...

• I

3 S.C.R.

SUlJREME COURT REPORTS 513

gratuity for other modes' oi termination of service.

That was the method followed in the award that fell for comideration fr1 Brahmachari's case.

That method has however not been followed in the award that we have to. consider here. ln this case there is no specific reference 'in the award to retrenchment as such: The reasonable conclusion from the scheme as drawn up is that the gratuity that could be claimed under this

award by retrenched workmen because of the fact that retrenchment is also one kind of termination !l'of service vl'ithin the meaning of the award was intended to be in addition to the retrenchment compensation and not in lieu thereof.

The decision in Brahmachari.'s case on the special facts of the award therein is therefoi; e of no assistance to the appeUai1t. \Ve are bound to hold on an examination of the award in the present case that the gratuity which the respoi1dent claims on the basis of the award is distinct from and in addition to the retrenchment compensatioh he has received. v\Te are of opinion therefore that the Tribunal was right in holding that the respondent is e1ititlecl to such gratuity e11en though he has already received payment of compensa'tion for retrenchment in accordance with the provisions of s. 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act.

The appeal 1s accordingly' dismissed with costs.

A jJ/JCal disntissed.

COMivIISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY

v . (S. K. DAs, J. L. KAPUR and/M. 1-TmAYATULLAtt, JJ.)

Income-tax-Association of persons-Meaning o(-Indian Incume-tax Act, 1922 (XI of .1922), s. 3.

A Hindu governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law died leaving three widows as his legal heirs.

The widows took the estate as joint tenants and did not exercise their right to separate possession and enjoyment.

The main income was from - dividends and from immovable property.

The latter was held under s. 9(3) of the Income-tax Act not to be assessable as income

Muller & Phij1ps .(India) Ltd. v. K. C. Sud

Das Gupla ].

Af, ril 14.

1960 of an association of persons.

The question was whether the three - ,, r widows could be assessed as an association of persons in respect Commissioner UJ of the rest of the income : lncomr-lax,

Bomba_)' Held, that the three widows did not have, the status of an v. association of persons within the meaning of s. 3 of the Income- Smt. Indira tax Act.

An association of persons is one in which two or more Balkrishua persons join in a common purose or common action and, for purposes of the income-tax law, one of its objects must be to produce income, profits or gains.

It must be a combination of persons formed for the promotion of a joint enterprise for pr.oducing income.

In the present case except for receiving the dividents and interest jointly the widows had done no act which helped to produce the income.

S. K. Das].

In re: B. N. Elias,

[1935] 3 1.T.R,. 408, Commissioner of l11cume-tax, Bombay v. Laxmidas Devidas, [1937.] 5 J.T.R. 484 and Re.Dwarakanath Harishchandm, [ 1937] 5 J.T.R. 716, approved.

CI\'IL APPELLATE Ju1usmcno;.;: Civil Appeals Nos. 219 & 250 of J 958.

Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated ;\larch 7, EJ56, of the Bombay High Court in l.T.R. Nos. C,2 and 53 of 1955.

K. N. RajagojJal Sastri and D. Gupta, for the appcl !ant (in both the appeals).

N. A. Pulkhivala, S. N. Andlcy and .f. B. Dadachanji, for the respondent (in both the appeals).

1%0.

April M.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S. K. DAS, J-These two appeals with special leave have been heard together.

They arise out of similar facts and the question of law arising therefrom is the sa1ne.

The short facts are these.

One Balkrishna Puru shottam .Purani died on November ll, 1947.

He left behincl him three widows and two daughters.

The three widows were named Indira, Ramluxmi and Prabhuluxmi.

These widows as legal heirs inherited the estate of the deceased, which consisted of immov able properties situate in Ahmedabad, shares in Joint.

Stock Companies, money lying in deposit, and share in a registered firm.

For the two assessment years 1900-51 and l!J51-:'i2 (the corresponding account years being the Sam bat years 200:> and 2006) the I ncomctax Oniccr . issued notices to the legal heirs of Balkrishna Purusl1011am Purani.

Pursuant to those notices, rcnti'ns were !lied under i-11e heading, "Lcgal heirs ol' Balkrishna Purushottam Purani", in one case

J •

...

\ ~

-..

1960 and in the name of t:J1e estate of Balakrishna in the other; the status was shown as "individual"' in one case and ''association of persons" in the other.

They were signed by Indira. one of the three widows.

For

' Commissioner of

' the assessment vear 19.'lO-:) l the total income was shown as under- , ·

Property Share from registered firm Dividends Interest Ground rent

Total

...

For the assessment year 1951-52, was shown as--

Property

Share from registered firm Dividends Interest on deposits Ground rent

Total

the

Rs. 11,011

4,071 51,796 22,343 125 --- 69,346 ---- \ total -income

Rs. 10,879

460 80,426 536 125

92,426

For both years the I ncorne-tax Officer took the status of the assessee as an "association of. persons" and on that footing made two assessment orders.

There was an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, and two of the points taken before him were-

(a) that the three widows ought to have been assessed separately and not as an "association of .persons", and (b) that n any event, the income from property ought to have been assessed separately in the haiids. of the three widows by reason of the provisions in s. 9(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1922.

The Appellate Assistant Commissioner rejected point ·(a) but accepted , point (b).

Then, there was a further appeal to' the

Incomttax,

Bomba;•

Smt. Indira Balkrislmn

S. K: Da.< J.

rommissioner n.f

l11comt-tax,

flmnba_f

\' Smt. l11riira

Balakri slmfl

S. K. D.m: J.

I nco111c-1ax Appellate Tribun:d, Bombay. The Tribunal held that the entire estate of deceased Balkrishna

Purushoitam Purani was inherited and possessed by the three widows as joint tenants and its income was liable 10 be assessed in their hands in the status of an associatio'n of persons.

The Tribun:il further held that the Appellate Assistanr Commissioner was wrong in holding that the shar<>s of the' three widows were definite and determinable and s. 9(3) was applicable.

The assessec then moved the Tribunal to refer certain questions of law which arose out of its orders to the High Court of Bombay.

The Tribunal referred four su.ch questions, but: we arc now concerned with only one of them, viz .. question No. 3 which was in the following terms :

"(.~) "Whether on the facts and in the circum- - stances of the case the Tr, ibunal was right in holding that the assessment made on the three widows of Balakrishna Purushottam Purani in the status of

an association of persons is legal and valid 111 Ia1,·?" Two references were made 'to the High Court 111 respect of the orders passed for two assessment years and they gave rise to Income-tax References Nos. !\2 and r, g of I !l:"1T>.

The leading jmlgrnent was given in I. T. R. r,2 of I D!i5.

The 1-1 igh Comt held that the Tribunal 10s in en'or in coming to the conclusion that the three widows could be assessed in the status of an association of persons with regard to the income which thcv earned as-heirs of their deceased husband.

Therefore: it answered question No. H in the negative.

The department represented by the Commissioner of:

T ncorlie-tax, Bombay, then applied to this Court and obtained special leave to appeal from the judgment and orders of the High Court of Bombay in the two References.

These two appeals have been filed in pursuance of the special leave granted bv this Court.

The appellant is the Commissioner of Income-tax, B01nbay, and the assessee is the respondent.

The argument on behalf of the appellant is that the High Court was in error when it said that "what: is required before an association of persons can he liable to tax is"not that they should receive income hut that

' ...

they should earn or help to earn income by reason of their association, and if the case of the Department stops short at mere receipt of income, then the Department rriust fail in bringing home the liability to tax of individuals as an asoci'ation o( persons." It is submitted that the High Court did not, in the statement quoted above, lay down the correct test for determining what is an "association of persons" for the purposes of the Income-tax Act.

Before we go on to discuss the argument presented on behalf of the appellant, it is necessary to clear the ground by stating what is the position of co-widows in Mitakshara, succession and what are the findings arrived at by the Tribunal. The position of co-widows is well-settled.

Thev succeed as co-heirs to the estate of their deceased h{1sband and take as joint tenants with rights of survivorship and equal beneficial enjoyment; they arc entitled as between themselves to. an equal share of the income. Though they take as joint tenants, no one of them has a right to enforce an absolute partition of the estate against the others so as to destroy their right of survivorship.

But they are entitled to obtain a partition of separate portions of the property so that each may enjoy her equal share of the income accruing therefrom. The Tribunal found that the widows in this case did not exercise their right to separate possession and enjoyment and "they chose to manage the property jointly, each acting for herself and the others and receiving the income of the property which they were entitled to enjoy in equal shares." Learned counsel for the appellant has emphasised before us the aforesaid finding of the Tribunal and has contended that on the finding of joint management, the widows fulfilled even the test laid down by the High Court and constituted an "association of persons" for taxing purposes.

The High Court, however, rightly pointed out that lhe only property which. the widows could have managed jointly was the immovable property which fetched an income of about Rs. 11,000, and as to that property, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had held that s. 9(3) applied.

There was no appeal by the Department against that finding and it was not 'f-6 SCI/ND/82

Commissioner of

lncometax,

Bombay v.

Smt. Indira Balkrishna

S. K. Das J.

C()mmi5siontr of

lncorm-ta.-;,

Bomb4v

Smt. Indira Balkrishna S. K. Das J.

open to !he Tribunal to go behind it.

Even on merits the Tribunal was 1nong in thinking that the respective shares of the widows "ere not definite and ascertainable.

They had an equal share in the income, viz., one-third each, and the provisions of s. 9(8) clearly applied in respect of the immovable property.

v\'ith regard to the shares, dividends and interest on deposits there was no finding of any act o( joint management. l ndeed, the main item consists of the dividends ancl it is difficult to understand what act of management the widows performed in respect thereof "hich produced or helped to produce income. On the. Contrary, the statement of the case shows that the assessce filed lists of shares, copies. whereof arc marked annexed C and form part of the case. which showed that the shares stood separately in the name of each one of the three widows and I his was not denied by the Department.

"Ve now come to the main question in this appeal. \\That constitutes an "association of persons" within the meaning of the Income-tax Act' It has been repeatedly pointed out that the Act does not define

what constitutes an association of persons, which under s. of the Act is an entity or unit of assessment.

Previous to the year 1924, the words of s. 3 were "individual, company, firm and Hindu undivided family."

By the Indian Income-tax Amendment Act of 1924 (Act XI of 1924) the words "individual; Hindu undivided family, company, firm and other association of individuals" were substituted for the former words.

By the Income-tax Amendment Act of 1939 (Act VII of 1939) the section was again amended and it then said:

'"Where any Act of the Central Legislature enacts that income-tax shall be charged for any year at any rate or rates. tax at that rate or those rates shall be charged for that year in accordance with, and subject to the provisions of, this Act in respect of the total income of the previous year of every individual. Hindu undivided family, company and local authority, and of every firm and other associations of persons or the partners of the firms or members of the association in- (\ividnally."

•• . -

,... '

,,;. ..

By the same Amending Act (Act VII of 1939) subs. (3) of s. 9 was also added.

Now, s. 3 imposes a tax "in respect of the total income ........................ of every individual, Hindu undivided family, company and local authority, and of every' firm and other association of persons or the partners of the firm or members of the association individually." In the absence of any definition. as to what constitutes an association of persons, we must construe the 'vords in their plain ordinary meaning and we must also bear in mind that the words occur in a section which imposes a tax on the total income of each one of the units of assessment mentioned therein including an association of persons.

The meaning to be assigned. to the words must take colour from the context in which they occur.

A number of decisions have been cited at the bar bearing on the question, and our attention has been drawn to the controversy as to whether the words "association of individuals" which occurred previously in the section should be read ejusdem generis with the word immediately preceding, viz., firm or with all the other groups of persons mentioned in the section.

Into that controversy it is unnecessary to enter in the present case.

Nor d0 we pause to consider the widely differing characteristics of the three other associations mentioned in the section, viz., Hindu undiv}cled family, a company and' a firm, and whether , in view of the amendments made in 1939 the words in question can be read ejusdem generis with Hindu undivided family or company.

It is enough for our purpose to refer to three decisions: In re: B. N. Elias and Others ('); Commissioner of income-tax, Bombay v. Laxmidas Devidas and Another (2); and In re: Dwarakanath Harishchandra Pitale and Another ('); In re: B. N. Elias and Others(')

Perbyshire, C. ]., rightly pointed out that the word ·"associate" means, according to the Oxford dictionary, "to join in common purpose, or to join in an .action." Therefore, an association of persons must be one in which two or more persons join in a common purpose or common action, and as the words occur in

(I) [1935] I.T.ll. 408

(2) [19S7] .5 I.T.R. 484

(3) [1937] 5 I.T.R. 716

Commissioner of

Incometa, Y,

Bomba;

V, Smt. India Balkrish11a

S. K. Das].

Commissioner of

b1cometax,

Bombay

Smt. Indira

Balkrishna

S. K. Das].

a section which imposes a tax on income, the association must be one the object of which is to produce income, profits or gains.

This was the view expressed by Beaumont, C.J., in Commissioner of Income-tax, Born bay v. Laxrnidas Devidas and A not her (') at page 589 and also in Re: Dwarakanatlt 1-iarishchandra Pi:tale and Another ('). In re: B. N. Elias (') Costello, .J., put the test in more forceful language. He said: "It may well be that the intention of the legislature was to hit combinations of individuals who were engaged together in some joint enterprise but: did not in law constitute partnership........................... \Vhen we find ........................ that there is a combination of persons formed for the promotion of a joint enterprise ...... then I think no diflio.dty arises in the way of saying that these persons did constitute an association .................. ".

\Ve think that the aforesaid decisions correctly lay down the crucial test for determining what is an association of persons within the meaning of s. 3 of the Income-tax Act, and they have been accepted and followed in a number of later decisions of different High Courts to all of which it is unnecessary to call attention.

It is, however, necessary to add' some words of caution here.

There is no formula of universal application as to what facts, how many of them and of what nature, arc necessary to come to a conclusion that there is an association of persons within the meaning of s. '3; it mu'st depend on Lhe particular facts and circumstances of each case as to whether the conclusion can be drawn or not.

Learned counsel for the appellant has suggested that having regard to ss. :J and 4 of the Indian Income-Lax Act, the real test is the existence of a co1nrnon .so1Lrce of incon1e in v.'hich t'vo 01 n1ore per~ sons arc interested as owner or otherwise and it is immatericli whether their shares are specific and de!inite or whether there is any scheme of management or not. He has submitted that if the persons so interested come to an arrangement, express or tacit, by which they divide the income at a point of time before it emanates from the source, then Lhc association ceases; otherwise it continues to be :m associ:ition,

:') [1937] 5 I.T.R. 481 (') [193715 l.T R. 716

(') [1935] 3 I.T.R. 408.

-- .,.

. ,.

• 1

vVe have indicated above what is the crucial test in determining an association of persons within the meaning of s. 3, and we are of the view that the test suggested by lea1•ned counsel for the appellant are neither conclusive nor determinative of the question before us.

Corning back to the facts found by the Tribunal, there is no finding that the three widows have corn_bined in a joint enterprise to produce income. The only finding is that they have not exercised their right to separate en joyrnent, and except for receiving the dividends and interest jointly, it has been found that they have clone no act which has helped to produce income 111 respect of the shares and deposits.

On these fmdings it cannot be held that the three widows had the status of an association of persons within the meaning of s. 3 of the Indian Income Tax Act.

The High Court correctly answered question No. 3 in the negative.

Accordingly, the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs.

There will be one set of hearing fee in the two_ appeals.

Appeals dismissed .

DARBAR SHRI VIRA VALA SU RAG 'y ALA,

Commission<r of

Income-tax,

Bomba;•

Smt. Indira Balkrishna

S.K. Das J.

VADIA 1960 v. '

THE STATE OF SAURASHTRA (NO-W BOMBAY)

(jAFER IMAM, S. K. DAS, ]. L. KAPUR, A. K. SARKAR and M. HrnAYATULLA, JJ.) Grant by Ruler to younger son as Bhayat-Son becoming Ruler -Whether grant resumable-"Bhayat", Meaning of.

In the Indian State of Vadia succession was governed by primogeniture. The Ruler in 1943 granted to his younger son, the petitioner, a village in the State in perpetuity and in heredity for enjoyment as 'Kapal-Giras' as 'Bhayat'. ln -1947 the State of Vadia acceded to the Dominion of India and by subsequent constitutional deve!opments it became merged in the State of Saurashtra. After the coming into force of the Constitution the elder son of the Ruler and then the Ruler died, and the petitioner was recognied as the Ruler.

Thereupon the State of Saurashtra issued a notification resuming the grant as it was deemed to have lapsed and revened to the former Vadia State.

The petitioner contended that the grant was absolute and unconditional for

April 14.

Brahmachari

s. 25F

Industrial Disputes Act

COMivIISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY

v . (S. K. DAs, J.

L. KAPUR

Indian Incume-tax Act, 1922

s. 3

s. 9(3)

Income-tax Act

s. 3

S. K. Das

B. N. Elias

Dwarakanath Harishchandm

CI\'IL APPELLATE

K. N. RajagojJal Sastri

D. Gupta

N. A. Pulkhivala

S. N. Andlcy

. B. Dadachanji

S. K. DAS

Balkrishna Puru

.Purani

Indira

Ramluxmi

Prabhuluxmi

Ahmedabad

I ncomctax Oniccr

s. 9(3)

Income-tax Act, 1922

Indira Balkrislmn

S. K. D.m

Balkrishna

Purushoitam Purani

s. 9(3)

High Court of Bombay

Balakrishna Purushottam Purani

Income-tax Act

Mitakshara

s. 9(3)

Indira Balkrishna

S. K. Das

Indira Balkrishna S. K. Das

s. 9(8)

Income-tax Act

s. 3

s. 9

s. 3

B. N. Elias

Dwarakanath Harishchandra Pitale

Perbyshire

S. K. Das

Beaumont

Costello

s. 3

Income-tax Act

s. 3

s. 3

DARBAR SHRI VIRA VALA

Indira Balkrishna

S.K. Das

STATE OF SAURASHTRA

jAFER IMAM

A. K. SARKAR

M. HrnAYATULLA

State of Vadia

Saurashtra

State of Saurashtra

Vadia


• 1

3 S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS -521

vVe have indicated above what is the crucial test in determining an association of persons within the meaning of s. 3, and we are of the view that the test suggested by lea1•ned counsel for the appellant are neither conclusive nor determinative of the question before us.

Corning back to the facts found by the Tribunal, there is no finding that the three widows have corn_bined in a joint enterprise to produce income. The only finding is that they have not exercised their right to separate en joyrnent, and except for receiving the dividends and interest jointly, it has been found that they have clone no act which has helped to produce income 111 respect of the shares and deposits.

On these fmdings it cannot be held that the three widows had the status of an association of persons within the meaning of s. 3 of the Indian Income Tax Act.

The High Court correctly answered question No. 3 in the negative.

Accordingly, the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs.

There will be one set of hearing fee in the two_ appeals.

Appeals dismissed .

DARBAR SHRI VIRA VALA SU RAG 'y ALA,

Commission<r of

Income-tax,

Bomba;•

Smt. Indira Balkrishna

S.K. Das J.

VADIA 1960 v. '

THE STATE OF SAURASHTRA (NO-W BOMBAY)

(jAFER IMAM, S. K. DAS, ]. L. KAPUR, A. K. SARKAR and M. HrnAYATULLA, JJ.) Grant by Ruler to younger son as Bhayat-Son becoming Ruler -Whether grant resumable-"Bhayat", Meaning of.

In the Indian State of Vadia succession was governed by primogeniture. The Ruler in 1943 granted to his younger son, the petitioner, a village in the State in perpetuity and in heredity for enjoyment as 'Kapal-Giras' as 'Bhayat'. ln -1947 the State of Vadia acceded to the Dominion of India and by subsequent constitutional deve!opments it became merged in the State of Saurashtra. After the coming into force of the Constitution the elder son of the Ruler and then the Ruler died, and the petitioner was recognied as the Ruler.

Thereupon the State of Saurashtra issued a notification resuming the grant as it was deemed to have lapsed and revened to the former Vadia State.

The petitioner contended that the grant was absolute and unconditional for

April 14.

Darbcr Shri Vira Vala Surag V alo,

Varlia

State of Saurashtra

Kapur J.

permanent enjoyment from generation to generation and the State could not resume it: Held, that the grant lapsed on the petitioner becoming the Ruler and the State could resume it.

The grant was to the petitioner as a "Bhayat", \vhich word meant a cadet or the descendant of a younger branch of a Talukdar's family where the estate folloed the rule of primogeniture; as such it ensured for his benefit as long as he remained a cadet.

But when the grantee became the Ruler and ceased to be a "Bhayat", the grant came to an end.

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petition No. 62 of 1956.

Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India. for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.

N. H. Ilingorani and A. N. Sinha, for the petitioner.

R. Ganapathy Iyer and T. M. Sen, for the respondent. l 960. April 11.

The .J u<lgrnent of the Court was delivered by KAPUR, .J.-Prior to the integration of the Indian States with the Union of I nclia on the promulgation of the Constitution of India there """ in Kathiawad a State of the name of Vadia, succession to the Rulership of which was by primogeiliture.

Its Ruler then was Darbar Saheb Shri Snrag Vala Bavavala.

He had two sons Kumar Shri Krishan Kumar and the petitioner Kumar Shri Vira Vala Surag Vala.

Kumar Shri Krishan Kumar being the cider son was the heir-apparent.

On .July 5, l !143, the Ruler Darbar Saheb Shri Surag Vala executed two documents in favour of the petitioner granting him in perpetuity and in heredity a village called 'Mota Pithadia in the State for enjoyment as 'Kap'11-Giras' as 'Bhayat".

The word 'Bhavat' means a cadet or the descendant of a youn'ger branch of a Talukdars family where the State follows die r11le of primogPnilure. 'Kapal-Giras' means a grant in appanage as a birthright to a share in the patrimony.

Sometime in or about August, 19'17, the State of Vadi; t acceded to the .Dominion of India on the terms contained in an instrument of accession then executed.

Thereafter, on .January ~'l, 19"}8, various States in the

Kathiall'arl area entered into a cmenant forming the United State of: Kathiawacl, aho called the United State of Saurashtra.

In terms of this covenant the

. ..

...

---.

. '

assets of each State excepting the private properties of the Ruler, became the assets of the United State.

The covenant also provided that the Ruler of each State shall be entitled to receive a .certain sum as his privy purse from the revenues of the United State, to retain ownership of all private properties to be determined in the manner provided and to all personal p1'ivileges, dignities and titles.

The Government of India concurred in the covenant and guaranteed all its provisions.

The State of Vadia was a party to this covenant and its assets therefore became vested in the U nitecl State.

On September 13, 1948, the United State of Kathiawad executed a fresh instrument of accession to the Dominion of India cancelling the instrument of accession executed by the covenant- _ing States in or about August, 1947. On November 13, 1949, the United State of Kathiawad agreed to adopt the Constitution to be framed b:y the Constituent Assembly of India and further that the Constitution of India as from the elate of its commencement would supersede and abrogate all other constitutional provisions inconsistent therewith in force in the United State.

On the promulgation of the Constitution of India on January 26, 1950, the United State merged in the Union of India and became Saurashtra, a Part B State mentioned in the Constitution.

The United State and therefore its component States since then lost all separate existence.

It is not in dispute that upon such merger all the assets of the United State became vested in the Union of India.

On January 27, 1950, Kumar Shri Kr'ishan Kumar, the elder son of the Ruler Darbar Saheb Shri Surag Vala died and thereafter on May 16, 1950, the Ruler himself died.

On February 12, 195 l, the President of India issued a notification recognising the petitioner as the Ruler of Vadia with effect from May 16, 1950,

and he became entitled to the rights of the Ruler which the Government of India had agreed to recognise.

These were the rights reserved to the Ruler under the covenant constituting the United State of Kathiawad, namely, the right to a privy purse, to the private properties and to the personal privileges, dignities and titles. ·

Darbar Shri Vira Vala Surag Vala,

Vadia

State of Saurashtra

Darbnr Skri Vi/"(1 Vala Surag Vala,

Varlia

Stalt of Saurashtra

Kajmr J.

524 SUPREl\1E COURT REPORTS [1960]

On .July ~. l 'J:l l, the Government of the State of Sat1rashtra issued a notificarion declaring that as the petitioner hacl succceclcd his father as Ruler, the village Pithacli; i should, pending final orders be treated as Khalsa or Khas village of the State of Saurashtra.

The petitioner was then a minor and his mother submitted a representation to the Government protesting against the notification.

No reply was received to this protest.

On \fay 2l, 1952. the Government of Saurashtra issued a further notificai-ion which stMed:

"\Vhereas the vilbe:e Pithaclia in Vadia Taluka of the i\ladhya Saurahtra District was granted, by Lekh No. 194 elater! 5th July, 19-13, as Kapa! Giras by the late Ruler .Darbar Saheb Suragwala of the former Vadia State to his seconcl son Shri K. S.

Viravala in the latter's capacity as ; i carlet, in :ippanage grant: ancl Whereas, the late Ruler and his eldest son Shri K. S. Krishna Knmarsinghji predeceased this second son Shri K. S. Viravala, the latter has been recogmsed as the Ruler of the former State of Vadia with effect from lGth May, 1950, by the Government of S:mrashtra and the President of T ndia as per Notification No. PD /MS /20 dated I 2th February, I 'l'i I. of the Government of Saurashtra Revenue Department !Political) published in the Gazette of Saurashtx:i :incl \Vhereas, pending the recognition the Government of Sanrashtr:i harl ordered, by Notification No. PD/148/20, dated 2nd July,

19Ci 1, of the Revenue Department (Political) that village should be treated as Khalsa village of the State of Saurashtra anrl whereas Shri K. S. Viravala's status as a• Cadet has ceased and the object of the grant in appanare has terminated in consequence of his being recognised as the Rt1ler.

Now, therefore, the gTant is deemed to have lapsed and reverted to the former Vaclia State now integrated with the State of Saurashtra :it present known as the State of S:iurashtra with effect from the date of Shri K. S. Viravala having been recognised as the Ruler of the former Vaclia State in succession to the late Ruler Darbar Shri Suragwala of V; iclia State, viz., 16th of May, 1950".

. ,.

. - . ...

...

( .

• •

The petitioner again lodged a protest against this latter notification but this time also received no reply.

On .March 9, 1956, he filed the present petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution asking for the issue of a writ cl irecting the respondent, the State of Bombay, in which State State of Saurashtra had earlier merged, to withdraw or cancel the notification and to restore the village Pithadia with all collections and realisations made by it to the petitioner and restraining the respondent from giving effect to the notification.

The petitioner's contention is that the village had been granted to him absolutely and untonditionally for permanent enjoyment from generation to generation and the State could not resume it so long as any of the descendants of the petitioner was alive.

He contends that President's recognition of him as Ruler of Vaclia did not affect his rights to the village.

The respondent's contention i.s that the, g1ant was not absolute or unconditional but it was to remain in force so long as the petitioner continued to be a cadet of the family and that as on his being recognised as the Ruler he ceased to be a cadet, the grant lapsed and the village reverted to the State.

It is said that the Union of India being entitled to all the assets of the State of Vaclia, the village has become. its property since the date of the . petitioner's recognition as the Ruler.

The question therefore is whether the grant lapsed on the grantee becoming the Ruler. That is a question depending on the terms of the grant. Capt. webb in his compilation called "Political Practice in Kathiawad" has defined a 'Bhayat' as a cadet or the descendant of a younger brnch of a Talukdar's family where the estate follows the rule of primogeniture.

The grant was made by a document called a Lekh or a writing to which was attached a Hakpatrak which is a Statement of rights created by the Darbar to a Bhayat.

Both these documents were registered before the Agency.

The main portions of the Lekh were in these terms :

"Passed by Shree Vadia Parbar Shree Suragvala Bavavala, to long-lived Kumar Shree Viravala.

To wit:-the Rule of primogeniture (i.e., the system

5-6 SCI/ND/84

Darbar Shri Vira Vala Surag Vala Vadia v.

State of Saurashtra

Kapur].

Darbar Shri Vira

Vala Surng J!, da

Vadia v.

State o..f Saurnshtra

f(aj111r J.

of Heir-apparent and cadets) having been applied to this State, and yon being our Kumar (son) younger than our eldest Kumar, long-lived Yuvaraj Shree Krishna Kumar Saheb, you are, by this Lekh, given, as Bhayat:, for permanent enjoyment as Kapa] Giras, from generation to generation, the village "i\lota-Pithadia'", a village of exclusive jurisdiction of this State, which is of our possession, enjoyment and ownership, "ith its village, Tai (village site), and Sim 'ith all their boundaries, fields, Vaclis, Kharo, Kharabo, etc., i.e., with all the boundaries of the said village, as Giras.

You may enjoy the revenues thereof from the beginning of the Year Samvat 2000. -

..................... Giras as above having been given to you as Bhayat, a Hakpatrak (statement of rights) thereof, according to procedure has been given. The same has been attached herewith.

You and your heirs and successors may enjoy the same. i\lap and Field-Book of this village have been maclc, true copies whereof have been got: prep; uecl and given to you''.

The lekh conferred various other dignities, pnv1leges, amenities ancl rights on the petitioner. Thus it is stated that the petitioner's marriage will be celebrated at the State expense and the State "ill arrange for his education, that no duties or taxes will be levied on the petitioner on account of his residence in Vaclia proper, that the petitioner's complaint regarding Giras, i.e., the village granted, or any other civil matter would be heard without: charging any court fee and he would be exempt from personal attendance in court in civil matters and that no process "ill be issned 'against him in criminal cases without the permission of the Ruler himself. All these dignities, rights and privileges are appropriate to a cadet of the Ruler's family, but have no meaning when applied to a Ruler.

In the Hak Patrak it is stated: "In future even if your descendants are joint or may have divided, any one Bhayat surviving from amongst your descendants shall enjoy the Sudharo Giras and it shall not

. ,..

. -

.. '

revert to the State till any" one Bhayat from amongst your descendants is living".

It also states that the grantee will not sell or mortgage the Giras without the permission of the State.

The grant and the Hak Patrak read together lead to the inescapable conclusion that in its true nature the grant is a grant to a cadet of the family and the grant enures for his benefit as long as he remains a cadet.

The expression "given as Bhayat" is not merely descriptive of the grantee, but indicates the true nature of the grant.

Nor do we agree that the expression "given as Bhayat" merely indicates the purpose for which the grant is made but describes the nature of the tenure.

The grant states in express terms that it is given as Bhayat for permanent enjoyment as Kapal-Giras, vvhich means that the grant is to a cadet as an appanage and continues from generation to generation as long as any of the descendants of the grantee is alive. , But if the g1antee ceases to be the younger branch and becomes heir-apparent by reason of the rule of primogeniture or ceases to be a cadet or Bhayat for any reason whatsoever, then the grant must come to an end.

This is what the rights and liabilities mentioned in the grant itself and also in the Hak Patrak show; for example, with regard to the right of succession, the Hak Patrak states that even if one Bhayat from amongst the descendants survives he shall enjoy the Giras and there will be no reversion to the State.

This, in our opinion, shows that the grant enures as long as there is a Bhayat. If there is no Bhayat the grant lapses.

If on a true construction the grant is of the nature indicated above, then no question of reading an implied term in the grant arises; nor is there anv necessitv of determining whether the petitioner

ha~ become' a ruler in the .ense in which his father was a ruler of the Vadia State. whatever be the reason for which the petitioner has ceased to be a Bhayat, either by reason of the death of his elder ') brother or hy reason of his becoming a ruler in the limited sense of the Constitution, he has ceased to be a Bhayat and the grant being given as Bhayat for

Darbar Shri Vira Vala Surag Vala Vadia v.

Stale of Sauraslttra

Kapur J.

1960 permanenl enjoyment as Kapal-Giras, it has come to an end.

Darbar Shri Vira Vala Surag Vala In that view of the matt.er the jJClitioner must be Vadia v. held to have failed to make oul any infringement of State"! ~"':rashtra his fundamental right by reason of the notification

Kapur J. dated May 213, l 952.

The inf1; ingement which the petitioner complains of is depri\ation of his property oy State action and he bases his right on the terms of the grant. If the grant is not an absolute grant in the sense in which the peLiLioner contends, but is a grant which Ly its \cry nature contains a defeasance clause, then the petitioner cannot found his claim on any violation of his fundamental right.

Ap6l 14.

The petition is therefore dismissed with costs.

Petition dismissed.

M/s. 1-IATISINGH i\IFG. CO. LTD.

AND ANOTHER

UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS.

(B. P. SINHA, C. ]., JAFER IMAM, A. K. SARKAR,

K. N. \VANCHOO and]. C. SHAH, JJ.)

Industrial Undertaking, Closure of-Compensation to workmen -Constitutional validity of enactment-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), as amended by Act 18 of 1957, s. 25FFF(l)- Constitution of India, Arts. 19\l)(g), 14, 20.

The question for determination in these petitions relates to the constitutional validity of s. 25FFF(l) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, inserted by Act 18 of 1957, which provides for payment of compensation to workmen on the closure of an industrial undertaking.

The petitioners urged that the impugned section (i) imposed unreasonable restrictions on the freedom to carry on business guaranteed by Art. 19(l)(g), which included the right to close the business,

(ii) discriminated between employers who closed their undertakings on or before November 27, 1956, and employers who closed thereafter and thus contravened Art, 14 and (iii) also penalised acts which were not offences when committed contrary to Art. 20( 1) of the Constitution: Held, that s. ZSFFF(l) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, inserted by Act 18 of 1957, including the proviso and the explanation, is not violative of Arts. 19(l)(g), 14, and 20 of the Constitution and its constitutional validity is beyond question:

•• ..

s. 3

s. 3

Indira Balkrishna

S.K. Das J.

THE STATE OF SAURASHTRA (NO-W BOMBAY

jAFER IMAM

L. KAPUR

A. K. SARKAR

State of Vadia

Dominion of India

Saurashtra

State of Saurashtra

Vira Vala Surag V

State of Saurashtra

Kapur

Art. 32

Constitution of India

N. H. Ilingorani

A. N. Sinha

R. Ganapathy Iyer

T. M. Sen

KAPUR

Constitution of India

Darbar Saheb

Snrag Vala Bavavala

Krishan Kumar

Vira Vala Surag Vala

5, l !

Surag Vala

State of Vadi

Government of India

September 13, 1948

United State of Kathiawad

November 13, 1949

United State

Constituent Assembly of India

Constitution of India

Constitution of India

January 26, 1950

United State

Union of India

January 27, 1950

Kr'ishan Kumar

May 16, 1950

February 12, 195

India

Vadia

Government of the State of Sat1rashtra

\fay 2l, 1952

Government of Saurashtra

.Darbar Saheb Suragwala

K. S.

Viravala

K. S. Krishna Knmarsinghji

K. S. Viravala

Government of Sanrashtr

.March 9, 1956

Art. 32

Pithadia

Vaclia

Union of India

State of Vaclia

webb

Kathiawad

Kumar Shree Viravala

Vala Surng

State

Kharo

Kharabo

Giras

Bhayat

s. 1

IATISINGH i\IFG. CO. LTD

B. P. SINHA

JAFER IMAM

K. N. \VANCHOO

C. SHAH

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

s. 25F

Constitution of India

Arts. 19

s. 25F

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

Art. 19(l)(g)

Art. 20( 1)

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

Arts. 19(l)(g), 14


SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960]

1960 permanenl enjoyment as Kapal-Giras, it has come to an end.

Darbar Shri Vira Vala Surag Vala In that view of the matt.er the jJClitioner must be Vadia v. held to have failed to make oul any infringement of State"! ~"':rashtra his fundamental right by reason of the notification

Kapur J. dated May 213, l 952.

The inf1; ingement which the petitioner complains of is depri\ation of his property oy State action and he bases his right on the terms of the grant. If the grant is not an absolute grant in the sense in which the peLiLioner contends, but is a grant which Ly its \cry nature contains a defeasance clause, then the petitioner cannot found his claim on any violation of his fundamental right.

Ap6l 14.

The petition is therefore dismissed with costs.

Petition dismissed.

M/s. 1-IATISINGH i\IFG. CO. LTD.

AND ANOTHER

UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS.

(B. P. SINHA, C. ]., JAFER IMAM, A. K. SARKAR,

K. N. \VANCHOO and]. C. SHAH, JJ.)

Industrial Undertaking, Closure of-Compensation to workmen -Constitutional validity of enactment-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), as amended by Act 18 of 1957, s. 25FFF(l)- Constitution of India, Arts. 19\l)(g), 14, 20.

The question for determination in these petitions relates to the constitutional validity of s. 25FFF(l) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, inserted by Act 18 of 1957, which provides for payment of compensation to workmen on the closure of an industrial undertaking.

The petitioners urged that the impugned section (i) imposed unreasonable restrictions on the freedom to carry on business guaranteed by Art. 19(l)(g), which included the right to close the business,

(ii) discriminated between employers who closed their undertakings on or before November 27, 1956, and employers who closed thereafter and thus contravened Art, 14 and (iii) also penalised acts which were not offences when committed contrary to Art. 20( 1) of the Constitution: Held, that s. ZSFFF(l) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, inserted by Act 18 of 1957, including the proviso and the explanation, is not violative of Arts. 19(l)(g), 14, and 20 of the Constitution and its constitutional validity is beyond question:

•• ..

... -.

Held, further, that the question whether a restriction imposed 1960 by a law on the exercise of the fundamental right guaranteed by Hatisingh Mfg.

Art. 19( 1 )(g) is a reasonable restriction within the meaning of Co. Ltd.

Art. 19(6) of the Constitution is to be judged not. by any theorev. tical standards or fixed patterns but in the light of the nature Union of Indio and incidents of the right, the interest of the general public sought to be secured and the reasonableness of the quality and extent of the restriction itself.

The clear intention of the legislature in using the words "as if the workmen had been retrenched" in s. ZSFFF(l) of the Act was not to place the closure of an undertaking on the same footing as retrenchment under s. ZSF.

While under s. ZSF of the Act no workman can be retrenched until the conditions prescribed therein are fulfilled, s. ZSFFF(l) does not prohibit the closure of an undertaking without payment of compensation or service of notice, or payment of wages in lieu thereof, and lays down no conditions precedent to closure.

But termination of service due to closure of an industrial under<aking stands on the same footing as termination of service on retrenchment and it is in the interest of the general public that the unemployed workmen should be afforded some protection to tide over the period of unemployment.

Since the impugned provision, with that object in view, seeks to achieve social justice, it is not material to probe into the motives of the employer or the bona fides of the closure.

Indian Hume Pipe Co., Ltd. v. Their Workmen, [1960] 2 S.C.R. 32, referred to.

Since wages in lieu of notice are normally inadequate recompense for loss of employment, the payment of additional compensation related to the length of service of the employee cannot be said to be unreasonable.

Nor can the provisicin for standardisation of compensation, which does not leave it to be judicially ascertained on the basis of the employer's capacity to pay or the loss suffered by the employees, be said to be unreasonable.

Payment of gratuity, which is a retiral benefit is essentially different from statutory compensation for term.ination of employment due to closure of an undertaking; a provision for payment of such compensation is not to be deemed unreasonable .merely because compensation for closure of an undertaking is in addition to gratuity, payable under an industrial award.

Since there can be no doubt as to th~ constitutionality of the principal provision for compensation, the proviso must also be regarded as constitutional.

The explanation to s. ZSFFF(l) of the Act does not provide that in no case of financial difficulty or accumulation of stocks coupled with other circumstances can the closure of an undertaking be regarded as due to unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the employer. It cannot, therefore, be regarded as unreasonable for although it may be irksome to some citizem, it is in the interest of the general public.

Hatisingh Afjg,

Co. LJd.

Union of India

Mohd. Hanif Quareshi and 01s. v. The State of Bihar, [1959] S.C.R. 629 and Bi1ay Cotton Mills Ltd. v. The State of Ajmer, (1955] 1 S.C.R. 752, referred to.

A law which is applicable generally to all persons who come within its ambit cannot be said to be discriminatory and violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution, even though it may be retrospective in operation.

The impugned section does not make payment of compensation a condition precedent to closure and creates no criminal liability and so neither s. 31(1) nor s. 31(2) of the Act can have any application. Article 20(1) of the Constitution is not, therefore, attracted and there can be no contravention of it.

ORIGINAL JuRrsmcnoN : Petitions Nos. 88 and lOli of J 957 and l03 of 1959.

Petition under Article 3'.! of the Constitution of India for enforcement of Fundamental Rights.

G. S. Pathak, I. M. Nariavati, S. N. Andley, ]. B.

Dadaclwnji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for petitioner No. l (In Petns. Nos. 88 of 57 and 103 of

1959).

I. M. Nmwvati; S. N. Andley, ]. B. Dadachanji, Ra1nes/1war Nath and P. L. Vohra, for petitioner No. 2 (In Petns. Nos. 88 of ii7 and IO:> of l'J'J!J).

B. Sen, B. K. B. Naidu and J. N. S/irof], for the petitioner (In Petn. No. 106 of 57).

M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, C. K.

DajJ/itary, Solicilor-Genernl of India, B. R. L. Iyengar and R. H. Dhe!J11r, for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 (In Petn. No. 88 of 57) arnl the respondents (In Petn.

No. 103 of 59).

C. K. DajJ!ttary, Solicitor-General of India, N. S.

Bindra and R H. D/11:/Jar, for respondent No. 1 (In Petn. No. I 03 of 59). ]ananlan Sharma, for respondent No. 2 (In Petn.

No. 103 of 59).

P. A. Melita and G. GojJalahrishnan, for the Intervener.

HIGO. April H. The Judgment of the Court was delivered bv

SHAH, J.-' In these three petitions the validity of s. 25FFJ<° (l) of the Industrial Disputes Act No. XlV of 1947 as amended by Act ,18 of 1953 is impugned.

Petition No. 88 of 1 %7 is by a company manufac- I tnrinocotton textiles in the town o[ Ahmedabacl. " The machinery in the factory of the company was

"<Ii.

installed in the year 1898 and has not been replaced thereafter.

The factory had, it is claimed by the petitioners, become, by the passage of time, an uneconomic unit and was closed on that account on April 27, 1957.

An attempt was made by the management to increase the number of spindles to make the unit economic, but without success.

The company was incurring losses year after year and early in the year 1956, the Registrar of Companies, Bombay, requested the Central Government to authorise him to wind up the company.

This authority was not given and the factory continued to work till April 28, 1957, on which date it was closed after notice of closure given in March, 1957.

The petitioner in Petition No. I 06 of 1957 was running a coal .mine which he had purchased in November, 1953.

The petitioner says that he made large investments in the mine, but due to flooding by undergTound water, the working of the mine consistently resulted in losses which aggregated to over rupees seven lakhs by February, 1957. The petitioner decided to close the mine and gave notice in that behalf to the employees.

The petitioner paid one month's salary to the monthly paid staff and 15 days' w;:iges to the weekly and daily rated staff, and closed the mine on February 10, 1957.

Petition No. 103 of 1959 is by a company which owns a spinning and we;:iving factory at J amnagar.

This factory which was started in the year 1938, proved an uneconomic unit, it is claimed resulting in persistent losses which aggregated to about Rs. 28 lakhs by the encl of the year l 9S7.

In view of these losses, the weaving department of the factory was closed on February l, 19.57, ; incl the entire factory was closed on April 24, 1957, after notice of closure to the employees.

By their petitions the three petit10ners impugn the validity of s. 2SFFF( I) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which requires them to pay compens:ition on closure of their undertakings, which they claim were due to circumstances beyond their control.

To appreciate the contentions, a brief review of the relevant legislative history may be set out :

Hatisingh Mfg. ro. Ltd.

Union of India

.5/zah J.

Hatisingh -~!Jg.

Co. Ltd. v.

Uninn of lnrlin

Shah].

The Parliament amended the Industrial Disputes Act, 1917, by Act 4'l of 1953 and incorporated therein Ch. VA which contained ss. 2?iA to 25].

By this Chapter, provision was made for payment of compensation for lay-off and retrenchment, and certain incidental provisions enunciating and regulating liability for payment: of compensation were enacted. By s. 2.~F it was enacted that no workman employed in any industry who had been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched unless the workman had been given notice of one month's duration or wages in lieu thereof and also had been paid at the time of retrenchment compensation equivalent to 15 da)s average pay for every completed year of se1-vice or any part thereof in excess of six months.

Retrenchmellt was defined by cl. (oo) of s. 2, as ineaningter111ination of service of a 'i\'Orkma11 for any reason whatsoever otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action.

But the amending Act of 1 'l53 did not expressly provide for liability to pay compensation for termination of employment on closure of an indnstrial undertaking.

In f-fnriprasnrl Shivslwnlrnr S/111'1/a v. A. D. Divr:- lrnr (') decided on 27-11-1%6, it was held by this Court :

"The word 'retrenchment' as defined in s. 2(po) ancl the worcl 'retrenched' in s. 2.~F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1047, as amended by Act XL III of l 95n, have no wider meanin~ than the ordinary accepted connotation of those words and mean the discharge of surplus labour or staff by the employer for anv reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punish;,, cnt inflicted by way of disciplinary action, and do not include termination of services of all workmen on a bona fide closure of industry or on change of ownership or management thereof." The President of India on April 27, 19il7, promulgated Ordinance No. IV of l 957, which amended Ch. VA of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. By this Ordinance, provision was made for payment with retrospective effect from December 1, l %6, of compensation to workmen on termination of employment

(I) 1957] S.C.R. 121

-..

. -

• -

\ '.

upon transfer or closure of an industrial undertaking.

This Orclinan<; e was latei' replaced with certain modifications by Act 1 S of 19:)7 which came into force on June 6, 1957, but with retrospective effect from November 28, 1956. Section 2SFFF which was incorporated by the amending Act by the first sub-section confers upon every workman who has been in continuous service for not less i:han one year immediately before the closure, right to notice and compensation in accordance with the provisions of s. 2.~F, and by the proviso thereto the maximum amount of compensation payable to a wot:kman is limited to average pay for three months when the undertaking is closed on account of nrcumstances beyond the control of the employer.

By the explanation, an undertaking closecl down on account . merely of financial difficulties (including financial losses) or accumulation of undisposecl of stocks is not to be deemed to have been closed down on account of unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the employer within the meaning of the proviso.

This provision for a11arcling compensation for termination of employment on closure of an industrial undertaking is challenged in these petitions on three grounds : (J) that it imposes unreasonable restrictions on the freedom guaranteed to every citizen by Art. 19( I )(g) of the Constitution to carry on business which freedom includes the right to close his business, (II) that it discriminates between different employers belonging to the same group placed in similar circumstances and thereby contravenes Art. 14 of the Constitution, and (III) that contrary to Art. 20 of the Constitution, it penalises acts which when committed were not offences.

Re. I:.

Section 25FFF(l) is impugned as imposing unreasonable restrictions upon the fu11damental freedom to close down an undertaking because liability to pay compensation is made a condition. precedent to closure of an undertaking even if it is effected bona fide by an employer who is unable on account of unavoidable circumstances to carry on the undertaking and also because it operates retrospectively on closure , effected since a date arbitrarily fixed by the Act.

It is :ilso

6-,-6 SCI/ND/82

Hatisingh Mfg.

Co. Ltd. v.

Union of India

Shah].

f-{ntiingh .i\1je.

Co, !Ad.

Union of l11dia

Shah].

SUPRE1\.1E COURT REPORTS [1960]

impugned on the ground Lhat compcnsat:io11 is not related to the loss suffered by the employees by termination of employment on closure, but is cmanlccl at standardized rates without taking into account the capacity o[ the employer t.o pay compensation to discharged employees.

Snb-s. l of s. 2!iFFF reads as follm1s:-

"\\'here an undertaking is close<! dmn1 for any reason every 'rorkrnan ,, vho ha~ l)ccn in continuous service fo1~ not. less than one year in that undertaking immediately before such closure, shall subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) be entitled to notice and compensation in accordance with the provisions of s. 2!iF, as if the workman had been retrenched."

There is between the text of s. 2.'iF and s. 25FFF(l) a significant difference in phraseology. \\'hcreas by s. 20F-the constitutional validity 11hereof does not fall t:o be determined in these petitions-certain conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen are prescribed, s. 2t>FFF(l) merely imposes liability rn give notice and to pay compensation on closure of an undertaking which results in termination of employment of the 1rnrkmen.

Under s. 2:iF, no workman employed in an industrial unclertaking can be retrenched by the employer until (a) the workman has been

gi, en one month's not.ice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period has expired or the "orkman has been paid salary in lieu of such

notice, (b) the workman has been paicl retrenchment compensation C<]uivalent to l :) days' average salary for every completed year of service ancl (e) notice in the prescribed manner is senccl on the appropriate Government .. Section iiFFFll) hnwcver enacts that the workman shall be entitled to notice and compensation in acconlance with the pro, ision of s. 2.'iF if the undertaking is closed for any reason, as if the workman has been retrenched.

By the plain intenclment of s. 2.'>FFF(I), the right to notice and compensation for termination of employment: Arrns from closure of the undertaking; the clause does not seek to make closure effective upon payment of compensation and upon service of notice or pavment of wages in lie11 of

.....

. -

. '

- '

notice.

An employer proposing to close his undertaking may serve notice of termination of employment and if he fails to do so, he becomes liable to pay wages for the period of notice.

On closure of an undertaking, the workmen are undoubtedly entitled to notice and compensation in accordance with s. 25F as if they had been retrenched, i.e., the workmen are entitled besides compensation to a month's notice or wages in lieu of such notice, but by the use of the words "as if the workman had been retrenched" the legislature has not sought to place closure of an undertaking on the same footing as retrenchment under s. 25F.

By s. 25F, a prohibition against retrenchment until the tonditions prescribed by that section are fulfilled is imposed; by s. 25FFF(l), termination of employment on closure of the undertaking without payment of compens:ttion and without either serving notice or paying wages in lieu of notice.,. is, not prohibited. Payment of compensation and payment of wages for the period of notice are not therefore conditions precedent to closure.

I By Art. 19(1 )(g) of the Constitution freedom w carry on any trade or business is guaranteed to every citizen, but this freedom is not absolute.

By cl. 8 of Art. 19, operation of any existing law or any law which the State mav make in so far as such law imposes in the interest of the general public reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right is not affected.

In the interest of the general public, the law may impose restrictions on the freedom of the citizens to start, carry on or close their undertakings. vVhether an. impugned provision imposing a fetter on the exercise of the fundamerital right guaranteed by Art. 19(1 )(g) amounts to a reasonable restriction imposed in the interest of the general public must be adjudged not in the background of any theoretical standards or predeterminate patterns, but in the light of the nature and incident.s of the right the interest of the general public sought to be secured by imposing the restriction and the reasonableness of the quality and extent of the fetter upon the right.

By Act 18 of 19.57, employers who close their undertakings after November 27, 1958, are made liable to pay compensation under s. 25FFF(l) at the prescribed

Halisivgh lvlfg.

Co. Ltd. v.

U11ion of India

Shah].

Hatifiiigh Mfg.

Co. Ltd. v.

Union of India

Shah].

rates, and this liability evidently arises even in respect of undertakings closed before the date of the enactment of the impugned section.

A law which creates a civil liability in respect of a transaction which has taken place before the date on which the Act was enacted docs not jJer se impose an unreasonable restriction.

It was on November 27, 1956, tbat this court held that s. 25F did not support a claim for compensation for termination of employment arising out of closure of an undertaking. The Parliament, evidently, respected the interpretation put on s. 25F by this court and directed that in respect of closures etfected ou or before the date on which judgment was delivered by this court in Tlariprasad's case, no compensation for termination of ernployment on account of closure of an undertaking would be awarded.

It is not disputed that a number of industrial undertakings were closed down after the judgment in Hariprasad's case was delivered by this court and more than 25,000 workmen were thrown out of employment on account of such closures.

The Parliament, in view of these developments enacted s. ~,-, FFF(I) imposing liability for payment of compensation by employers who closed their undertakings since November, 27, 1968. ·

Closure of an industrial undertaking involves termination of employment of many employees, and throws them into the ranks of the unemployed, and it is in the interest of the general public that misery resulting from unemployment should be redressed.

In Indian Hume Pipe Co Ltd. v. The Workmen (') this Court considered the reasom for awarding compensation under s. 2.5F (though not its constitutionality).

It was observed that retrenchment compensation was intended to give the workmen some relief and to soften the rigour of hardship which retrenchment brings in its wake when the retrenched workman is suddenly and without his fault thrown on the streets, to face the grim problem of unemployment.

It \\'as also observed that the workman naturally expects and looks forward to security of service spread over a long period, but retrenchment destroys his expectations.

The object of retrenchment compensation is therefore to give

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partial protection to the retrenched employee to enable him to tide over the period of unemployment.

Loss of service due to closure stands on the same footing as loss of service due to retrenchment, for in both cases, the employee_ is thrown out of employment suddenly and for no fault of his and the hardships which he has to face are, whether unemployment is the resnlt of Tetrenchment or closure of business, the same. If the true basis of the impugned provisions is the achievel

.,,, ment of social justice, it is immaterial to consider the motives of the employer or to decide whether the closure is bona fide or otherwise.

Wages in lieu of notice are normally inadequate compensation for loss of employment in an industrial undertaking.

Having regard to the prevailing condi- ' tions in the employment market, it would be difficult for the workman thrown out of empldyment to secure employment simi, lar to the one terminated within one month. and therefore the Parliament has thought it proper to provide for payment of additional ompen sation besides wages in lieu of notice.

The provision for payment of such compensation in addition to wages in lieu of notice cannot therefore be charac-

.;.., terised as unreasonable.

Compensation related to the length of service of the employee is also not unreasonable.

An employee remaining employed in an industry for an appreciable length of time acquires experience and some degree of aptitude in the branch in which he is employed and his experience in that branch qualifies him to pro-

-~ motion and to receive . wages at a higher level.

By his continued employment, he reaches seniority in the cadre of employme11t, with chances of promotion, the

1 bei; iefit of which he loses by sudden termination of employment.

The workman, on termination of employment, may have to compete for employment at

~ a lower level in branches to which he may be by experience or aptitude, not' fitted, or to seek employment in a _job similar to the one terminated at a. lower ·) level.

If, in the light of these considerations, the legislature has related the compensation payable on termination of employment to the period of service of

Iiatisingh Mfg.

Co. Ltd. v.

Union of lnaia

Slzah ].

Hatisiugh .'1{/'g.

C'o. Ltd. v.

U11io11 of India

Shah].

538 SUPRE:tvlE COURT REPORTS [1960]

the employee, the provision cannot be reganled as unreaso11able. ._..,, The plea of unreasonableness of the restriction imposed as flowing from the provision 11hich standardizes compensation and docs not leave it to be ascertained by a judicial tribunal in the light of the capacity of the employer and the loss suffered by the employees on termination of employment, cannot also be sustained.

Instead of leaving the question to be decided in each individual case in the context of a v:iriety of ci1Tu111st:mc"cs having a bearing on the amount of compensation to be awarclecl, the Parliament has standardized the compensation by relating it to the length of service of the employee, and thereby a definite standard for payment of rnmpensation related Lo readily ascertainable data is ptescribed .. , Standardization of compensation which dispenses with

recourse to a judicial tribunal for assessing the quantum is a recognized method of awarding compensation especially where large nnmbers of workmen are involved in a similar situation.

Absence of a provision for a judicial verdict on the quantum of compensation payable does not therefore make the law unreasonable.

Gratuity which is a kind of retiral benefit is essentially different from statutory compensation for termination of employmellt due to closure of an undertaking.

The objects intended to be achieved thereby are also distinct.

Therefore the argument that it is unreasonable to awarrl statutory compensation under s. 2C>FFF(l) when gratuity is otherwise claimable uncle!' an award binding upon the employer must be rejected.

The impugned section providing for payment of compensation is evidently related to the. object sought to be achieved by the Parliament, viz.: securing social justice.

The right to receive compensation arises because the workman is exposed to undeserved "''mt and the reasons for closure mav have no direct bearing thereon.

Payment of co1;1pensation which ts clircctecl to he marlc at the rate of l!i clays wages for every complctccl year of service cannot agaiff be characterised as was sought t:o be done by one of the

• t

3 S.C.R.

SUPREJVIE COURT REPORTS 539

learned counsel for the petitioriers as "drastic in its scope and content".

Does the impugner! provision impose an unreasonable restriction because it imposes liability to pay compensation which is not related to the capacity of the employer?

Before the impugned section was enacted, the industrial tribunals undoubtedly decided the individual claims for compensation for termination of employment submitted to them on their merits and sometimes, refused compensation if it was found that the closure was bona fide and was in part clue to irresponsible conduct of the workmen concerned.

The decisions of the industrial tribunals before the impugned. section was enacted again show that even where compensation was allowed, there was not fixed standard or principle on which the compensation was awarded. ' 1Vhere the business is continuing its capacity to meet the obligation to pay clearness allowance, gratuity and provident fund, etc., may have to be taken into account; the reason being that if the capacity to pay is not taken into account, the business itself may come to an end and the very purpose of industrial adjudication in the, matter of fixation of wages, payment of dearness allowance and the schemes of gratuity and provident fund which are intended for the amelioration of the conditions of labour may be frustrated.

But where a business is closed, the capacity to pay is not a relevant consideration.

Normally, if the business is capable of meeting the obligation to pay the wages of the workmen a)1d to meet the other expenses necessary for its continuance, it would not be closed down.

Capacity to pay has therefore to be taken into account in the case of a running business in assessing liability to fix wages or gratuity or clearness 'allowance.

Once the undertaking is closed and liability to p:1y compensation under the irn pugned section is not made a condition precedent, the amount which the workmen may be able to recover must depend upon the assets of the employer which may be available to meet the obligation.

The workmen would be entitled to recover compensation only if the employ.er is able to meet the obligation; otherwise they would have to rank pro

Halis£1tgh Mfg.

Co. Ltd. v.

Union of India

Shah}.

f{atiJi11gh Alfi;.

Co. Lt.f. v. [Jnfon of India

Sl1t1h J.

rata 11it:h the other ordinary creditors of the employer.

The lcgisbture has imposed restricted liability in cases where closure is due to circumstances beyond the cont:rol of the employer.

By the proviso to sub-s. I of s. 2iiFFF, where the underwking is closed down on account of circumstances beyond the control of the employer, the compensation to be paid to the 11ork men is not to exceed his average pay for three months.

If the principal provision is not unconstitutional as imposing an unreasonable restriction, it is not suggested that: the proviso is on any independenl ground unconsti t:ntional.

However, the explanation it is snbmirted, unreasonable. vides:

9'FFF . . to s. _,, • proviso 1s, The explanation pro-

"An undertaking which is closed down hy reason merely of financial difTicnlties (including financial losses) or accumulation of undisposed of stocks shall not be deemed to have been closed down on account of unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the employer within rhe mem1ing of the proviso to this sub-section."

The .efl:cct of the impugned section along with the proviso is to classify the undertakings into two classes, viz., (I) those which are closed clown on account of una\toiclable circumstances beyond the control of the employer and (2) the remaining. \Vhen the closure of an undertaking is clue to circumstances beyond the control of the enrployer, the maximum limit of. compensation is average pay for three months, irrespective of the length of service of the workmen; in the residuary class, the liability is unrestricted. The explanation is in substance a definition clause which sets out what shall not be deemed to he closures on account of circumstances beyond .the control of the emp1oyer.

By this explanation, employers who had to close down their industrial undertakings merely because of financial difficulties including financial losses or accumulation of und is posed of stocks are excluded from the benefit of the proviso to s. 25FFF(l).

The proviso restricts the liability of employers who are compelled to close down their undertakings on account of unavoidable circnmstances beyond their control, but in

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3 S.C.R.

SUPREME GOUR T REPORTS 541

the view of the Parliament, in that category are not to be included employers compelled to close down their undertakings merely becau:; e of financial difficulties or accumulation of undisposed of stocks.

Closure of an undertaking attributable merely to financial difficulties or accumulation of undisposed of stocks, is by the explanation, excluded from the benefit of restricted liability; but couplecl with other circumstances, financial difficulties or accumulation of undisposecl of stocks may justify the view that the closure is due to unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the employer, and attract the application of the proviso notwithstanding the explanation.

V\There an undertaking is closed down on account of persistent losses clue to no fault of the employer or due to accumulation of stocks having regard to persistent unfavourable market conditions, the closure may normally be regarded as clue to unavoidable circumstances beyond the , control of the employer.

By, the explanation, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal which may be called upon to ascertain whether in a given case, the closure was on account of circumstances beyond the control of the employer and whether on that account the employer was entitled to the benefit of the proviso may he restricted.

But it is not provided that in no case of financial difficulty or accumulation of stocks coupled with other circumstances, the closure is to be regarded as due to unavoidable circumstances beyond the control• of the employer.

It is only where the closure is "merely" on account of financial difficulties or accumulation of undisposed of stocks that the closure is not to be deemed due to circumstances beyond the control of the employer.

A state of financial difficulties or accumulation of undisposed of stocks may be temporary, it may be brought about by past mismanagement directly attributable to the employer or may even be deliberately brought about.

The closure on account of financial difficulties or accumulation of undisposed of stocks is accordingly not necessarily the result of unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the employer.

That, in certain events, a statute may impose restrictions which will be irksome and may be so regarded

7-6 SCI/ND/84

Hd!isingh Mfg.

Co. Ltd. v.

Union of India

Shah].

Hatisi11gh M.fff.

( 'o. f./d.

Union of India

Shah J.

by cenain citizens as unreasonable, is not decisive of the question whether it imposes a reasonable restriction. As observed in Mohr!. Hanif Q11mf'shi and Othrrs

v. Thi' Stat!' of Bihar (')by Das, C . .J.:

"In determining that question (the reasonableness of the restriction) the court we conceive, cannot proceed on a general notion of "hat is reasonable in the abstract or even on a consideration of "hat i.s reasonable from the point of view of rhe person or persons on whom the restrictions arc imposed.

The right conferred by sub-cl. (g) is expresser! in general languagc and if there had been no qm.lifyi11g provision like cl. (6), the right so conferred ; rnukl have been an absolute one. To the person "-ho has this right, any rcst:riction will be irksome :rnd may well be regarded by him as unreasonable. But the

question cannot he decided on that basis. \\'hat the court has to do is to consider whether the restrictions imposed are reasonable in the interest of the

gncral public."

Again, as observed in Bijay Cotton Mills Uri. v.

Thi' Sl11fl' of A jmer ('):

"Individual employers might find it difficult to (arry on the business on the basis of the minimum wages fixer! under the Act hut this must he due entirely to the economic conditions of these particular employers.

That cannot be a reason for the striking dmrn the law itself as unreasonable".

By the explanation, certain person., became of

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...

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persistent: losses or accumulation of stocks, find them- -" selves unable to carry on the business, and may still not be entitled to the benefit of the proviso, hut that "'iii not be a gronrnl for holrling th; it the explanation is unreasonable.

The tribunal called upon to decide "hcther the case of an employer is coverecl hv the proviso will certainly be entitled to look into the • causes which led to the financial losses or the accumulation of stocks and ascertain whether the closure was merely on account of financial losses or accumulation of stocks or was on ; iccoum of circumstances beyond the control of the employer, and in assessing whether the '

(1) [1959] s.c.R, 629,

(2) [19.>oJ J s.c.R. 7o2, 7os,

circumstances "'ere beyond the control of the employer, the fact that the employer has suffered financial losses or there is accumulation of stocks is not required by the legislature to be excluded from consideration.

The procedure for enforcement of liability to pa) compensation, prescribed by s. 33( c) of the Act which makes the amounl recover; ible as arrears of land revenue cannot, ex fac£c, be regarded il.S unreasonable

Undoubtedly, under certain State laws, (e.g., the. Bombay Land Revenue Code (Act V of 1879) for failure to pay land revenue, rhe defaulter may be imprisoned; but because of the special mode of recovery prescribed the law imposing a civil liability to pay compensation for termination of employment does not become unreasonable.

On a review of the relevant circumstances we are ol the view that the restrictions imposed. by the impugned provision including the proviso are not unreasonable restrict.ions on the exercise of fundamental right of the

employers to conduct and close their undertakings.

The provision requiring the employers to pay compensation to their employees though restrictive of the fundamental freedom guaranteed by Art. 19(1 )(g) is evidently in the interest of the general public, and is therefore saved by Art. 19(6) of the Constitution from the challenge that it infringes the fundamental right of the employers.

Re. II: Art. 14 of the Constitution is not violated by making by law a distinction betwee.n employers who closed their undertakings on or before November 27, 1956, and those who close their undertakings after that date.

The State is undoubtedly prohibited from denying to any person equality before the law or the equal iro tection of the laws, but by enacting a law which applies generally to all persons who come within its ambit as from the date on which it becomes operative, no discrimination is practised. \\!hen Parliament enacts a law imposing a liability as flowing from certain transactions . prospectively, it evidently makes a distinction between

those transaclions 11hich are covered by the Act and those which are not covered by the Act, because they

Hatisin.h Alfg.

Co. Ltd. v.

Union of India -- ' Shah J.

Halisingh J.lfjg.

Co. Ltd. v.

Union of India

Shah].

were completed before the dale 011 wliich the Act was enacted.

This differentiation, however, does not amount Lo discrimination which is liable Lo be struck clown under Art. 14. The power of the legislature to impose civil liability in respect 0£ transactions completed even before the date on 'd1ich the Act is eHacted does not appear to be restricted. If, as is conceclccland in our judgment rightly-by a statute imposing civil liability in respect of post enactment: transactions, no discrimination is practised, by a statute which imposes liability in respect 0£ t.r; insaction which have taken place after a date fixed by the statute, but before its enactment, it cannot be said that discrimination is practised.

An. 14 strikes at: discrimination in the application 0£ the laws bet"cen persons similarly circumstanced; it docs not strike at a differentiation which may res11lt by the enactment 0£ a law betwee11 transacticms governed thereby and those which are not governed thereby.

If the argument that discrimination results when by statute a civil liability is imposed upon tramact ions which were otherwise not subject to such liability be accepted, every law which imposes civil liability will be liable to be struck down under Art. 14 even if it comes into operation on the date on which it is passed, because immediately on its coming into operation, discrimination will arise between transactions which will be covered by the law after its coming into force and transactions before the law came into force which "'ill not naturally be hit by it.

If a statute creating a civil liability which is strictly prospective is not hit by Art:. l4, a law "hich imposes liability on transactions which have taken place before the date on which it was enacted, cannot also be hit by An. 14.

By bringing "ithin its fold transactions before rhc elate of its enactment, in truth, the date or the application of the Act is related back to a period anterior to the date on which the Act was enacted.

Re. Ill: For reasons already set out:, payment of compensation and wages in lieu of notice under the impuf(nccl section are not made conditions precedent to effective

. - ..

...

termination of employment.

The section only creates a right in the employees; it does not enjoin the employers to do anything before closure.

Section 31 (2) of the Act which imposes penal liability for contravention of the provisions of the Act can therefore have no application to failure to make payment of compensation and wages for the period of notice under s. 25FFF(l). The amending Act was, it is true, passed in June, 1957, and liability to pay compensation arises in respect of all undertakings dosed on or after November 26, 1956. But, if liability to pay compensation is. not a condition precedent to closures, by failing to discharge the liability to pay compensation and wages in lieu of notice, the employer does not contravene s. 25FFF( 1 ). A statute may prohibit or command an act and in either case, disobedience thereof will amount to contravention of the statute. lf the statute fixes criminal liability for contravention of the prohibition or the command which is made applicable to transactions which have taken place before the date of its enactment the protection of Art. 20(1) may be attracted.

But s. 25FFF(l) imposes neither a prohibition nor a command. Under s. 25F, there is a distinct prohibition against an employer against retrenching employees without fulfilling certain conditions. Similar prohibitions are found in ss. 22 and 23 of the Act. If this prohibition is infringed, evidently, criminal liability may arise. But there being no prohibition against closure of business without payment of compensation, s. 31(2) does not apply.

Bys. :J3(c), liability to pay compensation may be enforced by coercive process, but that again doe~ not amount to infringement of Art. 20( I) of the Constitution.

Undoubtedly for failure ro discharge liability to pay compensation, a person may be imprisoned, under the statute providing for recovery of the amount, e.g., the Bombay Land Revenue Code, but failure to discharge a civil liability is not unless the statute expressly so provides, an offence.

The protection of Art. 20(1) avails only against punishment for :rn act which is tre;:itcd ;:is ;:in offence. which when rlone w;:is not an offence.

Hatisingh lvlfg.

Co. Lt<(.

Union of Iudia

Shah J.

196U

J-Ialisi11gh .1.\lfg.

Co. Lid. v.

Union of India

196U

April 18.

SUPRE.\1E COURT REPORTS [1960]

ln our view, the impugned s. ~.'iFFF(I) indudiug the proviso and the explanation thereto are not 1111constillltional as infringing the freedom guaranteed by Art. 19(l)(g) of the Constitution or as infringing Arts. 14 or 20 of the Constitution. On that. view, the petitions fail and are dismissed "ith costs.

There will univ be one hearing fee. '

Pe!.ilions dis111issed..

QAMAR SHAFFI TYABJI

THE COi\li\JlSSlONER, EXCESS PROFITS TAX,

HYDERABAD

(S. K. DAs, J. L. KAPCR and 1\I. 1-lmAYATCLLMI, Jj.)

Excess Profits Tax-Managing Agency and Selling Agency agreements-Construction-Delegation of Agency-Delegate, whether agent or employee-Remuneration and commission derived by such delegate-Liability to tax-Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), s. 194.

By an order of the Ruler of the erstwhile State of Hyderabad an institution was formed for the development of industries on behalf of the Government, called the Industrial Trust Fund, to be managed by a committee called Trustees.

In 1934 the Trustees entered into agreements with two cotton mills situated in the

State by virtue of which they were appointed secretaries, treasurers and agents of the said mills.

They were gi , en the general inanagement of the mills including the power to appoint employees and were also appointed selling agents of the mills.

By separate agreements the Trustees were -given power to delegate to other persons all or any of the powers under the agreements subject to the approval of the Board of Directors of the respective mills.

On December 6, 1938, the Trustes entered into an agreement with the appellant whereby they delegated their powers in his favour and appointed him as the managing agent of their business as secretaries, treasurers and agents, as also selling agent of the two mills, subject to their general control.

The appellant was to hold the office of managing agent and selling agent for the remaining period of the original' managing agency and. selling agency agreements.

The remuneration of the appellant for the managing agency was fixed at Rs. 2,000 per month and a commission of 21 per cent. out of the commission of 121per cent. per annum on the annual profits payable to the Trustees.

For the selling agency a separate commission was payable on the sale of different kinds of goods.

Clause 9 of the agreement provided

. .

Vira Vala Surag Vala

s. 1

UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

B. P. SINHA

JAFER IMAM

A. K. SARKAR

C. SHAH, JJ.

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

s. 25F

Constitution of India

Arts. 19

s. 25F

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

Art. 19(l)(g)

November 27, 1956

Art. 20( 1)

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

Arts. 19(l)(g), 14

Hatisingh Mfg

Art. 19( 1 )(g)

Art. 19(6)

Indio

[1960] 2 S.C.R. 32

Hatisingh Afjg

(1955] 1 S.C.R. 752

Art. 14

s. 31(1)

s. 31(2)

Article 20(1)

Article 3

Constitution of India

G. S. Pathak

I. M. Nariavati

S. N. Andley

B.

Dadaclwnji

Rameshwar Nath

P. L. Vohra

I. M. Nmwvati

B. Sen

B. K. B. Naidu

J. N.

M. C. Setalvad

C. K.

DajJ

B. R. L. Iyengar

R. H. Dhe!J11r

C. K. DajJ!ttary

N. S.

Bindra

ananlan Sharma

P. A. Melita

G. GojJalahrishnan

SHAH

s. 25F

Industrial Disputes Act

April 27, 1957

Bombay

Central Government

April 28, 1957

February 10, 1957

February l, 19.57

April 24, 1957

s. 2S

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

Hatisingh Mfg. ro. Ltd.

Union of India

ss. 2

s. 2

s. 2

s. 2(po)

s. 2

Industrial Disputes Act, 1047

President of India

April 27, 19il7

VA of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

June 6, 1957

November 28, 1956

Section 2S

s. 2

Art. 19( I )(g)

Art. 14

Art. 20

Section 25F

s. 2

s. 2

s. 2

s. 25F

s. 20F

s. 2

s. 2

s. 2

s. 2

s. 25F

s. 25F

s. 25F

s. 25F

Art. 19(1 )(g)

cl. 8

Art. 19

Art. 19(1 )(g)

November 27, 1958

s. 25F

s. 25F

s. 25F

Tlariprasad

Hariprasad

November, 27, 1968

s. 2

s. 2C

s. 2

s. 25F

Shah

Das

s. 33( c)

Bombay Land Revenue Code

Art. 19(1 )(g)

Art. 19(6)

Art. 14

Art. 14

Art. 14

Section 31

s. 25F

November 26, 1956

s. 25F

Art. 20(1)

s. 25F

s. 25F

ss. 22 and 23

s. 31(2)

Art. 20( I)

Art. 20(1)

Art. 19(l)(g)

Arts. 14

QAMAR SHAFFI TYABJI

S. K. DAs

J. L. KAPCR

lmAYATCLLMI

s. 194

Hyderabad

December 6, 1938

Clause 9