ramanlal where it had been fixed with the accused that the duplicating would be done.\n\nThe three accused arrived duly. The second accued spread bottles, blank papers, etc., on a carpet and the first , accused, the appellant, asked Champaklal to produce the currencv notes.\n\nChampaklal who was carrying a bag supposed to contain the promised currency notes worth Rs. :20,000, took out two currency notes of Rs. 100 each from the bag and gave them to the appellant.\n\nAs soon as the appellant had taken the money, Champaklal gave the pre-arranged signal and the police came into the room and arrested all the accused persons.\n\nThey were thereafter prosecuted for the offence of an attempt to cheat upon a complaint lodged by Cbampaklal with the result already mentioned.\n\nThree points were argued by the learned advocate for the appellant.\n\nFirst, it was said that the charge was for an attempt to cheat Champaklal but there was no evidence to show that any representation had been made by anyone to Champaklal.\n\nThe Courts below howewr found that such a representation had been made and we think that the finding is clearly ,; upported by the evidence on record.\n\nThe next point taken was that there had been no attempt to commit the offence of cheating but only a prep'larch 31, 1952, the reference came up for consideration before the High Court, and after hearing Counsel, the High Court reformulated the first question as follows:\n\n\"vVhere the actual business of managrng agency was done which yielded the commission which is sought to be taxed?\"\n\nThe High Court directed the Tribunal to submit a supplemental statement of the case on the first question as reformulated.\n\nThe second question was not pressed by learned counsel for the appellant and does not no\\1r survive.\n\n, The Tribunal submitted a supplemental statement of the case on August 29, 1952 .. The reference was fipally heard on March 2, 1953, and the High Court answered the question by saying that the actual business of the managing agency which yielded the commission was done at Bombay and not at Cochin.\n\nIn arriving at the conclusion the High Court proceeded on the footing that the finding of the Tribunal in effect was that baning freight and collecting it at Cochin, all other important' and responsible work of managi11g the managed companies was clone from the head office at: Bombay.\n\nIt has been argued on behalf of the appellant that the High Court erroneously reformulated the question,\n\nShoo1ji Vallabhdas & r:o. v.\n\nCommissioner of lncome-tox/ Excess Profits Tax,\n\nBombay\n\nS. K. Das J.\n\n\\ ....\n\nJY6o and that the real question of law is whether on the facts and circunrstances of the case, an !'art of the Slwa1ji V11/Lc.bhdas\n\n& Co. 111anagi11g agency co1nn1ission accruccl outside British c,,,,,,.;:,;,,, u of lndia so that the appellant would be entitled to an\n\nlucom~-tax/ ap}JOrtionrnc11t of the 1na11aging agency co1nn11ss1011 E:i:cess Pro.lits T 11x, ancl to clain1 exetll)Jtion fro111 tax i11 resjJCCt of tl1e Bombay commission which accrued outside British lndia under s. K. Va> J. s. 14(2)( c) of the I nclian l ncome-tax Act, 1 YZZ (as it then stood) and the third proviso to s. 5 of the Excess\n\nProfits Tax Act, 1940.\n\nIL has been further contended that in vie11 of the findings of the Tribunal that (a) the commission earned was a pcrcentage of the freight and passage money received by two of the managed companies in Cochin and Travancorc States, (b) a part of the commission \"as payable there and (c) a part of the services was also rendered by the appellant: as manag ing agent in those States, the High Court was in error in coming to its conclusion that the \\\\'hole of the 1nanaging agency co1nn1ision accruell or at\"ose in Bon1~\n\nbay.\n\nWhil.e 11e agree with learned coumcl for the appellant that the real <1ucstion in this case is 11hether any part of the 111anaging agency co111111ission accrued outside British J nclia, we do not agree with him that the High Court was wrong in reformulating the ques tion.\n\nThe Tribunal formulated the question as though the computation of the appellant's remuneration on the basis of freight det:ennincd the place of accrual; in this the Tribunal was in error, and the High Court rightly pointed out that the test to he applied \"as not how the remuneratiop was to be computed or quanti fled, but where the services \"ere performed by the appellant, which yielded the profits sought to be t; ixed.\n\nThe High Coun rightly reformulated the question ou that basis, and asked the Tribunal to submit a supplemental statement of the case on the matcri; tls avaihiblc and placed before it by the appellant bearing on the question as reformulated by the I-ligh Court.\n\n\\Vhat did the Tribunal find in this case as to the place \"here the actual business was done, i.e.. !he services were performed by the appellant as rnanag111g ; went which vieklccl the commission?\n\nAfter referring h • - ' \" t~ the :igrrrments rcl:11ing to the cornp1llat ion of remuneration, the Trib1!11al said in its order dated\n\n. -\n\n.. -·\n\nDecember l 1, 1 nn)• v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras, No. 2('). The assessee in that case, Thiagaraja Chettiar, claimed that a portion of the commission credited to it in the company's accounts accrued to it in the Indian States \"here the company had opened branches for selling nrn and as the commission was not remitted to British India. it \\\\'as not assessable to tax.\n\nThis Court obser\\wl:\n\n\"The short answer to this argument is that the business of the company was carried on in British India, that the commission earned bv the firm on 'he profits made h,- the company in the States arose out of one indivisible agreement to charge the reduced commission of Ci per cent. on the profits of the companv and t.ha.t the managing agents had been rloing the business of the agency in British India and not in the States.\n\nIt. is not suggestcd that the managing agents performed anv fnnct.ions in the States.\"\n\nThe same question of the place of accrual arose in a somewhat. different context in Commissioner of lncorne-tax. Bomlrn)' Presidr:nC)' and Aden \\'. Chunilnl B. 1Wehta (') where a person resident in British India and carrying on business there controlled transactions abroad, and the question was if he was liable to pay tax upon profits deriYcd by him from contracts made for the nurch; ise and sale of commodities in various markets-' Liverpool, London, New York, etc.\n\nThe assessee disputed his liability in respect of such profits on the ground that they were not profits \"accruing or arising in British India\".\n\nIt was held that the .mere fact. that the profits made depended on the exercise m\n\nti) [1953] 24 l.T.R 535.\n\n(2) fl93B] 6 J.T.R. 521.\n\n~- ..\n\nBritish India of knowledge, skill and judgment on the 1960 part of the assessee did not mean that the profits arose Sho01ji Vallabhdas or accrued in British India, and there was no necessity & Co. arising out of the general conception of a business as Commiioner of an organisation that the 1xofits of the btlsjness must Income-Tax .\n\nExcess Profits tax/ 4nse only at one place, namely, the place of central Bombay control of the business.\n\nDelivering the judgment of the Privy Council in that case, Sir George Rankin observed:\n\n\"I'he words \"accruing or arising the British India\" may be taken, provisionally and in the first place, as an ordinary English phrase which derives no special meaning from the Act.\n\nThe alternative \"accruing or arising in\" and the antithesis between these words and the words \"received in\" or \"brought into\" afford no safe inference of any special meaning. \"Profit. ..... accruing or arising in British India\" are words which in their ordinary meaning seem to reqt1ire a place to be assigned as that at which the result of trading operation comes, whether gradually or suddenly, into existence.\" ...................................................... . ..........................................................................\n\n\" \"Their Lordships are not laying down any rule of general application to all classes of foreign transactions, or even with respect to the sale of goods. To do so would be nearly impossible and wholly unwise.\n\nThey are not saying that the place of formation of the contract prevails against everything else.\n\nIn some circumstances it may be so, but other matters-acts clone under the contract, for example-cannot be ruled out a priori.\n\nIn the case before the Board the contracts were neither framed nor carried out in British India; the High Court's conclusion that the profits accrued or arose outside British India is well-founded.\"\n\nA similar view was expressed in two earlier decisions: (1) In Re: The Aurangabad Mills Ltd. (1) where a reference was made to Commissioner of Taxation v. Kirk, (1900) Appeal Cases, page 588 and it was pointed out that the circumstance that the affairs of the company were directed from Bombay was not the detetmining test; but the test was where the processes\n\n(1) [1921] I.L.R. 45 Born. 12$6,\n\n10-6 SCI/ND/SZ\n\nS. K. Das].\n\nShonji Vallnb}ufas\n\n& Co. v.\n\nCommissionl!r of\n\nlnr.:ome-taxf Excess Pro.fits Tax, Bo, nba)'\n\nS. K. Das J.\n\nwhich yielded tl1e income were carried oul and 1.k1t was outside British India; (2) The Co111111issioner of fncome-lax, Bom/)(1)' Presidr; ncy v. l\\1es.1rs. S11r11/1chand Hulrnrnchand of Born/)ln', a firm (') where the assessees acted as the secretaries, treasurers and agents of a mill company registered at Indore, outside British India, and under the terms of' agreement, the assessees were entitled to charge and receive as selling agents commission on the gross sale proceeds of all doth produced by the mill and the company opened a shop in Bombay for the sale of cloth produced by the mill which was managed by the assessees.\n\nThe sale proceeds \"ere sent to Indore and the assessees were paid the commission at Indore.\n\nThe question arose whether the commission was liable to be assessed to income-tax in Bombay, and it was held that the income accrued in British India. Jn Comrn.issiona of T-nco111e-l11x. Bomlwy\n\nv. Alm1crl/Jhni U11111r/1/111i and Co., JJ0111bny(2) this Court dccilt with a case where a firm resident in British Inclia carried on the business of manufacturing ; rncl selling groundnut oil; it owned some oil mills within British India and a mill in Raichur in the l-1\\'Clcrabad Stcite where oil was manufactured.\n\nOne of th~ questions for decision was whether the profits of that part of the business, viz., the manufacture of oil at the mill in Rciichur accrued or arose in Raiclrnr within the meaning of the thircl proviso to s. ') of the Excess Profits Tax Act, l !l40.\n\nA majority of .Judges held that the profits arose in Rciichur, and in a composite business, the profits need not arise at one place only but may arise at more than one place aml an apportionment may b~ necessary.\n\nTh is \"as not, however, a case of ma nag1 ng agency.\n\n\"'c now come to the decision in Salt and fndwtries\n\nAgniris f, f:d., Bo111/Jny v. Co111111issioncr of Tncome-tax, Bomba)> City (') a decision of the same learned Chief Justice, in respect of which learned counsel for the appellant has made some very serious comments.\n\nThe facts of that case were these: the assessees, a company incorporated in Bombay were the managing agents of another company incorporated in Bombay and having its salt works at Aden and at Kanclla in die Kutch\n\n(1) [1930] I.LR. 55 Rom. 231.\n\n(2) [1950] S.C.R. 335.\n\n(3) [1950] 18 I.T.R. ;, s.\n\nState.\n\nThe assessee's registered office was in Bombay, where the board of directors met,· the books of account were maintained and various types of work connected with the company were clone.\n\nUnder the managing agency agreement the assessees were entitled to a commission at the rate of 12~- per cent. per annum on the annual net profits of the company and in any event a minimum of Rs. :W,000 per annum. The agreement also provided that such portion of the commission as was attributable to the net profits of the company arising or accruing in the Indian State was to be paid to the managing :1gents in such State and that with regard to the minimum commission half of it was to be paid in the State.\n\nIn pursuance of the assessees' articles of association the board of directors passed a resolution delegating a particular director to guide the company's operation in the State of Kutch and during the year of account that director supervised the salt works at Kanclla.\n\nThe qvestion was whether the sum of Rs. 88,065 representing assessees commission attributable to the salt works at .Kanclla accrued or arose at Kanclla or in British India.\n\nFirst, the learned Chief Justice referred to the test to be applied in order to determine where the profits of the assessee company accrned or arose, and he said that the test was to find out where the actual business of the company was clone which yielded the profits sought to be taxed.\n\nIn that connexion he said:\n\n\"The work of the maHaging agents must be looked upon as a unit and not as divided up into so many different categories, to each one of which a certain portion of the commissi9n earned by the managing .agents can be attributed or allocated.\"\n\nHe then went on to consider when the right to managing agency commission arose in that case and came to the conclusion, which was decisive in his op1111on, that it arose when all the accounts of the working of the company were submitted to the head office in Bombay and the profits were determined: therefore, the sum of Rs. 88.065 accrued or arose to the :1sscssccs in Bombay and not in the Indian State both for purposes of income-tax and excess profits tax.\n\nS!ll!orji Vallahhdas\n\n& Co. v.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax/ Excess Profits Tax, Bombay ·\n\nS.K. Das].\n\n1960 Now, learned counsel for the appellant has no\n\nShoarji Vallabhd\" quarrel with the decision in so far as it laid down\n\n& :_a. that (a) the Lest is to find out where the business is\n\nCommissi011er of actually done, i.e., wl1ere tJ1e services are performed, Incam•-tax/ d (b) h 1 · Excess Profits Tax, an t e rig 1t to managing agency co111n11ss1on arose Bambay in that case when all the accounts of the working of s. K. DasJ. the company were submitted to the head office in Bombay and the profits were determined.\n\nLearned counsel has contended that in the case under our consideration the services were performed partly in British India and partly .in. Cochin and the right to 111anag1ng agency con11111ss1011 arose as soon as the freight was paid at least in respect of two of the managed companies.\n\nHe has submitted, however, that the learned Chief .Justice was m error if he intended to lay down a rule of universal application that the work of the managing agents must always be looked upon as a unit and can never to be divided into categ'Ories.\n\nIt. is contended that the services of a managing agent can be performed at more than one place, and legally it is possible to apportion the commission and attribute a pan of it: to services rendered outside the taxable territories.\n\nWe consider it unnecessary in the present case to decide the question of performance of services and resultant apportionment, if any, on a theoretical or hypothetical basis, because the case can be disposed of on the short ground that on the findings of the Tribunal, the remuneration of Lhe managing agents accrued at Bombay. vVe had referred earlier to the findings reached by the Tribunal.\n\nThese findings show that except for an attempt at make-believe, no services were really performed by the appellant at Cochin.\n\nNo doubt, some freight was secured and paid for at Cochin.\n\nBut the managed company also had an office at Cochin to secure freight.\n\nIt has been argued that under the terms of the managing agency agTeements, the managing agents employed the staff, etc., and for two of the companies which carried on the cargo business, securing freight was the principal part of the managing agency business. The Hih Court, however. rightly pointed out:\n\n' .\n\n. -\n\n\"In our opm10n, it is not possible to read the managing agency agreement in that light.\n\nAll that clause 2 of the agreement does is to lay clown the standard by which the commission is to be computed and determined, and it lays down two different standards, one with regard to the shipping business and the other with regard to the other businesses, but as far as the business of the managing agency is concerned their responsibilities and their duties are integrated duties and responsibilities which are set out in the different clauses of the agreement.\n\nIt is impossible to contend that they had not to supervise, control and manage the shipping business and, as we have already said the business of a shipping company is vastly more detailed and responsible than the mere task of finding people to go by ship or send their goods by ship and for that purpose paying freight. . Freight is merely the resultant profit which accrues to a shipping company.\n\nIn order that that profit should result the company has got to have ships, it has got to have seaworthy ships, it has got to have sailors and officers, it has got to look to the repairs of the ships, the renovation o.f the ships and the replacements of the ships.\n\nAll this is part of the shipping company's business and all this business had to be attended to by the managing agents and the question is, where did they attend to this business.\n\nThe finding on this question is clear.\n\nThe finding, in effect, is that barring booking freight, and collecting freight at Cochin, all other important and responsible work of managing the managed companies was done from the head office at Bombay and not from Cohin.\"\n\nOn the findings reached, the position in law is quite clea1'.\n\nThe decisions to which we have referred clearly establish that normally, the commission payable to the managing agents accrues at the place where the business is actuallv clone, that is, where the services of the managig agents are performed.\n\nIn th is case the appellant practically performed all the services at Bombay, and therefore the commission which it earned though computerl on the percentage of freight and /or passage money in respect of two .of the managed companies, accrued or arose in British\n\nShoorji Vallabhdas & Ca. v.\n\nCommissiontr of\n\nln.ome-tax/ Excess Profits Tax, Bombay\n\nS. K. Das].\n\nSftaorji Vatlabhdas\n\n& Co. v.\n\nCommissioner of\n\nlucome-laxf Excess Profits T1, x,\n\nBombay\n\nS . .K. Das J.\n\nA.fHif 20\n\nIndia.\n\nAs to t.hc t.hirJo. LXX of J 951 (hereinafter called the Act), for recovery of the principal sum due as well as the rent which was said to be inarrears.\n\nThe application was resisted by the appellant on various grounds, one of which was that no snch application lay as the liability was not a debt under the Act.\n\nThe tribunal negatived the contention of the appellant and passed a preliminary decree for sale.\n\nSix month's time was allowed to the appellant to pay the decretal amount, failing which the respondents were at liberty to get a final decree prepared and bring the properties to sale.\n\nThe appellant went in appeal to the High Court but the appeal was dismissed.\n\nThen there was a Letters Patent Appeal, which was also dismissed.\n\nThe appellant then applied for and was granted special leave bv this Court, and that is how the matter has come UJJ before us.\n\nThe only point for our consideration is whether t.he liability created under a mortgage is a debt within\n\nRtefkumari Kausha/..yadevi\n\nBawa Prifma\n\nSingh\n\nWmzchoo ].\n\nRaj/,-umnri\n\nKausharadeui\n\nBawa Prilmn\n\nSi11gh\n\nJf'anchnn J.\n\nthe meaning of s. '.2(G) of the Act.\n\nThe rclev; mt part of that provision rum as follows:-\n\n\" 'Debt' meam any pecuniary liability, whether payable presently or in future, or under a decree or order of civil or revenue court or otherwise, or whether ascertained or to be ascertained, which-\n\n(a) in the case of a displaced person who has left or been displaced from his place of residence in any area now forming part of West Pakistan, was incurred before he came to reside 111 any area now lorming part of India;\n\n(b) in the case of a displaced person who, before and after the l.th day of August, 1947, has been residing in any area now forming part of India, was incurred before the said date on the security of any immovable property situate in the territories now forming part of 'Vest Pakistan:\n\nProvided that where any such liability was incrn red on the security of immovable properties situate both in India and in 'Nest Pakistan, the liability shall be so apportioned between the said properties that the liability in relation to each of the said properties bears the same proportion to the tutal amount of the debts as the value of each of the properties as at the date of the transaction hears to the total value of the properties furnished as security, and the liability, for the purposes of this clause, shall be the liability which is relatable to the property in vVest Pakistan;\n\n(c) is due to a displaced person from any other person (whether a displaced person or not) ordinarily residing in the territories to which this Act extends;\n\nx x x x\n\nThe contention 011 behalf of the appellant is that the liability 1111<10 a mortgage is not a pecuniary liability and therefore s. 2(6) will not apply to a mort- . gage debt.\n\nIt is further urged that the scheme of the Act shows that mortgages in relation to properties situate in what is now India are not covered by the Act at all.\n\n\"\" r •\n\nnebt is defined in s. 2(6) as meaning any pecuniary 1iability and has been restricted by the three subclauses _in the sub-ection with reference to the person who might be o-wrng the debt 01~ to whom the debt might be owed. Sub-els. (a) and (b) refer to the debts owed by a displaced person as defined in the Act while sub-cl. (c) refers to a debt due to a displaced person.\n\nSub-cl. (c) has therefore to be taken independently of snb-cls. (a) and (b), for it refers to a creditor who is a displaced person while the other two sub-clauses refer to a debtor who is a displaced person.\n\nUnder subcl. (c) a displaced person who is a creditor can recover the debt clue to him from any other person, whether a . displaced person or not, who is residing in the territories to which the Act extends.\n\nThe main contention of the appellant in this connection is that a mortgage debt is not a pecunfary liability and therefore does not fall within the definition of debt at all. vVe are of opinion that there is no force in this contention; The words \"pecuniary liability\" will cover any liability which is of a monetary. nature.\n\nNow the definition of a. mortgage in s. 58 of the Transfer of Property Act.\n\nNo. 4 of 1882, shows that though it is the transfer of an interest in specific immovable property, the purpose of the transfer is to secure the payment of money advanced or to be advanced by way of loan or to secure an existing or future debt or the performance of an engagement which may give rise to a pecuniary liability.\n\nThe money advanced by way of loan, for example, which is secured by a mortgage, obviously creates a pecuniary liability.\n\nIt is true that a mortgage in addition to creating the pecuniary liability also transfers interest in the specific immovable property to secure that liability; none the less the loan or debt to secure which the mortgage is created will remain a pecuniary liability of the person creating the mortgage .. Therefore a mortgage debt would create a pecuniary liability upon the mortgagor arid would be covered by the definition of the word \"debt\" in s. 2(6). v\\Te may in this connection refer to the Displaced Persons (Institution of Suits) Act, No. XL VII of 1948, which has been practically repealed by the\n\nll-6 SCI/ND/82\n\nRajkumari Kaushalyia Devi v.\n\nBawa Pritma Singh\n\nWanchoo J.\n\nRajkwnari Ka11shaf.ya Devi\n\nBawa Pritma Singh\n\nJVm1rlwn J.\n\nAct.\n\nIn LiiaL hw, >11.ils relating Lo immO\\'; ible pro pcny \"c1-c specially excepted 1I11•·• ' · . ., ·-· _ • • r \"' • There is therefore no.· force in this appeal and it is hereby dismissed with costs.\" .... ·: ·\n\n\" ·:·r:, _; ~-. ,' -'. ;:T .... Appl dis1nissed. ,··\n\n'.,,\n\n' - .. , :r , li ·.: .~.:,:~IAHAi>EOL.AilKANODIA,.· .. rr: li'. -, 11 - - '. •• -i ~-1 - . ;_i ::· . .i ;_ •l .. ~:f-, ·:.~·:_ -· ' '\";_,.::-,~ ,, v•, '•' ,-,; U'i ~. ' ('. \":.<:· ' / >, : .-THE -.AD~IINISTRATOR-GENERµ. OF-.\n\n.; ... , ,, ; .:\"' <:, ... WESTBENGA.L.• ;'-:\\'-·\" ·\n\n- , ' :• j • ' ' . (P .. B. GA.JENDRAGADKAR,- K. N; . w ANCHOO . : .•·· \"' :.':and K. C. DAs Gm.A.; JJ:)- - ..\n\n'!\\~-,~-- : .• _-:-.-~_!;:; i ,,_.',:.,_~.·- ~-' •.. '.:;; -· .. , • .Thika Tenancy..,-Decree for possession against tenant-Applicaiicln'f•·• ' · . ., ·-· _ • • r \"' • There is therefore no.· force in this appeal and it is hereby dismissed with costs.\" .... ·: ·\n\n\" ·:·r:, _; ~-. ,' -'. ;:T .... Appl dis1nissed. ,··\n\n'.,,\n\n' - .. , :r , li ·.: .~.:,:~IAHAi>EOL.AilKANODIA,.· .. rr: li'. -, 11 - - '. •• -i ~-1 - . ;_i ::· . .i ;_ •l .. ~:f-, ·:.~·:_ -· ' '\";_,.::-,~ ,, v•, '•' ,-,; U'i ~. ' ('. \":.<:· ' / >, : .-THE -.AD~IINISTRATOR-GENERµ. OF-.\n\n.; ... , ,, ; .:\"' <:, ... WESTBENGA.L.• ;'-:\\'-·\" ·\n\n- , ' :• j • ' ' . (P .. B. GA.JENDRAGADKAR,- K. N; . w ANCHOO . : .•·· \"' :.':and K. C. DAs Gm.A.; JJ:)- - ..\n\n'!\\~-,~-- : .• _-:-.-~_!;:; i ,,_.',:.,_~.·- ~-' •.. '.:;; -· .. , • .Thika Tenancy..,-Decree for possession against tenant-Applicaiicln'f-.\n\n3 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COl)RT REPOl\\'{S 581\n\nif the decree or order 'is not in conforn1ity yith: tl~~ beneficent provisions of the Act either to rescind the decree or order altogether or to vary it to bring it into such conformity.\n\nSection 28 with which we are specially concern.ed in this appeal is in these words:--\n\n''vVhere anv decree or order for the recovery of possession of any. holding from a Thika tenant has been made before the date of commencement of this Act but the possession f s1ich holding has not been recovered from\n\n1 the Thika tenant by the execution of such decree or order, the court bv which the decree or order was made may, if it is of opinion that the decree or order is not in conformity with any provision of th is Act other than sub-section (i) of section 5 or section 27, rescind or vary the decree or order in such manner as the Court niay think fit for the purpose of giving effect to such provision , anl a decree or order so varied by any Court shall be transferred to such Court to the Controller for execution under this Act as if it were an order made under and in accordance with the provisions of this Act.\" The new lqw however failed to achiev~ its object for some years as rhe Cot!rts interpreted the definition of Thika tenant in the Act in such a manner that speaking geerally no tnant. was able to establish its reqt!irement. To remedy this the Governor of West 'Bengal enacted on October 21, 1952, an Ordinance by which the definition of Thika tenant was revised and a few other amendments of the Act were made.\n\nThe . spcial protection given under ss. 28 and 29 of the Act to tenants against whom decrees or orders had been obtained or against whom cases were pending was however kept intact. The Ordinance by its s. 5 extended such special protection also to tenants whose cases were pending before .a court on the date of the commencement of the Ordinance and those against whom decrees or orders had been made after th~ date of the Act and before the date 13f the Ordinance but possession had not been o])tµ.ined.\n\nIn 1953 the West Bengal Legislature enacted the Clctta Thika Tenancy Amendment Act, 195q, revising r.ermanently the definition of Thika tenant ancl II1aking sqme other\n\n12-6 SCI/ND/82\n\nMahadeo(al\n\n'Kaiiodia\n\n\"V.· Administrator-\n\n' General of West Bngal\n\nDas Gupta].\n\nAfahndeolnl\n\nllanodia\n\nV, Adminislralor-\n\nGe11eral of JV'est Bengal\n\nD11s (,'11/ila ].\n\namendments.\n\nOne of the amendments was that ss. 28 aml 29 of the Original Act were omitted.\n\nThe principal question before us in this appeal is whether the provisions of s. '28 could be applied by a Court in a case where an application hacl been made b;· a tenant for relief under that section anrl such application was pending for disposal on the date the 01nission becan1e effective. l)y reason of the f\\n1cndmcnt Act coming into force.\n\nThe clecree for possession with which we are concerned in this case was made as far back as August 8,\n\nI 94 l, by a Munsif in Howrah. The tenant's appeal was dismissed on April 9, 194~. On February 28, 1949, on which rlate the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act of 1949 came into force, proceedings for the execution of the decree of ejectment 11ere pending in the 1\\hmsif's Comt.\n\nOn March Jlrator-\n\n(; e11cral qf TVest Bcn.!Ial\n\nJ)ns G11/1!a J.\n\nSUPREME GOUR T REPORTS [1960]\n\nrule of interpretation of beneficent legislation that in 'Cases of ambiguity the construction which advances the beneficent purpose should be accepted in preference to the one which lrator-\n\n(; e11cral qf TVest Bcn.!Ial\n\nJ)ns G11/1!a J.\n\nSUPREME GOUR T REPORTS [1960]\n\nrule of interpretation of beneficent legislation that in 'Cases of ambiguity the construction which advances the beneficent purpose should be accepted in preference to the one which nd is deemed to be registered under the Bihar & Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, 1935 (Bihar Acb VI of 1935) which in Bihar has replaced the Cooperative Societies Act of 1912. It was carrying on banking business in the State of Bihar. One of the objects of the Bank is to carry on general business of banking not repugnant to the provisions of the Bihar Act and rules framed thereunder for the time being in force (Bye-Law 3(a)vi). In the calendar years 1945, 1946 and 1947, the appellant Bank received by way of interest on deposits with the Imperial Bank of India the sums of Rs. 7,192, R(l. 20,250 and Rs. 22,600 respectively. It is these sums which are the subject matter of dispute in these three appeals which relate to the respective assessment years 1946-47, 1947-48 and 1948-49. These sums were not assessed when assessment was made under s. 23(3) of the Income-tax Act, but subsequently under s. 34 they were assessed as being ' income ' under the head 'other sources'. This order was upheld by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. A case was then stated to the High Court under s. 66(1) of the Act, but was decided against the appellant. The appella.nt brought three appeals in this Court in regard to the three assessment years.\n\nIn each one of them the respondent is the Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar & Orissa. As the appeals involve a common question of law they were consolidated and can conveniently be disposed of by one judgment:\n\nIn its return the appellant showe\\l these various sums as ' other sources ', but nothing turns on the manner in which the appellant chose to show this income in itlil return.\n\nThe Income-tax Officer, however, assessed the interest for these three years\n\nr960' under s. 12 of the Income-tax Act, as income from . 'other sources'. The appellant took an appeal to the\n\nC Bihar1 51\"8 1' k Appellate Assistant Commissioner where it was conoopera ive an ddh hb\" fh 11 Bk Ltd. ten e t at as t e usmess o t e appe ant an v. consisted oflending money and the deposits had been Commissioner of made not for the purpose of investment but for that Income Tax business and thereby fulfilling the purpose for which\n\nKapur]. the Co-operative Bank was constituted, these various sums of interest were not subject to income-tax because of the Notification issued by the Central Government under s. 60 of the Income-tax Act. The relevant portion of that Notification, C.B.R. N otification No. 35 dated October 20, 1934, and No. 33 dated August 18, 1945, was:-\n\n\"The following classes of income shall be exempt from the tax pa.yable under the said Act, but shall be taken into account in determining the total income of an assessee for the purpose of the said Act:-\n\n(2) The profits of any Co-operative Society other than the Sanikatta Salt Owners' Society in the Bombay Presidency for the time being registered under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1912 (Act II of 1912), the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925 (Bombay Act VII of 1925), or the Madras Cooperative Societies Act, 1932 (Madras Act VI of 1932), or the dividends or other payments received by the members of any such Society out of such profits.\n\nExplanation: For this purpose the profits of a Co-operative Society shall not be deemed to include any income, profits or gains from :-\n\n(1) Investments in (a) securities of the nature referred to ins. 8 of the Indian Income-tax Act; or\n\n(b) property of the nature referred to in s. 9 of that Act;\n\n(2) dividends, or\n\n(3) the 'other sources' referred to in s. 12 of the Indian Income-tax Act\".\n\nThe Appellate Assistant Commissioner, however, repelled the contention of the appellant. He held that the business of the appellant consisted of 'lending money, and selling agricultural and other products '\n\nI960 to its constituents' which could be planned ahead and nia state required no provision for extraordinary claims. He c0•0;.~:iive Bank remarked that it appeared from the balance-sheets Ltd. that in the accounting year 1945 the Bank invested v.\n\nRs. 13,50,000 as fixed deposits, which_, in the following Commissioner 01\n\nd 1 Income Tax year was raised to Rs. 15,00,000 an it was on y in -< the, accounting year 1947 that the fixed deposits Kapur J. 'were realised on maturity with interest'. He was also of the opinion that the length of the period during which this money 'was kept locked in this way ' showed clearly that ' not the exigencies of pressing necessities, but the motives of investment of surplus fund had actuated the deposits'. He there-\n\n>\\' fore held that the fixed deposits with the Imperial Bank were held as an investment quite apart from the business of the appellant and the interest from these deposits was not exempt from income-tax. He further held that the exemption as to the profit of a Co-operative Society extended to its sphere of cooperative activities and therefore interest from investments was no part of the appellan.t's business i. profits exempt from taxation. Against this order an appeal was taken to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal and it was there contended that the Bank did not make the deposits as investments, but in order that cash might be available to the appellant ' continuously ' for the carrying on of the purposes of its business, and that the deposits were intimately connected with the business of the appellant and \" therefore the interest should have been held to be profits arising from the business activities of the Bank, and that the finding tb'at the short-term deposits in the Imperial Bank were separate from the appellant's banking business was erroneous. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, by its order dated April 11, 1955, held :-\n\n\" (1) That the interest was an income rightly to ...;_ be included under the head of 'other sources' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n\n(2) The profits of a Co-operative Society indicates the profit derived from the business which can be truly called the business of the Co-operative\n\nzg6o\n\nBihar State Co-operative Bank Ltd. v.\n\nCommissioner of Income Tax\n\nKapu• J.\n\nSociety. Investments by the society either in securities or in shares or in bank fixed deposits are made out of surplus funds.\n\nThe interest or dividend derived from such investment cannot be regarded as part of the profits of the business (sic) qua such bank and therefore, it is not exempt from income.tax (Vide Hoshiarpur Central Co-operative\n\nBank v. Commissioner of Income-tax (1),)\" Against this order a case was stated at the instance of the appellant under s. 66(1) of the Act, and the following two questions of law were referred for the opinion of the High Court ;\n\n(1) Whether, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the receipt of interest on fixed deposits was an income under the head of 'other sources' : and\n\n(2) Whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, the receipt of interest from the fixed deposits was an income not exempt from taxation under the C. B. R. Notification No. 35 dated 20th October, 1934 and No. 33 dated the 18th August, 1945.\n\nIn the High Court the appellant's contention was that the fixed deposits were made with the Imperial Bank of India not with the idea of making investments, but for the reason that cash should be available to the appellant as and when it was needed for the purposes of its business. It was also contended that the deposits were short-term deposits and that the Bank could not ca.rry on its business without such short-term deposits. In other words, the contention was that making deposits with the Imperi:i.l Bank was intimately connected with the business activities of the appellant Bank and that the interest received on the deposits was profit attributable to its bus\"iness activities. But the High Court did not accept this contention. It held that if the income derived by a Co-operative Society was from the business of the Co-operative Society as such, it fell within the exemption, but if it arose out of the business with third parties as in the case of investment of surplus assets, the exemption was inapplicable because the\n\n(1) (1953] 24 l.T.R. 346, 350.\n\ninvestment of fluid assets was not a part of the busix960 ness of the Co-operative Bank and the reason for the Bihar state Notification was to exempt profits accruing to a Co- Co-operative Bank operative Society from 'carrying-on business of a Ltd. mutual co-operative society and upon the ground . ~· that a man cannot make profit or loss out of Commissioner 01 h.\n\nIf' Income Ta;>; 1mse .\n\nThe ground of mutuality was not relied upon Kapur J. before us by the learned Solicitor-General who appeared for the respondent. So the sole question for determination is whether the investment by a Cooperative Bank of its assets in fixed deposits in the manner that the appellant Bank had deposited its moneys falls within the term ' business' and s therefore assessable under s. IO of the Income-tax Act, or it is an investment the interest from which would fall under the term 'other sources ' and therefore within s. 12 of the Income-tax Act. It was contended by the learned Solicitor-General that the finding of the Appellate Tribunal as to the nature of these deposits was one of fact. This contention is not sustainable.\n\nIt has not been treated as a. finding of fact either by the Appellate Tribunal or by the High. Court. They have both treated it as a question of law and it is on that basis that the reference was made. The decision of the question depends on what'is comprised within the ordinary business of a bank and whether the business of the appellant bank is in any way different.\n\nRelying upon the decision of the Privy Council in The Punjab Go-operative Bank Ltd v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab (1), counsel for the appellant submitted that the business of a bank is one of dealing in money and credit and that laying. out moneys in deposit with other banks is just as much a mode of conducting business as lending moneys to\n\nborrnwers whether members of the society or to other co-operative societies, and is therefore a part of the appellant's business. Therefore, where out of moneys in deposit with a bank a portion is put away or laid out in securities or in deposits with another banker, two objects are served: (I) the moneys which are not immediately required do not remain idle but\n\n(x) (x940) ll I.T.R, 635\n\nearn interest; and (2) if and when money is required to meet any demand, the investment i. e. the deposits Bihar State 11 th •t• d f h. h C t .\n\nB k as we as e secun ies prov1 e a source rom w 1c a-apem we an • • 1 b Th h Ltd. tnese reqmrements can eas1 y e met. us t e v. credit of the bank remains unimpaired and its moneys Commissioner af continue to earn interest.\n\nIncome Tox Counsel for the respondent argued that where\n\nKapur]. moneys are so laid out they cannot be termed ' carrying on business of the bank ' and therefore any sums coming in from such investments cannot be termed profits arising from business, but they are income from ' others sources'. In support of this argument reliance was placed by counsel on The Madras Central. Urban Bank Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1); The Madras Provincial Co-operative Bank Ltd., Madras v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras (2); Commissioner of Income Tax, Burma v.\n\nBengalee Urban Co-operative Credit Society Ltd. ('); Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras v. Madras Provincial Co-operative Bank Ltd. ('); Hoshiarpur Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Simla (5); Cochin Cottage Industries Cooperative Marketing Society Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Mysore &c. (6).\n\nBut none of these cases supports the argum.(lnt raised on behalf of the respondent. In the Madras Central Urban Bank case (1 ) the society was required to invest 40 per cent. of its total liability under call deposits in a liquid or fluid form and the society invested it in Government securities which produced intere3t. It was held that interest from securities was not part of the profits of the business of the society as it was not obliged to invest in such securities. Similarly in the Madras Provincial Co-operative Bank Case (2 ) also the income which was the subject matter of dispute was interest received by the bank from its investments in Government securities and it was held that it was not part of the income derived from its business. The Rangoon case, Commissioner of Income-tax, Burma v. Bengalee Urban Go-operative Credit Society (') was also a case relating\n\n(1) I.L.R. 52 Mad. 640 F.B.\n\n(2) I.L.R. 56 Mad. 837 F.B.\n\n(3) [l9J4] 2 I.T.R. 121.\n\n(4) l.L.R. 1943 Mad. 390.\n\n(5) [1953] 24 I.T.R. 346.\n\n(6) [1956] 30 l.T.R, 356.\n\nto income derived from interest on capital invested in r960 Government securities. At p. 128, Page, C. J., said:- . \" d £ th f 'th Bihar State . t .... t ... f ........ , an . prima ~Cle erde o.re dne1f er Co-operative Bank m eres rom securities nor mcome erive rom Ltd. property are ' profits ' within the meaning of that v. term as used in the notification ..... , .................. It Commissioner of may be that investment of ca pita! in properties or Income Tax sec11rities is part of the business of an assessee, and in such a case, in my opinion, the net income accruing from such investm'ents would be, and be chargeable as, profits of the business\".\n\n(As the matter had not been considered from this point of view the. case was sent back for doing so).\n\nThese cases before the amendment of the Notification show that the income which was exempted was profit from business and not income from sources which fell under ss. 8 and 9 of the Income-tax Act. The.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. The Madras Provincial Go-operative Bank Ltd. (1) was a case where moneys ha~ been invested in debentures and for reasons similar to the ones given in the cases abovementioned, it was held that interest derived therefrom was not profits of the business.\n\nCounsel for the respondent relied on a judgment of the Punjab High Court in Hoshiarpur Central Cooperative Bank v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Simla (2).\n\nIn that case the Government authorised the Bank to deal in sugar, oil and standard cloth and it made profit thereform. Those activities were neither its business under the bye-laws nor within its objects.\n\nThe question was whether this profit was exempt from income-tax on account of its being profits of a\n\nco-operative society and it was held that the decided cases showed that where income was derived by a co-operative society, the profits were within the exemption, but not if the business was of the nature not covered by the objects of the society. This line of reasoning has not formed part of the. respondent's argument in this Court and the case therefore has no application to the facts of the present case. The decision in Cochin Cottage Industries Go-operative\n\n(1) I.L.R. [1943] Mad. 390 9\n\n(2) [1953) 24 I.T.R. 346\n\nKapur].\n\nz96o Marketing Society Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Mysore &c. (1) proceeded on the same ground. In Bihar State that case the profit which was held not to be exempt\n\nCo-operatve Bank under .the Notification was the apportioned profit of\n\nL~. the society from its dealings with non-members.\n\nCommiooioner of In the Surat Peoples' Co-operative Banlc Ltd. v. The Income Tax Commissioner of Income-tax, Ahmedabad (2 ) the profit arose duting the course of banking business out of Kapur 1 the sale of Government securities which formed part of the stock-in-trade and as it was a co-operative bank the profits made from such sales were held to be exempt from taxation under the Notification.\n\nIn the instant case the co-operative society (the appellant) is a Bank. One of its objects is to carry on the general business of banking. Like other banks money is its stock-in-trade or circulating capital and its normal business is to deal in money and credit . . It cannot be said that the business of such a Bank consists only in receiving deposits and lending money to its members or such other societies as are mentioned in the objects and that when it lays ou~ its moneys so that they may be readily available to meet the demand of its depositors if and when they arise, it is not a legitimate mode of carrying on of its banking business. The Privy Council in The Punjab Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Incometax, Lahore (3) where the profits arose from the sale of Government securities pointed out at p. 645 that in the ordinary cases the business of a Bank essentially consists of dealing with money and credit. Depositors put their money in the Bank at a small rate of interest and in order to meet their demands if and \"when they arise the Bank has always to keep sufficient cash or easily realisable securities. That is a normal step in the carrying on of the banking business. In other words 'that is an act done in what is truly the carrying on or carrying out of a business '.\n\nIt may be added that another mode of conducting business of a Bank is to place its funds in deposit with other banks and that also is to meet demands which may be made on it. It was however argued\n\n(1) [1956] 30 I.T.R. 356\n\n(2) [1958] 33 I.T.R. 396.\n\n(3) [1940] 8 l.T.R. 635\n\n-+ '\n\nthat in the instant case the moneys had been x96o deposited with the Imperial Bank on long term d 't h th d •t d £ Bihar State epos1 s masmuc as ey .were epos1 e or one year Co-operative Bank . and were renewed from time to time also for a year ; Ltd. but as is shown by the accounts these deposits fell due v. at short intervals and would have been available to Commissioner of the appellant had any need arisen.\n\nStress was laid on the use of the word ' surplus ' both by the tribunal as well as by the High Uourt and it was alflo con, tended before us that in the byelaws under the heading 'business of the bank' it was provided that the bank could 'invest surplus funds when not required for the business of the bank in one or more ways specified in s. 19 of the Bihar Act (Cl. 4 III(i) of the Bye-Laws). Whether funds invested as provided in s. 19 of the Bihar Act would be surplus or not does not arise for decision in this case, but it has not been shown that the moneys which were in deposit with other banks were 'surplus ' within that bye-law so as to take it out of banking business. As we have pointed out above, it is a normal mode of carrying on banking business to invest moneys in a manner that they are readily available and that is just as much a part of the mode of conducting a Bank's business as receiving deposits or lending moneys or discounting hundies or issuing demand drafts. That is how the circulating capital is employed and that is the normal course of business of a bank. The moneys laid out in the formof deposits as in the instant case would n, ot cease to be a part of the circulating capital of the appellant nor would they cease to form part of its banking business. The returns flowing from them would form part of its profits from its business. In a commercial sense the directors of the company owe it to the bank to make investments which earn them interest instead of letting moneys lie idle. It cannot be said that the funds of the Bank which were not lent to borrowers but were laid out in the form of deposits in another bank to add to the profit instead of lying .idle necessarily ceased to be a part of the stock-in-trade of the bank, or that the interest arising therefrom did not form part of its business profits. Under the bye-laws\n\nIncome Tax\n\nKapur].\n\n' f\n\none of the objects of the appellant bank is to carry on the general business of banking and therefore subject Bihar State h C S t' A t 't h t C P t .\n\nB k to t e o-operat1ve ome ies c , I as o carry on o-o era ive an • • b k Lrd. its business in the manner that ordmary an s do. v.\n\nIt may be added that the various heads under s. 6 of Commissioner of the Income Tax Act and the provisions of that Act Income Tax applicable to these various heads are mutually exclu-\n\nKapur].\n\nz960\n\nFebruary 22\n\nsive. Section 12 is a residuary section and does not come into operation until the preceding heads are excluded. Commissioner of Income-tax v. Basant Rai Tak hat Singh (1 ).\n\nIn our opinion, the High Court was in error in treating interest derived from deposits as not arising from the business of the Bank and therefore not falling within the income exempted under the Notification. The appeal must therefore be allowed and the judgment and order of the High Court set aside. The appellant will have its costs in this Court and in the Court below.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nTHE TINNEVELLY-TUTICORIN ELECTltIC\n\nSUPPLY CO. LTD., v.\n\nITS WORKMEN\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SUBBA RAO AND K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.) Industrial Dispute-Bonus~Full Bench formula-If applicable to workmen in electricity undcrtaking--Elcctric Supply Act. r948 (54 of r948). s. 57. Sixth Schedule, para, r7(2)(b)(xi).\n\nCan the Full Bench •formula for calculation of bonus apply to a claim of bonus made by \\.vorkmen engaged in electricity concerns and undertakings? That ¥.'as the question raised for decision in this appeal. A Special Bench of the Labour Appellate Tribunal held in the affirmative and the correctness of its decision was challenged in this appeal. It was contended on behalf of the appellant company that the Electricity Supply Act, 1948 (54 of\n\n1948) was a self-contained code intended to regulate the business and affairs of electricity concerns and that Act and not the formula applied to a claim of bonus by the workmen in an electricity concern.\n\n(r) (1933] I J.T.R, 197, 20I,\n\n. ' ...", "total_entities": 71, "entities": [{"text": "Palkiwala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 52, "end_char": 61, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "z960 view of this Mr. Palkiwala for the Managed Company did not press C. A. No."}}, {"text": "Kapur J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 407, "end_char": 415, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Kapur J.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "32\n\nTHE BIHAR STATE CO-OPERATIVE\n\nBANK LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 432, "end_char": 474, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE BIHAR STATE CO-OPERATIVE BANK LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 480, "end_char": 510, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. K. SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 526, "end_char": 538, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.K. SARKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 544, "end_char": 564, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 688, "end_char": 709, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Imperial Bank of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 907, "end_char": 929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appellant Bank which was registered under the Cooperative Societies 'Act, 1922, received, in the relevant account years, by way of interest on deposits with the Imperial Bank of India certain sums of money."}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1010, "end_char": 1015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income Tax-Co-operative Bank-Interest received on deposits with other banks-Exemption from taxation under Notification-\n\nIndian Income-tax Act", "statute": "Income Tax-Co-operative Bank-Interest received on deposits with other banks-Exemption from taxation under Notification-\n\nIndian Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1023, "end_char": 1049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1408, "end_char": 1426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Income-tax Officer assessed the aforesaid sums under s. 12 of the Indian Income-tax Act 1922, as income from other sources, but the appellant claimed that the deposits were made not with the idea of making investments but for the purpose of carrying on its business as a bank and that as the interest received on the deposits was profit attributable to its business activities it was not subject to incometax because of the Notification issued by the Central Government under s. 60 of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1433, "end_char": 1438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1616, "end_char": 1621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act 1922"}}, {"text": "N. A. Palkhivala", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2180, "end_char": 2196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. A. Palkhivala, Thakur Prasad and R. 0."}}, {"text": "K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2272, "end_char": 2283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor :General of India, R. Gana- Co-operative Bank pathy Iyer and D. Gupta, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "D. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2356, "end_char": 2364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor :General of India, R. Gana- Co-operative Bank pathy Iyer and D. Gupta, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "appellant is a Bank registered under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2506, "end_char": 2579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2650, "end_char": 2655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "d b Commissioner of WaS e lVere y Income Tax KAPUR, J.-The appellant is a Bank registered under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1912 (Act II of Kapur J.\n\n1912) 11>nd is deemed to be registered under the Bihar & Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, 1935 (Bihar Acb VI of 1935) which in Bihar has replaced the Cooperative Societies Act of 1912."}}, {"text": "Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2658, "end_char": 2697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bihar has replaced the Cooperative Societies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2730, "end_char": 2778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 23(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3460, "end_char": 3468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "One of the objects of the Bank is to carry on general business of banking not repugnant to the provisions of the Bihar Act", "statute": "One of the objects of the Bank is to carry on general business of banking not repugnant to the provisions of the Bihar Act"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3476, "end_char": 3490, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3515, "end_char": 3520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "One of the objects of the Bank is to carry on general business of banking not repugnant to the provisions of the Bihar Act", "statute": "One of the objects of the Bank is to carry on general business of banking not repugnant to the provisions of the Bihar Act"}}, {"text": "s. 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3743, "end_char": 3751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "One of the objects of the Bank is to carry on general business of banking not repugnant to the provisions of the Bihar Act", "statute": "One of the objects of the Bank is to carry on general business of banking not repugnant to the provisions of the Bihar Act"}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4373, "end_char": 4378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4386, "end_char": 4400, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4985, "end_char": 4990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4998, "end_char": 5012, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "October 20, 1934", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5091, "end_char": 5107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "35 dated October 20, 1934, and No."}}, {"text": "August 18, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5126, "end_char": 5141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "33 dated August 18, 1945, was:-\n\n\"The following classes of income shall be exempt from the tax pa.yable under the said Act, but shall be taken into account in determining the total income of an assessee for the purpose of the said Act:-\n\n(2) The profits of any Co-operative Society other than the Sanikatta Salt Owners' Society in the Bombay Presidency for the time being registered under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1912 (Act II of 1912), the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925 (Bombay Act VII of 1925), or the Madras Cooperative Societies Act, 1932 (Madras Act VI of 1932), or the dividends or other payments received by the members of any such Society out of such profits."}}, {"text": "Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5565, "end_char": 5604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Act VII of 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5606, "end_char": 5628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras Cooperative Societies Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5638, "end_char": 5676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras Act VI of 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5678, "end_char": 5699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6021, "end_char": 6035, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6083, "end_char": 6087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act VI of 1932", "statute": "Madras Act VI of 1932"}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6160, "end_char": 6165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madras Act VI of 1932", "statute": "Madras Act VI of 1932"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6180, "end_char": 6194, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Assistant Commissioner", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6212, "end_char": 6234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appellate Assistant Commissioner, however, repelled the contention of the appellant."}}, {"text": "Kapur", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6848, "end_char": 6853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "15,00,000 an it was on y in -< the, accounting year 1947 that the fixed deposits Kapur J. 'were realised on maturity with interest'.", "canonical_name": "Kapur J."}}, {"text": "Imperial Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7210, "end_char": 7223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He there-\n\\' fore held that the fixed deposits with the Imperial Bank were held as an investment quite apart from the business of the appellant and the interest from these deposits was not exempt from income-tax."}}, {"text": "April 11, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8287, "end_char": 8301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, by its order dated April 11, 1955, held :-\n\n\" (1) That the interest was an income rightly to ...;_ be included under the head of 'other sources' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ."}}, {"text": "Commissioner of Income Tax\n\nKapu• J.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8742, "end_char": 8778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) The profits of a Co-operative Society indicates the profit derived from the business which can be truly called the business of the Co-operative\n\nzg6o\n\nBihar State Co-operative Bank Ltd. v.\n\nCommissioner of Income Tax\n\nKapu• J.\n\nSociety."}}, {"text": "s. 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9245, "end_char": 9253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "20th October, 1934", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9700, "end_char": 9718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "35 dated 20th October, 1934 and No."}}, {"text": "18th August, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9740, "end_char": 9757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "33 dated the 18th August, 1945."}}, {"text": "IO of the Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11602, "end_char": 11626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11739, "end_char": 11744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IO of the Income-tax Act", "statute": "IO of the Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11752, "end_char": 11766, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bihar State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13177, "end_char": 13188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, where out of moneys in deposit with a bank a portion is put away or laid out in securities or in deposits with another banker, two objects are served: (I) the moneys which are not immediately required do not remain idle but\n\n(x) (x940) ll I.T.R, 635\n\nearn interest; and (2) if and when money is required to meet any demand, the investment i. e. the deposits Bihar State 11 th •t• d f h. h C t ."}}, {"text": "Madras Central Urban Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14422, "end_char": 14447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Madras Central Urban Bank case (1 ) the society was required to invest 40 per cent."}}, {"text": "Madras Provincial Co-operative Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14823, "end_char": 14858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly in the Madras Provincial Co-operative Bank Case (2 ) also the income which was the subject matter of dispute was interest received by the bank from its investments in Government securities and it was held that it was not part of the income derived from its business."}}, {"text": "Rangoon", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15087, "end_char": 15094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Rangoon case, Commissioner of Income-tax, Burma v. Bengalee Urban Go-operative Credit Society (') was also a case relating\n\n(1) I.L.R. 52 Mad."}}, {"text": "sec11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15844, "end_char": 15849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 8 and 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16303, "end_char": 16314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16322, "end_char": 16336, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16691, "end_char": 16708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel for the respondent relied on a judgment of the Punjab High Court in Hoshiarpur Central Cooperative Bank v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Simla (2)."}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20668, "end_char": 20673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cl. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20692, "end_char": 20697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20761, "end_char": 20766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22552, "end_char": 22556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Commissioner of the Income Tax Act and the provisions of that Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22560, "end_char": 22625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22726, "end_char": 22736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Commissioner of the Income Tax Act and the provisions of that Act", "statute": "Commissioner of the Income Tax Act and the provisions of that Act"}}, {"text": "TINNEVELLY-TUTICORIN ELECTltIC\n\nSUPPLY CO. LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23291, "end_char": 23337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE TINNEVELLY-TUTICORIN ELECTltIC\n\nSUPPLY CO."}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23358, "end_char": 23378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nITS WORKMEN\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SUBBA RAO AND K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23380, "end_char": 23392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nITS WORKMEN\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SUBBA RAO AND K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. c. DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23397, "end_char": 23412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nITS WORKMEN\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SUBBA RAO AND K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Full Bench formula-If applicable to workmen in electricity undcrtaking--Elcctric Supply Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23444, "end_char": 23535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23556, "end_char": 23561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Full Bench formula-If applicable to workmen in electricity undcrtaking--Elcctric Supply Act", "statute": "Full Bench formula-If applicable to workmen in electricity undcrtaking--Elcctric Supply Act"}}, {"text": "Sixth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23563, "end_char": 23577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Full Bench formula-If applicable to workmen in electricity undcrtaking--Elcctric Supply Act", "statute": "Full Bench formula-If applicable to workmen in electricity undcrtaking--Elcctric Supply Act"}}, {"text": "was contended on behalf of the appellant company that the Electricity Supply Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23950, "end_char": 24036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_590_603_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "lvfa/wdeo!nl\n\nJ(anodia\n\nAdminislra lor •\n\nGeut'ral of Wes! Rrngal\n\nDns G11/1!a J.\n\nA/1ril 20.\n\n------ ... ~\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960]\n\nthat the attention of the learned judges was not dra\"n in the presenr case to that rule.\n\nBut quite apart from any rule, considerations of . judicial proprietv and decorum ought never 10 be ignored by courts in such matters.\n\nOn the merits, as \\\\'C have Found that the view of l:nr taken by the High Conrt in this case 1s correct,\n\nthe appeal is dismissed.\n\nIn view however of the uncertainty that was in the law as regards the applicability of s. ~8 to proceedings pending on the commencement of the Thika Tenancy Ordinance, I 'l:i~. we order that the parties \"ill hear their own costs.\n\nA jijJeal dismissed.\n\nSATYADHYAN GHOSAL AND OTHERS\n\nSl\\I. DEORAJIN DEBI AND ANOTHER. (P. H. GA.JEN!lRAGADKAR, K N. ,\\T,1xcHoo and\n\nK. C. DAS Gl'l'TA, JJ.)\n\nRemand order-Interlocutory-Whether can be challenged in Tenancy Act (W.B. Act 11 of 1949), s. 28, The Calcutta Thika appeal from final or order-Res judicata-The Calcutta Thika Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1953 (W.B. Act VI of 1953), s. 1(2) The Calcutta Thika Tenancy (Amendment) Ordinance, 1952 (West Beniial Ordinance No. XV of 1952).\n\nThe Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949, came into force before the appellant-landlords could obtain possession in execution of their decree for ejectment against the respondent-tenants.\n\nFailing to get the decree set aside under 0. 9, r. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure the tenants made an application under s. 28 of the said Act praying that the decree against them be set aside on the ground that they were Thika tenants, but the Munsif holding that they were not Thika tenants dismissed their application.\n\nWhile an application by the tenants under s. llS of the Code o[ Civil Procedure against the Munsif's order was pending in the High Court the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Ordinance, 1952, and the Calcutta Thika Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1953, came into force.\n\nThe 1953 Amendment Act omitted s. 28 of the Original Act.\n\nThe High Court after considering the effect of s. 1(2) of the Amendment Act held that it did not affect the operation of s. 28 of the Original Act which was applicable to these proceedings.\n\nThe High Court also found that the tenants were Thika Tenants\n\n~ I\n\nand remanded the case to the Munsif for disposal according to 1960 law whereupon the Munsif rescinded the decree.\n\nOn an appli- Sal) adl!J'\"\" Ghosal cation by the landlord under s. ll5 of the Code of Civil Procedure v. against the order of the Munsif rescinding the decree the High Sm. Deoraji11 Debi Court held that the question of applicability of s. 28 was res judicata. between the parties and could not be raised again before the High Court and dismissed the landlord's application.\n\nOn appeal by the landlord by special leave the respondent contended that the appellant was barred by the principle of res judicata from raising before this Court the question whether on the enactment of the Thika Tenancy Amendment Act, 1953, s. 28 of the Original Act survives or not in respect of proceedings pending on the date. of the commencement of the Thika Tenancy Ordinance, 1952: Held, that the appellants were not precluded from raising before this Court t_he question that s. 28 of the Original Thika Tenancy Act was not available to the tenants after the Thika Tenancy Arnendinent Act came into force merely because they had no.t: appealed from the High Court's order of remand.\n\nAn interlocutory order which did not terminate the proceedings and which had not been appealed from either because no appeal lay or even though an appeal lay an appeal was not taken, could be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order.\n\nMaharaja Mohesur Singh v. The Bengal Government, (1859) 7 M.I.A. 283; Forbes v. Ameeroonissa Begum, (1865) 10 M.1.A 340\n\nan(\\ Sheonath v. Ramnath, (1865) 10 M.I.A. 413, followed.\n\nRcimkripal Shukul v. Mst. RupKuari, (1883) L.R. 11 I.A. 37, Bani Ram and Anr. v. Nandu Mal,\n\n(1884) L.R. 11 I.A. 181 and Hook v. Administrator General of Bengal and Ors. (1921) L.R. 48 I.A. 187, distinguished . . ''\"' .\n\nSection 28 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949, after its omission by the amending Act was not available in respect of proceedings pending on the date of the commencement of the Thika Tenancy Ordinance of 1952. , Mahadeolal Kanodia v. The Administrator General of West Bengal, [1960] 3 S.C.R. 578 followed.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 257 /59.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated April 18, 19.58, of the Calcutta High Court\n\nin Civil Rule No. 1487 of 1955, arising out of the judgment and order dated February 12, 1955, of the ,'\\fonsif Second Court, Ali pore, in Misc. Case No. 342 / 1949. .\n\nNalini Ranjan Bhaltar:harjec and R. R. Biswas, for the appellants.\n\nD. N. A1nhhcrjec, for the respondenls.\n\nSafyadhyan Ghosal v.\n\nSm. Deorajin Debi\n\nDas Gupta].\n\nSUPREME GOUR 1' REPOH.TS [ 1960]\n\n1%0. April 20.\n\nThe Judgment of u1e Court was delivered by\n\nDAs GUPTA, J.--This appeal is by the landlords who haYing obtained a decree for cjectmcnt against the tenants, Deorajin Debi and her minor son, on February JO, 1949, have not yet been able to get possession in execution thereof.\n\nSoon after the decree was made the Calculta Thika Tenancy Act, l!!-rn, came on the statute book.\n\nOn March 3, 1949, the tenants made an application under Or. 9, r. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure for having the decree set aside.\n\nThat application was dismissed on .July 16, 191'.I.\n\nOn September 9, 1949, ; rn application was made by the tenants under s. 28 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act alleging that they were Thika tenants and praving that the decree made against them on February 2, J !H9, may be rescinded.\n\nTh is Application was resisted by the landlords, the decree-holders. and on N01ember 12, 195 l, the Munsif holding that the applicants were not Thika Tenants within the meaning of the Thika Tenancy Act and accordingly the decree ''\"\"snot liable to be rescinded dismissed the application.\n\nAgainst this order the tenants moved the High Coirt of Calcutta under s. I l :i of the Code of Civil Procedure. By the time the Revision Application was taken up for hearing the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Ordinance had come into force on October 21, I Y:i2, and the Calcutta Thika Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1953, had come into force on l\\larch 14, J7, held that the Civil° Judge had been wrong in decreeing the mesne profits and further that the plaintiff was bound before he was entitled to have his conditional sale made absolute to render certain accounts.\n\nAccordingly the Sadar Diwani Adalat: remanded the case in order that the judge might call upon the plaintiff for his accounts and then decide the case in t:he light of the remarks made by\n\nthe Adalat.\n\nAfter t.he case went: back the plaint.iff produced accounts but the judge held that they were insu!Ticient :md dismissed the suit:.\n\nAn appeal w.as taken agaimt that decree of dismiss:1l to the Sa, br Diwani Adalat bur the appeal was unsuccessful; a later prayer for review w; is also rejected.\n\nOn behalf of the appellam it: was contended before the Privy Council that: the Sadar Diwani Adalat. \"as wrong in rcquiri.ngthe appellant: to produce his accounts.\n\nIn order however that this question could be raised, it was necessary to decide, whether if the Sadar Diwani Acblat was wrong in remanding the case for retrial, the appellant was bound by that decree he not havi.ng appe; ilcd therefrom.\n\nTheir Lordships of the Privy Council pointed out that the order of remand was an\n\nintcrloc11tory order and that it did not: purport lO dispose of the case and consequently upon the principle bid clown by the Privy Council in Afoharaja Moheshur\n\nSingh v.\n\nThe Government of Bengal (supra), the appellant was not precluded from insisting that the remand for the production of the accounts was crro ncous or that the cause should ha1e been decided in\n\nLI) [1865] IO M.[A. 340.\n\n. '\n\nhis favour, notwithstanding the non-production of the 1!!_6.!!_ accounts.\n\nTheir Lordships also mentioned the fact Satyadh;•an Ghosal that the learned 1\"t1dges of the Sadar Court also treats D v ... D b\" . . . h m. eora1in e t ed the latter point as still open to the appellant, w en considering his appeal against the decree of dismissal Das Gupta J. passed after remand.\n\nThe principle laid down in Moheshur Singh's Case\n\n(supra) was also acted upon by the Privy Council in Sheonath v. Ramnath ('). That litigation was commenced Ramnath by a suit in the Court of the Civil Judge, Lucknow, seeking a general account and partition.\n\nThe plaint mentioned the execution of some releases described as (Farighkuttees) but alleged that there had been no partition as between the parties as stated in them, that the partition was intended to take effect after the settlement of accounts when the Farighkuttees were to have been registered and that in the meantime they had remained with the appellant as incomplete instruments.\n\nThe Trial .Judge held however that the Farighkuttees had been executed on the footing of actual partition and diversion of the joint property, that these had been executed without taint of fraud and dismissed the suit. An appeal was taken to the Judicial Commissioner; he affirmed the Civil .Judge's decision on all points adding however that \"there was one account between the parties still unadjusted, viz., the division of the outstandings which was left open at the time of the division of the assets.\" ' In this view he remanded the case to the Judge to decide what sum should be awarded to the plaintiff in satisfaction of all claims on this account and directed that if possible a decision should be obtained from the arbitrators previously appointed by the parties.\n\nAfter remand the Civil Judge referred the question involved to certain arbitrators but the defendant did pot acquiesce in this Order and petitioned the .Judicial Commissioner against it, stating that he objected to the arbitrators to whom the Civil Judge had referred the case, and requesting that other arbitrators might be appointed.\n\nThis objection was overruled by the .Judicial Commissioner, _and the request was rejected.\n\nUltimately two separate decrees\n\n(I) [1865J 10 M.I.A. 413.\n\n14-6 SCI/ND/82\n\nSatyadhyan Ghosal\n\nSm. Deorajin Debi\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nwere made by the Civil Judge, one on the 4th September as regards part of the claim and the other on 22nd December as regards another part.\n\nOn appeal both these decrees were affirmed by the Judicial Commissioner.\n\nIt was against this decision of the Judicial Commissioner that the defendant appealed to the Privy Council.\n\nTwo points were raised before the Privy Council.\n\nThe first was that it was not compettent to the Judicial Commissioner except with the consent of both parties to vary, as he did vary, bv his order of May 1.5, 1862, the rights of the parties under the Farighkuttees and to impose on the defendant an obligation of purchasing the plaintiff's interests in the outstandings on a rough estimate of its value; the other point raised was that the nomination of the particular arbitrator by the Judge without the consent and against the repeated protests of the appellant was altogether irregular, and that the award was therefore not binding upon him.\n\nIt has to be noticed that the defendant had not appealed against the .Judicial Commissioner's order of May 1.5,\n\n1862, nor had he appealed against the Judicial Commissioner's later order rejecting the defendant's petition that he objected to the arbitrators to whom the Civil Judge bad referred the case and that other arbitrators might be selected by the parties.\n\nIn spite of these facts the Privy Council held that both these points were open to the appellant observing: -\n\n\"That both points are open to the appellant, although he has in terms appealed only against the final decision of the Civil Judge and the confirmation of it by the Judicial Commissioner, is, we think, established by the case of Moheshur Singh v. The Government of Bengal. The appeal. is, in effect, to set aside an Award which the appellant contends is not binding upon him.\n\nAnd in order to do this he was not bound to appeal against every interlocutory order which was a step in t_he procedure that led up to the Award.\" There can be little doublt about the salutary effect of the rule as laid down in the above cases on the ' ' administration of justice.\n\nThe very fact that in future litigation it will not be open to either of the\n\n.>.\n\nparties to challenge the correctness of the decision on 196~ a matter finally decided in a past litigation makes it Satyadhyan Ghasal important that in the earlier litigation the decision s D v ... D b' · m. eora1in e i must be final m the stnct sense of the term.\n\nWhen a court has decided the matter it is certainly final as Das Gupta J. regards that court. Should it always be treated as final in later stages of the proceeding in a higher court which had not considered it at all' merely on the ground that no appeal lay or no appeal was preferred?\n\nAs was pointed out by the Privy Council in Moheshur Singh's Case (supra) the effect of the rule that at every stage of the litigation a decision not appealed from must be held to be finally decided even in respect of the superior courts, will put on every litigant against whom an interlocutory order is decided, the burden of running .to the higher courts for redress of the\n\n.. grievances, even though it may very well be that though the interlocutory order is against him, the final order will be in his favour and so it may not be necessary for him to go to the appeal court at all.\n\nApart from the inevitable delay in the progress of the litigation that such a rule would cause, the interests of the other party to the litigation would also generally suffer by such repeated recourse to the higher courts in respect of every interlocutory order alleged to have been wrongly made.\n\nIt is in recognition of the importance of preventing this mischief that the Legislature included in the Code of Civil Procedure from the very beginning a provision that in an appeal from a .decree it will be open to a party to challenge the. correctness of any interlocutory order which had not been appealed from but which has affected the decision of the case.\n\nIn the Code of 1859 s. 363 after laying down that no appeal shall lie from any order passed in the course of a suit and relating thereto prior to a decree provided \"but if the decree be appealed against, any error, defect or irregularity in any such order affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the court may be set forth as a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal.\"\n\nWhen the Code of 1877 made provisions in Chapter 43 for appeal against certain orders, s. 591 thereof\n\nSatyadhyan Ghosal v.\n\nSm. Deorajin Debi\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nprovided \"Except as provided in this chapter, no appeal shall lie from any order passed by any court on the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction\" and went on to say \"but if any decree be appealed against any error, defect or irregularity in any such order a!Iesting the decision of the case, may be set forth as a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal.\" The position remained the same in the Code of 1882.\n\nThe present Code in its .105th section uses practically the same phraseology except that the word \"any such order\" has been substituted by \"any order\" and an additional provision has been made in the second sub-section in respect of orders of remand.\n\nThe expression \"such order\" in s. 591 gave rise to a contention in some cases before the Privy Council that s. 59 I applied to non-appealable orders only.\n\nThis contention was overruled by the Privy Council and that view was adopted by the Legislatureby changing the words \"any such order\" to \"any order\".\n\nAs regards the orders of remand it had been held that under s. 591 of the Code a party aggrieved by an order of remand could object to its validity in an appeal against the final decree, though he might have appealed against the order under s. .588 and had not clone so.\n\nThe 5econd sub-section of s. 105 precludes an appellant from taking, on an appeal from the final decree, any objection that might have been urged by way of appeal from an order of remand.\n\nIt is clear therefore that an interlocutory order which had not been appealed from either because no appeal lay or even though an appeal lay an appeal was not taken could be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order.\n\nA special provision was made as regards orders of remand and that was to the effect that if an appeal lay and still the appeal was not taken the correctness of the order of remand could not later be challenged in an appeal from the final decision. If however an appeal did not lie from the order of remand the correctness thereof could be challenged by an appeal from the final decision as in the cases of other interlocutory orders.\n\nThe second sub-section did not apply to the Privy Council and can have no application to appeals to the Supreme Court, one reason\n\n·~\n\nbeing that no appeal lay to the Privy Council or lies to . 1960 the Supreme Court against an order of remand.\n\nSatyadhyan Ghtisal There appears to be no reason therefore why the v. appellant should be precluded from raising before this Sm. Dearajin.Dei>i Court the question about the applicability of s. 28 Das GuptaJ. merely because he had not appealed from the High Court's order of remand, taking the view against him that the section was applicable; We are unable to agree with the learned Advocate that the decision of the Privy Council in Ram Kirpal Shukul' s Case (') affects this matter at all. .\n\nThat was a case as regards execution proceedings.\n\nThe decree in question had been made in 1862.\n\nIn execution proceedings the question arose whether or not. the decree awarded mesne profits.\n\nThe District Judge, Mr. Probyn, decided this question in the affirmative.\n\nIn 1879 the decree had not yet been executed and execution proceedings were pending. The question was raised again before the Executing Court whether the decree allowed mesne profits.\n\nThat court held that he was bound by the decision of Mr. Probyn that the decree did allow mesne profits and ordered the execution to proceed on that basis. His order was affirmed on appeal.\n\nThe judgment-debtor then appealed to the High Court. Before that could it was urged on behalf of the judgment-debtor that the law of res judicata did not apply to proceeding. in execution of a decree.\n\nThe Full Bench of the High Court to which the Division Bench referred this question answered the question in the negative and then the . Division Bench ordered, being of opinion that Mr. Probyn's view was wrong, that the appeal be decreed and execution of decree in respect of mesne profits be disallowed.\n\nThe Privy Council after stating that Mr. Probyri.'s order was an interlocutory judgment stressed the fact it had never been reversed or set aside, and said that the fact that second appeal did not lie to the High Court was of no consequence, for if no such appeal did lie the judgment was final and if an appeal did lie and none was preferred the judgment was equally binding upon\n\nthe parties.\n\nIn the opinion of the Judicial Committee the' learned Subordinate Judge and the Judge were bound by the order of Mr. Proby1i in proceedings\n\n(I) [1884] L.R.'il I.A. 37,\n\nSatyadhyan Ghosal v.\n\nSm, Deorajin Debi\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nbetween the same parties on the same judgment, the High Court was bound by it and so were their Lordships in adjudicating between the same parties.\n\nRam Kirpal Shukul's Case (supra) was followed by the Council in Bani Ram v. Nanhu Mal (1) which also related Privy to an order made in execution proceedings.\n\nIt was followed again by the Privy Council itself in Hook v. Administrator-General of Bengal (').\n\nThe facts in Hook's Case were that in an administration suit the High Court had held that certain conditions of a will had not been fulfilled and there was not an intestacy as to the surplus income, rejecting a contention on behalf of the next of kin that the gift over was invalid, as creating a perpetuity; the decree provided that the determination of the destination of the income or corpus of the fund upon the death of the annuitant should be deferred until after that event.\n\nIn further proceedings in the suit after the annuitant's death the next of kin contended that under the reservation in the decree they were entitled again to raise the contention that the gift over was invalid. The Privy Council held that the validity of the gift over was res judicata.\n\nIt will be noticed that in all these three cases, viz., Ram Kirpal Shukul's Case, Bani Ram's Case and Hook's Case, the previous decision which was found to be res judicata was part of a decree.\n\nTherefore though in form the later proceeding in which the question was sought to be raised again was a continuation of the previous proceeding, it was in substance, an independent subsequent proceeding.\n\nThe decision of a dispute as regards execution it is hardly necessary to mention was a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure and so in Ram Kirpal's Case and Bani Ram's Case, such a decision being a decree really terminated the previous proceedings.\n\nThe fact therefore that the Privy Council in Ram Kirpal Shukul's Case described Mr. Probyn's order as an \"interlocutory judgment\" does not justify the learned counsel's contention that all kinds of interlocutory judgments not appealed Jrom become res judicata.\n\nInterlocutory judgments which have the force of a decree must be distingui:shed from other interlocutory judgments which are a step\n\n(1) (1884) L.R. 11 I.A. 181.\n\n(2) (1921) L.R. 48 I.A. 187.\n\n• ..\n\nr '\n\n-.J\n\ntowards the decision of the dispute between parties by 196~ way of a decree or a final order.\n\nMoheshur Singh's Sal)adhyan Ghosal Case, Forbes' Case and Sheonath's Case dealt with s D v ... Db' . . h m. eoraJtn e i interlocutory judgments which did not termmate t e proceedings and led up to a decree or final order.\n\nDas Gupta].\n\nRam Kirpal Shukul's Case, Bani Ram's Case and Hook's Case deal with judgments which though called interlocutory, had, in effect, terminated the previous proceedings.\n\nThese cases are therefore of no assistance to the learned counsel for the respondent in his argument that the order of remand made by the High Court not having been appealed from to this Court the correctness of that order cannot be challenged now.\n\nIn our opinion the order of remand was an interlocutory judgment which did not terminate the proceedings and so the correctness thereof can be challenged in an appeal from the final order. We hold therefore that the appellant is not precluded from raising before us the question that s. 28 of the original Thika Tenancy Act was not available to the tenants after the Thika Tenancy Amendment Act came into force.\n\nOn this question we have already decided, as already indicated above, in Mahadeolal Kanodia':S Case (1) that section 28 after its omission by the Amending Act is not available in respect of proceedings pending on the date of the commencement of the Thika Tenancy Ordinance of 1952.\n\nWe hold therefore that the view taken by the High Court in this matter was wrong and that the Munsif acted without jurisdiction in rescinding the ejectment decree.\n\nWe accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court appealed from and also the order of the Munsif dated February 12, 1955, by which he rescinded the ejectment decree.\n\nIn consideration of the fact that the state of the law as regards the applicability of s. 28 .was uncertain, we order that the parties will bear their own costs in this Court.\n\nAppeal allowed\n\n(I) [1960) 3 S.C.R. 573.", "total_entities": 115, "entities": [{"text": "SATYADHYAN GHOSAL AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 750, "end_char": 778, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SATYADHYAN GHOSAL AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "I. 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"source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the High Court the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Ordinance, 1952", "statute": "the High Court the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Ordinance, 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2161, "end_char": 2166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the High Court the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Ordinance, 1952", "statute": "the High Court the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Ordinance, 1952"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2487, "end_char": 2514, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Deoraji11 Debi Court", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2585, "end_char": 2605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Deoraji11 Debi Court held that the question of applicability of s. 28 was res judicata.", "canonical_name": "Deoraji11 Debi Court"}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2649, "end_char": 2654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the High Court the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Ordinance, 1952", "statute": "the High Court the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Ordinance, 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3030, "end_char": 3035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Thika Tenancy Ordinance, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3146, "end_char": 3175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3272, "end_char": 3277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Thika Tenancy Ordinance, 1952", "statute": "the Thika Tenancy Ordinance, 1952"}}, {"text": "(1883) L.R. 11 I.A. 37", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3945, "end_char": 3967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1884) L.R. 11 I.A. 181", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4002, "end_char": 4025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1921) L.R. 48 I.A. 187", "label": 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the Calcutta High Court\n\nin Civil Rule No."}}, {"text": "Nalini Ranjan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4771, "end_char": 4784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nalini Ranjan Bhaltar:harjec and R. R. Biswas, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "R. R. Biswas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4804, "end_char": 4816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nalini Ranjan Bhaltar:harjec and R. R. Biswas, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "D. N. A1nhhcrjec", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4839, "end_char": 4855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. N. A1nhhcrjec, for the respondenls."}}, {"text": "Safyadhyan Ghosal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4879, "end_char": 4896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Safyadhyan Ghosal v.\n\nSm.", "canonical_name": "SATYADHYAN GHOSAL AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Deorajin Debi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4905, "end_char": 4918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Deorajin Debi\n\nDas Gupta].", "canonical_name": "Deoraji11 Debi Court"}}, {"text": "DAs GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5027, "end_char": 5036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of u1e Court was delivered by\n\nDAs GUPTA, J.--This appeal is by the landlords who haYing obtained a decree for cjectmcnt against the tenants, Deorajin Debi and her minor son, on February JO, 1949, have not yet been able to get possession in execution thereof.", "canonical_name": "Das GuptaJ."}}, {"text": "Deorajin Debi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5138, "end_char": 5151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of u1e Court was delivered by\n\nDAs GUPTA, J.--This appeal is by the landlords who haYing obtained a decree for cjectmcnt against the tenants, Deorajin Debi and her minor son, on February JO, 1949, have not yet been able to get possession in execution thereof.", "canonical_name": "Deoraji11 Debi Court"}}, {"text": "Soon after the decree was made the Calculta Thika Tenancy Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5257, "end_char": 5318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "March 3, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5358, "end_char": 5371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 3, 1949, the tenants made an application under Or."}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5427, "end_char": 5454, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": ".July 16, 191'", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5523, "end_char": 5537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That application was dismissed on .July 16, 191'."}}, {"text": "September 9, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5545, "end_char": 5562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nOn September 9, 1949, ; rn application was made by the tenants under s. 28 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act alleging that they were Thika tenants and praving that the decree made against them on February 2, J !"}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5611, "end_char": 5616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Soon after the decree was made the Calculta Thika Tenancy Act", "statute": "Soon after the decree was made the Calculta Thika Tenancy Act"}}, {"text": "February 2, J !H9", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5738, "end_char": 5755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.\n\nOn September 9, 1949, ; rn application was made by the tenants under s. 28 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act alleging that they were Thika tenants and praving that the decree made against them on February 2, J !"}}, {"text": "N01ember 12, 195", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5852, "end_char": 5868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and on N01ember 12, 195 l, the Munsif holding that the applicants were not Thika Tenants within the meaning of the Thika Tenancy Act and accordingly the decree ''\"\"snot liable to be rescinded dismissed the application."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6120, "end_char": 6128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against this order the tenants moved the High Coirt of Calcutta under s. I l :i of the Code of Civil Procedure."}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6148, "end_char": 6175, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6459, "end_char": 6464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6545, "end_char": 6550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6978, "end_char": 6985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7160, "end_char": 7165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Das Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7500, "end_char": 7509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly they allowed Das Gupta J. the a:pplication for revi'sion, set aside the order of the Munsif by which he had dismissed the application under s. 28 and remanded the case to the Ivf unsif's Court for disposal in accordance with law.", "canonical_name": "Das GuptaJ."}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7627, "end_char": 7632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8007, "end_char": 8012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8421, "end_char": 8428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta Thika Tenancy Amendment Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8436, "end_char": 8478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8503, "end_char": 8508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Amendment Act, 1953", "statute": "the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Amendment Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "Calcutta Thika Tenancy Ordinance, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8655, "end_char": 8693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8881, "end_char": 8886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Ordinance, 1952", "statute": "the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Ordinance, 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9069, "end_char": 9074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Ordinance, 1952", "statute": "the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Ordinance, 1952"}}, {"text": "December 12, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9159, "end_char": 9176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If therefore this argument is available to the appellant the appeal will succeed as in that view of the law no relief under s. 28 of the original Act is available to the tenants and the order made by the Munsif on December 12, 1955, rescinding the decree for ejectment must be set aside. ·"}}, {"text": "Deorajin J)ebi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9417, "end_char": 9431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Deorajin J)ebi\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nenactment of the Thika Tenancy Amendment Act, 1953, s. 28 of the original Act: survives or not in respect of proceedings pending on the date of the commencement of the Thika Tenancy Ordinance, I !):)", "canonical_name": "Deoraji11 Debi Court"}}, {"text": "Thika Tenancy Amendment Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9464, "end_char": 9497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9499, "end_char": 9504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Thika Tenancy Amendment Act, 1953", "statute": "the Thika Tenancy Amendment Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10495, "end_char": 10522, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10539, "end_char": 10544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT!REPORTS 595", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11764, "end_char": 11797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT!REPORTS 595\n\ngrievances of."}}, {"text": "December 6, 1841", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11969, "end_char": 11985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 6, 1841, Sm."}}, {"text": "Deorin Debi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11991, "end_char": 12002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Deorin Debi judgtnent was pronounced by the Special Commis- Das Gupta J. sioner to the effect that :l,.~ l !", "canonical_name": "Deoraji11 Debi Court"}}, {"text": "March 8, 1842", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12309, "end_char": 12322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This judgment was ; iffirmed by another Special Commissioner on March 8, 1842."}}, {"text": "Septem- \" ' ber 21, 1847", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12328, "end_char": 12352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On Septem- \" ' ber 21, 1847, a petition for review on behalf of the ' Government of Bengal was presented to another Special."}}, {"text": "Maich", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12539, "end_char": 12544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 After due hearing the judgment of Maich 8,\n\n18·12, 'was re, iersed."}}, {"text": "Government of Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12799, "end_char": 12819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was urged however on behalf of the Government of Bengal that it was then too late to impugn the regularity of the proceeding to gran, t, the review and that if the appellant deemed himself aggrived by , i, t, he ought to\n\nhave~ .~1ppealt; d at the time, and that it was too late to do so after a clecis.ion, had been pronounced against him."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13291, "end_char": 13296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dealing with observed:- ·\n\n\"I \" this objection the Privy Council\n\n\"\\Ve are of opinion that this objection cannot be sustained, \\Ve are not aware of any lavv or regulation prevailing in India .which renders it imperative ' upon the suitor to appeal from every interlocutory order by which he may conceive himself aggrieved, under the penalty, if he does not so do, of forfeiting for ever the benefit of the consideration of the ;:tppellate court..\n\nNo authority or precedent has been cited in support of such a proposition, and we cannot conceive that anything would be more detrimental to the expeditious; administration ."}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14006, "end_char": 14009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 18, 18J4", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14559, "end_char": 14576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I o against t 1c defendant: by the Civil Judge, Purnecha, on December 18, 18J4, the defendant appealed to the Sadar Diwani Adalat."}}, {"text": "Sadar Diwani Adalat", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14608, "end_char": 14627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I o against t 1c defendant: by the Civil Judge, Purnecha, on December 18, 18J4, the defendant appealed to the Sadar Diwani Adalat.", "canonical_name": "Sadar Diwani Adalat"}}, {"text": "Sadar Diwani Adalat", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14906, "end_char": 14925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly the Sadar Diwani Adalat: remanded the case in order that the judge might call upon the plaintiff for his accounts and then decide the case in t:he light of the remarks made by\n\nthe Adalat.", "canonical_name": "Sadar Diwani Adalat"}}, {"text": "Sadar Diwani Acblat", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15648, "end_char": 15667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order however that this question could be raised, it was necessary to decide, whether if the Sadar Diwani Acblat was wrong in remanding the case for retrial, the appellant was bound by that decree he not havi.ng appe; ilcd therefrom.", "canonical_name": "Sadar Diwani Adalat"}}, {"text": "Moheshur Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16671, "end_char": 16685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The principle laid down in Moheshur Singh's Case\n\n(supra) was also acted upon by the Privy Council in Sheonath v. Ramnath (')."}}, {"text": "Court of the Civil Judge, Lucknow", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16826, "end_char": 16859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That litigation was commenced Ramnath by a suit in the Court of the Civil Judge, Lucknow, seeking a general account and partition."}}, {"text": "Satyadhyan Ghosal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18573, "end_char": 18590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14-6 SCI/ND/82\n\nSatyadhyan Ghosal\n\nSm.", "canonical_name": "SATYADHYAN GHOSAL AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "May 1.5, 1862", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19150, "end_char": 19163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first was that it was not compettent to the Judicial Commissioner except with the consent of both parties to vary, as he did vary, bv his order of May 1.5, 1862, the rights of the parties under the Farighkuttees and to impose on the defendant an obligation of purchasing the plaintiff's interests in the outstandings on a rough estimate of its value; the other point raised was that the nomination of the particular arbitrator by the Judge without the consent and against the repeated protests of the appellant was altogether irregular, and that the award was therefore not binding upon him."}}, {"text": "May 1.5,\n\n1862", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19699, "end_char": 19713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has to be noticed that the defendant had not appealed against the .Judicial Commissioner's order of May 1.5,\n\n1862, nor had he appealed against the Judicial Commissioner's later order rejecting the defendant's petition that he objected to the arbitrators to whom the Civil Judge bad referred the case and that other arbitrators might be selected by the parties."}}, {"text": "Satyadhyan Ghasal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20931, "end_char": 20948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "parties to challenge the correctness of the decision on 196~ a matter finally decided in a past litigation makes it Satyadhyan Ghasal important that in the earlier litigation the decision s D v ... D b' · m. eora1in e i must be final m the stnct sense of the term.", "canonical_name": "SATYADHYAN GHOSAL AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22355, "end_char": 22382, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 363", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22639, "end_char": 22645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 591", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23101, "end_char": 23107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 591", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23886, "end_char": 23892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23963, "end_char": 23968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 591", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24222, "end_char": 24228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 105", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24460, "end_char": 24466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25393, "end_char": 25406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second sub-section did not apply to the Privy Council and can have no application to appeals to the Supreme Court, one reason\n\n·~\n\nbeing that no appeal lay to the Privy Council or lies to ."}}, {"text": "Satyadhyan Ghtisal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25535, "end_char": 25553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Satyadhyan Ghtisal There appears to be no reason therefore why the v. appellant should be precluded from raising before this Sm.", "canonical_name": "SATYADHYAN GHOSAL AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Dearajin.Dei>i Court", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25664, "end_char": 25684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dearajin."}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25725, "end_char": 25730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Das GuptaJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25731, "end_char": 25742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dei>i Court the question about the applicability of s. 28 Das GuptaJ. merely because he had not appealed from the High Court's order of remand, taking the view against him that the section was applicable; We are unable to agree with the learned Advocate that the decision of the Privy Council in Ram Kirpal Shukul' s Case (') affects this matter at all. .", "canonical_name": "Das GuptaJ."}}, {"text": "Ram Kirpal Shukul", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25969, "end_char": 25986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dei>i Court the question about the applicability of s. 28 Das GuptaJ. merely because he had not appealed from the High Court's order of remand, taking the view against him that the section was applicable; We are unable to agree with the learned Advocate that the decision of the Privy Council in Ram Kirpal Shukul' s Case (') affects this matter at all. .", "canonical_name": "Ram Kirpal Shukul"}}, {"text": "Probyn", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26247, "end_char": 26253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The District Judge, Mr. Probyn, decided this question in the affirmative.", "canonical_name": "Probyri"}}, {"text": "Probyn", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26540, "end_char": 26546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That court held that he was bound by the decision of Mr. Probyn that the decree did allow mesne profits and ordered the execution to proceed on that basis.", "canonical_name": "Probyri"}}, {"text": "Probyri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27224, "end_char": 27231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Privy Council after stating that Mr. Probyri.", "canonical_name": "Probyri"}}, {"text": "Proby1i", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27696, "end_char": 27703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the opinion of the Judicial Committee the' learned Subordinate Judge and the Judge were bound by the order of Mr. Proby1i in proceedings\n\n(I) [1884] L.R.'il I.A. 37,\n\nSatyadhyan Ghosal v.\n\nSm, Deorajin Debi\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nbetween the same parties on the same judgment, the High Court was bound by it and so were their Lordships in adjudicating between the same parties.", "canonical_name": "Probyri"}}, {"text": "Hook", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28224, "end_char": 28228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts in Hook's Case were that in an administration suit the High Court had held that certain conditions of a will had not been fulfilled and there was not an intestacy as to the surplus income, rejecting a contention on behalf of the next of kin that the gift over was invalid, as creating a perpetuity; the decree provided that the determination of the destination of the income or corpus of the fund upon the death of the annuitant should be deferred until after that event."}}, {"text": "Bani Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29064, "end_char": 29072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Kirpal Shukul's Case, Bani Ram's Case and Hook's Case, the previous decision which was found to be res judicata was part of a decree."}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29482, "end_char": 29509, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ram Kirpal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29520, "end_char": 29530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision of a dispute as regards execution it is hardly necessary to mention was a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure and so in Ram Kirpal's Case and Bani Ram's Case, such a decision being a decree really terminated the previous proceedings.", "canonical_name": "Ram Kirpal Shukul"}}, {"text": "(1884) L.R. 11 I.A. 181", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 30034, "end_char": 30057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1921) L.R. 48 I.A. 187", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 30064, "end_char": 30087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Forbes", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30242, "end_char": 30248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Moheshur Singh's Sal)adhyan Ghosal Case, Forbes' Case and Sheonath's Case dealt with s D v ... Db' . ."}}, {"text": "Sheonath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30259, "end_char": 30267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Moheshur Singh's Sal)adhyan Ghosal Case, Forbes' Case and Sheonath's Case dealt with s D v ... Db' . ."}}, {"text": "Das Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30424, "end_char": 30433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das Gupta].", "canonical_name": "Das GuptaJ."}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31138, "end_char": 31143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Thika Tenancy Act was not available to the tenants after the Thika Tenancy Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31160, "end_char": 31248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mahadeolal Kanodia':S", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31340, "end_char": 31361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On this question we have already decided, as already indicated above, in Mahadeolal Kanodia':S Case (1) that section 28 after its omission by the Amending Act is not available in respect of proceedings pending on the date of the commencement of the Thika Tenancy Ordinance of 1952."}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31376, "end_char": 31386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Thika Tenancy Act was not available to the tenants after the Thika Tenancy Amendment Act", "statute": "Thika Tenancy Act was not available to the tenants after the Thika Tenancy Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "February 12, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31839, "end_char": 31856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court appealed from and also the order of the Munsif dated February 12, 1955, by which he rescinded the ejectment decree."}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31990, "end_char": 31995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Thika Tenancy Act was not available to the tenants after the Thika Tenancy Amendment Act", "statute": "Thika Tenancy Act was not available to the tenants after the Thika Tenancy Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "[1960) 3 S.C.R. 573", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 32100, "end_char": 32119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_604_620_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "April21.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960]\n\nSAHEBZADA MOHAMMAD KAM GAR SHAH\n\nJAGDISH CHANDRA DEO DHABAL DEO\n\nAND OTHERS. (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO and\n\nK. C. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)\n\nDocument-Construction of-Discrepancy between earlier and later parts-\"Duly authorised\"~ meaning of-Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (IX of 1908), Explanation II, s. 19.\n\nIn 1900 the then proprietor of the Dhalbhum estate who was the predecessor-in-interest of the first respondent granted a permanent lease of the mining rights for certain metals and minerals in the estate to one Prince Mohammad Bakhtyar Shah.\n\nDuring the lifetime of the said proprietor the management of the estate was taken over by the Deputy Commission of Singhbhum under the Chotanagpur Encumbered Estates Act and after the former's death the manager of the Estate granted to the Official Receiver to the estate of Prince Mohammad Bakhtyar Shah another lease in respect of mining rights in the same area in 1919.\n\nThe first respondent commenced the present litigation for the purpose of recovering rents and royalties on the basis of the second lease from the heirs and representatives of the estate of Prince Mohammad Bakhtyar Shah and also from the appellant as the Receiver to that Estate. The decision of the case depended upon the construction of the two leases of 1900 and 1919 and the Trial Court aod the High Court decided the case in favour of the plaintiff respondents.\n\nOn appeal by the contesting defendant appellant on a certificate granted by the High Court: Held, that the intention of the parties to a dispositive document must be gathered from the words used by the parties themselves and they must be presumed to have used the words in their strict grammatical sense.\n\nIf the st:itements made in the earlier part of the document were irreconcilable with those made in - the later part, the earlier part must prevail.\n\nIn cases of ambiguity the court should look at all the parts of the document to ascertain the intention of the parties.\n\nIf ambiguity still remains, the Court should interpret the document strictly against the grantor and n favour of the grantee.\n\nUnder Exp. II of s. 19 of the Limitation Act the words \"duly authorised\" would include duly authorised either by the action of the party indebted or by force of law or order of the court.\n\nAnnapagonda v. Sangadiappa, (1901) Born. L.R. 221 (F.B.), Rashbehari v. Anand Ram, 43 Cal. 211, Ramcharan Das v. Gaya Prasad, 30 All. 422, Lakshmanan v. Sadayappa, A.LR. 1919 Mad 816 and Thankamma v. Kunhamma, A.I.R. 1919 Mad. 370, approved.\n\nr- (\n\nCurrimbhai v. Ahmedali, 58 Born. 505 and Lakshmanan Chetty v. Sadayappa Chetty, 35 M.L.J. 571, considered.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 81 of 1956.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated September 24, 1952, of the Patna High Court in First Appeal from Original Decree No. 2 of 1947, arising out of the judgment and decr'ee dated August 31, 1946, of the Special Subordinate Judge, Chaibassa, in Money\n\nSuit No. 3 of 1941.\n\nL. K. ]ha, B. K. Saran, S. T. Husain, S. K. ]ha and K. L. Mehta, for the appellant.\n\nH. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India ]. C. Das Gupta and R. C. Prasad, for respondent No. I.\n\n1960. April 21.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAs GUPTA. T .- Dhalbhum estate which covers an area of more than 1,000 sq. miles and Iles partly in the District of Midnapur and partly in the District of Singhbhum is rich in minerals.\n\nIn 1900 the then Proprietor of this estate Raja Satrughan Deo Dhabal Deo the predecessor-in-interest of the first respondent Jagdish Deo Dhabal Deo granted permanent lease of the mining rights for certain. metals and minerals in this estate to Prince Mohammad Bakhtyar Shah of Tollygunge in the District of 24-Parganas.\n\nRaja Sa\"trughan Deo Dhabal Deo died in 1916.\n\nBefore his death, however, the management of the estate had been taken over by the Deputy Commissioner of Singhbhum under the Chotanagpur Encumbered Estates Act.\n\nIn the course of such management the Manager of the Estate granted on September 1, 1919, to the Official Receiver to the estate of Prince Mohammad Bakhtyar Shah another lease in respect of mining rights in the same area.\n\nThe present litigation was\n\ncommnced by the first respondent with ii view to recover rents and royalties on the basis of the second lease . from the heirs and representatives of the es, tate of\n\nPrince Mohammad Bakhtyar Shah and also from the present appellant as Receiver to that estate.\n\nAs under the terms of the lease the lessor is entitled to the half\n\n15-6 SCI/ND/82\n\nSaheb.zada Mohammad Kamgar ShDh\n\n. v . .\n\nJagdish Chandr11\n\nDeo Dhabal D•o\n\nDas Gup111 J.\n\nSaheb;:ada Mohammad Kamgar Shah\n\nv. :Jagdish Chandra\n\nDeo Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nSUPR~ME COURT REPORTS [1960]\n\nshare of the receipts on account of rents and royalties and other incomes in respect of the minerals demised and the exact income could not be known until accounts were furnished by the lessee, the defendant prayed for a decree for accounts from .January I, 1926, and for a decree for the sum found due on such accounts.\n\nAs the suit was brought on August 12, 1941, the period prior to August 12, 1935, would prima facie be barred by limitation.\n\nAccording to the plaintiff, limitation was saved by the acknowledgments that had been made from time to time by the then Receiver of the estate .. ·\n\nTwo defences were raised by the Receiver who was the only contesting defendant.\n\nThe first was that the lessor had dispossessed him from part of the leasehold property and so there ought to be total suspension of rents and royalties. The second defence was as regards the claim for the period prior to August 12. 1935. It was pleaded that the letters which are claimed to have acknowledged the liability did not in law amount to acknowledgement of liability and that in any case the alleged acknowledgements being by the Receiver who was an agent of the court and not an agent of the parties the acknowledgments would be of no avail in saving limitation.\n\nThough the written statement itself did not in terms mention the nature of the lessee's dispossession frorn the leasehold property the definite case at the trial was that this dispossession was in respect of minerals which had been specifically excluded from the earlier lease of 1900 but according to the defendant included in the later lease.\n\nOne of the main questions in the appeal is whether the minerals specifically excluded in cl. 16 of the earlier lease were demised to the lessee by the later lease of 1919.\n\nOf the several issues that have been framed we are therefore concerned now only with the two issues in respect of these two defences.\n\nThe first of these is: \"Is the defendant entitled to suspension of rents and royalties as claimed\"; the second is: \"Is any portion of the plaintiff's claim barred by limitation?\" The Subordinate Judge held on a construction of the lease of 1919 that it did not include minerals specifically excluded by cl. 16 of the earlier lease and as the only\n\n' '\n\n) i\n\ncase of dispossession from leasehold property was made in respect of these minerals the plea of suspension of rent must fail.\n\nHe also negatived the plea of limitation, being of opinion that the Official Receiver was competent to make such acknowledgments and that in fact there were acknowledgments of the plaintiff's liability within the meaning of s. 19 of the Limitation Act. vVith regard to the period from 1935 to 1941, regarding which no question of limitation arose, the Subordinate Judge gave a decree of rendition of accounts and for payment of such amounts as would be found on accounting by the Commissioner.\n\nOn the basis of his finding that there was an acknowledgment of liability to the extent of Rs. 67,459-3-3 as due under the terms of the two leases up to the year 1935 but that there was no material on the record to find out as to what was the amount due up to that year on the basis of that second lease, he made an order in the following terms:\n\n\"The defendant is hereby directed to assess and state the amount due under the lease in suit out of the said sum of Rs. 67,459-3-3 on the basis of the accounts of his office ..... .in respect of the plaintiff's dues within two months from this date, failing which a commissioner will be appointed fo make accounts and ascertain the amount due to the plain.tiff, and the defendant shall be liable for the costs of the same.\" Against this decree the contesting defendant, the Receiver appealed to the High Court of Judicature at Patna.\n\nBefore the appeal court two points were raised.\n\nThe first was that on a proper construction of the 1919 lease it should be found that the minerals specifically excluded in clause 16 of the earlier lease were included in the 1919 lease and consequently, the lessor having granted certain leases to other parties in respect of these minerals in the area the lessee was entitled to suspension of rents. The other point raised was that in law there was no acknowledgment which could save limitation in respect of the claim prior to August 12, 1935.\n\n.Sahebzada Mohammad Kamgar .Shah\n\nJagdish Chandra\n\nDeo Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta].\n\nSahebzada Mohammad _ Kamgar Shah\n\nJagdish Chandra\n\nD10 Dhabal Do\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nOn both these points, the learned judges of the Patna High Court who heard the appeal agreed with the conclusions of the Trial Judge. On the first point they held that the minerals excluded by clause 16 of the 1900 lease were not included in the second lease and so there was no question of any suspension of rents.\n\nThey also held that quite apart from the question of construction of the document, the lessee was not entitled to suspension of rents as in order to justify. withholding of the rents, the act of the landlord must be forcible or, at any rate, tortious and that these conditions had not been established in the present case.\n\nOn the second question, the learned judges held that the letters on which the plaintiff relied to show acknowledgments by the Receiver did in law amount to acknowledgments and the acknowledgments being by the Receiver who was himself bound to pay the rent due to the superior landlord were good acknowledgments within the meaning of s. 19 of the Limitation Act.\n\nAccordingly they dismissed the appeal.\n\nThe present appeal has been brought by the contesting defendant the Receiver on a certificate given by the High Court under Art. 133 of the Constitution.\n\nBoth the defences raised in the court of appeal have been pressed before us.\n\nThe alleged dispossession on the basis of which the first defence of a right to suspension of rent is urged is only in espect of minerals mentioned specifically in clause 16 of the earlier lease of 1900.\n\nIt is necessary therefore to decide in the first place whether these minerals mentioned in clause 16 of the earlier lease have been included in the second lease.\n\nIf as found by the courts below they have not been so included no question of suspension will arise. If they have been included, some other questions of law and fact may have to be considered in deciding whether the defendant's plea of suspension of rent can succeed.\n\nWhile primarily we have to construe the 1919 lease to find an answer to the question indicated above, it will be necessary for that very purpose to refer to several portions of the earlier lease of 1900.\n\nThe very first clause in the operative portion of the 1900 lease is in these words : -\n\n' -\n\n, '\n\n) <.\n\n\"That you shall prospect, raise, purify, melt and sell gold, silver, copper, lead, zinc, iron, mercury, mica, sulphur, copper sulphate, coal, chalk, redearth, etc., mati slate stone and all kinds of precious stones such as diamond, ruby, emerald, topaz, crystals, etc., lying on the surface and subsoil of Ghatsila otherwise called pargana Dhalbhum, mentioned in the Schedule excluding the 2 mouzas Narsinghgarh and Ghatsila and the Dibkulis mentioned in Schedule below.\" It will be noticed that this clause does not mention stones, lime-stones, ghuting or ballasts. Clause 6 of the lease however provided that the lessee shall be \"competent to take stones, lime-stones, ghuting and ballast which may be required for constructing buildings, bungalows and pathways, etc., necessary for the aforesaid mining work free of cost and rent.\" Clause 16 of the lease contains some further provisions as regards these and is in these words :-\n\n\"That by virtue of the aforesaid patta, you shall not be competent to offer any obstruction either to me or to my any authorised person to raise stones\n\n(used) for utensils or stones, lime-stone and ghuting,, etc., for buildings which are not covered by this patta and sell the same to me or to tenants, etc., under me to dig bandh, tank, canal and wells, etc., but the terms of the said patta shall hold good in respect of the underground minerals, etc., lying under the said wells, etc.\" Two things that are abundantly clear from this document are:-(1) that the mining rights were specifically granted in respect of gold, silver, copper, lead zinc, iron, mercury, mica, sulphur, copper sulphate, coal, chalk, red-earth and certain precious stones such as diamond, ruby, emerald, topaz, crystals, etc., and (2) that stones for utensils or stones, lime-stones, ghuting, etc., and ballast for buildings were specifically excluded from the lease.\n\nBy the later lease of 1919 the lessor gave and the lessee obtained mining rights in respect of certain minerals not granted by the earlier lease. The question is whether what was granted by the later lease included in addition to things which had not been specifically named in the earlier grant also things which\n\nSahebzada Mohammad Kamgar Shah . v.\n\nJagdish Chandra Deo D habal Deo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nSahebzada Mohammad Kamgar Shah\n\nJagdish Chandra\n\n/J4o D habal Deo\n\nDos Gupta].\n\nhad been specifically excluded there.\n\nThe important portion of the operative clause of the later lease is in these words:-\n\n\"In consideration of the rent hereby reserved and of the covenants and conditions hereinafter contained the Manager hereby grants demised unto the Receiver all and singular all metals and minerals of whatsoever kind or description other than those spe- cifically comprised in and granted by the principal lease ............................. . .. .. .. .. .. .. for such purposes to have all and every the rights, privileges and powers comprised in and granted to the said Prince Mohammad Bakhtyar Shah by the said principal lease in all respects as though the same were repeated herein so far as they do not contradict any of the provisions herein contained and are still existing and capable of taking effect.\"\n\nThe covenant runs thus:- \"Receiver covenants with the Manager that he will at the time and in the manner provided for in the said principal lease pay the rent or royalty reserved hereby and will carry out and comply with all the provisions and conditions comprised in the 4 said principal lease so far as they are applicable to these presents in the same manner as though they had been inserted herein.\" The document contains next an agreement that the Receiver shall be at liberty to grant under-leases subject to certain conditions and provisions.\n\nOne of the conditions mentioned is:-\"That all such underleases shall be subject to such special terms in regard to specific minerals as may be prescribed from time to time by the Government Rules relating to Mining Leases and shall be subject to the provision of clause 16 of the said principal lease.\"\n\nThe lease concluded with the words:- \"Provided always and it is hereby agreed that nothing herein contained shall be deemed to show that the Pottah of the tenth day of January one thousand and nine hundred made between Raja Satrughan Deo Dhabal Deo, son of Gopinath. Deo Dhabal Deo, deceased and the Hon'ble Prince\n\n... -·\n\nI '\\\n\nMohammad Bakhtyar Shah, son of Prince Mohammad Anwar Shah, deceased is not still valid and subsisting.\"\n\nIn his .attempt to establish that by this later lease the lessor granted a lease even of those minerals which had been excluded specifically by clause 16 of the earlier lease, Mr. .Jha has arrayed in his aid several well established principles of construction.\n\nThe first of these is that the intention of the parties to a document of grant must be ascertained first and foremost from the words used in the disposition clause, understanding the words used in their strict, natural grammatical sense and that once the intention can be clearly understood from the words in the disposition clause thus interpreted it is no business of the courts to examine what the parties may have said in other portions of the document. Next it is urged that if it does appear that the later clauses of the document purport to restrict or cut down in any way the effect of the earlier clause disposing of property the earlier clause must prevail.\n\nThirdly it is said that if there be any ambiguity in the disposition clause taken by itself, the benefit .of that ambiguity must be given to the grantee, the rule being that all documents of grants must be interpreted strictly as against the grantor.\n\nLastly it was urged that where the operative portion of the document can be interpreted without the aid of the preamble, the preamble ought not and must not be looked into.\n\nThe correctness of these principles is too well established by authorities to justify any detailed discussion.\n\nThe task being to ascertain the intention of the parties, the cases have laid down that that intention has to be gathered by the words used by the parties themselves.\n\nIn doing so the parties must be presumed to h<_ive used the words in their strict grammatical sense. If and when the parties have first expressed themselves in one way and then go on saying something, which is irreconcilable with what has gone before, the courts have evolved the principle on the theory that what once had been granted cannot next be taken away, that the clear disposition by an earlier clause will not be allowed to be cut down by a later\n\nSahebzada Mohammad Kamgar Shah\n\nJagdish Chandra\n\nDeo Dhabal Dto\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nSahebz:ada Mohamm'ad Kamgar Shah\n\nJagdish Chanrka\n\nDeo Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nclause. where there is ambiguity it is the duty of the Court to look at all the parts of the documents to ascertain what was really intended by the parties. But even here the rule has to be borne in mind that the document being the grantor\"s document it has to be interpreted strictly against him and in favour of the grantee.\n\nBearing these principles in mind we shall now examine the 1919 lease to perform this task of ascertaining the intention of the parties as to what was being granted by this lease.\n\nThe disposition clause as has alreadv been set out is in these words:-\"The Manag-er herby grants demised unto the Receiver all and singular all metals and minerals of whatsoever kind or description other than those specifically comprised in and granted by the principal lease.\" On behalf of the appellant it is argued that if the totality of metals and minerals in the area is denoted by the symbol \"X\" and what was granted by the earlier lease is denoted by the symbol \"Y\" the intention of the parties in using the words set out above was that this lease should be in respect of \"X\" minus \"Y\". We are afraid however that this is an over-simplification of the problem which we must resist. while it is true that strict g-rammatical sense of the words must be given effect to, words and phrases are not used by people always and invariably in the same sense.\n\nAs has often been emphasised by eminent judges the intention of persons using certain words cannot be discovered by considering the words in the abstract.\n\nWhen in th is lease the grantor used certain words, what we cannot ignore is that when words set out above were used in the present lease both the parties had present in their minds the fact of the principal lease.\n\nThey were not only well aware of the fact of the earlier lease but actually referred to it as the principal lease and repeatedly emphasised the fact that the terms and conditions of the principal lease in so far as not contradicted by the present lease would remain valid and effective.\n\nOne of the principal facts of that earlier lease is that while some metals and minerals were specifically grantee\\ thereby some were specifically excluded.\n\nIn interpreting the words of\n\nr (\n\n- -\n\n. ) ~\n\nthe disposition clause we have to take notice of the fact that no reference is being made to that fact of specific exclusion. The question that arises for determination is whether by this omission to make a specific reference to the exclusion clause of the previous lease the parties intended that the exclusion clause will have no effect.\n\nThe appellant's argument is that the necessary result of the words \\'grants demised unto t.he Receiver all and singular all metals and minerals of whatsoever kind or description other than specifically comprised in and g-ranted by the principal lease\" is that the exclusion clause of the earlier lease was itself being excluded.\n\nWhile there is some scope for that interpretation. if we do not look further. we are unable to agree with the learned Advocate that it is clear and uambiguous that by this reference to the granting clause of. the earlier lease and the words used in respect thereof. the exclusion clause of the earlier lase was being necessarily excluded. There is in our opinion as much scope for arguing that the exclusion clause not being in terms referred to would remain valid and active as there is for the appellant's argument that the words used show an intention to exclude the exclusion clause itself.\n\nIn cases of ambiguity it is necessary and proper that the court whose task is to construe the document should examine the several parts of the document in order to ascertain what was really intended by the parties.\n\nIn this much assistance can be derived from the fourth condition of the conditions which were imposed by the lease as regards the grant of sub-leases.\n\nThis condition provided inter-alia that all such under-leases to be granted by the lessee shall be subject to the provisions of clause 16 of the principal lease. In other words, the sub-lessees shall not be competent to offer any obstruction to the head lessor or to any other person authorised by him to raise stone for utensils or stones or lime-stone and ghuting, etc., for buildings and in selling the same.\n\nNor will he be competent to offer any obstruction to any person authorised by the lessor in digging bandh, tank, canal and wells, etc. In terms this is a provision as regards under-leases only. But the question which springs to the mind is : what could be the sense of\n\n16-6 SCI/ND/82\n\nSahebzada Mohammad Kamgar Shah\n\nJagdish Chandra\n\nDeo Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nSahebzada Mohammad Kamgar Shah\n\nJagdish Chadra Deo Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nsuch a term being imposed in respect of under-lessees if so long as under-leases were not given, the lessee himself would not be bound by the provisions of clause 16 of the principal lease and would be competent to obstruct the head lessor in the several matters mentioned in clause 16?\n\nIt is in our opinion unthinkable that such a clause as this fourth clause would be included in respect of sub-leases unless it was also the intention of the parties that the lessee himself would be bound by the provisions of cl. 16 of the principal lease.\n\nThe view that this must have been the intention is strengthened by the concluding words of this lease which provide in substance that notwithstanding anything in the later lease the principal lease would be valid and subsisting.\n\nHere also there would be no point in saying that the principal lease would be valid and subsisting as regards merely the minerals which had been specifically granted by the principal lease.\n\nAs regards the principal lease being binding in respect of those minerals, there could be no doubt whatsoever and the concluding clause of the 1919 lease would be unnecessary and meaningless.\n\nAs regards the metals and minerals which are excluded by cl. 16 there might however be some scope for argument as to what would prevail.\n\nBut for some apprehension in the mind of the grantor perhaps on account of clause 6 that there might be some scope of difference as regards the metals and minerals mentioned in cl. 16 of the earlier clause, the inclusion of this clause in the principal lease itself would perhaps be unnecessary.\n\nIt was as a safeguard against that uncertainty that the concluding sentence of the later lease uses the words that we find.\n\nIt appears to us reasonable therefore to hold that of the two meanings of which the words in the disposition clause are capable the meaning that the parties intended that the minerals excluded by clause 16 of the principal lease were not covered by the present grant but would remain excluded, should be accepted.\n\nWe have so long not referred to the preamble of the document.\n\nThe relevant portion of the same which is of some assistance in construing the document before us, occurs where the Manager mentions the\n\nconsent of the High Court as regards this later lease.\n\nThe passage runs thus:-\n\n\"Whereas recently certain disputes have arisen betwen the Manager as representing the Estate of the said Sri Sri Satrughna Deo Dhabal Deb, and the Receiver as representing the estate of the said Prince\n\nMohammad Bakhtyar Shah now deceased with regard to the construction of the principal lease and the minerals comprised therein, and whereas in order to put an end to all such disputes and differences of opinion and for the purpose of preventing litigation and consequent loss of both the said Estates it has been agreed by and between the parties hereto subject to the consent and approval of the said High Court that the Manager shall grant to the Receiver a lease of all minerals other than those specifically mentioned in the said principal lease.\"\n\nIn the judgment of the Trial Court there is a statement that the dispute which had arisen as regards the construction of the principal lease was whether a mineral known as wolfram was included in the lease of\n\n1900 or not.\n\nThe correctness of this observation in the Trial Court's judgment based apparently on statements made at the bar has not been disputed before us. If that was the dispute then the object of the second lease was obviously to include therein, in respect of the purposes of the granting clause of the first lease even those minerals which had not been included. That the dispute must have been of the nature, as the Trial Court believes, appears probable also from the use of the words \"other than those specifically mentioned\" in the preamble. The dispute being on the question of } what was mentioned and what was not mentioned in the granting clause, the object of granting the second lease was that what had not so long been mentioned in the granting clause would also be included in such grant by a supplementary lease. The question of what had been excluded was not in the contemplation of the parties at all. It is significant to note that there was no evidence that before the date of the second lease, any dispute had arisen as regards the operation of the exclusion clause, viz., Clause 16.\n\nA consideration of\n\nSahebzaha Mohammed Kamgar Mah\n\nJagdish Chandr~\n\nDeo Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nSahebzada Mohammed Kamgar Shah\n\nJagdish Chandra Dto Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nthe preamble therefore further strengthens the conclusion that this later lease did not grant any mineral rights in respect of what bad been excluded by the principal lease in its 16th clause.\n\nIf we interpret: the disposition clause in the second lease in this way, as we think we must, there is no repugnancy between this clause and the later clauses and there is no scope therefore for the applicability of the doctrine relied on by Mr. Jha that if there be two clauses or parts of a deed one repugnant to the other the first part shall be accepted and the latter rejected.\n\nNor is there any question in the present case of the words being constructed strictly against the grantor. It is only if the meaning is not otherwise clear that the courts would by recourse to that rule give the grantee something which he might not clearly have received.\n\nAs however on a proper construction of the document as a whole we reach the conclusion that the intention of the parties has been clearly established to be that the minerals excluded by clause 16 of the principal lease will remain excluded from the later lease also, there is no scope of any benefit accruing to the lessee by reason of the rule that all deeds are to be construed strictly against the grantor and in favour of the grantee.\n\nWe have therefore come to the conclusion that the courts below were right in their conclusion that the minerals mentioned in cl. 16 of the principal lease were not granted. by the later lease also.\n\nThe appellant's plea of suspension of rents based as it is on the allegation that the metals and minerals mentioned in cl. 16 of the principal lease were covered by the later lease must therefore fail. We think it unnecessary to consider in this appeal the question whether if the construction which the appellant wanted to place on the document was correct the plea of suspension of rents would have been available to him and we express no opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the views expressed by the High Court as regards the circumstances in which a plea of suspen- .sion of rent can succeed.\n\nThere remains for consideration the question of limitation as regards the period of the claim prior to\n\n' '\n\nAugust 12, 1935.\n\nOn this point the learned counsel for the appellant has advanced a two-fold contention before us.\n\nIn the first place he has contended that the alleged acknowledgments were conditional, the condition as stated being that the statements of account enclosed with the letters which are said to constitute the acknowledgments must be accepted as correct.\n\nIn support of his argument Mr. Jha drew our attention to the words used in Exhibit 2(1) dated March 7, 1931, which typifies the nature of acknowldegments in the other letters relied on by the plaintiff. This letter addressed by the Official Receiver to Raja J agdish Dea Dhabal Dea is in these words:-\n\n\"Sir,\n\nI have the honour to send herewith two statements of account showing an aggregate sum of Rs. 4,993-6-1 as royalty due to the Dhalbhum Raj by the above estate from 1st January to 3 lst December,\n\n1930. On your accepting the statements as correct a cheque for the saicl sum of Rs. 4,993-6-1 will be sent to you.\n\nBesides the above, there is lying to credit of the Dhalbhum Raj the sum of Rs. 31,944-8-3 being the royalty upto the end of December, 1929.\n\nI shall be obliged if you will kindly let me know whether you are prepared to accept the same and on hearing from you I shall be glad to forward to you a cheque in payment thereof.\"\n\nAccording to Mr. Jha the first statement as regards the sum of Rs. 4,993-6-1 due to the Dhalbhum Raj by the above estate from 1st .January to 31st December, 1930, was not a clear and independent statement of the clues but was made subject to the condition that this was accepted as correct. Similarly he argued that the statement in the next paragraph of the letter as regards the sum of Rs. :n ,944-8-3 being the royalty up to the end of December, 1929, was also not a clear and independent statement of what is due but is made subject to the acceptance of the same. That in our opinion is not a proper reading of what is stated in the letter. In the very first sentence of the letter the Receiver is saying that a sum of Rs. 4,993-6-1 as shown\n\nSahebzada Mohammad Kamgar Shuh\n\nJagdish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nSaheb;:ada Mohammad Kamgar Shah v.\n\nJagdish Chandra\n\nDeo DhabalDeo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nin the enclosure to the docnment was according to him due to the Dhalbhum Raj for the year 1930 on account of royalty; to this he was adding a statement in the second sentence that as soon as this statement of dues was accepted as correct a cheque in payment thereof would be sent.\n\nTo say that however was not to say that the earlier statement of what is due is subject to the acceptance of the accounts.\n\nThe idea in the second sentence clearly was that in case the statement of what was due was not accepted as correct the matter will have to be decided by further discussion before payment will be made.\n\nThis second sentence cannot by any stretch of imagination be read as a condition to the statement made in the first sentence. Similarly the first sentence in the second paragraph of the letter as regards the sum of Rs. 31,944-8-3 being royalty up to the end of December, 1929, is, as we read the letter, made independent of what was stated in the following sentence and was not subject thereto.\n\nThe argument that these acknowledgments were conditional acknowledgments has therefore been rightly rejected by the High Court.\n\nThe second contention urged by the learned counsel is that in any case an acknowledgment by the Receiver of an estate is not an acknowledgment by an agent of the owners of the estate \"duly authorised in this behalf\" within the meaning of Explanation II of s. 19 of the Limitation Act, and so is not an acknowledg ment within the meaning of s. 19(1) of the Limitation Act.\n\nAccording to the learned counsel \"duly authorised in this behalf\" in Explanation II of s. 19 means \"duly authorised by the debtor\" and does not include duly authorised by law or by an order of the Court.\n\nFor this proposition we can find no support either in authority or principle. Explanation II to s. 19 of the Limitation Act in saying \"for the purposes of this section 'signed' means signed either personally or by an agent duly authorised in this behalf\" has not limited in any way the manner in which the authority can be given.\n\nThe view taken in this matter by a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Annapagonda v.\n\nSangadiappa \\) that \"duly authorised\" would include\n\n(1) [1901] Born. S.R. 221 (F.B.).\n\nr '\n\nduly authorised either by the action of the party indebted or by force of law or order of the Court has been followed in other High Courts also (Viele : Reshbehary v. Anand Ram ('); Ramcharan Das v. Caya Prasad ('); Lakshumanan v. Sadayappa (') and Thankamma v. Kunhamma (') and in our opinion represents the correct state of law. Mr. .Jha has next argued that, in any case, law does not authorise the Receiver of an Estate to make acknowledgments of debt due from the estate.\n\nFor this proposition he has relied on a decision of the Bombay High\n\nCourt in Currimbhai v. Ahmedali (').\n\nIn that case it was held that an acknowledgment by an official assignee will not amount to an acknowledgment by an agent of the debtor.\n\nThough this case does not deal strictly with the case of a Receiver, Mr. .Jha has relied on the reasoning therein as supporting his contention.\n\nOur attention has been drawn by Mr. Sanyal, on behalf of the respondent to the fact that a contrary view has been taken in Lakshmanan Chetty v.\n\nSadayappa Chetty ('). Mr. Sanyal has argued that in respect of a debt due from the estate the Receiver of the estate fully represents the owners of the estate and that once it is held as it must be, that the Receiver had authority to pay the debt, Mr. Sanyal argues, it must necessarily be held that acknowledgment of a debt as incidental to the Receiver's duties in respect of the payment of the debts, is also within his authority. So, he argues that in every case an acknowledgment by a Receiver is an acknowledgment by a duly authorised agent of the debtor.\n\nThe above is a brief indication of the arguments on either side on Mr. .Jha's contention that the Receiver has no authority to acknowledge debts on behalf of the Estate. It is unnecessary for us however to decide for the purpose of the present appeal the question whether a Receiver is an agent of the owners of the estate of which he is the Receiver for the purposes of an acknowledgment of a debt under s. 19 of the Limitation Act.\n\n(1) 43 Cal. 211.\n\n(3) A.I.R. 1919 Mad. 816.\n\n(5) 58 Born. 505.\n\n(2) 30 All. 422.\n\n(4) A.I.R. 1919 Mad 370.\n\n(6) 35 M.L.J. 571.\n\nSahebzada Mohammad Kamgar Miah\n\nJagdish Chandra\n\nDeo Dhabal Dto\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nSahetzi!da Mohammad Kamgar _Shah\n\nJagdish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nApril 21.\n\nIn the present case the suit .is based on the second lease of 1919 which was executed in favour of the then Receiver.\n\nThe acknowledgments by which limitation is claimed to have been saved is by a previous Receiver of the Estate through whom the appellant who is the present Receiver has derived his liability to pay the debt.\n\nSection 19 is therefore in terms applicable as the acknowledgments have been signed personally by those previous Receivers, and no recourse is needed by the p!Jintiff to the second part of Explanation II.\n\nThis position was indeed fairly concluded by Mr. .Jha who agreed that in view of this it was not necessary for us to decide whether the Receiver of an Estate is by that fact itself an agent of the owners of the estate duly authorised to make acknowledgments under s. 19 of the Limitation Act.\n\nThere can be no' doubt that the acknowledgments on which the plaintiff relies are acknowledgments within the meaning of s. 19 of the Limitation Act and save limitation in respect of the period prior to August\n\n12. l 935.\n\nThe Courts below were therefore right in rejecting the defendant's plea of limitation.\n\nAs both the contentions raised before us fail, the appeal is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nBOMBAY CITY, HOMBAY\n\nNANDLAL GANDALAL. (S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR and M. HIDAYATULLAH, .JJ.)\n\nIncome-fax-Assessment-Hindu undivided family carrying on business outside British India-Partnership entered into by coparceners with strangers in British India financed by remittances received from undivided family funds-Hindu undivided family, if resident m taxable territories-Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (XI of 1922), ss. 4A(b).\n\nN, a coparcener of the Hindu undivided family of G, carrying on business in Kathiwar, then outside British India, entered into a partnership with strangers in Bombay in 1944.\n\nA total sum of Rs. 1,50,000 was remitted to N from the undivided family", "total_entities": 120, "entities": [{"text": "SAHEBZADA MOHAMMAD KAM GAR SHAH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 71, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Sahebzada Mohammad _ Kamgar Shah", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGDISH CHANDRA DEO DHABAL DEO\n\nAND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 73, "end_char": 115, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JAGDISH CHANDRA DEO DHABAL DEO\n\nAND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 140, "end_char": 153, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS GUPTA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 159, "end_char": 179, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Limitation Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 281, "end_char": 308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 339, "end_char": 344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Limitation Act, 1908", "statute": "Indian Limitation Act, 1908"}}, {"text": "Deputy Commission of Singhbhum", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 684, "end_char": 714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the lifetime of the said proprietor the management of the estate was taken over by the Deputy Commission of Singhbhum under the Chotanagpur Encumbered Estates Act and after the former's death the manager of the Estate granted to the Official Receiver to the estate of Prince Mohammad Bakhtyar Shah another lease in respect of mining rights in the same area in 1919."}}, {"text": "Mohammad Bakhtyar Shah", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 872, "end_char": 894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the lifetime of the said proprietor the management of the estate was taken over by the Deputy Commission of Singhbhum under the Chotanagpur Encumbered Estates Act and after the former's death the manager of the Estate granted to the Official Receiver to the estate of Prince Mohammad Bakhtyar Shah another lease in respect of mining rights in the same area in 1919.", "canonical_name": "Mohammad Bakhtyar Shah"}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2151, "end_char": 2156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2164, "end_char": 2178, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2680, "end_char": 2708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "L. K. ]ha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3017, "end_char": 3026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. K. ]ha, B. K. Saran, S. T. Husain, S. K. ]ha and K. L. Mehta, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "L. K. ]ha"}}, {"text": "B. K. Saran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3028, "end_char": 3039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. K. ]ha, B. K. Saran, S. T. Husain, S. K. ]ha and K. L. Mehta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. T. Husain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3041, "end_char": 3053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. K. ]ha, B. K. Saran, S. T. Husain, S. K. ]ha and K. L. Mehta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. K. ]ha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3055, "end_char": 3064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. K. ]ha, B. K. Saran, S. T. Husain, S. K. ]ha and K. L. Mehta, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "L. K. ]ha"}}, {"text": "K. L. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3069, "end_char": 3080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. K. ]ha, B. K. Saran, S. T. Husain, S. K. ]ha and K. L. Mehta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "H. N. Sanyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3102, "end_char": 3114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India ]."}}, {"text": "C. Das Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3157, "end_char": 3169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Das Gupta and R. C. Prasad, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "R. C. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3174, "end_char": 3186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. Das Gupta and R. C. Prasad, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "DAs GUPTA. T .- Dhalbhum", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3271, "end_char": 3295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAs GUPTA."}}, {"text": "Midnapur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3388, "end_char": 3396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "miles and Iles partly in the District of Midnapur and partly in the District of Singhbhum is rich in minerals."}}, {"text": "Singhbhum", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3427, "end_char": 3436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "miles and Iles partly in the District of Midnapur and partly in the District of Singhbhum is rich in minerals."}}, {"text": "Raja Satrughan Deo Dhabal Deo", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3502, "end_char": 3531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1900 the then Proprietor of this estate Raja Satrughan Deo Dhabal Deo the predecessor-in-interest of the first respondent Jagdish Deo Dhabal Deo granted permanent lease of the mining rights for certain.", "canonical_name": "Raja Sa\"trughan Deo Dhabal Deo"}}, {"text": "Jagdish Deo Dhabal Deo", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3584, "end_char": 3606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1900 the then Proprietor of this estate Raja Satrughan Deo Dhabal Deo the predecessor-in-interest of the first respondent Jagdish Deo Dhabal Deo granted permanent lease of the mining rights for certain."}}, {"text": "Tollygunge", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3736, "end_char": 3746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "metals and minerals in this estate to Prince Mohammad Bakhtyar Shah of Tollygunge in the District of 24-Parganas."}}, {"text": "Raja Sa\"trughan Deo Dhabal Deo", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3780, "end_char": 3810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Sa\"trughan Deo Dhabal Deo died in 1916.", "canonical_name": "Raja Sa\"trughan Deo Dhabal Deo"}}, {"text": "September 1, 1919", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4059, "end_char": 4076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the course of such management the Manager of the Estate granted on September 1, 1919, to the Official Receiver to the estate of Prince Mohammad Bakhtyar Shah another lease in respect of mining rights in the same area."}}, {"text": "Saheb.zada Mohammad Kamgar ShDh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4585, "end_char": 4616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As under the terms of the lease the lessor is entitled to the half\n\n15-6 SCI/ND/82\n\nSaheb.zada Mohammad Kamgar ShDh\n\n.", "canonical_name": "Sahebzada Mohammad _ Kamgar Shah"}}, {"text": "Jagdish Chandr11", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4627, "end_char": 4643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagdish Chandr11\n\nDeo Dhabal D•o\n\nDas Gup111 J.\n\nSaheb;:ada Mohammad Kamgar Shah\n\nv. :Jagdish Chandra\n\nDeo Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nSUPR~ME COURT REPORTS [1960]\n\nshare of the receipts on account of rents and royalties and other incomes in respect of the minerals demised and the exact income could not be known until accounts were furnished by the lessee, the defendant prayed for a decree for accounts from .January I, 1926, and for a decree for the sum found due on such accounts.", "canonical_name": "JAGDISH CHANDRA DEO DHABAL DEO\n\nAND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Deo Dhabal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4645, "end_char": 4655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagdish Chandr11\n\nDeo Dhabal D•o\n\nDas Gup111 J.\n\nSaheb;:ada Mohammad Kamgar Shah\n\nv. :Jagdish Chandra\n\nDeo Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nSUPR~ME COURT REPORTS [1960]\n\nshare of the receipts on account of rents and royalties and other incomes in respect of the minerals demised and the exact income could not be known until accounts were furnished by the lessee, the defendant prayed for a decree for accounts from .January I, 1926, and for a decree for the sum found due on such accounts.", "canonical_name": "Deo Dhabal Dto"}}, {"text": "Jagdish Chandra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4713, "end_char": 4728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagdish Chandr11\n\nDeo Dhabal D•o\n\nDas Gup111 J.\n\nSaheb;:ada Mohammad Kamgar Shah\n\nv. :Jagdish Chandra\n\nDeo Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nSUPR~ME COURT REPORTS [1960]\n\nshare of the receipts on account of rents and royalties and other incomes in respect of the minerals demised and the exact income could not be known until accounts were furnished by the lessee, the defendant prayed for a decree for accounts from .January I, 1926, and for a decree for the sum found due on such accounts.", "canonical_name": "JAGDISH CHANDRA DEO DHABAL DEO\n\nAND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Das Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4746, "end_char": 4755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagdish Chandr11\n\nDeo Dhabal D•o\n\nDas Gup111 J.\n\nSaheb;:ada Mohammad Kamgar Shah\n\nv. :Jagdish Chandra\n\nDeo Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nSUPR~ME COURT REPORTS [1960]\n\nshare of the receipts on account of rents and royalties and other incomes in respect of the minerals demised and the exact income could not be known until accounts were furnished by the lessee, the defendant prayed for a decree for accounts from .January I, 1926, and for a decree for the sum found due on such accounts."}}, {"text": "August 12, 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5139, "end_char": 5154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the suit was brought on August 12, 1941, the period prior to August 12, 1935, would prima facie be barred by limitation."}}, {"text": "August 12, 1935", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5176, "end_char": 5191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the suit was brought on August 12, 1941, the period prior to August 12, 1935, would prima facie be barred by limitation."}}, {"text": "August 12. 1935", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5689, "end_char": 5704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second defence was as regards the claim for the period prior to August 12."}}, {"text": "cl. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6478, "end_char": 6484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7000, "end_char": 7006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7406, "end_char": 7411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7419, "end_char": 7433, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8523, "end_char": 8556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against this decree the contesting defendant, the Receiver appealed to the High Court of Judicature at Patna."}}, {"text": "clause 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8732, "end_char": 8741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ".Sahebzada Mohammad Kamgar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9106, "end_char": 9132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Sahebzada Mohammad Kamgar .Shah\n\nJagdish Chandra\n\nDeo Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta].", "canonical_name": "Sahebzada Mohammad _ Kamgar Shah"}}, {"text": "Sahebzada Mohammad _ Kamgar Shah", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9186, "end_char": 9218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sahebzada Mohammad _ Kamgar Shah\n\nJagdish Chandra\n\nD10 Dhabal Do\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nOn both these points, the learned judges of the Patna High Court who heard the appeal agreed with the conclusions of the Trial Judge.", "canonical_name": "Sahebzada Mohammad _ Kamgar Shah"}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9314, "end_char": 9330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sahebzada Mohammad _ Kamgar Shah\n\nJagdish Chandra\n\nD10 Dhabal Do\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nOn both these points, the learned judges of the Patna High Court who heard the appeal agreed with the conclusions of the Trial Judge."}}, {"text": "clause 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9459, "end_char": 9468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10240, "end_char": 10245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10253, "end_char": 10267, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10434, "end_char": 10442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10707, "end_char": 10716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10839, "end_char": 10848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12056, "end_char": 12064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12324, "end_char": 12333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sahebzada Mohammad Kamgar Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13684, "end_char": 13714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question is whether what was granted by the later lease included in addition to things which had not been specifically named in the earlier grant also things which\n\nSahebzada Mohammad Kamgar Shah .", "canonical_name": "Sahebzada Mohammad _ Kamgar Shah"}}, {"text": "Jagdish Chandra Deo D habal Deo", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13721, "end_char": 13752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nJagdish Chandra Deo D habal Deo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nSahebzada Mohammad Kamgar Shah\n\nJagdish Chandra\n\n/J4o D habal Deo\n\nDos Gupta].", "canonical_name": "JAGDISH CHANDRA DEO DHABAL DEO\n\nAND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Sahebzada Mohammad Kamgar Shah", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13768, "end_char": 13798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nJagdish Chandra Deo D habal Deo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nSahebzada Mohammad Kamgar Shah\n\nJagdish Chandra\n\n/J4o D habal Deo\n\nDos Gupta].", "canonical_name": "Sahebzada Mohammad _ Kamgar Shah"}}, {"text": "clause 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15500, "end_char": 15509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Raja Satrughan Deo Dhabal Deo", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15760, "end_char": 15789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lease concluded with the words:- \"Provided always and it is hereby agreed that nothing herein contained shall be deemed to show that the Pottah of the tenth day of January one thousand and nine hundred made between Raja Satrughan Deo Dhabal Deo, son of Gopinath.", "canonical_name": "Raja Sa\"trughan Deo Dhabal Deo"}}, {"text": "Gopinath. Deo Dhabal Deo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15798, "end_char": 15822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lease concluded with the words:- \"Provided always and it is hereby agreed that nothing herein contained shall be deemed to show that the Pottah of the tenth day of January one thousand and nine hundred made between Raja Satrughan Deo Dhabal Deo, son of Gopinath."}}, {"text": "Mohammad Bakhtyar Shah", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15871, "end_char": 15893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Deo Dhabal Deo, deceased and the Hon'ble Prince\n\n... -·\n\nI '\\\n\nMohammad Bakhtyar Shah, son of Prince Mohammad Anwar Shah, deceased is not still valid and subsisting.\"", "canonical_name": "Mohammad Bakhtyar Shah"}}, {"text": "Mohammad Anwar Shah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15909, "end_char": 15928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Deo Dhabal Deo, deceased and the Hon'ble Prince\n\n... -·\n\nI '\\\n\nMohammad Bakhtyar Shah, son of Prince Mohammad Anwar Shah, deceased is not still valid and subsisting.\""}}, {"text": "clause 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16120, "end_char": 16129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ".Jha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16156, "end_char": 16160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his .attempt to establish that by this later lease the lessor granted a lease even of those minerals which had been excluded specifically by clause 16 of the earlier lease, Mr. .Jha has arrayed in his aid several well established principles of construction.", "canonical_name": ".Jha"}}, {"text": "Jagdish Chandra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18103, "end_char": 18118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If and when the parties have first expressed themselves in one way and then go on saying something, which is irreconcilable with what has gone before, the courts have evolved the principle on the theory that what once had been granted cannot next be taken away, that the clear disposition by an earlier clause will not be allowed to be cut down by a later\n\nSahebzada Mohammad Kamgar Shah\n\nJagdish Chandra\n\nDeo Dhabal Dto\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nSahebz:ada Mohamm'ad Kamgar Shah\n\nJagdish Chanrka\n\nDeo Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nclause.", "canonical_name": "JAGDISH CHANDRA DEO DHABAL DEO\n\nAND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Deo Dhabal Dto", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18120, "end_char": 18134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If and when the parties have first expressed themselves in one way and then go on saying something, which is irreconcilable with what has gone before, the courts have evolved the principle on the theory that what once had been granted cannot next be taken away, that the clear disposition by an earlier clause will not be allowed to be cut down by a later\n\nSahebzada Mohammad Kamgar Shah\n\nJagdish Chandra\n\nDeo Dhabal Dto\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nSahebz:ada Mohamm'ad Kamgar Shah\n\nJagdish Chanrka\n\nDeo Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nclause.", "canonical_name": "Deo Dhabal Dto"}}, {"text": "Jagdish Chanrka", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18184, "end_char": 18199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If and when the parties have first expressed themselves in one way and then go on saying something, which is irreconcilable with what has gone before, the courts have evolved the principle on the theory that what once had been granted cannot next be taken away, that the clear disposition by an earlier clause will not be allowed to be cut down by a later\n\nSahebzada Mohammad Kamgar Shah\n\nJagdish Chandra\n\nDeo Dhabal Dto\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nSahebz:ada Mohamm'ad Kamgar Shah\n\nJagdish Chanrka\n\nDeo Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nclause.", "canonical_name": "JAGDISH CHANDRA DEO DHABAL DEO\n\nAND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Deo Dhabal Deo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18201, "end_char": 18215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If and when the parties have first expressed themselves in one way and then go on saying something, which is irreconcilable with what has gone before, the courts have evolved the principle on the theory that what once had been granted cannot next be taken away, that the clear disposition by an earlier clause will not be allowed to be cut down by a later\n\nSahebzada Mohammad Kamgar Shah\n\nJagdish Chandra\n\nDeo Dhabal Dto\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nSahebz:ada Mohamm'ad Kamgar Shah\n\nJagdish Chanrka\n\nDeo Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nclause.", "canonical_name": "Deo Dhabal Dto"}}, {"text": "clause 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22225, "end_char": 22234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jagdish Chadra Deo Dhabal Deo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22907, "end_char": 22936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the question which springs to the mind is : what could be the sense of\n\n16-6 SCI/ND/82\n\nSahebzada Mohammad Kamgar Shah\n\nJagdish Chandra\n\nDeo Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nSahebzada Mohammad Kamgar Shah\n\nJagdish Chadra Deo Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nsuch a term being imposed in respect of under-lessees if so long as under-leases were not given, the lessee himself would not be bound by the provisions of clause 16 of the principal lease and would be competent to obstruct the head lessor in the several matters mentioned in clause 16?", "canonical_name": "JAGDISH CHANDRA DEO DHABAL DEO\n\nAND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "clause 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23108, "end_char": 23117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23228, "end_char": 23237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23465, "end_char": 23471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24168, "end_char": 24174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24324, "end_char": 24332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24426, "end_char": 24432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24867, "end_char": 24876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Satrughna Deo Dhabal Deb", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25381, "end_char": 25405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The passage runs thus:-\n\n\"Whereas recently certain disputes have arisen betwen the Manager as representing the Estate of the said Sri Sri Satrughna Deo Dhabal Deb, and the Receiver as representing the estate of the said Prince\n\nMohammad Bakhtyar Shah now deceased with regard to the construction of the principal lease and the minerals comprised therein, and whereas in order to put an end to all such disputes and differences of opinion and for the purpose of preventing litigation and consequent loss of both the said Estates it has been agreed by and between the parties hereto subject to the consent and approval of the said High Court that the Manager shall grant to the Receiver a lease of all minerals other than those specifically mentioned in the said principal lease.\""}}, {"text": "Clause 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27333, "end_char": 27342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sahebzaha Mohammed Kamgar Mah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27365, "end_char": 27394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A consideration of\n\nSahebzaha Mohammed Kamgar Mah\n\nJagdish Chandr~\n\nDeo Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nSahebzada Mohammed Kamgar Shah\n\nJagdish Chandra Dto Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nthe preamble therefore further strengthens the conclusion that this later lease did not grant any mineral rights in respect of what bad been excluded by the principal lease in its 16th clause.", "canonical_name": "Sahebzada Mohammad _ Kamgar Shah"}}, {"text": "Jagdish Chandr~", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27396, "end_char": 27411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A consideration of\n\nSahebzaha Mohammed Kamgar Mah\n\nJagdish Chandr~\n\nDeo Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nSahebzada Mohammed Kamgar Shah\n\nJagdish Chandra Dto Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nthe preamble therefore further strengthens the conclusion that this later lease did not grant any mineral rights in respect of what bad been excluded by the principal lease in its 16th clause.", "canonical_name": "JAGDISH CHANDRA DEO DHABAL DEO\n\nAND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Sahebzada Mohammed Kamgar Shah", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27443, "end_char": 27473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A consideration of\n\nSahebzaha Mohammed Kamgar Mah\n\nJagdish Chandr~\n\nDeo Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nSahebzada Mohammed Kamgar Shah\n\nJagdish Chandra Dto Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nthe preamble therefore further strengthens the conclusion that this later lease did not grant any mineral rights in respect of what bad been excluded by the principal lease in its 16th clause.", "canonical_name": "Sahebzada Mohammad _ Kamgar Shah"}}, {"text": "Jagdish Chandra Dto Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27475, "end_char": 27516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A consideration of\n\nSahebzaha Mohammed Kamgar Mah\n\nJagdish Chandr~\n\nDeo Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nSahebzada Mohammed Kamgar Shah\n\nJagdish Chandra Dto Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nthe preamble therefore further strengthens the conclusion that this later lease did not grant any mineral rights in respect of what bad been excluded by the principal lease in its 16th clause.", "canonical_name": "JAGDISH CHANDRA DEO DHABAL DEO\n\nAND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Jha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27961, "end_char": 27964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If we interpret: the disposition clause in the second lease in this way, as we think we must, there is no repugnancy between this clause and the later clauses and there is no scope therefore for the applicability of the doctrine relied on by Mr. Jha that if there be two clauses or parts of a deed one repugnant to the other the first part shall be accepted and the latter rejected.", "canonical_name": ".Jha"}}, {"text": "clause 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28558, "end_char": 28567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28937, "end_char": 28943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29130, "end_char": 29136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Raja J agdish Dea Dhabal Dea", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30349, "end_char": 30377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This letter addressed by the Official Receiver to Raja J agdish Dea Dhabal Dea is in these words:-\n\n\"Sir,\n\nI have the honour to send herewith two statements of account showing an aggregate sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Dhalbhum Raj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30768, "end_char": 30780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Besides the above, there is lying to credit of the Dhalbhum Raj the sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "1st .January to 31st December, 1930", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31167, "end_char": 31202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4,993-6-1 due to the Dhalbhum Raj by the above estate from 1st .January to 31st December, 1930, was not a clear and independent statement of the clues but was made subject to the condition that this was accepted as correct."}}, {"text": "Sahebzada Mohammad Kamgar Shuh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31788, "end_char": 31818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4,993-6-1 as shown\n\nSahebzada Mohammad Kamgar Shuh\n\nJagdish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nSaheb;:ada Mohammad Kamgar Shah v.\n\nJagdish Chandra\n\nDeo DhabalDeo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nin the enclosure to the docnment was according to him due to the Dhalbhum Raj for the year 1930 on account of royalty; to this he was adding a statement in the second sentence that as soon as this statement of dues was accepted as correct a cheque in payment thereof would be sent.", "canonical_name": "Sahebzada Mohammad _ Kamgar Shah"}}, {"text": "Jagdish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31820, "end_char": 31861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4,993-6-1 as shown\n\nSahebzada Mohammad Kamgar Shuh\n\nJagdish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nSaheb;:ada Mohammad Kamgar Shah v.\n\nJagdish Chandra\n\nDeo DhabalDeo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nin the enclosure to the docnment was according to him due to the Dhalbhum Raj for the year 1930 on account of royalty; to this he was adding a statement in the second sentence that as soon as this statement of dues was accepted as correct a cheque in payment thereof would be sent.", "canonical_name": "JAGDISH CHANDRA DEO DHABAL DEO\n\nAND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Jagdish Chandra\n\nDeo DhabalDeo", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31902, "end_char": 31932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4,993-6-1 as shown\n\nSahebzada Mohammad Kamgar Shuh\n\nJagdish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nSaheb;:ada Mohammad Kamgar Shah v.\n\nJagdish Chandra\n\nDeo DhabalDeo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nin the enclosure to the docnment was according to him due to the Dhalbhum Raj for the year 1930 on account of royalty; to this he was adding a statement in the second sentence that as soon as this statement of dues was accepted as correct a cheque in payment thereof would be sent.", "canonical_name": "JAGDISH CHANDRA DEO DHABAL DEO\n\nAND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33338, "end_char": 33343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33351, "end_char": 33365, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33422, "end_char": 33430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33438, "end_char": 33452, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33542, "end_char": 33547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33756, "end_char": 33761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33769, "end_char": 33783, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 34044, "end_char": 34061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The view taken in this matter by a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Annapagonda v.\n\nSangadiappa \\) that \"duly authorised\" would include\n\n(1) [1901] Born."}}, {"text": "Bombay High\n\nCourt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 34708, "end_char": 34726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For this proposition he has relied on a decision of the Bombay High\n\nCourt in Currimbhai v. Ahmedali (')."}}, {"text": "Sanyal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35077, "end_char": 35083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Our attention has been drawn by Mr. Sanyal, on behalf of the respondent to the fact that a contrary view has been taken in Lakshmanan Chetty v.\n\nSadayappa Chetty (')."}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36154, "end_char": 36159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36167, "end_char": 36181, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sahebzada Mohammad Kamgar Miah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36312, "end_char": 36342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sahebzada Mohammad Kamgar Miah\n\nJagdish Chandra\n\nDeo Dhabal Dto\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nSahetzi!da Mohammad Kamgar _Shah\n\nJagdish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nApril 21.", "canonical_name": "Sahebzada Mohammad _ Kamgar Shah"}}, {"text": "Sahetzi!da Mohammad Kamgar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36391, "end_char": 36417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sahebzada Mohammad Kamgar Miah\n\nJagdish Chandra\n\nDeo Dhabal Dto\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nSahetzi!da Mohammad Kamgar _Shah\n\nJagdish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nApril 21."}}, {"text": "Jagdish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36425, "end_char": 36466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sahebzada Mohammad Kamgar Miah\n\nJagdish Chandra\n\nDeo Dhabal Dto\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nSahetzi!da Mohammad Kamgar _Shah\n\nJagdish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nApril 21.", "canonical_name": "JAGDISH CHANDRA DEO DHABAL DEO\n\nAND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36810, "end_char": 36820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ".Jha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 37065, "end_char": 37069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This position was indeed fairly concluded by Mr. .Jha who agreed that in view of this it was not necessary for us to decide whether the Receiver of an Estate is by that fact itself an agent of the owners of the estate duly authorised to make acknowledgments under s. 19 of the Limitation Act.", "canonical_name": ".Jha"}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37280, "end_char": 37285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37293, "end_char": 37307, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37430, "end_char": 37435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37443, "end_char": 37457, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nBOMBAY CITY, HOMBAY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37727, "end_char": 37775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nBOMBAY CITY, HOMBAY\n\nNANDLAL GANDALAL. ("}}, {"text": "NANDLAL GANDALAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37777, "end_char": 37793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nBOMBAY CITY, HOMBAY\n\nNANDLAL GANDALAL. ("}}, {"text": "S. K. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37796, "end_char": 37805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR and M. HIDAYATULLAH, .JJ.)", "canonical_name": "L. K. ]ha"}}, {"text": "J. L. KAPUR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37807, "end_char": 37818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR and M. HIDAYATULLAH, .JJ.)"}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37823, "end_char": 37838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR and M. HIDAYATULLAH, .JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38126, "end_char": 38153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 4A(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38168, "end_char": 38177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 38339, "end_char": 38345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N, a coparcener of the Hindu undivided family of G, carrying on business in Kathiwar, then outside British India, entered into a partnership with strangers in Bombay in 1944."}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_620_640_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "Sahetzi!da Mohammad Kamgar _Shah\n\nJagdish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deo\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nApril 21.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960]\n\nIn the present case the suit .is based on the second lease of 1919 which was executed in favour of the then Receiver.\n\nThe acknowledgments by which limitation is claimed to have been saved is by a previous Receiver of the Estate through whom the appellant who is the present Receiver has derived his liability to pay the debt.\n\nSection 19 is therefore in terms applicable as the acknowledgments have been signed personally by those previous Receivers, and no recourse is needed by the p!Jintiff to the second part of Explanation II.\n\nThis position was indeed fairly concluded by Mr. .Jha who agreed that in view of this it was not necessary for us to decide whether the Receiver of an Estate is by that fact itself an agent of the owners of the estate duly authorised to make acknowledgments under s. 19 of the Limitation Act.\n\nThere can be no' doubt that the acknowledgments on which the plaintiff relies are acknowledgments within the meaning of s. 19 of the Limitation Act and save limitation in respect of the period prior to August\n\n12. l 935.\n\nThe Courts below were therefore right in rejecting the defendant's plea of limitation.\n\nAs both the contentions raised before us fail, the appeal is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nBOMBAY CITY, HOMBAY\n\nNANDLAL GANDALAL. (S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR and M. HIDAYATULLAH, .JJ.)\n\nIncome-fax-Assessment-Hindu undivided family carrying on business outside British India-Partnership entered into by coparceners with strangers in British India financed by remittances received from undivided family funds-Hindu undivided family, if resident m taxable territories-Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (XI of 1922), ss. 4A(b).\n\nN, a coparcener of the Hindu undivided family of G, carrying on business in Kathiwar, then outside British India, entered into a partnership with strangers in Bombay in 1944.\n\nA total sum of Rs. 1,50,000 was remitted to N from the undivided family\n\n,.. .. ;.,\n\n'.i>\n\n) -\n\nfunds and utilised as capital in the partnership business.\n\nN's brother joined the partnership in Bombay.\n\nThe partnership started another firm in Banaras and a third brother of N joined the firm.\n\nFor the year of assessment 1945-46 the Income-tax Officer held that the Hindu undivided family of G was resident in the taxable territories and included the said sum in the income of the family under s. 4(l)(b)(iii) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, as having been brought into or received in British India in the relevant year and made the assessment on that basis.\n\nOn appeal by the assessee the Appellate Assistant Commissioner affirmed the assessment but the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal holding that in the year of assessment the family was not resident in the taxable territories deleted the said sum from the assessed income.\n\nThe decision of the Appellate Tribunal was upheld by the High Court in a reference under s. 66(1) of the Act made at the instance of the appellant: Held (per S. K. Das and J. L. Kapur, JJ.), that the expression 'control and management' occurring in s. 4A(b) of the Indian Income-tax Act means de facto control and management and the word \"affairs\" means the affairs of the Hindu undivided family capable of being controlled and managed by the said family as such.\n\nIt is .well-settled that a Hindu undivided family cannot exercise any controlling power of management of a partnership entered into by a coparcener with strangers either under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, or under the Hindu law.\n\nThe partnerships in the instant case could not, therefore, constitute affairs of the Hindu undivided family within the meaning of s. 4A(b) of the Act, although the incomes from the said partnerships might belong to the said family, and could not determine its residence.\n\nThe place of accrual of income of a Hindu undivided family and the place of its residence need not necessarily be the same under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.\n\nV. V. R. N. M. Subbayya Chettiar v. Commissioner of Incometax, Madras, [1950) S.C.R. 961, Kshetra Mohan Sannyasi Charan Sadhukhan v. Commissioner of Excess Profits Tax, West Bengal, [1953] 24 I.T.R. 488 and B. R. Naik v. Commissioner of Incometax, [1946] 14 I.T.R. 324, referred to.\n\nPer Hidayatullah, J.-Under s. 4A(b) of the Indian Incometax Act, what are really affairs of the Hindu undivided family must be decided in the light of the Hindu law, and not the law of Partnership.\n\nIt is well settled that a coparcener of a Hindu undivided family cannot claim any item of property or share of his own and, consequently, where certain coparceners enter into partnerships with strangers by investing capital from out of the undivided family funds, as in the instant case, the income from the business must belong to the undivided family.\n\nWhere the Hindu undivided family enters into a business activity in the taxable territories through its coparceners, invests money and earns income, even though the partnership which results may not be an\n\n17-6 SCI/ND/82\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax Bombay City v.\n\nN and lat Gandalal\n\nCommissioner of lncame-tax, Bombay City v.\n\nNandlal Gandalal\n\nS. K. Das :J.\n\n\"affair\" of the family, there is still a business activity resulting in the partnership and the partnership is the evidence of that business activity.\n\nThis 3.ctivity of a permanent character is sufficient for purposes of income-tax law to constitute an \"affair\" of the family within the meaning of s. 4A(b) of the Indian Income-tax Act.\n\nApprovier v. Rama Subba Aiyan, [1866] 11 M.I.A. 75, Katma Natchiar v. Rajah of Slzivaganga, [1864] 9 M.I.A. 539, Mangalchand Mohanlal, In re, [1952] 21 I.T.R. 164, Murugappa Chetty & Sons\n\nv. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1952] 21 I.T.R. 311 and Kaniram Hazarimull v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1955] 27 I.T.R. 294, referred to.\n\nV. V. R. N. M. Subbayya Chettiar v. Commissioner of lncometax, Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 961, considered.\n\nControl and management, in the case of a Hindu undivided family, can be exercised by one or more of its coparceners, even though partly, and if such coparceners reside in the taxable territories and manage its affairs, the family must be treated as resident in such territory.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 788 of 1957.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated February 16, 1%5, of the Bombay High Court in Income-tax Reference No. 38 /x of 19.54.\n\nDaphtary, Solicitor-General of India, R. Ganapath;1 l;1er and D. Gupta, for the appellant.\n\nR. ]. Kolah, S. N. Andley,\n\n.J.\n\nDadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the respondent.\n\n1960.\n\nApril 21.\n\nThe .Judgment of S. K. Das and Kapur, JJ., was delivered by S. K. Das, J. Hidayatullah, J. delivered a separate Judgment.\n\nS. K. DAs, J.-This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment and orders of the High Court of Bombay dated February 16, 19.'i.'i, in a reference un3] 24 I.T.R. 488.\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncome-tax, Bombay City v.\n\nNand!al Gan.fa/al\n\nS. K. Das].\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncome-tax, Bo.71bay City\n\nNand!al Gandalal\n\nS. K. Das].\n\nas it is sometimes called.\n\nFurthermore, it is settled we think, that the expression control and management\" means de facto control and management and not merely the right or power to control and manage (see B. R. Na1k v. Commissioner of Income-tax (')). It is also quite clear, we think, that if a coparcener becomes a partner (on behalf of the joint family) with strangers in a firm which carries on business in the taxable territories, that bv itself will not determine the residence of the family unless the control and management of the firm is at least, in part, in the Hindu undivided family.\n\nOn the facts of this case, the Hindu undivided family or for that matter, the Karta of that family, that is Gandalal, could exercise no power of controlling management over the partnership firm, either under Partnership law or under Hindu law.\n\nIt seems to us that the word \"affairs\" in s. 4A(b) must mean affairs of a Hindu undivided family which are capable of being controlled and managed by the said Hindu undivided family as silch. vVherc a coparcener enters into partnership with strangers. the Hindu undivided family exercises no controlling power of management over the partnership firm.\n\nIn that view of the matter the partnership firm cannot be an \"affair\" of the Hindu undivided family capable of being controlled and managed by the Hindu undivided family as such. It may be here observed that the decision in V. V. R. N. M. Subhayya Chettiar\n\nv. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras (') proceeded on the basis of onus only and as was specifically stated therein, it was confined to the year of assessment to which the case rebted and it was left open to the appellant of that case to show in future years by proper evidence that the seat of control and management. of the affairs of the family was wholly outside British India.\n\nIn the case before us the Tribunal no doubt found on the first. question raised before it that Nandlal and Girdharlal joined the Bombay and Banaras firms as coparceners of the Hindu undivided family and the money for starting the business came from the Hindu undivided family.\n\nThat finding by itself however does not determine the residence of the\n\n(I) [1946] 4 I.T.R. 324.\n\n(2) [19501 S.C.R, 961.\n\n!'\"\" ( •\n\n- .\n\n\\ 'J\n\nHindu undivided family of Gandalal.\n\nBoth under Hindu law and Partnership law the Hindu undivided family as such could exercise no control and management over the two businesses at Bombay and Banaras.\n\nThese businesses belonged to the partners and on the facts found in this case, it cannot be said that the businesses were the affairs of the Hindu undivided family of Gandalal within the meaning of s. 4A(b) of the Act.\n\nWe agree with the High Court that the position would be different if the Hindu undivided family itself carried on the business as its own business.\n\nIn that case the business would be an affair of the family, because the family wciuld be in control and management of the business.\n\nAt first sight it may\n\napper paradoxical that the income from the two businesses at Bombay and Banaras in the hands of Nandlal and Girdharlal should be treated as income of the Hindu undivided family and at the same time it should be held that the two businesses were not the affairs of the Hindu undivided family within the meaning of s. 4A(b) of the Act.\n\nThere is really no paradox because the place the accrual of income of such family and the place of its residence need not necessarily be the same under the Act.\n\nResidence under s. 4A(b) of a Hindu undivided family is determined by the seat of control and management of its affairs, and in the matter of partnership business in British India the Hindu undivided family as such had no connexion whatsoever with its control and management. If the seat of control is divided, the family may have more than one place of residence; and unless it is wholly outside the taxable territories, the family will be taken to be resi dent in such territories for the purposes of the Act. But whereas in this case in respect of the partnership business, the family as such has nothing to do with its control and management, we fail to see how the existence of such a partnership will determfoe residence of the family within the meaning of s. 41\\(b).\n\nTherefore, we are of the opinion that the High Court correctly answered the question. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\n18-6 SCI/ND/82\n\nCommissioner of Income tax, Bombay City\n\nNondlal Gandalal\n\nS. K. DasJ.\n\nCommissiMer of\n\nIncometax, Bombay City v.\n\nNandlal Gandalal\n\nHidayatullah].\n\nHrnAYATULLAH, J.-The Commissioner of Incometax, Bombay City, has filed this appeal, after obtaining special leave from this Court, against the judgment and order of the High Court of Bombay dated February l 6, 1955, in a Reference under s. 66( I) of the Indian Income-tax Act.\n\nBy the judgment under appeal, the High Court (in agreement with the decision of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Bombay, given earlier) answered in the negative the following question : ' \"Whether the Hindu undivided family of Gandalal represented by Nandlal in the firm of Amulakh Amichand & Co. of Bombay was resident in the taxable territories in the year of account relevant for the assessment year 1945-46.\" The facts briefly stated are as follows: ThPre was in Wadhwan State in Kathiawar a Hindu undivided family consisting of Gandalal and his four sons, Girdharlal, Hansraj, Nandlal and Ramniklal. This family was doing business in cloth.\n\nJn 1944 Nandlal went to Bombay and started on April 25, 1944, a cloth business in partnership with three strangers, known as Amulakh Amichand & Co.\n\nNandlal's share was ten annas, and that of his three partners, six ai, mas.\n\nAll the capital of the new firm was supplied by Nandlal, and for this purpose he received two remittances of Rs. 50,000 each on April 13 and 27 in the year 1944 and two other remittances aggregating to Rs. 50,000 on June 8 and 29 in the same year. Thus, a total sum of Rs. J ,!J0,000 was sent from Wadhwan to Bombay.\n\nSubsequently, Girdharlal also went to Bombay and joined Amulakh Amichand & Co. and he was given five annas' share out of Nandlal's share of ten annas.\n\nIn 1946 Amulakh Amichand & Co. started another firm at Banaras under the same name.\n\nThe partners of the Banaras firm were the partners of the firm at Bombay, an outsider from Banaras and a third brother of Nandlal. He did not bring any capital, and presumably received a share along with his other two brothers.\n\nFor the assessment year 1945-46 the Income-tax Officer treated the Hindu imdivided family as resident in British India under s. 4A(b) of the Indian Incometax Act and assessed the family after adding the sum of Rs. 1,50,000 to the income from the firm of\n\n. i ~\n\nAmulakh Arriichand & Co., Bombay.\n\nThe appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner failed.\n\nOn further appeal, the Appellate Tribunal, Bombay, held that Nandlal was still a coparcener and not a separated member, because the partition which was set up by him was not meant to be acted upon. The Tribunal, however, held that the decision of the Income-tax Officer and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that the Hindu undivided family was resident in British India in the relevant account year was not sound. The Appellate Tribunal, therefore, ordered that the sum of Rs. 1,50,000 i.ncluded under s. 4(l)(b)(iii) of the Income-tax Act could not be included and must be deleted.\n\nAccording to the Tribunal, the business at Bombay and later the business at Banaras could not be considered to be 'the affairs of the Hindu undivided family of Gandalal', so as to bring the matter within s. 4A(b) of the Act. The Appellate Tribunal held that these two businesses belonged to 'different entities', namely, the Bombay and Banaras firms, and that these firms could not be said to be \"the affairs of the Hindu undivided family\" but the affairs of Nandlal and his brothers under the law of Partnership. At the instance of the assessee, the Tribunal referred the above question for the opinion of the High Court.\n\nThe Bombay High Court referred to the decision of this Court in V. V. R. N. M. Subbayya Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras (1), and pointed out that by the expression \"the affairs of the Hindu undivided family\" was meant not the private or domestic affairs of the family but some affairs which had some reference to the Income-tax Act. The word \"affairs\" must, it was held, be construed in relation to taxation. The learned Judges then referred to the position of a coparcener entering into partnership with strangers, and observed that when a coparcener carried on such business in pa, rtnership on behalf of the Hindu family, \"the affair\" was of the coparcener and not of the family, but when the business was carried on by the family itself, then it was \"the affair\" of. the family and not of the coparcener or coparceners. They pointed out that in the cited case Faz! Ali, .J., seemed to have\n\n(!) [1950] S.C.R. 961.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City\n\nNandlal Gandalal\n\nHidayatullah ].\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncometax, Bombay City v.\n\nNandlal Gandalal\n\nHidayatullah J.\n\nheld that even though a partnership business might be an 'activity' of the Hindu family, it would not be \"the affair\" of the Hindu family in the sense in which the expression was used in the Indian Income-tax Act.\n\nThey, however, held that it did not follow that every activity of a coparcener or of a Karta, even if the activity resulted in profit, became \"the affair\" of the Hindu undivided family.\n\nThus, treating the business of Amulakh Amichand & Co. as \"the affair\" of the coparceners concerned and not of the Hindu undivided family, the High Court in agreement with the opinion of the Appellate Tribunal, answered the question in the negative.\n\nBefore dealing with the arguments addressed in the case and the interpretation of the relevant provision, it will be useful to summarise the findings. It is found that the Hindu undivided family did not disrupt and partition the assets. N andlal and Girdharlal continued to be coparceners, and the sum of Rs. 1,50,000 represented the funds of the Hindu undivided family.\n\nThere is no finding that besides the entering into partnership by some of the coparceners with outsiders, there was, in the taxable territories, any other business.\n\nThere is also no finding by the Tribunal that no part of the control and management was exercised in British India, though the High Court did find this to be so.\n\nWe are concerned in this case with the application of s. 4A(b), which deals with 'residence' in the taxable territories, of Hindu undivided family, firm or other association of persons. Before the present amendment, the section read as follows:\n\n\"4A. For the purposes of this Act-\n\n(b) a Hindu undivided family, firm or other association of persons is resident in British India unless the control and management of its affairs is situated wholly without British India.\" The words \"British India\" have now been replaced by the words \"taxable territories\"; but the reasoning applicable to tl}em is the same. The section was plain in so far as its intent and purpose was concerned.\n\nIt made a Hindu undivided family resident in British India, unless the control and management of its affairs\n\n....\n\nwas situated wholly without British India. If the control and management was wholly or partly situated in British India, then the family was treated as a resident.\n\nThe words \"wholly without British India\" showed that even if a part of the control and management, be it ever so small a part, was exercised in British India, the provision was satisfied.\n\nSo far, there is no dispute, and it is further clear that the \"affairs\" of the Hindu undivided family refer to something connected with the law of Income-tax. The section does not refer to the domestic or private affairs of the Hindu undivided family. It refers to an activity resulting in the making of income.\n\nParties are agreed -and I think rightly-that this aspect of the law is clear and unambiguous.\n\nIt is also settled after the decision of this Court in Subbayya C hettiar' s case (').\n\nParties are, however, at variance, when one comes to the interpretation .of the words \"its affairs\" in the section, anu tries to find the situs of the control and ' management. In cases where the Hindu undivided family itself or through its Karta controls and manages business in the taxable territories, no difficulty arises; but where, as here, the Hindu undivided family is represented by one of its coparceners as a partner in a firm, one faces some difficulties.\n\nTwo questions then arise, which are:\n\n(a) Is there any \"affair\" of the Hindu undivided family in the taxable territories m such nrcumstances; and\n\n(b) Is the fact that the coparcener controls and manages the partnership, wholly or partly, sufficient to enable one to say that the control and management of the family is located in the taxable territories?\n\nNow, it is settled law that a Hindu undivided family , cannot be a partner under the law of partnership.\n\nSuch of the coparceners who join the partnership are regarded quoad the other partners, as individuals in their own names and rights.\n\nYet, the benefits that arise to them from the partnership belong to the family, and their rights are the asset of the family.\n\nWe have recently held in Charandas Harida.S v. Commissioner Df Income-tax, Bombay\n\n(2) that in such a situation the matter has to be looked at in the light of\n\n(1) [1950] S.C.R. 961.\n\n(2) [1960] 3 s.c.R. ,296.\n\n1%0\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncome-tax, Bombay Ciry\n\nNandlal Gandalal\n\nHida.YJlullah J.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax, Bomba)' Cit;'\n\nNandlal Gcndalal\n\nHidayatullah J.\n\nthree separate and independent branches of law. They are the law of Partnership, the Hindu law and the law relating to Income-tax.\n\nThe implications of a coparcener joining as partner with strangers are different when one views the matter from the angle of the law of Partnership or from the angle of the Hindu law or the law of Income-tax.\n\nIn so tar as the law of Partnership is concerned, the coparcenary has no place in the partnership, and the coparcener-partner is everything.\n\nBut, viewed from the angle of Hindu law, the position is entirely different. ln this connection, we have to bear in mind two principles of the law relating to a coparccnary, which are well-settled. The first is contained in a well-known passage in the judgment of Lord Westbury in Appovier v. Rama Subba Aiyan('), which reads:\n\n\"According to the true notion of an undivided family in Hindu law, no individual member of that family, whilst it remains undivided, can predicate of the joint and undivided property, that he, that particular member, has a certain definiLe share......\n\nThe proceeds of undivided property must be brought, according to the theory of an undivided family, to the common chest or purse, and then dealt with according to the modes of enjoyment by the members of an undivided family.\"\n\nThe second is equally well-known, and is found stated in the judgment of Turner, L. J. in Katama Natchiar v. Rajah of Shivaganga (') in the following words:\n\n\"There is community of interest and unity of -< possession between all the members of the family, and upon the death of any one of them the others may well take by survivorship that in which they had during the deceased's life-time a common interest and a common possess10n.\n\nNo doubt, there are other principles also which qualify those quoted, as, for example, the right of a coparcener to claim a partition, or, where such usage obtains, to alienate his interest, which give rise to the .>- expression that the coparcener has a share. In point of Hindu law, however, a coparcener cannot claim ~\n\n(l) [1866] 11 M.I.A. 75, 89.\n\n(2) [1864] 9 M.I.A. 539, 61 l.\n\nany item of property or even a share of it as his own, and his dealings with the assets are, in so far as he is concerned, for the benefit of the family.\n\nThe law of Income-tax makes the sole test for purpose of residence of a Hindu undivided family, the existence of an 'affairs' and its control and management even partly in the taxable territories.\n\nFor this purpose, one may look at the actual facts, and an inference from facts in the light of Hindu law is equally open.\n\nIt is thus plain that whilst in the eye of the law of Partnership the coparcener who is a co-partner is everything, in the eye of Hindu law he is no more than a member of a bo, dy of owners.\n\nIn attempting to find out if there is any 'affair' of the Hindu undivided family,. we can consider the matter from the point of view of Hindu law. If this is the true position of a coparcener in Hindu law, it is difficult to accept the view of the High Court and of the Tribunal that there was no 'a'ffair' of the family in British India. The High Court, with respect, posed the wrong question when it asked itself, \"was Amulakh Amichand & Co., an affair of the family?\". That question is self-evident, and the answer is 'no'. from the point of view of the law of Partnership. The proper question to ask was. as I have framed it, viz., ·\"was there an affair of the Hindu undivided family in British India?\". To search and find this 'affair', it is not necessary to look for it within the partnership any more than to look for it in the affairs of a bank where the family keeps its money with which it does business. That this was not a mere 'activity' but an activity involving expenditure of familv funds in British India and resulting in the earning of money is admitted on all hands.\n\nThe income received from the partnership belonged to the family, as is well-settled. See Mangaichand Mohanlal, In re ( 1), Murugappa Chetty &Sons v. Commissioner of Income-tax (') and Kaniram Hazarimull v.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax (3) and the numerous cases cited there.\n\nThe affair. if any, which we have to find, is not to be found within the four corners of the partnership\n\n(I) [19.52] 21I.T.R.164.\n\n(2) [1952] 21I.T.R.311.\n\n(3) [1955] 27 I.T.R. 294.\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncome-tax, Bombay City v.\n\nN cndlal Gandalal\n\n.HitlayalullohJ.\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncome tax, Bombay Citp\n\nNandlal Gandalal\n\nHidayatuJlah J.\n\nbut outsi -\n\n,... { .\n\nsay, that there was an 'affair' of the Hindu undivided family in the taxable territories (then British India) in the circumstances of this case.\n\nThe question then is : where was the control and management of the Hindu undivided family located?\n\nIf it was wholly located without the taxable territories (then British India), then the family would be nonresident.\n\nThe burden was on the assessee to establish this, and we were not shown any evidence in this behalf.\n\nThe question can be decided here also on the burden of proof alone, as was done in Subbaya Chettiar's case ('). It need not, however, be decided on that narrow issue for reasons, which will presently appear.\n\nSection 4A deals with residence of an individual at one end and of a corporation like the company at the other.\n\nIt also deals with the residence of three entities, viz., Hindu undivided family, firm and association of persons in the remaining part. The tests for these three categories are different.\n\nSpecial tests have been provided for individuals, based on residence for a certain number of davs.\n\nTwo alternative tests have been provided for ompanies. the first being that the control and management of their affairs must be situated wholly within the taxable territories.\n\nWhere the control is without. a comnanv can still be taxed if its income within the taxabl~ territories in the year of account (omitting, capital gains) is greater than its income without the taxable territories. with the , same om1ss10n.\n\nThe first provision is necessary, because a company can have more than one residence, its residence being where it 'keeps house and does business'.\n\nThe test is reverse\\! for a Hindu undivided family, which is non-residence only if the whole of its control and management is situate without the taxable territories.\n\nThe residence of the members of the coparcenary is not a relevant factor, but if control and management is exercised by them within the1 taxable territory, the family as a whole is treated as resident. In Subbayya Chettiar's case (1); this Court observed that 'situated' implies functioning somewhat permanently, though the management and control may be exercised\n\n(1) [1950] S.C.R. 261. 83\n\n19-6 SCI/ND/82\n\n1960 .\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncome-ta\", Bombay City v.\n\nNandlal Gandalal\n\nHidayalU/lah :J.\n\nCommissioner of\n\nlncometax, Bombay City\n\nNandlal Gandalal\n\nHidayatullahJ.\n\nin more than one place.\n\nTo prove that management and control is within the taxable territories, something more than a casual 'activity' is needed.\n\nThe same tests also apply to a firm and an association of persons.\n\nThe words 'control and management' have been figuratively described as 'the heacl and brain'.\n\nIn the case of an individual, the test is not necessary, because his residence for a certain period is enough, it being clear that within the taxable territories he would necessarily bring his 'head and brain' with him.\n\nThe 'head and brain' of a company is the Board of Directors, and if the Board of Directors exercises complete local control, then the company is also deemed to be resident.\n\nIn the case of fil\"ms, association of persons and Hindu undivided family, the control and management can be exercised by one or more of the group.\n\nSo long as this control ancl management (even partly) is found, and it must be so when some coparceners reside in British India and manage the affair, the family must be treated as resident.\n\nThe necessity for the test is thus obvious.\n\nThe J ncome-tax law anticipated that control and management of the affairs of Hindu undivided families (firms and association of persons), might easily be in two or more places, one or more coparceners being within the taxable territories and the other or others, without.\n\nTo prevent the escape of tax and to get at the income of such families having multiple places of control and management, it was provided that the whole of the control and management must be without the taxable territories to avoid the implication of residence.\n\nOtherwise, rlifferent coparceners can manage different businesses in the taxable territories and the family cannot be regarded as resident if the karta lived outside, an anomaly which does not really arise.\n\nIn the present case, can one say that. the control and management was wholly without the taxable territories (then, British India)? If one goes by the case set up by the assessee, one. finds that the claim was that there was a partition in the family and that Nandalal came to\n\nr I\n\nBombay as a separated member. This claim involves the admission that the affairs, such as they were, were not controlled from Wadhwan. Since, however, the case of partition pleaded by the assessee was not accepted, it might be held that the family at Wadhwan was, perhaps, also in control.\n\nBut it is equally clear that a part of the control . of the affairs of the family was done in British India by those coparceners, .who became partners in the business and through whom and not directly from Wadhwan the partnership business at Bombay was run to the benefit of the family.\n\nThose partn.ers who were also coparceners of the family arranged to start this business at Bombay and stayed on and managed it; they started a fresh business at Banaras, admitted a stranger as partner at the new place and presumably supplied , capital from the Bombay firm or from the family coffers. There is no claim at all that they supplied their own separate funds.\n\nAll these actions were acts of control and management.\n\nThey were not casual but permanent in character.\n\nThus, the control and management of family affairs vis a vis the partnership vv'as being done by them. The coparceners who Januslike face two ways, cannot shelter behind the law of Partnership, and claim that their action had no reference to the 'affairs' of the family, which was at their back.\n\nI am not eq1,1ating the affairs of the partnership with the affairs of the family.\n\nBut the entire business involved a family undertaking, and those affairs were being managed in British India. This control and management of the businesses was, in fact, and for purposes of the law of Income-tax, control and management of the 'affairs' of the Hindu undivided family within British India, . a_nd the family must, therefore, be regarded as resident in the accounting year within British India. In my judgment, the decision of the Bombay High Court, with respect was erroneous. The answer to the question ought to have been in the affirmative.\n\nI would, therefore. dissolve the answer given by the Bombay High Court, and instead, would answer the question in the affirmative.\n\nI would also order that\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncome-tax, Bombay City\n\nNand(al Gandalal\n\nHidayatullah J.\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncome-tax, Bombay City v.\n\nNcmdlal Gandalal\n\nHidayatullahJ.\n\nthe respondent bear his own costs and pay those of the appellant here and throughout.\n\nORDER OF COURT.\n\nIn accordance with the majority judgment of the Court, the appeal is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nSTATE OF BOMBAY\n\nSUPREME GENERAL FILMS EXCHANGE LTD. (with connected appeal)\n\n(S. K. DAs, A. K. SARKAR and M. HrnAYATULLAH, JJ.)\n\nCourt Fee-Amendment of statute enabling levy of higher court fee-When retrospective-Suit instituted before amendment, appeal filed thereafter-Court fee on memorandum of appeal-Court Fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870), ss. 4, 6, Sch. I, Art. 1-Court Fees (Bombay Amendment) Act, 1954 (Rom. 12 of 1954).\n\nIn 1954 certain amendments were made in the Court Fees Act, 1870, as applied to Bombay by the Court Fees (Bombay Amendment) Act, 1954, by which the system of charging court fees in the Bombay High Court on the Original Side was altered and instead of a fixed fee payable on the plaint, etc., ad valorem fees became leviable. The amendments came into force on April 1, 1954, but there was no provision, express or by necessary intendment, for giving them retrospective effect.\n\nIn respect of appeals filed after that date against decrees passed in suits instituted before that date, the question arose as to whether the court fees payable on the memoranda of appeal were according to the law in force at the date of the filing of the suits or according to the law in force at the date of the filing of appeals: Held, that the court fees payable on the memoranda of appeal were according to the law as it stood at the date of the filing of the suits.\n\nAn impairment of the right of appeal by putting a new restriction thereon or imposing a more onerous condition is not a matter of procedure only; it impairs or imperils a substantive right and an enactment which does so is not retrospective unless it says\" so expressly or by necessary intendment.\n\nHoosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and others, [1953] S.C.R. 987 and Garikapatti Veerayya v.\n\nN. Subbiah Choudhury, [1957] S.C.R. 488, followed.\n\nA Reference under Section 5 of the Court Fees Act, (1954) 57 Born. L.R. 180, Amara Eswaramma and others v.\n\nMakkam\n\n....\n\nr f .", "total_entities": 140, "entities": [{"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 66, "end_char": 69, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.K. DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 449, "end_char": 459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ".Jha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 704, "end_char": 708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This position was indeed fairly concluded by Mr. .Jha who agreed that in view of this it was not necessary for us to decide whether the Receiver of an Estate is by that fact itself an agent of the owners of the estate duly authorised to make acknowledgments under s. 19 of the Limitation Act."}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 919, "end_char": 924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 932, "end_char": 946, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1069, "end_char": 1074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1082, "end_char": 1096, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nBOMBAY CITY, HOMBAY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1362, "end_char": 1414, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY CITY, BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "NANDLAL GANDALAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1416, "end_char": 1432, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NANDLAL GANDALAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "L. KAPUR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1449, "end_char": 1457, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.L. KAPUR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1462, "end_char": 1477, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1765, "end_char": 1792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 4A(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1807, "end_char": 1816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Kathiwar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1895, "end_char": 1903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N, a coparcener of the Hindu undivided family of G, carrying on business in Kathiwar, then outside British India, entered into a partnership with strangers in Bombay in 1944."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1978, "end_char": 1984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N, a coparcener of the Hindu undivided family of G, carrying on business in Kathiwar, then outside British India, entered into a partnership with strangers in Bombay in 1944."}}, {"text": "Banaras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2238, "end_char": 2245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The partnership started another firm in Banaras and a third brother of N joined the firm."}}, {"text": "s. 4(l)(b)(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2489, "end_char": 2504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2512, "end_char": 2539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3015, "end_char": 3023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "S. K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3084, "end_char": 3093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision of the Appellate Tribunal was upheld by the High Court in a reference under s. 66(1) of the Act made at the instance of the appellant: Held (per S. K. Das and J. L. Kapur, JJ.),", "canonical_name": "S. K. DasJ."}}, {"text": "J. L. Kapur", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3098, "end_char": 3109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision of the Appellate Tribunal was upheld by the High Court in a reference under s. 66(1) of the Act made at the instance of the appellant: Held (per S. K. Das and J. L. Kapur, JJ.),"}}, {"text": "s. 4A(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3175, "end_char": 3183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3198, "end_char": 3212, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Partnership Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3571, "end_char": 3599, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 4A(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3756, "end_char": 3764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4038, "end_char": 4052, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4349, "end_char": 4361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Hidayatullah, J.-Under s. 4A(b) of the Indian Incometax Act, what are really affairs of the Hindu undivided family must be decided in the light of the Hindu law, and not the law of Partnership.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "s. 4A(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4372, "end_char": 4380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Commissioner of Income-tax Bombay City v.\n\nN and lat Gandalal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5121, "end_char": 5182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Where the Hindu undivided family enters into a business activity in the taxable territories through its coparceners, invests money and earns income, even though the partnership which results may not be an\n\n17-6 SCI/ND/82\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax Bombay City v.\n\nN and lat Gandalal\n\nCommissioner of lncame-tax, Bombay City v.\n\nNandlal Gandalal\n\nS. K. Das :J.\n\n\"affair\" of the family, there is still a business activity resulting in the partnership and the partnership is the evidence of that business activity.", "canonical_name": "Commissioner of\n\nIncome-tax, Bombay City v.\n\nN cndlal Gandalal"}}, {"text": "s. 4A(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5560, "end_char": 5568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5583, "end_char": 5597, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mangalchand Mohanlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5713, "end_char": 5733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Approvier v. Rama Subba Aiyan, [1866] 11 M.I.A. 75, Katma Natchiar v. Rajah of Slzivaganga, [1864] 9 M.I.A. 539, Mangalchand Mohanlal, In re, [1952] 21 I.T.R. 164, Murugappa Chetty & Sons\n\nv. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1952] 21 I.T.R. 311 and Kaniram Hazarimull v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1955] 27 I.T.R. 294, referred to.", "canonical_name": "Mangalchand Mohanlal"}}, {"text": "Daphtary", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6521, "end_char": 6529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, R. Ganapath;1 l;1er and D. Gupta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "D. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6583, "end_char": 6591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, R. Ganapath;1 l;1er and D. Gupta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. ]. Kolah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6613, "end_char": 6624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. ]."}}, {"text": "S. N. Andley", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6626, "end_char": 6638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kolah, S. N. Andley,\n\n.J.\n\nDadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Dadachanji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6646, "end_char": 6656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kolah, S. N. Andley,\n\n.J.\n\nDadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6658, "end_char": 6672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kolah, S. N. Andley,\n\n.J.\n\nDadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "P. L. Vohra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6677, "end_char": 6688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kolah, S. N. Andley,\n\n.J.\n\nDadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Kapur", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6760, "end_char": 6765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The .Judgment of S. K. Das and Kapur, JJ.,"}}, {"text": "S. K. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6852, "end_char": 6861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. DAs, J.-This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment and orders of the High Court of Bombay dated February 16, 19.'i.", "canonical_name": "S. K. DasJ."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6937, "end_char": 6957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. DAs, J.-This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment and orders of the High Court of Bombay dated February 16, 19.'i."}}, {"text": "section 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7009, "end_char": 7022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7030, "end_char": 7057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Gandalal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7177, "end_char": 7185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reference was made in the following circumstances : The Hindu undivided family of one Gandalal carried on business in cloth in Watamped and might also have a right to have the matter determined by the court he had no vested\n\n- right in the procedure by which it was to be determined, and this procedure could be changed pending the suit and a change in procedure could not be said to deprive him of any vested right.\n\nIt would appear from what has been stated above that the decision proceeded on the footing that the amending Act conferred a new right of appeal, and not that it took away a vested right of appeal; and the reason of the decision was based on the principle that there is no vested right in the procednre by which the sufficiency of court fees is determined 'by a court.\n\nThat is a principle of a different character from the one v.re are concerned i; vit}1 in the present case, viz., the retrospective effect of a subsequent enactment which either takes away a right of appeal or impairs it by imposing a more stringent or onerous condition thereon. \\Ve do 11ot, therefore, think that the Allahabad decision helps the appellant.\n\nThe question was considered in reverse in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income-tax Commissioner, Delhi (') and the principle of Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving (') was applied.\n\nAnother decision in point is that of Nagendra Nath Bose v.\n\nMon Mohan Singh Roy (').\n\nIn that case the plaintiff instituted a suit for rent valued at Rs. J,306-15-0 and obtained a decree.\n\nIn execution of that decree the defaulting tenure was sold on November 20, 1926, for Rs. J ,600.\n\nOn December 19, l 928, an application was made under 0. 2 J, r. 90, of the Code of Civil Procedure, by the petitioner who was one of the judgment debtors for setting aside the sale.\n\nThat application having been dismissed for default of his appearance, the petitioner preferred an appeal to the District .Judge, Hoogly, who refused to admit the appeal on the gTound that the amount recoverable 111\n\n(1) [1927] L.R. 54- T.A. 421.\n\n(2) [1905] A.C. 31i9.\n\n(3) [1930] 34 C.W.N. 1009.\n\n> •\n\nr I\n\n- . -\n\nexecution of the decree had not . been deposited as required by the proviso to s. l 74(c) of the Bengal Tenancy Act as amended by an amending Act of 1928.\n\nThe contention of the petitioner was that the amending provision, which came into force on February 21, 1929, could not affect his right of appeal from the decision on an application made on December 19, 1928, for setting aside the sale.\n\nMitter, J., said: \"We think the contention of the petitioner is wellfouncled and must prevail. That a right of appeal is a substantive right cannot now be seriously disputed. lt is not a mere matter of procedure.\n\nPrior to the amendment of 1928 there was an appeal against an order refusing to set aside a sale (for that is the effect also where the application to set aside the sale is dismissed for default) under the provisions of Order 43, rule ( l ), of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nThat right was unhampered by any restriction of the kind now imposed by s. 174(5), proviso.\n\nThe Court was bound to admit the appeal whether the appellant deposited the amount recoverable in execution of the decree or not.\n\nBy requiring such deposit as a condition precedent to the admission of the appeal, a new restriction has been put on the right of appeal, the admission of which is now hedged in with a condition.\n\nThere Can be no doubt that the right of appeal has been affected by the new provision and in the absence of an express enactment this amendment cannot apply to proceedings pending at the elate when the new amendment came into force.\n\nIt is true that the appeal was filed after the Act came into force, but that circumstance is immaterial-for the date to be looked into for this purpose is the date of the original proceeding which eventually culminated in the appeal.\" This decision was approved by this Court both in Hoosein Kaam Dada (1) and Karikojlatti V eerayya (').\n\nIt is thus clear that in a long line of decisions approved by this Court and at least in one given by this Court, it has been held that an impairment of the right of appeal by putting a new restriction thereon or imposing a more onerous condition is not a matter of procedure only; it impairs or imp_erils a\n\n(IJ [1953] S.C.R. 987.\n\n(2) [1957] S.C.R 488.\n\nState of Bombay v.\n\nSupreme General Films Exchange Ltd.\n\nS. K. Das].\n\nState of Bombay\n\nSuj; reme Gener(!l\n\nlillms Exchange\n\nLid.\n\nS.K. Da.J.\n\nAf,,-il 22.\n\nsubstantive right and an enactment which does so is not retrospective unless it says so expressly or by necessary intendment.\n\n\\Ve are, therefore, of the view that the High Court was right in the view it took, and the orders of refund of excess court fees which it passed were correct in law.\n\nAccordingly, the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs.\n\nThere will be one set of costs, as the appeals have been consolidated and heard together.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\nBRlJENDRALAL GUPTA AND ANOTHER\n\nv. j\\\\'ALAPRASAD AND OTHERS. (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO and\n\nK. C. DAS GUPTA, JJ.) Election-Nomination, rejection of-Non-mention of age in nomination paper-If defect of substantial nature-Omission, if amounts to defect-Scrutiny-When enquiry necessary-Electoral Roll-Entry regarding age-How far conclusive-Representation of the People Act, 1951 (43 of 1951), ss. 33 and 36-Representation of the People Act, 1950 (43 of 1950), ss. 16 and 19.\n\nThirteen candicates filed their nomination papers for election to the Legislative Assembly of Madhya Pradesh.\n\nThe nomination of U was rejected on the ground that he failed to give a declaration as to his age as required in the nomination paper.\n\nAfter the poll the appellants were declared duly elected.\n\nThereupon one of the unsuccessful candidates J filed an elecion petition challenging the election of the appellants, inter alia, on the ground that the nomination of U had been improperly rejected.\n\nThe Election Tribunal dismissed the petition holding that U made no attempt before the returning officer to remedy the defect in the nomination paper, that the defect could not in law have been remedied at the stage of the scrutiny, that the defect was of a substantial character and that the rejection of the nomination was proper. On appeal the High Court held that at the time of the scrutiny U had offered to supply the omission but the returning officer had refused to allow him to do so, that the ret_urning officer was bound to make a summary enquiry before rejection,_ the nomination, that the non-mention of age in the nomination paper was not a defect of a substantial character and that the rejection of the nomination was improper and consequently allowed the appeal and set aside the election of the appellants:", "total_entities": 95, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF BOMBAY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 324, "end_char": 339, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "State. of Bombay", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SUPREME GENERAL FILMS EXCHANGE LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 341, "end_char": 375, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Supreme General\n\nFilms Exchange Ltd.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. K. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 403, "end_char": 412, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. K. DAs", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. K. SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 414, "end_char": 426, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.K. SARKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Court fee on memorandum of appeal-Court Fees Act, 1870", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 596, "end_char": 650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 4, 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 664, "end_char": 672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court fee on memorandum of appeal-Court Fees Act, 1870", "statute": "Court fee on memorandum of appeal-Court Fees Act, 1870"}}, {"text": "Art. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 682, "end_char": 688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court fee on memorandum of appeal-Court Fees Act, 1870", "statute": "Court fee on memorandum of appeal-Court Fees Act, 1870"}}, {"text": "Court Fees Act, 1870", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 793, "end_char": 813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 829, "end_char": 835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1954 certain amendments were made in the Court Fees Act, 1870, as applied to Bombay by the Court Fees (Bombay Amendment) Act, 1954, by which the system of charging court fees in the Bombay High Court on the Original Side was altered and instead of a fixed fee payable on the plaint, etc.,"}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 934, "end_char": 951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1954 certain amendments were made in the Court Fees Act, 1870, as applied to Bombay by the Court Fees (Bombay Amendment) Act, 1954, by which the system of charging court fees in the Bombay High Court on the Original Side was altered and instead of a fixed fee payable on the plaint, etc.,"}}, {"text": "April 1, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1108, "end_char": 1121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The amendments came into force on April 1, 1954, but there was no provision, express or by necessary intendment, for giving them retrospective effect."}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2190, "end_char": 2199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Court Fees Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2207, "end_char": 2221, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Seethamina", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2301, "end_char": 2311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Seethamina, A.I.R. 1955 Andhra 221, Arjun: v. Amrita and others, I.LR. ["}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2535, "end_char": 2563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "H. R. Khanna", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2731, "end_char": 2743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Khanna and R. H. Dhebar, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2748, "end_char": 2760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Khanna and R. H. Dhebar, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "S. D. Goswami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2783, "end_char": 2796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. D. Goswami and Gopal Singh, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Gopal Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2801, "end_char": 2812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. D. Goswami and Gopal Singh, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Court Fees Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3305, "end_char": 3319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "April 16, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3859, "end_char": 3873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 16, 1953, Messrs.\n\nSawaldas Madhavdas brought a suit against the Arati Cotton Mills Ltd., praying for a decree for rupees two lacs and odd."}}, {"text": "Sawaldas Madhavdas", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3884, "end_char": 3902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 16, 1953, Messrs.\n\nSawaldas Madhavdas brought a suit against the Arati Cotton Mills Ltd., praying for a decree for rupees two lacs and odd."}}, {"text": "Arati Cotton Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3930, "end_char": 3953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 16, 1953, Messrs.\n\nSawaldas Madhavdas brought a suit against the Arati Cotton Mills Ltd., praying for a decree for rupees two lacs and odd."}}, {"text": "July 22, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4030, "end_char": 4043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was decreed on July 22, 1954."}}, {"text": "September 4, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4130, "end_char": 4147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Arati Cotton Mills Ltd. filed a memorandum of appeal against the said decree on September 4, 1954, and paid court fees of Rs."}}, {"text": "October 5, l 954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4224, "end_char": 4240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On or about October 5, l 954, a settlement was arrived at between the parties and on October 9, 1954, a prayer was made for dismissal of the appeal for want of prosecution."}}, {"text": "October 9, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4297, "end_char": 4312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On or about October 5, l 954, a settlement was arrived at between the parties and on October 9, 1954, a prayer was made for dismissal of the appeal for want of prosecution."}}, {"text": "November 18, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4389, "end_char": 4406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 18, 1954, an application was\n\n1960 . •"}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4595, "end_char": 4618, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "December 17, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5997, "end_char": 6014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, on December 17, 1953, Messrs. Rasiklal and Company Ltd., brought a suit against Messrs. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. and two other defendants in which a decree was passed on May 11, 1954, for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Rasiklal and Company Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6024, "end_char": 6049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, on December 17, 1953, Messrs. Rasiklal and Company Ltd., brought a suit against Messrs. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. and two other defendants in which a decree was passed on May 11, 1954, for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6082, "end_char": 6117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, on December 17, 1953, Messrs. Rasiklal and Company Ltd., brought a suit against Messrs. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. and two other defendants in which a decree was passed on May 11, 1954, for a sum of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Supreme General\n\nFilms Exchange Ltd."}}, {"text": "May 11, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6175, "end_char": 6187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, on December 17, 1953, Messrs. Rasiklal and Company Ltd., brought a suit against Messrs. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. and two other defendants in which a decree was passed on May 11, 1954, for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6233, "end_char": 6268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H,876-12-0 against Messrs. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd.\n\nThe latter filed a memorandum of appeal on July 31, 1954, and paid court fees of Rs."}}, {"text": "July 31, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6313, "end_char": 6326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H,876-12-0 against Messrs. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd.\n\nThe latter filed a memorandum of appeal on July 31, 1954, and paid court fees of Rs."}}, {"text": "September 27, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6441, "end_char": 6459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal was, however, withdrawn with the leave of the High Court on September 27, 1954."}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6816, "end_char": 6831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~·\n\nBoth the applications were heard together after .issue of notice to the Advocate-General, Bombay, who appeared for 'the State of Bombay and opposed the applications."}}, {"text": "November 24, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6895, "end_char": 6912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its judgment and order dated November 24, 1954, the High Court allowed the applications."}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7356, "end_char": 7365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Court Fees Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7373, "end_char": 7387, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Schedule II", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7597, "end_char": 7608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7610, "end_char": 7617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Court Fees Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7631, "end_char": 7645, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8210, "end_char": 8233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Relying on the decision of this Court in H oosein Kasam Dada (India) Ltd. v.\n\nThe State of Madhya Pradesh and Others (') and certain other decisions to which we shall presently refer.,"}}, {"text": "State. of Bombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8981, "end_char": 8997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State.", "canonical_name": "State. of Bombay"}}, {"text": "Supreme General\n\nFilms Exchange Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8999, "end_char": 9035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Bombay\n\nSupreme General\n\nFilms Exchange Ltd.\n\nS.K. Das].", "canonical_name": "Supreme General\n\nFilms Exchange Ltd."}}, {"text": "Supreme General Films Exchangt\n\nLtd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9069, "end_char": 9105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Bombay v.\n\nSupreme General Films Exchangt\n\nLtd.\n\nS.K. Das].", "canonical_name": "Supreme General\n\nFilms Exchange Ltd."}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9323, "end_char": 9332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Court Fees Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9340, "end_char": 9354, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10816, "end_char": 10825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Court Fees Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10833, "end_char": 10847, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11851, "end_char": 11855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11869, "end_char": 11873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Court Fees Act, 1870", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11881, "end_char": 11901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12883, "end_char": 12896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Court Fees Act, 1870", "statute": "the Court Fees Act, 1870"}}, {"text": "Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12904, "end_char": 12951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "November 25, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13197, "end_char": 13214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Act was amended on November 25, 1949, ; ind s. 22(1) as amended provided that no appeal' should be admitted by the said authority unless such\n\n; i.ppeal was accompanied by satisfactory proof of the payment of the tax in respect of which the appeal had (I) [19!i3] S.C.R. 987."}}, {"text": "s. 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13222, "end_char": 13230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14038, "end_char": 14046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Court Fees Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15046, "end_char": 15060, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Garikapatti Veerayya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15462, "end_char": 15482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The point of the decision in Garikapatti Veerayya (') is, however, this: this Court referred with approval to decisions which accepted the position that taking away a right of appeal and imposing a more onerous condition on such right involved the same principles as to retrospective effect of the subsequent legislation."}}, {"text": "Punya Nahako", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16003, "end_char": 16015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant has relied on In re: Punya Nahako (3)."}}, {"text": "Court Fees Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16193, "end_char": 16207, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16322, "end_char": 16328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Chief Justice (Chagla, C.J.) expressed the· opinion that a review does not stand on the same footing as an appeal, and one cannot say that there is a substantive right of review."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16581, "end_char": 16598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be pointed out here that even in respect of a review, a view different from that of the Madras High Court was taken in Parmeshar K urmi v. Bakhtwar Pande (')."}}, {"text": "Bihar and Orissa Court Fees Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16995, "end_char": 17026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 6A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17409, "end_char": 17414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar and Orissa Court Fees Act", "statute": "Bihar and Orissa Court Fees Act"}}, {"text": "Court Fees Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17422, "end_char": 17436, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 6A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17752, "end_char": 17757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar and Orissa Court Fees Act", "statute": "Bihar and Orissa Court Fees Act"}}, {"text": "State", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18096, "end_char": 18101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Bombay v.\n\nSupreme General Films Exchange\n\nLtd.\n\nS. K. Das J.\n\nState of Bombay v.\n\nSupreme General\n\nFilms Exchange Ltd.\n\nS.K. Das:J.\n\nthe date on which he filed the plaint, it only conferred on him a new right; nor did it Lake away any right which was vested in the defendant, for though the defendant could object if the plaint was not properly >tamped and might also have a right to have the matter determined by the court he had no vested\nright in the procedure by which it was to be determined, and this procedure could be changed pending the suit and a change in procedure could not be said to deprive him of any vested right."}}, {"text": "Supreme General Films Exchange\n\nLtd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18116, "end_char": 18152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Bombay v.\n\nSupreme General Films Exchange\n\nLtd.\n\nS. K. Das J.\n\nState of Bombay v.\n\nSupreme General\n\nFilms Exchange Ltd.\n\nS.K. Das:J.\n\nthe date on which he filed the plaint, it only conferred on him a new right; nor did it Lake away any right which was vested in the defendant, for though the defendant could object if the plaint was not properly >tamped and might also have a right to have the matter determined by the court he had no vested\nright in the procedure by which it was to be determined, and this procedure could be changed pending the suit and a change in procedure could not be said to deprive him of any vested right.", "canonical_name": "Supreme General\n\nFilms Exchange Ltd."}}, {"text": "S. K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18154, "end_char": 18163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Bombay v.\n\nSupreme General Films Exchange\n\nLtd.\n\nS. K. Das J.\n\nState of Bombay v.\n\nSupreme General\n\nFilms Exchange Ltd.\n\nS.K. Das:J.\n\nthe date on which he filed the plaint, it only conferred on him a new right; nor did it Lake away any right which was vested in the defendant, for though the defendant could object if the plaint was not properly >tamped and might also have a right to have the matter determined by the court he had no vested\nright in the procedure by which it was to be determined, and this procedure could be changed pending the suit and a change in procedure could not be said to deprive him of any vested right.", "canonical_name": "S. K. DAs"}}, {"text": "S.K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18226, "end_char": 18234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Bombay v.\n\nSupreme General Films Exchange\n\nLtd.\n\nS. K. Das J.\n\nState of Bombay v.\n\nSupreme General\n\nFilms Exchange Ltd.\n\nS.K. Das:J.\n\nthe date on which he filed the plaint, it only conferred on him a new right; nor did it Lake away any right which was vested in the defendant, for though the defendant could object if the plaint was not properly >tamped and might also have a right to have the matter determined by the court he had no vested\nright in the procedure by which it was to be determined, and this procedure could be changed pending the suit and a change in procedure could not be said to deprive him of any vested right.", "canonical_name": "S. K. DAs"}}, {"text": "Allahabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19429, "end_char": 19438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\Ve do 11ot, therefore, think that the Allahabad decision helps the appellant."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19512, "end_char": 19517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question was considered in reverse in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income-tax Commissioner, Delhi (') and the principle of Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving (') was applied."}}, {"text": "November 20, 1926", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19917, "end_char": 19934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In execution of that decree the defaulting tenure was sold on November 20, 1926, for Rs."}}, {"text": "December 19, l 928", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19956, "end_char": 19974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 19, l 928, an application was made under 0."}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20024, "end_char": 20051, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "District .Judge, Hoogly", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20248, "end_char": 20271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That application having been dismissed for default of his appearance, the petitioner preferred an appeal to the District .Judge, Hoogly, who refused to admit the appeal on the gTound that the amount recoverable 111\n\n(1) [1927] L.R. 54- T.A. 421."}}, {"text": "February 21, 1929", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20698, "end_char": 20715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contention of the petitioner was that the amending provision, which came into force on February 21, 1929, could not affect his right of appeal from the decision on an application made on December 19, 1928, for setting aside the sale."}}, {"text": "December 19, 1928", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20798, "end_char": 20815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contention of the petitioner was that the amending provision, which came into force on February 21, 1929, could not affect his right of appeal from the decision on an application made on December 19, 1928, for setting aside the sale."}}, {"text": "Mitter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20846, "end_char": 20852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mitter, J., said: \"We think the contention of the petitioner is wellfouncled and must prevail."}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21305, "end_char": 21332, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 174(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21407, "end_char": 21416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hoosein Kaam Dada", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22274, "end_char": 22291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This decision was approved by this Court both in Hoosein Kaam Dada (1) and Karikojlatti V eerayya (')."}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22755, "end_char": 22770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Bombay\n\nSuj; reme Gener(!l\n\nlillms Exchange\n\nLid.", "canonical_name": "State. of Bombay"}}, {"text": "BRlJENDRALAL GUPTA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23306, "end_char": 23324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BRlJENDRALAL GUPTA AND ANOTHER\n\nv. j\\\\'ALAPRASAD AND OTHERS. ("}}, {"text": "j\\\\'ALAPRASAD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23341, "end_char": 23354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BRlJENDRALAL GUPTA AND ANOTHER\n\nv. j\\\\'ALAPRASAD AND OTHERS. ("}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23368, "end_char": 23388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO and\n\nK. C. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23390, "end_char": 23403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO and\n\nK. C. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23409, "end_char": 23424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO and\n\nK. C. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23653, "end_char": 23691, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 33 and 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23706, "end_char": 23719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Scrutiny-When enquiry necessary-Electoral Roll-Entry regarding age-How far conclusive-Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "Scrutiny-When enquiry necessary-Electoral Roll-Entry regarding age-How far conclusive-Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23720, "end_char": 23758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 16 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23773, "end_char": 23786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act, 1950", "statute": "Representation of the People Act, 1950"}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_669_680_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "-. .: -\n\n3 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 669\n\nM/S. PIYARE LAL ADISHWAR LAL v.\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, DELHI.\n\n(S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR and M. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.) Income Tax-Agreement between Treasurer and Bank--Construction-Treasurr, whether servant of Bank-Treasurer furnishing security of joint family property-Emoluments received by Treasurer, whether income of joint f amily-lndian Income-tax Act, 1922 (1] of 1922) SS. 7 JO.\n\nS was the karta of the Hindu undivided family, consisting of himself and his younger brother. Their father was the Treasurer of a Bank till his death in 1950.\n\nDuring his father's lifetime S was employed as an overseer in the Bank on a salary of Rs. 400 a month, and, subsequently, after his father's death he was appointed Treasurer of the Bank at Delhi and sixteen other branches of the Bank.\n\nAs Treasurer he furnished security to the Bank of ceriain properties of the Hindu undivided family.\n\nThe agreement dated September 19, 1950, between him and the Bank, showed that he was appointed Treasurer on a monthly salary of Rs. 1,750 and he was also paid certain sums of money for guaranteeing the conduct of the cashiers and other members of the Cash Department Staff which he was . required to employ with the approval of the Bank.\n\nHe was to carry out his duties as directed by the Bank and if in the discharge of his duties he caused. any loss to the Bank he was liable to make good the loss.\n\nHe was not required to serve personally, but his services could be terminated by notice. In the vear of account 1950-51 he received from the Bank a sum of Rs. 23.286 as Treasurer. The Income-tax authorities considered that this sum was not the individual income of S as salary but was part of the income of the Hindu undivided family and taxed it as such on the grounds (1) that the agreement between S and the Bank showed that the relationship between them was no~ one of master and servant but that of an employer and independent contractor and that the emoluments received by the Treasurer were profits and gains of business, (2) that S was appointed Treasurer not on account of any personal qualification but because his father was a Treasurer --rof the Bank before him, and (3) that as the security furnished by\n\nS came out of the joint family properties, the emoluments could\n\nIJOt be said to have been earned without detriment to the family property and therefore were part of the Hindu undivided family: Held, (1) That on the true construction of the agreement dated September 19, 1950, the Treasurer was a servant of the Bank.\n\nSivanandan Sharma v. The Puniab National Bank Ltd. [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1427 and Dharangadlzara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra, [1957] S.C.R. 152, relied on.\n\n(2) That in view of the fact that there was nothing to show that S had received any particular training at the expense of the\n\n23-6 SCI/ND/82\n\nApril 26.\n\n196G\n\nPiyare Lal Adishwar Lai\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncome-tax,\n\nDelhi •\n\nKapur J.\n\nfamily funds or that his appointmen_t as Treasurer was the result of any outlay or expenditure of or detriment to the family property, but on the other hand his previous experience as an overseer of the Bank was indicative of personal fitness for his appointment as Treasurer, the mere fact he had lodged joint family property by way of security would not make his earnings as Treasurer part of the income of the Hindu undivided family.\n\nThe use of the words \"risk of\" and \"detriment to\" in Gokul Chand v. Firm Hukum Chand Nath Mal, (1921) L.R. 48 I.A. 162, explained.\n\n\nAccordingly, the emoluments received by S were in the nature of salary and therccore assessable under s. 7 of the Indian Incom<;-tax Act, 1922, and not under s. 10 of the Act as profits and gains of business, and the salary was the income of the individual, S, and not the income of the Hindu undivided family.\n\nCrvIL APPELLATE JimrsmcTION: Civil Appeal No. 123 of 1957.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated May 12, 1955, of the Punjab High Court in Civil Reference No. l 7 /1953. .\n\nA. V. Viswanatha Sastri, S. N. Andley, ]. B. Dadachanji, Ramcshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellants.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, R. Ganapathy Iyer and D. Gupta, for the respondent.\n\n1960. April 26. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKAPUR, J.-This is an appeal against the judgment and order of the High Court of Punjab made on a reference under s. 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act which was answered in favour of the Commissioner of Income-tax. The appellant is the assessee-a Hindu undivided family-with Sheel Chandra as its Karta and the respondent is the Commissioner of Income-tax.\n\nThe appeal relates to the assessment year 1951-!>2.\n\nThe appellant, a Hindu undivicjed family, consisted of Sheel Chandra and his younger brother.\n\nTheir father, Adishwar Lal, upto his death on April 16, 1950, was the Treasurer of several branches of the Central Bank of India (which in the judgment will be referred to as the Bank).\n\nDuring his father's lifetime Sheel Chandra was employed as an Overseer in the Bank on a salary of Rs. 400 a month.\n\nSheel Chandra was appointed Treasurer of the Bank at Delhi and sixteen\n\n- -\n\nother branches of the Bank. As Treasurer he furnished security to the Bank of certain properties of the Hindu undivided family, which consisted of title deeds of immovable properties in Chandni Chowk, Delhi, and Government of India securities of -the value of Rs. 75,000.\n\nThe Hindu undivided family owns considerable property.\n\nIts income from house property alone is Rs. 50,000 per annum 'lnd it owns stocks, shares and Government securities also of considerable value.\n\nAs Treasurer Sheel Chandra received in the year of account from the Bank a sum of Rs. 23,286 and the question for decision is whether this sum is the individual income of Sheel Chandra as salary or it is part of the income of the Hindu undivided family.\n\nThe Income-tax Authorities held this sum to .be the latter and taxed it as such.\n\nThe Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in upholding this view held that on a proper construction of the written agreement between Sheel Chandra and the Bank, the emoluments received by the Treasurer were profits and gains of business and it further held1 that as the security furnished by Sheel Chandra came out of the joint family properties, the emoluments could not be said to have been earned without detriment to the family property and therefore were part of the income of the Hindu undivided family.\n\nAt the instance of the appellant the Tribunal referred under s. 66(1) the following two questions to the High Court: -\n\n(1) \"Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case and on a true construction of the agreement between the Central Bank of India and Sheel Chandra the salary and other emoluments received by Sheel Chandra as Treasurer of the said Bank are assessable under the head 'salary' or under the head 'Profits and gains of business'.\"\n\n(2) \"Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, Sheel Chandra's emoluments as Treasurer of the Central Bank of India Ltd. were rightly assessed in the hands of the Hindu undivided family of which he is the Karta\".\n\nBoth questions were answered against the appellant.\n\nOn a consideration of the various clauses of the agreement between Sheel Chandra and the Bank, the\n\nPiyare Lal Arlishwar Lal\n\nCommissioner of income-tax, Delhi\n\nKapur J.\n\nPi_yare Lal Adishwar Lal v.\n\nCommissioner of\n\nlncometax,\n\nDelhi\n\nKap11r j.\n\nHigh Court held that the relationship between them was not one of master and servant but that of an employer and independent contractor and therefore the emoluments received by Sheel Chandra as Treasurer were not salary but profits and gains of business.\n\nAs to the second question the High Court was of the opinion that the emoluments were the income of the Hindu undivided family because Sheel Chandra was not appointed Treasurer on account of any personal qualification but be was appointed becanse (a) his father was a Treasurer of the Bank before him and (b) he had furnished substantial security which was part of the property of the Hindu undivided family.\n\nAgainst this judgment and order the appellant has come in appeal to this Court.\n\nThe nature of the employment of Sheel Chandra has to be gathered from the agreement dated September 19, 1950, between him and the Bank.\n\nIt shows that on his application for appointment as a Treasurer at \"Delhi and sixteen other branches of the Bank, the Bank appointed him Treasurer for those branches and he could, by mutual agTcement, be appointed at other branches in the Punjab, U. P. and Rajasthan.\n\nThe appointment took effect from April 16, 1950.\n\nSheel Chandra undertook to perform the duties and be responsible as Treasurer of the various branches of the Bank and was required to engage and employ subordinate staff called the Cash Department Staff such as Head Cashiers, Cashiers, Potdars, Guaranteed Peons, Godown Keepers, Assistant Godown Keepers, Chowkidars and Clerks and other persons necessary for the efficient working of the said offices.\n\nHe h~:l the power to \"control, dismiss and change\" this Staff at his pleasure but he could not engage or transfer any member of the Staff except with the approval of the Bank and had to dismiss any such member if so required by the Managing Director of the Bank or Agent of the Office.\n\nThe Treasurer and the Cash Department Staff were to do and be responsible for all work in connection with receipts and payments of monies and bad to do such other work as was customarily done by cashiers\n\n--\n\nand shroffs of Banks. The Treasurer was also responsible for the correctness and genuineness of all hundies and cheques bearing signatures and endorsements in vernacular and for genuineness of all signatures and writings in any language or character or any securities, voucher deeds, documen_ts and writings which the Treasurer or. the Cash Department Staff dealt with and in case of any loss or damage arising out of any forged signatures and endorsements on any document accepted or dealt with by the Cash Department Staff as correct and geni1ine, the Treasurer was responsible to make good the loss.\n\nHe was also required,· when asked by the Bank, to engage the necessary staff, to look after the goods pledged with the Bank and he was responsible for the good conduct of such staff.\n\nIt was also his duty to make enquiries and report upon the identity, credit and solvency of persons dealing with the Bank and was liable for any loss arising out of any wilful misrepre, sentation or negligence in the enquiry or report made by him or his representative in any matter arising in the course of employment.\n\nHe or his representative were also required, when asked, to give reliable information in regard to hundi business but he was not responsible for any damage or loss arising therefrom.\n\nHe also undertook when required by the Officers of the Bank to value and give correct certificate in regard to the genuineness, fineness and weight of bullion and gold ornaments and other valuable pledged with the Bank.\n\nHe was responsible for any loss to the Bank in case of any wilful misrepresentation or negligence in regard to this branch of his duty.\n\nHe further undertook to supply to the Bank as many persons as were required at the various branches of the Bank which the Bank opened in future.\n\nHe undertook responsibility for the safe custody of the nionies and ornaments and other valuables kept with or pledged with the Bank as also for the . Bills of exchange, promissory notes, hundies or other securities.\n\nBesides .this he was required to satisfy the Agent r the ¥anager of the branch that all the monies of the Bank fq1id other valuable securities which had not been duly\n\nPiyare Lal Adishwar Lal v.\n\nCommissiotJer of\n\nIncome.tax,\n\nDelhi\n\nKapur].\n\nPi.yare Lnl Adishwar Lal\n\nCommissiontr of\n\nIncome-tax,\n\n!Jelhi\n\nKapur J.\n\nused and accounted for were intact and in their proper places.\n\nSheel Chandra was paid a salary of Rs. 1,750 per mensum for all the branches he was employed in.\n\nBesides this he was paid certain sums of money for guaranteeing the conduct of Godown Keepers, Assistant Godown Keepers and Chowkidars supplied by him. If the branches or out-agencies were increased he was to receive such increase in salary as might mutually be agreed upon.\n\nOn the closing of any branch there was to be a corresponding reduction in the remuneration. The members of the Cash Department Staff were to be paid travelling allowance according to the rules of the Bank.\n\nIn addition to the remuneration above mentioned the Treasurer or his authorised representative when v1s1tmg different branches were to get actual railway fare. The various members of the Cash Department Staff were to be paid their salary directly by the Bank but the Bank was not bound to pay more than the scale laid down by it.\n\nThe permanent members of the Cash Department Staff were to get the usual increments and benefit of Provident Fund and travelling allowance in accordance with the rules of the Bank. The Treasurer was required to engage members of the Cash Staff on salaries laid down by the Bank and if he paid anything more than the usual Bank scale he had to pay it himself.\n\nThe Treasurer was also entitled to nominate and appoint a representative to carry on the duties undertaken by him at the various offices of the Bank but these appointments were subject to the approval of the Bank.\n\nThe Treasurer was responsible for the acts of omission and commission and for neglect and default of his representatives and for each and every member of the Cash Department Staff. There are various clauses in the agreement requiring the Treasurer or his representative to perform their duties efficiently, honestly and in a proper manner.\n\nThe Treasurer ' and the Cash Department Staff were under t.he control of the Bank. \"They were required to make enquiries in the books of account which were furnished by the Bank giving full particulars of all monies received and paid\n\n- --\n\n. .\n\n1960 by them and in such manner as the Agent of the Bank might from time to time direct in writing.\n\nThe Treasurer had to carry out his duties faithfully and Jtf,:ar Lfat any communication made by the Bank to any member v. of the Cash Department Staff was to be considered as Commissioner •f d\n\nlncomt-tax, a communication made to the Treasurer himself an Delhi he was bound to take notice of it.\n\nThe agreement could be terminated by three calendar months' notice\n\niIJ writing by either side but in the event of any breach of any condition of the agreement by the Treasurer his services could be terminated forthwith; but his liability was to continue. There was also an arbitration clause.\n\nCounsel for the appellant contended that the various provisions of the agreement showed that Sheel Chandra was a servant of the Bank and not an indepndent contractor.\n\nHe laid particular emphasis on the fact that he was appointed a Treasurer on a monthly salary and his services could be terminated forthwith in certain circumstances.\n\nBesides this he\n\nws to carry out his duties as directed by the Bank and was to discharge his duties faithfully and if in the discharge of his duties he caused any loss to the Bank he was liable to make good the loss.\n\nThese factors, according to him, showed that he was not an independent contrnctor or an agent of the Bank but was a salaried servant. The contention on behalf of the respondent on the other hand was that the agreement ' showed that Sheel Chandra was carrying on a business in that he was supplying cashiers and other members of the Cash Department Staff for a monetary consideration.\n\nHe guaranteed their fidelity which was an insurance undertaken by him.\n\nHe was to get certain sums of money for supplying each member of certain classes of servants to the Bank and the agreement between the Bank and Sheel Chandra could be terminated by notice and there was an arbitration clause and he was not required to serve personally.\n\nUndoubtedly there are some terms in the agreement which are unusual as ordinary agreements of service go but in the case of an agreement between a Bank and a Treasurer they are not so unusual.\n\nThere was\n\nKapur J.\n\nPi)•are Lal Adishwar Lal v.\n\nComrnissio11er of l11conu-tax,\n\nDelhi\n\nKapur J.\n\nan agreement with very similar dauses in Shivanandan Sharma v. The Punjab National Bank Ltd. (') and it was held to be an agreement of service and not of agency.\n\nNow, the duties of Sheel Chandra under the agreement are such as are peculiar to the employment of Treasurers.\n\nIt is true that as Treasurer, Sheel Chandra had also undertaken to indemnify the Bank not only for his own default but also for the default of the members of the Cash Department Staff.\n\nBut Banks have to deal with monies, valuable securities, g<; lld and other valuables and must necessarily employ servants whose honesty is guaranteed and it is necessary for the Bank to have someone in its employment wLo can perform these duties in a responsible manner and be answerable to the Bank for negligence and default in the performance of this class of work.\n\nIn the very nature of things one man cannot do all this work, not even at one branch, what to say of several branches; other people have therefore to be employee! and although the persons. employed in the Cash Departi:nent are servants of the Bank they do the work which Treasurers ordinarily and customarily do and consequently the Treasurer is made responsible for any damage which the Bank suffers due to the default of the Treasurer or of those em ployed to do the work of the Cash Department.\n\nIt is difficult' to lay clown any one test to distinguish the relationship of master and servant from that of an employer and independent contractor.\n\nIn many cases the test laid clown is that in the case of master and servant the master can order or require what is to be done and how it is to be clone but in the case of an independent contractor an employer can only say what is to be done but not how it shall be done. But this test also does not apply to all cases, e.g., in the case of Ship's master, a chauffeur or a reporter of a newspaper.\n\nIt was pointed out in Cassid)' v. Ministry of Health (') that in the case of contract of service \"a man is employed as part of the business, and his work is done as an integral part of the business whereas under a contract for services the contractor is not (I) (195c•] 1 S.C.R. 112i. (2)\n\n[1951] 2 K.B. 343, 352·3.\n\n- -\n\nintegrated into the business but is only accessory to it\". In certam cases it has been laid down that the indicia of a contract of service are (a) the master's power of selection of the servant; (b) the payment of wages or other remunerations; (c) the master's right to control the method of doing the work and (d) the master's right of suspension or dismissal: Short v.\n\nI and Henderson Ltd. (1).\n\nBhagwati, J., in Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra (2) said that in all cases the correct method of approach is whether having regard to the nature of work there was due control and supervision by the employer.\n\nWe have given above the duties of the Treasurer in the present case, his obligations and the manner of control exercised over him and the staff employed by him to carry out the work of the Cash Department of the Bank.\n\nIt is no doubt true that the Treasurer guaranteed his fidelity, good faitl). and ho; nesty of the persons who were employed in the Cash Department of the Bank but that was a part of the duty that he undertook and that is peculiar to the very nature of his' employment.\n\nApplying the test which was laid down by Bhagwati, J., in Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saur0;5htra (') that having regard to the nature of the work whether there was due control and supervision of the Bank over the Treasurer, the Treasurer in the instant case must be held to be a servant of the Bank.\n\nWhat we have to see is the effect of the agreement as a whole and taking the various clauses together it must be held that Sheel Chandra, the Treasurer, was a servant of the Bank.\n\nIn view of this it is not necessary to discuss in detail the various cases that were cited at the bar. K. P. Bhargava v. The Commissioner vf Income- Tax, U. P. (') was the case of .a Treasurer of the Central Bank of India at Agra.\n\nThere he was paid a salary of Rs. I 00 and a commission for his work as a Guarantee Commission Agent but the terms of the contract were different and that was clearly a case of a Guarantee Commission Agency.\n\n(I) 62 T.L.R. 427, 429. (2)\n\n[1957] S.C.R. 152, 160.\n\n(3) [1954] 26 I.T.R, 489. .\n\n24-6 SCI/ND/82\n\nPiyare Lal Adishwar Lal\n\nCommisJioner of\n\nIn.come-tax,\n\nDell; ii\n\nKapur J.\n\nPiyare Lal Adishwar Lal\n\nLala ]eewan Lal v. Commissione1 of lncomelax (')' was also a case of commission agency and in the pecu\n\nliar circumstances of that case it was held to be business within s. 2(5) of the Excess Profits Tax Act.\n\nCommissiontr of The assessee there was paid a commission of 4 annas\n\nIncometax, per cent. on the value of the contracts secured b)' him.\n\nDelhi\n\nKapur J.\n\nSubsequently the commission was increased to Re. 1 per cent. and for this extra commission he agreed to reimburse the m.ill in case of failure of a person purchasing through him to pay the price. Counsel for the respondent: also relied on Commissioner of hu:om.c-fa.\"\n\nv. Kalu Babu Lal Chand (') where the Managing Director's remuneration was held to be the income of a joint family to be assessed as such in its hands. That case is distinguishable.\n\nThere the karta of a Hindu undivided family took over a business as a going concern and carried on the business till the company was\n\nincorporated.\n\nThe shares in the name of karta and his brother were acquired with the funds of the joint family.\n\nThe company was floated with the funds of the joint family and was financed by it and the remuneration received was credited in the books of the family.\n\nThe office of the Managing Director itself was assignable.\n\nThe Articles of Association provided that the karta or his assigns or successors in buiness \"whether under his name or any other style or firm\" would be the Managing Director of the Company and he was to continue for life until removed because of fraud or dishonesty. Thus the acquisition of business. the floatation of the Company and the appointment of the Managing Director were inseparably linked together. The facts of that case were quite different from that of the present case which are akin to the facts in Shivanandan Sharma v. Punjab National Bank Ltd. (').\n\nThe next question for decision is whether the salary of Sheel Chandra as Treasurer of the Bank is assessable as part of. the income of Hindu undivided family of which he is the karta or as his separate income.\n\nBoth the Appellate Tribunal and the High Court were of the opinion that the emoluments as Trea.mrer wer<>\n\nnot acquired without any detriment and risk to the\n\n(1) [1953] 24 l.T.R. 217, (2)\n\n[19GOJ 1 S.C.R. 320. (3)\n\n[19.\\51 1 $.C.R. 1427.\n\n- -\n\n- -\n\nfamily property and therefore formed part of the • income of the indu undivided family.\n\nTreasurership 1s an employment of responsibility, trust and fidelity and personal integrity and ability and mere ability to furnish a substantial security is not the sole or even the main reason for being appointed to such a responsible post in a Bank. like the Central Bank of tlndia. On the other hand his previous experience as an Overseer of the Bank and bis being appointed on his applying for the post are indicative of personal fitness for it.\n\nThere is nothing to show that Sheel Chandra had received any particular training at the expense of the family funds or his appointment was the result of any outlay or expenditure of or detriment to the family property. But it was argued on behalf of the respondent that because he had lodged joint family. property by way of security his earnings as Treasurer became a part of the income of the Hindu undivided family for the reason that the acquisition was not without risk to the family estate.\n\nHe relied on Gokul Chand v.\n\nFirm Hukum Chand Nath Mal (1) and Commissioner of lncome-ta.x v. Kalu Ba.bu Lal Chand (').\n\nIn the former , case a member of the joint family entered the Civil\n\nService and that was made possible by the expenditure of family funds which enabled him to acquire the necessary qualifications and it was that fact which made his earnmgs part of the family mcome.\n\nThe following passage m that judgment at p. 168 was emphasised: -\n\n\"It may be said to be direct in the one case and remote in the other, but if risk of or detriment to family property is the point in both cases, there appears to be no such merit in \"science\"; recognised by the sages of the Hindu law, as would warrant the exclusion of gains of science as such from the category of partible acquisitions\".\n\nCounsel particularly relied on the words 'risk of' and contended that by reason of the family property being given in security, the risk as understood in that judgment had arisen, because it became liable for any loss that might be incurred during the course of employ~ ment of Sheel Chandra.\n\nThe word 'risk' in that\n\n(1) [1921] 48 I.A. 162.\n\n\nPiyare Lal Adishwar Lal v.\n\nCopzmissioner of\n\nIncome-tax,\n\nDelhi\n\nKapur].\n\nPiyare Lal Adishwar Lal v.\n\nComrnissioner of\n\nIncome-tax,\n\nDelhi\n\nKapur J.\n\nSL'PREME COURT REPORTS [1960]\n\njudgment must be read in the context in which it was used.\n\nFamily estate was used and expenditure was incurred for equipping one of its members to join the Indian Civil Service. It was in that connection that the words 'risk of' or 'detriment to' family property were used.\n\nThe latter case, Kalu Babu Lal Chau.d's case ('), has already been discussed.\n\nThe facts and circumstances of that case were different.\n\nThe cases which the Privy Council relied upon in Gokul Chand's case (were all cases where joint family funds had been expended to fit a member of the joint family for the particular profession or avocation the income of which was the subject matter of dispute but the respondents were not able to refer to any decision in which it was held that the mere fact of giving joint family property in security for the good conduct of a member of the family employed in a post of trust was sufficient to make the emoluments of the post joint family property because of any detriment to family property or risk of loss. It has not been shown that in this case there was any detriment to the family property within the meaning of the term as used in decided cases.\n\nIn our opinion the judgment of the High Court was erroneous on both questions which were referred to it and they should both have been decided in favour of the appellant.\n\nThe emoluments received by Sheel Chandra were in the nature of salary and therefore assessable under s. 7 of the Income-tax Act and not under s. 10 of the Act as profits and gains of business and the salary was the income of the individual, i.e., Sheel Chandra and not the income of the Hindu undivided family.\n\n\\Ve therefore allow this appeal and set aside the judgment and order of the High Court. The appellant will have its costs in this Court as well as in the High Court.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n(I) [19GO] I S.C.R. 320.\n\n(2) [1921] 4B LA. IG2.", "total_entities": 52, "entities": [{"text": "669\n\nM/S. PIYARE LAL ADISHWAR LAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 74, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M/S. PIYARE LAL ADISHWAR LAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, DELHI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 79, "end_char": 116, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, DELHI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. K. DAS, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 120, "end_char": 133, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.K. DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "L. KAPUR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 134, "end_char": 142, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.L. KAPUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 147, "end_char": 167, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 393, "end_char": 413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "SS. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 427, "end_char": 432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 787, "end_char": 792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "400 a month, and, subsequently, after his father's death he was appointed Treasurer of the Bank at Delhi and sixteen other branches of the Bank."}}, {"text": "September 19, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 955, "end_char": 973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The agreement dated September 19, 1950, between him and the Bank, showed that he was appointed Treasurer on a monthly salary of Rs."}}, {"text": "[1955] 1 S.C.R. 1427", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2625, "end_char": 2645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 26.\n\n196", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2883, "end_char": 2897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) That in view of the fact that there was nothing to show that S had received any particular training at the expense of the\n\n23-6 SCI/ND/82\n\nApril 26."}}, {"text": "Piyare Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2900, "end_char": 2910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "196G\n\nPiyare Lal Adishwar Lai\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncome-tax,\n\nDelhi •\n\nKapur J.\n\nfamily funds or that his appointmen_t as Treasurer was the result of any outlay or expenditure of or detriment to the family property, but on the other hand his previous experience as an overseer of the Bank was indicative of personal fitness for his appointment as Treasurer, the mere fact he had lodged joint family property by way of security would not make his earnings as Treasurer part of the income of the Hindu undivided family."}}, {"text": "(1921) L.R. 48 I.A. 162", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3507, "end_char": 3530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3647, "end_char": 3651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3703, "end_char": 3708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. V. Viswanatha Sastri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4034, "end_char": 4057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, S. N. Andley, ]."}}, {"text": "S. N. Andley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4059, "end_char": 4071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, S. N. Andley, ]."}}, {"text": "B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4076, "end_char": 4089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Dadachanji, Ramcshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Ramcshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4091, "end_char": 4105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Dadachanji, Ramcshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "P. L. Vohra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4110, "end_char": 4121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Dadachanji, Ramcshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4144, "end_char": 4158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, R. Ganapathy Iyer and D. Gupta, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4188, "end_char": 4205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, R. Ganapathy Iyer and D. Gupta, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "D. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4210, "end_char": 4218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, R. Ganapathy Iyer and D. Gupta, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "KAPUR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4301, "end_char": 4306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKAPUR, J.-This is an appeal against the judgment and order of the High Court of Punjab made on a reference under s. 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act which was answered in favour of the Commissioner of Income-tax.", "canonical_name": "KAPUR"}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4367, "end_char": 4387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKAPUR, J.-This is an appeal against the judgment and order of the High Court of Punjab made on a reference under s. 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act which was answered in favour of the Commissioner of Income-tax."}}, {"text": "s. 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4414, "end_char": 4422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4437, "end_char": 4451, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sheel Chandra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4576, "end_char": 4589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is the assessee-a Hindu undivided family-with Sheel Chandra as its Karta and the respondent is the Commissioner of Income-tax."}}, {"text": "Adishwar Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4820, "end_char": 4832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Their father, Adishwar Lal, upto his death on April 16, 1950, was the Treasurer of several branches of the Central Bank of India (which in the judgment will be referred to as the Bank)."}}, {"text": "April 16, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4852, "end_char": 4866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Their father, Adishwar Lal, upto his death on April 16, 1950, was the Treasurer of several branches of the Central Bank of India (which in the judgment will be referred to as the Bank)."}}, {"text": "Central Bank of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4913, "end_char": 4934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Their father, Adishwar Lal, upto his death on April 16, 1950, was the Treasurer of several branches of the Central Bank of India (which in the judgment will be referred to as the Bank)."}}, {"text": "Chandni Chowk", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5372, "end_char": 5385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Treasurer he furnished security to the Bank of certain properties of the Hindu undivided family, which consisted of title deeds of immovable properties in Chandni Chowk, Delhi, and Government of India securities of -the value of Rs."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5398, "end_char": 5417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Treasurer he furnished security to the Bank of certain properties of the Hindu undivided family, which consisted of title deeds of immovable properties in Chandni Chowk, Delhi, and Government of India securities of -the value of Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6560, "end_char": 6568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Bank of India Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7055, "end_char": 7081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) \"Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, Sheel Chandra's emoluments as Treasurer of the Central Bank of India Ltd. were rightly assessed in the hands of the Hindu undivided family of which he is the Karta\"."}}, {"text": "Commissioner of\n\nlncometax,\n\nDelhi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7428, "end_char": 7462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On a consideration of the various clauses of the agreement between Sheel Chandra and the Bank, the\n\nPiyare Lal Arlishwar Lal\n\nCommissioner of income-tax, Delhi\n\nKapur J.\n\nPi_yare Lal Adishwar Lal v.\n\nCommissioner of\n\nlncometax,\n\nDelhi\n\nKap11r j.\n\nHigh Court held that the relationship between them was not one of master and servant but that of an employer and independent contractor and therefore the emoluments received by Sheel Chandra as Treasurer were not salary but profits and gains of business."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8597, "end_char": 8603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It shows that on his application for appointment as a Treasurer at \"Delhi and sixteen other branches of the Bank, the Bank appointed him Treasurer for those branches and he could, by mutual agTcement, be appointed at other branches in the Punjab, U. P. and Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "U. P.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8605, "end_char": 8610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It shows that on his application for appointment as a Treasurer at \"Delhi and sixteen other branches of the Bank, the Bank appointed him Treasurer for those branches and he could, by mutual agTcement, be appointed at other branches in the Punjab, U. P. and Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8615, "end_char": 8624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It shows that on his application for appointment as a Treasurer at \"Delhi and sixteen other branches of the Bank, the Bank appointed him Treasurer for those branches and he could, by mutual agTcement, be appointed at other branches in the Punjab, U. P. and Rajasthan."}}, {"text": "Pi.yare Lnl Adishwar Lal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11834, "end_char": 11858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pi.yare Lnl Adishwar Lal\n\nCommissiontr of\n\nIncome-tax,\n\n!"}}, {"text": "Kapur", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16225, "end_char": 16230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was\n\nKapur J.\n\nPi)•are Lal Adishwar Lal v.\n\nComrnissio11er of l11conu-tax,\n\nDelhi\n\nKapur J.\n\nan agreement with very similar dauses in Shivanandan Sharma v. The Punjab National Bank Ltd. (') and it was held to be an agreement of service and not of agency.", "canonical_name": "KAPUR"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18914, "end_char": 18922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhagwati, J., in Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra (2) said that in all cases the correct method of approach is whether having regard to the nature of work there was due control and supervision by the employer."}}, {"text": "Agra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20364, "end_char": 20368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. P. Bhargava v. The Commissioner vf Income- Tax, U. P. (') was the case of .a Treasurer of the Central Bank of India at Agra."}}, {"text": "Piyare Lal Adishwar Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20679, "end_char": 20702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "24-6 SCI/ND/82\n\nPiyare Lal Adishwar Lal\n\nCommisJioner of\n\nIn.come-tax,\n\nDell; ii\n\nKapur J.\n\nPiyare Lal Adishwar Lal\n\nLala ]eewan Lal v. Commissione1 of lncomelax (')' was also a case of commission agency and in the pecu\n\nliar circumstances of that case it was held to be business within s. 2(5) of the Excess Profits Tax Act."}}, {"text": "s. 2(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20950, "end_char": 20957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kalu Babu Lal Chand", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21417, "end_char": 21436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Kalu Babu Lal Chand (') where the Managing Director's remuneration was held to be the income of a joint family to be assessed as such in its hands.", "canonical_name": "Kalu Babu Lal Chau.d"}}, {"text": "Central Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23440, "end_char": 23452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "like the Central Bank of tlndia."}}, {"text": "Kalu Babu Lal Chau.d", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25744, "end_char": 25764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The latter case, Kalu Babu Lal Chau.d's case ('), has already been discussed.", "canonical_name": "Kalu Babu Lal Chau.d"}}, {"text": "Gokul Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25913, "end_char": 25924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The cases which the Privy Council relied upon in Gokul Chand's case (were all cases where joint family funds had been expended to fit a member of the joint family for the particular profession or avocation the income of which was the subject matter of dispute but the respondents were not able to refer to any decision in which it was held that the mere fact of giving joint family property in security for the good conduct of a member of the family employed in a post of trust was sufficient to make the emoluments of the post joint family property because of any detriment to family property or risk of loss."}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26893, "end_char": 26897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26905, "end_char": 26919, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26934, "end_char": 26939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_681_713_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "--'\n\n3 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREl\\iE COURT.REPORTS 681\n\nPING LE INDUSTRIES LTD., SECUNDERABAD 1960 v.\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, HYDERABAD\n\n(S. K. DAs, ]. L. KAPUR and M. HrnAYATULLAH, JJ.)\n\nIncome Tax-Business Expenditure-Right to extract stous fmm quarries-Character of expenditure-Test, whether revenue or capital in nature-Hyderabad Income Tax Act (Hyderabad VIII oj 1357 F), s. l2(2)(xv)-lndian Income Tax Act, s. 10(2)(xv).\n\nUnder a quolnama the assessec company was granted exclusive rights in the nature of a monopoly to extract Shahabad Flag Stones without limit to quantity or measurement from quarries situated in six villages for a period of 12 years on annual payment of Rs. 28,000 but not to manufacture cement.\n\nThe stones had to be extracted methodically and skilfully before they could be dressed and sold. The assessee company paid an initial sum of Rs. 96,000 as security and the balance of Rs, 20,000 was payable each year in monthly instalments of Rs. 1,666-10-8 each. The payments were to be made even if no stones were extracted or could not be extracted.\n\nThe question was whether the amount> paid were allowable as business expenditure under s. 12(2)(xv) of the Hvderabad Income Tax Act: Held (Per Kapur and Hidayatullah,\n\nJJ.\n\nS. K. Das, J., dissenting), that under the quolnama the assessee acquired by his long term lease a right to win stones and the lease conveyed to him a part of land.\n\nThe stones in situ were not his stock-intrade in a business sense but a capital asset from which after extraction he converred the stones into his stock-in-trade. The payment though periodic in fact was neither rent nor royalty but a lump sum payment in instalments for acquiring a capital asset of enduring benefit to his trade.\n\nThe right acquired is to a source from which the raw material was to be extracted. The expenditure was outgoings on capital account and was not allowable as deductions under s. 12(2)(xv) of the Hyderabad Income Tax Act.\n\nPer S. K. Das, J .-That on its true construction the transaction was the sale of raw materials coupled with a licence to the assessee to come on the land and remove the materials sold, the purchase price being paid partly in a lump sum and partly in monhly instalments, that the object was the procuring of the stones for making flag stones and not the acquisition of an enduring asset or advantage, that the payments made were the price of raw materials and that the assessee was therefore entitled to claim them as business expenditure under s. 12(2)(xv) of the Hyderabad Income Tax Act.\n\nAssam Bengal Cement Works Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax. West Bengal, r1955] 1 S.C.R. 972, distinguished.\n\nC1v1L APPELLATE JuR1sri1cnoN: Civil Appeal No. I 90 of 1955.\n\nApril 26.\n\nPinglt Induslrits Ltd., Stc1mderabad\n\nCommissinu of\n\nlncomtlax,\n\nH)'derabad\n\nS.K. Das].\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated July 31, 1953, of the Hyderabad High Court in Reference Case No. 302/5 of 1951-52.\n\nN. A. Palhivala and R.\n\nGanapathy Tyer,. for the appellants: H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India, H.]. Uinrignr and D. Gupta, for the respondent ..\n\n1960. April 26. The Judgment of Kapur and Hidayatullah, .JJ., was delivered by HidayaLUllah, J.\n\nS. K. Das, ]., delivered a separate Judgment.\n\nS. K. DAS, ].-This is an appeal by the assessee with leave of the High Court of Hyderabad gr. \\I) In re: Benarsi Das ]agannalh CJ; (2) Mohanlal f-largovind of ]ubbul/1ote v. Commissioner of Income-lax, C. P. and Berar, Nagpw (2); (3) Abdul Kayoom v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras (') and (4) Stow Bardolj1h Gravel Co. Ltd. v. Poole (Inspector of Taxes) (').\n\nThe first is a decision of the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court, the second, a decision of the Privy Council, the third, a decision of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court and the last a decision of the Court of Appeal in England. The facts in Benarsi Das ]agan11ath (') were these. The assessee, who was a manufacturer of bricks, obtai11ed certain lands on leases for the purpose of digging out earth for the manufacture of bricks.\n\nUnder the deeds he had the right to dig earth up to three to three and a half feet.\n\nHe had no interest left in the lands as soon as the earth was dug out and removed.\n\nThe periods of the leases varied from six months to three years.\n\nThe Income-tax authorities and the Appellate Tribunal held that the consideration paid by the assessee to the owners of the lands was a capital expenditure and was therefore not an allowable deduction under s. I 0(2)(xv) of the Indian Income-lax Act:.\n\nIt was held by the Full Bench that the main object of the agreement was the procuring of earth for manufacturing bricks and not the acquisition of an advantage of a permanent nature or .of an\n\nnduring character, that the payments made were the price of raw material and that the assessee was therefore entitled to claim them as business expenditure under s. 10(2)(xv). It was worthy of note that this decision was approved by this Court: in Assa111 Bengal Cement Co. Ltd v. Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal C).\n\nBhagwati, J., delivering the judgment of this Court said:\n\n\"This synthesis attempted by the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court truly enunciates the principles which emerge from the authorities.\n\nIn cases where the expenditure is made for the initial outlay or for\n\n(') [194G] I.L.R. 27 Lah. 307. (') [1949] L.R. 76 I.A. 23>. (') 1.L.R. [1%3] Mad. 1133. (') [195.\\] 27 I.T.R. 14G.\n\n(') [1955] 1 S.C.R. 972.\n\nJ...\n\n-- -- '\n\n. ..),\n\nextension of a business or a substantial replacement of the equipment. there is no dmibt that it is capital expenditure. 1} capital asset of the business is either acquired or extended or substantially replaced and that outlay whatever be its source whether it is drawn from the capital or the income of the concern is certainly in the nature of capital expenditure.\n\nThe question, however, arises for consideration where expenditure is incurred while the business is going on and is not incurred either for extension of the business or for the substantial replacement of its equipment.\n\nSuch expenditure can be looked at either from the point of view of what is acquired or from the point of view of what is the source from which the expenditure is incurred. If the expenditure is made for acquiring or bringing into existence an asset or advantage for the enduring benefit of the business it is properly attributable to capital and is of the nature of capita~ expenditure. If on the other hand it is made not for the purpose of bringing into existence of any asset or advantage but for running the business or working it with a view to produce . the profits it is a revenue expenditure. If any such asset or advantage for the enduring benefit of the business is thus acquired or brought into existence it would be immaterial whether the source of the payment was the capital or the income of the concern or whether the payment was made once and for all or was made periodically.\n\nThi; aim and object of the expenditure would determine the character of the expenditure whether it is a capital expenditure or a revenue expenditure. The source or the manner of the payment would then be of no consequence. It is only in those cases where this test is of no avail that one may go to the test of fixed or circulating capital and consider whether the expenditure incurred was part of the fixed capital of the business or part of its circulating capital. If it was part of the fixed capital of the business it would be of the nature of capital expenditure and if it was part of its circulating capital it would be of the nature of revenue expenditure.\n\nThese tests are thus mutually exclusive and have to be1 applied to the facts of each particular case in the manner above indicated. It has been rightly\n\n]960\n\nPingle~ Industries Ltd., Secunderabad\n\nCommissiouer ef\n\nIncome-tax,\n\nHyderabad\n\nS.K. Das].\n\nPinglt lnd11.>tries Ltd., Secunderr-bad\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncome-tax,\n\nH)'duabad\n\nS.K. Da< ].\n\n690 SUPREME COlJRT REPORTS\n\n[19GO]\n\nobserved that in the great diversity of human affairs and the complicated nature of business operations it is difficult to lay down a test which would apply to all . situations.\n\nOne has therefore got to apply these criteria one after the other from the business point of view and come to the conclusion whether on a fair appreciation of the whole situation the expenditure incurred in a particular case is of the nature of capital expenditure or revenue expenditure in which latter event only it would be a deductible allowance under section I 0(2)(xv) of the Income-tax Act. The question has all along been considered to be a question of fact to be determined by the Income-tax authorities on an application of the broad principles laid down above and the Courts of law would not ordinarily interfere with such findings of fact if they have been arrived at on a proper application of those principles\" [ do not read these observations as merely indicating an approval of certain general principles, but not necessarily an approval of the actual decision in Berwrsidas .f11gannath (') In cases of this nature it is the application of t.he principles to the facts of a case which presents difficulties, and I do not think that this Court. would have made the observations it made, unless it was aporoving the actual decision m Benarsidos .faganalh' (') In cases of this nature it general principles to the facts of that case l see no significant distinction between that case and the one before us.\n\nIn both cases, what was acquired was raw material--earth in one case and stone in the other-and the payments made were the price of the raw material.\n\nThe only distinction pointed out is the difference in the period of the contracts; that is a relevant factor bnt not determinative of the problem before us. Even in our case the contract in favour of Government was for five years only.\n\nSurely, it cannot be argued that three years in one case and five years in the other will make all the difference.\n\nI think that the real test is, in the context of the controversy before us, what was acquired-an enduring asset or advantage, or raw materials for running the business?\n\nJudged hy that test the present case stands on the same footing as the nise of Benarsidas .Jagannath (').\n\n(') [1946] I.L.R. 27 Lah. 307.\n\n......\n\n3 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR1S 691\n\nIn Mohanlal Hargovind (1) the facts were these. The assessees carried on business at several places as manufactures and vendors of country made cigarettes known as bidis.\n\nThese cigarettes were composed of tobacco rolled in leaves of a tree known as tendu leaves, which were obtained by the assessees by entering into a nuinber of short term contracts with the Government and other owners of forests.\n\nUnder the contracts, in consideration of certain sum payable by instalments, the assessees were granted the exclusive right to pick and carry away the tendu leaves from the forest area described: The assessees were allowed to coppice small tenclu plants a few months in advance to obtain good leaves and to pollard tendu trees a few months , in advance to obtain better and bigger leaves.\n\nThe picking of the leaves however had to start at once or practically at once and to proceed continuously. The Privy Council distinguished Alianza Co. v. Bell (') and overruling the decision in Income-tax Appellate Trihunal v. Haji Sabumiyan Haji Sirajuddin (') held that 'the expenditure was to secure raW1 material and was allowable as being on revenue account Lord Greene, delivering the judgment of the. Board said:\n\n\"lt appears to their Lordships that there has been some misapprehension as to the true nature of these agreements and they wish to state at once what in their opinion is and what is not the effect of them.\n\nThev are merely examples of many similar contracts entered into by the appellants wholly and exclusively for the purpose of their business, that purpose being to supply themselves with one of the raw materials of that business.\n\nThe contracts grant no interest in land and no interest in the trees or plants themselves.\n\nThey .are simply and solely contracts giving to the grantees the right to pick and car11y away leaves, which, of course, implies the right to appropriate them as their own property.\" ·\n\n. \"In the present case the trees were not acquired: nor were the leaves acquired until the appellants had reduced them into their own 1 possession and ownership by picking them. If the tendu leaves had been stored (1)\n\n[1949] L.R. 76 I.A. 235. (2)\n\n[1904] 2 K.B. 666. (3)\n\n[1946] 14 I.T.R. 447.\n\nPi rig le fod11slries Ltd., Securiderabad\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncome-tax,\n\nHyderabad\n\nS.K. Das.].\n\nin a merchant's goclown and the appellants had bought\n\nPingfr Iud.,,,.;,, the right to go and fetch them and so reduce them Ltd., S had reduced them into their own possession and ownership by picking them.\n\nThe two cases can, in their Lordships' opinion, in no sense be regarded as comparable. If the tendu leaves had been stored in a merchant's godown and the appellants had bought the right to go and fetch them and so reduce them into their possession and ownership it could scarcely have been. suggested that the purchase price was capital expenditure.\n\nTheir Lordships see no ground in principle or reason for differentiating the present case from that supposed.\" It is to be noticed that the Privy Council case w; is not applied but distinguished by the Court of Appeal in England in Stow BnrdolfJh Gravel Co. Ltd. v. Poole(')\n\nt'l (19101 .5 T.C. GO\n\n('' [1913] A.C. 771.\n\n(') [1954] 35 T.C. 459.\n\n- .\n\n\"\".\n\nIn that ease, the Company was doing the business of selling sand ahd gravel.\n\nIt purchased two unworked deposits, and it claimed that the payment should be deducted from its profits as being expenditure for acqumng its trading stock.\n\nIt was held that the Company had acquired a capital asset and not a stock-in-trade.\n\nHarman, J ., before whom the appeal came from the decision of the General Commissioners, said that the case was indistinguishable from the Golden Horse Shoe case ('), where the tailings were regarded as the stock-in-trade of the taxpayer.\n\nHe observed: '\"Now, it is said here that the opposite conclusion should be reached, and I think in substance the reason is because this. gravel had never been raked oft the soil upon which it was lying.\n\nThere is no question, in any true sense, of extracting gravel; there is no process, as I understand it, gone through here. It is not even suggested that a riddle or sieve is used; you merely dig it up or rake it up where it lies, put it on the lorry and sell it wherever you can.\n\nIt is said what was bought was a mere right to go on the place and win the gravel, but, in effect, in the Golden Horse Shoe case(') what was bought was the licence to go on the land ; rnd take away the tailings, and I myself think that it is a distinction without difference to suggest that, because nobody had ever applied a rake to this gravel before, it should be treated as capital, whereas if somebody had raked it into little heaps before the contract was made then its purchase would constitute a different form of adventure.\n\nIt is the same situation; it is no more and no less attached to the land.\" In dealing with this case on appeal, Lord Evershed, M. R. (then Sir Raymond Evershed), felt that the case was a little hard upon the taxpayer, and further that it' might, if proper enquiry had been made, have been possible to .hold that after the price was paid, the sand and gravel become, in truth, the stock-in-trade of the taxpayer. Taking the facts, however, as found, he held that what was purchased was a part of the\n\n( 1 ) (1933) 18 T.C. 280, 298.\n\nPingle Industries Ltd., Secunderahcd\n\nCommisswner of Income-tax,\n\nHytries Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20952, "end_char": 20976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pinglt lnd11.>tries Ltd., Secunderr-bad\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncome-tax,\n\nH)'duabad\n\nS.K. Da< ]."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21644, "end_char": 21658, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Berwrsidas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22142, "end_char": 22152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question has all along been considered to be a question of fact to be determined by the Income-tax authorities on an application of the broad principles laid down above and the Courts of law would not ordinarily interfere with such findings of fact if they have been arrived at on a proper application of those principles\" [ do not read these observations as merely indicating an approval of certain general principles, but not necessarily an approval of the actual decision in Berwrsidas .f11gannath (') In cases of this nature it is the application of t.he principles to the facts of a case which presents difficulties, and I do not think that this Court."}}, {"text": "Benarsidas .Jagannath", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23336, "end_char": 23357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Judged hy that test the present case stands on the same footing as the nise of Benarsidas .Jagannath (').", "canonical_name": "Benarsi Das ]agannalh CJ"}}, {"text": "Mohanlal Hargovind", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23444, "end_char": 23462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "......\n\n3 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR1S 691\n\nIn Mohanlal Hargovind (1) the facts were these.", "canonical_name": "M ohanlal H argovind"}}, {"text": "Greene", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24601, "end_char": 24607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Privy Council distinguished Alianza Co. v. Bell (') and overruling the decision in Income-tax Appellate Trihunal v. Haji Sabumiyan Haji Sirajuddin (') held that 'the expenditure was to secure raW1 material and was allowable as being on revenue account Lord Greene, delivering the judgment of the."}}, {"text": "L.R. 76 I.A. 235", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 25594, "end_char": 25610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Pi rig le fod11slries Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25664, "end_char": 25690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pi rig le fod11slries Ltd., Securiderabad\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncome-tax,\n\nHyderabad\n\nS.K. Das.]."}}, {"text": "Mohanlal H argovind", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26290, "end_char": 26309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Da; J.\n\nI also see no ground in principle or reason for differentiating the present case from that of Mohanlal H argovind (').", "canonical_name": "M ohanlal H argovind"}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27176, "end_char": 27182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I do not see how the present case can be distinguished from the Madras case without holding that the Madras decision was incorrect."}}, {"text": "Stow Bardolph Grnvd Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27261, "end_char": 27289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Last, I come to Stow Bardolph Grnvd Co. Ltd. (')."}}, {"text": "Benarsidas ]agannath", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27942, "end_char": 27962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If, as I hold, the decision in Benarsidas ]agannath (') was approved by this Court then we\n\n(I) (1949) L.R. 7G IA 23\".", "canonical_name": "Benarsi Das ]agannalh CJ"}}, {"text": "Evershed", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28266, "end_char": 28274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I may point out here what Evershed, M. R., said in the course of his judgment in that case:\n\n\"The Commissioners for the General Purpose of the Income Tax were of opinion that these claims to make deductions were not admissible, but Harman, ] .,", "canonical_name": "Evershed"}}, {"text": "Harman", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28472, "end_char": 28478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I may point out here what Evershed, M. R., said in the course of his judgment in that case:\n\n\"The Commissioners for the General Purpose of the Income Tax were of opinion that these claims to make deductions were not admissible, but Harman, ] .,", "canonical_name": "Harman"}}, {"text": "Pingle Indusaies Lui", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30317, "end_char": 30337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "26-6 scr I ND I 82\n\nPingle Indusaies Lui.,", "canonical_name": "Pingle Industries Ltd., Secunderabad"}}, {"text": "Commissioner of Income-tax,\n\nHyderabad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30357, "end_char": 30395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secunderabad v.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax,\n\nHyderabad\n\n5.K. Das J.\n\nPingle Industries Ltd., Secunderabad v.\n\nCommissiontr of Income-tax,\n\nHyderabad\n\nS.K. Das J,\n\nIn view of these observations I have considerable hestitation, and I say this with great respect, in accepting the decision as a decision on a general question of law.", "canonical_name": "Commissioner of\n\nIncome-tax,\n\nHyderabad\n\nHidayatulfoh"}}, {"text": "5.K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30397, "end_char": 30405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secunderabad v.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax,\n\nHyderabad\n\n5.K. Das J.\n\nPingle Industries Ltd., Secunderabad v.\n\nCommissiontr of Income-tax,\n\nHyderabad\n\nS.K. Das J,\n\nIn view of these observations I have considerable hestitation, and I say this with great respect, in accepting the decision as a decision on a general question of law.", "canonical_name": "S. K. DAs"}}, {"text": "Commissiontr of Income-tax,\n\nHyderabad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30451, "end_char": 30489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secunderabad v.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax,\n\nHyderabad\n\n5.K. Das J.\n\nPingle Industries Ltd., Secunderabad v.\n\nCommissiontr of Income-tax,\n\nHyderabad\n\nS.K. Das J,\n\nIn view of these observations I have considerable hestitation, and I say this with great respect, in accepting the decision as a decision on a general question of law.", "canonical_name": "Commissioner of\n\nIncome-tax,\n\nHyderabad\n\nHidayatulfoh"}}, {"text": "Harman", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30808, "end_char": 30814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision proceeded on the findings of the Commissioners and on the basis that there were no materials for the conclusion reached by Harman, J.\n\nIf we proceed on the findings of the Tribunal in the present case, there are enough materials to support the finding that the appellant acquired nothing but raw materials by the transactions in question.", "canonical_name": "Harman"}}, {"text": "Stow Bardolfih Gravel Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31060, "end_char": 31090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "nothing in the decision in Stow Bardolfih Gravel Co. Ltd. (') which need lead me to the conclusion that the decisions in Benarsidas Jagannath (') and Abdul Kayoom (\") were wrong and require reconsideration."}}, {"text": "Benarsidas Jagannath", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31154, "end_char": 31174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "nothing in the decision in Stow Bardolfih Gravel Co. Ltd. (') which need lead me to the conclusion that the decisions in Benarsidas Jagannath (') and Abdul Kayoom (\") were wrong and require reconsideration.", "canonical_name": "Benarsi Das ]agannalh CJ"}}, {"text": "Abdul Kayoom", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31183, "end_char": 31195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "nothing in the decision in Stow Bardolfih Gravel Co. Ltd. (') which need lead me to the conclusion that the decisions in Benarsidas Jagannath (') and Abdul Kayoom (\") were wrong and require reconsideration."}}, {"text": "Mohan/al Hargovind", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31358, "end_char": 31376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If I may again say so with great respect, the learned Master of the Rolls distinguished the Privy Council decision in Mohan/al Hargovind (') by saying that that decision rested upon the particular circumstances of the case and upon the fact that the Board was able to say that from the moment the contract was entered into and before the leaves had actually been picked, the tendu leaves were part of.", "canonical_name": "M ohanlal H argovind"}}, {"text": "L.R. 76 I.A. 235", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 32732, "end_char": 32748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Stow Bardolph Gravel Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32902, "end_char": 32931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in Stow Bardolph Gravel Co. Ltd. (')and the stone merchant in the present case?"}}, {"text": "HmAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33271, "end_char": 33282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HmAYATULLAH, ].-This is an assessee's appeal on a certificate of the High Court granted under s. 66A(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act."}}, {"text": "s. 66A(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33365, "end_char": 33374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33389, "end_char": 33403, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Pingle Industries Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33406, "end_char": 33428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pingle Industries Ltd. (hereinafter called the assessee) is a ptivate limited Company which carries on, among other businesses, the business of extracting stones from quarries, which, after dressing, it sells as flag stones.", "canonical_name": "Pingle Industries Ltd., Secunderabad"}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33713, "end_char": 33722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "obtained from Nawab Mehdi Jung Bahadur of Hyderabad the right to extract stones from certain q1iarries belonging -to the Nawab."}}, {"text": "Pingle Industrie, Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 34925, "end_char": 34947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pingle Industrie, Ltd., Secunderabad\n\nCommissioner of Incomt-tax, Hyderabad\n\nHidayatu/lah ].", "canonical_name": "Pingle Industries Ltd., Secunderabad"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35617, "end_char": 35631, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "High Court at Hyderabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 36806, "end_char": 36829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commissioner of Income-tax, Hyderabad Division, then asked for a reference of the case to the High Court at Hyderabad, and the ,;.ppellate Tribunal referred the following question of law under s. 66(1) of the Hyderabad Income-tax Act."}}, {"text": "s. 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36905, "end_char": 36913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36931, "end_char": 36945, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Nawab Mehdi Jung Bahadur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37005, "end_char": 37029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"Whether the lease-money paid by the assessee Company to Nawab Mehdi Jung Bahadur and to Government is capital expenditure or revenue expenditure.\""}}, {"text": "Pingle Industries Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37770, "end_char": 37792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pingle Industries Ltd., Secunderabad\n\nThe High Court of Hyderabad after an examination of several decisions rendered in India and the United Kingdom, held that the payments in each year of account \\~•ere of a capital nature, and that no deduction could be given under s. 12(2)(xv) of the Hyderabad Income-tax Act."}}, {"text": "High Court of Hyderabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 37812, "end_char": 37835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pingle Industries Ltd., Secunderabad\n\nThe High Court of Hyderabad after an examination of several decisions rendered in India and the United Kingdom, held that the payments in each year of account \\~•ere of a capital nature, and that no deduction could be given under s. 12(2)(xv) of the Hyderabad Income-tax Act."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 37890, "end_char": 37895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pingle Industries Ltd., Secunderabad\n\nThe High Court of Hyderabad after an examination of several decisions rendered in India and the United Kingdom, held that the payments in each year of account \\~•ere of a capital nature, and that no deduction could be given under s. 12(2)(xv) of the Hyderabad Income-tax Act."}}, {"text": "United Kingdom", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 37904, "end_char": 37918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pingle Industries Ltd., Secunderabad\n\nThe High Court of Hyderabad after an examination of several decisions rendered in India and the United Kingdom, held that the payments in each year of account \\~•ere of a capital nature, and that no deduction could be given under s. 12(2)(xv) of the Hyderabad Income-tax Act."}}, {"text": "s. 12(2)(xv)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38038, "end_char": 38050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38068, "end_char": 38082, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Palkhivala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40446, "end_char": 40456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The arguments of Mr. Palkhivala for the assessec may be shortly stated."}}, {"text": "S Pinglt Ind1 on the merits, and it was urged that the directi<:m to pay an additional bonus of two months' basic wages was improper and unjustified. The appellate tribunal negatived most of the contentions raised by the appellant, but it was satisfied that the calculation made by the tribunal in regard to the quantum of ¥ a vai!a ble surplus was erroneous, and so, after rectifying the said error, it held that the additional bonus which the appellant should pay to the respondents was one month's basic wage. It is against this decision of the appellate tribunal that the present appeal by special leave has been filed by the appellant before this Court. The main question which the appeal raises for our decision is whether the fuller bench of the Labour Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding that the Full Bench formula can and should be applied in adjudicating upon the respondents' claim for bonus against the appellant.\n\nIncidentally, we may point out that the fuller bench of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in the case of\n\nU. P. Electricity Supply Go. Ltd. & Ors. v. Their Workmen(') has decided two questions of law. The '\" first was in regard to the applicability of the Full Bench formula to the employees' claim for bonus against their employers carrying on the business of the supply of electricity, and the second was in regard to the extent of the statutory depreciation allowed by the Full Bench formula. The question was whether it should not include initial depreciation and additional depreciation which are given for the purpose '- of allowing relief in the matter of taxation under s. 10(2) (vi-b) of the Income-tax Act. The fuller bench had decided that in allowing a prior charge in the\n\n(1) (1955) L.A.C. 659.\n\n-+ '\n\nworking of the formula it is only the normal incomez96o tax depreciation (including multiple shift dapreciation) that should be allowed. The correctness of this latter T. T. E. supply Co. Ltd. decision was challenged before this Court in Sree v.\n\nMeenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Their Workmen (1) but the Its Workm1n challenge failed and the decision of the fuller bench - was confirmed. In the present appeal it is the Gajendragadkar f. correctness of the fuller bench decision on the first question which is challenged before us.\n\nLet us being by stating briefly the appellant's contention. It is urged on behalf of the appellant that it is only where the \"clear profits\" are in excess of the \" reasonable return \" under the Act that a case for the payment of bonus can really arise in regard to the electricity concerns and undertakings. The Act is a self-contained code intended to regulate the business and affairs of electricity concerns including the claim of their employees for bonus, and as such an industrial dispute between such concerns and their employees in regard to bonus must be determined solely by reference to the provisions of the Act and and not by the application of the Full Bench formula.\n\nAs to the quantum of bonus which should be awarded it would depend upon the circumstances in each case; but it is urged that it may as an ad hoc measure be decided that I/4th of the excess between clear profits and the reasonable return may be taken as a fair quantum of bonus which electricity concerns should be ordered to pay to their employees. Before dealing with the validity of this argument it is necessary to examine the scheme of the Act.\n\nLet us first consider some of the provisions in the Indian Electricity Act 9 of 1910 which may be relevant. Section 3(2)(d)(i) provides that the State Government may, on an application made in the prescribed form, and on payment of the prescribed fee (if any), grant, after consulting the State Electricity Board, a licence to any person, and that the said licence may prescribe such terms as to the limits within which, and conditions under which, the supply of energy is to be compulsory or permissive, and generally as to such matters as the State Govern-\n\n<1> (1958] S. C.R. 878.\n\nz96o ment may think fit.\n\nSection 3(f) provides that the\n\nT. T. E. Supply provisions.contained in the Schedule shall be deemed co. Ltd. to be incorporated with, and to form part of, every v. licence granted under this Part, except as in the Its Workmen manner therein described. Section 4(l)(b) empowers the State Government inter alia to revoke the licence Gajend.agadkar J. where the licensee breaks any of the terms or the conditions of his licence the breach of which is expressly declared by such licence to render it liable to revocation. Section 7(1) provides to the authorities specified in it option to purchase the undertaking.\n\nSection II requires the licensee to prepare and render to the State Government or to such authority as the State Government may appoint in that behalf, on or before the prescribed date in each year an annual statement of account of his undertaking made up to such date, in such form and containing such particulars, as may be prescribed in that behalf. Section 22 imposes on the licensee obligation to supply energy subject to the conditions prescribed ; and s. 23 provides that a licensee shall not, in making any agreement for the supply of energy, show undue preference to any person. The licensee_ cannot also charge for such supply any rates higher than those permitted. The appropriate Government is authorised to fix the maximum charges, and by appropriate rules both the maximam and minimum charges have been prescribed. These are the relevant provisions of Act 9 of 1910.\n\nLet us now refer to some of the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 57 provides the licensee's charges to consumers. According to it the provisions of the Sixth Schedule and the Seventh Schedule shall be deemed to be incorporated in the licence of every licensee, not being a local authority, in the manner specified by it. This section further provides inter alia that as from the specified date the licensee shall comply with the provisions of the said Schedules and not provisions of Act 9 of 1910, and the licence granted to him thereunder and of any other law, agreement or instrument applicable to the licensee shall, in relation to the licence, be void and of no effect in so far as they are inconsistent with the\n\nprovisions of s. 57 A and the said Sched1lles. Section x960 57 deals with the licensee's charges to the consumers and lays down provisions which shall have effect in T. T. E. Supply relation to the licence where the provisions of the Co. Ltd. v.\n\nSixth Schedule and the table appended to the Seventh Its Workmen Schedule are under sub-s. (1) deemed to be incorporated in the said licence. These provisions relate to the Gajendragadkar J. appointment of the Board and the rating committee.\n\nSection 57 A prescribes the principles and the procedure which hQ.s to be followed by the rating committee in making its report to the State Government regarding the charges for electricity which the licensee may make to any class or classes of consumers.. This provision gives us an idea as to the object which the Legislature had in mind in ultimately fixing the minimum and maximum rates chargeable to the consumers. Sections 78 and 79 provide for power to make rules and regulations. Nine Schedules are attached to the Act. Schedule Six deals with the financial principles and their application; Schedule Seven deals with the depreciation of assets ; Schedule Eight provides for the determination of cost of production of electricity at generating stations ; and\n\nSchedule Nine prescribes the method for allocation of costs of production at generating stations.\n\nIt is necessary at this stage to refer briefly to some of the provisions contained in the Sixth Schedule, because Mr. Viswanatha Sastri, for the appellant, has relied on the scheme of the said Schedule in support of his principal argument. These provisions prescribe the financial principles which have to be followed by the electricity concerns and undertakings covered by the Act. It is urged by the appellant that these principles along with the rest of the Schedules and the provisions of the Act constitute a self-contained code which govern the business and the financial affairs of electricity concerns, and as such even the claim of the appellant's employees for bonus must be dealt with in the light of these provisions. Paragraph 1 of Sixth Schedule provides :-'\n\n\"I. Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (9 of 1910) (except sub-s. (2) of s. 22A), and the provisions in the\n\nx960 licence of a licensee, the licensee shall so adjust his rates for the sale of electricity whether by enhanc- T. T. E. supply ing or reducing them that his clear profits in any Co. Ltd .. v. year of account shall not, as far as possible, exceed Its Workmen the amount of reasonable return;\". - This provision is made subject to four provisos Gajendrogadfar J. -which it is unnecessary to mention.\n\nParagraph 2 reads thus:-\n\n\"II. (1) If the clear profit of a licensee in any year of account is in excess of the amount of reasonable return, one-third of such excess, not exceeding five per cent. of the amount of reasonable return, shall be at the disposal of the undertaking.\n\nOf .the balance of the excess, one-half shall be appropriated to a reserve which shall be called the Tariffs and Dividends Control Reserve and the remaining half shall either be distributed in the form of a proportional rebate on the amounts collected from the sale of electricity and meter rentals or carried forward in the accounts of the licensee for distribution to the consumers in future, in such manner as the State Government may direct.\n\n(2) The Tariffs and Dividend Control Reserve shall be available for disposal by the licensee only to the extent by which the clear profit is less than the reasonable return in any year of account.\n\n(3) On the purchase of the undertaking under the terms of its licence any balance remaining in the Tariffs and Dividends Control Reserve shall be handed over to the purchaser and maintained as such Tariffs and Dividends Control Reserve.\" Paragraph 3 provides for the creation from existing reserve or from the revenue of the undertaking a reserve to be called Contingencies Reserve. Paragraph 4 prespribes the manner in which the licensee shall appropriate to Contingencies Reserve from the revenues of each year of account. Paragraph 6 directs that there shall be allowed in each year in respect of depreciation of fixed assets employed in the business of electricity supply such an amount as would if set aside annually throughout the prescribed period and accumulated at compound interest at 4 per\n\ncent. per annum, produce by the end of the prescribed rg6o period amount equal to 90 per cent. of the original cost of the asset after taking into account the sums T. T. E. supply already written off or set aside in the books of the Co. Ltd. v. undertaking; annual interest on the accumulated Its Workmen balance will be allowed as expense from revenue as\n\nwell as the annual incremental deposit. Paragraph 7 Gajendragadkar J. deals with assets which have ceased to be avilable for\n\nue through obsolescence, inadequacy, superfluity or for any other reason, and it allows the licensee to describe the said assets as no longer in use, and no further depreciation in respect thereof shall be allowed as a charge against the revenue. Paragraph 8 prohibits any further depreciation where an asset has been written down in the books of the undertaking to 10 per cent. or less of its original cost. Under paragraph 9, where a fixed asset is sold for a price exceeding its written down cost, the excess has to be credited to the Contingencies Reserve. Paragraph 10 requires the consent of the State Government to carry sums to a reserve or to declare a dividend in excess of 3 per cent. on share capital or other matters specified there in. Paragraph 13 imposes limitations in respect of ordinary remunerations of managing agents; whereas paragraph 14 provides that the Board of Directors shall not contain more than 10 directors ; and paragraph 15 prescribes the way in which the licensee can make any capital expenditure which exceeds Rs. 25,000 or 2 per cent. of the capital base within three years before the next option of purchase under the licence arises.\n\nParagraph 16 contains an arbitration clause . . Paragraph 17 gives definitions for the purpose of this Schedule. Capital base is defined by paragraph 17(1); clear profit is defined by paragraph 17(2) as meaning the difference between the amount of income and the sum of expenditure plus specific appropriations made up in each case as prescribed in several sub-clauses of clauses (a}, (b) and (c). It is necessary to refer to two sub-clauses under clause (b) :-\n\n\"(xi) other expenses admissible under the law for the time being in force in the assessment of, Indian Income-tax and arising from and ancillary or incidental to the business of electricity supply;\n\n:c960\n\nT. T. E. Supply Co. Ltd. v.\n\nIts Workmen\n\nGajendragadkar ].\n\n(xii) contributions to Provident Fund, staff pension, gratuity and apprentice and other training schemes.\" Paragraph 17(9) defines a reasonable return as meaning:-\n\n\" in respect of any year of account, the sum of the following :\n\n(a) the amount found by applying the standard rate to the capital base at the end of that year;\n\n(b) the income derived from invesments than those made under paragraph IV of this Schedule;\n\n(c) an amount equal to one half of one per centum on any loans advanced by the Board under subparagraph (2) of paragraph I of the First Schedule.\" One of the points which we have to decide in the present appeal is whether an amount of bonus paid by the employer to his employees is included under paragraph 17 (2) (b)(xi) of the Sixth Schdule.\n\nIt would thus be clear that the provisions of the Act in general and those of the Sixth Schedule in particular, are no doubt intended to control and regulate the rates chargeable to consumers and to provide the method and the machinery by which the electrical system of the country could be properly co-ordinated and integrated. The rates chargeable are fixed, so is a reasonable return provided for.\n\nBut it is not as if the Act intends to guarantee a minimum return to the undertaking. \\Vhat it purports to do is to prohibit a return higher than the one specified. Appropriations permissible under revenue receipts are also defined and enumerated and a clear profit as contemplated by the Act is also prescribed and defined. Large powers have. been given to the Electricity Authority, Boards and Councils for the purpose of canalising the activities of the concerns as well as for adjusting their activities for changing conditions and circumstances. Just as the Act has made provision for the control of rates chargeable to consumers its policy also is to give a fair deal to the undertaking and persons engaged in the business of supplying electricity. It is with this twin object that a working-sheet is required to be prepared under the provisions of the Act. It is, however, clear that the working-sheet thus prescribed is essentially\n\ndifferent from the balance-sheet and profit and loss x960 account which companies keep under the provisions of the Companies Act. The determination of clear profits T. T. E. Supply on the basis of the working-sheet '.proceeds on the Co. Ltd. v. consideration of previous losses, contributions towards Its workmen the arrears of depreciation and several appropriations authorised by the tate Government, matters which Gajendragadkar J. have no relevance to commercial accounting. The principles of commercial accounting on which the balance-sheets are prepared and profit and loss account made are very different from_ the principles on which the working-sheet as specified in the Act is required to be prepared. The question which arises for our decision is whether the appellant is right in contending that the present dispute arising from the respondents' claim for bonus must be decided by the provisions of the Act alone and that the Full Bench formula is wholly inapplicable for the purpose.\n\nIn dealing with this contention it is necessary to bear in mind that the fields covered by the Full Bench formula and by the provisions of the Act are entirely different. , The Full Bench formula has been evolved by industrial adjudication for the purpose of doing social justice to workmen and it is now well-established that the workmen's claim for bonus is justified on the ground that they contribute to the employer's profit and are entitled to claim a share in the . said profit with a view to fill the gap between their actual wages and the living wage which they aspire to earn.\n\nOn the other hand, the Act does not purport to deal with this problem at all. It is significant that though . the Act makes detailed provisions in respect of matters intended to be covered by it, it does not refer to the wages which the employer may hve to pay to his employees. Can it be said that in fixing the wagestructure as between an electricity undertaking and its employees considerations of social justice would be irrelevant? In fixing such wage-structure none of the provisions of the Act can afford the slightest assistance to industrial tribunals. That task must be attempted by the tribunals in the light of principles of social justice and other relevant considerations such as the capacity of the employer to pay and the wages\n\nx96o received by employees in comparable trades in the same region. Just as the problem of wage-structure T. T. E. Supply co. Ltd. has to be solved in the case of electricity concerns v. apart from the provisions of the Act and in the light of Its Workmen the relevant industrial principles, so must the problem of bonus be resolved in the like manner. There is Gajendragadkar J. really no conflict beween the Act and the principles of industrial adjudication. In fact they cover different fields and their relevance and validity is beyond question in their respective fields.\n\nAs we have just indicated the method of accounting required by the Act in preparing the working-sheet is substantially different from the commercial method of accounting which yields the gross profits in the form of profit and loss account. Determination of gross profit is the first step which industrial tribunals take , in applying the Full Bench formula. Such gross profit cannot be ascertained from the working-sheet prepared under the Act. It is not denied that the appellant has to keep accounts under the Companies Act on a commercial basis. That being so, in dealing with the respondents' claim for bonus, it is the balance-sheet and the profit and loss account prepared by the appellant thl•sore)\n\nPrivate Ltd. v.\n\nPothan Joseph\n\nGajendragadkar J.\n\nwhether stay should be granted or not.\n\nJf there has been a long delay in making an application for stay and the said delay may reasonably be attributed to the fact that the parties may have abandoned the arbitration agreement the court may consider the delay as a relevant fact in deciding whether stay should be granted or not.\n\nSimilarly, if complicated questions of law or constitutional issues arise in the decision of the dispute and the court is satisfied that it would be inexpedient to leave the decision of such complex issues to the arbitrator, it may, in a proper case, refuse to grant stay on that ground; indeed, in such cases the arbitrator can and may state a special case for the opinion of the court under s.\n\nJ 3(b) of the Act.\n\nThus, the question as to whether legal proceedings should be stayed under s. 34 .must always be decider! by the court in a judicial manner having regard to the relevant facts and circumstances of each case.\n\nWhere the discretion vested in the court under s. 34 has been exercised by the trial court the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the exercise of the said discretion.\n\nIn dealing with the matter raised before it at the appellate stage the appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion.\n\nIf the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a ditferent view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. As is often said, it is ordinarily not open to the appellate court to substitute its own exercise of discretion for that of the trial judge; but if it appears to the appellate court that in exercising its discretion the trial court has acted unreasonably or capriciously or has ignored relevant facts and has adopted an unjudicial approach then it would certainly be open . to the appellate court-and in niany cases it may be its duty-to interfere with the trial court's exercise of discretion.\n\nIn cases falling under this class the exercise of discretion by the trial\n\n' -\n\n,..\n\nconn is 111 law wrongful and improper and that would certainly justify and call for interference from the appellate court.\n\nThese principles are well established: but, as has been observed by Viscount Simon, L. C., in Chareles Osenton & Co. v. Johnston (1) \"the law as to the. reversal by a court of appeal of an order made by a judge below in the exercise of his discretion is well established, and any difficulty that arises is due only to the application of well settled principles m an individual case\".\n\nIn the present case there is one more fact which has to be borne in mind in dealing with the merits of the controversy before us.\n\nThe appellant has come to this Court by special leave under Art. 136; in other words the appellant is not entitled to challenge the correctness of the decision of the High Court as a matter of ri1?; ht.\n\nIt is only in the discretion of this Court that it can be permitted to dispute the correc.- ness or the propriety of the decision of the High Court,' and so in deciding whether or not this Court should interfere with the order under appeal it would be relevant for us to take into aocount the fact that the remedy sought for by the appellant is by an appeal which is a discretionary matter so far as this Court is concerned.\n\nIt is in the light of these principles that we must consider whether or. not the appellant's complaint agaimt the High Court's order can be upheld.\n\nThe first point which calls for a decision relates to the construction of the contracts between the parties.\n\nAs we have already stated two O?ntracts were executed between them but their terms are substantially the sarne and so we may deal with the subsequent; contract which. was executed on February 20, 1953 (P. 2). Under this contrac.t the respondent was engaged as the Editor of the Deccan Herald and his salary was fixed at Rs. l ,.IJOO per rnensern under paragraph 1 (a).\n\nParagraph l(b) and (c) deal with the other amenities to which the respondent was entitled: Clause (d) of paragraph l provides that when the newspaper shows a profit in the annual accounts the Editor shall be entitled to I/10th share of it; it is pn this clause that the respondent's claim in the present proceedings is\n\n(I) [1942] A.C. 130, 138.\n\nPrinters ( .tlfysore)\n\nPrivate Ltd., v.\n\nPotluiii Joseph\n\nGajmdragadkar J.\n\n1960 based. The terms on which the respondent had to re- -- main in the service of the appellant are specifiedinpara- Pri•ters (Mysore) h 2( ) d (b) p h 3 \"d f\" h 1 Private Ltd grap a an . aragrap prov1 es or t e renewa v. of the contract for a further period of five years if it is Po than Joseph found that such renewal is for the mutual advantage of . - the parties. This paragraph also provides that during Ga; endragadkar f. the continuance of his employment the respondent shall not directly or indirectly be interested in any other newspaper business than that of the appellant or any other journalistic activities in competition with that of the appellant. It also stipulates that if the contract is determined the respondent shall not for a period of three years thereafter be directly or indirectly interested in any newspaper business of the S'lme kind as is carried on by the appellant within the Mysore State. It would thus be seen that this paragraph shows the liability imposed on the respondent as a consideration for the benefit conferred on him by paragraph 1 in general and cl. (d) of the said paragraph in particular.\n\nParagraph 4 contains an arbitration agreement. It provides that if in the interpretation or application of the contract any difference of opinion arises between the parties the same shall be referred to arbitration.\n\nThe arbitrator can be named by both the parties but if they failed to choose the same person each side will choose an arbitrator and the two will elect another person to complete the panel. Their award shall be final and binding on both the parties.\n\nThe High Court has held that the present snit is outside the arbitration agreement because neither party disputes the applicability of the terms of the contract in the decision of the dispute. The High Court thought that in the context the words ' application of the contract' meant a dispute as to the applicability of the contract, and since the applicability of the contract was not in question and no dispute as to the interpretation of the contract arose, the High\n\nCourt held that paragraph 4 was inapplicable to the present suit. Mr. Purshottam, for the appellant, contends that the construction placed by the High Court on the word \"application\" is erroneous. According to him, any difference of opinion in regard to the application of the contract must in the context mea.n\n\n•...\n\nthe working out of the Gontract or giving effect to its terms. In our opinion, this contention is well founded.\n\nThe words 'interpretation or application of the contract' are frequently used in arbitration agreements and they generally cover disputes between the parties in regard to the construction of .the relevant terms of the contract as well as their effect, and unless the context. compels a contrary construction, a dispute in regard to the working of the contract would generally fall within the clause in question.\n\nIt is not easy to appreciate what kind of dispute according to the High Court would have attracted paragraph 4 when it refers to a difference of opinion in the application of the contract.\n\nSince both the parties have signed the c'cmtract the question about its applicability in that\n\nforn~ esor•)\n\nPrivat• Ltd. v.\n\nPothat1 Joseph\n\nGajmdragadkar\n\nPrinters (Mysore)\n\nPrivate Ltd.\n\nPotka11 ,7ospk\n\nGajendragadknr J.\n\n724 SUPREl\\lE COURT REPORTS [ 1960]\n\nrelevant facts to which both -the courts have referred, and on which both of them have relied though m different ways.\n\nwhat then are the broad features of the case on which the trial judge and the High Court have respect ively relied? It is clear that the present dispute is not the resuJt of an ordinary commercial transaction containing an arbitration clause. The contract in question is between a journalist and his employer by which the remuneration of the journalist has been fixed in a somewhat unusual manner by giving him a specified percentage in the profit which the Deccan Herald would make from year to year.\n\nAccording to the respondent he was surprised when the General Manager of the paper informed him that 75% of the overall expenditure incurred in the several activities of the appellant: was being charged to the Deccan Herald, and that the capital liabilities were charged in the same proportion; he thought that this system of accounting adopted by the appellant was repugnant: to the material\n\nprovisions in his contract. Indeed bis case is that after he came to know about this system he protested to the Director, Mr.\n\nVenkataswamy, who has been taking active part in the affairs of the appellant, and Mr.\n\nVenkataswamy assured him that as from the beginning of 19ilii the accounts were being separately maintained.\n\nIt would appear that the information received by the respondent from the General Mana12:er disillusioned him and that appears to be the beginning of the present dispute, according to the respondent's letter of May 24.\n\n19.55, (D. 1 ).\n\nOn February J 8, I 956, the respondent invoked the arbitration agreement and told Mr.\n\nVenkataswamy that Mr. Behram Doctor had agreed to work as arbitrator and give his award ID. 2). \\fr.\n\nVenkataswamy who was addressed by the respondent as the l\\'fana~!ing Director told him by his reply of March ~. I Y?>Ci, that he was not t:he Manap; ing Director and added that in his view it was not open to the respondent to invoke cl. 4 of the contract because he was aware that no monies were payable to the respondent under cl. 1 (d).\n\nIt would thus be seen that \\fr. \\'enkataswamy's immediate response to the respondent's request for arbitration was that the rcspon- .\n\ndnt 'could not invoke, the arbitration clause (D. 3). It 1960 is tnie that o'n April 23, . 1956, Mr. Venkataswamy a_ttempted to explain this statement. by saying . that all Pr~~~~~AJ!tJre) that he intendJd to. s:uggest was that no occasion for v. irwoking the arbitratio1J. agreement had arisen.\n\nThat, Pothan Joseph\n\nltq1e\\:er, .appears to , )Je an unsatisfactory explanation ... (J?, 10), Even so, Mr. Venkataswamy agreed to meet Gajendragadkar J; Mr. Bel)ram Doctor and so. on March 9, 1956, the\n\nrspondent gave to Jvt; r. Venkataswamy the address of J\\if r. Behram. Doctor and asked him to see him (D. S). fie informed Mr.\n\nBepram Doctor accor, dingly (D. 6).\n\nIi appears that subsequently Mr.\n\nBehtam Doctor n1et both the respondent and Mr, Venkataswamy on M, ay _9. J 956. be. proceeding.s of , this meeting which have been kept by Mr. Behram Doc.tor and copies of which have been supplied by him to both the parties indicate that Mr. . Behram Doctor attempted to mediate between the parties and presumably te parties were\n\nageeable to secure the mediation of Mr.. Behram\n\nD~Ktor to resolve dispute. v\\Te ought to add . that the copy of. the said proceedings produced by the appellant contains a statement that Mr. Venk.ataswamy at the outset told Mr.\n\nBehram Doctor that he had come 'oh an unofficial visit 'and was speaking without the consent. of the other directors.\n\nThis' statement is,' however, not tq. be found in the copy' supplied by Mr.\n\nBehram Doctor to the. resporn:lent. . Prim:i facie it is mt easy to 1, mdersand why Mr.\n\nBehram Doctor should have omitted this material statement in the copy SUp]; lied by him to the respondent.\n\nTht, however, isa matter which we do not propose)o pl.Ii-sue io the ptesent appeal.\n\nIt is thus clear that though Mr.\n\nBehram Dottor was not appointed an arbitrator and no reference in ' writing was made to him an attempt. was mad~ by' th~ 'parties to settle the dispute with the assi&tance of Mr.\n\nBehrarri Doctor, and that attempt faild.' Haying rega'rd 'to the facts which have come on the recqrd it may not be unreasonable to infer\n\ntliat the appellaJ?t was not too kt; en, tq pinsue the rrfa ttcr on the lries originally' adopted by ' both the patties before Mr.· Behram Doctor.· · It' also appars th;; tt for some, years th~ accouts .of , flie' D'eccan Herald 1:had not been separately kept as'\n\n30'-6 '.sCi-/ND/8.2.:\n\n1960 ;\n\nPrinters ( k(}isore)\n\nPrivate Ltd. v.\n\nPothan Joseph\n\nGajendragadkar J.\n\nthey should have been according to the respondent\"s case.\n\nThe respondent alleges that they have not been kept separately throughout the ten years; but that is a matter which is yet to be investigated.\n\nIf the accounts are not separately kept the question of allocating expenditure would inevitably arise and that can be decided after adopting some ad hoc. principle in that behalf.\n\nA plea of limitation has also been indicated by the appellant and it has ben suggested that the first contract having merged in the second it is only under the latter contract that the ffspondent may have a cause of action.\n\nThus the eflect of the two contracts considered together may have to be adjudged in dealing with the question of limitation. lt has also been suggested that the respondent , knew how the accounts were kept from year to year and in substance he may be deemed to have agreed with the method adopted in keeping the accounts.\n\nIf this point is raised by the appellant it may involve the decision of the question about the effect of the respondent's conduct on his present claim. The appellant has also suggested that the respondent has adopted an attitude of blackmailing the appellant and the respondent treats that as an aspersion on his charac- . ter. The relations between the parties have been very much embittered and the respondent apprehends that the appellant, being a powerful company, may delay and seek to defeat the respondent's claim by protracting the proceedings before the arbitrators.\n\nIt now looks impossible that the parties would agree to appoint one arbitrator, and so if the matter goes before the domestic tribunal the two arbitratots appointed hy the two parties respectivly may have to nominate a third one to complete the constitution of the domestic tribunal, and that it is , aid may easily lead to a deadlock.\n\nIn the trial court attempts were made to sett.le this unfortunate dispute but they failed and the respondent's grievance is that the appellant adopted an unhelpful and non-co-operative attitude.\n\nIt appea1s fairly clear that when the parties entered into the present contract and agreed that differences between them in regard to the interpretation and application of the contract should be referred to\n\n. -\n\n--· .\n\narbitration they did not anticipate the complications which have subsequently arisen.\n\nThat is why an arbitration agreement may have been introduced in the contract in question.\n\nAll these facts have been considered by both the courts, and though it is true that in their approach and final decisions in respect of these facts the two courts have differed in material particula1:s, they have in the result agreed with the conclusion that the discretion vested in them should be exercised in not granting stay as claimed by the appellant.\n\nUnder these circumstances we do not think we would be justified in substituting our discretion for that of the courts below.\n\nIt may be that if we were trying the appellant's application under s. 34 we might have come to a different conclusion; and also that we may have hesitated to confirm the order of the tnal court if we had been dealing with the matter as a court of first appeal; but the matter has now' come to us under Art. 136, and so we can justly interfere with the concurrent exercise of the discretion by the .courts below only if we feel that the said exercise of discretion is patently and manifestly unreasonable, capricious or perverse and that it may defeat the ends of justice. Having regard to all the circumstances and facts of this case we are not disposed to hold that a case for our interference has been made out by the appellant.\n\nThat is why we dismiss this appeal but make no order as to costs throughout.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nAHMEDABAD v.\n\nK:ARAMCHAND PREMCHAND LTD.,\n\nAHMEDABAD. (S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR and\n\nM. HIDAYADULLAH, JJ.) Income-tax-Set-off-Business loss in Indian State-Profits in British India-Applicability of the Act to business in Indian State- Business Profits Tax Act, 1947 (21 of 1947), ss. 2(3), 4, 5.\n\nThe assessee held the managing agency of a limited company in what was then called \"British India\" and had also a pharma-\n\nPrinters (Mysore)\n\nPrivale Ltd.\n\nv ..\n\nPothan Joseph\n\nGajendragailkar J.\n\nApril 28.", "total_entities": 81, "entities": [{"text": "Pingle Industries", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 144, "end_char": 161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All these cases turned on different facts, and it is not necessary to decide which of them in the special\n\nPingle Industries nrcumstances were correctly decided."}}, {"text": "Secunderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 219, "end_char": 231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This enquiry Ltd., Secunderabad will hardly help in the solution of the case in hand."}}, {"text": "THE PRINTERS (MYSORE) PRIVATE LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1139, "end_char": 1172, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE PRINTERS (MYSORE) PRIVATE LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "POTHAN JOSEPH. (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1181, "end_char": 1217, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "POTHAN JOSEPH. (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1238, "end_char": 1258, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Arbitration Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1496, "end_char": 1517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1531, "end_char": 1536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Arbitration Act, 1940", "statute": "Arbitration Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1537, "end_char": 1558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1560, "end_char": 1568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Deccan Herald", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1608, "end_char": 1621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent was the Editor of the Deccan Herald, owned and published by the appellant, and the two contracts executed by the parties contained an arbitration clause that if in the interpretation or applicatio.n of the contract any difference arose between the parties the same shall _ be referred to arbitration :ind the award shall be binding between the parties and also provided for, apart from his monthly salary, the payment of 10% of the profits to the respondent."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2377, "end_char": 2382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arbitration Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2390, "end_char": 2411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2741, "end_char": 2749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Arbitration Act, 1940", "statute": "the Arbitration Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2818, "end_char": 2823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Arbitration Act, 1940", "statute": "the Arbitration Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Arbitration Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2831, "end_char": 2852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4433, "end_char": 4441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4531, "end_char": 4536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JtrRJSDICTJON", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4803, "end_char": 4832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JtrRJSDICTJON: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Pnrshottam Trikamdas", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5015, "end_char": 5035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pnrshottam Trikamdas, S: N.-, Andley, ].·"}}, {"text": "P. L. Vohra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5093, "end_char": 5104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dadarhonji, Rames/wrar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. R. Karanth", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5132, "end_char": 5145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "....\n\nK. R. Karanth and Naunit Lal, for the respon-\n\n,. ' ."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5150, "end_char": 5160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "....\n\nK. R. Karanth and Naunit Lal, for the respon-\n\n,. ' ."}}, {"text": "GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5256, "end_char": 5270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-The respondent, Pothan Joseph, who was working as the Editor of the Deccan Herald owned and published by the appellant.", "canonical_name": "GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "Pothan Joseph", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5291, "end_char": 5304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-The respondent, Pothan Joseph, who was working as the Editor of the Deccan Herald owned and published by the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Pothart Joseph"}}, {"text": "Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5400, "end_char": 5430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd., in Bangalore has Jiled a suit against the appellant op two contr:icts executed between the parties on April 1, 1948, and February 20, 195;1, respectively, ..and has claimed acc.ounts of the working of the Deccan Herald newspaper from April 1, 1948, to March 31, 1958, as well as payment of the amount that mav be found due to him from the appellant under the 'provisions of cs."}}, {"text": "Bangalore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5435, "end_char": 5444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd., in Bangalore has Jiled a suit against the appellant op two contr:icts executed between the parties on April 1, 1948, and February 20, 195;1, respectively, ..and has claimed acc.ounts of the working of the Deccan Herald newspaper from April 1, 1948, to March 31, 1958, as well as payment of the amount that mav be found due to him from the appellant under the 'provisions of cs."}}, {"text": "March 31, 19.58", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6032, "end_char": 6047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "effect from March 31, 19.58."}}, {"text": "March 17, 19.58", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6128, "end_char": 6143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, by a subsequent letter writt.en by the appellant to the respondent on March 17, 19.58, the respondent was told that his services had been terminated with immediate effect and he was asked to hand over charge to his success6r, Mr. T. S. Ramachandra Rao."}}, {"text": "T. S. Ramachandra Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6288, "end_char": 6309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, by a subsequent letter writt.en by the appellant to the respondent on March 17, 19.58, the respondent was told that his services had been terminated with immediate effect and he was asked to hand over charge to his success6r, Mr. T. S. Ramachandra Rao."}}, {"text": "July 14,' 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6326, "end_char": 6340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter on July 14,' 1958, the respondent filed the present stiit against the appellant."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6681, "end_char": 6686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mysore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7134, "end_char": 7151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon the appellant preferred an appeal in the Mysore High Court but his appeal failed and the High Court confirmed the orde~ passed \"by •hp trial court though for different reasons."}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7339, "end_char": 7353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The -High\n\n' l\n\nPrintas (A1jlsore)'\n\nPrivate Ltd. v.\n\nPothan Joseph\n\nGajendragadkar J. ;\n\nPrinte.rs (Mjsore)\n\nPrivate Lid.", "canonical_name": "GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "Additional Civil Judge, Bangalore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7809, "end_char": 7842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent did not object, arid so the High Court directed that the suit may be transferred to the file of the Additional Civil Judge, Bangalore."}}, {"text": "Art. 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8061, "end_char": 8072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "February 20, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9248, "end_char": 9265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".~) of the said contract the period of the respondent's employment was extended by another five years by a subsequent contract entered into between the parties on February 20, 1953."}}, {"text": "March 17, I 9.~8", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9364, "end_char": 9380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As we have already mentioned the services of the respondent came to be terminated z, bruptly on March 17, I 9.~8."}}, {"text": "October 16, 19.57", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9419, "end_char": 9436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jt appears that by his letter dated October 16, 19.57, the respondent made certain claims against the appellant under the provisions of the \\Vorking Journalists Act."}}, {"text": "Vorking Journalists Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9524, "end_char": 9547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Behrarh Doctor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10442, "end_char": 10456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "mediation of Mr. Behrarh Doctor but the said attempt failed because the appellant was not serious about it and was just trying \"to protract, defeat and delay the plaintiff's moves\".", "canonical_name": "Behrarri Doctor"}}, {"text": "Behram Doctor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11949, "end_char": 11962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court\n\nci lsor•)\n\nPrivat• Ltd. v.\n\nPothat1 Joseph\n\nGajmdragadkar\n\nPrinters (Mysore)\n\nPrivate Ltd.\n\nPotka11 ,7ospk\n\nGajendragadknr J.\n\n724 SUPREl\\lE COURT REPORTS [ 1960]\n\nrelevant facts to which both -the courts have referred, and on which both of them have relied though m different ways.", "canonical_name": "GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "Venkataswamy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27442, "end_char": 27454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indeed bis case is that after he came to know about this system he protested to the Director, Mr.\n\nVenkataswamy, who has been taking active part in the affairs of the appellant, and Mr.\n\nVenkataswamy assured him that as from the beginning of 19ilii the accounts were being separately maintained.", "canonical_name": "\\'enkataswamy"}}, {"text": "Venkataswamy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28065, "end_char": 28077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Venkataswamy who was addressed by the respondent as the l\\'fana~!ing Director told him by his reply of March ~. I Y?>Ci, that he was not t:he Manap; ing Director and added that in his view it was not open to the respondent to invoke cl.", "canonical_name": "\\'enkataswamy"}}, {"text": "cl. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28298, "end_char": 28303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28393, "end_char": 28398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "\\'enkataswamy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28437, "end_char": 28450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\'enkataswamy's immediate response to the respondent's request for arbitration was that the rcspon- .", "canonical_name": "\\'enkataswamy"}}, {"text": "Venkataswamy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28641, "end_char": 28653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1956, Mr. Venkataswamy a_ttempted to explain this statement.", "canonical_name": "\\'enkataswamy"}}, {"text": "Pothan Joseph", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28843, "end_char": 28856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That, Pothan Joseph\n\nltq1e\\:er, .appears to , )Je an unsatisfactory explanation ... (J?,", "canonical_name": "Pothart Joseph"}}, {"text": "Bel)ram Doctor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28994, "end_char": 29008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "10), Even so, Mr. Venkataswamy agreed to meet Gajendragadkar J; Mr. Bel)ram Doctor and so.", "canonical_name": "Behrarri Doctor"}}, {"text": "Bepram Doctor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29168, "end_char": 29181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fie informed Mr.\n\nBepram Doctor accor, dingly (D. 6).", "canonical_name": "Behrarri Doctor"}}, {"text": "Behtam Doctor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29239, "end_char": 29252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ii appears that subsequently Mr.\n\nBehtam Doctor n1et both the respondent and Mr, Venkataswamy on M, ay _9.", "canonical_name": "Behrarri Doctor"}}, {"text": "Behram Doc.tor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29382, "end_char": 29396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "proceeding.s of , this meeting which have been kept by Mr. Behram Doc.tor and copies of which have been supplied by him to both the parties indicate that Mr. .", "canonical_name": "Behrarri Doctor"}}, {"text": "Behram\n\nD", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29611, "end_char": 29620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Behram Doctor attempted to mediate between the parties and presumably te parties were\n\nageeable to secure the mediation of Mr.. Behram\n\nD~Ktor to resolve dispute."}}, {"text": "Venk.ataswamy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29761, "end_char": 29774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the said proceedings produced by the appellant contains a statement that Mr. Venk.ataswamy at the outset told Mr.\n\nBehram Doctor that he had come 'oh an unofficial visit 'and was speaking without the consent.", "canonical_name": "\\'enkataswamy"}}, {"text": "Behram Doctor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29799, "end_char": 29812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the said proceedings produced by the appellant contains a statement that Mr. Venk.ataswamy at the outset told Mr.\n\nBehram Doctor that he had come 'oh an unofficial visit 'and was speaking without the consent.", "canonical_name": "Behrarri Doctor"}}, {"text": "Behram Dottor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30311, "end_char": 30324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is thus clear that though Mr.\n\nBehram Dottor was not appointed an arbitrator and no reference in ' writing was made to him an attempt.", "canonical_name": "Behrarri Doctor"}}, {"text": "Behrarri Doctor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30491, "end_char": 30506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was mad~ by' th~ 'parties to settle the dispute with the assi&tance of Mr.\n\nBehrarri Doctor, and that attempt faild.'", "canonical_name": "Behrarri Doctor"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33992, "end_char": 33997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34227, "end_char": 34235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 34754, "end_char": 34780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nAHMEDABAD v.\n\nK:ARAMCHAND PREMCHAND LTD.,"}}, {"text": "ARAMCHAND PREMCHAND LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34799, "end_char": 34822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nAHMEDABAD v.\n\nK:ARAMCHAND PREMCHAND LTD.,"}}, {"text": "S. K. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34838, "end_char": 34847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR and\n\nM. HIDAYADULLAH, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "J. L. KAPUR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34849, "end_char": 34860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR and\n\nM. HIDAYADULLAH, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYADULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34866, "end_char": 34881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR and\n\nM. HIDAYADULLAH, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "ss. 2(3), 4, 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35061, "end_char": 35075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pothan Joseph\n\nGajendragailkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35240, "end_char": 35270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessee held the managing agency of a limited company in what was then called \"British India\" and had also a pharma-\n\nPrinters (Mysore)\n\nPrivale Ltd.\n\nv ..\n\nPothan Joseph\n\nGajendragailkar J.\n\nApril 28.", "canonical_name": "POTHAN JOSEPH. (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_727_742_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "--· .\n\n3 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 727\n\narbitration they did not anticipate the complications which have subsequently arisen.\n\nThat is why an arbitration agreement may have been introduced in the contract in question.\n\nAll these facts have been considered by both the courts, and though it is true that in their approach and final decisions in respect of these facts the two courts have differed in material particula1:s, they have in the result agreed with the conclusion that the discretion vested in them should be exercised in not granting stay as claimed by the appellant.\n\nUnder these circumstances we do not think we would be justified in substituting our discretion for that of the courts below.\n\nIt may be that if we were trying the appellant's application under s. 34 we might have come to a different conclusion; and also that we may have hesitated to confirm the order of the tnal court if we had been dealing with the matter as a court of first appeal; but the matter has now' come to us under Art. 136, and so we can justly interfere with the concurrent exercise of the discretion by the .courts below only if we feel that the said exercise of discretion is patently and manifestly unreasonable, capricious or perverse and that it may defeat the ends of justice. Having regard to all the circumstances and facts of this case we are not disposed to hold that a case for our interference has been made out by the appellant.\n\nThat is why we dismiss this appeal but make no order as to costs throughout.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nAHMEDABAD v.\n\nK:ARAMCHAND PREMCHAND LTD.,\n\nAHMEDABAD. (S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR and\n\nM. HIDAYADULLAH, JJ.) Income-tax-Set-off-Business loss in Indian State-Profits in British India-Applicability of the Act to business in Indian State- Business Profits Tax Act, 1947 (21 of 1947), ss. 2(3), 4, 5.\n\nThe assessee held the managing agency of a limited company in what was then called \"British India\" and had also a pharma-\n\nPrinters (Mysore)\n\nPrivale Ltd.\n\nv ..\n\nPothan Joseph\n\nGajendragailkar J.\n\nApril 28.\n\nCommissior.tr of\n\nIncomttax\n\nKaramchand Prtmchand Ltd.\n\nSX. Das J,\n\nSUPREME COURT REP<; JRTS [ lYuQJ\n\nceutical business in the Baroda State which was at the relevant time an Indian State.\n\nThe business in British India showed profits asessable under the provisions of the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947, but the business carried on in Baroda resulted in .2 loss, in the relevant chargeable accounting 'periods between 1946 and 1949.\n\nBefore the Income-tax authorities the assessee claimed that the loss suffered by it in its business in Baroda should be deducted in computing its , bus, iness inome liable .o business profits tax, but this claim was rejected on the ground that though under s. 'S of the Act, if it stood by itself without any of the provisoes, the Act wound be applicable to the Baroda business, tile third proviso had the effect of extluding that 'business from tl\\e purvie\\\\,. of the Act, except in so far as the income, profits or _gains of the business were received or deemed to 1 be received in or brought into British India: ' . ' Held, th.at the citecr of the third proviso to s. 5 of , the. Business Profits Tax Act, 1947, was merely to exempt the income, profits and gains of the Baroda business except whet\\ they were reteived or brought into British India, but the. business itself v{as one to which the Act was applicable under \\he substantive part of s. 5.\n\nConsequently, the losses of the business could. be set off against the profits of the business in. British India. , The relevant provisions of .the Act _are set o.\\lt , in the judgent. ·\n\nC1v1L {\\PPELLATE JURISDICTTQN: Civil Appe_al No. 304. of 1958'. · ' Appeal from the j1ulgment and order dated September 7, 19.56, qf, the. Bombay: High Court. in Incometax Reference No. 19 qf 1956. ·\n\nC. K.\n\nDaph.tary, Solicitor-General of 1l11di11, K. N. Ri1jagofial Sasti; i and D. (Guf1ta, for. the appel- . Jant.\n\n N. A. Palkhivala and S. N. Andley, for the respondent.\n\n1960, , April 28.\n\nThe Judgment.of the Court was delivered by S. K. DAs, J.-This is an appeal on a certificate of fitness granted by the High Court of Bombay, and the short question for decision is the true scope and effect of the third proviso to s. 5 of the Business Profits Tax Act, 194-7 (Act No. XXI of 1947), hereinafter referred to as the Act.\n\nThe appellant is the Commissioner of Income-tax, Ahmedabad, and the respondent .is a private limited company .under . the name and style of . Karamchand Premchand Lt, d., Ahmedahad,. to be called hereafter , as the assessee. , \\ • ' ' . . - ' ' , \" I \"\n\n. -\n\n- .\n\n....\n\n3 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME OOURT REP~)R'T:S\n\n... The relevant .facts are tbe,5.e.: the assessee l1dd .the . managing agency -of the Abmedabad Manufa1=turing\n\n.aii:d Calico Printing Co.\n\nLd. 'It also haid , a: pharma\n\n(; e, uticl business , in the. Baroda State, wh, ich was t: the relevant. ime an indian State run: in tl1e name and sty le of Sarabhai Chem.icals.\n\nThe assessee' s business in India (we , shaU qse. the -expression i India in thisr:judgment to .mean:British . .India as it was then caHed: in contra-distinction. , to .an Indian .State) showed b:nsiness profits • as~sale l1nder the provisions of the A.ct; but the .business , carried on in the name and style of Sarabhai Chemicals in. Baroda ~.howed a lqs\n\nin the relevant chargeable accounting , periods which were four in number, namely: (1) April 1, 1946, 1 tp\n\nDecember 31, 1946; (2) January 1, 1 947, to December .31, 1947;. (3) January l, 19,48, -to December 31, 1-948; ancl (4) J anrtary l., 1949,\n\n1 o fy[arch 31, l 949, The assessee claimed t.hat ,-its assessable income : in\n\n, hiia should be reduced by•thelos '.sµffered RYiit ; in\n\nits business -in Baroda. The Income-tax Officer rejected the claim of the assessee and held that. the Act did 'pot apply to the business carried o~. ip 'an :Indian Stae\n\nµnless profits and gains of th.at business were rcceivd Ol'• deemed to hqve beer reeved .in , pr brought into -lndia.\n\nOn appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner upheld the 'cqptenti9n of the .· asesee arfl allowed the appeal.\n\nThe -Departrp.ep.t wet up , in appeal to the Appelhte Tribunal, _which help. . th:8,5, 1.:8, fi, c-;87\n\n1960\n\n11 Commi,1sioner P, f Income'.tax\n\n'v.\n\nK aramc.!umd Premchand Ltd.\n\nS._K. Das J.\n\n1960.\n\nC0111missioner of lncmne-tax\n\nKarnmchond Premchand Ltd.\n\nS. K. Das] ..\n\nand 88 of 1 %3-!i4, referred that question to the Bombay High Court in the following terms:\n\n\"W'hether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the loss suffered by the assessee in the busine'S of Sarabhai Chemicals should be deducted in computing the business income of the assessee company liable to business profits tax?\" The High Court answered the question in the affirmative and came to the conclusion that the assessee was entitled t:o deduct the losses incurred by it in its Baroda business and set them off against the profits made iu the taxable territories.\n\nThe appellant then moved the High Court and obtained a certificate of fitness.\n\nOn that certificate the present appeal has come to us.\n\nThe main contention on behalf of the appellant is that the High Court came to an erroneous conclusion with regtre received in or are brought into the taxable territories in any chargeable accounting period, or are assessable under section 42 of that Act.'' \\Ve have read the section as it stands to-day. The expression \" taxable territories\" in the provisoes was substituted for \"British India\" by the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950, and the third proviso originally referred to any income, profits or gains of business a.ceruing or arising within \"any Indian State\" ; then\n\n- .\n\n,,._\n\n the expression \"a Part B State\" was substituted, but this was again changed_ by the Adaptation of Law~ (No. 3) Order, 1956, and the present expression \"any part of India to which this Act does not extend\" was introduced.\n\nFor the purposes of this appeal nothing turns upon these changes, and :we may read the third proviso as referring to any income, profits or gains of a business accruing or arising in an Indistantive part of s. :\"i and as the third proviso .exempts income, profits or gains only, the losses of the Baroda business can be set off against the profits of the business in India.\n\nThese are the two main rival contentions which we have to consider in this appeal.\n\nNow, let us examine a little more closely ss. 4 and 5 of the Act. v\\'c have stated earlier that s. 4 is the charging secti•)n, which levies a tax on the amount of taxable profits during any chargeable accounting period, in respect of_ any\n\nbrnincss i-o which the Act applies. The corresponding section in the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940, was also s. 4 thereof, which levied a tax on the amount by which the profits during any chargeable accounting period exceeded the standard profits in respect of any business to which that Act applied. lJ nclcr the Excess Profits Tax Act, l 'l4·0, as also nnder the Act under onr consicleratio11, the unit is the husiness-bnsiness to which the Act applies.\n\nFor the application of the Act WC have to go to s. !J. vVc have i)ointed 0111. that\n\n>. '' in its substantive part makes the Act applicable to cvcrv hminess of which any part of th'e profits is chargeable to income-tax by virtue of the provisions of sub-cl. (i) or sub-cl. (ii) of cl. (b) of sub-s. (1) of s. 4 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and, thns makes\n\nthe Act applicable to the Baroda. bnsincss of the assessce.\n\nThe question then is-does the third proviso to s. :; exclude that business except in so far as the income, profits or gains of that. business are received or deemed to he received in or are brought. into the taxable territories in any chargeable accotinting period?\n\nIf that is the true scope and effect of the third proviso, then the appellant is entitled to succeed.\n\nIf, on the countrary, the third proviso merely makes the Act inapplicable to income, profits or gains of the Baroda bm1ness unies> such income, profits or gains arc\n\n--- .\n\nreceived or deemed to be received in or are brought into the taxable territories, but does not exclude the business from the purview of ss. 4 and 5, then the answer given\n\nby the High Court is correct.\n\nThe High Court has stated that whichever view is taken the third proviso leads to certain difficulties, and in a case where much can be said on both sides. the benefit of any ambiguity of language must be given to the assessee. \\Ne agree with the High Court that the question is not quite free from difficulty; but on the language of the proviso as it stands, the answer given by the High Court appears to us to be the correct answer.·.\n\nIt is not the case of the appellant that the first and the second provisoes to s. 5 apply to the facts of this case.\n\nBut it: is significant to note the phraseology of these two ptovisoes and contrast them with the third proviso.\n\nThe first proviso says:-· \"Provided that the Act shall not apply to any business the whole of the profits of which accrue or arise without the taxable territories, etc.., The language is clear enough to exclude the business referred to therein from the purview of the Act.\n\nSimilarly, the second proviso excludes under certain circumstances part of a b11siness aiicl uses appropriate language to give effect to that exclusion.\n\nBy a •legal fiction as it were, it divides a business into two parts, one separate from the other, and makes the Act applicable to one of them only.\n\nUnlike the other two provisoes, the third proviso does not use the language of exclusion in respect of' any business. vVhat it takes out of the ambit of the Act is merely the \"income, profits and gains\" of a particular business.\n\nThe language is thus more apt to effectuate an exemption from tax of \"income, profits or gains\" rather than an exclusion of the bl.1siness from the purview of the Act.\n\nOn behalf of the appellant it is contended that such a constructi?n results in this anomaly that if the income, profits or gains are not brought into India, they escape tax and yet tl1e losses of a business which is ontsicle India are taken into consideration in computing the profits, etc., in lndia.\n\nThis, it is argued, could not have been the object of the legislature in\n\nCo.mmissioner qf\n\nIncome tax\n\nv •.\n\nKaramchand Premchand Ltd.\n\nS. K. Das].\n\nCurn1nissioner\n\nlncomelax\n\nenacting I he third proviso to s. 5 uf the Act.\n\nIt is contended that the object was to exclude the business of in an Indian State as also the income; profits or gains thereof, ttnles uci1 }Jroiits, etc., \\Vere recc1vcc.l in or brought into J ndia.\n\nThis argument. is not devoid of plausibility and requires careful consideration.\n\nKaramchand Premchand Ltd,\n\nS.K. Das J. \\Ve may here refer tu the relev;111t provisions of the Excess Profits Tax Act, l 9·10.\n\nSection 5 of that Act in its substantive part and the first and second provisoes thereto were worded in identical languag-e, but the third proviso to s. 5 of the Excess Prolit:s Tax Act,\n\nHMO, was worded quite dilferemly from the third proviso to s. 5 of the Act.\n\nThe third proviso to s. 5 of the Excess Prolits Tax Act, lV-IU, stated:\n\n\"Provided further that this Act shall not apply to any busiue\" the 11holc oI the profits of which accrue or arise Jn a Part B State, and where the profits o[. a pan of a business accrue or arise in a\n\nPart ll State, sucli part shall, for the purposes of this provision, be clcemcd to be a separate business the whole of the profits of which accrue or arise in a Part B State, and the other part: of the business shall, for all the purposes oI this Act, be deemed to be a separate business.\" The languagc used was clearly one of exclusion, and it said that the Excess Profits Tax Act was not applicable to a business the profits of which rol'iso to s. ii of the Excess 0 .\n\nProfits Tax Act, l !J40, and s. 1+(2)(c) (now deleted) of the Indian I ncome-t:ix Act, I !l~2, wc1e cmcted :11 about the same time, and the broad object of both rhc\n\n. -\n\n.. -- .\n\nprovlSlons was to exclude profits of a business in an Indian or Part B State from charge of tax; but under the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940, such profits were not chargeable even if received in or brought into India whereas under s. 14(2)( c) of the Indian lncometax Act such profits became chargeable to tax if received in or brought into India.\n\nThis difference, learned counsel for the assessee states, was no doubt done away with by the change in language of the third proviso to s. 5 of the Act; but the change in language did smnething more, because it assimilated' the position under the proviso t:o that under s. 14(2)( c) of the Indian Income-tax Act, namely, that though . profits of a business. in an Indian State cannot be taxed unless they: are brought into the taxable territories, yet the losses incurred can be adjusted' in computing the profits of the business as a whole.\n\nLearned counsel for the assessee has relied on the decision of this Court: in Commissioner of lncornc-tax, Mysore, Trauancore- Cochin and Coorg v. lndo-Afercontile Bank Ltd. (')and the decisions of the Bombay High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax., Bombay City v., Murlidar iVl.athu.- rawalla Mahajan Association (2) and Commissioner of Excess Profits Tax, Bo111bay City v. Bhogilal H. Patel.\n\nBombay (').\n\nThe first two decisions cited above considered the effect of s. 21( I), Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, with special reference to the first proviso thereto (as it stood at the time relevant therein) and its inipact on ~. 10 of tl1e said Act.\n\nIt was held that sub-s. (I) of ~. 2-1 dealt onlv with set-off of loss under one head\n\nag'.aimt profits rn; der any other head, and therefore the old first proviso to sub-s; (l j of s. 21 applied and barred the right of set-off only where a loss in the Indian State was sought to be set off against Indian profits under any other head; where, however, the assessee sought to set off his loss in the I hdian State against his Indian profits under the same head, e.g., set-off of loss incurred in a pusiness carried on in an l ndian State against the profits of the same or another business carried on in India, the prmiso did not apply am! the assessce was en ti tied to such set-off under s. I 0\n\n(!) [19\"9] Supp_ 2 S.C.R. 2S6. (2) [19!P.J JG I.T.R. J.t:;,\n\n(3) [1952) 21 l.T.R. Z2.\n\nCommissiouer of 11lcorne-tax v.\n\nI( aramchand Premclumd Ltd.\n\nS.K. Das J.\n\n'960 of the Indian Income-tax Act. Learned counsel for -. -. the assessee has submitted that the same principle Commissioner of l' \"th d t th h' d . t 5 f th Imome-ta> app !BB WI regar o e t 1r proviso o s. o e v.\n\nAct. Learned counsel has submitted that as under\n\nKaramchand s. 10 of the Indian Income-tax Act, different businesses Premchand Ud. constitute one head and in order to determine what s. K. Das J. are the profits and gains of a business under s. 10 an assessee is entitled to show all his profits and set off against those profits losses incurred by him, in the same head ; so also under s. 5 of the Act, the Baroda business of the assessee is within the am bit of the Act, though the income, profits or gains thereof are excluded by the third proviso unless they are received or brought into India. He has pointed out that the position under the Excess Profits Tax Act was different, as was explained in Bhogilal Patel's case (1) where the learned Chief Justice said :\n\n\" This contention of Mr. Kolah is based on the language used in the proviso, namely, that 'this Act shall not apply to any business thew hole of the profits of which accrue or arise in an Indian State'.\n\nNow, this contention is obviously fallacious, because the proviso does not say that the Act shall not apply to the profits of a business which accrue or arise in an Indian State. What the proviso says is that the Act shall not apply to any business the whole of the profits of which accrue or arise in an Indian State.\n\nThe expression 'the whole of the profits of which accrue or arise in an Indian State ' is an expression which indicates the nature of the business which is excluded from the purview or ambit of the Act\".\n\nNow, the third proviso to s. 5 of the Act uses not the phraseology of the Excess Profits Tax Act, but the very phraseology which according to the learned Chief Justice would have made all the difference. Learned counsel for the assessee has argued, and we think it has considerable force, that the legislature had before it the language used in s. 14 (2) (c) of the Indian Income-tax Act and it knew the effect of those provisions and it used the same language in the third proviso to s. 5 of the Act. If the object of the legislature was to exclude the business itself from the ambit\n\n(t) (1952] 21 I.T.R. 72.\n\nof the Act wl1ile taxing the profits which were brought into the taxable territories, then it used language which failed to achieve that object.\n\nOn behalf of the appellant it bas been pointed out - that the expression used in the third proviso to s. 5 is - \"Provided further that the Act shall not apply to any income, profits or gains of a business, etc.\" It is argued that this language, (namely, that the Act shall not apply) is apt to exclude from the purview of the Act business the profits of which accrue or arise in an Jnclian State, - except in so far as _ such profits are brought into the taxable territories.\n\nIn support of this argument a reference has been made to s. 4(3) of the Indian Income-tax Act as it stood prior to 1939 and reliance is placed on the decisions in C.ommissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. M. T. T. K. M. M.\n\nS. M. A. R. Somasundaram Chettiar (1) and Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay v., The Provident Investment Co. Ltd. (2).\n\nIt is true that s. 4(3) of the Indian I ncome-t:ax Act, as it stood prior to 1039, said that this Act (meaning the Indian Income-tax Act, 1 l22) shall not apply to certain classes of income\", and in the two decisions cited it was held. that the word '\"business\" mca nt a business whose profits were being assessed in the year under consideration and there was no justification for deduction of the expe1ises of a foreign btisiness. 'Ne do not, however, think that the use of the expression, \"the Act shall not apply\", is. decisive in this case. \\;\\Te have to read the third proviso as a whole :ind in the context in which it occurs, in order to find o_ut what it means.\n\nSo read it is difficult to hold that it has the effect of excluding the Baroda business except in so far as the prof-its thereof are brought into the taxable territories. what it says in express terms is that the Act shall not apply to any income, profits or gains of business accruing or arising in an f nd ia n State, etc.\n\nIt does not say that the lnisiness itself is excluded from the purview of the Act.\n\nWe have to read and construe the third proviso in the context 'of the substantive part of s . .5 which takes in the Baroda business :ind the phraseology of , the first and second provisos thereto, which clearly uses the (l' A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 487. ,\n\n(2) (1931) I.L.R. 56 Born. 92.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax\n\nKaramchand Premchand I:.td.\n\nS.K. Das J-\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncomtlax\n\n\\'.\n\nll~, irt•mrhmuf Prnnclwud Ltd.\n\nS.K. Das J.\n\nHO SUPREiVm COl'RT REPORTS [1960]\n\nl:111g11agc of exclrnling the business referred to therein.\n\nThe third pnl\\'iso cloes not use th:il language and 1d1at learned counsel for the appellant is seeking to do is to atcr the l:i.ngu1gc of the proviso so as to n1:i.ke it rc:1cl as 1ho11gh it excl11clccl business the income, profits or p; ai'ns of \\\\'liich accrue or arise in :m Indian Staie.\n\nThe diflicnhy is that 1he third proviso docs not say so: ou the contriry, it uses language which rncrch exempts from tax the income, profits or gains unless such incnn1c, profits or g:i.ins arc received in or hro11ght into India.\n\nNext. we have to consider what the expression \"income, profits or gains\"' means.\n\nIn the context of 1he third proviso, it cannot include losses because the latter pan of the pro\\'iso .says \"unless such income, profits nr g; iins arc received, etc., into the taxable territories\".\n\nObvio11sly, losses cannot be hro11ght into 1he t:1x:ihle territories except in an accounting sense, :rnd the expression \"income, profits or gains\" in the context cannot include losses.\n\nThe expression mnst have the same rncanii1g thro11ghout the proviso, anrl cannot have one meaning in the first part an:8,5, 1.:8, fi, c-;87\n\n1960\n\n11 Commi,1sioner P, f Income'.tax\n\n'v.\n\nK aramc.!umd Premchand Ltd.\n\nS._K. Das J.\n\n1960."}}, {"text": "S._K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7169, "end_char": 7178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "numqered as >:8,5, 1.:8, fi, c-;87\n\n1960\n\n11 Commi,1sioner P, f Income'.tax\n\n'v.\n\nK aramc.!umd Premchand Ltd.\n\nS._K. Das J.\n\n1960.", "canonical_name": "s. K. Das J."}}, {"text": "C0111missioner of lncmne-tax\n\nKarnmchond Premchand Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7190, "end_char": 7245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C0111missioner of lncmne-tax\n\nKarnmchond Premchand Ltd.\n\nS. K. Das] ..\n\nand 88 of 1 %3-!i4, referred that question to the Bombay High Court in the following terms:\n\n\"W'hether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the loss suffered by the assessee in the busine'S of Sarabhai Chemicals should be deducted in computing the business income of the assessee company liable to business profits tax?\""}}, {"text": "S. K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7247, "end_char": 7256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C0111missioner of lncmne-tax\n\nKarnmchond Premchand Ltd.\n\nS. K. Das] ..\n\nand 88 of 1 %3-!i4, referred that question to the Bombay High Court in the following terms:\n\n\"W'hether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the loss suffered by the assessee in the busine'S of Sarabhai Chemicals should be deducted in computing the business income of the assessee company liable to business profits tax?\"", "canonical_name": "s. K. Das J."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8145, "end_char": 8149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Legislature passed the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8277, "end_char": 8336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "September 1, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8667, "end_char": 8684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the pmposes of that Act, the expression \"chargeable accounting period\" meant (a) any accounting period falling wholly within the term beginning on September 1, 1939, and ending on March 31, 1946, and (b) where any accounting period fell partly within and partly without the said term, such part of that accounting period as fell within the said term."}}, {"text": "March 31, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8700, "end_char": 8714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the pmposes of that Act, the expression \"chargeable accounting period\" meant (a) any accounting period falling wholly within the term beginning on September 1, 1939, and ending on March 31, 1946, and (b) where any accounting period fell partly within and partly without the said term, such part of that accounting period as fell within the said term."}}, {"text": "March 31, 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8949, "end_char": 8963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be here stated that originally the term was from September I, 1939, to March 31, 1941, but by several annual Finance Acts the term was extended up to March 31, 1946."}}, {"text": "s. 2(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9486, "end_char": 9493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9628, "end_char": 9633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9648, "end_char": 9662, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 2( l 7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9943, "end_char": 9953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10142, "end_char": 10149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10187, "end_char": 10191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10347, "end_char": 10351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "31st clay of March, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10717, "end_char": 10741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Charge of tax-Subject to the provisions of this Act, there shall in respect of any business to whid1 this Act applies, be charged, levied and paid on the amount of taxable profits during any chargeable accounting period, a tax (in this Act referred to as \"business profits tax'') which shall, in respect of any chargeable accounting period ending on or before the 31st clay of March, 1947, be equal to sixteen and two-third per cent."}}, {"text": "March 31, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11430, "end_char": 11444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the taxable profits in respect of the chargeable accounting period ending on or before March 31, 1947, and in respect of any chargeable accounting period after that date, the tax shall\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax v.\n\nKaramchand Premcliand Ltd.\n\nS. K. Das :J.\n\nCommtssioner of\n\nIncometax\n\nKaramchand Premckand Ltd.\n\nS. [(."}}, {"text": "Karamchand Premcliand Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11560, "end_char": 11586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the taxable profits in respect of the chargeable accounting period ending on or before March 31, 1947, and in respect of any chargeable accounting period after that date, the tax shall\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax v.\n\nKaramchand Premcliand Ltd.\n\nS. K. Das :J.\n\nCommtssioner of\n\nIncometax\n\nKaramchand Premckand Ltd.\n\nS. [(.", "canonical_name": "KARAMCHAND PREMCHAND LTD., AHMEDABAD"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11808, "end_char": 11812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11903, "end_char": 11907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Application of Act-This Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11910, "end_char": 11937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12175, "end_char": 12184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Application of Act-This Act", "statute": "Application of Act-This Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Incornet ax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12192, "end_char": 12220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12817, "end_char": 12831, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13494, "end_char": 13504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14272, "end_char": 14281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14375, "end_char": 14382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 4 and 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14607, "end_char": 14618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15272, "end_char": 15299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15384, "end_char": 15411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15479, "end_char": 15483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15762, "end_char": 15766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16527, "end_char": 16530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das J.\n\ning the income, profits or gains of the Baroda business except when they arc received or brought into India, ."}}, {"text": "Baroda business", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16889, "end_char": 16904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "hut the business itself is not: excluded from the purview of the Act; the business is still one to 'rhich the Act applies under the sul>stantive part of s. :\"i and as the third proviso .exempts income, profits or gains only, the losses of the Baroda business can be set off against the profits of the business in India."}}, {"text": "ss. 4 and 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17093, "end_char": 17104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17147, "end_char": 17151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "corresponding section in the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17331, "end_char": 17388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17399, "end_char": 17403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The corresponding section in the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940", "statute": "The corresponding section in the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18053, "end_char": 18057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The corresponding section in the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940", "statute": "The corresponding section in the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18065, "end_char": 18092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 4 and 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18851, "end_char": 18862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19435, "end_char": 19439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Karamchand Premchand Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20977, "end_char": 21002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This, it is argued, could not have been the object of the legislature in\n\nCo.mmissioner qf\n\nIncome tax\n\nv •.\n\nKaramchand Premchand Ltd.\n\nS. K. Das].", "canonical_name": "KARAMCHAND PREMCHAND LTD., AHMEDABAD"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21075, "end_char": 21079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Karamchand Premchand Ltd", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21376, "end_char": 21400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Karamchand Premchand Ltd,\n\nS.K. Das J. \\Ve may here refer tu the relev;111t provisions of the Excess Profits Tax Act, l 9·10.", "canonical_name": "KARAMCHAND PREMCHAND LTD., AHMEDABAD"}}, {"text": "S.K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21403, "end_char": 21411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Karamchand Premchand Ltd,\n\nS.K. Das J. \\Ve may here refer tu the relev;111t provisions of the Excess Profits Tax Act, l 9·10.", "canonical_name": "s. K. Das J."}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21503, "end_char": 21512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21653, "end_char": 21657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21750, "end_char": 21754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21789, "end_char": 21793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Profits Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23218, "end_char": 23233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23247, "end_char": 23251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Profits Tax Act", "statute": "Profits Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23509, "end_char": 23537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 14(2)( c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23628, "end_char": 23640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940", "statute": "the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23882, "end_char": 23886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940", "statute": "the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "s. 14(2)( c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24016, "end_char": 24028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940", "statute": "the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24043, "end_char": 24057, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 24491, "end_char": 24508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned counsel for the assessee has relied on the decision of this Court: in Commissioner of lncornc-tax, Mysore, Trauancore- Cochin and Coorg v. lndo-Afercontile Bank Ltd. (')and the decisions of the Bombay High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax.,"}}, {"text": "s. 21( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24760, "end_char": 24769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24771, "end_char": 24798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25120, "end_char": 25125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "aramchand Premclumd Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25758, "end_char": 25782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Commissiouer of 11lcorne-tax v.\n\nI( aramchand Premclumd Ltd.\n\nS.K. Das J.\n\n'960 of the Indian Income-tax Act.", "canonical_name": "KARAMCHAND PREMCHAND LTD., AHMEDABAD"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25816, "end_char": 25830, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26073, "end_char": 26078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26093, "end_char": 26107, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. K. Das J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26195, "end_char": 26207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "constitute one head and in order to determine what s. K. Das J. are the profits and gains of a business under s. 10 an assessee is entitled to show all his profits and set off against those profits losses incurred by him, in the same head ; so also under s. 5 of the Act, the Baroda business of the assessee is within the am bit of the Act, though the income, profits or gains thereof are excluded by the third proviso unless they are received or brought into India.", "canonical_name": "s. K. Das J."}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26254, "end_char": 26259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26399, "end_char": 26403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "has pointed out that the position under the Excess Profits Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26614, "end_char": 26680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bhogilal Patel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26716, "end_char": 26730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He has pointed out that the position under the Excess Profits Tax Act was different, as was explained in Bhogilal Patel's case (1) where the learned Chief Justice said :\n\n\" This contention of Mr. Kolah is based on the language used in the proviso, namely, that 'this Act shall not apply to any business thew hole of the profits of which accrue or arise in an Indian State'."}}, {"text": "Kolah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26807, "end_char": 26812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He has pointed out that the position under the Excess Profits Tax Act was different, as was explained in Bhogilal Patel's case (1) where the learned Chief Justice said :\n\n\" This contention of Mr. Kolah is based on the language used in the proviso, namely, that 'this Act shall not apply to any business thew hole of the profits of which accrue or arise in an Indian State'."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27537, "end_char": 27541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "He has pointed out that the position under the Excess Profits Tax Act", "statute": "He has pointed out that the position under the Excess Profits Tax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27856, "end_char": 27861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27884, "end_char": 27898, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27996, "end_char": 28000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28371, "end_char": 28375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28803, "end_char": 28810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28825, "end_char": 28839, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 4(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29104, "end_char": 29111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29210, "end_char": 29224, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32613, "end_char": 32627, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32853, "end_char": 32857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33235, "end_char": 33239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33399, "end_char": 33403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14(2)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33614, "end_char": 33625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14(2)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33824, "end_char": 33835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34021, "end_char": 34025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule II of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34347, "end_char": 34369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Schedule II", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34684, "end_char": 34695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule II of the Act", "statute": "Schedule II of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35393, "end_char": 35397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35448, "end_char": 35452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "H. C. NARAYANAPPA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36401, "end_char": 36418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. C. NARAYANAPPA AND OTHERS\n\nTHE STA.TE OF MYSORE AND OTHERS\n\n(B. P. Sinha, C.J.,' Jafer Imam, A. K. Sarkar,\n\nK. Subba Rao and J.C. Shah, JJ.) ."}}, {"text": "STA.TE OF MYSORE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 36435, "end_char": 36451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. C. NARAYANAPPA AND OTHERS\n\nTHE STA.TE OF MYSORE AND OTHERS\n\n(B. P. Sinha, C.J.,' Jafer Imam, A. K. Sarkar,\n\nK. Subba Rao and J.C. Shah, JJ.) ."}}, {"text": "B. P. Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36465, "end_char": 36476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. C. NARAYANAPPA AND OTHERS\n\nTHE STA.TE OF MYSORE AND OTHERS\n\n(B. P. Sinha, C.J.,' Jafer Imam, A. K. Sarkar,\n\nK. Subba Rao and J.C. Shah, JJ.) ."}}, {"text": "Jafer Imam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36485, "end_char": 36495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. C. NARAYANAPPA AND OTHERS\n\nTHE STA.TE OF MYSORE AND OTHERS\n\n(B. P. Sinha, C.J.,' Jafer Imam, A. K. Sarkar,\n\nK. Subba Rao and J.C. Shah, JJ.) ."}}, {"text": "A. K. Sarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36497, "end_char": 36509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. C. NARAYANAPPA AND OTHERS\n\nTHE STA.TE OF MYSORE AND OTHERS\n\n(B. P. Sinha, C.J.,' Jafer Imam, A. K. Sarkar,\n\nK. Subba Rao and J.C. Shah, JJ.) ."}}, {"text": "K. Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36512, "end_char": 36524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. C. NARAYANAPPA AND OTHERS\n\nTHE STA.TE OF MYSORE AND OTHERS\n\n(B. P. Sinha, C.J.,' Jafer Imam, A. K. Sarkar,\n\nK. Subba Rao and J.C. Shah, JJ.) ."}}, {"text": "J.C. Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36529, "end_char": 36538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. C. NARAYANAPPA AND OTHERS\n\nTHE STA.TE OF MYSORE AND OTHERS\n\n(B. P. Sinha, C.J.,' Jafer Imam, A. K. Sarkar,\n\nK. Subba Rao and J.C. Shah, JJ.) ."}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36773, "end_char": 36791, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 68C, 68D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36822, "end_char": 36834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36840, "end_char": 36861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 12, 13(3)(a), 19(l)(g), 19(6), 298", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36863, "end_char": 36903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36905, "end_char": 36921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 68C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37008, "end_char": 37014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37022, "end_char": 37045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Mysore Government Road Transport Departmem", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37074, "end_char": 37116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In exercise of the powers conferred by s. 68C of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939, the General Manager of the Mysore Government Road Transport Departmem published a scheme for the exclusion of pivate operators on certain routes in a specified area and reservation of those routes for the State Transport Undertaking."}}, {"text": "s. 68D(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37330, "end_char": 37339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act 1939"}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_742_754_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960]\n\n1960 here any hypothetical difficulty which may arise in the\n\nCommissioner of\n\nlnco.ne-ta,,;\n\napplication of s. 6. .\n\nThe appellant relies, on the third proviso to s. 5 of the Act in support of the contention that it excludes the Baroda business of the assessee and the losses of that business cannot be set off against the profits of the business in India, and the appellant can succeed only on establishing that the proviso clearly and without any ambiguity excludes the Baroda business.\n\nWe agree with the High Court that if there is any ambiguity of language, the benefit of that ambiguity must be given to the assessee. However, the conclusion at which we have arrived is that on the language of the proviso as it stands, it does not exclude the Baroda business of the assessee but exempts only the income, profits or gains thereof unless they are received or deemed to be received in or brought into India. Accordingly, the High Court correctly answered the question of law referred to it. The appeal fails. and is dismissed with costs.\n\nKnramch,, nd Pre, nchand Ltd.\n\nS.K. Das J.\n\nApril 28\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nH. C. NARAYANAPPA AND OTHERS\n\nTHE STA.TE OF MYSORE AND OTHERS\n\n(B. P. Sinha, C.J.,' Jafer Imam, A. K. Sarkar,\n\nK. Subba Rao and J.C. Shah, JJ.) . Transport Business-Stage carriages-Exclusion of private operators-Competence of Parliament to create monopolies-Grant of monopoly to State for transport business-Scheme framed by State for State Transport Undertaking-Legality-Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (IV of 1939), Ch. IV A, ss. 68C, 68D (2)--Constitution of India, Arts. 12, 13(3)(a), 19(l)(g), 19(6), 298, Seventh Schedule, List II, entry 26, List III, entries 21, 35.\n\nIn exercise of the powers conferred by s. 68C of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939, the General Manager of the Mysore Government Road Transport Departmem published a scheme for the exclusion of pivate operators on certain routes in a specified area and reservation of those routes for the State Transport Undertaking.\n\nThe scheme was approved by the Government under s. 68D(2) of the Act ater the Chief Minister of the State bad given an opµortunity to the operators affected by the scheme to make ri:resentations objecting to it.\n\nThe petitioners who were\n\ntf-, ....\n\n. .,\n\n• ...\n\n\"\"·\n\nprinte operators challenged the validity of the scheme and the Jl}(j(J action taken by the Government pursuant to it on the grounds, Utter alil. ( 1) that the petitioners have a fundamental right to N•l!Jlaru¥Pa airry on the business of plying stage carriages and that the prov. visions of Ch. IVA of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, which pro- State of MJsore vide for the right of the State to exclusive right to carry on motor transport business are invalid, (2) that by Ch. IV A Parliament had merely attempted to regulate the procedure for entry by the State into the business of motor transport in the State, and that in the absence of legislation expressly undertaken by the State in\n\nthat behalf, that State was incompetent to enter into the arena of motor transport business to the exclusion of private operators, and (3) that the scheme violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution because only fourteen out of a total of thirty one routes on which stage carriages were plied for public transport in the area specified were covered by the scheme : Held, (l) that the expression \"commercial and industrial monopolies\" in entry 21 of List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India is wide enough to include grant or cretttion of commercial or industrial monopolies to the State and citizens as well as control of monopolies.\n\n(2) th!!! it is' competent for the Parliament to enact Ch. IVA o.f the Act under entry 21 read with entry 35 of List III.\n\n(3) that the scheme framed under s. 68C of the Motor Vehicles Act may be regarded as \"law\" within the meaning of Art. 19(6) of the Constitution, made by the State excluding private operators from notified routes or notified areas, and immune from the attack that it infringes the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19(l)(g). ( 4) that on a true reading, the scheme in question was approved in. relation to the fourteen notified routes and not in relation to a notified area and that as a scheme under s. 68C of the Act may be one in relation to an area or any route or portion thereof, the scheme could not be challenged as discriminatory.\n\nORIGINAL ] URISDICTION: PETITION No. 2 OF 1960.\n\nPetition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.\n\nA. V. Viswanatha Sastry and B. R. L. Iyengar, for the petitioner.\n\nG. S. Pathak, R. Gopalakrishnan and T. M. Sen, for the respondents.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India and B.R.L. 1,1engar, for the Intervener (D. R. Karigowda).\n\n1960. April 28.\n\nThe Judgement of the Court was delivered by\n\nSH.AH, J.-The petitioners pray for a writ quashing ShtJ• .J. a. schenie approved under s. 68D(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act. I 939, by the Government of the State nf\n\n33-6 SCI/ND/82\n\nNarayonappa\n\ntaie o_f Mysore\n\nS.\\ah J.\n\nMysore an; er, Mysore Government Road Transport Depmtment, who \\'i ill hereinafter be referred to as the 2nd respondent, published a scheme in exer6se of the powers conferred by s. 68C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, for the exclusion of pr:vt< opc:rators on certain routes and reservation of these routes for the State trauspor~ undertakini~ in the Anekal area.\n\nThe Chief Minister of the Mysore State gave the op.-:rators affectesL1mption.\n\nThe other documem relie9, resi1tinti the applicatiJn for st.1gc\n\ncarriage permits to a private operator on the ronte Siddalaghatta-Bangalore via Nallm.\n\nIn para 4 of the statcn1c11t, ir \\~.:as sub1niuci.1 th:1: \"tl1l_' exi.; t!nr: noii(it~ tion dated October l 5, 1959 came under tl; e notified area of the department\" of the second respondent \"and that would overlap certain services of the department\".\n\nBut because in making his rlcfence, the seconrl respondent has referred to the scheme as dealing \"ith \"the notified area\". the scheme \"ill not necessarilv he helrl\n\nto be one in relation to the notified area. ·\n\nThe argument that among the operators on the fourteen routes, two haYe been selected for special trcatn1t:nt: ; inrl on that account. the sche1ne is ; er, Mysore Government Road Transport Depmtment, who \\'i ill hereinafter be referred to as the 2nd respondent, published a scheme in exer6se of the powers conferred by s. 68C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, for the exclusion of pr:vt< opc:rators on certain routes and reservation of these routes for the State trauspor~ undertakini~ in the Anekal area."}}, {"text": "Mysore Government Road Transport Depmtment", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5521, "end_char": 5563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On J anuan 13, 1959, the General Mana:>; er, Mysore Government Road Transport Depmtment, who \\'i ill hereinafter be referred to as the 2nd respondent, published a scheme in exer6se of the powers conferred by s. 68C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, for the exclusion of pr:vt< opc:rators on certain routes and reservation of these routes for the State trauspor~ undertakini~ in the Anekal area."}}, {"text": "s. 68C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5684, "end_char": 5690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5698, "end_char": 5722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Anekal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5857, "end_char": 5863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On J anuan 13, 1959, the General Mana:>; er, Mysore Government Road Transport Depmtment, who \\'i ill hereinafter be referred to as the 2nd respondent, published a scheme in exer6se of the powers conferred by s. 68C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, for the exclusion of pr:vt< opc:rators on certain routes and reservation of these routes for the State trauspor~ undertakini~ in the Anekal area."}}, {"text": "Mysore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5897, "end_char": 5903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chief Minister of the Mysore State gave the op.-:rators affecte- the State) of Madras. This Code also contains the Madras Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940, hereinafter called the Rules. The Rules came into force on April I, 1940.\n\nUnder Rule 3(c) \"Central Road Traffic Board\" or \"Central Board\" means the Provincial Transport Authority constituted for the State of Madras under sub-s. (I) of s. 44 of the Act. This definition obviously must have been inserted in the Rules after the constitu- ,-1 tion of the Prov incial Transport Authority in the year\n\n1947. This definition was again altered on December 20, 1955, and for the words \"Central Road Traffic Board\" or \"Central Board \" the words \" State Transport Authority\" was substituted. On the same date a further definition was added to the Rules by the insertion of cl. (m) in Rule 3 which was to the effect that\" Trans- port Department \" means the Motor Vehicles Department set up under s.133Aofthe Act. The Government of Madras issued a Notification No. G. 0. MS. 527 on February 14, 1953, wherein it was stated that prior\n\nto the decision of the Madras High Court in Writ\n\n.I960 Petition No. 806 of 1951 the Regional Transport A , -h -1 rrr .\n\nA . . . . h ll h runac a am i at uthorities were varymg w enever necessary a t e v. conditions of the permits, but according to the deci- Southern Ra(ldways sion of the High Court in that petition the Regional (Private) _Ltd.\n\nTransport Authorities could not vary the existing conditions of a stage carriage permit imposed under s. 48(d) of the Act and that it was only the State Transport Authority which could do so under s. 48A of the Act. The decision of the High Court resulted in great administrative inconvenience as all applications for variation of conditions of permit would have now to be made to the State Transport Authority which involved delay and inconvenience to operators.\n\nIt further stated that the Government of India had under consideration a proposal to amend s. 48 of the Act so as to empower the Regional Transport Authorities to vary all conditions of permits, but some time would be taken to carry out the necessary legislation.\n\nPending the legislation the Government of Madras had decided to empower Regional Transport Officers, as a temporary measure, to vary conditions of permits now dealt with by the State Transport Authority.\n\nThe notification further went on to say that in exercise of the powers conferred by s. 44A of the Act the Governor of Madras authorized the Regional Transport Officers and the Secretary, Road Traffic Board, Madras, to exercise the powers and discharge the functions of the State Transport Authority under ss. 48A, 51A and 56A of the Act. On October 20, 1955, the Government of Madras issued a further notification reorganizing the Motor Transport Department with reference to the Motor Vehicles (Madras Amendment) Act, 1944 (Act XXXIX of 1944). According to this notification a Member of the Board of Revenue should be appointed as Transport Commissioner under s. 44A of the Act and the present post of Transport Commissioner should be abolished ; that an officer of the Transport Department should be appointed as State Transport Authority who will also be the Assistant Transport Commissioner ; that the post of Secretary, Central Road Traffic Board, should be re~\n\ndesignated as Secretary, State Transport Authority ;\n\nImam].\n\n196o that Collectors of districts in the mofussil and the -- 1 Commissioner of Police in the City of Madras should Arunachalam Pi /aib • d R ·\n\n1 T A h ' ' d v. e appomte as eg10na ransport ut onties un er south\"n Roadwavs s. 44 of the Act; that the Regional Transport Officers\n\n(P, ivate) Ltd.· in the mofussil and the Deputy Commissioner of Police\n\nImam ]. (Traffic & Licensing) in the Madras City should be the Secretaries to the Regional Transport Authorities and that an officer of the grade of a District Judge should be appellate authority prescribed under s. 64(1) of the Act, as amended, to deal with appeals against the orders of the Regional Transport Authorities and be designated as the State Transport Appellate Tribu. nal.\n\nUnder cl. (2) of the notification the Member of the Board of Revenue to be appointed as Transport Commissioner would be the Head of the Transport Department and would have general responsibility for administration of the Act. He would be empowered by the Government under s. 44A to exercise the powers now exercised by the State Transport Authority under sub-ss. 3(a) and (c) and (4) of s. 44 of the Act. In the discharge of these functions the Transport Commissioner will have administrative control over the organisation at present working under the Transport Commisioner. Under cl. (4) (ii) the powers under ss. 48A, 51A and 56A of the Act to alter the conditions of stage carriage permits, contract carriage permits and public carriers permits, exercised by the Regional Transport Officers, would hereafter be exer. cised by the Regional Transport Authorities. Under\n\ncl. 5(i) the Regional Transport Officer would he the Secretary to the Regional Transport Authority and in that capacity he would assist the Regional Transport Authority in the performance of the functions prescribed in cl. (4). It is, however, to be remembered that when on July 19, 1954, the appellant applied to the Regional Transport Authority for the variation of the conditions of his permit, the Notification No. G.O.\n\nMS. 527 dated February 14, 1953, of the Government of Madras was in force by virtue of which Regional Transport Officers were authorised to discharge the functions of the State Transport Authority under ss. 48A, 51 A anrl 56A of the Act.\n\n....... ,'\n\nI ,\n\nIn paragraph 6 of the statement of the case filed by z96o the respondent it was stated that in the exercise of A ; 1ru . the powers conferred under s. 44(1) of the Act the rnnac ~.am ' '\" Government of Madras constituted Provincial and Southern Roadways Regional Transport Authorities. It also set up a .(Private) Ltd.\n\nMotor Transport Department with a Transport Com- Imam 1. missioner as its head and officers in t, hat Department, in the lower scale, were the Regional Transport Officers who functioned as the Secretaries of the respective Regional Transport Authorities called the Road Traffic Board. It was further stated in paragraph 7 that although a Regional Transport Officer was a su.bordinate of the Transport Commissioner on the administrative side he could not be held to be a subordinate officer within the meaning of s. 44A. The State Government may establish a Motor Vehicles Department and appoint officers thereto under s. 133A, but mere appointment of officers in that Department could not invest them with statutory functions to be discharged under the Act and under the Rules. Sec. tion 133A contemplates framing of rules to regulate the discharge by officers of the department of their functions as also to state the authorities to whom such officers shall be subordinate and the duties to be performed by them. It was not suggested that any duties or powers of a statutory nature had been vested in the Tra.nsport Commissioner; nor was there any rule showing that the Regional Transport Officer is a subordinate of the Transport Commissioner for the purposes of the Rules. 'l'he statement of the case further stated that s. 44A required a functional subordination and not merely an administrative one.\n\nThe Madras Financial Code, Vol. II, Appendix I, shows the list of Heads ofDepartments of the Government of Madras. The Transport Commissioner is shown as the Head of a Department. The Half-Yearly List of Gazetted Officers in the Transport Department corrected upto the 31st of July, 1955, shows that the Transport Commissioner is also the Chairman, Central Road Traffic Board, Madras, and subordinate to him are the Secretary, Central Road Traffic Board, Madras, Assistant Secretary, Road Traffic Board, Madras and Regional Transport Officers.\n\nz96o There can be no question therefore that the Regional\n\nA h- 1 pii . Transport Officers arc officers subordinate to the runae a am • \"'T C •\n\nI • h £ h\" v. ransport omm1ss10ner. t 1s per aps or t 1s reason\n\nsou- the State) of Madras."}}, {"text": "This Code also contains the Madras Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24943, "end_char": 25004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April I, 1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25065, "end_char": 25078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Rules came into force on April I, 1940."}}, {"text": "Central Road Traffic Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25098, "end_char": 25124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under Rule 3(c) \"Central Road Traffic Board\" or \"Central Board\" means the Provincial Transport Authority constituted for the State of Madras under sub-s. (I) of s. 44 of the Act."}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25206, "end_char": 25221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under Rule 3(c) \"Central Road Traffic Board\" or \"Central Board\" means the Provincial Transport Authority constituted for the State of Madras under sub-s. (I) of s. 44 of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25242, "end_char": 25247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "This Code also contains the Madras Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940", "statute": "This Code also contains the Madras Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940"}}, {"text": "20, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25456, "end_char": 25464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This definition was again altered on December 20, 1955, and for the words \"Central Road Traffic Board\" or \"Central Board \" the words \" State Transport Authority\" was substituted."}}, {"text": "s.133A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25792, "end_char": 25798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "This Code also contains the Madras Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940", "statute": "This Code also contains the Madras Motor Vehicles Rules, 1940"}}, {"text": "s. 48(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26380, "end_char": 26388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 48A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26475, "end_char": 26481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26770, "end_char": 26789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It further stated that the Government of India had under consideration a proposal to amend s. 48 of the Act so as to empower the Regional Transport Authorities to vary all conditions of permits, but some time would be taken to carry out the necessary legislation."}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26834, "end_char": 26839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27297, "end_char": 27303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 48A, 51A and 56A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27518, "end_char": 27538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October 20, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27554, "end_char": 27570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 20, 1955, the Government of Madras issued a further notification reorganizing the Motor Transport Department with reference to the Motor Vehicles (Madras Amendment) Act, 1944 (Act XXXIX of 1944)."}}, {"text": "s. 44A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27874, "end_char": 27880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28466, "end_char": 28471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras City", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28631, "end_char": 28642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Traffic & Licensing) in the Madras City should be the Secretaries to the Regional Transport Authorities and that an officer of the grade of a District Judge should be appellate authority prescribed under s. 64(1) of the Act, as amended, to deal with appeals against the orders of the Regional Transport Authorities and be designated as the State Transport Appellate Tribu."}}, {"text": "s. 64(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28807, "end_char": 28815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29254, "end_char": 29260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 3(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29341, "end_char": 29349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29369, "end_char": 29374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 48A, 51A and 56A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29593, "end_char": 29613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 5(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29854, "end_char": 29862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 48A, 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30482, "end_char": 30493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30683, "end_char": 30691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31367, "end_char": 31373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 133A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31473, "end_char": 31480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32179, "end_char": 32185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "31st of July, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32530, "end_char": 32548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Half-Yearly List of Gazetted Officers in the Transport Department corrected upto the 31st of July, 1955, shows that the Transport Commissioner is also the Chairman, Central Road Traffic Board, Madras, and subordinate to him are the Secretary, Central Road Traffic Board, Madras, Assistant Secretary, Road Traffic Board, Madras and Regional Transport Officers."}}, {"text": "Central Road Traffic Board, Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32610, "end_char": 32644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Half-Yearly List of Gazetted Officers in the Transport Department corrected upto the 31st of July, 1955, shows that the Transport Commissioner is also the Chairman, Central Road Traffic Board, Madras, and subordinate to him are the Secretary, Central Road Traffic Board, Madras, Assistant Secretary, Road Traffic Board, Madras and Regional Transport Officers."}}, {"text": "ransport", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32879, "end_char": 32887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Transport Officers arc officers subordinate to the runae a am • \"'T C •\n\nI • h £ h\" v. ransport omm1ss10ner."}}, {"text": "Section 44A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33191, "end_char": 33202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 133A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33528, "end_char": 33535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33741, "end_char": 33747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33856, "end_char": 33862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34006, "end_char": 34012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 133A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34345, "end_char": 34352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 133A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34367, "end_char": 34374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "is no clear material on the record or in the Madras Road Traffic Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34664, "end_char": 34733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Decemlier 20, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34905, "end_char": 34923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is significant, however, by a notification dated Decemlier 20, 1955, cl. ("}}, {"text": "s. 133A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35060, "end_char": 35067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is no clear material on the record or in the Madras Road Traffic Code", "statute": "There is no clear material on the record or in the Madras Road Traffic Code"}}, {"text": "Arunachalam Pillai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35199, "end_char": 35217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apparently, until this date Transport r960 Department was something other than the Motor ~-· V h. 1 D t d 133A f h A Arunachalam Pillai e 1c es epartmen set up un er s. o t e ct. .", "canonical_name": "Arunachalam Pillai"}}, {"text": "Februa.ry 14, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35296, "end_char": 35314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is clear, therefore, that on Februa.ry 14, 1953, when Southernvoadways the Notification G.O. MS."}}, {"text": "s. 133A(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35684, "end_char": 35694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There is no clear material on the record or in the Madras Road Traffic Code", "statute": "There is no clear material on the record or in the Madras Road Traffic Code"}}, {"text": "s. 133A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36147, "end_char": 36154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36229, "end_char": 36235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36616, "end_char": 36622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37061, "end_char": 37067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 64A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37743, "end_char": 37749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SuBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38735, "end_char": 38744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SuBBA RAO, J.-I have had the advantage_ of perusing the judgment of my learned brother, Imam, J.\n\nI regret my inability to agree with him in regard to the main question raised in the case, namely, whether the Regional Transport Officer is subordinate to the State Transport Commissioner within the meariing of s. 44A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of 1939) (hereinafter referred to as the Act).", "canonical_name": "Subba Rao"}}, {"text": "s. 44A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39045, "end_char": 39051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39059, "end_char": 39083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 44A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39231, "end_char": 39242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Balakrishna Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40580, "end_char": 40597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the former case, Balakrishna Ayyar, J., delivering the judgment of the Court, summarized his views thus at p. 602 :\n\n\"Of the three views placed before us we are inclined to prefer the third (statutory subordination)."}}, {"text": "Satyanarayana Raju", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41638, "end_char": 41656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, Satyanarayana Raju, J., speaking for the full bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, in the latter case summarizes his views thus at p. 416:\n\n(1) A.LR."}}, {"text": "Regional Transport Officer", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 41913, "end_char": 41939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\" The Regional Transport Officer is an indj vi dual who is invested with the authority and is required to perform the duties incidental to an office and is therefore an officer."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 42811, "end_char": 42816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "VI), motor vehicles temporarily leaving or visiting India (Ch."}}, {"text": "Section 133A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43267, "end_char": 43279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44036, "end_char": 44041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44196, "end_char": 44206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44240, "end_char": 44243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transport Authorities created under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44458, "end_char": 44501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44503, "end_char": 44513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transport Authorities created under the Act", "statute": "Transport Authorities created under the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 44A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44778, "end_char": 44789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transport Authorities created under the Act", "statute": "Transport Authorities created under the Act"}}, {"text": "Sections 45 to 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45342, "end_char": 45359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Transport Authorities created under the Act", "statute": "Transport Authorities created under the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45640, "end_char": 45650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45702, "end_char": 45707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45761, "end_char": 45771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45895, "end_char": 45905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 64A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46132, "end_char": 46143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46386, "end_char": 46396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arunachalam Pillai State Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 46570, "end_char": 46605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".of this chapter; and under sub-s. (2)(a) thereof the Arunachalam Pillai State Government is authorized to make rules in res-\n\nSouthe.n vRoadways pect of the period of appointment and the terms of . ("}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47106, "end_char": 47111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ofKrishnaswamy Naidu", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 47937, "end_char": 47957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It also appears from the judgment ofKrishnaswamy Naidu, J., who referred the question to the full bench of the Madras High Court, that the State Government established a Motor Vehicles Department under s. 133A of the Act and appointed Regional Transport Officers."}}, {"text": "s. 133A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48105, "end_char": 48112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Regional Transport Authority", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 48340, "end_char": 48368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under r. 124, the Regional Transport Officer is made the Secretary and executive officer of the Board, i.e., the Regional Transport Authority."}}, {"text": "s. 133A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49440, "end_char": 49447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49707, "end_char": 49713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 133A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50134, "end_char": 50141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 20, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50477, "end_char": 50494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "m) which was inserted in r. 3 on December 20, 1955, clarifies the position by enacting that the Transport Department is the Motor Vehicles Department set up under s. 133A of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 133A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50607, "end_char": 50614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50779, "end_char": 50784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 133A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50789, "end_char": 50796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50853, "end_char": 50863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 133A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51234, "end_char": 51241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 52938, "end_char": 52950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If that is excluded, the only two remaining documents are, (i) The Madras Financial Code giving a list of the heads of departments of the Madras State, and (ii) the Half-Yearly List of Gazetted Officers in the Madras State Government."}}, {"text": "Madras State Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 53010, "end_char": 53033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If that is excluded, the only two remaining documents are, (i) The Madras Financial Code giving a list of the heads of departments of the Madras State, and (ii) the Half-Yearly List of Gazetted Officers in the Madras State Government."}}, {"text": "s. 44A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53981, "end_char": 53987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 44A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54284, "end_char": 54295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 133A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54519, "end_char": 54526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 133A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55148, "end_char": 55155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arunacha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 55671, "end_char": 55679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the Government decides not to exercise the powers Arunacha am • a• fi d d b f\n\nA . ."}}, {"text": "s. 133 , 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55737, "end_char": 55747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 56412, "end_char": 56422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Statutory rules are placed before Parliament for its approval, while administrative regulations are entirely in the discretion of the executive government."}}, {"text": "s. 133A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56895, "end_char": 56902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 133A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57205, "end_char": 57212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57612, "end_char": 57618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arunachalam Pillai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 57798, "end_char": 57816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ig6o\n\nIn view of the majority judgment of the Court, the Arunachalam Pillai appeal is allowed with costs in this Court, and the SouthernvRoadways case rem.anded to the High Court for a re-hearing by (Private) L1a.", "canonical_name": "Arunachalam Pillai"}}, {"text": "SHRIMANT DATTAJIRAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 58051, "end_char": 58070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHRIMANT DATTAJIRAO\n\nBAHIROJIRAO GHORPADE\n\nSHRIMANT VIJAYASINHRAO AND ANOTHER."}}, {"text": "BAHIROJIRAO GHORPADE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 58072, "end_char": 58092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHRIMANT DATTAJIRAO\n\nBAHIROJIRAO GHORPADE\n\nSHRIMANT VIJAYASINHRAO AND ANOTHER."}}, {"text": "SHRIMANT VIJAYASINHRAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 58094, "end_char": 58116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHRIMANT DATTAJIRAO\n\nBAHIROJIRAO GHORPADE\n\nSHRIMANT VIJAYASINHRAO AND ANOTHER."}}, {"text": "S. K. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 58136, "end_char": 58145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. DAS, A. K. SARKAR and M. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 58164, "end_char": 58179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. DAS, A. K. SARKAR and M. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Saranjam Estate", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 58187, "end_char": 58202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Saranjam Estate-Maintenance grant to junior member-Power of Government to resume and re-grant-Custom of lineal primogeniture, • extent and effect of-Suit challenging Government order of resumption and re-grant-If barred-Saranjam Rules-Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, z876 (Bom."}}, {"text": "Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 58422, "end_char": 58453, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58478, "end_char": 58482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Suit challenging Government order of resumption and re-grant-If barred-Saranjam Rules-Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act", "statute": "Suit challenging Government order of resumption and re-grant-If barred-Saranjam Rules-Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act"}}, {"text": "Government of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 58527, "end_char": 58547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Upon the death of the holder in 1932, the Government of Bombay by order dated June 7, 1932, resumed the Saranjam estate of Gajendragad and re-granted the same to his eldest son."}}, {"text": "June 7, 1932", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 58563, "end_char": 58575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Upon the death of the holder in 1932, the Government of Bombay by order dated June 7, 1932, resumed the Saranjam estate of Gajendragad and re-granted the same to his eldest son."}}, {"text": "Gajendragad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 58608, "end_char": 58619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Upon the death of the holder in 1932, the Government of Bombay by order dated June 7, 1932, resumed the Saranjam estate of Gajendragad and re-granted the same to his eldest son."}}, {"text": "May 14, 1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 58822, "end_char": 58834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 14, 1940, B died leaving his widow, A, and his undivided brother, D. A asked the Government for permission to adopt a son but without the permission being granted adopted Von July IO, l94I. By an order dated December 17, 1941, the Government continued the maintenance grant (Saranjam potgi) to D. Thereupon V filed a suit against .,"}}, {"text": "December 17, 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 59034, "end_char": 59051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 14, 1940, B died leaving his widow, A, and his undivided brother, D. A asked the Government for permission to adopt a son but without the permission being granted adopted Von July IO, l94I. By an order dated December 17, 1941, the Government continued the maintenance grant (Saranjam potgi) to D. Thereupon V filed a suit against .,"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59840, "end_char": 59844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 59852, "end_char": 59889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60036, "end_char": 60040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876", "statute": "the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876"}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_789_804_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "....\n\n• I\n\n3 S.0.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 789\n\nOrder of Court.\n\nIg6o\n\nIn view of the majority judgment of the Court, the Arunachalam Pillai appeal is allowed with costs in this Court, and the SouthernvRoadways case rem.anded to the High Court for a re-hearing by (Private) L1a. a single Judge. Costs in the High Court will . abide Subba Rao J. the result.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nSHRIMANT DATTAJIRAO\n\nBAHIROJIRAO GHORPADE\n\nSHRIMANT VIJAYASINHRAO AND ANOTHER.\n\n/ . (S. K. DAS, A. K. SARKAR and M. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.)\n\nSaranjam Estate-Maintenance grant to junior member-Power of Government to resume and re-grant-Custom of lineal primogeniture, • extent and effect of-Suit challenging Government order of resumption and re-grant-If barred-Saranjam Rules-Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, z876 (Bom. X of I876), s. 4.\n\nUpon the death of the holder in 1932, the Government of Bombay by order dated June 7, 1932, resumed the Saranjam estate of Gajendragad and re-granted the same to his eldest son.\n\nBy the same order the assignment of some lands out of the estate in favour of B, a younger member of the family, by way of maintenance was also continued. On May 14, 1940, B died leaving his widow, A, and his undivided brother, D. A asked the Government for permission to adopt a son but without the permission being granted adopted Von July IO, l94I. By an order dated December 17, 1941, the Government continued the maintenance grant (Saranjam potgi) to D. Thereupon V filed a suit against ., the Government and D for recovery of the lands on the grounds\n\n(i) that the order of the Government dated December 17, 1941, was ultra vires, null and void, and (ii) that by the custom of lineal primogeniture which prevailed in the family the lands, upon the death of B and upon the adoption of V by A, devolved upon V in preference to D. The suit was contested, inter alia, on . the grounds : (i) that under the relevant Saranjam Rules the interest of B came to an end on his death and was not such as could devolve upon V despite the order dated December 17, 1941,\n\n(ii) that the alleged family custom did not apply to maintenance grants and (iii) that the suit was barred under s. 4 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876 : Held, that the plaintiff was not entitled to the lands either under the Saranjam Rules or under the custom; further that the suit was barred by s. 4 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction A.ct, 1876,\n\nIQ~\n\ni960\n\nApril 29.\n\nThe maintenance grant (potgi holding) was part of the\n\nS . -- ..\n\nSaranjarn and was governed by the incidents of Saranjarn tenure hriman~ D~_tta1irao and by the relevant Saran jam Rules.\n\nSaran jam grants were BGk;;;;;;; o granted or 'vithheld at the will and pleasure of the sovereign v. power and the grant was always subject to interruption and Shrimant Vijayarevocation by resumption, temporary or absolute.\n\nOn the death sinhrao of B it was open to the Government to resume the grant and to grant it to D and this is what it did by the order dated December 17, 194r. The taking in adoption of the plaintiff by the widow of the deceased could not affect the operation of the order passed by the Government.\n\nDaulatrao Malojirao v. Province of Bombay (1946) 49 Born.\n\nL.R. 270, referred to.\n\nEven under the custom of lineal primogeniture pleaded by the plaintiff, D was entitled to get the properties after the death of B. It was not pleaded that the properties once so vested were divested by subsequent adoption by the widow. Further it was neither pleaded nor proved that the custom took away the right of the Government to resume the maintenance grant and to make a fresh grant thereof.\n\nSub-clause 4 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876, . barred the jurisdiction of civil courtsin respect of'' claims against the Government relating to lands granted or held as Saranjam\".\n\nThe plaintiff asked for a finding that the order of December 17,\n\nr94r, was null and void and did not affect the properties in suit.\n\nUnless the order was out of his way, the plaintiff was not entitled to claim recovery of possession.\n\nThe claim v.1as one which fell .within the mischief of s. 4 and the suit was barred.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 37 of 1960.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated November 12, 1952, of the Bombay High Court in First Appeal No. 492 of 1949, arising out of the judgment and decree dated the 20th April, 1949, of the First Class Sub-Judge, Dharwar, in Special Civil Suit No. 16 of 1943.\n\nS. N. Andley, J.B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellant.\n\nN aunit Lal, for respondent No. 1.\n\nB. R. L. Iyengar and T. M. Sen, for respondent No. 2.\n\n1960.\n\nApril 29.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by :) s. K, Das], S. K. DAS, J.-This is an appeal on a certificate given by the High Court of Bombay, from the judgment and decree of the said High Court dated\n\n'\"\"'\\\n\n.....\n\nNovember 12, 1952, by which it reversed the decision 196o of the Civil Judge, First Class, at Dharwar dated Shrima;;; J;;, ttajfrao April 20, 1949, in Special Civil Suit No. 16 of 1943.\n\nBahirojirao The material facts are these. Gajendragad in Taluk Gho_'t, ade Ron in the district of Dharwar is a Saranjam estate Shrimnt Vijaya-, k th G . d d S . b . b sinhrao nown as e aJen raga aranJam earmg num er _ 91 in the Saranjam list maintained by Government. s. K. Das J.\n\nWithin that estate lay village Dindur and survey field No. 302 of Unachgeri, which are the properties iri suit; One Bhujangarao Daulatrao Ghorpade was the holder of the Saranjam estate at the relevant time. In 1932 the Saranjam was resumed and regranted to the said Bhunjangarao by Resolution No. 8969 dated June 7, 1932, of the Government of Bombay in the Political Department. This Resolution said :\n\n\" The Governor in Council is pleased to direct that the Gajendragad Saranjam should be formally resumed and re.granted to Bhujangarao Daulatrao Ghorpade, the eldest son of the deceased Saranjamdar Daulatrao Bhujangarao Ghorpade, and that it should be entered in his sole name in the accounts of the Collector of Dharwar with effect from the date of the death of the last holder. The Collector should take steps to place the Saranjamdar in possession of the villages of the Saranjam estate which were in possession of the deceased Saranjamdar .\n\nThe Governor in Council agrees with the Commissioner, Southern Division, that the assignments held by the Bhaubands as potgi holders shoud be continued to them as at present.\" One of the younger branches of the Ghorpade family was Babasaheb Bahirojirao Ghorpade, to be referred to hereinafter as Babasaheb. He held by way of maintenance (as potgi holder) the aforesaid village of Dindur and survey field No. 302 of Unachgeri. He had an undivided brother called Dattojirao, who was defendant No. 2 in the suit and is appellant before us.\n\nIn this judgment we shall call him the appellant: Babasaheb died on May 14, 1940. On his death he left a widow named Abayabai and the appellant, his undivided brother. On July 10, 1941, Abayabai adopted Vijayasinhrao as a son to her deceased husband.\n\nVijayasinha was the plaintiff who brought the suit,\n\nr960 and is now the principal respondent before us. It will\n\nShrima;;/ Dallajiiao be convenient if we call him the plaintiff-respondent,\n\nBaJ, frojirao and state here that he was the natural son of Gko'./.ade Bhujangarao's younger brother, another Dattajirao\n\nShrimnt Vijayato be distinguished from the appellant who also bears\n\n''::_h::'_o the same name. On Babasaheb's death Abayabai s. K Dos J. asked for sanction of Government to her taking a boy in adoption ; this application was opposed by the appellant. On December 17, 1941, the Government of • Bombay passed a Resolution in the following terms :\n\n\" 1. Government is pleased to direct that the -~ Saranjam potgi holding of village Dindur and Survey No. 302 of Unachgeri, which were assigned for maintenance to the deceased potgidar, Mr. Babasaheb Bahirajirao Ghorpade, at the time of the re-grant of the Gajendragad Saranjam, should be ,\"' continued to his undivided brother, Mr. Dattajirao Bahirojirao Ghorpade. 2.\n\nGovernment is also pleased to direct, under Rule 7 of the Saran jam Rules, that the new potgidar, Mr. Dattajirao Bahirojirao Ghorpade, should give to Bai Abaibai, widow of the deceased Potgidar, Mr.\n\nBabasaheb Bahirojirao Ghorpade, an annual maintenance allowance of Rs. 300 for her life. .., 3.\n\nThese orders should take effect from the 14th May, 1940, i.e., the date on which the deceased potgidar, Babasaheb Bahirojirao Ghorpade, died. 4.\n\nThe Commissioner S. D. should be requested to communicate these orders to Bai Abaibai, widow of the late potgidar, with reference to her petitions addressed to him and also to the Rayats of Dindur, with reference to their petition, dated the 12th May, 1941. The orders shduld also be communicated to the present Saranjamdar of Gajendragad.\" On February 8, 1943, the plaintiff-respondent brought the suit against the Province of Bombay as defendant No. 1, the appellant as defendant No. 2 and Abayabai as defendant No. 3. The suit was contested by the Province of Bombay (now substituted by the State of Bombay) and the appellant. Abayabai supported the case of the plaintiff-respondent, but she died during the J, lenrlency of the suit.\n\nThe claim of the plaintiff-respondent was that on i96o his adoption the estate of his deceased adoptive father Shrimant Dattajirao devolved on him by the rule of lineal primogeniture fiakiroJirao • 11 Th • l f h Ghorpade m.preference to th~ appe ant. e mam pea o t e v plaintiff-respondent was stated in paragraph 6 of the Shrim0; nt Vijayaplaint, which read as follows : s•nhrao \" 6. The Government Resolution passed by 5 K; Das l•· defendant No. 1 in 1941 is ultra vires and null and void for the following reasons :\n\n(a) Defendant No. 1 made a regrant of the Saranjam estate to Shrimant Sardar Bhujangarao Ghorpade in 1932 and therein the suit properties were, according to defendant No. 1, continued tq the adoptive father of plaintiff. Under the Saranjam rules no occasion has arisen for interference by Government at this stage. The regrant made by Government would in any case be effective during the life-time of the grantee, viz., Shrimant Sardar\n\nBhujangarao Ghorpade. Further the said Shrimant Sardar Bhujangarao Ghorpade was not consulted by defendant No. 1 before the said Government Resolution.\n\n(b) By the custom of the family to which the family belongs, the estate of a deceased person devolves by the rule of lineal primogeniture. Hence after the death of plaintiff's adoptive father anQ. the adoption of plaintiff himself, all the estate vested in plaintiff's adoptive father has devolved on the plaintiff in preference to defendant No. 2.\n\nThe action of defendant No. 1 in ignoring this rule of succession prevalent in the family is ultra vires and null and void.\" On the aforesaid pleas, the plaintiff-respondent prayed for (a) recovery of possession of properties in suit from the appellant, (b) mesne profits, and (c) costs.\n\nOn behalf of the Province of Bombay several pleas by way of defence were taken. The main pleas were\n\n(1) assuming that the plaintiff-respondent was validly adopted, he had nevertheless no legal claim to the properties in suit because under the relevant Saranjam Rules the interest of Babasaheb came to an end on his death and was not of such a nature as would\n\nr96o devolve on the plaintiff-respondent despite tbe Govern- Shrimant Dattajirao ment Resolution dated December 17, 1941, (2) that\n\nBahirojirao the alleged family custom did not apply to mainten- Gho; ade ance grants, and (3r that, in any event, the suit was\n\nShrimant Vijayabarred under s. 4 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction sinhrao Act, 1876. The appellant besides supporting the afores. K. Das J. said pleas raised the additional pleas that there was no valid adoption of the plaintiff-respondent and Abayabai was expressly prohibited by her husband from adopting a son.\n\nOn these pleadings several issues were framed. The suit was originally dismissed on a preliminary ground, namely, that the plaint did not disclose any cause of action. The learned Civil Judge apparently took the view that the properties in suit were subject to the Saranjam Rules and on examining those rules, he came to the conclusion that as the plaintiff-respondent on his adoption became a nephew of the appellant and in that sense was claiming maintenance from the latter, it was necessary for him to have alleged the necessary circumstances under which certain members of a Saranjam Family are entitled to claim maintenance under Rule 7 of the said Rules and as those circumstances were not pleaded by the plaintiff-respondent, the plaint disclosed no cause of action. The High Court rightly pointed out that the plaintiff-respondent did not make a claim for maintenance under Rule 7 of the Saranjam Rules, but claimed that the properties in suit devolved on him by reason of his adoption and the custom of lineal primogeniture. Therefore, the High Court held that the claim of the plaintiff-respondent was much more fundamental than a mere claim of maintenance, and the learned Civil Judge had misdirected himself as to the true scope of the suit.\n\nAccordingly, the High Court set aside the decree of dismissal and directed the suit to be tried on all the issues.\n\nAfter this direction the learned Civil Judge tried all the issues.\n\nIssues 1 and 2 related to the question of adoption, namely, (1) whether the ceremony of adoption was properly proved and (2) whether Babasaheb during his life-time had prohibited his wife from making an adoption. On the first issue the learned\n\nCivil Judge found in favour of the plaintiff-respondent\n\nI96° and on the second against him.\n\nThe High Courtshrima-,-; tn-attnjirao affirmed the finding on the first issue, and on a care- Bahirojiao fol and detailed examination of the evidence held on Gho•.t, a e the second issue that the learned Civil Judge was Shrimif\"' Vijayawrong in holding that the adoption was invalid by •':'_h~~ reason of the alleged prohibition of Babasaheb. The s. K. Das J.\n\nHigh Court held that there was no such prohibition, and the adoption was valid. We do not think that this finding of the High Court has been or can be successfully assailed before us.\n\nTherefore, we have proceeded in this appeal on the basis that the plaint\"I'- respondent was validly adopted by Abayabai on July 10, 1941.\n\nWe go now to a consideration of those issues which are material for a decision of this appeal. They are: Issue No. 3-Does plaintiff prove his title to the suit property?\n\nIssue No. 4-Is it proved that the Government Resolution (D. G.) No. 8969 of December 17, 1941, is ultra vires and null and void as alleged in the plaint ?\n\nIssue No. 5-Is the suit barred under section 4 of the Revenue Jurisdiction Act?\n\nIssue No. 7-Is the alleged custom set up in para. 6(b) of the plaint proved?\n\nOn all these issues the learned Civil Judge found against, the plaintiff-respondent, and held that the latter was not entitled to recover possession of the properties in suit, that he had failed to prove the custom pleaded in paragraph 6(b) of the plaint, that the Government Resolution of December 17, 1941, was not ultra vires, and that the suit itself was barred under s. 4 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act,\n\n1876. The High Court reversed the decision of the learned Civil Judge on all the aforesaid issues, and held that as the properties in suit were given to the junior branch of Babasaheb for its maintenance and were impartible and governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture, they devolved on the appellant after Babasaheb's death; but as soon as Babasaheb's widow\n\nz960 made a valid adoption, the properties were divested\n\nShrima.ntDttajfraoand inasmuch as the plaintiff-respondent became the Bahirojirao eldest member of the senior branch of Babasaheb's Gho; pade family, he became entitled thereto as a result of the\n\nShrimnt Vijayacombined effect of the family custom and ordinary\n\nsinh.ao Hindu law. The High Court said that looked at from s. K. Das ./. this point of view, no question arose of the validity of the Government Resolution dated December 17, 1941, and no relief for possession'having been claimed against Government, the suit was not barred under s. 4 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876 .\n\n• On behalf of the appellant, it has been very strenuously argued that the High Court was in error in holding that the properties in suit which are part of a Saranjam, vested in the appellant on the death of Babasaheb and were then divested on the adopti9n of the plaintiff-respondent; it is contended that snch a conclusion is inconsistent with the nature of a Saranjam tenure and furthermore, the properties in suit having vested in the appellant by reason of the regrant dated December 17, 1941, they could not be divested by the adoption made on July 10, 1941. Nor does it follow, it is contended, from the custom pleaded in paragraph 6(b) of the plaint, apart from the question whether even that custom has been proved or not, that the properties in suit having once vested iti the appellant will be divested on a valid adoption.\n\nSecondly, it has been contended that the High Court\n\nwas also in error in holding that there was no claim against Government within the meaning of the fourth sub-cl. of s. 4(a) of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876.\n\nThe argument before us has been that thPre was such a claim, and no Civil Court had jurisdiction to determine it.\n\nWe are satisfied that these arguments are correct and should be accepted. The claim of the plaintiffrespondent that the properties in suit devolved on him on his adoption may be examined either from the point of view of the Saranjam Rules or the custom which he pleaded in paragraph 6(b) of the plaint. Let us examine the claim first from the point of view of the Saranjam Rules assuming here that they apply,\n\n.... -\n\nas far as practicable, to maintenance grants (potgis) x960 within the Saranja_m. In the Resolution of June 7'.hrimantDattajirao 1932, quoted earher, the Government of Bombay JJahirojirao treated the potgi holders as being within the Saranjam Ghorpade_ and made provision for them. The Resolution of Shrima:i Vijaya• December 17, 1941, also proceeded on that footing. sinhiao Two earlier Resolutions, one of 1891 (Ex. 100) and s. K. vas J. the other of 1936 (Ex. 101 ), also treated the whole of Gajendragad and also parts thereof as a Saranjam.\n\nBabasaheb in his lifetime wanted to surrender the grant in his favour to the Saranjamdar, but Government refqsed to accept such relinquishment.\n\nEven Abayabai asked for permission of Government to . take a boy in adoption, which permission she did not obtain. All this shows that the potgi holding was part of the Saranjam and was treated as such by all the parties concerned.\n\nWhat is a Saranjam?\n\nThe word \"Saranjam\" literally means apparatus, provisions or materials. In his Glossary, Wilson defines Saranjam as temporary assignments of revenue from villages or lands for support of troops or for personal service usually for the lifetime of the grantees. Dr. G. D. Patel in his book on \" The Indian Land Problem and Legislation \"\n\nhas said:\n\n\"According to the account given by Col. Ethe- . ridge in his preface to the Saranjam List, it was the practice of the former Governments, both the Muslims and the Marathas, to maintain a species of feudal aristocracy for the State purposes by temporary assignments of revenue either for the support of the troops or personal service, the maintenance of official dignity or for other specific reasons. The holders of such lands were entrusted at the time with the necessary powers for enabling them to collect and appropriate the revenue and to administer the general management of the lands. Under the Muslim rule, such holdings were called J ahagirs and under the Maratha rule, they came to be called Saranjam. However, this distinction between these tenures ceased to exist during the Maratha period.\n\nAt the time of the introduction of the British rule,\n\nr960 ·\n\nShrimant Dattajirao :' Bahirojirao.\n\nthe difference between a Jahagir and a Saranjam ceased to exist, to all intents and purposes. The two terms became convertible and all such grants came to be known by the general term \"saranjam\".\n\nApart from the Saranjam grants, which were found only in the Deccan, there were other grants of a political nature found scattered over the whole State. Their origins did not materially differ from those of the Saranjam with the result that the British treated them under the same rules called the Saranjam Rules\".\n\nGhorpade\n\nShrimant Vijaya~\n\nsinhr40\n\nS. K. Das].\n\nThe Saranjam Rules were made in exercise of the . powers referred to in r. 10 of Schedule B of Act XI of 1852 and of the second sub-cl. to cl. 3 of s. 2 of Bombay Act VII of 1863. We may here reproduce some of these Rules:\n\n\" Rule 1-Saranjams shall be ordinarily continued in accordance with the decision already passed or which may hereafter be passed by Provincial Government in each case.\n\nRule 2-A Saranjam which has been decided to be hereditarily continuable shall ordinarily descend to the eldest male representative in the order of primogeniture, of the senior branch of the family descended from the First British grantee or any of his brothers who were undivided in interest. But Provincial Government reserve to themselves the rights for sufficient reasons to direct the continuance of the Saranjam to any other member of the said family, or as an act of grace, to a person adopted into the same family with the sanction of Provincial Government. When a saranjam is thus continued to an adopted son, he shall be liable to pay to Provincial Government a nazarana not , exceeding one year's value of the saranjam, and it . shall be levied from him in such instalments as Provincial Government may in each case direct.\n\nRule 5-Every saranjam shall be held as a life estate. It shall be formally resumed on the death of the holder, and in cases in which it is capable of further continuance, it shall be made over to the next holder as a fresh grant from Provincial\n\n3 S.C.l{. SUPREME COURT REPOHTS 799\n\nGovernment, unencumbered by a:iy debts or charges I96o save such c, s may be specially imposed by ProvincialshrimantDattajirao Government itself.\n\nBahirojirao , Ghorpade Rule 7-Every saranJamdar shall be responsible v. for making a suitable provision for the maintenance Shrimant Vijayasinhrao of the willow or widows of the preceding saranjamdar, his own brothers, or any other member of his S. K. Das J. family who, having a valid claim arising from infancy, mental or physical deformity rendering such member incapable of earning a livelihood, may be deemed deserving of support at his hands. When this obligation is not fulfilled by any saranjamdar, Provincial Government may direct him to make suitable provision for such person and may fix the amount, which he shall pay in each instance; provided that no one who has independent means of his own, or is, in the opinion of Provincial Govern- ' ment, otherwise sufficiently provided for, shall be entitled to maintenance from the Saranjamdar.\n\nRule 8-Every order passed by Provincial Government under the above rule for the grant of maintenance by a Saranjamdar shall hold good during his life only \".\n\nThe true nature of a Saranjam tenure was considered by a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Daulatrao Malojirao v. Province of Bombay(') where their Lordships after referring to the earlier decisions in Shekh Sultan Sani v. Shekh Ajmodin(2 ) and.Raghojirao v. Laxmanrao(3) observed:\n\n\" An examination of the authorities, makes it clear that the whole structure of a Saranjam tenure is founded in the sovereign right, which can only change by conquest or by treaty. So founded, jagirs and Saranjams, with the feudal incidents connected with them, are granted or withheld at the will and pleasure of the sovereign power, and, if granted, the fixity of tenure is always subject to interruption and revocation by resumption, be it temporary or absolute in character. No incident normally applicable\n\n(1) (1946) 49 Bum. L.R. 270.\n\n(2) (1892) L.R. 20 I.A. 50.\n\n(3) (1912) 14 Born. L.R. 1226.\n\n'960 to private rights between subject and subject can\n\nShrimant Dattajirao fetter or disturb the sovereign will \".\n\nBahirojirao I c 1 1 h h S Ghorpad• t seems to us mamiest y c ear t at t e araniam v.\n\nRules furnish no basis for the claim of the plaintiff- Shrimant Vijayad Ab b k d f h sinhrao respon ent. aya a1 as e or sanction to er taking a boy in adoption. No such sanction was s. K. Das f. given. On the death of Babasaheb, it was open to Government to resume the grant, and by its Resolution of December 17, 1941, Government directed that the Saranjam potgi holding of village Dindur and Survey No. 302 of Unachgeri should be continued to the appellant. This really amounted to a resumption and fresh grant and we do not agree with the High Court that the order passed amounted to no more than recognising the legal position according to the rule of succession and stood on the same footing as any order of ordinary mutation. The High Court has emphasised the use of the word \" continued\" in the Resolution dated December 17, 1941, and has contrasted that Resolution with the earlier Resolution dated June 7, 1932, which was clearly a Resolution giving effect to a resumption and regrant of the Gajendragad Saranjam. It may, however, be pointed out that in paragraph 2 of the earlier Resolution, Government used the same word \"continued \" in connection with the maintenance grants, namely, potgi holdings within a Saranjam. Nothing, therefore, turns upon the use of the word \"continued\" and if the Resolution dated December 17, 1941, is read as a whole it is clear that the potgi of village Dindur and Survey field No. 302 of Unachgeri was granted to the present appellant. It was open to Government to pass such an order, and we see no reasons to hold that it was null and void. Indeed, the High Court did not say that it was an invalid order; on the contrary, it said that it was a good order and operated with effect from the death of Babasaheb. But it said erroneously in our opinion, that by reason of the subsequent event of adoption, the order ceased, for all practical purposes, to have any effect from that event. It is well to remember that the doption took place on July 10, 1941, and the Resolut10n was passed on December 17,\n\n1941, though it took effect retrospectively from the r96o date ?f death of Babasaheb. We see _no reasons why Shrima-;,, Dttajirao a vahd order made by Government will cease to have Bahirnjirao any effect because of an adoption made by Abayabai &ho; tade without sanction of Government. To hold that the Shrimant Vi; aya- Government Order ceased to have any effect by reason sinhrao of the act of a private party will be to go against the s. K. Das J. very nature of a Saranjam tenure.\n\nLet us now examine the claim of the plaintiff-respondent from the point. of view of the custom pleaded in paragraph 6(b) of the plaint. The custom pleaded was the rule of lineal primogeniture. In its written statement Government said :\n\n\" The family custom alleged in clause (b) is not admitted, and it is denied that such a custom can apply in respect of maintenance grants. Under Rule 7 of the Saranjam Rules, which merely embody the customary law relating to Saranjams, Government is given absolute discretion to determine whether or not to make an order and what provision to make and in whose favour\".\n\nThe appellant said:\n\n\"The contents of para. 6(b) of the plaint are not correct. The custom of descent by the rule of primogeniture is denied. This defendant has become the owner by survivorship, after the death of Babasaheb \".\n\nThe learned Civil Judge found that the custom pleaded in paragraph 6(b) of the plaint was not proved.\n\nThe High Court has not referred to any evidence on which the custom could be said to have been proved, but observed that \"it is common ground that the properties which had been assigned to this branch for its maintenance is impartible and goes by primogeniture\". Even if we assume that the High Court is right in its observation, though in face of the denial in the two written statements it is difficult to see how this could be common ground between the parties, we fail to appreciate how the assumption helps the plaintiff-respondent. On the operation of the rule of lineal primogeniture after the death of Babasaheb, the appellant became entitled to and got the\n\nI96o properties. It was not pleaded in the plaint that the\n\nShrimot~Dttajirao properties once vested by the customary rule of lineal ,\n\n8(;~\" 017° primogeniture were divested on subsequent adoption 0 ~~· ' by the widow.\n\nNo such plea was specifically taken,\n\nShrimnt Vijaya: but the High Court relied on the concession made by -- 1 . earned advocate for the appellant that under ordmary s. K. Das J.\n\nHindu law the properties which were vested in the appellant were divested on a subsequent valid adoption . by the widow.\n\nWe consider it unnecessary to go into the vexed question of divesting of an .estate on a subsequent valid adoption by the widow. It is enough to point out that the plaint disclosed no such case; no such issue was raised .and it was not open o the plaintiff-respondent to make out a new case fo; the first time in appeal. The plaintiff-respondent seu up a family custom of lineal primogeniture different fr01_, the ordinary law of inheritance; it was incumbent on him to allege and prove the custom on which he relied and to show its precise extent and how far it prevailed over ordinary Hindu law. In our opinion, he failed to plead or prove any family custom by which th!!. properties devolved on him. Moreover, in order fo succeed the plaintiff-respondent must further establish that the custom was such as would bind the Government. The appellant and the Government never conceded that the custom of lineal primogeniture, if it prevailed in the family, took away the right of Government to resume the maintenance grant which was pat\"t of a Saranjam and make a. fresh grant thereof in accordance with the Saranjam Rules.\n\nNow, as to s. 4 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876. The section, so far as it is relevant for our purpose, says:-\n\n\" S. 4.-Subject to the exceptions hereinafter appearing, no Civil Court shall exercise jurisdiction as to any of the following matters :\n\n(a) claims against the Government relating to any property appertaining to the office of any hereditary officer appointed or recognised under Bombay Act No. III of 1874 or any other Jaw for the time being in force, or of any other village-officer or \\ servant, or\n\nt. /\n\n-~-· -\" ·-~\n\nclaims to perform the duties of any such officer I96o or servant, or in respect of any injury caused by Shrimant Dattajirao exclusion from such office or service, or Ba_hiroji>ao suits to set aside or avoid any order under the Gho::ade same Act or any other law relating to the same Shrimnt Vijayasubject for the time being in force passed by the sinhrao State Government or any officer duly authorized 's. K. Das j. in that behalf, or claims against the Government relating to lands held under treaty, or to lands granted or held as Saranjam, or on other political tenure, or to lands declared by the Provincial Government or any officer duly authorized in that behalf to be held for service\".\n\nIn M allappa alias A nnasaheb Basvantrao Desai N adgouda v. Tukko Narshinha Mutalik Desai and Others (1) it was pointed out that in the section a distinction has been made between claims and suits. The subclause we are concerned with is the fourth sub-clause which relates inter alia to\" claims against the Government relating to lands granted or held as Saranjam \".\n\nThe High Court has taken the view that no claim was made against Government in the present case.\n\nWe are unable to agree. In express terms, the plaintiffrespondent asked for a finding that the Government Resolution dated December 17, 1941, was null and\n\nvoid and did not affect the properties in suit because the Government had either no authority to make such an order or no occasion to do so.\n\nHe asked for possession of those properties in spite of the orders of Government. In these circumstances we must hold that Government was more than a purely formal party, and a claim was made against it in respect of the orders contained in its Resolution dated December 17, 1941. Unless the Resolution is out of his way, the plaintiff.respondent is not entitled to claim recovery of possession from the appellant with mesne profits, etc. The Civil Court has no jurisdiction to determine any claim against the Government in the niatter of the Resolution of December 17, 1941, relating to Saranjam lands, and the suit was barred under s. 4 of the Bombay Revenue J urisdictiori Ac't,' 1876.' ·\n\n(I) l.L.R. [1937J Ilo~. 464.\n\nr96o We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the\n\nShrimant Dattajirao judgment and decree of the High Court dated N ovem-\n\nBuhirojirao ber 12 1952 and restore that of the learned Civil\n\nGho~ade Judge' dated' April 20, 1949. The appellant will be Shrimant Vijayaentitled to his_ costs throughout from the plaiutiffsinhrao -\n\nS. K, Das j.\n\nApril 29.\n\nrespondent.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nM/S. CHANDAJI KUBAJI & CO.\n\nTHE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH. (S. K. DAS, J. L. K~PUR and M. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.)\n\nR_eview-Grounds for-Whether allowable on party's own deliberate negligence and intentional withholding of evidence-The Madras General Sales Tax Act, I939 (Mad. Act IX of Ig39), s. I2A\n\n(6) (a).\n\nThe appellant company was a dealer in ghee and groundnut oil et~. The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer assessed it to sales tax for the year 1948-49 on a turnover of Rs. 28,69,151 and odd. Similarly for the year 1949-50 the appellant was assessed to sales tax on a turnover of Rs. 28,72,083 and odd.\n\nThe appellant challenged these assessments and its appeal before the Commercial Tax Officer having failed the two matters came up in second appeal before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. In the Tribunal the appellant did not place any materials in support of its contentions and the two appeals were disposed of by the Tribunal holding that the appellant was correctly assessed to sales tax. In respect of the aforesaid orders of the Tribunal the appellant filed applications for review under s. l2A(6)(a) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 (Mad. Act IX of 1939), taking the plea that in the first case the materials could not be placed before the Tribunal as there was none to instruct the appellant's advocate in English or Telegu, and in the second case the relevant correspondence was mixed up with other records. The Tribunal rejected the applications for review on the ground that a failure to produce the necessary materials in support of a plea taken before it, due either to gross negligence or deliberate withholding, did not come within the reason of s. 12A(6)(a) of the Act. The High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal. On appeal by specialleave in one case and a certificate of the High Court in the other : Held, that the provision ins. l2A(6)(a) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 (Mad. Act IX of 1939), permits a review when through some oversight, mistake or error the necessary facts, basic or evidentiary, were not present before the Court when it passed the order sought to be reviewed, but a party was not", "total_entities": 110, "entities": [{"text": "S.0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13, "end_char": 16, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arunachalam Pillai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 121, "end_char": 139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ig6o\n\nIn view of the majority judgment of the Court, the Arunachalam Pillai appeal is allowed with costs in this Court, and the SouthernvRoadways case rem.anded to the High Court for a re-hearing by (Private) L1a."}}, {"text": "SHRIMANT DATTAJIRAO\n\nBAHIROJIRAO GHORPADE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 374, "end_char": 415, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHRIMANT DATTAJIRAO BAHIROJIRAO GHORPADE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHRIMANT VIJAYASINHRAO AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 417, "end_char": 451, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHRIMANT VIJAYASINHRAO AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. K. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 459, "end_char": 468, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. K. DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. K. SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 470, "end_char": 482, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.K. SARKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 487, "end_char": 507, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 745, "end_char": 776, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 801, "end_char": 805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Suit challenging Government order of resumption and re-grant-If barred-Saranjam Rules-Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act", "statute": "Suit challenging Government order of resumption and re-grant-If barred-Saranjam Rules-Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act"}}, {"text": "Government of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 850, "end_char": 870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Upon the death of the holder in 1932, the Government of Bombay by order dated June 7, 1932, resumed the Saranjam estate of Gajendragad and re-granted the same to his eldest son."}}, {"text": "May 14, 1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1145, "end_char": 1157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 14, 1940, B died leaving his widow, A, and his undivided brother, D. A asked the Government for permission to adopt a son but without the permission being granted adopted Von July IO, l94I. By an order dated December 17, 1941, the Government continued the maintenance grant (Saranjam potgi) to D. Thereupon V filed a suit against .,"}}, {"text": "December 17, 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1357, "end_char": 1374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 14, 1940, B died leaving his widow, A, and his undivided brother, D. A asked the Government for permission to adopt a son but without the permission being granted adopted Von July IO, l94I. By an order dated December 17, 1941, the Government continued the maintenance grant (Saranjam potgi) to D. Thereupon V filed a suit against .,"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2163, "end_char": 2167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2175, "end_char": 2212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2359, "end_char": 2363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876", "statute": "the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876"}}, {"text": "December 17, 194r", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2987, "end_char": 3004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the death sinhrao of B it was open to the Government to resume the grant and to grant it to D and this is what it did by the order dated December 17, 194r."}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3633, "end_char": 3641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3649, "end_char": 3686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4115, "end_char": 4119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876", "statute": "the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876"}}, {"text": "S. N. Andley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4470, "end_char": 4482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Andley, J.B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "J.B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4484, "end_char": 4499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Andley, J.B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4501, "end_char": 4515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Andley, J.B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. L. Vohra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4520, "end_char": 4531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Andley, J.B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "N aunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4553, "end_char": 4564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N aunit Lal, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "B. R. L. Iyengar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4589, "end_char": 4605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. R. L. Iyengar and T. M. Sen, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "T. M. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4610, "end_char": 4619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. R. L. Iyengar and T. M. Sen, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "s. K, Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4708, "end_char": 4717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by :) s. K, Das], S. K. DAS, J.-This is an appeal on a certificate given by the High Court of Bombay, from the judgment and decree of the said High Court dated\n\n'\"\"'\\\n\n.....\n\nNovember 12, 1952, by which it reversed the decision 196o of the Civil Judge, First Class, at Dharwar dated Shrima;;; J;;, ttajfrao April 20, 1949, in Special Civil Suit No.", "canonical_name": "S. K. DAS"}}, {"text": "April 20, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5009, "end_char": 5023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by :) s. K, Das], S. K. DAS, J.-This is an appeal on a certificate given by the High Court of Bombay, from the judgment and decree of the said High Court dated\n\n'\"\"'\\\n\n.....\n\nNovember 12, 1952, by which it reversed the decision 196o of the Civil Judge, First Class, at Dharwar dated Shrima;;; J;;, ttajfrao April 20, 1949, in Special Civil Suit No."}}, {"text": "s. K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5332, "end_char": 5341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s. K. Das J.\n\nWithin that estate lay village Dindur and survey field No.", "canonical_name": "S. K. DAS"}}, {"text": "Dindur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5377, "end_char": 5383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s. K. Das J.\n\nWithin that estate lay village Dindur and survey field No."}}, {"text": "Bhujangarao Daulatrao Ghorpade", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5462, "end_char": 5492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "302 of Unachgeri, which are the properties iri suit; One Bhujangarao Daulatrao Ghorpade was the holder of the Saranjam estate at the relevant time."}}, {"text": "June 7, 1932", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5654, "end_char": 5666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8969 dated June 7, 1932, of the Government of Bombay in the Political Department."}}, {"text": "Saranjamdar Daulatrao Bhujangarao Ghorpade", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5934, "end_char": 5976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Resolution said :\n\n\" The Governor in Council is pleased to direct that the Gajendragad Saranjam should be formally resumed and re.granted to Bhujangarao Daulatrao Ghorpade, the eldest son of the deceased Saranjamdar Daulatrao Bhujangarao Ghorpade, and that it should be entered in his sole name in the accounts of the Collector of Dharwar with effect from the date of the death of the last holder."}}, {"text": "Dharwar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6061, "end_char": 6068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Resolution said :\n\n\" The Governor in Council is pleased to direct that the Gajendragad Saranjam should be formally resumed and re.granted to Bhujangarao Daulatrao Ghorpade, the eldest son of the deceased Saranjamdar Daulatrao Bhujangarao Ghorpade, and that it should be entered in his sole name in the accounts of the Collector of Dharwar with effect from the date of the death of the last holder."}}, {"text": "Saranjamdar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6173, "end_char": 6184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Collector should take steps to place the Saranjamdar in possession of the villages of the Saranjam estate which were in possession of the deceased Saranjamdar ."}}, {"text": "Bhaubands", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6400, "end_char": 6409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Governor in Council agrees with the Commissioner, Southern Division, that the assignments held by the Bhaubands as potgi holders shoud be continued to them as at present.\""}}, {"text": "Ghorpade", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6505, "end_char": 6513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the younger branches of the Ghorpade family was Babasaheb Bahirojirao Ghorpade, to be referred to hereinafter as Babasaheb."}}, {"text": "Babasaheb Bahirojirao Ghorpade", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6525, "end_char": 6555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the younger branches of the Ghorpade family was Babasaheb Bahirojirao Ghorpade, to be referred to hereinafter as Babasaheb.", "canonical_name": "Babasaheb Bahirojirao Ghorpade"}}, {"text": "Unachgeri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6709, "end_char": 6718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "302 of Unachgeri."}}, {"text": "Dattojirao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6755, "end_char": 6765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He had an undivided brother called Dattojirao, who was defendant No."}}, {"text": "Babasaheb", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6882, "end_char": 6891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this judgment we shall call him the appellant: Babasaheb died on May 14, 1940."}}, {"text": "Abayabai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6949, "end_char": 6957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On his death he left a widow named Abayabai and the appellant, his undivided brother.", "canonical_name": "Abayabai"}}, {"text": "July 10, 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7003, "end_char": 7016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 10, 1941, Abayabai adopted Vijayasinhrao as a son to her deceased husband."}}, {"text": "Abayabai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7018, "end_char": 7026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 10, 1941, Abayabai adopted Vijayasinhrao as a son to her deceased husband.", "canonical_name": "Abayabai"}}, {"text": "Vijayasinhrao", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7035, "end_char": 7048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 10, 1941, Abayabai adopted Vijayasinhrao as a son to her deceased husband.", "canonical_name": "Vijayasinhrao"}}, {"text": "Vijayasinha", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7084, "end_char": 7095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vijayasinha was the plaintiff who brought the suit,\n\nr960 and is now the principal respondent before us.", "canonical_name": "Vijayasinhrao"}}, {"text": "Abayabai s. K Dos", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7514, "end_char": 7531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On Babasaheb's death Abayabai s. K Dos J. asked for sanction of Government to her taking a boy in adoption ; this application was opposed by the appellant."}}, {"text": "Government of • Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7675, "end_char": 7697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 17, 1941, the Government of • Bombay passed a Resolution in the following terms :\n\n\" 1."}}, {"text": "Babasaheb Bahirajirao Ghorpade", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7933, "end_char": 7963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "302 of Unachgeri, which were assigned for maintenance to the deceased potgidar, Mr. Babasaheb Bahirajirao Ghorpade, at the time of the re-grant of the Gajendragad Saranjam, should be ,\"' continued to his undivided brother, Mr. Dattajirao Bahirojirao Ghorpade.", "canonical_name": "Babasaheb Bahirojirao Ghorpade"}}, {"text": "Gajendragad Saranjam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8000, "end_char": 8020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "302 of Unachgeri, which were assigned for maintenance to the deceased potgidar, Mr. Babasaheb Bahirajirao Ghorpade, at the time of the re-grant of the Gajendragad Saranjam, should be ,\"' continued to his undivided brother, Mr. Dattajirao Bahirojirao Ghorpade."}}, {"text": "Dattajirao Bahirojirao Ghorpade", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8076, "end_char": 8107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "302 of Unachgeri, which were assigned for maintenance to the deceased potgidar, Mr. Babasaheb Bahirajirao Ghorpade, at the time of the re-grant of the Gajendragad Saranjam, should be ,\"' continued to his undivided brother, Mr. Dattajirao Bahirojirao Ghorpade.", "canonical_name": "Dattajirao Bahirojirao Ghorpade"}}, {"text": "Dattajirao Bahirojirao Ghorpade", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8215, "end_char": 8246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Government is also pleased to direct, under Rule 7 of the Saran jam Rules, that the new potgidar, Mr. Dattajirao Bahirojirao Ghorpade, should give to Bai Abaibai, widow of the deceased Potgidar, Mr.\n\nBabasaheb Bahirojirao Ghorpade, an annual maintenance allowance of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Dattajirao Bahirojirao Ghorpade"}}, {"text": "Bai Abaibai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8263, "end_char": 8274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Government is also pleased to direct, under Rule 7 of the Saran jam Rules, that the new potgidar, Mr. Dattajirao Bahirojirao Ghorpade, should give to Bai Abaibai, widow of the deceased Potgidar, Mr.\n\nBabasaheb Bahirojirao Ghorpade, an annual maintenance allowance of Rs."}}, {"text": "Potgidar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8298, "end_char": 8306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Government is also pleased to direct, under Rule 7 of the Saran jam Rules, that the new potgidar, Mr. Dattajirao Bahirojirao Ghorpade, should give to Bai Abaibai, widow of the deceased Potgidar, Mr.\n\nBabasaheb Bahirojirao Ghorpade, an annual maintenance allowance of Rs."}}, {"text": "Commissioner S. D.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8560, "end_char": 8578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commissioner S. D. should be requested to communicate these orders to Bai Abaibai, widow of the late potgidar, with reference to her petitions addressed to him and also to the Rayats of Dindur, with reference to their petition, dated the 12th May, 1941."}}, {"text": "12th May, 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8798, "end_char": 8812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commissioner S. D. should be requested to communicate these orders to Bai Abaibai, widow of the late potgidar, with reference to her petitions addressed to him and also to the Rayats of Dindur, with reference to their petition, dated the 12th May, 1941."}}, {"text": "February 8, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8900, "end_char": 8916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 8, 1943, the plaintiff-respondent brought the suit against the Province of Bombay as defendant No."}}, {"text": "Abayabai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9048, "end_char": 9056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 and Abayabai as defendant No.", "canonical_name": "Abayabai"}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9150, "end_char": 9165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was contested by the Province of Bombay (now substituted by the State of Bombay) and the appellant."}}, {"text": "Shrimant Dattajirao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9405, "end_char": 9424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The claim of the plaintiff-respondent was that on i96o his adoption the estate of his deceased adoptive father Shrimant Dattajirao devolved on him by the rule of lineal primogeniture fiakiroJirao • 11 Th • l f h Ghorpade m.preference to th~ appe ant.", "canonical_name": "Shrimant Dattajirao"}}, {"text": "Shrimant Sardar Bhujangarao Ghorpade", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9875, "end_char": 9911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 made a regrant of the Saranjam estate to Shrimant Sardar Bhujangarao Ghorpade in 1932 and therein the suit properties were, according to defendant No.", "canonical_name": "Shrimant Sardar\n\nBhujangarao Ghorpade"}}, {"text": "Shrimant Sardar\n\nBhujangarao Ghorpade", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10234, "end_char": 10271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shrimant Sardar\n\nBhujangarao Ghorpade.", "canonical_name": "Shrimant Sardar\n\nBhujangarao Ghorpade"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11072, "end_char": 11078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the Province of Bombay several pleas by way of defence were taken."}}, {"text": "Bahirojirao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11536, "end_char": 11547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The main pleas were\n\n(1) assuming that the plaintiff-respondent was validly adopted, he had nevertheless no legal claim to the properties in suit because under the relevant Saranjam Rules the interest of Babasaheb came to an end on his death and was not of such a nature as would\n\nr96o devolve on the plaintiff-respondent despite tbe Govern- Shrimant Dattajirao ment Resolution dated December 17, 1941, (2) that\n\nBahirojirao the alleged family custom did not apply to mainten- Gho; ade ance grants, and (3r that, in any event, the suit was\n\nShrimant Vijayabarred under s. 4 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction sinhrao Act, 1876.", "canonical_name": "Bahirojirao"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11692, "end_char": 11696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction sinhrao Act, 1876", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11704, "end_char": 11749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11796, "end_char": 11802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Das J. said pleas raised the additional pleas that there was no valid adoption of the plaintiff-respondent and Abayabai was expressly prohibited by her husband from adopting a son.", "canonical_name": "K. Das"}}, {"text": "Saranjam Family are entitled to claim maintenance under Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12561, "end_char": 12621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bahirojiao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13854, "end_char": 13864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Courtshrima-,-; tn-attnjirao affirmed the finding on the first issue, and on a care- Bahirojiao fol and detailed examination of the evidence held on Gho•.t, a e the second issue that the learned Civil Judge was Shrimif\"' Vijayawrong in holding that the adoption was invalid by •':'_h~~ reason of the alleged prohibition of Babasaheb.", "canonical_name": "Bahirojirao"}}, {"text": "Shrimif\"' Vijayawrong", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13980, "end_char": 14001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Courtshrima-,-; tn-attnjirao affirmed the finding on the first issue, and on a care- Bahirojiao fol and detailed examination of the evidence held on Gho•.t, a e the second issue that the learned Civil Judge was Shrimif\"' Vijayawrong in holding that the adoption was invalid by •':'_h~~ reason of the alleged prohibition of Babasaheb."}}, {"text": "K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14110, "end_char": 14116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The s. K. Das J.\n\nHigh Court held that there was no such prohibition, and the adoption was valid.", "canonical_name": "K. Das"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14809, "end_char": 14818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15303, "end_char": 15307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15315, "end_char": 15346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16092, "end_char": 16101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court said that looked at from s. K. Das ./. this point of view, no question arose of the validity of the Government Resolution dated December 17, 1941, and no relief for possession'having been claimed against Government, the suit was not barred under s. 4 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876 .", "canonical_name": "S. K. DAS"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16313, "end_char": 16317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act,\n\n1876", "statute": "the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act,\n\n1876"}}, {"text": "Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16325, "end_char": 16362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 4(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17371, "end_char": 17378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17386, "end_char": 17423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Let us examine the claim first from the point of view of the Saranjam Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17844, "end_char": 17919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of Bombay JJahirojirao", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18113, "end_char": 18146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Resolution of June 7'.hrimantDattajirao 1932, quoted earher, the Government of Bombay JJahirojirao treated the potgi holders as being within the Saranjam Ghorpade and made provision for them."}}, {"text": "Shrima:i Vijaya•", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18259, "end_char": 18275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Resolution of Shrima:i Vijaya• December 17, 1941, also proceeded on that footing.", "canonical_name": "Shrima:i Vijaya•"}}, {"text": "K.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18389, "end_char": 18391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "100) and s. K. vas J. the other of 1936 (Ex."}}, {"text": "Wilson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18994, "end_char": 19000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his Glossary, Wilson defines Saranjam as temporary assignments of revenue from villages or lands for support of troops or for personal service usually for the lifetime of the grantees."}}, {"text": "G. D. Patel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19169, "end_char": 19180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. G. D. Patel in his book on \" The Indian Land Problem and Legislation \"\n\nhas said:\n\n\"According to the account given by Col."}}, {"text": "Ethe-", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19292, "end_char": 19297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ethe- ."}}, {"text": "Shrimant Vijaya~", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20678, "end_char": 20694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghorpade\n\nShrimant Vijaya~\n\nsinhr40\n\nS. K. Das].", "canonical_name": "Shrima:i Vijaya•"}}, {"text": "S. K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20705, "end_char": 20714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ghorpade\n\nShrimant Vijaya~\n\nsinhr40\n\nS. K. Das].", "canonical_name": "S. K. DAS"}}, {"text": "Schedule B of Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20799, "end_char": 20816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "cl. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20857, "end_char": 20862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule B of Act", "statute": "Schedule B of Act"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20866, "end_char": 20870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule B of Act", "statute": "Schedule B of Act"}}, {"text": "Bombay Act VII of 1863", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20874, "end_char": 20896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23462, "end_char": 23479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The true nature of a Saranjam tenure was considered by a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Daulatrao Malojirao v. Province of Bombay(') where their Lordships after referring to the earlier decisions in Shekh Sultan Sani v. Shekh Ajmodin(2 ) and."}}, {"text": "(1892) L.R. 20 I.A. 50", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 24221, "end_char": 24243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Shrimant Vijayad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24536, "end_char": 24552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bahirojirao I c 1 1 h h S Ghorpad• t seems to us mamiest y c ear t at t e araniam v.\n\nRules furnish no basis for the claim of the plaintiff- Shrimant Vijayad Ab b k d f h sinhrao respon ent.", "canonical_name": "Shrima:i Vijaya•"}}, {"text": "December 17,\n\n1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26512, "end_char": 26530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is well to remember that the doption took place on July 10, 1941, and the Resolut10n was passed on December 17,\n\n1941, though it took effect retrospectively from the r96o date ?"}}, {"text": "Shrimnt Vijaya", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28877, "end_char": 28891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No such plea was specifically taken,\n\nShrimnt Vijaya: but the High Court relied on the concession made by -- 1 .", "canonical_name": "Shrima:i Vijaya•"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30276, "end_char": 30280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30288, "end_char": 30325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30392, "end_char": 30396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876", "statute": "the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32906, "end_char": 32910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shrimant Dattajirao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33049, "end_char": 33068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "r96o We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the\n\nShrimant Dattajirao judgment and decree of the High Court dated N ovem-\n\nBuhirojirao ber 12 1952 and restore that of the learned Civil\n\nGho~ade Judge' dated' April 20, 1949.", "canonical_name": "Shrimant Dattajirao"}}, {"text": "S. K, Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33323, "end_char": 33332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant will be Shrimant Vijayaentitled to his_ costs throughout from the plaiutiffsinhrao -\n\nS. K, Das j.\n\nApril 29.", "canonical_name": "S. K. DAS"}}, {"text": "CHANDAJI KUBAJI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33383, "end_char": 33398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/S. CHANDAJI KUBAJI & CO."}}, {"text": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33410, "end_char": 33433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH. ("}}, {"text": "L. K", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33450, "end_char": 33454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. DAS, J. L. K~PUR and M. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 34137, "end_char": 34165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant challenged these assessments and its appeal before the Commercial Tax Officer having failed the two matters came up in second appeal before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal."}}, {"text": "Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34493, "end_char": 34527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 12A(6)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35049, "end_char": 35061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939", "statute": "the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35262, "end_char": 35296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_804_810_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960)\n\nr96o We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the\n\nShrimant Dattajirao judgment and decree of the High Court dated N ovem-\n\nBuhirojirao ber 12 1952 and restore that of the learned Civil\n\nGho~ade Judge' dated' April 20, 1949. The appellant will be Shrimant Vijayaentitled to his_ costs throughout from the plaiutiffsinhrao -\n\nS. K, Das j.\n\nApril 29.\n\nrespondent.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nM/S. CHANDAJI KUBAJI & CO.\n\nTHE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH. (S. K. DAS, J. L. K~PUR and M. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.)\n\nR_eview-Grounds for-Whether allowable on party's own deliberate negligence and intentional withholding of evidence-The Madras General Sales Tax Act, I939 (Mad. Act IX of Ig39), s. I2A\n\n(6) (a).\n\nThe appellant company was a dealer in ghee and groundnut oil et~. The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer assessed it to sales tax for the year 1948-49 on a turnover of Rs. 28,69,151 and odd. Similarly for the year 1949-50 the appellant was assessed to sales tax on a turnover of Rs. 28,72,083 and odd.\n\nThe appellant challenged these assessments and its appeal before the Commercial Tax Officer having failed the two matters came up in second appeal before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. In the Tribunal the appellant did not place any materials in support of its contentions and the two appeals were disposed of by the Tribunal holding that the appellant was correctly assessed to sales tax. In respect of the aforesaid orders of the Tribunal the appellant filed applications for review under s. l2A(6)(a) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 (Mad. Act IX of 1939), taking the plea that in the first case the materials could not be placed before the Tribunal as there was none to instruct the appellant's advocate in English or Telegu, and in the second case the relevant correspondence was mixed up with other records. The Tribunal rejected the applications for review on the ground that a failure to produce the necessary materials in support of a plea taken before it, due either to gross negligence or deliberate withholding, did not come within the reason of s. 12A(6)(a) of the Act. The High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal. On appeal by specialleave in one case and a certificate of the High Court in the other : Held, that the provision ins. l2A(6)(a) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 (Mad. Act IX of 1939), permits a review when through some oversight, mistake or error the necessary facts, basic or evidentiary, were not present before the Court when it passed the order sought to be reviewed, but a party was not\n\nentitled to ask for a review when it had deliberately or intentionally withheld evidence in support of a claim made by it.\n\nState of Andhra v.\n\nSri Arisetty Sriramulu, A.LR. r957 Andhra Pradesh r30, not approved.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 420of1957.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 8, 1955, of the former Andhra High Court in Tax Revision Case No. 2 of 1955.\n\nWITH Civil Appeal No. 142 of 1958.\n\nAppeal from the' judgment and order dated July 28, 1955, of the former Andhra High Court in T.R.C.\n\nNo. 32 of 1954.\n\nN. Rajeswara Rao and Sarrlar Bahailur, for the appellants (in both the appeals).\n\nT. V. R. Tatachari and T. M. Sen, for the respondent (in both the appeallil).\n\nll960. April 29.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nChandaji Kubaji 0- Co.\n\nv; State of A ndhra Pradesh\n\nR K. DAS, J.-These two appeals, one with special s. K. Das J. leave from this Court and the other on a certificate\n\ngrnnted by the High Court of Andhra, have been heard together and this judgment will govern them bo•jh,\n\n'rhe faets are similar and the short question for decision is whether the appellant, Messrs. Chandaji Knbaji and Company, Guntur, was entitled to apply under s. 12A(6)(a) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 (Madras Act IX of 1939), as applied to.\n\nAndhra, for a review of an order of the Appellate Tribunal made under sub-s. (4) of s. 12A of the said\n\nAct. The relevant facts are these. The appellant is a dealer in ghee, groundnut oil, chillies, etc., and was carrying on its business at Guntur. In Civil Appeal No. 420 of 1957, the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Guntur, a.ssessed the appellant to sales tax for the yea, r 1948 .. 49 on a turnover of Rs. 28,69,151 and odd.\n\nTbe appellant having unsuccessfully appealed to the Commercial Tax Officer, Guntur, made a second appeal to the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, hereinafter called\n\nz960\n\nChandaji Kubaji 6- Co. v.\n\nState of Andhra\n\nPradesh\n\nS. K. Das J.\n\nthe Tribunal. Before the Tribunal the appellant contended inter alia that out of the total turnover a sum of Rs. 10,45,156 and odd related to commission purchase of commodities taxable at the stage of sale on behalf of principals resident outside the State of Andhra and was not therefore taxable by the respondent State. In respect of this plea the Tribunal said :\n\n\"As regards the alleged commission agency business to the tune of Rs. 10,45,156-4-9 the appellants have neither advanced arguments nor placed before us any materials in support of the contention raised in this behalf \".\n\nIn the result the Tribunal dismissed the appeal on May 30, 1953.\n\nIn Civil Appeal No. 142 of 1958 the appellant was assessed by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Guntur, on a net turnover of Rs. 28,72,083 and odd for the year 1949-50.\n\nThe appellant objected to the inclusion of a sum of Rs. 19,89,076 and odd on the ground that the goods relating thereto had been consigned to self and despatched to places outside the State and in fact were delivered outside the State.\n\nThis plea was disallowed by the Sales Tax authorities, and the Tribunal said :\n\n\" In the grounds of appeal it has been urged with regard to these sale transactions the ownership in the goods continued to vest in the appellant till the sale price was collected and the goods were delivered to the buyers at places outside the State. Beyond advancing a broad argument of this type no material has been placed before us or was placed bef0re the assessing authority or the Commercial Tax Officer to support the appellant's version that the property in the goods passed to the buyer only at places outside the State \".\n\nx x x \" It is not denied that though contracts in writing were not entered into, these transactions were the result of correspondence between the appellant on the one hand as seller and various persons on the other as buyers. It is conceded that such corresp9rr433 and from January l, 1945, to March 31, 1945, to Rs. 67,959.\n\nThe case of the appellant-company was that for the assessment year 1946-47 it was liable to pay tax only on the commission of Rs. 67,959 which it had earned by working as managing agent of the Mills company and it was not liable to pay tax on the sum of Rs. 2,20>433 On a difference of opinion having arisen between the departmental taxing authorities and the Tribunal the following question was referred to the High Court for decision :-\n\n\" Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the managing agency commission of 3!% on sales made by the New Swadeshi Mills of Ahmedabad Ltd., between April l, 1944, and December 31, 1944, accrued to Shivnarayan Surajmal Nemani or to the assessee ? \"\n\n. The High Court following the decision of the Supreme Court in E. D. Sassoon and Company Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City, held that the appellant company was liable to pay tax on the whole of the commission as the commission accrued due on March 31, 1945, and they became entitled to receive it at the end of the year; it also held that no debt was created in favour of the agents when the goods were sold. On appeal by the a:ssessee company on a certificate of the High Court : Held, that the view of the High Court was correct. The commission. of the managing agents accrued and became due at the end of the financial year and that neither any debt nor any right to receive payment arose in favour of the aenb• when each\n\nr960 transaction of sale took place. No income arose or accrued on the sale proceeds at the time of each sale.\n\nCotton Agent' Ltd, E. D. Sassoon and Company Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income- _•·. tax, Bombay, [1955] l S.C.R. 313, referred to.\n\nCommimoner of L k G l d 5 Th Tncome-lax a shminarayan Ram opa an ons v. e Government of Hyderabad, [r955] r S.C.R. 393, followed.\n\nCommissioners of Inland Revenue v. Gardner Mountain & D'Ambrumenil Ltd., (r947) 29 T.C. 69 and Turner Morrison & Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal., [r953] 23 I.T.R. 152, distinguished. -:-. 1 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 100 of 1959.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated February 11, 1957, of the Bombay High Court in Income-tax Reference No. 53 of 1956.\n\nR. J. Kolah, Dwarkadas, S. N. Andley, J.B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellants.\n\nK. N. Rajagopal Sastri and D. Gupta, for the respondent. 1960.\n\nMay 3.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by s. K. D•\" J.\n\nS. K. DAS, J.-This is an appeal on a certificate granted by the High Court of Bombay, under s. 66A (2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, l922. The short facts are these. The Cotton Agents Limited, Bombay, are a limited liability company registered under the Indian Companies Act and will be called the assessee Company in this judgment. It held a substantial number of shares of the New Swadeshi Mills of Ahmedabad, Ltd. (hereinafter called the Mills Company). Messrs.\n\nShivnarayan Surajmal Nemani (called the Nemani group) also held a block of shares of the Mills Company along with its managing agency. The assessment year was 1946-47, and the year ending with Diwali, 1945 (October 18, 1944, to November 4, 1945) was the accounting year. Sometime in 1944 so.me differences arose between the assessee Company and the Nemani group; these differences were referred to one Govindram Seksaria, who decided that the Nemani group should sell its block of shares to the assessee Compa.ny e, t an agreed price. It was further decided\n\n... <:>..- ·~ • l 1 .... .,.. •• •\n\nthat a sum of Rs. 5,00,000 be paid by the assessee x9i; o\n\nCompay to the Neahni grTouh:p as the price tof the Cotton Agents Ltd;\n\nmanagmg agency rig ts. 1s arrangemen was v. approved by the share-holders of the Mills Company aommissiomr of by a resolution dated January 4, 1945, and came into Income-ta~ effect immediately. The agreement further was that th C Id · S, K.Dasj. e assessee ompany wou come m as managmg agents of the Mills Company in place of the Nemani group and would be entitled to the emoluments of the managing agents as from Aprill, 1944. The managing agency commission from April 1, 1944, to December 31, 1944, amounted to Rs. 2,20,433 and from January 1, 1945, to March 31, 1945, to Rs. 67,959. The case of the assessee Company was that for the assessment year 1!146-4 7 it was liable to pay tax only on the commission of Rs. 67,959 which it had earned by working as managing agent of the Mills Company and it was not liable to pay tax on the sum of Rs. 2,20,433. This contention of the assessee Company was not accepted by the departmental taxing authorities; but the Tribunal decided in its favour.\n\nThe assessee Company's case before the Tribunal was that as the managing agency commission was based on the sales, the commission accrued to the managing agents as and when the sales were made and furthermore the sum of Rs. 5,00,000 paid by the assessee Company to the retiring managing agents included the purchase price of the mana.ging agency commission which had accrued in the hands of the retiring agents. The Tribunal expressed the view that on a true construction of the relevant managing agency agreement, the 3! per cent. commission on sales made when the Nemani group was the managing agent accrued to that group and not to the assessee Company and thus a debt was created in favour of the Nemani group on every sale during its period of managing agency and only the payment of the debt was deferred till the accounts of the Mills Company were passed at a general meeting; therefore, the commission prior to the close of the year 1944 was assessable in the hands of the Nemani group and thereafter in the hands of the assessee Compa:1y.\n\nThe Department, however, contended that the whole\n\nof the managing agency commission accrued to the assessee.\n\nThereupon, at the instance of the Depart- Cotton A;, ents Ltd. ment, the Tribunal referred the following question of\n\ncommissioner of law to the High Court for decision :-\n\nIncome-tax \"Whether on the facts and circumstances of the\n\nS. J(. Das J. case the managing agency commission at 3t% on sales made by the New Swadeshi Mills of Ahmed a bad Ltd., between April I, 1944, and December 31, 1944, accrued to Shivnarayan Surajmal Nemani, or to the assessee ? '' The High Court hEild that the matter was concluded by the decision of this Court in E. D. Sassoon and Company Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City (' ). With reference to the argument of learned counsel for the assessee Company that the commission was payable on the sale proceeds and not on the profits as in Sassoon's case('), it said:\n\n\"We would have given serious thought to this aspect of the matter but for the view we take that the decision of the Supreme Court with regard to the question of creation of the debt and with regard to the serving by the managing agents for a term of one year being a condition precedent for their being entitled to receive payment, is indistinguishable on the facts of this case.\n\nWe may point out that here as in the Sassoon's case(') the commission of 3t per cent. is to be earned in any year, and also by clause 3 of the agreement the commission is to become due to the managing agents at the end of each financial year. Therefore, till the end of the financial year there is no debt whatsoever created in favour of the managing agents and also their right to receive payment depends upon their having served for a whole year. Under the circumstances we must hold, following the decision of the Supreme Court, that the assessees are liable to pay tax on the whole of the commission as the commission accrued due on March 31, 1945, and they became entitled to receive it at the end of the year. We do not agree with the view of the Tribunal that according to the agreement of the managing agents the debt was\n\n(1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 313.\n\n. -\n\n,.J\n\ncreated in favour of the agents when the goods were 1960 sold by the company and that the payent was Cotton Agents Lta; deferred to a date after the accounts havrng been v. passed by the shareholders in the. general meeting Commission.r nf of the company. In no view of the case can it be, Income-tax said that the debt was created in favour of the agents when the goods were sold\". s. K. Das.!- The answer to the question really depends on a construction of the relevant terms of the managing agency agreement dated March 15, 1925, entered into between the Mills Company and the Nemani group.\n\nBefore we proceed to a consideration of those terms it is necessary to state that the Department has assessed the Nemani group also to tax in respect of the commission for the period April 1, 1944, to December 31, 1944. That circumstance has, however, no bearing on the question of construction and learned counsel for the Department has stated before us that there is no intention to tax two parties for the same income and if the tax has been realised from both fol'\n\nthe same income, it will have to be refunded to one of the two parties after the decision of this Court.\n\nWe are not considering in this case the validity or otherwise of what are known as protective or precautionary assessments, and nothing said in this judgment has any bearing on that question.\n\nWe go at once to the Managing Agency Agreement dated March 15, 1925. Under that agreement the managing agents were appointed for a period of fifty one years, but with liberty to them to resign the appointment and retire from the agency at any time by twelve calendar months' notice in writing, such notice to t:ixpire at the end of any financial year of the\n\nMills Company. Then came els. (2) and (3) of the agreement, which are material and must be quoted so far as they are necessary for our purpose :-\n\n\" (2) The remuneration of the Agents as -such Agents of the Company as aforesaid shall be as follows:- A commission at the rate of three and a half per cent. on the gross proceeds of .all sales of the yarn, cloth, waste and other articles manufactured\n\nCotton Agents Ltd.\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncome-ta%\n\ns. K.t'Das J.\n\nby the Company earned in any year or other period for which the accounts of the Company are made up and laid before the General Meeting.\"\n\nProvided, etc., (it is unnecessary to quote the proviso).\n\n\" (3) The said commission shall become due to the Ma.naging Agents at the end of each financial year or other period for whieh the accounts of the Company are to be laid before the General Meeting and shall be payable and paid immediately after such accounts have been passed by the General Meeting\".\n\nClauses (6) to (11) recited the rights and duties of the managing agents, one of such rights being to retain, reimburse and pay themselves \"all sums due to the agents for commission\". Clauses (13) and (14) dealt with the right to assign the remuneration and the managing agency, and said inter alia that\" it shall be lawful for the agents to assign this agreement and the benefit thereof and their rights and privileges, etc., to any person or firm or company having authority by its constitution to become bound by the obligations undertaken by the agents ........................... and the Company shall be bound to recognise the person, firm or company aforesaid as the agents of the Company\".\n\nIt is unnecessary to read the other clauses of the managing agency agreement.\n\nThe controversy before us hinges really on the scope and effect of clauses (2) and (3), read in the context of the agreement as a whole. On behalf of the assessee Company the argument is that under cl. (2) the managing agency remuneration accrued at the rate of 3! per cent. on the gross proceeds of all sales; the word \" all\" is emphasised, and it is argued that the remuneration accrued as ea.ch sale took place, the totality of sales giving the gross sale proceeds. It is argued that embedded in each sale was the managing agency commission of the assessee Company. It is further sug£lested on behalf of the assessee Company that though cl. (3) uses the word \" due '', it merely\n\ninr1irat.ed the time of payment and not that of accrual,\n\nWe do not think that this reading of the two clauses r960 is correct. In our view, cl. (3) is the accrual clause; -- . . it shows that the commission became due at the end Cotton Agents Ud. of each financial year or other period for which the Commi;; ioner of accounts of the Mills Company were to be laid before inoome-tax the General Meeting. Significantly enough, the clause consists of two parts; one part says when the coms, K. Das J; mission becomes due and the other says when it is to be payable and paid. In very clear terms, the clause says that the commission becomes due normally at the end of the financial year, but is payable after the accounts have been passed by the General Meeting.\n\nLet us contrast cl. (3) with cl. (2).\n\nClause (2) states how the remuneration has to be calculated. It says in effect that the remuneration has to be cn.lculated at the rate of 3! per cent. on the gross proceeds of all sales, etc., earned in any year or other period for which the accounts of the Mills Company are made up.\n\nPutting the two clauses side by side, the conclusion at which we have arrived is that in their true scope and effect cl. (3) determines the time of accrual of the managing agency remuneration and cl. (2) determines the rate at which the remuneration is to be calculated; and as to the time of payment, that is determined by the second part of cl. (3). - This view of the managing agency agreement of March 15, 1925, concludes the appeal. If the remuneration accrued at the end of the financial year, then undoubtedly it accrued in the hands of the assessee Company. It remains now to refer briefly to some of the decisions cited at the Bar.\n\nAs to th~ decision in Sassoon'8 case(1) it is pointed out that the commission there payable by way of remuneration was a percentage on the net profits and this, - it is argued for the assessee Company, distinguishes that decision from the present case. Indeed, it is true that in Sassoon's case (1) the remuneration was fixed at a percentage on the net profits, but the real point of the decision was as to when the remuneration accrued.\n\nOn this point the majority of learned Judges said:\n\n(t) (1q551 r 1>.C.R. 313.\n\n1960 \"It is clear therefore that income may accrue to an\n\nCotton A, gents Lid. assessee without he actu.al receipt o~ the sae. If v. the assessee acqmres a right to receive the mcome, Commissioner of the income can be said to have accrued to him though\n\nIncome-lo~ it may be received later on its being ascertained. The basic conception is that he must have acquired a s. K. Das f right to receive the income. There must be a debt owed to him by somebody. There must be as is otherwise expressed debitum in presenti, solvendum in futuro: see W. S. Try Ltd. v. Johnson(') and Webb v.\n\nStenton (').\n\nUnless and until there is created in favour of the assessee a debt due by somebody it cannot be said that he had acquired a right to receive the income or that income has accrued to him\".\n\nIt has been argued before us that the decision requires reconsideration because it failed to make a further distinction, a distinction which it is stated arises in law, between the right to receive payment and the creation of a debt. We consider it unnecessary to consider such a distinction, if any such exists, in the present case. On our view of the managing agency agreement, the commission of the managing agents became due at the end of the financial year and that is when it accrued; and there were neither any debt created nor any right to receive payment when each transaction of sale took place.\n\nWe were also addressed at some length on the further question whether managing agency is service and if so, whether it must be for one full year or whether apportionment is permissible.\n\nThese questions do not fall for decision in the present case and we express no opinion thereon.\n\nWe have proceeded in this case on the footing that the managing agency work of the assessee Company constituted business within the rule of the decision in Lakshminarayan Ram GopaJ, and Sons Ltd. v. The Government of Hyderabad(') and on that footing we have decided the question of accrual.\n\nIn Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Gardner Mountain & D'AmbrumenilLtd. ('), on which learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance, the facts were quite\n\n(1) [1946] I All E.R. 53Z. 539\n\n(3) (1955] (1) S.C.R. 393.\n\n(2) [1883] II Q.B D. 518, 522. 527.\n\n(4) (1941] 29 T.C. Lg.\n\n' --\n\ndifferent and on a true construction of the agreements 1960 there, it was held that the commission payable under - d ' t th Cotton Agents Ltd certam un er-writers agreemen s arose m e year m which the policies were underwritten. That decision Commi;; ioner of proceeded on a construction of the agreements there Income-tax considered ; and it is no authority for construing other agreements of a different character. Learned s. K Das J. counsel for the appellant relied on Turner Morrison & Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal(1) for his contention that in the sale proceeds of each\n\ntransaction of sale were embedded the income, profits' or gains to be earned by the managing agents and, therefore, the accrual took place on each transaction, ofsale. The observations at page 160 of the report on which reliance was placed were made in a different context, namely, in the context of the place of receipt of income in relation to the provisions of s. 4(l)(a) of the Income-tax Act.\n\nLearned counsel for the respondent has pointed out to us that the observations of Lord Justice Fry in Colquhoun v. Brooks (2) were not very accurately reproduced in Rogers Pyatt Shellac and Co. v. Secretary of State for India (3). He submitted that Lord Justice Fry did not say that the words \" accrual\" or \"arising\" represented a stage anterior to the point of time when the income becomes receivable and connote a character of the income which is more or less inchoate.\n\nHe has argued that there is nothing inchoate about the income when it arises or accrues.\n\nWe consider it unnecessary to embark on a discussion as to how far the aforesaid observations require consideration by us.\n\nIt is enough to say that on the view which we have taken of the relevant clauses of the managing agency agreement, no income arose or accrued on the sale proceeds at the time of each transaction of sale ; the income accrued at the end of the financial year at the rate of 3! per cent. on t}ie gross proceeds of all sales of yarn, cloth, waste, etc., earned in any one year. In that view of the matter, the High Court correctly answered the question.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n(r) [r953] 23 I.T.R. r52.\n\n(2) (r888) 21 Q.B.D. 52, 59. <3l (1924111.r.c. 363, 372,", "total_entities": 53, "entities": [{"text": "S. K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 63, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. K. Das", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 12A(6)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1434, "end_char": 1446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "THE COTTON AGENTS LTD., BOMBAY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1615, "end_char": 1645, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE COTTON AGENTS LTD., BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "S. K. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1687, "end_char": 1696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. DAS and M. HrnAYATULLAH, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "S. K. Das"}}, {"text": "M. HrnAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1701, "end_char": 1716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. DAS and M. HrnAYATULLAH, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "M. HrnAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "Shivnarayan Surajmal Nomani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1861, "end_char": 1888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Messrs. Shivnarayan Surajmal Nomani were the managing agents of the New Swadeshi Mills of Ahmedabad Ltd. The Nemani group and the appellant-company which is the assessee\n\n, J .. ,..,. ...", "canonical_name": "Shivnarayan Surajmal Nomani"}}, {"text": "Nemani group", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1962, "end_char": 1974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Messrs. Shivnarayan Surajmal Nomani were the managing agents of the New Swadeshi Mills of Ahmedabad Ltd. The Nemani group and the appellant-company which is the assessee\n\n, J .. ,..,. ..."}}, {"text": "Nemani group", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2448, "end_char": 2460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5,00,000 to the Nemani group and would be entitled to the emoluments of the managing agents as from April l, 1944 , The relevant portion of the Managing Agency Agreement ran thus :-\n\n\" (2) The remuneration of the agents as such agents of the company as aforesaid shall be as follows :- A commission at the rate of three and a half per cent."}}, {"text": "Diwali, 1945 (", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3366, "end_char": 3380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessment year was 1946-47, and the year ending with Diwali, 1945 (October 18, 1944, to November 4, 1945) was the accounting year."}}, {"text": "October 18, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3380, "end_char": 3396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessment year was 1946-47, and the year ending with Diwali, 1945 (October 18, 1944, to November 4, 1945) was the accounting year."}}, {"text": "November 4, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3401, "end_char": 3417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessment year was 1946-47, and the year ending with Diwali, 1945 (October 18, 1944, to November 4, 1945) was the accounting year."}}, {"text": "Aprill, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3480, "end_char": 3492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The managing agency commission from Aprill, 1944, to December 31, 1944, amounted to Rs."}}, {"text": "December 31, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3497, "end_char": 3514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The managing agency commission from Aprill, 1944, to December 31, 1944, amounted to Rs."}}, {"text": "January l, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3550, "end_char": 3565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,20>433 and from January l, 1945, to March 31, 1945, to Rs."}}, {"text": "March 31, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3570, "end_char": 3584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,20>433 and from January l, 1945, to March 31, 1945, to Rs."}}, {"text": "New Swadeshi Mills of Ahmedabad Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4154, "end_char": 4190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,20>433 On a difference of opinion having arisen between the departmental taxing authorities and the Tribunal the following question was referred to the High Court for decision :-\n\n\" Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the managing agency commission of 3!% on sales made by the New Swadeshi Mills of Ahmedabad Ltd., between April l, 1944, and December 31, 1944, accrued to Shivnarayan Surajmal Nemani or to the assessee ? \""}}, {"text": "April l, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4200, "end_char": 4213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,20>433 On a difference of opinion having arisen between the departmental taxing authorities and the Tribunal the following question was referred to the High Court for decision :-\n\n\" Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the managing agency commission of 3!% on sales made by the New Swadeshi Mills of Ahmedabad Ltd., between April l, 1944, and December 31, 1944, accrued to Shivnarayan Surajmal Nemani or to the assessee ? \""}}, {"text": "Shivnarayan Surajmal Nemani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4249, "end_char": 4276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,20>433 On a difference of opinion having arisen between the departmental taxing authorities and the Tribunal the following question was referred to the High Court for decision :-\n\n\" Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the managing agency commission of 3!% on sales made by the New Swadeshi Mills of Ahmedabad Ltd., between April l, 1944, and December 31, 1944, accrued to Shivnarayan Surajmal Nemani or to the assessee ? \"", "canonical_name": "Shivnarayan Surajmal Nomani"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4348, "end_char": 4361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court following the decision of the Supreme Court in E. D. Sassoon and Company Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City, held that the appellant company was liable to pay tax on the whole of the commission as the commission accrued due on March 31, 1945, and they became entitled to receive it at the end of the year; it also held that no debt was created in favour of the agents when the goods were sold."}}, {"text": "Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4399, "end_char": 4433, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "R. J. Kolah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5813, "end_char": 5824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. J. Kolah, Dwarkadas, S. N. Andley, J.B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Dwarkadas", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5826, "end_char": 5835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. J. Kolah, Dwarkadas, S. N. Andley, J.B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "S. N. Andley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5837, "end_char": 5849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. J. Kolah, Dwarkadas, S. N. Andley, J.B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "J.B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5851, "end_char": 5866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. J. Kolah, Dwarkadas, S. N. Andley, J.B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5868, "end_char": 5882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. J. Kolah, Dwarkadas, S. N. Andley, J.B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "P. L. Vohra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5887, "end_char": 5898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. J. Kolah, Dwarkadas, S. N. Andley, J.B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5921, "end_char": 5943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and D. Gupta, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "D. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5948, "end_char": 5956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and D. Gupta, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "s. K. D•\" J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6036, "end_char": 6048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by s. K. D•\" J.\n\nS. K. DAS, J.-This is an appeal on a certificate granted by the High Court of Bombay, under s. 66A (2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, l922."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6114, "end_char": 6134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by s. K. D•\" J.\n\nS. K. DAS, J.-This is an appeal on a certificate granted by the High Court of Bombay, under s. 66A (2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, l922."}}, {"text": "s. 66A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6142, "end_char": 6148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6167, "end_char": 6181, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Cotton Agents Limited, Bombay", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6220, "end_char": 6249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Cotton Agents Limited, Bombay, are a limited liability company registered under the Indian Companies Act and will be called the assessee Company in this judgment.", "canonical_name": "Cotton Agents Limited, Bombay"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6311, "end_char": 6324, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "New Swadeshi Mills of Ahmedabad, Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6429, "end_char": 6466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It held a substantial number of shares of the New Swadeshi Mills of Ahmedabad, Ltd. (hereinafter called the Mills Company)."}}, {"text": "Shivnarayan Surajmal Nemani", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6516, "end_char": 6543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Messrs.\n\nShivnarayan Surajmal Nemani (called the Nemani group) also held a block of shares of the Mills Company along with its managing agency.", "canonical_name": "Shivnarayan Surajmal Nomani"}}, {"text": "Govindram Seksaria", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6918, "end_char": 6936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sometime in 1944 so.me differences arose between the assessee Company and the Nemani group; these differences were referred to one Govindram Seksaria, who decided that the Nemani group should sell its block of shares to the assessee Compa.ny e, t an agreed price."}}, {"text": "January 4, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7373, "end_char": 7388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1s arrangemen was v. approved by the share-holders of the Mills Company aommissiomr of by a resolution dated January 4, 1945, and came into Income-ta~ effect immediately."}}, {"text": "April 1, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7705, "end_char": 7718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The managing agency commission from April 1, 1944, to December 31, 1944, amounted to Rs."}}, {"text": "January 1, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7776, "end_char": 7791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,20,433 and from January 1, 1945, to March 31, 1945, to Rs."}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9633, "end_char": 9636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das J. case the managing agency commission at 3t% on sales made by the New Swadeshi Mills of Ahmed a bad Ltd., between April I, 1944, and December 31, 1944, accrued to Shivnarayan Surajmal Nemani, or to the assessee ? ''"}}, {"text": "New Swadeshi Mills of Ahmed", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9704, "end_char": 9731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das J. case the managing agency commission at 3t% on sales made by the New Swadeshi Mills of Ahmed a bad Ltd., between April I, 1944, and December 31, 1944, accrued to Shivnarayan Surajmal Nemani, or to the assessee ? ''"}}, {"text": "Sassoon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10175, "end_char": 10182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With reference to the argument of learned counsel for the assessee Company that the commission was payable on the sale proceeds and not on the profits as in Sassoon's case('), it said:\n\n\"We would have given serious thought to this aspect of the matter but for the view we take that the decision of the Supreme Court with regard to the question of creation of the debt and with regard to the serving by the managing agents for a term of one year being a condition precedent for their being entitled to receive payment, is indistinguishable on the facts of this case."}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10712, "end_char": 10720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1955] 1 S.C.R. 313", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 11420, "end_char": 11439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "March 15, 1925", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11969, "end_char": 11983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s. K. Das.!- The answer to the question really depends on a construction of the relevant terms of the managing agency agreement dated March 15, 1925, entered into between the Mills Company and the Nemani group."}}, {"text": "Cotton Agents Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13575, "end_char": 13593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on the gross proceeds of .all sales of the yarn, cloth, waste and other articles manufactured\n\nCotton Agents Ltd.\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncome-ta%\n\ns. K.t'Das J.\n\nby the Company earned in any year or other period for which the accounts of the Company are made up and laid before the General Meeting.\""}}, {"text": "K.t'Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13627, "end_char": 13634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on the gross proceeds of .all sales of the yarn, cloth, waste and other articles manufactured\n\nCotton Agents Ltd.\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncome-ta%\n\ns. K.t'Das J.\n\nby the Company earned in any year or other period for which the accounts of the Company are made up and laid before the General Meeting.\""}}, {"text": "K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16088, "end_char": 16094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Significantly enough, the clause consists of two parts; one part says when the coms, K. Das J; mission becomes due and the other says when it is to be payable and paid.", "canonical_name": "K. Das"}}, {"text": "K Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20531, "end_char": 20536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned s. K Das J. counsel for the appellant relied on Turner Morrison & Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal(1) for his contention that in the sale proceeds of each\n\ntransaction of sale were embedded the income, profits' or gains to be earned by the managing agents and, therefore, the accrual took place on each transaction, ofsale.", "canonical_name": "K. Das"}}, {"text": "s. 4(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21067, "end_char": 21077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21085, "end_char": 21099, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Fry", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21197, "end_char": 21200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned counsel for the respondent has pointed out to us that the observations of Lord Justice Fry in Colquhoun v. Brooks (2) were not very accurately reproduced in Rogers Pyatt Shellac and Co. v. Secretary of State for India (3)."}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_820_841_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "May 3.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960]\n\nTHE EAST AND WEST STEAMSHIP COMP ANY,\n\nGEORGE TOWN, MADRAS\n\nS. K. RAMALINGAM CHETTIAR. (And connected appeal) ( P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, IC N. W ANCHOO and K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)\n\nCarrier of goods by sea-Loss or damage, meanmg of-Liability of carrier-Delivery of goods-Time for-The Indian Carriage of Goods Act, r925 (XXVI of r925), Schedule, Art III, para: 6, cl. 3.\n\nThe appellant in the first case (C. A. No. 88/56) and the respondents in the other two cases (C. As. Nos. gr & 92 of 1958) were shipping companies carrying goods by sea from one port to another. They carried goods of the opposite parties by ships to their places of destination but failed to deliver the whole of the goods consigned. In the suits brought by the owners of the goods for compensation the main question related to the interpretatibn of the 3rd clause of para. 6 of Art. III in the Schedule to the Indian Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1925 (XXVI of 1925) which runs thus:-\n\n\"In any event the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought within one year after the delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered \".\n\nIn the first case the Madras High Court expressed the opinion that the above clause did not provide for the extinction of the consignor's right to claim compensation but merely prescribed a rule of limitation. It also held that the term in the bill of Jading requiring that the claim for compensation should be made within one month from the date of arrival of the vessel was repugnant to Rule 8 to Art. III of the Schedule and was void. The Bombay High Court held that Art. III(6) dealt with all cases of loss or damage whether the loss or damage was caused by the deterioration of the goods or by their non-.delivery and further that the words \" the loss or damage \" included any loss or damage caused to the consignee in respect of his claim for compensation from the shipping company. It also held that the goods should have been delivered as soon as they were landed.\n\nOn appeal by special leave: Held, that the word \"loss\" in cl. 3, para. 6 of Art. III in the schedule to the Indian Carriage of Goods Act, 1925, meant and included any loss caused to a shipper or consignee by reason of the inability of the ship or the carrier to deliver part or whole of the goods, to whatever reason such failure might be due.\n\nSpens and another v. The Union Marine Insurance Co. Ltd., 3 Common Pleas 427, .\\iistinguished.\n\n• --\n\nSandeman & Sons v. Tyzack and Brllnfoot Steamship Co. Ltd., [1913] A. C. 680, referred to.\n\nThe words \"discharged from liability\" were intended to mean and did mean that the liability had totally disappeared and not only that the remedy as regards the liability had disappeared.\n\nThe date when the goods should have been delivered for the purpose of cl. 3, para. 6 of Art. III of the Act was the date when the ship by which the gooas were carried left the port of delivery.\n\nThe stipulation in the bill of lading requiring claim for compensation being made within one month from the date of arrival of the ship was null and void.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 88 of 1956.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated February 11, 1954, of the Madras High Court in Civil Revision Petition No. 921 of 1952, arising out of the judgment and decree dated November 2, 1951, of the Court of Small Causes, Madras, in Suit No. 4076 of 1950 (N. T. A. No. 113 of 1951).\n\nWith Civil Appeals Nos. 91 and 92 of 1958.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and decree dated March 10, 1955, of the Bombay High\n\nCourt in Appeals Nos. 66/X and 67/X of 1954, arising out of the judgment and decree dated February 15, 1954, of the said High Court in Suits Nos. 1693 of 1949 and 105 of 1950, respectively.\n\nB. Sen, S. N. Mukherjee and B. N. Ghosh, for the appellant (in C. A. No. 88 of 1956).\n\nC.R. Pattabhiraman and Ganapathy Iyer, for respondent (in C. A. No. 88 of 1956).\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, S. N.\n\nAndley, J.B. Dadachanji and Rameshwar Nath; for the appellants (In C. As. Nos. 91 and 92 of 1958).\n\nGopalakrishnan, for the respondent (In C. A.\n\nNo. 91/58).\n\nA. V. Viswanatha Sastri and G. Gopalakrishnan, for the respondent (In C. A. No. 92 of 58).\n\n1960. May 3. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nEa•I WeS't\n\nSeamship Co.\n\nRamglin gam\n\nChtt1a•\n\nz960\n\nEast & West Steamship Co. v.\n\nRamalingam\n\nChettiar\n\nDas Gupta].\n\n. Das Gl'PTA, J.-These three appeals-Civil Appeal No. 88of1956, Civ; J Appeal No. 91of1958 and Civil Appeal No. 92of1958, of which one is from a decision of the High Court of Madras and the other two from decisions of the High Court of Bombay raise sori1e common questions of general importance to carriers of goods by sea and of shippers as regards tbe 3rd clause of paragraph 6 of Art. III in the Schedule of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (hereinafter called \"the Act\"). T.his clause provides that \"in any event the carrier and the shipper shall be discharged from all liability in respect of loss or damage unless a suit is brought within one year after the delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered\". In all the three appeals before us the carriers' main defence to claims of compensation by the owners of the goods was based on this clause and the courts had to consider whether this defence was available to the carrier.\n\nThe appeal from the Madras High Court was in respect of a consignment of 90 bundles of brass circles which were consigned to the respondent at Madras from Bombay to Madras per S. S. Fakira, a Steamer belonging to the East and West Steamship Co. The Ship arrived in Madras on August 1, 1948, and 78 out of the 90 bundles were delivered on August 25, 1948, to the appellant through his clearing agent, the second respondent. Five more bundles were delivered on September 25, 1948.\n\nAfter some correspondence between the Shipping Company and the first respondent regarding the seven bundles not delivered the appellant company repudiated finally the respondent's claim on March 24, 1950. The first respondent brought the present suit on June 27, 1950, claiming Rs. 1,023-5-0 as compensation-Rs. 974-13-0 for the value of the undelivered goods and Rs. 48-8-0 as the profit of which he had been deprived. The claim for this amount of profit was given up at the Trial. The appellant's defence was: (1) that the suit having been filed beyond the period prescribed in cl. 6 of Art. 3 of the Act ;\n\n(2) that the suit was also barred as no claim had been made within the period of one month from the date of\n\n...\n\narrival of the vessel as stipulated in the bill of lading and (3) that the goods were insufficiently packed and therefore carrier was not liable for the alleged loss.\n\nThe learned Judge of the Small Causes Court who tried the suit as also the Judge who heard the matter on a new trial application held that the plaintiff's right to claim compensation was extinguished before the date of the suit.\n\nAs regards the second defence based on the stipulation in the bill of lading that notice has to be given within one month the Trial Court held that this term in the bill of lading was void and of no effect. The learned Judges who heard the new trial application disagreed with this and accepted the defence on this point also. In the result they dismissed the new trial application and confirmed the order of dismissal made by the learned Trial , Judge. Against this order the High Court of Madras was moved by the plaintiffs under s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Judge held that the term in the bill of lading as regards one month's notice was repugnant to Rule 8 to Art. III of the Schedule to the Act and was void. He was also of opinion that the date.of the final repudiation of liability by the Shipping Company as regards the short delivery or non-delivery is the date \"when the goods should have been delivered\" within the meaning of the 3rd clause of the 6th paragraph of Art. III and so whether this clause provided for extinction of a right or only prescribed a rule oflimitation, the defence based on this clause of the Act could not succeed.\n\nHe expressed his own opinion, however, that this clause did not provide for extinction of the right but merely prescribed a rule of limitation. In view of his conclusions he set aside the decision of the lower courts and remanded the suit for further disposal to the trial court. After remand the trial court on May 4, 1954, decreed the suit for a sum of Rs. 974-13-0.\n\nAgainst that decree no steps were taken by the Shipping Company. It was after that date that the Shipping Company applied for and obtained from this Court special leave to appeal on October 11, 1954. It has to be noticed that as the decree made in the suit has become final and unassailable, this appeal is really vf\n\nEast & West Steamship Co.\n\n\\(, Ramalingam Chettiar\n\nDas Gupta].:\n\nl?ast & West Steamship Co.\n\nRamalingam\n\nChettiar\n\nDas Gupta].\n\nacademic interest. In view however of the fact that the main question of law raised, viz., as regards the scope and interpretation of the 3rd Clause of para. 6 of Art. III of the Schedule to the Act is being raised before us in the other two appeals from the Bombay High Court also we have heard the counsel for both sides in this appeal in full.\n\nOf the two appeals from Bombay-the one Civil Appeal No. 92 of 1958 is in respect of some consignments at Bombay by S. S. Tweedsmuir Park, S. S.\n\nFinnamore Hill and S. S. Ismalia-all vessels belonging to the first defendant, the British India Steam Navigation Company Ltd.\n\nS. S. Tweedsmuir and S. S. Finnamore Hill arrived in the port of Bombay on or about September 10, 1948, and steamer Ismalia arrived in Bombay on September 6, 1948. The vessels discharged their cargoes alongside on to the docks belonging to the Trustees of the Port of Bombay. The plaintiffs took delivery of the goods packed in bags which bore their distinctive and identifying marks, but were unable to obtain delivery of 164 bags out of the consignment sent by Ismalia, 869 bags out of the consignment sent by Finnamore and 1,657 bags out of the consignment sent by Tweedsmuir Park. The suit was brought on a claim of Rs. 1,10,323·8-0 as compensation for the bags not delivered. The Trustees of the Port of Bombay were also made defendants. We are no longer concerned with them as after the suit was dismissed by the Trial Judge against both the defendants the plaintiffs did not prefer any appeal against the order of dismissal as against the Trustees.\n\nThe main defence of the first defendant, the Shipping Company, was that the company was discharged from all liability in , respect of the loss or damage alleged in the plaint by reason of the provisions of the Act inasmuch as the suit had not been brought within one year of the date ''when the goods should have been delivered\". Another defence was that the company was not liable as no notice within 3 days after discharge and before goods were removed from the quay or ship's side or place of discharge had been given and so in view of Clause 20 of the bill of lading the company w WeS't\n\nSeamship Co.\n\nRamglin gam\n\nChtt1a•\n\nz960\n\nEast & West Steamship Co. v.\n\nRamalingam\n\nChettiar\n\nDas Gupta].", "canonical_name": "Ramalingam\n\nChettiar\n\nDas Gupta"}}, {"text": "Das Gl'PTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4524, "end_char": 4534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das Gl'PTA, J.-These three appeals-Civil Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "Das Gl'PTA"}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4683, "end_char": 4703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "92of1958, of which one is from a decision of the High Court of Madras and the other two from decisions of the High Court of Bombay raise sori1e common questions of general importance to carriers of goods by sea and of shippers as regards tbe 3rd clause of paragraph 6 of Art."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4744, "end_char": 4764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "92of1958, of which one is from a decision of the High Court of Madras and the other two from decisions of the High Court of Bombay raise sori1e common questions of general importance to carriers of goods by sea and of shippers as regards tbe 3rd clause of paragraph 6 of Art."}}, {"text": "III in the Schedule of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4910, "end_char": 4965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5507, "end_char": 5513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal from the Madras High Court was in respect of a consignment of 90 bundles of brass circles which were consigned to the respondent at Madras from Bombay to Madras per S. S. Fakira, a Steamer belonging to the East and West Steamship Co. The Ship arrived in Madras on August 1, 1948, and 78 out of the 90 bundles were delivered on August 25, 1948, to the appellant through his clearing agent, the second respondent."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5642, "end_char": 5648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal from the Madras High Court was in respect of a consignment of 90 bundles of brass circles which were consigned to the respondent at Madras from Bombay to Madras per S. S. Fakira, a Steamer belonging to the East and West Steamship Co. The Ship arrived in Madras on August 1, 1948, and 78 out of the 90 bundles were delivered on August 25, 1948, to the appellant through his clearing agent, the second respondent."}}, {"text": "S. S. Fakira", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5663, "end_char": 5675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal from the Madras High Court was in respect of a consignment of 90 bundles of brass circles which were consigned to the respondent at Madras from Bombay to Madras per S. S. Fakira, a Steamer belonging to the East and West Steamship Co. The Ship arrived in Madras on August 1, 1948, and 78 out of the 90 bundles were delivered on August 25, 1948, to the appellant through his clearing agent, the second respondent."}}, {"text": "East and West Steamship Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5704, "end_char": 5731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal from the Madras High Court was in respect of a consignment of 90 bundles of brass circles which were consigned to the respondent at Madras from Bombay to Madras per S. S. Fakira, a Steamer belonging to the East and West Steamship Co. The Ship arrived in Madras on August 1, 1948, and 78 out of the 90 bundles were delivered on August 25, 1948, to the appellant through his clearing agent, the second respondent."}}, {"text": "August 1, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5762, "end_char": 5776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal from the Madras High Court was in respect of a consignment of 90 bundles of brass circles which were consigned to the respondent at Madras from Bombay to Madras per S. S. Fakira, a Steamer belonging to the East and West Steamship Co. The Ship arrived in Madras on August 1, 1948, and 78 out of the 90 bundles were delivered on August 25, 1948, to the appellant through his clearing agent, the second respondent."}}, {"text": "August 25, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5825, "end_char": 5840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal from the Madras High Court was in respect of a consignment of 90 bundles of brass circles which were consigned to the respondent at Madras from Bombay to Madras per S. S. Fakira, a Steamer belonging to the East and West Steamship Co. The Ship arrived in Madras on August 1, 1948, and 78 out of the 90 bundles were delivered on August 25, 1948, to the appellant through his clearing agent, the second respondent."}}, {"text": "September 25, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5946, "end_char": 5964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Five more bundles were delivered on September 25, 1948."}}, {"text": "March 24, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6156, "end_char": 6170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After some correspondence between the Shipping Company and the first respondent regarding the seven bundles not delivered the appellant company repudiated finally the respondent's claim on March 24, 1950."}}, {"text": "June 27, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6221, "end_char": 6234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first respondent brought the present suit on June 27, 1950, claiming Rs."}}, {"text": "cl. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6547, "end_char": 6552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6556, "end_char": 6562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7621, "end_char": 7627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7631, "end_char": 7658, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "III of the Schedule to the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7781, "end_char": 7811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "May 4, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8575, "end_char": 8586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After remand the trial court on May 4, 1954, decreed the suit for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "October 11, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8815, "end_char": 8831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was after that date that the Shipping Company applied for and obtained from this Court special leave to appeal on October 11, 1954."}}, {"text": "III of the Schedule to the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9248, "end_char": 9278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. S. Tweedsmuir", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9543, "end_char": 9559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "92 of 1958 is in respect of some consignments at Bombay by S. S. Tweedsmuir Park, S. S.\n\nFinnamore Hill and S. S. Ismalia-all vessels belonging to the first defendant, the British India Steam Navigation Company Ltd.\n\nS. S. Tweedsmuir and S. S. Finnamore Hill arrived in the port of Bombay on or about September 10, 1948, and steamer Ismalia arrived in Bombay on September 6, 1948."}}, {"text": "S. S.\n\nFinnamore Hill", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9566, "end_char": 9587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "92 of 1958 is in respect of some consignments at Bombay by S. S. Tweedsmuir Park, S. S.\n\nFinnamore Hill and S. S. Ismalia-all vessels belonging to the first defendant, the British India Steam Navigation Company Ltd.\n\nS. S. Tweedsmuir and S. S. Finnamore Hill arrived in the port of Bombay on or about September 10, 1948, and steamer Ismalia arrived in Bombay on September 6, 1948.", "canonical_name": "S. S.\n\nFinnamore Hill"}}, {"text": "S. S. Ismalia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9592, "end_char": 9605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "92 of 1958 is in respect of some consignments at Bombay by S. S. Tweedsmuir Park, S. S.\n\nFinnamore Hill and S. S. Ismalia-all vessels belonging to the first defendant, the British India Steam Navigation Company Ltd.\n\nS. S. Tweedsmuir and S. S. Finnamore Hill arrived in the port of Bombay on or about September 10, 1948, and steamer Ismalia arrived in Bombay on September 6, 1948."}}, {"text": "S. S. Finnamore Hill", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9722, "end_char": 9742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "92 of 1958 is in respect of some consignments at Bombay by S. S. Tweedsmuir Park, S. S.\n\nFinnamore Hill and S. S. Ismalia-all vessels belonging to the first defendant, the British India Steam Navigation Company Ltd.\n\nS. S. Tweedsmuir and S. S. Finnamore Hill arrived in the port of Bombay on or about September 10, 1948, and steamer Ismalia arrived in Bombay on September 6, 1948.", "canonical_name": "S. S.\n\nFinnamore Hill"}}, {"text": "September 6, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9846, "end_char": 9863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "92 of 1958 is in respect of some consignments at Bombay by S. S. Tweedsmuir Park, S. S.\n\nFinnamore Hill and S. S. Ismalia-all vessels belonging to the first defendant, the British India Steam Navigation Company Ltd.\n\nS. S. Tweedsmuir and S. S. Finnamore Hill arrived in the port of Bombay on or about September 10, 1948, and steamer Ismalia arrived in Bombay on September 6, 1948."}}, {"text": "Finnamore", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10213, "end_char": 10222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiffs took delivery of the goods packed in bags which bore their distinctive and identifying marks, but were unable to obtain delivery of 164 bags out of the consignment sent by Ismalia, 869 bags out of the consignment sent by Finnamore and 1,657 bags out of the consignment sent by Tweedsmuir Park."}}, {"text": "Tweedsmuir Park", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10269, "end_char": 10284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiffs took delivery of the goods packed in bags which bore their distinctive and identifying marks, but were unable to obtain delivery of 164 bags out of the consignment sent by Ismalia, 869 bags out of the consignment sent by Finnamore and 1,657 bags out of the consignment sent by Tweedsmuir Park."}}, {"text": "Clause 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11197, "end_char": 11206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.S. Finnamore Hill", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11334, "end_char": 11353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trial judge held that\n\n,.._;- -\n\nin view of the fact that S.S. Finnamore Hill completed discharging her cargo on 19th September, 1948, S.S.\n\nIsmalia completed discharging her cargo on 25th September, 1948, and S.S. Tweedsmuir Park completed discharging her cargo on 2.7th September, 1948, the suit was clearly not brought \" within one year\" from the date\" when the goods should have been delivered\"."}}, {"text": "19th September, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11389, "end_char": 11409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trial judge held that\n\n,.._;- -\n\nin view of the fact that S.S. Finnamore Hill completed discharging her cargo on 19th September, 1948, S.S.\n\nIsmalia completed discharging her cargo on 25th September, 1948, and S.S. Tweedsmuir Park completed discharging her cargo on 2.7th September, 1948, the suit was clearly not brought \" within one year\" from the date\" when the goods should have been delivered\"."}}, {"text": "S.S.\n\nIsmalia", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11411, "end_char": 11424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trial judge held that\n\n,.._;- -\n\nin view of the fact that S.S. Finnamore Hill completed discharging her cargo on 19th September, 1948, S.S.\n\nIsmalia completed discharging her cargo on 25th September, 1948, and S.S. Tweedsmuir Park completed discharging her cargo on 2.7th September, 1948, the suit was clearly not brought \" within one year\" from the date\" when the goods should have been delivered\"."}}, {"text": "25th September, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11460, "end_char": 11480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trial judge held that\n\n,.._;- -\n\nin view of the fact that S.S. Finnamore Hill completed discharging her cargo on 19th September, 1948, S.S.\n\nIsmalia completed discharging her cargo on 25th September, 1948, and S.S. Tweedsmuir Park completed discharging her cargo on 2.7th September, 1948, the suit was clearly not brought \" within one year\" from the date\" when the goods should have been delivered\"."}}, {"text": "S.S. Tweedsmuir Park", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11486, "end_char": 11506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trial judge held that\n\n,.._;- -\n\nin view of the fact that S.S. Finnamore Hill completed discharging her cargo on 19th September, 1948, S.S.\n\nIsmalia completed discharging her cargo on 25th September, 1948, and S.S. Tweedsmuir Park completed discharging her cargo on 2.7th September, 1948, the suit was clearly not brought \" within one year\" from the date\" when the goods should have been delivered\"."}}, {"text": "2.7th September, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11542, "end_char": 11563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The trial judge held that\n\n,.._;- -\n\nin view of the fact that S.S. Finnamore Hill completed discharging her cargo on 19th September, 1948, S.S.\n\nIsmalia completed discharging her cargo on 25th September, 1948, and S.S. Tweedsmuir Park completed discharging her cargo on 2.7th September, 1948, the suit was clearly not brought \" within one year\" from the date\" when the goods should have been delivered\"."}}, {"text": "September 19, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12935, "end_char": 12953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned judges also held that so far as the shipping company was concerned the delivery of goods is given or ought to be given as .soon as the goods are landed and therefore in this case the goods with regard to the three ships having been cleared on September 19, 1948, September 25, 1948, and September 27, 1948, respectively."}}, {"text": "September 27, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12979, "end_char": 12997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned judges also held that so far as the shipping company was concerned the delivery of goods is given or ought to be given as .soon as the goods are landed and therefore in this case the goods with regard to the three ships having been cleared on September 19, 1948, September 25, 1948, and September 27, 1948, respectively."}}, {"text": "Cochin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13468, "end_char": 13474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "91 of 1958 is in respect of a consignment of 6,000 bags of cocoanut from Cochin and 4,733 bags of copra and cocoa.nuts from Badagara\n\nIQ60\n\nEast & West Steamship Co. v.\n\nRamalintJam\n\nChettiar\n\nDas Gupta]."}}, {"text": "Badagara", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13519, "end_char": 13527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "91 of 1958 is in respect of a consignment of 6,000 bags of cocoanut from Cochin and 4,733 bags of copra and cocoa.nuts from Badagara\n\nIQ60\n\nEast & West Steamship Co. v.\n\nRamalintJam\n\nChettiar\n\nDas Gupta]."}}, {"text": "East & West Steamship Co. v.\n\nRamalintJam\n\nChettiar\n\nDas Gupta]", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13535, "end_char": 13598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "91 of 1958 is in respect of a consignment of 6,000 bags of cocoanut from Cochin and 4,733 bags of copra and cocoa.nuts from Badagara\n\nIQ60\n\nEast & West Steamship Co. v.\n\nRamalintJam\n\nChettiar\n\nDas Gupta].", "canonical_name": "East & West Steamship Co. v.\n\nRamalintJam\n\nChettiar\n\nDas Gupta]"}}, {"text": "December 5, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14066, "end_char": 14082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They brought the suit on December 5, 1949, against the shipping company, the\n\nBharat Lines Ltd., and also against the Trustees of the Port of Bombay on a claim of Rs."}}, {"text": "Bharat Lines Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14119, "end_char": 14136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They brought the suit on December 5, 1949, against the shipping company, the\n\nBharat Lines Ltd., and also against the Trustees of the Port of Bombay on a claim of Rs."}}, {"text": "Indian Carriage of Goods by Sea Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14732, "end_char": 14767, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "cl. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15353, "end_char": 15358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Brussels", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17829, "end_char": 17837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As has been mentioned in the preamable to the Act it was passed to give effect to the recommendation of the International Conference of Maritime Law at Brussels in October, 1922."}}, {"text": "Scrutton", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17982, "end_char": 17990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The circumstances which led to the holding of the conference and were responsible for the recommendations have been stated by Scrutton on Charter Parties, 15th Edition, at p. 439, in these words:- •\n\nEast & West Steamship Co. v.\n\nRamalingam Chettiar\n\nDas Gupta]."}}, {"text": "American Harter Act or the Australian", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18476, "end_char": 18513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Canadian Water Carriage of Goods Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18555, "end_char": 18597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Governments the adoption of the Hague Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18885, "end_char": 18928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "U. K.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19138, "end_char": 19143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is important to mention that apart from our own country, U. K., Australia, Canada, Ceylon, Newfoundland, New Zealand as well as Belgium, France and U. S. A. have given statutory effect-wholly or partially to the Hague l{ules."}}, {"text": "Australia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19145, "end_char": 19154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is important to mention that apart from our own country, U. K., Australia, Canada, Ceylon, Newfoundland, New Zealand as well as Belgium, France and U. S. A. have given statutory effect-wholly or partially to the Hague l{ules."}}, {"text": "Canada", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19156, "end_char": 19162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is important to mention that apart from our own country, U. K., Australia, Canada, Ceylon, Newfoundland, New Zealand as well as Belgium, France and U. S. A. have given statutory effect-wholly or partially to the Hague l{ules."}}, {"text": "Newfoundland", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19172, "end_char": 19184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is important to mention that apart from our own country, U. K., Australia, Canada, Ceylon, Newfoundland, New Zealand as well as Belgium, France and U. S. A. have given statutory effect-wholly or partially to the Hague l{ules."}}, {"text": "New Zealand", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19186, "end_char": 19197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is important to mention that apart from our own country, U. K., Australia, Canada, Ceylon, Newfoundland, New Zealand as well as Belgium, France and U. S. A. have given statutory effect-wholly or partially to the Hague l{ules."}}, {"text": "Belgium", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19209, "end_char": 19216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is important to mention that apart from our own country, U. K., Australia, Canada, Ceylon, Newfoundland, New Zealand as well as Belgium, France and U. S. A. have given statutory effect-wholly or partially to the Hague l{ules."}}, {"text": "France", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19218, "end_char": 19224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is important to mention that apart from our own country, U. K., Australia, Canada, Ceylon, Newfoundland, New Zealand as well as Belgium, France and U. S. A. have given statutory effect-wholly or partially to the Hague l{ules."}}, {"text": "U. S. A.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19229, "end_char": 19237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is important to mention that apart from our own country, U. K., Australia, Canada, Ceylon, Newfoundland, New Zealand as well as Belgium, France and U. S. A. have given statutory effect-wholly or partially to the Hague l{ules."}}, {"text": "Atkin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19700, "end_char": 19705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is helpful to remember in this connection the caution uttered by Lord Atkin in Stag Line Ltd. v. < Foscold (1) about the importance of giving words in these rules their plain meaning, and not to colour one's interpretation by considering whether a meaning otherwise plain should be avoided if it alters the previous law."}}, {"text": "United Kingdom", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20527, "end_char": 20541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It will be remembered that the Act only applies to contracts of carriage of goods outwards from ports of the United Kingdom; and the rules will often have to be interpreted in the courts of the foreign consignees."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21024, "end_char": 21029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Our own Act applies to contracts of carriage of goods outwards from the ports of India."}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21032, "end_char": 21041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The House of Lords was in that case interpreting certain provisions of the English Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924", "statute": "The House of Lords was in that case interpreting certain provisions of the English Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924"}}, {"text": "Schedule 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21079, "end_char": 21089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The House of Lords was in that case interpreting certain provisions of the English Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924", "statute": "The House of Lords was in that case interpreting certain provisions of the English Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924"}}, {"text": "Indian", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21367, "end_char": 21373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though in the appeals before us we are concerned with only contracts of carriage of goods from -0ne Indian port to another Indian port, it is necessary to remember that these rules will often have to be interpreted in the courts of the foreign consignees."}}, {"text": "Das Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27004, "end_char": 27013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "III the 6th paragraph seeks to provide an immunity to the carrier \"from all liability in respect of loss or damage \" after a certain time,· it is reasonable to think that it is loss or damage to the owner of the goods, be he shipper or the consignee, which is also meant, in addition to the \" loss of the goods \", When\n\nEast & West Steamship Co. v.\n\nRamalingain\n\nChettiar\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nEast & West Steamship Co. v.\n\nRamalingam\n\nChettiaf'\n\nDas Gupta j.\n\nthe goods themselves are lost, e.g., by being jettisoned, or by being destroyed by fire or by theft, there will be failure to discharge the goods in full and loss to the owner of the goods will occur.", "canonical_name": "Das Gl'PTA"}}, {"text": "East & West Steamship Co. v.\n\nRamalingam Ghettiar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31527, "end_char": 31576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "East & West Steamship Co. v.\n\nRamalingam Ghettiar\n\nDas Gupta .f.", "canonical_name": "East & West Steamship Co. v.\n\nRamalintJam\n\nChettiar\n\nDas Gupta]"}}, {"text": "East & West Steamship Co. v.\n\nRamalingam", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31600, "end_char": 31640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ":c960\n\nEast & West Steamship Co. v.\n\nRamalingam\n\nChettiar\n\nDas Gupta].", "canonical_name": "East & West Steamship Co. v.\n\nRamalintJam\n\nChettiar\n\nDas Gupta]"}}, {"text": "Moulton", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32929, "end_char": 32936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In cases of such mixture of cargo of different owners it was pointed out by Lord Moulton in Sandeman & Sons v. Tyzack and Branfoot Steamship Go."}}, {"text": "Bombay High°Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 35014, "end_char": 35031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the next question whether this clause prescribes only a rule of limitation or provides for the e, xtinction of a right to compensation, it will be observed that the Bombay High°Court has not discussed it at all, apparently because on the facts of the case before it,\n\nitwould have mattered little whether the provision was one of limitation or of extinction of right."}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35483, "end_char": 35490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35498, "end_char": 35512, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38268, "end_char": 38275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38283, "end_char": 38297, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38522, "end_char": 38529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38537, "end_char": 38551, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38821, "end_char": 38828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38836, "end_char": 38850, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39053, "end_char": 39060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ramalingam", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 40730, "end_char": 40740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nRamalingam\n\nChettia1\n\nDas Gupta ].", "canonical_name": "Ramalingam\n\nChettiar\n\nDas Gupta"}}, {"text": "Ramalingam Chettiar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 45247, "end_char": 45266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The arrival at port of the vessel by which the goods have been contracted to be carried being known and the departure being equally an ascertainable thing and the duty of the carrier being necessarily to complete the delivery before leaving the port, the date , by which the delivery should have been made is\n\nEast(;,, West Steamship Co.\n\nv. Ramalingam Chettiar\n\nDas Gupta ].", "canonical_name": "Ramalingam\n\nChettiar\n\nDas Gupta"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45643, "end_char": 45650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45658, "end_char": 45672, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_842_857_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "1\\.fay 4.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nLUHAR AMRIT LAL NAGJI v.\n\n. [1960]\n\nDOSHI J A YANTILAL JETHALAL AND OTHERS.\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. W ANCHOO and K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.) Hindu Law-Father's anticedent debt-Pious obligation of sons to pay-Onus.\n\nA Hindu father, speculating in gold and silver, lost heavily and sought to recoup by borrowing on a mortgage. The mortgagee obtained a decree and sought to execute it by sale of the mortgaged property. The sons and the wife sued for a declaration that the decree was not binding since the debt though antecedent was immoral (avyavaharik). The trial court found in their favour and on appeal the District Judge affirmed its decision. On second appeal the High Court held that it was for the plaintiffs to prove not merely that the antecedent debt was immoral but also that the mortgagee had notice of the said character of the debt and since they had led no evidence to discharge that onus, they were not entitled to a decree. The plaintiffs came up on appeal by special leave : Held, that the High Court took the correct view of the law and the appeal must fail. • Any attempt to test the correctness of the principles laid down by the Privy Council in the case of Suraj Bunsi Koer, which have held the field for more than three quarters of a century, purely in the light of ancient Sanskrit texts would now not merely be hit by the principle of stare decisis, which must inevitably come into operation, bnt would also be inexpedient and futile.\n\nSuraj Bunsi Koer v. Sheo Proshad Singh, (r879) L.R. 6 I.A. 88 and Brij Narain v. M angla Prasad (r923) L.R. SI I.A. r29, applied.\n\nThe principles laid down in those two cases make no distinction between an alienation made for the payment of the father's antecedent debt and an alienation made in execution of a decree passed against him and in both cases the sons must j>rove not only the immoral character of the antecedent debt but also the know ledge of the alienee.\n\nCase-law considered.\n\nCrVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 121 of 1956.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 29, 1953, of the former Saurashtra High Court in Civil Second Appeal No. 82 of 1952, arising out of the judgment and decree dated April 29, 1952, of the District Judge, Rajkot, in Civil Appeal No. 4 of 1952. ·\n\nW. S. Barlingay and A.G. Ratnaparkhi, for the 1960\n\nappellant. · Luhar A111ritlal M. L. Jain, for respondent No. 1.\n\nNag; i\n\n1960. May 4. The Judgment of the Court was v. delivered by Doshi ]ayantilal j ethalal GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal by special _ leave raises an interesting q 11 uestion of H 1 . ind~ Law. dif Gajendragadkar J., a Hindu son wants to cha enge an a ienatwn ma e by his father to pay his antecedent debt is it necessary for him to prove not only that the said antecedent debt was immoral but also that the alienee had notice of the immoral character of the said debt ? The High Court has held that the son must prove both the immoral character of the debt and notice of it to the alienee; the correctness of that view is challenged before us by the appellants in the present appeal.\n\nThe appellants are two brothers, Amritlal and Mohanlal Nagji, and their mother, Bai Jakal Arjan.\n\nThe three appellants and respondent 2, Nagji Govind, the father of appellants 1 and 2 and the husband of appellant 3, constitute an undivided Hindu family.\n\nRepondent 2 executed a mortgage deed in favour of respondent 1, Jayantilal Doshi, in respect of the joint. famil:y property for Rs. 2,000.\n\nThis document was executed on February 5, 1946. In 1950, respondent 1 sued respondent 2 on his mortgage, obtained a decree for sale and filed an application for execution' for sale of the mortgaged property. Sale was accordingly ordered to be held. At that stage the appellants filed the present suit on April 30, 1951, and claimed a. declaration that the decree passed in the mortgage suit (Civil Suit No. 589 of 1949) in favour of respondent 1 and against respondent 2 was not. binding in respect of the 3/4th share of the appellants in the mortgaged property ; they also asked for a perpetual injunction restraining respondent I from executing the said decree in respect of their share. To this suit the mortgagor, respondent 2, was impleaded as a party.\n\nIn their plaint the appellants have stated that respondent 2 had speculated in gold and silver and had thereby lost a large amount of money which he sought to make up by borrowing amounts from several creQ.itors.. One of such creditors was Dharsi Shami,\n\nz960 to whom Rs. 2,000 were payable by respondent 2.\n\nAccording to the appellants the impugned mortgage Luhar Amritlal h d b d b d .C h Nagji a een execute y respon ent 2 ior t e payment v. of the said debt of Rs. 2,000, and since the said debt Doshi Jayantilal was immoral or avyavaharik the appellants were not\n\nfethalal bound by it.\n\nThe claim was resisted by both respondent I and Gajendragadk•• ]. respondent 2 who pleaded that the mortgage had been executed for the payment of debts which were binding on the family and that there was no substance in the plea of immoral debts raised by the appellants.\n\nIt was also alleged by them that the mortgaged property was not the property of the undivided Hindu family.\n\nOn these pleadings the trial court framed a, ppropriate issues. It found that the mortgaged property was the coparcenary property of the family, that the mortgage-deed in question had been executed to pay off a debt which was immoral and that in consequence the mortgage was not binding against the appellants.\n\nAccording to the trial court the debt contracted by respondent 2 to pay the losses incurred by him in speculative transactions must be held to have been contracted for illegal and immoral purposes and as such the subsequent alienation for the payment of the said debt cannot bind the appellants. The trial court also observed that respondent I had not stepped into the witness box to give evidence to show that he had made any enquiries about the existence of any antecedent debts payable by respondent 2. In the result the suit filed by the appellants was decreed. Against the said decree respondent 1 preferred an appeal before the District Judge, but the District Judge agreed with all the findings made by the trial court and dismissed the said appeal. Respondent I then took the matter before the High Court of Saurashtra in second appeal.\n\nThe High Court agreed that the mortgaged property wa8 the property of the joint Hindu family and that respondent 1 had made no attempt to prove any enquiry on his part before he entered into the transaction. The High Court did not think it necessary to\n\nconRider whether the antecedent debt due to Dharsi Sbamji, for the repaymeut of which. the impue; ned\n\n...\n\nmortgage was created, was in law immoral or illegal, 1960 it proceeded to deal with the appeal on the assumption 1-uhar A mritlal that the said debt was illegal or immoral. On that Nagji assumption the High Court considered the material v. principles of Hindu Law and held that it was for the Doshifayantilal appellants to prove not only that the antecedent debt 18!!:.~!al was immoral or illegal, but also that respondent I had Gajendragadkar 1. notice of the said character of the debt ; and since the appellants had led no evidence to discharge this onus they were not entitled to claim any relief against respondent I. On this finding the second appeal preferred by respondent I was allowed and the suit filed by the appellants was ordered to be dismissed. It is against this decree that the appellants have come to this Court by special leave.\n\nOn behalf of the appellants Dr. Barlingay has urged that the principles of Hindu Law do not justify the view taken by the High Court that the appellants had to prove the alienee's knowledge about the immoral character of the antecedent debt. He concedes that the judicial decisions on this point are against his contention; but he argues that there is paucity of caselaw on the subject, and that, having regard to the importance of the point raised by him, we should examine the true legal position by reference to the texts rather than by reference to judicial decisions .\n\nJ, et us then set out the appellant's argument based on the textual provisions of Hindu Law.\n\nThe doctrine of pious obligation under which sons are held liable to discharge their father's debts is based solely on religious considerations; it is thought that if a person's debts are not paid and he dies in a state of indebtedness his soul may have to face evil consequences, and it is the duty of his sons to save him from such evil consequences. The basis of the doctrine is thus spiritual and its sole object is to confer spiritual benefit on the father. It is not intended in any sense for the benefit of the creditor. As has been observed by the Privy Council in Sat Narain v.\n\nDas (1 ) this doctrine \"was not based on any necessity for the protection of third parties but was based on\n\n(r) (1936) L.R. 63 I.A. 384, 395\n\nx960\n\nLuha,- Ani,-itlal\n\nNagji v.\n\nDoshi ] ayantilal\n\n]ethalal\n\nGajendragadkar J.\n\nthe pious obligation of the sons to see their father's debts paid.\"\n\nThis doctrine inevitably postulates that the father'R debts which it is the pious obligation of the sons to repay must be vyavaharik. If the debts are not vyavaharik or are avyavaharik the doctrine of pious obligation cannot be invoked. The expression 'avyavaharik' which is generally used in judicial decisions has been based on the text of Usanas which has been quoted by Mitakshara in commenting on the relevant text of Yajnavalkya (').\n\nAccording to Usanas, whatever is not vyavaharik has not to be paid by the son. 'Na vya vaharikam' are the words used by U sanas, and put in a positive form they mean 'avyavaharik'. Colebrooke has translated these words as meaning \"debt for a cause repugnant to good morals\". These words have received different interpretations in several decisions.\n\nSometimes they are rendered as meaning \"a debt which as a decent and respectable man the father ought not to have incurred\": Darbar Khachar v. Khachar Hansar (2); or, \"not lawful, usual or customary\" : Chhakauri Mahton v. Ganga Prasad (3); or, \"not supportable as valid by legal arguments and on which no.right could be established in a court of justice in the creditor's favour\": Venugopala Naidu v. Ramanathan Chetty (').\n\nBut it appears that in Hemraj v. Khemchand(') the Privy Council has, on the whole, preferred to treat Colebrooke's translation as making the nearest approach to the real interpretation of the word used by Usanas; whatever may be the exact denotation of the word, it is clear that the debt answering the said description is not such a debt as the son is bound to pay, and so as soon as it is shown that the debt is immoral the doctrine of pious obligation cannot be invoked in support of such a debt.\n\nIn this connection, it has also been urged by Dr. Barlingay that the onus placed on the sons to prove the immoral character of the debt is already very heavy.\n\nIn discharging the said onus the sons are required to prove not merely that their father who\n\n(I) Yajnavalkya, ii, 47.\n\n(2) (1908) I.L.R. 32 Bom. 348, 351.\n\n(3) (19II) I.L.R. 39 Cal. 86z, 868, 869. (4) (19I2) I.L.R. 37 M•d. 458, 46o.\n\n(5) I.L.R. [1943j All. 727.\n\n.----; .\n\ncontracted the impugned debt lived an extravagant or rg6o immoral life but they are required to establish a direct Luhar A mrillal connection between the immorality of the father and Nagji the impugned debt. If this onus is made still more v. onerous by requiring the sons to prove that the alienee Doshi /ayantilal had knowledge of the immoral character of the antece- Jeal' dent debt, it would virtually make the sons' taskGajendragadkar J. impossible, and notwithstanding the sprit underlying the doctrine of pious obligation the sons in fact would be compelled to pay the immoral or impious antecedent debt of their father.\n\nThat is why the rule which requires that the sons should prove the knowledge of the alienee is inconsistent with the basis of the doctrine of pious obligation. Thus presented the argument is no doubt simple and prima facie attractive. The question which we have to consider is whether we should attempt the task of examining the texts and determining the true effect of the original provisions of Hindu Law in spite of the fact that the point raised is covered by judicial decisions which have been treated for many years as laying down the correct law on the subject.\n\nBefore answering this question it is necessary to consider the relevant judicial decisions. In 1874, the Privy Council had occasion th consider this branch of Hindu Law inGirdhareeLal v. KantooLalandMuddun Thakoor v. Kantoo Lal (1). It appears that Kantoo Lal and his minor cousin had brought a suit to recover\n\npossesion of certain properties belonging to their family which had been sold respectively by a private sale and at court auction. The private sale had taken place on July 28, 1856, and the deed had been executed by the fathers of the two plaintiffs.\n\nThe case of the plaintiffs was that they were not bound by the impugned transaction. The Principal Sudder Ameen dismissed the suit but the High Court set aside that decision and a warded Kan too Lal one-half of his father's share. The claim made by the other plaintiff was dismissed on the ground that he had not been born at the time of the impugned transaction.\n\nThe decree passed in favour of Kantoo Lal was challenged by the alienee before the Privy Council. Evidence showed that at the\n\n(t} (1874) L.R. I I.A. 32x.\n\n.r960\n\nLuhar Amrillal\n\nNagji .v.\n\nDoshi J ayantilal jethalal\n\nGajendragadkaf' j.\n\ntime when the sale deed was executed a decree had been obtained against Bhikharee Lal, the father of Kantoo Lal, upon a bond executed by him in favour of his creditor and an execution had issued against him upon which the right and share in the property had been attached. It was therefore thought necessary to raise money to pay the debt of Bhikharee Lal and get rid of the execution. It was on these facts that the Privy Council had to consider whether Kantoo Lal was justified in challenging the binding character of the sale transaction. In dealing with this point the Privy Council referred with approval to the rule which had been enunciated by the Board earlier in the case of Hunooman Persaud Panday v. Mussummat Babooee Munraj Koonweree (1). The rule of Hindu Law bad been thus stated by Lord Justice Knight Bruce in that judgment: \"The freedom of the son from the obligation to discharge the father's debt, has respect to the nature of the debt, and not to the nature of the estate, whether ancestral or acquired by the creator of the debt\".\n\nThen the Privy Council held that if the debt of the father had been contracted for immoral purpose the son might not be under arty pious obligation to pay it ; but that was not the case before the Board. It' had not been shown that the' bond upon which the decree was obtained was for immoral purpose; and on the other hand, it a.ppeared that an action had been brought on the bond, a decree had been passed on it and there was nothing whatever to show thattbe debt was tainted with immorality. The Privy Council also noticed that Kantoo Lal bad brought the action probably at the instigation of the father, and, we may add, that is many times the feature of such litigation. On these facts the Privy Council set aside the decree passed by the High Court and held that Kan too Lal was not entitled to any relief. It would thus be seen that this decision merely shows that where any alienation has been effected by the father for the payment of his antecedent debt and the said antecedent debt is not shown to be immoral the .son cannot challenge the validity of the alienation. Since the antecedent debt was not shown to be immoral no question arose as to\n\n(t) (1856) 6 M.I.A. 393, 421.\n\nwhat would be the nature of the onus which the son r96o would have to discharge if the antecedent debt is in Luhar Amritlal fact shown to be immoral.\n\nNagji In regard to the auction sale which the plaintiffs v. challenged in that suit the Privy Council held that a Doshi Jayantilal\n\nd . . l b d Jethalal purchaser un er an execut10n 1s sure y not oun to __ go back beyond the decree to ascertain whether the Gajend•agadk1Jr J. court was right in giving the decree, or having given it, in putting up the property for sale under an execution upon it. Evidence showed that the auction purchaser acted bona fide, had made enquiries and was satisfied that the decree had been properly passed and purchased the property at auction sale on payment of valuable consideration.\n\nOn these facts it was held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to any relief. This decision als0 was not concerned with the position that would arise if the antecedent debt had in fact been proved to be immoral.\n\nThat question arose before the Privy Council in Suraj Bunsi Kaer v. Shea Prashad Singh( 1). In that case an ex parte decree for money had been obtained against a Hindu governed by Mitakshara on a mortgage bond, the property .mortgaged being ancestral immoveable estate. Under the said decree the mortgaged property was attached amt· te decree-holder sought to bring the said property to sale. Prior to the execution sale, however, the judgment-debtor died and his infant sons and co-heirs filed a petition of objections; but they were referred to a regular suit. In the suit which they filed they challenged the binding character of the debt and claimed appropriate relief against the execution creditor and the purchasers. The Privy Council held that as between the infant sons of the judgmentdebtor and the execution creditor neither the sons nor the ancestral immoveable properties in their hands was liable for the father's debt; and as regards the purchasers, it was held that, since they had purchased after objections had been filed by the plaintiffs, they must be taken to have had notice actual or constructive thereof and therefore to have purchased with the knowledge of the plaintiffs' claim ana subject to the result of the suit to which they had been referred,\n\n(I) (1879) L.R. 6 I.A. 88.\n\nz96o The subordinate judge decreed the claim, set aside\n\nLuhar Amritlal the mortgage bond, the decree thereon and the execu- Nagji tion sale thereof.\n\nBy this decision the mortgage, the v. decree and the execution sale in regard to the alienor's Doshi Jayantilal share had also been set aside. The High Court, howl ethalal d h d _ ever, reverse t at ju gment and dismissed the suit.\n\nG•jendragadkar ]. The Privy Council partly allowed the appeal preferred by the plaintiffs, and held that the shares of the plaintiffs were not bound either by the mortgage deed, the decree or the execution sale. Thus it is clear that in that case the Privy Council held that the antecedent debt was for immoral purposes and that the auction purchaser had notice of it. But in dealing with the question of law raised before it the Privy Council had occasion to examine the relevant provisions of Hindu Law and the decisions bearing on them.\n\nAmongst the decisions considered by the Privy Council was the case of Kantoo Lal (1 ). Sir James Col vile, who delivered the judgment of the Board, referred to the case of Kantoo Lal (1) and observed that \"this case then, which is a decision of this tribunal, is undoubtedly an authority for these propositions : 1st. that where joint ancestral property has passed out of a joint family, either under a conveyance executed by a father in consideration of an antecedent debt, or in order to raise money to pay off an antecedent debt, or under a sale in execution of a decree for the father's debt, his\n\nsons, by reason of their duty to pay their father's debts, cannot recover that property, unless they show that the debts were contracted for immoral purposes, and that the purchasers had notice that they were so contracted; and 2ndly, that the purchasers at an execution sale, being strangers to the suit, if they have not notice that the debts were so contracted, are not bound to make inquiry beyond what appears on the face of the proceedings ''. The first proposition which has been laid down in this judgment as deduced from Kantoo Lal's case (1) is clear and unambiguous. Where ancestral property has been alienated either under a conveyance executed by the father in consideration of an antecedent debt, or in order to raise money to pay off an antecedent debt, or under a sale in executic11 of\n\n(I) (1874) L.R. I I.A, 321,\n\n..._ ____ .. , ..... ~· _,___-·\n\n...... .· a. decree for the father's debt; the sons have to prove .· 'roo not only that the antecedent debts , were immoral: but . also that the purchasers had notice that. they were SO LuAaivftr.\"1al contracted .. .,: -\\Vith . respect, it : is open to argument . v. . whether the two propositions inevitably arise from the Doshi Jayattilal\n\n. earlier . decision of ihe :Privy Council in Kantoo Lal's Jet1tarai case (1~ ; : bu~ since J8:79.when this proposition was thusGajendragadAar:f.' enunciated it has apparently been accepted by all the · courts in India as the correct statement of Hindu Law ··\n\n) . on the point. : . ··.:. ·, ..: ;,, , ' :' ': ·:; ._. ,, : ... . :, ~: . , In Sat.Narain v~- Behari , Lal, (9) while .. dealing with :· the que_stion as\"to wheher the ·.property of the joint r . family consisting of an insolvent Hindu father, and his ... sons does not, by vitue of the ' father's adjudication as insolvent; bcaina vested in the. official assignee, Sir J'ohn Edge, has incidentally referred to these two propositions with approval. No decision has been cited\n\n... -. before us .. where the correctness . of these propositions has ever hE'.en doubted . or questioned ... \\ . \\ , _ ·. '. .. ; '. , .\n\n_ .In this connection it may be relevant to recall: that soon after the Privy Council pronounced its.judgment\n\nin .. the: case of Kantoo Lal (1) Bbttacha.ryya, :in his Tagore Law Lectures on the . '~ Law:· relating to Joint . . .·,' Hindu Family~, (pp. 549, 550), examined the said deci.\n\n. ; ~--.. sion and_ obs_erved that \"many in the profession think . ·,.·:·: that the case dealt a. death-blow'. to the institution of.\n\nHindu family, that it has done a.way with the essential ',' feature of that institution, 'that it .has rendered the ' . father independent of the control of his sons in dealing > with allcestral : property which ; had-:all along been looked upon. as a. common fund belonging. as much to the aans a.a to. the . father\".·. Having thus _expressed --· .· his surprise at . the decision Mr. Bhattacharyya. also added that \" _th~ shifting of the burden _of proof to the 'son . ..imposed _upon him, a , difficulty'._ which is almost : _ practically insuperable\". Nevertheless, .. he ~. has not\n\nfailed to take notice of the fact that.the promulgation of the princ.iple which was adopted.by the Privy Coun cil had become almost a necessity to . put:an end.to serious abuse which had become rife in the !Iitaksha.ra. . districts ; . and. he has added that ~' in those places. the fathers _of families knowing well that ancestral -pro-· perties ·:were scure against the cis .. C?f th~4-... own '\" - :-.• . •\" •\"\n\n(1) (187-tl LR. l l.A. $2'•\n\n(2) (1924) LR. $2 t.~~ 2i. ~·\n\n. \\\n\n' -----·~.;,,;. ......-.. ~._...-·~~~~~~\n\n.. - ·.·: . .:.. . .. ~· .\n\nr960 creditors bad established almost a regular system of inveigling innocent persons of substance to lend Luhar Amritlal Nagjt . money to them and when a decree was obtained and v. properties were attached they used to put forward Doises of business are closed the insurer shall be sub- Fraser & Ross ject to all the provisions of the Act so long as his Wanchoo ]. liabilities in India in respect of any business of all classes remain unsatisfied or not otherwise provided for.\n\nTherefore on a plain reading of s. 2D there can be no doubt that an insurer who has closed all classes of his insurance business remains subject to all the provisions of the Act in relation to such classes so long as his liabilities in India remain unsatisfied or not otherwise provided for.\n\nTherefore s. 33 will certainly apply to a case where all classes of insurance business have been closed so long as the liabilities remain unsatisfied or not otherwise provided for. The first contention of the appellant therefore that no investigation can be ordered under s. 33 in its case because it has closed all classes of its insurance business fails.\n\nTurning now to the second contention, the argument on behalf of the appellant is three-fold. In the first place it is urged that an order can only be made under s. 33 read with s. 2D when the Central Government is satisfied that the liabilities have not been satisfied or otherwise provided for, and that the order should show on the face of it that the Central Government had considered this aspect of the matter and had come to the conclusion that the liabilities remained unsatisfied or not otherwise provided for.\n\nFurther there is nothing in the present order to show that the Central Government ever considered this aspect of the matter and was satisfied that the liabilities of the appellant- Company remained unsatisfied or not otherwise pro-. vided for.\n\nThere is no doubt that the order is utterly silent on this point and it was only in his letter of October 15, 1957, that the Assistant Controller pointed out s. 2D of the Act and referred to this aspect of the matter. It seems to us only just and proper that when an order is being passed under s. 33 read withs. 2D of the Act it should show on the face of it that the\n\nVangua,.d Fi,.e\n\n& Gene,.ai Insurance Co. Ltd. v.\n\nF,.ase,. & Ross\n\nWanchoo }.\n\nCentral Government was prima facie satisfied that the liabilities had remained unsatisfied or not otherwise provided for, for it is only when the liabilities have not been satisfied or otherwise provided for that an order under s. 33 read with s. 2D would be justified in the case of an insurer who has closed his business. We use the word \"prima f acie\" advisedly, for it seems to have been suggested in the High Court that uo order could be passed under s. 33 unless it was proved to the hilt that there were liabilities which remained unsatisfied or otherwise unprovided for. It is obvious that such proof would only be available after investigation in to the affairs of the insurer. Therefore in order that s. 2D may be workable, all that is required under it is that the Central Government should be satisfied after such prima facie inquiry as it considers necessary that there are reasons to believe t.hat the liabilities of the insurer who has closed his business remain unsatisfied or not otherwise provided for and in coming to this prima facie conclusion the Central Government may make enquiry from the insurer with respect to complaints that it may have received against him. But the fact that the order does not on the face of it show that the Central Government considered this aspect of the matter would not make it bad, if in subsequent proceedings taken to challenge it, it is shown that there were materials before the Central Government which would justify its coming to the prima facie conclusion that the liabilities had not been satisfied or otherwise provided for, and therefore an investigation into the affairs was called for. In the present case we find from the materials on the record that there were complaints before the Central Government from those who had claims against the company. Those complaints were apparently referred to the Company and it does not appear that the Company satisfied the Central Government that the complaints were unjustified. It was in this situation that the order for investigation was made in July, 1957, after the Company had closed its insurance business. Further on the materials available on the record it does appear that even how there are claims pending to the tune of about one lac of rupees against the Company. So it ca.nnot\n\n-f-\n\n3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORT8 869\n\nbe said that there were no liabilities of the Company •96o outstanding which were not satisfied or otherwise pro- Vanguard Fire vided for when the order was made in July, 1957. In &General the circumstances the order cannot be held to be bad Insurance Co. I.td. because it does not show on the face of it that there v Fraser & Ross were liabilities which had remained unsatisfied or not otherwise provided for.\n\nWanchoo ].\n\nIn the second place it is urged that there can be no question of satisfying or otherwise providing for liabilities unless the liabilities are ascertained and either admitted or proved. In other words the argument is that it is only those liabilities which are admitted by the insurer or which have been decreed against him and the decrees have become final which can be taken into account in deciding whether the liabilities have remained unsatisfied or not otherwise provided for. It is urged that only those liabilities which are ascertained and either undisputed or proved can be satisfied and that the same applies to their being otherwise provided for. It is true that only those liabilities, which are ascertained and either admitted or proved, can be satisfied; but it does not follow that \" provision otherwise \" must also be only of liabilities which are ascertained and either admitted or proved. If that were so a dishonest insurer who closes his business could always get out of the provisions of s. 33 read withs. 2D by repudiating all claims made against him and then saying that there are no liabilities which remained unsatisfied or otherwise unprovided for.\n\nThere can be no doubt, therefore, if these provisions have to serve the purpose for which they were enacted, (namely, the protection of the interest of the policy-holders and the general public), the words \" not otherwise provided for\" in s. 2D must refer to liabilities in the nature of claims against the insurer whether the insurer admits them or not and whether a decree has been finally passed in respect of them or not. The intention of making this provision in s. 2D is to ensure that probable claims arising out of the insurance buRiness that is closed are provided for before the insurer who has closed his business can say that he is not governed by all the provisions of the Act. There can be no doubt, therefore,\n\nVanguaYd Fire\n\n& General Insurance Co. Ltd.\n\nthat when \"provision otherwise\" has to be made it must be with respect to probable claims also that are likely to arise out of the insurance business which has been closed. In the present case even the Company admits that there are probable claims to the tune of v.\n\nF1'aser &- Ross\n\nWanchoo ]. about rupees one lac still pending and in the circumstances until they are satisfied or it is shown that they have been provided for otherwise, all the provisions of the Act, including s. 33, will apply to the Com. pany.\n\nThe last argument in support of the second contention is that the liabilities have been otherwise provided for. It is said that the Company deposited Rs. 3,94,000 as security under s. 7 of the Act, which is still available to pay off the liabilities of the Company and therefore when such liabilities do not appear to exceed that amount they have otherwise been provided for.\n\nThe question thus raised is whether the Company is entitled to take into account the security deposit under s. 7 in order to show that the liabilities have been otherwise provided for.\n\nThe contention on behalf of the Controller is that when the Act envisages \" provision otherwise \", this provision has to be over and above the security deposit made by the Company under s. 7. It appears from s. 8 that this deposit is available for the discharge of liabilities arising out of policies of insurance issued by the insurer so long as any such liability remains unsatisfied. But even if a decree has been obtained by a policy-holder on the basis of a liability under the policy he is not entitled to attach any part of this deposit until he shows that he has failed to realise the decree in any other way. Further it appears thats. 8 only contemplates policy-holders holding a decree attaching part of the security deposit in case they fail to realise their debt in any other way; it does not contemplate, for example, third parties who have decrees against an insurer, like the Company (which in its motor insurance business indemnifies the policy-holders against third party risk up to a certain extent), doing so. Such third parties cannot under any circumstances attach any part of the deposit, for s. 8 only permits its v,, ttaolpne11t !11 the last resort by a policy-holder of the\n\ninsurer in respect of a debt due upon a policy. But r96o under s. 2D the decree of a third party in such a case v d p ld b h 1. b\"l\" f h . . f h\" anguar ire wou e t e Ia I ity o t e msurer m respect o IS &- General motor insurance business which could not be realised Inmrance.Co. Ltd. by attachment of any part of the deposit under s. 7.\n\nFraser~ Ross Besides, even with respect to decrees of policy-holders the deposit could only be attached when all other ways Wanchoo J. ofrealising the money have failed.\n\nIn these circumstances it can hardly be said that the fact that this deposit is there is itself a \" provision otherwise \" to meet the liabilities of tho insurer. The policy-holder cannot attach this deposit unless he first exhausts all other means. Even if he has got a decree and even if the insurer admits his claim and wants to pay it, he cannot do so out of the money in deposit under s. 7.\n\nAs for third parties who may have decrees against the insurer, they can never attach this deposit in view of the provisions of s. 8. It could not be the intention of the legislature when it was in effect exempting the insurer from all the provisions of the Act on his liabilities being otherwise provided for that such provision should include the security deposit under s. 7, when it has made it so difficult for a policy-holder to get his debt satisfied from that deposit and when it is clear that a third party could not in any way attach the deposit. In these circumstances we are of opinion that when s. 2D provides that the insurer shall be subject to all the provisions of the Act so long as his liabilities in India in respect of the business which is closed remain unsatisfied or not otherwise provided for, the satisfaction or \"provision otherwise\" does not refer to the deposit under s. 7 and has to be over and above that deposit. It is true thats. 9 provides that the insurer can take back the deposit after satisfying the court that he has satisfied or otherwise provided for his liabilities. But this \" provision otherwise\" for the purposes of s. 9 must obviously be other than the deposit itself. Further when the insurer wants to take back his deposit on making \" provision otherwise\" he will have to satisfy the court that the \"provision otherwise \" has been fully made and the court will be in a position to investigate into the matter.\n\nThis, however, does not mean that if the insurer does\n\n,960 not want to take advantage of s. 9 of the Act he can say without submitting to the terms of that section\n\nVa;;_g~=~~,;, fre that he has made \"provision otherwise\", because the lnsu .. nce Co. Ltd. deposit which is made under s. 7 is more than all his v. liabilities of the insurance business that he has closed.\n\nFram & Ross It is urged that it is hard, for example, on an insurer\n\nWanchoo J. who has a large deposit and whose liabilities are small that he should not be able to fall back on his deposit for the purposes of s. 2D. We do not, however, see any hardship in a case of this kind, for if it is a fact that the deposit of the insurer is large and his liabilities are small he can always take advantage of s. 9 of the Act and submit to an investigation by the court and take back his deposit after depositing the small sum required to meet his liabilities. We are, therefore, of opinion that when s. 2D speaks of satisfaction or \"provision otherwise\" for the liabilities of insurance business which is closed it contemplates such satisfaction or \" provision otherwise\" over and above the deposit made under s. 7. It is not in dispute in this case that there are some liabilities still pending; it is also not in dispute that they are not satisfied and no provision has been made otherwise for them irrespective of the security deposit. This also appears to have been the position when the order was made in July,\n\n1957. In the circumstances the order is good and cannot be called in question by the Company.\n\nThe appeal therefore fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.\n\n.Appeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 146, "entities": [{"text": "Luhar Amritlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 151, "end_char": 165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The propositions in question r96o treated an alienation made for the payment of the Luhar Amritlal father:'s antecedent debt on the same footing as an Nagji alienation made in execution of a decree passed against v. him and in both cases the principle enunciated is that Doshi Jayantilal in order to succeed in their challenge the sons must Jealal prove the immoral character of the antecedent debtcajendragadkar J. and the knowledge of the alienee."}}, {"text": "Brij Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 744, "end_char": 755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Having regard to the broad language used in stating the two propositions, we do not think that a valid distinction could be made between a mortgage and a sale particularly after the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Brij Narain (1)."}}, {"text": "Nagpur High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 792, "end_char": 809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is the view taken by the Nagpur High Court in Udmiram Koroodimal and Anr."}}, {"text": "THE VANGUARD FIRE AND GENERAL\n\nINSURANCE CO. LTD., MADRAS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1003, "end_char": 1060, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE VANGUARD FIRE AND GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD., MADRAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M/S. FRASER AND ROSS AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1062, "end_char": 1094, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M/S. FRASER AND ROSS AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1138, "end_char": 1158, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1420, "end_char": 1439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Insurance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1466, "end_char": 1479, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "SS. 2(9), 2D, 7, 9, 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1499, "end_char": 1521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "General Clauses Act", "statute": "General Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "July l, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1958, "end_char": 1970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, on application made by the company to the Controller of Insurance, the certificate granted to it for carrying on insurance business was cancelled with effect from July l, 1957 In the meantime, complaints against the company were being received by the Government of India, who, thereupon, passed an order on July 17, 1957, under s. 33 of the Insurance Act, 1938, directing the Controller of Insurance to investigate the affairs of the company and to submit a report."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2046, "end_char": 2065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, on application made by the company to the Controller of Insurance, the certificate granted to it for carrying on insurance business was cancelled with effect from July l, 1957 In the meantime, complaints against the company were being received by the Government of India, who, thereupon, passed an order on July 17, 1957, under s. 33 of the Insurance Act, 1938, directing the Controller of Insurance to investigate the affairs of the company and to submit a report."}}, {"text": "17, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2107, "end_char": 2115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, on application made by the company to the Controller of Insurance, the certificate granted to it for carrying on insurance business was cancelled with effect from July l, 1957 In the meantime, complaints against the company were being received by the Government of India, who, thereupon, passed an order on July 17, 1957, under s. 33 of the Insurance Act, 1938, directing the Controller of Insurance to investigate the affairs of the company and to submit a report."}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2123, "end_char": 2128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "General Clauses Act", "statute": "General Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "Insurance Act, 1938", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2136, "end_char": 2155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "L.R. 51 I.A. 129", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2296, "end_char": 2312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2513, "end_char": 2531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Van guard Fire\n\n& General Insurance Co. Ltd.\n\nFraser & Ross\n\nthe legality of the order on the grounds, ( r) that as all its insurance business had been closed the Central Government had no jurisdiction to pass an order under s. 33 of the Act, which only enables the investigation of the affairs of an insurer who, as defined in s. 2(9), is one who is actually carrying on the business of insurance, (2) that such an order could not be sustained under s. 2D of the Act as that section was applicable only to those cases where an insurer was carrying on different classes of insurance \\\\ business and had closed some of them but not all of them, (3) that even if such order could be passed under s. 33 read with s. 2D it could not be done in the present case as the company's liabilities did not remain unsatisfied or not otherwise provided for, and (4) that, in any case, the order in question was invalid because it did not show on the face of it that the Central Government was prima facie satisfied that the liabilities had remained unsatisfied or not otherwise provided for : Held, (r) that the word \"insurer\" in s. 33 of the Insurance Act, 1938, refers not only to a person who is actually carrying on ."}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2575, "end_char": 2580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Insurance Act, 1938", "statute": "the Insurance Act, 1938"}}, {"text": "s. 2(9)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2678, "end_char": 2685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Insurance Act, 1938", "statute": "the Insurance Act, 1938"}}, {"text": "s. 2D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2801, "end_char": 2806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Insurance Act, 1938", "statute": "the Insurance Act, 1938"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3044, "end_char": 3049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Insurance Act, 1938", "statute": "the Insurance Act, 1938"}}, {"text": "s. 2D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3060, "end_char": 3065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Insurance Act, 1938", "statute": "the Insurance Act, 1938"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3466, "end_char": 3471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Insurance Act, 1938", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3479, "end_char": 3498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 2D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3645, "end_char": 3650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Insurance Act, 1938", "statute": "the Insurance Act, 1938"}}, {"text": "s. 2D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3787, "end_char": 3792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Insurance Act, 1938", "statute": "the Insurance Act, 1938"}}, {"text": "s. 2D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4043, "end_char": 4048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Insurance Act, 1938", "statute": "the Insurance Act, 1938"}}, {"text": "s. 2D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4242, "end_char": 4247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Insurance Act, 1938", "statute": "the Insurance Act, 1938"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4390, "end_char": 4394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Insurance Act, 1938", "statute": "the Insurance Act, 1938"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4470, "end_char": 4475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Insurance Act, 1938", "statute": "the Insurance Act, 1938"}}, {"text": "s. 2D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4486, "end_char": 4491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Insurance Act, 1938", "statute": "the Insurance Act, 1938"}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDIOTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5125, "end_char": 5153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDIOTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5251, "end_char": 5268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and order dated January 16, 1959, of the Madras High Court in Writ Appeal No."}}, {"text": "B. Aggarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5440, "end_char": 5452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Aggarwala, S. N. Andley, J.B. DadachanJi c;.", "canonical_name": "B. Aggarwala"}}, {"text": "S. N. Andley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5454, "end_char": 5466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Aggarwala, S. N. Andley, J.B. DadachanJi c;."}}, {"text": "J.B. DadachanJi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5468, "end_char": 5483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Aggarwala, S. N. Andley, J.B. DadachanJi c;."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5500, "end_char": 5514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "General and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5556, "end_char": 5573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Insurance Co. Ltd.\n\nR. Ganapathy Iyer, H. J. Umrigar, R. H. Dhebar Fraser v&, Ross and T. M. Sen, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "H. J. Umrigar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5575, "end_char": 5588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Insurance Co. Ltd.\n\nR. Ganapathy Iyer, H. J. Umrigar, R. H. Dhebar Fraser v&, Ross and T. M. Sen, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5715, "end_char": 5722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nWANCHOO, J.-This is an appeal on a certificate Wanchoo ].", "canonical_name": "WANCHOO"}}, {"text": "October 15, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5962, "end_char": 5978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 15, 1956, an extraordinary general meeting of the shareholders of the Company passed a resolution by which all its insurance business was to cease forthwith and no further policies of insurance of any kind were to be issued thereafter."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6310, "end_char": 6314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Insurance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6322, "end_char": 6335, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "July 1, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6871, "end_char": 6883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In May, 1957, the Controller wrote to the Company that its certificates for carrying on insurance business would be deemed to be cancelled from July 1, 1957, and the cancellation was notified in the Gazette of India."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6937, "end_char": 6942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In May, 1957, the Controller wrote to the Company that its certificates for carrying on insurance business would be deemed to be cancelled from July 1, 1957, and the cancellation was notified in the Gazette of India."}}, {"text": "July 17, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7052, "end_char": 7065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Consequently on July 17, 1957, the Government of India passed an order under s. 33 of the Act directing the ControUer of Insurance to investigate the affairs of the Company and to submit a report."}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7113, "end_char": 7118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Fraser", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7276, "end_char": 7282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon the Controller appointed Messrs. Fraser and Ross to act as auditors to assist him in the investigation.", "canonical_name": "Fraser"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7464, "end_char": 7469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7764, "end_char": 7769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7860, "end_char": 7868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8107, "end_char": 8112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8275, "end_char": 8280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8379, "end_char": 8384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8395, "end_char": 8400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Fraser", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8588, "end_char": 8594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Messrs. Fraser and Ross as well as the Controller were made parties to the petition.", "canonical_name": "Fraser"}}, {"text": "Ross", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8599, "end_char": 8603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Messrs. Fraser and Ross as well as the Controller were made parties to the petition."}}, {"text": "s. 2D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8779, "end_char": 8784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8826, "end_char": 8831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9022, "end_char": 9027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9038, "end_char": 9043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Aggarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9550, "end_char": 9559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aggarwala appearing for the Company has urged the same two points before us.", "canonical_name": "B. Aggarwala"}}, {"text": "Section 2(9)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9713, "end_char": 9725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Vanguard Fire", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9911, "end_char": 9924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c) of this I96o clause) carrying on the business of insurance, which is Vanguard Fire a body corporate incorporated under any law for the & General time being in force in India or stands to any such Insurance Co. Ltd. body corporate in the relation of a subsidiary company v.\n\nFraser & Ro•s within the meaning of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, as defined by sub-s. (2} of s. 2 of that Act."}}, {"text": "Indian Companies Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10156, "end_char": 10182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10212, "end_char": 10216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "the Indian Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10230, "end_char": 10239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "the Indian Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "Section 3(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10491, "end_char": 10503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "the Indian Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "s. 3(5B)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10594, "end_char": 10602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "the Indian Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11038, "end_char": 11042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "the Indian Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11118, "end_char": 11127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "the Indian Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11166, "end_char": 11170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "the Indian Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "Section 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11712, "end_char": 11724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11871, "end_char": 11875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Insurane Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12388, "end_char": 12405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "h & General receipts and payments in respect of eac such class of\n\nInsurane Co. Ltd.· insurance business."}}, {"text": "Section 33(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12428, "end_char": 12441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12975, "end_char": 12985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13301, "end_char": 13306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13311, "end_char": 13316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(9)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13362, "end_char": 13369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13984, "end_char": 13989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14234, "end_char": 14239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 33 and 2D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14424, "end_char": 14437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14465, "end_char": 14470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(9)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14658, "end_char": 14665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Wanehoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14880, "end_char": 14887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be accepted that generally the word \"insurer\" has Wanehoo J. been defined for the purposes of the Act to mean a person or body corporate, etc.,", "canonical_name": "WANCHOO"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15123, "end_char": 15127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17447, "end_char": 17454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17778, "end_char": 17791, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17986, "end_char": 17993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18496, "end_char": 18503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18513, "end_char": 18517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18686, "end_char": 18690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18877, "end_char": 18882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(9)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19603, "end_char": 19610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19612, "end_char": 19619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, v. h h h d• • b h Fraser & Ross t oug t e or mary meanmg to e given to t e word \"insurer\" is as given in the definition clause (s. 2(9)) Wanchoo J. and refers to a person or body corporate, etc.,", "canonical_name": "WANCHOO"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19902, "end_char": 19907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19911, "end_char": 19916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20315, "end_char": 20320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20524, "end_char": 20529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20956, "end_char": 20961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21346, "end_char": 21351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21465, "end_char": 21470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22152, "end_char": 22157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22260, "end_char": 22265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22374, "end_char": 22379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23140, "end_char": 23145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23153, "end_char": 23172, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 2D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23369, "end_char": 23374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24437, "end_char": 24442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24708, "end_char": 24713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24970, "end_char": 24975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25217, "end_char": 25222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25233, "end_char": 25238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October 15, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25918, "end_char": 25934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no doubt that the order is utterly silent on this point and it was only in his letter of October 15, 1957, that the Assistant Controller pointed out s. 2D of the Act and referred to this aspect of the matter."}}, {"text": "s. 2D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25978, "end_char": 25983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26115, "end_char": 26120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26498, "end_char": 26503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26514, "end_char": 26519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26726, "end_char": 26731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26981, "end_char": 26986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 29021, "end_char": 29028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Wanchoo ]."}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30042, "end_char": 30047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30448, "end_char": 30453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30677, "end_char": 30682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "VanguaYd Fire\n\n& General Insurance Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30935, "end_char": 30978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There can be no doubt, therefore,\n\nVanguaYd Fire\n\n& General Insurance Co. Ltd.\n\nthat when \"provision otherwise\" has to be made it must be with respect to probable claims also that are likely to arise out of the insurance business which has been closed."}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31460, "end_char": 31465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31678, "end_char": 31682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31982, "end_char": 31986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32246, "end_char": 32250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32268, "end_char": 32272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33175, "end_char": 33179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33323, "end_char": 33328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Inmrance.Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 33528, "end_char": 33545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "f h\" anguar ire wou e t e Ia I ity o t e msurer m respect o IS &- General motor insurance business which could not be realised Inmrance."}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33593, "end_char": 33597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34160, "end_char": 34164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34294, "end_char": 34298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34538, "end_char": 34542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34773, "end_char": 34778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35062, "end_char": 35066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35326, "end_char": 35330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35714, "end_char": 35718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35909, "end_char": 35913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36208, "end_char": 36213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36399, "end_char": 36403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2D", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36590, "end_char": 36595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36800, "end_char": 36804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_85_91_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "' -\n\n3 S.O.R. SUPREME OOlJRT REPORTS 85\n\nand in substance this claim has been rejected by the i96o appellate tribunal on the ground that sufficient\n\nmaterfal has not been placed before it by the appellant T. ~0~}.1~'.pzy on which the claim could be examined and grantedi v.\n\nIn such a case we do not see how we can interfere in Its Workmen • favour of the appellant.' The present decision will . -- not preclude the appellant from making a similar Ga1endragadkar J. claim in future and justifying it by leading proper evidence.\n\nIn the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. -\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nTHE BRIHAN MAHARASHTRA SUGAR\n\nSYNDICATE LTD.\n\n~ '\n\nJANARDAN RAMOHANDRA KULKARNI\n\nAND OTHERS\n\n(S. K. DAS, A. K. SARKAR AND\n\nM. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.)\n\nCompany Law-Proceedings pending under the repealed Act-If and when could be continued-Indian Companies Act, I9IJ, (VII of I9I3) s. IS3-C-Companies Act, Ig56, (I of Ig56) ss. IO and 647.\n\nThe respondent had made an application under s. 153-C of the Companies Act, 19:1;3, with an alternative prayer for winding up against the appellant company, to the District Judge, Poona, who had been authorised under the Act to exercise jurisdiction.\n\nWhile the application was pending the Companies Act, 1913, was repealed by the Companies Act, 1956. The appellant company thereupon applied to the District Judge to dismiss the application on the ground that he had ceased to have any jurisdiction to deal with the application on the repeal of the Companies Act or 1913.\n\nHeld, that s. 6 of the General Clauses Act preserved the jurisdiction of the District Judge to deal with the application under s. 153-C of the Indian Companies Act of 1913, notwithstanding therepeal of that Act.\n\nSection 647 of the Companies Act, 1956 did not indicate any intention to affect the rights under the Indian Companies Act of 1913, for s. 658 of the Companies Act of 1956 made s. 6 of the General Clauses Act applicable notwithstanding anything contained in s. 647 of that Act.\n\nr960\n\nI960 Section 24 of the General Clauses Act does not put an end to any notification. It does not therefore cancel the notification B. M. Sugar issued under the Indian Companies Act of 1913 in so far as that Syndicate Ltd. notification empowered the District Judge to exercise jurisdiction v. under s. 153-C of the Indian Companies Act of 1913 even though ]. R. Kulkarni under s. 10 of the Companies Act of 1956, a District Judge can no longer be empowered to exercise jurisdiction under (a) sections 397 to 407 of the Companies Act, 1956, which correspond to s. 153-C of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 or (b) in respect of the winding up of a company with a paid up share capital of not less than Rs. 1,00,000/- which the appellant company was.\n\nCIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 513 of 1958.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated November 20, 1957, of the Bombay High Court in First Appeal No. 600 of 1956, arising out of the judgment and order dated October 17, 1956, of the District Judge, Poona, in Misc. Petition No. 2 of 1956.\n\nH. D. Banaji, S. N. Arulley, J. B. Darlachanji, Hameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the.appellant.\n\nA. V. Viswanatha Sastri, Sorab N. Vakil, B. K. B.\n\nNaidu and I. N. Shroff~ for respondents Nos. 1 and 2.\n\n1960. February, 22.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sarkar J.\n\nSARKAR, J.-Respondcnts Nos. 1 to 4 are shareholders in the company which is the appellant in this case. They made an application against the appellant and its directors under s. 153-C of the Companies Act, 1913 before that Act was repealed on April 1, 1956, as hereinafter mentioned, for certa.in reliefs which it is not necessary to state. This Act will be referred to as the Act of 1913.\n\nThis application had been made to the Court of the District Judge of Poona which Court had been empowered to exercise jurisdiction under the Act of 1913 by a notification issued by the Government of Bombay under s. 3(1) of that Act.\n\nBefore the application could be disposed of by the District Judge, Poona, the Act of 1913 was repealed and re-enacted on April 1, 1956, by the Companies Act of 1956, which will be referred to as the Act of 1956.\n\nOn or about June 28, 1956, the appellant made an application to the District Judge of Poona for an order dismissing the application under s. 153-C of the\n\n' -\n\nAct of 1913 on the ground that on the repeal of that Act the Court had ceased to have jurisdiction to deal with it. The District Judge of Poona dismissed this application. The appellant's appeal to the High Court of Bombay against this dismissal also failed. Hence the present appeal.\n\nSection 644 of the Act of 1956 repeals the Act of 1913 and certain other legislation relating to companies. Sections 645 to 657 of the Act of 1956 contain various saving provisions. Mr. Banaji appearing for the appellant contended that the proceeding before the District Judge of Poona under s. 153-C of the Act ef 1913 had not been saved by any of these provisions.\n\nWe do not consider it necessary to pronounce on this question for it seems to us clear that that proceeding can be continued in spite of the repeal of the Act of 1913 in view of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act. -Section 658 of. the Act of 1956 expressly provides that, \"The mention of particular matters in ss. 645 to 657 or in any other provision of this Act shall not prejudice the general application of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (X of 1897), with respect to the effect of repeals.\" Mr. Banaji said that s. 658 had been enacted ex abundante cautela.\n\nBe it so. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act none the less remains applicable with respect to the effect of the repeal of the Act of 1913.\n\nSection 6 of the General Clauses Act provides that where an Act is repealed, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect any right or liability acquired or incurred under the repealed enactment or any legal proceeding in respect of such right or liability and the legal proceeding may be continued as if the repealing Act had not been passed.\n\nThere is no dispute that s. 153-C of the Act of 1913 gave certain rights to the shareholders of a company and put the company as also its directors and managing agents under certain liabilities. The application under that section was for enforcement of these rights and liabilities. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would therefore preserve the rights and liabilities created by s. 153-C of the Act of 1913 and a continuance of the proceeding in respect thereof would be\n\nB. M. Sugar Syndicate Ltd. v. ]. R. Kulka>ni\n\nSarkar ].\n\nr960\n\nB. M. Sugay Syndicate Ltd. v. ]. R. Kulkarni\n\nSa,-kay ].\n\ncompetent in spite of the repeal of the Act of 1913, unless of course a different intention would be gathered.\n\nNow it has been held by this 'Court in State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh (1) thats. 6 applies even where the repealing Act contains fresh legislation on the same subject but in such a case one would have to look to the provisions of the new Act for the purposes of determining whether they indicate a different intention. The Act of 1956 not only repeals the Act of 1913 but contains other fresh legislation on the matters enacted by the Act of 1913. It was further observed in State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh (1 ) that in trying to ascertain whether there is a contrary intention in the new legislation, \"the line of enquiry would be not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them.\"\n\nThe question then is whether the Act of 1956 indicates that it was intended thereby to destroy the rights created by s. 153.C of the Act of 1913.\n\nMr. Banaji said that s. 64 7 of the Act of 1956 indicates an intention to destroy the rights created by s. 153-C of the Act of 1913.\n\nWe find nothing there to support this view. That section only says that where the winding up of a company commences before the commencement of the Act of 1956, the company shall be wound up as if that Act had not been passed, but s. 555(7) of the Act of 1956 will apply in respect of moneys paid into the Companies Liquidation Account.\n\nAll that this section does is to make the provisions of the repealed Act applicable to the winding up notwithstanding the repeal. The provisions of s. 555(7) need not be referred to as they do not affect the question. Section 647 of the Act of 1956 therefore indicates no intention that the rights created by s. 153-C of the Act of 1913 shall be destroyed. Nor is an argument tenable thassince bys. 647 the Act of 1956 expressly makes the repealed Act applicable to a winding up commenced under it, it impliedly indicates that in other matters the repealed Act cannot be resorted to, for, in view of s. 658 of the Act of 1956,\n\n(i) (1955] I $.C.R. 893.\n\nthe mention of a particular matter in s. 647 would not prejudice the application of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act; in other words, nothing ins. 647 is to be understood as indicating an intention that s. 6 of the General Clauses Act is not to apply. On the other hand, the parties are agreed that the provisions of s. 153-0 of the Act of 1913 have been substantially re-enacted by the Act of 1956 and this would indicate an intention not to destroy the rights created by s. 153-C.\n\nMr. Banaji then drew our attention to s. 10 of the Act of 1956 and s. 24 of the General Clauses Act.\n\nSection 10 of the Act of 1956 corresponds to s. 3 of the Act of 1913 and deals with the jurisdiction of Courts.\n\nUnder s. 10, the Central Government may empower a District Court to exercise jurisdiction under the Act, not being the jurisdiotion conferred among others by ss. 397 to 407 nor ill respect of the winding up of companies with a paid up share capital of not less than Rs. 1,00,000. Sections 397 to 407 of the Act of 1956, it is agreed, contain substantially the provissions of s. 153-0 of the Act of 1913. It has also to be stated that the paid up capital of the appellant is more than Rs. 1,00,000 and the application under s. 153-C of the Act of 1913 contained a prayer in the alternative for the winding up of the appellant.\n\nSection 24 of the General Clauses Act provides that where .any Act is repealed and re-enacted with or without modifications, then, unless it is otherwise expressly provided, any notification issued under the repealed Act shall, so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions re-enacted, continue in force and be deemed to have been issued under the provisions so re-enacted unless and until it is superseded by a notification issued under those provisions.\n\nMr. Banaji points out that in view of s. 10 of the Act of 1956 a District Court can no longer be empowered to deal with an application of the kind made to the District Judge of Poona, as that application asks for reliefs similar to those contemplated by ss. 397 to 407 of the Act of 1956 and also asks for the winding up of a company whose paid up capital\n\nxceeds Rs. 11001000 and power to deal with such an . ._, ....\n\nH. M. Sugar Syndicate Ltd. v. ]. R. Kulkarni\n\nSarl S.C.1\\,\n\n~U.PHEME COU]:{, T HE.POH.T~ 897\n\nthat in regard to the properties under the management of the Court of Wards, \" sthanam registration took place in Malabar and all the properties belonging to the sthanee were registered in the name of Kavalappara Moopil Nair\". But that in itself does not conclude the matter. Ordinarily, when a question raised depends upon elucidation of further facts not disclosed in the statements already filed, we would be very reluctant to allow a party to raise such a plea at the time of arguments. But in this case we do not think we would be justified in not allowing the respondents to raise the contention, as the validity of the impugned Act depends upon the application of Art. 31A of the Constitution. We would, therefore, for the purpose of this petition, assume against the petitioner that he is in possession of the properties in janmam right and proceed to consider on that basis the contention raised.\n\nLearned counsel for the respondents contends that Art. 31A of the Constitution excludes the operation of Art.13 in the matter of the extinguishment or modification of any rights in an estate, that the impugned legislation either extinguishes or modifies the sthanam right in the janmam property which is an \"estate\" as defined in the said Article and that, therefore, the impugned Act cannot be challenged on the ground that it infringes Arts. 14, 19 and 31 in Part III of the Constitution. To appreciate this contention it will be convenient to read the material portions of Art. 31A.\n\nArticle 31A. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained ii; i article 13, no law providing for-\n\n(a) the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or . modification of any such rights, ............................................................... shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by article 14,. article 19 or article 31.\n\no o 0 0 0 o o 0 o 0 o 0 o o o o o o 0 0 o 0 o o o o o 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o 0.0 I 0 0 o 0 0 o 0 0 0 0 0 I\n\n(2) In this article,-\n\nK • valappara\n\nKottarathil\n\nldiaries between the State and the tiller of tne soil has been achieved for the most part, our next objectives in land reform are the fixing of limits to.the extent of agricultural land that may be owned or occupied by any person, the disposal of\n\n:.-,-\n\nany land held in excess of the prescribed maximum and the further modification of the rights of land owners and tenants tua, ry mortgage, with relinquishment of the power nf transfer), ottikkumpuram (where a surn is advanced beyond the otti amount), neerrnuthal (where a further sum is advanced on an otti mortgage in addition to the ottikkumpuram), peruvartham (usufructuary mortgage, the land being redeemable at its value in the market at the time of redemption}, anubham or anubhavam (relinquishment of land for enjoyment by the tenant in perpetuity), karankari or jamma koyu (sale\n\nKavalappara\n\nKot, arath1l\n\nJ, the law depriving a person of his property-however urent the need may be and whatever grave danger or serious vice it seeks to avert or suppress-can never be a reasonable restriction on the right to enjoy property and therefore every such law would be void. The learned Attorney-General argues that in the present case the petitioner is not deprived of his property, but his right is only restricted. It depends upon the perspective from which we look at the facts. In one sense, the petitioner has been deprived of his shares in the property given by the statute to the respondents, but, even on that assumption, we do not think that the argument of the respondents has any substance. The correct approach to the question is, first to ascertain what is the fundamental right of the petitioners; then to see, whether the law infringes that right. If the law ex facie infringes that right, the State can support that law only by establishing that the la.w imposes reasonable restrictions on the petitioner's fundamental . right in the interests of the general public. If so approached, the impugned Act by seeking to deprive the petitioner of his property certainly infringes his fundamental right. There is absolutely nothing on the record to sustain the validity of the law under the said clause (5) of Art. 19. The apprehension that deprivation can never be a restriction and therefore every law depriving a person of his property must necessarily be void, even if justifiable, cannot help the respondents, for if it is not saved by cl. (5), that result must ft.ow from the premises. But that apprehension has no justification. This Court has held in a recent decision that under certain circumstances a law depriving a citizen of his fundamental right to property may amount to a reasonable restriction. In Narendra Kumar v. The Union of India (1), Das Gupta., J., observed:\n\n\\II [1900] z s.c.R. 375\n\nKavalappara\n\nK o/tarathil\n\nKochuni\n\nState of Mad•as\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nKav-1lappra\n\nKottarathil Kochuni v.\n\nS'tate oj .\\fadras\n\nSubba Rao].\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960]\n\n\" It is reasonable to think that the makers of the Constitution considered the word 'restriction ' to be sufficiently wide to save laws 'inconsistent' with Art. 19(1), or 'taking away the rights' conferred by the Article, provided this inconsistency or taking away was reasonable in the interests of the different matters mentioned in the clause. There can be no doubt therefore that they intended the word 'restriction ' to include cases of ' prohibition' also. The contention that a Ia w prohibiting the exercise of a fundamental right is in no case saved, cannot therefore be accepted. It is undoubtedly correct, however, that when, as in the present case, the restriction reaches the stage of prohibition special care has to be taken by the Court to see that the test of reasonableness is satisfied. The greater the restriction, the more the need for strict scrutiny by the Court. \" If so, the State can establish that a law, though it purports to deprive the petitioner of his fundamental right, under certain circumstances amounts to a reasonable restriction within the meaning of cl. (5) of Art. 19 of the Constitution.\n\nWe, therefore, hold that a law made depriving a citizen of his property shall be void, unless the law so made complies with the provisions of cl. (5) of Art. 19 of the Constitution.\n\nThis leads us to the question whether the provisions of the Act infringe Art. 19(l)(f) of the Constitution.\n\nThe impugned Act is The Madras Marumakkathayam (Removal of Doubts) Act, 1955 (Madras Act No. XXXII of 1955). As the argument turns upon the provisions of the Act and as the Act itself is a short one, it will be convenient to set out all the provisions thereof.\n\nThe Madras Marumakkathayam (Removal of Doubts) Act, 1955 (Act No. XXXll of 1955). (An Act to remove certain doubts in the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, 1932 (Madras Act XXII of 1933), in regard to sthanams and sthanam properties).\n\nWhereas doubts have arisen about the true legal character of certain properties which are erroneously\n\nclaimed to be or regarded as sthanam properties, but which are properties of the tarwad, the male members of which are entitled to succeed to the sthanam and it is necessary to remove those doubts in respect of this question : Be it enacted in the Sixth Year of the Republic of India as follows :\n\n1. This Act may be called the MADRAS MARU-\n\nMAKKATHAY AM (REMOVAL OF DOUBTS) ACT,\n\n1955.\n\n(2) It shall apply to all persons governed by the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, 1932 (Madras Act, XXII of 1933).\n\n2. Notwithstanding any decision of Court, any sthanam in respect of which :-\n\n(a) there is or had been at any time an intermingling of the propert, ies of the sthanam and the properties of the tarwad, or\n\n(b) the members of the tarwad have been receiving maintenance from the properties purporting to be sthanam properties as of right, or in pursuance of a custom or otherwise, or\n\n(c) there had at any time been a vacancy caused by there being no male member of the tarwad eligible to succeed to the sthanam, shall be deemed to be and shall be deemed always to have been a Marumakkathayam tarwad and the properties appertaining to such a sthanam shall be deemed to be and shall be deemed always to have been properties belonging to the tarwad to which the provisions of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, 1932 (Madras Act XXII of 1933), shall apply.\n\nExplanation :-All words and expressions used in this Act shall bear the same meaning as iu the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, 1932 (Madras Act XXII of 1933).\n\nThe Act presupposes the existence of a sthanam and its properties. It says tha.t the sthanam and its properties possessing one or more of the characteristics mentioned therein shall be deemed and shall be always deemed to have been a Marumakkathayam tarwad and its properties respectively.\n\nThee\n\nI960\n\nKavalaj>para\n\nJ< ottarwthil\n\nf{ochuni\n\nState of Madras\n\nSubba R, w J.\n\nTt}~O\n\nKavnloppat'a\n\nf(otta,, athil\n\nJ(ochuni v.\n\nState of Madt'as\n\nSubba Rao].\n\nimpugned Act applies also to sthanams whose title to properties has been declared by courts of law.\n\nFurther the Act is given retrospective operation.\n\nIt is suggested that the provisions of the Act have not been happily worded and, if properly understood with the help of the preamble, it would be clear that the sthanams were not converted into tarwads but only tarwads which were wrongly claimed to be sthanams were declared to be not sthanams.\n\nThe preamble of a statute is \"a key to the understanding of it\" and it is well established that\" it may legitimately be consulted to solve any ambiguity, or to fix the meaning of words which may have more than one, or to keep the effect of the Act within its real scope, when ever the enacting part is in any of these respects open to doubt\". We do not find any .ambiguity in the enacting part of the Act. Assuming that there is some doubt, the preamble confirms our view of the construction of the Act.\n\nAccording to the preamble certain properties of the tarwad are erroneously claimed to be or regarded as sthanam properties. and it has become necessary to remove those doubts~ by making the Act. The preamble also recognizes the existence of sthanams and the doubts related only to the title to the property of sthanams. The enacting part purports to resolve these doubts by laying down . three tests, and if any one of these tests is satisfied, the sthanam shall be deemed to be a tarwad and the properties tarwad properties. In short, the Act, read with the preamble, takes the sthanam, lays down certain tests and proceeds to say that if one or other of the tests is satisfied in respect of any property claimed to be that of the sthanam, the sthanam by statutory fiction is treated as the tarwad and its properties as tarwad properties. The tests, as we will presently show, are arbitrary and not germane to the question whether the properties belong to a sthanam or a tar wad. Whatever may be the phraseology used, in effect and substance,, the Act in the guise of applying certain tests seeks' to convert certain sthanams into tarwards and their properties into tarwad properties. It applies equally to sthanams governed by decrees of courts and sthanams whose character and title to the properties can be established by clear .. -\n\n-- --\n\n....\n\nevidence and to sthanams whose title is admitted. In the said cases no question of doubt can conceivably arise. The Act in the guise of dispelling doubts abolishes a class of sthanarns and deprives them of their properties. The question is whether th0 said legislation can stand the test of Art. 19(5) of the Constitutiom\n\nThe learned Advocate-General of Kernla seeks to support the legislation on the ground that under the Marninakkathayam law, the three characteristics of properties mentioned in 13. 2 pertain to tarwad and, therefore, when wrong decisions were given by c,1urts introducing confusion in titles, the legislature rightly stepped in to set right the wrong and declare such 8thanams possessing definite characteristics of the tarwad to be and always to have been the tarwad properties.\n\nHe further argues that, as ehe law w<1s made to protect the rights of the members of the tarwad in a p11rticular class of sthanams, the restrictions imposed on the s_thanees' rights in their properties would be reasonable and would be in the interests of the general public, notwithstanding the fact that the legislation indirectly affects the rights of a few decree-holder sthanees, who have establit; hed their rights in a court of law.\n\nMr. Purshottam Tricumdas supported the learned Advocate-General in this contention.\n\nMr. A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, who followed him, preferred to found his contention on a broader basis, namely, that the members of a tarwad and a sthanee have some interest in each other's property and the legislation did nothing more than regulate their interest inter se to restore peace and harmony among them and to change the m11tual relationship to bring it in accord with the concept of a modern welfare State. If that be the object of the Act, the argument proceeds, the mere fact that the law incidently disturbs the rights of parties whn have obtained decrees of court does not make it unre1Lsonable.\n\nBefore we consider the v1Llidity of these arguments, it would be convenient at this stage to notice the scope of Art. 19(l)(f) and Art. 19(5) of the Constitution. The said Article:> read;\n\n1')00\n\nKrivalnf'P\"\"a\n\nI< otforathil\n\nState of Madras\n\nSit/Jba Rao ].\n\nK avalappara\n\nKottarnthil Kochuni v . .'-'tale of 1\\1 adras\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nArticle 19. (1) All citizens shall have the right-\n\n(f) to acquire, hold and dispose of property.\n\n(5) Nothing in sub-clauses (d), (e) and (f) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said sub-clauses either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe.\n\nUnder cl. (5), the State can make a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the fo.ndamental rights embodied in Art.19(l)(f) in the interests of the general public.\n\nWhat is \"reasonable restriction\" has been succinctly stated by Patanjali Sastri, C. J., in State of Madras v. V. G. Raw( 1) thus at p. 607:\n\n\" It is important in this context to bear in mind that the test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be applied to each individual statute impugned, and no abstract standard, or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproport.ion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict.\" If we may say so, with respect, this passage summarizes the law on the subject fully and precisely.\n\nThe learned Chief Justice in his description of the test of reasonableness, in our view, has not stated anything more than the obvious, for the standard of reasonableness is inextricably conditioned by the state of society and the urgency for eradicating the evil sought to be remedied.\n\nSome of the American decisions and passages from text-books cited at the Bar may be useful in ascertaining whether in the instant case the restrictions imposed by the statute are reasonable,\n\n(I) [1952] S.C.ll. 597\n\n.~-' -\n\nIn Willoughby's Constitutional Law it is stated at p. 795 thus:\n\n\"As between individuals, no necessity, however great, no exigency, however imminent, no improvement, however valuable, no refusal, however unneighbourly, no obstinacy, however unreasonable, no offers of compensation, however extravagant, can compel or require any man to part with an inch of his estate.\" The Supreme Court of th') United States of America in Henry Webster v. Peter Cooper(1) observed:\n\n\"The result of the decision is, that the constitution of the State has secured to every citizen the right of acquiring, possessing, and enjoying property and that, by the true intent and meaning of this section, property cannot, by a mere act of the Legislature, be taken from one man and vested in another directly ; nor can it, by the retrospective operation of law, be indirectly transferred from one to another, or be subjected to the government of principles in a court of justice, which must necessarily produce that effect.\" In The Citizens' Savings and Loan Association of Cleveland, Ohio v. Topeka City {2), the Supreme Court of the United States of America again declares the importance of individual property right thus:\n\n\" The theory of our governments, state and national, is opposed to the deposit of unlimited power anywhere. The executive, the legislative and the judicial branches of these governments are all of limited and defined powers.\n\nThere are limitations on such power which grow out of the essential nature of all free governments.\n\nImplied reservations of individual rights, without which the social compact could not exist, and which are respected by all governments entitled to the same. No court, for instance, would hesitate to declare void a statute which enacted that A and B who were husband and wife to each other should be so no longer, but that A should thereafter be the husband of C, and B the wife of D. Or which should enact that the homestead now owned by A should \\1) i.~ Law Ed. 510, 517.\n\nKa val appara\n\nKottamthil\n\n[{ochuni v.\n\nState of .ifartras\n\nSubba Rao /.\n\nKnva7appara\n\n[{ ntta1athil\n\nKrchufli\n\nState cf Modrfl.<::.\n\nSubba Ran ].\n\nno longer be his, but should henceforth be the property of B.\" We have cited the relevant passages from the textbook and the decisions not with a view to define the scope of \"reasonable restrictions\" in Art. 19(5) of our Constitution, but only to point out that, as between citizens, the individual proprietary rights are ordinarily respected unless a clear case is made out for imposing restrictions thereon. There must, therefore, be harmonious balancing between the fundamental rights declared by Art. 19(1) and the social control permitted by Art. 19(5). It is implicit in the natu, re-. of restrictions that no inflexible standard can be laid' down : each case must be decided on its facts.\n\nBut the restrictions sought to be imposed shall not be arbitrary but must have reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved and shall be in the interests of the general public.\n\nBefore we proceed to consider whether the restrictions imposed by the impugned Act are reasonable within the meaning of cl. (5) of Art. 19, it would be necessary to ascertain precisely the law on the follow - ing three matters:\n\n(1) What is a sthanam in Marumakkat.hayam law?; (2) what is tarwad under the said law ? ; and (3) what is the relationship between members of a tarwad and a sthanee?\n\nMarumakkathayam law governs a large section of people inhabiting the West Coast of South India. l\\farumakkathayam literally means descent through sisters' children. It is a body of custom and usage which have received judicial recognition. Though Sundara Aiyar, J., in Krishnan Nair v. Damodaran Nair1 1) suggested that \"Malabar law is really only a school of Hindu law\", it has not been accepted by others. There is a fundamental difference between Hindu Law and Marumakkathayam system in that the former is founded on agnatic family and the latter is based on matriarchate. Marumakkathayam family consists of all the descendants of the family line of one common ancestor and is called a tarwad.\n\nThe incidents of a tarwad are so well-settled that it is not necessary to consider the case-law, but it would {1) (191>, 1 I.L.R. 38 Mad. <18\n\n'' \\\n\n3 s.c.n, SUPL{E.\\IE COUltT REPOltTS 929\n\nbe enough if the relevant passages from the book \"Malabar and Aliyasanthana Law\" by Sundara .\n\nAiyar are cited.\n\nThe learned author says at p. 7 thus:\n\n\"The joint family in a Marumakkathayam Ni1yar tarwad consists of a mother and her male and female children, and the children of those female children, and so on. The issue of the male children do not belong to their titrwad but to the tarwad of their consorts. The property belonging to the tarwad is the property of all the males and females that compose it. Its affairs are administered by one of those persons, usually the eldest male, called the karnavan. The individual members are not entitled to enforce partition, but a partition may be effected by common consent.\n\nThe rights of the junior members are stated to be (1) if males, to succeed to management in their turn, (2) to be maintained at the family house, (3) to object to an improper alienation or administration of the family property, (4) to see that the property is duly conserved, (5) to bar an adoption, and (6) to get a share at any partition that may take place. These are what may be called effective rights. Otherwise everyone is a proprietor and has equal rights.\" ]'or the purpose of this case it is not necessary to go into further ramifications of the incidents of a tarwad, for nothing turns upon them.\n\nWe are concerned in this case with a sthanam. In the book of Sundara Aiyar the origin, scope and mcidents of a sthanam are discussed at p. 249:\n\n\" As a technical word, ' stanom ' means a position of dignity of this kind, that is, one to which certain specific property is attached, and which passes with it, and is held by the person as the \" stani \". . .................... The origin of stanom is by no means clear and is more or less a matter for speculation.\" The learned author proceeds to give the three modes of the origin of sthanams, namely, (1) in a ruling family \" it was considered necessary in the circumstances that for the maintenance of the dignity of the ruler he should own properties in which the\n\nl\\ava!appara\n\nJ{ ottarathil\n\nJ{ochuni\n\nState nf Madras\n\nSu/, h.• Rao ].\n\nf( 11valatp11.Ya ,\n\nf{ottrJ?athil\n\nJ(ochuni v.\n\nState of 1\\1 adYaS\n\nSiihba Rao ].\n\nmembers of the tarwad as such had no right or interest and which would pass with the Crown to his successor\" : sthanams in the families of Zamorin, Palghat, Wulluvanad and other Rajas are given as instances of this class of sthanams ; (2) \" in the case of some chieftains and public officers, sthanams were created by the ruling king, who, when he appointed the head of a particular family to an office with hereditary succession attached also certain lands for the maintenance of the officer-holder \" : Para N ambi is given as a prominent instance of this class ; and\n\n(3) \" when a family became very opulent and influential, it was sometimes deemed necessary in order to keep its social position and influence that the head should be able to maintain a certain amount of state, and for that purpose the members of the family agreed to set a part certain property for him, and such property, would descend to the head of the family for the time being\". To some of the questions posed by the decisions or that are likely to arise, the learned author suggested some answers. The learned author describes the position of a sthanee vis-a-vis the members of the tarwad thus :\n\n\"It is rather that of a member of a tarwad who separates himself from it by division.\n\nHis accession to the stanom operates as a severance from the family. In consideration of his solely becoming entitled to the stanom property it was probably considered fair that he should give up his existing right in the property of the tarwad. But he and his tarwad will have the same right of succession to the properties of each other as if his severance from the family had been the result not of his accession to the stanom, but a voluntary division between him and the rest of the family.\" Another difficulty visualized and attempted to be answered by the learned author is the case of a family which has no male member to succeed to the sthar\n\nnam. He gives three possible answers, namely, ' -\n\n(i) escheat to the Crown; (ii) descent according to the rules of devolution applicable to the property of a divided member ; and (iii) on the assumption that\n\nthe property is dedicated for the purpose of the tar. wad, reverting to the tarwad. On the question, what would happen to the sthanam, if at the time of the death of the sthanee there was no male member in the tarwad, though he cited a decision of the Madras High Court where a subsequent born male infant was given a decree to recover the properties, he was of the view that the question was not an easy one to decide. The decided cases considered the nature of this institution and also its incidents.\n\nA division bench of the Madras High Court in Vira Rayen v. The Valia.\n\nRani of Pudia Kovilagom, Calicut (1) held that according to the custom obtaining in the family of the Zamorin Rajas of Calicut, property acquired by a sthanam-holder and not merged by him in the properties of his sthanam, or otherwise disposed of by him in his lifetime, became, on his death, the property of the kovilagom in which he was born, and, if found in the possession of a member of the kovilagom, belonged presumably to the kovilagom as common property. In the course of the judgment, the learned judges pointed out that in the family of the Zamorin of Calicut there were five sthanams or places of dignity with separate properties attached to them, which were enjoyed in succession by the senior male members of the kovilagom. It appears from the judgment that the senior lady of the whole family also enjoyed a sthanam with separate property. The Judicial Committee in Venkateswaraiyanv. Shekhari Varma (2) was considering the validity of a perpetual lease of sthanam lands effected by one of the Valia Rajas of Palghat. In that context, Sir Arthur Hobhouse, delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee, described a sthanam thus at p. 386:\n\n\"It appears that in the families of the Malabar Rajas it is customary to have a number of palaces, to each of which there is attached an establishment with lands for maintaining it, called by the name of a sthanam. The Palghat family have no less than nine sthanams. Each sthanam has a raja as its head or Sthanamdar. The Sthanamdar represents\n\n(r) (1881) I.L.R. 3 Mad. 141.\n\n(2) (1881) I.L.R. 3 Mad. 384.\n\nKa-val 1ppara\n\n/(ottaralhil\n\nKochuni v.\n\nState oJ M adros\n\nSubba Rao ].\n\nK nvrll,., ppa'ra\n\nf(ottar ithil\n\n/\\. ochuni\n\nv. .'i't':lfe of J\\.1ridris\n\nSubl>a Rao ],\n\nthe corpus of his sthanam much in the same way as \"· Hindu widow represents the estates which have devolved upon her, and he may alienate the property for the benefit or proper expenses of the sthanarn.\" This passage equates a sthanamdar to a Hindu widow vis-:i-vis his rights both in the matter of representation as well as his right to alienate the property pert.aining t.o the sthanam. The decision in Mahomed\n\nv. Krishnan (1 ) dealt with a suit filed by the junior members of a tarwad, which consisted of the three sthanams, against the karnavan and others, including certain persons tow horn he had alienated some tarwad propert.y, inter alia, for a declaration that the alienations were invalid as against the tarwad and for possession of thA property alienated. One of the questions raised was whether the plaintiffs were competent to maintain the suit. The suit was resisted on several grounds and one of them was that the t.arwad\n\nwas not a Malabar family in the ordinary sense of the term, but that it consisted of three sthanams and three illakur houses or sub>idiary tarwads. In considering the objections the learned Judges considered the nature of a sthanam property and made the following observations at p. 112:\n\n\"According to the custom of Malabar, the nature of stanom property is such that the present holder has in it a life interest and th\" successor derives no benefit from it during the life of his predecessor, whereas in ordinary t similar to those of the petitioner's sthanam and that the Act confers title on the junior members of tarwad in properties of such sthanams and that they form a defined section of the public. If so, a question arises whether a section of the public is \"general public \" within the meaning of Art .. 19(5).\n\nThis fell to be considered bv a fuII bench of the Calcutta High Court in l8wari \"Prasad v. N. R. Sen (1). It was contended before the foII bench of the said High Court that the words \"in the interests of the general public\" mean \"in the interests of the public of the whole of the Republic of India\". Negativing this contention, Harries, C.J., observed at p. ~78 thus;\n\n\"The phrase 'in the interests of the general public' means I think nothing more than 'in the public interest', and it may well be that legislation affecting a limited class of persons or a limited area might well be legislation in the public interests, though the public of other part;; of India might not be directly affected by such legislation. If they are indirectly affected such would be quite sufficient to make such legislation in the public interest. Legisla. tion affecting a particular class or a particular area would only directly affect the members of that class or the inhabitants of that particular area. But the removal of some serious abuse or grievance or discontent is a matter indirectly affecting the public generally. It is not in the interests of the general public or in the public interest to allow any class of persons to labour under some grievance and to be genuinely discontented. It is in the interests of the general public or in the public interest that all classes of the citizens of India are content and that their grievances should be removed. A festering sore on the human body may eventually affect the whole (I) A.I.R. 1952 Cal. 273.\n\nHavalappara\n\nHotta.rathil\n\nJld by the latter at a price to be fixed in the manner indicated. It was held that though this provision violated Art. 19(l)(f) yet it was saved by Art. 31A.\n\nIt will be seen that here the incidents of the tenure on which the landlord held the land were not altered.\n\nAfter he had been compelled to transfer the lands to his tenants, he held the remainder on the same terms as before, yet it was held that the Acts compelling the landlord to sell a part of the land held by him were saved by Art. 31A. In our view, therefore, the Act now before us is saved by Art. 31A and it cannot be declared invalid even if it violates the provisions of Arts. 19(l)(f), 14 and 31 (1) of the Constitution. In this view of the matter it is not necessary for us to consider whether the Act in fact violates Arts. 14, 19(l)(f) and 31(1) or any of them or is saved by\n\ncl. (5) of Art. 19. Next it is said that the Act. is bad as it is really an exercise by the legislature of judicial power which it does not possess and not an exercise of a legislative power at all. We are unable to hold that this is so.\n\nThere are two things in the Act on which. this contention ha• heen based. The first is that the Act has been given a retrospective operation. It is quite clear to us that that by itself does not make the Act a thing done in the exercise of judicial power.\n\nThe legislature has the power to give retrospective operation to an Act. That of course interferes with vested rights but the legislature can interfere with such rights in the exercise of its legislative power. That is not adjudicating between parties affected by the Act. It is laying down the law to be followed by\n\n(1) (1959) Supp. I S.C.R. 489.\n\n(2) [1959) Supp. I S.C.R. 748.\n\nI I\n\n3 S.C.R. SUPREME COUI{, T REPOHTl::l 951\n\ncourts in future. It is so none the less that the law is altered as from a past date.\n\nThen it is s1tid that the Act provides that it is to have effect notwithstanding any decision of the Court contrary to its provisions. That the Act no doubt does.\n\nCan it be said that it thRreby adjudicates and not legislates? In Piare Dusadh v. King Emperor(') it was pointed out that in India the legislature very often in the enactments that it makes sets aside decisions of Courts. In America a rule appears to obtain that \" Legislative action cannot be made to retroact on past controversies and to reverse decisions which the courts in the exercise of their undoubted authority have made\": Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., p. 190. It was held in Piare Dusadh's case (1) at p. 104, that this rule had no application in India.\n\nThe observation there made may be set out:-\n\n\" It is clear from the American authorities that this limitation has been derived from the interpretation placed by the American courts on what are known as the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments which provide against any person being \"deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law\". The expression \"due process of law\" has . been interpreted as referring only to ' judicial process ' and as not including legislation, ........... . ............ As this requirement had been made part of the written constitution, it followed that no enactment passed by a legislature limited by that constitution could authorise anything in violation ofit ..................... Hence the rule (stated by Cooley) that ' it would be incompetent for the legislature, by retrospective legislation, to make valid any proceedings which had been had in the courts but which were void for want of jurisdiction over the parties.' The constitutional position in India is different. \" It seems to us that this observation of the Federal Court which no doubt wa.s made with reference to the Government of India Act, 1935, applies with equal force to the position obtaining under our Constitution.\n\nIt has been held by this Court that there is no scope\n\n(1) [1944] F.C.R. 61.\n\nKavalappara\n\nKoltatuthit\n\nKoch uni v.\n\nStale of Madras\n\nSarkar j.\n\nz960\n\n!{avalappara\n\nKottarathil\n\nKochuni\n\nStale of Madras\n\nSarkar].\n\nunder our Constitution for the application of the American concept of \"due process of law\". The American cases cited in support of the contention tha.t a legislation cannot override judicial decisions therefore afford no assistance in our country. Article 31B itself provides that it would apply notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court to the contrary and it had been enacted by an Act passed by the Parliament. Thero have been many Acts passed since the Constitution came into force which contained similar provisions. In no case has it ever been contended that such an Act amounted to an exercise of the judicial function by the legislature.\n\nThe Act before us lays down a law to be applied by courts in fnture in the adjudication of disputes between parties. It also says that the courts shall apply the law notwithstanding that there is an earlier decision on the rights of the parties which are being litigated upon in a subsequent proceeding. The Act does not itself annul any decision of auy court. All that it says is that the law laid down is to be applied by courts irrespective of any previous decision. It does not in any sense adjudicate between parties. It, therefore, seems to us that the contention that the impugned Act is really an exercise of judicial power is ill-founded.\n\nIn our view, the challenge brought against the impugned Act fails.\n\nPetition No. 443 of 1955 should, therefore, be dismissed with costs.\n\nComing now to the Petition No. 40 of 1956 the petitioners here are the wife and the two daughters of the petitioner in Petition No. 443 of 1955.\n\nThe respondents are t.he junior members of the tarwad as also the Moopil Nayar. The petitioners claim as donees from the Moopil Nayar to be entitled to the sthanam lands in the Palghat area. It is not necessary for us to decide whether the petitioner in Petition No. 443of1955 h'1.d the right to make the gift in favour of his wife and daughters. That question has not been gone into by consent of the parties. If the gift is valid then what we have said earlier in connection with Petition No. 443 of 1955, will apply to this petition also and it must for the same res.son\n\n---'\\\n\nfail. If the gift is invalid, the petition must fail on the ground that the Act has not affected the petitioners' rights in any lands held by them.\n\nWe would, therefore, dismiss that petition with costs except the costs of the hearing before us for all the three petitions were heard together.\n\nLastly, we come to Petition No. 41 of 1956. This petition must clearly be dismissed. It was filed by the son of the petitioner in Petition No. 443 of 1955 claiming to be entitled to the sthanam lands situate in an area which was formerly Pi1'rt of the Cochin State. It is not in dispute that the impugned Act was never extended to that area. Therefore, whether the gift to him was valid or not, as to which we say nothing, the petitioner in this petition is not affected by that Act at all. His petition is clearly misconceived. His petition is, therefore, dismissed and he will pay the costs excepting the costs of the hearing.\n\nORDER OF COURT.\n\nIn view of the judgment of the majority, Petition No. 443 of 1955, is allowed with costs, Petition No. 40 of 1956, is allowed without costs, and Petition No. 41 of 1956, is dismissed without costs.\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX,\n\nBOMBAY\n\nTHE ELPHINSTONE SPINNING AND\n\nWEAVING MILLS LTD. (S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR and M. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.) Income-tax-Assessee incurring loss but paying dividends- Additional income-tax, liability to pay-Construction of taxing statute-Income-tax Act, I922 (XI of I922), s. 3-Finance Act, I9SI (23 of I9SI), First Schedule, Paragraph B.\n\nThe assessee had made profits during the assessment year 1951-52 but after deduction of the depreciation allowance it was found to have incurred a loss for income-tax purposes. In the same year the assessee declared dividends. The Income-tax Officer treated this amount as ' excess dividend ' and levied additional income-tax as provided in paragraph B of Part I of the First Schedule to the Indian Finance Act, 195L The assessee contended that inasmuch as there was no income at all which wa~\n\n19~0\n\nK avalappata Kottarathil Kochuni v.\n\nState of Madras\n\nSarkar }.\n\nMay 4,", "total_entities": 447, "entities": [{"text": "KA V ALAPPARA KOTTARATHIL KOCHUNI\n\nAND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 923, "end_char": 968, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KAVALAPPARA KOTTARATHIL KOCHUNI AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF MADRAS AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 970, "end_char": 1000, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF MADRAS AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAFER IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1022, "end_char": 1032, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SYED JAFFER IMAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. 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C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L.\n\nVohra, for the petitioners (In all the petitions)."}}, {"text": "P. L.\n\nVohra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12822, "end_char": 12834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L.\n\nVohra, for the petitioners (In all the petitions)."}}, {"text": "H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12885, "end_char": 12894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. Dhebar and T. M. Sen, for the State of Madras."}}, {"text": "T. M. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12899, "end_char": 12908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. Dhebar and T. M. Sen, for the State of Madras."}}, {"text": "K. V. Suryanarayana Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12936, "end_char": 12960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. V. Suryanarayana Iyer, Advocate-General for the State of Kerala and T. M. Sen, for the State of Kerala."}}, {"text": "A. V. Viswanatha Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13044, "end_char": 13067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and M. R. Krishna Pillai, for respondents Nos.", "canonical_name": "A. V. Viswanatha Sastri"}}, {"text": "M. R. Krishna Pillai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13072, "end_char": 13092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and M. R. Krishna Pillai, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Purshottam Trikamdas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13124, "end_char": 13144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Trikamdas and M. R. Krishna Pillai, for respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Purshottam Trikamdas"}}, {"text": "K. R. Krishnaswami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13251, "end_char": 13269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and K. R. Krishnaswami, for respondents Nos.", "canonical_name": "K. R. K rishnaswami"}}, {"text": "Kavalappara", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13406, "end_char": 13417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kavalappara\n\nKottarathil\n\nlfochuni\n\nState oj Mad1as\n\nKavulappa'Ta\n\nl(ottarathU\n\nKochuni\n\nv. '; tate of Mad'Tas\n\nSubba Rao ].", "canonical_name": "Kavalappara tarwad"}}, {"text": "State", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13442, "end_char": 13447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kavalappara\n\nKottarathil\n\nlfochuni\n\nState oj Mad1as\n\nKavulappa'Ta\n\nl(ottarathU\n\nKochuni\n\nv. '; tate of Mad'Tas\n\nSubba Rao ].", "canonical_name": "State of .ifartras"}}, {"text": "K. R. K rishnaswami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13557, "end_char": 13576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Trikamdas and K. R. K rishnaswami, for respondent No.", "canonical_name": "K. R. K rishnaswami"}}, {"text": "Sardar Bahadur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13700, "end_char": 13714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sardar Bahadur, for Intervener No."}}, {"text": "Imam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13857, "end_char": 13861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by Subba Rao, ; r.· The judgment of Imam and Sarkar, JJ."}}, {"text": "SuBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13907, "end_char": 13916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by Sarkar, J.\n\nSuBBA RAO, J.-These three connected petitions filed under Art.", "canonical_name": "Subba Raoj"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13965, "end_char": 13972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "March 4, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14315, "end_char": 14328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These petitions were heard by this Court on a preliminary question raised by the res- pondents and the judgment thereon was delivered on March 4, 1959."}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14544, "end_char": 14547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts have been fully stated by Das, C. J., in the prelimina.ry judgment and it would, therefore, be sufficient if the relevant facts pertaining to the ques tions raised were stated here.", "canonical_name": "Das"}}, {"text": "Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochunni @ Moopil Nair", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14747, "end_char": 14793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "443 of 1955 is Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochunni @ Moopil Nair."}}, {"text": "Malabar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14933, "end_char": 14940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He is the holder of the Kavalappara sthanam to which is attached Kavalappara estate situate in Walluvanad Taluk in the district of South Malabar."}}, {"text": "ofKavalappara Swaroopam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15028, "end_char": 15051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pre-British times the Kavalappa.ra Moopil Nair, who was the seniormost male member ofKavalappara Swaroopam (dynasty), was the ruler of Kavalappara territory."}}, {"text": "Kavalappara Moopil Nair", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15177, "end_char": 15200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Besides the Rajasthanam, the Kavalappara Moopil Nair held five other sthanams granted by the Raja of Palghat for rendering military services and two other sthanams granted to his ancestors by the Raja of Cochin for rendering similar services."}}, {"text": "Cochin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15352, "end_char": 15358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Besides the Rajasthanam, the Kavalappara Moopil Nair held five other sthanams granted by the Raja of Palghat for rendering military services and two other sthanams granted to his ancestors by the Raja of Cochin for rendering similar services."}}, {"text": "Moopil Nair", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15526, "end_char": 15537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner's immediate predecessor died in 1925 and the petitioner became the Moopil Nair of Kavalappara estate and as such the sthanee of the properties\n\nattached to the various sthanams held by him.", "canonical_name": "Moopil Nayar"}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge of Ottapalam", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16312, "end_char": 16342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "46 of 1934 in the court of the Subordinate Judge of Ottapalam for a declaration that all the properties under the management of the sthanee were tarwad properties belonging equally and jointly to the sthanee and the members of the tarwad."}}, {"text": "s11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16556, "end_char": 16559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High C.mrt of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16578, "end_char": 16598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal, the High C.mrt of Madras on April 9, 1943, allowed the appeal and reversed the decision &f the Subordinate Judge and decreed the suit."}}, {"text": "April 9, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16602, "end_char": 16615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal, the High C.mrt of Madras on April 9, 1943, allowed the appeal and reversed the decision &f the Subordinate Judge and decreed the suit."}}, {"text": "July 29, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16781, "end_char": 16794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On further appeal to the Privy Council, the Board by its judgment dated July 29, 1947, restored the judgment of the Subordinate Judge."}}, {"text": "Walluvanad Taluk", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16899, "end_char": 16915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Privy Council found that the Kavalappara estate in Walluvanad Taluk was an impartible estate and that nothing had happened to alter the original character of the property in its relation to the members of the family."}}, {"text": "Madras Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17445, "end_char": 17463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the title of the sthanee was thus established, the Madras Legislature passed the impugned Act in\n\n1955."}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17829, "end_char": 17844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sthanee\n\nKov, lrippara\n\nK oltarathil\n\nKrchuni v.\n\nState of Madras\n\nSuiba Rao].", "canonical_name": "State of .ifartras"}}, {"text": "August 3, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18435, "end_char": 18449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On\n\nAugust 3, 1955, the sthanee executed a gift deed in favour of the petitioners in the said petition in respect of properties granted to his predecessor by the Raja of Palghat."}}, {"text": "Palghat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18601, "end_char": 18608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On\n\nAugust 3, 1955, the sthanee executed a gift deed in favour of the petitioners in the said petition in respect of properties granted to his predecessor by the Raja of Palghat."}}, {"text": "Ravunniarath Rajan Menon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18749, "end_char": 18773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "41 of 1956 is filed by Ravunniarath Rajan Menon, who is the son of the sthanee."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19435, "end_char": 19442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19601, "end_char": 19611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19668, "end_char": 19675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20046, "end_char": 20054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 19 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20220, "end_char": 20239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20390, "end_char": 20400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20471, "end_char": 20481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20543, "end_char": 20553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20766, "end_char": 20776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21057, "end_char": 21064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kerala State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21548, "end_char": 21560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not disputed that, after the States J{eorganization, the provisions of the Act were not extended by any legal process to the properties situate in that area of the Kerala State\n\nwhich originally formed part of Cochin State."}}, {"text": "Cochin State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21594, "end_char": 21606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not disputed that, after the States J{eorganization, the provisions of the Act were not extended by any legal process to the properties situate in that area of the Kerala State\n\nwhich originally formed part of Cochin State."}}, {"text": "State of M", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22356, "end_char": 22366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of M adr.as\n\nSubba Raoj,\n\n1y60\n\nKoval appara\n\nKottarAhil\n\nKochuni\n\nState of .. \\!", "canonical_name": "State of .ifartras"}}, {"text": "Subba Raoj", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22375, "end_char": 22385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of M adr.as\n\nSubba Raoj,\n\n1y60\n\nKoval appara\n\nKottarAhil\n\nKochuni\n\nState of .. \\!", "canonical_name": "Subba Raoj"}}, {"text": "Art. 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22604, "end_char": 22612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23227, "end_char": 23235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Kerala", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23279, "end_char": 23294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Only in the counter filed by the State of Kerala, this contention is raised."}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23593, "end_char": 23600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24457, "end_char": 24465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25313, "end_char": 25321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25599, "end_char": 25607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art.13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25654, "end_char": 25660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 19 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25987, "end_char": 26006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26125, "end_char": 26133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26136, "end_char": 26147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26194, "end_char": 26204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26553, "end_char": 26563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26566, "end_char": 26576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26580, "end_char": 26590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kerala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27192, "end_char": 27198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(a) The expression \"estate\" shall, in relation to any local area, have the same meaning as that expression or its local equivalent has in the existing law relating to land tenures in force in that area, and shall also include any jagir, inam or muafi or other similar grants and in the States of Madras and Kerala any janmam right."}}, {"text": "Article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27837, "end_char": 27848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28225, "end_char": 28236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "articles 31A and 31B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28373, "end_char": 28393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28402, "end_char": 28416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "articles 14, 19 and 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28516, "end_char": 28538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29226, "end_char": 29234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29270, "end_char": 29281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31A(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30451, "end_char": 30462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31499, "end_char": 31511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32005, "end_char": 32013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 3I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33373, "end_char": 33383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Moor", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33811, "end_char": 33815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Moor in his \"Malabar Law and Custom\" describes it as a hereditary proprietorship."}}, {"text": "cl. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34116, "end_char": 34121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34145, "end_char": 34153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kochuni", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 35942, "end_char": 35949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K avalappnra\n\nKottarath11\n\nKochuni v.\n\nState of Madras\n\nSubba Rao].", "canonical_name": "Kochuni"}}, {"text": "Court was concerned with the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenure Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38797, "end_char": 38878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 39655, "end_char": 39661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is clear from the said Act that the provisions thereof purport to regulate the rights in respect of lands which are estates within the meaning of the law relating to land-tenures in Punjab."}}, {"text": "Art. 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39711, "end_char": 39719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court was concerned with the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenure Act", "statute": "Court was concerned with the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenure Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39946, "end_char": 39954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40543, "end_char": 40551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40809, "end_char": 40817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41600, "end_char": 41608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42093, "end_char": 42100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42214, "end_char": 42224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(l)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42252, "end_char": 42265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(l)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42415, "end_char": 42428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42448, "end_char": 42458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42719, "end_char": 42729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(l)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42759, "end_char": 42772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43018, "end_char": 43028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43154, "end_char": 43167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43413, "end_char": 43423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 31A and 31B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43813, "end_char": 43830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44365, "end_char": 44375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45064, "end_char": 45074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45990, "end_char": 45997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46049, "end_char": 46056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46820, "end_char": 46827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Coke", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46880, "end_char": 46884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "31, it is necessary to consider,\n\nin the words of Lord Coke, the following circumstances: (i) What was the law before the Act was passed;\n\n(ii) What was the mischief or defect for which the law had not provided;\n\n(iii) What remedy Parliament has appointed; and\n\n(iv) the reason of the remedy."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 47056, "end_char": 47066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "31, it is necessary to consider,\n\nin the words of Lord Coke, the following circumstances: (i) What was the law before the Act was passed;\n\n(ii) What was the mischief or defect for which the law had not provided;\n\n(iii) What remedy Parliament has appointed; and\n\n(iv) the reason of the remedy."}}, {"text": "s. 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47369, "end_char": 47374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bengal Revenue Sales Act, 1859", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47382, "end_char": 47412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47749, "end_char": 47753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Revenue Sales Act, 1859", "statute": "the Bengal Revenue Sales Act, 1859"}}, {"text": "s. 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47762, "end_char": 47767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Revenue Sales Act, 1859", "statute": "the Bengal Revenue Sales Act, 1859"}}, {"text": "s. 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47793, "end_char": 47798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Revenue Sales Act, 1859", "statute": "the Bengal Revenue Sales Act, 1859"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47818, "end_char": 47822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Revenue Sales Act, 1859", "statute": "the Bengal Revenue Sales Act, 1859"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48015, "end_char": 48019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Revenue Sales Act, 1859", "statute": "the Bengal Revenue Sales Act, 1859"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(l)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48071, "end_char": 48084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Revenue Sales Act, 1859", "statute": "the Bengal Revenue Sales Act, 1859"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48168, "end_char": 48175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Revenue Sales Act, 1859", "statute": "the Bengal Revenue Sales Act, 1859"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48292, "end_char": 48299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Revenue Sales Act, 1859", "statute": "the Bengal Revenue Sales Act, 1859"}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48463, "end_char": 48479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri, C. J., expressed his view thus at p. 618 :\n\n\"Under the Constitution of India, however, such questions must be determined with reference to the expression \" taken possession of or acquired \" as interpreted above, namely, that it must be read along with the word \"deprived\" in clause (1) and understood as having reference to such substantial abridgement of the rights of."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48536, "end_char": 48557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 49025, "end_char": 49034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K aval'1ppara\n\nFotta, ath1l Ipara\n\nJ< ottarwthil\n\nf{ochuni\n\nState of Madras\n\nSubba R, w J.\n\nTt}~O\n\nKavnloppat'a\n\nf(otta,, athil\n\nJ(ochuni v.\n\nState of Madt'as\n\nSubba Rao].", "canonical_name": "State of .ifartras"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87307, "end_char": 87317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kernla", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 87371, "end_char": 87377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19(5) of the Constitutiom\n\nThe learned Advocate-General of Kernla seeks to support the legislation on the ground that under the Marninakkathayam law, the three characteristics of properties mentioned in 13."}}, {"text": "Purshottam Tricumdas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 88263, "end_char": 88283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Purshottam Tricumdas supported the learned Advocate-General in this contention.", "canonical_name": "Purshottam Trikamdas"}}, {"text": "A. V. Viswanatha Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 88348, "end_char": 88371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, who followed him, preferred to found his contention on a broader basis, namely, that the members of a tarwad and a sthanee have some interest in each other's property and the legislation did nothing more than regulate their interest inter se to restore peace and harmony among them and to change the m11tual relationship to bring it in accord with the concept of a modern welfare State.", "canonical_name": "A. V. Viswanatha Sastri"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(l)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89067, "end_char": 89080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89085, "end_char": 89095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89288, "end_char": 89298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art.19(l)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89890, "end_char": 89902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of th') United States of America", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 91635, "end_char": 91681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Supreme Court of th') United States of America in Henry Webster v. Peter Cooper(1) observed:\n\n\"The result of the decision is, that the constitution of the State has secured to every citizen the right of acquiring, possessing, and enjoying property and that, by the true intent and meaning of this section, property cannot, by a mere act of the Legislature, be taken from one man and vested in another directly ; nor can it, by the retrospective operation of law, be indirectly transferred from one to another, or be subjected to the government of principles in a court of justice, which must necessarily produce that effect.\""}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of the United States of America", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 92350, "end_char": 92395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In The Citizens' Savings and Loan Association of Cleveland, Ohio v. Topeka City {2), the Supreme Court of the United States of America again declares the importance of individual property right thus:\n\n\" The theory of our governments, state and national, is opposed to the deposit of unlimited power anywhere."}}, {"text": "State of .ifartras", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 93304, "end_char": 93322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ka val appara\n\nKottamthil\n\n[{ochuni v.\n\nState of .ifartras\n\nSubba Rao /.\n\nKnva7appara\n\n[{ ntta1athil\n\nKrchufli\n\nState cf Modrfl.", "canonical_name": "State of .ifartras"}}, {"text": "Subba Ran", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 93398, "end_char": 93407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subba Ran ].", "canonical_name": "Subba Raoj"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93615, "end_char": 93625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93912, "end_char": 93922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93959, "end_char": 93969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94429, "end_char": 94436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "South India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 94777, "end_char": 94788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Marumakkathayam law governs a large section of people inhabiting the West Coast of South India."}}, {"text": "Sundara Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94941, "end_char": 94954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though Sundara Aiyar, J., in Krishnan Nair v. Damodaran Nair1 1) suggested that \"Malabar law is really only a school of Hindu law\", it has not been accepted by others.", "canonical_name": "Sundara Aiyar"}}, {"text": "Sundara", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95666, "end_char": 95673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "<18\n\n'' \\\n\n3 s.c.n, SUPL{E.\\IE COUltT REPOltTS 929\n\nbe enough if the relevant passages from the book \"Malabar and Aliyasanthana Law\" by Sundara .", "canonical_name": "Sundara Aiyar"}}, {"text": "Aiyar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 95677, "end_char": 95682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aiyar are cited."}}, {"text": "Sundara Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96978, "end_char": 96991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the book of Sundara Aiyar the origin, scope and mcidents of a sthanam are discussed at p. 249:\n\n\" As a technical word, ' stanom ' means a position of dignity of this kind, that is, one to which certain specific property is attached, and which passes with it, and is held by the person as the \" stani \". . ....................", "canonical_name": "Sundara Aiyar"}}, {"text": "Zamorin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 97929, "end_char": 97936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "members of the tarwad as such had no right or interest and which would pass with the Crown to his successor\" : sthanams in the families of Zamorin, Palghat, Wulluvanad and other Rajas are given as instances of this class of sthanams ; (2) \" in the case of some chieftains and public officers, sthanams were created by the ruling king, who, when he appointed the head of a particular family to an office with hereditary succession attached also certain lands for the maintenance of the officer-holder \" : Para N ambi is given as a prominent instance of this class ; and\n\n(3) \" when a family became very opulent and influential, it was sometimes deemed necessary in order to keep its social position and influence that the head should be able to maintain a certain amount of state, and for that purpose the members of the family agreed to set a part certain property for him, and such property, would descend to the head of the family for the time being\"."}}, {"text": "Palghat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 97938, "end_char": 97945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "members of the tarwad as such had no right or interest and which would pass with the Crown to his successor\" : sthanams in the families of Zamorin, Palghat, Wulluvanad and other Rajas are given as instances of this class of sthanams ; (2) \" in the case of some chieftains and public officers, sthanams were created by the ruling king, who, when he appointed the head of a particular family to an office with hereditary succession attached also certain lands for the maintenance of the officer-holder \" : Para N ambi is given as a prominent instance of this class ; and\n\n(3) \" when a family became very opulent and influential, it was sometimes deemed necessary in order to keep its social position and influence that the head should be able to maintain a certain amount of state, and for that purpose the members of the family agreed to set a part certain property for him, and such property, would descend to the head of the family for the time being\"."}}, {"text": "Wulluvanad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 97947, "end_char": 97957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "members of the tarwad as such had no right or interest and which would pass with the Crown to his successor\" : sthanams in the families of Zamorin, Palghat, Wulluvanad and other Rajas are given as instances of this class of sthanams ; (2) \" in the case of some chieftains and public officers, sthanams were created by the ruling king, who, when he appointed the head of a particular family to an office with hereditary succession attached also certain lands for the maintenance of the officer-holder \" : Para N ambi is given as a prominent instance of this class ; and\n\n(3) \" when a family became very opulent and influential, it was sometimes deemed necessary in order to keep its social position and influence that the head should be able to maintain a certain amount of state, and for that purpose the members of the family agreed to set a part certain property for him, and such property, would descend to the head of the family for the time being\"."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 100164, "end_char": 100181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the question, what would happen to the sthanam, if at the time of the death of the sthanee there was no male member in the tarwad, though he cited a decision of the Madras High Court where a subsequent born male infant was given a decree to recover the properties, he was of the view that the question was not an easy one to decide."}}, {"text": "Calicut", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 100513, "end_char": 100520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rani of Pudia Kovilagom, Calicut (1) held that according to the custom obtaining in the family of the Zamorin Rajas of Calicut, property acquired by a sthanam-holder and not merged by him in the properties of his sthanam, or otherwise disposed of by him in his lifetime, became, on his death, the property of the kovilagom in which he was born, and, if found in the possession of a member of the kovilagom, belonged presumably to the kovilagom as common property."}}, {"text": "Arthur Hobhouse", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 101542, "end_char": 101557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that context, Sir Arthur Hobhouse, delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee, described a sthanam thus at p. 386:\n\n\"It appears that in the families of the Malabar Rajas it is customary to have a number of palaces, to each of which there is attached an establishment with lands for maintaining it, called by the name of a sthanam."}}, {"text": "Malabar Rajas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 101687, "end_char": 101700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that context, Sir Arthur Hobhouse, delivering the judgment of the Judicial Committee, described a sthanam thus at p. 386:\n\n\"It appears that in the families of the Malabar Rajas it is customary to have a number of palaces, to each of which there is attached an establishment with lands for maintaining it, called by the name of a sthanam.", "canonical_name": "Malabar Rajas"}}, {"text": "Ka-val 1ppara", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 102054, "end_char": 102067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ka-val 1ppara\n\n/(ottaralhil\n\nKochuni v.\n\nState oJ M adros\n\nSubba Rao ]."}}, {"text": "karnavan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 102758, "end_char": 102766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision in Mahomed\n\nv. Krishnan (1 ) dealt with a suit filed by the junior members of a tarwad, which consisted of the three sthanams, against the karnavan and others, including certain persons tow horn he had alienated some tarwad propert.y, inter alia, for a declaration that the alienations were invalid as against the tarwad and for possession of thA property alienated."}}, {"text": "Malabar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 103474, "end_char": 103481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In considering the objections the learned Judges considered the nature of a sthanam property and made the following observations at p. 112:\n\n\"According to the custom of Malabar, the nature of stanom property is such that the present holder has in it a life interest and th\" successor derives no benefit from it during the life of his predecessor, whereas in ordinary t have been used for conveying voters to the polling station, but no prejudice was caused to the appellant as a result of that omission. In the view of the High Court the testimony of A. P. Malik, the Presiding Officer at Naholi polling station, corroborated by exh. 22, a petition submitted on the date of the polling by one Raghuraj Singh, agent of Ram Dulari, a contesting candidate, and further supported by the evidence of witness Kalika Prasad and another witness Raghuraj Singh, established that voters were conveyed in a trailer attached to a tractor, at the instance of the appellant to the Naholi polling station, and that the evidence of one Hanuman Singh established the contract of hiring the tractQr used for conveying voters to the polling station. The High Court accordingly held that the appellant had committed the corrupt practice of hiring a vehicle for conveying voters to the polling station. Against the order passed by the High Court declaring the election of the appellant void, this appeal has by special leave been filed.\n\nSection 83{l}(b) of the Representation of the People Act, as amended provides that an election petition\n\nI960 shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice\n\nShri Balwan Singh the petitioner alleges, including as full a statement as v. possible of the names of parties alleged to have com- Shri mitted such corrupt practice and the date and place Lakshmi Narain of the commission of each such practice. Section 123 sets out what shall be deemed to be corrupt practices Shah J. for the purposes of the Act, and by Cl. (5) thereof, as it stood at the material date, it was in so far as it is relevant, provided :\n\n\"The hiring or procuring, whether on payment or otherwise, of any vehicle or vessel by a candidate or his agent or by any other person for the conveyance of any elector (other than the candidate himself, the members of his family or his agent) to or from any polling station provided under section 25 or a place fixed under sub-section (1) of section 29 for the poll.\" Neither in the petition as originally filed nor as amended, the date and place of hiring the tractor which was alleged to have been used for conveying the voters, and the names of the persons between whom the contract of hiring was settled, were set out. The question which then falls to be determined is : Whether the election petition was liable to be rejected because it did not set forth particulars of the date and place of hiring the vehicle alleged to have been used in conveying voters? In the opinion of the High Court the corrupt practice described in s. 123(5) being the hiring or procuring of a vehicle for conveying voters to the polling station, in the absence of a detailed statement as to the time and place of the hiring, the petition was defective. In so opining, the High Court relied upon an earlier decision of that Court, Madan Lal v. Syed Zargham Haider and others('). In that case, Bhargava, J., delivering the judgment of the Court, observed:\n\n\" ...... under s. 123(5) of the Representation of the People Act, a corrupt practice consists in the act of hiring or procuring certain types of vehicles by a candidate or his agent or by any other person for the conveyance of any elector to or from any polling station. A corrupt practice is, therefore, . .\n\nIf) IJ E.L.R. 4~6.\n\ncommitted not by conveying the voter but by the .r96o= act of hiring or procuring the conveyance. In clause . .\n\n(b) of section 83(1), an election petitioner is required Shri BaJwan Singh to set forth full particulars of the corrupt practice s: . including as full a statement as possible of the Lakshmi ; arain names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of the com- Shah J. mission of each such practice. The language used in this provision of law requires the setting forth of the full particulars of the corrupt practice and specially mentions at least three particulars which must be given. These are the names of the parties alleged to have committed the corrupt practice, the date when the corrupt practice was committed and the place of the commission of the corrupt practice.\" Not the contract of hiring but the fact of hiring for conveying voters to and from the polling station is declared by s. 123(5) a corrupt practice. A petition which sets forth the particulars about -the use of a vehicle . for conveying voters to and from the polling station, with details as to the time and place coupled with as full a statement as possible in support of the plea that the vehicle was hired or procured by the candidate or his agent or another person substantially complies with the requirement of s. 83(l)(b). In considering whether a corrupt praetice described in s. 123(5) is committed, conveying of electors cannot be dissociated from the hiring of a vehicle. The corrupt practice being the hiring or procuring of a vehicle for the conveyance of the electors, if full particulars of conveying by a vehicle of electors to or from any polling station are given, s. 83 is duly complied with, even if the particulars of the contract of hiring, as distinguished from the fact of hiring, are not given.\n\nNormally, the arrangement for hiring or procuring a vehicle, is within the special knowledge of the parties to that agreement and it is difficult to assume that it was intended to require the petitioner in an election dispute to set out the particulars of facts within the special knowledge of the other party, and expose the petition to a penalty of dismissal if those particulars could not be given. If particulars in support of the\n\n'960 plea of the vehicle being hired or procured by the\n\nSh . B -1 - 5 . h candidate or his agent or by another person was used ri a wan ing , . .\n\nv. • for conveymg voters to or from the pollmg stat10n Sh1i are set out, failure to set out particulars of the con- Lakshmi Na1ain tract of hiring or arrangement of procuring will not\n\nShah]. render the petition defective.\n\nBy The Representation of the People Act, 1951, as amended by Act 27 of 1956, a• penalty of dismissal of a petition or the striking out of the plea of a corrupt practice merely because particulars in that behalf are not set out is not imposed. By s. 90, cl. (5) of the Act the Tribunal is authorised to allow particulars of ariy corrupt practice alleged in the petition, to be amended or amplified in such manner as 11!.ay, in its opinion, be necessary for ensuring a fair and effective trial of the petition. By s. 90( I) of the Act every election petition is, subject to the provisions of the Act and Rules made thereunder to be tried as nearly as may be in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Civil Procedure Code to the trial of suits: and for failure to furnish particulars after being so ordered but not before the Tribunal may strike out a defective plea. The practice to be followed in cases where insufficient particulars of a corrupt practice are set forth in an election petition is this.\n\nAn election petition is not liable to be dismissed in limine merely because full particulars of a corrupt practice alleged in the petition, are not set out.\n\nWhere an objection is raised by the respondent that a petition is defective because full particulars of an alleged corrupt practice are not set out, the Tribunal is bound to decide whether the objection is wellfounded. If the Tribunal upholds the objection, it should give an opportunity to the petitioner to apply for leave to amend or amplify the particulars of the corrupt practice alleged; and in the event of noncompliance with that order the Tribunal may strike out the charges which remain vague. Insistence upon full particulars of corrupt practices is undoubtedly of paramount importance in the trial of an election petition, but if the parties go to trial despite the absence of full particulars of the corrupt practice alleged, and evidence 9f the contesting parties is led on the plea\n\n-f raised by the petition, the petition cannot thereafter r96o be dismissed for want of particulars, because the defect,.,, . B -1 - 5 . k f d d f . . d. . f h .., ri a wan ing is one o proce ure an not one o Juris 1ct10n o t e v.\n\nTribunal to adjudicate upon the plea in the absence of Shri particulars. The appellate court may be justified in Lakshmi Narain setting aside the judgment of the Tribunal if it is satisfied that by reason of the absence of full parti- _. culars, material prejudice has resulted; and in considering whether material prejudice has resulted failure to raise and press the objection about the absence of particulars before going to trial must be given due weight.\n\nAssuming that in the case before us, the petition was defective because particulars as to the persons x between whom the contract of hiring was entered into, and the date and place thereof, have not been set out, the High Court was right in holding that no material prejudice was occasioned thereby. In the written statement to the petition as originally filed, it was not expressly contended that because of the absence of particulars as to the names of the persons between whom the contract of hiring took place, and\n\n_., the date and place of the contract; the appellant was unable to meet the charges made against him. Even after the petition was amended, no such objection was raised by the appellant. Before the Tribunal, at the hearing of the argument, a plea that the petition was defective, because of lack of particulars relating to the names of the persons who entered into the contract of hiring, and the time and place thereof was apparently raised. But all the evidence relating to the hiring. and the time and place thereof, was without objection admitted on the record. It is not even suggested that because of the absence of the particulars, the appellant was embarrassed in making his defence, or that he could not lead evidence relevant to the plea of corrupt pni.ctice set up by the first respondent. We are therefore unable to hold that any material pre-\n\n-I judice was occasioned because of the absence of those particulars in the petition.\n\nThe order of the Tribunal rejecting the application of the first respondent for amplification of the particulars of the corrupt practice alleged in the election\n\nShah ].\n\nr960 petition was, for reasons already set out, erroneous ;\n\nSh .B -1 - 5 . hand in that view the question whether the High Court \" a wan ing d\" t d \"t ]f h Id\" \"t If b d t th h v. mis tree e 1 se m o mg 1 se oun , a e ear- Shri ing of the appeal, by its earlier judgment delivered Lakshmi Narain on the writ petition, does not fall to be determined.\n\nShah].\n\nCounsel for the appellant urged that in any event, the High Court was not justified in disagreeing with the considered judgment of the Tribunal on questions purely of appreciation of evidence. But this appeal has been filed with special leave granted under Art.136 of the Constitution. It is the settled practice of this Court to grant leave to appeal under Art. 136 only if exceptional and special circumstances exist, or that substantial and grave injustice has been done and the case presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the decision appealed against. Merely because the appeal has been admitted by special leave, the entire case is not at large, and the appellant is not free to contest the findings of fact of the subordinate tribunals. Only those points on which special leave may initially be granted, can be urged at the final hearing; and normally, special leave will not be granted by this Court under Art 136(1) of the Constitution on a plea of error committed by the Courts below in the appreciation of evidence.\n\nThis would be sufficient to justify us in refusing to entertain the argument advanced by the counsel for the appellant. 'Ve may, however, observe that even on a review of the evidence, we are satisfied that the High Court was right in its conclusion. There was before t.he Tribunal the evidence of Mr. A. P. Malik, the Presiding Officer at the N aholi polling station, who testified that he had seen on the day of polling a tractor at a distance of 100 to 150 yards from the polling booth. The witness stated that he did not remember having seen any flag or poster on the tractor. The witness, however, had made a note in his diary about an application submitted to him by Raghuraj Singh. P. W. 30. A copy of that application has been produced, and it is recited in that application that a tractor had come to the polling booth and was parked near \"the line of yoters\"; that some persons, a majority of whom were women, were sitting on the\n\ntractor; that a red flag was hoisted and posters of the r960 socialist party were pasted on the tractor; and that - some men and women, who came on the tractor, were Shri Balwan Singh placed in the queue of voters. There was also the s~; ri evidence of Raghuraj Singh, P.W. 38, a voter in the Lakshmi Narain constituency. He stated that he had seen the tractor belonging to Chandra Bahadur Pandey of village Shah ].\n\nChapargatha, near :the polling station; that a red flag was hoisted and posters were pasted over the tractor with the symbol of a banyan tree which was the emblem of the party of the appellant. He further stated that one Kalika Prasad and some female members of his family had come on the trailer and Radhey Shyam, an agent of the appellant, had taken all these voters and had given them slips of paper. Kalika Prasad was also examined and he stated that he and his wife and several other villagers had gone to the N aholi polling station to exercise their franchise on the trailer attached to the tractor; that a red flag was hoisted and posters were pasted on the trailer; and that there was on the posters the legend that votes be cast in favour of the appellant. lt is established by unimpeachable evidence that a tractor was brought to N aholi Polling Station on the date of the polling. The Tribunal accepted the evidence of Mr. Malik, but rejected the testimony of other witnesses on somewhat fanciful theories. The Tribunal observed that at the material time no tractor was brought near the polling booth, and if one was brought, the owner of the tractor may possibly have given a free lift to the voters to the polling station and back. The Tribunal also suggested that the tractor may have been brought without the consent of the appellant or his agents. But the fact that a tractor was brought to the polling station, is clearly established by the evidence of Mr. Malik. That on the tractor was carried a red flag of the party of the appellant, is established by the evidence of th, e two witnesses, Raghuraj Singh, P.W. 30 and Raghuraj Singh P.W. 38, and also by the evidence of Kalika Prasad. It is also established on the evidence that on the tractor, were displayed posters bearing the symbol of a banyan tree, which was the election emblem of the party of the _appellant at the election. There was no\n\nz960 sufficient reason for disc11rding this testimony. Witness . - .\n\nHanuman Singh P. w. 56 deposed that he was present Shn Balwan Singh t h f th t j f th b f. h · a t e t.1me o e se t ement o e argam o irmg\n\n;~,; the tractor belonging to Chandra Bahadur for convey- Lakshmi Narain ing voters. The High Court accepted that evidence and we do not think, judged in the context of the other evidence that the High Court was in error in so doing.\n\nThe appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nSarkar J.\n\nSARKAR, J.-I agree that this appeal fails.\n\nThe appellant had been declared elected at an election. The first respondent filed an election petition under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 to to have the appellant's election declared void. Among other things it was said that the appellant had committed a corrupt practice which was described in the petition substantially in these words : In villages mentioned in annexure D the appellant hired a tractor for conveying women electors from their houses to places of polling and back.\n\nThe appellant applied to have this allegation struck out as it did not contain sufficient particulars of the corrupt practice alleged. The respondent in his turn sought permission to give particulars of this corrupt practice by amending his petition by the substitution of a new annexure to his petition marked Dl in the place of the existing annexure D. The Election Tribunal first made an order refusing the amendment and striking out the allegation as desired by the appellant. Later it made another order reviewing its earlier order and thereby cancelled that order. By this order it directed the restoration of the allegation struck out and the substitution of .annexure D by annexure D 1.\n\nThe appellant moved the High Court at Allahabad under arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution against the latter order of the Tribunal. The High Court held that the Tribunal had the power to review any order made by it and that the order made on review allowing the amendment was correct. It also held that if the Tribunal had no power of review, the High Court\n\nbeing itself seized of the matter, would be deemed to r960 have set aside the first order of the Tribunal and d d 11 . th d t Th l Shri Balwan Singh ma e an or er a owmg e amen men . . e appe - lant did not appeal from this order of the High Court. s~i The parties then went to trial before the Tribunal. Lakshmi Narain The appellant led his evidence without any objection as to the petition being defective for want of any Sarkar J. particulars. The Tribunal took the view that the corrupt practice alleged had not been proved and dismissed the petition. On appeal the High Court held that the corrupt. practice had been proved and set aside the election of the appellant. Hence this appeal. It is said that the election petition should have been dismissed because sufficient particulars of the corrupt practice alleged had not been given in the petition. The corrupt practice alleged is of the kind mentioned in s. 123 (5) of the Act which is in these words: The hiring or procuripg, whether on payment or otherwise, of any vehicle or vessel by a candidate .............. : ......... for the conveyance of any elector ............... to or from any polling station.\n\nIt is contended that the hiring of the vehicle is an essential element of the corrupt practice mentioned in this section. I am leaving out of.consideration the procuring of a vehicle because that is not the case here. It is said that the petition must, therefore, state the particulars of the date and place of the contract of hiring and the parties to it. Reference is made to s. 83 of the Act where it is provided that, \"An election petition ............ shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice that the petitioner alleges, including as full a statement as possible of the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of the commission of each such corrupt practice.\" The question thus arises whether the particulars of the parties to the contract of hiring and the date when, and the place where, it had been made should have been given.\n\nThe respondent does not deny that the particulars of the contract of hiring had not been stated in the\n\nz960 petition. According to him the corrupt practice\n\nSh .. 1- 5 . h mentioned in s. 123 (5) is not committed by the \" Ba wan ing f h\" . b b h contract o irmg ut y t e conveyance of the\n\n5v/,,; electors in a hired vehicle.\n\nHence, he says that no Lakshmi Narain question as to these particulars arises.\n\nIn my view the appellant's contention is well- Sarkar J. founded.\n\nUnder the section the hiring of the vehicle for the conveyance of electors is the corrupt practice.\n\nIt is of the essence of this corrupt practice that the vehicle must have been hired, that is to say, a contract for the hiring of the vehicle must have been made. I am unable to imagine how a vehicle can be hired without a contract. Therefore it seems to me that particulars of that contract should be given.\n\nI am also unable to appreciate the respondent's contention. It seems to me that to say that the corrupt practice is committed by the conveyance of electors in a hired vehicle is the same thing as saying that electors had been conveyed by a vehicle which had been hired, that is, a vehicle in respect of which a contract of hiring had been made. Simple conveyance of electors in a vehicle is not enough.\n\nThe vehicle must be a hired vehicle. Hence there is no corrupt practice unless the hiring of the vehicle, that is, the contract of hire in respect of it is established.\n\nWhether a simple contract of the hiring of a vehicle for the conveyance of electors without actual conveyance of them would amount to a corrupt practice or not, is a question that does not arise in this case. But it seems to me that whatever view is taken of that question, that would not make the contract of hiring any the less an essential clement of the corrupt practice described in s. 123(5).\n\nIn my view therefore the appellant was entitled to the particulars the want of which he now complains.\n\nThe question then is what is the effect of the failure to supply these particulars ? I am unable to agree that the petition was thereupon liable to be dismissed.\n\nIt has not been shown to us that the Act provides for such dismissal. Section 83 does not say that on failure to furnish the prescribed particulars the petition shall be dismissed. On the other hand, s .. 90(3) of the Act provides that, \"The Tribunal bhall\n\n...\n\n3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 105 -f dismiss an election petition which does not comply z960 with the provisions of section 81, section 82 or sec- . - . tion 117.\" This section does not include s. 83. It Shri Balwan Singh v. • therefore seems to me that the appellant was not Shri entitled to a dismissal of the petition for want of the Lakshmi Narain particulars.\n\nThe appellant was certainly entitled to apply for the particulars. I conceive he would have such a right 1lnder s. 83 and also s. 90(1) of the Act which made the provision_s of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to a trial before an Election Tribunal, in the view that I have taken, that the contract of hiring is an essential element of the corrupt practice mentioned in s. 123(5) of the Act. The appellant ' however made no such application. Instead he went to trial and led evidence without making any grievance that he was hampered in his defence for want of the particulars. He cannot at a later stage complain about the absence of the particulars. It is unnecessary to consider what would have happened if upon the appellant's application the respondent had been directed to furnish the. particulars and had\n\n.._ failed to do so, for no such order had been made.\n\nIt only remains for me to say that it is not open for the appellant to contend now that the Tribunal was wrong in reviewing its order. The High Court rejected that contention in the order made on the application under arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. For greater safety it also made an order allowing the amendment sought by the respondent.\n\nThe High Court's decision not having been questioned by the appellant by an appeal, is binding on him.\n\nHe must therefore accept the position that the amendment of the petition was proper. I may also state that if the amendment had not been properly allowed that would not have made any difference.\n\nThe only result would have been that some more particulars of the corrupt practice alleged would have been wanting. For the reasons earlier stated this would not have entailed a dismissal of the election petition.\n\nSarkar].\n\nz960 The only other point that was argued at the bar . - . was a question of fact, namely, whether the corrupt Shri Bal wan Singh practice alleged had been proved. On that point\n\n;;.,; I am in perfect agreement with the view expressed Lakshmi Narain by my learned brothers and have nothing to add.\n\nSarkar ].\n\nz960\n\nFebruary, 24\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nTHE STATE OF VINDHYA PRADESH\n\n(NOW MADHYA PRADESH)\n\nMORADHWAJ SINGH AND OTHERS\n\n(B. P. SINHA, c. J., JAFER IMAM, A. K. SARKAR, K. N. WANCHOO AND J. c. SHAH, JJ.)\n\n] agirs, Abolition of-Constitutional validity of enactment- V indhya Pradesh Abolition of J agirs and Land Reforms Act, I952\n\n(XI of I952), ss. 22(r), 37, Schedule cl. (4)(e)-Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of I908), s. 9-Constitution of India, Art. JI A. ;.\n\nThese appeals raised the question of constitutional validity of the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, 1952 (XI of 1952). Applications were made before the Judicial Commissioner under Art. 226 of the Constitution on the ground that various provisions of the Act placed unreasonable restrictions on the exercise of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The Judicial Commissioner held that the Act, excepting s. 22(1), s. 37 and cl. (4)(e) of the Schedule to the Act, was constitutionally valid. The State appealed against that part of the order which declared the three provisions unconstitutional and one of the petitioners appealed against the order declaring the rest of the Act constitutional.\n\nHeld, that the appeal OD the State must be allowed and that of the petitioner dismissed.\n\nIt was not correct to say that s. 22 of the Act, which lays down the scheme for giving effect to s. 7(a) of the Act which permits the Jagirdars to remain in possession of certain lands even after the abolition of their jagirs, is a piece of colourable legislation and, therefore, ultra vires the Legislature. That section cannot be said to discriminate as between jagirdars on the one hand and other occupants of land, to whom s. 28(1) applies, on the other, since they belong to distinct and different classes.", "total_entities": 131, "entities": [{"text": "District Judge of Poona", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 129, "end_char": 152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "District Judge of Poona continues to have jurisdiction to entertain it."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 225, "end_char": 229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "BALWAN SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 379, "end_char": 391, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Bal wan Singh", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "LAKSHMI NARAIN & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 401, "end_char": 424, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LAKSHMI NARAIN & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. 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N. Wanchoo and J.C. Shah, JJ), that the corrupt practice under s. 123(5) was the conveying of electors to and from the polling station and not the contract of hiring.", "canonical_name": "JAFER IMAM"}}, {"text": "K. N. Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1845, "end_char": 1858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jafer Imam, K. N. Wanchoo and J.C. Shah, JJ), that the corrupt practice under s. 123(5) was the conveying of electors to and from the polling station and not the contract of hiring.", "canonical_name": "K. N. WANCHOO"}}, {"text": "J.C. Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1863, "end_char": 1872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jafer Imam, K. N. Wanchoo and J.C. Shah, JJ), that the corrupt practice under s. 123(5) was the conveying of electors to and from the polling station and not the contract of hiring.", "canonical_name": "J. c. SHAH"}}, {"text": "s. 123(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1911, "end_char": 1920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Balwan Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2538, "end_char": 2550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If an objection was taken and Shri Balwan Singh the Tribunal was of the view that full particulars had not been v. set out the petitioner had to be given an opportunity to amend Shri or amplify the particulars.", "canonical_name": "Bal wan Singh"}}, {"text": "Lakshmi Narain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2747, "end_char": 2761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was only in the event of non- Lakshmi Narain compliance with the order to supply the particulars that the\n\nchare which remained vague could be struck ont.", "canonical_name": "LAKSHMI NARAIN & OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Sarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3014, "end_char": 3020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarkar J.-Under s. r23(5) the hiring of the vehicle for conveyance of electors was an essential element of the corrupt practice and it was necessary to give particulars of the contract of hiring.", "canonical_name": "Sarkar"}}, {"text": "Section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3304, "end_char": 3314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 90(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3419, "end_char": 3427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3513, "end_char": 3518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3816, "end_char": 3836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated 9th January 1959 of the Allahabad High Court in :First Appeal No."}}, {"text": "L. K. Jha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3874, "end_char": 3883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. K. Jha, P. Rama Reddy, R. K. Garg and R. Patnaik fm the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. Rama Reddy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3885, "end_char": 3898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. K. Jha, P. Rama Reddy, R. K. Garg and R. Patnaik fm the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. K. Garg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3900, "end_char": 3910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. K. Jha, P. Rama Reddy, R. K. Garg and R. Patnaik fm the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. Patnaik", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3915, "end_char": 3925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. K. Jha, P. Rama Reddy, R. K. Garg and R. Patnaik fm the appellant."}}, {"text": "G. S. Pathak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3945, "end_char": 3957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Pathak, G. N. Dikshit, Udai Pratap Singh, J. 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Dikshit, Udai Pratap Singh, J. P. Goval, M. S. Gupta and P. C. Aggarwala, fo:r respondent No."}}, {"text": "P. C. Aggarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4022, "end_char": 4037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Pathak, G. N. Dikshit, Udai Pratap Singh, J. P. Goval, M. S. Gupta and P. C. Aggarwala, fo:r respondent No."}}, {"text": "Imam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4113, "end_char": 4117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Sinha, C. J.\n\nImam, Wanchoo and Shah, JJ."}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4119, "end_char": 4126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Sinha, C. J.\n\nImam, Wanchoo and Shah, JJ."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4131, "end_char": 4135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Sinha, C. J.\n\nImam, Wanchoo and Shah, JJ."}}, {"text": "J. Sarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4165, "end_char": 4174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by\n\nShah, J. Sarkar, J. delivered a separate Judgment."}}, {"text": "J.\n\nSHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4216, "end_char": 4224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shah J.\n\nSHAH, J.-Three candidates, Balwan Singh (hereinafter referred to as the appellant), Ram Dulari and Gaya Prasad, contested the election to the U. P.\n\nLegislative Assembly from tho Akbarpur Rural Assem."}}, {"text": "Balwan Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4247, "end_char": 4259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shah J.\n\nSHAH, J.-Three candidates, Balwan Singh (hereinafter referred to as the appellant), Ram Dulari and Gaya Prasad, contested the election to the U. P.\n\nLegislative Assembly from tho Akbarpur Rural Assem.", "canonical_name": "Bal wan Singh"}}, {"text": "Ram Dulari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4304, "end_char": 4314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shah J.\n\nSHAH, J.-Three candidates, Balwan Singh (hereinafter referred to as the appellant), Ram Dulari and Gaya Prasad, contested the election to the U. P.\n\nLegislative Assembly from tho Akbarpur Rural Assem."}}, {"text": "Gaya Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4319, "end_char": 4330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shah J.\n\nSHAH, J.-Three candidates, Balwan Singh (hereinafter referred to as the appellant), Ram Dulari and Gaya Prasad, contested the election to the U. P.\n\nLegislative Assembly from tho Akbarpur Rural Assem."}}, {"text": "U. P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4362, "end_char": 4367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shah J.\n\nSHAH, J.-Three candidates, Balwan Singh (hereinafter referred to as the appellant), Ram Dulari and Gaya Prasad, contested the election to the U. P.\n\nLegislative Assembly from tho Akbarpur Rural Assem."}}, {"text": "February 28, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4524, "end_char": 4541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The polling of votes took place on February 28, 1957, and the result of the election was declared on March 2, 1957."}}, {"text": "March 2, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4590, "end_char": 4603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The polling of votes took place on February 28, 1957, and the result of the election was declared on March 2, 1957."}}, {"text": "Election Commission of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4807, "end_char": 4835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A voter named Lakshmi Narain-who will hereinafter be referred to as the first respondent-submitted an application to the Election Commission of India to declare the election of the appellant Balwan Singh\n\n.I ."}}, {"text": "District Judge, Kanpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5653, "end_char": 5675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This elec\n\ntion petition was referred for trial to the District Judge, Kanpur, who was constituted the Election Tribunal for trying the petition."}}, {"text": "July 15, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6317, "end_char": 6330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 15, 1957, the first respondent applied for leave to amplify the particulars set out in the various clauses of para."}}, {"text": "July 29, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7218, "end_char": 7231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 29, 1957, the Election Tribunal\n\nShah ]."}}, {"text": "Election Tribunal\n\nShah ].\n\nr96o", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7237, "end_char": 7269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 29, 1957, the Election Tribunal\n\nShah ]."}}, {"text": "Section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7607, "end_char": 7617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7632, "end_char": 7664, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "September 9, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7826, "end_char": 7843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Relying upon a judgment of the Allahabad High Court delivered on September 9, 1957, Mubarak Mazdoor v. K. K. Banerji and another (1) in which, the practice to be followed in dealing with allegations of corrupt practices, made in an election petition, on the ground of vagueness, was enunciated the first respondent applied for review of that order."}}, {"text": "EJection Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8114, "end_char": 8131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The EJection Tribunal, by its order, dated September 13, 1957, accepted the plea of the first respondent for review of the order, and directed that the order dated July 29, 1957, be set aside."}}, {"text": "September 13, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8153, "end_char": 8171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The EJection Tribunal, by its order, dated September 13, 1957, accepted the plea of the first respondent for review of the order, and directed that the order dated July 29, 1957, be set aside."}}, {"text": "Art. 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8332, "end_char": 8340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8369, "end_char": 8406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "227 of the Constitution, to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, challenging the correctness and propriety of the order of the Election Tribunal reviewing its order dated July 29, 1957."}}, {"text": "Art. 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8993, "end_char": 9001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9634, "end_char": 9640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Balwan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9646, "end_char": 9652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "h observed that the corrupt practice described in s. 123 Shri Balwan ing\n\n(5) of the Representation of the People Act, lies in the .;", "canonical_name": "Bal wan Singh"}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9669, "end_char": 9701, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 116A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10247, "end_char": 10254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court Qf Judicature at Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10344, "end_char": 10381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In an appeal under s. 116A of the Respresentation of the People Act, against the order of the Election Tribunal the High Court Qf Judicature at Allahabad set aside the order and declared the election of the appellant void."}}, {"text": "A. P. Malik", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10786, "end_char": 10797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the view of the High Court the testimony of A. P. Malik, the Presiding Officer at Naholi polling station, corroborated by exh."}}, {"text": "Naholi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10824, "end_char": 10830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the view of the High Court the testimony of A. P. Malik, the Presiding Officer at Naholi polling station, corroborated by exh."}}, {"text": "Raghuraj Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10928, "end_char": 10942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "22, a petition submitted on the date of the polling by one Raghuraj Singh, agent of Ram Dulari, a contesting candidate, and further supported by the evidence of witness Kalika Prasad and another witness Raghuraj Singh, established that voters were conveyed in a trailer attached to a tractor, at the instance of the appellant to the Naholi polling station, and that the evidence of one Hanuman Singh established the contract of hiring the tractQr used for conveying voters to the polling station."}}, {"text": "Kalika Prasad", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11038, "end_char": 11051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "22, a petition submitted on the date of the polling by one Raghuraj Singh, agent of Ram Dulari, a contesting candidate, and further supported by the evidence of witness Kalika Prasad and another witness Raghuraj Singh, established that voters were conveyed in a trailer attached to a tractor, at the instance of the appellant to the Naholi polling station, and that the evidence of one Hanuman Singh established the contract of hiring the tractQr used for conveying voters to the polling station."}}, {"text": "Hanuman Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11255, "end_char": 11268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "22, a petition submitted on the date of the polling by one Raghuraj Singh, agent of Ram Dulari, a contesting candidate, and further supported by the evidence of witness Kalika Prasad and another witness Raghuraj Singh, established that voters were conveyed in a trailer attached to a tractor, at the instance of the appellant to the Naholi polling station, and that the evidence of one Hanuman Singh established the contract of hiring the tractQr used for conveying voters to the polling station."}}, {"text": "Section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11652, "end_char": 11662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11676, "end_char": 11708, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12065, "end_char": 12076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12564, "end_char": 12574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12617, "end_char": 12627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13205, "end_char": 13214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhargava", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13549, "end_char": 13557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case, Bhargava, J., delivering the judgment of the Court, observed:\n\n\" ...... under s. 123(5) of the Representation of the People Act, a corrupt practice consists in the act of hiring or procuring certain types of vehicles by a candidate or his agent or by any other person for the conveyance of any elector to or from any polling station."}}, {"text": "s. 123(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13627, "end_char": 13636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13644, "end_char": 13676, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 83(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14062, "end_char": 14075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "BaJwan Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14117, "end_char": 14129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(b) of section 83(1), an election petitioner is required Shri BaJwan Singh to set forth full particulars of the corrupt practice s: .", "canonical_name": "Bal wan Singh"}}, {"text": "s. 123(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14894, "end_char": 14903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 83(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15292, "end_char": 15303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15360, "end_char": 15369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15658, "end_char": 15663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "By The Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16604, "end_char": 16649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 90", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16850, "end_char": 16855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "By The Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "By The Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s. 90( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17116, "end_char": 17125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "By The Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "By The Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Art.136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21520, "end_char": 21527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21621, "end_char": 21629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art 136(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22201, "end_char": 22211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A. P. Malik", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22617, "end_char": 22628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was before t.he Tribunal the evidence of Mr. A. P. Malik, the Presiding Officer at the N aholi polling station, who testified that he had seen on the day of polling a tractor at a distance of 100 to 150 yards from the polling booth."}}, {"text": "N aholi polling station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22659, "end_char": 22682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was before t.he Tribunal the evidence of Mr. A. P. Malik, the Presiding Officer at the N aholi polling station, who testified that he had seen on the day of polling a tractor at a distance of 100 to 150 yards from the polling booth."}}, {"text": "Lakshmi Narain", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23549, "end_char": 23563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was also the s~; ri evidence of Raghuraj Singh, P.W. 38, a voter in the Lakshmi Narain constituency."}}, {"text": "Chandra Bahadur Pandey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23630, "end_char": 23652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He stated that he had seen the tractor belonging to Chandra Bahadur Pandey of village Shah ].", "canonical_name": "Chandra Bahadur Pandey"}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23664, "end_char": 23668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He stated that he had seen the tractor belonging to Chandra Bahadur Pandey of village Shah ]."}}, {"text": "Kalika Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23894, "end_char": 23907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He further stated that one Kalika Prasad and some female members of his family had come on the trailer and Radhey Shyam, an agent of the appellant, had taken all these voters and had given them slips of paper."}}, {"text": "Radhey Shyam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23974, "end_char": 23986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He further stated that one Kalika Prasad and some female members of his family had come on the trailer and Radhey Shyam, an agent of the appellant, had taken all these voters and had given them slips of paper."}}, {"text": "Malik", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24608, "end_char": 24613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal accepted the evidence of Mr. Malik, but rejected the testimony of other witnesses on somewhat fanciful theories."}}, {"text": "Balwan Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 25716, "end_char": 25728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hanuman Singh P. w. 56 deposed that he was present Shn Balwan Singh t h f th t j f th b f. h · a t e t.1me o e se t ement o e argam o irmg\n\n;~,; the tractor belonging to Chandra Bahadur for convey- Lakshmi Narain ing voters."}}, {"text": "Chandra Bahadur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25831, "end_char": 25846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hanuman Singh P. w. 56 deposed that he was present Shn Balwan Singh t h f th t j f th b f. h · a t e t.1me o e se t ement o e argam o irmg\n\n;~,; the tractor belonging to Chandra Bahadur for convey- Lakshmi Narain ing voters.", "canonical_name": "Chandra Bahadur Pandey"}}, {"text": "SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26106, "end_char": 26112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarkar J.\n\nSARKAR, J.-I agree that this appeal fails.", "canonical_name": "Sarkar"}}, {"text": "first respondent filed an election petition under the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26210, "end_char": 26302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "High Court at Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27369, "end_char": 27392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant moved the High Court at Allahabad under arts."}}, {"text": "arts. 226 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27399, "end_char": 27416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28620, "end_char": 28626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29253, "end_char": 29258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29967, "end_char": 29973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31629, "end_char": 31638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31978, "end_char": 31988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32288, "end_char": 32298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32300, "end_char": 32310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32366, "end_char": 32371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32650, "end_char": 32655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 90(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32665, "end_char": 32673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32715, "end_char": 32742, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 123(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32914, "end_char": 32923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "arts. 226 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33630, "end_char": 33647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bal wan Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 34401, "end_char": 34414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was a question of fact, namely, whether the corrupt Shri Bal wan Singh practice alleged had been proved.", "canonical_name": "Bal wan Singh"}}, {"text": "STATE OF VINDHYA PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34638, "end_char": 34662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF VINDHYA PRADESH\n\n(NOW MADHYA PRADESH)\n\nMORADHWAJ SINGH AND OTHERS\n\n(B. P. SINHA, c. J., JAFER IMAM, A. K. SARKAR, K. N. WANCHOO AND J. c. SHAH, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "MORADHWAJ SINGH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34686, "end_char": 34701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF VINDHYA PRADESH\n\n(NOW MADHYA PRADESH)\n\nMORADHWAJ SINGH AND OTHERS\n\n(B. P. SINHA, c. J., JAFER IMAM, A. K. SARKAR, K. N. WANCHOO AND J. c. SHAH, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "J. c. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34779, "end_char": 34789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF VINDHYA PRADESH\n\n(NOW MADHYA PRADESH)\n\nMORADHWAJ SINGH AND OTHERS\n\n(B. P. SINHA, c. J., JAFER IMAM, A. K. SARKAR, K. N. WANCHOO AND J. c. SHAH, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "J. c. SHAH"}}, {"text": "ss. 22(r), 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34937, "end_char": 34950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Abolition of-Constitutional validity of enactment- V indhya Pradesh Abolition of J agirs and Land Reforms Act", "statute": "Abolition of-Constitutional validity of enactment- V indhya Pradesh Abolition of J agirs and Land Reforms Act"}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34972, "end_char": 34995, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35013, "end_char": 35017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Abolition of-Constitutional validity of enactment- V indhya Pradesh Abolition of J agirs and Land Reforms Act", "statute": "Abolition of-Constitutional validity of enactment- V indhya Pradesh Abolition of J agirs and Land Reforms Act"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35018, "end_char": 35039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35263, "end_char": 35271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "These appeals raised the question of constitutional validity of the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, 1952", "statute": "These appeals raised the question of constitutional validity of the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35503, "end_char": 35511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "These appeals raised the question of constitutional validity of the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, 1952", "statute": "These appeals raised the question of constitutional validity of the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35513, "end_char": 35518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "These appeals raised the question of constitutional validity of the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, 1952", "statute": "These appeals raised the question of constitutional validity of the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35915, "end_char": 35920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "These appeals raised the question of constitutional validity of the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, 1952", "statute": "These appeals raised the question of constitutional validity of the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 7(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35981, "end_char": 35988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "These appeals raised the question of constitutional validity of the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, 1952", "statute": "These appeals raised the question of constitutional validity of the Vindhya Pradesh Abolition of Jagirs and Land Reforms Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 28(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36311, "end_char": 36319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_953_967_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "---'\\\n\n3 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 953\n\nfail. If the gift is invalid, the petition must fail on the ground that the Act has not affected the petitioners' rights in any lands held by them.\n\nWe would, therefore, dismiss that petition with costs except the costs of the hearing before us for all the three petitions were heard together.\n\nLastly, we come to Petition No. 41 of 1956. This petition must clearly be dismissed. It was filed by the son of the petitioner in Petition No. 443 of 1955 claiming to be entitled to the sthanam lands situate in an area which was formerly Pi1'rt of the Cochin State. It is not in dispute that the impugned Act was never extended to that area. Therefore, whether the gift to him was valid or not, as to which we say nothing, the petitioner in this petition is not affected by that Act at all. His petition is clearly misconceived. His petition is, therefore, dismissed and he will pay the costs excepting the costs of the hearing.\n\nORDER OF COURT.\n\nIn view of the judgment of the majority, Petition No. 443 of 1955, is allowed with costs, Petition No. 40 of 1956, is allowed without costs, and Petition No. 41 of 1956, is dismissed without costs.\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX,\n\nBOMBAY\n\nTHE ELPHINSTONE SPINNING AND\n\nWEAVING MILLS LTD. (S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR and M. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.) Income-tax-Assessee incurring loss but paying dividends- Additional income-tax, liability to pay-Construction of taxing statute-Income-tax Act, I922 (XI of I922), s. 3-Finance Act, I9SI (23 of I9SI), First Schedule, Paragraph B.\n\nThe assessee had made profits during the assessment year 1951-52 but after deduction of the depreciation allowance it was found to have incurred a loss for income-tax purposes. In the same year the assessee declared dividends. The Income-tax Officer treated this amount as ' excess dividend ' and levied additional income-tax as provided in paragraph B of Part I of the First Schedule to the Indian Finance Act, 195L The assessee contended that inasmuch as there was no income at all which wa~\n\n19~0\n\nK avalappata Kottarathil Kochuni v.\n\nState of Madras\n\nSarkar }.\n\nMay 4,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [l9fjUj\n\nIy6o taxable the words \"on the total income\" in pa.ragraph B did not apply to it and no additional income-tax could be levied. co1nniissironer of fhe appellant, relying on the proviso to paragraph B, contended\n\nJncorne Ta~. that additional income-tax was imposed on excess dividend and Bombay if excess dividend was paid out, the liability to tax arose: v.\n\nHeld, that the assessee was notliable to pay additional income- Etphinstone tax. The liability to tax was imposed by s. 3 of, the Income-tax 'P'\"\"'i!J¥/'\"i d Act and the Finance Act merely laid down the rates at which tax Weaving tl s 1 was to be levied on the total income. If there was no income there was no question of applying a rate to the \"total income\" and no income-tax or super-tax could possibly result.\n\nThe word \"additional\" in the expression \"additional income-tax\" implied that there was a tax before. The expressions \"charge on the total income \" and \"profits liable to tax \" in paragraph B contemplated only those cases where there was income and not cases where there was loss.\n\nConsequently the expression \"dividends payable out of such profits\" could only apply when there were profits and not.when there were no profits. The imposition of additional income-tax was conditioned by the existence.of income and profits. The legislature used language appropriate to income and applied the rate to the \"total income\". Where there was no total income the law could not apply and the courts could not be asked to supply the omission made by the legislature or to delete or to modify any words. If the words of a taxing statute failed then so did the tax. The courts could not, except rarely and in clear cases, help the draftsman by a favourable construction.\n\nCurtis v. Stovin, (r889) 22 Q.B. 5r3, Commissioner of Incometax v. Teja Singh, [r959] 35 I.T.R. 408 S.C., Whitney v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, (r925) IO T.C. 88, special Commissioners of Income Tax v. Linsleys, Ltd., (r958) 37 T.C. 677 and Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. South Georgia Co. Ltd. (r958) 37 T.C. 725, distinguished.\n\nThe Cape Brandy Syndicate v. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue, (r920) r2 T.C. 358 and Wolfson v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, (r949) 3r T.C. r4r, referred to.\n\nThe proviso to paragraph B prescribed varying rates for varying circumstances; it dealt with rates alone and not with the chargeability to tax. There were no words in this proviso making the excess dividend into income or subjecting it to tax independently of the charge to tax on the total income.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 427 of 1957.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated September 9, 1955, of the Bombay High Court in Income-tax Reference No. 31/X of 1954.\n\nK. N. Rajagopal Sastri and D. Gupta, for the appellant.\n\nN. A. Palkhivala, S. N. Andley and J. B. Dadachanji, for the respondents and intervener.\n\nr--·\n\n--'1\n\n~ S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPOR1'S 955\n\n1960. May 4. The Judgment of the Court was\n\nI960\n\ndelivered by Commissioner of HIDAYATULLAH, , J.-The High Court of Bombay in Income Tax, n. reference under s. 66( 1) of the Indian Income-tax Bombay Act by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Bombay, Elphv. 1 was referred the following two questions for decision: spin~7~;'; f.\n\n(1) Whether the assessee Company was liable to pay Weaving Mills Ltd. additional income-tax ? and - H idayatullah J.\n\n(2) If the answer to question No. 1 is in the affirmative, whether the levy of the additional income.tax is ultra vire8 ?\n\nThe High Court answered the first question in the negative and in the circumstances, left the second question unanswered. This appeal is against the judgment and order of the High Court on a certificate granted by it. The Commissioner of Income-tax is the appellant, and the Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd., Bombay (the assessee Company) is the respondent.\n\nThe facts may now be stated briefly. For the assessment year 1951-52 (the previous year .being the calendar year 1950), the tss.essee Company was found to have incurred a loss of Rs. 2,19,848 and was thus adjudged to be not liable to income-tax. In that year, the assessee Company had made profits, but the depreciation allowance under the Income-tax Act came to Rs. 7,84,063, thus converting the profit into loss for income-tax purposes. In the same year, the assessee Company declared dividends a.mounting to Rs. 3,29,062. The Income-tax Officer treated this amount as •excess dividend' and levied additional income-tax as provided in Paragraph B of Part I of the First Schedule to the Indian Finance Act, 1951.\n\nThis additional income-tax was computed to be Rs. 41,132-12-0. The contention of the assessee Company that it was not liable to pay additional incometax was not accepted by the Tribunal, but the High Court, on an examination of the relevant provisions and the scheme of the Indian Income-tax Act and the Finance Act, 1951, held that it was sound.\n\nHence this appeal by the Commissioner of Income-tax.\n\nWe are concerned with the Finance Act, 1951, and Paragraph B of the First Schedule reads :\n\nCommissioner of Income Tax,\n\nBombay\n\nElphinston8 Spinning &\n\nWaving 1W-1lls Ltd.\n\nHidayatullah .f,\n\n\"B. In the case of every company-\n\nOn the whole of total income\n\nRate Surcharge Four annas one-twentieth in the of the rate rupee specified in the preceding column: Provided that in the case of a company which, in respect of its profits liable to tax under t'he Income-tax Act for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1952, has made the prescribed arrangements for the declaration and payment within the territory of India excluding the State of J ammu and Kashmir, of the dividends payable out of such profits, and has deducted super-tax from the dividends in accordance with the provisions of subsection (3D) or (3E) of section 18 of the Act--\n\n(i) Where the total income, as reduced by seven annas in the rupee and by the amount, if any, exempt from income-tax, exceeds the amount of any dividends (including dividends payable at a fixed rate) declared in respect of the whole or part of the previous year for the assessment for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1952, and no order has been made under sub-section (1) of section 23A of the Income-tax Act, a rebate shall be allowed at the rate of one anna per rupee on the amount of such excess;\n\n(ii) Where the amount of dividends referred to in clause (i) above exceeds the total mcome as reduced by seven annas in the rupee and by the amonnt, if any, exempt from income-tax, there shall be charged on the total income an rtdditional income-tax equal to the sum, if any, by which the aggregate amount of income-tax actually borne by such excess (hereina.fter referred to as' the excess dividend') falls short of the amount calculated at the rate of five annas per rupee on the excess dividend.\n\nFor the purposes of the above proviso, the expression 'dividend' shall have the meaning assigned to it in clause ·(6A) of section 2 of the Income-tax Act, but any distribution included in that expression,\n\nmade during the year ending on the 31st day of 1 960 March, 1952, shall be deemed to be a dividend Commissioner of declared in respect of the whole or part of the Income Ta,., previous year. fl, mbay For the purposes of clause (ii) of the above v.\n\nElphinstone proviso, the aggregate amount of income-tax actually spinning a;. borne by the excess dividend shall be determined as We •ving Mills Ltd. follows:- H idayatullah J. (i} the excess dividend shall be deemed to be out of the whole or such portion of the undistributed profits of one or more years immediately preceding the previous year as would be just sufficient to cover the amount of the excess dividend and as have not likewise been taken into account to cover an excess dividend of a preceding year;\n\n(ii) such portion of the excess dividend as is deemed to be out of the undistributed profits of each of the said years shall be deemed to have borne tax,- ( a) if an order has been made under sub-section (1) of section 23A of the Income-tax Act, in respect of the undistributed profits of that year, at the rate of five annas in the rupee, and\n\n(b) in respect of any other year, at the rate applicable to the total income of the company for that year reduced by the rate at which rebatP, if any, was allowed on the undistributed profits.\" The contention of the assessee Company was that inasmuch as there was no income at all which was taxable, the words \"on the total income\" did not apply to it and no additional income-tax could be charged.\n\nThe Tribunal interpreted the Paragraph to cover even a case where there was a loss holding that ' even a loss may be a total income', because if total income had to be computed in the manner laid down in the Indian Income-tax Act, the total income might be a negative figure. The Tribunal also held that inasmuch as excess dividends were to be deemed to have come out of the undistributed profits of the preceding year or years and such undistributed profits were available, the assessee Company was liable. The High Court dicl not accept these rea'lom, and reluctantly held, for reasons which may not be detailed at the present\n\nlf\n\n196o moment., that the assessee Company did not come within the letter of the law, however much the inten- Comw.issinner of • b d 1 Tneome Tax, tion might have een to impose an a ditionn.\n\nRmbay income-tax under such circumstances.\n\nThe Commisv. sioner now contends that the High Court ought to\n\nfff;~7~~'J:, have read the Paragraph B as modified by the inte11- W\"ving Mills Ltd. tion or to have treated it as an independent charging section.\n\nHid•yatullah .f.\n\nThe liability to tax is imposed not by the Finance Act but by the Indian Income-tax Act.\n\nSection 3 of the latter Act is the charging section, and it provides that the tax shonld be collected at such rate or rates on the total income as laid down in any Central Act.\n\nThe Finance Act is an annual Act prescribing the rate or rates.\n\nWe are concerned with the Finance Act, 1951.\n\nSection 2 of .the ]'inance Act prescribes the rates of income-tax by its Firs!• Schedule, and by the seventh sub.section of that section provides:\n\n\"For the purposes of this section and of the rates of tax imposC'd thereby, the expression 'total income' means total income as determined for the purposes of income-tax or super-tax, as the case may be, in accordance with the provisions of the Income-tax Act-..\" It is thus clear from this that if there is no income, there is no question of applying a rate to the 'total income' and no income-tax or super-tax can possibly result. The Commissioner, however, relies upon the proviso to Paragraph B of the ]'irst Schedule, and says that the tax is imposed on excess dividend and if excess dividend is paid out, the liability to tax must arise.\n\nThe proviso was framed to discourage the paying of large dividends quite disproportionate to the income. For this purpose, a ceiling was laid down.\n\nThat ceiling was nine annas in the rupee of the total income reduced by any portion of that income which was exempt from income-tax. If only nine annas in the rupee from the income were .paid as dividend, there were no consequences in law. If, however, the dividends paid amounted to less, a rebate of one anna in the rupee in the tax was given. This was provided by the first part of the proviso. There was,\n\n_ _,;\n\nhowever, a provision for enhanced tax in the second x96o part, which worked the other way round.\n\nWhere the dividend distributed exceeded the total income as co;:r;;,;::; 0 ;~,:. 01 reduced by seven annas in the rupee, there was Eom.iaii ch:uged on the total income an additional income-tax v, 1 h 'f b h\" Eiphinstone equa to t e sum, 1 any, y w ich the aggregate spinning o;, amount of income-tax actually borne by such excess Weaving Mills Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the \"excess dividend\") falls short of the amount calculated at the rate of five Hidayatullak J. annas per rupee on the exr:ess dividend. In simpler language, there was a rebat J of one anna on anything saved from 9/16th of the total income, and there was an extra payment of one anna on the amount paid in excess of it. The income-tax, in either event, was payable on the total income and the additional income .. tax on the excess dividends.\n\nNow, the difficulty arises in applying this proviso.\n\nWhere there is a total income and there is a payment of dividend either more or less than the limit fixed, one can easily find the figures by which the total income as reduced exceeds or falls short of the dividends and the additional tax that has to be paid.\n\nBut when the total income is a negative figure and no tax on the total income is levied, the words of the second part of the Paragraph 'total income ', 'profits liable to tax', 'dividends payable out of such profits ' and 'an additional income-tax', cease to have the meaning they were intended to convey. The Commissioner contends that some of these words may be ignored as being surplusage or a drafting error, and refers to rulings in which such a course was adopted.\n\nThe first case he relies on is Curtis v. Stovin (1). In that case, the words of the statute were :\n\n\"It shall be lawful for either party to the action ... to apply to a judge of the High Court ... to order such action to be tried in any court in which the action might have been commenced, or in any court convenient thereto ... \" The word \" court\" was defined as \" county court \" in that statute. Lord Es her, M.R., held that the words should be extended to mean \"in any county court in which, if it had been a county court action, the action\n\n(1) \\1889) 22 QB. 513.\n\n1960 might have commenced\". The ambiguity which would have otherwise arisen was removed by taking aid from Comniissio11er of l I Income Tax, the a ternative c ause \"or in any court. convenient Bombay there-to\" which referred to locality, and it was said that v. the first clause meant a county court in the district of.\n\nfff;!~~~n;,, whch the parties resided, or in which one of them Weaving Mills Ltd. resided. In that case, however, there were determinative words helping construction. It is to he Hidayatullah J. noticed that Lord Esher, M. B., also warned a.gainst doing by construction what only a legislature could do by enactment, in the following words:\n\n\"It is, no doubt, very easy for a judge to say that he is introducing words into an Act only by way of construing it, while he is really making a new Act.\" The words \"if it had been a county court action \" which were read as implicit in the section were necessary to give a sensible meaning consistent with the intention expressed by other clear words.\n\nThe above case was applied and followed in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Teja Singh('), which is next relied upon. In that case, the construction, if literally made, was apt to make one section nugatory. This Court laid down that \"a construction which leads to such a result must, if that is possible, be avoided \". It, however, quoted also the observations of Lord Dunedin in Whitney v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (') that:\n\n~ A statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretation thereof by a court should be to secure that object, unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable.\" The next case relied upon is Special Commissioners of Income-tax v. Linsleys Ltd. (3). It dealt with an obvious drafting error. Section 68(2) of the English FinanceAct, 1952, contained a reference to Paragraph (a) of the proviso to sub.s. (2) of s. 262 of the lncometax Act, 1952, and the section went on to say of that Paragraph parenthetically \"which relates to the deductions allowable in computing the actual income from all sources of an investment company in relation to which a direction is in force under sub-section 1 of\n\n(t) [t959l 35 I.T.R, ~08 S, C,\n\n(2) (r925) 10 T.C. 88, no. (>) (ro58) 37 T. C. 677,\n\n',-\n\nthat section\".\n\nAs a summary of Paragraph (a), it was entirely wrong and mi;; leading.\n\nSince the Paragraph was there for every one to read, the draftsman's summary of it in the brackets was not accepted.\n\nLord Reid observed :\n\nCommissioner of Income Tax,\n\nBombay v.\n\nElphinstone \" The difficulLy does not arise from the enacting Spinning & wordi3 but from the words in brackets which purport Weaving Mills Ltd. to describe the proviso to Section 262(2) of the -- H idayatullah J.\n\nIncome Tax Act, 1952. Those words could well be held to support the view of the Court of Appeal, but they seem to me to be a misdescription of the proviso to Section 262(2).\n\nThis is one of the places where I think that obscurity bas resulted from a failure of the draftsman to anticipate a case like the present-as I have said, a very natural failure.\n\nIn fact the proviso merely deals with the deductions to be allowed in computing actual income. But the words in brackets in Section 88(2) refer to deductions in computing actual income of a company 'in relation to which a direction is in force' under Section 262(1). It would seem that these words have crept in because the draftsman assumed that a direction would always be given automatically in the case of an investment company and did not realise that a computation must first be made to determine whether the company has in fact any actual income. Whether that be the true explanation or not, I cannot regard the presence of these words in brackets, which are mere description, as of much weight in comparison with the other considerations to which I have referred.\" If the section was there, its meaning could be taken from the words used there and not from a description of what it enacted, put parenthetically in another statute. The case cited is hardly in point.\n\nThe last case cited is Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. South Georgia Co. Ltd. (1 ).\n\nThe words of a proviso there construed, ran as follows:\n\n\"Provided that where the said gross relevant distributions exceed the profits computed without ahatement and including franked investment income,\n\n'960 the net relevant distributions shall be ... \"\n\n(S. 34(2)\n\nCommiSinneY of\n\ntncnme Ta•. by the existence of income and profits, to the totalof Rombay which income the rate is made applicable. Unless some\n\nElhh;~,10n, other amount., not strictly income, is by law deemed spinnin< & to be income. (see fo, r example, McGregor & Balfour Weavin< Mill.< Lid. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income.tax (1) ), we cannot im1Jrove the existing law by deeming it to be so by Hidayatullah .f, our interpretation.\n\nThe Commissioner next contends that the proviso speaks of excess dividends, which means that dividends in excess of the permissible limits have been paid. He says that where the income is nil or a negative figure, whatever is paid is excess dividend, and indeed, the Tribunal also felt that the excess dividends in this case were more because of the loss sustained. This argument has a familiar ring, It is really that \"you can have more than nothing\".\n\nReference was made in this connection to Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. South Georgia Co. Ltd.(') where Lord Simonds observed at p. 736:\n\n\"Upon this proviso, interpreted in the light of Paragi:aph 7 of the Schedule as amended, the Crown makes a very simple case: upon the undisputed figures the gross relevant distributions were £ 181,000, and the profit, s including franked investment income were nil (I may interpolate that the reference to abatement may throughout be disregarded) : therefore the net relevant distribution must be the excess of £ 181,000 over nil, i.e., £ 181,000: nothing has to be brought in under (a) of the proviso, for there were no profits.\" Jteliance was also placed upon the observations at p. 737 (ibid) where it was observed :\n\n\"The learned Dean of Faculty on behalf of the Respondents urged, in support of the construction that he invited your Lordships to adopt, that it was really meaningless to speak of a nil profit or of adding something to it, and this plea found favour with the Lord President. As I understood it, this was only relevant if the view was accepted that there were two separate operations and not a single\n\n(t) [tq50] 36 !.T.R. 65 S.C.\n\n(2) (1958] 37 T.C. 725\n\nJ -\n\ncomputation. In the view which I take, therefore, 196? it does not arise, but I think it right to say that I see no impropriety of language in speaking of a Commissioner of Incmne Tax, nil profit where the question is whether any or what Bombay profit has been made. And the answer would be v.\n\nElphinstone equally valid in the case of an exact balance or spinning o;. of a loss.\" Weaving Milts Ltd.\n\nThese passages were used in the other case decided Hidayatullah J. today, in which there were no profits of the previous yea.rs.\n\nThere is, however, this difficulty that there the tax was laid on the net relevant distribution, and it was conceded that no charge could be imposrd if the proviso was inapplicable (see p. 736).\n\nThe provisions of Paragraph 7 of the Schedule as amended by s. 32 of the English Finance Act, 1947, were entirely different, and the proviso to s. 34(2) of the English Act was held applicable. The scheme of the provisions we are interpreting is entirely different. Reliance was also placed upon Rajputana Agencies Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax (1), but we find nothing there to support the appellant's case.\n\nSimilarly, in ~JYl cGregor and Balfour Ltd. v. Oommis8ioner of Income-tax (2), the words were held to be apt 'to impose a charge'. It is obvious enough that unless they were so or unless the Act covered the instant cases, the tax must fail.\n\nThe gist of the matter is not the possibility of an arithmetical calculation as in the English case.\n\nThe rate in the proviso is applicable to the 'total income ' though after the application of a simple arithmetical calculation.\n\nThe ' total income', however, is still the total income as determined for the purpose of incometax, and in the case of businesses, the rules require that the total income shall not include the depreciation allowance. By the application of those rules if the total income ceases to exist, the second paragraph of the proviso, as it is worded, ceases to be workable.\n\nAll the four expressions to which we have referred earlier cease to have natural meaning, and the Commissioner is again driven to contend that we must delete the offending words or suitably modify them.\n\nThis we are not prepared to do, because the intention might well have been not to comprehend such cases.\n\n{l) [1959] 35 I.T.R. lE8.\n\n(2) [1959] 36 I.T.R. 65 S.C.\n\nz96o The Commissioner next contends that we may treat\n\nCommissioner of this as an independent charging section and give effect Income Tax, to it. The proviso is to Paragraph B in the First\n\nBo~~''Y Schedule of the Finance Act, and the Schedule only Elphinstone imposes a rate of tax and this rate, either by itself or\n\nW Spi••ning & with rebate or with additional tax at a higher rate, eavrng M, lls Ltd. h b l' d h ) Th __ as to e a pp ie to t e to ta mcome. e extra tax Hidayatulloh J. under the second part of the proviso, though called an additional tax, is only the difference between the tax charged at one rate and the ta.x subsequently chargeable at another rate. The function of the proviso is thus to prescribe varying rates for varying circumstances, and it deals with rate or rates, first and last, and not with chargeability to tax, which is the subjectmatter of s. 3 of the Income-tax Act. There are no words here making the excess dividend into income or subjecting it to tax independently of the charge to tax on the total income. We are thus unable to treat the proviso as an independent charging section. In this view of the matter, no useful purpose will be served by referring to those cases noted by this Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Calcutta National Bank Ltd. (1 ), where a schedule which went beyond the purpose for which it was enacted was given effect to. The proviso here was framed to lay down the rates, and has done no more.\n\nIt remains to consider two other arguments, which were addressed to us on behalf of the Commissioner.\n\nThe first pointed out an anomaly that if there was a total income of even one rupee, the proviso could be made applicable according to its terms but not if the income was nil or negative. The Commissioner contended that such an anomaly should be avoided, and that the proviso should be interpreted in such a way as to take in all the kinds of cases.\n\nOur answer to this is much the same as was given by the learned Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court. The learned Chief Justice o hserves :\n\n\" There seems to be no logic, there seems to be no reason nor principle why a distinction should be made between the cases of two such companies.\n\nBut if life is not logic, income-tax is much less so,\n\n(1) [1959] 37 I.T.R. 171.\n\n\\. -\n\n.,. --\n\n-'1\n\n) -\n\n3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT I~EPORTS 967\n\nand it is clear that we cannot impose tax upon a\n\nI960 sub1'ect by implication or because we think that the Commissioner of object of the legislature was a particular object.\" Income Tax, vVe respectfully agree with the learned Chief Justice Bombay that thoi:gh te interpretation we hav.e plaed upon Elfh~; stone the proviso might lead to some anomalies, it IS for the :>pinning &- legislature to avoid the anomalies which, according to Weaving Mitts Ltd. us, spring not from our interpretation but from the Hidayatullah J. language employed.\n\nThe second argument is that the proviso itself states that the excess dividend shall be deemed to be out of the undistributed profits of one or more years immediately preceding the previous year, and that the fiction makes the profits take the place of total income for purposes of tax. In our opinion, the fiction cannot be carried further than the purpose for which it has been put in, in the statute. The Income-tax Act creates an assessment year and a corresponding previous year. Assessment to tax in any assessment year can only be in respect of the profits of the immediately preceding previous year.\n\nAll that the fiction does is to bring profits of back years into the immediately preceding previous years, so that the requirements of the Income-tax law may be complied with.\n\nAs we have already stated, this fiction cannot be carried further than what it is intended for; it cannot be used to make these profits take the place of total income, which did not exist in the previous year and to which the rate is to be applied under the terms of the proviso.\n\nWe do not accept both the arguments, and agxee with the High Court in the answer given to the first question.\n\nAs pointed out by the High Court, the second question does not survive, after the first question is answered against the Department.\n\nIn the result, the appeal fails, and will be dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 82, "entities": [{"text": "Cochin State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 591, "end_char": 603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "443 of 1955 claiming to be entitled to the sthanam lands situate in an area which was formerly Pi1'rt of the Cochin State."}}, {"text": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX,\n\nBOMBAY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1185, "end_char": 1224, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE ELPHINSTONE SPINNING AND\n\nWEAVING MILLS LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1226, "end_char": 1273, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE ELPHINSTONE SPINNING AND WEAVING MILLS LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "L. KAPUR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1290, "end_char": 1298, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.L. KAPUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1303, "end_char": 1323, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1453, "end_char": 1467, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1488, "end_char": 1492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1525, "end_char": 1539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Part I of the First Schedule to the Indian Finance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1911, "end_char": 1965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Jncorne Ta~.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2371, "end_char": 2383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "co1nniissironer of fhe appellant, relying on the proviso to paragraph B, contended\n\nJncorne Ta~. that additional income-tax was imposed on excess dividend and Bombay if excess dividend was paid out, the liability to tax arose: v.\n\nHeld, that the assessee was notliable to pay additional income- Etphinstone tax."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2635, "end_char": 2639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part I of the First Schedule to the Indian Finance Act", "statute": "Part I of the First Schedule to the Indian Finance Act"}}, {"text": "Act and the Finance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2676, "end_char": 2699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2751, "end_char": 2754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act and the Finance Act", "statute": "Act and the Finance Act"}}, {"text": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4890, "end_char": 4912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and D. Gupta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "D. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4917, "end_char": 4925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and D. Gupta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "N. A. Palkhivala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4947, "end_char": 4963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. A. Palkhivala, S. N. Andley and J. B. Dadachanji, for the respondents and intervener."}}, {"text": "S. N. Andley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4965, "end_char": 4977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. A. Palkhivala, S. N. Andley and J. B. Dadachanji, for the respondents and intervener."}}, {"text": "J. B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4982, "end_char": 4998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. A. Palkhivala, S. N. Andley and J. B. Dadachanji, for the respondents and intervener."}}, {"text": "S 955", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5079, "end_char": 5084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 66( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5243, "end_char": 5252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Weaving Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5465, "end_char": 5483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 was referred the following two questions for decision: spin~7~;'; f.\n\n(1) Whether the assessee Company was liable to pay Weaving Mills Ltd. additional income-tax ?"}}, {"text": "H idayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5514, "end_char": 5527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and - H idayatullah J.\n\n(2) If the answer to question No.", "canonical_name": "H idayatullah"}}, {"text": "Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd., Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5930, "end_char": 5985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commissioner of Income-tax is the appellant, and the Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd., Bombay (the assessee Company) is the respondent."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6369, "end_char": 6383, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Paragraph B of Part I of the First Schedule to the Indian Finance Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6666, "end_char": 6741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act and the Finance Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7018, "end_char": 7065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "are concerned with the Finance Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7149, "end_char": 7189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7214, "end_char": 7228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We are concerned with the Finance Act, 1951", "statute": "We are concerned with the Finance Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Commissioner of Income Tax,\n\nBombay\n\nElphinston8 Spinning &\n\nWaving 1W-1lls Ltd.\n\nHidayatullah", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7238, "end_char": 7332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are concerned with the Finance Act, 1951, and Paragraph B of the First Schedule reads :\n\nCommissioner of Income Tax,\n\nBombay\n\nElphinston8 Spinning &\n\nWaving 1W-1lls Ltd.\n\nHidayatullah .f,\n\n\"B. In the case of every company-\n\nOn the whole of total income\n\nRate Surcharge Four annas one-twentieth in the of the rate rupee specified in the preceding column: Provided that in the case of a company which, in respect of its profits liable to tax under t'he Income-tax Act for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1952, has made the prescribed arrangements for the declaration and payment within the territory of India excluding the State of J ammu and Kashmir, of the dividends payable out of such profits, and has deducted super-tax from the dividends in accordance with the provisions of subsection (3D) or (3E) of section 18 of the Act--\n\n(i) Where the total income, as reduced by seven annas in the rupee and by the amount, if any, exempt from income-tax, exceeds the amount of any dividends (including dividends payable at a fixed rate) declared in respect of the whole or part of the previous year for the assessment for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1952, and no order has been made under sub-section (1) of section 23A of the Income-tax Act, a rebate shall be allowed at the rate of one anna per rupee on the amount of such excess;\n\n(ii) Where the amount of dividends referred to in clause (i) above exceeds the total mcome as reduced by seven annas in the rupee and by the amonnt, if any, exempt from income-tax, there shall be charged on the total income an rtdditional income-tax equal to the sum, if any, by which the aggregate amount of income-tax actually borne by such excess (hereina.fter referred to as' the excess dividend') falls short of the amount calculated at the rate of five annas per rupee on the excess dividend."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7600, "end_char": 7614, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "31st day of March, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7642, "end_char": 7665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are concerned with the Finance Act, 1951, and Paragraph B of the First Schedule reads :\n\nCommissioner of Income Tax,\n\nBombay\n\nElphinston8 Spinning &\n\nWaving 1W-1lls Ltd.\n\nHidayatullah .f,\n\n\"B. In the case of every company-\n\nOn the whole of total income\n\nRate Surcharge Four annas one-twentieth in the of the rate rupee specified in the preceding column: Provided that in the case of a company which, in respect of its profits liable to tax under t'he Income-tax Act for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1952, has made the prescribed arrangements for the declaration and payment within the territory of India excluding the State of J ammu and Kashmir, of the dividends payable out of such profits, and has deducted super-tax from the dividends in accordance with the provisions of subsection (3D) or (3E) of section 18 of the Act--\n\n(i) Where the total income, as reduced by seven annas in the rupee and by the amount, if any, exempt from income-tax, exceeds the amount of any dividends (including dividends payable at a fixed rate) declared in respect of the whole or part of the previous year for the assessment for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1952, and no order has been made under sub-section (1) of section 23A of the Income-tax Act, a rebate shall be allowed at the rate of one anna per rupee on the amount of such excess;\n\n(ii) Where the amount of dividends referred to in clause (i) above exceeds the total mcome as reduced by seven annas in the rupee and by the amonnt, if any, exempt from income-tax, there shall be charged on the total income an rtdditional income-tax equal to the sum, if any, by which the aggregate amount of income-tax actually borne by such excess (hereina.fter referred to as' the excess dividend') falls short of the amount calculated at the rate of five annas per rupee on the excess dividend."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7760, "end_char": 7765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are concerned with the Finance Act, 1951, and Paragraph B of the First Schedule reads :\n\nCommissioner of Income Tax,\n\nBombay\n\nElphinston8 Spinning &\n\nWaving 1W-1lls Ltd.\n\nHidayatullah .f,\n\n\"B. In the case of every company-\n\nOn the whole of total income\n\nRate Surcharge Four annas one-twentieth in the of the rate rupee specified in the preceding column: Provided that in the case of a company which, in respect of its profits liable to tax under t'he Income-tax Act for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1952, has made the prescribed arrangements for the declaration and payment within the territory of India excluding the State of J ammu and Kashmir, of the dividends payable out of such profits, and has deducted super-tax from the dividends in accordance with the provisions of subsection (3D) or (3E) of section 18 of the Act--\n\n(i) Where the total income, as reduced by seven annas in the rupee and by the amount, if any, exempt from income-tax, exceeds the amount of any dividends (including dividends payable at a fixed rate) declared in respect of the whole or part of the previous year for the assessment for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1952, and no order has been made under sub-section (1) of section 23A of the Income-tax Act, a rebate shall be allowed at the rate of one anna per rupee on the amount of such excess;\n\n(ii) Where the amount of dividends referred to in clause (i) above exceeds the total mcome as reduced by seven annas in the rupee and by the amonnt, if any, exempt from income-tax, there shall be charged on the total income an rtdditional income-tax equal to the sum, if any, by which the aggregate amount of income-tax actually borne by such excess (hereina.fter referred to as' the excess dividend') falls short of the amount calculated at the rate of five annas per rupee on the excess dividend."}}, {"text": "J ammu and Kashmir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7789, "end_char": 7807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are concerned with the Finance Act, 1951, and Paragraph B of the First Schedule reads :\n\nCommissioner of Income Tax,\n\nBombay\n\nElphinston8 Spinning &\n\nWaving 1W-1lls Ltd.\n\nHidayatullah .f,\n\n\"B. In the case of every company-\n\nOn the whole of total income\n\nRate Surcharge Four annas one-twentieth in the of the rate rupee specified in the preceding column: Provided that in the case of a company which, in respect of its profits liable to tax under t'he Income-tax Act for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1952, has made the prescribed arrangements for the declaration and payment within the territory of India excluding the State of J ammu and Kashmir, of the dividends payable out of such profits, and has deducted super-tax from the dividends in accordance with the provisions of subsection (3D) or (3E) of section 18 of the Act--\n\n(i) Where the total income, as reduced by seven annas in the rupee and by the amount, if any, exempt from income-tax, exceeds the amount of any dividends (including dividends payable at a fixed rate) declared in respect of the whole or part of the previous year for the assessment for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1952, and no order has been made under sub-section (1) of section 23A of the Income-tax Act, a rebate shall be allowed at the rate of one anna per rupee on the amount of such excess;\n\n(ii) Where the amount of dividends referred to in clause (i) above exceeds the total mcome as reduced by seven annas in the rupee and by the amonnt, if any, exempt from income-tax, there shall be charged on the total income an rtdditional income-tax equal to the sum, if any, by which the aggregate amount of income-tax actually borne by such excess (hereina.fter referred to as' the excess dividend') falls short of the amount calculated at the rate of five annas per rupee on the excess dividend."}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7965, "end_char": 7975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We are concerned with the Finance Act, 1951", "statute": "We are concerned with the Finance Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "section 23A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8375, "end_char": 8386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8394, "end_char": 8408, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9123, "end_char": 9132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9140, "end_char": 9154, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "31st day of 1 960 March, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9242, "end_char": 9271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the purposes of the above proviso, the expression 'dividend' shall have the meaning assigned to it in clause ·(6A) of section 2 of the Income-tax Act, but any distribution included in that expression,\n\nmade during the year ending on the 31st day of 1 960 March, 1952, shall be deemed to be a dividend Commissioner of declared in respect of the whole or part of the Income Ta,.,"}}, {"text": "We •ving Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9586, "end_char": 9605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "borne by the excess dividend shall be determined as We •ving Mills Ltd. follows:- H idayatullah J. (i} the excess dividend shall be deemed to be out of the whole or such portion of the undistributed profits of one or more years immediately preceding the previous year as would be just sufficient to cover the amount of the excess dividend and as have not likewise been taken into account to cover an excess dividend of a preceding year;\n\n(ii) such portion of the excess dividend as is deemed to be out of the undistributed profits of each of the said years shall be deemed to have borne tax,- ( a) if an order has been made under sub-section (1) of section 23A of the Income-tax Act, in respect of the undistributed profits of that year, at the rate of five annas in the rupee, and\n\n(b) in respect of any other year, at the rate applicable to the total income of the company for that year reduced by the rate at which rebatP, if any, was allowed on the undistributed profits.\""}}, {"text": "section 23A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10183, "end_char": 10194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10202, "end_char": 10216, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10932, "end_char": 10946, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11886, "end_char": 11900, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11903, "end_char": 11912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "are concerned with the Finance Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12149, "end_char": 12189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12192, "end_char": 12201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We are concerned with the Finance Act, 1951", "statute": "We are concerned with the Finance Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12585, "end_char": 12599, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Es her", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15660, "end_char": 15666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Es her, M.R., held that the words should be extended to mean \"in any county court in which, if it had been a county court action, the action\n\n(1) \\1889) 22 QB.", "canonical_name": "Es her"}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16326, "end_char": 16338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is to he Hidayatullah J. noticed that Lord Esher, M. B., also warned a.gainst doing by construction what only a legislature could do by enactment, in the following words:\n\n\"It is, no doubt, very easy for a judge to say that he is introducing words into an Act only by way of construing it, while he is really making a new Act.\"", "canonical_name": "H idayatullah"}}, {"text": "Esher", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16360, "end_char": 16365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is to he Hidayatullah J. noticed that Lord Esher, M. B., also warned a.gainst doing by construction what only a legislature could do by enactment, in the following words:\n\n\"It is, no doubt, very easy for a judge to say that he is introducing words into an Act only by way of construing it, while he is really making a new Act.\"", "canonical_name": "Es her"}}, {"text": "Dunedin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17209, "end_char": 17216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It, however, quoted also the observations of Lord Dunedin in Whitney v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (') that:\n\n~ A statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretation thereof by a court should be to secure that object, unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable.\""}}, {"text": "Section 68(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17590, "end_char": 17603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 262", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17708, "end_char": 17714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17979, "end_char": 17988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Reid", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18294, "end_char": 18298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Reid observed :\n\nCommissioner of Income Tax,\n\nBombay v.\n\nElphinstone \" The difficulLy does not arise from the enacting Spinning & wordi3 but from the words in brackets which purport Weaving Mills Ltd. to describe the proviso to Section 262(2) of the -- H idayatullah J.\n\nIncome Tax Act, 1952."}}, {"text": "Section 262(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18522, "end_char": 18536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18565, "end_char": 18585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 262(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18723, "end_char": 18737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income Tax Act, 1952", "statute": "Income Tax Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Section 88(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19043, "end_char": 19056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income Tax Act, 1952", "statute": "Income Tax Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Section 262(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19170, "end_char": 19184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income Tax Act, 1952", "statute": "Income Tax Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "S. 34(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20239, "end_char": 20247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "English Finance Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20271, "end_char": 20296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "IJombay Court of Session", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20363, "end_char": 20387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the IJombay Court of Session, the word was equated to \"adding \"\n\nElph; stone correcting, as it was felt, a dafting inaccuracy."}}, {"text": "Weauing M.tls Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20558, "end_char": 20576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the spinning & House of Lords, however, thrn change was not accepted Weauing M.tls Ltd. and a meaning was found."}}, {"text": "Hidayatllah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20603, "end_char": 20614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hidayatllah J.\n\nThe learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, relies upon the observations of Rowlatt, J., in The Gape Brandy Syndicate v. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue(') to the effect that in a taxing measure one can only look at the language since there is no room for an intendment.", "canonical_name": "H idayatullah"}}, {"text": "Rowlatt", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20710, "end_char": 20717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hidayatllah J.\n\nThe learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, relies upon the observations of Rowlatt, J., in The Gape Brandy Syndicate v. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue(') to the effect that in a taxing measure one can only look at the language since there is no room for an intendment."}}, {"text": "Simonds", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20946, "end_char": 20953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also refers to the speech of Lord Simonds in Wolfson v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue ('), where the following passage occurs at p. 169:\n\n\"It was urged that the constrnction that I favour leaves an easy loophole through which the evasive taxpayer may find escape."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24076, "end_char": 24090, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Weaving Milts Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27406, "end_char": 27424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Weaving Milts Ltd.\n\nThese passages were used in the other case decided Hidayatullah J. today, in which there were no profits of the previous yea.rs."}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27812, "end_char": 27817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "English Finance Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27825, "end_char": 27850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 34(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27896, "end_char": 27904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the English Finance Act, 1947", "statute": "the English Finance Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Schedule of the Finance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29570, "end_char": 29597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Hidayatulloh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29844, "end_char": 29856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "e extra tax Hidayatulloh J. under the second part of the proviso, though called an additional tax, is only the difference between the tax charged at one rate and the ta.x subsequently chargeable at another rate.", "canonical_name": "H idayatullah"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30248, "end_char": 30252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule of the Finance Act", "statute": "Schedule of the Finance Act"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30260, "end_char": 30274, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 31377, "end_char": 31394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Our answer to this is much the same as was given by the learned Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court."}}, {"text": "S.C.R. SUPREME COURT I~EPORTS 967", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 31690, "end_char": 31723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'1\n\n) -\n\n3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT I~EPORTS 967\n\nand it is clear that we cannot impose tax upon a\n\nI960 sub1'ect by implication or because we think that the Commissioner of object of the legislature was a particular object.\""}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31967, "end_char": 31973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Income Tax, vVe respectfully agree with the learned Chief Justice Bombay that thoi:gh te interpretation we hav.e plaed upon Elfh~; stone the proviso might lead to some anomalies, it IS for the :>pinning &- legislature to avoid the anomalies which, according to Weaving Mitts Ltd. us, spring not from our interpretation but from the Hidayatullah J. language employed."}}, {"text": "Weaving Mitts Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32162, "end_char": 32180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Income Tax, vVe respectfully agree with the learned Chief Justice Bombay that thoi:gh te interpretation we hav.e plaed upon Elfh~; stone the proviso might lead to some anomalies, it IS for the :>pinning &- legislature to avoid the anomalies which, according to Weaving Mitts Ltd. us, spring not from our interpretation but from the Hidayatullah J. language employed."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32677, "end_char": 32691, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_968_975_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "Muy5.\n\n[llJtiU]\n\nRAMNAGAR CANE AND SUGAR CO. LTD.\n\n968 SUPl{EME COURT REPORTS\n\nJATIN CHAKRAVORTY AND OTHERS.\n\n(P. B .. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO\n\nand K. C. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)\n\nSubversive Activity-Public utility concern-Strike by workmen pending conciliation with rival union-Settlement, if binding on all workmen-Legality of strike-West Bengal Security Act, r950 (W. B. XIX of r950), s. 2(9)(e), Expl. (ii)-Industrial Disputes Act, r947 (r4 of r947), ss. r8(3)(d), 22(r)(d), 24(r)(i).\n\nWhere two rival unions of workmen in a public utility concern, a sugar industry, present demands covering the entire body of workmen and while one of them carries on conciliation proceedings with the employer the other commences a strike, any settlement, arrived at in such conciliation proceedings must bind all the employees under s. 18(3)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the strike must, on a reasonable construction of the provisions of s. 22(1)(d) of the Act, amount to a contravention of it and must be illegal under s. 24( t)(i) of the Act.\n\nIt was not necessary, in order to bind the workmen to the settlement arrived at before the conciliator, to show that they belonged to the union which took part in the conciliation proceedings, since the policy underlying s. 18 of the Act is to give an extended operation to such a settlement.\n\nThe Associated Cement Company Ltd., Porbandar v. Their Workmen, [1960] 3 S.C.R. 157 and M/s. New India Motors (P) Ltd. v. K. T. Morris, [1960] 3 S.C.R. 350, referred to.\n\nConsequently, where the courts below, on an erroneous view of the law, acquitted certain workmen of the offence of subversive activity for joining an illegal strike under s. II of the West Bengal Security Act, 1950, on the ground that the rival union to which they belonged was not a party to the conciliation proceedings, such acquittal must be set aside.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 96 of 1959.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 19, 1957, of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Revision No. 1577 of 1956, arising out of the judgment and order dated August 3, 1956, of the Magistrate, :First Class, at Krishnagar, Nadia, in G. R. Case No. 69 of 1954.\n\n0. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India and P. /(. Ohatlerjee, for the appellant.\n\nTho respondent did not appear.\n\n' -\n\n3 S.C.R.\n\nSUPB.EME COURT REPORTS 969\n\n1960. May 5. The Judgmen~ of the Court was i960 delivered by -- G J\n\nT . . l b l J Ramnagar Cane :xAJENDRAGADKAR, . - his apptia y specia eave and sugar co. Ltd. raises a short question about the construction and v. effect of the provisions of s. 2i(l)(d) of the Industrial Jatin Chak1avorty Disputes Act, 14 of 1947, (hereinafter called the Act). . - The appellant,, Ramnagar Cane & Sugar Co. Ltd., Ga1endragadlir J.\n\nCalcutta, is a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act and carries on the business of manufacturing sugar which is an essential commodity in its factory at Plassey in the District of Nadia. The appellant was declared a public utility concern or service by a notification duly issued in that behalf on October 8, 1953. The appellant employs in its business about 545 permanent men and 703 seasonal men excluding casual labourers.\n\nA majority of the workmen employed by the appellant belong to the Ramnagar Cane & Sugar Co. Employees' Union (hereinafter called the Employees' Union), whereas a minority of workmen belong to the rival Union called Ramnagar Sugar Mill Workers' Union (hereinafter called the Workers' Union). It appears that on December 9, 1953, the Workers' Union presented a charter of demands to the appellant. This was followed by a similar charter of demands by the Employees' Union on January 20, 1954. On the same day the Workers' Union served a notice of strike on the appellant. On February 1, 1954, a meeting was held before the Conciliation Officer which was attended by the Employees' Union and the appellant. A notice of the said meeting had been served on the Workers' Union as well.\n\nOn February 2, 1954, the appellant suggested to the conciliation officer that it should discuss the matter separately with the representatives of the two Unions but to this suggestion the Workers' Union took an objection. Thereupon the said Union informed the conciliation officer that it assumed that the conciliation had failed. Consequently on February 3, 1954, the conciliation officer sent his report under s. 12, sub-s. (4) of the Act about the failure of conciliation with the Workers' .Union only. On February 25, 1954, the appellant and the Employees' Union arrived at a settlement, and it was recorded in the form of a memo\n\nr960 of settlement which was duly signed by both the - parties. Meanwhile, on Februa'ry 13, 1954, the Ramnagar Cane W k\n\n, U • A 1 . and sugar co. Ltd. or ers mon commenced a strike. .e>S a resu t of v. this strike a crimjnal complaint was filed against the Jatin Chukravorty eleven respondents under s. 11 of the West Bengal - Security Act, XIX of 1950, and a charge was subse-\n\nGa~••dragadkar J. quently framed against them.\n\nThe case as formulated in the charge against the said respondents was that on or about February 13, 1954, at Plassey each one of them did commit subversive acts which were intended or likely to impede, delay or restrict the work of Ramnagar Cane & Sugar Co. Ltd., which was a public utility concern for production of sugar, an essential commodity. The respondents pleaded not guilty to the charge substantially on the ground that the strike in question was not illegal. It was not denied that they had gone on strike on February 13, 1954; it was, however, urged that since the strike was lawful the offence charged could not be said to be proved. The learned magistrate upheld the respondents' plea and acquitted the respondents. The appellant challenged the correctness of the said order of acquittal by preferring a revisional application before the Calcutta High Court. Its revisional application, however, failed since the High Qourt held that the strike was not illegal and agreed with the conclusion of the trial magistrate. The appellant then applied for a certificate before the said High Court but its application was dismissed. Then the appellant applied for and obtained special leave from this Court; and the only point which is raised on its behalf before us is that in coming to the cone.lusion that the strike in question was not illegal the Courts below have misconstrued the provisions of s. 22(l)(d) of the Act.\n\nBefore we consider this point it is relevant to refer to the relevant provisions of the West Bengal Security Act. Section 11 of this Act provides that if any person commits any subversive act he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extenq\n\nto five years or with fine or with both. Section 2(9)(e) defines a subversive act as meaning any act which is intended or is likely to impede, delay or restrict-\n\n, -\n\n(i) any work or operation, or (ii) any means of transport r96o or locomotion,-necessary for the production, procure- R l d. 'b t' f t' l amnagar Cane ment, supp y or istn u 10n o any essen ia comand Sugar co. I.Id. modity, except in furtherance of an industrial dispute v. a:> defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. JatinChakravorty Explanation (ii) to this definition provides that an -- illegal strike or an illegal lock-out as defined in s. 24 Gajendragadkarf. of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, shall not be deemed to be an act in furtherance of an industrial dispute for the purposes of sub-cl. (e). It is thus clear that if the impugned strike is held to be illega.l it would constitute a subversive act as defined by s.2(9)(e) of the West Bengal Security Act. This position has been accepted in the courts below. That is why the only question which arises for our decision is whether the strike in question is an illegal strike under s. 24 of the Act.\n\nSection 24 of the Act provides, inter alia, that a strike shall be illegal if it is commenced or declared in contravention of s. 22 or s. 23. That takes us to the provisions of s. 22, and we have to find out\n\nwhether in commencing the strike on February 13, 1954, the respondents had contravened the provisions of s. 22(l)(d) of the Act.\n\nSection 22(1J(d) lays down that no person employed in a public utility service shall go on strike in breach of contract during the pendency of any conciliation proceedings before a conciliation officer and seven days after the conclusion of such proceedings. The effect of this provision is clear. If a strike is declared in a public utility service during the pendency of a conciliation proceeding it is illegal. Was any conciliation proceeding pending between the appellant and the respondents at the relevant time? That is the question which calls for an answer in the present appeal. The respondents contend that the Workers' Union to which they belonged had left the conciliation proceedings on February 2, 1954, and that in fact the conciliation officer had submitted his failure report to that effect on February 3, 1954; and so, between the Workers' Union and the appellant no conciliation proceeding was pending after February 5, 1954, in any case when the Government received the failure report of the\n\n'96° conciliation offi.cer.\n\nOn the other hand, the appellant contends that conciliation proceedings with the Emplo- Ramn.7.f:ar Cane U d 1 d and Sugar Co. Ltd. yees' 11ion contin\"{Jc unti February 25, 1954, an m v. fact settlement was arrived at between the parties on .Jatin ChakrnvMty that date and duly signed by them. The appellant's -- argument is that the pendency of the conciliation Gajendragadkar ]. d • b h II d h E 1 ' procee mgs etween t e appe ant an t e mp oyees Union makes illegal the strike in which the respondents joined on February 13, 1954. The High Court bas held that since it is not shown that the respondents belong to the Employees' Union it would not be possible to hold that any conciliation proceeding was pending between them and the appellant. It is the correctness of this view that is challenged before us.\n\nIn appreciating the merits of the rival contentions thus raised in this appeal it is necessary to bear in mind the scheme of the Act. It is now well settled that an industrial dispute can be raised in regard to any matter only when it is sponsored by a body of workmen acting through a union or otherwise. When an industria.l dispute is thus raised and is decided either by settlement or by an award the scope and effect of its operation is prescribed by s. 18 of the Act.\n\nSection 18(1) provides that a settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and the workman otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceed-, ing shall be binding on the parties to the agreement ; whereas s. 18(3) provides that a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings which has become enforceable shall be binding on all the parties specified in els. (a), (b), (c} and (d) of sub-s. (3).\n\nSection 18(3)(d) makes it clear that, where a party referred to in cl. (a) or. (b) is composed of workmen, all persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, .as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part., would be bound by the settlement. In other words, there can be no doubt that the settlement arrived at between the appellant and the Employees' Union during the course of conciliation proceedings on February 25, 1954, wonld bind not only the members of the said Union but all workmen\n\nemployed in the establishment of the appellant at that x960 date. That inevitably me!l.ns that the respondents Ramnagar Cane would be bound by the said settlement even though and sur, ar co. Lid. they may belong to the rival Union. In order to . v. bind the workmen it is not necessary to show that the Jatm Chakravorty said workmen belong to the Union which was a partyG . d--dk 1 h d b c h ']' t Th h l a1en rag, ar . to t e tspute e1ore t e conc1 ia or. e w o e policy of s. 18 appears to be to give an extended operation to the settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings, and that is the object with which the four categories of persons bound by such settlement are specified in s. 18, sub-s. (3).\n\nIn this connection we may refer to two recent decisions of this Court where similar questions under s. 19(6) and s. 33 (l)(a) of the Act have been considered. (Vide: The Associated Cement Companies Ltd., Porbandar v. Their Workmen(1) and Messrs. New India Motors (P.) Ltd. v. K. T. Morris (2) ).\n\nThis position has an important bearing on the construction of s. 22(l)(d).\n\nWhen the said provision rafers to the pendency of any conciliation proceedings it must reasonably be construed to mean any conciliation proceedings which may lead to a settlement before the conciliation officer and which settlement may bind all the workmen concerned ; in other words, if a conciliation proceeding is pending between one union and the employer and it relates to matters concerning all the employees of the employer, the pendency of the said conciliation proceeding would be a bar against all the employees of the employer employed iri a public utility service to go on a strike during the pendency of the said proceeding under s. 22 (I )(d).\n\nIn our opinion, this construction would be consistent with the specific provisions as to the effect of conciliation settlements prescribed bys. 18(3)(d) and is harmonious with the general policy of the Act ; otherwise, it would unnecessarily disturb industrial peace, if one union employed in a public utility service is allowed to go on strike even though demands common to the members of the said union as well as the rest of the workmen are being considered in conciliation proceedings bet ween the said employer and his other employees\n\n(r) [196o] 2 S.C.R. 974\n\n(2) [1960] 3 S.C. R. 350. 126\n\nz91; o represented by another union. It would be another matter if the conciliation proceedings in question are Ramnaga• Cane confined to specific demands limited to a specified and Sugar Co Ltd. v. class of employees. In such a caee it may be contend ]atin Chakrnvmty ed that the other workmen who are not interested in -- the said demands may not be bound by the said Gajendragadkar J. proceedings. That, however, is another aspect of the matter with which we are not concerned in the present appeal. We have seen the charter of demands submitted by both the Unions to the appellant, and it is clear that the said demands cover all employees of the appellant and not only one section of them; in other words, both the charters have made demands the benefit of which was; intended to accrue to all the workmen of the appellant; they are not demands by one section of the workmen belonging to one separate part of the establishment run by the appellant. The demands made are no doubt by two Unions but they cover the same ground and in effect they represent the demands made by the whole body of workmen. In fact the conciliation settlement reached between the appellant and the Employees' Union has benefited the members of the Workers' Union as much as those of the Employees' Union. That :being so we think the courts below were in error in putting an unduly narrow and restricted construction on the provisions of s. 22(l)(d) of the Act. In our opinion, the pendency of the conciliation proceedings between the appellant and the Employees' Union attracts the provisions of s. 22(l)(d) to the strike in question and makes the said strike illegal under s. 24 (1 )(i) of the Act. If the strike is illegal it follows that the respondents have taken part in a subversive activity as defined by s. 2(9)(e) of the West Bengal Security Act and as such\n\nha.ve committed an offence punishable under s. 11 of the said Act.\n\nWe would accordingly set aside the order of acquittal passed by the High Court in favour of the respondents and convict them of the offence charged. The Solicitor-General has fairly told us that the appellant has come to this Court not so much for the purpose of pressing for the conviction of, and a heavy sentence against, the respondents but for obtaining a decision\n\nh r\n\n...\n\n....,....\n\n,._~ -._,\n\non the important question of law in regard to the c960 construction of s. 22 (l)(d) of the Act.\n\nUnder the R -- c circumstances of this case we think the ends of justice anI';::;::~/2a. would be met if we convict the respondents of the v. offence charged and direct that each one of them Jatin Chakravo1ty\n\nshould pay a fine of rupee one.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nJAI KAUR & OTHERS\n\nv .\n\nSHER SINGH & OTHERS. (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. W ANCHOO and K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)\n\nHindu Law-] ats of Grewal got-Customary law of succession- N on-ancestral property-Daughter, if pref erred to collaterals- Doctrine of surrender-Gift to daughter by widow, if accelerates succession-Rattigan's Customary Law of the Punjab, para 23-Riwaji-am, r882, Question 43.\n\nUnder the customary law prevalent amongst the Hindu Jats of Grewal got in Ludhiana, a daughter is a preferential heir to her father in respect of his self-acquired property to his collaterals.\n\nRattigan's Digest of Customary Law, paragraph 23, which records the correct law on the point, is not in conflict with Riwaj-i-am, 1882, Question No. 43, which refers only to ancestral property and not to self-acquired property at all.\n\nMt. Hurmate v. Hoshiaru, A.I.R. 1944 Lah. 21, approved.\n\nMohinder Singh v. Kher Singh, A.LR. 1949 East Punjab 328, disapproved.\n\nMt. Subhani v. Nawab, A.LR. 1941 (P.C.) 21, referred to.\n\nCase-law discussed.\n\nThe doctrine of surrender in Hindu Law is based on a theory of complete self-effacement by the widow in favour of the reversioner and in order that such surrender. can accelerate the reversion, it must be of the entire interest in the entire property.\n\nThe law does not recognise a partial self-effacement nor a division between ancestral and non-ancestral property. The exception made in respect of a small portion of the property retained for the widow's maintenance does not detract from the rigour of the rule.\n\nRangaswami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden, (1918) L.R. 46 I.A. 72 and Phool Kau.r v. Prem Kaur, [1952] S.C.R. 793, referred to.\n\nConsequently, in a case where a Hindu widow of the Jat Grewal got made a gift only of the self-acquired property of her husband to her daughters such gift had not the effect of a surrender in law so as to accelerate the daughters' succession and the gift could not be valid beyond her lifetime.\n\nGajsndragadkar j\n\nMay 6.", "total_entities": 81, "entities": [{"text": "RAMNAGAR CANE AND SUGAR CO. LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17, "end_char": 48, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAMNAGAR CANE AND SUGAR CO. LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JATIN CHAKRAVORTY AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 79, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JATIN CHAKRAVORTY AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B .. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 133, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. B .. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 135, "end_char": 148, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. N. W ANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. C. DAS GUPTA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 154, "end_char": 174, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. C. DAS GUPTA, JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Legality of strike-West Bengal Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 314, "end_char": 357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2(9)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 385, "end_char": 395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Legality of strike-West Bengal Security Act", "statute": "Legality of strike-West Bengal Security Act"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 408, "end_char": 431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 18(3)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 820, "end_char": 831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 839, "end_char": 868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 22(1)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 941, "end_char": 952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 24( t)(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1023, "end_char": 1035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1270, "end_char": 1275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "[1960] 3 S.C.R. 157", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1407, "end_char": 1426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1960] 3 S.C.R. 350", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1479, "end_char": 1498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "II of the West Bengal Security Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1688, "end_char": 1728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "K. Daphtary", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2228, "end_char": 2239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India and P. /(."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2630, "end_char": 2634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "II of the West Bengal Security Act, 1950", "statute": "II of the West Bengal Security Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Ramnagar Cane & Sugar Co. Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2754, "end_char": 2784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant,, Ramnagar Cane & Sugar Co. Ltd., Ga1endragadlir J.\n\nCalcutta, is a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act and carries on the business of manufacturing sugar which is an essential commodity in its factory at Plassey in the District of Nadia.", "canonical_name": "RAMNAGAR CANE AND SUGAR CO. LTD"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2858, "end_char": 2871, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Plassey", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2973, "end_char": 2980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant,, Ramnagar Cane & Sugar Co. Ltd., Ga1endragadlir J.\n\nCalcutta, is a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act and carries on the business of manufacturing sugar which is an essential commodity in its factory at Plassey in the District of Nadia."}}, {"text": "Nadia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3000, "end_char": 3005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant,, Ramnagar Cane & Sugar Co. Ltd., Ga1endragadlir J.\n\nCalcutta, is a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act and carries on the business of manufacturing sugar which is an essential commodity in its factory at Plassey in the District of Nadia."}}, {"text": "October 8, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3118, "end_char": 3133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was declared a public utility concern or service by a notification duly issued in that behalf on October 8, 1953."}}, {"text": "Ramnagar Cane & Sugar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3313, "end_char": 3334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A majority of the workmen employed by the appellant belong to the Ramnagar Cane & Sugar Co. Employees' Union (hereinafter called the Employees' Union), whereas a minority of workmen belong to the rival Union called Ramnagar Sugar Mill Workers' Union (hereinafter called the Workers' Union)."}}, {"text": "Ramnagar Sugar Mill Workers' Union", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3462, "end_char": 3496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A majority of the workmen employed by the appellant belong to the Ramnagar Cane & Sugar Co. Employees' Union (hereinafter called the Employees' Union), whereas a minority of workmen belong to the rival Union called Ramnagar Sugar Mill Workers' Union (hereinafter called the Workers' Union)."}}, {"text": "December 9, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3557, "end_char": 3573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that on December 9, 1953, the Workers' Union presented a charter of demands to the appellant."}}, {"text": "January 20, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3720, "end_char": 3736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was followed by a similar charter of demands by the Employees' Union on January 20, 1954."}}, {"text": "February 1, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3820, "end_char": 3836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 1, 1954, a meeting was held before the Conciliation Officer which was attended by the Employees' Union and the appellant."}}, {"text": "February 2, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4031, "end_char": 4047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 2, 1954, the appellant suggested to the conciliation officer that it should discuss the matter separately with the representatives of the two Unions but to this suggestion the Workers' Union took an objection."}}, {"text": "February 3, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4375, "end_char": 4391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Consequently on February 3, 1954, the conciliation officer sent his report under s. 12, sub-s. (4) of the Act about the failure of conciliation with the Workers' .Union only."}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4440, "end_char": 4445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "February 25, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4537, "end_char": 4554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 25, 1954, the appellant and the Employees' Union arrived at a settlement, and it was recorded in the form of a memo\n\nr960 of settlement which was duly signed by both the - parties."}}, {"text": "Februa'ry 13, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4741, "end_char": 4759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meanwhile, on Februa'ry 13, 1954, the Ramnagar Cane W k\n\n, U • A 1 ."}}, {"text": "Ramnagar Cane W k\n\n, U • A 1 . and sugar co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4765, "end_char": 4814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meanwhile, on Februa'ry 13, 1954, the Ramnagar Cane W k\n\n, U • A 1 ."}}, {"text": "Jatin Chukravorty", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4921, "end_char": 4938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".e>S a resu t of v. this strike a crimjnal complaint was filed against the Jatin Chukravorty eleven respondents under s. 11 of the West Bengal - Security Act, XIX of 1950, and a charge was subse-\n\nGa~••dragadkar J. quently framed against them."}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4964, "end_char": 4969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "February 13, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5178, "end_char": 5195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case as formulated in the charge against the said respondents was that on or about February 13, 1954, at Plassey each one of them did commit subversive acts which were intended or likely to impede, delay or restrict the work of Ramnagar Cane & Sugar Co. Ltd., which was a public utility concern for production of sugar, an essential commodity."}}, {"text": "Ramnagar Cane & Sugar Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5323, "end_char": 5353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case as formulated in the charge against the said respondents was that on or about February 13, 1954, at Plassey each one of them did commit subversive acts which were intended or likely to impede, delay or restrict the work of Ramnagar Cane & Sugar Co. Ltd., which was a public utility concern for production of sugar, an essential commodity."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5943, "end_char": 5962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant challenged the correctness of the said order of acquittal by preferring a revisional application before the Calcutta High Court."}}, {"text": "s. 22(l)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6497, "end_char": 6508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6636, "end_char": 6646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Before we consider this point it is relevant to refer to the relevant provisions of the West Bengal Security Act", "statute": "Before we consider this point it is relevant to refer to the relevant provisions of the West Bengal Security Act"}}, {"text": "Section 2(9)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6825, "end_char": 6840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Before we consider this point it is relevant to refer to the relevant provisions of the West Bengal Security Act", "statute": "Before we consider this point it is relevant to refer to the relevant provisions of the West Bengal Security Act"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7244, "end_char": 7273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7400, "end_char": 7405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7430, "end_char": 7459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s.2(9)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7686, "end_char": 7695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7903, "end_char": 7908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7922, "end_char": 7932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8048, "end_char": 8053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8057, "end_char": 8062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8099, "end_char": 8104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 22(l)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8236, "end_char": 8247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Section 22(1J(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8261, "end_char": 8277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "February 5, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9188, "end_char": 9204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents contend that the Workers' Union to which they belonged had left the conciliation proceedings on February 2, 1954, and that in fact the conciliation officer had submitted his failure report to that effect on February 3, 1954; and so, between the Workers' Union and the appellant no conciliation proceeding was pending after February 5, 1954, in any case when the Government received the failure report of the\n\n'96° conciliation offi.cer."}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10571, "end_char": 10576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10590, "end_char": 10603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10810, "end_char": 10818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18(3)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11020, "end_char": 11036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ramnagar Cane", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11762, "end_char": 11775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That inevitably me!l.ns that the respondents Ramnagar Cane would be bound by the said settlement even though and sur, ar co. Lid."}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12126, "end_char": 12131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12355, "end_char": 12360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12475, "end_char": 12483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12488, "end_char": 12493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22(l)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12734, "end_char": 12745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13391, "end_char": 13396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1960] 3 S.C. R. 350", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 13977, "end_char": 13997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ramnaga• Cane", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14116, "end_char": 14129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would be another matter if the conciliation proceedings in question are Ramnaga• Cane confined to specific demands limited to a specified and Sugar Co Ltd. v. class of employees."}}, {"text": "s. 22(l)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15422, "end_char": 15433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22(l)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15581, "end_char": 15592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15659, "end_char": 15664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(9)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15797, "end_char": 15807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15897, "end_char": 15902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16395, "end_char": 16400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "JAI KAUR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16681, "end_char": 16689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JAI KAUR & OTHERS\n\nv ."}}, {"text": "SHER SINGH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16705, "end_char": 16715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHER SINGH & OTHERS. ("}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16727, "end_char": 16747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. W ANCHOO and K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "P. B .. GAJENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "K. N. W ANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16749, "end_char": 16763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. W ANCHOO and K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "K. N. W ANCHOO"}}, {"text": "K. c. DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16768, "end_char": 16783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. W ANCHOO and K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "K. C. DAS GUPTA, JJ."}}, {"text": "Riwaj-i-am, 1882", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17380, "end_char": 17396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rattigan's Digest of Customary Law, paragraph 23, which records the correct law on the point, is not in conflict with Riwaj-i-am, 1882, Question No."}}, {"text": "(1918) L.R. 46 I.A. 72", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 18263, "end_char": 18285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Gajsndragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18645, "end_char": 18659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gajsndragadkar j\n\nMay 6."}}]} {"document_id": "1960_3_975_988_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "....,....\n\n,._~ -._,\n\n3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 975\n\non the important question of law in regard to the c960 construction of s. 22 (l)(d) of the Act.\n\nUnder the R -- c circumstances of this case we think the ends of justice anI';::;::~/2a. would be met if we convict the respondents of the v. offence charged and direct that each one of them Jatin Chakravo1ty\n\nshould pay a fine of rupee one.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nJAI KAUR & OTHERS\n\nv .\n\nSHER SINGH & OTHERS. (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. W ANCHOO and K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)\n\nHindu Law-] ats of Grewal got-Customary law of succession- N on-ancestral property-Daughter, if pref erred to collaterals- Doctrine of surrender-Gift to daughter by widow, if accelerates succession-Rattigan's Customary Law of the Punjab, para 23-Riwaji-am, r882, Question 43.\n\nUnder the customary law prevalent amongst the Hindu Jats of Grewal got in Ludhiana, a daughter is a preferential heir to her father in respect of his self-acquired property to his collaterals.\n\nRattigan's Digest of Customary Law, paragraph 23, which records the correct law on the point, is not in conflict with Riwaj-i-am, 1882, Question No. 43, which refers only to ancestral property and not to self-acquired property at all.\n\nMt. Hurmate v. Hoshiaru, A.I.R. 1944 Lah. 21, approved.\n\nMohinder Singh v. Kher Singh, A.LR. 1949 East Punjab 328, disapproved.\n\nMt. Subhani v. Nawab, A.LR. 1941 (P.C.) 21, referred to.\n\nCase-law discussed.\n\nThe doctrine of surrender in Hindu Law is based on a theory of complete self-effacement by the widow in favour of the reversioner and in order that such surrender. can accelerate the reversion, it must be of the entire interest in the entire property.\n\nThe law does not recognise a partial self-effacement nor a division between ancestral and non-ancestral property. The exception made in respect of a small portion of the property retained for the widow's maintenance does not detract from the rigour of the rule.\n\nRangaswami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden, (1918) L.R. 46 I.A. 72 and Phool Kau.r v. Prem Kaur, [1952] S.C.R. 793, referred to.\n\nConsequently, in a case where a Hindu widow of the Jat Grewal got made a gift only of the self-acquired property of her husband to her daughters such gift had not the effect of a surrender in law so as to accelerate the daughters' succession and the gift could not be valid beyond her lifetime.\n\nGajsndragadkar j\n\nMay 6.\n\nI960\n\n]ai Kau, v.\n\nShe, Singh\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nC1vrL APPELLA'l'E JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 108/ 56.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and decree dated May 27, 1953, of the Punjab High Court in Regular Second Appeal No. 176 of 1949, against the judgment and decree dated December 20, 1948, of the District , Judge, Ludhiana, arising <)Ut of the Judgment and decree dated February 6, 1948, of the Subordinate Judge, II Class, Ludhiana, in Suit No. 918 of 1946.\n\nGopal Singh, for the appellants.\n\nG. B. Aggarwala and K. P. Gupta, for the respondents.\n\n1960. May 6.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAS GUPTA, J.-The suit out of which this appeal has arisen was instituted by the respondents 1 and 2, Sher Singh and Labh Singh, for a declaration that a deed of gift executed by the first appellant, Jai Kaur, in respect of 8 (1-10) Bighas of land which she had inherited from her husband, Dev Singh, in favour of her two daughters, the 2nd & 3rd appellants before us, \" shall be null and void against the reversionary rights of the plaintiffs\", and defendant Nos. 4 to 6 after the death of defendant No. 1 (i.e., Jai Kaur) and shall not be binding upon them. The plaintiffs' case was that these lands left by Dev Singh were all ancestral lands qua the plaintiffs and according to the customary law which governs the Jats belonging to Grewal got to which these parties belong daughters do not succeed to property left by sonless fathers and so the gift by Dev Singh's widow in favour of her daughters would be null and void as against the plaintiffs and others who would be entitled on Jai Kaur's death to succeed to the estate as reversioners. In the alternative, the plaintiffs contended that even if the land in suit was not ancestral qua the plaintiffs then also the deed of gift would be null and void as against their reversionary interests inasmuch as even as regards nonancestral property daughters do not succeed among the' Grewal Jats. The main contention of defendants 1 to 3 (the appellants before us) was that the suit land was not ancestral qua the plaintiffs and defendants\n\nI -\n\nNos. 4 to 6, and that according to the customary law governing the Jats of the Grewal got, daughters exclude collaterals as regards non-ancestral property and a widow is competent to make a gift of such property in favour of her daughters. It was pleaded on behalf of the two daughters that they being preferential heirs in respect of the land in suit as against the plaintiffs, the gift is tantamount to acceleration of succession and is valid in every way. The Trial Judge held that 2B-2B,14-B out of the land in suit was ancestral and the gift was invalid to that extent, because as regards ancestral property a daughter does not succeed in the presence of collaterals. As regards the remainder of the suit land which he held was non-ancestral, the learned Judge was of opinion that the gift was merely an acceleration of succession as under the customary law governing the parties daughters exclude collaterals as regards succession to non-ancestral property.\n\nAccordingly he gave the plaintiffs a decree as prayed for as regards 2-B-2B, 14-B out of the land in suit and dismissed it as regards the remaining portion of the land in suit.\n\nThe plaintiffs appealed to the District Judge, Ludhiana, against this decreeand cross-objections were filed by the defendants Nos. 1 to 3. The Tria.l Court's finding about a portion of the land being ancestral and the rest non-ancestral was not disputed before the appeal court. On the question of custom the learned District Judge agreed with the Trial Judge's view that among the Grewal Jats of Ludhiana the daughter excluded collaterals as regards non-ancestral property. He held, therefore, agreeing with the Trial Judge that as regards the non-ancestral property the deed of gift was merely an act of acceleration of\n\nsucession and was, therefore, valid and binding. The appeal was accordingly dismissed and so also were the cross-objections which appear not to have been pressed.\n\nOn second appeal the learned judges of the East Punjab High Court accepted the contention urged on behalf of the plaintiffs that a special custom was proved to be in force among the Grewal J ats under which the daughter does not inherit even as regards\n\n/ai Kaur v.\n\nSher Singh\n\nDas Gupta ].\n\nI960\n\n.Jai Kaur\n\nv Sher '-i\"ingh\n\nDas Gupta ].\n\nnon-ancestral property. In that view they held that even as regards the non-ancestral property the gift by Jai Kaur would be valid only during her lifetime, and allowed. the appeal.\n\nAgainst this decree of the High Court defendants Nos. 1 to 3-Jai Kaur and her two daughters, the donees-have filed this appeal on the strength of special leave granted by this Court.\n\nTwo questions arise for consideration in this appeal.\n\nThe first is whether under the customary law governing the Jats of the Grewal got in Ludhiana to which the parties belong, the daughter or the collaterals are the preferential heirs as regards non-ancestral property. If the answer to this question be that daughters have preference over collaterals (the plaintiffs here), the other question which arises is whether this gift is such acceleration of succession in favour of the daughters as is permissible under the law.\n\nOn the question of custom the appellants rely on the statements in paragraph 23 of Rattigan's Digest of Customary Law (Thirteenth Edition) that in regard to the acquired property of her father the daughter is preferred to collaterals. It is not disputed that nonancestral property is \" acquired property \" within the meaning of this statement by Rattigan. Against this the plaintiffs-respondents rely on the answers to question No. 43 relating to Hindu Grewal Jats of Ludhiana as appear in the Riwaj-i-am prepared at the revised settlement of 1882. The question and. the answer are in these words :- Question: \"Under what circumstances can daughters inherit ? If there are sons, widows or near collaterals, do they exclude the daughter? If the collaterals exclude her, is there any fixed limit of relationship or degree within which such near kindred must stand ?\"\n\nAnswer:\n\n<.- (\n\n \" In our tribe the daughter does not succeed under 1any circumstances. If a person dies sonless, his collaterals succeed him. There is no fixed limit of relationship for purposes of excluding her.\n\nIf there are no collaterals of the deceased, the owners of the Thulla or Patti or village would be owners of his property.\" The authoritative value of Rattigan's compilation of customary law is now beyond controversy, having Leen recognised in the judicial decisions of the Punjab courts too numerous to mention, which have also received the approval of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.\n\nTherefore it is not, and cannot be disputed that under the general customary law of the Punjab daughters exclude collaterals in succession to non-ancestral property. The value of entries in the IUwaj-i-am has, also however, been repeatedly stressed.\n\nThat they are relevant evidence under s. 35 of the Evidence Act iR clear and the fact that the entries therein are the result of careful research of persons who might also be considered to have become experts in these matters, after an open and public enquiry has given them a value which should not be lightly underestimated. There is, therefore, an initial presumption of correctness as regards the entries in the Riwaj-i-am and when the custom as recorded in the Riwaj-i-am is in conflict with the general custom as recorded in Rattigan's Digest or ascertained otherwise, the entries in the Riwaj-i-am should ordinarily prevail except that as was pointed out by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in a recent decision in Mt. Subhani\n\nv. Nawab (1), that where, as in the present case, the Riwaj-i-am affects adversely the rights of females who had no opportunity-whatever of appearing before the revenue authorities, the presumption would be weak, and only a few instances would suffice to rebut it.\n\nIn the present appeal the oral testimony given on behalf of either party is practically valueless to show any instance in favour of the custom pleaded by them.\n\nIf, therefore, the Riwaj-i-am does show as urged by the plaintiffs a custom of they recognised the existence of such a custom, had been solely or even mainly based on evidence, other than entries in the Riwaji-i-am, they might have been of some assistance. Examination of these cases, however, shows unmistakably that they were either wholly, or mainly based on the entries in the Riwaj-i-am on the assumption that these entries referred to both ancestral and non-ancestral property.\n\nThis assumption having been established to be baseless, these decisions are valueless, to show that the custom as alleged by the plaintiffs-respondents did exist as regards non-ancestral property. Further, the oral evidence produced in the present case is wholly insufficient to prove such a custom.\n\nIt must, therefore, be held that the customary law among the Grewal J ats of Ludhiana district as regards succession to non-ancestral property is the same as recorded generally for the Punjab in Paragraph 23 of Hiattigan's Digest-i.e., the daughter is preferred to (I) A.I.R. I9H Lah. ~53\n\n(2) (rgu) 9 I.C. 608, ;3) (19111 13 1.c. 177,\n\n] ai Kaur\n\nSher Singh\n\nIJas Gupta ].\n\nJai /{aur\n\nSher Singh\n\nDas Guptri ].\n\ncollaterals, and consequently, the second and the third appellante, were the next reversioners to that portion of Dev Singh's property which has been found to be non-ancestral.\n\nThis brings us to the question whether the gift of this portion, by the first appellant to these reversioners, gives them a good title, beyond the widow's lifetime.\n\nWe have to remember in this connection that as regards the ancestral property, these daughters were not the reversioners, and the further fact that out of the ancestral property, the house was not included in the deed of gift. The position. therefore, is that out of the property in which the first appellant held a widow's estate, she gave by the deed of gift a portion to the reversioners as rAgards that portion, a portion to persons who were strangers to the reversion as regards that portion and a portion was retained by her. The doctrine of Hindu law according to which, a limited owner can accelerate the reversion, by surrendering her interest, to tjie next reversioner, is based on a theory of self-effacement of the limited owner.\n\nThat is why it has been laid down that in order that a surrender by a limited owner to a reversioner, may be effective, the surrender must be of the entire interest of the limited owner in the entire property. The exception made in favour of the retention of a small portion of the property for her maintenance, does not affect the strictness of the requirement that a surrender to be effective, must be of the entire interest in the entire property: Vide Rangasami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden(') and Phool Kaur v. Pem Kaur(').) In so far as there is gift to a stranger, there is no effacement of the limited owner; nor is there any effacement in respect of the property which is retained.\n\nWe find it impossible to say, therefore, that there is such effacement of the limited owner in this case, as would accelerate the daughter's rights by converting the future contingent right into a present vested right.\n\nOn behalf of the appellants it is argued that there is certainly a total effacement in respect of the non. ancestral property, so that the right of the next reversioners-the daughters-in that property has\n\n(1) (1918) L.R. 46 I, A. 7'-\n\n(2) [1952] S.C.R. )93\n\n,_ I\n\n....\n\nbeen acceler.1ted.\n\nWe do not think we shall be justified in recognising this novel doctrine of the possibility of effa.cement of the limited owner vis-a-vis the next reversioner of the non-ancestral property when there is no effacement vis-a-vis the reversioner of the ancestral property, and vice versa.\n\nEffacement cannot be broken up into two or more parts in this manner; and however much the limited owner may wish to efface herself only vis-a-vis those next reversioners whom she wants to benefit, law does not recognise such \" partial effacement \".\n\nThe Hindu Law doctrine of surrender does not, therefore, make the gift of the non-ancestral property to the daughters valid beyond the widow's lifetime.\n\nIt is not suggested that there is any customary law by which such sunender can be made.\n\nThough, therefore, we have found disagreeing with the learned judges of the High Court that under the customary law governing the Grewal got of Jats to which the parties belong, the daughters-the second and the third appellants-:1rn preferential heirs to the non-ancestral portion of the suit lu.nd, we hold that their conclusion that this deed of gift in favour of the daughters is not v,1lid even a\" regard.:1 the non-ancestral property, beyond the donor's lifetime is correct and must be maintained .\n\nAs a last attempt Mr. Gopal Singh, counsel for the appellants, wanted us to hold that under s. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, which became law in 1956, either the mother or the daughters have become full owner.:1 of thiil property, and S'J the plaintiffs' suit should be dismissed.\n\nAs the Hindu Succession Act was not on the statute-book, when the written statement was filed or at any time before the suit was disposed of in the courts below, the defence under s. 14 of that Act could not be thought of and was not raised. The necessary consequence is that evidence was not adduced, with the facts material for the application of s. 14 in view, by either party. Mr. Agarwala has, on behalf of the plaintiffs-respondents, contended that as the record stands the mother had ceased to be in possession and could not get the benefit of s. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, and that the\n\n]at f{aur\n\n,'-i'her S1ngh\n\nDa> Gupta .J.\n\nJai i Gupta .J.\n\nJai i Gupta .J.\n\nJai i Gupta .J.\n\nJai isee Nagsee\n\nb Co.\n\nHidayat111/ah ) .\n\nComniissioner of\n\nInc1 me Tax\n\nNarsee ~Vagsee &Co,\n\nHidayatullah ].\n\nSUPREME COURT REPUJ{TS [l9U(;]\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax obtained a certificatP from the High Court, and filed this appeal.\n\nBefore dealing with the reasons given by the High Court and the Tribunal and considering arguments urged in this appeal, it will be convenient to reproduce ss. 11(1) and 14 of the Act:\n\n\"11(1). The Income-tax Officer may, for the purposes of this Act, nquire any person w horn he believes to be engaged in any business to which this Act applies, or to have been so engaged dnring any chargeable acconnting period, or to be otherwise liable to pay business prnfits tax, to furnish within such period, not being less than forty-five days from the date of the service of the notice, as may be specified in the notice, a return in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner setting forth (along with such other particulars as may be provided for in the notice) with respect to any chargeable accounting period specified in the not ice, the profits (the taxable profit\") of the business or the amount of deficiency, if a11y, available for rdief under section 6 : Provided that the Income-tax Officer may, in his discretion, extend the datP for the delivery of the return. 14.\n\nIf, in consequence of definite information which has come into his possession, the Income-tax Officer discovers that profits of any chargeable accounting period chargeable to business profits tax have escaped assessment, or have been under-assessed, or have been the subject of excessive relief, be may at any time within four years of the end oftbe chargeable acwunting period in question serve on the person liable to such tax a notice containing all or any of the rpq uirements w hicb may be included in a notice undPr section 11, and may proceed to assess or reassess the amount of such profits liable to businASS profits ta.x, and the provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply as if the notice were a notice issued under that section.\" The Tribunal construed both these sections together, and expressed the opinion that the notice under s. 11 in respect of a chargeable accounting period should\n\n3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPOH,'l':) 1007\n\nissue before the commencement ofthe next chargeable accounting period, and that if the notice was not so issued, profits must be considered to have escaped assessment, and that action could only be taken nnder s. 14 within four years of the close of the chargeable accounting period in respect of which it was sought to tax the assessee. The Tribunal, therefore, held that inasmuch as the notice in this case was issued in January, 1953, more than four years after October 31, 1948, when the chargeahle accounting period came to an end, the notice and th i assessment were barred by time.\n\nThe Tribunal also pointed out that the intention of the legislature could be gathered from the fact that though in s. 15 of the Excess Profits Tax Act the limitation of five years was deleted by Act 22 of 1947, a similar amendment was not made in s. 14 of the Act, which corresponds to s. 15 of the Excess Profits Tax Act, though the Act was passed at the same time being Act 21 of 1947.\n\nHolding, therefore, that the profits which were not taxed at all and were never brought under assessment must be deemed to have \"escaped assessment\" because notice under s. 11 was not issued in time, the Tribunal was of opinion that action could only be taken under s. 14 of the Act within the time specified there. The Bombay High Court did not accept that the notice under s. 11 had to be given before the end of the chargeable accounting period, but held that the two sections must be interpreted together, and observed:\n\n\" Inasmuch as section 11 doeB not indicate any period of time with regard to the issue of a notice, would it or would it not be right for us to import into section 11 the consideration which led the Legislature to fix a limitation of time for the purpose of issuing a notice under section 14? If wfl were not to do that we would arrive at this rather extraordinary conclusion that the Legislature while saving the subject from harassment of proceedings with regard to escaped assessment or under-assPssment, permitted that harassment with regard to the very initiation of the proceedings after the lapse of four years. It is contended that the period of four years mentioned in section 14 suppliPs a11\n\nCommissioner of I nconze Tax\n\nV. 1Varsee ;..Vagsee\n\n&Co.\n\nHidayatuliah ].\n\nCommissioner of\n\nTneome Tax\n\nNarsee Nagsee\n\n&Co.\n\nHidr•yalullah ].\n\nimportant indication for what the period of limitation should be with regard to the issue of a notice under section 11. If income which has escaped assessment can only be taxed within four years by reason of section 14, then it must inferentially follow that income must escape assessment at some point of time anterior to the period of four years mentioned in section 14.\n\n......\n\n• c ..................................................................\n\nOn the facts of this case the most significant and salient fact is that the notice has bPen issued four '\" years after the close of the chargeable accounting period and as that notice is beyond the time mentioned in section 14, in our opinion, the notice is not a valid notice under section ll.\" The Commissioner has contended that. s. 11 deals ·~ with the issuance of a notice for the first time before any income has been returned or brought to tax The notice under s. 11, it is submitted next, is without any limit of time, and a limitation cannot be read into a section, when the legislature has not thought it fit to lay it down.\n\nAccording to the Commissioner, s. 14 deals with \"escaped assessment\", which, under the scheme of the Act, must, be given a narrow meaning as indicating the escapement of profits from tax either wholly or partly for any reason, after the process of assessment has taken place. Section 14, it is argued, operates after one set of proceedings for assessment of tax have taken place, and applies only where the profits either escape assessment, or are under-assessed ·.\"--' or excessive relief has been granted, while s. l l, on the other hand, applies to all cases, where the assessee has not been called upon to file a return or has not filed one himself.\n\nAs against this, the assessee firm adopts the reasons given by the Tribunal and the High Court, and adds that whereas under s. 14 some definite information must be possessed by the Incometax Officer before he can issue the notice, the Incometax Officer has only to entertain a belief that business L was carried on in the chargeable accounting period to enable him to serve the notice under s. ll. The assessee firm, therefore, contends that it would be open to the Income tax Officer to ignore s. 14\n\naltogether, and to issue a notice under s. 11 in a case even after the expiry of a considerable time. The Commissioner contends that the liability to pay tax arises under s. 4 of the Act, and it remains till the liability is discharged by payment of tax, and the higislature has, therefore, advisedly left the power to the Income-tax Officer to assess the tax where there has been no proceeding to assess it, without imposing any limit a.s to time.\n\nSection 14, on the other hand, has been so framed that persons whose profits have been brought to assessment once should not be exposed to a double peril, except within the stated period.\n\nThe two sections must be reconciled.\n\nThe learned Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court, who delivered the judgment of the Bench, stated that it was not an easy matter to give a rational meaning to them.\n\nHe, however, felt that between the two rival contentions, the argument of the assessee firm was the more reasonable, and that where two constructions were possible, one strict and the other beneficial to the assessee, the latter should be preferred if it was equally reasonable.\n\nThe scheme of the Act, in so far as asking for a return is concerned, is entirely different from that of the Indian Income-tax Act. Under the latter Act, a general notice is issued calling upon every assessee whose income exceeds the minimum which is exempt under the Income-tax Act, to file a return within the period stated in the notice. The Income-tax Officer\n\nhas further power to issue a notice to any individual assessee during any assessment year calling for a return of his income during the previous year.\n\nAn assessee under the Income-tax Act is, therefore, bound, if his income is liable to tax, to file a ret.urn whether it be in answer to the general notice or to the special notice issued to him. The assessee may ven file a return voluntarily before the special notice is issued to him. Even before 1939, though there was no general notice the distinction between the previous year and the assessment year obtained. The notice under s. 22 of the Indian Income-tax Act must issue befr1re llH?\n\nCommisar of the business for the purposes of the Incounting periodf'. Then comes s. 4, which is the charging section. That sect.ion, omitting the provisions about exemptions which do not concern us, reads:\n\n\"Subject to the provisions of this Act, there shall, in respect of any business to which this Act applies, be charged, levied and paid on the amount of the taxable profits during any chargeable accounting period, a tax (in this Act referred to as 'business profits tax ') which shall, in respect of any chargeable accounting period ending on or before the 31st day of March, 1947, be equal to sixteen and two thirds per cent. of the taxable profits, and in respect of any chargeable accounting period beginning after that date, be equal to such percentage of the taxable profits as may be fixed by the annual Finance Act.\n\nProvided ............ \" (omitted).\n\nSection 5 deals with the application of the Act.\n\nThat section, omitting again the provisos that do not affect the present matter, provides:\n\n\"This Act shall apply to every business of which any part oft.he profits made during the chargeable accounting period is chargeable to income-tax by\n\nCommissioner (lf\n\nlnconie Tnx\n\nNarsee J\\7a gsee\n\n&Co\n\nHidayatul/uh J.\n\nCornmissioner of\n\nincome Tux\n\nN arsee Na see\n\n&Co.\n\n\\, Hidayatullah j.\n\nvirtue of the provisions of sub-clause (i) or subola use (ii) of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 4 of the Indian Income-tax Ac!, 1922, or of clause(<·) of that sub-section:\n\n\"Provided ............ \" (omitted).\n\nIt will appear from these sections quoted that the business profits tax comes in the wake of the incometax. That is to say, the assessability to profits tax follows the assessability to incomP-tax. The tax is laid on the taxable profits accruing within a stated period which may include not more than four accounting periods corresponding either wholly or partly to the previous year under the Income-tax Act.\n\nThe C'hargeability to income-tax is a condition precedent to the chargeability to profits tax, but not every business which pays in0ome. tax necessarily pays busi1wss profits tax. The Act, however, does not prescribe a period comparable to the assessment yt>1ir under the Indian Income-tax Act. It does not lay down any term within which the assessment should be completed.\n\nThe short question thus is whether in s. 11 of the Act a limitation corresponding to the limitation contained in s. 14 must necessarily be read. It seems to he agreed on all hands, and it was not denied at the Bar before us that ifs. 11 is to be interpreted according to its own terms, then no such limitation can be read in it.\n\nThe Tribunal and the High Court resort to s. 14 to do so.\n\nIt is always a serious matter to read into a section what the legislature has not chosen to put there.\n\nAs pointed nut by Lord EshPr, M. H., in Curtis v.\n\nStovin (1):\n\n\"It is, no doubt, very easy for a judge to say that he is introducing words into an Act only by way of construing it, while he is really making a new Act\".\n\nS110h procedure is wholly out of place if the language of the section does not admit of any extension.\n\nThe question invariably is not what the legislature might have said, or might be supposed to have intended to say, but what it did say. This is more so in an\n\n(I) (188\\)) 22 Q.B.D. 5'J•\n\n~· \\\n\n....\n\nAct which imposes a tax, and which cannot be added 1960 to or subtracted from except perhaps for the most Com :;;;,.., of clear and compelling reasons. Bearing these principles, r:Cme Tax which have received recognition on many an occasion, v. in mind, I address myself to the task.\n\nNarsee Nagsee Under the scheme of the Act analysed above, it is & Co, quite clear that the liability to tax depends not on Hidayatullak 1. any action to be taken nuder the Act to recover the tax, but it attaches itself to the taxable profits when they have been made in any chargeable accounting period. Once this liability attaches, it can only be dissolved either by payment of the tax or by the levy becoming impossible due to lapse of stated time. The Commissioner contends that the liability to pay the tax in the case of a business not brought to tax does not cease by reason of any passage of time. It ceases only when by reason of an attempted assessment once, the proceedings under s. 14 cannot be initiated again after the expiry of four years from the end of any chargeable accounting period. The Commissioner contends that the phrase \"profits have escaped assessment\" in s. 14 must be limited to those cases only.\n\nFor this purpose, reliance is placed upon a recent decision of the Privy Council in a case from Africa, Gokulrlas Ratanji Manrlavia v. Commissioner of Incometax (1 ), which will be referred to in some detail.\n\nThe Income.tax authorities in Nairobi in that case wrote on May 26, 1953, asking Mandavia for information and a deposit of£ 2,000 and saying :\n\n\"As you do not appear at any time to have made a return of total income and claim for allowances, I am sending under separate cover forms covering years of assessment 1943 to 1953. These should be completed and submitted to me along with the accounts of your professional activities and of your property dealings as set out in the preceding\n\nparagraphs\".\n\nMandavia was at that time in England, and wrote on June 4, asking for time till the end of July. On June 15, 1953, the Regional Commissioner wrote to inform him that he was proceeding to assess him and impose penalties on the basis of such information as (I) (1959] A, C. Il4,\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncome Tax\n\n~Varsee Nagsee\n\n&Co.\n\nHidayatullah .J.\n\nhad been submitted. These assessments were made on June 18, but were dated June 26 apparently to give the taxpayer more time in which to pay. Under s. 59 of the East African Income Tax (Management) Act, 1952, it was provided :\n\n\"59(1 ).\n\nThe commissioner may, by notice in writing, require any person to furnish him within a reasonable time, not being less than thirty days from the date of service of such notice, with a return of income and of such particulars as may be required for the purposes of this Act with respect to the income upon which such person appears to be chargeable\".\n\nUnder the third sub-section of that section, a duty was laid upon every person to give notice to the Commissioner before October 15 in the year following the year of income that he was so chargeable, where no notice had been served under sub-s. (1) and no return had been furnished within nine months of the close of the year of account. Then followed two sections, which need to be quoted partly. Section 71 provided, inter alia :\n\n\"(1). The commissioner shall proceed to assess every person chargeable with tax as soon as may be after the expiration of the time allowed to such person for the delivery of his return.\" The section provided by sub-s. (2) for cases in which a return was made which was (a) accepted and (b) not accepted, and by sub-s. (3), for cases where no return was filed.\n\nThen followed s. 72 which provided (leaving out the proviso) :\n\n\"Where it appears to the commissioner that any person liable to tax has not been assessed oi; has been assessed at a Jess amount than that which ought to have been charged, the commissioner may, \"within the year of income or within seven years after the expiration thereof, assess such person at such amount or additional amount as, according to his judgment, ought to have been charged, and the provisions of this Act as to notice of assessment, appeal and other proceedings under this Act shall apply to such assessment or additional assessment and to the tax charged thereunder. \"\n\n,_ .\n\nNow, the Commissioner in the cited case justified the assessments under s. 72, because it was contended that the assessments were ultra vires and void, in that they were made before the\" time allowed\". He relied upon the general words of s. 72, and submitted that they covered even a case where a pe:\\'son was not assessed whether he had a notice and a \"time allowed\" under ss. 59 and 71 or not. The argument on behalf of the taxpayer was that s. 72 only dealt with cases where subsequent informq, tion led either to an assessment after a prior asses1ment or to an additional assessment but had no application to cases in which the machinery of s. 59(1) had not been operated.\n\nThe Privy Council accepted the contention of the taxpayer. It held that before assessments could be made, the \"time allowed\" had to elapse. It, however, gave a narrow meaning to the words as to assessing for the first time in s. 72, as restricted to \"cases in which, the machinery ofs. 59(1) having been operated, no assessment has been made\". Their Lordships gave three reasons for this conclusion, which may be set out in their own words : \"If the power to make an assessment under section 72 applies to the making of an original assessment their Lordships are unable to imply a term restricting it to back cases or making it ultra vires to operate it at any time. One would expect an opportunity to make a return to be a condition precedent to assessment. This is supported by the provisions for personal allowances in Part VI of the Act. If the respondent is right any person can be assessed without having any such opportunity.\n\nThere would be two concurrent jurisdictions~ one providing reasonable protection for the taxpayer and the other providing no protection quoad the original assessment, apart from a right to appeal.\n\nSuch a construction seems to their Lordships inconsistent with the general and mandatory provi sions of section 71. That section is providing how all original assessments are to be made.\n\nSection 72 deals, inter alia, with additional assess ments, with cases in which, owing presumably to subsequent information, the Revenue desires to\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncome Ta\"\n\nNarsee Nagsee\n\n&Co.\n\nHidayatullah J.\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncome Tax\n\nNarsee Nagsee\n\nc;. Co.\n\nHidayatullah J.\n\nreopen what had apart from section 72 been settled.\n\nHaving regard to the wording of section 71 it seems to their Lordships necessary to restrict the words as to assessing for the first time in section 72 to cases in which, the machinery of section 59 (1) having been operated, no assessment has been made. So far as the taxpayer is concerned, after he had made his return or had an opportunity of doing so, it was settled that he was under no liability to tax for that year. Subsequent information leads the Revenue to reopen the matter and decide that he ought to he assessed. ·\n\nSection 72 is dealing with the reopening of cases which had been settled under the normal procedure.\n\nThis explains the fact that section 72 contains a prima facie limitation of seven years whereas section 71 contains no limitation. On the respondents' arguments this seems inexplicable. On the other argument it seems reasonable that there should after a certain time be no reopening of what has been settled unless there has been fraud or wilful default. The construction also gains support from the words 'ought to have been charged', when they occur for the second time in section 72. They there apply to' such amount' as well as' such additional amount'.\" The case, though it is easily distinguishable on the ground that the African Act and the Act are not in pari materia, shows that by the compulsion of the language employed and the scheme of taxation, a restricted meaning may have to be given to certain general words.\n\nWhen such a claim is made, only the statute under which the claim is made, can be the guide and not another not in pari materia. The decision is also distinguishable on the ground that there a notice under s. 59 (1) was pending and the \"time allowed \" had not expired.\n\nThe assessee relies upon a decision of the Bombay High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. P. N.\n\nContractor ('), where the previous year ended on March 31, 1934.\n\nNo notice was served on the assessee under s. 22(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act during\n\n1•1 ~·~371 r:r.:a. 336.\n\n--\"\n\nthe year of assessment. Then a notice under s. 34 of the Income-tax Act was served on June 26, 1935. It was held by Beaumont, C. J., and Rangnekar, J., that s. 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act was wide enough to include those cases in which there was no notice under s. 22 or a first assessment. Beaumont, C. J., dissented from the observations of Sir George Rankin in In re Lachhiram Basantlal (1) made obiter that \" income cannot be said to have escaped assessment except in the case where an assessment has been made which does not include the income\", and observed :\n\n\"Under s. 34 what must be escaped is assessment and.that means the whole process of assessment, which, in the case of individuals, starts with the service of a notice under s. 22(2).\n\nThe liability to assessment is a risk to which every person in British India entitled to income is liable, and I cannot see why the process of assessment has not been just as much escaped by a person who receives no notice under s. 22(2) as by a person who receives such a notice which proves in fact ineffective. It seems to me that a person who receives no notice under s. 22(2) has escaped assessment, although, through no fault of his own, the process of assessment has never been set in motion. \" The assessee also relied upon Commissioner of Income-tax, Burma v. Ved Nath Singh (2), where Roberts, C. J., Mya Bu and Dunkley, JJ., observed:\n\n\"We are of opinion that s. 34 is applicable to cases in which either no assessment at all has been made upon the person who received the income, profits or gains liable to assessment, or, where an assessment has been made in the course of the year, but some portion of the income, profits or gains of such assessee for some reason or other has not been included in the order of assessment; such income is income which has 'escaped assessment' in the year, and falls within the ambit of s. 34 of the Act. \" These cases arose before the amendments of 1939 and in those days there was no provision for a general\n\n(I) (1931) l.L.R 58 Cal. 909, 912. \\2) [1940] 8 I.T.R. 23a,\n\nCommissioner of Income Tax\n\nNarsee Nagsee\n\n&Co.\n\nHidayatullah ].\n\nI960\n\nCommissioner of\n\nJnc; onie Tax\n\nN ar.ee 1-l agsee\n\n&Co.\n\nHidayatullah ].\n\nnotice such as is now issued under s. 22(1).\n\nEven in those days, the return asked for the particulars of the total income during the previous year.\n\nThus, at the end of the assessment year it was not possible to issue a notice for a back period beyond the previous year. By the force of s. 22(2) it could be said at the end of any assessment year that in so far as the income of the corresponding previous year was concerned, it had escaped assessment. The logical result of this was that if no notice calling for a return under s. 22 was issued within the assessment year, thens. 34 was the only means to get at the tax: See Rajendra Nath Mukerjee v. Commissioner of Income-tax {1). The scheme of the Indian Income-tax Act is entirely different, and by fixing a time limit for the issuance of a notice under s. 22(2) makes it clear that in s. 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act the words \"escaped assessment\" ex facie covered all cases of escaped assessment whether within or without a prior assessment. The assessment there 'escapes' when once the assessment year expires. The cases under the Incometax Act which expound s. 34 are, thus, not in point.\n\nThe cases of this Court relied upon by the assessee also do not help. In Kamal Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax (2), it was held that the word \"information \" was wide enough to include information as to the true and correct state of the law and the word \"escaped \" was wide enough to cover cases of inadvertence or oversight on the part of the assessing authorities. In Commissioner of Income-tax v. Ranchhoddas Karsondas ('), the respondent assessee had submitted a ' voluntary ' return showing no taxable income, and it was held that the Income-tax Officer could not ignore the return and proceed under s. 34 of the Income-tax Act. In Maharajadhiraj Sir Kameshwar Singh v. State of Bihar {4), the income returned was not brought to tax and later under s. 26 of the Bihar Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1938, it was sought to be assessed. Section 26 of that Act was held to cover such a case, and the language of that section was extremely wide.\n\nThese cases are hardly in point.\n\n(1} L.R. {1933 1 6I I.A. Io.\n\n(2) f1959] Supp. l S.C.R. Io.\n\n(3) [1960] ' S.C.R. 114.\n\n(4)[1960] I S.C.R. 332.\n\n!--\n\n\\.. ..\n\nWe are thus thrown back upon the construction of z96o the two sections, and must find out where the compulc .-. 1 ommisstoner o sion of the language employed and the general scheme Income Tax of the provisions lead to.\n\nBefore doing so, I shall v. discuss one other extraneous consideration called in Narsee Nagsee aid by both the Tribunal and the High Court. The & Co.\n\nAct followed the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940, which Hidayatullah J. provided for the levy of tax on excess profits made during the chargeable accounting periods within the term beginning on the first day of September, 1939, and ending on the thirty-first day of March, 1941. By succeeding Finance Acts, the year 1941 was changed to 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945 and 1946. Thereafter came the Act.\n\nSections 13 ancl 15 of the Excess Profits Tax Act correspond respectively to ss. 11 and 14 of the Act with the difference that the limitation in s. 15 was five years. By Act 21 of 1947 (which immediately preceded the Act) this period of limitation was removed, by deleting retrospectively the words \"within five years of the end of the chargeable accounting period in quesLion\" from s. 15 of the Excess Profits Tax Act.\n\nThus, by the amendment there was no limitation for bringing to tax profits which had escaped assessment, and it was so held by Falshaw and Kapur, JJ., in Telu Ram Jain & Co. v. Commissioner of Income-tax (1).\n\nNow, the Tribunal and the High Court reason that it was the simplest matter for the legislature to have deleted similar words from s. 14 of the Act, if the intention was to create no limitation for the assessment of profits which had not been assessed before.\n\nThe fact that there was no corresponding change in the Act, it is said, shows that no first assessment or reassessment could be made after a lapse of four years.\n\nThis argument views the matter from one angle only. There is another side to it which is equally plausible. The intention of the legislature in making the amendment in the Excess Profits Tax Act was manifestly to make the tax leviable by a first assessment and also by a reassessment without any limit of time.\n\nAfter the amendment, no limitation existed either in s.13 ors. 15 of the Excess Profits Tax Act.\n\n(1) [1955] 27 I.T.R. 94\n\nIg6o\n\nConitnissioner of\n\nIncome Tax\n\n. v.\n\nNarsee N11gsee\n\n&Co,\n\nHidayatullah J.\n\nSuch assessment or reassessment could be made at any time or even after considerable time. The question of hardship involved in calling for returns after the lapse of considerable time, which has weighed heavily with the High Court, did not seem to ha,-e distressed the legislature. It is thus impossible to think that the legislature left the Act untouched from a converse motive. . '\\Ve must not forget that the Act was then freshly enacted, and the first chargeable accounting period was hardly over for any assessee and every case of escaped assessment or underassessment was also well within the time prescribed by s. 14 of the Act. There would hardly be any present need for such a drastic provision to start with. It might well ha.ve been thought that there would not be cases in which four years could not be considered ample, except those cases where a particular business was never brought to tax at all. ]'or that, it might equally have been thought that s. 11, as is contende-d by the Commissioner, was sufficient. The amendment in s. 15 of the Excess Profits Tax Act might have been advisedly made to reach even those cases where though the profits of a business had once been brought to assessment, they needed to be re-assessed even though the first assessment resulted in some tax or no tax. For those cases it might have been felt that the limit of :five years ought to go.\n\nIf this is as good an explanation of the intention of the legislature in amending s. 15, then the reason given by the High Court is not the only explanation, and it cannot be accepted. If the intention of the legislature can be gathered in two different ways, it is sheer speculation to say which is the true intention.\n\nAs said earlier, it is always inadvisable to go by a supposed intention of the legislature and construe the words of the statute in the light of that supposed intention. The intention must be gathered from the words of the section in which the legislature has chosen to express its intention and not vice versa.\n\nI am accordingly of the view that this ground is not valid.\n\nThe High Court and the Tribunal read s. 11(1) somewhat differently.\n\nAccording to the Tribunal,\n\n' I '\n\n.....\n\nthe notice under that section must issue before the end of the chargeable accounting period, and according to the High Court, within four years from the end thereof. There is nothing in the section which justifies any of these two readings.\n\nThree classes of persons are there mentioned. They are (a) prsons believed to be engaged in any business, (b) persons believed to have been so engaged in any chargeable accounting period, and (c) persons believed to be otherwise liable to business profits tax. The first two categories clearly show that whereas for the first category the assessee must be engaged in business in the year of notice, for the second category the notice may issue in respect of a back chargeable accounting period.\n\nThe words \"to be engaged\" and \"to have been so engaged during any chargeable accounting period\" cannot but refer to \" current\" and \"back\" chargeable accounting periods. The latter words plainly refer to a \" back \" period and the word \"any\" shows that it need not be the \" back\" period immediately preceding the \"current\" chargeable accounting period only.\n\nIndeed, it is possible to issue the notice under s. 11(1) after March 31, 1949, in respect of the very first chargeable accounting period and also every succeeding period lying within the term beginning on April 1, 1946, and ending on March 31, 1949.\n\nIf this be the natural meaning of the section-and this meaning is made more probable by the residuary category, viz., persons otherwise liable to pay business profits tax-it is an irresistible conclusion that no period comparable to the assessment year under the Income-tax Act was either introduced or contemplated.\n\nThe distinction between \" back \" chargeable accounting periods and \"current\" chargeable accounting periods also disappears. Unless one can say when or after how much lapse of time profits escape assessment, s. 14 cannot be made applicable at all. Section 4 of the Act says that in respect of any business to which the Act applies, there shall be charged, levied and paid a tax referred to as the busi.ness profits tax.\n\nThe liability that is incurred can bnly be discharged by payment of the tax and the charging and levying\n\n13~\n\nCommissioner of Income Ta:r\n\nN arsee N agsee\n\n&Co.\n\nHidayatullah ].\n\nCommissioner of Income Lax\n\nNarsee Nagsee\n\n&Co.\n\nHidayatullah .J.\n\nSUPREME COURT HEPORTS [1960]\n\nare duties laid upon the Income-tax Officers who execute them by issuing a notice under s. 11 and by assessing and demanding the tax. For this purpose, any person believed to be engaged in business to which the Act applies, or to have been so engaged or to be otherwise liable can be called upon to make a return. Of course, the proceedings thus initiated may or may not result in tax, but that is another matter.\n\nThis is the first operation of the Act against a likely taxpayer. For this purpose, it is admitted, on all hands, there is no express limitation in s. 11(1) or elsewhere.\n\nThe question next is whether there is anything in s. 14, which impliedly imposes such a limitation.\n\nThat section deals with \"escaped assessment\", \"under-assessment\" or\" excessive relief\".\n\nThe last two categories ex facie refer to an assessment after a prior assessment. The question thus is whether the words\" escaped assessment\", refer also to an assessment after a prior assessment.\n\nThe word \"assessment \", was explained by the Judicial Committee in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Khemchand Ramdas(').\n\nIt sometimes means the computation of income or profits, sometimes, the determination of the amount of tax payable, and, sometimes, the whole procedure laid down in a taxing Act for imposing the liability on an assessee. In s. 14 where the words \"escaped assessment \" are used, it means that there was a determination of the amount of the tax payable but some profits escaped that process either wholly or partly.\n\nProfits cannot be said to have escaped assessment when there are proceedings afoot and assessment is being made. In my opinion, they cannot be said to have escaped assessment when they are exposed to assessment and assessment has yet to be done. It is to be noticed that s. 14 requires \"definite information\" in the possession of the Income-tax Officer and to \" discovery \" by him of the fact of escaped assessment as a condition precedent to action under that section. If under s. 4 the liability to tax exists and there is no limitation, and if under s. 11(1) it can be (II) (t938) L.R:65 I.A 236.\n\n- I\n\nenforced without any limit as to time, the profits r96o cannot be said to have escaped assessment any more h h d. f d Commissioner of t an w ere assessment procee mgs are a oot an are Income Tax not yet over.\n\nThis is not a case where by the operav. tion of some other period of limitation the assessment Narsee Nagsee proceedings can be said to be out of reach of the & co.\n\nDepartment. If the profits are still assssable by Hidayatullah ]. reason of the charge under s. 4 and are subJeCt to the process under s. 11(1), there is no \"esca, ped assessment\". There are here no \"back\" periods which cannot be reached under c:. 11 like the period prior to the previous year of the Income-tax Act, for which only s. 34 is available.\n\nAU chargeable accounting periods are on the same footing, and s. 11 is wide enough to reach all of them. Further, it is to be noticed that there is no time limit for completing an assessment once begun.\n\nAlso, if profits which have never been processed can be dealt with both under ss. 11 and 14 and both have the limit of 4 years, why have two sections, one depending on belief and the other on definite information? We must look to some different meaning and different fields of operation. That can only be if the words \"escaped assessment\" are given a restricted meaning in s. 14.\n\nIn this view of the scheme of the Act and the clear words of s. 11(1), it seems difficult to put a limit of time because one is contained in s. 14 in respect of profits escaping assessment. No doubt, both the sections must be construed harmoniously; but as was observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Mohammad Sher Khan v. Seth Swami Dayal (1), the provisions of one section cannot be used to defeat those of another, unless it is impossible to effect reconciliation between them. Equally both sections must not be made to operate in the same field.\n\nIn the Act with which we are concerned, reconciliation is only possible if the words of s. 11(1) and s. 14 are given meanings without importing certain implications from one into the other, and the only way different fields can be found is to read them differently. The interpretation of the High Court, if I may figuratively describe it, makes the two sections march hand in hand during the four\n\n(I) (1922] L.R. 49. I.A. 60.\n\nI960\n\nCommissioner of Income Tax\n\nNarsee Nagse8\n\n&Co.\n\nH idayatullah ] .\n\nyears which ex facie could not have been intended, as one section depends upon the entertainment of belief and the other section requires definite information leading to a positive discovery.\n\nRead in this way, it is clear that s. 11 effectuates the assessment, levy and collection of tax from persons believed to be liable, while s. 14 enables a reopening of cases where after an assessment there is discovery that profits have escaped assessment due to one reason or another.\n\nThe use of the words\" escaped assessment\" in the context of the Act has reference only to those cases where profits of a business were brought to process once but for some reason some profits escaped assessment or were under-assessed or received excessive relief. The insistence upon definite information leading to such a discovery before action is taken under s. 14, also points in the same direction. \"Definite information \" denotes that there is something discovered which can demonstrate the falsity of something done previously. The existence of belief shows the possibility of there existing some profits which need to be taxed. Whereas \"definite information\" points to a state of affairs in which though there was a processing of the profits before, something definite having been found out the result of that processing is discovered to be incorrect, the word \" belief\" in s. 11 shows that the Income-tax Officer is to embark upon a first enquiry as to whether the business comes within the purview of the Act or not.\n\nTo summarise, therefore, though it is possible to make the chargeable accounting period correspond to the •previous year' under the Income-tax law, there is no method by which the conception of an assessment year can be brought in. To say that s. 11 operates for full four years is to find not an \" assessment year\" but an \" assessment period \". During the course of those four years, the tax would be realisable under s. 11, because the assessment period could not be said to be over. But then, there would be no room for the operation of s. 14, particularly where it speaks of\" escaped assessment''. During the whole of the four years, there would never be any escaped assessment, and there would be no further time available\n\n' -\n\n.....\n\nfor the operation of s. 14.\n\nEven on this reasoning, ry6o some meaning other than what prevails under the Income-tax Act will have to be given to the same Commissioner uf Income Tax words by the compulsion of the language employed v. in ss. 11 and 14. On the reasoning of the High Court, Narsee Nagsee the whole of the period of four years would be the & Co. \"assessment period\". It would begin at the end of H'd --1 h h bl . . d d d f h t ayatul ak j. t e c argea e accountmg per10 an en a ter t e lapse of four years. It would embrace all the chargeable accounting periods within reach.\n\nBut then, s. 14 also operates in the same manner and for the same time. This construction renders s. 14 otiose.\n\nNor do I think that there is any unreasonableness in the construction, which I have indicated apove.\n\nThe legislature might have been solicitous that persons who have been subjected to the process of assessment once should not be exposed to a second peril except within the reasonable period of four years from the end of the chargeable accounting period; but it did not view in a similar way those persons who were never troubled before but whose liability to pay tax remained unaltered. The motive with which limitation was introduced in one section cannot be the motive for the Courts to introduce the same period in quite another section. To adopt the reasoning of the High Court would be to make no distinction between ss. 11 and 14 and to render meaningless the fiction to be found in the last words of s. 14. ]'or profits which have never been brought to assessment, there would be two notices possible in some cases, one under s. 11(1) and the other under s. 14, one requiring only the entertainment of a belief as to a certain state of things and the other requiring definite information and discovery that profits have escaped assessment. These two conditions cannot co-exist in the same case.\n\nHarmonious construction requires that there should arise no impossible situations. Such situations are avoided ifthe operation of s. 11 is confined to those cases where there has been no prior assessment and the operation of s. 14 to those cases where after a prior assessment there is an escaped assessment, under-assessment or excessive relief. For the subsequent and reopened assessment there is a limit of\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncome Tax\n\nv Narsee Nagsee\n\n&Co.\n\nHidavatullah f.\n\nfour years, but for the assessment for the first time there is no limit.\n\nI have looked into the Rules framed under the Act.\n\nNo doubt, R. 50 speaks of a period during which refunds can be claimed, and it may be argued that this rule has to be interpreted in harmony with the Act. If the Rule cannot be reconciled with the Act, then the Rule must fail.\n\nSee Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edn., p. 51, where the following passage occurs : \"If reconciliation is impossible, the subordinate provision must give way, and probably the instrument would be treated as subordinate to the section.\" See also Institute of Patent Agents v. Lockwood (1) and Minister of Health v. R: Ex parte Yaffe('). The breakdown of R. 50 would leave into operation R. 48, which is without any limitation of time, and refunds would be available under that Rule. This argmnent receives great support from the fact that under the Excess Profits Tax Act ss. 48 and 50 of the Indian Income-tax Act, were brought in mutatis mutandis.\n\nIf, as has been shown above, there is no limitation either under s. 13 or s. 15 of the Excess Profits Tax Act s. 50 will have to be applied to that Act without any limit as to time. It appears to me that R. 50 is not framed in consonance with the spirit underlying s. 11, and if it was necessary for me to say so, I would have been disposed to thinking that being a Rule of the Board of Revenue, it would have to give way, even though under the Act it has to be read as a part thereof. This argument, therefore, has no validity.\n\nIn my opinion, the answer to the first question should be in the affirmative. In view of this answer, the second question would not fall to be answered.\n\nI would, therefore, allow the appeal with costs here and below.\n\nBY COURT : In accordance with the judgment of the majority, the appeal is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n(1) (1894] A.C. 347, 360,\n\n\\ZI (1931] A.C,· 494• ~03,", "total_entities": 402, "entities": [{"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 26, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.K. DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 717, "end_char": 722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 730, "end_char": 750, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "THE COMMISSIONER 0]' INCOME TAX,\n\nBOMBAY CITY I, BOMBAY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1210, "end_char": 1265, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE COMMISSIONER 0]' INCOME TAX, BOMBAY CITY I, BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. NARSEE NAGSEE AND CO., BOMBAY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1272, "end_char": 1304, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M/S. NARSEE NAGSEE AND CO., BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "L. KAPUR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1322, "end_char": 1330, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.L. KAPUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Business Profits Tax-Limitation for assessment-Notice under Business Profits Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1360, "end_char": 1444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Excess JYrofits Tax Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1526, "end_char": 1555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss.13, 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1570, "end_char": 1579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Excess JYrofits Tax Act, 1940", "statute": "Excess JYrofits Tax Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act,1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1580, "end_char": 1606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 22(2), 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1621, "end_char": 1637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act,1922", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act,1922"}}, {"text": "Income Tax and Excess Profits Tax Amendment Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1638, "end_char": 1691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Business Profits Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1705, "end_char": 1735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "January 21, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1849, "end_char": 1865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessee firm which was doing business in Bombay \\vas served with a notice on January 21, 1953, by the Income-tax , Officer under s. n(1) of the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947 in respect of the chargeable accounting period from November 13, 1947, to October 31, 1948, calling upon it to submit its return."}}, {"text": "Business Profits Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1916, "end_char": 1946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "November 13, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1999, "end_char": 2016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessee firm which was doing business in Bombay \\vas served with a notice on January 21, 1953, by the Income-tax , Officer under s. n(1) of the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947 in respect of the chargeable accounting period from November 13, 1947, to October 31, 1948, calling upon it to submit its return."}}, {"text": "October 31, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2021, "end_char": 2037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessee firm which was doing business in Bombay \\vas served with a notice on January 21, 1953, by the Income-tax , Officer under s. n(1) of the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947 in respect of the chargeable accounting period from November 13, 1947, to October 31, 1948, calling upon it to submit its return."}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2152, "end_char": 2157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2334, "end_char": 2339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2601, "end_char": 2606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "S. K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2675, "end_char": 2684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question was whether in s. II of the Act a limitation 1960 corresponding to the limitation contained in s. 14 must be necessarily read and whether in a case where the profits were not Commissioner of brought to assessment because notice under s. II was not issued Income Ta\" in time, they must be deemed to have escaped assessment and v. action could only be taken under s. 14 within the time specified N\"\"\" N,, gsee therein ; &- Co.\n\nHeld (per S. K. Das and Kapur, J].,"}}, {"text": "Kapur", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2689, "end_char": 2694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question was whether in s. II of the Act a limitation 1960 corresponding to the limitation contained in s. 14 must be necessarily read and whether in a case where the profits were not Commissioner of brought to assessment because notice under s. II was not issued Income Ta\" in time, they must be deemed to have escaped assessment and v. action could only be taken under s. 14 within the time specified N\"\"\" N,, gsee therein ; &- Co.\n\nHeld (per S. K. Das and Kapur, J].,", "canonical_name": "Kapur"}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2701, "end_char": 2713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hidayatullah, J., dissenting), (r) that the words \"profits escaping assessment\" in s. 14 of the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947, apply equally to cases where a notice was received by the assessee but resulted in no assessment, under-assessment or excessive relief, and to cases where due to any reason no notice was issued to the assessee and therefore there was no assessment of his income ;\n\n(2) that ss.", "canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2784, "end_char": 2789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Business Profits Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2797, "end_char": 2827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section II of the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3544, "end_char": 3592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "N. Sanyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4405, "end_char": 4414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Sanyal, Additional Solicilor-General of India, K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and D. Gupta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. N. Rajagopal Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4455, "end_char": 4477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Sanyal, Additional Solicilor-General of India, K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and D. Gupta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "D. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4482, "end_char": 4490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Sanyal, Additional Solicilor-General of India, K. N. Rajagopal Sastri and D. Gupta, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "N. A. Palkhivala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4512, "end_char": 4528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. A. Palkhivala, S. N. Andley, J. B. Da 53 Cal. 631, explained.\n\nKeshabdeo Kedia v. P. Banerjee, Sanitary Inspector, Howrah Municipality. A.LR. (1943) Cal. 31 and State v. Manilal Jethalal A.LR. (1953) Born. 365, referred to.\n\nCole v. Coulten, 2 Ellis & Ellis 695, Buckler v. Wilson, (1896) I Q.B.D. 83, The Queen v. Stewart, (1896) l Q.B.D. 300 and Giebler\n\nv. Manning, (1906) l K. B 709, held inapplicable.\n\nThe Queen v. Cubitt. (1889) 22 Q.B.D. 622, relied on.\n\nPer Hidayatullah, J. The sanction given by the Health Officer was valid as the delegation of authority to him by the order of December 20, 1949, was not taken away by subsequent orders. The order of December 20, 1949, which specially conferred the power to order prosecution to sign prosecution sheets was a special order and was unaffected by the general order of April 7, l95L The later order put a time limit only on delegations made under that order and not on orders made before.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 159 of 1956.\n\nAppeal from the Judgment and Order dated June 25, 1956, of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Revision No. 870 of 1956, arising out of the judgment and order dated May 5, 1956, of the Sessions Judge, Howrah, in Criminal Petition 8 of 1956 against the judgment and order dated February 20, 1956, of the Magistrate First Class, Howrah, in Case No. 1-C of\n\n1954:.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee S. K. Kapur and Nanak Chand Pandit, for the appellant.\n\nS. C. Mazumdar, for the respondent.\n\n1960. January 15. Judgment of S. K. Das and A. K. Sarkar, JJ. was delivered by S. K. Das, J., Hidayatullah, J. delivered a separate Judgment.\n\nS. K. DAS, J.-The appellant Ballavdas Agarwala f\n\nS. K. Das]. was the proprietor o a restaurant in the Railway premises at Howrah Railway Station within the Municipality of Howrah, and his servant Shyamlal Missir was in charge of that restaurant. Under an agreement with the Railway authorities, the appellant\n\nz960 had taken out a vendor's license dated January 9,\n\nB -A 1 1952, by which he was permitted to sell or exhibit for allavdas garwa a l b l b\"d\" b v. sa e sweetmeats, ete , 1 1, cigarettes etc., ut not Shri specifically including butter, attbe Howrah goods shed. ]. c. Chakravarty On December 2, 1953, during the currency of the -- license, the Health Officer of the Howrah.Municipality s. K. Das J. along with his Sanitary Inspector and a peon visited • the establishment and found that butter was being sold from glass jars standing on a table between the - c.ustomers and the vendor. The appellant was then absent and Shyamlal was dealing with the customers.\n\nThe Sanitary Inspector then took three samples from an one-pound slap of butter which was taken out of a glass jar that was fully exposed to public view and \\vhich stood open on the selling counter. The samples were taken in clean bottles, sealed and labelled on the spot under a seizure list which -Shyamlal signed. A sum of Rs. 2 was also given to Shyamlal as the price of the sample butter. One of, the samples was later sent to the Health Department of the Government of West Bengal for analysis and report. The Public Analyst of West Bengal sent a report stating that the butter in question was grossly adulterated and did not contain any butter fat, and also contained a large excess of water. On January 2, 1954, the Sanitary\n\nInspector filed a complaint before the magistrate of Howrah asking for the issue of summons to the appellant and his servant Shyamlal for an offence < under sections 488/406 and 407 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923, as extended to the Municipality of j Howrah. The complaint was signed in token of I sanction by the Health Officer of the Municipality.\n\nOn the aforesaid complaint, the appellant and his servant were put on trial. Their defence was that it was not .a case of voluntary sale, nor of a sale of butter.\n\nThe learned Magistrate who tried the case in the first instance held that no case of selling adulterated butter was made out, and the reason which the learned Magistrate gave for his finding was that the butter purchased by the Sanitary Inspector was not purchased from the jar from which butfor was being sold to other customers. The learned Magistrate acquitted both the accused persons. ~\n\nThe Administrator, Howrah Municipality, then x96o preferred an application in revision to the High Court a-· 1 H . h C \"d h d fBallav as,, garwa a of Calcutta. The 1g ourt set as1 e t e or er o v acquittal and ordered a retrial by another magistrate.\n\nSh.ri At the retrial several points were taken on behalf J. c. Chakravarty of the appellant one of which was that at the relevant time the Health Officer had no power to sanction the s. K. Das J. prosecution. This time the trying magistrate found against the appellant on all questions of fact, and on the question of sanction he referred to certain orders of the Chairman of the Municipality and held that the power delegated to the Health Officer by one of those orders had not been revoked and, therefore, the Health Officer was competent to sanction the prosecution. The appellant was accordingly convicted under ss. 406 and 407 read with s. 488 of the Calcutta Municipal Act and sentenced to a fine of Rs. 200/- or in default simple imprisonment for 30 days.\n\nThe appellant then moved the learned Sessions Judge of Howrah for a reference to the High Court, but without success. An application in revision was then moved in the High Court, but this was summarily . dismissed by a Single Judge. From that summary order of dismissal, the appellant asked for and obtained from a Division Bench of the High Court a certificate for leave to appeal to this Court under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution. While granting the certificate Das Gupta, J. giving the decision of the Division Bench said:\n\n\"On the 4th July, 1951, in my opinion the Health Officer of the Municipality had no longer in him the powers to order prosecution in any case regarding the Health Deprtment and that power >vas at that time vested in the Vice-Chairman of the Municipality Shri Sankar Lal Mukherjee, as a result of delegation by the Chairman by the order, Exhibit-D. On the 12th\n\nDecember, 1952, the new Chairman Shri K. C. Datta passed a further order revoking his previous order , dated 4th July, 1951, so far as it related to the Health Department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n\nThe position, therefore, after 12th December, 1952, was that the Chairman of the Howrah Municipality\n\n'960 himself was the only person compent to exercise the\n\nB ll d-A 1 powers of Commissioners under Section 537 of the a av as garwa a . . v.\n\nCalcutta Mummpal Act.\n\n1 c chi 1 If, therefore, the proceedings unless instituted by\n\n avor Y the Commissioners in accordance with Section 537 of s. K. Das J. the Calcutta Municipal Act cannot form the legal basis • of any conviction for contravention of any provision of that law, the conviction in this case must be held - to have no legal basis.\"\n\nHe expressed the view that the quetion of the true import and effect of the provisions of s. 537 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923 was a question of general public importance which should be settled by this Court.-\n\nThe present appeal has come to us on the aforesaid certificate.\n\nOn behalf of the appellant it has been argued that\n\n(1) the appellant was not responsible for the sale, because the licence did not authorise the sale of butter and (2) there was no \" adulteration \" of butter, because there was no butter fat in the sample analysed. On. these two points we are in agreement with the conclusion reached by our learned brother Hidayatullah, J. and we do not think it necessary to repeat what he has said in support of that conclusion.\n\nWe proceed now to consider the question of the power and authority of the Health Officer to sanction the prosecution in the present case. On this question we have reached a conclusion different from that of our learned brother. It is not disputed before us that the sanctioning of prosecution for selling or storing adulterated food is a matter which concerns the Health Department of the Municipality and any delegation of powers in respect of the Health Department will include the power to sanction prosecution for selling adulterated food, unless otherwise expressly stated in the order of delegation.\n\nIn the High Court, at the stage of the application for a certificate for leave to appeal, counsel for the Municipality relied on s. 51 of the Bengal Municipa~\n\n...\n\n--•\n\nAct, 1932 for his contention that the Chairman was\n\nI 960 entitled to exercise all the powers vested in the Ballavdo1s Agaiwala\n\nCommissioners and could delegate his powers to any v. other Municipal Officer. It appears now that the Shri relevant section is s. 12 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, J. c. Chakravarty 1923 as applied to Howrah. Under sub-section (1) of - s. 12, the Commissioners may by a resolution passed at s. K. Das J. a special meeting delegate to the Chairman any of their powers, duties and functions under the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923 as in force in the Municipality of Howrah or under the Bengal Municipal Act, 1884 or under any rule or bye-law made thereunder. Under sub-section (2), the Chairman may by a general or special order in writing redelegate to the Vice-Chairman or any Municipal officer any of the powers, duties or functions which have been delegated to him by the Commissioners. We may, therefore, proceed on the basis, as did the High Court with reference to s. 51 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932 that the Commissioners could delegate to the Chairman their powers under s. 537 by a resolution passed at a special meeting, and the Chairman in his turn could redelegate those powers, by a general or special order, to the Vice-Chairman or a Municipal officer. The question before us is-did he do so by a valid, subsisting order at the relevant time ?\n\nThe relevant date is the date of the complaint which was made on January 2, 1954. Therefore, we have'to see what the position was on that date. The first difficulty in the way of the respondent is that it led no evidence in this case to show that the provisions of s. 12(1) of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923 were complied with, and the Commissioners by a resolution passed at a special meeting delegated their powers under s. 537 to the Chairman. Even if we ignore this difficulty on the ground that no question regarding the powers of the Chairman was raised and, therefore, no evidence was given on the point, there is a second and, in our opinion, insuperable difficulty. An Order Book of the Chairman of the Howrah Municipality containing extracts of orders passed by the Chairman of the Municipality from May 9, 1938 to April 221 19571 W&&\n\n1960 filed in the case.\n\nThis book is, however, of very little -A , use to us. It does not give the terms of the orders nor Ballavdas garwaa . d I . .c v. their ates. t contams a re; erence to orders under Shri other sections, but not under s. 537. The five orders J. c. Chakravarty with which we are concerned were exhibited separately and to those we now turn. T be first order is the one 5 K. Das J. dated February 6, 1948, by which the then Chairman of the Howrah Municipality delegated to the Vice Chairman all bis powers, duties and functions as Chairman in respect of seven departments including the Health Departn; ient. This was followed by a second order passed on December 20, 1949, which was in the following terms :\n\n\"I hereby delegate my powers and functions to the Health Officer to order prosecution, to sign prosecution sheets in respect of cases concerning the Health and Conservancy Departments.\" The third order came on April 7, 1951, on the eve of the new election. This third order, so far as it is relevant for our purpose, stated :\n\n\"Till the election of Executives by the New Board I delegate all my powers and functions except those that are delegated to the Vice-Chairman to respective officers of departments.\" The exact date on which the new election took pl, ace is not known, but it is admitted that some time between April 7, 1951 and July 4, 1951, the New Executives had come into being. On July 4, 1951 the New Chairman passed the following order :\n\n\"I hereby delegate to the Vice-Chairman, Sri Sankar Lal Mukherjee, all my powers, duties and functions as Chairman in respect of the following departments which are placed under his charge: 1.\n\nAssessment Department (Except power under\n\nSection 146 C. M. Act. 2.\n\nHealth Department. 3.\n\nBuilding Department. 4.\n\nLighting Department. 5.\n\nAccounts Department. 6.\n\nCash Department.\n\nThe fifth order was passed on December 12, 1952 which said:'\n\nI -\n\n\"I hereby revoke my order dated the 4th July,\n\nI96° 1951, so far as it relates to the Health Department - which shall henceforth be direct under my charge until BallavdasAgarwala further .orders.\n\nThis will take effect from 15th s:i December, 1952.\" ]. c. Chakravarty The question before us is-what is the effect of the aforesaid five orders ? It is clear that by the order 5 H. Das J. dated February 6, 1948, the Chairman delegated his powers to the Vice-Chairman in respect of the Health Department, and by the next order dated December 20, 1949, he delegated his powers to the Health Officer in respect of certain particular matters, such as, ordering prosecution and signing complaints concerning the Health and Conservancy Departments.\n\nOn April 7, 1951, however, the Chairman passed another order which imposed a time limit by the expression : \" Till the election of the Executives by the new Board.\" The question is if this time limit affected the operation of the second order. dated December 20, 1949 so that it would come to an end with the election of the new Executives, and the position thereafter would be governed by the orders dated July 4, 1951, and December 12, 1952. Ex Facie, it appears to us that the order dated April 7, 1951, affects the operation of the second order dated December 20, 1949. The two orders, placed side by side, cannot stand together unless the earlier order is read as modified by the latter order. The earlier order delegated the power of the Chairman in respect of some particular matters mentioned therein to the Health Officer; the latter order states that it delegates all the powers of the Chairman to respective officers of Departments till the election of the new Executives.\n\nWe have emphasised the word' all' occurring in the latter order, as it must include the particular powers referred to in the earlier order. It cannot be that in the same field the two orders will operate-one unlimited and the other limited by a time factor. It has, however, been submitted to us that they do not operate in the same field and three reasons have been given : firstly, it is said that the order dated April 7, 1951, is a general order which does not affect the order dated\n\nr96o December 20, 1949, which is a special order and for\n\n11 - 1 this, the principle of generalia specialibus non derogant Ba auda:garwa a is invoked; secondly, it is said. that the time limit\n\nShri imposed by the order dated April 7, 1951, related to J. c. Chakrauarty such delegation as is made by that order itself; and thirdly, it is said that if the time limit imposed by the 5 I<. Das J. order dated April 7, 1951, applies even to earlier administrative orders, then there would be great inconvenience by such orders coming abruptly to an end as the new Executives come into existence.\n\nWe shall now deal with these reasons.\n\nWe do not think that the question is one of the application of the principle of generalia specialibus non derogant.\n\nApart from any doubt that may arise as to whether such a principle is applicable to orders by which the Chairman redelegated powers delegated to him by the Commissioners, we think that the real answer to the question must be found in the words used in the order. The order dated April 7, 1951, makes an exception in favour of the Vice-Chairman ; it says \"except those that are delegated to the Vice-Chairman.\" This obviously has reference to the delegations already made in favour of the Vice-Chairman, because the order makes no new delegation in favour of the Vice-Chairman. It states in term.s that the time limit applies to all delegations except those made in favour of the Vice-Chairman.\n\nOnly one exception is made, and if the intention was that there would be othe:r exceptions, the order would have said so.. The order does not say so; on the contrary, it is expressed in language of the widest i!, mplitude to include within itself all delegations of power except those made in favour of the Vice- Chairman.\n\nWe are not impressed by the argument of administrative inconvenience. Obviously, the objeot of the order of April 7, 1951, was to leave the new Chairman free to pass his own orders of delegation and not to fetter the discretion of the new Executives in any way ; that is why in the matter of delegation a time limit was imposed. We do not have in the records full details of all orders of delegation made by. the new Chairman.\n\n... l -\n\nhave only two orders dated July 4, 1951, and Decemz960 her 12, 1952. By order dated July 4, 1951, the new - Chairman delegated his powers to the Vice-Chairman Ballavdas Agarw\"la\n\nin respect of six departments including the Health sri Department, though the earlier delegation in favour J. c. Chakravarty.\n\nof the Vice-Chairman was not subject to any time limit. The order dated December 12, 1952, is imports. K. Dai]. ant. It not merely revoked the order dated 4, 1951, but said that \"the Health Department shall henceforth be direct under my charge until further orders.\" If earlier special orders regarding the Health Department were subsisting on December 12, 1952, the Chairman would not have used the words which he used on that date.\n\n We are, therefore, of the view that in the absence of a fresh order of delegation of which there is no evidence in the record, the Health Officer of the Howrah Municipality was not empowered as the duly delegated authority to institute criminal proceedings against the appellant on the date on which he made the complaint.\n\nWhether as an ordinary citizen he could file the complaint takes us to the next question-are the provisions s. 537 merely enabling or are they obligatory in the sense that no legal proceeding under the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923 as in force in the Municipality of Howrah, can be instituted except in accordance with the provisions of that Act ? It is\n\nnecessary to read at this stage s. 537. It is in these terms:\n\n\"The Commissioners may-\n\n(a) institute, defend, or withdraw from lega.l proceedings under the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923, as in force in the Municipality of Howrah or under any rule or byelaw made thereunder;\n\n(b) compound any offence against the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923, as in force in the Municipality of Howrah or against any rule or bye-law made thereunder which, under any enactment for the time being in force, may lawfully be compounded;\n\n(c) admit, compromise or withdraw any claim made under the Ualcutta 1\\'[unicipal Act, 1923, as in\n\nr960\n\nBallavdas Agarwala v.\n\nShri ]. C. Chakravarty\n\nS. K. Das].\n\nforce in the Municipality of Howrah or under any rule or bye-law made thereunder; and\n\n(d) obtain such legal advice and assistance as they may from time to time think it necessary or expedient to obtain for any of the purposes referred to in the foregoing clauses of this section, or for securing the lawful exercise or discharge of any power or duty vesting in or imposed upon the Commissioners or any Municipal officer or servant.\n\nOn behalf of the appellant it has been urged before us that the provisions of s. 537 are obligatory, and the principle invoked in aid of this construction is that adopted by the Privy Council in Nazir Ahmad v.\n\nKing Emperor (1) viz. that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. In other words, the argument of learned counsel for the appellant is not that the word 'must' must necessarily be read for the word 'may' in s. 537, but that if a legal proceeding is to be instituted under the Municipal Act in question, it must be done in accordance with the provisions of the Act and not otherwise. On behalf of the respondent, however, the contention is that s. 537 is merely enabling in nature, as the use of the word 'may' shows, and the general principle embodied in the Code of Criminal Procedure of taking cognisance of an offence on a complaint by even a private person is not in any way affected by s. 537.\n\nThese are the rival contentions which fall for consideration and we are of the view that the construction put on the section on behalf of the appellant is the sounder and more acceptable construction.\n\nThe section talks of various acts which the Commissioner may do and these acts have been put in four categories under clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d).\n\nWe are primarily concerned with clause (a), which talks of three things-\" institute, defend, or withdraw from legal proceedings under the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923.\" It can hardly be doubted that the section does not compel the Commissioners to institute, defend or withdraw from legal proceedings; for example,\n\n(1) (1936) L.R. 63 I.A. 372 at 38'r.\n\nclause (d) says \"obtain such legal advice and assistance\n\nI960 as they may from time to time think it necessary or B 11 d-A la • . . a av as garwa or expedient to obtam etc.\" This obv10usly shows v. that the Commissioners are not compelled to obtain Shri legal advice. In the context, the use of the word J. c. Chakravarty 'may' is therefore appropriate. But the question still remains-if the Commissioners wish to do any of the 5 K. Das f. acts mentioned in s. 537, must they do so in accordance with the provisions of the Act? We think that they must ; otherwise s. 537 becomes clearly otiose.\n\nWhat is the necessity of s. 537 if the Commissioners can do the acts mentioned therein independent of and in a manner other than what is laid down therein?\n\nLearned counsel for the respondent suggested that s. 537 was enacted by way of abundant caution to enable the Municipality, a body corporate, to spend money on the institution of legal proceedings etc.\n\nWe are not impressed by this argument. Like all other Municipal Acts, the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923 has a section (section 5) which constitutes the Municipality into a body corporate and there are detailed provisions about Finance, Loans, Accounts, Taxation etc. Section 84 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923 lays down:\n\n\"84 (1) The moneys from time to time credited to the Municipality shall be applied in payment of all sums, charges and costs necessary for carrying out the purposes of this Act, or of which the payment is duly. directed or sanctioned by or under any 0f the provisions of this Act.\n\n(2) Such money shall likewise be applied in payment of all sums payable out of the Municipal Fund under any other enactment for the time being in force.\" Obviously, therefore, no other separate provision for expenditure of money in connection with the acts mentioned in s. 537 was necessary by way of abundant caution. We are, therefore, unable to accept as correct the reason given by learned counsel for the respondent for the insertion of s. 531.\n\nThere are other provisions of the Act which also throw some light on the '-question. Section 531\n\n196o provides for the appointment of Municipal Magistrates\n\nJJallaudasAgarwalafor the trial of offences under the ct and the :ules or v. bye-laws made thereunder. Sect10n 532 provides for\n\nShYi cognisance of offence by Municipal Magistrates having J. c. Chakrauarty jurisdiction in Calcutta; section 533 gives power to hear a case in the absence of the accused perso1~ ; s. K. Das f. section 534 prescribes a period of limitation for prosecution and section 535 says who can make a complaint of the existence of any nuisance. Under s. 535 the complaint can be ma.de either by the Municipality or any person who resides or owns property in Calcutta. The above provisions are followed by ss. 537, 538 and 539. Section 537 gives power to the Municipality to institute legal proceedings etc. ; s. 538 deals with suits against the Municipality and s. 539 provides the usual indemnity clause.\n\nAn examination of the aforesaid provisions shows that the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923 provides inter alia for a machinery for proceedings before Magistrates and other legal proceedings. All these provisions can have one meaning only, viz. that the machinery provided in the Act must be followed in enforcing these provisions. It would, we think, be against the tenor and scheme of the Municipal Act to hold that s. 537 is merely enabling in nature, and tha.t any private person may institute a legal proceeding under the Municipal Act independent and irrespective of the provisions of the Act.\n\nWe now turn to such authorities as have been brought to ournotice. We may say at once that no decision directly in point has been brought to our notice. It is well to remember, however, that the phraseology adopted in different Municipal Acts is not the same. Some Municipal Acts have adopted a phraseology which leaves :ao doubt in the matter; e.g. s. 375 of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act, 1922 which says-\"No prosecution for any offence shall be instituted without the order or consent of the Commissioners ......... \". Section 353 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1884 was in similar terms. Having regard to the phraseology so adopted, there are decisions which say tha.t the sections there considered were\n\nobligatory and sanction or consent of the Commis-\n\nI910 sioners was necessary. We have, however, seen no - decision directly bearing on s. 537 of the Calcutta Ballavdas AgarwMla Municipal Act, 1923 except one (to which we shall 5~~; presently refer), and that decision was given in an J. '\" Chakrararty entirely different context.\n\nWe may refer first to some decisions which deal s. K. Das f. not with a Municipal Act but other Acts. Sections 82 and 83 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 have given rise to a divergence of views, which need not detain us: see Gopi Nath v. Kuldip Singh (1); Nga Pan Gaing v. King Emperor (9) and Emperor v. Muhammad Mehdi and Others (3).\n\nWe do not think that the said provisions in the Indian Registration Act, 1908 are in pari materia., and the decisions given on the terms of those sections are not of much assistance in solving the problem before us. There is a decision of this Court on which learned counsel for the respondent has placed some reliance. Dr. Sailendranath Sinha and Another v. Josoda Dulal Adikary and Another (4).\n\nThat decision dealt with ss. 179 and 237 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 and it was held that there was nothing in those sections which indicated that if a liquidator took action without a direction of 1Jhe court, that action would be illegal or invalid. The decision proceeded on the terms of the sections there considered and is of no helpin construing s. 537 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923.\n\nNow, we come to the decisions under the Muuicipal Act. In Sisir Kumar Mitter v. Corporation of Calcutta\n\n( 5) it was observed :\n\n\"Section 537 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, as we read it, is merely an enabling section, and the powers given thereunder to do the various acts specified therein can, in our opinion, only be exercised in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\"\n\nLearned counsel for the respondent relies on these observations in support of his contention that the\n\n(1) (1885) I.L.R. II Cal. 566.\n\n(2) (1926) I.L.R. 4 Rangoon 437.\n\n(3) (193-t) l.L.R. 57 All. 412.\n\n(f) A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 51.\n\n(5) (1926) I.L.R. 53 Sal. 631. 96\n\nz960 provisions of s. 537 are merely enabling provisions.\n\nB 11 d-::;- 1 It is worthy of note, however, that the precise question a av •:. garwa a for decision in that case was entirely different. The\n\nSh>i question there raised was whether the provisions of ]. c. Chakravarty s. 248 of the Criminal Procedure Code were affected or abrogated by s. 537 of the Calcutta Municipal Act. 5 K. Das J. \"What happened in that case was that the Sanitary Inspector of he Corporation as the complainant filed a petition of withdrawal but the magistrate rejected the application. On a later date the accused was absent, and a warrant of arrest was issued against him. The accused then moved the High Court, and the main ground taken was that the magistrate should have allowed the withdrawal; because s. 537 of the Calcutta Municipal Act must be held to have modified the provisions of s. 248 of Criminal Procedure Code and taken away the discretion of the magistrate not to permit withdrawal of the case. This contention was negatived, and it was held that s. 248 of Criminal Procedure Code was neither abrogated nor modified by s. 537 of the Calcutta Municipal Act. It was incidentally observed that the Corporation being a creature of the statute, it was necessary to give it specific power to institute, defend or withdraw from legal proceedings.\n\nWe do not read the decision as deciding the question if a private person can institute a legal proceeding under the Calcutta Municipal Act independent of the provisions of that Act. It decided merely the short point that s. 248 of Criminal Procedure Code was not modified nor abrogated by s. 537 of the Calcutta Municipal Act; this clearly was right, because s. 537 does not compel the Municipality to to withdraw from a legal proceeding nor does it impose any obligatioµ on the Court to accept such withdrawal. The other observation made therein appear to us to be obiter, and it is unnecessary for us to consider the correctness of those observations, though learned counsel for the appellant relying on The .Minister of Works, and Planning v. Henderson and Others (1) has contended that the mere fact of incorporation without reservation confers on a body corporate the privilege of suing and the liability to be sued. (I) (1947) l K.B. 91.\n\n....\n\nThe next decision is that of Keshabdeo Kedia v.\n\nI960 P. Banerjee, Sanitary Inspector, Howrah Municipa- 8 11 d-A 1 l . ) Th' l d 3 f h C l M . . 1 a av as garwa a ity1(1 • rn re ate to ei. 5 5 o t e a cutta umcipa v.\n\nAct, and it was held that a magistrate was not entitled shri to act under s. 535(2) upon a complaint filed by the J. c. Chakravarty Sanitary Inspector in his personal capacity in the absence of anything to show that he was authorised 5 K. Das f. by the Chairman of the Municipality or was complaining on behalf of the Municipality or resided or owned property in Calcutta. This decision helps the appellant to the extent that it holds that the right of a private person to make a complaint is cut down by s. 535.\n\nIn The State v. Manilal Jethalal (2), ss. 481 and 69 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act (59 of 1949) came in for consideration. Section 481 of that Act gave the Commissioner power to \"take'', or withdraw from, proceedings in respect of an offence committed under the Act. The omplaint in that case was filed by the Jilla Inspector, and the argument was that he was not authorised by the Commissioners to \"take\" proceedings. This argument was dealt with in the following observations :\n\n\"Now, it is quite true that the object of s. 69, sub-s. (1), is to empower the Commissioner to delegate his powers under the Act to other Municipal officers, with a view that the Commissioner may not himself be burdened with duty of deciding whether any action should be taken against a person, who, it is alleged, has committed an offence either against the Act or the rules. It is also true that whenever the Act gives any power to a Commissioner, the power must be exercised by him, or by an officer, to whom the Commissioner's power is delegated under the provisions of s. 69. But we do not think that it would be correct to restrict the meaning of the words \"take proceedings\" to actually filing a complaint. The object of s. 481 is that whenever it is alleged that any person has committed an offence under the Municipal Act, or under the rules framed under the Act, he should not be prosecuted, unless either the Commisioner himself\n\n(1) A.LR. (1943) Cal. 3r.\n\n(2) A.LR. (1953) Born. 36, s.\n\nr960 orr some responsible officer has had an opportunity of - applying his mind to the question as to whether a Ballavdadg., wala prosecution should or should not be instituted. But\n\n5:,; onee this has been done, there does not seem to be J. c. Chakrava1ty any particular necessity for requiring that, if it is decided to prosecute, the coviplaint must actually be 5 K. Das J. lodged by the Commissioner, or the officer, to whom his powers are delegated. It is quite true that that words \"take proceedings\" may mean to lodge the complaint oneself. But we think that that is not the only meaning which can be given to these words. It also means to do an act by which a prosecution would be lodged.\" This decision also help the appellant in so far as it lays down that whenever the Act gives any power to a Commissioner, the powrir must be exercised by him, or by an officer, to whom the Commissioner's power is delegated. Th8 decision proceeded, however, on a somewhat wide meaning given to the words \" take proceedings\" that part of the decisim1, as to the correctness of which we say nothing, does not concern us here, because the words used in s. 537 of the Calcutta Municipal Act are different.\n\nOur attention has bgen drawn to four English decisions where a l'rivate person was held competent to make a complaint in respect of (1) consumption of refreshments in places of public resort, (2) sale of \"margarine\" (3) acts of cruelty to animals and (4) sale of unsound m9at: Cole v. Coulton {'); Buckler v.\n\nWilson ('); The Queen v. Stewart('); Giebler v. Manning('). All these four decisions proceeded on the terms of the statutes under which the offences were alleged to have been committed and it was held that those statutes did not contain any provisions which made it obliga.tory that the complaint should be made by a particular authority in a particular manner.\n\nThey do not really help the respondent to establish his contentions that in spite of s. 537, Calcutta Municipal Act, a private person can institute a. lega.l proceeding under the said Act. They take us back\n\n(r) 2 Ellis & Ellis 695; 121 E.R 261. (31 \"11896) l Q.B.D. 3ro.\n\n(2) (1896) I Q.B.D. 83.\n\n(4) (Lgo6) I K.B. 709,\n\nto the point from which we started; namely, what z96\" is the true nature and import of s. 537 of the Calcutta B 11 d-; 1 Municipal Act. If it is obligatory in the sense a av a:. gisrwa a explained earlier, the appellant is entitled to succeed.\n\nShri If it is merely enabling, then the respondent is entitled J. C. Chalmwarty to succeed. The decision in The Queen v. Stewart (1) on which learned counsel for the respondent strongly 5 K. Das f. relied, dealt with the provisions of the Diseases of the Animals Act, 1894. Lindley, L.J. said:\n\n\"Reading those sections together, they in fact affirm the right of any person to prefer an information in most significa.nt terms. Is there anything in the Act or the Order which so clearly restricts that right that we ought to say that in thil:l case no one but the borough council had the right to take proceedings? I can find nothing of the kind.\" Giebler v. Manning (2) was decided on the terms of s. 47, sub-s. (2) of the Public Health (London) Act, 1891 and the question was-could a private person institute proceedings under 21. 4: 7, sub-s. (2) ? Bord Alverstone 0. J. answered the question in the following observations:\n\n\"Having regard to the object of the statute, the protection of the public against the offering of diseased meat for sale, I think that if it had been intended to limit the right to take proceedings for the recovery of penalties to a limited class of persons, such as medical officers and sanitary inspectors, words would have been introduced into the section taking away from private persons the right to lay informations under the section.\"\n\nLastly, there is the decision in The Queen v. Oubitt (3).\n\nThis was a case under the Sea Fisheries Act, 1883 (46 and 47 Viet. c. 22), s. 11 of which said: \"The provisoes of this Act ............ shall be enforced by seafishery officers.\" It was held that the effect of the above words was that no one except a sea-fishery officer could prosecute for an offence against the Act and a rule calling upon the justices to hear and determine a summons for an offence against the Act taken out by a private individual, was discharged.\n\nLord Coleridge, C. J. observed: ·\n\n(I) (1896) I Q.B.D. 300.\n\n(2) (1906) I K.B. 709.\n\n(3) (1889) 22 Q.B.D. 622.\n\n'96° \"If any one may enforce the Act, s. 11 is useless.\n\nB II d-A 1 I do not think that negative words are required to a av as garwa a l d d. b h v. exc u e procee mgs y persons ot er than sea-fishery Shri officers. For instance, if an Act provided that the J. c. ChoMavarty Attorney-General was to sue for a penalty, no one else could sue for it; it is obvious that if everyone could 5 I<. Das J. sue for the penalty the Attorney-General could sue for it, so that on that view of the statute the clause enabling him to sue would be unnecessary and useless.\"\n\nOn a parity of reasoning, if anybody can institute a legal proceeding under the Calcutta Municipal Act, s. 537 thereof becomes practically useless. Even without that section, the Municipality could do the acts specified therein, and it is difficult to understand the necessity of a provision like s. 537 unless the intention was to confer a power on the Municipality which power must be exercised in accortl.ance with the provisions of the Act and not otherwise.\n\nIt was faintly suggested that the absence of a complaint by the Commissioners or the Chairman or a duty delegated authority was a mere error or irregularity which could be cured under s. 537 Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nOur attention was also drawn to s. 79 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923. In the view which we have taken the absence of a proper complaint was not a mere defect .or irregularity; it affected jurisdiction and initiation of proceedings.\n\nFor these reasons, we allow the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence passed against the appellant. The fine, if paid, must be refunded to the appellant.\n\nHidayatullah ].\n\nHIDAYATULLAH J.-. In this appeal which has been filed on a certificate of fitness under Art. 134 (l)(c) of the Constitution granted by the Calcutta High Court, the appellant challenges his conviction under ss. 406 and 407 read with s. 488 of the Calcutta Municipal Act as applied to Howrah, and the sentence of fine of Rs. 20Q (in default, simple insprisonment for 30 days).\n\nThe appellant, Ballabhdas Agarwala, is the proprietor of a chain of restaurants, and one such restaurant is at the Howrah Railway Station. He had\n\n• -\n\nntered into an agreement with the railway, and had z960 taken out a vendor's licence No. 54 of 1951 dated January 9, 1952, by which he was permitted to sell or BallavdasAgarwala exhibit for sale, sweetmeats, betel, bidi, cigarettes, tea, ;;.,; CJ.ke, bread and biscuits and parched gram at J. c. Chakravarty Howrah goods shed between January 6, 1951 and December 31, 1953.\n\nHidayatullah ].\n\nOn December 2, 1953, the Health Officer, a Sanitary Inspector and a peon of the Howrah Municipality visited the restaurant, where the servant of the appellant, one Shyamlal Missir, was in charge. On the counter, there was a jar containing \"butter\".\n\nThis- \"butter\" was being sold to customers. The Sanitary Inspector took three samples of this\" butter\" from an one-pound slab and put them into three clean. bottles, which were sealed and labelled. Missir was paid Rs. 2 as the price. One bottle was left with Missir as required by the rules. Of the remaining two bottles, one was sent for analysis of the sample, to the Public Analyst, West Bengal. On the report of the Analyst that the sample did not contain any butter fat at all and contained an excess of water, the Health Officer accorded sanction for the prosecution of the appellant and Missir. The complaint was signed by the Sanitary Inspector as well as the Health Officer.\n\nThe case was tried summarily, and the Magistrate acquitted both the accused, b@cause, in his opinion, the samples were taken not from the jar from which butter was being sold to the other customers but from another jar. The High Court, however, set aside the order, and the case was re-tried. It resulted in the conviction and sentence of the appellant, as stated above. The Sessions Judge (appellate jurisdiction) who was moved by a criminal motion rejected the motion. The appellant then moved the High Court in revision, but Debabrata Mookerjee, J. dismissed it summarily. The appellant applied for and obtained a certificate of fitness under Art. 134 (1) (c) of the Constitution and filed this appeal.\n\nThree points were argued before . us.\n\nThe first was that by the terms of the agreement and licence, the appellant was not authorised to sell butter, and\n\n'960 thus he was not responsible for the sale in questiori. - It was contended that the sale might have been made llalla•d., Aarwala b\n\nM\" • h\" t Th\" t t• y Issir on IS own accoun .\n\nIS con en ron IS\n\n5;;, without substance. That there was a sale of the J. ~. Chakravafty seized article at the restaurant of the appellant goes . - without saying. Sections 406 and 407 of the Calcutta H•4 •Y•lullah J. Municipal Act make the sale of adulterated or misbranded article an offence, and every person who sells such article directly or indirectly, himself or by any other person is liable. Even though such sale might be outside the permit of the vendor's licence, the seized article was, in fact, sold. The words of the sections vicariously fasten the responsibility on masters for the acts of the servants, and the maxim, qui f acit per alium f acit per se, a pp lies.\n\nThe finding is that the sale was for and on behalf of the proprietor, and in view of the clear words of the section, he would be answerable.\n\nNext, it was argued that this was not a case of \"adulteration\" at all, because there was, in fact, no butter fat, in the sample analysed. Reference was made to a decision of the Punjab High Court in Mangal Mal v. 'The State (1) in support of the contention that the prosecution for the sale of\" adulterated\" butter was defective. No doubt, the ordinary sense of\" adulteration\" connotes the mixing of deleterious or other substance with the main basic article ; but the definition in the Act has been widened to include even those articles where the contents do not include the basic substance either wholly or partly. In view of the definition, this line of criticism was rightly not pressed.\n\nThe last point is the main argument in this case, on the strength of which the certificate was obtained.\n\nThe argument is that the complaint presented to the Court in this case was by an unauthorised person and was thus no complaint at all. The argument embrarn; id a consideration of certain sections of the Calcutt!!.\n\nMunicipal Act, 1923, as applied to Howrah and of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, and the notifications issued under them. The first section to which reference\n\n(1) A.LR. 1952 Pun. 140.\n\n• -\n\nwas made is s. 537 of the Calcutta Municipal Act in its r960 application to Howrah Municipality. It reads thus: B\n\n11 -A 1 •• apa \"The Comm1ss10ners mayv.\n\n(a) institute, defend or withdraw from legal $hri proceedings under the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923, f. c. Chakravafly as in force in the Municipality of Howrah or under Hidayatullah J. any rule or by-law made thereunder;\n\n(b) compound any offence against the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923, as in force in the Municipality of Howrah or against any rule or by-law made thereunder which, under any enactment for the time being in force, may lawfully be compounded;\n\n(c) admit, compromise or withdraw any claim made under the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923, as in force in the Municipality of Howrah or under any rule or by-law made thereunder; and\n\n(d) obtain such legal advice and assistance as they may from time to time think it necessary or expedient to obtain, for any of the purposes referred to in the foregoing clauses of this section, or for securing the lawful exercise or discharge of any power or duty vesting in or imposed upon the commissioners or any municipal officer or'Servant.\"\n\nIt is contended for the appellant that the Commissioners are the only body of persons who could have instituted the complaint. In reply, it is pointed out that under s. 12 of the Calcutta Municipal Act as applied to Howrah, the Commissioners can delegate their functions to a Chairman by a resolution passed . at a special meeting, and . the Chairman can also by a general or special order in writing, re-delegate any of the delegated powers to the Vice-Chairman or to any municipal offi, cer.\n\nThis power of delegation authorises both the Commissioners as well as the Chairman to delegate or re-delegate, as the case may be, their powers under the Bengal Municipal Act also.\n\nThe ·.Divisional Bench of the Calcutta High Court referred to s. 51 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932 as enabling delegation, but that section has no application, in view of the provisions of s. 542 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, which repeals s. 51 of the Bengal\n\nI96o Municipal Act in its application to the Howrah\n\nII d-A Municipality. I have thus only s. 12 of the Calcutta Ba av a' garwala M . . 1 A t . •t 1. t• t th H h v. umc1pa c m 1 s app rna ion o e owra Shd Municipality to consider, and as summarised above, it ]. c. Chakravarty permits delegation of powers from the Commissioner , to the Chairman and from the Chairman to the Vice- Hidayatullah ]. Chairman or any other officer of the Municipality. It' was by virtue of this section that the Chairman was presumably delegated the powers of the Commissioners, though no proof has been given in this case. No point was made of the lack of this evidence, and I need say nothing about it. If it had been raised, the prosecution would have led evidence, if available. But without this objection having been raised at an appropriate stage, it is impossible to say now that it is well-founded.\n\nIt is, however, in the re-delegation of the powers from the Chairman to the other officers of the Municipality that the question, whether such delegation was existing on the date on which the prosecution was initiated agafnst the appellant, has risen.\n\nA number of notifications must now be set out, because it rs contended that the later notifications rescind or modify those issued earlier :\n\n, I. \" Howrah Municipality\n\nOrder.\n\nI hereby delegate to the Vice-Chairman, Dr. Beni Chandra Dutta, all my powers, duties aud functions as Chairman in respect of the following departments which are placed under his charge:-\n\nHealth Department.\n\nThe 6th February, 1948.\n\nII.\n\nHowrah Municipality.\n\nOrder.\n\nS. K. l\\fokherji, Chairman.\n\nI hereby delegate my powers and functions to the Health Officer to order prosecution, to sign prosecution sheets in respect of cases concerning the Health and Conservatory Departments.\n\n-..\n\nThe 20th December, 1949.\n\nS. K. Mukherjee, Chairman.\n\nIII.\n\nBallavdas Agarwala v.\n\nHowrah Municipality.\n\nShri Order. ]. C. Chak¥avarty Till the election of Executives by the New Board I delegate all my powers and functions except those that are delegated to the Vice-Chairman to respective officers of departments ........ .\n\nThe 7th April, 1951: S. K. Mukherji,\n\nIV. Howrah Municipality.\n\nOrder.\n\nChairman.\n\nI hereby delegate to the Vice;. Chairman, Sri Sankar Lal Mukherji, all my powers, duties and functions as Chairman in respect of the following departments which are placed under his charge.\n\nHealth Department.\n\nThe 4th July, 1951.\n\nK. C. Dutta,\n\nChairman. \" It is admitted in this case that the election of the Executives by the New Board took place between April 7, 1951 and July 4, 1951. v. \"Howrah Municipality.\n\nOrder. I hereby revoke my order dated the 4th July, 1951, so far as it relates to Health Department which shall henceforth be direct under my charge until further orders. This will take effect from 15th December, 1952.\n\nThe 12th December, 1952. (Sd.) K. C. Dutta, Chairman. \" This was the position of the Orders on December 2, 1953 (the date of the offence) and also on January 5, 1954, when the complaint was filed.\n\nNow, the municipal corporation is a collection of persons, and is invested. with a legal personality by the statute under which it is created. The statute\n\nHidayatullah ].\n\nr96o gives it perpetual succession and a power to act in\n\nB II d-A 1 many ways. Among its multifarious functions is an a av as garwa a . . v. mherent power to sue or . be sued by its corporate Shri name, but the statutes creating such corporations J. c. Chakravarty aggregate provide expressly for such power. In the absence of provision to the contrary, the body Hidayatullah J. corporate in such matters must act as a corporation.\n\nThe inconvenience of having the entire body to meet and decide upon every individual case is apparent, and the law, therefore, provides •for delegation of the functions of the body corporate to the Chairman.\n\nEven there, the burden on the Chairman's time would be enormous, and thus the law enables him to re-delegate, in his turn, his delegated powers to others.\n\nSection 12 of the Calcutta Municipal Act enables the Chairman to delegate his powers, duties or functions to the Vice-Chairman or to any municipal officer.\n\nSuch officers are to be distinguished from mere servants who carry out orders but do not exercise definite municipal powers, duties or privileges as the officers do.\n\nThis distinction was made in Abbott's Corporations, Vol. II, p. 1456 etc., and is to be found reflected also in the Act under consideration.\n\nAn officer of the municipality must himself perform his duties created by statute or bye-Jaw.\n\nHe cannot delegate them to others, unless expressly authorised in this behalf. The Act does not so empower the officers to delegate their functions in their turn, and thus an officer to w horn the power is delegated by the Chairman must perform them himself. A glance at the Act under consideration will show the numerous functions with which the Act invests the Chairman. In addition, the Chairman is invested with the functions delegated by the Commissioners. In most municipalities (if not all), the Chairman maintains an order book in which he designates the officers to whom his functions are delegated. In the present case, there are extracts from the orders of the Chairman from May 9, 1938 to April 22, 1957 (Ex. A). These extracts show only the powers and functions delegated to the Engineer, Water Works Overseers, and they run the course of thirteen pages of small print in tho Paper Book and involve one hundred\n\n• -\n\nand thirty-seven special delegations. If the whole r960 book were to be before us, these special delegations -; 1 will show an enormous number of specially delegated Ballavdas garwa a v. powers.\n\nShri These functions cannot be performed by any but J. c. Chakravarty the officers concerned and are not taken away every time the Chairman passes an order investing by a Hidayatullah J . general order his functions, in te Vice-Chairman, or withdraws them from him. Notification No. II quoted above was a special delegation, and would presumably figure in the order book as an item in the duties of the Health Officer specially delegated to him. After this delegation, it was the Health Officer and Health Officer alone who could exercise this power.\n\nIt is -contended, however, that the Order of April 7, 1951 (No. III) led to the cancellation of the Order of December 20, 1949 (No. II), or at least imposed a time limit tii} the election of the new Board. I am afraid this is not a correct interpretation of the Order.\n\nNo doubt, the Chairman stated that he delegated all his powers and functions to the respective officers of the departments till the election of the new Board ; but the officers of the Department are invested with both administrative and special powers. In my opinion, a distinction must be made between delegation of a power to do special acts by a special order, and delegation ofa general character which can only be interpreted generally as applicable to administrative control.\n\nSection 12 itself contemplates two kinds of orders, and it cannot be gainsaid that the Order of December 20, 1949 (No. II) was a special Order, while the Order of\n\npril 7, 1951, was a general one.\n\nThe first Order (No. I dated February 6, 1948) delegated all the powers of the Chairman in respect of the Health and other Departments to the Vice- Chairman. It did not mean that the order book (Ex. A) came to an end ; nor did it mean that from_ February 6, 1948, it was the Vice-Chairman who alone could do all that is mentioned in the thirteen pages printed in the Paper Book and what is presumably there regarding other departments. Delegation of administrative powers is one thing, and delegation of\n\nI96o power to do some specific act or acts is quite another.\n\nd-A 1 The general order in favour of the Vice-Chairman Ballav as garwa a (N l) Id d h . v. o. wou not cut own t e special orders of the Shri Chairman. The general order cannot be read as special, J. c. Chakravarty because generalia verba sunt generaz.iter intelligenda, and generalities never derogate from specialities. It only Hidayatullah J. granted the residuary powers which were not covered by the special delegations from timo to time. No doubt, the word used is \"all\", but the whole intent and purpose of the delegation must be borne in mind. Qui haeret in litera haeret in cortice. (Broome's Legal Maxims, 9th Edn., p. 443).\n\nThe rules of interpretation of statutes only follow rules of interpretation of deeds and instruments and not vice versa.\n\nTo hold otherwise would mean that after the order of February 6, 1948 (No. I), all functions, duties and powers including those specifically mentioned in the order book came to be centred in the Vce-Chairman.\n\nIt was he alone who could inspect and examine house drains (s. 275), approve the site and position of the cess-pools (s. 279), issue or serve notices (s. 503), inspect the service pipes (R. 5 (3)), examine the water pipes (R. 6)-so on and so forth. And yet, this would be the effect of the Order of February 6, 1948, if the effect of the Order of April 7, 1951, on the Order of December 20, I 949, is, as is claimed. It may be contented that if that is the effect of the Order, we can declare it to be so ; but one reaches this result only if one disregards the distinction between special and general orders, and there is no principle of interpretation on which it can be rested.\n\nThe special delegation order of December 20, 1949, could only come to an end if it was withdrawn either expressly or by necessary . implication. No doubt, it was a delegation by Mr. S. K. Mukherjee, and he ceased to hold office later; but the delegation made by him would not fall by that reason alone. The delegation was not personal to Mr. Mukherjee but was made by virtue of office and it could only cease to be operative if cancelled in the same manner by the same officeholder or his successor. It was, however, argued that it came to an end because of a time-limit imposed by\n\n• -\n\nthe Chairman by hiS Order of April 7, 1951 (No. III). •960 That Order stated that powers and functions except Ballavdas Agarwala those delegated to the Vice-Chairman were to be v. exercised till the election of the Executives by the new Shri Board. But the time-limit was imposed on powers J.C. Chakravarty delegated by that Order. This is clear from the language Hidayatullah J. employed:\n\n\"Till the election of Executives by the New Board I delegate all my powers and functions ...... to respective officers of departments.\" The contention is that this Order had the effect of imposing a time-limit on all delegations made even before. This general order did not have this effect on a special order for the reasons stated. The delegation of the power to order prosecution and to sign prosecution sheets was specially conferred by the Order of December 20, 1949 (No. II), and was not revoked by the general order which could not be read specially;. nor was it intended that this power was to have a timelimit. By \"officers of the department\" was not meant the officers on whom special powers were conferred to do special acts. The Order quoted above is in general terms, and puts a timelimit on the delegation made ?Jy that order. It says nothing about delegations of a special kind already in existence, or that the general order was to be in supression of all special orders. It does not, in terms, seek to affect them either expressly or even by implication. In iny opinion, the special delegation made by the Order of December 20, 1949 (No. II), remained unaffected, and thus enables the Health Officer to file the complaint.\n\nIn this view of the matter, it is unnecessary to decide whether s. 537 of the Calcutta Municipal Act is merely enabling or mandatory, and whether in the absence of a proper delegation, the Health Officer or other officers of the Municipality or any private person could have initiated the prosecution in such a case.\n\nI would, therefore, hold that the appeal has no force, and that it should be dismissed.\n\nORDER OF COURT In view of the judgment of the majority the appeal is allowed.\n\nAppeal aUowed.", "total_entities": 228, "entities": [{"text": "October 18, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on October 18, 1939, is barred in so far as those properties are concerned, and the Devasthanam cannot get possession of them."}}, {"text": "Devasthanam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 165, "end_char": 176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on October 18, 1939, is barred in so far as those properties are concerned, and the Devasthanam cannot get possession of them."}}, {"text": "R. Muthammal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 209, "end_char": 221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Muthammal (Died) Para1neswari Both the Courts below have concurred in holding Thayammal that M. Picha Pillai must have got possession other- 5 b v.. . • •"}}, {"text": "Thayammal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 290, "end_char": 299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Muthammal (Died) Para1neswari Both the Courts below have concurred in holding Thayammal that M. Picha Pillai must have got possession other- 5 b v.. . • •"}}, {"text": "M. Picha Pillai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 305, "end_char": 320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Muthammal (Died) Para1neswari Both the Courts below have concurred in holding Thayammal that M. Picha Pillai must have got possession other- 5 b v.. . • •"}}, {"text": "because even Devasthanam D.W. 2 not very friendly to the Devasthanam admitted that M. Picha Pillai was at the time of his death in Hidayatullah J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 420, "end_char": 566, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. HIDAYATULLAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BALLAVDAS AGARW ALA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1307, "end_char": 1326, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BALLAVDAS AGARW ALA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHRIJ.C.CHAKRAVARTY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1331, "end_char": 1350, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHRIJ.C.CHAKRAVARTY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. K. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1353, "end_char": 1362, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. K. DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. K. SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1365, "end_char": 1377, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. K. SARKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 406 and 407", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1681, "end_char": 1696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1707, "end_char": 1713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January z, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1836, "end_char": 1851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "406 and 407 read with s. 488 of the Calcutta Municipal Act as extended to the Municipality of Howrah on a complaint filed by the Sanitary Inspector on January z, 1954 which was signed in token of sanction by the Health Officer of the said municipality."}}, {"text": "J. C. Chakravarty", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2540, "end_char": 2557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question of the Shri delegation of their power by the Commissioners was not specifi- J. C. Chakravarty cally raised, but it was urged that the Chairman had by certain subsequent orders revoked the delegation in favour of the Health Officer.", "canonical_name": "J. C. Chakravarty"}}, {"text": "February 6, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2739, "end_char": 2755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first order passed by the Chairman on February 6, 1948, delegated to the Vice-Chairman all his powers, duties and functions in respect of seven departments including the Health Department."}}, {"text": "December 20, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2922, "end_char": 2939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second order was passe.d on December 20, 1949, by which the Chairman delegated his powers and functions to the Health Officer to order prosecution and to sign prosecution sheets in respect of cases concerning the Health and Conservancy Departments."}}, {"text": "April 7, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3171, "end_char": 3184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The third order was made on April 7, 1951, on the eve of the new election, and stated : \"Till the election of ExecutiYes by the New Board I delegate all my powers and functions except those that are delegated to the Vice-Chairman to the respective officers of departments\"."}}, {"text": "July 4, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3473, "end_char": 3485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the election, the new Chairman passed an order on July 4, 1951, delegating all his powers, duties and functions in respect of six departments including the Health Department to the Vice-Chairman."}}, {"text": "December 12, r952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3648, "end_char": 3665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last order was passed on December 12, r952, which said: \"I hereby revoke my order dated the 4th July 1951, so far as it relates to the Health Department which shall henceforth be direct under my charge until further orders."}}, {"text": "4th July 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3715, "end_char": 3728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last order was passed on December 12, r952, which said: \"I hereby revoke my order dated the 4th July 1951, so far as it relates to the Health Department which shall henceforth be direct under my charge until further orders."}}, {"text": "15th December, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3874, "end_char": 3893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This will take effect from 15th December, 1952\"."}}, {"text": "S. K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4218, "end_char": 4227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held, (per S. K. Das and A. K. Sarkar, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "S. K. DAS"}}, {"text": "A. K. Sarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4232, "end_char": 4244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held, (per S. K. Das and A. K. Sarkar, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "A. K. SARKAR"}}, {"text": "Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4910, "end_char": 4938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Howrah", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4970, "end_char": 4976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held, further, that a complaint under the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923, as applied to Municipality of Howrah, can only be filed by the uthorities mentioned therein and not by an ordinary citizen."}}, {"text": "Section 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5064, "end_char": 5075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "statute": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923"}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5197, "end_char": 5202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "statute": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923"}}, {"text": "s. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5519, "end_char": 5525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "statute": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923"}}, {"text": "(1936) L.R. 63 I.A. 372", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5605, "end_char": 5628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 7, l95L", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6520, "end_char": 6533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of December 20, 1949, which specially conferred the power to order prosecution to sign prosecution sheets was a special order and was unaffected by the general order of April 7, l95L The later order put a time limit only on delegations made under that order and not on orders made before."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6773, "end_char": 6792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated June 25, 1956, of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Revision No."}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7073, "end_char": 7089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee S. K. Kapur and Nanak Chand Pandit, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. K. Kapur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7090, "end_char": 7101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee S. K. Kapur and Nanak Chand Pandit, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Nanak Chand Pandit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7106, "end_char": 7124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee S. K. Kapur and Nanak Chand Pandit, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. C. Mazumdar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7146, "end_char": 7160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. C. Mazumdar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Ballavdas Agarwala", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7354, "end_char": 7372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. DAS, J.-The appellant Ballavdas Agarwala f\n\nS. K. Das].", "canonical_name": "BALLAVDAS AGARW ALA"}}, {"text": "S. K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7376, "end_char": 7385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. DAS, J.-The appellant Ballavdas Agarwala f\n\nS. K. Das].", "canonical_name": "S. K. DAS"}}, {"text": "Shyamlal Missir", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7523, "end_char": 7538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was the proprietor o a restaurant in the Railway premises at Howrah Railway Station within the Municipality of Howrah, and his servant Shyamlal Missir was in charge of that restaurant.", "canonical_name": "Shyamlal Missir"}}, {"text": "December 2, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7922, "end_char": 7938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c. Chakravarty On December 2, 1953, during the currency of the -- license, the Health Officer of the Howrah."}}, {"text": "s. K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8025, "end_char": 8034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Municipality s. K. Das J. along with his Sanitary Inspector and a peon visited • the establishment and found that butter was being sold from glass jars standing on a table between the - c.ustomers and the vendor.", "canonical_name": "S. K. DAS"}}, {"text": "Shyamlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8259, "end_char": 8267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was then absent and Shyamlal was dealing with the customers.", "canonical_name": "Shyamlal Missir"}}, {"text": "-Shyamlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8600, "end_char": 8609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The samples were taken in clean bottles, sealed and labelled on the spot under a seizure list which -Shyamlal signed.", "canonical_name": "Shyamlal Missir"}}, {"text": "Health Department of the Government of West Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8737, "end_char": 8787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of, the samples was later sent to the Health Department of the Government of West Bengal for analysis and report."}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8835, "end_char": 8846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Public Analyst of West Bengal sent a report stating that the butter in question was grossly adulterated and did not contain any butter fat, and also contained a large excess of water."}}, {"text": "January 2, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9004, "end_char": 9019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 2, 1954, the Sanitary\n\nInspector filed a complaint before the magistrate of Howrah asking for the issue of summons to the appellant and his servant Shyamlal for an offence < under sections 488/406 and 407 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923, as extended to the Municipality of j Howrah."}}, {"text": "sections 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9192, "end_char": 9204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9224, "end_char": 9252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Howrah Municipality", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9967, "end_char": 9986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~\n\nThe Administrator, Howrah Municipality, then x96o preferred an application in revision to the High Court a-· 1 H ."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10098, "end_char": 10106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "h C \"d h d fBallav as,, garwa a of Calcutta."}}, {"text": "ss. 406 and 407", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10817, "end_char": 10832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10843, "end_char": 10849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sessions Judge of Howrah", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11002, "end_char": 11026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant then moved the learned Sessions Judge of Howrah for a reference to the High Court, but without success."}}, {"text": "Article 134(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11367, "end_char": 11384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Das Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11437, "end_char": 11446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While granting the certificate Das Gupta, J. giving the decision of the Division Bench said:\n\n\"On the 4th July, 1951, in my opinion the Health Officer of the Municipality had no longer in him the powers to order prosecution in any case regarding the Health Deprtment and that power >vas at that time vested in the Vice-Chairman of the Municipality Shri Sankar Lal Mukherjee, as a result of delegation by the Chairman by the order, Exhibit-D. On the 12th\n\nDecember, 1952, the new Chairman Shri K. C. Datta passed a further order revoking his previous order , dated 4th July, 1951, so far as it related to the Health Department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ."}}, {"text": "4th July, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11508, "end_char": 11522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While granting the certificate Das Gupta, J. giving the decision of the Division Bench said:\n\n\"On the 4th July, 1951, in my opinion the Health Officer of the Municipality had no longer in him the powers to order prosecution in any case regarding the Health Deprtment and that power >vas at that time vested in the Vice-Chairman of the Municipality Shri Sankar Lal Mukherjee, as a result of delegation by the Chairman by the order, Exhibit-D. On the 12th\n\nDecember, 1952, the new Chairman Shri K. C. Datta passed a further order revoking his previous order , dated 4th July, 1951, so far as it related to the Health Department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ."}}, {"text": "Sankar Lal Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11759, "end_char": 11779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While granting the certificate Das Gupta, J. giving the decision of the Division Bench said:\n\n\"On the 4th July, 1951, in my opinion the Health Officer of the Municipality had no longer in him the powers to order prosecution in any case regarding the Health Deprtment and that power >vas at that time vested in the Vice-Chairman of the Municipality Shri Sankar Lal Mukherjee, as a result of delegation by the Chairman by the order, Exhibit-D. On the 12th\n\nDecember, 1952, the new Chairman Shri K. C. Datta passed a further order revoking his previous order , dated 4th July, 1951, so far as it related to the Health Department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .", "canonical_name": "Sankar Lal Mukherjee"}}, {"text": "12th\n\nDecember, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11855, "end_char": 11875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While granting the certificate Das Gupta, J. giving the decision of the Division Bench said:\n\n\"On the 4th July, 1951, in my opinion the Health Officer of the Municipality had no longer in him the powers to order prosecution in any case regarding the Health Deprtment and that power >vas at that time vested in the Vice-Chairman of the Municipality Shri Sankar Lal Mukherjee, as a result of delegation by the Chairman by the order, Exhibit-D. On the 12th\n\nDecember, 1952, the new Chairman Shri K. C. Datta passed a further order revoking his previous order , dated 4th July, 1951, so far as it related to the Health Department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ."}}, {"text": "K. C. Datta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11899, "end_char": 11910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While granting the certificate Das Gupta, J. giving the decision of the Division Bench said:\n\n\"On the 4th July, 1951, in my opinion the Health Officer of the Municipality had no longer in him the powers to order prosecution in any case regarding the Health Deprtment and that power >vas at that time vested in the Vice-Chairman of the Municipality Shri Sankar Lal Mukherjee, as a result of delegation by the Chairman by the order, Exhibit-D. On the 12th\n\nDecember, 1952, the new Chairman Shri K. C. Datta passed a further order revoking his previous order , dated 4th July, 1951, so far as it related to the Health Department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .", "canonical_name": "K. C. Datta"}}, {"text": "12th December, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12186, "end_char": 12205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The position, therefore, after 12th December, 1952, was that the Chairman of the Howrah Municipality\n\n'960 himself was the only person compent to exercise the\n\nB ll d-A 1 powers of Commissioners under Section 537 of the a av as garwa a . ."}}, {"text": "Section 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12356, "end_char": 12367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta Mummpal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12399, "end_char": 12419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12530, "end_char": 12541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Calcutta Mummpal Act", "statute": "Calcutta Mummpal Act"}}, {"text": "K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12548, "end_char": 12554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 c chi 1 If, therefore, the proceedings unless instituted by\n\n avor Y the Commissioners in accordance with Section 537 of s. K. Das J. the Calcutta Municipal Act cannot form the legal basis • of any conviction for contravention of any provision of that law, the conviction in this case must be held - to have no legal basis.\""}}, {"text": "s. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12840, "end_char": 12846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Calcutta Mummpal Act", "statute": "Calcutta Mummpal Act"}}, {"text": "Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12854, "end_char": 12882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14236, "end_char": 14241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14534, "end_char": 14539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14643, "end_char": 14648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14806, "end_char": 14834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Municipality of Howrah or under the Bengal Municipal Act, 1884", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14854, "end_char": 14916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15276, "end_char": 15281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Municipality of Howrah or under the Bengal Municipal Act, 1884", "statute": "the Municipality of Howrah or under the Bengal Municipal Act, 1884"}}, {"text": "Bengal Municipal Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15289, "end_char": 15315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15389, "end_char": 15395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932", "statute": "the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "s. 12(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15934, "end_char": 15942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932", "statute": "the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15950, "end_char": 15978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16094, "end_char": 16100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "statute": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923"}}, {"text": "May 9, 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16481, "end_char": 16492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An Order Book of the Chairman of the Howrah Municipality containing extracts of orders passed by the Chairman of the Municipality from May 9, 1938 to April 221 19571 W&&\n\n1960 filed in the case."}}, {"text": "s. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16758, "end_char": 16764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "statute": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923"}}, {"text": "Section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18238, "end_char": 18249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "15th s:i December, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18672, "end_char": 18695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This will take effect from 15th s:i December, 1952.\" ]."}}, {"text": "c. Chakravarty", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18701, "end_char": 18715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c. Chakravarty The question before us is-what is the effect of the aforesaid five orders ?", "canonical_name": "J. C. Chakravarty"}}, {"text": "H. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18824, "end_char": 18830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is clear that by the order 5 H. Das J. dated February 6, 1948, the Chairman delegated his powers to the Vice-Chairman in respect of the Health Department, and by the next order dated December 20, 1949, he delegated his powers to the Health Officer in respect of certain particular matters, such as, ordering prosecution and signing complaints concerning the Health and Conservancy Departments."}}, {"text": "December 12, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19615, "end_char": 19632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "dated December 20, 1949 so that it would come to an end with the election of the new Executives, and the position thereafter would be governed by the orders dated July 4, 1951, and December 12, 1952."}}, {"text": "Decemz960", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22914, "end_char": 22923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "... l -\n\nhave only two orders dated July 4, 1951, and Decemz960 her 12, 1952."}}, {"text": "Ballavdas Agarw\"la", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23028, "end_char": 23046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By order dated July 4, 1951, the new - Chairman delegated his powers to the Vice-Chairman Ballavdas Agarw\"la\n\nin respect of six departments including the Health sri Department, though the earlier delegation in favour J. c. Chakravarty.", "canonical_name": "BALLAVDAS AGARW ALA"}}, {"text": "J. c. Chakravarty", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23155, "end_char": 23172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By order dated July 4, 1951, the new - Chairman delegated his powers to the Vice-Chairman Ballavdas Agarw\"la\n\nin respect of six departments including the Health sri Department, though the earlier delegation in favour J. c. Chakravarty.", "canonical_name": "J. C. Chakravarty"}}, {"text": "Howrah Municipality", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23764, "end_char": 23783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are, therefore, of the view that in the absence of a fresh order of delegation of which there is no evidence in the record, the Health Officer of the Howrah Municipality was not empowered as the duly delegated authority to institute criminal proceedings against the appellant on the date on which he made the complaint."}}, {"text": "s. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24043, "end_char": 24049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24137, "end_char": 24165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24321, "end_char": 24327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "statute": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923"}}, {"text": "Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24446, "end_char": 24474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24601, "end_char": 24629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25482, "end_char": 25488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "statute": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923"}}, {"text": "s. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25896, "end_char": 25902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26133, "end_char": 26139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26248, "end_char": 26274, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26380, "end_char": 26386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26879, "end_char": 26907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1936) L.R. 63 I.A. 372", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 27061, "end_char": 27084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27554, "end_char": 27560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "statute": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923"}}, {"text": "s. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27660, "end_char": 27666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "statute": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923"}}, {"text": "s. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27717, "end_char": 27723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "statute": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923"}}, {"text": "s. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27899, "end_char": 27905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "statute": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923"}}, {"text": "Like all other Municipal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28091, "end_char": 28119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28126, "end_char": 28154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28170, "end_char": 28179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "statute": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923"}}, {"text": "Section 84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28318, "end_char": 28328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "statute": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923"}}, {"text": "Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28336, "end_char": 28364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28929, "end_char": 28935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "statute": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923"}}, {"text": "s. 531", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29101, "end_char": 29107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "statute": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923"}}, {"text": "Section 531", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29195, "end_char": 29206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "statute": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923"}}, {"text": "section 533", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29500, "end_char": 29511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 534", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29592, "end_char": 29603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 535", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29658, "end_char": 29669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 535", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29740, "end_char": 29746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 537, 538 and 539", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29894, "end_char": 29914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29916, "end_char": 29927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 538", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29998, "end_char": 30004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 539", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30051, "end_char": 30057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "examination of the aforesaid provisions shows that the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30099, "end_char": 30182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30509, "end_char": 30515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "An examination of the aforesaid provisions shows that the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "statute": "An examination of the aforesaid provisions shows that the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923"}}, {"text": "Some Municipal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30952, "end_char": 30970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 375", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31042, "end_char": 31048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Some Municipal Act", "statute": "Some Municipal Act"}}, {"text": "Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31056, "end_char": 31092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 353", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31219, "end_char": 31230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act, 1922", "statute": "the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Bengal Municipal Act, 1884", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31238, "end_char": 31264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31540, "end_char": 31546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Municipal Act, 1884", "statute": "the Bengal Municipal Act, 1884"}}, {"text": "Calcutta Ballavdas AgarwMla Municipal Act, 1923", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31554, "end_char": 31601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Municipal Act but other Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31808, "end_char": 31835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sections 82 and 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31838, "end_char": 31856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipal Act but other Act", "statute": "Municipal Act but other Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Registration Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31864, "end_char": 31893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "do not think that the said provisions in the Indian Registration Act, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32081, "end_char": 32155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 179 and 237", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32501, "end_char": 32516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We do not think that the said provisions in the Indian Registration Act, 1908", "statute": "We do not think that the said provisions in the Indian Registration Act, 1908"}}, {"text": "Indian Companies Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32524, "end_char": 32550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32833, "end_char": 32839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "the Indian Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32847, "end_char": 32875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33008, "end_char": 33019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "statute": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33250, "end_char": 33276, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33562, "end_char": 33568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "statute": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923"}}, {"text": "s. 248", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33820, "end_char": 33826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "statute": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923"}}, {"text": "s. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33888, "end_char": 33894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34332, "end_char": 34338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 248", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34417, "end_char": 34423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34427, "end_char": 34450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 248", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34589, "end_char": 34595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34599, "end_char": 34622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34661, "end_char": 34667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "s. 248", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35104, "end_char": 35110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35114, "end_char": 35137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35172, "end_char": 35178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "s. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35242, "end_char": 35248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "s. 535(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36126, "end_char": 36135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "J. c. Chakravarty", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 36166, "end_char": 36183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 5 o t e a cutta umcipa v.\n\nAct, and it was held that a magistrate was not entitled shri to act under s. 535(2) upon a complaint filed by the J. c. Chakravarty Sanitary Inspector in his personal capacity in the absence of anything to show that he was authorised 5 K. Das f. by the Chairman of the Municipality or was complaining on behalf of the Municipality or resided or owned property in Calcutta.", "canonical_name": "J. C. Chakravarty"}}, {"text": "s. 535", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36557, "end_char": 36563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 481 and 69", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36604, "end_char": 36618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 481", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36711, "end_char": 36722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 69", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37111, "end_char": 37116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 69", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37643, "end_char": 37648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 481", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37797, "end_char": 37803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39214, "end_char": 39220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40025, "end_char": 40031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta Municipal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40033, "end_char": 40055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40349, "end_char": 40355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Calcutta Municipal Act", "statute": "Calcutta Municipal Act"}}, {"text": "J. C. Chalmwarty", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40570, "end_char": 40586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri If it is merely enabling, then the respondent is entitled J. C. Chalmwarty to succeed.", "canonical_name": "J. C. Chakravarty"}}, {"text": "Diseases of the Animals Act, 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40746, "end_char": 40779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Lindley", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40781, "end_char": 40788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lindley, L.J. said:\n\n\"Reading those sections together, they in fact affirm the right of any person to prefer an information in most significa.nt terms."}}, {"text": "s. 47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41204, "end_char": 41209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Diseases of the Animals Act, 1894", "statute": "the Diseases of the Animals Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "Bord Alverstone", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41357, "end_char": 41372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bord Alverstone 0."}}, {"text": "This was a case under the Sea Fisheries Act, 1883", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41935, "end_char": 41984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42010, "end_char": 42015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "This was a case under the Sea Fisheries Act, 1883", "statute": "This was a case under the Sea Fisheries Act, 1883"}}, {"text": "Coleridge", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42410, "end_char": 42419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Coleridge, C. J. observed: ·\n\n(I) (1896) I Q.B.D. 300."}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42555, "end_char": 42560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "This was a case under the Sea Fisheries Act, 1883", "statute": "This was a case under the Sea Fisheries Act, 1883"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42908, "end_char": 42911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das J. sue for the penalty the Attorney-General could sue for it, so that on that view of the statute the clause enabling him to sue would be unnecessary and useless.\""}}, {"text": "s. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43181, "end_char": 43187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43374, "end_char": 43380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43725, "end_char": 43731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43732, "end_char": 43755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43790, "end_char": 43795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43803, "end_char": 43831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "HIDAYATULLAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44179, "end_char": 44191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HIDAYATULLAH J.-.", "canonical_name": "HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "Art. 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44267, "end_char": 44275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "statute": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923"}}, {"text": "ss. 406 and 407", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44385, "end_char": 44400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "statute": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923"}}, {"text": "s. 488", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44411, "end_char": 44417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "statute": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923"}}, {"text": "Ballabhdas Agarwala", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 44570, "end_char": 44589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, Ballabhdas Agarwala, is the proprietor of a chain of restaurants, and one such restaurant is at the Howrah Railway Station.", "canonical_name": "BALLAVDAS AGARW ALA"}}, {"text": "January 6, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45041, "end_char": 45056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CJ.ke, bread and biscuits and parched gram at J. c. Chakravarty Howrah goods shed between January 6, 1951 and December 31, 1953."}}, {"text": "December 31, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45061, "end_char": 45078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CJ.ke, bread and biscuits and parched gram at J. c. Chakravarty Howrah goods shed between January 6, 1951 and December 31, 1953."}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45081, "end_char": 45093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hidayatullah ].", "canonical_name": "HIDAYATULLAH"}}, {"text": "Missir", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45942, "end_char": 45948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the report of the Analyst that the sample did not contain any butter fat at all and contained an excess of water, the Health Officer accorded sanction for the prosecution of the appellant and Missir."}}, {"text": "Debabrata Mookerjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 46561, "end_char": 46580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant then moved the High Court in revision, but Debabrata Mookerjee, J. dismissed it summarily."}}, {"text": "Art. 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46679, "end_char": 46687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 406 and 407", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47242, "end_char": 47262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 48081, "end_char": 48098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference was made to a decision of the Punjab High Court in Mangal Mal v. 'The State (1) in support of the contention that the prosecution for the sale of\" adulterated\" butter was defective."}}, {"text": "Municipal Act, 1923", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48918, "end_char": 48937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Howrah and of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48953, "end_char": 48997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49121, "end_char": 49127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Howrah and of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932", "statute": "Howrah and of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49337, "end_char": 49365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49526, "end_char": 49554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49788, "end_char": 49816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50425, "end_char": 50430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923", "statute": "the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923"}}, {"text": "Howrah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 50475, "end_char": 50481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In reply, it is pointed out that under s. 12 of the Calcutta Municipal Act as applied to Howrah, the Commissioners can delegate their functions to a Chairman by a resolution passed ."}}, {"text": "s. 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50998, "end_char": 51003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bengal Municipal Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51011, "end_char": 51037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 542", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51128, "end_char": 51134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932", "statute": "the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "s. 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51180, "end_char": 51185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932", "statute": "the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51292, "end_char": 51297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932", "statute": "the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "Beni Chandra Dutta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 52563, "end_char": 52581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I hereby delegate to the Vice-Chairman, Dr. Beni Chandra Dutta, all my powers, duties aud functions as Chairman in respect of the following departments which are placed under his charge:-\n\nHealth Department."}}, {"text": "S. K. l\\fokherji", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 52788, "end_char": 52804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. l\\fokherji, Chairman.", "canonical_name": "S. K. l\\fokherji"}}, {"text": "S. K. Mukherjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 53034, "end_char": 53049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Mukherjee, Chairman.", "canonical_name": "S. K. l\\fokherji"}}, {"text": "S. K. Mukherji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 53355, "end_char": 53369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 7th April, 1951: S. K. Mukherji,\n\nIV.", "canonical_name": "S. K. l\\fokherji"}}, {"text": "Sankar Lal Mukherji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 53463, "end_char": 53482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chairman, Sri Sankar Lal Mukherji, all my powers, duties and functions as Chairman in respect of the following departments which are placed under his charge.", "canonical_name": "Sankar Lal Mukherjee"}}, {"text": "K. C. Dutta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53649, "end_char": 53660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. C. Dutta,\n\nChairman. \"", "canonical_name": "K. C. Datta"}}, {"text": "5, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54211, "end_char": 54218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was the position of the Orders on December 2, 1953 (the date of the offence) and also on January 5, 1954, when the complaint was filed."}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55223, "end_char": 55233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 22, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 56485, "end_char": 56499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case, there are extracts from the orders of the Chairman from May 9, 1938 to April 22, 1957 (Ex."}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58215, "end_char": 58225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "pril 7, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 58379, "end_char": 58391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "II) was a special Order, while the Order of\n\npril 7, 1951, was a general one."}}, {"text": "Ballav", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 59035, "end_char": 59041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "d-A 1 The general order in favour of the Vice-Chairman Ballav as garwa a (N l) Id d h ."}}, {"text": "Broome", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 59572, "end_char": 59578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Broome's Legal Maxims, 9th Edn.,"}}, {"text": "s. 275", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60007, "end_char": 60013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 279", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60065, "end_char": 60071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 503", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60098, "end_char": 60104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 20, I 949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 60325, "end_char": 60343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And yet, this would be the effect of the Order of February 6, 1948, if the effect of the Order of April 7, 1951, on the Order of December 20, I 949, is, as is claimed."}}, {"text": "20, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 60670, "end_char": 60678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The special delegation order of December 20, 1949, could only come to an end if it was withdrawn either expressly or by necessary ."}}, {"text": "S. K. Mukherjee", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 60811, "end_char": 60826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No doubt, it was a delegation by Mr. S. K. Mukherjee, and he ceased to hold office later; but the delegation made by him would not fall by that reason alone.", "canonical_name": "S. K. l\\fokherji"}}, {"text": "Mukherjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 60971, "end_char": 60980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The delegation was not personal to Mr. Mukherjee but was made by virtue of office and it could only cease to be operative if cancelled in the same manner by the same officeholder or his successor."}}, {"text": "J.C. Chakravarty", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61507, "end_char": 61523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the time-limit was imposed on powers J.C. Chakravarty delegated by that Order.", "canonical_name": "J. C. Chakravarty"}}, {"text": "December 20, 1949 (No. II)", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 62740, "end_char": 62766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In iny opinion, the special delegation made by the Order of December 20, 1949 (No."}}, {"text": "s. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62913, "end_char": 62919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1960_2_768_774_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "]anuat'y Ij.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)]\n\nNANDURIYOGANANDA\n\nLAKSHMINARASIMACHARI AND ORS.\n\nSRI AGASTHESW ARASW AMI V ARU OF\n\nKOL AKAL UR\n\n(J. L. KAPUR. P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR AND K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)\n\nGrant-Inam-Intention-Spccified charitable payments exhausting income at date of grant~Intention is to denote tfJhole income to charity-Plaint-Prayer portion-If and when can be allowed to be amended-Documents-The interpretation possible-Supreme Conrt not to intervene with view taken by the courts below. The sole trustee of a deity in a suit prayed for a decree for the recovery of the arrears of income of a property alleging that the property in dispute constituted a specified endowment for Kalyanotsavam of the deity and the appellants who were trustees of the said property had committed defanlt in carrying out the purpose of the trust; but there was no formal prayer for the declaration that the said properties and income thereof formed a specific endowment for the said due performance of the services of Kalyanotsovam of the deity and feeding charges, and other expenses.\n\nThe defence raised was that Inam was a personal grant bnrdened with service of the deity and that it was not a specific trust or an endowment for the benefit of the idol.\n\nThe High Conrt after allowing the respondents to amend the plaint by adding a formal prayer for declaration stating that the properties and income thereof formed a specific endowment for the dne performance of the services of Kalyanotsavam of the deity held in favour of the respondents and further; observed that the appellants were liable to pay the_ entire income to the deity. On appeal to the Supreme Court it was contended for the appellants inter alia (r) that the grant was a personal grant, burdened with the provision for service and it was not a specific grant.\n\n(2) that High Court should not have allowed the amendment of the plaint.\n\nHeld, that in the instant case the grant, was a specific endowment for Kalyanotsavam of the deity and therefore a specific trust and not a grant to the appellants with the added obligation of spending on the service.\n\nIn considering the question of the nature of a grant, the inam registers have always been treated as evidence of the utmost importance particularly where Sanad & Inam title deeds are not produced, and when two inferences are possible from the reading of documents there is no reason why the Supreme Court will interfere with the view taken by the courts below.\n\nWhen at the time of a grant the specific charitable payments exhaust the income of the prpperty, it is a fair inference to draw\n\ntherefrom that the intention was to devote the whole income to 19fio charity and any subsequent increase in the value of the property accrues to the charity and the courts would be right to apply the Nanduri doctrine of Cy-pres.\n\nYogananda Held, further, that where necessary allegations had been Lakshin1narasimamade in a plaint and the requisite pleas raised and issues framed chari and Ors. on the question and the parties were fully cognizant on the points v. in controversy and necessary evidence led by them, the courts Sri would be right in allowing the amendment by the addition of a Agastheswaraswami • prayer in the prayer clause, which was in the nature of formal Varu of Kolakalur relief which flowed from the allegation in the plaint.\n\nCIVIL APPEL.ATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 147 of 1956.\n\nAppeaJ from the judgment and decree dated August 7, HJ52, mf the Madras High Court in A. S. No. 809 of 194 7; arising out of the judgment and decree dated October 31, 1947, of the Sub Judge, Tenali in 0. S. No. 64 of 1944.\n\nK. R. Chaudri, T. S. Venkataraman and K. R.\n\nSharma, for the appellants.\n\nN. Subramanyam and T. Satyanarayana for the respondent.\n\n1960. January 15. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKAPUR J.-This is an appeal against the judgment and decree of the High Court of Madras varying the decree of the trial court. The appellants were the defendants in the trial court and the respondent was the plaintiff who was represented by the sole trustee appointed by the Hindu Religious li:ndowment Board.\n\nThe suit was brought by the deity through the sole trustee for recovery of Rs. 3,480 towards the arrears of income of the property in trust for the years 1942-44 and for a direction for future payment at the rate of 160 bags of paddy per year or its equivalent i.e. Rs. 1,680. The plaintiff alleged that the property in dispute constituted a specific endowment for Kalyanotsavam of the deity and that the defendants who were trustees had committed default in carrying out the purpose of the trust. The prayer was for a decree for the recovery of expenses of Kalyanotsavam and of the feeding char.ges. The defence raised wat; i\n\nKapur J.\n\nz960 that the inam was a personal grant for driving the car of the deity on the festival days and that it was\n\nYNanduna not a specific trust or an endowment for the benefit of ogonan a h 'd 1 I ] d . f h .\n\nLaf.shniinara.iniat e l\n\nO • n ot ier wor sit was a grant o t e inam chari and o,,. burdened with service to the god. There were other v.. pleas raised in regard to jurisdiction, res judicata and 5\" adverse possession.\n\nThe trial court held that the A [lastheswaraswatni \"fi d f h K l vru of Kolakalurgrant wa~ a spe01 IC en owment or t e a yanotsavam of the deity but the appellants were not bound to Kapur J. spend the whole income of the lands for the purpose.\n\nIt decreed a sum of Rs. 200 per year as adequate provision for the performance of the service of Kalyanotsavam. The other pleas raised were decided against the appellants.\n\nIn the High Court the only point argued was regarding the nature of the grant and as in the opinion of that court a general trustee could not call upon a specific trustee to pay any money except on the ground of expending that amount and there was no proof of this expenditure the prayer as contained in the plaint was not granted and the High Court was also of the opinion that as all the facts had been\n\npleaded and there were no new facts to be alleged and the parties were alive to the real nature of the dispute and had even the issues framed on that very question, it allowed the plaint to be amended by the addition of. the prayer for a declaration that the properties in the schedule and the income thereof formed a specific endowment for the due performance of the services of Kalyanotsavam of the deity and feeding charges and other expenses incidental thereto and the appellants were therefore liable to pay the entire income. It was also of the opinion that all the available evidence had been adduced by both the parties and that the prayer for declaration was only a formal relief which flowed from the allegations in the plaint. It neither involved a change of the cause of action nor did it require a fresh trail and therefore the petition for amendment was allowed by the addition of the prayer stated above.\n\nIn this n, ppeal counsel for the appellant has raised hrnet points : (I) that the suit was not maintainable;\n\n(2) that the amendment should not have been 1 960 allowed and (3) the grant was a personal grant to the . appellants burdened with the provision for service and YNandu•d• . 'fi d\n\nA £ h fi oganan a it was not a spec1 c en owment. s ar as t e rst Lakshminarasima question is concerned it has not been shown as to how chari and ors. the suit was not maintainable. The question of v. amendment, in our opinion, was rightly decided by the Sri .\n\nHigh Court. As held by that court all the necessary :gasthw; rs:m• allegations had been made in the plaint and the aru\n\n0 0\n\na a ur requisite pleas had been raised by the appellants; an Kapur J. issue was framed on the question and the parties were fully cognizant of the points in controversy and the necessary evidence was led by the parties. In this view . of the matter the High Court was right in allowing tlre amendment by the addition of a prayer in the prayer clause.\n\nWe then come to the question of the nature of grant which on a consideration of the documentary evidence and other evidence has been found by both the courts below to be a specific endowment for Kalyanotsavam. This finding was challenged by the appellant. For that purpose it is necessary to consider the inam papers which form the main and basic documentary evidence by the appellant. Inam registers have always been treated as evidence of the utmost importance. The first document to be considered is of the year 1859-60. which is a copy of the inam statement made by N. Buchayya, the ancestor of the present appellants. Column 1 of this document shows the names of the inamdars and the enjoyers to be\" N. Buchayya the present enjoment is towards the Kalyanotsavam\" of the deity. Columns 4 & 5 give the residence and name of the original inamdars.\n\nIn Column 5 are given the particulars of the family of the then enjoyers and the entry is for the deity's Kalyanotsavam. In Column 6 is given the name of the grantor who gave the land to the grantee and \"with the income therefrom he has been performing Sri Swami Varu's Kalyanotsavam frqm that time\".\n\nColumns 7-9 give the extent of the land. In Column 11 . \" particulars relating to the present enjoyment are to be given and the entry was Sri Swami Varu's\n\n'960 Halyanotsavam. In Column 12 it wa• shown that the Nandnri grant was revenue-free and the land was under the Yogananda cultivation of Buchayya the income of which was Lahshmin\"'asima- Rs. 11 per annum. The entries show that the inam chari and Ors. was granted as a specific endowment for the Kalya- ;; i notsa:vam of the dity and the amount was spent in the\n\nA ga.; theswaraswami servICeS of the deity.\n\nVaru 0! Kolakalur The next document to be considered is a copy of\n\nJ6° the added obligation of spending on the service must be accepted to be correct.\n\nNanduri Th t t\" c d · t h t Yogananda • e nex q.ues ron 1or ecs1on is as . o w a Lak.S ad f l b t h t . t d 'd and 5 ,, Ltd o tie contract, u t a 1t was unnecessary o em e :. s. whether the claim described in Sch. C for an increase The Union of India in the financing and overhead mandi charges, was\n\nShah ]. properly ruled out by the umpire.\n\nIn the meantime, by letter dated August 2, l 952, the Agents called upon the Government of India to appoint their arbitrator under cl: 20 of the agreement dated May 3, 1937, for a fresh adjudication of the dispute, and intimated that they had again appointed Nigam to be their arbitrator. The Government of India informed the Agents by their letter dated August 14, 1952, that they had filed an appeal against the judgment of the Subordinate Judge, Delhi, and in the circumstances, the question of appointing an arbitrator, did not arise until the final disposal of the appeal. The Government, however, without prejudice to their rights, including the right to prosecute the appeal, again appointed Rangi Lal to be arbitrator on their behalf.\n\nAfter the Appeal under the LE; tters Patent, was decided by the East Punjab High Court on December 16, 1953, the arbitrators entered upon the reference.\n\nOn March 1, 1954, the Agents submitted their claim, contending that the supplementary agreement dated June 20, 1942, was void and not binding upon them, and that, in any event, on the representations made on December 6, 1943, and from time to time thereafter, they were assured by the Chief Director of Purchases that the claim made by them would be favourably considered by the Government of India, and relying on these assurances, they continued to supply ghee in quantities demanded by the Government after incurring \"heavy extra expenditure\".\n\nThey also claimed that they were constantly demanding an increase in the mandi and financing charges, but the Chief Director of Purchases, who was duly authorized in that behalf by the Government, gave rRpcated verbal assurances that their demands would be satisfied, and requested them to continue supplies for the successful prosecution of the war. Contending\n\nthat the Government of India was estopped from z96u repudiating their claim set out in Schedules B and C, - · f 11 h f t d t d M/s. AlopiParshad • in view o a t e ac s an mrcums ances state in and Sons. Ltd. the petition, the Agents prayed for a declaration that v. the supplementary agreement dated June 20, 1942, The Union of India was void and not binding upon them, and for a decree for payment of Rs. 27,48,515 with interest at the rate Shah J. of 6 per cent. per annum from March 1, 1954, and, in the alternative, for a decree for Rs. 25,63,037-7-3, with interest at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum from March 1, 1954, till recovery. This claim of the Agents was resisted by the Government of India.\n\nInter alia, it was denied that any assurances were given by the Director of Purchases, or that the Agents continued to supply ghee relying upon such alleged assurances. It was asserted that the Agents continued to supply ghee without insisting upon any modification of the agreement, because they found, and it must be presumed that they found, it profitable to do so under the terms fixed under the supplementary contract dated June 20, 1942. The claims made for the additional buying remuneration, for mandi charges and for establishment and contingency charges, were denied. It was urged that, in any event, the claim for additional buying remuneration and for mandi charges and for reimbursement of establishment and contingencies, was not covered by cl. 20 of the agreement, under which the submission to arbitration was made, and the arbitrators had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon those claims. .\n\nOn the claim made by the Agents, and the denial thereof, the arbitrators incorporated the points of contest in the form of certain issues. On May 2, 1954, the arbitrators made an award rejecting the primary claim on the view that the supplementary agreement dated June 20, 1942, was for consideration and the same was valid and binding upon the Agents. On the alternative claim, they awarded, under the head of establishment and contingencies, Rs. 80,994-12-6, being the actual loss which, in their view, the Agents had suffered, and Rs. 11,27,965-11-3, in addition to the amounts received by the Agents from the Government\n\nI96o for mandi and financing charges. The arbitrators\n\nM Al-.\n\nP h daccordingly awarded an amount of Rs. 13,03,676-12-6\n\n:d ;:;, Z~ a with future interest from November 15, 1949, till the\n\nv. · date of realization, and costs.\n\nThe Union of India The award was filed in the court of the Commer-\n\nShah J. cial Subordinate Judge, Delhi, on June 2, 1954. The Government of India applied under ss. 30 and 33 of the Indian Arbitration Act, to set aside the award on the grounds that it was invalid, that it had been improperly procured, and that it was vitiated on account of judicial misconduct of the arbitrators.\n\nThe Commercial Subordinate Judge held that the arbitrators had committed an error apparent on the face of the award in ordering the Union to pay to the Agents additional remuneration and financing and overhead charges, but, in his view, specific questions having been expressly referred for adjudication to the arbitrators, the award was binding upon the parties and could not be set aside on the ground of an error apparent on the face thereof. The learned Judge, accordingly, rejected the application for setting aside the award.\n\nAgainst the order made by the Subordinate J udgc, an appeal was preferred by the Union of India to the High Court of East Punjab at Chandigarh. At the hearing of the appeal, counsel for the Agents sought to support the award on the plea that certain questions had been specifically referred to the arbitrators, and it was open to the arbitrators to make the award which they. made, on the basis of quantum meruit.\n\nThe High Court held that there was no specific reference of any questions of law to the arbitrators, and the decision of the arbitrators was not conclusive and was open to challenge, because it was vitiated by errors apparent on the face of the award. The High Court reversed the order passed by the Subordinate Judge, and set aside the award of the arbitrators, holding that there was no \"legal basis for awarding any compensation\" to the Agents for any loss which they might have sustained. This appeal has been filed with leave of the High Court under cl. 133 (l)(a) of the Constitution.\n\nThe extent of the jurisdiction of the court to set .r96o aside an award on the ground of an error in making M/ Al-p P , a ' ll d fi d Th d f b' s. 0 i arsiia ' the award is we - e ne . . ea war o an ar itrator and sons. Ltd. may be set aside on the ground of an error on the v. face thereof only when in the award or in any docu- The Union of India ment incorporated with it, as for instance, a note appended by the arbitrators, stating the reasons for his decision, there is found some legal proposition which is the basis of the award and which is erroneous-Champsey Bhara and Company v. Jivaraj Balloo Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited (1 ).\n\nIf, however, a specific question is submitted to the arbitrator and he answers it, the fact that the answer involves an erroneous decision in point of law, does not make the award bad on its face so as to permit of its being set aside-Jn the matter of an arbitration between King and Duveen and Others (2) and Government of Kelantan v. Duff Development Company Limited (3).\n\nWas the reference made by the parties to the arbitrators a specific reference, that is, a reference inviting the arbitrators to decide certain questions of law submitted to them? If the reference is of a specific question of law, even if the award is erroneous, the decision being of arbitrators selected by the parties to adjudicate upon those questions, the award will bind the parties. In the reference originally made to the arbitrators by the letter of the Agents on July 1, 1946, and the reply of the Government dated July 10,\n\n1946, a general reference of the dispute was made in terms of cl. 20 of the agreement. Even though the award made on that reference, was set aside by the Subordinate Judge, the arbitration was not superseded, and the reference was expressly kept alive, reserving an opportunity to the parties to appoint fresh arbitrators pursuant to the agreement, for settling the dispute; and by letters respectively dated August 2, 1952, and August 14, 1952, a general reference was again made to the arbitrators. Paragraph 14 of the letter written by the Agents on August 2, 1952, evidences an intention to serve the notice under cl. 2U\n\n(I) L.R. 50 I.A. 324.\n\n(2) L.R. (1913) 2 K.B.D. 32.\n\n(3) L.R. 1923 A.C. 395\n\nShah].\n\nz96o of the agreement. Issues were undoubtedly raised -.\n\nP h dby the arbitrators, but that was persumably to focus Mjs. Alop• ars a th t t• f h h t · £ and Sons. Ltd. e at en ion o t e parties on t e porn s ansmg or v. adjudication. The Agents had made their claim The Union of India before the arbitrators, and the claim and the jurisdiction of the arbitrators to adjudicate upon the claim, Shah f. were denied. The arbitrators were by the terms of reference only authorized to adjudicate upon the disputes raised.\n\nThere is no foundation for the view that a specific reference, submitting a question of law for the adjudication of the arbitrators, was made.\n\nWe agree, therefore, with the view of the High Court that the reference made, was a general reference and not a specific reference on any question of law.\n\nThe award may, therefore, be set aside if it be demonstrated to be erroneous on the fac.e of it.\n\nThe original agreement dated May 3, 1937, was modified by the supplementary agreement dated June 20, 1942, and the arbitrators have held that the modified agreement was binding upon the Agents.\n\nBy the agreement as modified, a graded scale was fixed for the establishment and the contingencies to be paid to the Agents, and also for the mandi charges and overhead expenses. The arbitrators still proceeded to award an additional amount for establishment and contingencies and an additional amount for mandi charges. By cl. 14(a), read with cl. 12(b) (2) of the agreement, the rate at which establishment and contingency charges were to be paid, was expressly stipulated, and there is no dispute that the Government of India have paid to the Agents those charges at the stipulated rate for ghee actually purchased.\n\nThe award of the arbitrators shows that the amount actually received from the Government, totalled Rs. 6,04, 700-9-0, whereas, according to the accounts maintained by the Agents, they had spent Rs. 6,77,542-0-3. Granting that the Agents had incurred this additional expenditure under the head 'establishment and contingencies', when the contract expressly stipulated for payment of charges at rates specified therein, we fail to appreciate on what ground the arbitrators could ignore the express\n\ncovenants between the parties, and award to the\n\nI960 Agents amounts which the Union of India had not u Az-p P h d ..1.n s. o i ars a agreed to pay to the Agents. The award of the and Sons. Ltd. arbitrators, awarding additional expenses under the ~. head of establishment and •contingencies, together The Union of India with interest thereon, is on the face of it erroneous.\n\nBefore the arbitrators, a number of arhatias, who supplied ghee to the Agents, appeared and produced extracts from their books, showing the amounts actually due to them from the latter. Detailed charts, showing the total amount due under each head of expenditure to each arhatia, were produced. The arbitrators were satisfied that the statements produced, reflected a general rise in prices and cost of labour.\n\nTaking into consideration the fact that the other persons were buying ghee at rates considerably in excess of the stipulated rates, the arbitrators held that the Agents were entitled to be reimbursed to the extent of Rs. 11,27,965-11-3. But the terms of the contract, stipulating the rate at which the financing and overhead charges were to be paid under cl. 13(a) read with cl. 12(b ), remained binding so long as the contract was not abandoned or altered by mutual agreement, and the arbitrators had no authority to award any amount in excess of the amount expressly stipulated to be paid. Mr. Chatterjee, on behalf of the Agents, submitted that the circumstances existing at the time when the terms of the contract were settled, were \"entirely displaced\" by reason of the commencement of hostilities in the Second World War, and the terms of the contract agreed upon in the light of circumstances existing in May, 1937, could not, in view of the turn of events which were never in the contemplation of the parties, rymain binding upon the Agents.\n\nThis argument is untrue in fact and unsupportable in law.\n\nThe contract was modified on June 20, 1942, by mutual consent, and the modification was made nearly three years after the commencement of the hostilities. The Agents were fully aware of the altered circumstances at the date when the modified schedule for payment of overhead charges, contingencies and buying remuneration, was agreed\n\nShah ].\n\nupon.\n\nAgain, a contract is not frustrated merely because the circumstances in which the contract was M /s. Aiopi Panhad made, are altered. and Sos. Ltd. . .\n\nIg6o\n\nSection 56 of the Indian Contract Act provides The Union of India that: '\n\nShah]. \" A contract to do an act which, after the contract is made, becomes impossible, or, by reason of some event which the promisor could not prevent, unlawful, becomes void when the act becomes impossible or unlawful.\"\n\nPerformance of the contract had not become impossible or unlawful; the contract was in fact performed by the Agents, and they have received remuneration expressly stipulated to be paid therein.\n\nThe Indian Contract Act does not enable a party to a contract to ignore the express covenants thereof, and to claim payment of consideration for performance of the contract at rates different from the stipulated rates, on some vague plea of equity. \"The parties to an executory contract are often faced, in the course of carrying it out, with a turn of events which they did not at all anticipate-a wholly abnormal rise or fall in prices, a sudden depreciation of currency, an unexpected obstacle to execution, or the like. Yet this does not in itself affect the bargain they have made. If, on the other hand, a consideration of the terms of the contract, in the light of the circumstances existing when it was made, shows that they never agreed to be bound in a fundamentally different situation which has now unexpectedly emerged, the contract ceases to bind at that point-not because the court in its discretion thinks it just and reasonable to qualify the terms of the contract, but because on its true construction it does not apply in that situation.\n\nWhen it is said that in such circumstances the court reaches a conclusion which is 'just and reasonable' (Lord Wright in Constantine's case (1 ) or one' which justice derriands' (Lord Sumner in H irji M ulji v.\n\nCheong Yue Steamship Co. Ltd. (2), this result is arrived at by putting a just construction upon the contract in accordance with an 'implication ............ from the\n\n(1) (1942) A.C. 154 186.\n\n(2) (1926) A.C. 497, 510,\n\npresumed common intention of the parties'-speech 1v6o of Lord Simon in British Movietonews Ltd. v. London and District Cinemas Ltd. (1 ).\n\nM /s. Alopi Parskad There is no general liberty reserved to the curts and Sons Ltd. to absolve a party from liability to perform his part The Uni;;, of India of the contract, merely because on account of an -- ;... uncontemplated turn of events, the performance of the Shah f. contract may become onerous. That is the law both\n\nin India and in England, and there is, in our opinion, no general rule to which recourse may be had, as\n\nontended by Mr. Chatterjee, relying upon which a party may ignore the express covenants on account of an uncontemplated turn of evel).ts since the date of the contract. Mr. Chatterjee strenuously contended that in England, a rule has in recent years been evolved which did not attach to contracts the same sanctity which the earlier decisions had attached, and in support of his contention, he relied upon the observations made in British M ovietonews Ld. v. London and District Cinemas Ld. ( 2 In that case, Denning, L, J., is reported to have observed:\n\n\" ............ no matter that a contract is framed in words which taken literally or absolutely, cover what has happened, nevertheless, if the ensuing turn of events _was so completely outside the contemplation of the parties that the court is satisfied that the parties, as reasonable people, cannot have intended that the contract should apply to the new situation, then the court will read the words of the. contract in a qualified sense ; it will restrict them to the circumstances contemplated by the parties; it will not apply them to the uncontemplated turn of events, but will do therein what is just and reasonable. \" - But the observations made by Denning, L.J., upon which reliance has been placed, proceeded substantially upon misapprehension of what was decided in Parkinson &: Go. Ld. v. Commissioner.$ of Works (3), on which the learned Lord Justice placed considerable reliance.\n\nThe view taken by him, was negatived in\n\n(1) L.R. 1952 A.C. '66 at pp. 185 & 186.\n\n(2) (1951) I KB.D. 190, 201,\n\n\\3) (1.~49) 2 I\\, B, D, 6~2,\n\nr96o appeal to the House of Lords in the British Movie- -- tonew's case-(1952) A.C. 166-already referred to. In M/o Afopi PanhadI d\" . th d\"fi d 1 f t t th . th\" a 5 ltd n ra, m eco 1 e aw o con rac s, ere1s no. mg an °;' · which justifies the view that a change of circum-\n\nThe Union of Tndia stances, \" completely outside the contemplation of\n\nparties\" at the time when the contract was entered Shah I into, will justify a court, while hol.ding the parties bound by the contract, in departing from the express terms thereof. Parkinson and Co. Ld. v. Commissioners of Works (1) was a case in which on the true interpretation of a contract, it was held, though it was not SQ expressly provided, that the profits of a private contractor, who had entered into a contract with the Commissioners of Works to make certain building constructions and such other additional constructions as may be demanded by the latter, were restricted to a fixed amount only if the additional quantity of work did not substantially exceed in value a specified sum.\n\nThe Court in that case held that a term must be implied in the contract that the Commissioners should not be entitled to require work materially in excess of the specified sum. In that case, the Court did not proceed upon any such general principle as was assumed by Denning, L.J., in the BritishMovietonews Ld. v. London and District Cinemas Ld. (2).\n\nWe are, therefore, unable to agree with the contention of Mr. Chatterjee that the arbitrators were justified in ignoring the express terms of the contract prescribing remuneration payable to the Agents, and in proceeding upon the basis of quantum meruit.\n\nRelying upon s. 222 of the Indian Contract Act, by which duty to indemnify the agent against the consequences of all lawful acts done in exercise of the authority conferred, is imposed upon the employer, the arbitrators could not award compensation to the agents in excess of the expressly stipulated consideration. The claim made by the Agents was not for indemnity for consequences of acts lawfully done by them on behalf of the Government of India; it was a claim for charges incurred by them in excess of those stipulated. Such a claim was not a claim for\n\n(') ('949) 2 KP.D. 632.\n\n(2) (19.!)I) I ICB.D. 190, 201,\n\n~ ...... -\n\n• -\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUH, T REPORTS 809\n\nindemnity, but a claim for enhancement of the rate of z96o the agreed consideration .. Assuming that the Agents M/ Al-. P h ,\n\nreied upon assurances alleged . to be given by the\n\n:a ;:s. \";,;/\"' Director in-charge of Purcha.ses, m the absence of an v. express covenant modifying the contract which The Union of India governed the relations of the Agents with the Government of India, vague assurances could not Shah J. modify the contract. Ghee having been supplied by the Agents under the terms of the contract, the right of the Agents was to receive remuneration uner the terms of that contract. It is. difficult to appreciate the argument advanced by Mr. Chatterjee that the Agents were entitled to claim remuneration at rates substantially different from the terms stipulated, on the basis of quantum meruit. Compensation quantum meruit is awarded for work done or services rendered,. when the price thereof is not fixed by a contract. For work done or services rendered pursuant to the terms of a contract, compensation quantum meruit cannot be awarded where the contract provides for the consideration payable in that behalf. Quantum meruit is but reasonable compensation awarded on implication of a contract to remunerate, and an express stipulation governing the relations between the parties under a contract, cannot be displaced by assuming that the stipulation is not reasonable. It is, therefore, unnecessary to consider the argument advanced by Mr.\n\nChatterjee that a claim for compensation on the basis of quantum meruit, is one which arises out of the agreement within the meaning of cl. 20. Granting that a claim for compensation on the basis of quantum meruit, may be adjudicated upon by the arbitrators in a reference made under cl. 20 of the agreement, in the circumstances of the case before us, compensation on that basis could not be claimed.\n\nThe plea that there was a bar of res judicata by reason of the decision in the Letters Patent Appeal No. 31of1953, has, in our judgment, no force.\n\nThe Subordinate Judge set aside the award on the ground that there had been judicial misconduct committed by the umpire and also on the view that the claims made, as described in Schedules B and D, were not outside\n\nr96o the competence of the arbitrators. The High Court ., Ai-r , din appeal under the Letters Patent, did confirm the\n\n\"\"/S. opi arsna d , 'd h d b t th a?td sans. Ltd. or er, setting as1 e t e awar ; u ere was no v. binding decision between the parties that the claim The Union of Iudia described in Sch. B, that is, the claim for establish-\n\nShah J.\n\nJanuary 2I\n\nment and contingency charges, was within the competence of the arbitrators in reference under cl. 20.\n\nIt may be observed that according to the High Court\n\nof East Punjab in the Appeal No. 31 of 1953, under the Letters Patent, it was not necessary to express any opinion whether the claim in Sch. U was within the competence of the arbitrators, and the claims described in Sch.]) does not appear to have been agitated in the second arbitration proceeding.\n\nWe, accordingly, agree with the view of the High .Court that the Award of the arbitrators was liable to be set aside because of an error apparent on the face of the award. In this view, the appeal fails and\n\ni~ dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed,.\n\nCHAMPALAL\n\nMST. SAMARATH BAI\n\n(JAFER IMAM, J. L. KAPUR AND K. SUBBA RAO, JJ.)\n\nArbitration-Award, Registration of-Power of court to extend time for filing-The Arbitration Act, 1940 (X of 1940), s. 14(2)- Jndian Ncgistration Act, (XV I of 1908), ss. 17, 49-Indian Limitation Act, (J X of 1908), Art. 178-Jndian Succession Act, 1925 (XXXIX of 1925), s. 192.\n\nBy means of a will the respondent's husband authorised her to adopt the appellant, and the will was duly registered after the death of the testator. The relevant portion of the will ran thus:-\n\n\"Under this will, I am authorising the said Champalal Ishv,:ardas to execute the same.\n\nI have appointed him the executor of this will.\n\nUnder the said will the said Champalal alone shall be the full O\\vner of my entire rnovable and immoveable property and the executor of. the will after my", "total_entities": 103, "entities": [{"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 77, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "clearly stated that the Central Government considered z960 it against public interest to disclose to the petitioner 1 h 5 , ."}}, {"text": "him The Union of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 285, "end_char": 307, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE UNION OF INDIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 22(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 393, "end_char": 403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. ALOPI PARSHAD & SONS, LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1254, "end_char": 1282, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M/s. ALOPI PARSHAD & SONS, LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. K. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1309, "end_char": 1318, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.K. DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1342, "end_char": 1354, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "June 20, 1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1949, "end_char": 1962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the outbreak of the World War II there was an enormous increase in the demand of ghee by the Government and the agreement was revised by mutual consent on June 20, 1942, and the original rates of payment were scaled down."}}, {"text": "December 6, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2020, "end_char": 2036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 6, 1943, the appellants made a representation to the Government for enhancing, the rates as conditions had become\n\nI960\n\nJanuary 20."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2516, "end_char": 2530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government did not enhance the The Union of India rates and the matter \\Vas referred to arbitration under the agreement of 1937 Before the arbitrators the appellants contended that the agreement of 1942 was not binding upon them and claimed payment on the basis of the agreement of r937; and in the alternative claimed payment on the basis of increased rates of mandi charges, additional buying remuneration and contingency charges.", "canonical_name": "Union of India"}}, {"text": "May 2, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3142, "end_char": 3153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an award dated May 2, 1954, the arbitrators rejected the primary claim of the appellant holding that the agreement of r942 was binding."}}, {"text": "Commercial Sub-Judge, Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3489, "end_char": 3516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The award was filled in the Court of the Commercial Sub-Judge, Delhi, and the Government applied to have it set aside."}}, {"text": "L. R. 50 I. A. 324", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4804, "end_char": 4822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "N. 0. Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6622, "end_char": 6638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. 0."}}, {"text": "S. K. Kapur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6640, "end_char": 6651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chatterjee, S. K. Kapur, N. H. Hingorani and Ganpat Rai, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "N. H. Hingorani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6653, "end_char": 6668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chatterjee, S. K. Kapur, N. H. Hingorani and Ganpat Rai, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6673, "end_char": 6683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chatterjee, S. K. Kapur, N. H. Hingorani and Ganpat Rai, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "H. J. Umrigar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6706, "end_char": 6719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. J. Umrigar and T. M. Sen, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "T. M. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6724, "end_char": 6733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. J. Umrigar and T. M. Sen, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6818, "end_char": 6822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHAH J.-On May 3, 1937, M/s. Alopi Parshad and Sons Ltd., who will herinafter be referred to as the Agents, were, under an agreement in writing, appointed by the Governor-General for India in Council, as from October 1, 1937, agents for purchasing ghee required for the use of the Army personnel.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "Alopi Parshad and Sons Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6847, "end_char": 6874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHAH J.-On May 3, 1937, M/s. Alopi Parshad and Sons Ltd., who will herinafter be referred to as the Agents, were, under an agreement in writing, appointed by the Governor-General for India in Council, as from October 1, 1937, agents for purchasing ghee required for the use of the Army personnel."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7001, "end_char": 7006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHAH J.-On May 3, 1937, M/s. Alopi Parshad and Sons Ltd., who will herinafter be referred to as the Agents, were, under an agreement in writing, appointed by the Governor-General for India in Council, as from October 1, 1937, agents for purchasing ghee required for the use of the Army personnel."}}, {"text": "October 1, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7027, "end_char": 7042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSHAH J.-On May 3, 1937, M/s. Alopi Parshad and Sons Ltd., who will herinafter be referred to as the Agents, were, under an agreement in writing, appointed by the Governor-General for India in Council, as from October 1, 1937, agents for purchasing ghee required for the use of the Army personnel."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7119, "end_char": 7138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of India, by cl."}}, {"text": "cl. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7143, "end_char": 7149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7427, "end_char": 7433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12 of the agreement, undertook to pay to the Agents the actual expenses incurred for purchasing ghee, cost of empty tins, expenses incurred on clearance ; of Government tins from the railway, export ]and-customs duty levied on ghee purchased and exported from markets situated in Indian States, octroi duty, terminal tax or other local rates on ghee, and certain other charges incurred\n\nShah]."}}, {"text": "cl. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8199, "end_char": 8205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8416, "end_char": 8422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 11, 1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10077, "end_char": 10095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This modification in the rates became effective from Shah J.\n\nSeptember 11, 1940."}}, {"text": "May 17, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10825, "end_char": 10837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 17, 1945, the Government of India, purporting to exercise their option under cl."}}, {"text": "cl. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10906, "end_char": 10911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 22; 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10998, "end_char": 11010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 22; 1945, the Chief Director of Purchases, on behalf of the Government of India, replied to the letter dated December 6, 1943, and informed the Agents that normally no claim for revision of rates could be entertained during the currency of the agreement an<) especially with retrospective effect, but a claim for ex-gratia compensation to meet any actual loss suffered by an agent, might be entertained, if the Agents established circumstances justifying such a claim."}}, {"text": "October 31, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11856, "end_char": 11872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The notice dated May 17, 1945, was waived by mutual consent, and under an arrangement dated May It), 19461 the Agents agreed to supply five\n\nr96o thousand tons of ghee by October 31, 1946, on which\n\nM Al--:-P h ddate, the agreement dated May 3, 1937, was to come fs."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12042, "end_char": 12056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd. to an en °\n\nBy their letter dated July 1, 1946, the Agents The Union of India claimed that a dispute had arisen under the contract, and app0inted one Nigam to be arbitrator on their Shah .J. behalf to adjudicate upon the dispute, pursuant to\n\ncl.", "canonical_name": "Union of India"}}, {"text": "Nigam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12129, "end_char": 12134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd. to an en °\n\nBy their letter dated July 1, 1946, the Agents The Union of India claimed that a dispute had arisen under the contract, and app0inted one Nigam to be arbitrator on their Shah .J. behalf to adjudicate upon the dispute, pursuant to\n\ncl."}}, {"text": "cl. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12222, "end_char": 12228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rangi Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12423, "end_char": 12432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of India, by their letter dated July 10, 1946, nominated one Rangi Lal to be arbitrator on their behalf."}}, {"text": "May 3, 1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12795, "end_char": 12806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "23,08,372-8-0 being the difference between the buying remuneration, establishment and contingency charges due under the agreement dated May 3, 1937, and the amount actually received."}}, {"text": "Lala Achru Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13542, "end_char": 13556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.\n\nThe arbitrators did not arrive at any agreed decision, and the dispute was referred to Lala Achru Ram who was nominated an umpire."}}, {"text": "Alopi Parshad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14004, "end_char": 14017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s. Alopi Parshad This Award was filed in the court of the Suborand Sans.", "canonical_name": "Alopi Parshad"}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14254, "end_char": 14258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Agents applied v. to set aside the Award on the grounds that the The Union of India umpire was guilty of misconduct in that he failed to Shah J. give an adequate opportunity to the Agents to present and substantiate their case before him, and that in holding that the claims as described in Schedules B, C and D, either did not arise out of the agreement or were outside the scope of the Reference, the umpire erred.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "cl. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15182, "end_char": 15188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of East Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15314, "end_char": 15339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against the order of the Subordinate Judge, the Union of India appealed to the High Court of East Punjab."}}, {"text": "Khosla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15341, "end_char": 15347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Khosla, J., who heard the appeal, confirmed the order passed by the court of first instance."}}, {"text": "August 2, l 952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16502, "end_char": 16517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime, by letter dated August 2, l 952, the Agents called upon the Government of India to appoint their arbitrator under cl: 20 of the agreement dated May 3, 1937, for a fresh adjudication of the dispute, and intimated that they had again appointed Nigam to be their arbitrator."}}, {"text": "August 14, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16824, "end_char": 16839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of India informed the Agents by their letter dated August 14, 1952, that they had filed an appeal against the judgment of the Subordinate Judge, Delhi, and in the circumstances, the question of appointing an arbitrator, did not arise until the final disposal of the appeal."}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge, Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16899, "end_char": 16923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of India informed the Agents by their letter dated August 14, 1952, that they had filed an appeal against the judgment of the Subordinate Judge, Delhi, and in the circumstances, the question of appointing an arbitrator, did not arise until the final disposal of the appeal."}}, {"text": "East Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17277, "end_char": 17299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the Appeal under the LE; tters Patent, was decided by the East Punjab High Court on December 16, 1953, the arbitrators entered upon the reference."}}, {"text": "December 16, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17303, "end_char": 17320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the Appeal under the LE; tters Patent, was decided by the East Punjab High Court on December 16, 1953, the arbitrators entered upon the reference."}}, {"text": "March 1, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17370, "end_char": 17383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 1, 1954, the Agents submitted their claim, contending that the supplementary agreement dated June 20, 1942, was void and not binding upon them, and that, in any event, on the representations made on December 6, 1943, and from time to time thereafter, they were assured by the Chief Director of Purchases that the claim made by them would be favourably considered by the Government of India, and relying on these assurances, they continued to supply ghee in quantities demanded by the Government after incurring \"heavy extra expenditure\"."}}, {"text": "AlopiParshad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18410, "end_char": 18422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Contending\n\nthat the Government of India was estopped from z96u repudiating their claim set out in Schedules B and C, - · f 11 h f t d t d M/s. AlopiParshad • in view o a t e ac s an mrcums ances state in and Sons.", "canonical_name": "Alopi Parshad"}}, {"text": "cl. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19742, "end_char": 19748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shah J. cial", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20815, "end_char": 20827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union of India The award was filed in the court of the Commer-\n\nShah J. cial Subordinate Judge, Delhi, on June 2, 1954."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20875, "end_char": 20894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of India applied under ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 30 and 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20909, "end_char": 20922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of East Punjab at Chandigarh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21767, "end_char": 21806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against the order made by the Subordinate J udgc, an appeal was preferred by the Union of India to the High Court of East Punjab at Chandigarh."}}, {"text": "cl. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22634, "end_char": 22641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22815, "end_char": 22819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "King", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23596, "end_char": 23600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If, however, a specific question is submitted to the arbitrator and he answers it, the fact that the answer involves an erroneous decision in point of law, does not make the award bad on its face so as to permit of its being set aside-Jn the matter of an arbitration between King and Duveen and Others (2) and Government of Kelantan v. Duff Development Company Limited (3)."}}, {"text": "Duveen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23605, "end_char": 23611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If, however, a specific question is submitted to the arbitrator and he answers it, the fact that the answer involves an erroneous decision in point of law, does not make the award bad on its face so as to permit of its being set aside-Jn the matter of an arbitration between King and Duveen and Others (2) and Government of Kelantan v. Duff Development Company Limited (3)."}}, {"text": "July 1, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24168, "end_char": 24180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the reference originally made to the arbitrators by the letter of the Agents on July 1, 1946, and the reply of the Government dated July 10,\n\n1946, a general reference of the dispute was made in terms of cl."}}, {"text": "July 10,\n\n1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24220, "end_char": 24234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the reference originally made to the arbitrators by the letter of the Agents on July 1, 1946, and the reply of the Government dated July 10,\n\n1946, a general reference of the dispute was made in terms of cl."}}, {"text": "cl. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24292, "end_char": 24298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "August 2, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24639, "end_char": 24653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even though the award made on that reference, was set aside by the Subordinate Judge, the arbitration was not superseded, and the reference was expressly kept alive, reserving an opportunity to the parties to appoint fresh arbitrators pursuant to the agreement, for settling the dispute; and by letters respectively dated August 2, 1952, and August 14, 1952, a general reference was again made to the arbitrators."}}, {"text": "cl. 2U", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24848, "end_char": 24854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "L.R. 50 I.A. 324", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 24860, "end_char": 24876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25334, "end_char": 25338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Agents had made their claim The Union of India before the arbitrators, and the claim and the jurisdiction of the arbitrators to adjudicate upon the claim, Shah f. were denied.", "canonical_name": "SHAH"}}, {"text": "cl. 14(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26376, "end_char": 26385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 12(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26397, "end_char": 26406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 13(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28312, "end_char": 28321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 12(b )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28332, "end_char": 28342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28553, "end_char": 28563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Chatterjee, on behalf of the Agents, submitted that the circumstances existing at the time when the terms of the contract were settled, were \"entirely displaced\" by reason of the commencement of hostilities in the Second World War, and the terms of the contract agreed upon in the light of circumstances existing in May, 1937, could not, in view of the turn of events which were never in the contemplation of the parties, rymain binding upon the Agents."}}, {"text": "Section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29576, "end_char": 29586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29594, "end_char": 29613, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30074, "end_char": 30093, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Wright", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31239, "end_char": 31245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When it is said that in such circumstances the court reaches a conclusion which is 'just and reasonable' (Lord Wright in Constantine's case (1 ) or one' which justice derriands' (Lord Sumner in H irji M ulji v.\n\nCheong Yue Steamship Co. Ltd. (2), this result is arrived at by putting a just construction upon the contract in accordance with an 'implication ............ from the\n\n(1) (1942) A.C. 154 186."}}, {"text": "Constantine", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31249, "end_char": 31260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When it is said that in such circumstances the court reaches a conclusion which is 'just and reasonable' (Lord Wright in Constantine's case (1 ) or one' which justice derriands' (Lord Sumner in H irji M ulji v.\n\nCheong Yue Steamship Co. Ltd. (2), this result is arrived at by putting a just construction upon the contract in accordance with an 'implication ............ from the\n\n(1) (1942) A.C. 154 186."}}, {"text": "Sumner", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31312, "end_char": 31318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When it is said that in such circumstances the court reaches a conclusion which is 'just and reasonable' (Lord Wright in Constantine's case (1 ) or one' which justice derriands' (Lord Sumner in H irji M ulji v.\n\nCheong Yue Steamship Co. Ltd. (2), this result is arrived at by putting a just construction upon the contract in accordance with an 'implication ............ from the\n\n(1) (1942) A.C. 154 186."}}, {"text": "Simon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31623, "end_char": 31628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) (1926) A.C. 497, 510,\n\npresumed common intention of the parties'-speech 1v6o of Lord Simon in British Movietonews Ltd. v. London and District Cinemas Ltd. (1 )."}}, {"text": "Alopi Parskad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31706, "end_char": 31719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Alopi Parskad There is no general liberty reserved to the curts and Sons Ltd. to absolve a party from liability to perform his part The Uni;;, of India of the contract, merely because on account of an -- ;... uncontemplated turn of events, the performance of the Shah f. contract may become onerous.", "canonical_name": "Alopi Parshad"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 32044, "end_char": 32051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is the law both\n\nin India and in England, and there is, in our opinion, no general rule to which recourse may be had, as\n\nontended by Mr. Chatterjee, relying upon which a party may ignore the express covenants on account of an uncontemplated turn of evel).ts since the date of the contract."}}, {"text": "Denning", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32642, "end_char": 32649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 In that case, Denning, L, J., is reported to have observed:\n\n\" ............ no matter that a contract is framed in words which taken literally or absolutely, cover what has happened, nevertheless, if the ensuing turn of events _was so completely outside the contemplation of the parties that the court is satisfied that the parties, as reasonable people, cannot have intended that the contract should apply to the new situation, then the court will read the words of the."}}, {"text": "Parkinson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33467, "end_char": 33476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the observations made by Denning, L.J., upon which reliance has been placed, proceeded substantially upon misapprehension of what was decided in Parkinson &: Go."}}, {"text": "Union of Tndia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34007, "end_char": 34021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "mg an °;' · which justifies the view that a change of circum-\n\nThe Union of Tndia stances, \" completely outside the contemplation of\n\nparties\" at the time when the contract was entered Shah I into, will justify a court, while hol.ding the parties bound by the contract, in departing from the express terms thereof.", "canonical_name": "Union of India"}}, {"text": "s. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35394, "end_char": 35400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35408, "end_char": 35427, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "cl. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37653, "end_char": 37659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37801, "end_char": 37807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38743, "end_char": 38749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court\n\nof East Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 38793, "end_char": 38819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be observed that according to the High Court\n\nof East Punjab in the Appeal No."}}, {"text": "CHAMPALAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 39360, "end_char": 39369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CHAMPALAL\n\nMST."}}, {"text": "SAMARATH BAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 39376, "end_char": 39388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SAMARATH BAI\n\n(JAFER IMAM, J. L. KAPUR AND K. SUBBA RAO, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "JAFER IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 39391, "end_char": 39401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SAMARATH BAI\n\n(JAFER IMAM, J. L. KAPUR AND K. SUBBA RAO, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "L. KAPUR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 39406, "end_char": 39414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SAMARATH BAI\n\n(JAFER IMAM, J. L. KAPUR AND K. SUBBA RAO, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 39419, "end_char": 39431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SAMARATH BAI\n\n(JAFER IMAM, J. L. KAPUR AND K. SUBBA RAO, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Registration of-Power of court to extend time for filing-The Arbitration Act, 1940", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39458, "end_char": 39540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 14(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39554, "end_char": 39562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Registration of-Power of court to extend time for filing-The Arbitration Act, 1940", "statute": "Registration of-Power of court to extend time for filing-The Arbitration Act, 1940"}}, {"text": "Jndian Ncgistration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39564, "end_char": 39587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 17, 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39605, "end_char": 39615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jndian Ncgistration Act", "statute": "Jndian Ncgistration Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39616, "end_char": 39637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39654, "end_char": 39662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Limitation Act", "statute": "Indian Limitation Act"}}, {"text": "Jndian Succession Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39663, "end_char": 39690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 192", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39708, "end_char": 39714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jndian Succession Act, 1925", "statute": "Jndian Succession Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "Champalal Ishv,:ardas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39955, "end_char": 39976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant portion of the will ran thus:-\n\n\"Under this will, I am authorising the said Champalal Ishv,:ardas to execute the same."}}]} {"document_id": "1960_2_810_820_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(2)]\n\nr96o the competence of the arbitrators. The High Court ., Ai-r , din appeal under the Letters Patent, did confirm the\n\n\"\"/S. opi arsna d , 'd h d b t th a?td sans. Ltd. or er, setting as1 e t e awar ; u ere was no v. binding decision between the parties that the claim The Union of Iudia described in Sch. B, that is, the claim for establish-\n\nShah J.\n\nJanuary 2I\n\nment and contingency charges, was within the competence of the arbitrators in reference under cl. 20.\n\nIt may be observed that according to the High Court\n\nof East Punjab in the Appeal No. 31 of 1953, under the Letters Patent, it was not necessary to express any opinion whether the claim in Sch. U was within the competence of the arbitrators, and the claims described in Sch.]) does not appear to have been agitated in the second arbitration proceeding.\n\nWe, accordingly, agree with the view of the High .Court that the Award of the arbitrators was liable to be set aside because of an error apparent on the face of the award. In this view, the appeal fails and\n\ni~ dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed,.\n\nCHAMPALAL\n\nMST. SAMARATH BAI\n\n(JAFER IMAM, J. L. KAPUR AND K. SUBBA RAO, JJ.)\n\nArbitration-Award, Registration of-Power of court to extend time for filing-The Arbitration Act, 1940 (X of 1940), s. 14(2)- Jndian Ncgistration Act, (XV I of 1908), ss. 17, 49-Indian Limitation Act, (J X of 1908), Art. 178-Jndian Succession Act, 1925 (XXXIX of 1925), s. 192.\n\nBy means of a will the respondent's husband authorised her to adopt the appellant, and the will was duly registered after the death of the testator. The relevant portion of the will ran thus:-\n\n\"Under this will, I am authorising the said Champalal Ishv,:ardas to execute the same.\n\nI have appointed him the executor of this will.\n\nUnder the said will the said Champalal alone shall be the full O\\vner of my entire rnovable and immoveable property and the executor of. the will after my\n\ndeath if I adopt him during my lifetime or even if my wife r960 adopts him (after my death).\"\n\nChampa/al The appellant applied for appointment of a curator under v. s. 192 of the Succession Act but subsequently the parties entered Mst. Samarath Bai into an agreement for arbitration in the matter. Three arbitrators were appointed and the time for making the award was extended by the Court on their application. The arbitration agreement stated that the arbitrators had to decide what should be the respective rights of the parties in the estate in case the respondent adopted the appellant. An award was made and filed in Court by the arbitrators to the effect that the respondent should adopt the appellant according to Hindu Law within four months failing which the appellant would be heir and executor of the entire property of the deceased and the respondent would be entitled to a maintenance of Rs. zoo per mensem.\n\nBut if in spite of the respondent's readiness to adopt, the appellant refused to be adopted within four months, he would not have any right in the property nor would he be the executor.\n\nThe award was at first unregistered and on being returned it was subsequently registered and refiled in Court. The attorney of two of the arbitrators furnished to the Sub-Registrar a list of the property covered by the award. The proceedings under the Succession Act and the Arbitration Act were then separated. The respondent made an application under s. 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, and the appellant applied for setting aside the award. The Court passed a decree in terms of the award. The High Court on appeal by the appellant .upheld the award.\n\nOn appeal by a certificate of the High Court the appellant contended that being an executor he could not refer the matter to arbitration,· that the award was not filed within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act, that it was not registered according to law, that the First Additional Judge had no jurisdiction to extend time for making the award, that the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct and the award was in excess of the power given to them and that even if the awarci\"was proper and legal the respond'\"nt having refused to adopt the appellant the decree should have been as provided by the award on the happening of tlile contingency and the Court passing the decree had no jurisdiction to take subsequent events into consideration.\n\nHeld, that the filing of the award by the arbitrators after notice to the parties was not barred by limitation as Art. 178 of the Limitation Act applied to applications made by the parties and not to the filing of the award by the arbitrators.\n\nThe award required registration but the filing of an un-· registered award under s. 49 of the Registration Act was not prohibited; what was prohibited was that it could not be taken into evidence so as to affect immoveable property falling under s. 17 of the Act.\n\nChampalal\n\n812 SUPREME lJOURT REPORTS [1960(2)]\n\nThe Court had jurisdiction to entertain the application for filing the award and to extend time for filing it.\n\nBy the will the appellant could not get the property of the Mst. Samarath Bai testator nor \\Vas he constituted an executor except in the event of his being adopted and therefore he could enter into the arbitration agreement.\n\nKapur].\n\nThe agreement for arbitration having specifically stated that the consequences of adoption or non-adoption \\Vere to be decided by the arbitrators, they rightly laid down what was to happen if the adoption did not take place owing to the default of either party, imposing a time limit was implicit in the terms of the agreement and their award \\Vas not in excess of the power given to them by the arbitration agreement.\n\nThe award could not be treated as having perverted the line of succession by merely stating that if the adoption did not take place the respondent would receive l: share of the testator's property and it would form her stridhan.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 34 of 1956.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated February 19, 1954 of the former Nagpur High Court, in Misc. Appeal No. 164 of 1949, arising out of the judgment and decree dated November 22, 1949, of the First Additional District Judge, Akola, in Civil Suit No. 12-A of 1948.\n\n0. B. Agarwala and GanpaJ; Rai, for the appellant.\n\nS. K. Kapur and B. P. Maheshwari, for the respondent.\n\n1960. January, 21. The Judgmentof the Court was delivered by\n\nKAPUR J.-This is an appeal against the judgment and order of the Nagpur High Court and arises out of proceedings under the Indian Arbitration Act.\n\nThe appellant in this case is Champalal and the respondent is Samarath Bai, the widow of Lal Chand.\n\nThe parties who are Jains belong to Balapur in the district of Akola in the previous State of Madhya Pradesh. The relationship of the parties is shown by the following pedigree table : ·\n\nI Nanak Chand\n\nI Bulakhidas= Jivanbai\n\nI Babibai= Rasiklal\n\nPhool Chand\n\nI I I Khushal Chand Sundarlal I Lalchand= Samarathbai\n\nI Ishwardas ·\n\nI Champalal\n\nI Sakarchand\n\nI Ratanbai= Vijay Kumar\n\nI Bag la!\n\nI I I Vinaychand\n\nI Deolal\n\nI I\n\nI I\n\nI Digamber Das\n\nI Vimalchand\n\nOn September 14, 1944, Lal Chand made a will by which he authorized his wife Samarath Bai to adopt Champalal and made certain disposition of his property. Lal Chand died on September 26, 1944.\n\nOn October 20, 1944, the appellant made an application under s. 192 of the Succession Act to the First Additional District Judge of Akola for the appointment of a Curator. This was Misc. J udl. No. 3 of 1944.\n\nNotices were issued to the respondent, Samarath Bai and her daughters. The will was registered on December 2!J, 1944. On January 10, 1945, an arbitration agreement was entered into between the appellant and the respondent and on January 16, 1945, both parties applied for stay of proceedings in the case (Misc. Judi.\n\nNo. 3of1944) and the case was adjourned to March 28, 1945, and then was adjourned to June 18, 1945. On that date the arbitrators made an application to the First Additional District Judge for extension of time for four months for making the award. This application was opposed by the appellant but the court gave three months' time on July 26, 1946. The award was made on October 18, 1946. On October 21, it was filed by the arbitrators in the court of the First Additiona.l Di,; trict Judge who on October 30, gave to the parties ten days' time for objections, On November 15~\n\nChampa I al v.\n\nMst. Samarath /la1\n\nKapu1 J.\n\nSUPREME COURT.REPORTS [1960(2))\n\n'96° 1946, the appellant filed objections to the award and on January 31, 1947, the respondent applied for a Champalal f v. judgment in terms o the award and for a decree . • VI st. Samaratk Bai The award was unregistered and therefore at the request of the respondent it was handed over for Kapur J. getting it registered to Mithulal who was an attorney of two of the arbitrators Magandas and Sakarchand.\n\nOn February 7, 1947, he presented it for registration to the Sub-Registrar but the Sub-Registrar returned it as it was not accompanied by a list and particulars of the property covered by the award. On February 15, 1947, the list and particulars signed by Mithulal were supplied and the award was represented for registration by Mithulal. As he was an attorney of only two of the three arbitrators the Sub-Registrar registered the document on March 26, 1947, in regard to said arbitrators and refused it qua the third arbitrator, Bhogilal. But under the orders of the Registrar the document was registered in regard to Bhogilal also and it was refiled on July 21, 1948, in the Court of the First Additional District Judge. He ordered the two proceedings one under s. 192 of the Succession Act and the other under the Arbitration Act to be separated and the proceedings under the Arbitration Act were ordered to be registered as a suit on August 14, 1948, and on August 30, the court ordered a proper application as required under the High Court Rules to be filed. On September 15, 1948, an application under s. 14(2) of the Arbitration Act was filed.\n\nOn October 14, 1948, the appellant filed an application for setting aside the award and therein raised various objections which were rejected and on November 22, 1949, a judgment was passed. in accordance with the terms of the award followed by a decree.\n\nAgainst this order the appellant took an appeal to the High Court which was dismissed on February Hl, 1954.\n\nThe High Court held that the application filed by the respondent dated September 15, 1948, under s. 14(2) of the Arbitration Act was not within time but the original application filed by the arbitrators on October 21, 1946, was within time; that no objection could be taken to the award on the ground that\n\nthere were two awards one by ; he arbitrators and 1 ~6° the other by Mithulal who had added to the award by giving the list and particulars; that the First . Cha.;:alat . Additional District Judge was authorised to extend Mst. samarath Bai time for making an award on the application of the arbitrators and he was properly seized of the case ; Kapur J. that no misconduct had been proved and that no illegality had been established and that the appellant : did not get anything under the will except on adoption nor was he until then constituted an executor.\n\nAgainst this judgment this appeal has been filed on a certificate by the High Court.\n\nIn appeal before us counsel for the appellant raised six points: (I) the filing of the award was not within time as no application was made under s. 14 within the time allowed by the Limitation Act; (2) that the award required registration and was not registered in accordance with law and the mere fact that it was registered does not clothe it with legality ; (3) the :First Additional District Judge had no jurisdiction to grant three months' extension of time to the arbitrators for . making the award which was granted on July 26, 1946; (4) that the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct; (5) that the award is in excess of the power given to the arbitrators under the agreement of arbitration and (6) even ifthe award was proper and legal the respondent had refused to adopt the appellant and therefore the decree should have been as provided by the award on the happening of that contingency and in the alternative the First Additional District Judge who passed the decree had no jurisdiction to take.subsequent events into consideration.\n\nIn our opinion points nos. I, 2 and 3 are wholly without substance. The award was made on October 18, 1946, and the arbitrators filed it in the court of the First Additional District Judge and they also gave notice to the parties by registered post informing them of the making of the award. It has not been shown as to how the filing of the award is barred by limitation.\n\nArticle 178 of the Limitation Act which was\n\nI Of\n\nr9o relied upon by the appellant applies to applications made by the parties and not to the filing of the award Cha1npalal\n\nv. by the arbitrators.\n\nMst. Samarath Bai The second question that the award required registration and could not bet filed by the arbitrators T ---\n\n'prize competition' as defined in S; 2(d) of the Act\n\nI960 included those in whi9h success depended to a The superintendent substantial degree on skill as well as those in which it central Prison ' did not so depend, this Court elaborately considered Fatehgurh the doctrine of severability and laid down as many v. as seven rules of construction. On the application of Ram Manohar\n\nLakia the said rules it was held that the impugned provisions were severable in their application to competitions in which success did not depend to any Subba Rao f. substantial degree on skill.\n\nThe foregoing discussion yields the following results: (I) \"Public order\" is synonymous with public safety and tranquillity : it is the absence of disorder involving breaches of local significance in contradistinction to national upheavals, such as revolution, civil strife, war, affecting the security of the State ; (2) there must be proximate and / reasonable nexus between the speech and the public order; (3) s. 3, as it now stands, does not establish in most of the cases comprehended by it any such nexus; (4) there is a conflict of decision on the question of severability in the context of an offending provision the language whereof is wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without the limits of constitutionally permissible legislation; one view is that it cannot be split up if there is possibility of its being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Oonstituti®n and the other view is that such a provision is valid if it is severable in its application to an object which is clearly demarcated from other object or objects falling outside the limits of constitutionally permissible legislation; and (5) the provisions of the section are so inextricably mixed up that it is not possible to apply the doctrine of severability so as to enable us to affirm the validity of a part of it and reject the rest.\n\nIt is not necessary in this case to express our preference for one or other of the foregoing decisions.\n\nAssuming that the summary of the rules of construction given in the last of the cases cited supra are correct and exhaustive, we are not satisfied that in the instant case the impugned section with the\n\n.t97\n\n840 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [HlliO (2)]\n\nI9~0 omissions suggested by the learned Advocate General --:- could, wholly or to any extent, be salvag('d. The The Sapmntendent, d f th t\" \"th ti t d · Central Prison wor s o e sec ion WI 1e sugges e om1ss1ons Fafohgarh continue to suffer from the same vice they are v. subjected to without the said omissions, The\n\nRam Manohar suggested omissions from the section only exclude r.ohia individuals from the operation of the section and confine it to a class of persons and in other respects Subba Rao J, it is not freed from the defects already pointed out by us. In R. M. D. Chamarbaugwalla's Case (1) the difference between two classes of competitions, namely, those that are of gambling nature and t.11ose in which success depends on skill, is clear-cut and has long been recognized in legislative practice. Rut in the present case it is not even possible to predicate with some kind of precision the different categories of instigation falling within or without the field of constitutional prohibitions.\n\nThe constitutional validity of a section cannot be made to depend upon such an uncertain factor. Whether the principle of the first two decisions is applied or that of the third is invoked, the constitutional validity of the section cannot be sustained.\n\nWe, therefore, hold that s. 3 of the Act is void as infringing Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The entire section therefore must be struck down as invalid.\n\nIf so, the prosecution of the respondent under that section is void.\n\nThe learned Advocate General made an impassioned appeal to persuade us to express our view that though the present section is void on the ground that it is an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right, in the interests of public order the State could legitimately re-draft it in a. way that it would conform to the provisions of Art. 19(2) of the Constitution. It is.not this Court's province to express or give advice or make general observations on situations that a.re not presented to it in a particular case. It is always open to the State to make snch reasonable rcstrictiolls which are permissible under Art. 19(2) of the Constitution.\n\nIn the result, the appEial is dismissed.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n(1) [1957] s.c.R. 930.", "total_entities": 131, "entities": [{"text": "821\n\nTHE SUPER.INTENDENT, CENTR.AL PR.ISON,\n\nFATEHGARE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 88, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE SUPERINTENDENT, CENTR.AL PRISON, FATEHGARH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAM MANOHAR. LORIA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 90, "end_char": 108, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Ram Manohar Fazl Ali", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 128, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 130, "end_char": 149, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SuBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 151, "end_char": 163, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K.C. DAs GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 165, "end_char": 179, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. SHAH, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 186, "end_char": 198, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.C. SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 405, "end_char": 426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Special Powers Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 457, "end_char": 475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 501, "end_char": 505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special Powers Act", "statute": "Special Powers Act"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 508, "end_char": 517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special Powers Act", "statute": "Special Powers Act"}}, {"text": "Special Powers Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 530, "end_char": 554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1478, "end_char": 1488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special Powers Act, 1932", "statute": "Special Powers Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1795, "end_char": 1805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1905, "end_char": 1915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. 296", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2636, "end_char": 2642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 2c.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2662, "end_char": 2673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I960\n\nJanuary 2c."}}, {"text": "Art. 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3210, "end_char": 3220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3518, "end_char": 3522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3733, "end_char": 3743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "K. L. Misra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5331, "end_char": 5342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. L. Misra, Advocate-General for the State of Uttar Ig6o Pradesh."}}, {"text": "G. C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5398, "end_char": 5410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. C. Mathur and 0."}}, {"text": ". P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5416, "end_char": 5424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. C. Mathur and 0."}}, {"text": "Ram Manohar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5587, "end_char": 5598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court Ram Manohar was delivered by Lohia\n\nSUBBA RAO J.-This appeal raises the question of Subba Rao J. interpretation of the words \"in the interest of public -order\" in Art.", "canonical_name": "Ram Manohar Fazl Ali"}}, {"text": "Lohia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5616, "end_char": 5621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court Ram Manohar was delivered by Lohia\n\nSUBBA RAO J.-This appeal raises the question of Subba Rao J. interpretation of the words \"in the interest of public -order\" in Art.", "canonical_name": "Lohia"}}, {"text": "SUBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5623, "end_char": 5632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court Ram Manohar was delivered by Lohia\n\nSUBBA RAO J.-This appeal raises the question of Subba Rao J. interpretation of the words \"in the interest of public -order\" in Art.", "canonical_name": "SUBBA RAO"}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5671, "end_char": 5680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court Ram Manohar was delivered by Lohia\n\nSUBBA RAO J.-This appeal raises the question of Subba Rao J. interpretation of the words \"in the interest of public -order\" in Art.", "canonical_name": "SUBBA RAO"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5750, "end_char": 5760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ram Manohar Lohia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5866, "end_char": 5883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent, Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, is .", "canonical_name": "Ram Manohar Fazl Ali"}}, {"text": "Socialist Party of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5919, "end_char": 5943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the General Secretary of the Socialist Party of India."}}, {"text": "U. P. Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5949, "end_char": 5965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The U. P. Government enhanced the irrigation rates for water supplied from canals to cultivators."}}, {"text": "Farrukhabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6288, "end_char": 6299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pursuant to the policy of his party, the respondent visited Farrukhabad and addressed two public meetings wherein he made speeches instigating the audience not to pay enhanced irrigation rates to the Government."}}, {"text": "July 4, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6443, "end_char": 6455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 4, 1954, at 10 p.m. he was arrested and produced before the City Magistrate, Farrukhabad, who remanded him for two days."}}, {"text": "City Magistrate, Farrukhabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6508, "end_char": 6536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 4, 1954, at 10 p.m. he was arrested and produced before the City Magistrate, Farrukhabad, who remanded him for two days."}}, {"text": "Kaimganj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6611, "end_char": 6619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After investigation, the Station officer, Kaimganj, filed a charge-sheet against the respondent before Sri P.R. Gupta, a Judicial Officer at Farrukhabad."}}, {"text": "P.R. Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6676, "end_char": 6686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After investigation, the Station officer, Kaimganj, filed a charge-sheet against the respondent before Sri P.R. Gupta, a Judicial Officer at Farrukhabad."}}, {"text": "July 6, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6726, "end_char": 6738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 6, 1954, the Magistrate went to the jail to try the case against the respondent, but the latter took objection to the trial being held in the jail premises."}}, {"text": "Special Powers Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7251, "end_char": 7269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Fatehgarh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7574, "end_char": 7583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "r960 In the first instance the petition came up for -- disposal before a division bench of the High Court at The Supnintcndenl, All h b d t\" f D d Ch t d\" Central Prison a a a COilSIS Ill g 0 ' esa1 an a urve I, Fatehgarh JJ.", "canonical_name": "Fatehgarh"}}, {"text": "Ram lVlanohar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7691, "end_char": 7704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judges delivered Ram lVlanohar differing judgments expressing their views on the Lohia main points raised before them.", "canonical_name": "Ram Manohar Fazl Ali"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7952, "end_char": 7956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special Powers Act", "statute": "Special Powers Act"}}, {"text": "Powers Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7979, "end_char": 7989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "26th of January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8190, "end_char": 8211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19(l)(a} of the Constitution on the 26th of January, 1950?\""}}, {"text": "Agarwala", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8307, "end_char": 8315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petition was placed before Agarwala, J., as a third Judge, who agreeing with Desai, J., gave the following answers to the questions referred to him : Question No. ("}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8357, "end_char": 8362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petition was placed before Agarwala, J., as a third Judge, who agreeing with Desai, J., gave the following answers to the questions referred to him : Question No. ("}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8466, "end_char": 8475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special\n\nPowers Act", "statute": "Special\n\nPowers Act"}}, {"text": "Special Powers Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8489, "end_char": 8513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 19(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8670, "end_char": 8686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special Powers Act, 1932", "statute": "Special Powers Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "26th , January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8714, "end_char": 8734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The provision of section 3 of the U. P. Special Powers Act, 1932, making it penal for a person by spoken words to instigate a class of persons not to pay dues recoverable as arrears of land revenue, was inconsistent with Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution on the 26th , January, 1950.\""}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8786, "end_char": 8795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special Powers Act, 1932", "statute": "Special Powers Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "Special Powers Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8809, "end_char": 8833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9501, "end_char": 9511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special Powers Act, 1932", "statute": "Special Powers Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9600, "end_char": 9610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special Powers Act, 1932", "statute": "Special Powers Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "Ram Manohar Lohia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9980, "end_char": 9997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fatehgarh The gist of the argument of the learned Advocate v.\n\nGeneral may be stated thus : The legislature can Ram Manohar Lohia make laws placing reasonable restrictions on the rights of a citizen to freedom of speech and expression Subba Rao J. in the interests of public order among other grounds.", "canonical_name": "Ram Manohar Fazl Ali"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10487, "end_char": 10491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10810, "end_char": 10820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11025, "end_char": 11029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lohia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11082, "end_char": 11087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Advocate General pointed out that the object of the State in preferring this appeal was to obtain the decision of this Court on the question of constitutional validity of s. 3 of the Act and not to pursue the matter against Dr. Lohia.", "canonical_name": "Lohia"}}, {"text": "N. S. Bindra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11257, "end_char": 11269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the question raised was an important one, we requested Mr. N. S. Bindra to assist the Court, and he kindly agreed to do so."}}, {"text": "Congress Party", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11680, "end_char": 11694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In an attempt to offset the campaign of non-payment of taxes and other forms of agitation resorted to by the Congress Party, originally it was put on the."}}, {"text": "ss. 1 and 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11864, "end_char": 11875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11962, "end_char": 11969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Fatehgarh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12039, "end_char": 12048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fatehgarh exten a or any o t e remammg sectrons to any v. district or to any part of a district in the United Ram Manohar Provinces.", "canonical_name": "Fatehgarh"}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12322, "end_char": 12331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Between April and Subba Rao f.\n\nJune, 1954, the State Government extended the prov1s10ns of the Act to 33 districts including :Farrukhabad district.", "canonical_name": "SUBBA RAO"}}, {"text": "Farrukhabad district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12431, "end_char": 12451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Between April and Subba Rao f.\n\nJune, 1954, the State Government extended the prov1s10ns of the Act to 33 districts including :Farrukhabad district."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12731, "end_char": 12735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13021, "end_char": 13030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13193, "end_char": 13202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13803, "end_char": 13812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ram Manohar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14353, "end_char": 14364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "d h d h k The Superinten ent, • (1) w oever by wor , eit er spo en or written, or Central Prison by signs or by visible representations or otherwise, Fatehgarh\n\n(ii) instigates, (iii) expressly or by implication, v.\n\n(iv) any person or class of persons, (v) not to pay Ram Manohar any liability, (vi) to defer payment of any liability, Lohia\n\n(vii) does an act with intent that any words etc.", "canonical_name": "Ram Manohar Fazl Ali"}}, {"text": "ss. 2 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15138, "end_char": 15149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Fatehgarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16462, "end_char": 16471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In short, no Fatehgarh person, whether legal adviser or a friend or a wellv."}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16881, "end_char": 16891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17442, "end_char": 17449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17921, "end_char": 17928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18259, "end_char": 18266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of America", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19070, "end_char": 19094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the words of an eminent Judge of the Supreme Court of America \"the essential rights are subject to the elementary need for order without which the guarantee of those rights would be a mockery\"."}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19316, "end_char": 19332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19416, "end_char": 19423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19459, "end_char": 19466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19612, "end_char": 19622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19 can only be appreciated by ascertaining how the Article was construed before it was inserted therein and what was the defect to remedy which the Parliament inserted the same by the said amendment."}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19689, "end_char": 19696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19700, "end_char": 19713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19845, "end_char": 19865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There the Government of Madras, in exercise of their powers under s. 9(1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949, purported to issue an order whereby they imposed a ban upon the entry and circulation of the journal called the \"Cross Roads\" in that State."}}, {"text": "s. 9(1-A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19901, "end_char": 19910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19918, "end_char": 19962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20311, "end_char": 20321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949", "statute": "the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20491, "end_char": 20507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In considering whether the impugned Act was made in the interests of security of the State, Patanjali Sastri, J., as he then was, after citing the observation of Stephen in his Criminal Law of England, states:\n\n(1) [19soJ s-.c."}}, {"text": "Stephen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20561, "end_char": 20568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In considering whether the impugned Act was made in the interests of security of the State, Patanjali Sastri, J., as he then was, after citing the observation of Stephen in his Criminal Law of England, states:\n\n(1) [19soJ s-.c."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20592, "end_char": 20599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In considering whether the impugned Act was made in the interests of security of the State, Patanjali Sastri, J., as he then was, after citing the observation of Stephen in his Criminal Law of England, states:\n\n(1) [19soJ s-.c."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21083, "end_char": 21100, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21257, "end_char": 21267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22488, "end_char": 22498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23019, "end_char": 23021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "EastPunjabPublicSafety Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23164, "end_char": 23196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ram Manohar Fazl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23199, "end_char": 23219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Manohar Fazl Ali, J., in his dissenting judgment gave the Lahia expression \"public order\" a wider meaning than that Subba Rao J. given by the majority view.", "canonical_name": "Ram Manohar Fazl Ali"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24030, "end_char": 24037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the EastPunjabPublicSafety Act, 1949", "statute": "the EastPunjabPublicSafety Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24253, "end_char": 24260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ramesh Thappar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24322, "end_char": 24336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the said amendment, this Court explained the scope of Ramesh Thappar' s Gase (1) in The State of Bihar v. Shailabala Devi (2).", "canonical_name": "Ramesh Thappar"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24456, "end_char": 24460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24731, "end_char": 24738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan, J., as he then was, observed at p. 660.:"}}, {"text": "Shearer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25152, "end_char": 25159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1o6\n\nThe Superintendent,\n\nCentral Prison Fatehgarh v.\n\nRan1 1\\1 anohar Lohia\n\nSubba _Rao J.\n\nRamesh ThfiLppar's case could easily have been avoided as it was avoided by Shearer J., who in very emphatic terms said as follows :\n\n\"I have read and re-read the judgments of the Supreme Court, and I can find nothing in them myself which bear directly on the point at issue, and leads me to think that, in their opinion, a restriction of this kind is no longer permissible. \""}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25256, "end_char": 25269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1o6\n\nThe Superintendent,\n\nCentral Prison Fatehgarh v.\n\nRan1 1\\1 anohar Lohia\n\nSubba _Rao J.\n\nRamesh ThfiLppar's case could easily have been avoided as it was avoided by Shearer J., who in very emphatic terms said as follows :\n\n\"I have read and re-read the judgments of the Supreme Court, and I can find nothing in them myself which bear directly on the point at issue, and leads me to think that, in their opinion, a restriction of this kind is no longer permissible. \""}}, {"text": "America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25949, "end_char": 25956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The words \"public order \" were also understood in America and England as offences against public safety or public peace."}}, {"text": "Art. 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26870, "end_char": 26880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ram Manoha•", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27490, "end_char": 27501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the interests of public order, the i960 State may prohibit and punish the causing of ' loud and raucous noise' in streets and public places by The Superintenden', means of sound amplifying instruments, regulate the Central Prison hours and place of public discussion, and the use of Fatgarh the public streets for the purpose of exercising freedom Ram Manoha• of speech ; provide for the expulsion of hecklers from Lakia meetings and assemblies, punish utterances tendirig to incite an immediate breach of the peace or riot as Subba Rao J. distinguished from utterances causing mere 'public inconvenience, annoyance or unrest'.\"", "canonical_name": "Ram Manohar Fazl Ali"}}, {"text": "England also Acts like Public Order Act, 1936", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27774, "end_char": 27819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Theatres Act, 1843", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27821, "end_char": 27839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28511, "end_char": 28516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But in India under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28523, "end_char": 28533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Theatres Act, 1843", "statute": "Theatres Act, 1843"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30187, "end_char": 30190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not necessary to state the facts of that case, as reliance is placed only on the observations of Das, C.J., at p. 865, which read:\n\n\"It will be noticed that the language employed in the amended clause is \"in the interests of\" and not \"for the maintenance of'."}}, {"text": "Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31675, "end_char": 31678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of U.P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 33121, "end_char": 33139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case, the appellant was detained in pursuance of the order ma.de by the Government of U.P. under the U.P. Prevention of Black-Marketing (Temporary Powers) Act, 1947."}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33281, "end_char": 33288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34826, "end_char": 34830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34935, "end_char": 34939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36416, "end_char": 36420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36504, "end_char": 36517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36737, "end_char": 36747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37665, "end_char": 37675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ramesh Thapper", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38025, "end_char": 38039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Ramesh Thapper's case (1) such an argument has been repelled by this Court.", "canonical_name": "Ramesh Thappar"}}, {"text": "Superintendent,\n\nCentral Prison\n\nFatehgarh v.\n\nRam JVI ano har Lohia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 38226, "end_char": 38294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Superintendent,\n\nCentral Prison\n\nFatehgarh v.\n\nRam JVI ano har Lohia\n\nSubba Rao]."}}, {"text": "ss. 4 and 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39679, "end_char": 39690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prize Competitions Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39698, "end_char": 39720, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 2(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39803, "end_char": 39810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41444, "end_char": 41448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R. M. D. Chamarbaugwalla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43284, "end_char": 43308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In R. M. D. Chamarbaugwalla's Case (1) the difference between two classes of competitions, namely, those that are of gambling nature and t.11ose in which success depends on skill, is clear-cut and has long been recognized in legislative practice."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44006, "end_char": 44010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44044, "end_char": 44057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44548, "end_char": 44558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44830, "end_char": 44840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]} {"document_id": "1960_2_841_851_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 841\n\nKHANDESH SPG. & WVG. MILLS CO. LTD. v.\n\nTHE RASHTRIYA GIRNI KAMGAR SANGH,\n\nJALGAON (P. B. GAJEND_RAGADIUR, K. SuBBA RAo, AND K. c. DAS GUPTA; JJ.)\n\nIndustrial Dispute-Bonus-Fu.ll Bench Formula-Rehabilitation-Reserves used as working capital-Mode of Proof.\n\nIn ascertaining the surplus available for the payment of bonus according to the Full Bench formula the Industrial Court allowed the statutory depreciation but did not give any credit for the rehabilitation amount claimed. The Industrial Court estimated the amount required for rehabilitation at Rs. 60 lakhs; out of this amount it deducted Rs. 51 lakhs representing the reserves and the balance of Rs. 9 lakhs spread over a period of 15 years gave the figure of Rs. 60,000 as the amount that should be set apart for the year in question for rehabilitation. This amount being less than the statutory depreciation the Industrial Court held that the appellant was not entitled to any deduction on account of rehabilitation as a prior charge. The appellant contended that the balance-sheet disclosed that the entire reserves had been used as working capital and consequently the said reserves should not be excluded from the amount claimed towards rehabilitation.\n\nHeld, that the appellant had failed to prove that the reserves had in fact been used as working capital and as such the amount was i; ightly deduct11d by the Industrial Court from the amount fixed for rehabilitation.\n\nThe Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. Its Workmen. \"[1959] S.C.R. 925, referred to.\n\nIn view of the importance of the item of rehabilitation in the calculation of the available surplus it was necessary for tribunals to weigh with great care the evidence of both parties to ascertain every sub-item that went into or was subtracted from the item of rehabilitation. If parties agreed, agreed figures could be accepted.\n\nIf they agreed to a decision on affidavits, that course could be adopted. But in the absence of agreement the procedure prescribed by 0. XIX, Code of Civil Procedure had to be followed.\n\nThe accounts, the balancesheet and profit and loss accounts were prepared by the management and the labour had no hand in it.\n\nWhen so much depended on this item it was necessary that the Industrial Court insisted upon a clear proof of the item of rehabilitation and also gave a real and adequate opportunity to labour to canvass the correctness of the particulars furnished by the employers.\n\nIndian Hume Pipe Company, Ltd. v. Their Workmen. [r960] 2 S.C, R. 32, Tata Oil Mills Company Ltd. v. Its Workmen. [r960] I S.C.R I. and Anil Starch Products Ltd. v. Ahmedabad Chemical Workers' Union. C.A. No. 684 of 1957 (not reported), referred to.\n\nz960 January 22.\n\nr96o\n\nCIVIL APPELATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.\n\nKhand'5h SPG & 257 of 1958. wvG. Mill; Appeal by special leave from the Award dated co. Ltd.\n\nAugust 20, 1957, of the Industrial Court, Bombay, in v.\n\nReference (IC) No. 197 of 1956.\n\nTheRoshtriyaGirni O. K. Daphtary Solicitor - General of India.\n\nKainf:Za~;, ngh, S. N. Andley, J.B. Dadachanji and Rameshwar Nath,\n\n for the appellant.\n\nSubba Rao].\n\nB. P. Maheshwari, for the respondent.\n\nI. N. Shroff, for Interveners Nos. 1 and 2.\n\nThe Intervener No. 3 did not appear. •' 1960 January 22, The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSuBBA RAO J.-This appeal raises the quest.ion as to what extent the reserves can be deducted from the amount required for rehabilitation of plant and machinery and also as to the manner by which the deductible reserves can be ascertained. It would be enough if we narrated only the facts relevant to the question raised. The appellant., Khandesh Spinning and Weaving Mills Company Limited, is a textile mill and its factory is situate at Jalgaon. The respondent, Rashtriya Girni Kamgar Sangh, represents the employees of the appellant-Company. The responde11t on behalf, of the employees issued a notice to the appellant under s. 42(2) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, demanding payment of reasonable bonus for the period from January 1, 1955 to December 31, 19()5.\n\nNegotiations in this regard having failed, the respondent made a reference to the Industrial Court under s. 73A of the said Act for arbitration of the dispute arising out of the said notice.\n\nThe arbitrato_r, i.e. the Industrial Court, following the \"Full Bench Formula\", ascertained the surplus to be Rs. 2·20 lakhs after deducting the prior charges from the gross profits of the Company, but it did not give any credit to the rehabilitation amount apart from the statutory depreciation. The Industrial Court disallowed this item for the following reasqns: It estimated the amount required for rehabilitation at Rs. 60 lakhs; out of this amount it deducted Rs. 51 lakhs representing the reserves and the balance of Rs. 9 lakhs spread over a period of 15 years gave the\n\n- t- ' -\n\nfigure of Rs. 60,000 as the amount that should be set I96o apart for the year in question for rehabilitation. As E--\n\nbeen reasonably earmarked for specific purposPs of I96o the industry are, however, not taken into account J(andesh SPG. & in this connection. Last of all the rehabilitation wvc. Mills amount which may have been allowed to the co. Ltd. employer in previous years would also have to be v. deducted if it appears that the amount was avail- The Rahstiiya Girni able at the time when it was awarded in the past Kmr; Sangh,\n\nand that it had not been used for rehabilitation a gaon purposes in the meanwhile. These are the broad Subba Rao J. features of the steps which have to be taken in deciding the employer's claim for rehabilitation under the working of the formula.\" This decision, therefore, lays down, so far as it is relevant to the present purpose, that two items shall be deducted from the rehabilitation amout ai;; certained by adopting the \"Full Bench Formula\" namely,\n\n(i) general reserves available to the employer; and\n\n(ii) reserves which have not already been reasonably, earmarked for specific purposes of the industry. The question is whether the mere availability of reserves or the simple earmarking for specific purposes would be sufficient to claim the said amounts as deductions. 'Ve do not think that by using the said words this Court meant to depart. from the well-recognized principle that if the general reserves have not been used as working capital, they cannot be deducted from the rehabilitation amount. The reserves may be of two kinds. Moneys may be set apart by a company to meet future payments which the company is under a contractual or statutory obligation to meet, such as gratuity etc. These amounts are set apart and tied down for a specific purpose and, therefore, they are not available to the employer for rehabilitation purposes. But the same thing cannot be said of thA general reserves: they would be available to the employer unless he has used them as working capital.\n\nThe use of the words \"reasonably earmarked\" is also deliberate and significant. The mere nominal aHocation for binding purposes, such as gratuity etc., in the company's books is not enough. It must be ascertained by the Industrial Court on the material placed before it whether the said amount is far in excess of the requirements of the particular purpose for which\n\nz96o it is so earmark0d and whether it is only a device to reduce the claim of the labour for bonus. vVe do not J{andesh SPG. &\n\nWVG. Mills suggest that it is the duty of the Industrial Court to co. Ltd. ascertain the correct. or exact figure required for a v. . .particular purpose; but it is certainly its duty to The Rashtnya Girni discover whether the so. called earmarking for a parti-\n\nKamgar Sanah, l • d · h c 1 Jalgaon ° cu ar purpose is a ev10e to mrcurnvent t e ; ormu a.\n\nIf it is satisfied that there is such a device, it shall Subba Rao J. deduc_t that figure in calculating the rehabilitation amount and if possible arrive at a real figure for that purpose. So too, in the case of general reserves when an employer claims that a specific amount reserved has been used as working capital, it is the duty of the Industrial Court to arrive at a finding whether the said reserves, or any part of them, have been used as working capital and, if so, to what extent during the bonus year. Shortly stated before a particular reserve can be deducted from the rehabilitation 'amount it must be established that it has been reasonably earmarked for a binding purpose or the whole or a part of it ha~ been used as working capital and that only such part of the reserves coming under either of the two heads can be deducted from the said amount.\n\nTo illustrate, take a particular bonus year, say 1955.\n\nTo start with, from the gross profits of that year only items specifically declared by this Court in The Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. lt.s Workmen(') to have a prior charge over the bonus shall be deducted to arrive at the surplus. No question of deducting any other amount reserved in regard to the profits of that year arises. But the company has specifically earmarked certain amounts for specific binding purposes in 1954 or earlier to meet future binding obligations, such as gratuity etc. ; or has reserved amounts for general purposes but not to meet any contractual or statutory obligations and has not utilised the same as working capital. In the former case the amount must be deemed to have been utilised and, therefore, it cannot be deducted from the rehabilitation amount ; but in the latter case, as the said amounts were not utilised by the employer as working capital, they shall be deducted from the rehabilitation amount.\n\n(1) [1959] S.C.R. 925\n\n...\n\nWhat then is the procedure to be followed for z96o ascertaining the said facts ? The burden is obviously Kanrlesh SPG . .,,. on the employer who claims the exclusion of the wvc. Mills reserves from the rehabilitation amount on the ground Co. Ltd. that they are used as working capital or reasonably v. earmarked for a specifie purpose to establish the said TKheRashtri5yaGihrni amgar ang , facts and to prove the same by relevant and Jalgaon acceptable evidence. The importance of this question in the context of fixing the amount required for Suba Rao J. rehabilitation cannot be over-estimated. The item of rehabilitation is generally a major item that enters into the calculations for the purpose of ascertaining the surplus and, therefore, the amount of bonus. So, there would be a teudency on the part of the employer to inflate this figure and the employees to deflate it. The accounts of a company are prepared by the management. The balance-sheet and the\n\nprofit and loss account are also prepared by the company's officers.\n\nThe labour have no concern in it. When so much depends on this item, the principles of equity and justice demand that an Industrial Court should insist upon a clear pro.of of the same and also give a real and adequate opportunity to the labour to canvass the correctness of the particulars furnished by the employer.\n\nCases coming before us disclose that the Industrial Courts and Labour Tribunals are not bestowing so much attention on this aspect of the case as they should. Some of the tribunals act on affidavits and sometimes even on balance-sheets and extracts of accounts without their being proved in accordance with law.\n\nFor the purpose of holding an enquiry or a proceeding under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, s. 118 of the said Act confers on the Industrial Court the same powers as are vested in\n\nCourts in respect of-(a) proof of facts by affidavits;\n\n(b) summoning and enforcing t.he attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (c) compelling the production of documents; and (d) issuing commissions for the examinations of witnesses.\n\nIn Courts facts have to be established either by oral evidence or by documentary evidence proved in the\n\nr960 manner prescribed by law.\n\nBut Order XIX of the\n\n1, ande.) [1959] S, C, R, 925\n\nI '\n\nbalance-sheet showed that they were in fact so used.\n\nI 96o Bhagwati, J., who delivered the judgment of the Court, presumably to meet the contention that the Kandesh SPG. &\n\nh d b d b d 362 WYG. Mills balance-sheet a not een prove , o serve at p. h\n\n~~ t us: v. \"Moreover, no objection was urged in thiSTkeRashtriyaGirni behalf, nor was any finding to the contrary recorded Kamgar Sangh, by the tribunal.\" Jalgaon In that case it was conceded that the reserves were I Subba Rao ]. in fact used as working capital. t is suggested that the learned Judge solely relied upon the relevant items in the balance-sheet in support of his conclusion and that the said observation was only an additional ground given by him, but we are inclined to think that the Court would not have accepted the items in the balance-sheet as proof of user if it was not satisfied that no objection was taken in that behalf. In Tata Oil Mills Company Ltd. v. Its Workmen (1 ), a similar question was raised. It was contended by the labour in that case that the depreciation reserve was not used as working capital and therefore no return should be allowed on the said reserve. The Chief Accountant of the Company made an affidavit on behalf of the Company that the said depreciation reserve, along with others, had been used as working capital. This Court accepted the affidavit for the year in question, but made the following observations for future guidance:\n\n\"It will, however, qe open to the workmen in future to show by proper cross-examination of the company's witnesses or by proper evidence that the amount shown as the depreciation reserve was not available in whole or in part to be used as working capital and that whatever may be available was not in fact so used in the sense explained above. In the present appeal, however, we must accept the affidavit of the chief accountant.\" These observations also recognized the necessity to give an opportunity to the workmen to cross-examine the witnesses put forward by the management to prove the user of any particular reserve as working capital. This Court once again dealt with the same\n\n(1) (1959) S.C.R. 924.\n\nsubject in Anil Starch Products Ltd. v. Ahmedabad\n\nChemical Workers Union (1).\n\nThat appea.! also raised 1'\"\"d\"h Sl'G. & the question whether return should be allowed on the lVVG . • fills depreciation reserve used as working capital. It was Co. Ltd. v. contended for the labour in that case that the The Rashtriya Girni depreciation reserve was not used as working\n\nHamgar Sangh capital. Rejecting the said contention,· \\V'anchoo,\n\nJalgaon J b d\n\nSubba l?ao ]. ., o serve :\n\n\" It is enough to say in that connection that an affidavit was filed by the manager of the company to the effect that all its reserves including the depreciation fund had been used as working capital.\n\nThe manager appeared as a witness for the company before the Tribunal and swore that the affidavit made by him was correct. He was crossexamined as to the amount required for rehabilitation, which was also given by him in that affidavit; but no question was put to him to challenge his statement that the entire depreciation reserve had been used as working capital.. ....... In the circumstances, we must accept the affidavit so far as the present year is concerned and hold that the working capital was l{s. 34 lacs.\" Notwithstanding the said finding, the learned Judge took care to reserve the rights of the workmen in future by making the following observations:\n\n... It will, however, be open to the workmen in future to show by proper cross-examination of the company's witnesses or by proper evidence that the amount shown as depreciation reserve was not available in whole or in part as explained above to be used as working capital and that whatever was available was not in fact so used.\" This judgment again reinforces the view of this Court that proper opportunity should be given to the labour to test the correctness of the evidence given on affidavit on behalf of the management in regard to the user of the reserves as working capital.\n\nWhat is the position in the present case ? It is not suggested that there is any reserve which has been reasonably earmarked to discharge a contractual or statutory obligation.\n\nWe are only concerned with \\1) Civil Appeal No. 684 of 1957 (not reported)\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUl~T REPORTS 851\n\ngeneral reserves. :The 'learned .Solicitor _General r 96o contends that the balance-sheet discloses that the entire reserves have been used as working capital and Kandesh SPG. &\n\nh h . d d'd . - th' •t• WVG Mills t at t e respon ent . I_ not canvass __ IS ~OSI 10n m Co.· Ltd. the statement filed by It before the Industrial Court. v.\n\nWe have already pointed out that the balarice-sheet, TheRdshtriyaGirni without its being proved by a pers.on competent to do Kamgar Sangh, so, cannot prove that any reserves have been utilised Jalgaon as working capital. In the written-statement filed Subba Rao]. by the appellant before the Industrial Court, no specific allegation is made that the reserves were utilised as working capital, though in its statement o~ calculations the said reserves were not excluded from the amount claimed towards rehabilitation. As there ii no specific allegation, the respondent also in its statement did not deny the said fact, but in its statement of calculations it did not deduct the reserves from the rehabilitation amount. Therefore, it must be held that the respondent did not accept the position that the reserve funds were utilised as working capital. Strong reliance is placed upon the evidence of the General Superintendent of the appellant-Company, but a perusal of that evidence discloses that the said witness has not depmied that -the Company used the .reserves as working capital; nor does the said witness seek to prove either the balanceslieet or any extract taken therefrom. - In the circumstances, the respondent had 1no _ opportunity to cross-examine him in respect of the alleged user of the reserves. For the aforesaid reasons, -we, have no option but to hold that Rs. 51 lakhs representing the reserves were not used as working capital and, therefore, the said .amount , was rightly deducted bythe Industrial Court from Rs. 60 lakhs fixed by it-towards rehabilitation. As the balance of Rs. 9 lakhs _ sp!'ead over 15 years came to only Rs. 60,000 during the bonus year and as the statutory depreciation was Rs. 83,639, the Industrial Court rightly excluded .the entire rehabilitation amount from its.calculations in arriving at the surplus. . _ No other points were raised before us. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. ·\n\n... : .. , · Appeal di8m_i8sd. _", "total_entities": 36, "entities": [{"text": "841\n\nKHANDESH SPG. & WVG. MILLS CO. LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 69, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KHANDESH SPG. & WVG. MILLS CO. LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE RASHTRIYA GIRNI KAMGAR SANGH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 75, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE RASHTRIYA GIRNI KAMGAR SANGH,", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SuBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 154, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. c. DAS GUPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 160, "end_char": 175, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2033, "end_char": 2056, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2747, "end_char": 2774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "r96o\n\nCIVIL APPELATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "TheRoshtriyaGirni O. K. Daphtary", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2978, "end_char": 3010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TheRoshtriyaGirni O. K. Daphtary Solicitor - General of India."}}, {"text": "S. N. Andley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3059, "end_char": 3071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kainf:Za~;, ngh, S. N. Andley, J.B. Dadachanji and Rameshwar Nath,\n\n for the appellant."}}, {"text": "J.B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3073, "end_char": 3088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kainf:Za~;, ngh, S. N. Andley, J.B. Dadachanji and Rameshwar Nath,\n\n for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3093, "end_char": 3107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kainf:Za~;, ngh, S. N. Andley, J.B. Dadachanji and Rameshwar Nath,\n\n for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3131, "end_char": 3140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subba Rao].", "canonical_name": "Subba Rao"}}, {"text": "B. P. Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3144, "end_char": 3160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. P. Maheshwari, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3183, "end_char": 3195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. N. Shroff, for Interveners Nos."}}, {"text": "SuBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3329, "end_char": 3338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1960 January 22, The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSuBBA RAO J.-This appeal raises the quest.ion as to what extent the reserves can be deducted from the amount required for rehabilitation of plant and machinery and also as to the manner by which the deductible reserves can be ascertained.", "canonical_name": "Subba Rao"}}, {"text": "Khandesh Spinning and Weaving Mills Company Limited", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3666, "end_char": 3717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Khandesh Spinning and Weaving Mills Company Limited, is a textile mill and its factory is situate at Jalgaon."}}, {"text": "Jalgaon", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3767, "end_char": 3774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Khandesh Spinning and Weaving Mills Company Limited, is a textile mill and its factory is situate at Jalgaon."}}, {"text": "Rashtriya Girni Kamgar Sangh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3792, "end_char": 3820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent, Rashtriya Girni Kamgar Sangh, represents the employees of the appellant-Company."}}, {"text": "s. 42(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3956, "end_char": 3964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3972, "end_char": 4009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "January 1, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4069, "end_char": 4084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The responde11t on behalf, of the employees issued a notice to the appellant under s. 42(2) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, demanding payment of reasonable bonus for the period from January 1, 1955 to December 31, 19()5."}}, {"text": "December 31, 19()5", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4088, "end_char": 4106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The responde11t on behalf, of the employees issued a notice to the appellant under s. 42(2) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, demanding payment of reasonable bonus for the period from January 1, 1955 to December 31, 19()5."}}, {"text": "s. 73A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4214, "end_char": 4220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946", "statute": "the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5458, "end_char": 5467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Solicitor General contended that the Subba Rao f.\n\nIndustrial Court accepted the position that the reserves were used as working capital, but deducted the said amount from the amount required for rehabilitation op a wrong and unjustified assumption that, as the amounts so required would be spent for rehabilitation over a course of 15 years by instalments, the temporary user of the said reserves would not affect the question as they would be released in part or in whole in future years.", "canonical_name": "Subba Rao"}}, {"text": "Vimadalal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6977, "end_char": 6986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Industrial Court in dealing with the contentions of the parties before it observed as follows :\n\n\"lt is true that until some amount is required to be spent for rehabilitation, replacement or modernization, reserves must be used as working capital, but Shri Vimadalal's argument overlooks that the amount required to be spent for rehabilitation over a course of 15 years is not required to be •\n\nI960 spent all at once, but by instalments over a long period.\""}}, {"text": "Hamgar Sangh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7458, "end_char": 7470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was v. only an assumption made by the Industrial Court, as, TheRashtriyaGirni in the view taken by it, it was immaterial whether\n\nHamgar Sangh, the reserves were used as working capital or not.", "canonical_name": "Hamgar Sangh"}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7587, "end_char": 7596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We Jalgaon do not think that the aforesaid opinion expressed by\n\nSubba Rao J. the Industrial Court is sound.", "canonical_name": "Subba Rao"}}, {"text": "Suba Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14549, "end_char": 14557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The importance of this question in the context of fixing the amount required for Suba Rao J. rehabilitation cannot be over-estimated.", "canonical_name": "Subba Rao"}}, {"text": "s. 118", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15773, "end_char": 15779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "For the purpose of holding an enquiry or a proceeding under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946", "statute": "For the purpose of holding an enquiry or a proceeding under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16288, "end_char": 16311, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Order XIX of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18040, "end_char": 18061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18545, "end_char": 18553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I 96o Bhagwati, J., who delivered the judgment of the Court, presumably to meet the contention that the Kandesh SPG. &"}}, {"text": "Kandesh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18643, "end_char": 18650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I 96o Bhagwati, J., who delivered the judgment of the Court, presumably to meet the contention that the Kandesh SPG. &"}}, {"text": "thiSTkeRashtriyaGirni", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18784, "end_char": 18805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mills balance-sheet a not een prove , o serve at p. h\n\n~~ t us: v. \"Moreover, no objection was urged in thiSTkeRashtriyaGirni behalf, nor was any finding to the contrary recorded Kamgar Sangh, by the tribunal.\""}}, {"text": "Kamgar Sangh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18859, "end_char": 18871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mills balance-sheet a not een prove , o serve at p. h\n\n~~ t us: v. \"Moreover, no objection was urged in thiSTkeRashtriyaGirni behalf, nor was any finding to the contrary recorded Kamgar Sangh, by the tribunal.\"", "canonical_name": "Hamgar Sangh"}}, {"text": "Jalgaon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18891, "end_char": 18898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jalgaon In that case it was conceded that the reserves were I Subba Rao ]."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21816, "end_char": 21821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1960_2_852_866_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "January 25.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960 (2)]\n\nJ. V. GOKAL & Co. (PRIVATE) LTD. v.\n\nTHE ASSISTANT COLLECTOR OF SALES-TAX\n\n(INSPECTION) AND OTHERS (B. P. SINHA, c. J., P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SUBBA RAO, K. c. DAS GUPTA AND J. c. SHAH, JJ.) Sales Tax-Sale in the course of import-Goods on high seas- Transfer of shipping documents against payment Whether amounts to delivery of goods-Whether transaction exempt from tax- Constitution of India, Art, 286(r)(b).\n\nThe petitioner who entered into contracts with the Government of India for the supply of certain quantities of sugar of foreign origin, placed orders \\vith dealers in foreign countries and made arrangements for transporting the goods to Bombay by engaging steamers. When the goods were on the high seas and before the vessels arrived at Bo1nbay harbour, the petitioner delivered to the Government the shipping documents including the bill of lading pertaining to the goods and received the price.\n\nAfter the goods reached the port, they were taken delivery of by the Government of India after paying the requisite customs duties to the authorities concerned.\n\nFor the assessment year 1954-55, the Assistant Collector of Sales Tax held that sales tax was payable by the petitioner in respect of the transaction relating to the sugar sold to the Government. The petitioner claimed, inter alia, that the sales had taken place in the course of import and therefore they were not liable to sales tax under Art. 286(1)(b) of the Constitution of India.\n\nBut it was contended for the Sales Tax Authorities that the sales were not in the course of import and that, in any case, under the terms of the contracts the intention of the parties was that notwithstanding the delivery of the bills of lading against payment the property in the goods should not pass to the Government till actual delivery was made.\n\nHeld:\n\n(1) that under Art. 286(r)(b) of the Constitution of India the course of the import of the goods starts at a point when the goods cross the customs barrier of the foreign country and ends at a point in the importing country after the goods cross the customs barrier ;\n\n(2) that an importer can, if he receives the shipping documents, transfer the property in the goods when they are on the high seas to a third party by delivering to him shipping documents against payment and such a sale is one made in the course of import;\n\n(3) that the delivery of a bill of lading while the goods are afloat is equivalent to the delivery of the goods themselves; Sanders Brothers v. Maclean & Co,, (1883) II Q. B. D. 327, relied on.\n\n(4) that oii a true construction of the contracts in question the property in the goods passed to the Government of India\n\n' .I--\n\nwhen the shipping documents were delivered to them against I{!6o payment; and (S) that the sales in question took place in the course of]. V. Gol1at & Co import into India and were exempted from sales tax under Art. v. 286(r)(b) of the Constitution.\n\nAssistant State of Travancore-Cochin v. The Bombay Co. Ltd., [1952] Collector of S. C. R. III2, followed.\n\nSales-Tax ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petition No. 38 of 1959.\n\nPetition under article 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of Fundamenal Rights.\n\nPurshottam Tricumdas, and I. N. Shroff, for the Petitioner.\n\nA. V. Viswanatha Sastri, R. Ganapathi Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents.\n\nN. A. Palkhivala and I. N. Shroff, for Interveners Nos. 1 to 3 (The Bombay Chamber of Commerce & Industry, Bombay and others).\n\nC. J(. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India and T. M. Sen, for intervener No. 4 (Attorney-Genral for India).\n\n1960. January 25.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by Subba Rao].\n\nSuBBA RAO, J.-This is a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution for quashing the order of the first respondent dated February 9, 1959, setting aside the order .of the second respondent allowing a deduction of an amount of Rs. 1,86,42,730-15-0 from the petitioner's sales tax turn-over on the ground that the said amount was not liable to tax by virtue of s. 46 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953 (Act III of 1953), (hereinafter called the Act).\n\nThe material facts are not in dispute and they may be briefly stated : The petitioner is a private company within the meaning of the Companies. Act, 1956, and has its registered office at Kasturi Buildings, Bombay-I. On March 24, 1954 and April 15, 1954, the petitioner entered into two contracts with the Government of India for selling to the latter two\n\nconsignments of sugar-one of 9500 Long Tons of sugar of Peruvian origin and the other of 25000 Metric Tons of sugar of continental origin. To fulfil the terms of the contracts, the petitioner placed order with dealers in foreign countries. The following are the particulars relating to the first contract dated\n\nr960 March 24, 1954, for the Rupply of 9500 Long Tons of -- sugar: ]. V. Gokal & Co\n\n(i) 3rd April, 1954 Letter of Credit opened by the petitioner. v.\n\nAssistant Collector of\n\nSales~Tax\n\nSubba Rao].\n\n(ii) 3rd l\\fay, 1954 S. S. Alba sails from Sala verry (Peru) carrying 9782.01688 Long Tons of sugar.\n\n(iii) 26th May, 1954 The petitioner delivered to its\n\n(iv) 7th June, 1954\n\n(v) 26th June, 1954\n\nBankers, the Central Bank of India Limited, Bombay, along with the invoice for Rs. 50,35,405-11-0\n\nthe Documents of Title (viz. the Bills of Lading duly endorsed in favour of the Government of India, Ministry of Food & Agriculture (Agriculture) to the above goods) together with other papers (such as Certificates) and instructed the said Bankers to present the same to the Government of India, and to collect the said amount of Rs. 50,35,405-11-0 from the Deputy Accountant General (Food & Rehabilitation), New Delhi ........ .\n\nPayment made to petitioner's Bankers by the Government of India against delivery of Invoice and Bills of Lading.\n\nDate of arrival of S. S. Alba at Bombay Harbour.\n\nThe corresponding details pertaining to the second contract are as follows :\n\nVessel Vessel Vessel S. S. Eleni s. s.\n\nS.S. Inger Stathatos Giovanni Marie Amendola I.\n\nII.\n\nIII.\n\nIV.\n\n(i) 9910-858 9919-7158 4464-315 Total 24292- 8888 Tons.\n\nTons.\n\nTons Tons.\n\n(ii) 15/6th 15/6th 15/6th Letter of Credit opened June. 1954. June, 1954. June, 1954 by petitioner.\n\n(iii) roth 31st July, 31st July, Date of Sailing of July, 1954. 1954. 1954, Vessel.\n\n•. '\n\n....,\n\n...\n\nIg6o Vessel S.S. Eleni\n\nStathatos\n\nVessel s. s.\n\nGiovanni Amendola\n\nVessel S.S. Inger Marie ]. V. Gokal & Co.\n\n(iv) 22nd 12th August.16th August, July, 1954. 1954. 1954.\n\n(v) 26th 18th August,19th August, July, 1954. . 1954. 1954.\n\n(vi) 12th 3rd Septem- 9th Septem- August 1954. ber, 1954. ber, 1954.\n\nThe petitioner delivered to its Bankers, the Bank of Baroda Limited, Bombay, along with its invoices for Rs. 50,43,501-8-0, Rs. 22, 69,800-13-0, Rs. 50,38, 997-14-0 respectively the Documents of Title (viz. the Bills of Lading) duly endorsed in favour of the Government of India, Ministry of Food & Agriculture (Agriculture) to the above goods together with other papers (such as Certificates) and instructed the said Bankers to present the same to the Government of India and collect the said amounts of Rs. 50.{3, 501-8-0, Rs. 22,69, 800-13-0 and Rs. 50,38, 997-14-0, from the Deputy Accountant General (Food & Rehabilita- _ tion) New Delhi.\n\nPayment made to the petitioner's Bankers by the Government of India against delivery of Invoices and Bills of Lading.\n\nDate of arrival of Vessel at Bombay Harbour.\n\nThe foregoing particulars disclose that some weeks before the vessel arrived at the Bombay harbour, i.e., when the vessels were on the high seas, the Government of India received the documents of title, including bills of lading, pertaining to the sugar purchased by them and paid the price to the petitioner. Indeed after the goods reached the port, they were unloaded, taken delivery of, and cleared by the Government of\n\nAssistant Collector of\n\nSales-Tax\n\nSubba Rao f\n\nIndia after paying the requisite customs duties to the authorities concerned. f. v. Gvkat & Co.\n\nFor the assessment year 1954.55, i.e., April 1, 195! v.\n\nAosistant to March 31, 1955, the petitioner was assessed to sales- Coll\"tor of tax by the Sales Tax Officer, Licence1Circle, Division 1, Sales-Tax Bombay. In calculating the turn-over of the petitioner, the Sales Tax Officer deducted the price of the Subba Rao J. said two sales from the petitioner's turn-over. On January 31, 1958, the first respondent, the Assistant Collector of Sales Tax, issued a notice to the petitioner under s. 31 of the Act proposing to review the said assessment order passed by the Sales Tax Officer. In due course the petitioner filed objections and made his representations. The petitioner contended before the first respondent that the notice should have been\n\n• issued, if at all, under s. 15 and not under s. 31 of the Act inasmuch as the sales had been disclosed to the Sales Tax Officer and the deduction of the same had been allowed by him. It was also pleaded that in any event the sales had taken place in the course of import and therefore they were not liable to sales tax. The first respondent rejected both the contentions and held that sales tax was payable in respect of the said two transactions. He reassessed the petitioner to a total amount of sales tax and general tax of Rs.10,22,850-12-0 .Jess Rs. 315-3-0 already paid by the petitioner, i.e., a sum of Rs. 10,22,535-9-0 and directed the second respondent, the Sales Tax Officer, to issue a notice of demand for the said amount. Pursuant to that order, the second respondent issued a notice dated ]'ebruary 14, 1959. The petitioner has filed the present petition for the issue of a writ of certiorari cancelling the demand notice issuPd by the second respondent.\n\nThe learned Solicitor-General intervened on behalf of the Union Government and Mr. Palkhivala intervened for interveners 1 to 3, and both of them supported the petitioner.\n\nMr. Purshottam Tricumdas, appearing for the petitioner, raised before us the following contentions:\n\n(1) Under Art. 286(l)(b) of the Constitution, as it stood before the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1956, the sales in question were not liable to sales tax inasmuch as they took place in the course of import of the\n\n.......\n\n' ;\n\n.~ --\n\ngoods into the territory of India; (2) the said sales z960 were exempted from sales tax by the Bombay State v - under the explanation to Art. 286(1) of the Constitu- 1 Gokal & co. tion, as the goods were delivered for the purpose of As:tant consumption in States other than Bombay; (3) the Collector of sales were effected outside the State of Bombay i.e., Sales-Tax New Delhi, and therefore they were also exempted under Art. 286(l)(a} of the Constitution; and (4) the Subba Rao J. first respondent could have only interfered with the earlier order of assessment under s. 15 of the Act within three years from the end of the assessment year 1954-55, i.e., March 31, 1955, and that the said period havingelapsed, hehad no power to interfere in revision under s. 31 of the Act.\n\nThe first point is the most substantial. one in the case and if the petitioner succeeds on that point, no other question would arise for consideration.\n\nThe first question turns upon the interpretation of Art. 286(l)(b) of the Constitution before it was amended by the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1956.\n\nThe said Article read ;\n\n\"(1) No law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale cir purchase takes place- ............................................................\n\n(b) in the course of the import of goods into, or export of the goods out of, tho territory of India. \" Under this Article, if the sales by the petitioner to the Government of India took place in the course of the import of the goods into the territory of India, the Bombay State would have no power to impose sales tax on the said sales.\n\nWhat does the phrase \"in the course of the import of the goods into the territory of India\" convey? The crucial words of the phrase are \"import\" and \" in the course of\". The term \"import\" signifies etymologically \" to bring in \". To import goods into the territory of India therefore means to bring into the territory of India goods from abroad. The words \"course \" means \" progress from point to point\". The course of import, therefore, starts from one point and ends at. another.\n\nIt starts when the goods cross the customs barrier in foreign country and erids when they cross.the customs\n\nz96o barrier in the importing country. These words were - subject of judicial scrutiny by this Court in State of J. v. Gokol & Co. Travancore-Oochin v. Shunmugha Vilas Cashew Nut\n\nFactory (1).\n\nConstruing these words, Patani\"ali Sastri Assistant Colleclo' of C.J., observed at p. 62 : Sales-Tax \" The word \"course\" etymologically denotes movement from one point to another, and the Subba Rao J. expression \"in the course of\" not only implies a period of time during which the movement is in progress but postulates also a connected relation. \" As regards the limits of the course, the learned Chief Justice observed at p. 68 :\n\n\"It would seem, therefore, logical to hold that the course or the export out of, or of the import into the territory of India does not commence or termi- . nate until the goods cross the customs barrier. \" Das, J., as he then was, in his dissenting judgment practically agreod with Patanjali Sastri, C. J., on the interpretation of the said words. The learned J ud.ge expressed his view at p. 92 thus :\n\n\" The word \"course\" conveys to my mind the idea of a gradual and continuous flow, an advance, a journey, a passage or progress from one place to another. Etymologically it means and implies motion, a forward movement. The phrase \"in the course of\" clearly has reference to a period of time during which the movement is in progress. . Therefore, the words \"in the course of the import of the goods into and the export of the goods out of the territory of India \" obviously cover the period of time during which the goods are on their import or export journey\".\n\nWe respectfully agree with the aforesaid observations of the learned Judges. The course of the import of the goods may be said to begin when the goods enter their import journey, i.e., when they cross the customs barrier of the foreign country and end when they cross the customs barrier of the importing country.\n\nThe next question is, when can it be said that a sale takes place in the course of import journey ?\n\nThis Court in State of Travancore-Oochin v. The Bombay Go. Ltd. (2) held that a sale which occasioned\n\n(1) [1954J s.c.u. s~\n\n(2) [1952] S.C.R. III2\n\nI ~\n\n_, -t--\n\nthe export was a sale that took place in the course of r960 export of the goods. If A, a merchant in India, sells his - goods to a merchant in London and puts through the f. v. Gokal & Co. transaction by transporting the goods by a ship to Ass~; tant London, the said sale which occasioned the export is Collector of exempted under Art. 286(l)(b) of the Constitution from Sales-Ta\" the levy of sales tax:. The same principle applies to a converse case of goods which occasioned the import of Subba Rao J. the goods into India. This Court again in State of Travancore-Cochin v. hanmugha Vilas Cashew Nut Factory (1) extended the doctrine to a case of ale or a purchase of goods effected within the State by transfer of shipping documents while the goods were in the course of transit. The decision dealt with three types of purchases, viz., (i) purchases made in the local market; (ii) purchases made in the neighbouring districts of an adjacent State; and (iii) imports from Africa. The imports from Africa consisted of two groups-one group consisted of goods that were purchased when they were on the high seas and_ shipped from the African ports to Cochin or Quilon : we are not concerned with the other group. In the said case som~ commission agents at Bombay arranged for the purchase on behalf of the assessee, got delivery of the shipping documents at Bombay through a bank which advanced money against the shipping documents and collected the same from the assessees at destination. This Court, by a majority, held that, in respect of the purchases falling under the first group of imports, the commission agents acted merely as agents of the respondents therein and that the said purchpital learned counsel appearing for both the parties that it M\"zdou• Sabha would be better if the said question was decided by it -- as it was a question of law and the decision of the Gajendmgadko• f. said issue by the Court of Appeal would a, void a remand and a further a.ppeal. That is how the iswc\n\nwas considered by the Court of Appeal and answered in favour of the raspondents. In the result the decision of Tendolkar J. was reversed, the writ petition was allowed and a writ in the nature' of mandamus was issued against the appellant.\n\nThe appellant then applied for and obtained a certificate of fitness from the Bombay High Court and with the said certificate it has brought the present appeal before us. On behalf of the appellant two points have been raised for our decision in the present appeal: Was the Appellate Court justified in holding that the contravention of the material provisions of s. 25ll' of the Act rendered the impugned orders invalid; and do the relevant provisions of the Act apply to the group of Hospitals run by the appellant; are they an industry within the meaning of the Act ?\n\nBefore dealing with these points it would be relevant to state the materia, l facts in regard to the group of Hospitals themselves which are not in dispute. This group consists of five Hospitals. It appears that in 1835 Sir Robert Grant, the then Governor of Bombay, desired tci start an institution for the purposes of imparting medical education in the Presidency of Bombay. His proposal in that behalf was sanctioned by the Board of Directors of the East India Company and funds amounting to Rs. 44,000 were collected for the purpose and an equal amount was contributed by the Directors to defray the cost of construction of the College building. In 1843 the foundation of the Medical College building was laid and the same was completed in 1845.\n\nAbout that time an idea of building a hospital for the sick people of all classes and castes was mooted and Sir Jamsetjee .Jeejibhoy offered donation and some contribution was made by the Government\n\n+• -\n\nwith which the J. J. Hospital was constructed and it 1960\n\nwas formally opened on May 15, 1845. Similarly the State of Bomba_v other four Hospitals in the group were built in course v. of time from donations. Except for a small amount The Ho, pital qf Rs. 10,000 the rest of the expenditure which is in the Mazdoor Sabha neighbourhood of Rs. 27 lakhs is entirely met by the appellant out of the grant sanctioned in the budget Gajendragadkar J. under the head \"38-Medicial \". The group is under the administrative control of the Surgeon-General of the appellant and its day-to-day affairs are conducted and controlled by the Superintendent who is a full time employee of the appellant; the residential staff: including the Resident Medical Officers, Assistant Medical Officers, Housemen, Nurses and others are all full-time employees of the appellant and their salaries are drawn on the establish.ment pay bills every month and paid entirely by the appellant.\n\nThis group serves' as a clinical training ground for students of the Grant Medical College which is a Government Medical College run and managed by the appellant for imparting medical sciences leading to the Degrees of\n\nBachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of 1:-\\urgery of the Bombay University as well as various Post-Graduate qualifications of the said University and the College of Physicians and Surgeons, Boru bay; the group is thus run and managed by the appellant to provide medical relief and to promote the health of the people of Bombay.\n\nNow, turning to the first point, it may be stated that the facts on which the respondents' plea is based are not in dispute. It is conceded that the services of respondents 2 and 3 have been retrenched though it may be for the purpose of making room for other Government servants with a longer record of service who had to be retrenched owing to the closure of the appellant's Civil Supplies Department. It is also not disputed that the said respondents had not been paid at the time of retrenchment compensation as prescribed by s. 25F(b). The respondents' contention is that the failure to comply with the said requirement makes the order of retrenchment invalid. This plea has been upheld by the Court of Appeal.\n\nSection 25F (b) provides that no workman employed\n\nz96o in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be State of Bombay h d b 1 h b \"d retrenc e y that employer unti he as een pa1 Th' Zspital at the time of retrenchment compensation which Mazdaor Sabha shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of service or any part thereof Gajmdragadkar ]. in excess of six months.\n\nClauses (a) and (c) of the said section prescribe similar conditions but we are not concerned with them. On a plain reading of s. 25F (b) it is clear that the requirement prescribed by it is a condition precedent for the retrenchment of the workman. The section provides that no workman shall he retrenched until the condition in question has been satisfied. It is difficult to accede to the argument that when the section imposes in mandatory terms a condition precedent, non-compliance with the said condition would not render the impugned retrenchment invalid.\n\nThe argument which appealed to Tendolkar, J., however, was that the consequence of non-compliance with the requirement of s. 25F (b) was not to render the impugned retrenchment invalid, because he thought that by s. 251 a specific provision has been made for the recovery of the amount prescribed by s. 25F (b).\n\nSection 251 provides for the recovery of monies due from employers under Ch. V, and according to Tendolkor J. this provision covers the amount due to the workman by way of compensation under s. 25F (b).\n\nIn our opinion, this view is untenable. Having regard to the fact that the words used in s. 25F (b) are mandatory and their effect is plain and unambiguous it seems to us that the Court of Appeal was right in holding thats. 251 covered cases of recovery of monies other than those specified ins. 25F (b), and it is obvious that there are several other cases in which monies become due from the employers to the employees under Ch. V; it is for the recovery of these monies that s. 251 had been enacted. Therefore, we see no substance in the argument that the Court of Appeal has misconstrued s. 25F (b ).\n\nThat being so. failure to comply with the said provision renders the impugned orders invalid and inoperatjve,\n\n- .-\n\nDoes the said provision apply to the present z96o proceedings ? In other words, is the Act itself State of Bombay applicable to the group of Hospitals with which we v • . are concerned? That is the next question which The Hospital calls for an answer in the present appeal. Indeed it Mazdoor Sabha is this general question which has been strenuously -- argued before us by the learned Solicitor-General on Gajendragadkar J. behalf of the appellant. The decision of this question depends upon the interpretation of the dt:; finition of \"industry\" prescribed by s. 2(j) of the Act.\n\nLet us first read the definition. Section 2(j) providies that \" industry\" means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture o!' calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or a.vocation of workmen.\n\nIt would be noticed that the words used in the definition are very wide in their import and even so its latter part purports to provide an inclusive definition.\n\nThe word \"undertaking\" according to Webster means \"anything undertaken; any business, work or project which one engages in or attempts, an enterprise ''. Similarly, \"trade \" according to Halsbury, in its primary meaning, is \"exchange of goods for goods or goods for money\", and in its secondary meaning it is \" any business carried on with a view to profit whether manual or mercantile, as distinguished from the liberal arts or learned professions and from agriculture\"; whereas \"business\" is a wider term not synonymous with trade and means practically \" anything which is an occupation as distinguished from a pleasure\". The word \" calling \" again is very wide; it means \" one's usual occupation, vocation, business or trade\"; so is the word \" service \" very wide in its import. Prima facie, if the definition has deliberately used words of such wide import, it would be necessary to read those words in their wide denotation; and so read, Hospitals cannot be excluded from the definition.\n\nIt is, however, contended that, in construing the definition, we must adopt the rule of construction noscuntur a sociis. This rule, according to Maxwell, . means that, when two or more words which are\n\nsusce; ptible of analogous meaning are coupled togez960 ther they are understood to be used in their cognate sense.\n\nThey take as it were their colour from each State of Bombay h h h 1 d v. ot er, t at is, t e more genera is restricte to a sense\n\nThe Hopital High Court was right. in coming to the conclusion Mazda°' Sabha that the conduct and running of the group ofHospitfils\n\nby the appellant fimotmted to an undertaking under Gajendragadkar ]. s. 2 (j) find the relevant provisions of the Act were\n\napplicfible.\n\nIn this connection it would be relevant to refer to the fact that in the First Schedule to the Aet which enumerates industries which may be declared as public utility service under s 2(n)(vi), three entries have bcPn added by Act 36 of 1956. They are Defence Establishment, services in hospitals and dispensari<•s, and Fire Brigade service. In other words, by the addition of these three entries the Legislfiture has clearly indic\"ted its intention that service in hospitals find dispensaries can be declared to be a public utility sPrvice under s. 2(n)(vi); and there is no doubt that unless the service in hospitals falls under s. 2(j) and is treated as an industry it cannot be declared to be a public utili1y service. It is true that this p\"rticnlar entry bad not been included in the First Schedule at the time when the present reference waR made, but its subspital learned counsel appearing for both the parties that it M\"zdou• Sabha would be better if the said question was decided by it -- as it was a question of law and the decision of the Gajendmgadko• f. said issue by the Court of Appeal would a, void a remand and a further a.ppeal."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10470, "end_char": 10487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant then applied for and obtained a certificate of fitness from the Bombay High Court and with the said certificate it has brought the present appeal before us."}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10756, "end_char": 10761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Robert Grant", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11188, "end_char": 11200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that in 1835 Sir Robert Grant, the then Governor of Bombay, desired tci start an institution for the purposes of imparting medical education in the Presidency of Bombay."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11223, "end_char": 11229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that in 1835 Sir Robert Grant, the then Governor of Bombay, desired tci start an institution for the purposes of imparting medical education in the Presidency of Bombay."}}, {"text": "East India Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11417, "end_char": 11435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His proposal in that behalf was sanctioned by the Board of Directors of the East India Company and funds amounting to Rs."}}, {"text": "Jamsetjee .Jeejibhoy offered donation and some contribution was made by the Government", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11827, "end_char": 11913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "About that time an idea of building a hospital for the sick people of all classes and castes was mooted and Sir Jamsetjee .Jeejibhoy offered donation and some contribution was made by the Government\n\n+• -\n\nwith which the J. J. Hospital was constructed and it 1960\n\nwas formally opened on May 15, 1845."}}, {"text": "May 15, 1845", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12003, "end_char": 12015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "About that time an idea of building a hospital for the sick people of all classes and castes was mooted and Sir Jamsetjee .Jeejibhoy offered donation and some contribution was made by the Government\n\n+• -\n\nwith which the J. J. Hospital was constructed and it 1960\n\nwas formally opened on May 15, 1845."}}, {"text": "State of Bomba_v", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12031, "end_char": 12047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly the State of Bomba_v other four Hospitals in the group were built in course v. of time from donations."}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12347, "end_char": 12361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "27 lakhs is entirely met by the appellant out of the grant sanctioned in the budget Gajendragadkar J. under the head \"38-Medicial \".", "canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*"}}, {"text": "College of Physicians and Surgeons, Boru bay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13253, "end_char": 13297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This group serves' as a clinical training ground for students of the Grant Medical College which is a Government Medical College run and managed by the appellant for imparting medical sciences leading to the Degrees of\n\nBachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of 1:-\\urgery of the Bombay University as well as various Post-Graduate qualifications of the said University and the College of Physicians and Surgeons, Boru bay; the group is thus run and managed by the appellant to provide medical relief and to promote the health of the people of Bombay."}}, {"text": "s. 25F(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13958, "end_char": 13967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14145, "end_char": 14156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14730, "end_char": 14736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15290, "end_char": 15296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 251", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15381, "end_char": 15387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15468, "end_char": 15474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 251", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15481, "end_char": 15492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tendolkor", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15578, "end_char": 15587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V, and according to Tendolkor J. this provision covers the amount due to the workman by way of compensation under s. 25F (b).", "canonical_name": "Tendolkar"}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15672, "end_char": 15678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15774, "end_char": 15780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 251", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16163, "end_char": 16169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16277, "end_char": 16283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16968, "end_char": 16975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17023, "end_char": 17035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Halsbury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17600, "end_char": 17608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly, \"trade \" according to Halsbury, in its primary meaning, is \"exchange of goods for goods or goods for money\", and in its secondary meaning it is \" any business carried on with a view to profit whether manual or mercantile, as distinguished from the liberal arts or learned professions and from agriculture\"; whereas \"business\" is a wider term not synonymous with trade and means practically \" anything which is an occupation as distinguished from a pleasure\"."}}, {"text": "Maxwell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18552, "end_char": 18559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This rule, according to Maxwell, ."}}, {"text": "GaJendrngadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19038, "end_char": 19052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "p. 207) : \"Associated words take their meaning from GaJendrngadkar J. one another under the doctrine of noscuntur a sociis, the philosophy of which is that the meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it; such doctrine is broader than the maxim Ejusdem Generis.\"", "canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20665, "end_char": 20669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21339, "end_char": 21346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21602, "end_char": 21609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(rr)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21625, "end_char": 21633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(s)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21649, "end_char": 21656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21679, "end_char": 21686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(m)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21752, "end_char": 21759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(m)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21868, "end_char": 21875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22008, "end_char": 22015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22067, "end_char": 22079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Stroud", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22504, "end_char": 22510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vide: Stroud's \"Judicial Dictionary\", Vol."}}, {"text": "s. 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24021, "end_char": 24028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24198, "end_char": 24205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24958, "end_char": 24965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25609, "end_char": 25616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25827, "end_char": 25834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ga1endragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25990, "end_char": 26004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is also common ground Ga1endragadkar J. that the absence of investment of any capital would not make a material difference to the applicability of s. 2(j).", "canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*"}}, {"text": "s. 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26115, "end_char": 26122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26258, "end_char": 26265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26440, "end_char": 26447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26517, "end_char": 26524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26690, "end_char": 26697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27316, "end_char": 27323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27529, "end_char": 27536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Watson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27635, "end_char": 27641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The activities which do not fall within s. 2(j) and which are described as governmental or regal or sovereign have been pithily described by Lord Watson as \"the primary and inalienable functions of a constitutional Government\" (Vide : Coomber v. Justices of Berks(1) ) ; and it is only these activities that are outside the scope of s. 2(j)."}}, {"text": "s. 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27822, "end_char": 27829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gajendragodkor", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28266, "end_char": 28280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection it would be relevant to point out Gajendragodkor J. that the definition of the word \"employer\" given by s. 2(g) is not without significance: an \"employer\" means under s. 2(g) (i) \"in relation to an industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central Government or State Government authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is prescribed the head of the department.\"", "canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*"}}, {"text": "s. 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28336, "end_char": 28343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28399, "end_char": 28406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28501, "end_char": 28519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection it would be relevant to point out Gajendragodkor J. that the definition of the word \"employer\" given by s. 2(g) is not without significance: an \"employer\" means under s. 2(g) (i) \"in relation to an industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of the Central Government or State Government authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is prescribed the head of the department.\""}}, {"text": "Jinition clearly indicates that the Legislature intended the application of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28651, "end_char": 28734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28785, "end_char": 28792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jinition clearly indicates that the Legislature intended the application of the Act", "statute": "Jinition clearly indicates that the Legislature intended the application of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29467, "end_char": 29471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jinition clearly indicates that the Legislature intended the application of the Act", "statute": "Jinition clearly indicates that the Legislature intended the application of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29634, "end_char": 29641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jinition clearly indicates that the Legislature intended the application of the Act", "statute": "Jinition clearly indicates that the Legislature intended the application of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29756, "end_char": 29763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29888, "end_char": 29895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30095, "end_char": 30102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(J)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30376, "end_char": 30383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31494, "end_char": 31501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31724, "end_char": 31731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32328, "end_char": 32335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32673, "end_char": 32680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32994, "end_char": 32998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33136, "end_char": 33150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s 2(n)(vi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33244, "end_char": 33254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(n)(vi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33609, "end_char": 33620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33693, "end_char": 33700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33852, "end_char": 33866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34036, "end_char": 34043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34332, "end_char": 34346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34439, "end_char": 34446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Municipality MazdJor Sabha", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 35225, "end_char": 35251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Municipality MazdJor Sabha then took the matter to the High Court at Calcutta by - means of a petition for a writ of certiorari under Arts."}}, {"text": "High Court at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 35280, "end_char": 35302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Municipality MazdJor Sabha then took the matter to the High Court at Calcutta by - means of a petition for a writ of certiorari under Arts."}}, {"text": "Art. 132(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35869, "end_char": 35880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38295, "end_char": 38302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Baroda Borough Municipality", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 38975, "end_char": 39002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case this Court was concerned with the claim for bonus made by the workmen of the Baroda Borough Municipality and it was rejected; comment has been made by learned counsel on some of the grounds accepted by this Court in support of its final decision, but in the present appeal we are not concerned with the claim for bonus and it is not necessary for us to refer to the said comment or to deal with it."}}, {"text": "State of Bombay considered at length the policy and o ject of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39652, "end_char": 39721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39833, "end_char": 39840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State of Bombay considered at length the policy and o ject of the Act", "statute": "State of Bombay considered at length the policy and o ject of the Act"}}, {"text": "limitGajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 39957, "end_char": 39976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Vishuddhananda Sa.raswathi Marwari Hospital v. x960 Their W or km en (1) the Labour Appellate 'lribunal b State of Bombay considered at length the policy and o ject of the Act, several judgments cited before it and came to the The ;; spital conclusion that the definition of industry in s. 2(j) was Mazdoor Sabha of wide amplitude and that there was no good reason for cutting down its natural meaning so as to limitGajendragadkar J. its operation to profit-making enterprises only.", "canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*"}}, {"text": "High Court of Australia", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 40315, "end_char": 40338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "modern democratic State the decision of the High Court of Australia in The Federated State School Teachers' -1ssociation of Australia And The State of\n\nVictoria & Ors (2), is generally cited."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40724, "end_char": 40728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1904", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40736, "end_char": 40787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41007, "end_char": 41012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1904", "statute": "the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1904"}}, {"text": "Isaacs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41042, "end_char": 41048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Isaacs J., however, struck an emphatic note of dissent, and the principles enunciated in this note of di>ORTS 903\n\nGarikapatti V eeraya (1) and was in fact considered and r960 decided. Mr. Achru Ram, for the respondent, has h f I\n\n; i• Moti Rain suggested that the very passage in t e case o nu, ira v.\n\nSohanlal (2) which enunciated the principle appears to Suraj Bhan have been cited with approval. However that may _ be, we are bound by the decision of this Court in the Gajendra •adkar J. case of Indira Sohanlal (2) and that decision is clearly b against the contention of the appellant that the amended provision in respect of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court was inapplicable.\n\nThat takes us to the other contention that the amended provision of s. 13(3) (a) (iii) applies. There is no doubt that if this amended provision applied to the present case respondent l would not be entitled to obtain an order of ejectment. It is plain that by the amendment Legislature has imposed rigorous limitations on a landlord's right to recover possession in the . case of any building or rented land. The question is whether this amendment can be said to be retrospective in operation. It is clear that the amendment made is not in relation to any procedure and cannot be characterised as procedural. It is in regard to a matter of substantive law since it affects the substantive rights of the landlord. It may be conceded that the Act is intended to provide relief to the tenants and in that sense is a beneficial measure and as such its provision should be liberally construed; but this principle would not be material or even relevant in deciding the question as to whether the new provision is retrospective or not.\n\nIt is wellsettled that where an amendment affeets vested rights the amendment would operate prospectively unless it is expressly made retrospective or its retrospective operation follows as a matter of necessary implication.\n\nThe amending Act obviously does not make the relevant provision retrospective in terms and we see no reason to accept the suggestion that the retrospective operation of the relevant provision can be spelt out as a matter of necessary implication. We ought to add that Mr. Bindra has not argud that the initial provision in s. 13(1) which is retrospective is\n\n(r) [1957] S.C.R. 448.\n\n(2) (1955] S, C.R. I n7.\n\nII5\n\nI96o attracted in interpreting the amended provision in s. 13(3) (a) (iii).\n\nSuch a contention would of course be Moti Ram v. wholly untenable.\n\nSum} JI hon There is another consideration to which reference may be made. If the new provision is held to be\n\nGojendragadkar J. retrospective in its operation what would be the consequence? Inevitably all pending actions in which landlords may have applied for possession of their buildings let out to the tenants under the provisions of s. 13(3) (a) (iii) as it stood before the amendment would automatically fail because they would not satisfy the tests imposed by the amended provision.\n\nIf such a drastic consequence was really intended by the Legislature it would certainly have made appropriate provisions in express terms in that behalf.\n\nWhere the Legislature intends to make substantive provisions of law retrospective in operation it generally makes its intention clear by express, provisions in that behalf. We are, therefore, satisfied that s. 13(3) (a) (iii) as amended cannot apply to proceedings which were pending either before the Controller or before the appellate authority at the time when the amendment was made. In this connection we ought to add that when the revisional application was argued before the High Court it was admitted by the appellant that it was the old law which was in force before the date of the amendment that applied to the case. Even so we have allowed Mr. Bindra to raise the point before us but we see no substance in it~ This point has been considered by the Punjab High Court in Ram Parshad Halwai, Ludhiana v. Mukhtiar Chand (1 ) and it appears that the Punjab High Court has taken the same view about the effect of the amendment made m s. 13(3) (a) (iii).\n\nThere is one more point which remains to be considered.\n\nMr. Uindra has argued that the High Court was in error in coming to its own conclusion as to whether the requirement of s. 13(3) (a) (iii) has been satisfied .. As we have already pointed out the finding of the Rent Controller and the appellate authority was that the claim made by respondent 1 that he\n\n\\I) I.l,.R. \\r958) Punjab r5~3\n\n- '\n\nrequired the shop for the purpose of reconstuction r95o was not bona fide.\n\nThe High Court has reversed this Moti Ram conclusion and Mr. Bindra challenges the correctness v. or the propriety oJ the said conclusion. The revisional Suraj Bhan power conferred upon the High Court under s. 15(5) is wider than that conferred by s. 115 of the Code of Gajendragadkar .T Civil Procedure. Under s. 15(5) the High Court has\n\njurisdiction to examine the legality or propriety of the order under revision and that would clearly justify the examination of the propriety or the legality of the finding made by the authorities in the present case about the requirement of the landlord under s. 13(3)(a) (iii).\n\nThe High Court no doubt has accepted the appellant's argument that the requirement in question must be bona fide but it has observed that there was no legal evidence on which it could be said that the landlord's requirement was not bona fide.\n\nIndeed it is obvious that the tests applied both by the Rent Controller and the appellate authority in dealing with the question were based on the assumption that the amended provision of s. 13(3)(a) (iii) applied to the present proceedings. Otherwise it was irrelevant to enquire whether the property in question had become unsafe or unfit for human habitation as they have done. All the relevant evidence available on the record on this point clearly sustains the view taken by the High Court that the case made by the landlord under s. 13(3) (a) (iii) was bona fide.\n\nSoon after he purchased the house he decided to reconstruct the building, moved the Municipality with his plan and obtained its sanction. It is difficult to understand how on these facts it would be permissible to hold that the landlord is acting mala fide. That is the view which the High Court took and we see no substance in the argument that in taking the said view the High Court has acted either irregularly or improperly.\n\nIn the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 80, "entities": [{"text": "S.N. Namasfoayam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 146, "end_char": 162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.N. Namasfoayam I th lt !]"}}, {"text": "MOTI RAM", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 391, "end_char": 399, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MOTI RAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "OTHERS. (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 417, "end_char": 446, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SuBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 448, "end_char": 460, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 465, "end_char": 485, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 2 and 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 970, "end_char": 981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1103, "end_char": 1108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1116, "end_char": 1160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 13(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1241, "end_char": 1249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949", "statute": "the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1468, "end_char": 1478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949", "statute": "the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1558, "end_char": 1563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949", "statute": "the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "September 24, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1752, "end_char": 1770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By Amending Act 29 of r956, which came into force on September 24, 1956, ss."}}, {"text": "s. 15(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2105, "end_char": 2113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949", "statute": "the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2700, "end_char": 2705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Moti Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2767, "end_char": 2775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant contended that the amended provisions of s. 15 which permitted a revision to be filed before the High Court Moti Ram were inapplicable as the case was governed by the law as it stood v. on the date when the application for ejectment was made and Suraj Bhan that Respondent l was not entitled to the decree as the case did not fall within the provisions of.", "canonical_name": "MOTI RAM"}}, {"text": "Suraj Bhan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2905, "end_char": 2915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant contended that the amended provisions of s. 15 which permitted a revision to be filed before the High Court Moti Ram were inapplicable as the case was governed by the law as it stood v. on the date when the application for ejectment was made and Suraj Bhan that Respondent l was not entitled to the decree as the case did not fall within the provisions of.", "canonical_name": "SURAJ BHAN & OTHERS"}}, {"text": "N. S. Bindra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4704, "end_char": 4716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. S. Bindra and P. 0."}}, {"text": "P. 0. Aggarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4721, "end_char": 4736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. S. Bindra and P. 0."}}, {"text": "Achhru Ram", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4759, "end_char": 4769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Achhru Ram and• K. P. Gupta, for respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Achhru Ram"}}, {"text": "K. P. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4775, "end_char": 4786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Achhru Ram and• K. P. Gupta, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "GAJ'1NDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4872, "end_char": 4887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGAJ'1NDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal by special leave arises from ejectment proceedings taken by Suraj\n\nBhan (respondent 1) against the appellant Moti Ram iri respect of a shop sitU.Med in the urban ·area o'f\n\nr960 Gurgaon which has been in the occupation of the appellant as a tenant for more than twenty years on ]\\1 oti Ra1n d v. a monthly rental of Rs.", "canonical_name": "GAJ'1NDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "Suraj\n\nBhan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4964, "end_char": 4975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGAJ'1NDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal by special leave arises from ejectment proceedings taken by Suraj\n\nBhan (respondent 1) against the appellant Moti Ram iri respect of a shop sitU.Med in the urban ·area o'f\n\nr960 Gurgaon which has been in the occupation of the appellant as a tenant for more than twenty years on ]\\1 oti Ra1n d v. a monthly rental of Rs.", "canonical_name": "SURAJ BHAN & OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Moti Ram", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5013, "end_char": 5021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGAJ'1NDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal by special leave arises from ejectment proceedings taken by Suraj\n\nBhan (respondent 1) against the appellant Moti Ram iri respect of a shop sitU.Med in the urban ·area o'f\n\nr960 Gurgaon which has been in the occupation of the appellant as a tenant for more than twenty years on ]\\1 oti Ra1n d v. a monthly rental of Rs.", "canonical_name": "MOTI RAM"}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5368, "end_char": 5382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respon ent 1 purchased suraj Bhan the shop on June 15, 1956, and soon thereafter he applied to the Rent Controller for the eviction of the Gajendragadkar /. appellant under s. 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent\n\nHestriction Act, 1949 (3 of 1949) (hereinafter called the Act).", "canonical_name": "GAJ'1NDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5402, "end_char": 5407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hestriction Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5439, "end_char": 5460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Municipal Committee\n\nof Gurgaon", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6092, "end_char": 6123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was urged that the appellant was a habitual defaulter and was in arrears of rent, that the return of the money invested by respondent 1 in the purchase of the shop was not adequate, that respondent 1 apprehended that the godown and the shop of which he was in possession as a tenant would be sold off and he may be dispossessed therefrom, that is why he would require the shop in the present proceedings for his personal use and that respondent 1 wanted to reconstruct the shop for which necessary sanction had been obtained by him from the Municipal Committee\n\nof Gurgaon and the plan prepared in that behalf had been duly approved."}}, {"text": "suraj Bhan of Punjab at Chandigarh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7443, "end_char": 7477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "dent 1 by his revisional application in the High Court suraj Bhan of Punjab at Chandigarh."}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7565, "end_char": 7579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the findings of the courts below on the first three pleas Gajendragadkar J. raised by respondent 1.", "canonical_name": "GAJ'1NDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "Bindra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7965, "end_char": 7971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Bindra on behalf of the appellant it is necessary to mention one material fact."}}, {"text": "August 28, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8087, "end_char": 8102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The application for ejectment was made on August 28, 1956."}}, {"text": "ss. 13 and 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8315, "end_char": 8328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8341, "end_char": 8354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8546, "end_char": 8551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8567, "end_char": 8599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8625, "end_char": 8635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab\n\nUrban Rent Restriction Act, 1947", "statute": "the Punjab\n\nUrban Rent Restriction Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Section 13(3)(a)(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8963, "end_char": 8984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab\n\nUrban Rent Restriction Act, 1947", "statute": "the Punjab\n\nUrban Rent Restriction Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Section 13(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9407, "end_char": 9420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab\n\nUrban Rent Restriction Act, 1947", "statute": "the Punjab\n\nUrban Rent Restriction Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9938, "end_char": 9943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9963, "end_char": 9968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11197, "end_char": 11202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lahore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12432, "end_char": 12438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case the appellant who was a displaced person from Lahore was the owner of a house there and had arranged to have it exchanged with certain lands in a village in the St'ate of Delhi belonging to an evacuee' M '."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12557, "end_char": 12562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case the appellant who was a displaced person from Lahore was the owner of a house there and had arranged to have it exchanged with certain lands in a village in the St'ate of Delhi belonging to an evacuee' M '."}}, {"text": "February 23, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12596, "end_char": 12613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 23, 1948, the said owner made an application to the Additional Custodian of Evacuee Property (Rural) Delhi for the confirmation of the transaction of exchange under s. 5-A of the East Punjab Evi!-cuees' (Administration of Property) Act, 1947 as amended in 1948 and applied to the State of Delhi."}}, {"text": "Additional Custodian of Evacuee Property (Rural) Delhi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12657, "end_char": 12711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 23, 1948, the said owner made an application to the Additional Custodian of Evacuee Property (Rural) Delhi for the confirmation of the transaction of exchange under s. 5-A of the East Punjab Evi!-cuees' (Administration of Property) Act, 1947 as amended in 1948 and applied to the State of Delhi."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12770, "end_char": 12774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12907, "end_char": 12911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 20, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13129, "end_char": 13143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, the application in question was not disposed of until March 20, 1952, on which date the Additional Custodian passed an order confirming the exchange."}}, {"text": "Meanwhile the relevant provisions of the law had been amended and ultimately Central Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13226, "end_char": 13314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13422, "end_char": 13427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Meanwhile the relevant provisions of the law had been amended and ultimately Central Act", "statute": "Meanwhile the relevant provisions of the law had been amended and ultimately Central Act"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13923, "end_char": 13927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Meanwhile the relevant provisions of the law had been amended and ultimately Central Act", "statute": "Meanwhile the relevant provisions of the law had been amended and ultimately Central Act"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13986, "end_char": 13990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Meanwhile the relevant provisions of the law had been amended and ultimately Central Act", "statute": "Meanwhile the relevant provisions of the law had been amended and ultimately Central Act"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14178, "end_char": 14182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Meanwhile the relevant provisions of the law had been amended and ultimately Central Act", "statute": "Meanwhile the relevant provisions of the law had been amended and ultimately Central Act"}}, {"text": "s. 58(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14233, "end_char": 14241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Meanwhile the relevant provisions of the law had been amended and ultimately Central Act", "statute": "Meanwhile the relevant provisions of the law had been amended and ultimately Central Act"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14492, "end_char": 14496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14504, "end_char": 14523, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 58(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14545, "end_char": 14553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14777, "end_char": 14781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jagannadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14916, "end_char": 14929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even if there be in law any such right at all'', observed Jagannadhadas J., who delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court, \" it can in no sense be a vested or accrued right."}}, {"text": "Indira Sohanlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15989, "end_char": 16004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may incidentally point out that the said principle laid down in the case of Indira Sohanlal (') has been cited by this Court in Garikapatti Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhury ('), and it has been observed that the question which was left open by the court on the earlier occasion fell to be considered in the case of\n\n(1) (1927) I.L.R. 9 Lah 284."}}, {"text": "Garikapatti V eeraya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16341, "end_char": 16361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) (1905) A.C. 369\n\n(4) (1957 J S.C.R. 488\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REJ;>ORTS 903\n\nGarikapatti V eeraya (1) and was in fact considered and r960 decided."}}, {"text": "Achru Ram", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16415, "end_char": 16424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Achru Ram, for the respondent, has h f I\n\n; i• Moti Rain suggested that the very passage in t e case o nu, ira v.\n\nSohanlal (2) which enunciated the principle appears to Suraj Bhan have been cited with approval.", "canonical_name": "Achhru Ram"}}, {"text": "Sohanlal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16530, "end_char": 16538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Achru Ram, for the respondent, has h f I\n\n; i• Moti Rain suggested that the very passage in t e case o nu, ira v.\n\nSohanlal (2) which enunciated the principle appears to Suraj Bhan have been cited with approval."}}, {"text": "Gajendra •adkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16700, "end_char": 16715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However that may _ be, we are bound by the decision of this Court in the Gajendra •adkar J. case of Indira Sohanlal (2) and that decision is clearly b against the contention of the appellant that the amended provision in respect of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court was inapplicable.", "canonical_name": "GAJ'1NDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "s. 13(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16988, "end_char": 16996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18500, "end_char": 18508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18647, "end_char": 18655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gojendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18847, "end_char": 18861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the new provision is held to be\n\nGojendragadkar J. retrospective in its operation what would be the consequence?"}}, {"text": "s. 13(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19075, "end_char": 19083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19590, "end_char": 19598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20144, "end_char": 20161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even so we have allowed Mr. Bindra to raise the point before us but we see no substance in it~ This point has been considered by the Punjab High Court in Ram Parshad Halwai, Ludhiana v. Mukhtiar Chand (1 ) and it appears that the Punjab High Court has taken the same view about the effect of the amendment made m s. 13(3) (a) (iii)."}}, {"text": "s. 13(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20324, "end_char": 20332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Uindra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20406, "end_char": 20412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Uindra has argued that the High Court was in error in coming to its own conclusion as to whether the requirement of s. 13(3) (a) (iii) has been satisfied .. As we have already pointed out the finding of the Rent Controller and the appellate authority was that the claim made by respondent 1 that he\n\n\\I) I.l,."}}, {"text": "s. 13(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20522, "end_char": 20530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21026, "end_char": 21034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21067, "end_char": 21073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21130, "end_char": 21138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13(3)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21420, "end_char": 21431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13(3)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21872, "end_char": 21883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 13(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22220, "end_char": 22228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1960_2_906_911_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "February, 3\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960 (2))\n\nPETLAD TURKEY RED DYE WORKS LTD. v.\n\nDYES & CHEMICAL WORKERS' UNION,\n\nPETLAD & AK:R.\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SUBBA RAO AND\n\nK.C. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)\n\nWorking capital-Reserve fund utilised as such-Return, if atty available-Balance sheet, if proof of reserve actually used as working capital.\n\nThe Industrial Tribunal, in the process of ascertaining the available surplus, disalJowed a claim of the appelJant employer for interest on a certain sum of money standing in the depreciation fund and alleged to have been used as working capital. If this claim was alJowed and the amount claimed deducted as a prior charge, the employees would not be entitled to any bonus as there would be no surplus. The Industrial Tribunal was of opinion that even if the depreciation reserve was utilised as \\vorking capital no return thereon was allo\\vable in deciding what amount was to , be deducted as prior charge. On appeal the appellant contended, inter alia, that the balance sheet of the employer company placed before the Industrial Tribunal itself showed thatthe entire sum of depreciation fund was used as working capital.\n\nHeld, that any portion of the reserve fund actualJy utilised as working capital in the year under consideration should be treated as entitled to a reasonable rate of return and the amount thus ascertained deducted as a prior charge in ascertaining the available surplus.\n\nThe balance sheet did not by itself prove the fact of utilisation of any reserve as working capital and the law required that such an important fact as the utilisation of the reserve as working capital had to be proved by the employer by evidence on affidavit or otherwise after giving opportunity to the workmen to contest the correctness of such evidence by cross-examination.\n\nManagement of Trichinopoly Mills Ltd. v. National Cotton Textile Mills Workers Union, C.A. No. 309 of 1957. and Khandesh Spg. & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. The Rashtriya Girni Kamgar Sangh, J algaon, C.A. No. 257 of 1958, folJowed.\n\nIndian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen. (1959) II L.L.J. 357, explained.\n\nCrvrL\n\nAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 258 of 1958.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Award dated August 17, 1957, of the Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, in Keference (IT) No. 15 of 1957.\n\nI.M. N anavati, S. N. Andley, J.B. Dadachanji and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant,\n\n....\n\nB.K.B. Naidu and I. N. Shroff, for respondent\n\nN 0. 1.\n\nP. T. Red Dye I. N. Shroff, for interveners Nos. 1 and 2. works Ltd. 1960, February 3.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was v. delivered by Dyes & Chemical D.As GUPTA, J.-The only point raised in this Workers' Union appeal by the employer, Petlad Turkey Red Dye Works Ltd., Petlad, against the award of an Industrial Tribunal of a sum of Rs. 9,839 equivalent to one month's basic wages is as regards the correctness of the disallowance, in the process of ascertaining the available surplus, of a claim of 4% interest on Rs. 2,27,000 standing in the depreciation fund said to have been used as working capital. If this claim was allowed and the amount claimed deducted as a prior charge no surplus would remain so that the employees would not be entitled to any bonus. The Industrial Tribunal was of opinion that even if the depreciation reserve was utilized as working capital no return thereon was allowable for the purposes of deciding on the amount to be deducted as prior eharges in applying the Full Bench Formula. In this view it was clearly wrong.\n\nNumerous decisions of this Court make it abundantly clear that any portion of the reserve actually utilized as working capital in the year under consideration should be treated as entitled to a reasonable rate of return and the amount thus ascertained deducted as a prior charge in ascertaining the available surplus. There is no reason whatsoever for making an exception in this respect as regards depreciation reserves.\n\nThe question remains, however, whether this amount of Rs. 2,27,000 in the depreciation fund was actually used as working capital. The Tribunal did not think it necessary to consider this question, as in its view even if this entire amount has been utilised as working capital no return was allowable. If on the materials on.the record it was possible to reach a conclusion that any reserve or any portion of it was used as working capital during the period under CQnsideration we would have thought fit to calculate the amount allowable as return thereupon and deducted it from the amount ascertained as surplus\n\nDas Gupta].\n\n• z96o by the Industrial Tribunal. On an examination of P. T. Red Dye the record, however, we cannot discover any such works Ltd. material. All that we have is that the employer v.\n\nCompany in its written statement claimed interest on Dyes & Chemfral reserves as working capital at Rs. 32,000 the rate of\n\nWorkers' Union return being mentioned as 4%. It was not men-\n\nDas Gupta f tioned therein in so many words that the depreciation fund was part of the reserves employed as working capital. It is claimed however that such an averment was implicit in the claim of Rs. 32,000 as the amount allowable as return on reserves employed as working capital. Assuming that this is so it still remained the duty -of the Company to prove that any portion of the depreciation fund was actually utilised as working capital. It was suggested before us that this averment by implication that the depreciation fund was also used as working capital was not challenged by the workers. This suggestion is obviously incorrect.\n\nWe find that in Exhibit U/l a statement submitted on behalf of the workers containing calculations for the available surplus Rs. 3,000 was shown as the amount deductible on working capital at 2%. That is, a sum of Rs. 1,50,000 out of the reserves was stated to have been used as working capital. The employer's statement in Exhibit C/3 dated July 12, 1957, shows a deduction of\"Interest at 4% ou Reserves employed as working capital-Rs. 32,000\". A similar claim is made in Ex. C/4, an alternative statement filed on behalf of the employer on July, 12, 1957. The workmen also filed a statement showing calculations of bonus made by them on the same date i.e., July, 12,\n\n1957. This is marked as Ex. U/3. According to this, return at the rate of 4% on working capital of Rs. 1,66,000 was allowable as deduction. Thus, according to workmen, the reserves used as working capital was stated to be Rs. 1,66,000 while according to the employer this amount was no less than 8 lakhs.\n\nIt is quite clear therefore that the workmen had at no stage admitted either expressly or by implication the employer's claim that any portion of the depreciation fund was utilized as working reserve.\n\nOn behalf of the appellant it was strenuously contended, however, that the balance.sheet of the\n\n• -\n\nCompany which was placed before the Industrial\n\nP. T. Red Dye Works Ltd.\n\nTribunal will itself show that the entire sum of depreciation fund of Rs. 2,27,000 was used as working capital. The balance-sheet does show a sum of v.\n\nRs. 2,27 ,000 as the depreciation fund.\n\nAssuming for Dyes &- Chemical the purposes of the present case that this was the Workers' Union actual sum standing in the depreciation reserve the . further question is whether the balance-sheet proves that this sum was utilized as working capital. Assuming further for the purposes of this case that the analysis of the statement made in the balance-sheet might indicate that this sum could not but have been utilised as working capital, it has to be remembered that no such conclusion is possible unless it is known as a fact that the statements made in the balancesheets under the different heads are correct statements.\n\nOn that there is absolutely no evidence. All that the balance-sheet, as submitted, shows is that certain statements were made. The mere fact that the statements were made can never be taken as proving that the statements were correct.\n\nThat is a distinction which the courts of law have always been careful to make. Thus, if a person is to prove that he was ill on a particular date, the mere filing of a certificate of a medical man that he was ill on that date is not accepted as evidence to show that he was ill. The correctness of the statement made in the certificate has to be proved by an affidavit or oral testimony in court by the Doctor concerned or by some other evidence. There is no reason why an exception should be made in the case of balance sheets prepared by Companies for themselves. It has to be borne in mind that in m::i.ny cases the Directors of the Companies may feel inclined to make incorrect statements in these balance-sheets for ulterior purposes.\n\nWhile that is no reason to suspect every statement made in these balance-sheets, the position is clear that we cannot presume the statements made therein to be always correct. The burden is on the party who asserts a statement to be correct to prove the same by relevant and acceptable evidence. The\n\nmere 1;1ta, tement of the b1J.>lance-ebeet ie of no assistance\n\nDas Gupta] .\n\nto show therefore that any portion of the reserve was actually utilized as working capital.\n\nP:O,:,'~ye The question whether a balance-sheet can be taken\n\nv. as proof of a claim of what portion of reserve has Dyes & Chemical actually been used as working capital was very\n\nWorkers Union recently considered by us in Kha.ndesh Spg. & Weaving Mill Go., Ltd. v. The Rashtriya Girni Kamgar Sangh, Jalgaon (Civil Appeal No. 257 of 1958).\n\nAs was Das Gupta j.\n\npointed out by Subba Rao, J. in that case the balancesheet of a Company is prepared by the Company's own officers and when so much depends on the ascertainment of what portion of the reserve was utilized as working capital, the principles of equity and justice demand that an Industrial Court should insist upon a clear proof of the same and also give a real and adequate opportunity to the labour to canvass the correctness of the particulars furnished by the employer. In that case we also considered an observation in Indian Hume Pipe Company Ltd. v.\n\nTheir Workmen (1 ) which was relied upon for an argument that the balance-sheet was good evidence to prove that amounts were actually used as working capital. As was pointed out in Khandesh Spg. & Weaving Mills Gase (Supra) this observation was not intended to lay down the law that a balance-sheet by itself was good evidence to prove any fact as regards the actual utilisation of reserves as working capital.\n\nThe observation relied on was a sentence at page 362 :-\"Moreover, no objection was urged in this behalf, nor was any finding to the contrary recorded by the Tribunal.\" If it had been intended to state as a matter of law that the balance-sheet itself was good evidence to prove the fact of utilisation of a portion of the reserve as working capital it would have been unnecessary to add such a sentence.\n\nThis question as regards the sufficiency of the balance-sheet itself to prove the fact of utilization of any reserve as working capital was also considered by us in Management of Trichinopoly Mills Ltd. v.\n\nNational Cotton Textile Mills Workers Union (Civil Appeal No. 309 of 1957) and it was held that the balance-sheet does not by itself prove any 'such fact and that the law requires that such an important\n\n(1) (1959) II L.L.J. 357\n\n......\n\nfact as the utilisation of a portion of the reserve as working capital has to be proved by the employer by evidence given on affidavit or otherwise and after giving an opportunity to the workmen to contest the correctness of such evidence by cross-examination.\n\nWe must therefore reject the contention urged on behalf of the employer-appellant that the balancesheet that has been filed is sufficient to prove that Rs. 2,27,000 of the depreciation fund was actually used as working capital. There is, as we have already stated, no material on the record from which any conclusion can be reached as regards the utilisation of the whole or any portion of this sum lying in depreciation fund as working capital.\n\nThe appellant's counsel finally asked that the matter may be sent back to the Industrial Tribunal and an opportunity given to him to adduce proper evidence on this point.\n\nWe do not see any circumstance that will justify us in making an order of remand in a case of this nature.\n\nThe appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH\n\nHAFIZ MOHAMMAD ISMAIL AND\n\nHAFIZ JAWED ALI\n\n(JAFER IMAM, K. N. WANCHOO AND J. c. SHAH, JJ.)\n\nCriminal Trial-Counterfeit trade mark-Wrappers and labels of soap made to resemble those of another soap-If Counterfeit- Indian Penal Code, I86o (XLV of I86o). ss. 28 and 486.\n\nThe respondents were found selling counterfeit Sunlight and Lifebuoy soaps and were prosecuted under s. 486 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe Magistrate found that the resemblance between the wrappers and labels in which the soaps were being sold and those of the genuine soaps was such that a person may be deceived by it and convicted the respondents. An appeal to the Sessions Judge was dismissed. On revisl.on the High Court held that the wrappers and labels were mere colourable imitations of the genuine trade mark, but were not counterfeit and acquitted the respondents.\n\nII6\n\nP. T. Red Dye\n\nWo?hs Ltd. v.\n\nDyes &- Chemical\n\nWorkers' Union\n\nDas Gupta].\n\nFebruary, 9", "total_entities": 33, "entities": [{"text": "PETLAD TURKEY RED DYE WORKS LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 47, "end_char": 78, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PETLAD TURKEY RED DYE WORKS LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "v.\n\nDYES & CHEMICAL WORKERS' UNION,\n\nPETLAD & AK", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 128, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DYES & CHEMICAL WORKERS UNION, PETLAD & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 134, "end_char": 154, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SUBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 156, "end_char": 168, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K.C. DAS GUPTA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 174, "end_char": 193, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "I.M. N anavati", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2318, "end_char": 2332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.M. N anavati, S. N. Andley, J.B. Dadachanji and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant,\n\n....\n\nB.K.B. Naidu and I. N. Shroff, for respondent\n\nN 0."}}, {"text": "S. N. Andley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2334, "end_char": 2346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.M. N anavati, S. N. Andley, J.B. Dadachanji and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant,\n\n....\n\nB.K.B. Naidu and I. N. Shroff, for respondent\n\nN 0."}}, {"text": "J.B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2348, "end_char": 2363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.M. N anavati, S. N. Andley, J.B. Dadachanji and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant,\n\n....\n\nB.K.B. Naidu and I. N. Shroff, for respondent\n\nN 0."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2368, "end_char": 2382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.M. N anavati, S. N. Andley, J.B. Dadachanji and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant,\n\n....\n\nB.K.B. Naidu and I. N. Shroff, for respondent\n\nN 0."}}, {"text": "B.K.B. Naidu", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2410, "end_char": 2422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.M. N anavati, S. N. Andley, J.B. Dadachanji and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant,\n\n....\n\nB.K.B. Naidu and I. N. Shroff, for respondent\n\nN 0."}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2427, "end_char": 2439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I.M. N anavati, S. N. Andley, J.B. Dadachanji and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant,\n\n....\n\nB.K.B. Naidu and I. N. Shroff, for respondent\n\nN 0."}}, {"text": "P. T. Red Dye I. N. Shroff", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2466, "end_char": 2492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. T. Red Dye I. N. Shroff, for interveners Nos.", "canonical_name": "P. T. Red Dye I. N. Shroff"}}, {"text": "Dyes & Chemical D.As GUPTA", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2600, "end_char": 2626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was v. delivered by Dyes & Chemical D.As GUPTA, J.-The only point raised in this Workers' Union appeal by the employer, Petlad Turkey Red Dye Works Ltd., Petlad, against the award of an Industrial Tribunal of a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Petlad Turkey Red Dye Works Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2700, "end_char": 2732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was v. delivered by Dyes & Chemical D.As GUPTA, J.-The only point raised in this Workers' Union appeal by the employer, Petlad Turkey Red Dye Works Ltd., Petlad, against the award of an Industrial Tribunal of a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Das Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4552, "end_char": 4561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If on the materials on.the record it was possible to reach a conclusion that any reserve or any portion of it was used as working capital during the period under CQnsideration we would have thought fit to calculate the amount allowable as return thereupon and deducted it from the amount ascertained as surplus\n\nDas Gupta].", "canonical_name": "Das Gupta"}}, {"text": "P. T. Red Dye", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4621, "end_char": 4634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On an examination of P. T. Red Dye the record, however, we cannot discover any such works Ltd. material.", "canonical_name": "P. T. Red Dye I. N. Shroff"}}, {"text": "July 12, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5917, "end_char": 5930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The employer's statement in Exhibit C/3 dated July 12, 1957, shows a deduction of\"Interest at 4% ou Reserves employed as working capital-Rs."}}, {"text": "July, 12, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6117, "end_char": 6131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C/4, an alternative statement filed on behalf of the employer on July, 12, 1957."}}, {"text": "July, 12,\n\n1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6234, "end_char": 6249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The workmen also filed a statement showing calculations of bonus made by them on the same date i.e., July, 12,\n\n1957."}}, {"text": "Industrial\n\nP. T. Red Dye Works Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6891, "end_char": 6927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the appellant it was strenuously contended, however, that the balance.sheet of the\n\n• -\n\nCompany which was placed before the Industrial\n\nP. T. Red Dye Works Ltd.\n\nTribunal will itself show that the entire sum of depreciation fund of Rs."}}, {"text": "Das Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9547, "end_char": 9556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As was Das Gupta j.\n\npointed out by Subba Rao, J. in that case the balancesheet of a Company is prepared by the Company's own officers and when so much depends on the ascertainment of what portion of the reserve was utilized as working capital, the principles of equity and justice demand that an Industrial Court should insist upon a clear proof of the same and also give a real and adequate opportunity to the labour to canvass the correctness of the particulars furnished by the employer.", "canonical_name": "Das Gupta"}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9576, "end_char": 9585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As was Das Gupta j.\n\npointed out by Subba Rao, J. in that case the balancesheet of a Company is prepared by the Company's own officers and when so much depends on the ascertainment of what portion of the reserve was utilized as working capital, the principles of equity and justice demand that an Industrial Court should insist upon a clear proof of the same and also give a real and adequate opportunity to the labour to canvass the correctness of the particulars furnished by the employer."}}, {"text": "Khandesh Spg. & Weaving Mills Gase", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10297, "end_char": 10331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As was pointed out in Khandesh Spg. &"}}, {"text": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12438, "end_char": 12460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH\n\nHAFIZ MOHAMMAD ISMAIL AND\n\nHAFIZ JAWED ALI\n\n(JAFER IMAM, K. N. WANCHOO AND J. c. SHAH, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "HAFIZ MOHAMMAD ISMAIL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12462, "end_char": 12483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH\n\nHAFIZ MOHAMMAD ISMAIL AND\n\nHAFIZ JAWED ALI\n\n(JAFER IMAM, K. N. WANCHOO AND J. c. SHAH, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "HAFIZ JAWED ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12489, "end_char": 12504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH\n\nHAFIZ MOHAMMAD ISMAIL AND\n\nHAFIZ JAWED ALI\n\n(JAFER IMAM, K. N. WANCHOO AND J. c. SHAH, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "JAFER IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12507, "end_char": 12517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH\n\nHAFIZ MOHAMMAD ISMAIL AND\n\nHAFIZ JAWED ALI\n\n(JAFER IMAM, K. N. WANCHOO AND J. c. SHAH, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12519, "end_char": 12532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH\n\nHAFIZ MOHAMMAD ISMAIL AND\n\nHAFIZ JAWED ALI\n\n(JAFER IMAM, K. N. WANCHOO AND J. c. SHAH, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "c. SHAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12540, "end_char": 12547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH\n\nHAFIZ MOHAMMAD ISMAIL AND\n\nHAFIZ JAWED ALI\n\n(JAFER IMAM, K. N. WANCHOO AND J. c. SHAH, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12676, "end_char": 12693, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 28 and 486", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12715, "end_char": 12729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Trial-Counterfeit trade mark-Wrappers and labels of soap made to resemble those of another soap-If Counterfeit- Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Criminal Trial-Counterfeit trade mark-Wrappers and labels of soap made to resemble those of another soap-If Counterfeit- Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 486", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12833, "end_char": 12839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Trial-Counterfeit trade mark-Wrappers and labels of soap made to resemble those of another soap-If Counterfeit- Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Criminal Trial-Counterfeit trade mark-Wrappers and labels of soap made to resemble those of another soap-If Counterfeit- Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12847, "end_char": 12864, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]} {"document_id": "1960_2_911_917_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "......\n\nS.C .. R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 911\n\nfact as the utilisation of a portion of the reserve as working capital has to be proved by the employer by evidence given on affidavit or otherwise and after giving an opportunity to the workmen to contest the correctness of such evidence by cross-examination.\n\nWe must therefore reject the contention urged on behalf of the employer-appellant that the balancesheet that has been filed is sufficient to prove that Rs. 2,27,000 of the depreciation fund was actually used as working capital. There is, as we have already stated, no material on the record from which any conclusion can be reached as regards the utilisation of the whole or any portion of this sum lying in depreciation fund as working capital.\n\nThe appellant's counsel finally asked that the matter may be sent back to the Industrial Tribunal and an opportunity given to him to adduce proper evidence on this point.\n\nWe do not see any circumstance that will justify us in making an order of remand in a case of this nature.\n\nThe appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH\n\nHAFIZ MOHAMMAD ISMAIL AND\n\nHAFIZ JAWED ALI\n\n(JAFER IMAM, K. N. WANCHOO AND J. c. SHAH, JJ.)\n\nCriminal Trial-Counterfeit trade mark-Wrappers and labels of soap made to resemble those of another soap-If Counterfeit- Indian Penal Code, I86o (XLV of I86o). ss. 28 and 486.\n\nThe respondents were found selling counterfeit Sunlight and Lifebuoy soaps and were prosecuted under s. 486 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe Magistrate found that the resemblance between the wrappers and labels in which the soaps were being sold and those of the genuine soaps was such that a person may be deceived by it and convicted the respondents. An appeal to the Sessions Judge was dismissed. On revisl.on the High Court held that the wrappers and labels were mere colourable imitations of the genuine trade mark, but were not counterfeit and acquitted the respondents.\n\nII6\n\nP. T. Red Dye\n\nWo?hs Ltd. v.\n\nDyes &- Chemical\n\nWorkers' Union\n\nDas Gupta].\n\nFebruary, 9\n\nr960\n\nState of U. P,\n\nH ufiz ~VJ ohnnirned\n\nIsmail & Hafiz jawed Ali\n\nHeld, that the wrappers and labels were counterfeit of the genuine wrappers and labels of Sunlight and Lifebuoy soaps. In order to prove that the v.rrappers and labels were counterfeit within the meaning of s. 28 of the Indian Penal Code rear! with Explanation z thereof the Court had to decide (i) whether the \\vrappers and labels on the soaps sold by the respondents were made to resemble the \\vrappers and l:J.bls of the genuine Sunlight and Lifebuoy soaps, and (ii) if they were so made to resemble, whether the resemblance \\Vas such as might deceiyea pcr':'..on.\n\nIt \\\\-'as not necessary to import \\Yards like \"coluurablc imitation \" ins. 28. Explanation I of s. 28 provided that it \\Vas not essential to counterfeiting that the imirntion should be exact and the High Court had erred in not considering \\vhether tl1e resemblance was such as might deceive a person, inspite of the difference in detail between the two sets of wrappers and labels.\n\nCriminal Appellate Jurisdiction : Criminal Appeals Nos. 129-130 of 57. ' Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 13, 1956 of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) at Lucknow in Criminal Revisions Nos. 118 and 119 of 1955, arising out of the judgment and order dated March 31, 1959 of the Second Civil and Sessions Judge, Lucknow in Criminal\n\nAppeals Nos. 511 and 512 of 1954.\n\nH. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India, G. C. Mathur, and 0. P. Lal, for the appellant.\n\nN uruddin Ahmad and N aunit Lal, for the respon dents. 1960 February, 9. The Judgment of the Court\n\nwas delivered by ,..\n\nWanchoo J.\n\nW ANCHOO, J.-These are two connected appeals by special leave againt the judgment of the Allahabad c High Court. The brief fa<>ts necessary for their disposal are these.\n\nOue Bhagwan Swarup Saxena, the Trade Marks Investigator, Lever Brothers Limited\n\nIndia (hereinafter called the company) was working in Lucknow on behalf of the company. He came to know that counterfeit Sunlight and Lifebuoy soaps were being manufactured and sold on a large scale in Y ahiaganj and other places in Lucknow. This was investigated on behalf of the company which manufactured genuine Sunlight and Lifebuoy soaps. It was found that two soap factories in Lucknow were manufacturing , counterfeit Sunlight and Lifebuoy\n\nsoaps. It was also found that l!a.fiz Mohammad •\n\nIsmail and Hafiz Jawed Ali who are the respondents r96o in the two appeals before us were selling these counterfeit soaps in Yahiaganj where they have shops.\n\nStateofU.P.\n\nConsequently a raid was made on the two shops with H ifi r..; h a. the help of the police on May 19, 1953. A large ;,,; ail:;:,;;\n\nnumber of soaps were recovered from the two shops Jawed Ali which were wrapped in labels said to be counterfeits of those in which the genuine Sunlight and Lifebuoy Wanchoo .f. soaps of the company are sold. Consequently the two respondents were prosecuted under ss. 482 and 486 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe Magistrate found the case proved and held that the labels in which the respondents were selling soaps were counterfeit of the labels of genuine Sunlight and Lifebuoy soaps. He, therefore, convicted the respond.ents under ss. 482 and 486 of the Code. The respondents went in appeal to the Sessiom; Judge but their appeals were dismissed. They then went in revision to the High Court. The High Court held that the cases did not fall within s. 482 of the Indian Penal Code and therefore acquitted them of the charge under that section. It further held that the labels or wrappers used on the soaps sold by he respondents could not be regarded as counterfeit of the genuine wrappers and labels of Sunlight and Lifebuoy soaps though they were colourable imitations of the same; it therefore acquitted them under s 486 also, without going into the other points raised on behalf of the respondents. The applications of the State of Uttar\n\nPradesh for a certificate to appeal to this Court having been rejected, the State applied for leave to appeal to this Court which was granted; and that is how the matter has come up before us.\n\nThe learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the State has not pressed the appeals so far as the acquittal under s. 482 of the Code is concerned. The\n\nacquitt.al therefore under that section will stand. He has, however, strenuously urged that the view of t.he High Court that the wrappers and labels are not counterfeit but are mere colourable imitations of the genuine trade marks of the company is incorrect inasmqch as the High Court has not given full effect to the\n\nr960\n\nState of U. P.\n\nHafiz .11.f ohamnied\n\nIsmail & fl afi z\n\nJawed Ali\n\nWanchoo ].\n\n914 SUPREME COURT REPOl'tTS [l!l60 (2)]\n\nwords of s. 486 in that behalf and the definition of ' counterfeit' in s. 28 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nSection 28 is in these terms-\n\n\" A person is said to 'counterfeit ' who causes one thing to resemble another thing, intending by means of that resemblance to practise deception or knowing it to be likely that deception will thereby be practised. . Explanation 1.-It is not essential to counterfeiting that the imitation should he exact.\n\nExplanation 2.-When a person causes one thing to resemble another thing, and the resemblance is such that a person might be deceived thereby, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that the person so causing the one thing to resemble the other thing intended by means of that resemblance to practise deception or knew it to be likely that deception would thereby be practised.\" The relevant part of s. 486 is in these terms-\n\n\" Whoever sells, or exposes, or has in possession for sale or any purpose of trade or manufacture any goods or things with a counterfeit trade mark or property mark affixed to or impressed upon the same or to or upon any case, package or other receptacle in which such goods are contained, shall, unless he proves- ( a) ....... ········································ ............... .\n\n(b) .................•....•........................•..........•......\n\n(c) .............................................................. . be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year or with fine or with both.\" The contention on behalf of the appellants is that the High Court in holding that the labels and wrappers in this case were only coloura hie imitations of the genuine trade mark labels and wrappers of the company and were not counterfeit has not taken into account the words of s. 28 and particularly of the two Explanations thereof. It is pointed out that the words \"colourable imitation\" do not appear ins. 28 which defines the word \"counterfeit \" and t)J.e High Court seems to have misdirected itself by treating the wrappers and labels in this case as colourable\n\nimitations and not counterfeit within the meaning of s. 28.\n\nThe main ingredients of counterfeiting as laid down in s. 28 are (i) causing one thing to resemble another thing, and (ii) intending by means of that r:esemblance to practise deception or (iii) knowing it to be likely that deception will thereby be practised. Thus if one thing is made to resemble another thing and the intention is that by such resemblance deception would be practised or even if there is no intention but it is known to be likely that the resemblance is such that deception will thereby be practised there is counterfeiting. Then comes Explanation 1 to s. 28 which lays down that it is not essential to counterfeiting that the imitation should be exact.\n\nOrdinarily counterfeiting implies the idea of an exact imitation; but for the purpose of the Indian P'enal Code there can be counterfeiting even though the imitation is not exact and there are differences in detail between the original and the imitation so long as the resemblance is so close that deception may thereby be practised.\n\nThen comes the second Explanation which lays down that where the resemblance is such that a person might be deceived thereby it shall be presumed until the contrary is proved that the person causing one thing to resemble another thing was intending by means of that resemblance to practise deception or knew it to be likely that deception would thereby be practised. This Jl}.rplanation lays down a rebuttable presumption where the resemblance is such that .a person might be deceived thereby.\n\nIn such a case the intention or the knowledge is presumed unless the contrary is proved.\n\nThis analysis of s. 28 shows that there is no necessity of. importing words like ' colourable imitation ' therein. In order to apply it, what the Court bas to see is whether one thing is made to resemble another thing, and if that is so and if the resemblance is such that a person might be deceived by it there will be a presumption of the necessary intention or knowledge to make the thing counterfeit, unless the contrary is 11roved.\n\nWhat the court therefore has to see is whether one thing has been made to resemble another\n\nState of U. P.\n\nHafiz Mohamed Ismail & H afii\n\njawed Ali\n\nWanchoo .f.\n\n1960 thing. If it finds that in fact one thing has been\n\nma.de to resemble another it has further to decide State of u. P. whether the resemblance is such that a person might\n\nHafiz !>; hammed be deceived. If it comes to the conclusion that the\n\nfonail &- HafiZ resemblance is such that a person might be deceived Jawed Ati by it, it can presume the necessary intenion or knowledge (until the contrary is proved) and counterfeiting Wanchoo J. would then be complete. Therefore the two things that were necessary to decide in this case were (i) whether the labels or wrappers on the soaps sold by the respondents were made to resemble the labels and wrappers of the genuine Sunlight and Lifebuoy soaps, and (ii) if they were so made to resemble, whether resemblance was such as might deceive a person. If both these things were found the labels and wrappers in this case would be counterfeit and the necessary intention or knowledge would be presumed unless the contrary was proved.\n\nNow the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge examined the wrappers and labels in this case and compared them with the genuine labels and wrappers of the Sunlight and Lifebuoy soaps of the company and came to the conclusion that there was resemblance between the two sets of wrappers and labels and that that resemblance was so close that a person might be deceived. On that finding, they held that these wrappers and labels were counterfeit because the contrary was not proved before them. The High Court does not say that there is no resemblance between the two sets of wrappers and labels. The very fact that the High Court says that the wrappers and labels found in this case were colourable imitations of the genuine wrappers and labels shows that there was resemblance. The High Court however has stressed the difference in detail between the two sets of wrappers and labels but seems to have overlooked Explanation 1 of s. 28 which says that it is not essential to counterfeiting that the imitation should be exact, even though the Explanation is quoted in the judgment of the High Court. What the High Court had to decide was whether oven with these differences in detail which had also. been noticed by the Magistrate and the Sessions Judge a person might\n\nbe deceived by these wrappers and labels recoverd from the respondents' shops. This aspect of the matter has not been considered by the High Court at all and it has contented itself by saying that the wrappers and labels recovered in this case were colourable imitations of the genuine trade marks. That in our opinion does not dispose of the matter so far as s. 28 is ·\n\nconcerned.\n\nThe High Court should have found whether the resemblance in this case was such as might deceive a person. The High Court had before it the opinions of the Magistrate and the Sessions Judge. Their opinion was to the effect that the resemblance was such as might deceive a person and that the differences in detail did not affect that resemblance. It was this aspect of the matter which the High Court failed to consider when it went on to hold that the labels and wrappers recovered along with the soaps from the shops of the respondents were not counterfeit.\n\nWe have looked at the labels and wrappers on the soaps recovered from the shops of the respondents ourselves and compared them with the labels and wrappers of the genuine Sunlight and Lifebuoy soaps and we agree with the opinions of the Magistrate and the. Sessions Judge that the resemblance is such that a person may be deceived by it.\n\nIn the circumstances, Explanation 2 to s. 28 will apply and as the contrary was not proved it must be hPld that the necessary intention or knowledge was there and these wrappers and labels arc counterfeit of the genuine wrappers and labels of the Sunlight and Lifebuoy soaps of the company.\n\nThe appeals must therefore be allowed; but as the High Court did not consider the points relating to jurisdiction and limitation and whether the respondents were protected under cl. (a) and cl. (b) or (c) of s. 486, they will have to be remanded to the High Court for disposal ac0ording to law on these points.\n\nWe therefore allow the appeals and setting aside the acquittal Of the respondents under s. 486 of the Indian Penal Code only send the cases back to the High Court\n\n0for disposal on the lines indicated above.\n\nAppeals allowed.\n\nOases remanded,\n\nI960\n\nState of U. P.\n\nHafiz Mohamed Ismail &- H aftz\n\nJawed Alt\n\nWanchoo ].", "total_entities": 56, "entities": [{"text": "THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1103, "end_char": 1129, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HAFIZ MOHAMMAD ISMAIL AND\n\nHAFIZ JAWED ALI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1131, "end_char": 1173, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HAFIZ MOHAMMAD ISMAIL AND HAFIZ JAWED ALI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAFER IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1176, "end_char": 1186, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SYED JAFFER IMAM*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. N. WANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1188, "end_char": 1201, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.N. WANCHOO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "c. 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P."}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2349, "end_char": 2354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Trial-Counterfeit trade mark-Wrappers and labels of soap made to resemble those of another soap-If Counterfeit- Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Criminal Trial-Counterfeit trade mark-Wrappers and labels of soap made to resemble those of another soap-If Counterfeit- Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2362, "end_char": 2379, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2807, "end_char": 2812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "H. N. Sanyal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3498, "end_char": 3510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India, G. C. Mathur, and 0."}}, {"text": "0. P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3569, "end_char": 3578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India, G. C. Mathur, and 0."}}, {"text": "N uruddin Ahmad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3600, "end_char": 3615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N uruddin Ahmad and N aunit Lal, for the respon dents."}}, {"text": "N aunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3620, "end_char": 3631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N uruddin Ahmad and N aunit Lal, for the respon dents."}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3722, "end_char": 3729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court\n\nwas delivered by ,..\n\nWanchoo J.\n\nW ANCHOO, J.-These are two connected appeals by special leave againt the judgment of the Allahabad c High Court.", "canonical_name": "W ANCHOO"}}, {"text": "W ANCHOO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3734, "end_char": 3742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court\n\nwas delivered by ,..\n\nWanchoo J.\n\nW ANCHOO, J.-These are two connected appeals by special leave againt the judgment of the Allahabad c High Court.", "canonical_name": "W ANCHOO"}}, {"text": "Oue Bhagwan Swarup Saxena", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3905, "end_char": 3930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Oue Bhagwan Swarup Saxena, the Trade Marks Investigator, Lever Brothers Limited\n\nIndia (hereinafter called the company) was working in Lucknow on behalf of the company."}}, {"text": "Lucknow", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4040, "end_char": 4047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Oue Bhagwan Swarup Saxena, the Trade Marks Investigator, Lever Brothers Limited\n\nIndia (hereinafter called the company) was working in Lucknow on behalf of the company."}}, {"text": "Ismail", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4485, "end_char": 4491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also found that l!a.fiz Mohammad •\n\nIsmail and Hafiz Jawed Ali who are the respondents r96o in the two appeals before us were selling these counterfeit soaps in Yahiaganj where they have shops."}}, {"text": "Hafiz Jawed Ali", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4496, "end_char": 4511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also found that l!a.fiz Mohammad •\n\nIsmail and Hafiz Jawed Ali who are the respondents r96o in the two appeals before us were selling these counterfeit soaps in Yahiaganj where they have shops."}}, {"text": "Yahiaganj", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4610, "end_char": 4619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also found that l!a.fiz Mohammad •\n\nIsmail and Hafiz Jawed Ali who are the respondents r96o in the two appeals before us were selling these counterfeit soaps in Yahiaganj where they have shops."}}, {"text": "May 19, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4750, "end_char": 4762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "StateofU.P.\n\nConsequently a raid was made on the two shops with H ifi r..; h a. the help of the police on May 19, 1953."}}, {"text": "Jawed Ali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4838, "end_char": 4847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A large ;,,; ail:;:,;;\n\nnumber of soaps were recovered from the two shops Jawed Ali which were wrapped in labels said to be counterfeits of those in which the genuine Sunlight and Lifebuoy Wanchoo .f.", "canonical_name": "Jawed Ali"}}, {"text": "ss. 482 and 486", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5051, "end_char": 5066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5074, "end_char": 5091, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 482 and 486", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5319, "end_char": 5334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 482", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5536, "end_char": 5542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5550, "end_char": 5567, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s 486", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5905, "end_char": 5910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Uttar\n\nPradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6014, "end_char": 6037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The applications of the State of Uttar\n\nPradesh for a certificate to appeal to this Court having been rejected, the State applied for leave to appeal to this Court which was granted; and that is how the matter has come up before us."}}, {"text": "s. 482", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6347, "end_char": 6353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of U. P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6711, "end_char": 6725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He has, however, strenuously urged that the view of t.he High Court that the wrappers and labels are not counterfeit but are mere colourable imitations of the genuine trade marks of the company is incorrect inasmqch as the High Court has not given full effect to the\n\nr960\n\nState of U. P.\n\nHafiz .11.f ohamnied\n\nIsmail & fl afi z\n\nJawed Ali\n\nWanchoo ]."}}, {"text": "s. 486", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6841, "end_char": 6847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6903, "end_char": 6908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6916, "end_char": 6933, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6936, "end_char": 6946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 486", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7686, "end_char": 7692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8639, "end_char": 8644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8982, "end_char": 8987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9045, "end_char": 9050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9562, "end_char": 9567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10601, "end_char": 10606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of U. P.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11114, "end_char": 11128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What the court therefore has to see is whether one thing has been made to resemble another\n\nState of U. P.\n\nHafiz Mohamed Ismail & H afii\n\njawed Ali\n\nWanchoo .f.", "canonical_name": "State of U. P."}}, {"text": "Hafiz Mohamed Ismail", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11130, "end_char": 11150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What the court therefore has to see is whether one thing has been made to resemble another\n\nState of U. P.\n\nHafiz Mohamed Ismail & H afii\n\njawed Ali\n\nWanchoo .f."}}, {"text": "H afii\n\njawed Ali\n\nWanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11153, "end_char": 11179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What the court therefore has to see is whether one thing has been made to resemble another\n\nState of U. P.\n\nHafiz Mohamed Ismail & H afii\n\njawed Ali\n\nWanchoo .f."}}, {"text": "Jawed Ati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11499, "end_char": 11508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If it comes to the conclusion that the\n\nfonail &- HafiZ resemblance is such that a person might be deceived Jawed Ati by it, it can presume the necessary intenion or knowledge (until the contrary is proved) and counterfeiting Wanchoo J. would then be complete.", "canonical_name": "Jawed Ali"}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13098, "end_char": 13103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13797, "end_char": 13802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14759, "end_char": 14764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 486", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15220, "end_char": 15226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 486", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15412, "end_char": 15418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15426, "end_char": 15443, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "State of U. P.\n\nHafiz Mohamed Ismail", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15574, "end_char": 15610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Oases remanded,\n\nI960\n\nState of U. P.\n\nHafiz Mohamed Ismail &- H aftz\n\nJawed Alt\n\nWanchoo ]."}}]} {"document_id": "1960_2_918_926_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "February, 9\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960 (2)]\n\nM/S. KUNDAN SUGAR MILLS\n\nZIYAUDDIN AND OTHERS. (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SUBJlA RAO, AND K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.) Industrial Dispute-Rights of employer lo transfer a wor/mian- If implicit in every contract of service.\n\nThe General Manager of the appellant Mills ordered the transfer of four workmen from the appellant mill to a new mill, which had been purchased subsequently. The only connection between the two mills was the identity of ownership and, but for it, one had nothing to do with the other. The concerned workmen protested to.the said order of transfer and did .not acceed to the request, thereupon they were served with notice for disobedience of standing orders and were called upon for explanation which the workmen did and thereafter they were dismissed from service.\n\nThe Labour Appellate Tribunal found that the management had no right to transfer the workmen to the new factory and therefore the order dismissing them was illegal. The appellants came up by special leave before the Supreme Court and contended that the right to transfer an employee by an employer from one of his concerns to another is implicit in every contract of service. The question is \\Vhether a person employed in a factory can be transferred to some other independent concern started by the same employer at a stage subsequent to the date of the employment.\n\nHeld, that apart from any statutory provision, the right of an employee and an employer are governed by the terms of contracts between them or by the terms necessarily implied therefrom; but in the absence of an express agreement between the employer and employees it cannot necessarily be implied that the employer has the right to transfer the employee to any of its concerns in any place, and that the employee has a duty to join the concern to which he may be transferred.\n\nIn the instant case, it was not a condition of service of employment of the concerned workmen either express or implied that the employer had the right to transfer them to a new concern started by the employer subsequent to the date of the employment.\n\nAlexandre Bouzourou v, The Ottoman Bank, A.LR. 1930 P.C. nS, Mary (Anamalai :Plantation Workers' Union) v. Selaliparai Estate, (1956) I.L.L.J. 243 and Bata Shoe Company, Ltd v. Ali Hasan, (1956) I.L.L.J. 278, discussed.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 136 of 1958.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the decision dated April 30, 1956, of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India at Lucknow in Appeal No. III-45 of 1956,\n\nansmg out of the award dated February 6, 1956 of the State Indmitrial Tribunal, Allahabad, in reference No. 96of1955.\n\nRam Lal Anand, J.M. Lal and S. S. Sulcla, for the appellants.\n\nB. D. Sharma, for respondents Nos. 1to5.\n\nO.P. Lal and G. N. Dikshit, for respondent No. 6.\n\n1960. February 9.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered dy\n\nSuBBA RAO, J.-This is an appeal by special leave against the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India setting aside the award of the Industrial Tribunal, Allahabad, and directing the re-instatement of the workers in Kundan Sugar Mills at Amroha. \" Kundan Sugar Mills\" is a partnership concern and owns a sugar mill at Amroha. The respondents 1 to 4 were employed by the appellant as seasonal masons in the year 1946. In 1951 the partners of the appellant-Mills purchased the building machinery and other equipment of another sugar mill at Kiccha' in the district of Nainital. They closed the said mill at Kiccha and started it at Bulandshahr.\n\nThe new factory was named Pannijee Sugar & General Mills, Bulandshahr. On January 19, 1955, the General Manager of the appellant-Mills ordered the transfer of the respondents 1 to 4 from the appellant-Mills to the new mill at Bulandshahr. The said respondents through their representative, the fifth respondent, protested to the General Manager against the said transfer. But the General Manager, by his letter dated January 22/24, 1955, insisted upon their joining the new mill at Bulandshahr. But the said respondents did not accede to his request. On\n\nJanuary 28, 1955, the General Manager served a notice on the respondents 1 to 4 stating that they had disobeyed his orders and thereby committed misconduct under Standing Order No. L(a). They were asked to submit their explanation as to why action should not be taken against them unaer the Standing Order.\n\nThe Labour Union, by its letter dated January 31, 1955, denied t.he charges. On February 2, 1955, the General Manager made an order dismissing the respondents 1 to 4 from service on the ground that\n\nK11ndan Sugar\n\nMills v.\n\nZiyauddin\n\nS11bba Rao J.\n\nJ(undan Sugar\n\nJI/I ills\n\nZiyauddin\n\nSubba Rao].\n\nthey had disobeyed his order of transfer and thns they were guilty of misconduct under Standing Orde1 No. LI(a). The Labour Union there(1fter rnisecl an industrial dispute and the Government of U.P. by its notification dated November 7, 1955, referred the following issue for decision to the State Industrial Tribunal for U. P. at Allahabad:\n\n\"Whether the employers have wrongfully and/or unjustifiably terminated the services of Sarv(1 Shri Zia Uddin, Raisuddin, Shafiqnddin and Ahmed Bt1x for refusal to obey the orders of tranfer to M/s.\n\nPannijee Sugar and General_ Mills Co., Bufandshahr.\n\nIf so, to wh(], t relief are the workmen entitled.\" The State Industrial Tribunal by its order d(], ted February 6, 1956, made its award holding that the management was within its rights and that, as the respondents l to 4 had disobeyed the order of the management, they were properly dismissed by the management. The said respondents through their Union, respondent No. 51 perferred an appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India and the said Appellate Tribunal held that the management had no right to transfer the respondents 1 to 4 to the new factory and therefore the order dismissing them was illegal. The management has preferred the present appeal against the said order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellnnt raised before us the following two questions: (1) The right to transfer an employee by an employer from one of his concern& to another is implicit in every contract of service;\n\n(2) the State Industrial Tribunal having held that both the concerns, i.e., the mills nt Amroha and the mills nt Bulandshahr, forri1ed one unit, the Appellate Tribunal had no juridiction to set aside that finding under s. 7(1) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950.\n\nTo appreciate the first contention, it is necessary to notice the undisputed facts in this case. It is true that the partners of the Sugar Mills at Amroha own also the Sugar Mills at Bulandshahr; but they were proprietors of the former Mills in 1946 whereas they purchased the latter mills only in the year 1951 and\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME OOUR'r B, EPORTS 921\n\nstarted the same in Bulandshahr in or about 1955.\n\nThe respondents l to 4 were employed by the owners of the appellant-Mills at the Sugar Mills at 'Amroha at a time when they were not proprietors of the Sugar Mills at Bulandshahr. It is conceded that it was not an express term of the contract of service between the appellant and the respondents 1 to 4 that the latter should serve in any future concerns which the appellant might acquire or start. lt is also in evidence that though the same persons owned both the Mills they were two different concerns. In the words of the Appellate Tribunal, the only connection between the two is in the identity of ownership and, but for it, one has nothing to do with the other. It is also in evidence that an imported workman at Amroha is entitled to house-rent, fuel, lht and travelling expenses both ways, while at l3ulandshahr the workmen are not entitled to any of these amenities. The workmen at Amroha are entitled to benefits under the Kaul Award while those at Bulandshahr are not so entitled.\n\nThe General Manager~ E.W.l, in his evidence stated that \"the interim bonus of the Bulandshahr factory as ordered by the Government in November 1955 was Rs. 11,000 while for Amroha\n\nit, was nearly li lacs\". He also stated that \"the bonus for last year at Amroha would be probably equal to li months' wages and at Bulandshahr equal to about 4 or 5 days' wages.\" It is also in evidence that apart from the disparity in the payment of bonus, the accounts are separately made up tor the two mills. lt is clear that the two mills arc situated at different places with accounts separately maintained and governed by different service conditions, though they happened to be under the common management; therefore, they are treated as two different entities.\n\nThe question of law raised in this case must be considered in relation to the said facts. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the right to transfer is implicit in every contract of service is too wide the mark. Apart frorn any statutory provision, the rights of an employer and an employee are governed by the terms of contracts between them or by the terms necessarily implied therefrom. It fo\n\n.,..\n\nKundan Sugar\n\nMills v.\n\nZiyauddin\n\nSubba Rao ].\n\nconceded that there is no express agreement between\n\nKundan Sugar the appellant and the respondents w hereunder the Mitts appellant has the right to transfer the respondents to\n\nv, Zi) auddin any of its concerns in any place and the respondents the duty to join the concerns to which they may be transferred. If so, can it be said that such a term 1has Subba Rao f. to be necessarily implied between the parties? When the respondents I to 4were employed by the appellant, the latter was running only one factbry at Amroha. . There is nothing on record to indicate that at that time it was intended to purchase factories at other places or to extend its activities in the same line at different places. It is also not suggested that even if the appellant had had such an intention, the respondents I to 4 had knowledge of the same. Under such circumstances, without more, it would not be right to imply any such term between the contracting parties when the idea of starting new factories at different places was not in contemplation. Ordinarily the employees would have agreed only to serve in the factory then in existence and the employer would have employed them only in respect of that factory.\n\nThe matter does not stop there. In the instant case, as we have indicated, the two factories are distinct entities, situated at different places and, to import a term conferring a right on the employer to transfer respondents I to 4 to a different concern is really to make a new contract between them.\n\nThe decisions. cited at the Bar do not in the least sustain the appellant's broad contention. In Alexandre Bouzourou v. The Ottoman Bank (1) the appellant was an employee of the respondent-bank. The bank transferred him from one branch to another branch of the bank situated in different towns.\n\nAs he refused to comply with the order of transfer, he was dismissed.\n\nThereafter, he filed a suit to recover damages from the bank for wrongful dismissal. It was argued before the Judicial Committee that under the terms of his contract of service the sphere of his employment included only the head office and not the branches of the bank. The evidence in that case showed that tvansfer was one of the ordinary incidents of the . bank's employment, being usually concurrent with an (I) A.1.R. [1930] P.C, l!8, 119 •\n\n-..\n\nincrease of salary and responsibility, and suggested no more than that the bank considered their officials' convenience where possible. Indeed the appellant therein did not even suggest in his correspondence that the transfer was a breach of his contract. On these circumstances the Judicial Committee observed as follows at p. 119 :\n\n\"From the point of view of proper organization of their staff, it is difficult to assume that the Bank would willingly agree that their employees should not be bound to serve outside the place where the contract was made except with their consent, and, in their Lordships' opinion such a condition of the contract would require to be clearly established.'.' The essential distinction between that case and the present one is that there the bank with its branches was one unit and the records clearly indicated that transfer was one of the ordinary incidents of service in the Bank. In such circumi; itances when a person joined such a service, the Privy Council found it easy to imply a term of transfer. That decision is therefore\n\n- not of any relevancy to the present case. In Mary (Anamalai Plantation Workers' Union) v. Selaliparai estate (2), labour was recruited in the plantations without any differentiation being made between factory and field workers and it had been the common practice prevailing for several years to transfer the factory workers to the field and vice-versa, according to the exigencies of work. A worker who had been appointed in such a plantation was transferred, owing to mechanisation in the factory, from the factory to the field.\n\nThe Labour Appellate Tribunal of India held tha.t in the circumstances of the case the liability to be so transferred must be deemed to be an implied condition of service. So too in Bata Shoe Company, Ltd. v. Ali Hasan (Industrial Tribunal, Patna & Ors.)\n\n( 3) transfer of an employee in the circumstances of that case from one post to another was held not to be an alteration of any service condition within the meaning of s. 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act. That was a case of a management employing a worker in one concern and transferring him from one post to\n\n(2) [r956] I.L.L.J. 343\n\n(3) [1956] I L.L.J. 278.\n\nKundan Suga•\n\nMilts\n\nZiyauddin\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nKundan Sugar\n\nMills v.\n\nZiyauddin\n\nSubba Rao].\n\nanother. In such a case it was possible to imply the condition of right of the management to transfer the employee from one post to another. S. N. Mukherjee\n\nv. Kemp & Go. Ltd. (') was a case arising out of s. 23 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950.\n\nThe complaint there was that an employee was transferred by the management with a view to victimize him and that it amounted to alteration in the conditions of employment. It was held that if an employer employed a person it was implicit in the appointment that he could be transferred to any place where the business of the employer in the same line was situated, unless there was an express condition to the contrary in the contract of employment. In that case the worker was employed by Kemp & Co., Limited, which had branches in different places. The decision assumed that the business was one unit and that the only question raised was that he should not be transferred to a place different from the place where he was actually discharging his duties. These observations must be limited to the facts of that case.\n\nIt is not necessary to multiply the citation, for the other decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant pursue the same reasoning followed in the aforesaid cases.\n\nWe have referred to the decisions only to distinguish them from the present case, and not to express our opinion as to the correctness of the decisions therein.\n\nIt would be enough to point out that in all the said decisions the workers had been employed in a business or a concern and the question that arose was whether in the circumstances of each case the transfer from one branch to another was valid or amounted to victimization. None of these decisions deals with a case similar to that presented in this appeal, namely, whether a person employed in a factory can be transferred to some other independent concern started by the same employer at a stage subsequent to the date of his employment. None of these cases holds, as it is suggested by the learned counsel .for the appellant, that every employer has the inherent right to transfer his employee to another place where ho chooses to start\n\n(4) [1954] L.A:c. 903\n\n' •\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT RE!)ORTS 925\n\na bu::; iness subsequent to the date of the employmE>nt.\n\nWe, therefore, hold that it was not a conditioll of service of employment of the respondents either express or implied that the employer has the right to transfer them to a new concern stared by him subsequent to the date of their employment.\n\nThe respondents also relied upon a Government Order No. 6122 (ST)/XXXVI-A-640(8)-T-1953 in support of their contention that the order of transfer was bad. By this Order the Government of U. P. had directed that the employment of seasonal workmen in all vacuum pan sugar factories in the Uttar Pradesh should be governed by the rules contained in the atinexure thereto. Rule 1 in the said annexure is to the following effect :\n\n\"A worker who has worked or but for illness or any other unavoidable cause would have worked in a factory during the whole of the second half of the last preceding season will be employed in this season in such factory.\" This rule has no relevancy to the question raised in the present case.\n\nThis rule only enjoins upon an employer to employ a worker in the circumstances mentioned therein in the same factory in which he was working in the previous season during the next season also. This does not prevent the employer to transfer an employee if he has the right to do so under the contract of service or under any statutory provisions.\n\nWe have already held that the employer in the present case has no such right.\n\nLastly it is said that the Appellate Tribunal had no jurisdiction to set aside the finding of the State Industrial Tribunal, as it did not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of s. 7(1) of the Industrial Disputes {Appellate Tribunal) Act,\n\n1950. The question raised was one of law, namely, whether the appellant had the right to transfer the respondents 1 to 4 from one concern to another. A substantial question of law involved between the parties and that raised also an important principle governing the right of an employer to transfer his employees from one concern to another of his in the circumstances of this case.\n\nWe, therefore, hold that\n\nKundan Sugar\n\nMills v.\n\nZiyauddin\n\nSubba Rao ].\n\nJ(undan Sugar Mills v.\n\nZiyauddin\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nFebruary, 9\n\na substantial question of law arose in the case and that it was 1voll within the powers of the Labour Appellate Tribunal to entertain the appeal.\n\nIn the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nS.S. LIGHT RAIL\\VAY CO., LTD. v.\n\nUPPERDOAB SUGAR MILLS LTD. & ANOTHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SuBBA RAo and K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ).\n\nRailway Rates-Terminal charges fied by Government-When leviable-Railway Rates Tribunal-Jurisdiction of-Indian Railways Act, I890 (IX of I890). SS, 3 (I4) 32 and 4I.\n\nIn pursuance of s. 32 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 (IX of 1890), the Central Government had by means of a notification, fixed certain rates of terminal charges for loading and unloading goods carried from one station to another by Railway. Inspite of this notification the appellant Railway Company did not levy any terminal charges in accordance with those rates up to a certain point of time and continued to charge at a rate which \\Vas\n\n- then prevalent and in \\vhich no terminal charges \\Vere included.\n\nSubsequently, however, the Railway Company issued a Local Rates Advice by which terminal charges were added to the prevalent rates with the result that the total charges payable to the Railway by the respondent mills rose considerably. It was for relief against this increase that the mills made a complaint under s. 41 (r) (i) of the Indian Railways Act to Railway Rates Tribunal.\n\nThe contention of the Railway Company, inter alia, was that as in increasing the charges the .Administration had merely applied standardised terminal charges as notified by the Central Government no complaint could be made in respect thereof under s. 41\n\n(r) (i).\n\nThe Tribunal by a majority held that this was not a case ot application ot a standardised terminal charge and so it had jurisdiction to consider the question, and they ordered a reduction of terminal charges from the total charges. On appeal by the Railway, Held, that the Railway Rates Tribunal had no jurisdiction either to investigate the reasonableness or otherwise of terminal charges levied by the Railway or to reduce the same.\n\nThe charges sought to be levied by the Railway Administration were \" terminal charges\" within the meaning of the", "total_entities": 56, "entities": [{"text": "M/S. KUNDAN SUGAR MILLS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 47, "end_char": 70, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M/S. KUNDAN SUGAR MILLS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "OTHERS. (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 115, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. SUBJlA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 117, "end_char": 130, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBJlA RAO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 136, "end_char": 156, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1046, "end_char": 1059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants came up by special leave before the Supreme Court and contended that the right to transfer an employee by an employer from one of his concerns to another is implicit in every contract of service."}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2350, "end_char": 2378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Ram Lal Anand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2678, "end_char": 2691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Lal Anand, J.M. Lal and S. S. Sulcla, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "J.M. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2693, "end_char": 2701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Lal Anand, J.M. Lal and S. S. Sulcla, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "S. S. Sulcla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2706, "end_char": 2718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Lal Anand, J.M. Lal and S. S. Sulcla, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "B. D. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2741, "end_char": 2753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. D. Sharma, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "O.P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2783, "end_char": 2791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "O.P. Lal and G. N. Dikshit, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "G. N. Dikshit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2796, "end_char": 2809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "O.P. Lal and G. N. Dikshit, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "SuBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2897, "end_char": 2906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered dy\n\nSuBBA RAO, J.-This is an appeal by special leave against the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India setting aside the award of the Industrial Tribunal, Allahabad, and directing the re-instatement of the workers in Kundan Sugar Mills at Amroha. \"", "canonical_name": "SuBBA RAO"}}, {"text": "Kundan Sugar Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3120, "end_char": 3138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered dy\n\nSuBBA RAO, J.-This is an appeal by special leave against the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India setting aside the award of the Industrial Tribunal, Allahabad, and directing the re-instatement of the workers in Kundan Sugar Mills at Amroha. \""}}, {"text": "Amroha", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3142, "end_char": 3148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered dy\n\nSuBBA RAO, J.-This is an appeal by special leave against the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India setting aside the award of the Industrial Tribunal, Allahabad, and directing the re-instatement of the workers in Kundan Sugar Mills at Amroha. \""}}, {"text": "Kundan Sugar Mills", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3152, "end_char": 3170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kundan Sugar Mills\" is a partnership concern and owns a sugar mill at Amroha.", "canonical_name": "Kundan Sugar Mills"}}, {"text": "Kiccha", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3443, "end_char": 3449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1951 the partners of the appellant-Mills purchased the building machinery and other equipment of another sugar mill at Kiccha' in the district of Nainital."}}, {"text": "Nainital", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3470, "end_char": 3478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1951 the partners of the appellant-Mills purchased the building machinery and other equipment of another sugar mill at Kiccha' in the district of Nainital."}}, {"text": "Bulandshahr", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3534, "end_char": 3545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They closed the said mill at Kiccha and started it at Bulandshahr."}}, {"text": "Pannijee Sugar & General Mills, Bulandshahr", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3574, "end_char": 3617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The new factory was named Pannijee Sugar & General Mills, Bulandshahr."}}, {"text": "January 19, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3622, "end_char": 3638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 19, 1955, the General Manager of the appellant-Mills ordered the transfer of the respondents 1 to 4 from the appellant-Mills to the new mill at Bulandshahr."}}, {"text": "January 22/24, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3965, "end_char": 3984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the General Manager, by his letter dated January 22/24, 1955, insisted upon their joining the new mill at Bulandshahr."}}, {"text": "January 28, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4103, "end_char": 4119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On\n\nJanuary 28, 1955, the General Manager served a notice on the respondents 1 to 4 stating that they had disobeyed his orders and thereby committed misconduct under Standing Order No."}}, {"text": "February 2, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4491, "end_char": 4507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 2, 1955, the General Manager made an order dismissing the respondents 1 to 4 from service on the ground that\n\nK11ndan Sugar\n\nMills v.\n\nZiyauddin\n\nS11bba Rao J.\n\nJ(undan Sugar\n\nJI/I ills\n\nZiyauddin\n\nSubba Rao]."}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4646, "end_char": 4649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of U.P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4891, "end_char": 4909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Labour Union there(1fter rnisecl an industrial dispute and the Government of U.P. by its notification dated November 7, 1955, referred the following issue for decision to the State Industrial Tribunal for U. P. at Allahabad:\n\n\"Whether the employers have wrongfully and/or unjustifiably terminated the services of Sarv(1 Shri Zia Uddin, Raisuddin, Shafiqnddin and Ahmed Bt1x for refusal to obey the orders of tranfer to M/s.\n\nPannijee Sugar and General_ Mills Co., Bufandshahr."}}, {"text": "November 7, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4936, "end_char": 4952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Labour Union there(1fter rnisecl an industrial dispute and the Government of U.P. by its notification dated November 7, 1955, referred the following issue for decision to the State Industrial Tribunal for U. P. at Allahabad:\n\n\"Whether the employers have wrongfully and/or unjustifiably terminated the services of Sarv(1 Shri Zia Uddin, Raisuddin, Shafiqnddin and Ahmed Bt1x for refusal to obey the orders of tranfer to M/s.\n\nPannijee Sugar and General_ Mills Co., Bufandshahr."}}, {"text": "State Industrial Tribunal for U. P. at Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5003, "end_char": 5051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Labour Union there(1fter rnisecl an industrial dispute and the Government of U.P. by its notification dated November 7, 1955, referred the following issue for decision to the State Industrial Tribunal for U. P. at Allahabad:\n\n\"Whether the employers have wrongfully and/or unjustifiably terminated the services of Sarv(1 Shri Zia Uddin, Raisuddin, Shafiqnddin and Ahmed Bt1x for refusal to obey the orders of tranfer to M/s.\n\nPannijee Sugar and General_ Mills Co., Bufandshahr."}}, {"text": "Zia Uddin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5153, "end_char": 5162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Labour Union there(1fter rnisecl an industrial dispute and the Government of U.P. by its notification dated November 7, 1955, referred the following issue for decision to the State Industrial Tribunal for U. P. at Allahabad:\n\n\"Whether the employers have wrongfully and/or unjustifiably terminated the services of Sarv(1 Shri Zia Uddin, Raisuddin, Shafiqnddin and Ahmed Bt1x for refusal to obey the orders of tranfer to M/s.\n\nPannijee Sugar and General_ Mills Co., Bufandshahr."}}, {"text": "Raisuddin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5164, "end_char": 5173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Labour Union there(1fter rnisecl an industrial dispute and the Government of U.P. by its notification dated November 7, 1955, referred the following issue for decision to the State Industrial Tribunal for U. P. at Allahabad:\n\n\"Whether the employers have wrongfully and/or unjustifiably terminated the services of Sarv(1 Shri Zia Uddin, Raisuddin, Shafiqnddin and Ahmed Bt1x for refusal to obey the orders of tranfer to M/s.\n\nPannijee Sugar and General_ Mills Co., Bufandshahr."}}, {"text": "Shafiqnddin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5175, "end_char": 5186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Labour Union there(1fter rnisecl an industrial dispute and the Government of U.P. by its notification dated November 7, 1955, referred the following issue for decision to the State Industrial Tribunal for U. P. at Allahabad:\n\n\"Whether the employers have wrongfully and/or unjustifiably terminated the services of Sarv(1 Shri Zia Uddin, Raisuddin, Shafiqnddin and Ahmed Bt1x for refusal to obey the orders of tranfer to M/s.\n\nPannijee Sugar and General_ Mills Co., Bufandshahr."}}, {"text": "Ahmed Bt1x", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5191, "end_char": 5201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Labour Union there(1fter rnisecl an industrial dispute and the Government of U.P. by its notification dated November 7, 1955, referred the following issue for decision to the State Industrial Tribunal for U. P. at Allahabad:\n\n\"Whether the employers have wrongfully and/or unjustifiably terminated the services of Sarv(1 Shri Zia Uddin, Raisuddin, Shafiqnddin and Ahmed Bt1x for refusal to obey the orders of tranfer to M/s.\n\nPannijee Sugar and General_ Mills Co., Bufandshahr."}}, {"text": "February 6, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5410, "end_char": 5426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Industrial Tribunal by its order d(], ted February 6, 1956, made its award holding that the management was within its rights and that, as the respondents l to 4 had disobeyed the order of the management, they were properly dismissed by the management."}}, {"text": "Labour Appellate Tribunal of India", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5707, "end_char": 5741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "51 perferred an appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India and the said Appellate Tribunal held that the management had no right to transfer the respondents 1 to 4 to the new factory and therefore the order dismissing them was illegal."}}, {"text": "s. 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6456, "end_char": 6463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9502, "end_char": 9511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If so, can it be said that such a term 1has Subba Rao f. to be necessarily implied between the parties?", "canonical_name": "SuBBA RAO"}}, {"text": "tvansfer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11328, "end_char": 11336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence in that case showed that tvansfer was one of the ordinary incidents of the ."}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13497, "end_char": 13502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13510, "end_char": 13533, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Kundan Suga•", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13691, "end_char": 13703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kundan Suga•\n\nMilts\n\nZiyauddin\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nKundan Sugar\n\nMills v.\n\nZiyauddin\n\nSubba Rao].", "canonical_name": "Kundan Sugar Mills"}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13723, "end_char": 13732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kundan Suga•\n\nMilts\n\nZiyauddin\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nKundan Sugar\n\nMills v.\n\nZiyauddin\n\nSubba Rao].", "canonical_name": "SuBBA RAO"}}, {"text": "S. N. Mukherjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13926, "end_char": 13941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Mukherjee\n\nv. Kemp & Go."}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13992, "end_char": 13997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kemp & Co., Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14548, "end_char": 14567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case the worker was employed by Kemp & Co., Limited, which had branches in different places."}}, {"text": "Government of U. P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16501, "end_char": 16520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By this Order the Government of U. P. had directed that the employment of seasonal workmen in all vacuum pan sugar factories in the Uttar Pradesh should be governed by the rules contained in the atinexure thereto."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16615, "end_char": 16628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By this Order the Government of U. P. had directed that the employment of seasonal workmen in all vacuum pan sugar factories in the Uttar Pradesh should be governed by the rules contained in the atinexure thereto."}}, {"text": "s. 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17681, "end_char": 17688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. SuBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18587, "end_char": 18599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ANOTHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SuBBA RAo and K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ).", "canonical_name": "K. SUBJlA RAO"}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18737, "end_char": 18749, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18809, "end_char": 18814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Railway Rates-Terminal charges fied by Government-When leviable-Railway Rates Tribunal-Jurisdiction of-Indian Railways Act", "statute": "Railway Rates-Terminal charges fied by Government-When leviable-Railway Rates Tribunal-Jurisdiction of-Indian Railways Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Railways Act, 1890", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18822, "end_char": 18847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18866, "end_char": 18884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SS, 3 (I4) 32 and 4I.\n\nIn pursuance of s. 32 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 (IX of 1890), the Central Government had by means of a notification, fixed certain rates of terminal charges for loading and unloading goods carried from one station to another by Railway."}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19619, "end_char": 19624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Railways Act, 1890", "statute": "the Indian Railways Act, 1890"}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19647, "end_char": 19659, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Railway Rates Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19663, "end_char": 19685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was for relief against this increase that the mills made a complaint under s. 41 (r) (i) of the Indian Railways Act to Railway Rates Tribunal."}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19936, "end_char": 19941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1960_2_926_942_EN", "year": 1960, "text": "J(undan Sugar Mills v.\n\nZiyauddin\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nFebruary, 9\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960 (2)]\n\na substantial question of law arose in the case and that it was 1voll within the powers of the Labour Appellate Tribunal to entertain the appeal.\n\nIn the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nS.S. LIGHT RAIL\\VAY CO., LTD. v.\n\nUPPERDOAB SUGAR MILLS LTD. & ANOTHER\n\n(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SuBBA RAo and K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ).\n\nRailway Rates-Terminal charges fied by Government-When leviable-Railway Rates Tribunal-Jurisdiction of-Indian Railways Act, I890 (IX of I890). SS, 3 (I4) 32 and 4I.\n\nIn pursuance of s. 32 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 (IX of 1890), the Central Government had by means of a notification, fixed certain rates of terminal charges for loading and unloading goods carried from one station to another by Railway. Inspite of this notification the appellant Railway Company did not levy any terminal charges in accordance with those rates up to a certain point of time and continued to charge at a rate which \\Vas\n\n- then prevalent and in \\vhich no terminal charges \\Vere included.\n\nSubsequently, however, the Railway Company issued a Local Rates Advice by which terminal charges were added to the prevalent rates with the result that the total charges payable to the Railway by the respondent mills rose considerably. It was for relief against this increase that the mills made a complaint under s. 41 (r) (i) of the Indian Railways Act to Railway Rates Tribunal.\n\nThe contention of the Railway Company, inter alia, was that as in increasing the charges the .Administration had merely applied standardised terminal charges as notified by the Central Government no complaint could be made in respect thereof under s. 41\n\n(r) (i).\n\nThe Tribunal by a majority held that this was not a case ot application ot a standardised terminal charge and so it had jurisdiction to consider the question, and they ordered a reduction of terminal charges from the total charges. On appeal by the Railway, Held, that the Railway Rates Tribunal had no jurisdiction either to investigate the reasonableness or otherwise of terminal charges levied by the Railway or to reduce the same.\n\nThe charges sought to be levied by the Railway Administration were \" terminal charges\" within the meaning of the\n\n....\n\n....\n\nRailways Act, and the proposed levy being in accordance -with r960 the Government notification under s. 32 of the Act was nothing more than the application of standardised terminal charges.\n\nS. s. Light Irrespective of the fact of the actual user by any particular Railway Co. Ltd. consignor of the stations, sidings and other things mentioned in v. s. 3 (14) of the Railways Act, \" terminal charges\" were leviable Upper Doab Sugar by reason of the mere fact that these things had been provided Mills Ltd. for by the Railway Administration.\n\nHall & Co. v. London Brighton and South Coast Railway, Co., (I885) IS Q. B. D. 505, considered.\n\nCIVIL APPELATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 347of1955.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated April 20, 1955, of the Railway Rates Tribunal, Madras, in Complaint No. 2of1954.\n\nH. N. Sany<; tl Additional Solicitor General of India, Niren De. P. C. Chatterjee and P. K. Ghosh, for the appellant.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee, J.P. Aggarwalla, B. K. B. Naidu and I. N. Shroff, for respondent No. 1.\n\nB. K. Khanna and R. H. Dhebar, for respondent No.2.\n\n1960. February 9.\n\nJudgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAS GUPTA, J.-When total char:ges payable in res- Das Gupta J. pect of goods traffic carried by a Railway are increased by the Railway Administration on the basis of terminals fixed by the Central Government in pursuance of s. 32 of the Indian Railways Act, has the Railway Rates Tribunal jurisdiction to investigate the reasonableness of the charge as thus increased ? That is the question raised in this appeal. The first respondent, the Upper Doab Sugar Mills Ltd., manufactures sugar in its Mills situated at Shamli. The sugarcane needed as its raw material has to be brought by the Company from different places in the neighbourhood. It is in this connection that the appellant- Railway Company's services are required.\n\nThe Railway Company carries the sugarcane in trucks from several stations on its line, to Shamli. As the Mills premises are situated a short distance away from the station platform the Mills had at the very time when it started functioning, a siding agreement with the Rly., Company so that the trucks carrying the\n\nz960 sugarcane are ultimately brought into the Mills siding . from where the unloading takes place. The nearest s. s. Light point of the Mills siding from the station platform at Railway Co. Lid. Shamli is about 100 to 150 ft. away. The Rly. locoupper n:b sugar motives bring the sugarcane trucks to this point-pt.\n\nMiu, Ltd.\n\nA in the Plan-after which the Mills makes its own arrangement for taking them inside the sidings. After Da; Gupta J. several increases from time to time which it is not necessary to mention, the charges payable in respect of sugarcane carried in the Railway Company's trucks and brought by the Railway Company's locomotives up to the point A stood on September 30, 1953, at the following figures :- Rs.\n\nAns.\n\nPs.\n\nFrom Ail um 3 8 Kandhla 3 8 Khandraoli 3 8 Hind 3 8 Thanabhawan 3 8 Nanautta 4 ·!\n\nSona Arjunpur 4 4 In each case a surcharge of annas 2 per rupee was added.\n\nBefore this, however, on February 20, 1950, the Central Govt., had made an order under s. 32 of the Indian Railways Act, the relevant portion of which is in these words:-\n\n\" In pursuance of section 32 of the Indian Rlys.\n\nAct, 1890 (IX of 1890) the Central Government is pleased to fix the following rates of terminals, transhipment, short distance, percentage on value and percent[tge on excess value charges, namely :- 1.\n\nTERMINAL CHARGES.\n\n(a) Goods Traffic\n\n(i) General Merchandise Eight pies per maund at each end where the railway is required to do loading and unloading.\n\nSix pies per maund at each end, where the owners of the goods are required to do loading and unloading ...... \". ·\n\nIn §lpite of this however the Railway Company did\n\nI960 not levy any terminal charges in accordance with s. s. Light this rate up to September, 1953 and continued to Railway co. Ltd. charge at the rate mentioned above. v.\n\nOn August 1, 1953 the Railway Company issued a upper Doab'Sugar Local Rate Advice the relevant portion of which was Mills Ltd. in these ternis :-\n\n\"With effect from 1-10-53 the following station to station rates will be introduced and will remain in force till further advice :-\n\nCommodity From To Rate Sugarcane Ailuin Shamli Rs. 2·6 'plus terminal Rs. 9.6 Khandla do 2·6 do Khandraoli do 1·12 do Hind do r12 do Thanabhawan do 3·2 do Harar Siding do 3·2 do Nanautta do 3·15 do Sona Arjunpur do 4n do The consequence of this was that with effect from October 1953 the total charges payable by the Mills rose considerably. From Rs. 3·8 formerly payable in respect of sugarcane carried from Ailum, Khandla, Khandraoli, Hind, Thanabhawan, the rate now payable became Rs. U 12, Rs. U 12, Rs. U 2, Rs. U 2\n\nand Rs. 12·8 respectively while for sugarcane carried from Nanautta and Sona Arjunpur, the amount now payable was Rs. 13'5 and Rs. 14·1 in place of Rs. 4·4 and Rs. 4·4 payable prior to October 1, 1953. It was for relief against this increase that the Mills made a complaint under s. 41(1) (i) of the Indian Railways Act to the Railway Rates Tribunal. Relief in respect of certain other matters like rates on molasses, increase in siding charges, rates on coal, gunnies, limestone, firewood etc., and rates on sugar was also asked for; but later all these prayers having been withdrawn at the hearing before the Tribunal. The Tribunal bad to deal only with the Mills' complaint as regards this increase in charges in respect of sugarcane.\n\nThe main contention raised on behalf of the Railway Company was that as in increasing the charges the Administration had merely applied standardized terminal charges no complaint lay in respect of the\n\nDas Gupta J.\n\nz96o same under section 4l(l)(i). The Railway Company\n\n5 L. h also further contended in this connection that con-\n\nRoil~:; ~:. td. siderable services, apart from the carriage of the goods, v. were rendered by the Company at each end and so, upper Doab Sugar in any case, the terminal charges as standardized by Mills Ltd. notification by the Central Governmen~ were legally levied. The Tribunal by a majority held that this Das Gupta ]. f l\" f d d d was not a case o app 1cat10n o a stan ar ize terminal charge and so it had jurisdiction to consider the question. Shri L.M. Roy and Shri V. Subrahmanyan who formed the majority were of opinion that services were rendered only at the loading station, and not at Shamli; so only Rs. 4 11 annas out of the terminal charge of Rs. 9·6 was reasonable and only this amount could be levied on sugarcane in addition to the conveyan or such other point or length as may hereafter be fixed upon by mutual consent of the Firm and the Railway Administration in writing.\n\n(c) As soon as wagons are placed at the line \"A\" referred, to, the Station Master will fill in columns 1, 2 and 3 of both foils of Annexure A, and obtain the Firm'ssignature in column 4 of the inner foil and make over the outer foil to the firm.\n\nWhen this has been done, the wagons will be considered as made over to the Firm and the free time permissible under the rules will then commence. Similarly, wagons will be considered as returned to the Railway by the Firm as soon as they are placed at the line \"B \" referred to and the Station Master has been advised by the Firm\".\n\nS.S. Light Railway Co. Ltd. v.\n\nUpper Doab Sitgar\n\nAt ills Ltd.\n\nDas Gupta].\n\nThis will de done by presentation of the outer foil with column filled in.\n\nThe Station Master will then initial in column 5 of the outer foil, and fill in columns 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the inner foil and columns 6, 7 and 8 of the outer foil and recover the demurrago duo.\n\nNote 1. The free time referred to above will be calculated in accordance with the rules in force from time to time as published in the Goods Traffic Books of the Railway Administration und wagons detained by the Firm over and above such free time shall be subject to payment of the demurrage charges laid down in such tariffs.\n\nNote 2. The Firm will arrange to hand shunt wagons to and from t.he said length \" A \" with their own labour and the Railway Administration will not be responsible for any delay, loss or damage caused in consequence of the failure of the Firm to arrange for such hand shunting.\n\nIt is important to notice that cl. 13 mentions in definite and categorical language that freight is charged up to and from Shamli station. It is reasonable to read the \"station\" here as the \" station platform \". When in clause 15 it is agreed that the \"wagons will be hauled by the Ra.ii way to and from the lines marked A and 13\" nothing is said about any charge being made therefor. It is impossible to read into the words used in cl. 15(b) an implication that carriage up to point A was being charged for.\n\nOn a proper reading of these clauses we think it reasonable to hold that carriage up to the station platform only was being charged for.\n\nThe haula.ge of the trucks from the station platform to point A was thus necessarily a service rendered by the Railway Company in addition to the carriage and so was a terminal service.\n\nIt is clear therefore that even on the assumption made that on the definition of the terminals in s. 3(14) no charges are payable unless certain services in addition to carriage are performed by the Railway Company, terminals were leviable in the present case at the Shamli end also and so the foundation for the argument that Rs. 4.11 being charged at the Shamli\n\n,_ .\n\nend was not really a terminal charge but some other x960 charge in the garb of terminal disappears. /\n\nf itthisEinte 1 eshtidng ~°:this c 1 nhnectiontto 1\n\ntur~ to somde Rai~!~ L~!.htd. o e ng is e01s10ns w uc seem o iave impresse v. the members of the TribuJ!al. In Foster v G. E. upper Doab Sugar Railway Co. (1), the Court had to consider certain sec- Mills Lta. tions of the Great Eastern Railway Company (Rates and Charges) Order Confirmation Act, 1891. Section Das Gupta J. 2 thereof provided that the m_aximum rate for conveyance is the maximum rate which the company may charge for the conveyance of -merchandise by merchandise train; and, subject to the exceptions and provisions specified in th, e schedule includes the provisions of locomotive power and trucks by the company, and every other expense incidental to such conveyance not hereinafter provided for. Section 3 provides that the maximum station terminal is the maximum charge which the company may make to a trader for the use of the accommodation (exclusive of coal) provided and for the duties undertaken by the company for which no other provision is made in the schedule, at the terminal station for or in dealing with merchandise, as carriers thereof, before or after conveyance. Section 5 provides that the company may charge for the services for the following, or any of them, when rendered to a trader at his request or for his convenience, a reasonable sum, by way of addition to the tonnage rate and services rendered by the Company, at or in connection with sidings not belonging to the Company.\n\nIt was in connection with this scheme of the law that the .Court had to consider where conveyance should be held to end. It was held that conveyance for the purpose of rates might or might not coincide with the contractual conveyance but that it could not be said as matter of law that it did. Theipoint at which it ended would prima facie be the point at which the goods train detached and deposited the Trucks, but if they were so detached and deposited for the convenience of the railway company at a point short ofthat to which.as conveyers they would be bound to take them for the purposes of delivery . to a\n\n(r) (r92<>) K.B, 574.\n\n• •\n\nx96o: distributing carrier in times when such carriers existed, a charge could not be made for haulage S. S. Light b t th . t Railway Co. Ltd. eAweehn ese polrt s. . , v. . s as already been noticed our legrnlature has upper Doab Sugar thought fit to avoid the use of the word \"conveyance\"\n\nMills Ltd. and has provided for maximum and minimum being\n\nDas Gupta ;. prescribed for rates as defined in s. 3(13), viz., as charges for \" carriage\". It is obvious that carriage which is charged for under the \"rates \" may include something in addition to the actual conveyance, viz., collection of goods just before haulage starts and delivery of goods just after haulage ends. It is helpful to see that even in he English courts were the distinction between conveyance and carriage ran through the whole scheme of legislation in view of the historical growth of the Railways and the extension of their functions, services rendered after the point where the goods train detaches and deposits the trucks would prima facie be considered a terminal service ; while if the train which detaches and deposits at a point short of where they would have been bound to take for the purposes of delivery to a distributing carrier in olden days, the haulage between the two points cannot be charged for in addition to the conveyance charge. Applying the reasoning underlying this decision to Indian conditions we think it proper to hold that haulage beyond a point where the trucks would be taken for persons other than the owners of a siding would be a terminal service except where this additional haulage is for the convenience of the Railway itself or where the rate charged for carriage covers the entire route up to the lat point of haulage.\n\nEven if therefore a correct interpretation of the definition of \" terminals \" did not permit charges to be levied where no services were rendered in addition to the carriage charged for, the levying of Rs. 9·6 as terminal charges in the present case is clearly the application'of standardized terminal charges .. As s. 41 in terms excludes standardized terminal charges from the scope of any complaint thereunder the Railway Tribunal w0uld have no jurisdiction to investigate\n\nthe reasonableness or otherwise of these charges and\n\nthe majority decision of the Tribunal must be set z96o aside. 5 5 L' ht We do not propose, however, to rest our decison Raila; ~;.Ltd. on this narrow question of haulage from the stat10n v. platform to point A, as in our view the assumption upper Doab Sugar made above as regards the definition of terminals in Mills Ltd. s. 3(14) is not justified. The definition as has already been stated is in these words. \"Terminals \" includes Das Gupta f. \"charges in respect of stations, sidings, wharves, depots, warehouses, cranes and other similar matters, and of any service . rendered thereat.\" Thus two classes of charges are included in the definition. The first is \" charges in respect of stations, sidings • wharves, depots, warehouses, cranes and other similar matters.\" The second is \"charges in respect of any servioes rendered thereat.\" Whether or not therefore any servi-Oation of the\n\nCity of Nagpur v. Its Employees\n\nSubba Rao ].\n\nthe material Wealth jointly produced and capable . of registration in statistics. At heart they are a struggle, constantly becoming more intense on the part of the employed group engaged in co-operation with the employing group in rendering services to the community essential for a higher general human welfare, to share in tlmt welfare in a grea.ter degree. All industrial enterprises contribute more or less to the general welfare of the community, and this is a most material consideration when we come to determine the present question apart from the-particular contention raised at the Bar.\n\nMonetary considerations for service is, therefore, not an essential characteristic of industry in a modern State.\n\nThe learned counsel then sought to demarcate th~. activities of a municipality into three categories, namely, (i) the activities of the department which performs the services; (ii) those of the department which only impose taxes, collect them and administer them; and (iii) those of the departments which are purely in administrative charge of other departments. We do not see any justification for this artificial division of municipal activities. Barring the regal functions of a municipality, if such other activities of it, if undertaken by an individual, would be industry, then they would equally be industry in the hands of a municipality. It would be unrealistic to draw a line between a department doing a service and a department controlling or feeding it. Supervision and actual performance of service are integral part of the same activity. In other words, whether these three functions are carried out by one department or divided between three departments, the entire organizational activity would be an industry. This aspect of the question was incidentally touched upon by this Court in Baroda Borough Municiiality v. Its Workmen (1) and the following passage at p. 49 reads thus :\n\n\"We have already pointed out that under the Municipal Act a municipality may perform various functions, some obligatory and some diseretional.\n\nThe activities may be of a composite nature : some\n\n(1) [1957] S.C.R. 33\n\nof the departments may be mostly earning departr96o ments and some mostly spending departments. For c -.- 1 ._ 1 th d t t h. h ll t . . l orporationo 1,.., examp e, e epar. en w ic co. ec s mi; immpa City of Nagpur taxes or other mummpal revenue, is essentially an v. earning department whereas the sanitary depart- Its Employees ment or other service department is essentially a spending dep1trtment. There may indeed be depart- Subba Rao f. ments where the earning and spending may almost balance each other.\" We 1have extracted this passage only because the observations are apposite to the discussion on hand but not to express our concurrence with the conclusion drawn in that case. The question of bonus does not fall to be considered in the present &ppeal. These observations lend suppoTt to our view that integrated activities of a municipality cannot be lileparated. to take in some under the definition of\" industry \" and exclude others from it.\n\nWe can also visualize different situations.\n\nA particular activity of a municipality may be covered by the definition of \"industry \". If the financial and administrative departments are solely in charge of that activity, there can be no difficulty in treating those two departments also as part of the industry.\n\nBut there may be cases where the said two departments may not only be in charge of a particular activity or serviee covered by the defi:r:iition of \"industry \" but also in charge of other activity or activities falling outside the definition of \"industry\".\n\nIn such cases a working rule may be evolved to advance social justice consistent with the principles of equity. In such cases the solution to the problem depends upon the answer to the question whether • such a department is primarily and predominantly concerned with industrial activity or incidentally connected therewith.\n\nThe result of the discussion may be summarized thus: (1) The definition of\" industry\" in the Act is very comprehensive. It is in two parts: one part defines it. from the standpoint of the employer and the other from the standpoint of the employee. If an activity falls under either part of the definition_ it will be an industry within the meaning of the Act.\n\n• •\n\nr960\n\n(2) The history of industrial disputes and the legisla- -~ tion recognizes the basic concept that the activity C°'.poratio• of the shall be an organized one and not that which pertains\n\nCity of ~-agpur to private or personal employment. (3) The regal\n\nIts Employees functions described as primary and inalienable functions of State though statutorily delegated to a\n\n; ,.,,' ~\n\n00I corporation are necessarily excluded from the purview of the definiti.on. Such regal functions shall be confined to legislative power, administration of law and judicial power.\n\n(4) If a service rendered by an individual or a private person would be an industry, it would equally oe an industry in the hands of a corporation. (5) If a service rendered by a corporation is an industry, the employees in the departments connected with that service, whether financial, administrative or executive, would be entitled to the benefits of the 4ct. (6) If a department of a municipality discharges many functions, some pertaining to industry as defined in the Act and other non-industrial activities, the predominant functions of the department shall be the criterion for the purposes of the Act.\n\nThe following are the various departments of the Nagpur City Corporation: (1) General Administration Department; (2) Octroi Department; (3) Tax Department;\n\n(4) Public Conveyance Department;\n\n(5) Fire .. Brigade Department; (6) Lighting Department; (7) Water Works Department ; (8) City Engineer Department; (9) Enforcement (encroachment) Department: (10) Sewage Pumping Station Department; (11) Sewage Farm Department; (12) Health Department; (13) Market Department; (14) Cattle Pound Department; (15) Public Gardens Department; (16) Public \\Vorks Department; (17) Assessment Department; (18) Estate Department; (19) Education Department; (20) Printing Press Department;\n\n(21) Workshop Depa__rtment; and (22) Building Department. Out of these departments, the State Industrial Court has held that all the departments except those pertaining to (i) assessment and levy of house-tax, (ii) assessment and levy of octl'oi,\n\n(iii) removal of encroachment and pulling down of dilapidated houses, (iv) maintenance of cattle pounds,\n\n-.-\n\nand (v) prevention and control of food adulteration,\n\nI96° are industries. Even in regard to the departments c -t'- 1th . which the State Industrial Tribunal held to be ;, fy\n\n0 :; i;:; pu/ industries it denied relief to persons who are not v. covered by the definition of \"employees\" in the Act.\n\nIts Employees As the employees have not preferred any appeal against the award in so far as it went against them, Subba Rao f nothing further need be said in regard to the aforesaid five departments.\n\nBefore we consider whether all or any of the departments of the Corporation fall within the definition of \" industry \" in the Act, it will be convenient to notice the scheme of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948 (Madhya Pradesh Act No. 2 of 1950).\n\nSection 7 makes the Corporation a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal. Section 6 describes the murricipal authorities charged with the execution of the Act and they are: (a) the Corporation; (b) the Standing Committee; and (c) the Chief Executive Officer. Chapter II of Part II contains the aforesaid sections and it further provides for the constitution of the Corporation and the mode of election to the said body. Chapter III of the said Part prescribes the procedure for the conduct of business of the Qorporation.\n\nChapter IV thereof provides for ilhe appointment of municipal officers and servants and for their punishment and removal. Chapter V deals with powers, duties. and functions of the municipal authorities; it gives the obligatory and discretionary duties of the Corporation. Under s. 57, the Corporation shall make adequate provision, by any means or measures which it may lawfully use or take, such as for lighting public streets, cleaning of public streets, disposal of nightsoil and rubbish, maintenance of firebrigade and other welfare activities in the interest of the public. Section 58 confers a discretionary power on the Corporation to provide for other amenities not covered by s. 57, and which are comparatively not absolutely essential but are necessary for the happiness of the people of the State. Provisions of Ch. VI enable the municipality to hold and acquire properties, to manage public institutions maintained out of municipal funds.\n\nSection 79 enjoins on the\n\n• •\n\nz960\n\nCorporation of the\n\nCity of Nagpur v.\n\nIts Employees\n\nSubba Rao ].\n\nmunicipality to apply the fund available with it to discharge its statutory duties and pay salaries and allowances of its various servants. Chapter IX enables the municipality to raise loans on the security of its properties for discharging debts and for meeting the capital expenditure. Part IV empowers the municipality to impose taxes fat the purposes of this Act and also describes the procedure for collecting the same.\n\nPart V confers powers and imposes duties on the Corporation and its officers in respect of public health, safety and convenience. This Part deals with public convenience, drains and privies, conservancy, sanitary provisions, water supply and drainage, regulation of factories and trades, markets and slaughter places, food, drink, drug and dangerous articles, prevention of infectious diseases and disposal of the dead. Part VI empowers the Corporation to draw up townplanning schemes, . to regulate erection and re-erection of buildings, to close public streets, to remove obstruction in streets, to regulate laying of new streets, to dispose of mad and stray dogs, to control public begging, to prohibit brothels etc. Part VIIl lays down the general provisions for carrying on the municipal administration and also enabling the Corporation to make by-laws for carrying out the provisions and intentions of the Act. Shortly stated, the Act creates the Corporation a juristic person capable of holding and dispoing of property, confers power on it to impose and collect taxes and licence fees, to borrow money, to decide disputes in the first instance in respect thereof, constitutes the amounts so collected as the fund of the municipality from and out of which the liabilities of the Corporation are n:iet and the salaries of its employees are paid, imposed on it duties to carry out various welfare activities in the interest of the public, confers on it powers for implementing their duties satisfactorily and also powers to make by-laws for regulating its various functions. In short, a corporation is analogous to a big public company carrying out most of the duties which such a company can undertake to do with the difference that certain statutory powers have been conferred on the corporation for carrying out its functions more satisfactorily .\n\n-- ......\n\nWith this background let us take each of the r960 departments of the Corporation held by the State c P -1.- fth , b A or ora ion o e Industrial Court to be governed Y the ct.\n\nCity of Nagpur\n\n(i) Tax Department : The main functions of this v. department are the imposition and collection of oonser- Its Employees vancy, water and property taxes. No separate staff has been employee). for the assessment and levy of Subba .Rao J. property taxe.s : the same staff does the work connected with assessment and collection of water rates as well as scavenging taxes. It is not disputed that he\n\nwork of assessment and levy of water rate and scavenging rate for private latrines is far heavier than the other works entrusted to this department.\n\nNo attempt has been made to allocate specific propor-\n\n- tion of the staff for different functions. We, therefore, must accept the finding of the State Industrial Court\n\nthat the staff of this department doing clerical or manual work preclominaritly does the work connected with scavening taxes and water rate. The said rates are really intended as fees for the service rendered. The services, namely, scavenging and supply of water, can equally be undertaken by a private firm or an individual for remuneration and the fact that the municipality does the same duty does not make it any the less a service coming under t.he definition of \"industry\".\n\nWe would, however, prefer to sustain the finding on a broader basis. There cannot be a distinction between property tax and other taxes collected by the municipality for the purpose of designating the tax department as an industry or .otherwise. The scheme of the Corporation Act is that taxes and fees are collectyd in order to enable the municipality to discharge its statutory functions. If the functions so discharged are wholly or predominantly covered by the definition of \"industry\", it would be illogical to exclude the tax department from the definition. While in t, he case of private individuals or firms services are paid in cash or otherwise, in the case of public institutions, as the services are rendered to the public, the taxes collected from them constitute a fund for performing those services. As most of the services rendered by the municipality come under the definition of \"industry\", we should hold that the employees of the\n\n• •\n\ntax department are also entitled to the benefits under the Act.\n\nCorporation of the\n\n(ii) Public Conveyance Department: This is a tax City of Nagpur' v. which is a wheel-cum-road tax. Conveyance depart- Its Employees ment is meant to regulate the using of cycles,\n\nSubba Rao j.\n\nrickshaws, bullock-carts etc. This department recovers r&gistration fees for rickshaws, licence fee from rickshaw drivers and wheel tax from bullock-carts. It also recovers cycle tax on every cycle used in Corporation limits. (See 'the evidence of Witness No 1 for Pasty No. 1). These taxes are therefore really fees collected by the Corporlltion for the services rendered to the owners of cycles and other conveyances by way of maintenance and construction of roads. These services can equally be performed by a private individual or a firni for remuneration. It satisfies the tests laid down by us.\n\nThis department, therefore, is an industry within the meaning of the definition in the Act.\n\n(iii) Fire Brigade Department: Ex. N. A. 22 gives the duties of the driver-cum-fitter of the Fire Brigade Department. This exhibit indicates that the function of this department is to attend to fire calls.\n\nWitness No. 3 for Party No. 1 says that it is the duty of the firebrigade to' supply water at marriage functions and other public functions. The fire brigade employees are not paid any extra amount for supplying water at public or private functions. Though the department renders some extra services, the main function of the department is to attend to. \"fire calls\". Private bodies also can undertake this service. It is said that under s. 333 of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act powers are conferred on specified officers to remove or order the removal of any person who interferes with or impedes the operation for extinguishing the fire, to close any street or passage in or near which any fire is burning, to break into or pull down or use for the passage of hoses or other appliances, any premises for the purpose of extinguishing the fire and generally to take such measures as may appear necessary for the preservation of life or property, and that the services of the ; i.rebrigade cannot be satisfactorily rendered without such powers and that no private iudividual\n\n- -\n\ncan per.form the same. Here the argument tends to\n\nI960\n\nbe fallacious as it ignores the distinction between the CorJ; ortion of the services and the statutory powers conferred to satis- :city of Nagpur factorily discharge the said services. A private person v. or a firm can eqYally do the same serviaes and nothing Its Employees prevents the legislature from conferring similar powers Subba Rao J. on an individual or a i'irm. These services also satisfy all the tests laid down by us and therefore we hold that this department is also an industry.\n\n(iv) Lighting Department : Lighting Department looks after the arrangements for lighting the streets in the Corporation area. There are two systems oflighting streets, namely, (1) by electricity, and (2) by ke.rosene oil lamps. Electric street lighting is given on contract to Nagpur Light and Power Co., Nagpur, by the Corporation. Kerosene oil street lighting is done departmentally by the lighting department. Electric Light and Power Co., is responsible to the Corporation for stree, t lighting. The said Company has to fix electric lights according to the programme given to it by the Corporation. The burning hours are also fixed by the Corporation. The Corporation does not charge the public for street lighting. (See the evidero.ce of Witness No. 5 for Party No. 1).\n\nWe have already indicated that quid pro quo in the shape of payment of money for particular services rendered is not a necessary condition for the application of the definition of \"industry\". The services rendered by the department satisfy the terms of the definition. They also satisfy both the positive and negative ests laid down by us.\n\nWe, therefore, hold that this department is an industry. .\n\n(v) Water Works Department: This department maintains three head-works, Kanhan, Gorewara, and Ambazeri. There are pumping stations at Kanhan and Gorewara. At the pumping stations the water is filtered and pnrnped into service reservoir at Nagpur.\n\nThe Corporation has a separate staff at each pumping station. It has also a separate staff for distribution.· In addition it maintains an assessment department to assess water cess for the distribution of water. (See the evidence of Witness No. 9 for Party No. 1).\n\nThese three branches of he department have an\n\n• •\n\nCorporation of the\n\nCity of Nagpur v.\n\nIts Employees\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\nadministrative and an executive staff. Whether the services rendered by the department are concerned with manufacturing procss or not, they are certainly covered by the wide definition of \"industry\" in the Act. They also satisfy both the posit.ive and negative tests laid down by us.\n\nNone of them comprises delegated regal functions of State and they are such that a private individual can equally undertake to do. We, therefore, hold that the said department comes under the definition of \"industry\".\n\n(vi) City Engineers Department: The function of this department is to exercise supervisory and administrative control over its subordinate departments.\n\nTheCity Engineer is the head of this department. (See the evidence of Witness No. 5 for Party No. 1).\n\nAs we are of the view that the departments subordinate to this department come under the definition of \"industry\", this department, which has administrative control over those subordinate departments, must be considered a part of those departments. If so, it follows that this department is also an industry.\n\n(vii) Enforcement (encroachment) Department: The function of this department is to remove encroachment and unauthorised constructions and dilapidated houses. This department is a section of the Estate Department. (See the evidence of Witness No. 5 for Party No. 1). It is contended that the functions of this department are all statutory and that no private individual can perform them. Statutory powers are conferred on the Corporation to remove encroachment and unauthorised construction and dilapidated houses. These powers are necessary for the Corporation to protect its properties and to prevent encroachment thereon and to remove dilapidated houses in the interest of the public. But if a distinction is made between the powers and. the nature of the services rendered, it would be obvious that the services rendered are not peculiar to a corporation.\n\nA private firm may undertake to manage the properties of otlrers. It will have to appoint persons to detect encroachment and to take steps to recover possession of lands encroached upon. The only difference between a firm and a municipal corporation is that the corporation\n\n-'\n\ncan, in exercise• of its statutory powers, remove the r960 encroachment, but it does not prevent the aggrieved c -.- f . t . 'l t t t bl' h h t'tl orporation of the party rom gomg o a. mv1 cour o es a\n\nIS .\n\nIS 1 e City of Nagpur to the property : but m the case of a firm, 1t cannot v. take the law into its own hands: it has to get the Its Emptoyeas encroachment removed through a court of law. So far as the nature of the service is concerned, namely, Subba Rao J. protecting its properties in the interest of the public from encroachment and to recover possession of the lands encroached upon, there is no essential distinction between the said service of the Corporation and a similar service performed by a private firm.\n\nThe service satisfies not only the. terms of the definition, but also the tests laid down by us.\n\nEven so, it is contended that the said reasoning cannot be invoked in the case of the service rendered by the municipality in removing dilapidated houses and it is said that the said service is rendered in exercise of a governmental function which a private individual cannot himself discharge.· Here again the incidental power is confused with the service. To illustrate, a firm may undertake to remove dilapidated houses and render the said service to those who engage it. It may not have the power to remove dilapidated houses of persons other than those who employed its services. . The difference does not in any way affect the character of the service. We, therefore, hold that this department is also an industry.\n\n(viii) Sewage Department; The sewage pumping station is meant for pumping sewage at the outfall of the underground sewers. The sewage is utilised.on the land on broad irrigation system, and some crops are also grown on the farm. (See the evidence of Witness No. 8 for Party No. 1). In the cross-examination of the said witness it was elicited that whatever sewage is left after irrigating the farm maintained by the Corporation will be sold to the neighbouring farms. ll'or the said reasons, it must be held that this department is also an industry.\n\n(ix) Health Department: This department looks after scavenging, sanitation, control of epidemics, control of food adulteration and running of public dispensaries. Private institutions can also render\n\n• •\n\nI960 these services. It is said that the control of food c -;;- 1 th adulteration and the control of epidemics cannot be ';;1:;:j ;:; p.: done by private individuals and institutions. We do v. not see why. There can be private medical units to Its Employees help in the control of food adulteration and in the control of epidemics for remuneration. Individuals Subba Rao J. may get the food articles purchased by them examined by the medical unit and take necessary action against guilty merchants. So too, they can take advantage of such a unit to prevent epidemics by having necessary inocnlations and advice. This department also satisfies the other tests laid down by us, and is an industry within the meaning of the definition of \"industry\" in the Act.\n\n(x) Market Department: The function of the Market Department is to issue licences, collect ground-rent and registration fee and to detect short weights and measures. Rents are collected for permitting persons to enter the Corporation land and transact business thereon. Detection of short weights\n\nand measures is a service to the people to prevent their being cheated in the market. The setting apart of market places, supervision of weights and measures are services rendered to the public and the fees collected are remuneration for the services so rendered.\n\nThese servicas can equally be done by any private individual. This department a.Jso siblishment, and (b) the standing orders are otherwise in conformity with the provisions of this Act. The rest of the provision of s. 4 has already been cited and considered by us.\n\nHaving thus provided for the tests which have to be satisfied before a draft submitted by the employer can be treated as certifiable, s. 5 provides for the procedure of the proceedings which are taken before the certifying officer. tlection 5 (2) lays down that after notice is given to the parties concerned the certifying officer shall decide whether or not any modification of, or addition to, the draft submitted by the employer is necessary to render tho draft standing orders certifiable under the Act, and shall. make an order in writing accordingly. Sub-section (3) of s. 5 then provides for\n\nI- <\n\nr i\n\nS.O.R.\n\nSUPREME OO:URT REPORTS 979\n\ncertifying the draft after making modifications, if any, z96o under sub-s. (2). There is one more section to which Associated reference may be made. Section 15(2)(b) provides Cement Co. Ltd. that the rules which the appropriate government may v. make under the Act may set out model standing orders P. D. Vyas for the purposes of this Act. The cumulative effect of . - these provisions is that the certifying officer has to be Ga; endragadkar J. satisfied that the draft standing orders deal with every matter set out in the Schedule and are otherwise in conformity with the provisions of the Act. This latter requirement necessarily imports the consideration specified in s. 3, sub-s. (2), that is to say, the draft standing order must be in conformity with the model standing .order which is provided under s. 15(2)(b) for the purposes of th~ Aot, and, as we have already seen, unless it is shown that it would be impracticable to do so, the draft standing order must be in conformity with the model standing order. It is quite true that this requirement does not: mean that the draft standing order must be in identical words but it does mean that in substance it must conform to the model prescribed by the appropriate government.\n\nThe question which then arises is: was it or was it not open to resp-ondent 2 to consider whether the draft submitted by the appellants should not conform to the model standing order in respect of fihe topics with which we are concerned in the present appeal? The answer to this question must obviously be in the affirmative. It was not only open to respondent 2 to enquire into the matter but it was clearly his duty to do so before holding, that the draft orders were certifiable under s. 4. Now such an enquiry necessarily involves: the consideration of the question as to whether it would be practicable to insist upon conformity with the model standing order in regard to the matters in dispute. If respondent 2 was satisfied that it would be practicable to insist upon such conformity it would be within his competence to make the suitable modifications in the draft. If, on the other hand, he took the\"view that it would not be practicable to insist upon such conformity he would, despite the disparity between the model and the draft, treat the draft as certifiable .. In te present case respondent 2 a~ well\n\n• •\n\nI96o as respondent 1 have held that it was practicable to insist upon conformity with the model standing order Assoc-lated Cement Co. Ltd. in regard to the matters in dispute; and so they have v. made suitable modifications. Having regard to the P. D. Vyas relevant provisions which we have just considered, it . - seems difficult to accept the plea that in making the Ga1endragadkar f. modifications in question respondent 2 and respondent 1 have exceeded their jurisdiction. It is important to make a distinction between considerations of fairness or reasonableness which are excluded from the purview of the enquiry before respondent 2 and respondent 1 from considerations of practicability which are necessarily imported in such an enquiry. The line separating the one from the other may be thin but nevertheless it is a firm and existing line which is statutorily recognised in the respective provisions of the Act.\n\nRespondent 2 may not modify the draft on the ground that its provisions are unfair or unreasonable but he can and must modify the draft in matters covered by the model standing order if he is satisfied that conformity with such model standing order is practicable in the circumstances of the case. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court was right in holding that the authorities under the Act had, acted within their jurisdiction in making the impugned modifications.\n\nWe may aow refer to the decisions to which our attention was invited by Mr. Kolah. In Guest, Kten, ·\n\nWilliams (Private) Ltd v. Sterling (P. J.) & Ors. ('}, this Court had occasion to consider the effect of a part of the provision contained in s. 4 of the Act as it stood before its amendment in 1956. It is, however, clear that in that case the point raised for our decision now did not fall to be considered. In Electric W orlcers'\n\nUnion v. The U.P. Electric Supply Go.('}, Mr. Justice Wanchoo, who was acting as the appellate authority under the Act, appears to have held that the provision contained in s. 3(2) had nothing to do with the power of the certifying officer to substitute the model for the draft. According to the learned judge the said provision was intended merely to help and guide the employers as to how they should frame their draft standing orders. This decision appa.rently supports\n\n(1) (1960) I S.C.R. 348\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1949 All. 504.\n\n• At ,_\n\nthe argument that the certifying officer cannot make r960 any changes in the pro.visions of the draft where those Associated provisions are clear on the ground that they are not cement co. Ltd. reasonable and fair and that other provisions which v. may have been provided in the model standing orders P.D. Vyas should be substituted for them. If, in making these . - observations, it was intended to decide that, before Ga_, endraga./kar J. certifying the draft standing orders submitted by the employer, the certifying officer cannot enquire and decide whether it would be practicable or not to ma.ke the provisions in the draft conform to the model standing orderi;;, with respect, we would hold that th~ said decision is inconsistent with the true effect of the relevant provisions of the Act.\n\nWe may incidentally add that the observations made by Wanchoo J. in that case have not been approved by the Allahabad High Court in Jiwan Mal & Co. v. Secretqry, Kanpur Loha Mills Karamchari Union & Ors. (1).\n\nIn Mysore K irloskar Employees' Association v. Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore & Anr. (2), the Mysore High Court bas considered this question and it appears to have concurred more with the view expressed by the Bombay High Court which is the subject-matter of the present appeal than with the observations of Wanchoo J.\n\nThere is one more point to which reference must be made. Mr. Kolah attempted to argue before us that, even if the authorities under the Act had jurisdiction to deal with the matter and examine whether or not it was practicable to insist upon conformity with the model standing orders, the modifications made by them on the merits are impracticable. We have not allowed Mr. Kolah to urge t, his contention before us because such a plea was not raised by the appellants in their petition for a writ before the Bombay High Court, and it would not be open to them to raise it for the first time before us.\n\nBesides, in a petition for a writ of certiorari it would normally not be open to the appellants to challenge the merits of the findings made by the authorities under the Act.\n\nThe result is the appal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1955 All. 581.\n\nAppeal dismissed\n\n(2) [1959] I L.L. J. 53r.\n\n• •", "total_entities": 40, "entities": [{"text": "THE ASSOCIATED CEMENT COMPANY LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 747, "end_char": 780, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE ASSOCIATED CEMENT COMPANY LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "OTHERS. (B. P. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 807, "end_char": 836, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 841, "end_char": 861, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K.C. DAS GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1189, "end_char": 1196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1204, "end_char": 1253, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1395, "end_char": 1404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1649, "end_char": 1656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P. D. Vyas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2456, "end_char": 2466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "16(2) in the Associated C•ment Co. Ltd. draft standing orders provided that striking work v. either singly or with other workers without giving P. D. Vyas fourteen days' previous notice would be treatPd as - misconduct; whereas item No.", "canonical_name": "P. D. Vyas"}}, {"text": "Gajendragadka", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2569, "end_char": 2582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "16(3) provided that Gajendragadka.", "canonical_name": "Gajendragadkar"}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3532, "end_char": 3549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "267 of 1954, in the Bombay High Court challenging the validity of the action of respondents 2 and 1."}}, {"text": "Coyajce", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3624, "end_char": 3631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr Justice Coyajce, who heard the said application, upheld the contention raised by the appellants and came to the concluEion that in making the impugned modifications respondent 2 and respondent 1 had acted beyond their jurisdiction.", "canonical_name": "Coyajce"}}, {"text": "Coyajee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4131, "end_char": 4138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellate court reversed the decision of Coyajee J. and held that the action of respondents 2 and 1 in making the modifications in question was justified by the provisions , of the Act.", "canonical_name": "Coyajce"}}, {"text": "Cement co. Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4599, "end_char": 4614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is against this decision that the present appeal has been preferred by\n\n/ -\n\nthe appellants; and the short question which it raises z960 for our decision is: whether, under the provisions of Associated the Act, it was eompetent to respondents 2 and 1 to Cement co. Ltd. make the impugned modifications in the draft standing v. orders submitted by the appellants for certification P.D. Vyas under the Act?"}}, {"text": "P.D. Vyas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4725, "end_char": 4734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is against this decision that the present appeal has been preferred by\n\n/ -\n\nthe appellants; and the short question which it raises z960 for our decision is: whether, under the provisions of Associated the Act, it was eompetent to respondents 2 and 1 to Cement co. Ltd. make the impugned modifications in the draft standing v. orders submitted by the appellants for certification P.D. Vyas under the Act?", "canonical_name": "P. D. Vyas"}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4798, "end_char": 4812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Act has been passed because it was thought Gajendragadkar l• \"expedient to require employers in industrial establish; men ts to define with sufficient precision the conditions of employment under them and to make the said conditions known to workmen employed by them.\"", "canonical_name": "Gajendragadkar"}}, {"text": "s. 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5055, "end_char": 5062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kolah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5249, "end_char": 5254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Kolah, for the appellants, contends that the main object of the Act is to require the employers to provide for conditions of service in respect of all the matters covered by the Schedule, and, according to him, the jurisdiction of respondent 2 under the Act as it then stood is confined only to see that standing orders are made in respect of all th.e items specified in the Schedule."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5703, "end_char": 5707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6472, "end_char": 6476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6656, "end_char": 6660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7188, "end_char": 7197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7264, "end_char": 7276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7683, "end_char": 7687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7850, "end_char": 7854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8076, "end_char": 8080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8399, "end_char": 8403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8584, "end_char": 8588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9027, "end_char": 9031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15(2)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9247, "end_char": 9263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "endragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9529, "end_char": 9540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "these provisions is that the certifying officer has to be Ga; endragadkar J. satisfied that the draft standing orders deal with every matter set out in the Schedule and are otherwise in conformity with the provisions of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9771, "end_char": 9775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15(2)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9907, "end_char": 9918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10822, "end_char": 10826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Assoc-lated Cement Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11568, "end_char": 11595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If, on the other hand, he took the\"view that it would not be practicable to insist upon such conformity he would, despite the disparity between the model and the draft, treat the draft as certifiable .. In te present case respondent 2 a~ well\n\n• •\n\nI96o as respondent 1 have held that it was practicable to insist upon conformity with the model standing order Assoc-lated Cement Co. Ltd. in regard to the matters in dispute; and so they have v. made suitable modifications."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13095, "end_char": 13099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13340, "end_char": 13347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Justice Wanchoo, who was acting as the appellate authority under the Act, appears to have held that the provision contained in s. 3(2) had nothing to do with the power of the certifying officer to substitute the model for the draft."}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13459, "end_char": 13466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ga_, endraga./kar J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14241, "end_char": 14261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "observations, it was intended to decide that, before Ga_, endraga./kar J. certifying the draft standing orders submitted by the employer, the certifying officer cannot enquire and decide whether it would be practicable or not to ma.ke the provisions in the draft conform to the model standing orderi;;, with respect, we would hold that th~ said decision is inconsistent with the true effect of the relevant provisions of the Act."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14727, "end_char": 14747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may incidentally add that the observations made by Wanchoo J. in that case have not been approved by the Allahabad High Court in Jiwan Mal & Co. v. Secretqry, Kanpur Loha Mills Karamchari Union & Ors. ("}}, {"text": "Mysore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14923, "end_char": 14940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2), the Mysore High Court bas considered this question and it appears to have concurred more with the view expressed by the Bombay High Court which is the subject-matter of the present appeal than with the observations of Wanchoo J.\n\nThere is one more point to which reference must be made."}}]}