I959

Lipton Ltd. v.

Their Employees

 S. K. Das].

I9~9

February a.

180 SUPitEME .COURT REPOitTS [1959] Supp.

by the Industrial Tribunal to bring the present employees into the new scales of pay will stand subject to the necessary modification that instead of January 1, 1954, the relevant date should be November I, 1955.

The result,, therefore, is as follows: Appeal No. 715 of 1957 is dismissed with costs. Appeals Nos. 713 and 714 off 957 are allowed to the extent indicated above.

The order for the grant of bonus for 1951 is set aside and the new scales of pay will take effect from November 1, 1955, instead of from January 1, 1954. There will be no order for costs in these two appeals.

Appeals Nos. 713 and 714 allowed in part.

Appeal N_o. 715 dismissed.

DAMODHAR TUKARAM MANGALMURTI

AND OTHERS

THE STATE OF BOMBAY (SYED JAFER IMAM, S. K. DAS and J. L. KAPUR, JJ.) Lease-Construction-Enha11ce1nent of rent-" Fair and eqititable enhancement as the lessor shall determine" -Lease, whether void for uncertainty-Court's power to determine fair and equitable rent.

In r909, for the purpose of residential accommodation, plots of land were given on lease by the Government to the appellants and others for which a premium of Rs. 350 and an annual rent of ll.s. 3-8-0 for each plot had to be paid. Clause III of the deed "of lease in each case provided: " And the lessor does further covenant that he will at the end of the term of 30 years hereby granted and so on from time to time thereafter at the end of each successive further term of years as shall be granted at the request of the lessee execute to him a renewed lease of the land hereby demised for the term of 30 years: Provided that the rent of the land hereby demised shall be subject to such fair and equitable enhancement as the lessor shall determine on the grant of every rene\val: Provided also that every such renewed lease of the land shall contain such of the covenants, provisions and conditions in these presents contained as shall be applicable and shall always contain a covenant for further renewal of the lease.'

By the year 1939 the first 30 years' period of some of the leases came to an end, and the Government sought to enhance the annual rent from Rs. 3-8-0 to Rs. 21-14-0 per plot and also to insert some new terms in the renewed deeds of lease. The appellants brought a suit inter alia for a declaration that the enhancement proposed was not fair and equitable within the meaning of Clause III of the deed of lease, that the fair and equitable rent should be Rs. 7 per plot and that if the court was of the opinion that Rs. 7 was not a fair and equitable rent then it should fix such sum as it considered fair and equitable. The respondent pleaded that such a suit was incompetent. The question was whether the civil court had jurisdiction to enquire whether the enhancement of the rent determined by the lessor was fair and equitable within the meaning of cl,.. III of the deed of lease, and whether, in any case, the lease was void for uncertainty.

Held, (per Jafer Imam and S. K. Das, JJ.), that the lease is not void for uncertainty; that the expression "fair and equitable" in the clause in question means fair and equitable in fact, and not what the lessor subjectively considered to be fair and equitable ; and, that reading the clause as a whole and giving effect to all the words used therein, the meaning is that the lessor must first determine what it considers to be fair and equitable enhancement, but, if in fact it is not so, it is open to the lessee to ask the court to determine what is fair and equitable enhancement. Accordingly, the suit was maintainable.

The rule laid down in Gourlay v. The Duke of Somerset, (1815) 19 Ves. 429; 23 E.R. 576, held applicable.

The New Beerbhom Coal Company Limited v. Boloram Mahata and others, (1880) L.R. 7 I.A. 107 and Secretary of State for India in Council v. Volkart Brothers, (1926) I.LR. 50 Mad. 595, relied on.

Collier v. Mason, (1858) 25 Beav. zoo; 53 E.R. 613 and Tekchand Kapurchand v. Mt. Birzabai, A.LR. 1942 Nag. i19,

distinguished.

Pr Kapur, J.-The correct interpretation to be put on

cl. III of the deed of lease is that the lessor was given the authority to determine the enhancement of rent but such enhancement was to be fair and equitable and what would be fair and equitable in any particular case was also to be determined by the lessor. The rule applicable to the present case is that relating to valuation or fixation of prices that where the valuation is fixed by a valuer the court will hold it conclusive in the absence of fraud or mistake or misconduct and the court will not enter into the propriety of the valuation made or substitute its own valuation in place of that determined by the valuer because that will not be an execution of the contract of the parties but making a contract for them.

Case law discussed.

M angalmurti v.

State of Bombay

I959

M angalmurti v.

Slate of Bombay

S. K. Das].

CIVIL

APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Nos. 181 and 181-A of 1955.

Ci vii Appeals

Appeals from the judgment and decree dated September 30, 1952, of the former Nagpur High Court in Second Appeals Nos. 699 and 700 of 1946, arising out of the judgment and decree dated February 21, 1946, of the court of First Additional District Judge, Nagpur, in Civil Appeals Nos. 22-A and 23-A of 1946, against the judgment and decree dated January 2, 1945, of the Court of Second Subordinate Judge, Nagpur, in Cjvil Suit No. 143-A of 1944.

H.J. Umrigar, Ratnaparkhi A. G. and Shankar Anand Zinjarde, for the appellants.

W. s; Barlingay and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent. ·

1959. February 2.

The Judgment of Jafer Imam and S. K. Das, JJ., was delivered by S. K. Das, J.

Kapur, J., delivered a separate judgment.

S. K. DAS, J.-These two appeals arise out of a litigation which has had a chequered career in the courts below. The short facts are these. The suit out of which the appeals arise was instituted on January 13, 1941, but the plaint was amended on May 4, 1942.

The amended plaint was to the effect that in or about the year 1905 the defendant, the then Provincial Government of the Central Provinces and Berar, Nagpur, "opened up" an area known as the C1; addock Town Area which was originally called the Sitabuldi Extension Area or Dhantoli Area.

Due to the scarcity of residential accommodation in the city of Nagpur, the then Provincial Government along with some prominent members of , the Nagpur Municipal Committee devised a scheme to extend residential accommodation by acquiring agricultural land and making it available for residential purposes.

With that object in view, the area .in question was acquired and building sites of the average size of about 10,000 sq. ft. each were carved out. These were leased out on a premium of Rs. 350 and an annual rent of Rs. 3-8-0 each. The indenture of lease in each case contained a. clause to the following effect :-

"III. And the lessor does further covenant that he will at the end of the term of 30 years hereby granted and so on from time to time thereafter at the end of each successive further term of years as shall be granted at the request of the lessee execute to him a renewed lease of the land hereby demised for the term of 30 years; Provided that the rent of the land hereby demised shall be subject to such fair and equitable enhancement as the lessor shall determine on the grant of every renewal : Provided also that every such renewed lease of the land shall contain such of the covenants, provisions and conditions in these presents contained as shall be applicable and shall always contain a covenant for further renewal of the lease." One of the leases was executed on May 24, 1909, and some other leases near about that year. By the year 1939 the first 30 years' period of some of the leases came to an end. The original plaintiffs, who were two in number and who sued in their individual right as also representing the members of an association known as the Craddock Town Plot-holders Association alleged that on the expiry of the terms of the leases in question, during which period some of the lessees had built houses on the leasehold property, the then Provincial Government proposed an enhancement of Rs. 21-14-0 from Rs. 3-8-0 as annual rent and also the insertion of some new terms in the re.newed deeds of lease.

The plaintiffs, on the contrary, said that Rs. 7 per plot was the fair and equitable enhancement. Various representations to the relevant authorities having proved unavailing, the plaintiffs instituted the suit in which they prayed (a) that the enhancement of rent from Rs. 3-8-0 to Rs. 21-14-0 per plot was not fair and equitable within the meaning of

cl. III of the deed of lease; (b) that the offer of Rs. 7 as annual rent made by the association was fair and reasonable; (c) that the defendant do insert in the renewed deeds of lease only such conditions as were to be found in the original deed and not to add to them to the detriment of the lessees' interest ; and

(d) that in the event of this Court not agreeing that

r959

M angalmurti v.

State of Bombay

S. K. Das].

I959

.i11 angalmurti v.

State of Bombay

S. K. Das].

Rs. 7 was a fair and reasonable rent, a fair and equitable rent should be fixed by it. The suit was contested by the defendant on several grounds, with most of which we are not now concerned.

The learned Subordinate Judge of Nagpur, who dealt with the suit in the first instance, took up certain preliminary issues for decision and by a judgment dated April 13, 1942, he disposed of those preliminary issues. One such issue material for our purpose was in these terms: "In case of dispute as to what is fair and equitable rent, has the civil court no right to determine what is fair rent?" On this preliminary issue, he found "that under the terms of cl. III of the indenture of lease, the defendant was entitled to fix a fair and equitable rent; but the civil court has jurisdiction to enquire whether the rent fixed by the defendant is fair and equitable within the meaning of

cl. III ". We need not refer to the other preliminary issues on which the learned Subordinate Judge gave his decision, because those issues no longer survive.

On the disposal of the aforesaid preliminary issue, the plaint was amended and some more lessees were added, the 30 years' period of whose leases had also expired ; therefore the position was that the plaintiffs were those lessees, the 30 years' period of whose leases had expired and as respects the renewal of whose leases the defendant had proposed an enhancement of Rs. 21-14-0. The defendant claimed that it had been very reasonable in fixing the enhanced rent and it further claimed the right of withdrawing the offer of Rs. 21-14-0 and of making a fresh demand at a much higher rent if the lessees did not agree to the terms originally proposed by the defendant. The defendant further denied that the offer of Rs. 7, that is, twice the original rent, made by the lessees was a reasonable and fair enhancement.

After the disposal of the preliminary issues the learned Subordinate Judge proceeded to try the suit on merits and on January 2, 1945, he found on issue no. 4 that Rs. 14 per year would be the fair and equitable enhanced rent for each plot of about 10,000 sq. ft. and he fixed that rent for the next term of 30 years to

which the lessees were entitled under cl. III; he further directed the grant of a rebate of 25 per cent. to those lessees 'Yho agreed to a renewal for a term ending in 1948.

From the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge two appeals, one by the plaintiffs, and the other by the defendant, were taken to the District Judge and they were heard by the Additional District Judge of Nagpur, who by his Judgment dated February 21, 1946, affirmed the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge that under cl. III of the indenture of lease it was open to the Subordinate Judge to determine what was the fair and equitable rent. The learned Additional District Judge, however, reversed the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge as to the quantum of the fair and equitable rent. He came to the conclusion that the enhancement of rent should not exceed Rs. 7, as any increase over that amount would not be a fair and equitable one within the meaning of

cl. III of the indenture of lease.

 From the decision of the learned Additional District Judge, two appeals were taken to the then High Court of Judicature at Nagpur by the defendant Government. The appeals were first placed before a single Judge who directed that they should be heard by a Division Bench. The appeals were then heard by B. P.

Sinha, C. J. (as he then was) and Mudholkar, J. The learned Chief Justice came to the conclusion that the suit must fail on the ground that the authority of the court had been invoked in a matter which really lay in contract and the civil court had no jurisdiction to determine the fair and equitable rent. Mudholkar, J., came to a contrary conclusion and held that the suit was maintainable and the courts below could determine the fair and equitable rent. On the question of what should be the fair and equitable rent, the learned Chief Justice gave no finding except saying that " the decision of the lower appellate court on the question of assessment of fai:u and equitable rent was not satisfactory, because it had gone more by the rule of the thumb than upon the evidence adduced in the

I959

M angalmttrti

Stale of Bombay

S. K. Das j.

'959

M angalmurti v.

State of Bombay

S. K. Das].

case or upon any other sound basis." Mudholkar, J., however, said that he saw no adequate ground for differing from the view taken by the lower appellate court with regard to the quantum of fair and equitable rent. On this difference of opinion between the learned Chief Justice and Mudholkar, J., the case was referred to a third Judge, namely, Hemeon, J., who agreed with the view of the learned Chief Justice that, on a proper construction of cl. III of the indenture of lease, the civil court had no jurisdiction to determine the fair and equitable rent and the parties had consciously and deliberately stipulated to abide by the lessor's fixation of a fair and equitable enhancement of rent; and in that view of the matter, he expressed no opinion as to what s.hould be the fair and equitable rent.

In accordance with the opinion of the majority of Judges, the appeals in the High Court were allowed and the suit was dismissed with costs.

The plaintiffs, who are the appellants here, then asked for a certificate of fitness under Art. 133(l)(c) of the Constitution of India. The High Court granted the necessary certificate by an order dated October 23, 1953, and the present appeals have been filed in pursuance of that certificate. The area in question being now within the State of Bombay, the State of Bombay has been substituted as the respondent before us.

The principal question before us is one of construction of cl. III of the indenture of lease. On behalf of the appellants it has been argued that the construction put upon the clause by the majority of Judges in the High Court is not correct inasmuch as it gives no effect to the words " fair and equitable enhancement " occurring therein. On behalf of the respondent, it has been submitted that the expression " subject to such fair and equitable enhancement as the lessor shall determine " is tantamount to saying " subject to such enhancement as the lessor shall determine to be fair and equitable,, ; in other words, the argument of learned counsel for the respondent is that the parties had deliberately chosen to abide by whatever was determined to be fair and equitable enhancement by

the lessor. Mudholkar, J., had proceeded on the footr959 ing that the primary intention of the parties was that

£ bl d h Mangalmurti the enhncement must be air and equita e an t e v. adjectival clause "as the lessor shall determine " state of Bombay following the word 'enhancement' being subordinate - to the primary intention of the parties could be s. K. Das J. ignored. Learned counsel for the respondent has very strongly submitted that this view is not correct. •

We think that the clause should be read as a whole and every effort should be made to give effect to all the words used therein. The relevant portion of the clause states-" such fair and equitable enhancement as the lessor shall determine ". If the construction is that whatever the lessor determines as fair and equitable enhancement must be treated as bindingon the lessee, then the words ' fair and equitable ' are not given the meaning and sense which they have according to the ordinary acceptation of those words. ']'air ' and 'equitable' mean fair and equitable in fact, and not what the lessor subjectively considered to be fair and equitable. The words 'fair' and 'equitable' both mean' just or unbiased' (see the Concise Oxford Dictionary, 4th Edn., p. 426 and p. 402). If the intention was to.leave the enhancement to the subjective determination of the lessor, the clause would have more aptly said-'such enhancement as the lessor shall determine'.

We consider that the words' fair and equitable' must be given their due meaning and proper effect.

The question then asked is-what meaning is to be given to the words' such ...... as the lessor shall determine'.

It is indeed true that these words constitute an adjectival clause to the expression ' fair and equitable enhancement', but we consider that the meaning of the adjectival clause is merely this : the lessor must first determine what it considers to be fair and equitable enhancement; but if in fact it is not so, it is open to the lessee to ask the Court to determine what is fair and equitable enhancement. We do not think that on a proper construction of the clause, the intention was to oust the jurisdiction of the Court and make the determination of the enhancement by the lessor final and binding on the lessee.

We think that

I959

M angalmurti v.

State of Bombay

S. K. Das].

the conclusion at which Mudholkar, J., arrived on this point was correct, though not exactly for the reasons given by him.

If the construction stated above is the correct constrmtion, then no further difficulty is presented by

cl. III. The learned Judges of the High Court unanimously expressed the view that the lease was not void for u\icertainty, and in that view we concur. There is authority in support of the view that a covenant to settle land 'at a proper rate' or 'upon such terms and conditions as should be judged reasonable ' is not void for uncertainty (see -The New Beerbhoom Coal Company Limited v. Boloram Mahata and others(') and Secretary of State for India in Council v. Volkart Brothers(')). In the former case, Sir Barnes Peacock who delivered the judgment of their Lordships said :

" The High Court affirmed the decision, but not for reasons which their Lordships consider to be correct. They affirmed it upon the ground that it was impossible to determine what was a reasonable rate.

Their Lordships cannot think that in the present 9ase the Court, upon a proper inquiry, would have been unable to determine it.

There might have been considerable difficulty in fixing the rate; but difficulties often occur in determining what is a reasonable price or a reasonable rate, or in fixing the amount of damages which a man has sustained under particular circumstances. These are difficulties which the Court is bound to overcome."

Our attention has been drawn to some English decisions in which the point arose if a contract which appoints a way of determining the price can be specifically enforced.

There are two lines of decisions. In Milnes v. Grey(') the contract provided that the price shall be valued by two different persons to be nominated and if they happened to disagree then those two persons shall choose a third person whose determination shall be final.

The question was whether such a contract could be specifically performed and the

(1) (1880) L.R. 7 I.A. 107.

(2) (1926) I.L.R. 50 Mad. 595.

(3) (1807) 14 \?'"es, 400; 33 E.R. 574.

answer given by the Master of the Rolls can be best put in his own words :

" The more I have considered this case, the more I am satisfied, that, independently of all other objections, there is no such agreement between the parties, as can be carried into execution. The only agreement, into which the Defendant entered, was to purchase at a price, to be ascertained in a specified mode.

No price having ever been fixed in that mode, the parties have not agreed upon any price; Where then is the complete and concluded contract, which this Court is called upon to execute ? " In Taylor v. Brewer (1) a claim to compensation was founded on the resolution of a committee which provided that "such remuneration be made as should be deemed right ". It was held that the engagement was merely an engagement of honour and no claim could be made on it. An example of the other line of decisions is furnished by Gourlay v. The Duke of Somerset (2).

In that case the agreement provided for " all such usual and proper conditions, reservations, and agreements, as shall be judged reasonable and proper by John Gale, land surveyor, and in case of his death, by some other proper a.nd competent person to be mutually agreed upon by the said parties". The plaintiff came to court and the question arose whether the reference to ; settle the lease to be made by the defendant to the plaintiff should be to the Master or to Mr. Gale, the defendant contending tha.t the court decreeing specific performance will take the whole subject to itself and determine by its own officer, not by a particular individual, what are usual and proper covenants. Sir William Grant, Master of the Rolls, said:- , ·"When the agreement is, that the price of the estate shall be fixed by arbitrators, and they do not fix it, there is no contract as the price is of the essence of a contract of sale, and the Court cannot make a contract, where there is none; but, where the Court has determined, that the agreement is binding and (I) (I8I3) IM. & s. 290; I05 E.R. I08,

(2) (1815) 19 Yes. 429; 34 E.R. 576.

I959

M angalmurti v.

State of Bombay

S. K. Das].

I959

Mangalniurti

State of Bombay

..S. K. Das ].

concluded and such as ought to be executed, it does not require foreign aid to carry the details into execution. Gale's agency is not of the essence of this contract ......... If the parties had gone to Gale, and got him to settle a lease, and one of them had objected to the covenants as improper, and the Bill had been filed by the other, the Court would have inspected. the lease; and if it were found unreasonable, would not have decreed an execution of the agreement." We consider that the present case comes within the rule laid down in Gourlay v. The Duke of Somerset (1).

Learned counsel for the respondent placed strong reliance on Gollier v. Mason ('). That was a case in which the defendant had agreed to purchase a property at a valuation to be made by AB ; the Court, though it considered AB's valuation very high and perhaps exorbitant, decreed specific performance, there appearing neither fraud, mistake or miscarriage. The case was decided on the footing that the contract provided that the property shall be purchased at such a price or sum as should be fixed by reference to AB, and it was pointed out that there being no evidence of fraud, mistake or miscarriage the parties were bound by the contract they had made. There was no question in that case of the court stepping in, under the terms of the contract, to determine what was fair and reasonable. Learned counsel for the respondent also relied on Tekchand Kapurchand v. Mt. Birzabai (').

The principle lai1'l down therein was that a contract binds the parties to it and their representatives and the court's power to interfere with contracts is limited to such cases as fraud, undue influence or mistake and relief against penalty or forfeiture.

Indeed, we agree that if the contract in the present case was that whatever the lessor determined as the enhanced rent would be binding on the parties, then the court has no power to interfere with that contract unless it is vitiated by fraud, undue influence, mistake, etc. If, however, the proper construction of cl. III of the contract is what

(1) (1815) 19 Ves. 429; 34 E. R. 576.

(2) (1858) 25 Beav. 200; 53 E.R. 613.

(3) A.I.R. 1942 Nag. II9.

w~ have held it to be, then the contract itself provides 1959 that the enhanced rent though determined by the less- M angalmurti or in the first instance, must be fair and equitable. On v. such a construction the determination of the enhancestate of Bombay ment by the lessor would not be final and it would be - open to the court to determine what is fair and equits. K. Das J. able enhancement.

We say this with respect, but the Patna decisions (Secretary of State for India in Council v. Nistarini Annie Mitter (1) and Se.cretary of State v. Babu Rajendra Prasad (2) ), referred to by the learned Chief Justice in his judgment are not in point. Those decisions were not concerned with interpreting a clause in the agreement like the one before us and it was rightly held that in the absence of a contract between the parties, the court had no power to impose upon the parties a bargain not of their own making.

For the reasons given above, we hold that the decision of the majority of the learned , Judges of the High Court with regard to the interpretation of cl. III of the indenture of lease is not correct and these appeals must go back for a fresh hearing by the High Court in accordance with law for determination of what should be t!ie fair and equitable enhancement. On that point there was no concluded finding by the majority of the learned Judges of the High Court, but learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the finding of the learned Additional District Judge on the quantum of fair and equitable enhancement was a finding f fact and therefore binding in second appeal. At this stage we express no opinion on such a submission, nor do we express any opinion whether the courts below or any of them have gone wrong in principle in determining what should be the fair and equitable enhancement and whether on merits it should be Rs. 7 or Rs. 14 or Rs. 21-14-0, or even a higher sum.

All these points must be considered afresh by the High Court.

There is a further point which must also be dealt with in the High Court.

The learned Subordinate Judge decided on issue no. 7 with regard to the conditions for a renewal of the lease tha, t the Government

(8) (1927) I.L.R. 6 Pat. 446.

(9) A.I.R. 1937 Pat. 391.

I959

M angaltnurti

State of Bombay

S. K. Das].

Kapur J.

were not entitled to make any alterations in the clauses relating to re-entry and notice of demand as contained in cl. II of the original lease. The learned Addi. District Judge said :

" As regards the new form of lease, it is clear that the chi.use regarding building would be deleted if it is found to be superfluous or redundant. While that in respect of right of lessor to enter on the land without a demand of ground rent (in case of failure to pay it on the appointed date) it is not necessary to interfere as it would amount to making a contract for the parties. It is better to leave the matter to the parties and their legal advisers." Whether the view of the learned Subordinate Judge or of the District Judge is correct or not was not considered by the High Court and as the appeals are going back on remand this point should also be dealt with by the High Court.

Accordingly, we allow the appeals and set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court dated September 30, 1952.

The appeals must go back for a fresh hearing by the High Court in accordance, with law and in the light of the observations made above. In the peculiar circumstances of this case, there will be no order for costs of the hearing of the appeals in this Court. Costs incurred in the two courts below and costs incurred in the High Court, both before and after remand, will be dealt with by the High Court when finally disposing of the appeals.

KAPUR, J.-I regret I am unable to agree in the proposed judgment that it is open to the Court in the circumstances of this case to go into the question of the valuation and to determine as to what, in its opinion, would be fair and equitable enhancement in rent and to interfere with the enhancement as determined by the lessor under the terms of the indenture of lease executed on May 24, 1909.

The original lease was for a term of 30 years with a provision for renewal for another 30 years with the proviso that the rent of the land demised was "subject to such fair and equitable enhancement as the lessor shall determine".

The facts are set out in the judgment of my learned r959 brother, S. K. Das, J., and it is not necessary to repeat h Pl f l d b 0 f Mangalmurti t em. ots o an measuring a out 1 ,000 sq. t. v. were given on lease by the Government to the appelstate of Bombay lants and others, for which the premium to be paid - was Rs. 350 and the rent Rs. 3-8-0 per annum or Re. 1 Kapur J. per cent. of the premium. Lease deeds were executed in 1909 under clause III of which the lessor determined the enhanced rent at Rs. 21-14-0 and thus raised it from Rs. 3-8·0 per plot to Rs. 21-14-0.

The appellants brought a suit for declaration that the enhancement proposed was excessive and the fair and equitable rent should be Rs. 7 per plot and if the Court was of the opinion that Rs. 7 was not a fair and equitable rent then it should fix such sum as i1; considered fair and equitable. The respondent pleaded that such a suit was incompetent. The question for decision is what is the effect of using the adjectival words "fair and equitable". For the appellants it was argued that because in the lease deed the enhancement contemplated was qualifiea by the words "fair and equitable" the determination became clothed with a qualification which made it subject to judicial review and determi. nation because it was for the Court to say whether the determined enhancement conformed to the standard prescribed in the disputed clause or not. The . respondent contended on the other hand that the rule applicable to determinations by valuers is that it is conclusive and cannot be overhauled except upon proof of fraud and imposition of gross misconduct.

Thus according to the submission of the appellant the clause in dispute means such enhancement as the lessor shall determine and which determination shall, in the opinion of the Court, be fair and equitable and according to the respondent it means that the amount of enhancement shall be fair and equitable but what is fair and equitable shall be determined by the lessor, such determination being conclusive. The appellants do not contend that the lessor is not a valuer and that if the qualifying words " fair and equitable" had not been used then

'959 the enhancement determined would notbe conclusive but the contention is that by using these words the M angalmurti v. quality and the quantity of enhancement is no longer State of Bombay in the sole determination of the lessor but the final determination must be of the Court because otherwise Hapur J. any fanciful amount would have to be accepted as fair and equitable and that the parties intended that the lessor was not the final determiner of the quality and quantity of enhancement and his determination was not conclusive but the lessee if dissatisfied could get the matter reviewed by the Court.

In my view the correct interpretation to be put on this clause of the lease deed is what is contended for by the respondent. The lessor was given the authority to determine the enhancement but such enhancement was to be fair and equitable and what would be fair and equitable in any particular case was also to be determined by the lessor. The lease deed entered into between the parties is dated May 24, 1909. In the first clause are given the usual obligations of the lessee as to payment of rent, the purpose of the building to be constructed, the period in which it was to be completed, the design of the building and keeping it in proper condition. In the second clause of the agreement the lessor covenanted peaceful possession subject to the right of the lessor to recover rent as arrears of land revenue and other remedies for non-observance of the obliga- tions contained in the first clause with a provision for re-entry upon failure of certain conditions. In the third clause the lessor covenanted for grant of lease for further periods of 30 years at the request of the lessee with the following proviso : . "Provided that the rent of the land_ hereby demised shall be subject to such fair and eci, uitable enhancement as the lessor shall determine on the grarit of every ren.ewal ". . . . . _.

This is the disputed clause .. Now it appears that this further covenant was for the benefit of the lessee and the reservations made are couched in such la.nguage which left the discretion in regard to. eµhancement of rent to the lessor. What the enhancement was to be and what would be fair and equitable was left to the

determination of the lessor. It is not an unusual provision in a lease for a long term of years with provision for renewal to leave the question of rent to b'e determined by the lessor or an outside valuer and it would not, in my respectful opinion, be a correct interpretation to say that the enhancement by a valuer would be unchallengeable if the adjectival words " fair and equitable" are not used but would be subject to court's review if these words are employed. That is going contrary to the very notion of valuations and their legal incidence.

The extent of the power of courts over valuations by valuers has been stated in text books and in certain decided cases. In Williston on Contracts, Vol. 3, s. 802, at p. 2252 the law is stated thus:

" In the absence of fraud or mistake, the price fixed by agreed valuers is conclusive upon the parties.

Though an excessively large or an unreasonably small price involves some element of penalty or forfeiture, the possibility of this is not enough to overcome the express terms of the contract in the absence at least of fraud, gross mistake, or such arbitrary conduct as is outside what the parties could have reasonably contemplated".

And it is not a far step to say that in all cases of valuation the parties do contemplate a fair and equitable amount to be fixed or determined and not any price fancifulor otherwise.

In Collier v. Mason (1) the defendant agreed to purchase a property at a valuation to be made by a third party. The defendant repudiated the value as exorbitant and refused to complete his contract and the plaintiff-vendor instituted a suit for specific performance.

The Court held that the valuation was very high and perhaps exorbitant but it decreed specific performance of the contract as there appeared no fraud, mistake or miscarriage. It was said by the Master of the Rolls "It may have been improvident as between these parties to enter into a contract to buy and sell property at a price to be fixed by another person, but that cannot avoid the contract.

(1) (1858) 25 Beav. 200; 53 E. R 613.

Mangalmurti v.

State of Bombay

Kapur].

r959 Here the referee has fixed the price, which is said to be evidence of miscarriage, but this Court, upon the Mangalmiuti

v. principle laid down by Lord Eldon, must act on that

State of Hombay valuation, unless there be proof of some mistake, or some improper motive, I do not say a fraudulent one; Kapur J. as if the valuer had valued something not included, or had valued it on a wholly erroneous principle, or had desired to injure one of the parties to the contract; or even, in the absence of any proof of any of these things, if the price were so excessive or so small as only to be explainable by reference to some such cause ; in any one of these cases the Court would refuse to act on the valuation ".. It does not a.ppear that in that case the words "fair and equitable" were used but that is implied in every reference. for valuation to be made by an agreed .referee. He cannot act in a fanciful or a corrupt manner or with puerile motives nor can be make a valuation which be does not consider to be fair and equitable.

In cases of transfer of property the form of contract to buy and sell may make a provision and very often such a provision is made that the price payable shall be that which a certain valuer shall fix.

Such a requirement is an express condition or a condition implied in fact qualifying the obligation of the buyer to pay tbe price and such a contract cannot be performed unless the valuation first takes place. Such a condition is a necessary condition or an inherent condition.

Williston on Contracts, 'Vol. 3, s. 800; Firth

v. Midland Railway Go. (1).

In such contracts it must be assumed that the parties laid weight on the particular individuality of the valuer.

Accordingly if the valuer dies. or refuses to act the buyer cannot be compelled to pay the price.

A similar condition is common in long-term leases and in provisions for renewal of leases and where the parties choose to abide by the determination of a valuer and that valuation is not acceptable to one of the parties, Courts will not interfere, the only exception being fraud, mistake or misconduct. In Vickers v. Vickers(') which was a suit for specific

{1) (1875) L.R. 20 Eq. 100, 112.·

(2) (1867) L.R. 4 Eq. 529.

performance of a contract enforcing an option of r959 purchase where the stock was to be valued in the usual . b 1 d f h l M angalnzurti way y two va uers an one o t e va uers was not allowed to proceed, it was held that there was no state 0;· Bombay contract between the parties which the Court could specifically enforce. Sir W. Page Wood, V. C., said at I•apur J. p. 535: . "If a nomination of that kind fails, or if the two persons named do not make their award, this Court has said there is no constat of the price ; the contract is not a complete contract, and there is nothing on which it can act".

In Weekes v. Gallard (1) where a contract was entered into for the sale of certain property, the price to be fixed by two valuers who afterwards valued the property at inadequate price, it w'as held that in the abence of fraud or collusion on the part of the valuer, the buyer was entitled to specific performance of the contract. Lord Romilly said :-

"The court has really no discretion in the matter.

The discretion of the court is bound, as Lord Ellenborough says, by fixed rules. In one case of this kind a house and furniture were valued at three times their value, and yet there was a decree for specific performance. The only defence to such a suit would be fraud or collusion".

A valuer may, in one sense, be called an arbitrator but not in the proper legal sense of the term. Per Lindley, L. J., In re Carus Wilson & Greene (2).

But there is this difference between arbitration and valuation that the object of the former is to settle a dispute which has arisen and of the latter to avoid a dispute arising. The arbitrator is called in to settle judicially any matter in controversy between the parties and the valuer by the exercise of his knowledge and skill has to make a valuation the object being to prevent disputes from arising.

A valuer like an arbitrator is required to act fairly and diligently.

He cannot act in .a fanciful or a perverse manner and his determination must be fair and equitable whether the authority given to him uses these words or not. But once a

(I) (1869) 21 L.T. 655.

(2) (1886) 18 Q.B.D. 7, IO,

I959

/1.1 angal1nurti

State of Botnbay

Kapur ].

valuation is properly made the valuation is conclusive as between the parties and the Court in the absence of fraud, mistake or collusion cari no more go info whether it 'is fair and equitable thari a Court can sit in appeal against 'the award of an arbitrator as to what would be fair amount of damages in a particular case of breach of contract. See also Emery v, Wase (:).

The decision in Gourlay v. Somerset (Duke of)(') was relied upon by the appellants in support of their case.

That does not, in my opinion, deal with the matter now before us. There the suit was for specific performance of an agreement to grant a lease. One of the conditions of the contract was that the farm was to be let on conditions, reservations and agreements "as shal) be judged reasonable and proper by John Gale ......... ". The Court was of the opinion that Gale's agency was not of the essence of the contract and that it could not be contended that the contract was to end if Gale refused to settle a lease.

The Court said : " Suppose the reference is made to Gale ; is his decision liable to exception ? If it is, the decision with regard to the propriety of the lease will ultimately be that of the Court. If not, the Court may be carrying into execution a lease, which it may think extremely unreasonable and improper. If the parties had gone to Gale, and got him to settle a lease, and one of them had objected to the covenants as improper and the Bill had been filed by the other, the Court would have inspected the lease; and if it were found unreasonable, would not have decreed an execution of the agreement".

That was a case relating to covenants other than fixation of price. With regard to the valuation or fixation of price it was said that if an agreement was that the price of the estate would be fixed by arbitrators and they did not fix it there was no contract of sale as the contract as to the mode of fixing the price was of the essence of the contract of sale and the Court could not make a contract where there is none. Similarly it may be said that where the valuation is fixed by a valuer

(1) (1801) 5 Vos. 846, 847, 848; 31 E.R. 889.

(2) (1815) 19 Yes. 429; 34 E.R. 576.

the court will hold it conclusive in the absence of fraud or mistake or misconduct. The Court will not enter into the propriety of the valuation made or substitute its own valuation in place of that determined by the valuer because that will not be an execution of the contract of the parties but making a contract for them.

The Transfer of Property Act contains no provision by which the Court is empowered to fix rent of premises demised although by legislation in the case of agricultural holdings certain tribunals have been set up to make such determinations. The appellant relied on The New Beerbhoom Goal Company v. Boloram Mahata (1).

The covenant between 'the parties was:- " Within that aforesaid mouzah we will not give a pottah, let give settlement to anybody. If you take possession according to your requirement of extra land over and above this pottah, and we shall settle any such lands with you at a proper rate".

A suit was brought by the lessees against the lessor to obtain specific performance to execute a permanent lease of a large area of land claiming benefit of the covenant above given and contended that the defendants were bound to let them the land whenever called upon to do so.

The appellant company stated that they had negotiated with the lessor for lease of the adjoining land (not of land which they had agreed to lease) upon the terms that they were to pay Rs. 1-8-0 for waste land and Rs. 3 for cultivable land and the suit was for the grant of specific performance of the agreement by compelling the lessor to grant them the lease at those rates and if the Court would not order the lease at those rates then at such rates as the Court shall think reasona hie. The trial Court held that apart from 51 bighas mentioned in the covenant the lessor could not be compelled to grant a lease for the remaining land of the mouzah. The High

Court affirmed this decision but on the ground that it was impossible to determine what. was the reasonable rate. Sir Barnes Peacock said:-..

(r) (1880) L.R. 7 I.A. 107.

z959

M angalmurti v.

State of Bombay

Kapur ].

I959

Mangalmurti v.

SJate of BOmbay

Kapur J.

" Their Lordships cannot think that in the present case the court, upon a proper inquiry, would have been unable to determine it (proper rent). There might have been considerable difficulty in fixing the rate; but difficulties often occur in determining what is a reasonable price or a reasonable rate, or in fixing the amount of damages which a man has sustained under particular circumstances. These are difficulties which the Court is bound to overcome ".

These observations of the Privy Council are relied upon by the appellants to support the argument that it is open to the Court to determine what the reasonable rate would be. This was not a case where any question of valuation arose nor was it a case where a valuation made by a valuer was sought to be reviewed as not being proper and apart from the fact that the observations are mere obiter this case is no authority for saying that the determination of a valuer is subject to review by courts.

Another case which the appellant relied upon was The Secretary of State for India v. Volkart Brothers (1).

There, in a deed of lease granted for 99 years by the East India Company there was a clause for renewal for another like period on the lessee paying a sum of money and " upon such terms and conditions as should be judged reasonable". The Secretary of State assigned a major portion of the holding to a third party and Volkart Brothers before the expiry of the original lease period tendered the due amount and asked for renewal of the lease which the Secretary of State refused to renew and sued to eject the lessees and the latter sued for specific performance of the covenant for renewal. It was held by a majority that the covenant was not unenforceable on account of uncertainty.

Krishnan, J., was of the opinion that such a covenant was too vague and uncertain and unenforceable because the clauses to be inserted in the contract were themselves uncertain and the contract could not be enforced. Venkatasubba Rao, J., was.of the opinion that if the parties would not agree to a reasonable rent the Court will intervene and fix it; The New Beerbhoom

(1) (1926) I.L.R. 50 Mad. 595

Coal Company v. Boloram Mahata (1) was relied upon. 1959 Coutts Trotter, C. J., was also of the opinion that the Mangalmurti covenant was not too vague to be enforced. But this v. again was a case not of interfering with the deter- State of Bombay mination of a valuer but of specific performance of a contract of renewal and it was held that by taking evidence even a vague and indefinite covenant relating to renewal could be made definite.

In my opinion, therefore, the Court cannot go into the question of correctness or otherwise of the determination of the lease and the appeal should therefore be dismissed with costs.

BY OouRT.-In view of the opinion of the majority, the appeals are allowed, setting aside the judgment and decree of the High Court dated September 30, 1952.

No order as to costs of the hearing in this Court.

.Appeals allowed .

. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v.

MUBARAK ALI (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR and K. SuBBA RAo, JJ.) Criminal Law-Public servant receiving bribe-Investigation by officer below rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police-Permission to investigate granted by Magistrate-Order not disclosing material before Magistrate nor disclosing reasons for order-Permission, if invalid-Investigation, scope of-Prevention of Corruption Act, r947

(2 of r947), s. 5A-Code of Criminal Procedure, r898 (Act 5 of

I898), S. 4(I)."

Section 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, provided: "No police officer below the rank ......... of a deputy Superintendent shall investigate any offence punishable under s. 161, s. 165 or s. l65A of the Indian Penal Code or under s. 5(2) of the Act without the order of. ........ a magistrate of the first class ......... ".

(1) (1880) L.R. 7 I.A. ro;.

Kapur .f.

I959

February 3.

S. K. Das

DAMODHAR TUKARAM MANGALMURTI

AND OTHERS

THE STATE OF BOMBAY (SYED JAFER IMAM

L. KAPUR, JJ.

s. 3

(1880) L.R. 7 I.A. 107

Art. 133(l)(c)

Constitution of India

(1880) L.R. 7 I.A. 107

s. 290

s. 802

s. 800

Transfer of Property Act

(1880) L.R. 7 I.A. 107

Prevention of Corruption Act

s. 5A

Code of Criminal Procedure

S. 4(I)

Section 5A

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947

s. 161

s. 165

Indian Penal Code

s. 5(2)


THE SUPREME COURT REPORTS

FAGUNA KANTA NATH v.

THE STATE OF ASSAM (J. L. KAPUR and K. N. w ANCHOO, JJ.)

Criminal Law-Abetment--Bribery-Conviction for bribery set aside-Maintenance of conviction for abetment-Legality-Indian

Penal Code (Act XLV of r86o), ss. ro7, r6r, r65A.

The appellant was triedJor an offence under s. l65A of the Indian Penal Code for having abetted K, an Inspector in charge of checking paddy, in the commission of an offence by the latter under s. 161 of the Code.

The prosecution case was that while the complainant was taking paddy for sale K demanded Rs. 200/- as bribe and threatened him that unless the money was paid the paddy would be seized, that at the instance of K the complainant handed over the bribe money to the appellant for being counted and that the latter after checking the money paid it to K. The Special Judge who tried the case accepted. the prosecution story and convicted K under s. 161 of the Indian Penal Code and the appellant for abetment of the offence. On appeal, the High Court was of the opinion that the evidence was not strong enougli to prove payment to K, and set aside his conviction, but confirmed that of the appellant on the ground that money was taken by him for P, ayment to K as illegal gratification and whether he actually paid it to him or not the offence fell under s. l65A.

Held, that the conviction of the appellant for abetment under s. l65A of the Indian Penal Code must under the circumstances be set aside. On the facts found, the appellant received the money in the presence of and for and on behalf of K and if K was acquitted on the ground that no offence under s. l6I was committed, then no question of intntionally aiding by any act or omission the commission of the offence arose. Consequently, the appellant's conviction for the offence of abetment was not maintainable.

Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, [1954] S.C.R. 145, distinguished.

CRIMINAL

APPELLATE

JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 203 of 1956. _ Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated December 14, 1955, of the Assam High Court at Gauhati in Criminal Appeal No. 54 of 1955, arising out of the judgment and order dated May 23,

I959

January IJ.

z959 1955, of th1l Court of the Special Judge, Lower Assam Districts at Dhubri in Special Case No. 2 of 1954.

Faguna Kanta 1 • Nath Nur-ud-Din Ahmad and K. R. Ohaudhury, for the v. appellant.

The State of Assam Naunit Lal, for the respondent.

1959. January 13.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Kapur J.

KAPUR, J.-This appea.I by special leave is directed against the judgment and order of the High Court of Assam.

The appellant before us was tried for an offence under s. l65A of the" Indian Penal Code for having abetted one Khalilur Rahman in the commission of an offence by the latter under s. 161, Indian Penal Code.

Both the appellant and Khalilur Rahmau were convicted of the offences with which they were charged and sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment. On appeal the High Court acquitted Khalilur Rahman but maintained the conviction and sentence of the appellant.

The facts of this appeal are that on May 9, 1952, the complainant Narendra Nath Brahma was taking two carts carrying 25 Mds. of paddy for sale to Billashiparabazar along the path which runs by the side of the river Gauranga.

When he had gone only a short distance he was stopped by the paddy-checking Inspector, Khalilur Rahman, who was accompanied by the appellant and three others. Khalilur Rahman demanded Rs. 200 as bribe and threatened the complainant that unless the amount demanded was paid his cart and paddy would be seized. In this he was supported by the appellant and three others. The complainant expressed his inability to give that much amount but ultimately he agreed to pay Rs. 150. He borrowed Rs. JOO from one Surajmal Oswal out of which he offered Rs. 80 to Khalilur Rahman who asked him to hand them over to the appellaut who. counted the money and made it over to Khalilur Rahman. The complainant was also forced to execute a promissory note for a sum of Rs. 70 in favour of the appellant and he promised that the money would be paid the following day after the paddy was sold. The

1959 complainant learnt in the bazar that another person Happaram Rai had been similarly treated but he had only paid Rs. 15.

On May 11, 1952, the complainant Fagua 1:anta approached the appellant for the refund of his money ~. and the return of his pronote and although the appel- The State of Assam lant promised he did not do so.

The same day there was a meeting at ]'utkibari Middle English School where the Deputy Commissioner was present. The complainant presented to him a written complaint describing how he was forced to pay Rs. 80 and made to execute a pronote for Rs. 70.

Thereupon both Khalilur Rahman and the appellant were prosecuted, the former under s. 161, Indian Penal Code, read with s. 5(2) of the Preventio;1 of Corruption Act, 1947 (2 'of

1947) and the latter under s. 165A and they were convicted and sentenced by the Special Judge as already stated.

The evidence of the complainant was that before Rs. 200 was demanded from him, the appellant and Khalilur Rahman " went aside and had some talks and coming together accused Khalilur Rahman demanded Rs. 200 ". He also stated "I told them that I managed to procure ls. 80 somehow and I wanted to hand over to accused Khalilur Rahman who directed me to hand over to accused Faguna, saying he would take counting, accused Faguna counted the money and then made over the entire money to accused Khalilur Rahman saying that.Rs. 80 would not do and I should execute a handnote for the balance of Rs. 70 promising to pay on the following Saturday". According to the complainant it was Khalilur Rahman ho tore out a page from his note book and handed over the same to the cqmplainant and also lent him his fountain pen and after the pronote was executed both the pen and the pronote were handed over to Khalilur Rahman. The Special Judge found :-

" I am fully convinced that a sum of Rs. 80 was realised from the complainant for forbearing from seizing of the paddy by the accused Khalilur Rahman, being helped and abetted by the accused ]'aguna Kanta Nath."

Kapur].

z959 He therefore convicted Khalilur Rahman under s. 161, Indian Penal Code, but acquitted him of an offence Faguna Kanta Nath under s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, v. 194 7, and convicted the appellant, for abetment of The State of Asoam that offence. On appeal Deka, J., held that from the complaint made by the complainant it was not Kapur f. clear that any payment was made to Khalilur Rahman. He said :

"It may be that Khalilur. Rahman was a party to squeezing out some money from a dealer in paddy who tried to evade the law, but that falls far short of proving that he had accepted the money through

Fgunakanta Nath as alleged now in Court''.

The learned Judge accepted the complainant's story that money was paid to the appellant but he was of the opinion that the evidence was not strong enough to prove payment to Khalilur Rahman and therefore he was "prepared to give .the benefit of doubt to Khalilur Rahman and direct that his conviction under s. 161, Indian Penal Code be set aside". As to the appellant he was of the opinion that money was taken by him for payment to Khalilur Rahman as illegal gratification and whether he actually paid it to him or not the offence fell under s. 165A and therefore he held the appellant guilty under that section. Thus according to the learned Judge the case against Khalilur Rahman was not proved and as money had been paid to the appellant he was guilty of abetment under s. 165A, Indian Penal Code.

The appellant has come to this Court by special leave.

T.he main argument raised on behalf of the appellant is that as Khalilur Rahman has been acquitted, on the facts and circumstances of this case the conviction of the appellant for abetment cannot be sustained. The evidence of the complainant on which the conviction is based was that the money was demanded by Khalilur Rahman and at bis instance it was made over to the appellant who counted the money and handed it over to Khalilur Rahman. The pronote was also written at the instance of Khalilur Rahman and was handed over to him. The part played by the appellant according to the story of the

complainant was that before the demand of bribe z959 both Khalilur Rahman and the appellant "went aside" and held a conference and Khalilur Rahman then Faguna Kanta Nath demanded Rs. 200. Rs. 80 was brought by the comv. plainant and paid to the appellant at the instance of The State of Assain Khalilur Rahman for the purpose of counting and he in turn gave it to Khalilur Rahman who put it in his Kapur f. trouser's pocket. About this portion of the evidence the trial Court said " it may not be fully true " and the finding of the High Court was that the money remained with him and was not paid to Khalilur Rahman; the question is whether in these circumstances the offence of abetment can be held to have been made out.

Under the.Indian law for an offence of abetment it is not necessary that the offence should have been committed. A man may be guilty as an abettor whether the offence is committed or not.

Section 165A is as follows :

S. 165A "Whoever, abets any offence punishable under section 161 or section 165, whether or not that offence is committed in consequence of the abetment, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years or with fine or with both".

Therefore for a person to be guilty of abetment of an offence under s. 161, it is not necessary that the offence should have been committed.· Abetment is defined in s. 107 and a person abets the doing of a thing when

(1) he instigates any person to do that thing or (2) engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the dofog of that thing, ...... or (3) intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation (2) to s. 107 is as follows:-

" Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act." It is not suggested that there was any instigation by the appellant for the commission of the offence.

'959 Further the circumstances proved against the appellant

Fagnna Kanta did not bring the case under the second part of s. 107

Nath bec.ause it is not alleged that there was any conspiracy v. and a charge of conspiracy must necessarily fail if the The State of Assam other alleged conspirator is acquitted: See The King

v. Plummer (1) which has received the approval of this Kapur J.

Court in Topandas v. State of Bombay (2).

In either of , these cases it is immaterial whether the person instigated commits the offence or not or the persons conspiring together actually carry out the object of conspiracy.

There then remains the third part of s. 107 that is abetment by aid.

A person abets by aiding when by the commission of an act he intends to facilitate and does facilitate the commission thereof. By the acquittal of Khalilur Rahman. the High Court must be deemed to have held that there was nci offence under s. 161.

But it was contended on behalf of the respondent that the acquittal of Khalilur Rahman was wrong and this Court should hold that a wrong acquittal does not prevent the conviction of the appellant for the offence of abetment. Counsel for the respondent referred to Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab(') where at p. 156 Bose, J., said:

"We have taken into consideration the fact that the High Court considers that the portion of Mst.

Punnan's story regarding the lambardars has been falsely introduced by the police, also .that both courts have rejected the evidence about the dying declaration.

Despite that, we agree with the learned Sessions Judge that Mst. Punnan and Mst. Charni are to be believed regarding the main facts and that they correctly named all seven accused as the assailants. On that finding the conviction under section 302 read with section 149 can be sustained. We accordingly uphold these convictions. The acquittals in the other three cases will of course stand but the mere fact that these persons have, in our opinion, been wrongly acquitted cannot affect the conviction in other cases ".

In that case although the High Court had acquitted three accused persons of an offence under s. 302 read

(1) [1902] 2 K.B. 339.

(2) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 881.

(3) [1954] S.C.R. 145

withs. 149, Indian Penal Code, yet as in the opinion

I959 of this Court the acquittal was wrongs. 149 was held Faguna Kanta applicable in the case of four others who had been Nath convicted by the High Court of s. 302 read with v. s. 149. The decision in that case must be circumscrib- The State of Assam ed to the peculiar circumstances of that case. In the present case the person who demanded the illegal Kapur J. gratification for allowing the carts to proceed was Khalilur Rahman who had the authority to do or not to do a particular act and all"that the appellant is alleged to have done was to receive the money at the instance of Khalilur Rahman for counting and then paid the money to him. It is not tbe prosecution case that the appellant abetted tbe offence by instigating Khalilur Rahman to demand the illegal gratification ; nor has the prosecution set up or proved a case of conspiracy between the appellant and Khalilur Rahman for the commission of an offence under s. 161.

On the findings of the Court the appellant received the money for and on behalf of Khalilur Rahman and the evidence of t_he complai:dant is that Khalilur Rahman bad asked him to hand over the money to the appellant. If Khalilur Rahman is acquitted and therefore the offence under s. 161 is held not to have been committed, then in this case no question of intentionally aiding by any act or omission the commission of the offence arises. It may be as counsel for the respondent contended that the acquittal of Khalilur Rahman is wrong and it appears and we say so with respect that the findings of the High Court are inconsistent but as the matter of Khalilur Rahman is not before us by way of appeal against acquittal we do not express any opinion on that question.

We are of the opinion that on the facts found and circumstances established in this case and as Khalilur Rahman has been acquitted the appellant's conviction cannot be upheld.

We therefore allow this appeal and set aside the order of conviction. The bail bonds shall also stand discharged.

Appeal allowed.

FAGUNA KANTA NATH

THE STATE OF ASSAM

L. KAPUR

Penal Code

Indian Penal Code

s. 161

s. 161

Indian Penal Code

Indian Penal Code

Indian Penal Code

s. 161

Indian Penal Code

s. 161

Indian Penal Code

s. 5(2)

Corruption Act, 1947

s. 165A

s. 161

Indian Penal Code

s. 5(2)

Prevention of Corruption Act

s. 161

Indian Penal Code

s. 165A

s. 165A

Indian Penal Code

Section 165A

S. 165A

section 161

section 165

s. 161

s. 107

s. 107

s. 107

s. 107

s. 161

section 302

section 149

s. 302

[1955] 2 S.C.R. 881

Indian Penal Code

s. 302

s. 149

s. 161

s. 161


(2) S.O.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 201

Coal Company v. Boloram Mahata (1) was relied upon. 1959 Coutts Trotter, C. J., was also of the opinion that the Mangalmurti covenant was not too vague to be enforced. But this v. again was a case not of interfering with the deter- State of Bombay mination of a valuer but of specific performance of a contract of renewal and it was held that by taking evidence even a vague and indefinite covenant relating to renewal could be made definite.

In my opinion, therefore, the Court cannot go into the question of correctness or otherwise of the determination of the lease and the appeal should therefore be dismissed with costs.

BY OouRT.-In view of the opinion of the majority, the appeals are allowed, setting aside the judgment and decree of the High Court dated September 30, 1952.

No order as to costs of the hearing in this Court.

.Appeals allowed .

. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH v.

MUBARAK ALI (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR and K. SuBBA RAo, JJ.) Criminal Law-Public servant receiving bribe-Investigation by officer below rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police-Permission to investigate granted by Magistrate-Order not disclosing material before Magistrate nor disclosing reasons for order-Permission, if invalid-Investigation, scope of-Prevention of Corruption Act, r947

(2 of r947), s. 5A-Code of Criminal Procedure, r898 (Act 5 of

I898), S. 4(I)."

Section 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, provided: "No police officer below the rank ......... of a deputy Superintendent shall investigate any offence punishable under s. 161, s. 165 or s. l65A of the Indian Penal Code or under s. 5(2) of the Act without the order of. ........ a magistrate of the first class ......... ".

(1) (1880) L.R. 7 I.A. ro;.

Kapur .f.

I959

February 3.

I959

The State of M adhy.i l'radesh

Mubarak Ali

On January II, 1955, B, the manager of a company, gave information to the Sub-Inspector of Police, Special Police Establishment, that the respondent, an Assistant Station Master, was demanding a bribe for sending the goods belonging to the company by raiL The Sub-Inspector, after assisting B to trap the respondent, came on the scene, questioned the latter, searched his person and recovered the marked notes and other articles from him. The Sub-Inspector filed an application before the District Magistrate, stating that he had been deputed to investigate the case and the permission might be given to him to do so under s. 5A of the Act. On the application the Magistrate passed the order ' 1 permission given." Neither the application nor the order made thereon disclosed that any material was placed before the Magistrate on the basis of which he gave permission.

A charge-sheet was filed before the Special Judge. The respondent filed objections questioning, inter alia, the validity of the Magistrate giving permission to the Sub-Inspector to make the investigation. The Special Judge disallowed the objection. On revision, the High Court set aside the order of the Special Judge with a direction that" in order to rectify the defects and cure the illegality" he should order the Deputy Superintendent of Police to carry on the investigation himsef while the case remained pending on his file.

The State preferred an appeal against the order of the High Court by special leave:- Held, that the statutory safeguards under s. 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act must strictly be complied with for they were conceived in public interest and were provided as a guarantee against frivolous and vexatious prosecution~.

A Magistrate cannot surrender his discretion to a police officer, but must exercise it having regard to the relevant material made available to him at the stage of granting permission. He must also be satisfied that there is sufficient reason owing to the exigencies of the administrative convenience to entrust a subordinate officer with the investigation.

Where an officer other than the designated officer seeks to make an investigation, he should get order of a Magistrate empowering him to do so before he proceeds to investigate, and it is desirable that the order giving the permission should ordinarily on the face of it disclose the reasons for giving permission.

Where objection is taken by the accused that the order giving permission was invalid, the prosecution, at the earliest opportunity, must adduce evidence to support the contention that the Magistrate gave the permission only after having satisfied himself on the advisability of doing so on the material placed before him.

H. N. Rishbud & Inder Singh v. State of Delhi, [r955] r S.C.R. n50 and Viswabhusan Naik v. The State of Orissa, [1955] I S.C.R. 92, relied on.

Held, further, that an investigation starts after the police x959 officer receives information in regard to an offence, and that as under s. 5 of the Act attempt to obtain from any person any The State of gratification is in itself an offence, any steps taken by the Sub- Madhya Pradesh Inspector after the information was given to him amounted to v. investigation.

Mubarak Ali

CRIMINAL

APPELLATE

JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 141 of 1958.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated November. 28, 1957, of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Criminal Revision No. 78 of 1957, arising out of the judgment and order dated August 21, 1957, of the Court of Special Judge at Gwalior in File No. 2/57 Special Case.

G. 0. Mathur and R.H. Dhebar, for the appellant.

The respondent did not appear.

1959. February 3.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SuBBA RAO, J.-This is an appeal by special leave Subba Rao J. against the Judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at J abalpur directing the Special Judge, Indore, to order the Deputy Superintendent of Police to carry on the investigation afresh. The facts are simple.

One Shri Mohinder Nath Bhalla was the manager of Daisy Sewing Machine Co. Ltd., Bhopal. On January 11, 1955, between 12 and 1 p. m., he contacted the Sub-Inspector of Police, Special Police Establishment, Gwalior, and gave him the following information: The company had opened their stall in the Gwalior Mela and. he (Shri Bhalla) had to book empty wooden cases of machine and machine parts from Golakmandir railway station, which was near th<?

Gwalior Mela, to New Delhi. When he went to the station to enquire for booking the said cases, the Station Master demanded annas ten for each case as illegal gratification, but he did not agree to it. Subsequently, the Assistant Station Master agreed to accept annas eight for each case and asked him to bring the wooden cases between 2 and 4 p. m. on the same day, i.e., January 11, 1955. On this allegation he requested the police to take action " to stop the said sort of

z959

The State of Madhya Pradesh v.

Mubarak Ali

Subba Rao ].

corruption". The police officer went along with the informant to his stall at Gwalior Mela and saw the twenty wooden .cases_..:twelve big and eight smallready for booking.

The said Shri Bhalla gave the police officer a typed complaint signed by him and duly attested by two witnesses.

With the assistance of the police officer, a trap was laid. The numbers of the rupee notes intended to be given as bribe to the Assistant Station Master were entered in a memorandum which was attested by witnesses. The said rupee notes were given to Shri Bhalla in the presence of the witnesses. Shri Bhalla was instructed to pay the amount to the Assistant Station Master when demanded by him in such a manner that the witnesses could overhear the conversation and also see the Assistant Station Master taking the bribe. He was also told that on his giving a signal, the police would come on the scene.

The plan was carried out in detail as agreed. The Assistant Station Master, after some bargaining, took the bribe, and after the act of bribery was completed, Shri Bhalla gave the pre- • arranged signal.

The Sub-Inspector then went to the Station Office and disclosed his identity to the Assistant Station Master in the presence of witnesses and asked him to produce the money taken by him as bribe. The Assistant Station Master, when questioned by the Sub-Inspector, gave him his name and also produced the notes which he had kept in his pocket.

The police officer took those notes and counted them.

The numbers on those notes tallied with those noted in the memorandum. He then searched the person of the Assistant Station Master and secured the articls found on him. He also searched the person of Shri Bhalla and took from his shirt two currency notes, which he did not give to the Assistant Station Master, as the bargain was struck at a smaller amount, and secured the same. The numbers of those notes also tallied with the corresponding numbers noted in the memorandum. Thereafter, a memorandum of the articles recovered was prepared in the presence of the witnesses and was duly attested by them. The forwarding note, together with the record copy of the

R/R prepared in respect of the booking of the twenty wooden cases to New Delhi, was taken possession of and another memorandum was prepared in regard to them.

An inventory of the twenty wooden cases lying on the platform near the weighing machine as booked by the Assistant Station Master was also prepared and the same was attested by the witnesses.

The Sub-Inspector, having regard to the aforesaid facts, came to the conclusion that the facts disclosed offences punishable under ss. 120-B and 161 of the Indian Penal Code and s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (2 of 1947), had been committed by the Assistant Station Master, Shri Mubarak Ali, and the pointsman, Shri Mool Chand, of Golakamandir railway station. On the same day he sent a report of the aforesaid facts to the Special Police Establishment, Office, Madhya Bharat. The office registered it on January 14, 1955, in its register. Seven days thereafter, on January 21, 1955, the Sub-Inspector filed an application . before the Additional District Magistrate (Judicial), Gwalior, asking for permission to investigate the offence under the aforesaid sections.

The record does not disclose what further steps were taken by the Sub-Inspector after he obtained the said permission from the Additional District Magistrate. On October 1, 1955, a charge-sheet was filed before the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption, Indore. It appears from the record that soon after the case was taken up for trial, the respondent filed objections questioning, inter alia, the validity of the order of the Additional District Magistrate giving permission to the Sub- Inspect0r to make the investigation. But the scope of the objections is not clear as they have not been placed before us. It appears that the Special Judge intended to take evidence on the question of delegation of power of investigation, but the prosecution applied for adjournment on the ground that an appeal had been filed in the High Court against a similar order directing the prosecution to give evidence on the said question and the same was pending there. The learned Special Judge, though inclined not to give the adjournment, made an order giving an adjournment

I959

The State of Madhya Pradesh v.

Mubarak Ali

Subba Rao].

'959 of three weeks on December 3, 1955, on the ground

The State of that "the Specia~ Police Establishment Office might Madhya Prndcsh not have any gnevance on that account". We do v. not know what transpired between December 3, 1955, Muba•ak Ali and the date of disposal of the objections by the Special Judge, i.e., August 21, 1957.

On August 21, Subba Rao f 1957, the learned Special Judge made au order discharging Shri Moo! Chand, the pointsman, and charging Shri Mubarak Ali, the Assistant Station Master, under s. 161 of the Indian Penal Code.

By the said order the learned Judge, presumably an officer different from the one who gave the adjournment in 1955, disallowed the objection of the accnsed on the ground that on the date when the Magistrate gave the sanction, there were many papers in connection with a case against the accused, on observing which the Magistrate could have satisfied himselfwhetherthere was a prima facie case or not against the accused and that there was no reason to believe that at the time of giving the sanction, the Magistrate did not peruse the papers. The accused preferred a Revision against the said order to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh.

The High Court came to the conclusion that the Sub- Inspector applied for permission ten days after investigation had started and that the Magistrate did not satisfy himself that there were good and sufficient reasons for authorising the officer of a lower rank to conduct the investigation but had given the permission as a mere matter of routine. In the result, the High Court set aside the order of the Special Judge with a direction that " in order to rectify the defects ' and cure the illegality " he should order the Deputy Superintendent of Police to carry on the investigation himself while the case remains pending on his file".

The State preferred the present appeal against the said order of the High Court.

Learned Counsel, appearing for the State, raised before us two. points: , (i) the High Court was not justified in holding that the Magistrate gave the permission as a mere matter of routine without satisfying himself as to the advisability of giving such permission ; (ii) the High Court was wrong in holding

that the investigation started ten days prior to the 1959 obtaining of permission of the Magistrate by the Sub- The State of Inspector.

Madhya Pradesh To appreciate the first contention, it is necessary to v .• set out some of the relevant provisions of The Preven- Mubarak Ali tion of Corruption Act, 1947 (2 of 1947), hereinafter referred to as the Act.

Subba Rao J.

Section 3 (as it stood before the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 1955 (50 of 1955):

" An offence punishable under section 161 or section 165 or section 165A of the Indian Penal Code (Act 45 of 1860) shall be deemed to be a cognizable offence for the purposes of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act 5 of 1898), notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained therein".

Section 4. "(1) Where in any trial of an offence punishable under section 161 or section 165 of the Indian Penal Code (Act 45 of 1860), it is proved that an accused person has accepted or obtained, or has agreed to accept or attempted to obtain, for himself or for any other person, any gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing from any person, it shall be presumed unless the contrary is proved that he accepted or obtained, or agreed to accept or attempted to obtain, that gratification or that valuable thing, as the case may be, as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in the said section 161, or, as the case may be, without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate".

The Act was passed, as the preamble indicates, to make more effective provisions for the prevention of bribery and corruption among public servants. It introduced a definition of the offence of criminal misconduct in discharging an official duty and new rules of presumption against accused in the case of the said offence.

But in the year 1952, by Act 59 of 1952, presumably on the basis of the experience gained, s. 5A was inserted in the Act to protect the public servants against harassment and victimization. If it was in the interest of the public that corruption should be eradicated, it was equally in the interest of the public that honest public servants should be able to

'959 discharge their duties free from false, frivolous and

The State of malici?us accusations. To. achieve this object, ss. 5A Madhya Pradesh and 6 mtroduced the followmg two safeguards: (1) no . v. police officer below the rank-(a) in the presidency

Mubrak Ali towns of Madras and Calcutta, of an assistant com- . missioner of police, (b) in the presidency town of Subba Rao f. Bombay, of a superintendent of police and (c) elsewhere, of a deputy superintendent of police, shall investigate any offence punishable under s. 161, s. 165 or s. 165A of the Indian Penal Code or under sub-s. (2) of s. 5 of the Act, without the order of a presidency magistrate or a magistrate of the first class, as the case may be, or make any arrest therefor without a warrant-see s. 5A ; (2) no court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under s. 161 or s. 164 or s. 165 of the Indian Penal Code or under s. 5(2) of the Act, alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction, of the appropriate Government-see s. 6.

These statutory safeguards must be strictly complied with, for they were conceived in public interests and were provided as a guarantee against frivolous and vexatious prosecutions.

While in the case of an officer of assured status and rank, the legislature was prepared to believe them implicitly, it prescribed an additional guarantee in the case of police officers below that rank, namely, the previous order of a presidency magistrate or a magistrate of the first class, as the case may be. The magistrate's status gives assurance to the bona fides of the investigation.

In such circumstances, it is self-evident that a ma'gistrate cannot surrender his discretion to a police offic0r, but must exercise it having regard to the relevant material made available to him at that stage. He must also be satisfied that there is sufficient reason, owing to the exigencies of administrative convenience, to entrust a subordinate officer with the investigation.

This Court in H. N. Rishbud and Inder Singh v. The State of Delhi (1) emphasised the necessity to adhere strictly to the provisions of s. 5A of the Act. J agannadhadas, J.; who delivered the judgment of the Court, observed at p. 1159 :

(•) [1955] I S.C.R. 1150.

" When, therefore, the Legislature thought fit to x959

remov~ the protection rom t?e ublic servants, in so The State of far as it relates to the mvest1gat10n of the offences of Madhya Pradesh corruption comprised in the Act, by making them v. cognisable, it may be presumed that it was considered Mubarak Ali necessary to provide a substituted safeguard from undue harassment by re_quiring that the investigation Subba Rao f. is to be conducted normally by a police officer of a designated high rank. Having regard therefore to the peremptory language of sub-section (4) of section 5 of the Act as well as to the policy apparently underlying it, it is reasonably clear that the said provision must be taken to be mandatory". .

After adverting to the argument advanced on behalf of the State, the learned Judge closed the discussion thus at p. 1162:

" We are, therefore, clear in our opinion that section 5(4) and proviso to section 3 of the Act and the corresponding section 5-A of Act LIX of 1952 are mandatory and not directory and that the investigation conducted in violation thereof bears the stamp of illegality ".

This Court again considered the scope of s. 6 of the Act in Biswabhusan. Naik v. The State of Orissa (1).

One of the questions raised there was that the .sanction given by the Government was invalid. In rejecting that contention Bose, J., observed at p. 95:

" The judgment of the Judicial Committee relates to clause 23 of the Cotton Cloth and Yarn (Control) Order, 1943, but the principles apply here. It is no more necessary for the sanction under the Prevention of Corruption Act to be in any particular form, or in writing. or for it to set out the facts in respect of which it is given than it was under clause 23 of the Order which their Lordships wer{) considering. The de:; iirability of such a course is obvious because when the facts . are not set out in. the sanction proof has to be given aliunde that sanction was given in respect of the facts constituting . the offence charged, but an

(r) [1955] r S.C.R. 92. 27 .•

The State of Madhya Pradesh v.

Mubarak Ali

Subba Rao j.

omission to do so is not fatal so long as the facts can be, and are, proved in some other way".

While the former decision emphasises the importance of the protection given by the Act to public servants against harassment, the latter decision points out the desirability of giving all the necessary facts in an order giving sanction-the same applies to an order of a Magistrate-and also the necessity of proof aliunde of the said facts in case the facts are not disclosed in the sanction. Applying the said two principles, we must hold that in a case where an officer other than the designated officer, seeks to make an investigation, he should get the order of a Magistrate empowering him to do so before he proceeds to investigate and it is desirable that the order giving the permission should ordinarily, on the face of it, disclo8e the reasons/for giving the permission. .Fm one reason or other, if the said salutary practice is not adopted in a particular case, it is the duty oft.he prosecution to establish, if that fact is denied, that the Magistrate in fact has taken into consideration the relevant -circumstances before granting the permission to a subordinate police officer to investigate the case.

In the present case, though objection was taken by the accused at the earliest stage in 1955 on the ground that the order giving permission was invalid no attempt was made by the prosecution, though years have elapsed between the date of the petition and that of the order of the Sessions Judge, to adduce any evidence to support the contention that the Magistrate gave the permission to the Sub-Inspector only after satisfying himself on the advisability of doing so on the material placed before him. The only material that was placed before the Sessions Judge was the application filed by the Sub-Inspector before the Magistrate seeking the said permission and the order made by him thereon. In that application the Sub-Inspector stated that he had been deputed to investigate the case and therefore permission might be given to him to do so under s. 5-A of the Act.

On that application, the Magistrate passed the order "permission given". Neither the application

nor the order made thereon discloses that any matex959 rial was placed before th~ fagistrate o_n _the basis The State of of which he gave the perm1ss10n.

Ex facie it appears Madhya Pradesh to us, just like it appeared to the High Court, v. that the Magistrate did not realise the significance Mubarak Ali of his order giving permission, but only mechanically issued the order on the basis of the application Subba Rao f. which did not disclose any reason, presumably because he thought that what was required was only a formal compliance with the provisions of the section.

A request was made before the High Court that an opportunity should be given to the prosecution to enable them to produce the necessary evidence to support the order of the Magistrate. But the learned Judge of the High Court rightly did not accede to that belated request. We, therefore, without any hesitation, agree with the High Court that the provisions of s. 5A of the Act have not been strictly complied with in this case.

In this view no other question arises for consideration. But as the learned Counsel appearing for the State contended that the observations of the learned Judge of the High Court that permission of the Magistrate was obtained ten days after the investigation was started was wrong, it would be as well that we considered the argument briefly. Section 4(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure defines " invest!gation " as to include all the proceedings under that Code for the collection of evidence conducted by the police officer or other persons other than a Magistrate who is authorised by the Magistrate in this behalf. Chapter XIV of the Code prescribes the procedure for investigation.

Investigation starts after the police officer receives information in regard to an offence.

Under the Code "investigation consists generally of the following steps: (i) proceeding to the spot ; (ii) ascertainment of the facts and circumstances of the case; (iii) discovery and arrest of the. suspected offender; (iv) collection of evidence relating to the commission of the offence which may consist of (a) the

examinat1on of various persons (including the accused) and the reduction of their statements into writing, if

z959' the officer thinks fit, (b) the search of places of seizure

The state of of things considered trecessry for the investiation Madhya Pradesh and to. b: produced• at the trial; and (v) format10n of v. the opm10n as to whether oh the material' collected Mubarak Ali there is a case to place the accused before a Magistrate for trial and if so taking the necessary steps for the' Subba Rao f. same by the filing of a charge-sheet under s. 173. "-· ' See H. N. Rishbud and Inder Singh'v: The 'Stdfe of Delhi (1).

From the narration of facts given supra, 'it would be seen that in the present case Shri 'Bhalla gave information to the Sub-Inspector on January 11, 1955, as regards the attempt by the Station Master as well as the Assistant Station Master to take bribe from him.

Under s. 5 of the Act, attempt to obtain from any person for himself or for any other person any gratification is in itself an offence and there' fore the information certainly related to an offence.

Thereafter, the Sub-Inspector, after assisting Shri Bhalla to trap the accused, came on the scene, questioned the accused, searched his person and recovered the marked notes and other articles from him ; he searched the person of the informant and recovered the other notes marked but not given to the accused; he took possession of the twenty wooden boxes intended to be booked and the forwarding note together with the record copy of the R/R; he got prepared relevant memoranda for the aforesaid recoveries and got them duly attested by witnesses; and thereafter on the basis of his investigation he sent a report to the Special Police Establishment Office, Indore. We do not know on the material placed before us what further things he did in the matter of investigation between the 14th and 21st when he obtained the permission of the District Magistrate. In the circumstances, we must hold, agreeing with the High Court that the investigation in this case was started by the Sub-Inspector on the 11th, i.e., ten days prior to his obtaining permission of the Magistrate.

The appeal fails and is dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.

(z) [1955] 1 S.C.R. II50.

THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

MUBARAK ALI (P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR

A. K. SARKAR

K. SuBBA RAo, JJ.

Prevention of Corruption Act

s. 5A

Code of Criminal Procedure

S. 4(I)

Section 5A

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947

s. 161

s. 165

Indian Penal Code

s. 5(2)

s. 5A

s. 5A

Prevention of Corruption Act

s. 5

ss. 120

Indian Penal Code

s. 5(2)

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947

s. 161

Indian Penal Code

Section 3

section 161

section 165

section 165A

Indian Penal Code

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898

Section 4

section 161

section 165

Indian Penal Code

section 161

s. 5A

ss. 5A

s. 161

s. 165

s. 165A

Indian Penal Code

s. 5

s. 5A

s. 161

s. 164

s. 165

Indian Penal Code

s. 5(2)

s. 6

s. 5A

section 5

section 5(4)

section 3

section 5

s. 6

clause 23

Prevention of Corruption Act

clause 23

s. 5

s. 5A

Section 4(1)

Code of Criminal Procedure

Chapter XIV of the Code

s. 173

s. 5