February, 9

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960 (2)]

M/S. KUNDAN SUGAR MILLS

ZIYAUDDIN AND OTHERS. (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SUBJlA RAO, AND K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.) Industrial Dispute-Rights of employer lo transfer a wor/mian- If implicit in every contract of service.

The General Manager of the appellant Mills ordered the transfer of four workmen from the appellant mill to a new mill, which had been purchased subsequently. The only connection between the two mills was the identity of ownership and, but for it, one had nothing to do with the other. The concerned workmen protested to.the said order of transfer and did .not acceed to the request, thereupon they were served with notice for disobedience of standing orders and were called upon for explanation which the workmen did and thereafter they were dismissed from service.

The Labour Appellate Tribunal found that the management had no right to transfer the workmen to the new factory and therefore the order dismissing them was illegal. The appellants came up by special leave before the Supreme Court and contended that the right to transfer an employee by an employer from one of his concerns to another is implicit in every contract of service. The question is \Vhether a person employed in a factory can be transferred to some other independent concern started by the same employer at a stage subsequent to the date of the employment.

Held, that apart from any statutory provision, the right of an employee and an employer are governed by the terms of contracts between them or by the terms necessarily implied therefrom; but in the absence of an express agreement between the employer and employees it cannot necessarily be implied that the employer has the right to transfer the employee to any of its concerns in any place, and that the employee has a duty to join the concern to which he may be transferred.

In the instant case, it was not a condition of service of employment of the concerned workmen either express or implied that the employer had the right to transfer them to a new concern started by the employer subsequent to the date of the employment.

Alexandre Bouzourou v, The Ottoman Bank, A.LR. 1930 P.C. nS, Mary (Anamalai :Plantation Workers' Union) v. Selaliparai Estate, (1956) I.L.L.J. 243 and Bata Shoe Company, Ltd v. Ali Hasan, (1956) I.L.L.J. 278, discussed.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 136 of 1958.

Appeal by special leave from the decision dated April 30, 1956, of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India at Lucknow in Appeal No. III-45 of 1956,

ansmg out of the award dated February 6, 1956 of the State Indmitrial Tribunal, Allahabad, in reference No. 96of1955.

Ram Lal Anand, J.M. Lal and S. S. Sulcla, for the appellants.

B. D. Sharma, for respondents Nos. 1to5.

O.P. Lal and G. N. Dikshit, for respondent No. 6.

1960. February 9.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered dy

SuBBA RAO, J.-This is an appeal by special leave against the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India setting aside the award of the Industrial Tribunal, Allahabad, and directing the re-instatement of the workers in Kundan Sugar Mills at Amroha. " Kundan Sugar Mills" is a partnership concern and owns a sugar mill at Amroha. The respondents 1 to 4 were employed by the appellant as seasonal masons in the year 1946. In 1951 the partners of the appellant-Mills purchased the building machinery and other equipment of another sugar mill at Kiccha' in the district of Nainital. They closed the said mill at Kiccha and started it at Bulandshahr.

The new factory was named Pannijee Sugar & General Mills, Bulandshahr. On January 19, 1955, the General Manager of the appellant-Mills ordered the transfer of the respondents 1 to 4 from the appellant-Mills to the new mill at Bulandshahr. The said respondents through their representative, the fifth respondent, protested to the General Manager against the said transfer. But the General Manager, by his letter dated January 22/24, 1955, insisted upon their joining the new mill at Bulandshahr. But the said respondents did not accede to his request. On

January 28, 1955, the General Manager served a notice on the respondents 1 to 4 stating that they had disobeyed his orders and thereby committed misconduct under Standing Order No. L(a). They were asked to submit their explanation as to why action should not be taken against them unaer the Standing Order.

The Labour Union, by its letter dated January 31, 1955, denied t.he charges. On February 2, 1955, the General Manager made an order dismissing the respondents 1 to 4 from service on the ground that

K11ndan Sugar

Mills v.

Ziyauddin

S11bba Rao J.

J(undan Sugar

JI/I ills

Ziyauddin

Subba Rao].

they had disobeyed his order of transfer and thns they were guilty of misconduct under Standing Orde1 No. LI(a). The Labour Union there(1fter rnisecl an industrial dispute and the Government of U.P. by its notification dated November 7, 1955, referred the following issue for decision to the State Industrial Tribunal for U. P. at Allahabad:

"Whether the employers have wrongfully and/or unjustifiably terminated the services of Sarv(1 Shri Zia Uddin, Raisuddin, Shafiqnddin and Ahmed Bt1x for refusal to obey the orders of tranfer to M/s.

Pannijee Sugar and General_ Mills Co., Bufandshahr.

If so, to wh(], t relief are the workmen entitled." The State Industrial Tribunal by its order d(], ted February 6, 1956, made its award holding that the management was within its rights and that, as the respondents l to 4 had disobeyed the order of the management, they were properly dismissed by the management. The said respondents through their Union, respondent No. 51 perferred an appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India and the said Appellate Tribunal held that the management had no right to transfer the respondents 1 to 4 to the new factory and therefore the order dismissing them was illegal. The management has preferred the present appeal against the said order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal.

Learned counsel for the appellnnt raised before us the following two questions: (1) The right to transfer an employee by an employer from one of his concern& to another is implicit in every contract of service;

(2) the State Industrial Tribunal having held that both the concerns, i.e., the mills nt Amroha and the mills nt Bulandshahr, forri1ed one unit, the Appellate Tribunal had no juridiction to set aside that finding under s. 7(1) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950.

To appreciate the first contention, it is necessary to notice the undisputed facts in this case. It is true that the partners of the Sugar Mills at Amroha own also the Sugar Mills at Bulandshahr; but they were proprietors of the former Mills in 1946 whereas they purchased the latter mills only in the year 1951 and

S.C.R.

SUPREME OOUR'r B, EPORTS 921

started the same in Bulandshahr in or about 1955.

The respondents l to 4 were employed by the owners of the appellant-Mills at the Sugar Mills at 'Amroha at a time when they were not proprietors of the Sugar Mills at Bulandshahr. It is conceded that it was not an express term of the contract of service between the appellant and the respondents 1 to 4 that the latter should serve in any future concerns which the appellant might acquire or start. lt is also in evidence that though the same persons owned both the Mills they were two different concerns. In the words of the Appellate Tribunal, the only connection between the two is in the identity of ownership and, but for it, one has nothing to do with the other. It is also in evidence that an imported workman at Amroha is entitled to house-rent, fuel, lht and travelling expenses both ways, while at l3ulandshahr the workmen are not entitled to any of these amenities. The workmen at Amroha are entitled to benefits under the Kaul Award while those at Bulandshahr are not so entitled.

The General Manager~ E.W.l, in his evidence stated that "the interim bonus of the Bulandshahr factory as ordered by the Government in November 1955 was Rs. 11,000 while for Amroha

it, was nearly li lacs". He also stated that "the bonus for last year at Amroha would be probably equal to li months' wages and at Bulandshahr equal to about 4 or 5 days' wages." It is also in evidence that apart from the disparity in the payment of bonus, the accounts are separately made up tor the two mills. lt is clear that the two mills arc situated at different places with accounts separately maintained and governed by different service conditions, though they happened to be under the common management; therefore, they are treated as two different entities.

The question of law raised in this case must be considered in relation to the said facts. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the right to transfer is implicit in every contract of service is too wide the mark. Apart frorn any statutory provision, the rights of an employer and an employee are governed by the terms of contracts between them or by the terms necessarily implied therefrom. It fo

.,..

Kundan Sugar

Mills v.

Ziyauddin

Subba Rao ].

conceded that there is no express agreement between

Kundan Sugar the appellant and the respondents w hereunder the Mitts appellant has the right to transfer the respondents to

v, Zi) auddin any of its concerns in any place and the respondents the duty to join the concerns to which they may be transferred. If so, can it be said that such a term 1has Subba Rao f. to be necessarily implied between the parties? When the respondents I to 4were employed by the appellant, the latter was running only one factbry at Amroha. . There is nothing on record to indicate that at that time it was intended to purchase factories at other places or to extend its activities in the same line at different places. It is also not suggested that even if the appellant had had such an intention, the respondents I to 4 had knowledge of the same. Under such circumstances, without more, it would not be right to imply any such term between the contracting parties when the idea of starting new factories at different places was not in contemplation. Ordinarily the employees would have agreed only to serve in the factory then in existence and the employer would have employed them only in respect of that factory.

The matter does not stop there. In the instant case, as we have indicated, the two factories are distinct entities, situated at different places and, to import a term conferring a right on the employer to transfer respondents I to 4 to a different concern is really to make a new contract between them.

The decisions. cited at the Bar do not in the least sustain the appellant's broad contention. In Alexandre Bouzourou v. The Ottoman Bank (1) the appellant was an employee of the respondent-bank. The bank transferred him from one branch to another branch of the bank situated in different towns.

As he refused to comply with the order of transfer, he was dismissed.

Thereafter, he filed a suit to recover damages from the bank for wrongful dismissal. It was argued before the Judicial Committee that under the terms of his contract of service the sphere of his employment included only the head office and not the branches of the bank. The evidence in that case showed that tvansfer was one of the ordinary incidents of the . bank's employment, being usually concurrent with an (I) A.1.R. [1930] P.C, l!8, 119 •

-..

increase of salary and responsibility, and suggested no more than that the bank considered their officials' convenience where possible. Indeed the appellant therein did not even suggest in his correspondence that the transfer was a breach of his contract. On these circumstances the Judicial Committee observed as follows at p. 119 :

"From the point of view of proper organization of their staff, it is difficult to assume that the Bank would willingly agree that their employees should not be bound to serve outside the place where the contract was made except with their consent, and, in their Lordships' opinion such a condition of the contract would require to be clearly established.'.' The essential distinction between that case and the present one is that there the bank with its branches was one unit and the records clearly indicated that transfer was one of the ordinary incidents of service in the Bank. In such circumi; itances when a person joined such a service, the Privy Council found it easy to imply a term of transfer. That decision is therefore

- not of any relevancy to the present case. In Mary (Anamalai Plantation Workers' Union) v. Selaliparai estate (2), labour was recruited in the plantations without any differentiation being made between factory and field workers and it had been the common practice prevailing for several years to transfer the factory workers to the field and vice-versa, according to the exigencies of work. A worker who had been appointed in such a plantation was transferred, owing to mechanisation in the factory, from the factory to the field.

The Labour Appellate Tribunal of India held tha.t in the circumstances of the case the liability to be so transferred must be deemed to be an implied condition of service. So too in Bata Shoe Company, Ltd. v. Ali Hasan (Industrial Tribunal, Patna & Ors.)

( 3) transfer of an employee in the circumstances of that case from one post to another was held not to be an alteration of any service condition within the meaning of s. 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act. That was a case of a management employing a worker in one concern and transferring him from one post to

(2) [r956] I.L.L.J. 343

(3) [1956] I L.L.J. 278.

Kundan Suga•

Milts

Ziyauddin

Subba Rao J.

Kundan Sugar

Mills v.

Ziyauddin

Subba Rao].

another. In such a case it was possible to imply the condition of right of the management to transfer the employee from one post to another. S. N. Mukherjee

v. Kemp & Go. Ltd. (') was a case arising out of s. 23 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950.

The complaint there was that an employee was transferred by the management with a view to victimize him and that it amounted to alteration in the conditions of employment. It was held that if an employer employed a person it was implicit in the appointment that he could be transferred to any place where the business of the employer in the same line was situated, unless there was an express condition to the contrary in the contract of employment. In that case the worker was employed by Kemp & Co., Limited, which had branches in different places. The decision assumed that the business was one unit and that the only question raised was that he should not be transferred to a place different from the place where he was actually discharging his duties. These observations must be limited to the facts of that case.

It is not necessary to multiply the citation, for the other decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant pursue the same reasoning followed in the aforesaid cases.

We have referred to the decisions only to distinguish them from the present case, and not to express our opinion as to the correctness of the decisions therein.

It would be enough to point out that in all the said decisions the workers had been employed in a business or a concern and the question that arose was whether in the circumstances of each case the transfer from one branch to another was valid or amounted to victimization. None of these decisions deals with a case similar to that presented in this appeal, namely, whether a person employed in a factory can be transferred to some other independent concern started by the same employer at a stage subsequent to the date of his employment. None of these cases holds, as it is suggested by the learned counsel .for the appellant, that every employer has the inherent right to transfer his employee to another place where ho chooses to start

(4) [1954] L.A:c. 903

' •

S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT RE!)ORTS 925

a bu::; iness subsequent to the date of the employmE>nt.

We, therefore, hold that it was not a conditioll of service of employment of the respondents either express or implied that the employer has the right to transfer them to a new concern stared by him subsequent to the date of their employment.

The respondents also relied upon a Government Order No. 6122 (ST)/XXXVI-A-640(8)-T-1953 in support of their contention that the order of transfer was bad. By this Order the Government of U. P. had directed that the employment of seasonal workmen in all vacuum pan sugar factories in the Uttar Pradesh should be governed by the rules contained in the atinexure thereto. Rule 1 in the said annexure is to the following effect :

"A worker who has worked or but for illness or any other unavoidable cause would have worked in a factory during the whole of the second half of the last preceding season will be employed in this season in such factory." This rule has no relevancy to the question raised in the present case.

This rule only enjoins upon an employer to employ a worker in the circumstances mentioned therein in the same factory in which he was working in the previous season during the next season also. This does not prevent the employer to transfer an employee if he has the right to do so under the contract of service or under any statutory provisions.

We have already held that the employer in the present case has no such right.

Lastly it is said that the Appellate Tribunal had no jurisdiction to set aside the finding of the State Industrial Tribunal, as it did not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of s. 7(1) of the Industrial Disputes {Appellate Tribunal) Act,

1950. The question raised was one of law, namely, whether the appellant had the right to transfer the respondents 1 to 4 from one concern to another. A substantial question of law involved between the parties and that raised also an important principle governing the right of an employer to transfer his employees from one concern to another of his in the circumstances of this case.

We, therefore, hold that

Kundan Sugar

Mills v.

Ziyauddin

Subba Rao ].

J(undan Sugar Mills v.

Ziyauddin

Subba Rao J.

February, 9

a substantial question of law arose in the case and that it was 1voll within the powers of the Labour Appellate Tribunal to entertain the appeal.

In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed.

S.S. LIGHT RAIL\VAY CO., LTD. v.

UPPERDOAB SUGAR MILLS LTD. & ANOTHER

(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SuBBA RAo and K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ).

Railway Rates-Terminal charges fied by Government-When leviable-Railway Rates Tribunal-Jurisdiction of-Indian Railways Act, I890 (IX of I890). SS, 3 (I4) 32 and 4I.

In pursuance of s. 32 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 (IX of 1890), the Central Government had by means of a notification, fixed certain rates of terminal charges for loading and unloading goods carried from one station to another by Railway. Inspite of this notification the appellant Railway Company did not levy any terminal charges in accordance with those rates up to a certain point of time and continued to charge at a rate which \Vas

- then prevalent and in \vhich no terminal charges \Vere included.

Subsequently, however, the Railway Company issued a Local Rates Advice by which terminal charges were added to the prevalent rates with the result that the total charges payable to the Railway by the respondent mills rose considerably. It was for relief against this increase that the mills made a complaint under s. 41 (r) (i) of the Indian Railways Act to Railway Rates Tribunal.

The contention of the Railway Company, inter alia, was that as in increasing the charges the .Administration had merely applied standardised terminal charges as notified by the Central Government no complaint could be made in respect thereof under s. 41

(r) (i).

The Tribunal by a majority held that this was not a case ot application ot a standardised terminal charge and so it had jurisdiction to consider the question, and they ordered a reduction of terminal charges from the total charges. On appeal by the Railway, Held, that the Railway Rates Tribunal had no jurisdiction either to investigate the reasonableness or otherwise of terminal charges levied by the Railway or to reduce the same.

The charges sought to be levied by the Railway Administration were " terminal charges" within the meaning of the

M/S. KUNDAN SUGAR MILLS

OTHERS. (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR

K. SUBJlA RAO

K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ.

Supreme Court

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Ram Lal Anand

J.M. Lal

S. S. Sulcla

B. D. Sharma

O.P. Lal

G. N. Dikshit

SuBBA RAO

Kundan Sugar Mills

Amroha

Kundan Sugar Mills

Kiccha

Nainital

Bulandshahr

January 19, 1955

January 22/24, 1955

January 28, 1955

February 2, 1955

Government of U.P.

November 7, 1955

Zia Uddin

Raisuddin

Shafiqnddin

Ahmed Bt1x

February 6, 1956

Labour Appellate Tribunal of India

s. 7(1)

Subba Rao

tvansfer

s. 33

Industrial Disputes Act

Kundan Suga•

Subba Rao

S. N. Mukherjee

s. 23

Kemp & Co., Limited

Government of U. P.

Uttar Pradesh

s. 7(1)

K. SuBBA RAo

Railways Act

s. 32

Indian Railways Act, 1890

Central Government

s. 41

Railways Act

Railway Rates Tribunal

s. 41


J(undan Sugar Mills v.

Ziyauddin

Subba Rao J.

February, 9

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960 (2)]

a substantial question of law arose in the case and that it was 1voll within the powers of the Labour Appellate Tribunal to entertain the appeal.

In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed.

S.S. LIGHT RAIL\VAY CO., LTD. v.

UPPERDOAB SUGAR MILLS LTD. & ANOTHER

(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SuBBA RAo and K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ).

Railway Rates-Terminal charges fied by Government-When leviable-Railway Rates Tribunal-Jurisdiction of-Indian Railways Act, I890 (IX of I890). SS, 3 (I4) 32 and 4I.

In pursuance of s. 32 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 (IX of 1890), the Central Government had by means of a notification, fixed certain rates of terminal charges for loading and unloading goods carried from one station to another by Railway. Inspite of this notification the appellant Railway Company did not levy any terminal charges in accordance with those rates up to a certain point of time and continued to charge at a rate which \Vas

- then prevalent and in \vhich no terminal charges \Vere included.

Subsequently, however, the Railway Company issued a Local Rates Advice by which terminal charges were added to the prevalent rates with the result that the total charges payable to the Railway by the respondent mills rose considerably. It was for relief against this increase that the mills made a complaint under s. 41 (r) (i) of the Indian Railways Act to Railway Rates Tribunal.

The contention of the Railway Company, inter alia, was that as in increasing the charges the .Administration had merely applied standardised terminal charges as notified by the Central Government no complaint could be made in respect thereof under s. 41

(r) (i).

The Tribunal by a majority held that this was not a case ot application ot a standardised terminal charge and so it had jurisdiction to consider the question, and they ordered a reduction of terminal charges from the total charges. On appeal by the Railway, Held, that the Railway Rates Tribunal had no jurisdiction either to investigate the reasonableness or otherwise of terminal charges levied by the Railway or to reduce the same.

The charges sought to be levied by the Railway Administration were " terminal charges" within the meaning of the

....

....

Railways Act, and the proposed levy being in accordance -with r960 the Government notification under s. 32 of the Act was nothing more than the application of standardised terminal charges.

S. s. Light Irrespective of the fact of the actual user by any particular Railway Co. Ltd. consignor of the stations, sidings and other things mentioned in v. s. 3 (14) of the Railways Act, " terminal charges" were leviable Upper Doab Sugar by reason of the mere fact that these things had been provided Mills Ltd. for by the Railway Administration.

Hall & Co. v. London Brighton and South Coast Railway, Co., (I885) IS Q. B. D. 505, considered.

CIVIL APPELATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 347of1955.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated April 20, 1955, of the Railway Rates Tribunal, Madras, in Complaint No. 2of1954.

H. N. Sany<; tl Additional Solicitor General of India, Niren De. P. C. Chatterjee and P. K. Ghosh, for the appellant.

N. C. Chatterjee, J.P. Aggarwalla, B. K. B. Naidu and I. N. Shroff, for respondent No. 1.

B. K. Khanna and R. H. Dhebar, for respondent No.2.

1960. February 9.

Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DAS GUPTA, J.-When total char:ges payable in res- Das Gupta J. pect of goods traffic carried by a Railway are increased by the Railway Administration on the basis of terminals fixed by the Central Government in pursuance of s. 32 of the Indian Railways Act, has the Railway Rates Tribunal jurisdiction to investigate the reasonableness of the charge as thus increased ? That is the question raised in this appeal. The first respondent, the Upper Doab Sugar Mills Ltd., manufactures sugar in its Mills situated at Shamli. The sugarcane needed as its raw material has to be brought by the Company from different places in the neighbourhood. It is in this connection that the appellant- Railway Company's services are required.

The Railway Company carries the sugarcane in trucks from several stations on its line, to Shamli. As the Mills premises are situated a short distance away from the station platform the Mills had at the very time when it started functioning, a siding agreement with the Rly., Company so that the trucks carrying the

z960 sugarcane are ultimately brought into the Mills siding . from where the unloading takes place. The nearest s. s. Light point of the Mills siding from the station platform at Railway Co. Lid. Shamli is about 100 to 150 ft. away. The Rly. locoupper n:b sugar motives bring the sugarcane trucks to this point-pt.

Miu, Ltd.

A in the Plan-after which the Mills makes its own arrangement for taking them inside the sidings. After Da; Gupta J. several increases from time to time which it is not necessary to mention, the charges payable in respect of sugarcane carried in the Railway Company's trucks and brought by the Railway Company's locomotives up to the point A stood on September 30, 1953, at the following figures :- Rs.

Ans.

Ps.

From Ail um 3 8 Kandhla 3 8 Khandraoli 3 8 Hind 3 8 Thanabhawan 3 8 Nanautta 4 ·!

Sona Arjunpur 4 4 In each case a surcharge of annas 2 per rupee was added.

Before this, however, on February 20, 1950, the Central Govt., had made an order under s. 32 of the Indian Railways Act, the relevant portion of which is in these words:-

" In pursuance of section 32 of the Indian Rlys.

Act, 1890 (IX of 1890) the Central Government is pleased to fix the following rates of terminals, transhipment, short distance, percentage on value and percent[tge on excess value charges, namely :- 1.

TERMINAL CHARGES.

(a) Goods Traffic

(i) General Merchandise Eight pies per maund at each end where the railway is required to do loading and unloading.

Six pies per maund at each end, where the owners of the goods are required to do loading and unloading ...... ". ·

In §lpite of this however the Railway Company did

I960 not levy any terminal charges in accordance with s. s. Light this rate up to September, 1953 and continued to Railway co. Ltd. charge at the rate mentioned above. v.

On August 1, 1953 the Railway Company issued a upper Doab'Sugar Local Rate Advice the relevant portion of which was Mills Ltd. in these ternis :-

"With effect from 1-10-53 the following station to station rates will be introduced and will remain in force till further advice :-

Commodity From To Rate Sugarcane Ailuin Shamli Rs. 2·6 'plus terminal Rs. 9.6 Khandla do 2·6 do Khandraoli do 1·12 do Hind do r12 do Thanabhawan do 3·2 do Harar Siding do 3·2 do Nanautta do 3·15 do Sona Arjunpur do 4n do The consequence of this was that with effect from October 1953 the total charges payable by the Mills rose considerably. From Rs. 3·8 formerly payable in respect of sugarcane carried from Ailum, Khandla, Khandraoli, Hind, Thanabhawan, the rate now payable became Rs. U 12, Rs. U 12, Rs. U 2, Rs. U 2

and Rs. 12·8 respectively while for sugarcane carried from Nanautta and Sona Arjunpur, the amount now payable was Rs. 13'5 and Rs. 14·1 in place of Rs. 4·4 and Rs. 4·4 payable prior to October 1, 1953. It was for relief against this increase that the Mills made a complaint under s. 41(1) (i) of the Indian Railways Act to the Railway Rates Tribunal. Relief in respect of certain other matters like rates on molasses, increase in siding charges, rates on coal, gunnies, limestone, firewood etc., and rates on sugar was also asked for; but later all these prayers having been withdrawn at the hearing before the Tribunal. The Tribunal bad to deal only with the Mills' complaint as regards this increase in charges in respect of sugarcane.

The main contention raised on behalf of the Railway Company was that as in increasing the charges the Administration had merely applied standardized terminal charges no complaint lay in respect of the

Das Gupta J.

z96o same under section 4l(l)(i). The Railway Company

5 L. h also further contended in this connection that con-

Roil~:; ~:. td. siderable services, apart from the carriage of the goods, v. were rendered by the Company at each end and so, upper Doab Sugar in any case, the terminal charges as standardized by Mills Ltd. notification by the Central Governmen~ were legally levied. The Tribunal by a majority held that this Das Gupta ]. f l" f d d d was not a case o app 1cat10n o a stan ar ize terminal charge and so it had jurisdiction to consider the question. Shri L.M. Roy and Shri V. Subrahmanyan who formed the majority were of opinion that services were rendered only at the loading station, and not at Shamli; so only Rs. 4 11 annas out of the terminal charge of Rs. 9·6 was reasonable and only this amount could be levied on sugarcane in addition to the conveyan<Je charges from the forwarding station. They ordered a reduction of terminal charge from Rs. 9·6 to Hs. 4·11.

The President of the Tribunal Mr. Lokur, forming the minority, was of opinion that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to consider the question of reasonableness. He was also of opinion that terminal services were rendered by the respondent Railways both at the loading station and also after the carriage was complete at Shamli.

In our opinion, the Tribunal (by which we mean the majority of the Tribunal) was wrong in thinking that this was not a case of standardized terminal charges.

The first argument which seems 1.o have found favour with the majority and which was repeated here on behalf of the respondent was that while the Government Notification fixed a terminal cha.rge of 6 pies per maund at each end, where loading and unloading is done by the owner, as -in the present case, the Railway Company fixed Rs. 9·6 per 4 wheeler as the terminal charge for the two ends together irrespective of the maundage carried. It is obvious that the charge of R.s. 9.6 is equivalent to charge of one anna, the total of 6 pies at each end, per maund on 11"0 mds. It is urged that it may very well happen that some trucks will carry more than 150 mds. and some less.

The fixation of such a lump sum of Rs. 9·6 is, it is contended, not an application of the charges fixed by the Government, but quite a distinct arrangement. In

( ..

- -<

S.C.R,

SUPREME COUHT REPORTS 931

our opinion there is no substance. in this contention. It r960 does not appear to be disputed that on an average 200 5 5 L. ht rods. are carried in each 4 wheeler truck. Exhibit A-6 Rail~~.; d:. Ltd. shows a number of bills for charges for the period v.

February, 1953 to F8bruary 10, 1953, for sugarcane upper Doab Sugar carried from these stations to Shamli. 'I'he number Mills Ltd. of trucks for each consignment is mentioned as also the Das Gupta 1. weight carried. In each case we find 200 mds. mentioned as the weight. It is obvious and indeed undisputed that this statement of 200 rods. as the weight is not made on actual weighment but is mentioned on the weight carried on the basis of capacity. As regards the rate for carriage, it is common ground that charge is made per truck and not according to maunclage. It also appears to be common ground that this charge is actually calculated on the basis of 150 rods. per truck.

We are unable to agree that when the Central Government fixed the charge at so much per round it was intended that before any such charge could be levied the actual weight should be ascertained by actual weighment. There is nothing to prevent the Railway Company and the consignor from entering into an agreement as to what should be accepted as weight without actual weighment. Once such a fixation is agreed upon, the amount calculated on that figure at the rate fixed by Government must be deemed to be the amount properly payable in accordance with the rate fixed by Government. The fact that in some cases less than 150 rods. may be carried in a truck and in other cases more. than 150 .mds. may be carried does not affect the position that the party who is to pay and the party who is entitled to payment have accepted a particular figure as the weight carried, without actual weighment. When therefore Rs. 9·6 is sought to be levied as the terminal charge being equivalent to 6 pice per maund on 150 rods. at each end, it .is really an application of the charge fixed by the Central Government.

Nor are we impressed with the argument that the words used in the Local Ra.te Advice of August 1, 1953, which has been set out above show that a standardized terminal charge was not being levied but some other rate is sought to be levied. It is no

.z960 doubt true that this Advice quotes "station to station s. s. Light rate" -the amount being then mentioned in two Railway Co. Ltd. parts, one obviously the rate for carriage, and the

v. second the terminal charge. In fact the words "plus Uppe~; a~ ugar terminal charge ,,- are actually mentioned. The Rail-

' '

• way Act has made a clear distinction between the rate Das Gupta J. and terminal charge. The word "rate " is defined in s. 3(13) as including "any fare, charge or other J?ayment for the carriage of any passenger, animals or goods; the word "terminals" is defined in clause 14 of the same section as including " charges in respect of stations, sidings, wharves, depots, .warehouses, cranes and other similar matters, and of any services, rendered thereat."The word "station to station rate" is defined ins. 460 (g) as meaning" a special reduced rate applicable to a specific commodity booked between two specified stations." The same section also defines "class rate" and " schedule rate." .The first being defined as " rate fixed according to the class given to a commodity in the classification of goods and the second as " the rate lower than the maximum or class rate applied on a commodity basis." We can see no reason for not interpreting the word "rate " used in this section, (460), as being "any fare charges or other payment for the carriage of any passenger, animals or goods " as defined in s. 3(13).

Thus interpreted "station to station rate" in respect of goods will mean only a charge payable for carriage of goods as may be made specially applicable to a specific commodity booked between two specified stations for the carriage of the same. This would not include any charge made in addition to the charge for carriage. It must therefore be held that the words of the Local Advice Order stating the new station to station rate as so much plus "so much for terminal charge" are not strictly accurate. The proper way of giving information to parties concerned would be to state the station to station rate as consisting of the amount mentioned in the first party only-the charge for carriage-and to make a separate announcement as regards terminal charge. This inaccuracy in expression cannot however affect the substance of the matter. The fact that the terminal charge was mentioned as a part of the station

to station rate is no reason to think that standardized

I960 terminal charges were not being applied. s. s. Light More important is the argument that the Central Gov- Railway co Ltd. ernment Notification fixing 6 pies per maund as the v. terminal charge at each end, where loading and upper Doab Sugar

unloading is done by the owner, should be interpreted Mills Ltd. as permitting the levy of such charges only if some Das Gupta J. service in addition to the carriage is being performed.

This argument is based on a view of the definition of the word "terminals" in s. 3(14) that " terminals" means charges for certain services rendered. Acceptance of that view will undoubtedly justify a conclusion that in fixing "terminals" the Central Government only authorized the charges to be levied, on certain services in addition to carriage having been rendered.

If thereafter it is found that no such services were rendered the conclusion that will follow is that levying of a charge at the end where no such services were rendered was not levying of a "standardized terminal

charge."

Assuming for the present, that on a proper interpretation of the definition of the word "terminals", no terminal charge can be made unless some service in addition to the carriage of the goods is rendered, it is necessary to see whether the conclusion of two members of the Tribunal who formed the majority was correct in so far as they held that no such service was performed at the Shamli end. It is important to bear in mind that in so far as such a conclusion is a pure finding of fact this Court will not ordinarily interfere therewith. If however the conclusion is apparently vitiated by an error of law it becomes proper and desirable for this Court to consider what the correct finding would be on a correct appreciation of law.

Both Shri L.M. Roy and Shri Subrahmanian proceeded on the basis that " the loaded cane specials are taken to point A in the map and then pushed inside, leaving them at the assisted siding. It is here that the

onveyance ends and the terminal begins. Whatever services are rendered thereafter would be as carriers and are subject to separate charges in the form of

terminals." The distinction between "conveyance" and duty as a "carrier" was made in many of the

r96o English Railway Acts so that in many cases before the courts in England, the judges had to consider S.S. Light Railway co. Lid. where the conveyance ends and the carrier's duty v. begins.· These decisions arc necessarily coloured by UPP" Doab Sugar the historical considerations in England whore at first

Mill' Lid. railway companies supplied only milway lines, where private carriers could take their locomotives on pay- Das Gupta]. ment of a charge for the line and at a later stage the Railway Company supplied locomotives and power and the railway line but the private carrier remained there undertaking carriage, till ultimately the third stage was roached when the railway company functioned also as carriers on the line. \Vhile some assistance can no doubt be derived from the learned discussions by English judges as to where conveyance ends and the carrier's duty begins, it would be more helpful to concentrate at first on the scheme of our own legislation.

Turning to the Indian Railways Act, it is clear that carriage on the Railway line is primarily a function of the Railway Company and for such carriage charges are made. The Act further contemplates that in addition to some charge having been made for carriage certain other charges can be made under the head "terminals". In such a scheme the proper approach to a decision of the question where carriage ends.is to find out what carriage has been charged for. If what is charged is the charge for carriage up to the i,, tation platform of the destination station, anything done to assist the party after carriage is complete is a service in addition to carriage, that is, a terminal service. If the point A in the map is the distance up to which carriage is charged the view of the majority of the Tribunal that no ndditional service is being rendered by the Railway Company in bringing the trucks from the station platform up to point A is correct. If on the other hand, the carriage which is charged for is . carriage up to the station platform of Shamli only, bringing the trucks from the station platform to point A where the sidings begin is clearly a terminal service.

The majority of the Tribunal failed to appreciate this distinction and erred in law inassuming that because the siding commenced at A shunting of trucks from

J {

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S.C.R.

SUPREME OOURT REPORTS 935

the station platform to A could not be a terminal z96o service. s s Light The important question therefore is as regards the Raila~ co. Ltd. point up to .which the carriage was being charged for. v.

It is necessary to consider in this connection els. 13 & Upper Doab Sugar 15 of the siding agreement. They are in these words:- Mills Ltd. "Clause 13: Freight for all clauses of goods will Das Gupta]. be charged up to and from Shamli station. Railway receipts and invoices shall be issued to and from the station only and in accordance with the rates -from time to time published in Goods Traffic Books of the Railway Administration. In addition to such freight, the Railway Administration will make the following charges in such directions for every wagon loaded or empty, placed in or removed from the lines A and B mentioned in clause 15 below :-

(1) per 4-wheeler wagon 0-3-4

(2) per 8-wheeler wagon 0-6-8 In addition when use of an engine is made to place or remove wagon from the siding, a charge of Rs. 5 for each transaction shall be levied by Administration.

Clause 5: (a) Wagons will be made over to the Firm and returned by the Firm in the form of certificate shown in Annexure A.

(b) Wagons will be handled by the Railway to and from the lines marked A and Bin Plan No.12-A hereinbefore referred t<'> or such other point or length as may hereafter be fixed upon by mutual consent of the Firm and the Railway Administration in writing.

(c) As soon as wagons are placed at the line "A" referred, to, the Station Master will fill in columns 1, 2 and 3 of both foils of Annexure A, and obtain the Firm'ssignature in column 4 of the inner foil and make over the outer foil to the firm.

When this has been done, the wagons will be considered as made over to the Firm and the free time permissible under the rules will then commence. Similarly, wagons will be considered as returned to the Railway by the Firm as soon as they are placed at the line "B " referred to and the Station Master has been advised by the Firm".

S.S. Light Railway Co. Ltd. v.

Upper Doab Sitgar

At ills Ltd.

Das Gupta].

This will de done by presentation of the outer foil with column filled in.

The Station Master will then initial in column 5 of the outer foil, and fill in columns 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the inner foil and columns 6, 7 and 8 of the outer foil and recover the demurrago duo.

Note 1. The free time referred to above will be calculated in accordance with the rules in force from time to time as published in the Goods Traffic Books of the Railway Administration und wagons detained by the Firm over and above such free time shall be subject to payment of the demurrage charges laid down in such tariffs.

Note 2. The Firm will arrange to hand shunt wagons to and from t.he said length " A " with their own labour and the Railway Administration will not be responsible for any delay, loss or damage caused in consequence of the failure of the Firm to arrange for such hand shunting.

It is important to notice that cl. 13 mentions in definite and categorical language that freight is charged up to and from Shamli station. It is reasonable to read the "station" here as the " station platform ". When in clause 15 it is agreed that the "wagons will be hauled by the Ra.ii way to and from the lines marked A and 13" nothing is said about any charge being made therefor. It is impossible to read into the words used in cl. 15(b) an implication that carriage up to point A was being charged for.

On a proper reading of these clauses we think it reasonable to hold that carriage up to the station platform only was being charged for.

The haula.ge of the trucks from the station platform to point A was thus necessarily a service rendered by the Railway Company in addition to the carriage and so was a terminal service.

It is clear therefore that even on the assumption made that on the definition of the terminals in s. 3(14) no charges are payable unless certain services in addition to carriage are performed by the Railway Company, terminals were leviable in the present case at the Shamli end also and so the foundation for the argument that Rs. 4.11 being charged at the Shamli

,_ .

end was not really a terminal charge but some other x960 charge in the garb of terminal disappears. /

f itthisEinte 1 eshtidng ~°:this c 1 nhnectiontto 1

tur~ to somde Rai~!~ L~!.htd. o e ng is e01s10ns w uc seem o iave impresse v. the members of the TribuJ!al. In Foster v G. E. upper Doab Sugar Railway Co. (1), the Court had to consider certain sec- Mills Lta. tions of the Great Eastern Railway Company (Rates and Charges) Order Confirmation Act, 1891. Section Das Gupta J. 2 thereof provided that the m_aximum rate for conveyance is the maximum rate which the company may charge for the conveyance of -merchandise by merchandise train; and, subject to the exceptions and provisions specified in th, e schedule includes the provisions of locomotive power and trucks by the company, and every other expense incidental to such conveyance not hereinafter provided for. Section 3 provides that the maximum station terminal is the maximum charge which the company may make to a trader for the use of the accommodation (exclusive of coal) provided and for the duties undertaken by the company for which no other provision is made in the schedule, at the terminal station for or in dealing with merchandise, as carriers thereof, before or after conveyance. Section 5 provides that the company may charge for the services for the following, or any of them, when rendered to a trader at his request or for his convenience, a reasonable sum, by way of addition to the tonnage rate and services rendered by the Company, at or in connection with sidings not belonging to the Company.

It was in connection with this scheme of the law that the .Court had to consider where conveyance should be held to end. It was held that conveyance for the purpose of rates might or might not coincide with the contractual conveyance but that it could not be said as matter of law that it did. Theipoint at which it ended would prima facie be the point at which the goods train detached and deposited the Trucks, but if they were so detached and deposited for the convenience of the railway company at a point short ofthat to which.as conveyers they would be bound to take them for the purposes of delivery . to a

(r) (r92<>) K.B, 574.

• •

x96o: distributing carrier in times when such carriers existed, a charge could not be made for haulage S. S. Light b t th . t Railway Co. Ltd. eAweehn ese polrt s. . , v. . s as already been noticed our legrnlature has upper Doab Sugar thought fit to avoid the use of the word "conveyance"

Mills Ltd. and has provided for maximum and minimum being

Das Gupta ;. prescribed for rates as defined in s. 3(13), viz., as charges for " carriage". It is obvious that carriage which is charged for under the "rates " may include something in addition to the actual conveyance, viz., collection of goods just before haulage starts and delivery of goods just after haulage ends. It is helpful to see that even in he English courts were the distinction between conveyance and carriage ran through the whole scheme of legislation in view of the historical growth of the Railways and the extension of their functions, services rendered after the point where the goods train detaches and deposits the trucks would prima facie be considered a terminal service ; while if the train which detaches and deposits at a point short of where they would have been bound to take for the purposes of delivery to a distributing carrier in olden days, the haulage between the two points cannot be charged for in addition to the conveyance charge. Applying the reasoning underlying this decision to Indian conditions we think it proper to hold that haulage beyond a point where the trucks would be taken for persons other than the owners of a siding would be a terminal service except where this additional haulage is for the convenience of the Railway itself or where the rate charged for carriage covers the entire route up to the lat point of haulage.

Even if therefore a correct interpretation of the definition of " terminals " did not permit charges to be levied where no services were rendered in addition to the carriage charged for, the levying of Rs. 9·6 as terminal charges in the present case is clearly the application'of standardized terminal charges .. As s. 41 in terms excludes standardized terminal charges from the scope of any complaint thereunder the Railway Tribunal w0uld have no jurisdiction to investigate

the reasonableness or otherwise of these charges and

the majority decision of the Tribunal must be set z96o aside. 5 5 L' ht We do not propose, however, to rest our decison Raila; ~;.Ltd. on this narrow question of haulage from the stat10n v. platform to point A, as in our view the assumption upper Doab Sugar made above as regards the definition of terminals in Mills Ltd. s. 3(14) is not justified. The definition as has already been stated is in these words. "Terminals " includes Das Gupta f. "charges in respect of stations, sidings, wharves, depots, warehouses, cranes and other similar matters, and of any service . rendered thereat." Thus two classes of charges are included in the definition. The first is " charges in respect of stations, sidings • wharves, depots, warehouses, cranes and other similar matters." The second is "charges in respect of any servioes rendered thereat." Whether or not therefore any servi<les have been rendered" thereat" that is, at the stations, sidings, wharves, depots, warehouses, cranes and other similar matters the other class of terminals in respect of these-stations, sidings, wharves, depots, warehouses, cranes and similar other matters remain. A further question thus arises as regards the interpretation of the phrase "in respect of". Does it mean charges for the mere

provision and maintenance of stations, sidings, depots, wharves, warehouses, cranes and other similar matters are the terminals or does it contemplate charges only for use of sidings, stations, wharves, depots, warehouses, cranes and other similar matters?

The words " in respect of " are wide enough to permit charges being made as terminals so long as any of these things, viz., stations, sidings, wharves, depots, warehouses, cranes and other similar matters have been provided and are being maintained.

The question is whether the import of this generality of language should be cut down for any reason. It is well-settled that a limited interpretation has to be made on words used by the legislature in spite of the generality of the language used where the literal interpretation in the general sense would be so unreasonable or absurd that the legislature should be presumed not to have intended the same. Is there arty such reasoli for c?tting dowli the result of the

• •

I960 generality of the language used present here ? The answer, in our opinion, must be in the negative. It 5 5 Light is true that in many cases stations, sidings, wharves, Railway Co. Ltd. v. depots, warehouses, cranes and other similar things upper Doab Sugar will be used and it is arguable that in using the Mills Ltd. words " in respect of" the legislature had such user in mind. It is well to notice however that the legisla- Das Gupta f. ture must have been equally aware that whereas in some cases accommodation provided by stations will be used, in some cases sidings will be used, in others wharves, in other warehouses and in other cases cranes, and in certain cases several of these may be used, in most cases there will be no use of all of these .

From the practical point of view it is impossible to regulate terminal charges separately in respect of user of each of these several things mentioned. When therefore the legislature authorised the Central Govt., to fix terminals as defined ins. 3(14), the intention must have been that the terminals leviablc would not depend on how many of these things would be used.

It is also worth noticing that the user of a depot, warehouse and cranes would necessarily mean some service rendered " thereat ". If terminals did . not include charges in respect of the provisions of depots, warehouses and cranes unless these were used, there would be no need of including these in the first portion as they would be covered by the second part of the definition, viz., "of any services rendered thereat". Far from being there any reason to cut down, the consequence of the generality of language used viz., " in respect of", there is thus good ground for thinking that the legislature used this language deliberately to cut across the difficulty of distinguishing in a pa; rticular case as to which of these things had been used or whether any of them had been used at all.

Innumerable people carry goods over the Railways and many of them, for the purpose of the carriage make use of the stations, sidings, wharves, depots, warehouses, cranes and other similar matters, while many do not. Though .at first sight it might seem unreasonable that those who had not used would have to pay the same charge as those who had made use of these,_ it is obvious that the

• -

_,...

interminable disputes that would arise between the z96o Railway Administration and the Railway users, if the fact of user of stations, sidings and other things Rag~;; ~!.htd. mentioned had to determine the amount payable, v. would be unhelpful not only to the Railway Adminis- Upper Doab Suga• tratiol} but also to the using public. The sensible wy Mills Ltd. was therefore to mn.ke a charge leviable for the mere Das GitJda J. provision of thase things irrespective of whether any use was made thereof. That was the reason why such wide words " in respect of" was used. We are therefore of opinion that the words "in respect of" \lsed in s. 3(14) means "for' the provi.sion of" and not "for the user of".

It is worth considering in this connection that the definition of "terminal charges " in the Indian Act is a verbatim reproduction of the definition appearing in the English Railway and Canals Traffic Act, 1888 and that only three years before the English Parliament passed that Act an English Court had held in Hall & Co. v: London, Brighton and South Coast Rly., Co. (2), that for the purposes of interpretation of section 51 of the London, Brighton, and South Coast Rly. Act, 1863 which did not include such a definition . of . terminal charges, the words " any service incidental to the dutv or business of a carrier", does comprise providing su; h station accommodation and such sidings, and such weighing, checkage and labelling as is incidental to the duty which they undertake, of collecting and dealing with the goods as carriers." It is reasonable to think that the English Parliament in defining " terminal charges " in the Railway and Canals Act, 1889 intended to give effect to this view that provision of station accommodation and sidings entitled the Railway Administration to levy " terminal charges." When the Indian Legislature adopted the same definition in its own Act it is proper to think that it also was aware of the view taken in Hall's Case (2). This consideration fortifies the conclusion which we have already reached on an examination of the scheme of our own Act, apart from authorities, that the words "in respect of" used in s. 3(14) in the definition of

(2) (1885) 15 K.B. 505.

• •

I960

"terminal charges" means "for the provision of" and not" for the user of".

S. S. Light Railway Co. Ltd.

The necessary conclusion that follows is that v. irrespective of the fact of the actual user by any Upper Doob Sugar particular consignor of the stations sidings and other Mills Ltd. things mentioned in s. 3(14) "term'inal charges" are

Das Gupta 1. leviable by reason of the mere fact that these 'things have been provided by the Railway Administration.

The conclusion that necessarily follows therefrom is that the charges of Rs. 4·11 at either end sought to be levied by the Railway Administration in addition to the charges for carriage was " terminal charges" within the meaning of the Railways Act and the proposed levy being in accordance with Government Notification under s. 32 of the

0Act was nothing more than the application of standardized terminal charges.

The Tribunal had therefore no jurisdiction to investigate the reasonableness or otherwise of the same and had no jurisdiction to reduce the same. The order made by the majority of the Tribunal cannot therefore be allowed to stand.

Februa, ry. IO

The order made by the Tribunal is therefore set aside. The application made under s. 41 in respect of this levy of Rs. 9·6 per 4 wheeler truck in addition to the carriage is rejected. The appeal is allowed with costs.

Appeal allowed.

THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF

NAGPUR

ITS EMPLOYEES

(P. I3. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SUBBA RAO AND

K.C. DAS GUPTA, JJ.) Industrial Dispute-Services undertaken by City Corporation-If and when industry-Test-'Inditstry'. Meaning of--Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, r947 (C.P. & Berar XXIII of r947). s. 2 (r4)-City of Nagpur Corporation Act. r948 (Madhya Pradesh 2 of Ig50).

The question for determination in these appeals was whether and to what extent the municipal activities of the Corporation of

Subba Rao J.

UPPERDOAB SUGAR MILLS LTD. & ANOTHER

P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR

K. c. DAS GUPTA, JJ

Railways Act

s. 32

Indian Railways Act, 1890

Central Government

s. 41

Railways Act

Railway Rates Tribunal

s. 41

Railways Act

s. 32

s. 3

Railways Act

H. N. Sany

Niren De. P. C. Chatterjee

P. K. Ghosh

N. C. Chatterjee

J.P. Aggarwalla

B. K. B. Naidu

I. N. Shroff

B. K. Khanna

R. H. Dhebar

DAS GUPTA

Das Gupta

s. 32

Railways Act

Upper Doab Sugar Mills Ltd.

Shamli

Rly., Company

Miu, Ltd.

September 30, 1953

Kandhla

Khandraoli

Thanabhawan

Nanautta

February 20, 1950

Central Govt

s. 32

Railways Act

section 32

August 1, 1953

Sona Arjunpur

Ailum

Khandla

Khandraoli

Hind

Nanautta

October 1, 1953

s. 41(1)

Railways Act

Das Gupta

section 4

Doab Sugar

L.M. Roy

V. Subrahmanyan

Lokur

s. 9

s. 3(13)

clause 14

s. 3(13)

Central Gov- Railway co Ltd.

s. 3(14)

Subrahmanian

English Railway Act

England

S.S. Light Railway co. Lid

Turning to the Indian Railways Act

Clause 13

clause 15

Clause 5

cl. 13

clause 15

cl. 15(b)

s. 3(14)

Order Confirmation Act, 1891

Section 3

Section 5

s. 3(13)

s. 41

Mills Ltd.

s. 3(14)

s. 3(14)

English Parliament

section 51

Railway and Canals Act, 1889

s. 3(14)

S. S. Light Railway Co. Ltd.

s. 3(14)

Railways Act

s. 32

Februa

s. 41

GAJENDRAGADKAR

K. SUBBA RAO

K.C. DAS GUPTA

s. 2

City of Nagpur Corporation Act