r960

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

RABARI GHELA JADAV

THE STATE OF BOMBAY

[1960]

(B. P. SINHA, C. J., JAFER IMAM AND

J. 0. SHAH, JJ.)

Criminal Appeal-If can be admitted and heard on question of sentence only-Code of Criminal Procedure (V of I898), ss. 4I8(I),

4I9, 42I, 422.

The appellant was convicted under s. 304 Part I of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life by the trial Court. His appeal to the High Court was admitted only on the question of sentence and at the hearing the .sentence was reduced to ro years' imprisonment. On appeal by special leave the appellant contended that his appeal in the High Court could not, in Jaw, be admitted on the question of sentence only and that he was entitled to be heard on the merits of the case also.

Held, that having regard to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure while an Appellate Court had power to dismiss an appeal summarily if it considered that there was no sufficient ground for interfering, it had no power to direct the appeal to be heard on the question of sentence only.

The Appellate Court, after hearing the appeal had the power in finally disposing of the appeal to reduce the sentence but was not entitled to direct the appeal to be admitted only on the question of sentence. The appellant was entitled to have his appeal heard on the merits in the High Court.

The King Emperor v. Dahu Raut, (1935) LR. 62 I.A. 129, followed.

Najar Sheikh v. Emperor, (1914) I.LR. 41 Cal. 606, Gaya Singh v. King Emperor, (1925) I.LR. 4 Pat. 254, and Su.dhir Kumar Neogi and Another v. Emperor, A.LR. (1942) Pat. 46, approved.

Bdl Dhankor v. Emperor, (1937) I.LR. Born. 365, not applicable.

0RIMIN4L

APPELLATE

JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 14 of 1959.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated November 19, 1957, of the Bombay High Court at Rajkot in Criminal Appeal No. 137 of 1957, arising out of the Judgment and order dated August 31, 1957, of the Sessions Judge, Sorath Division, Junagadh, in Sessions Case No. 26 of 1957.

P. K. Chatterjee, for the appellant.

H.J. Umrigar and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent.

1960, February, 26.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered l5y

IMAM, J.-This appeal is by special leave. The appellant was convicted under s. 304, Part I of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life. He appealed to the Bombay High Court.

According to the judgment of the High Court the appeal was admitted only on the point of sentence.

The High Court reduced the sentence from imprisonment for life to 10 years' rigorous imprisonment.

It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that the High Court could not, in law, admit an appeal only on the point of sentence and the appellant was entitled to have his appeal heard on the merits of his conviction as well. The evidence upon which the appellant was convicted was unsatisfactory and he was entitled to be acquitted.

Shortly stated, the case of the prosecution was that the appellant had caused the death of Zina Hira on April 6, 1957, when the deceased was returning from an adjoining village to the village of his residence.

The appellant met 'him on the way and accused him of having committed theft in the appellant's house which the deceased denied. Upon this the appellant attacked him with a stick which had iron rings round it. A number of blows were given by the appellant with this stick in consequence of which Zina Hira fell down. Although a doctor was called for from Keshod, 8 miles away, ultimately the deceased was taken to Junagadh for better medic_al treatment but died on the way in the early hours of the morning of April 7.

According to the case of the appellant he was not present at the scene of the crime and pleaded not guilty to the charge.

According to the judgment of the High Court the appeal of the appellant before it was admitted only on the point of sentence. It was urged that this procedure adopted by the High Court was not in conformity with the provisions of ss. 421 and 422 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Reliance was placed upon the decisions of the Calcutta High Court and Patna High Court in the ca13es of Nafar Sheikh v,

Rabari Ghela jadav v.

State of Bombay

Imam].

Rabari Ghela Jadav v.

State of Bombay

Imam].

Emperor (1), Gaya Singh v. King Emperor (2), Sudhir Kumar Neogi and Another v. Emperor(') and Sheikh Rijhu and Others v. Emperor(') and of the Privy Council in the case of The King-Emperor v. Daku Raut(').

Reference was also made to the decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Kuldip Das v. King Emperor (6) and the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Bai Dhankor v. Emperor(').

In order to appreciate the submission made on behalf of the appellant reference to certain provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure in Chapter XXXI concerning Appeals will be necessary. Under s. 418(1) an appeal may lie on a matter of fact as well as a matter of law, except where the trial was by jury, in which case the appeal shall lie on a matter of law only. It is unnecessary to refer to sub-s. (2) of this section for the purposes of this appeal. Under s. 419 every appeal shall be made in the form of a petition in writing presented by the appellant or his pleader and every such petition shall (unless the Court to which it is presented otherwise directs) be accompanied by a copy of the judgment or order appealed against, and, in cases tried by a jury, a copy of the heads of the charge recorded under section 367.

As to what should follow on the presentation of such a petition in will be necessary to quote the provisions of ss. 421 and 422 of the Code.

Section 421 reads: "421 (1) On receiving the petition and copy under section 419 or section 420, the Appellate Court shall peruse the same, and, if it considers that there is no sufficient ground for interfering, it may dismiss the appeal summarily: Provided that no appeal presented under section 419 shall be dismissed unless the appellant or his pleader has had a reasonable opportunity of being heard in support of the same.

(2) Before dismissing an appeal under this section, the Court may call for the record of the case, but shall not be bmmd to do so."

(r) (rgr4) I.L.R. 4r Cal. 606. (2} (I925) I.L.R. 4 Pat. 254.

(3) A.I.R. (1942) Pat 46. (4) A.LR. (1931) Pat. 351,

(S)

(1935) L.R. 62 I.A. 129.

(6) (1932) I.L.R. II Pat. 697.

(7) (1937) l.L.R. Bom 365.

\--

. -i

...

3 S .. Q.R.

SUPRI5ME COURT REPORTS 133

Section 422 reads : r960 " 422. If the Appellate Court does not dismiss Rabari the appeal summarily, it shall cause notice to be Gkela Jadav given to the appellant or his pleader, and to such v. officer as the State Government may appoint in this State of Bombay behalf, of the time and place at which such appeal will be heard, and shall, on the application of such Imam J. officer, furnish him with a eopy of the grounds of appeal; and, in cases of appeal under section 411A, subsection (2), or section 41,7, the Appellate Court shall cause a like notice to be given to the accu_sed." It is clear from these provisions that on receiving the petition and a copy under s. 419, the Appellate Court shall peruse the same and if it considers that the11e is no sufficient ground for interfering it will dismiss the appeal summarily, and that if the Appellate Court does n0t dismiss the appeal summarily, it shall cause notice to be given to the appellant or his pleader, and to such officer as the State Goernment may appoint in this behalf. of the time and place at which such appeal will be heard. The recording of • an order that the appeal is admitted, when it is not summarily dismissed, is not a happily chosen expression as was pointed out by. the Privy Council in the case of 'The King-Emperor v. Dahu Raut (1 ).

Section 421 giv8s ample power to the Appellate Court to dismiss an appeal summarily if it considers that there is no sufficient ground for interfering. On the other hand, if it does not dismiss the appeal summarily then it is obligatOJ'y upon it to cause notice of the appeal to be given to the appellant and to such officer as the State Government may appoint in this behalf of the time and place at which such appeal will be heard. These provisions do not contemplate a partial summary dismissal of an appeal as was pointed out by the Privy Council in the above-mentioned case where it was stated by Lord Thankerton:

" The terms of the section equally exclude the possibility of partial sun:unary dismissal, e. g., in so far as the conviction is appealed against. Failing summary dismissal, the provisions of ss. 422 and 423 apply and, in their l, iordships' opinion, the pro-

(1) [193~] L.R. 62 I.A. 129

I960

Rabari Ghela Jadav v.

State of Bombay

Imam].

visions as to notices in s. 422 and the provisions as to sending for the record in s. 423 are clearly peremptory and there can be no room for revision at that stage. " It was, however, submitted on behalf of the State of Bombay that the facts in the case before the Privy Council can be distinguished from the facts of the present case becauGe in the case before the Privy Council no notices were issued under s. 422 and the record was not sent for in accordance with s. 423. In the present case notices were issued under s. 422 and the record was sent for in accordance with s. 423 of the Code.

Particular reliance was placed upon the concluding portion of the Privy Council judgment to the following effect :-

"Accordingly, their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeals should be allowed, and that it should be declared that, upon the true construction of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Appellate Cpurt is entitled to dismiss an appeal summarily in terms of s. 421 unless the Court is satisfied that there is no sufficient ground for interfering in accordance with the relief sought in the appeal, and that where the appeal is not dismissed summarily, the court is bound, in order to the disposal of the appeal, to comply with the provisions of s. 422 as to notice, and with the provisions of s. 423 as to the sending of the record, if such record is not already in Court ...... "_ It seems to us, however, having regard to the provisions of the Code, that while an Appellate Court has power to dismiss an appeal summarily, if it considers that there is no sufficient ground for interfering, it has no power to direct, as in the case before us, that the appeal shall be heard only on the point of sentence. Such an order is not an order of summary dismissal under s. 421 and neither is it an order in terms of s. 422 of the Code. When an appeal is filed it is an appeal against conviction and sentence and it is not permissible for an Appellate Court to direct that it shall be heard only on the question of sentence.

Our interpretation of ss. 421 and 422 is in keeping with the interpretation of these sections by the

I- .

-I

3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 135 - Privy Council in Dahu Raut's case.

The decisions of the Calcutta High Court and the Patna High Court in Rabari

(1914) I.L.R. 41 Cal. 606, A.I.R. 1942 Pat. 46,, (1925) Ghela ]adav I.L.R. 4 Pat. 254 referred to above appear to us to be v. correct. In these circumstances reference need not be State of Bombay made to the v.iew expressed by the Patna High Court in (1932) I.L.R. 11 Pat. 697 which was a judgment before the decision of the Privy Council in Dahu Raut's case. The decision of the Bombay High Court in I.L.R. 1937 Boni. 365 endeavoured to find a way 'in which the difficulty could be resolved where the Appellate Court was of the opinion that only the question of sentence was involved. For the purposes of this appeal it is unnecessary for us to say anything about this decision because what was stated there does not arise for consideration, as, in the present case, according to the judgment of the High Court, the appeal was admitted only on the point of sentence.

It was also urged by Mr. Umrigar that under s. 423 an Appellate Court had the power to reduce the sentence. That is so, but that power can only be exercised after the requirements of s. 422 have been complied with. The Appellate Court after hearing the appeal, certainly has the power in finally disposing of the appeal to reduce the sentence but that does not entitle it to direct thii, t an appeal is admitted only on the question of sentence.

We make it clear, however, that in dealing with Mr.

Umrigar's submission on this point we are concerned with the powers of an Appellate Court and not with the power of a High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction which does not arise for consideration in this appeal. In our opinion, the form of the . order admitting the appeal in the present case was invalid and the appellant could have insisted that since the appeal had not been summarily dismissed, the High Court should have heard his appeal on the merits as well. .

As the appeal was not heard o_n the merits, we considered whether the appeal should be sent back to the High Court for rehearing on the merits. We have, however, thought it fit to hear the appeal on the merits for ourselyes.

Imam].

I960

Rabari Ghela Jadav v.

State of Bombay

Imam].

136 SUPREME COURT REltOR'.rS [1960]

We, acoordingly, heard the learned Advocate for the appellant on the evidence. It is cka.r to us from a perusal of the evidence that the case has been amply proved against the appellant. There was an eye-witness who saw the appellant assaulting the deceased with a stick. l{e was in some way related to the deceased, which he attempted to deny, otherwise there is nothing in his evidenee to indHce a court to distrust his testimony. This eye-witness, Bava Tapu, immediately after the assault, went to the Police Patel of Simroli, one Keshav, and told him that the deceased had been assaulted by the appellant. Keshav corroborated Bava Tapu in this respect.

Keshav's evidence in this respect is also corroborated by Natha Jiwa who stated that Bava Tapu came and informed Keshav that Zina Hira had been severely assaulted and injured by the appellant. Bogha Jiwa ;:1lso corroborated Keshav in this respect. None of these witnesses have any real motive to depose against the appellant. In addition to this evidence there was the dying declaration of the deceased as to who 'his assailant was. Furthermore, there was the recovery of a stiok buried underground at the instance of the appellaat which was found to be stained with human blood according to the report of the Serologist. The other circumstant.ial evidence need not be referred to.

It was urged on behalf of the appellant that the reason for the appellant assaulting the deceased could not be true as no reference was made to it in the First InformatiOn lodged by Keshav. Reference also was made to the evidence of the Police Officer Priyakant that no information of the theft had been lodged by the appellant at the thana. Th!J appellant in his statement denied that the deceased had committed , any theft in his house and the witness Karsan brother of the appellant had stated in cross examination that there had been no theft in their house.

This witness was examined by the prosecution but was declared hostile and permission was granted by the Court to cross-examine him.

It seems to us, however, that even if the story about the accusation of theft against the deceased made by

te appellant was not stated in the First Information the omission is of little , consequence because even

Keshav stated in the First Information that he had enquired from Bava Tapu as to how the quarrel had started. Merely because there was no information lodged about the theft at the police station, it does not necessarily follow that the appellant could not have been suspecting the deceased. The denial of the appellant and of his brother cannot assume much importance as it would be natural for them to deny any such thing. Apart from this even if the real cause for the assault may be obscure, if the evidence is clear that the appellant assaulted the deceased, .it matters very little if the Court has not before it a very clear motive for the assault. As we have already said, apart from Bava Tapu hesitating to admit that he was somewhat related to the deceased, there was no apparent motive for him to depose against the appellant in such a serious case as this. His conduct would show that he had, in fact, witnessed the assault because immediately after the assault he went to the Police Patel Keshav and informed him that the appellant had assaulted the deceased with a stick. There is no reason to doubt the genuineness of the dying declaration. There is no good reason for supposing that the deceased would have accused the appellant falsely as there was no previous enemity established. It is also unlikely that he would let go his real assailant and accuse the appellant falsely. The dying declaration is corroborated by the evidence of the eye-witness Bava Tapu. It further receives corroboration from the recovery of the stick stained with human blood at the instance of the appellant which had been identified by Bava Tapu as belonging to the appellant.

It is clear, therefore, that the evidence in the case, which we have carefully examined and see no good reason to distrust, established beyond doubt that the appellant had struck the deceased several blows with a stick and thus caused his death. He was, therefore, guilty at least under s. 304 of the Indian Penal Code as found bythe trial court. The reduced sentence imposed by the High Court does not appear to be unduly severe. · ·· ' The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed . .Appeal dismissed.

Rabar.i G he la ] ad av .. v.

State of Bombay

Imam].

RABARI GHELA JADAV

THE STATE OF BOMBAY

B. P. SINHA

JAFER IMAM

0. SHAH, JJ.

Code of Criminal Procedure

ss. 4I

s. 304

Part I of the Indian Penal Code

Code of Criminal Procedure

(1935) LR. 62 I.A. 129

P. K. Chatterjee

H.J. Umrigar

R. H. Dhebar

IMAM

s. 304

Part I of the Indian Penal Code

Bombay High Court

Zina Hira

Keshod

Junagadh

ss. 421 and 422

Code of Criminal Procedure

Calcutta High Court

Patna High Court

Code of Criminal Procedure

s. 418(1)

s. 419

section 367

ss. 421 and 422

Section 421

section 419

section 420

section 419

(1935) L.R. 62 I.A. 129

Section 422

Rabari

Bombay

section 411A

section 41

s. 419

Section 421

Thankerton

ss. 422 and 423

L.R. 62 I.A. 129

s. 422

s. 423

State of Bombay

s. 422

s. 423

s. 422

s. 423

Cpurt

s. 421

s. 422

s. 423

s. 421

s. 422

ss. 421 and 422

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 135

Dahu Raut

Umrigar

s. 423

s. 422

Bava Tapu

Simroli

Keshav

Bava Tapu

Natha Jiwa

Bogha Jiwa

Priyakant

Karsan

s. 304

Indian Penal Code


February 26

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

SAHIBZADA SAIYED MUHAMMED

AMIRABBAS ABBASI & OTHERS

THE STATE OF MADHYA BHARAT

& OTHERS

[1960]

(B. P. SINHA, C.J., JAFER IMAM, A.K. SARKAit.

K. N. WANCHOOAND J.C. SHAH, JJ.)

Personal Law-Right to Guardianship-If can be enforced by way of constitutional remedy-Constitution of India, Art. 32.

The first petitioner, who had migrated to West Pakistan, applied to the High Court of Madhya Bharat for a writ of habeas corpus for directions to produce petitioners 2 and 3, his minor children, before the Court on the allegation that they were wrongfully confined and, upon the dismissal of the said application, applied to the District Judge of Ratlam under the Guardian and Wards Act for his appointment as guardian of the person and property of the said minors. The District Judge rejected the application and appointed the second respondent as such guardian. The first petitioner appealed to the High Court against the said order of the District Judge but that appeal was dismissed. He applied for special leave to appeal to this Court but that application was also rejected. Thereafter the first petitioner, as natural guardian of petitioners 2 and 3, filed the present petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution. His case in substance was that the interest of the second respondent was adverse to that of the minors, that he had misappropriated their property and that the first respondent, the State of Madhya Bharat, was bound to take steps to protect the property of the minors which it had failed to do and had thus rendered itself liable to make good the loss sustained by the minors in consequence.

Held, that the petition was wholly misconceived, and must be dismissed.

The Court can exercise jurisdiction .under Art. 32 of the Constitution only in enforcement of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. Where on account of the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction, the right alleged by the petitioner does not exist and therefore its infringemen~ cannot arise, this Court cannot entertain a petition under that Article for protection of the alleged right.

A claim as to denial of equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws can be made again:"t executive action or against legislative process but not against the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction.

Nor can an order of this Court rejecting an application for special leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution be circumvented by an application for a writ under Art. 32.

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petition No .. 217 of 'r960 1956.

Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of Ami~~.;~:bbasi India for enforcement of Fundamental rights. v.

Pandit Nanak Chand, for the petitioners.

State of M. B.

I. N. Shroff, for respondent No. 1. 1960 February, 26. The Judgment of the Court Shah J. was delivered by

SHAH, J.-This is a petition filed by Sahibzada Saiyed Muhammed Amirabbas Abbasi, who will hereinafter be referred to as the first petitioner on behalf of himself and as the natural guardian of his two minor children, Kamal Abbas and Jehanzeb Bano, petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 against the State of Madhya Bharat (now the State of Madhya Pradesh) and three other respondents for an appropriate writ or writs of Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, Certiorari, Prohibition and any other writ, direction or order directing the State of Madhya Bharat immediately to assume charge of the properties of the minor petitioners 2 and 3 and determining the a.mount of loss sustained by the minors and calling upon the State of Madhya Bharat and the other respondents to compensate the minors for the full value of the property lost due to their negligence in the discharge of their respective duties in failing to protect the minors' properties, and calling upon the 4th respondent to produce the minors before this court and directing that the minors be handed over to the custody of some relation who is competent under the Personal Law to have their custody, and calling upon the Chief Secretary of the State of Madhya Bharat to furnish full particulars of the trust property released in favour of the 2nd respondent and directing the 1st respondent to produce in this court the box of jewellery entrusted to it with full particulars' regarding its custody f.t:om March 29, 1948, and ascertaining whether the contents have been misappropriated and further ascertainingthe loss, if any, occasioned to the minor petitioners and its quantum and declaring liability of the respondents in that behalf and for further relief which the court may award in the circumstances of the case, as just and proper.

I96o Prima facie, the reliefs claimed are not within the

~ 5 scope of a petition for a writ under Art. 32 of the

Ami; bb~~:bbasi Constitution. This court has power under that Article .

v. to issue directions, orders or writs, including writs in State of M. B. the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari whichever may be appro- Shah J. priate for the <mforcement of any of the fundamental rights; but by this petition, the first petitioner claims on the plea that the respodents have misappropriated or misapplied the property of petitioners 2 -and 3, a writ or writs directing that Joss sustained _by the minors be ascertained and made good and also asks this court to provide for the custody of the minors according to their Personal Law.

The facts which give rise to the petition are these: The first petitioner married in 1940 one N aiyar J ahan Begam and by her he had two childrenpetitioners 2 and 3.

Naiyar Jahan Begam died in the year 1943 and petitioners 2 and 3 were thereafter looked after by Musharraf Jahan Begam, mother of Naiyar Jahan Begam. From her father Naiyar Jahan Begam had inherited certain valuable property and from her mother, Musharraf Jahan Begam, she had received a dowry of substantial value at the time of her marriage. Before she died on March 6, 1949, Musharraf Jehan Begam had made a trust in respect of certain property of the benefit of petitioners 2 and

3. The first petitioner had after the death of Naiyar Johan Begam contr_acted a second marriage and of that marriage there were three children. During the life of Musharraf J ehan Begam the first petitioner took no interest in petitio.ners 2 and 3 and at sometime in the year 1948, he migrated to West P.akistan and took up residence in Rawalpindi.

After the death of Musharraf Jehan Begam, the first petitioner applied to the Madhya Bharat High Court for a writ in the nature of habeas corpus for a direction to produce petitioners 2 and 3 before the court on the allegation that the latter were wrongfully detained.

The High Court refused to give the direction and ordered that the first petitioner might, if so advised, apply under the Guardian and Wards Act for appropriate relief.

The first petitioner then applied to the

court of the District Judge at Ratlam for an order

I960 that he be appointed a guardian ofthe person and s. s. Md. property of petitioners 2 and 3. On November 23, Amirabbas Abbasi 1949, the second respondent, Sultan Hamid Khan, v. cousin of Musharraf J ehan Begam applied that he be State of M: B. appointed guardian of the person an~ property of petitioners and 3 and by order dated December 5, 1949, the District Court appointed him guardian and rejected the application filed by the first petitioner. Against the order passed by the District Court, Ratlam, Appeal No. 20of1950 was filed in the High Court of Madhya Bharat. This appeal was dismissed on March 29; 1954. An application for special leave to appeal to this court under Act. 136 against that order of the High Court was rejected on N @vember 12, 1956.

The first petitioner had, in the meantime, applied to this court under Art. 32 of the Constitution for the reliefs which have already been set out. To this petition, petitioners 2 and 3 were impleaded as party .petitioners, the first petitioner alleging that he was their natural guardian and next friend. Evidently, the first petitioner could not claim to be the next friend of the minor petitioners 2 and 3, a guardian of their person and property having been appointed by the District Court, Ratlam, unless this court for reasons to be recorded deemed it to be for the welfare of the minors that the first petitioner be permitted to act or be appointed as the case may be (vide 0. 32, r. 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure). The first petitioner did not obtain any order of this court permitting him to act as the next friend of petitioners 2 and 3 notwithstanding the order passed by the District Court appointing respondent No. 2 as their guardian.

The petition filed by the first petitioner is a somewhat prolix document. The first petitioner claimed that the interest of the second respondent who was appointed a guardian by the District Court was adverse to the interests of the minors, and that the latter was, in any event, unfit to be appointed a guardian of the minors, that the second respondent had misappropriated the property of the minors and that he was not looking after the. minors and was

Shah ].

z96o acting contrary to their interest and that proceedings s. s. Md. in th~ ?istrict Cour.t "'.ere vitiated on acco:unt of Amirabbas Abb,.i ' partiality and collus10n ' and by reason of deliberate

v, violation of the order passed by the High Court. The State of M. B. petitioner also claimed that the State of Madhya Bharat was bound to take steps to protect the entire Shah J. property of the minor petitioners 2 and 3, but the first respondent had neglected to do so and had thereby rendered itself liable to make good the loss.

On these allegations, the first petitioner submitted that the minor petitioners were deprived of the equal protection of the laws in force including the Personal Law and were accordingly discriminated against and their property was, by reason of such discrimination in serious danger of being wasted or mis-appropriated.

He also submitted that he could not be denied his rights under the Personal Law governing the minors as their natural guardian, merely because he had acquired a foreign domicile.

Exercising jurisdiction under Art. 32 of the Constitution, this court may grant relief for enforcement, only of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution. The alleged right of the first petitioner to guardianship of his minor children under the Personal Law is not one of the fundamental rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution; nor by appointing respondo; int No. 2 as the guardian of the minors under the Guardian and Wards Act is discrimination practised against the minors. The second respondent was appointed guardian of the minors by order of a competent court, and denial of equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws can be claimed against executive action or legislative process but not against the decision of a competent tribunal. The remedy of a person aggrieved by the decision of µ, competent judicial tribunal is to approach for redress a superior tribunal, if there be one.

In the present case, against the order of the District Court appointing the second respondent the guardian of the person and property of the minors, an appeal was preferred to the High Court and that appeal was dismissed.

Even an application for special leave to appeal to this court was rejected, and the order of the District Court

became final. If, since the date on which the order z96o appointing the guardian of the minors, events have s s Md transpired which necessitate a modification of that Amirbbs Abbasi order, the proper remedy of the first petitioner is to v. apply to the District Court for relief in that behalf State of M. B. and not to approach this court for a writ under Art. 32 of the Constitution. This court has rejected the appli- Shah J. cation for special leave tq appeal under Art. 136; and that' order cannot be circumvented by resorting to an application for a writ under Art. 32. Relief under Art. 32 for enforcement of a right conferred by ch; III can be granted only on proof of that right and infringement thereof, and if, by the adjudication by a court of competent jurisdiction the right claimed has been negatived, a petition to this court under Art. 32 of the Constitution for enforcement of that right, notwithstanding the adjudication of the civil court, cannot be entertained.

The relief claimed by the first petitioner for assessing the liability of the respondents on the plea tha~ they have either misappropriated the estate or by negligence caused loss to the estate of the minors, may be obtained in a properly constituted suit and not in a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution. The property to which the minors are or may be entitled may be ascertained in a proceeding under the Gua; dian and Wards Act or in a suit in the civil court ana not in a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution.

In our judgment, the petition is wholly miscon~ ceived and must be dismissed with costs payable by the first petitioner personally.

Petition dismissed.

THE STATE OF MADHYA BHARAT

& OTHERS

B. P. SINHA, C.J.

JAFER IMAM

C. SHAH, JJ.

Constitution of India

Art. 32

High Court of Madhya Bharat

District Judge of Ratlam

Art. 32

Art. 32

Art. 136

Art. 32

Article 32

Pandit Nanak Chand

State of M. B.

I. N. Shroff

Shah

SHAH

Kamal Abbas

Jehanzeb Bano

Madhya Bharat

March 29, 1948

Art. 32

N aiyar J ahan Begam

Naiyar Jahan Begam

Musharraf Jahan Begam

March 6, 1949

Musharraf Jehan Begam

Naiyar Johan Begam

Musharraf J ehan Begam

West P.akistan

Rawalpindi

Madhya Bharat High Court

December 5, 1949

District Court, Ratlam

March 29; 1954

N @vember 12, 1956

Art. 32

the Code of Civil Procedure

Amirabbas Abb,.i

State of M. B.

State of Madhya Bharat

Art. 32

Amirbbs Abbasi

Art. 32

Art. 136

Art. 32

Art. 32

Art. 32

Art. 32

Art. 32


March I

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960]

M/S. SW ADESAMlTRAN LIMITED, MADRAS v.

THEIR WORKMEN (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SuBBA RAO AND K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.).

Industrial Dispute-Rule of retrenchment-" Last come first go" -If citn be departed from by employer-Protracted litigation and employment of other hands-If a ground for defeating claim for re-instatement.

The management by a notice terminated the services of 39 workmen as a measure of retrenchment. The 'vorkmen went on strike which led to an industrial dispute. The Industrial Tribunal interalia held that the strike was not justified and that the management had made out of a case of necessity for retrenchment and no malafidcs had been established; but the principle of last come first go had not been observed in selecting the personnel for retrenchment and ordered the reinstatement of 15 out of the 39 workmen retrenched. The Appellate Tribunal confirmed the findings of the Industrial Tribunal with certain modifications by way of compensation. The management came up in appeal by special leave. ·

Held, that where a case of retrenchment is made out the employer has normally to follow the industrial rule of retrenchment last come and first go; for valid reasons he may however depart from the said rule; in that case he has to show by reliable evidence, preferably from the recorded history of the workmen concerned showing their inefficiency, unreliability or habit'>i'l irregularity and can satisfy the Tribunal that the deparfure from the rule was justified by sound and valid reasons; otherwise the departure from the rule could be treated as being malafide or amounting to unfair. Jabour practice. _ Held, further that once it was found that retrenchment was unjustified and improper it is for the Tribunal to consider to what relief the retrenched workmen will be entitled; ordinarily retrenched workmen would be entitled to claim reinstatement, and the fact that in the meantime the employer has engaged other workmen would not necessarily defeat the claim for reinstatement, nor would the fact that protracted litigation in regard to the dispute has inevitably meant delay defeat such a claim for reinstatement. Therefore the conclusion that 15 workmen were improperly retrenched cannot be sucessfully challenged. •

CIVIL

APPELLATE

JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 483of1958.

Appeal by speoial leave from the decision dated March 20, 1956, of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Madras, in Appeal No. Bow. 90 of 1952 arising

out of the Award dated December 28, 1951, of the r96o Industrial Tribunal, Madras, in Industrial Dispute Swadesamilran Ltd.

No. 48 of 1951. .

Madras

1960. February 11, 12.

M. 0. Setalvad, Attorneyv; General of India, R. Ganapathy Iyer and G. Gopal- Their Workmen krishnan, for the appellants. This appeal arises from an Industrial Dispute between M/s. Swadesamitran and their workmen. Three items of dispute were referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal at Madras. One of them being whether the retrenchment of 39 workmen affected by the appellant in May 1951, was justified, and if not, what relief the retrenched workmen were entitled to. The modified award directed the reinstatement of 15 of the retrenched workmen and the question is whether such direction is correct. It has to be remembered that the direction was given on March 28, 1956, in respect of retrenchment made in May 1951, with half their back wages. The Tribunal erred in applying the rule "last come first go " as if it were an inflexible rule. The management is the best Judge as to who were fit to be retained and who should be sent out. No doubt, if the selection of persons disclosed that the management was guilty of any unfair labour practice, that would have been ground for interference. Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal found that the action of management in selecting the personnel was not at all malafide. It cannot be said to be unreasonabl~ if persons are selected for discharge because they had reached an age which would affect their efficiency and so fit for being retrenched. It cannot be the rule that once a workmen is entertained he should be kept on for ever. Moreover, the evidence shows that a committee of three sat for the purpose of making a selection and they applied their minds to the problem and took into account all factors, viz. length of service, efficiency, defect in eye-sight with regard to very small types and general aptitude for the new kind of work on lino machines. Further, the workmen had themselves settled accounts with the management and drawn whatever was due t.o them and their claims having been satisfied it was unfair

r96o and unjust to direct that they should be reinstated in - their old jobs with back wages. The others were Swadesamitran Ltd. f d ffi t d 1 tt d d M d 5 oun me cien an irregu ar m a en ance an ::• therefore the selection by the management should Their Workmen not have been interfered with at all by the Tribunal.

Principles of social justice do not compel an employer to keep an inefficient or unsuitable and superannuated workman in his service. The principle of ' last come first go' should not have been so strictly applied on the facts of this case. The Labour Appellate Tribunal erred in law in directing reinstatement when it did not differ from the conclusion of the Industrial Tribunal that the strike of the respondents

\W1S unjustified and that the appellants had acted bona fide in coming to the conclusion that retrenchment of 39 workmen was necessary. It is only if the Industrial Tribunal was satisfied that in retrenching its employees the appellant had acted malafide that it would be open to the Tribunal to interfere with the order of retrenchment passed by the appellant. The order of reinstatement in substance is inconsistent with the findings about the bona fides of the appellant.

The Tribunal further erred in preparing a pooled seniority list to determine the seniority.

The management must be given the discretion to run the business in its best interests and it is not for the Tribunal to say that the work done in the several sub-sections of composing department was similar and the workmen can be inter-shifted. Merely because no' record was maintained as to the fitness or otherwise of each individual worker prior to the retrenchment, it was not right to infer that there was no material for the management to judge of the comparative fitness of the workmen under it. In entertaining the grievan!Je of the workmen against their order of retrenchment the Labour Appellate Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction. Retrenchment is and must be held to be a normal management function and privilege, and as soon as a case for retrenchment has been made out liberty and discretion must be left to the employer to select which employee should in fact be retrenched. In holding an enquiry about the validity of reasonableness of retrenchment of certain

""" .

specified persons the appellate tribunal had trespassed x960 on the management function and as such exceeded - 't · d' t' -Swadesamitran Ltd. l S JUflS lC 10n.

M d

0. Anthoni. Pillai, (President, City Printing Press a;, as Workers' Union), for the respondents was not called Their Workmen upon to reply. .

1960. March, I. The Judgment of the Court was Gajendragadkar J . • delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal by special leave arises from an industrial dispute between Messrs.

Swadesamitran Ltd., Madras (hereinafter called the appellant) and their workmen (hereinafter called the respondents). On November 3, 1951, three items of dispute were referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal at Madras by the Madras Government under s. lO(l)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947) (hereinafter called the Act). One

of these items was whether the retrenchment of 39 workmen effected by the appellant in May 1951 was

justified~ and if not, what relief the retrenched workmen were entitled to. It would be relevant to mention briefly the material facts leading to this dispute. It appears that on August 26, 1950, the respondents addressed a charter. of demands to the appellant in which eleven demands were made, and they intimated to the appellant that, if the said demands were not

granted, they would go on . strike. The appellant pointed out to the respondents that it was working at a loss and that proposals for retrenchment and rationalisation were then under its active considera- tion. It promised the respondents that as soon as its financial condition improved their de!llands would be sympathetically considered. Thereupon the demands were withdrawn; but on January 24, 1951, another communication was addressed by the respondents making as many as thirteen demands coupled with the same threat that if the said demands were not granted the respondents would go on strike. A copy of this communication was sent to the State Government which was requested to refer the said demands for adjudication to the industrial tribunal. The Government, however referred the matter to the Conciliation Officer who found that the demands were

x960 not justified. He accordingly made a report on - February 22, 1951.

Immediately thereafter the

Swade~=~::, n Ltd"respondents wrote to the .Governmen_t repeating their v. request for reference, but on April 24, 1951, the Their Workmen Government ordered that no case for reference had

been made.

Gajendragadkar J.

Meanwhile the appellant was taking steps to effect retrenchment in. the staff owing to the steep rise in the prices of newsprint and scarcity of supplies, the imposition by the Government of India of a pricepage schedule and the progressive introduction of mechanisation in the composing section by installation of lino-type machines. When the respondents came to know about this their Union called for a strike ballot and as a result of the ballot the respondents decided to go on strike. A notice in that behalf was issued on May 9, 1951. The appellant then appealed to the respondents not to precipitate matters, promised to consider their demands as soon as its financial position improved and warned them that, if they refused to report for work in accordance with the strike notice, it would deem to amount to resignatiOn of each one of the strikers of his job. The Conciliation Officer who was approached by the appellant also advised the respondents not to go on strike. Nevertheless the respondents went on strike on May 30, 1951.

Before the rspondents thus went on strike services of 39 members of the staff had been terminated by a notice as a measure of retrenchment witli effect from May 18, 1951. It is the retrenchment of these 39 workmen which led to the industrial dispute with which we are concerned in tlie present appeal.

Before this dispute was thus referred for adjudication the respondents had filed a writ petition in the Madras High Court asking for a writ calling upon the Government to make a reference under s. lO(l)(c) of the Act. This writ application was allowed; but on . appeal the Court of Appeal modified the order issued by the original court by substituting a direction that the Government should discharge its duties under s. 12(5) of the Act. On June 12, 1951, the strike was called off by the respondents and they offered to resume work ; but by then the appellant had engaged

-,._)

new hands and so it was able to re-engage only some r960 of the respondents who offered to resume work. The - failure of the appellant to take into service all its Swades;:mtran Ltd. workmen is another item of dispute between the ::as parties; but with the said dispute the present appeal Their Workmen is not concerned. It was as a result of the order passed by the Madras High Court that the present Gajendragadkar J. dispute was ultimately referred for adjudication to the industrial tribunal. .

The tribunal held that the strike declared by the respondents was not justified. and that the appellant was justified in retrenching 39 workmen in question.

According to the tribunal, though in retrenching 39 workmen the principle qf 'last 9.ome first go' was not strictly followed, the appellant was justified in departing from the said principle. because it was entitled to give preference to "persons mechanically inclined and having good eyesight." Thatis why the tribunal rejected the respondents' plea that in effecting retrenchment the appellant had indulged in any unfair labour practice .. Since the tribunal was satified that the retrenchment of39 workmen was effected in the usual course for good and sufficient reasons it ordered that the said retrenched workmen were not entitled to any relief. The respondents challenged this award by an appeal before the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The appellate tribunal was satisfied that the impugned finding about .the. bona fides and the validity of the _retrenchment was not justified. It, therefore, remanded the proceedings to the industrial tribunal for df)ciding afresh the four points formulated by it. Two of these points are relevant for our purpose. One was whether the formula 'last com:e first go' had been complied with; and if it was not, the tribunal was asked to scrutinise in relation to each individual whether the reasons for breaking the said rule were sufficient in his case ; and the other was whether the management was motivated by any unfair labour practice or victimisation.

Pursuant to this order of remand the industrial tribunal allowed an opportunity to the appellant to lead evidence, and, on considering the evidence, it came to the conclusion that the appellant had made

'960 out a case of necessity for retrenchment and that it

5 d -.1 Ltd had justified the extent of retrenchment as pleaded by

wa '';;;;,,:• it. No mala jides in that behalf had been established v. according to the tribunal. It, however, held that the Their Workmen principle of' last come first go' had not been observed . - in selecting the personnel for retrenchment; and it Ga; endragadkar J. rejected the explanation given by the appellant in retrenching 15 out of the said 39 workmen. That is why it ordered the appellant to reinstate the said 15 workmen without any back wages. In regard to the remaining 24 workmen no order was made by the tribunal in respect of any compensation payable to them. .

On receipt of the fi._ndings recorded by the tribunal the matter went back to the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Both parties had filed objections against the findings in question. The appellate tribunal considered these objections and held that the appellant had made out a case for retrenching 39 of its employees; but it agreed with the industrial tribunal that the principle of' last come first go' had not been observed and that no case had been made out to depart from the said principle. That is why it confirmed the finding of the tribunal that the 15 named employees should be reinstated and added that they should be given half the amount of their back wages. In regard to the remaining 24 workmen who had been retrenched, the appellate tribunal directed that they should be awarded compensation at the rate of half a month's wages including dearness allowance for each year of service. It is against this decision that the present appeal has been preferred by special leave.

The first point which the learned Attorney-General has raised before us in this appeal on behalf of the appellant is that the Labour Appellate Tribunal erred in law in directing reinstatement when it did not differ from the conclusion of the industrial tribunal that the strike of the respondents was unjustified and that the appellant had acted bona fide in coming to the conclusion that retrenchment of 39 workmen was necessary.

It is urged that it is only if the industrial tribunal is satisfied that in retrenching its employees the appellant had acted mala fide that it would be open to the

\,---:

3 S.C.R. SUPRE¥E COURT REPORTS 151

tribunal to interfere with the order of retrenchment r960 passed by the appellant; and the argument is that -. L d h d f . t t t . b t . . . t t Swadesamitran

I • t e or er o reins a emen In su s ance IS Inconsis en Madras with the findings about the bona fides of the appellant. v.

In our opinion this argument is misconceived. There Their Workmen are two aspects of the question with which the appel- -- late tribunal was concerned in the present proceedings : Gajendragadkar I Was the appellant justified in coming to the conclusion in exercise of its management function and authority that 39 workmen had to be retrenched ; if yes, .has the retrenchment been properly carried out ? The first question has been answered in favour of the appellant by both the tribunals below. It has been found that the respondents' strike was unjustified and that for the reasons set out by the appellant retrenchment to the extent pleaded by it was also called for and justified. It is in regard to this aspect of the matter that the appellant's bonafides have no doubt qeen found; but the bona fides of the appellant in coming to the conclusion that 39 workmen had to be retrenched have no material bearing nor have they any. relevance in fact with the question as to whether the appellant ated fairly or reasonably in selecting for retrenchment the 39 workmen in question. It is in regard to this latter aspect of the matter that concurrent findings have been recorded against the appellant that it acted without justification and the retrenchment of the 15 workmen in question amounts to an unfair labour practice. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the argument that there is any inconsistency in the two findings. They deal with two different aspects of the matter and so they cannot be said to conflict with each other at all.

It is then urged that in entertaining the grievance of the respondents against their order of retrenchment the Labour Appellate Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction. The case presented before us on this ground assumes that retrenchment is . and must be held to be a normal management function and privilege, and as soon as a case for retrenchment had been made out liberty and discretion must be left to the • employer to select which employees should in fact be retrenched. In holding an enquiry about the valiQ.iy

 1960 or reasonableness .of retrenchment of certain specified - persons the appellate tribunal has trespassed on the Swadesamitran Ltd. t f t• d h h d d •t M d managemen unc 10n an as sue as excee e 1 s ::•s jurisdiction. We are not impressed by this argument.

Their Workmen It may be conceded that if a case for retrenchment is made out it would normally be for the employer to Gajendragadkar J. decide which of the employees should be retrenched; but there can be no doubt that the ordinary industrial rule of retrenchment is 'last come first go', and where other things are equal [this rule has to be followed by the employer in effecting retrenchment. We must, however, add that when it is stated that other things being equal the rule 'last come first go' must be applied, it is not intended to deny freedom to the employer to depart from the said rule for sufficient and valid reasons. The employer may take into account considerations of efficiency 0.nd trustworthy character of the employees, and if he is satisfied that a person with a long service is inefficient, unreliable or habitually irregular in the discharge of his duties, it would be open to him to retrench his services while retaining in his employment employees who are more efficient, reliable and regular though they may be junior in service to the retrenched workmen. Normally, where the rule is thus departed from there should be reliable evidence preferably in the recorded history of the workmen concerned showing their inefficiency, unreliability or habitual irregularity. It is not as if industrial tribunals insist inexorably upon compliance with the industrial rule of retrenchment; what they insist on is on their being satisfied that wherever the rule is departed .from the departure is justified by sound and valid reasons. It, therefore, follows that, wherever it is proved that the rule in question has been departed from, the employer must satisfy the industrial tribunal that the departure was justified ; and in that sense the onus would undoubtedly be on the employer. In dealing with cases of retrenchment it is essential to remember that the industrial rule of 'last come first go' is intended to afford a very healthy • safeguard against discrimination of workmen in the matter of retrenchment, and so, though the employer may depart from the rule, he s.hould be able to justify

- '

the departure before the industrial tribunal whenever r960 an industrial dispute is raised by retrenched workmen . - d h h . . d h Swadesamitran Lid. on the groun .t at t eir ni; ipgne . rtenc. ment Madras amounts to unfair labour practice or victimisat10n. v.

It appears that in 1946 the Government of India, TlieirWorkmm in its Department of Labour, formulated certain rules . - . for retrenchment and commended them to the atten- Gajendragadkar l tion of all employers of labour and trade unions so that disputes on that score may be minimised. Rule 4 amongst the said rules was that as a rule discharge of personnel who are still surplus to requirements should be in accordance wft; h the principles of short service, that is to say, last man engaged should be the first man to be discharged. Due notice or wages in lieu thereof should be given. The same principle has been accepted and applied by industrial tribunals on several occasions (Vide: Indian Navigation & Industrials, Alleppey And Certain Workmen (1); Outtack Electric Supply Go. Ltd. And Their Workmen (2); and Shaparia Dock and Steel Company And Their Workers (3) ). We ought to add that the same principle has now been statutorily recognised by s. 25(g) of the Act.

This section provides inter alia that where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of India, is to be retrenched, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in the same category, unless, for reasons to be recorded, the employer retrenches any other workman; in other words, by this section a statutory obligation is imposed on the employer to follow the rule, and if he wants to depart from it to record his reason for the said departure.

In support of his contention that the Labour Appellate Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction in examining the merits of the retrenchment effected by the appellant, the learned Attorney-General has relied upon certain observations made by this Court in the case of J. K. Iron & Steel Go. Ltd. v. Its Workmen (4).

Dealing with the argument of the appellant that the order of retrenchment should be left to the management and that the decision by the management that

(r) (1952) II L.L.J. 6n.

(2) 1954 I L.L.J. 723.

(3) (1954) II L.L.J. 208.

(4) Civil Appeal No, 2Q6 of 1958 decidd on u-a-1960.

r960 some, employees are better qualified than others should

S -. not be questioned by the adjudicator unless he came wadesamitran Ltd. h l . h h

.I' • l Madras to t e cone us10n t at t e _Pre1erentra treatment was v. deemed to be mala: fide, this Court observed that the Their Workmen proposition involved in the argument was unexception- . - able, it was added, that, if the preferential trea.t- Ga1endrag•dkar J. ment given to juniors ignores the well recognised principles of industrial law of' first come last go' without any acceptable or sound reasoning a tribunal or an adjudicator will be well justified _to hold that the action of the management is not bona fide.

We do not see how either of the two propositions set out in this judgment can support the appellant's argument before us.

The position under the industrial law seems to us to be fairly clear. The management has the right to retrench the workmen provided retrenchment is justified.

In effecting retrenchment the management normally has to adopt and give effect to the industrial rule of retrenchment. For valid reasons it may depart from the said rule. If the departure from the said rule does not appear to the industrial tribunal as valid or satisfactory, then the action of the management in so departing from the rule can be treated by the tribunal as being mala fide or as amounting to unfair labour practice ; in other words, departure from the ordinary industrial rule of retrenchment without any justification may itself, in a proper case, lead to the inference that the impugned retrenchment is the result of ulterior considerations and as such it is mala fide and amounts to unfair labour practice and victimisation.

That is precisely what this Court has held in the case of J. K. Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. (').

We are, therefore, satisfied that there is no substance in the appellant's contention that the tribunals below have exceeded their jurisdiction in enquiring into the validity of the retrenchment of the 39 workmen in question.

There is one more point which may briefly be mentioned in this connection. After the matter was remanded the industrial tribunal has carefully considered the evidence given by the appellant. In fact it is clear from the record that at the original enquiry no evidence had been led by thl appellant to justify tI) Civil Af.ipeal No. :266 of 1958 decided on 11:.2-6~.

... -

the departure from the rule even though it was. con-

I960 ceded that the rule had not be.en followed.

The 5 d -. L d . l £ . wa esamitran t • Labour Appellate Tribuna, therefore, airly gave a Madras chance to the appellant to justify the said departure, v. and accordingly evidence was led by the appellant.

Their Workmen This evidence consists of the testimonv of Mr. Lakshminarasimhan, who has been working ith the appellant Gajendragadkar J •. for 32 years. He works as an Assistant Editor, and in addition attends to press work. He stated that he was having a personal supervision of the entire work and that when retrenchment was actually effected a committee was appointed consisting of himself, the Manager Mr. Ayyangar and the Press Manager Mr.

Rajagopala Ayyangar. At the time of the enquiry the Manager was dead. According to the witness the committee took the advice of the Foremen of various sections in deciding which workmen should be retained and which should be retrenched. The witness gave evidence about the defects in the cases of the 39 workmen who were retrenched; and in support . of his oral testimony he filed two statements T-1 and T-2 giving material particulars in respect of all the said workmen. It is admitted that no records were made at the time when the cases of these workmen were examined, and so the witness was driven to give . evidence merely from memory. The tribunal has held that having regard to the nature . of the defects attributed to the several workmen to which the witness deposed it was impossible to accept his testimony as satisfactory, and the tribunal was also not satisfied that it was likely that the witness should have any personal knowledge in regard to the said defects. In the 'result the tribunal rejected this testimony. It also examined some cases 'in detail, and it was satisfied that the reasons given for retrenching them were demonstrably unsatisfactory. It is on these findings that the tribunal came to the conclusion that the appellant had not shown any valid or rea.sonable ground for departing from the usual rule, and thie. finding has been accepted by the Labour Appellate Tribunal. In such a case we do not see how in .the present appeal the appellant can successfully challenge the correctness of the conclusion that in substance the retrenchment

z960 of the 15 workmen amounts to an unfair labour practice and victimisation.

Swad'5amitran Ltd.· That leaves two minor questions which were formu- M":/."s lated for our decision by the learned Attorney-General.

Their Workmen He contended that, even if the impugned retrenchment of the 15 workmen in question was not justified, Gajendragadkar J. reinstatment should not have been directed; some compensation instead should have been ordered; and in the alternative he argued that the order directing compensation to the remaining 24 retrenched workmen was also not justified. We do not see any substance in either of these two contentions. Once it is found that retrenchment is unjustified and improper it is for the tribunals below to consider to what relief the retrenched workmen are entitled. Ordinarily, if a workman has been improperly and illegally retrenched he is entitled to claim reinstatement. The fact that in the meanwhile the employer has engaged other workmen would not necessarily defeat the claim for reinstatement of the retrenched workmen ; nor can the fa

0ct that protracted litigation in regard to the dispute has inevitably meant delay, defeat such a claim for reinstatement. This court has consistently held that in the case of wrongful dismissal, discharge or retrenchment, a claim for reinstatement cannot be defeated merely because time has lapsed or that the employer has engaged fresh hands (Vide: The Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. The All-India Punjab National Bank Employees' Federation (1); and National Transport and General Co. Ltd. v. The Workmen (2).

Then as to the compensation awarded to the 15 and 24 workmen respectively, it is a matter of discretion and as such is not open to challenge in the present appeal.

In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed

(t) t196o] I S.C.R. 806.

(t) Civil Appeal No. 312 of 1956 decided on januaty 22, 1937,

___ ,

S. SW ADESAMlTRAN LIMITED, MADRAS

THEIR WORKMEN (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR

K. SuBBA RAO

K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.

R. Ganapathy Iyer

G. Gopal-

Swadesamitran

March 28, 1956

Swadesamitran Ltd.

Anthoni. Pillai

Gajendragadkar

GAJENDRAGADKAR

Madras

November 3, 1951

Madras Government

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

August 26, 1950

January 24, 1951

February 22, 1951

Government of India

May 9, 1951

May 30, 1951

May 18, 1951

Madras High Court

s. 12(5)

June 12, 1951

On June 12, 1951, the strike was called off by the respondents and they offered to resume work ; but by then the appellant had engaged
,._)

endragadkar

Outtack Electric Supply Go. Ltd.

Shaparia Dock and Steel Company

s. 25(g)

India

J. K. Iron & Steel Co. Ltd.

Lakshminarasimhan

Ayyangar

Rajagopala Ayyangar

Swad'5amitran Ltd.

januaty 22, 1937

312 of 1956 decided on januaty 22, 1937,

 ,


3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 157

THE ASSOCIATED CEMENT COMPANIES LTD. v.

THEIR WORKMEN

(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR,' A. K. SARKAR AND K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.)

Industrial, Dispute-Award-Notice of Termination-Whether can be given by minority union-Industrial, Disputes Act, I947, (I4 of I947), ss.'I8, I9(6). - The appellant's workmen were represented by a Union called Kamdar Mandal Cement Works, Porbandar. The registration of the said union was cancelled and that led to the formation of two Unions, the Cement Kamdar Mandal and Cement Employees Union. The Cement Kamdar Mandal gave two notices one after another to the appellant, purporting to terminate two previous awards, wherein the defunct union represented the workmen.

Thereafter the Mandal presented fresh demands and the dispute was referred to the Tribunal. The second union, the Cement

Employees' Union which represented the majority of the appellant's workmen at Porbandar had been impleaded in the proceedings. The appellant raised preliminary objections before the Tribunal against the competency of the reference inter alia on the ground that the award in question by which the parties were bound had not been duly terminated under s. r9(6) of the Act in as much as the union which purported to terminate the said award represented only a minority of workmen bound by it. The Tribunal by its interlocutary judgment found against the appellant.

The dispute between the parties centres round the question as to who can issue the notice terminating the award on behalf of workmen who are bound by the award as a result of s. rS of the Act. The question therefore for decision is whether a registered trade union representing a minority of workmen governed by an award can give notice. to the other party intimating its intention to terminate the award under s. r9(6) of the Industrial Disputes tr~~ .

Held, that the effect of s. rS is that an award properly made by an industrial tribunal governs the employer and all those who represent him under s. rS(c) and the employees who are parties to the dispute and all those who are included ins. rS(b) and (d). On

a fair and reasonable reading of s. r9(6), the true position is that, though the expression "any party bound by the award" refers to all workmen bound by the award, notice to terminate the said award can be given not by an individual workman but by a group of workmen acting collectively either through their union or otherwise, and it is not necessary that such a group of workmen acting coJlectively either through their union or otherwise, should represent the majority of workmen bound by the award. Thus it is open to a minority of workmen or a minority union to terminate

r960

March 3

I960 the award by which they, along with other employees, are bound just as much as it is open to them to raise an industrial dispute Associated under the Act.

Cement Companies The Central Provinces Transport Services Limited v. Raghunath Ltd.

Gopal Patwardhan, [1956] S.C.R. 956 and The Newspapers Limited , v.

v. The State Industrial Tribunal, U. P., [1957] S.C.R. 754, refer- Their Workmen red to.

CIVIL

APPELLATE

JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 404 of 1958.

Appeal by special leave from the decision dated March 10, 1958, of the Industrial Tribunal, Rajkot, in Adjudication Case No. 67 of 1955.

M. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, R. J.

Kolah, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellants.

Janardan Sharmii, for respondent No. 2.

1960. March, 3.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Gajendragadkar ].

GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-Can a registered trade union representing a minority of workmen governed by an award give notice to the other party intimating its intention to terminate the award under s. 19(6) of the Industrial Disputes Act XIV of 194 7 (hereinafter called the Act)? That is the short question which arises for decision in the present appeal. In answering the said question it would be necessary to examine the scheme of the Act and to ascertain the true meaning and effect of s. 19(6) on its fair and reasonable construction. The controversy thus raised undoubtedly lies within a narrow compass; but before addressing ourselves to the merits of tbe dispute, it is necessary to state the material facts which led to the present proceedings.

The present appeitl has been brought before this Court by the Associa.ted Cement Companies Limited (hereinafter called the appellant) against their workman (hereinafter called the respondents), and it arises from an industrial dispute between them which was referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal for the State of Saurashtra by the Saurashtra Government under s. 10(1) of the Act. Several items of demand presented by the respondents constituted the subject-matter of the reference.

When the tribunal began its proceedings the appellant raised four preliy

r-.

'i -

minary objections against the competence of the z96o reference itself. The tribunal heard parties on these A . 1 a preliminary objections, and by its interlocutory judgcemens~;~; anies ment delivered on March 10, 1958, it has found Ltd. against the appellant on all the points. In the result v. it set down the reference for further hearing on the Their Workmen merits. It is against this interlocutory judgment and G . d--dk ]. d h h" C a1en raga ar . or er that the appellant as come to t is ourt . by special leave. Out of the four points urged by the appellant as preliminary objections we are concerned with only one in the present appeal, and that relates to the 'incompetence of the reference on the ground that the award in questionby which the parties were bound has not been duly terminated under s. 19(6) of the Act inasmuch as the union which purported to terminate the said award represents only a minority of workmen bound by it.

The circumstances under which this contention was raised must now be stated in some detail. The appellant is a limited company and owns and runs a number of cement factories spread ou.t in different States in India as well as in Pakistan. It has a factory at Porbandar in Saurashtra. The factory is known as the Porbandar Cement Works. An industrial dispute arose between the appellant and the respondents in 1949 and it was referred for adjudication to the industrial tribunal on March 22, 1949.

This reference ended in an award made on September 13, 1949. Thereafter the said award was terminated by the appellant; and on disputes arising between it and the respondents another reference was made to the same tribunal for adjudication of the said disputes.

A second award was made on July 24, 1951, by which the earlier award with slight modifications was ordered to continue in operation. In the proceedings in respect of both the references the appellant's workmen were represented by their Union called Kamdar Mandal, Cement Works, Porbandar. It appears that the registration of the said u_nion was cancelled on July 2, 1954, and that led to the formation of two unions of the appellant's workmen, the Cement Kamdar Manda! whic.h was registered on

z960 July 7, 1954, and the Cement Employees' Union which was registered on September 18, 1954.

Associated Th C K d M d 1 h Cement Companies e ement am ar an a gave notice to t e Ltd. appellant's manager on September 23, 1954, purportv. ing to terminate the first award pronounced on Their Workmen September 13, 1949, at the expiration of two months' -- notice from the date of the said communication. By Gajendragadkar J. another letter written on December 20, 1954, the same union purported to terminate the second award pronounced on July 24, 1951, in a similar manner.

On November 22, 1954, the said Manda! presented fresh demands most of which were covered by the two previous awards. The said demands were referred to the Conciliation Officer for conciliation but the efforts at conciliation failed, and on receiving a failure report from the officer the Saurashtra Government made the present reference purporting to exercise its jurisdiction under s. lO(l)(c) of the Act. The appellant's case is that the Cement Kamdar Manda! was not authorised to terminate either of the two awards under s. 19(6) of the Act, that the second award is thus still in operation, and so the reference is invalid.

Meanwhile it appears that the Cement Employees' Union, which represents the majority of the appellant's workmen at Porbandar, instead of giving notice of termination under s. 19( 6 ), raised disputes with the appellant and the same were referred to the Conciliation Officer.

Efforts at conciliation having failed the conciliation officer made a failure report to the Government of Saurashtra; the Saurashtra Government, however, did not refer the said dispute for adjudication. In the present proceedings this Union has been impleaded and it haK supported the demands made by the Cement Kamdar Mandal; in other words, notwithstanding the rivalry between the two Unions, the demands made by the minority union were supported by the majority union, and in fact, in the appeal before us, it is th_e latter union that has appeared to contest the appeal. The tribunal has dealt with the point of law raised by the appellant under s. 19(6) on the assumption that the Cement

Kamdar Manda! which purported to terminate the awards under the said section represents the minority

< -

' )

of_ the workmen employed at Porbandar, and we 1960 propose to deal with the point raised in the appeal on . the same assumption.

Associated .

Th . t' b' h .e ll t b 'd d . Cement Companie~ e mam sec 10ns w 10 1a o e cons1 ere m Ltd •. dealing with the dispute are ss. 18 and 19 as they k . W k stood in 1954. Section 18 provides, inter alia, that T cir ,. or .me'! a? a; ward which has _become enorceabe shll be Gajeridrf'gadk_ar J. bmdmg on (a) all parties to the mdustr1al dispute, ·

(b) all other partis summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the Board or tribunal, as the case may be, records the opinion that they were so summoned without proper cause,

(c) where a party referred to in cl. (a) or cl. (b) is an employer, .his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates, and

(d) where a party referred to in cl. (a) or cl. (b) is composed of workmen, all persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute, and all persons who subsequently became employed in that establishment or part. It is thus clear that though an industrial dispute may be raised by a group of workmen who may not represent all or even the majority of workmen, still, if the said dispute is referred to the industrial tribunal for adjudication and an award is made, it binds not only the parties to the dispute or other parties summoned to appear but. all persons who were employed in the establishment or who would be employed in future are also governed by the award ; in other words, the + effect of s. 18 is that an award properly made by an industrial tribunal governs the employer and all those who represent him under s. 18(c) and the employees who are parties to the dispute. and all those who are included ins. 18(b)_and (d). .

Section 19' prescribes the period of operation of settlements and awards. Section 19(3) provides that an award shall, subject to the provisions of this section, remain in operation for a period of one year.

This is subject to the provisos to sub-s. (3) as well as to subs. (4) but we are not concerned with the said provisions.

Section 19(6) provides that notwithstanding the expiry of the period of operation under

'96° sub-s. (3) the award shall continue to be binding on

A . d the parties until a period of two months has elapsed ssoctate f th d t h' h th ' b Cement Companies rom e a e on w IC e notice 1s given y any Ltd. party bound by the award to the other party or v. . parties intimating its intention to terminate the Their Workmen award. The effect of this sub-section is that unless

G . d -dk the award is duly terminated as provided by it it •Je• raga ar J. shall continue to be binding notwithstanding the expiration of the period prescribed by sub-s. (3). This position is not in dispute. The dispute between the parties centres round the question as to who can issne the notice terminating the award on behalf of workmen who are bound by the award as a result of s. 18 of the Act. What the sub-section requires is that a notice shall be given by any party bound by the award to the other party or parties. To whom the notice should be given may not present much difficulty. Where the award is sought to be terminated on behalf of the employees the notice has to be given to the employer and that is the party entitled to receive notice. Then, as to "the parties" to whom also notices are required to be given, it may per haps be that the parties intended are those joined under s. 10, sub-s. (5) or under s. 18, sub-s. (2) or are .otherwise parties to the dispute; but with that aspect of the question we are not concerned in the present appeal, because notice has been given to the appPllant and all the workmen concerned in the dispute have appeared before the tribunal through the two respective unions. The question with which we are concerned and which is not easy to determine is tlie true interpretation of the word "any party bound by the award". We have already noticed the effect of s. 18, and we have seen how wide is the cir.ole of persons who are bound by the award as a result of the said section. Literally construed, any party bound by the award may mean even a single employee who is bound by the award, and on this literal construction even one dissatisfied employee may be entitled to give notice terminating the award. On the other hand, it may be possible to contend that any party in the context must mean a party that represents the majority of the persons bound by the award.

""'".

Terminating the award is a serious step and such a z96o • step can be taen by a pary nly if it can c.laim to Associated represent the will of the maJority on that pomt. It Cement Companies .. is for this construction that the appellant contends Ltd .. v. before US.

Their Workmen In construing this provision it would be relevant __ to remember that an industrial dispute as defined by Gajendrngadkar): s. 2(k) of the Act means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen which is connected with the employment or non-employment, or the terms of employment, or with the conditions of labour of any person. This definition emphatically brings out the essential characteristics of the dispute with which the Act purports to deal.

The disputes must relate to the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour and they must arise, inter alia, between workmen and their employer.

Ordinarily, an individual dispute which is not sponsored by the union or is otherwise not supported by any group of workmen is not regarded as an industrial dispute for the purposes of the Act. A provision like that contained in s. 33A is of course an exception to this rule.

The basis of industrial adjudication recognised by the provisions of the Act clearly appears to be that disputes between employers and their employees would be governed by the Act where such disputes have assumed the character of an industrial dispute. An element of collective bargaining which is the essential feature of modern trade union movemenl' is necessarily involved in industria1 adjudication.

That is why industrial courts deal with disputes in relation to i, ndividual eases only where such disputes -assume the character of an industrial dispute by reason of the fact that they are sponsored by the union or have otherwise been taken up by a group or body of employees. In The Central Provinces Transport Services Limited v. Raghunath Gopal Patwardhan

( 1) this Court has observed that" the preponderence of judicial opinion is clearly in favour of the view. that an individual dispute cannot per se be an industrial dispute but may become one if taken up by a

[1) {1956JS.C, R. 956,

r960 trade union or a number of persons". These observations have been cited with approval by this Court in Associated f Th N L · d Th S Cement Companies the cas.e o . e ewspapers irni_te v. e tae Ltd. lrulustrial Tribunal, U. P. (1 ).

Havmg regard to this v. aspect of the matter it would be difficult to hold that Their Workmen "any party bound by the award" can include an . . - individual workman, though speaking literally he is Ga; endragadkar ]. b d b h d I · h a party oun y t e awar . n our opm10n, t erefore, "the said expression cannot include an individual workman. We ought to add that this position is fairly conceded by Mr. Sharma for the respondents.

That takes us to the question as to whether the expression " any party bound by the award " must mean a union representing the majority of the workmen bound by it or a group of workmen constituting such majority acting otherwise than through the union. The expression •· aGy party bound by the award" obviously refers to, and includes, all persons bound by the award under s. 18. The learned Attorney- General has urged before us that we should construe s. 19(6) so . as to preclude a minority of workmen bound by the award from disturbing the smooth working of the award and thereby creating an industrial dispute. When an award is made it binds the parties for the statutory period under s. 19(3); and even after the expiration of the said period it continues to be binding on the parties under s. 19(6) unless it is duly terminated. The policy of the Act, therefore, appears to be that the smooth working of the award even after the prescribed statutory period should not be disturbed unless the majority o'f the workmen bound by it feel that it should be terminated and fresh demands should be made. If a minority of workmen or a minority union is allowed to terminate the award it would lead to the anomalous result that despite the willingness of the majority of workmen to abide by the award the minority can create disturbance and raise an industrial dispute and that cannot be within the contemplation of the Legislature when it enacted s. 19(6) of the Act.

That in substance is the argument urged before us ; thus presented the argument no doubt appears prima facie attractive;

(1) [1957] S.C.R. 754

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. ..,

3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT B.EPORTS 165

but, in our opinion, it would be unreasonable to z960 accept this construction and impose the limitation of . d the majority vote in the matter of the termination of Cem::is~;:; anies the award.

Ltd.

The effect of imposing such a limitation would, in v. our opinion, seriously prejudice the interests of the Their Workmen e; nployees. It is well-known that the trade union - t th" t t t l t Gajendtagadkar ]. movemen m 1s coun ry canno ye c aim o cover all employees engaged in several branches of industry.

Membership of the important trade unions no doubt shows an appreciable increase and progress, but the stage when trade unions can claim to have covered all employees or even a majority of them has still not been reached. If the majority rule for which . the appellant contends is accepted ands. 19(6) is accordingly construed, termination of the award would, we apprehend, become very difficult, if not impossible, in a very large number of cases. It is in this context that the effect of s. 18 has to be borne in 1 mind. As we have already indicated the class of employees bound by the award under s. 18 is very much wider than the parties to the industrial dispute in which the award is made; the said class includes not only all the persons employed in the establishment at the date of the award but it covers even the subsequent employees in the said establishment. It is, therefore, obvious that if the majority rule is adopted very few awards, if any, could be terminated.because very few unions would be able to claim a majority of members on their rolls, and in their present stage of organisation in very few cases would a majority of workmen be able to meet, decide . and act together otherwise than through their unions. That is why the majority rule would very seriously prejudice the rights of employees to terminate awards when they feel that they need to be modified or changed. That is one aspect of the matter which cannot be ignored in construing the material words in s. 19(6).

There is another aspect of the question which is also relevant and which, in our opinion, is against the . construction suggested by the appellant. We have already noticed that an industrial dispute can be raised by a. group of workmeri or by . a union even

r96o though neither of them represent the majority of the . workmen concerned; in other words, the majority

Cem::, s~~::;:nies rule on which the appellant's construction of s. 19(6) Ltd. is based is inapplicable in the matter of the reference v. of an Industrial dispute under s. 10 of the Act. Even Their Workmen a minority group of workmen can make a demand -- and thereby raise an industrial dispute which in a Gajendragadkar J. proper case would be referred for adjudication under s. 10. It is true that an award pronounced on such reference would bind all the employees under s. J 8; but logically, if an industrial dispute can be raised by a minority of workmen or by a minority union why should it not be open to a minority of workmen or a minority union to terminate the award which is passed on reference made at their instance? The anomaly to which the learned Attorney-General refers has no practical significance. If the majority of workmen bound by the award desire that the award should continue and needs no modification, they may come to an agreement in that behalf with their employer, and adopt such course as may be permissible under the Act to make such agreement effective.

However that may be, we are satisfied that both logic and fairplay would justify the conclusion that it is open to a minority of workmen or a minority union to terminate the award by which they, along with other employees, are bound just as much as it is open to them to raise an industrial dispute under the Act.

That is the view taken by the industrial tribunal in the present case and we see no reason to differ from it.

It appears that when this question was argued before the tribunal the appellant strongly relied on rule 83 framed by the Government of Bombay under s. 38 of the Act; and it was urged that the said rule is consistent with the construction sought to be placed by the appellant on s. 19(6). It is conceded that at the relevant time this rule was not in force; and so it is strictly not applicable to the present proceedings.

That being so, we do not propose to consider the argument based on the said rule and to examine the question as to whether the rule really supports the appellant's construction, and, if yes, whether it would be valid. The question raised before us must obvi-

.....

ously be decided on a fair and reasonable construction r960 of s. 19(6) itself, and the rule in question, even if Associated applicable would not be material in that behalf. We Cement companies accordingly hold that, on a fair and reasonable Ltd. construction of s. 19(6), the true position is that, v. though the expression "any party bound by the Their Workmen award" refers to all workmen bound by the award, G . d-dk 1 , . h 'd d b . a; en raga ar . notice to termmate t e sa1 awar can e given not by an individual workman but by a group of workmen acting collectively either through their union or otherwise, and it is not necessary that such a group or the union through which it acts should represent the majority of workmen bound by the award.

In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed.

JAMES ANDERSON, ADMINISTRATOR OF

THE ESTATE OF THE

LATE HENRY GANNON, BOMBAY . . v .

THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,

BOMBAY

(S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR AND

M. HIDAYATULLAH, JJ.)

Income-tax-Distribution of capital assets-Whether distribution mu.st be in specie-Sale of capital assets by administrator for distribution amongst legatees-Profit on such sales, if amounts to capital gains liable to tax-Income-tax Act, r922 (XI of r922), s. I2B(I), third proviso.

The appellant was the administrator of the estate of one Henry Gannon, a resident of British India, who left for the

~ United Kingdom in 1944 and died there in 1945 In the course of administration the appellant sold certain shares and securities belonging to the deceased for the purpose of distributing the assets amongst the legatees and thereby realised more than their cost price. The excess of sale price over the cost price was treated by the Income-tax Officer as capital gain under s. 12B

March 4

157

THE ASSOCIATED CEMENT COMPANIES LTD

THEIR WORKMEN

P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR

A. K. SARKAR

K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.

Kamdar Mandal Cement Works, Porbandar

Cement Kamdar Mandal

Cement Employees Union

Cement

Employees' Union

Porbandar

March 3

I960

M. 0. Setalvad

R. J.

Kolah

S. N. Andley

J. B. Dadachanji

Rameshwar Nath

P. L. Vohra

Janardan Sharmii

Gajendragadkar

GAJENDRAGADKAR

s. 19(6)

Industrial Disputes Act

s. 19(6)

Associa.ted Cement Companies Limited

Saurashtra Government

s. 10(1)

March 10, 1958

s. 19(6)

India

Pakistan

Saurashtra

Porbandar Cement Works

March 22, 1949

September 13, 1949

July 24, 1951

Kamdar Mandal, Cement Works, Porbandar

July 2, 1954

Cement Kamdar Manda

July 7, 1954

Cement Employees' Union

September 18, 1954

September 23, 1954

December 20, 1954

November 22, 1954

s. 19(6)

s. 19( 6 )

Government of Saurashtra

s. 19(6)

sec 10

ss. 18 and 19

Section 18

s. 18

s. 18(c)

Section 19

Section 19(3)

Section 19(6)

s. 18

s. 10

s. 18

s. 18

Gajendrngadkar

Their Workmen In construing this provision it would be relevant  to remember that an industrial dispute as defined by Gajendrngadkar): s. 2(k) of the Act means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen which is connected with the employment or non-employment, or the terms of employment, or with the conditions of labour of any person.

s. 2(k)

s. 33A

Sharma

s. 18

s. 19(6)

s. 19(3)

s. 19(6)

s. 19(6)

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT B.EPORTS 165

s. 18

s. 18

s. 19(6)

s. 19(6)

s. 10

s. 10

Government of Bombay

s. 38

s. 19(6)

s. 19(6)

s. 19(6)

JAMES ANDERSON

COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,

BOMBAY

S. K. DAS

L. KAPUR

M. HIDAYATULLAH

Income-tax Act

Henry Gannon

British India

United Kingdom

s. 12B