{"document_id": "1958_1_1218_1225_EN", "year": 1958, "text": "l!JJ8\n\nSrt11tosli K1tm'lr\n\nv Bltai .Jlool Singh\n\nBoe J.\n\n1''1'.bruury 6.\n\n1218 SUPHE:\\IE C'OUHT JUWOH'l'S [1958]\n\narbitrarily. or is based on a misunderstanding of the principles that govern its exercise. then interference is called for if there has been a resultant failure of justice. As we have said, the only ground given for concluding that the defence is not bona fide is that the defendant did not prove his assertions before he was allowed to put in his defence; and there\n\ni' an obvious failure of justice if judgment is entered against a. man who, if he is allowed to prove his case, cannot but succeed. Accordingly, interference is called for here.\n\nThe appeal is allowed. We set aside the orders of the High Court and the learned trial Judge and remand the case to the first Court for trial of the issues raised by the defendants. The costs of the appellants in this Court will be paid by the respondent who has failed here.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nKANT A PRASHAD\n\nDELHI ADMINISTRATION\n\n(and connected appeal)\n\n(B. P. SINHA and JAFER IMAM JJ.)\n\nCriminal Law-Grant of pardon-Power of the District Magistrate--.Case triable by Court of Special Judge-Cou1't of Session=-ConcUrrent jurisdiction to tender pardon-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (2 of 1947), s. 5(2)-Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 (46 of 1952), ss. 8(2)(3), 9-Code of Cm minal Procedure (Act 5 of 1898). ss. 337. 338.\n\nThe appellants were convicted under s. 120B and s. 224/109 of the Indian Penal Code and s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, by the Court of Special Judge constituted under the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952. It was contended I\n\nfor them that lhe conviction was bad on the ground inter alia that the pardon tendered to the approver by the Ditsrict M.agistrate under s. 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by virtue\n\nof which he was examined as a witness by the Special Judge,\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPRE'.ME countr REPORTS 1219\n\nwas without jurisdiction. The contention was that the provisions Qf s. 337 were not applicable to the case, as the offence under s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, was punishable with impl'li!ionment which may extend to ten years, while s. 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure enabled a Distr'ict\n\nMagistrate to tender a pardon \"in the case of any offence triable exclusively by the High Court or a Court of Session or any offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to ten years ............ \". But under ss. 8(3) and 9 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952, for the purposes of the Couri of Criminal Procedure, the Court of Special Judge is deemed to be 1.1 Court of Session 1lI'yi, ng cases without jur-·:\n\nHeld, that although the offence was triable exclusively by the Court of Special Judge, the District Magistrate had authomty to tender a pardon under s. 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as tbe Court of Special Judge was, 1ln law, a Court of Session.\n\nCRIMIN'AL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeals Nos. 202 and 203 of 1957.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated November 16, 1956, of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) at Delhi in Criminal Appeals Nos. 31-D and 506-C Gf 1956, arising out of the judgment and order dated August 31. 1956, of the Court .of the Special Judge at Delhi, in Corruption Case No. 8 of 1956.\n\nD. R. Kalia and K. L. Arora, for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 202 of 1957.\n\nD. R. Katia and Raghu Nath; for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 203 of 1957.\n\nH. J. Umrigar and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent in both the appeals.\n\n1958. February 6. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nIMAM J.-The appellants, who were police constables at the time of.the occurrence, were convicted by the Special Judge of Delhi under s. 1208 and s. 224/ 109 of the Indian\n\nPenal Code and s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (2 of 1-947). They were sentenced to two years' rigorous imprisonment under s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and to nine months' rigorous imprisonment under each of the ss. 1208 and 224/ 109 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\n.Kantn Prw~!trul\n\nv. ])d!i; Ar..lminil!t.raUon\n\nlmam, J.\n\n/!1.iS\n\nAr1nt11 Pra.lwd\n\nJJdld\n\nAdminitn1liun\n\nluwm .!,\n\n1220 SUPREME ('Ol'RT UEPOUTS [1958]\n\nThe sentences of imprisonment were directed to run concurrently. Their appeals to the Punjab High Court were dismissed and the present appeals are by special leave.\n\nThe case of the prosecution, as stated in the charge, was that the appellants had onspired at Delhi with Ram Saran Das, the approver, M.P. Khare, Nand Parkash Kapur and Murari between the 16th and 16th of November, 1955, to bring <(bout the escape from lawful custody of M.P. Khare, an undertrial prisoner, and that they had also agreed to accept Rs. I ,000 each and other pecuniary advantages as illegal gratification for rendering the escape of M. P. Khare from lawful custody and that in pursuance of the said conspiracy they had a.betted the escape of M. P. Khare and that they had accepted the illegal gratification from Nand Parkash Kapur.\n\nIt is clear from the findings of the courts below that M.P.\n\nKhare escaped from lawful custody and the appellants had enabled him to do so and that they had received money as illegal gratification for the part they had played in enabling M. P. Khare to escape from lawful custody.\n\nThe learned Advocate for the appellants had submitted live points for our consideration in support of his contention that the conviction of the appellants must be set aside (!) the pardon tendered lo the approver Ram Saran Das by the District Mµgistrale of Delhi under s. 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was without jurisdiction and authority. Consequent ly, the evidence of the approver was not admissible (2) on the case of the prosecution, the offence of conspiracy lo commit an offence under s. 224 of the Indian Penal Code had not been committed but that offence, if at all, was one under s. 222 of the Indian Penal Code. As an offence under s. 222 of the Indian Penal Code is a non-cognizable offence no conviction under s. I20B of the Indian Penal Code could be had in the absence of a sanction under s. l 96A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (3) Prosecution witnesses Mela Ram, P.W. 6, and Shiv Parshad. P.W. 7. were accomplices on their own show ing a.nd as such their testimony could not be taken into consideration (4) no test identification parade of the appellants\n\nhad been held (5) the charge, as framed, contra.vened the mandatory provisions of s. 233 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nPoints 3, 4 and 5 may be disposed of at the outset. We have examined the evidence of Mela Ram and Shiv Pa-rshad and find nothing in their evidence which establishes them as accomplices. It does not appear that before the High Court it had ever been urged that these witnesses were accomplices and their evidence could not be taken into consideration to corroborate the approver. It was, however, urged that these witnesses were unreliable because they had knowledge that an attempt would be made to enable M.P. Khare to escape from lawful custody and yet they informed no authority about it. As to the reliability of these witnesses the' courts below were entitled to believe them and nothing of any consequence has been placed before us to convince us to take a different view from that taken by the courts below.\n\nAs for the test identification parade, it is tnw tliat no test identification parade wa.s held. The appellants were known to the police officials who had deposed against the appellants and the only persons who did not know them before were the persons who gave evidence of association, to which the High Court did not attach much importance. It would no doubt have been prudent to hold a test identification parade with respect to witnesses who did not know the accused before the occurrence, but failure to hold such a parade would not make inadmissible the evidence of ideritification in court. The weight to be attached to such identification would be a matter for the courts of fact and it is not for this Court to reassess the evidence unless exceptional grounds were established necessitating such a course.\n\nIt is true that no separate charges were framed under ss. 120B, 224/109 of the Indian Penal Code and s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, I 947. Separate charges should have been framed as required bys. 233 of the Code of Crimim1l Procedure. In our opinion, the irregularity committed, in\n\n19J8\n\nKanta .Prashad\n\nDelhi Administration\n\nImam .J.\n\n19:J8\n\n)\\ (l//{(I f'l'08}Uld\n\nv. l>dhi Atlminisfrntion\n\nJrnrim .J.\n\nthis case, was cured by the provisions of s. 537 of the Code.\n\nIt is to be noticed that it was urged before the Special Judge that separate charges should have been framed and that a single charge shou!d not have been framed but the objection had been abandoned by the Advocate for the accused when the Special Judge told him that if it was his contention that the accused had been prejudiced by this from of the charge. he would frame separate charges under separate heads and then proceed with the trial. Furthermore, when the charge was framed. the public prosecutor had urged that charges under separate heads for each offence should be framed and that they should not be joined together under one head. The Advocate for the accused, however, had urged that the charge, as framed, was correct. It seems to us that when the charge was being framed the Advocate for the appellants desired that the charge as framed should stand and the public prosecutor's objection should be overruled. It cannot be now urged that the appellants were prejudiced by the charge as framed. Indeed, the Advocate for the appellants abandoned this objection and there is nothing in the High Court's judgment to show that this contention was again raised. We cannot permit such a question to be raised at this stage. It seems to us, therefore, that there is no substance in the submissions made on behalf of the appellants with reference to the abovementioned points 3, 4 and S.\n\nWith reference to the second point, even if it is assumed that the offence alleged against the appellants does not come under s. 224 of the Indian Penal Code, but under s. 222 of the Indian Penal Code, it has to be remembered that this would be of academic interest in this case, if the appellants have been rightly convicted under s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. It also does not appear from the judgments of the Special Judge and the High Court that it had been contended that there was no sanction under s. 196A of the Code of Criminal Procedure and consequently the court could not take cognizance of the offence under f. l 20B of the Indian Penal Code. Whether a sanction had been granted under s. 196A was a question of fact which ought to have\n\nbeen urged at the trial and before the High Court It is impossible at this stage to go into this question of fact. Furthermore, this question also is one of academic interest if the conviction and sentence of the appellants under s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, are affirmed.\n\nComing now to the first point urged on behalf of the appellants, it would appear that the District Magistrate of Delhi granted a pardon under s. 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to Ram Saran Das, the approver, in consequence of which Ram Saran Das was examined as a witness by the Special Judge. It was urged that the District Magistrate could not grant a pardon when the case was triable by the Court of Special Judge constituted under the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952. The offence under s. 5(2) of the Prevention\n\nof Corruption Act, 1947, is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both. It was not an offence which was punishable with imprisonment which may extend to ten years. The provisions of s. 337 enabled a District Magistrate to tender a pard/Jn in the case of any offence triable exclusively by the High Court or a. Court of Session, or any offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to ten years, or any offence punishable under s. 211 of the Indian Penal Code with imprisonment vyhich may extend to seven years, or any offence\n\nunder ss. 216A, 369, 401, 435 and 477A of the Indian Penal Code. These provisions of s. 337 at the time that the pardon: was tendered were inapplicabl.e as the present case was not covered by its terms. It is pointed out that the High Court erred in supposing that the District Magistrate could grant pardon in a case where the offence was punishable with imprisorunent which may extend to seven years or more and which was triable exclusively by the Court of Session. The Code of Criminal Procedure at the time that the pardon was granted spoke of an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years and not seven years. The amendment to s. 337 of the Code. which came\n\nKanta PrashaJ.\n\nDelhi Administration\n\nIm°'\".!.\n\n)!J.j8\n\nKanfn Prasl1ad\n\nv. lJelhi Admi1ti1Sfralion\n\nf111a 111 ./,\n\n1224 SUPREi\\JE COURT REPORTS\n\n[I 958)\n\ninto effect in January, 1956, spoke of an offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years, but this amendment could have no application to a pardon tendered on 1-12-'55. It seems to us, however, that the District Magistrate had authority to tender a pardon under s. 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with reference to a case concerning an offence triable exclusively by the Special Judge and, therefore. we need not consider whether the offence was punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years. Under s. 8(3) of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 1952 it is expressly stated that for the purposes of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the Court of Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Court of Session trying cases without a jury or without the aid of assessors. Section 9 of that Act provides for an appeal from the Court of the Special Judge to the High Court and states that the High Court may exercise, as far as they may be applicable, all the powers conferred by Chapters XXXI and XXXII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, I 898, as if the Court of the Special Judge were a Court of Session trying cases without a jury. It would seem, therefore, that although a Special Judge is a court constituted under the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act yet, for the purposes of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that Act, it is a Court of Session. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that although the offence was triable exclusively by the Court of the Special Judge the District Magistrate had• authority to tender a pardon under s. 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as the court of the Special Judge was, in law, a Court of Session.\n\nIt was, however, suggested that the proper authority to grant the pardon was the Special Judge and not the District Magistrate, but it seems to us that the position of the Special Judge in this matter was similar to that of a Judge of a Court of Session. The proviso to s. 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure contemplates concurrent jurisdiction in the District Magistrate and the Magistrate making an enquiry or holding the trial to tender a pardon. According to the provisions of\n\ns.c.n.\n\nSUPREl\\Il~ COURT REPOR'fS 1225\n\ns. 338 of the Code, even after commitment but before judgment is passed, the Court to which the commitment is made may tender a pardon or order the committing Magistrate or the District Magistrate to tender a pardon. It would seem, therefore that the District Magistrate is empowered to tender a pardon even after a commitment if the Court so directs.\n\nUnder s. 8(2) of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952, the Special . Judge has also been granted power to tender pardon. The conferment of this power on the Special Judge in no way deprives the District Magistrate of his power to grant a pardon under s. 337 of the Code. At the date the District Magistrate tendered the pardon the case was not before the Special Judge. There seems to us, therefore, no substance in the submission made that the District Magistrate had not authority to tender a pardon to Ram Saran Das, the approver, and consequently the approver's evidence was inadmissible.\n\nThe findings of the High Court establish the offence of the appellants under s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and we can find no sufficient re'!son to think that\n\nth1: appellants were wrongly convi.:ted thereunder.\n\nThe appeals are accordingly dismissed.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\nL/S4SCI-:l\n\n1Yti8\n\nK a\"ta l'ra8hml\n\nDel/ii A d1nini.trali'un\n\n]tllflllt J.", "total_entities": 115, "entities": [{"text": "KANT A PRASHAD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 955, "end_char": 969, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KANT A PRASHAD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DELHI ADMINISTRATION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 971, "end_char": 991, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DELHI ADMINISTRATION", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1018, "end_char": 1029, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAFER IMAM JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1034, "end_char": 1048, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SYED JAFFER IMAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ConcUrrent jurisdiction to tender pardon-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1173, "end_char": 1248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1262, "end_char": 1269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "ConcUrrent jurisdiction to tender pardon-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "ConcUrrent jurisdiction to tender pardon-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "ss. 8(2)(3), 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1319, "end_char": 1333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "ConcUrrent jurisdiction to tender pardon-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "ConcUrrent jurisdiction to tender pardon-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "ss. 337", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1378, "end_char": 1385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "ConcUrrent jurisdiction to tender pardon-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "ConcUrrent jurisdiction to tender pardon-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 120B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1429, "end_char": 1436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "ConcUrrent jurisdiction to tender pardon-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "ConcUrrent jurisdiction to tender pardon-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1441, "end_char": 1447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "ConcUrrent jurisdiction to tender pardon-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "ConcUrrent jurisdiction to tender pardon-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1459, "end_char": 1476, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1481, "end_char": 1488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "ConcUrrent jurisdiction to tender pardon-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "ConcUrrent jurisdiction to tender pardon-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1496, "end_char": 1530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 337", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1777, "end_char": 1783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1791, "end_char": 1817, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 337", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1997, "end_char": 2003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2058, "end_char": 2065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2073, "end_char": 2107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 337", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2182, "end_char": 2188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2196, "end_char": 2222, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 8(3) and 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2462, "end_char": 2476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 337", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2819, "end_char": 2825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2833, "end_char": 2859, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "D. R. Kalia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3323, "end_char": 3334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. R. Kalia and K. L. Arora, for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "D. R. Kalia"}}, {"text": "K. L. Arora", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3339, "end_char": 3350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. R. Kalia and K. L. Arora, for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "D. R. Katia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3407, "end_char": 3418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. R. Katia and Raghu Nath; for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "D. R. Kalia"}}, {"text": "Raghu Nath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3423, "end_char": 3433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. R. Katia and Raghu Nath; for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "H. J. Umrigar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3490, "end_char": 3503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. J. Umrigar and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent in both the appeals."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3508, "end_char": 3520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. J. Umrigar and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent in both the appeals."}}, {"text": "IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3625, "end_char": 3629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nIMAM J.-The appellants, who were police constables at the time of.the occurrence, were convicted by the Special Judge of Delhi under s. 1208 and s. 224/ 109 of the Indian\n\nPenal Code and s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (2 of 1-947)."}}, {"text": "s. 1208", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3758, "end_char": 3765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3770, "end_char": 3776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3797, "end_char": 3807, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3812, "end_char": 3819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3827, "end_char": 3855, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3932, "end_char": 3939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3947, "end_char": 3981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 1208 and 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4042, "end_char": 4058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4071, "end_char": 4088, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": ".Kantn Prw~!trul", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4091, "end_char": 4107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Kantn Prw~!trul\n\nv. ])d!i; Ar..lminil!t.raUon\n\nlmam, J.\n\n/!1.iS\n\nAr1nt11 Pra.lwd\n\nJJdld\n\nAdminitn1liun\n\nluwm .!,"}}, {"text": "Ram Saran Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4514, "end_char": 4527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the prosecution, as stated in the charge, was that the appellants had onspired at Delhi with Ram Saran Das, the approver, M.P. Khare, Nand Parkash Kapur and Murari between the 16th and 16th of November, 1955, to bring <(bout the escape from lawful custody of M.P. Khare, an undertrial prisoner, and that they had also agreed to accept Rs."}}, {"text": "M.P. Khare", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4543, "end_char": 4553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the prosecution, as stated in the charge, was that the appellants had onspired at Delhi with Ram Saran Das, the approver, M.P. Khare, Nand Parkash Kapur and Murari between the 16th and 16th of November, 1955, to bring <(bout the escape from lawful custody of M.P. Khare, an undertrial prisoner, and that they had also agreed to accept Rs.", "canonical_name": "M. P. Khare"}}, {"text": "Nand Parkash Kapur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4555, "end_char": 4573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the prosecution, as stated in the charge, was that the appellants had onspired at Delhi with Ram Saran Das, the approver, M.P. Khare, Nand Parkash Kapur and Murari between the 16th and 16th of November, 1955, to bring <(bout the escape from lawful custody of M.P. Khare, an undertrial prisoner, and that they had also agreed to accept Rs."}}, {"text": "Murari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4578, "end_char": 4584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the prosecution, as stated in the charge, was that the appellants had onspired at Delhi with Ram Saran Das, the approver, M.P. Khare, Nand Parkash Kapur and Murari between the 16th and 16th of November, 1955, to bring <(bout the escape from lawful custody of M.P. Khare, an undertrial prisoner, and that they had also agreed to accept Rs."}}, {"text": "M. P. Khare", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4856, "end_char": 4867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I ,000 each and other pecuniary advantages as illegal gratification for rendering the escape of M. P. Khare from lawful custody and that in pursuance of the said conspiracy they had a.betted the escape of M. P. Khare and that they had accepted the illegal gratification from Nand Parkash Kapur.", "canonical_name": "M. P. Khare"}}, {"text": "M.P.\n\nKhare", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5111, "end_char": 5122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is clear from the findings of the courts below that M.P.\n\nKhare escaped from lawful custody and the appellants had enabled him to do so and that they had received money as illegal gratification for the part they had played in enabling M. P. Khare to escape from lawful custody.", "canonical_name": "M. P. Khare"}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5595, "end_char": 5600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the pardon tendered lo the approver Ram Saran Das by the District Mµgistrale of Delhi under s. 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was without jurisdiction and authority."}}, {"text": "s. 337", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5607, "end_char": 5613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5621, "end_char": 5647, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5840, "end_char": 5846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5854, "end_char": 5871, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5938, "end_char": 5944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5952, "end_char": 5969, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5991, "end_char": 5997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6005, "end_char": 6022, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6086, "end_char": 6103, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6168, "end_char": 6194, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mela Ram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6221, "end_char": 6229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As an offence under s. 222 of the Indian Penal Code is a non-cognizable offence no conviction under s. I20B of the Indian Penal Code could be had in the absence of a sanction under s. l 96A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (3) Prosecution witnesses Mela Ram, P.W. 6, and Shiv Parshad."}}, {"text": "Shiv Parshad", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6243, "end_char": 6255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As an offence under s. 222 of the Indian Penal Code is a non-cognizable offence no conviction under s. I20B of the Indian Penal Code could be had in the absence of a sanction under s. l 96A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (3) Prosecution witnesses Mela Ram, P.W. 6, and Shiv Parshad."}}, {"text": "s. 233", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6506, "end_char": 6512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6520, "end_char": 6546, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mela Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6634, "end_char": 6642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have examined the evidence of Mela Ram and Shiv Pa-rshad and find nothing in their evidence which establishes them as accomplices."}}, {"text": "Shiv Pa-rshad", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6647, "end_char": 6660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have examined the evidence of Mela Ram and Shiv Pa-rshad and find nothing in their evidence which establishes them as accomplices."}}, {"text": "ss. 120B, 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8234, "end_char": 8247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8259, "end_char": 8276, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8281, "end_char": 8288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8296, "end_char": 8324, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Kanta .Prashad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8484, "end_char": 8498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In our opinion, the irregularity committed, in\n\n19J8\n\nKanta .Prashad\n\nDelhi Administration\n\nImam .J.\n\n19:J8\n\n)\\ (l//{(I f'l'08}Uld\n\nv. l>dhi Atlminisfrntion\n\nJrnrim .J.\n\nthis case, was cured by the provisions of s. 537 of the Code.", "canonical_name": "KANT A PRASHAD"}}, {"text": "s. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8642, "end_char": 8648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10185, "end_char": 10191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10199, "end_char": 10216, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10228, "end_char": 10234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10242, "end_char": 10259, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10391, "end_char": 10398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10406, "end_char": 10440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 196A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10585, "end_char": 10592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10600, "end_char": 10626, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10717, "end_char": 10734, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 196A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10778, "end_char": 10785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11060, "end_char": 11067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11075, "end_char": 11109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "District Magistrate of Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11216, "end_char": 11244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Coming now to the first point urged on behalf of the appellants, it would appear that the District Magistrate of Delhi granted a pardon under s. 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to Ram Saran Das, the approver, in consequence of which Ram Saran Das was examined as a witness by the Special Judge."}}, {"text": "s. 337", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11268, "end_char": 11274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11282, "end_char": 11308, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ram Saran Das", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11312, "end_char": 11325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Coming now to the first point urged on behalf of the appellants, it would appear that the District Magistrate of Delhi granted a pardon under s. 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to Ram Saran Das, the approver, in consequence of which Ram Saran Das was examined as a witness by the Special Judge."}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11626, "end_char": 11633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "of Corruption Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11653, "end_char": 11676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 337", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11892, "end_char": 11898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention\n\nof Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention\n\nof Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 211", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12145, "end_char": 12151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention\n\nof Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention\n\nof Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12159, "end_char": 12176, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 216A, 369, 401, 435 and 477A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12251, "end_char": 12283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention\n\nof Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention\n\nof Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12291, "end_char": 12308, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 337", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12330, "end_char": 12336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention\n\nof Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention\n\nof Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12718, "end_char": 12744, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 337", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12913, "end_char": 12919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kanta PrashaJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12945, "end_char": 12959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "which came\n\nKanta PrashaJ.\n\nDelhi Administration\n\nIm°'\".!.", "canonical_name": "KANT A PRASHAD"}}, {"text": "Kanfn Prasl1ad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13001, "end_char": 13015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.j8\n\nKanfn Prasl1ad\n\nv. lJelhi Admi1ti1Sfralion\n\nf111a 111 ./,\n\n1224 SUPREi\\JE COURT REPORTS\n\n[I 958)\n\ninto effect in January, 1956, spoke of an offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years, but this amendment could have no application to a pardon tendered on 1-12-'55."}}, {"text": "lJelhi Admi1ti1Sfralion", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13020, "end_char": 13043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.j8\n\nKanfn Prasl1ad\n\nv. lJelhi Admi1ti1Sfralion\n\nf111a 111 ./,\n\n1224 SUPREi\\JE COURT REPORTS\n\n[I 958)\n\ninto effect in January, 1956, spoke of an offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years, but this amendment could have no application to a pardon tendered on 1-12-'55."}}, {"text": "s. 337", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13383, "end_char": 13389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13397, "end_char": 13423, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 8(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13641, "end_char": 13648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13763, "end_char": 13795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13926, "end_char": 13935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "Chapters XXXI and XXXII of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14132, "end_char": 14167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14435, "end_char": 14461, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 337", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14685, "end_char": 14691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapters XXXI and XXXII of the Code", "statute": "Chapters XXXI and XXXII of the Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14699, "end_char": 14725, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 337", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15064, "end_char": 15070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapters XXXI and XXXII of the Code", "statute": "Chapters XXXI and XXXII of the Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15078, "end_char": 15104, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 338", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15319, "end_char": 15325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15678, "end_char": 15685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 337", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15925, "end_char": 15931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16345, "end_char": 16352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16360, "end_char": 16394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S4S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16564, "end_char": 16567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}]}
{"document_id": "1958_1_1226_1239_EN", "year": 1958, "text": "l~58\n\nFebNUlry 7.\n\n1226 SUPREME COURT REPOH'l'S\n\nTALAB HAJI HUSSAIN\n\n11.\n\nMADHUKAR PURSHOTTAM MONDKAR\n\nAND ANOTHER\n\n[IDllll\n\n<BHAGWATI, J. L. KAPUR and GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ.)\n\nC1'iminal Law-Bail-Cancellation-High Oou1't's inherent power-Bailable offence-Accused released on bail by Magistrate-Subsequent P1'•iudicial conduct of accused-High Court's power to cancel bail-code of Crimmal Procedure (Act 5 of 1898), ss, 426, 496, 497, 498, 561A.\n\nThe appellant was charged under s. 120B of the Indi'1n Penal Code and s. 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, which were bllilable offences, and was released on bail by the Chief Presidency Magistrate under s. 496 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. An application made subsequently by the complainant for cancellation of the bail was dismissed by the Magistrate on the ground that under s. 496 he had no jurisdiction to cancel the bail. The complainant invoked the inherent power of the High Court under s. 561A of the Code and the High Court took the view that under that section it had inherent power to cancel the bail. and findinl! that on the material produced before the Court it would not be safe to penn\\t the appellant to be at large, it cancelled the bail. On appeal to the Supreme Court:-\n\nHeld, that though under s. 496 of the Code of Criminal Procedure a person accused of a bailable offence is entitled to be released on bail pending his trial, if Iris conduct subsequent to his release is found to be prejudicial to a fair trial, he forfeits his right to be released on baH and such furfeiture can be made effective by invoking the inherent power of the High Court under s. 561A of the Code. But the inherent power has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only where such exercise is )\\!stifled by the tests specifically laid down in the section itsel:t'.\n\nLala Jui.ram Das & Others v. King Emperor, (1945) L.R. 72 I.A. 120, distinguished.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 16 of 1958.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 14, 1958, of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Application No. 60 of 1958 arising out of the judgment and order dated January 9, 1958, of the Court of Chief Presidency Magistrate at Bombay in an application for cancellation of bail in Case No. roB/W of 1957.\n\nS.C.It.\n\nSUPREME COUR'r REPORTS i227\n\nPurshottam Tricumdas, Rajni Patel and l.N. Shroff, for the 1968 appellant. 'l'IJlab Haji\n\nHuaaaii\\ K. J. Khandalwala and R. H. Dhebar, for respondent v.\n\nM adllukar Ptm1wt• No. l. lam Mondkar\n\n1958. February 7. The Judgment of the Court was de livered by\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR J .-The appellant, along with others, has been charged under s. 120B of the Indian Penal Code (lajendragadkar J, and s. 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act (8 of 1878). There is no doubt that the offences charged against the appellant are bailable offences. Under s. 496 of the Code of Criminal Pro cedure the appellant was released on bail of Rs. 75,000 with one surety for like amount on December 9, 1957, by the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate at Bombay. On January 4, 1958, an a.pplication was made by the complainant before the learned Magistrate for cancellation of the bail; the learned Magistrate, however, dismissed the application on the ground that under s. 496 he had no jurisdiction to cancel the bail.\n\nAgainst this order, the complainant preferred a revisional application before the High Court of Bombay. Another applica tion was preferred by the complainant before the same Court invoking its inherent power under s. 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Chagla C. J. and Datar J. who heard these applications took the view that, under s. S61A of the Code of Criminal Procedure the High Court had inherent power to cancel the bail granted to a person accused of a bail able offence and that, in a proper case, such power can and must be exercised in the interests of justice. The learned Jud ges then considered the ma.terial produced before the Court and came to the conclusion that, in the present case, it would not be safe to permit the appellant to be at large. That is why the application made by the complainant invoking the High Court's inherent power under s. 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure was allowed, the bail-bond executed by the appel !ant was caneelled and an order was passed directing that the appellant be arrested forthwith and committed to custody. It is against this order that the appellant has come to L/S4SC1-3(a)\n\n12:18 SUI'IU~:IIE COUH'l' HE1'0H'l'8\n\n1968 this Court in appeal by special leave. Special leave granted\n\nTu/ab Haji td the appellant has, however, been limited to the question ilu•sai\" of the construction of s. 496 read with s. 56JA ot the Code v.\n\nMudhukar Pur.h-01of Criminal Procedure. Thus the !)vint of law which falls to\n\n'\"\"' :ltondkar be considered in the present appeal is whether, in the case\n\nUajcndrago<lkar J. of a person accused of a bailable offence where bail has been granted to him under s. 496 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it can be cancelled in a proper case by the High Court in exercise of its inherent power under s. S61A of the Code of Criminal Procedure? This question is no doubt of considerable importance and its decision would depend upon the construction of the relevant sections of the Code.\n\nThe material provisions on the subject of bail are contained in ss. 496 to 498 of the Code of, Criminal Procedure.\n\nSection 496 deals with persons accused of bailable offences.\n\nIt provides that \"when a person charged with the commission of a bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by.an officer in charge of a police station or is brought before a court and is prepared at any time, while in the custody of such officer or at any stage of the proceedings before such court, to give bail. such person shall be released on bail.\" The section further leaves it to the discretion of the police officer or the court if he or it thinks fit to discharge the accused person on his executing a bond without sureties for his appea ranee and not to take bail from him. Section 497 deals with the question of granting bail in the case of non-bailable offences. A person accused of a non-bailable offence may be released on bail but he shall not be so released if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. This is the effect of s. 497(1). Sub-section (2) deals with cases where it appears to the officer or the court that there are not reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed a non-bailable offence. but there are sufficient grounds for further enquiry into his guilt and it lays down that in such cases the accused shall, pending such enquiry, be released, on bail\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME t; OURT REPORTS 1229\n\nor at the discretion of the officer or co.urt, on the execution by him of a bond without sureties for his appearance as hereinafter provided. Sub-section (3) requires that, when jurisdiction, under sub-s. (2) is exercised in favour of an accused person, reasons for exercising such jurisdiction shall be recorded in writingi Sub-section (3A) which has been added in 1955 deals with cases where the trial of a person accused of any non-bailable offence is not concluded within a period of sixty days from the first day fixed for taking evidence in the case and it provides that such person shall, if he is in custody during the whole of the said period, be released on bail unless for reasons to be recorded in writing the magistrate otherwise directs. Thy last subsection confers on the High Court and the Court of Session. and on any other court in the case of a person released by itself, power to direct that a person who has been released on bail under any of the provisions of this section should be arrested and committed to custody. Section 498(1) confers on the High Court or the Court of Session power to direct admission to bail or reduction of bail in all cases where bail is admissible under ss. 496 and 497 whether in such cases there be an appeal against conviction or. not. Sub-section (2) of s. 498 empowers the High Court or the Court of Session to cause any person who has been admitted to bail under sub-s. (1) to be arrested and committed to custody. There is one more section to which reference must be made in this connection and that is s. 426 of the Code. This section incidentally deals with the power to grant bail to persons who have been convicted of non-bailable offences when such convicted persons satisfy the court that they intend to present appeals against their orders of conviction. That is the effect of s. 426(2A) which has been added in 1955. A similar power has been conferred on the High Court under sub-s. (2B) of s. 426 where the High Court is satisfied tha.t the convicted person has been granted special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against any sentence which the High Court has imposed or maintained. Sub-section\n\n(3) provides that. if the appellant who is released on bail\n\nTalab Haji\n\nHuasain ....\n\nMaJliukar Purs1wt.\n\ntam.Mondkar\n\nGajenbagadknr J.\n\n1fl.)8\n\n1.'alab H(1ji\n\nH1M,, ain\n\nJf111lhvkar Pura'li.ot-\n\n,.,\" Jlontlkor\n\nf:ujnirlmgadkaf' J.\n\nunder said sub-s. (2) or (28) is ultimately sentenced to imprisonment, the time during which he is so released shall bo\n\nexcluded in computing the teem for which he is so sentenced.\n\nThat briefly is the scheme of the Code on the subject of bail.\n\nThere is no doubt that under s. 496 a person accused of a bailable offence is entitled to be released on bail pending his trial. As soon as it appears that the accused person is prepared to give bail, the police officer or the court, before whom he offers to give bail, is bound to release him on such terms as to bail as may a.ppear to the officer or the court to be reasonable. It would even be open to the officer or the court to discharge such person on executing his bond as provided in the section instead of taking bail from him. The position of persons accused of non-bailable offences is entirely different. Though the recent amendments made in the provisions of s. 497 have made definite improvement in fa:vour of persons accused of non-bailable offences, it would nevertheless be correct to say that the grant of bail in such cases is generally a matter in the discretion of the authorities in question. The classification of offences into the two categories of bailable and non-bailable offences may perhaps be explained on the basis that bailable offences are generally regarded as less gra:ve and serious 'than non-bailable offences. On this basis it may not be easy to explain why, for instance offences under ss. 477, 477A, 475 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code should be regarded as bailable whereas offences under s .. 379 should be non-bailable. However, it cannot be disputed that s. 496 recognizes that a person accused of a bailable offence has a right to be enlarged on bail and that is a consideration on which Shri Purushottam, for the appellant, has very strongly relied.\n\nSbri Purushottam has also emphasized the fact that. whereas legislature has specifically conferred power on the specified courts to cancel the bail granted to a person accused of a non-bailable offence by the provisions of s. 497(5), no such power has been conferred on any court in regard to\n\nS.C.R.\n\nStffiPEME COURT REPORTS 1231\n\npersons accused of bailable offences. If legislature had intended to confer such a power it would have been very easy for h to add an appropriate suHection under s. 496. The omission to make such a provision is, aecording to Sbri Purushottam, not the result of inadvertence but is deliberate; and if that is so, it would not be legitimate or reasonable to clothe the High Courts with the pow9r to cancel bails in such cases under s. S61A. It is this aspect of the matter which needs careful examination in the present case.\n\nSection 561 A was added to the Code in 1923 and it purports to save the inherent power of the High Courts. It provides that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as ma.y be necessary to give effect tQ any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It appears that doubts were expressed in some judicial decisions about the existence of such inherent power in the High Courts prior to 1923. That is why legislature enacted this section to clarify the position that the provisions of the Code were not intended to limit or affect the inherent power of the High Courts as mentioned in s. 561A. It is obvious that this inherent power can be exercised only for either of the three purposes specifically mentioned in the section. This inherent power cannot naturally be invoked in respect of any matter covered by the specific provisions of the Code. It cannot also be invoked if its exercise would be inconsistent with any of the specific provisions of the Code. It is only if the matter in question is not covered by any specific provisions of the Code that s. 561A can come into operation, subject further to the requirement that the exercise of such power must serve either of the three purposes mentioned in the said section. In prescribing rules of procedure legisla.ture undoubtedly attempts to provide for all\n\nt:Qses that are likely to arise; but tt is not possible that any legislative enactment dealing with f)rocedure, however carefully it may be drafted, would succeed in providing for all cases that may possibly arise in future. Lacunae are some-\n\n19$8\n\n2'alab Baja\n\nBuasain\n\nT, Madhukar Purshcl\n\ntam J[ond/<or\n\nGajeniragadfor J.\n\nTalab Haji\n\nB1M80l1£\n\nM adhulcar Purahot.\n\ntam Mondkar\n\n1232 SUPRE!lffi COURT REPORTS [1!}581\n\ntimes discovered in procedural law and it is to cover such lacunae and to deal with cases where such lacunae are discoverd that procedural law invariably recognizes the existence of inherent power in courts. It would be noticed that it is only. the High Courts whose inherent power is recognized by s. 561A; and even in regard to the High Courts' inherent power definite salutary safeguards have been laid down as to its exetcise. It is only where {he High Court is satisfied either that an order passed under the Code would be rendered ineffective or tha, t the process of any court would be abused or that the ends of justice would not be secured that the High Court can and must exercise its inherent power under s. S61A. There can thus be no dispute about the scope and nature of the inherent power of the High Courts and the extent of its exercise.\n\nNow it is obvious tha.t the primary object of criminal procedure is to ensure a fair trial of accused persons. Every criminal trial begins with the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused; and provisions of the Code are so framed that a criminal trial should begin with and be throughout governed by this essential presumption; but a. fair trial\n\n~~~~~~vi~Hbe~~~~~ and must also be fair to the prosecution. The test of fairness in a criminal trial must be judged from this dual point of view. It is therefore of the utmost importance that, in a criminal trial, witnesses should be able to give evidence without any inducement or threat either from the prosecution or the defence. A criminal trial must never be so conducted by the prosecution as would lead to the conviction of an innocent person; similarly the progress of a criminal trial must not be obstructed by the accused so as to lead to the acquittal of a really guilty offender. The acquittal of the innocent and the conviction of the guilty are the objects of a criminal trial and\n\n!O there can be no possible doubt that, if any conduct on the part of an accused person is likely to obstruct a fair trial, there is occasion for the exercise of the inherent power of the\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSuPREME COURT REPORTS 123:1\n\nHigh Courts to secure the ends of justice. There can be no more important requirement of the ends of justice than the uninterrupted progress of a fair trial; and it is for the continuance of such a fair trial that the inherent powers of the High Courts are sought to be invoked by the prosecution in cases where it is alleged that accused persons, either by suborning or intimidating witnesses, are obstructing the smooth progress of a fair trial. Similarly, i.f an accused person who is released on bail jumps bail and attempts tq run to a foreign country to escape the trial, that again would be a case where the exercise of the inherent power would be justified in order to compelthe accused to submit to a fair trial and not to escape its consequences by taking advantage of the fact that he has been released on bail and by absconding to another country. In other words, if the conduct of the accused person subsequent to his release on bail puts in jeopardy the progress of a fair trial itself and if there is .no other remedy which can be effectively used against the accused person, in such a case the inherent power of the High Court can be legitimately invoked.\n\nIn regard to non-bailable offences there is no need to invoke such power because s. 497 (5) specifically deals with such cases. The question which we have to decide in this case is whether exercise of inherent power under s. 561A against persons accused of bailable offences, who have been released on bail, is contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of s. 496 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nShri Purushottam contends that the provisions of s. 496 are plainly inconsistent with the exercise of inherent power under s. 561A against the appellant in the present case and; he argues that. despite the order which has been passed by the High Court. he would be entitled to move the trial court for bail again and the trial court would be bound to release him on bail because the right to be released on bail recognized by s. 496 is an absolute and an indefea<>ible right; and despite the order of tbe High Court, that right would still be available\n\nJnti8\n\n'l'alnb Haji\n\nH11&aain\n\nv. lot adlmkar Purshnt.\n\nlam Mondkar\n\nOajendragadkar .J.\n\nTalab Haii\n\nHttssain\n\nJlfadlukar Purslwt•\n\ntnm Mondka.r\n\nOnjendr11,'larllcar .J.\n\nto the appellant. If that be the true position, the order passed under s. 56IA would be rendered ineffective and that itself would show that there is a conflict between the exercise of the said power and the provisions of s. 496. Thus presented, the argument no doubt h prima facie attractive; but a close examination of the provisions of s. 496 would show that there is no conflict between its provisions and the exercise of the jurisdiction under s. 561A. In dealing with this argument it is necessary to remember that, if the power under s. 561A is exercised by the High Court, the bail offered by the accused and accepted by the trial court would be cancelled and the accused would be ordered to be arrested forthwith and committed to custody. In other words, the effect of the order passed under s. 561 A, just like the effect of an order passed under s. 497 (5) a.nd s. 498 (2), would be not only that the bail is cancelled but that the accused is ordered to be arrested and committed to custody. The order committing the accused to custody is a judicial order passed by a criminal court of competent jurisdiction. His commitment to custody thereafter is not by reason of the fact that he is alleged to have committed a bailable offence at all; his commitment to custody is the result of a judicial order passed on the ground that he has forfeited his bail and that his subsequent conduct showed that, pending the trial, he cannot be allowed to be at large. Now, where a person is committed to custody under such an order, it would not be open to him to fall back upon his rights under s. 4%, for s. 496 would in such circumstances be inapplicable to his case. It may be that there is no specific provision for the cancellation of the bond and the re-arrest of a person accused of a bailable offence; but that does not mean tha.t s. 496 entitles such an accused person to be released on bail, even though it may be shown that he is guilty of conduct entirely subversive of a fair trial in the court. We do not read s. 496 as conferring on a person accused of a bailable offence such an unqualified, absolute and an indefeasible right to be released on bail.\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUR'i' REPORTS - 1235\n\nIn this connection, it would be relevant to consider the 1968 effect of the provisions of s. 498. Under s. 498(1), the High Tawb Haji - HWJ•ain Court or the Court of Sessions may, even in the case of perv. sons accused of bailable offences, admit such .accused persons Jl'fi':i'M::tI:,;01• to bail or reduce the amount of bail demanded by the• pres- Gajend;,, adbar ,/, cribed authorities under s. 496. Shri Purushottam no doubt attempted to argue that the operative part of the provisions of s. 498(1) does not apply to persons accused of bailable offences; but in our opinion, there ca1n be no doubt that this sub-section deals with cases of persons accused of bailable as well as non-bailable offences. We have no doubt that, 1 even in regard to persons accused of bailable offences, if the amount of bail fixed under s. 496 is unreasonably: high the accused person can move the High Court or the Court of Sessions for reduction of that amount. Similarly, a person accused of a bailable offence may move the High Court or the Court of Sesslons to be released on bail and the High Court or the Court of Sessions may direct either that the amount should be reduced or that the person may be admitted to bail. If a person accused of a bailable offence is admitted to bail by an order passed by the High Court or the Court of Sessions, the provisions of sub-s. (2) become appli- _ cable to his case; and under these provisions the High Court or the Court of Sessions is expressly empowered to cancel the bail granted by it and to arrest the accused and commit him to cusody. This sub-section, as we have already pointed out, has been added in 1955 and now there is no doubt that legislature has conferred upon the High Court or the Court of Sessions power to cancel bail in regard to cases of persons _ accused of bailable offences where such persons have been admitted to bail by the High Court or the Court of Sessions under s. 498(1). The result is that with regard to a class of cases of badlable offences falling under s. 498(1), even after the accused persons are admitted to bail, express power has been conferred on the High Court or the Court of Sessions to arrest them and commit them to custody. Clearly\n\nTalab Baji\n\nHuaain\n\nMadkukar PuraAot.\n\ntam .Mim.dkar\n\nGn}endragadl:ar J,\n\nthen it cannot be said that the right of a person accused of a bailable offence to be released on bail cannot be forfeited even if his conduct subsequent to the grant of bail is found to be prejudicial to a fair trial.\n\nIt would also be interesting to notice that, even before s. 498(2) was enacted. there was consensus of judicial opinion in favour of the view that, if accused persons were released on. bail under s. 498(1), their bail-bond could be cancelled and they could be ordered to be arrested and committed to custody under the provisions of s. 561A of the Code (Mirza Mohammad Ibrahim v. Emperor('), Seoli v. Rex('), Bachchu Lal v. State('), Munshi Singh v. State(') and The Crown Prosecutor, Madras v. Krishnan(')). These deeisions would show that the exercise of inherent power to cancel baH under s. 561 A was not regarded as inconsistent with the provisions of s. 498(1) of the Code. It is true that all these decisi1>ns referred to cases of persons charged with non, bailable offences; but it is significant that the provisions of s. 497(5) did not apply, to these cases and the appropriate orders were passed under the purported exercise of inherent power under s. 56 l A. On principle then these decisions prl>ceed on the assumption, and we think rightly, that the exercise of inherent power in that behalf was not inconsistent with the provisions of s. 498 as it then stood.\n\nIt would riow be relevant to enquire whether, on principle, a distinctii>n can be made between bailable and nonbailable offences in regard to the effect l>f the prejudicial conduct of accused persons subsequent to their release on bail.\n\nAs we have already observed, if a fair trial is the main objective of the criminal procedure, any threat to the continuance . of fair trial must be immediately arrested and. the smooth progress of a fair trial must be ensured; and this can be done, if necessary, by the exercise l>f inherent power. The classification of offences into bailable and non-bailable on whicli are based the different provisions as to the grant of (') A.I.I\\. 1932 All. 534. (') AI.R.1948All. 366. (') A.l.R. 1951 All 836. t') A.I.R, 1952 All. 39 (') I.L.R. 1948 Mad. 62.\n\ns.c.n.. 8Ul'Rli.:l\\IE COUU'l' HJ~PORTS\n\nbail would not, in our opinion, have any material bearing in deaHng with the effect of the subsequent conduct of accused persons on the continuance of a fair trial itself. If an accused person, by his conduct, puts the fair trial into jeopardy, it would be the primary and paramount duty of criminal courts to ensure that the risk to the fair trial is removed and criminal courts are allowed to proceed with 1the trial smoothly and without any interruption or obstruction; and this would be equally true in cases of both bailable as well as non-bailable offences. We, therefore, feel no difficulty in holding that, if, by . his subsequent conduct, a person accused of a bailable offence forfeits his right tJ be released on bail, that forfeiture must be made effective by invoking the inherent power of the High Court under s. 561A. Omission of legislature to make a specific provision. in that behalf is clearly due to oversight or inadvertence and cannot be regarded as deliberate. If the appellant's contention is sound, it would lead to fantastic re.- suits. The argument is that a person accused of a bailable offence has such an . unquatified right to be released on bail that even. if he dues his worst to obstruct or to defeat a fair trial, his bail-bond cannot be cancelled and a, threat to a fair trial cannot be arrested or prevented. Indeed Shree Purushottam went the length of suggesting that in .such a case the impugned subsequent conduct of the accused may give rise to some other charges under the Indian Penal Code, but it cannot justify bis re-arrest. Fortunately that does not appear to be the true legal position if the relevant provisions of the Code in regard to the grant of bail are considered as a whole along with the provisions of s. S61A of the Code.\n\nIt now remains to consider .the decision of the Privy Council in Lala Jairam Das de Others v. King Emperor('), be cause Shri Purushottam has very strongly relied on some of the t>bservations made in that case. According to that decision, he provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure confer no power on High Courts to grant bail to a person who has been convicted and sentenced fo imprist>nment and to\n\n(') (1945) L.R. 72 I.A. 120, 132.\n\n19J8\n\nTalab Haji\n\nHusain\n\nM adliukar Puuhutta.m Afondkar\n\nGajcndragadkur ,/,\n\nTalab Haji\n\nHu.asain\n\nMudhukar Purlllwt\n\ntam Mondknr\n\nG11je:1ulra9adkflr J.\n\nwhom His .Majesty in Council ha1; given special leave to appeal against his sentence and conviction. Divergent views had been expressed by the High Courts in this country on the question as to the High Courts' power to grant bail to convicted persons wht> had been given special leave to appeal to the Privy Council; these views and the scheme of the Code in regard to the grant of bail were examined by Lord Russel of Killowen who delivered the judgment of the Board in Lala Jairam Das's case('). The decision has thus no application to the facts before us; but Shri Purushottam relies on certain observations made in the judgment. It has been observed in that judgment that \"their Lordships take the view that Ch.\n\nXXXIX of the Code together with s. 426 is, and was intend to contain, a complete and exhaustive statement of the powers of a High Court in India to grant bail, and excludes the exist ence of any additit>nal inherent power in a High Court relating to the subject of bail\". The judgment further shows that in their Lordships' opinion, like the High Court of Justice in England, High Courts in India would not have inherent .power to grant bail to a convited person. It would be clell'l\" from the judgment that their Lordships were not called upon to consider the question about the inherent power of the High Courts to cancel bail under s. 56 lA. That point did not obviously arise in the case before them. Even so, in dealing with the question as to whether inherent pt>wer could be exercised for granting bail to a convicted person, their Lordships did refer to s. 561A of the Code and they pointed out that such a power cannot be properly attributed to the High Ct>urts because it would, if exeroised, interrupt the serving of the sentence; and, besides it would, in the event of the appeal being unsuccessful, result in defeating the ends Of justice. It was also pointed out that if the bail was allowed in such a case, the exercise of the inherent power would result in an alteration by the High Court of its judgment which is prohibit-\n\n(') (1945) L.R. 72 I.A. 120, 132.\n\ned b.y s. 369 of the Code. In other , words, their Lt>rdship~ t9ad examined the provisions of s. 561A and came to the conclu- Talab Haji sion that the power to grant.bail to a convicted person would Huaaai\" . - n0t t\\t in with the scheme of Chapter XXXIX of the C:::ode Madloukar Pur\"\"'11\n\nread with s. 561A: In our opinion, neither this decision 'nor tam MaruUar even the observations on which Shri Purushot~ relied can Gajendrr.lfltldkar J. afford any assistance in cfeciding the point which this appeal bas raised before us. Incidentally we may add that it was as a result of the observations made by the Privy Cuncil in that case thats. 426 of the Code was amended in 1945 and power has been conferred on appropriate dourts either to suspend the sentence or to grant bail as mentioned in the several subsections of s. 426. That is how s. 426(2A) and (2B) now deal with the subject of bail even though the main section is apart of Chapter XXXI which deals with appeals, references and revisions.\n\nWe must . accordingly hold that the view taken by the Bombay High Court about its inherent power to act in this case under s. 561A is right and must be confirmed~ It is hardly necessary to add that the inherent power conferred on High Courts under s. 561A has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only where such exercise is justified by the tests speciflcally laid down in the section itself;\n\nAfter all, procedure, whether criminal or civil, must serve the higher purpose of justiee; and it is only when the ends of justice are put in jeopardy by the conduct of the accuse.d that the inherent power can and should be exercised in cases like the present. The result is that. the aru>eal fails and must be dismissed.\n\nAppeal dismbsed.", "total_entities": 148, "entities": [{"text": "S\n\nTALAB HAJI HUSSAIN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 46, "end_char": 67, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "TALAB HAJI HUSSAIN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MADHUKAR PURSHOTTAM MONDKAR\n\nAND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MADHUKAR PURSHOTTAM MONDKAR AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 126, "end_char": 138, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "L. KAPUR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 139, "end_char": 147, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.L. KAPUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 152, "end_char": 170, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 120B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 473, "end_char": 480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 496, "end_char": 506, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 167(81)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 511, "end_char": 521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sea Customs Act, 1878", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 529, "end_char": 550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 496", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 649, "end_char": 655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 663, "end_char": 689, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 496", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 829, "end_char": 835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878"}}, {"text": "s. 561A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 946, "end_char": 953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court:-", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1226, "end_char": 1241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal to the Supreme Court:-\n\nHeld, that though under s. 496 of the Code of Criminal Procedure a person accused of a bailable offence is entitled to be released on bail pending his trial, if Iris conduct subsequent to his release is found to be prejudicial to a fair trial, he forfeits his right to be released on baH and such furfeiture can be made effective by invoking the inherent power of the High Court under s. 561A of the Code."}}, {"text": "s. 496", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1267, "end_char": 1273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1281, "end_char": 1307, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 561A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1628, "end_char": 1635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1945) L.R. 72 I.A. 120", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1878, "end_char": 1901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Purshottam Tricumdas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2349, "end_char": 2369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COUR'r REPORTS i227\n\nPurshottam Tricumdas, Rajni Patel and l.N. Shroff, for the 1968 appellant. '"}}, {"text": "Rajni Patel", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2371, "end_char": 2382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COUR'r REPORTS i227\n\nPurshottam Tricumdas, Rajni Patel and l.N. Shroff, for the 1968 appellant. '"}}, {"text": "l.N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2387, "end_char": 2398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COUR'r REPORTS i227\n\nPurshottam Tricumdas, Rajni Patel and l.N. Shroff, for the 1968 appellant. '"}}, {"text": "K. J. Khandalwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2448, "end_char": 2465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'IJlab Haji\n\nHuaaaii\\ K. J. Khandalwala and R. H. Dhebar, for respondent v.\n\nM adllukar Ptm1wt• No."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2470, "end_char": 2482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'IJlab Haji\n\nHuaaaii\\ K. J. Khandalwala and R. H. Dhebar, for respondent v.\n\nM adllukar Ptm1wt• No."}}, {"text": "s. 120B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2681, "end_char": 2688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2696, "end_char": 2713, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "lajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2715, "end_char": 2729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was de livered by\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR J .-The appellant, along with others, has been charged under s. 120B of the Indian Penal Code (lajendragadkar J, and s. 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act (8 of 1878)."}}, {"text": "s. 167(81)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2737, "end_char": 2747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2759, "end_char": 2770, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 496", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2879, "end_char": 2885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 9, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3005, "end_char": 3021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "75,000 with one surety for like amount on December 9, 1957, by the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate at Bombay."}}, {"text": "Chief Presidency Magistrate at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3038, "end_char": 3075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "75,000 with one surety for like amount on December 9, 1957, by the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate at Bombay."}}, {"text": "January 4, 1958", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3080, "end_char": 3095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 4, 1958, an a.pplication was made by the complainant before the learned Magistrate for cancellation of the bail; the learned Magistrate, however, dismissed the application on the ground that under s. 496 he had no jurisdiction to cancel the bail."}}, {"text": "s. 496", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3285, "end_char": 3291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3418, "end_char": 3438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against this order, the complainant preferred a revisional application before the High Court of Bombay."}}, {"text": "s. 561A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3550, "end_char": 3557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3565, "end_char": 3591, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3593, "end_char": 3599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chagla C. J. and Datar J. who heard these applications took the view that, under s. S61A of the Code of Criminal Procedure the High Court had inherent power to cancel the bail granted to a person accused of a bail able offence and that, in a proper case, such power can and must be exercised in the interests of justice."}}, {"text": "Datar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3610, "end_char": 3615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chagla C. J. and Datar J. who heard these applications took the view that, under s. S61A of the Code of Criminal Procedure the High Court had inherent power to cancel the bail granted to a person accused of a bail able offence and that, in a proper case, such power can and must be exercised in the interests of justice."}}, {"text": "S61A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3677, "end_char": 3681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3689, "end_char": 3715, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 561A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4204, "end_char": 4211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4219, "end_char": 4245, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S4S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4473, "end_char": 4476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 496", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4693, "end_char": 4699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 56J", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4710, "end_char": 4716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "lkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4900, "end_char": 4904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "vint of law which falls to\n\n'\"\"' :ltondkar be considered in the present appeal is whether, in the case\n\nUajcndrago<lkar J. of a person accused of a bailable offence where bail has been granted to him under s. 496 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it can be cancelled in a proper case by the High Court in exercise of its inherent power under s. S61A of the Code of Criminal Procedure?"}}, {"text": "s. 496", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4991, "end_char": 4997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5005, "end_char": 5031, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S61A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5131, "end_char": 5135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5143, "end_char": 5169, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 496 to 498", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5379, "end_char": 5393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 496", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5431, "end_char": 5442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 497", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6092, "end_char": 6103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 497(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6439, "end_char": 6448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 498(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7880, "end_char": 7894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 496 and 497", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8044, "end_char": 8059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 498", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8148, "end_char": 8154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 426", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8400, "end_char": 8406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 426(2A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8681, "end_char": 8691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 426", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8796, "end_char": 8802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8912, "end_char": 8925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A similar power has been conferred on the High Court under sub-s. (2B) of s. 426 where the High Court is satisfied tha.t the convicted person has been granted special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against any sentence which the High Court has imposed or maintained."}}, {"text": "Talab Haji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9069, "end_char": 9079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "if the appellant who is released on bail\n\nTalab Haji\n\nHuasain ....\n\nMaJliukar Purs1wt.", "canonical_name": "Talab Haji"}}, {"text": "Gajenbagadknr", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9128, "end_char": 9141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mondkar\n\nGajenbagadknr J.\n\n1fl.)8\n\n1.'alab H(1ji\n\nH1M,, ain\n\nJf111lhvkar Pura'li.ot-\n\n,.,\""}}, {"text": "1.'alab H(1ji", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9154, "end_char": 9167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mondkar\n\nGajenbagadknr J.\n\n1fl.)8\n\n1.'alab H(1ji\n\nH1M,, ain\n\nJf111lhvkar Pura'li.ot-\n\n,.,\""}}, {"text": "ujnirlmgadkaf", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9223, "end_char": 9236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jlontlkor\n\nf:ujnirlmgadkaf' J.\n\nunder said sub-s. (2) or (28) is ultimately sentenced to imprisonment, the time during which he is so released shall bo\n\nexcluded in computing the teem for which he is so sentenced."}}, {"text": "s. 496", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9518, "end_char": 9524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 497", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10161, "end_char": 10167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 477, 477A, 475 and 506", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10714, "end_char": 10740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10748, "end_char": 10765, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 496", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10889, "end_char": 10895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Purushottam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11028, "end_char": 11039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, it cannot be disputed that s. 496 recognizes that a person accused of a bailable offence has a right to be enlarged on bail and that is a consideration on which Shri Purushottam, for the appellant, has very strongly relied.", "canonical_name": "Purushottam"}}, {"text": "s. 497(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11310, "end_char": 11319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 496", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11581, "end_char": 11587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sbri Purushottam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11644, "end_char": 11660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The omission to make such a provision is, aecording to Sbri Purushottam, not the result of inadvertence but is deliberate; and if that is so, it would not be legitimate or reasonable to clothe the High Courts with the pow9r to cancel bails in such cases under s. S61A. It is this aspect of the matter which needs careful examination in the present case.", "canonical_name": "Shree Purushottam"}}, {"text": "S61A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11852, "end_char": 11856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 561", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11944, "end_char": 11955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 561A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12670, "end_char": 12677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 561A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13142, "end_char": 13149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gajeniragadfor", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13709, "end_char": 13723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lacunae are some-\n\n19$8\n\n2'alab Baja\n\nBuasain\n\nT, Madhukar Purshcl\n\ntam J[ond/<or\n\nGajeniragadfor J.\n\nTalab Haji\n\nB1M80l1£\n\nM adhulcar Purahot."}}, {"text": "Talab Haji", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13728, "end_char": 13738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lacunae are some-\n\n19$8\n\n2'alab Baja\n\nBuasain\n\nT, Madhukar Purshcl\n\ntam J[ond/<or\n\nGajeniragadfor J.\n\nTalab Haji\n\nB1M80l1£\n\nM adhulcar Purahot.", "canonical_name": "Talab Haji"}}, {"text": "s. 561A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14122, "end_char": 14129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court is satisfied either that an order passed under the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14275, "end_char": 14341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S61A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14542, "end_char": 14546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "High Court is satisfied either that an order passed under the Code", "statute": "High Court is satisfied either that an order passed under the Code"}}, {"text": "s. 497", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17211, "end_char": 17217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 561A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17352, "end_char": 17359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 496", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17492, "end_char": 17498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17506, "end_char": 17532, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 496", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17584, "end_char": 17590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 561A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17658, "end_char": 17665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 496", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17961, "end_char": 17967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "lam Mondkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18145, "end_char": 18156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lam Mondkar\n\nOajendragadkar .J.\n\nTalab Haii\n\nHttssain\n\nJlfadlukar Purslwt•\n\ntnm Mondka.r\n\nOnjendr11,'larllcar .J.\n\nto the appellant."}}, {"text": "s. 56I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18331, "end_char": 18337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 496", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18482, "end_char": 18488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 496", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18599, "end_char": 18605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 561A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18709, "end_char": 18716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 561A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18801, "end_char": 18808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 561", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19061, "end_char": 19067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 497", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19117, "end_char": 19123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 498", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19133, "end_char": 19139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19852, "end_char": 19856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 496", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19863, "end_char": 19869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 496", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20096, "end_char": 20102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 496", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20281, "end_char": 20287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 498", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20555, "end_char": 20561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 498(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20569, "end_char": 20578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Tawb Haji - HWJ•ain Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20584, "end_char": 20614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under s. 498(1), the High Tawb Haji - HWJ•ain Court or the Court of Sessions may, even in the case of perv."}}, {"text": "s. 496", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20860, "end_char": 20866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 498(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20958, "end_char": 20967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 496", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21286, "end_char": 21292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 498(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22391, "end_char": 22400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 498(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22488, "end_char": 22497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Talab Baji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22680, "end_char": 22690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clearly\n\nTalab Baji\n\nHuaain\n\nMadkukar PuraAot.", "canonical_name": "Talab Haji"}}, {"text": "Madkukar PuraAot", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22700, "end_char": 22716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clearly\n\nTalab Baji\n\nHuaain\n\nMadkukar PuraAot."}}, {"text": "s. 498(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23031, "end_char": 23040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 498(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23170, "end_char": 23179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 561A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23306, "end_char": 23313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 561", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23565, "end_char": 23571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 498(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23630, "end_char": 23639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 497(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23801, "end_char": 23810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23933, "end_char": 23938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 498", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24123, "end_char": 24129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 561A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25801, "end_char": 25808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shree Purushottam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26330, "end_char": 26347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indeed Shree Purushottam went the length of suggesting that in .such a case the impugned subsequent conduct of the accused may give rise to some other charges under the Indian Penal Code, but it cannot justify bis re-arrest.", "canonical_name": "Shree Purushottam"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26492, "end_char": 26509, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S61A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26739, "end_char": 26743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27017, "end_char": 27043, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "(1945) L.R. 72 I.A. 120", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 27167, "end_char": 27190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Talab Haji", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27204, "end_char": 27214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19J8\n\nTalab Haji\n\nHusain\n\nM adliukar Puuhutta.m Afondkar\n\nGajcndragadkur ,/,\n\nTalab Haji\n\nHu.asain\n\nMudhukar Purlllwt\n\ntam Mondknr\n\nG11je:1ulra9adkflr J.\n\nwhom His .Majesty in Council ha1; given special leave to appeal against his sentence and conviction.", "canonical_name": "Talab Haji"}}, {"text": "Russel of Killowen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27762, "end_char": 27780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Divergent views had been expressed by the High Courts in this country on the question as to the High Courts' power to grant bail to convicted persons wht> had been given special leave to appeal to the Privy Council; these views and the scheme of the Code in regard to the grant of bail were examined by Lord Russel of Killowen who delivered the judgment of the Board in Lala Jairam Das's case(')."}}, {"text": "Lala Jairam Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27824, "end_char": 27839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Divergent views had been expressed by the High Courts in this country on the question as to the High Courts' power to grant bail to convicted persons wht> had been given special leave to appeal to the Privy Council; these views and the scheme of the Code in regard to the grant of bail were examined by Lord Russel of Killowen who delivered the judgment of the Board in Lala Jairam Das's case(')."}}, {"text": "s. 426", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28102, "end_char": 28108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28209, "end_char": 28214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XXXIX of the Code together with s. 426 is, and was intend to contain, a complete and exhaustive statement of the powers of a High Court in India to grant bail, and excludes the exist ence of any additit>nal inherent power in a High Court relating to the subject of bail\"."}}, {"text": "High Court of Justice in England", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 28412, "end_char": 28444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment further shows that in their Lordships' opinion, like the High Court of Justice in England, High Courts in India would not have inherent .power to grant bail to a convited person."}}, {"text": "High Courts in India", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 28446, "end_char": 28466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment further shows that in their Lordships' opinion, like the High Court of Justice in England, High Courts in India would not have inherent .power to grant bail to a convited person."}}, {"text": "s. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28705, "end_char": 28710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 561A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28932, "end_char": 28939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1945) L.R. 72 I.A. 120", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 29415, "end_char": 29438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 369", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29453, "end_char": 29459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 561A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29540, "end_char": 29547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 561A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29746, "end_char": 29753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "MaruUar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29802, "end_char": 29809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "n0t t\\t in with the scheme of Chapter XXXIX of the C:::ode Madloukar Pur\"\"'11\n\nread with s. 561A: In our opinion, neither this decision 'nor tam MaruUar even the observations on which Shri Purushot~ relied can Gajendrr.lfltldkar J. afford any assistance in cfeciding the point which this appeal bas raised before us."}}, {"text": "Purushot~", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29846, "end_char": 29855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "n0t t\\t in with the scheme of Chapter XXXIX of the C:::ode Madloukar Pur\"\"'11\n\nread with s. 561A: In our opinion, neither this decision 'nor tam MaruUar even the observations on which Shri Purushot~ relied can Gajendrr.lfltldkar J. afford any assistance in cfeciding the point which this appeal bas raised before us.", "canonical_name": "Purushottam"}}, {"text": "Gajendrr.lfltldkar J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29867, "end_char": 29888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "n0t t\\t in with the scheme of Chapter XXXIX of the C:::ode Madloukar Pur\"\"'11\n\nread with s. 561A: In our opinion, neither this decision 'nor tam MaruUar even the observations on which Shri Purushot~ relied can Gajendrr.lfltldkar J. afford any assistance in cfeciding the point which this appeal bas raised before us."}}, {"text": "s. 426", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30265, "end_char": 30271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 426(2A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30285, "end_char": 30295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 30500, "end_char": 30517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "accordingly hold that the view taken by the Bombay High Court about its inherent power to act in this case under s. 561A is right and must be confirmed~ It is hardly necessary to add that the inherent power conferred on High Courts under s. 561A has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only where such exercise is justified by the tests speciflcally laid down in the section itself;\n\nAfter all, procedure, whether criminal or civil, must serve the higher purpose of justiee; and it is only when the ends of justice are put in jeopardy by the conduct of the accuse.d that the inherent power can and should be exercised in cases like the present."}}, {"text": "s. 561A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30569, "end_char": 30576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 561A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30694, "end_char": 30701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1958_1_1240_1274_EN", "year": 1958, "text": "'1240\n\nSUPREME COURT- REPORTS [l958j.\n\n., NAGENDRA NATH BORA & ANOTHER .·• . . v.\n\n•. 'I February 7 . ', ~\n\n.- THE .. COMMISSIONER OF HILLS 'DIVISIO~ _.-\n\n.· ..\n\n~ND- APPEA~S, ASSAM, A~D- OTHERS_\n\n-·- : '; ·:\n\n- (and connected appeals) : - . l ',.. . ·.· ..• . . . ' ' ' . ' ' . ~·: (BHAGWATit' B. P. SINHA~ JAFER I~IAM, J. L~ KAPUR I\n\n: •. ' . .. ) . 'and GA~~N!; JR.A.G.ADKAR JJ.) \\. ·--~. ' ·.· :' '~\n\n_ High Court, Powers of-. vVrit of certiorari,. if can be issue, l. to quash an r, rror of fact appare1t , on the face of the .record-Judicia~ Supervision,· Scope of-Appellate , Authority if and. when _acts_ i1~ quasi-judicial. capacity-· Tes~-:-Plea of failure of .natzeral justice~ when can be ·entertai}£ed-Constitution of India, Arts. 226,· 2:27-· Eastern Bengal and :Assam Excise. Act, I9IO (E. B. & Assam Act I of.I9IO) as amendedby Ad. 23 of I955, s. 9 Rule 343 . : ·.\n\nThe High Court has no power under Art. 226 of the Con5titi.i'- tion to issue a writ of certiorari in order to quash an error of tact, even though it may be apparent on the face of the record. It can do so only where the error is one of law and that is apparent on the face of the record. 'Any error of law or fact which it can conect as a: court of appeal or revision cannot be a ground for the exercise of its power under that Article. ' . . H ari V islmu Kamath v. Syecl Alwed I shaquc a-n, l 'otlzers, [1955]\n\nI S.C.R. II04, relied on.\n\nQuem v. James Bolton, (r84r)'(r) Qucen.•s Bench 66, Ki1g Nat Belt Liqzors, Limited, [1922] 2 A.C. 128, Rex v. Nortlumb,; r land Compensation.. Appeal Tribunal, (1951) I K.B. 7II and Rex v_.\n\nNortlmmberlmtd Compensatiol~ Appeal Tribunal, (1952) I K.B. 338, ; referred to.\n\n. . .\n\nThe jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution is limited to seeing that the judicia~ or quasi-judicial tribunals or administrative bodies exercising quasi-juditial powers, do not exceed their statutory jurisdiction and correctly administer the law laid down by the statute under which they act. So long. as the hierarchy of officers and Appellate authorities created by a statute function within their ambit, the manner in which they do so can be no ground for interference. The powers of judicial supervision of the High Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution are not greater than those under Art. 226 and must be limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.\n\n}Varyam Singh and another v. Amama!IJ and another~ [1954] S.C. R. 565, referred to.\n\nConsequently, where the High Court in exercise of its powers under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution interfered with\n\n...\n\nI . s.c.It~ S.UPREI\\fE COURT ; REPORTS 1241\n\n. tain orders.made by th: Exise Appellate Authority under the\n\nI9J8 cersam Excise Act a~ bcmg m excess of its jurisdiction on the As und that they were ';'itiated by errors of fact apparent on the lfagmdra Nath\n\nf:e of the record, such tntrference was without jurisdiction and Bora 6- Another\n\nthe orders passed by thcHtgh Court must be set aside. . ·.\n\nv. . . 1 Tha CommtssumBr Held further; that w 1ere an appellate Authority as in the fH'll D · . , . ' ' d h h\" • ' 0 I .S\n\nIUISJ01J nstaltt case, IS constitute t e 1hest authonty by the statute cS- Appeals Assam\n\nor decidin~ as betveen . the c\\lffiS Of rival parties, its powers and O; hers ' cannot be c1rcums; nbed o~ cn t be hehl to. have acted in excess of its powers or. w1thout JUn_sdlctlOn on considerations foreign to\n\nthe statute or .the rules. . . . . . . . . . .\n\nRainmt and Raman Ltd. v. The State of J.l!adra.s, [rgs6] S.C.R. zs6, referred to. . ' . ! .\n\nIn the absence of anything to show that the appellate Authority had contravened any rules of natural justice, which must be understood in the context of tl~ rules Jaid down by the statute itself, it would be wrong to say that there has been a :failure of natural justice simply because the .view it took of the\n\nmatter might not be acceptable to another tribunal.\n\nNew Prakas!J Transport .co. Ltd. v. New Suu::ama Transport Co. Ltd., [I957] S.C.R. g8, rehed on. · ' • The question vhether an administrative authority functions merely in .an administrative. or quasijudicial capacity .must be determined on an examination of the statute and its rules under\n\n\\vhich it acts, and there can be no doubt on such examination that the Authorities mentioned in s. g of the Eastern Bengal and Assam Excise Act, 1910, as amended by Assam Act 23 of 1953, are no mere administrative bodies and their orders are, therefore, amenable to the powers of control and supervision vested in the High Court by Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. . CrviL APPELLATE . JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 668; 669, 670 and 672 of 1957. • . Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 6, 1957, of the Assam High Qourt in Civil Rule No. 65 of 1957. · .\n\nA. V. Viswanatha Sa8iri and. Dipa.k Datta Chudltur?J, for the appellants in C. As. Nos. 668 and 669 of 1957 and respondent No.2 in C.A .. No. 670 of 1957.\n\nS. }Jf. Lahiri, Advocate-General for the State of Assam an? Naunit Lal, for the appellants in C.A. No. 6!0 of 19o7 and respondent No. 2 in C.A. No. 669 of 19o7.\n\n1958. February 7; Tho following Judgment of the .Court was delivered by ' . ' . .. . . ..\n\n:r95B ~SINHA J.-These appeals by special leave redirect. - ed aoainst the judgments and orders of the Assam Nagendra Nath H 1\"gh° Court, exercising its powers under Arts. 226 and Bora 6- Another ...... . v. 227 of the Constitution, in respect of orders passed by The. Commisio\"ne~ the Revenue Authorities under the provisions of the . of Hills Divisio11 Eastern Bengal and Assam Excise Act, 1910 (E. B.\n\n\"&Appeals~ Assam, and Assam Act I of 1910) (hereinafter referred to as\n\nand Others the Act). They raise certain common questions of\n\nSinlla ]. constitutional law~ and have, therefore, been heard together, and will be disposed of by this Judgment • .\n\nThough there are certain common features in the pattern of the proceedings relating to the settlement of certain country spirit shops, when they passed through the hierarchy of the authorities under the Act, the facts of each case are different, and have to be stated separately in so far as it is necessary to sta.te them. ·\n\n(I) Oivil Appeal No. 668 of 1957.\n\nThe two appellants Nagendra Na.th Bora and Ridananda Dutt are partners, the partnership having been formed in view of the Government notification dated November 30, 1956, amending rule 232 of the Assam E:!cise Rules, to the effect that the settlement of the country spirit shops which may be declared by the Government to be 'big shops', shall be made with two or more partners who shall not belong to the same family nor should be re1ated to one. another (vide correction slip at p. 106 of the Assam Excise l\\Ia.oua.l,\n\n1946). In accordance with the rules framed under the Act, tenders were invited by the Deputy Commissioner of SibsC;\\gar, for the settlement of Jorhat country spirit shop for the financial year 1957-58 in December, 1956.\n\nTte appella!lts as rnembers of the' partnerhip aforesatd, subm1tted a tender in the prescrtbed form.\n\nRespondents 3 and 4, Dharmesh war l(a.lita and Someswa.r Neog, respectively, also were amongst the tenderers. Tho Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam, and the Commissioner of Excise, Assam, ar~ the first and the second respondents in th_is case. It 1s necessary to state at this stage that 1n respect of the financial year 1956·57, the shop in\n\nI )\n\ns.c.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT.REPORTS 1243\n\nuestion was ordered b; r the first respondent as the I 9s8\n\nxoise Appellate Authonty to be settled. with the first . . ellant Nagendra Na.th as an individual setting Nagelldra Nut!, app d f th D t c . . ' Bora & Anotller aside the or es ? e . epu y ommxsswr:ter and, the v.\n\nExcise .CommtssiOnr. .The oher. c.omptltors for the n 8 Commissio?Jer settlem.ent of the sa1d shop being dissa.t1sfied with the of Hills Division orders of the first respondent, moved the Assam High cS- Appeals, A ssam, Court. and challenged . the validity of the settlement aud OJ hers made in . the. first . appellant's favour. , Similar writ\n\n5;,1111 J. cases .. oha.llenging ... orders of settlement by the first respondent as the .•Excise Appellate .Authority, had been instituted in the High Court. All those cases were heard together, and the High Court, by its judgment dated May 22, 1956, quashed the orders passed by the firs~ respondent, chiefly on the ground that the Appellate , Authority .• had been illegally constituted.\n\nThe matter was brought by way of, special leave to this Court, and was heard by the Constitution Bench\n\nwhich, by. its judgment dated January 31, 1957, decided that the constitution of the Commissioner of Hills Division . and . Appeals as the . ultimate appellate\n\nAuthority. under . the Act, wa.s not unconstitutionat The judgment of this Court is reported in the case of The State of. Assam v. A. N. Kidwai (1). It will be necessary, in the course of this judgment, tu make several references to that decision which, for the ~1.ke\n\nof brevity, we shall call the 'ruling of this Court,.· Tl.e result of the ruling of this Court, was that the determination by the Assam. High Court that the orders passed by. the . first respondent, were void, was set aside, and the settlement made by that Authority, consequently, stood restored. But. in the meantime,\n\nas the orders of the first respondent stood quashed as a. result of the judgment of the High Court, the directton of the Excise Commissioner tha.t the shop in\n\nquestion be re-settled, was carried out, and the settlement was made with the third respondent aforesaid as a.n individual • . He continued in possession of the shop until February 26, 1957, on which date, the fi:rst appellant was put in possession as a result of the ruhng\n\nA .\n\n(I) [1957) S.C.R. 2.95\n\n I 1~8. ':. : . , . . • , , . ,\n\nNagendra N ath Bora c;. At•otller\n\nof this Court. Even . sg, the first appellant could exercise his r1ghts as a lessee of the shop only for a, few months during the financial year ending March 31 1957. . . . . . '\n\nTile c_ommiso~'er For the financial year 1957-5 8, the Deputy CommisofA~lstDtAvmon sioner, in consultation with the local Advisory Com~ & rrea s, ssam, • 1 d th h . .\n\n411d others mlttee; sett e e s op In q uest1on with the third and the fourth respondents aforesaid. The tender sub ..\n\nSinh&~ J. itte~ by the ppellants, :was not considered by the hcens1ng authority on the erroneous.. ground that the orders passed by the first. respondent , as the ultimate Revenue Authority in the matter of settlement of excise shops, had beeri rendered null and vo1d as a result of the decision of the High Court; referred to above.\n\nThe appellants, as also others who were competnors for the settlement aforesaid, preferred appeals to the Excise Commissioner who set aside the settlement mad~ in favour of the respondents. 3 and 4, and ordered settle~\n\nment of the shop. with the appellants. The Excise Commissioner took into consideration the fact that\n\nthe order of the High Court, nullifying the proceedings before the first respondent, had been set aside by the ruling of this Court. The consequence of the order of this Court; was, as the Commissioner of Excise pointed out, that a supposed disqualification of the appellants as competent tenderers, stood vacated as a result of the first respondent's order. The third and the fourth respondents, as also other dissatisfied tenderers preferred appeals to the first respondent against the order of the second respondent (the .Excise Commissioner).\n\nThe first respondent dismissed those appeals and confirmed the order settling the shop with the appellants, by his order dated June 10, 1957.\n\nTho respondents 3 and 4, then, moved the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution, for an appropriate writ for quashing the order passed by the first respondent. .The Ifigh Court, by its order dated August 6, 1957, quashed the aforesaid order of settlement in favour of the appellants by the first respondent. The High Court further directed that all the tenders be re-considered in the light of the observations made by it. The main ground of decision in the\n\n,..\n\ns.c.R ..\n\nSUPRE~IE COURT REPORTS 1245\n\nI!igh Court,: was that the. Ecie :\\P, Pellate Authority had aoted 1n . . excess of Its JUrrsdrctiOn, and that its d b Nagendra Nath order was v1t1ate yerrors appaent on the face of Bora G- Another the record.· The prayer for a. c.ertJcate that .the case v, was a. fit one for appeal to this Court, ha vmg been Till Commissione., . refused by the High Court, the 'appellants obtained of Hills Division\n\n· ialleave to appeal. . ·. . 6- Appeals, Assrzm. spec . . . and Others ' ·(II) Civil Appeal No. 669 of 1957. . ·.:This appeal relates to the settlement of the Murmuria. country spirit shop in the district of Sibsagar, for the financial year 1957-58. The appellant La.kbiram Ka.lita and the first respondent Bhanuram Pegu, amongst others, had submitted their tenders for the settlement of the shop. The Deputy Commissioner, after consulting the Advisory Committee, settled the shop with the first respondent aforesaid. The appeals filed by the appellant and other disappointed tenderera, were dismissed . by the Excise Commissioner by his order dated 1\\-Ia.rch 25, 1957.\n\nAgainst the said order, the appellant and another party filed further appeals to the Commissioner of Hills Division and\n\nAppeals, who, by his order dated ~Jay 30, 1957, set aside the settlement in favour of the first respondent, and ordered settlement with the appellant. In pursuance of that order, the appellant took possession oJ ·\n\nthe shop with effect from June 5, 1957. The first\n\nrepondent's application for review of the order afore- satd, stood dismissed on June 11, 1957. Against the\n\naforesaid orders of the Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, the first respondent moved the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution, for a proper writ for quashing them. On June 17, .1957, the writ petition was heard e~ pa1'te, and the High Court isaued a rule to show cause why. a w1it as prayed for, . should not be issued. The rule wa~ made returnable within three weeks. The High Court also ma.de the further order in these terms :- .\n\nSinhca f.·\n\n t . . ''Meanwhile the status quo ante will be main- ~:uned ,, . ' !hia lst , order was mis-interprtcd by the first respo~\n\nent and his advisers o.s entitling them to be put 1n\n\nI i ' ( !\n\nz95a possession of the shop, and it is stated .that .he first respondent. threatened the appellant to oust hlm from Nagendra Nath the shop on the. basis of the order of the High Court . Bora&- AtJotlleY Th II d th H. h 0\n\nv. . . . quoted above.· . e appe ant move e 1g ourt The commissioner for : a clarification of. its order aforesaid. ·. The High of Hills Division Court\"naturaUy observed that by .' maintaining status &-Appeals, Assam quo ante', the High Court meaut that whoever , was\n\n. and Others in possession of he.~ sop on .June 17, 1957, will con-\n\nSinha J. . tinue to' be in possessron ur1ng the pendency. of the case in the High Court . . But, curiously enough, the Deputy;. Commissioner, by an ex parte order, on\n\nJune 21, 1957, directed that the first respondent be put in charge of the shop forthwith, and the order was carried out.\n\nWhen the Deputy Commissioner was approached by the appellant to restore him to possession in view of the observation of the High Court, he asked the appellant to obtain further order from the High Court .. Thereafter, the appellant again moved the High Court on June 28,.1957, stating all the facts leading to his wrongful dispossession, and seeking relief in the High Court. No order was passed on that petition. Ultimatey, the High Court, by its order dated July 31, 1957, set aside the order of the Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals. The appellant's prayer\n\nfor a certificate that the case was a fit one for appeal to this Court, having been refused by the High Court, he moved this Court and obtained special leave to appeal. - \\ · .. ; .. . (III) Civil Appeal .No. 670 of 1957 • . ; .: .\n\nThis appeal is on behalf of the Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam, against the judgment and order of the High Court relating to the J\\furmuria shop which . is the subject-matter of Civil Appeal No. 669 referred to in the previous paragraph~ The first respondent to this appeal is Bhanuram Pe(J'u who is also the first respondent in Civil Appeal No. 669 of 1957. The second respondent is Lakhiram l(alita who is the appellant in Civil Appeal No: 669 of 1957.\n\nBoth these respondents, as already indicated, are the competing tenderers for the shop in question. The\n\nfacts of this case have already been stated in relation\n\ns.c.R.\n\nSUPRE~1:E COURT -REPORTS 1247\n\ntq Civil Appeal No .. 669 of 1957: This appeal has been brought :vrt~ a v1ew to getting the legal position clarified lD vrew of the frequent appeals made to the Nagenrira Nath\n\nt ' th tt f ttl f Bora 6- Anothe'f' appellan .m e ma . er o se ement o excise shops.. .v.\n\n(IV) Civil Appeal No. 672 0; 1957. ·~' The Commi.ss.i~r . . . . . . . 'J ·• ·• of Hzlls Dnn.sum . This appeal relates to the Tinsukia. country spirit6- Appeals, Assam, shop in the district of Lakhimpur. The appellants . and Others.\n\nRfiplla. . l{.han and Mahibuddin Ahmad, are partners: and as -such, are interested in the settlement of the shop for the financial year 1957-58. This shop bad been jointly settled with the first appellant and his father for a number of years. For the year 1956-57 also, the lease had been granted to them by the Deputy Commissioner, after consultation with the Advisory Committee . . A number of unsuccessful tenderers filed\n\nappeals before the Commissioner of Excise questioninO' the settlement with the first appellant and his fathe~ in respect of the year 1956-57. The Excise Commissioner set aside the settlement, and ordered a re.settlement. The first . appellant and his father filed an appeal before the Excise Appellate Authority, against the order of the. Commissioner of. Excise. The Appellate Authority allowed the appeal, and set aside the orders of the Commissioner and the Deputy, Commissioner. One Rafiqul Hussain, one of the competitors for the shop, filed a writ petition before the High Cour~\n\nunder Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Th1s 'Yrit application, along with other similar applications, was heard and decided by the High Court, as aforesaid, by its judgment da.ted ]flay 23, 1956 . . Against the judgment of the High Court, the first appellant and his father appealed tothis Court by special leave, with the result indicated above. During the pendency of the appeal i~ this Court in the absence of a stay order, the direction of the Commissioner for a resettle-· ment, was carried out. The Deputy Commissioner, with the unanimous advice of the Advisory Committee settled' the shop with the first appellant on July 25,\n\n1956. The first respondent and some others peferred appeals before tho Commissioner of Excise, a.gamst the order aforesaid of the Deputy Commissioner.\n\nAs the\n\nSinluJ ].\n\n' I ! '\n\n,· I\n\n\\ I\n\n1-,\n\nI ! , .\n\n!· ,,\n\n) . r;\n\nI ; I ji 1: !! \" ' \" ' ; j\n\n' .I I!\n\n195s special leave appeal.s to .thjs .curt '\"ere pending !l''t - that time,\" .the Excise Commissioner, under a m18_ Natendra Nath apprehension of the effect of this Court's order refusing\n\nBora~ Another interim stay, set aside the Deputy Commissioner's\n\nThs com:issioner order, and directed the settlement to be ade with the of Hills Division first respondent. As thre was no Exmse Appellate\n\n<JJ.Appcals. Assam, Authority functioning ·. t te time as a resul.t of the\n\nand OJhrs decision, aforesaid, of the .High. Court, delanng the\n\nSinha J. constitution of such a.n Autbonty to be void, the.first appellant moved the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution, on the ground that the order of the Excise Commissioner was vitiated byan error apparent on the face o~ the record in so far as he had misunderstood the order of the Supreme Court passed on the stay petition.\n\nThe High Court admitted the application but rejected the prayer for maintenance of status quo in the sense that the first appellant's possession be maintained. On the stay petition being rejected by the High Court, the first respondent took possession of the shop from the first appellant as a result of the Excise Commissioner's order in his favour.\n\nThe High Court ultimately dismissed the writ application by its order dated December 6, 1956. The appeal filed by the appellant and his father, already pending in this Court, was heard and determined as . aforesaid, in January, 1957.\n\nThis Court reversed the decision of the Hicrh Court and restored the status of\n\nth~ Excise . Appellate Authority. As a. result of .the ruh!lg of th1s Court, the Excise Appellate Authority, by Its ordr dated February 25, 1957, directed delivery of pssesston back to the first appellant and his father, holdtng that the order of re-settlement and the rese.ttlement, itself, in pursuance of that order, were all Wiped out. Against the said order the first respondent move~ th~ High Court under Art~. 226 and 227 of the Constit!-ltiOn for quashing the order for delivery of J.?ORsess!on, ?n the ground of want of jurisdiction, and for ad tntenm stay. The liigh Court issued a rule and passecl. an order for interim stay on February 26, 1957 ..\n\nThe Illgh Coul't made the rule absolute by its order\n\natedf1\\1a.rch 26, 1957, taking thf' view that the a.tte_n\n\nwn o th&s Court had not been drawn to the intertm\n\n~ :f ' !\n\nsettlement Of the ShOp in the. abS6DC8 Of an Order Of\n\nI958 stay.· H appears further that during the pendency of Nagmdra Nat\" the appeal in tis Court, fresh settlement for the B()ra 6-AMih~ financial year 19~7 ·~8, took place towards the end of v. 1956 a.nd the beginning of 1957. The Tinsukia. shop The Commissioner\n\nas 'settled with respondents 1 and 2 though . the of Hills Divisicm W 1 h d • tl b d cS< Appeals Assam appellants a so a JOin y su mttte a tender for the end OJiusrs ' same.\n\nThe appellants and other parties preferred a.ppeals against the said order of settlement made by Si\"JJha J. the Deputy Commissioner.' The Excise Commissioner set aside the settlement by the Deputy Commissioner, and directed settlement in favour of the appellants by his order dated April 16, 1957.\n\nAgainst that order, respondents I and 2 and others preferred appeals before the . Excise Appellate Authority who, by an order dated June 3, 1957, dismissed the o.ppea.ls.\n\nAccordingly, the appellants were given possession of the shop on June 7, 1957. The respondents 1 and 2 again moved the High Court for quashing the order of the Excise Appellate Authority, affirming tha.t of tbe Excise Commissioner, and also pro.yed for the Blatus quo being maintained. The High Court admitted the petition and ordered 'meanwhiLe, status quo ante be maintained.', Tills took place on June 10, 1957.\n\nIn pursuo.nc6 of the aforesaid order of the High Court, the appellants were dispossessed of the shop even though they had been put in possession only three dayd earlier.\n\nThis was done on a complete misapprehensio11 of the true effect of the order of the High Court maintaining Btatus quo ante. If the High Court had passed its order in a less sophisticated and more easily under. stood language in that part of the country, perhaps, the party in possession, would not have been dispossessed of the shop settled with it. The appellants moved\n\nte High Court against the . Commissioner's order dtrecting possession to be given to the respondents 1 &od 2. The High Court issued a. rule but refused to grant stay of the operation of the order directing possession to be given. During the final bearing of te rule before the High Court, the appellants ago.xn moved a petition on July 5, 1957, for vacating the\n\n' l\n\n.·.,;\n\n( ...\n\n; j i\n\n; .\n\n'i I .,\n\n' l l I\n\n' I 1\n\nI i 1 l\n\nJ I l l J\n\nl j\n\nxgsB order of possession which was based on a misapprehen~ sion of the order ~£the High Court maintaining status NaGendra Nlh quo ante, but apparently, no order was passed because Bora & Anotm!r • h d. 1 d b t th v. possesston a .. a rea y . een gtven o e respondents Ths commissioter 1 and.2.J;.Daring the hearing of the rule by the High of Hills Divison Court; an unfortunate incident occurred, for which the\n\n~Appeals, Assam, appellants cannot altogether be absolved. of. some and Othus \"b'] t lt f h' h f th 1 . _ resp_ons1 1 1 y, . as a. resu o w 1c , one o e earned Sinha]. judges cqnstituting .the.Bench,· namely, Deka J. ex~ pressed his .unwillingness to proceed with the hearing of the : case. t The . hearing : had, therefore, to be adjourned. on July 15, 1957, until a new Bench could\n\npe constituted. The appellants renewed their appli- _cation already made on July 5, as. aforesaid, for un-:\n\ndoing: the .. unintended effect of the order of the High Court, that the status quo ante was to continue. . But on July 30, the Chief Justice directed that the matter\n\nbe, placed before a Division Bench. As there was no third. judge at the time, the disposal of the case, naturally had to stand over until the third judge was\n\navailable .. The matter of delivery of possession was again. mentioned before the Division Bench of the Chief Justice and Deka J. . The High Court rejected the application on grounds which cannot bear a close scrutiny .. The petitioners also approached the Excise App.ellate Authority, but it refused to re-consider the matter as the case was then pending before the High Court. Again on August 14-, 1957, a fresh application was made to the High Court, along with a copy of tha orders passed by the Excise Appellate Authority an~ the Deputy Commissioner, Lakhimpur, giving delivery. of possession to respondents 1 and 2.\n\nBut, this time, Deka J. refused to hear the matter, and naturally, the Chief Justice directed the matter to be placed before him, sitting singly. Ou August 19, 1957, the matter was placed before the Chief Justice sitting singly, and ho directed a rule to issue on the opposite party cited before that Court,. to show cause. Apparently, the learned Chief Justice treated the matter as a new case and not as an off-shoot of the case already pending before the lligh Court. The High Court closed for the long vacation on September 2, and was to re-open on\n\nNoveber 3, 1957. '.The vacancy of .the' third judge h d not been filled till then, and .as the appellants felt thant they had been wrongfully deprived of their right Nagendra Nath ... h It f Bora <So A11otlur to bold their s op,. as a resu .o .an erroneous inter. v. pratation of the o:der of the Htgh Court, passed on The commissiontrr June 10, as aforesaid, and as there was no prospect of of Hills Division the oase being . disposed . of quickly, the appellants <So App6als, Assam, xnoved this Court and obtained . special leave . 'to and Others\n\npx:~~~ evidi{t f1:~~ .the tatement ·f fac~S iz~ c~nec-: Sir.lus ] . tion with each one of the appeals, set out above, _these cases have ollowed a common pattern. They conie from the' non-prohibited areas' in the State of Assam where sale of' country spirit' js regulated by .licences issued by the authorities under the provisions of the Act. Settlement of shops for the sale of such liquor is made for one year April! to larch 31. According to the present practice contained in Executive Instructions, intending candidates for licences, have \"to submit tenders to the Deputy Commissioner for the Sadar\n\nDivision and to Huh-Divisional officers for Sub-Divisions, in accordance with the terms of notices published\n\nfor the purpose. Such tenders are treated as strictly confidential. Settlement is made by the Deputy Commissioner or the Sub-Divisional Officer concerned~ as the case may be, in consultation with a~ Advisory Committee consisting of 5local members or less.; The selection of a particular tenderer is more or less a\n\nmatter of administrative discretion with the officer making the settlement. Under the Act, an appeal from an order of settlement made by a Deputy Commissioner or Sub-Divisional officer, lies to the commissioner of Excise, and from an order of the\n\nommissioner of Excise to the Excise Appellate Autho~ r1ty whose decision becomes final. Section 9 of the Aot, dealing with appeal and revision, has undergone a series of amendments, and the section as it has\n\nmerge.d out of the latest amendment by the Amcndtng Act-The Assam Act 23 of 1955-which received the assent of the Governor of Assam on December 22, 19?5, and was published in the ssam Gazette. dted\n\n, .\n\nx95a December 28, 19 55, is in these terms: . . . . . .. . \"9. (1) Orders passed under this Act or under Nagendra Nath any . rule made hereunder shall . be appealable as Bora <5o Anot!JtJr • . 'b d b h I h follows 10 the manner prescn e . y sue ru es as t e The comv:nissioncr State Government may make in this behalf- . of Hills Divison · (a) t~ the Excise Commissioner, any order passed ·\n\ncS- Appeaol\\Assam. by the District Collect_or or a Collector other than the\n\nand t ers C ll t .. . .\n\nDistrict o ec or, : 1\\'· ' . ·\n\nSinha J. ·\n\n(b) to the Appellate Autnority appointed by tbe State Government for the purpose, any order passed by the Excise Commissioner •. ·\n\n (2) Iri cases not provided ' fo~· by clauses {a) and (b) of sub-section (I), orders passed under this Act or under any rules made hereunder shall be appealable to such authorities as the State Government may prescribe. · · · .. · . . (3) The Appellate Authority, the Excise Commissioner or the District Collector may call for the proceedings held by any officer or person subordinate to it or him or subject to its or his control and pass such . orders thereon as it or he may think fit.'' Rules 339, 340, 341 and 345 of the Assam Excise Manual, ha. ve, thus, become obsolete and have been deleted as a result of the latest amendment aforesaid.\n\nThe power of hearing appeals and revisions under the Act, has been vested successively in the Board, the Assam Revenue Tribunal, the Commissioner for Hills Division and Appeals; . and ultimately, under the amended section, in the Appellate Authority. The history of the legislation relating to the highest Revenue Authority under the Act, has been traced in the judgment of this Court in the State of Assam v.\n\nA. N. Kidwai (supra), and need not be repeated here.\n\nIt . is convenient, first, to deal with the general questioilB of public importance raised on behalf of the appellant in CivH Appeal No. 670 of 1957. At the forefront of the arguments advanced on behalf of the Appellate Authority, was the plea that the several authorities already indicated, concerned with the settlement of excise shops like those in question in these appea.ls, are merely administrative bodies, and, ..\n\nI - \\.\n\n; I\n\ntherefore~· their :orders .. whether passed in the first\n\nI95B instance or on appeal, should not be amenable to the • d' t ' · d\" Nagendra Nat!J writ JUriS 10 100 or supervisory JUris Ictwn of the Bora&- A1lotner Jiigh Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constituv. tion. If the matter had rested only with the provi, Tile Commissioner sions of the Act, apart from the rules made under of 111/ls Division\n\n8. 36 of the Act, much could have been said in support 6- Appurls, Assam, of this contention. As observed by this Court in the and Others case of Oooverjee B. Bltarucha v. The ExcisG Com- 5111,;; 1. missioner and the Chief Commissioner, Ajmer and \"· otherB(1) there is no inherent right in a. citizen to sell\n\nliquor. It has further been observed by this Court in the recent case of the State of Assam v. A. N. J(idwai, (supra), at page.30l as follows: ·\n\n\" A perusal of the Act and rules will make it clear that no person has any absolute right to sell liquor a.nd . that the purpose of the Act and the rules is to\n\ncontrol and restrict the consumption of intoxicating liquors, such control and restriction being obviously\n\nnecessary for the preservation of public health and morals, and to raise revenue.\" It is true that no one has an inherent right to settle~ ment of liquor shops, but when the State, by public notice, invites candidates for settlement to make their\n\ntenders, and in pursuance of such a. notice, a numller of persons make such tenders ea.ch one makes a. claim for himself in opposition to the claims of the others, and the public authorities concerned with the settlement, ha.ve to choose from amongst them. If the ohoice had rested in the hands of only one authority like the District Collector on his subjective satisfaction a.s t-o the fitness of a particular candidate without his ordors being amenable to an appeal or appeals or ·. revision, the position may have been different. But 8• 9 of the Act has Ia.id down a regular hierarchy of authorities, one above the other, with the right of hearing appeals or revisions. Though the Act and the rules do not, in expres., terms, require reasoned or?ers\n\nto be recorded, yet, in the context of the subJect- .. lllatter of the rule~, it becomes necessary for the\n\n(l) [19:51] S. C. R. 873, 83o.\n\nz9sa several authorities to pass what are called 'speaking . orders '. .Where there is a ·. right vested in -an au tho ..\n\nNagendra Nath b t b 't d · t t ' · Bora & Another rity created y sttu e, e 1 a_ ~11!118 r3: IVe or quasiv. . . judicial, to her ~peals and !ev1s1ons,. It becoll!-es .its The cmmisoer duty to her JUdl?Ially, tha~_lS to say! 1!1 an . objeCtive\n\nof HJlls DwJsJon manner, . Impartially and~, after g1v1ng reasonable\n\n& AppdeaOlst; Assam. opportunity to the parties Concerned. in the. dispute,\n\nan ,, ers • 'b £ 't I to place their .respect1 ve . cases e ore 1 • n this Sitiha J. connection;. the ·.observations of , Lord Haldane at p. 132, and of Lord Moulton at p. 150, in Local Government Board v. Atlidge (1), to the following effect are very apposite: .\n\nLord Haldane: \"My Lor'ds, when . the duty of deciding an appeal is imposed, those whose duty it is to decide it must act judicially. They must deal with the question referred to them without bias, and they must give to each of the parties the opportunity of adequately presenting the case made. The decision must be come to in the spirit and with the sense of responsibility of a tribunal whose duty it is to mete out justice. But it does n.ot follow that the procedure of every such tribunal must be the same.', Lord Moulton: \"In the present case, ho1'\\rever, the Legislature has provided an appeal, but it is an appeal to an administrative department of State and not to a judicial body. It is said, truthfully, that on such an appeal the Local Government Board must act judicially, but this, in my opinion, only mans that it must preserve a judicial temper and perform its duties conscientiously, with a proper feeling of responsibility, in view of the fact that its acts affect the property and rights of individuals. Parliament has wisely laid down certain rules to be observed in the performance of its functions in these matters, and those rules must\n\nbe obBcrved because they are imposed by statute, and for no other reason, and whether they give much or little opportunity for what I may call quasi.litigious procedure depends solely on what Parliament has thought right.- These rules are beyond the criticism of tho Courts, and it ia not their business to add to or\n\n(I) [19f.5] A.C. 1'20. • \\ . ..\n\ntake a.wy from thm~ ?r even to discuss whether in\n\nI958 the opimon of the Indtvidual members of the Court Nagendra Nath they are adequate or not.\" Bora e. Anotl1er The legal position lias been very succinctly put in v.\n\nHalsbury's Laws of England('}, as follows:- Th6 Commissiolw~ of Jltlls Division \"1vioreover an administrative body, whose decie. Appeals. Assam. sion is actuated in whole or in part by questions of emd Others policy, may be under a duty to act judicially in the course of arriving at that decision. Thus, if in order inha J. to arrive at the decision, the body concerned had to consider proposals and objections and consider evidence, if at some stage of the proceedings leading up to the decision there was something in t.he nature of a lis before it, then in the course of such consideration and at that stage the body would be under a duty to act judicially. If, on the other ha.nd, an administrative body in arriving at its decision has before it at no stage any form of lis and throughout has to consider the question from the point of view of policy and expediency, it cannot be said that it is under a duty\n\na.t any time to act judicially. Even where the body is at some stage of the proceedings leading up to the decil:iion under a duty to act judicially, :he supervi sory jurisdiction of the Court does nl')t exteu•l to considering the sufficiency of the grounds for, or othPrwise\n\nchallenging, the decision itself.\" · .\n\nThe provisions of the Act are intended to safeguarrl' the int(>rest of the State on the one hand, by stopping, or at any rate, checking illicit distillation, and on the other ha.nd, by raising the maximum revenue consist. ently with the observance of the rules of temperance.\n\nThe authorities under the Act, with Sub-divisional\n\nOfficers at tho bottom and the Appellate Authority at the apex of the 'hierarchy, are charged with those duties. The rule~ under the Act and the executive instructions which have no statutory force but which are meant for the guidance of the officers concerned, enjoin upon those officers, the duty of seeing to it that shops are settled with persons of. character a:nd e~\n\nper•ence in the line, subject to certam reservations 1n\n\n(•) Vol. II. Jrd Edn., pp. s6S7\n\nI . ;\n\n. SUPRE~IE COURT REPORTS [1958]\n\nI958 favour of tribal population. Except those general con. .· . . siderations, there are no specific rules. governing the Nagendra Natb . grant of leases or licences in respect of liquor shops, .\n\nBora &- AnoJiser • • t\" d f 1 and 1n a certain con 1ngency, even raw1ng o ots, 18 Th6 con:;, issioner provided for, vide Executive Instructions 110 at p~ 174\n\nof Hills Division of the 11anual. .. ' The words of sub-s. (3) of s. 9 as o- Appeals. Assam, amended set out above, vest complete discretion in\n\n~.mdOthers the Appllate Authority, the Excise Commisioneror ·\n\nSiiJIIa 1. the District Collector, to 'pass such orders thereon as it or he may think fit.' The sections of the Act do not 1nake any reference to the recording of evidence or hearing of parties or even recording reasons for orders passed by the authorities aforesaid. But we have been informed at the bar that as a matter of practice, the authorities under the Act, hear counsel . for the parties,· and give reasoned judgments, so as to enable the higher authorities to know why a particular choice has been made. That is also apparent from the -several orders passed by them in course of these few cases that are before us .\n\n. But when wo come to the rules relating to appeals and revisions, we find that the widest scope for going up in appeal or revision, has been given . to persons interested, because r . . 344 only lttys down that no appeal shall lie against the orders of composition, . thus, leaving all other kinds of orders open to appeal or revision. Rule 343 provides that every memo.\n\nrandum of appeal shall be presented within one month from the date of the order appealed against, subject to the requisite time for obtaining a. certified copy of the order bing excluded. Rule 344: requires the memorandum of appeal to be accompanied by a certified copy of the order appea1ed against.\n\nThe memo .. randum of appeal has to be stamped with a requisite courtfeo stamp. Rule 3!3 was futther amended by theN otification dated niarch 14, 1U57, by o.dding the following proviso and explanations to tho.t rule:\n\n\"Provided further that the co1npetent Appellate Authority shall have the power to admit the appeal after the prescribe(! porioJ. of limitation when the appellant sa, tisfies the Appellate Authority that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal \\\n\n[ f\n\n' ~-• '.f' 4• I\n\nwithin such period. . z95R Explanation (1). The fact that the appellant was Nagendra Nail• misled by any rde~, practic~ .or judgment of any Bora 6- Another Appellate A.utorrty _In_ aso.ertammg or computing the v., . prescribed period of hmrtatwn may be sufficient cause Th' omnus~er\n\n•thin the meaning of this Rule. . of Hllls Dwr .. non Wl cS- Appeals, Assam, . Explanation (2) . . The fact that the Appellate . and Olhers Authority was una.ble. o function for any period by reason of any JUdlmal pronouncement shall . be Sinha J. sufficient cause within the meaning of this Rule.\n\n : The amendment shall be deemed to have been made on 23rd 1\\rlay, 1956, and shall have retrospective effect since tha.t date. \" These rules, read along with the recent amendments, set out above, approximate the procedure to be followed by the Appellate Authorities, to the regular procedure observed by courts of justice in entertaining appeals. As would appear from the ruling of this Court at p. 304, where the provisions and effect of the Assam Revenue Tribunal (Transfer of Powers) Act, 1948, (Assam IV of 1948) have been set out, the ultimate jurisdiction to hear appeals aucl revisions, was divided between the Assam High Court and the Authority referred to in s. 3(3) of that Ad . Appeals and revisions arising out of cases covered by the provisions of the enactments specified in Schedule ' A' to that Act, were to lie in and to be heard by the .• -\\ --sam ....\n\nHigh Coutt, and the jurisdiction to entertain appt>als and revisions in matters arising under the provision::; of the enactments specified in Schedule 'B, to that Act, was vested in the Authority to. be set up under s. 3(3), that is to say, for the purposes of the present appeals before us, the Excise .Appellate Authority.\n\nThus, the Excise Appellate .Authority, for the purposes of cases a.rising under the Act, was vested with the power of the highest appellate Tribunal, even as the High Court was, in respect of the other group of cases.\n\nThat does not necessarily mean that the_ Excis~ Appllte Authority was a Tribunal of co.ordmate J~IriSdiCtlOn with the High Court, or that that Authonty was not amenable to tho supervisory jurisdiction of the\n\nx9sB High Court under Arts. 226 and ~27 of the Constitu-· . tion. But the juxtaposition of the two parallel highest . Na&endra Nat!• Tribunals, one in t•espect of pre-dominantly civil cases,\n\nBora 6-. A?Jother and the other, in respect of pre-dominantly revenue\n\nThe con~:isioeY cases {without attempting any cler cut line of demarof Hills Division cation), would show that the E.x~Jse Appellate Auto & Appeals, Assam, rity was not altogether an administrative body whiCh\n\nandOt.hers had no judicial orquasi-judicial functions.\n\n. Neither the Act nor the rules made thereunder, indicate the grounds on which the first Appellate Authority, namely, the Rxcise Commissioner, or the second Appellate Author:t.v (the Excise Appellate Authority), has to exercise hv- ()r its appel1ate or revisional powers. There is no in<.l.1 1ttion that they make any . distinction between the grou nds of interference on appeal and in revision. That be1n so, the powers of the Appellate Authorities in the. ro.Ltter of settlement, would be co-extensive with the ~· •wers of . the primary authority, namely, the District l .nector or the Sub-Divisional Officer.\n\nSee in this co1, ~\"ction, the observations of the Federal Court in Lach7ilt -hwar\n\nPrasad Shukul and others v. J(eshwar Lal ChauJJ~ ,, ri and others (1), and of this Court in Ebrahim Aboobaku. ,· and another v. Custodian-General of Evacuee Property(2 ).\n\nIn the latter case, this Court, dealing with the powers of the Tribunal (Custodian-General of the Evacuee Property), under s. 24 of Ordinance No. 27 of 1949, observed:\n\nSinlla ].\n\n '' Like all courts of appeal exercising genera.! jurisdiction in civil cases, the respondent has been constituted an appellate court in words of the widest amplitude and the legislature has not limited his jurisdiction by providing that such exercise will depend on the existence of any particular state of facts. \" ·· 'fhus, on a review of the provisions of the Act and the rules framed thereunder, it cannot be said that the authorities mentioned in s. 9 of the Act, pass ·\n\npurely administrative orders which are beyond the ambit of the Iligh Court's power of supervision and control. \\Vhether or not. an administra-tive body or\n\n(!) [1910] F.C.R. 84, 102,\n\nauthority functions as a purely administrative one or :r958 in a quasi-judicial capa0ity, must be determined in each case, on a.n examination of the relevant statute ~:;:n':~:'o~~:,. and the rules framed thereunder. The first contention v. raised on behalf of the appellant must, therefore, be The Commissioner overruled. . . of Hills Dillision Now, turning to the merits of the High Court's & Appeals. Assam. d d and Olhers order, 1t was conten e on behalf of the appellant _ that the High Court had misdirected itself in holding Sinha J. that the Appellate Authority had exceeded its jurisdiction in passing the order it did. Thera is no doubt that if the Appellate Authority whose duty it is to determine questions affecting the right to settlement of a liquor shop, in a judicial or quasi-judicial manner, a.ots in excess of its authority vested by law, that is to say, the Act and the rules thereunder, its order is subject to the controlling authority of the High Court.\n\nThe question, therefore, is whether the High Court was right in holding that the Appellate Authority had exceeded its legal power. In this connection, it is best to reprodncet, in . the words of the High Court itself, what it conceived to be the limits of the appellate jurisdiction: \" In other words, it is not for the A ppella.te Authority to make the choice, since the choice has already been made by the officera below; and it is not only where the choice is perverse or illegal a.nd not in accordance with the Rules that the A ppella.te Authority can interfere with the order and make its own selected (sio.) out of the persona offering tenders. If the Appellate bodies chose to act differently and consider themselves free to make their own choice of the person to be offered settlement irrespective of the recommendations of the Deputy Commissioner or the Officer conducting the settlement, the AppcJlate bodies will be obviously ex:cecding the jurisdiction, which they\n\npossess under th'3 ln. w or going beyond the scope of their authority as contemplated by the Rules.'' .\n\nIn our opinion, in so circumscribing the powers of the :\\ppolla.te Authority, the High Court has er!ed. See 1n this connection, the decision of this Court m Raman l6o\n\n' .\n\nr95s and Raman Ltd. v. The State of Madras (1). In that case this Court dealt with the powers of the State Nagendra Nath Govrnment, which had been vested with the final Bora&- Another • • h tt f t f t v. . athor1ty n t e rna er o gran o s age carriage per-\n\nTh~ commissioner roits;· Thts Court held that as the State Government\n\nof Hills Division had been constituted the final authority under the c;,. Appeals, Assam, Motor Vehicles. Act, to decide as between the rival\n\nand Others l . t J: •t •t d · ld t b _ c a1man s .10r perm1 s, 1 s ectston cou no e Inter- Si?Jha 1. fered with under Art. 226 of the Constitution, merely because the Government's view may have peen erroneous. In the instant cases, the Appellate Authority is contemplated by s. 9 of the Act, to be the highest authority for deciding questions of settlement of liquor shops; as between. rival claimants. The appeal or revision being undefined and unlimited in its scope, the highest authority under the Act, could not be deprived of the plenitude of its powers by introducing considerations which are not within the Act or the rules. : ' .\n\nIt is true that the . Appellate Authority should not lightly set aside the selection made by the prhnary\n\nAuthority, that is to say, a selection made by a Sub- Divisional Officer or by a District Collector, should be given due weight in view of the fact that they have much greater opportunity to know local conditions . and local business people than the Appellate A utho. rity, even as the appeal courts are enjoined not to interfere lightly with findings of fact recorded by the original courts which had the opportunity of seeing witnesses depose in court, and their demeanour while deposing in court. But it is not correct to hold that because the Appellate Authority, in the opinion of the lligh Court, has not observed that caution, the choice made by it, is in excess of its power or without juris. diction. · ·. ·. . . . . · : .\n\nThe next ground of attack against the order of the lligh Court, under appeal, was that the HiCYh Court had erredin coming to the conclusion that there had been a ftilure of natural justice. In this connection, the Iligh Court has made reference to the several affi. da. vits filed on either side, and the order in which they\n\n(I) [1956] S.C.R. 256. •. \"' • '\n\nhd been filed; and the use made of those affidavits or\n\nCounter-affidavits. As already indicated, the . rules c Nagmdra Nalh make no provisions or the reception of evidence oral Bora& Anothtr or documentary, or the hearing of oral arguments, or v. even for .the issue of notice of the hearina\n\n0 to the par- The Ccnnmi.ssioncr ties. concerned. ··:.The en tire proceeding~ are marked of Hill! Dtvision by a. oomp_lete lack of formalty. . The several au tho~ e. A!!;~:he~; sam,\n\ndties: have been left to their own resources to make the best selection. o In this. connection, reff3rence may\n\nb~ made to the observations of this Court in the 1 case oofNe-w.Prakash T\"''ansport Co., Ltd.· v. New S.uwa.rna .Transport Co., Ltd: (1 ) • . In that case, this Court has , laid down that the rules of natural justice vary ,. with the varying constitutions of statutory bodies and the rules prescribed by the Act under which they function;\n\nand the question whether or not any rules of natural justice hf!.d been contravened, should be decided not .under any pre-conceived notions, . but in the light of the statutory rules and provsions. In the instant case, no such rules have been brought to our notice, which could be said to have been . contravened by the Appellate Authority.\n\nSimply because it viewed :a, case in a. particular light which may not be accopt.able to another independent tribunal, is no ground . for interference either under Art .. 226 or Art. 227 of , the\n\nConstitution. - .\n\nIt roma.ins to consider the last. contention raisd .on behalf of the appellants : in . these cases, na.mely, whether there has been any error apparent on the face of the record, in the order of the Appellate Authority, which would attract the supervisory . jurisdiction of the High Court. In this connection, the following observations of the High Court are relevant :\n\n\"But the most glaring error on face of the order of the Appellate Authority is that it does not even refer to the report of the Deputy Commissioner on\n\nwhich the Excise Commissioner had so strongly relied.\n\nIn my opinion, it was under the Rules obligatory on the\n\nApellate Authority to consider t; bat report before dis~ posmg of the appeal, and in failing to d~ so~ th~ officer\n\n(I) [r?,7] S.C.Ro 98 .\n\n• 0\n\nSi11TJ<.J ]. \\ ...\n\nt d arbitrarily and :in excess of his powers as n I 95a ac e . , . . . _ .\n\nAppellate Authority. · · .\n\nNagendra Nath It may be that during the prolonged hearxng of these Bora & Atwt/Jer s before the High Court were counsel for the v case . . . ·.The Com,;, issio\"e' different parties placed their respehct1dve Vlew.points of Hills Division after making copious references to t . e ocuments, the\n\n~Appeals. Assam. High Court was greatly impresed that the order of and Others settlement in one case (Murmur1a shop), made by the Deputy\" Commissioner, as confirmed by the Excise Commissioner; was the right one at:td that the choice made by the Appellate Authority did not commend itself to the High Court~ It may further be that the conclusions of fact of the High Court were more in consonance with the entire record of the proceedings, and that the choice made by the ultimate Revenue Authority, was wrong.\n\nBut, under the law a's it stands, the High Court exceeded its powers in pronouncing upon the merits of a controversy which the Legislature has left to the discretion of the AppeiJate\n\nAuthority. But is that a mistake apparent on the face of the record, as understood in the context of Art. 226 of the Constitution ?\n\nTha.t leads us to a consideration of the nature of the error which can be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record which would be one of the gr?unds to attract the supervisory jurisdiction of the H1gh Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The ancient writ of certiorari which now in Encrland is known as the order of certiorari could be iued on very limited grounds. 'fhese gronds have been discussed by this Court in the cases of: .\n\nParry & Co. v. Commercial Employee's Association, Madras (1),\n\nVeerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd., and otlbera (11),\n\nIbrahim Aboobaker v. Ouatodian Genetal of vacuee Property ('), .\n\nT. C. Basappa v. T. 'f.lagappa (').\n\nAll these cases have been considered by this Court in\n\n( J) {!9.52] S.C.R. '19. (2 ) [x9sz] S.C.R. .583.\n\n(3) [t952] s.c.R. 6g6. <-t> [19551 1 s.c.R. 2.50.\n\n) . 1\n\nthe case of Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad z95a Jshaque and others (1}. Ven_katara.ma Ayyar J., speakinofor the full Court, la.td d lWn four propositions Nagendra Nath\n\nbering on the character and scope of .the writ of Bora b v A\"otller ce'ftiorari as est a blisbed upon the authorities. The The c0m,;1issioHer third proposition out of. those four, may be stated in of Hills Divion the words of that learned Judge, as follows : b Appeals, Assam •.\n\n. i \" The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exerand Others oise of a. supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction.\n\nOne consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact. reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal, evep if they be erroneous.\" .. . .. While considering the fourth proposition whether the writ can be issued in the case of a. decision which\n\nwas erroneous in law, after considering the recent Authorities, the same learned Judge, in the course of his judgment, at p. 1123, has observed as follows; .\n\n\"It may therefore be taken as settled that a writ of certiorari could be issued to correct an error of law.\n\nBut it is essential that it should be something more\n\nthan a mere error: it must be one which must be manifest on the face of the record.\" The High Court appears to have been under the i impression that the expression \"error apparent on the face of the record\" may also be in retipect . of findings of fact. For example, in Civil Appeal No. 668 of 1957, relating to J or hat shop, the High Court has observed as follows : · · \"The Appellate Authority further re-inforced its suspicion by mentioning that Dharmeswar, his father and brother are summoned in connection with some complaint, but that was a matter purely extraneous, to speak the least-and it could have found that the oompla.int was filed after the settlement. The complaint had no reference to any offence of smuggling or the like as has been conceded. These were errors a.p~ parent on the face of the record.\" La.ter, in the course of the same judgment, it has been observed as follows: · ·. \"This is another instance where I find that the Excise Appellate Authority has . misconceived its\n\n(1) [1955]1 S.C.R. tiO.f.t uu.\n\nSinha].\n\nI958 powerd aS SUCh and purported t~ decide te appeal . either on errors of record, speculations or on Irrelevant NagedrAa Ntth considerations, irrespective of an that happened in Bora 1.9'v na '''' 'the earlier stacres of the matter. It starts with an \\\n\nThe Conuission Br app.arent ·. erro~ of record when it says that in the of Hills Division judgment of the Excise Commissioner it finds 'a 'clear a,. Appeals~ Assam, admission. that Shri Garela l(alita, father of Shri\n\nand Others Dh'.\n\nK l•t • t d\n\n1 ' I armeswar a 1 a; xs a suspec e smugger. n\n\nSinha J.- fact,' there was no such dmission. It was held by the Commissioner ' on· the contrary that 'the learned Deputy Commissioner and men1bers of the Advisory Committee thought that the major son who bears an excellent character should not be punished for the alleged sin of his father'.\" ' ~\n\n) .These excerpts from the judgment of the High Court\n\nare not exhaustive,. but only illustrative of the observation that the H1gh Court appears to have treated\n\nan_ error of fact on the same footing as an error of law apparent on the face of the record. The question, naturally; arises whether an error,. of fact can be in voked in aid of the power of the High Court to quash an order of a subordinate court or Tribunal. The High Court would appear to have approximated it to an' error apparent on the face of the record' as used in r.\"l of 0. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code, as one of the grounds for revie\\v of a judgment or order; but that is clearly not the correct position. Ordinarily, a mistake of law in a judgment or an order of a, court, . would not be a ground for review. It is a mistake or\n\nan error of fact apparent on. the face of the record, which may attract the power of review as contem .. plll.ted by r. 1 of 0. 47. But is the power of a. High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution, to interfere on certiorari, attracted by such a mistake, and not the reverse of it, in the sense that it is onl v an error of law apparent on the face of the reco1:d, which can attract the supervisory jurisdiction of a Hicrh Court!\n\nThis question, so far as we kno'vv, has not b\n\n0een raised in this form in this Court in any one of the previous docisioi1s bearing on tho scope and character of the writ of certiorari. It is, therefore, necessary to examine this question diroctly raised in this batch of appeals,\n\nbcause,. in ach case, the High. Court has een invited to exer?tse t.ts powers un?er Art. 226, to IBsue a writ of ce1hora.n on the speClfio ground that the orders impugned before it, had been vitiated by errors ap- v. parent on the face of the record-errors not of law Ju Co1nm; ssi01rer but of fact. · . . • ), j Hills Division The ancient case of the Queen v.\" James ' Bolton (1) .s. Appdeaols,, Assam, 1 h . ' an t ers is treated as a landmar r on t e question of the power _ to issue a writ or order of certiorari. That was a. case Sinha J. in which an order of justices for delivering up a. house\n\nto parish officers, . under a. statute, 'vas called up on certiorctri.: Lord Denman C. J. while discharging the rule, made the following observations ' in the course of his judgment, which have been treated as a.uthoitative and good law even now : · · ' . \"The first of these is a point of much importance, because of very general application; but the principle upon which it turns is very simple: the difficulty is always found in applying it. The case to be supposed is one like the present, in which the Legislature has trusted the original, it may be {as here) the final, jurisdiction on the merits to the magistrates pelow; in which this Court bas no jurisdiction as to the f\n\nmerits eit, her originally or on appeal. All that we can then do, when their decision is complained of, is to sec that tho cn.se was one within their jurisdiction, and tha.t their proceedings on the face of them are regular and according to law. Even if their decision) should upon the merits be unwise or unjust, on these grounds we cannot reverse it.\" . .' . •\n\n~Vhilc dealing with the argument at the Bar, complain- Ing of. the unsoundness of the conclusi01'1s reached f by he magistrates a.nd the hardships to be. ca use.d .by { thou erroneous order, the Court made tho followmg observations which are very apposite to the facts and\n\ncircumstances disclosed in the intant appeals, and\n\nwhich all courts entrusted with the duty of administering law should bear in mind, so t.ha.t they ma.y not be dcflcted from the stra.ight path of enforcing the law, by considerations based on hardship or on vague\n\n(I) [l8<f r] (1) Queen'; lJ<Incb p. 66, 72,76; t 13 English Repor~ . . . ' 105-f; 1057 1058.\n\nr958 ideas of what is sometimes described as just.ice of t'he cause: ·. . . · . . NagetJdra Nath , . . \"Beyond this we cannot go. The affidavits, being\n\nBora 6- Another,· · h t d h . .\n\nv. . f before us, were used on t e arguf mhen ; an 1\n\n_mucd was Th1 Commissiont!. said of the unasona.bleeS!J .!2~ _t -~ -c~!!c_ USIn ra wn\n\nnf Hills Division\\ by the magistrates, ana _of te hardshii? OD tfle defen- 6- Appeals, Assam,:da.nt if we would not review It, there he1ng no appeal\n\nand Others ' • tu .c b ' / to the sesswns. u e 10r ear to ex press any optniOn on Si,-:;;]. ·~ that which is not before US! the propriety of he con-\n\n: elusion drawn from the evtdence by the magistrates:\n\nJ they nd they alone were the copetent author.ity to :·!; draw 1t; and we must not constitute ourselves Into a\n\n: ~Court of Appe.al where te statute does not make us l ·; such, because 1t has constituted no other . • , It is of much more importance to hold the rule _of la\\v straight than, from a feeling of the supposed hard. ship of any particular decision, to interpose relief at the expense of introducing a precedent full of inconvenience and uncertainty in the decision of future cases.\" . · The case of Reg v. Bolton (supra) was approved and followed by the Privy Council in the case of the King\n\nv. Nat Bell Liqttors, Limited (1). In that case their Lordships of the Judicial Committee held that a con\n\nviction by a magistrate for a. nonindictable offence, (cannot be quashed on certiorari on the ground that\n\n1 the record showed that there was no evidence to sup ') port the conviction, or thn.t the maaist.rate had mist directed himself in considering the vidence. It was\n\n'--further laid down that the absence of evidence did not affect tho jurisdiction of the magistrate to try the charge. In tho courae of their jud(J'ment, their Lord • . ships further observed that the Ia\\~ laid down in Reg ·\n\nv. Bolton (supra.) has never been seriously questioned in England, and that the same rules were applicable to other parts of tho Commonwealth, except in so far as they may have been modified by statute. They also obsorved that the decision in Re(J v. Bolton (supra.)\n\n~· ul}doubtdly is a Indm.ark in the history of certioran, for It summarises 1n an impeccable form the principles of its appJication ...... , But latterly, the rule\n\n(1) [l922J 2 A.C. 1 a B. .\n\nIid down in Bolton's ase, appear~ to have been slurr.\n\nd over in some dcmded cases, 1n England which e urported to a.y down hat a writ o.r order of crtiora1i Nagendra Nat!J ould be obt~cd. oly If the rder 1m pugned disclosed Bora 6-vnoJhf on error of JUrLSdwtwn, that IS to say, complete lack Th c . ·. · .. , , . f , , , . <t ornm ISSI 01leY' of junsd.wtl_?D. or. e-:cccss o ]Ur1Sd10t10n or the refusal of 1/ills Division to exercise JUl'lSdlCtlOn, and not to correct a.n error of~ Atpeals, As.sam/ }a, w, even though apparent on the face of the record.: and OtJ, eu' The question was brought to a.. head in the case of Rex. y. Northumberland Oon:pen; satton Appeal 'J'ribunal (1) ..\n\nIt arose out of an apphca.twn for an order of certiorari for quashing a decision reached by the respo11dent_:_ Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal,: Lord G9ddn.rd C. J. began his judgment by observing that the point involved in the case was \"of the very\n\ngreates~ importance\" which had \"necessitated the examination of a large number of cases and cousidera-: tion of: the principles which apply to the doctrine of\n\ncertiorari -\"., He further : obse, rved that certiarari is a. remedy of .a very special character. He, then, dis-: cussed the object and scope of the writ of certiorari\n\nnd: the history of the jurisdiction as exercised in the English courts. He then dealt with the conteQtion directly raised for the determination of the court that\n\nan order of certiorari, can issue only to remove .a. defect of jurisdiction and that it does not extend to removing an order out of the way of the parties on account of & mistake of law apparent on the face of the record.\n\nThe court then considered the relevant authorities, and came to the conclusion that it was wrong to hold that the ground of interference on certiorari, was only an error or e:tcess of jurisdiction, and. that it did no~\n\nxtend . to correction of au error of law apparent on the face of the record. . .The Lord Chief Justice then pointed. out that the examination of the authorities\n\n~?aring on the exercise of the power of certiorari,\n\nYleldd the result that it wa.s open to the High Court -to examine the record and to see whether or not there\n\nWas an error of law a ppu, rent on the fo.ce of the rec?rd.\n\nTe Lod Chief Justice concluded his observations ?t'1th these remarks :- ·. .\n\n(1) [l9St]t KB. 71r.\n\nJ6t . . '\n\nS1'nha'j: ~\n\nt 95a _ ··, \"The tribunal have told us what they have taken - into account, what they have disregarded, and the Nagendra Nath contentions which they accepted. They have told us Bora 0- Atolhcr ·. • • f h 1 d f . . th t th v. their view o t e aw, an we are o opinion a e The Commi$sipner construction which they . placed on this very compli. of Hills Division cated set of regulations was wrong.\"\n\nd). Appeals, Assam, • d . . h 11 d d 1 th and Others This eciS!OO was c a enge , an on appea, e · Court of Appeal . dealt with t.his point in Rex v.\n\nSinha].\n\nNorthumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal(!). The Court of Appeal affirmed the proposition laid down by the High Court that an order for certiorari, can be granted and the decision of an inferior court such as a statutory tribunal, quashed on the ground of an error of law apparent on the face of the record. Sing .. ( leton L~ J. in the course of his judgment, observed ) that an error on the face of the proceedings, which 'i in that case was an error of law, has always been re ..\n\n1, cognized as one of the grounds for the issue of an order ( of certiorari. Denning L~ J. also, in the course of his\n\n\\ .. judgment, examined the question whether the High\n\nCourt could intervene to correct the decision of a statutory tribunal which is erroneous in point of la\\v.\n\nOn an examination of the authorities from ancient times, the Lord Justice made the following o bserva .. tiona:-\n\n\" Of recent years the scope of certiorari seems to have been somewhat forgotten. It has been supposed to be confined to the correction of excess of jurisdiction, and not to extend to the corl'ection of errors of law;\n\nand sc'Veral judges have said as much. But the Lord Chief J uatice bas, in the present case, restored certiorari to its rightful position and shown that it can be used to correct errors oflo.w which appear on the face of the record even though thoy do not go to jurisdiction.\n\nI have looked into the history of the matter, and find that the old cases fully support all that the Lord Chief Justice said. Until about 100 years ago, certiorari was regularly used to correct errors of law on the face of the record. It is only within the last century tha.t it has fallen into disuse, and that is onlv becu.uso there has, until recently, been little occasion for its exercise,\n\n(•) [195:1] I K.B. 338.\n\n' .\n\n,~ Jf\n\nNolV, with the advent f. many new tribunals, and the\n\nI958 plain need for superv1s1on over them, recourse must once again be dha.Jd to his whell-tried means of control.\" :a:!e; t;!~~!\n\nThe other Lor ust1e w o took part in the hearing v. of . the appeal, :Morris L. J. also examined that Tlu commissiontr question and concluded as follows;- of Hills Division . \"It is plain t!Iat .ceriorari will not issue as the'-.App\"als, Assam. cloak of an appeal In dtsgmse. It does not lie in order /and Other$ to bring. up a:n order or deci.sion for reearing of the Sinha J. · issue raised m the proceedmgs. It exists to coiTect error of law where revealed on the face of an order or decision, or irregularity, or absence of, or excess of, jurisdiction where shown.\" . ·. It is clear from an examination of the authorities of this Court as also of the couxts in England, that one of the grounds on which the jurisdiction of the High Court on certiorari may be invoked, is an error of law a.ppa.rent on the fa.ce of the record and not every error7 either of law or fact, which can be corrected by a.~ superior court, in exercise of its statutory powers as a {\n\ncourt of appeal or revision. j So far as we know, it has never been contended be-~ fore this Court that an error of fact, e\\en though\n\napparent on the face of the record, could be a. ground for interference by the court exercising its writ jurisdic- ) tion. No ruling was brought to our notice in support / of the proposition that the court exercising its powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution, could quash an ;' order of an inferior tribunal, on the ground of a.\n\nmistake of fact apparent on the face of the record.\n\nBut the question still remains as to what is the legal import of the expression' error of Jaw apparent on the fa<.:e of the record.' Is it everv error of law that can attract tho supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court, to quash the order impugned? This court, as obsered above, has settled the law in this respect by laymg down that in order to attract such jurisdiction, it is\n\nessential that the error should be something more than\n\na. mere error of Io.w • that it must be one which is manifest on the face dr the record. In this respect, the law in lndin. and the law in Eugln.nd, are, therefore, the same.· It is also clear, on a.n examination of all\n\n1958 the authorities of this Court and of those in Englad~ . ' - referred to above; as also those considered in the Nagendra NatA several judgments of this Court, that the Common Law Bora & .Attot!Jer . writ, . now . called order of certiorari, which was also\n\nTire co:~, issio~&e~ adopted by our Constitution, is not meant to take the\n\nof Hills Divisiolf place of an appeal where the satute does nt cnfer a ?-Appeals, Assanll, right of appeal. Its purpose IS only to determine, on\n\na?Jd Othus -an examination of the record, whether the inferior\n\nSi?Jh\" J. -~\n\n1tribunal h.as exceeded its. jurisdiction ?r has ·!lo~ · proceeded 1n accordance With the essential requirements of the law which it was meant to administer. }1ere formal or technical errors, even though 9f law, will not be sufficient to attract this extraordinary jurisdiction. : ' . :;- .. :, . ·:. The principle underlying the jurisdiction to issue a writ or order of certiorari, is no more in doubt, but the real difficulty arises, as it often does, in applying the\n\nprinciple to the particular facts of a given _case. In\n\nhe judgments and orders impugned in these appeals, the High Court has exercised its supervisory jurisdiction in respect of errors .which cannot be said to be . errors of law apparent on the face of the record. If at .. all they are errors, they are erroJs in appreciation of\n\ndocumentary evidence or atlidavitst errors in drawinO' inferences or omission to draw inferences. In othe~ :words, those are errors which a court sitting as a, court\n\nof appeal only, could have examined and, if necessary, corre(.; ted .. As already indicated, the Appellate Autho- .rity had unlimited jurisdiction to examine and appreciate the evidence in the oxercise of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction. Section 9(3) of the Act, give.s it the power to pass such orders as it thought fit. ( hese. are words of vey great al_llplitude. The jrisdic\n\n)' t10u of the Appellate Authority, to entertatn the . appeals, has never been in doubt or dispute. Only the\n\n) manner of the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction was\n\n1 in controversy. It has not been sho'~\"n that in exercising\n\n~ its powers, tho Appella, te Authonty disregarded any\n\n. mandatory provisions of the law. Tho utmost that\n\nhas beeu suggested, is that it has not canied out certain .Bxocutive lustructions . . For example, it has been said , that the Appellate . Authority did not observe the\n\n- .,\n\nl I' ~· r\n\nB.O.R.\n\nSUPREME COUR1\n\n1 REPORTS 1271\n\ninstructions that tribal people have to be given certain r9sa preferences, or, that persons on the debarred list, like smugglers, should be kept out (see p. 175 of the Nagendra Nd.Jh Bora 6- Another Manual). But all these are only Executive Instructions v. which have no statutory force. Hence, even assuming, Tile commissioner though it is by no means clear, tha.t those instructions of lhlls Division have been disregarded, the non-observance of those <So Appeals. Assam, instructions cannot ffect the power of the Appellate and others Authority to . make 1ts own selection, or affect the SinJia 1. validity of the order passed by it. r The High Court, in its several judgments and 6rdera,( h'as scrutinized, in great detail, the orders passed by the Excise Authorities under the Act. \\Ve have not thought it fit to examine the record or the orders below i in any detail, because, in our opinion, it is not the 1 function of the High Court or of this Court to do so. \\ The jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution is I limited to seeing that the judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals or .. administrative bodies exercising quasijudicial powers, do not exercise their powers in excess ( of their statutory jurisdiction, but correctly administer the law within the ambit of the statute creating them I or entrusting those functions to them. The Act has :·\n\ncreated its own hlrarchy of officers and Appellate authorities, a.s indicated above, to administer the law ..\n\nSo long as those Authorities function within the letter and spirit of the law, tho High Court has no concern 7 With : the manner in .which those powers have been L exercised. In the instant cases, the High Court appears 1 •\n\nto have gone beyond the limits of its powers under '\n\nArts. 2261l, nd 227of tho Constitution. . .· .\n\n . , J. In ontl of the cases, the High Court has observed -that though it could ha.ve interfered by issuing a. writ\n\nunder :Art. 226 of the Constitution, they would be .contont to utilize their powers of judicial superintenence under 'Art. 227 of tho Constitution vide its Judgment dated July 31, 1957, in appeals relating to Murmuria shop (Civil Appeal~ Nos. 669. and 670 of 1957). In exercise of that power, the H1gh Court set\n\nside the order of the Appellate Authority, and directed lt to re-hear the appeal 'according to law in the light of the principles indicated in this judgment '. . :\n\nz9sB A Constitution Bench of this Court examined tlie scope of Art. 227 of the Constitution in the case of Nagendra Nath W aryam Singh and another v. Arnarnath and another (1 ).\n\nBora cS- A'Jot!Jer v.\n\nThis Court, in the course of its judgment, made the\n\nTl1s Commissioner following observations at p. 571 : ' .\n\nQj H ills DivisiaJJ .·. ·.\" This power of superintendence conferred by\n\n& Appeals, Assam, article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries C .. J. in Dalmia .\n\nandOthers Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar JY!ukherjee('~'), to be\n\nSinha 1. exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere\n\nerrors.\" It is, thus, clear tha.t the powers of judicial interference under Art. 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, a.re not greater than the powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Under Art. 226, the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Art. 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing tha.t the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. Hence, interference by the High Court, in these cases, either under Art. 226 or 227 of the Constitution, wa.s not justified. . After having dealt with the common arguments more or less applicable to all the cases, it remains to consider the special points raised on behalf of the respondents in Civil Appoa.l No. 672 of 1957, relating, to the Tinsukia country spirit shop. It was strenuously argued that the appeal was incompetent in view . of the fact that the rule issued by the High Court,\n\nwas still pending, and that this Court does not ordinarily, entertain a.n appeal against an interlocutory order. It is true that this Court does not interfere in cases which have not been decided by the High Court, but this case baa some extraordinary features which attracted the notice of this Court when special leave\n\nto appeal was granted. As already stated, the shop in question was settled with the appellants by the Excise Commissioner, and his order was upheld by the Appellate Authority.\n\nAccordingly, the appellants,\n\n(r) [rOH] S.C.R. 565. {l) A. L R {19$1) Cal I93•\n\nhad been pu~ in possessin ?f t.he shop on June 7, 19'11 )957. The H1gh Court, while 1ssmng the rule, passed an order on the stay application, which, as already Nagendra Nath • d h d b • d .\n\nBora 6- Anclher indicate , a.. • een mtsun erstood by the D1strict v.\n\nExcise author1ttes, and the appellants were dispossess- The Commissioner ed a.nd the respondents 1 and 2 put back in possesof Hills Division sion, without any authority of I a w. This was a 6- Appeals, Assam,\n\nflagrant interference with tho appellants' rights •ntl OJners a.rising out of the settlement made in their favour by si,.lla 1. the highest revenue authorities. The High Court had not and could not have authorized the dispossession of the persons rightfully in possession of the shop. . The appellants brought this flagrant abuse of power to the notice of the High Court several times, but the High Court felt unduly constrained to permit the wrong to continue. We heard the learned counsel for the respondents at great length a.s to whether he could justify the continuance of this undesirable and unfortunate state of affairs. It has . to be remembered\n\nth&t the appellants, as a result of fortuitous circum stances, had been deprived of the possession of the shop during the best part of the financial year 1956-57.\n\nThe appellants had been deprived of the fruits of their hard-won victory in the revenue courts, without any authority of law, and the High Court failed to right the wrong in time, though moved several times.\n\nIn the-se circumstances, we found it necessary to hear both the parties on the merits of the orders passed by the Commissioner of Excise and the Appellate Authority, in favour of the appellants, against which, the respondents had obtn.incd a rule. After having heard ,, both sides, we have come to the conclusion that no i grounds have been made out for interference by the I High Court, under its powers under arts. 226 and 22i of the Constitution. This case shares the common fate of tht! other on.ses before us, of having run through the entire gamut of the hierarchy created under the Act, read alonCl' with tho amendina Act and the rules thereunder. \\V~ do not find a.ny gounds in the orders of the Excise Authorities which could attract the -.\" supervisory jurisdiction of tho High Court, there being /~ no error of law apparent on the face of the record, ,.,\n\nf I\n\n1958 or a defect . of jurisdiction in the Authorities whose orders have been impugned in the High Court. , We Nagendra Nath Bqr~ e. Another would, however, like to make it clear that we are\n\ny. interfering with the interlocutory order passed by the\n\nTTl~ Commis.si.oer High Court in this case because of its unusual and of Hills Dwrs10n exceptional features. It is clear that our decision on & .Appeals, Assam. tb • • t d . t. h th I .l ·- and Others e marn po1n s urge 1n. o o er appea s necessan y · leads to the inference that, even if all the allegations .\n\nSi\"ha J. made by the respondents in their petition before the Assam High Court are .aceepted as true, there would be no case whatever for issuing a rule. Indeed, the respondent found it difficult to resist the appellant's argument that, if the other appeals were allowed on the general contentions raised by the appellants, the dismissal of his petition before the Assam High Court would be a foregone conclusion. It is because of these special circumstances that we have decided t~ interfere with the interlocutory order in this case in the interests of justice.\n\n As a, result of these considerations, the appeals must be allowed and the orders passed by the High . Court in the several cases, set asirle. . On the question of costs, we direct that the appellants in each case, should get their costs here and in the High Court, except the appellant in Civil Appeal No.-670, who has failed on the main point raised on his behalf, and who, there. fore, mut bear his own cosls.\n\nI • .. '\n\nAppeals allowed.\n\n. '\n\n' -", "total_entities": 125, "entities": [{"text": "NAGENDRA NATH BORA & ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 42, "end_char": 70, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NAGENDRA NATH BORA & ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE .. COMMISSIONER OF HILLS 'DIVISIO~ _.-\n\n.· ..\n\n~ND- APPEA~S, ASSAM, A~D- OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 194, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE COMMISSIONER OF HILLS DIVISION AND APPEALS, ASSAM AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATit' B. P. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 284, "end_char": 306, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "L~ KAPUR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 324, "end_char": 332, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.L. KAPUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 715, "end_char": 736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 738, "end_char": 747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 860, "end_char": 864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 916, "end_char": 924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1742, "end_char": 1750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2259, "end_char": 2267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2321, "end_char": 2329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 226 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2577, "end_char": 2594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Eastern Bengal and Assam Excise Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4369, "end_char": 4410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 226 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4593, "end_char": 4610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Eastern Bengal and Assam Excise Act, 1910", "statute": "the Eastern Bengal and Assam Excise Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "A. V. Viswanatha Sa8iri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4853, "end_char": 4876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Viswanatha Sa8iri and."}}, {"text": "Dipa.k Datta Chudltur?J", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4882, "end_char": 4905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dipa.k Datta Chudltur?J, for the appellants in C. As."}}, {"text": "S. }Jf. Lahiri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5009, "end_char": 5023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. }Jf."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5069, "end_char": 5079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Naunit Lal, for the appellants in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "~SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5268, "end_char": 5274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ":r95B ~SINHA J.-These appeals by special leave redirect. -", "canonical_name": "~SINHA"}}, {"text": "Assam Nagendra Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5364, "end_char": 5383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ed aoainst the judgments and orders of the Assam Nagendra Nath H 1\"gh° Court, exercising its powers under Arts."}}, {"text": "Arts. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5427, "end_char": 5436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Eastern Bengal and Assam Excise Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5616, "end_char": 5657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Assam Act I of 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5688, "end_char": 5707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Nagendra Na.th Bora", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6298, "end_char": 6317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The two appellants Nagendra Na.th Bora and Ridananda Dutt are partners, the partnership having been formed in view of the Government notification dated November 30, 1956, amending rule 232 of the Assam E:!cise Rules, to the effect that the settlement of the country spirit shops which may be declared by the Government to be 'big shops', shall be made with two or more partners who shall not belong to the same family nor should be re1ated to one.", "canonical_name": "NAGENDRA NATH BORA & ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Ridananda Dutt", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6322, "end_char": 6336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The two appellants Nagendra Na.th Bora and Ridananda Dutt are partners, the partnership having been formed in view of the Government notification dated November 30, 1956, amending rule 232 of the Assam E:!cise Rules, to the effect that the settlement of the country spirit shops which may be declared by the Government to be 'big shops', shall be made with two or more partners who shall not belong to the same family nor should be re1ated to one."}}, {"text": "Dharmesh war l(a.lita and", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7144, "end_char": 7169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondents 3 and 4, Dharmesh war l(a.lita and Someswa.r Neog, respectively, also were amongst the tenderers."}}, {"text": "Someswa.r Neog", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7170, "end_char": 7184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondents 3 and 4, Dharmesh war l(a.lita and Someswa.r Neog, respectively, also were amongst the tenderers."}}, {"text": "May 22, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8382, "end_char": 8394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All those cases were heard together, and the High Court, by its judgment dated May 22, 1956, quashed the orders passed by the firs~ respondent, chiefly on the ground that the Appellate , Authority .• had been illegally constituted."}}, {"text": "Constitution Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8620, "end_char": 8638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter was brought by way of, special leave to this Court, and was heard by the Constitution Bench\n\nwhich, by."}}, {"text": "Assam. High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9200, "end_char": 9217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tl.e result of the ruling of this Court, was that the determination by the Assam."}}, {"text": "Nagendra N ath Bora", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9888, "end_char": 9907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nagendra N ath Bora c;.", "canonical_name": "NAGENDRA NATH BORA & ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "June 10, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11722, "end_char": 11735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first respondent dismissed those appeals and confirmed the order settling the shop with the appellants, by his order dated June 10, 1957."}}, {"text": "Arts. 226 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11796, "end_char": 11813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "August 6, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11951, "end_char": 11965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".The Ifigh Court, by its order dated August 6, 1957, quashed the aforesaid order of settlement in favour of the appellants by the first respondent."}}, {"text": "La.kbiram Ka.lita", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12923, "end_char": 12940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant La.kbiram Ka.lita and the first respondent Bhanuram Pegu, amongst others, had submitted their tenders for the settlement of the shop."}}, {"text": "Bhanuram Pegu", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12966, "end_char": 12979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant La.kbiram Ka.lita and the first respondent Bhanuram Pegu, amongst others, had submitted their tenders for the settlement of the shop.", "canonical_name": "Bhanuram Pe(J'u"}}, {"text": "Arts. 226 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13941, "end_char": 13958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "June 17, .1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14020, "end_char": 14034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 17, .1957, the writ petition was heard e~ pa1'te, and the High Court isaued a rule to show cause why."}}, {"text": "Sinhca", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14287, "end_char": 14293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sinhca f.·\n\n t . . ''", "canonical_name": "~SINHA"}}, {"text": "ent", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14423, "end_char": 14426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "hia lst , order was mis-interprtcd by the first respo~\n\nent and his advisers o.s entitling them to be put 1n\n\nI i ' ( !"}}, {"text": "High of Hills Division Court\"naturaUy", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14833, "end_char": 14870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High of Hills Division Court\"naturaUy observed that by .'"}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15048, "end_char": 15053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Others in possession of he.~ sop on .June 17, 1957, will con-\n\nSinha J. .", "canonical_name": "~SINHA"}}, {"text": "Ultimatey", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15752, "end_char": 15761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ultimatey, the High Court, by its order dated July 31, 1957, set aside the order of the Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals."}}, {"text": "July 31, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15798, "end_char": 15811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ultimatey, the High Court, by its order dated July 31, 1957, set aside the order of the Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals."}}, {"text": "Assam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16217, "end_char": 16222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This appeal is on behalf of the Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam, against the judgment and order of the High Court relating to the J\\furmuria shop which ."}}, {"text": "Bhanuram Pe(J'u", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16437, "end_char": 16452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "669 referred to in the previous paragraph~ The first respondent to this appeal is Bhanuram Pe(J'u who is also the first respondent in Civil Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "Bhanuram Pe(J'u"}}, {"text": "Lakhiram l(alita", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16544, "end_char": 16560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second respondent is Lakhiram l(alita who is the appellant in Civil Appeal No: 669 of 1957."}}, {"text": "Nagenrira Nath", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16978, "end_char": 16992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\nSUPRE~1:E COURT -REPORTS 1247\n\ntq Civil Appeal No .. 669 of 1957: This appeal has been brought :vrt~ a v1ew to getting the legal position clarified lD vrew of the frequent appeals made to the Nagenrira Nath\n\nt ' th tt f ttl f Bora 6- Anothe'f' appellan .m e ma .", "canonical_name": "NAGENDRA NATH BORA & ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Lakhimpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17277, "end_char": 17286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "country spirit6- Appeals, Assam, shop in the district of Lakhimpur."}}, {"text": "Mahibuddin Ahmad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17340, "end_char": 17356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l{.han and Mahibuddin Ahmad, are partners: and as -such, are interested in the settlement of the shop for the financial year 1957-58."}}, {"text": "Rafiqul Hussain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18231, "end_char": 18246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Rafiqul Hussain, one of the competitors for the shop, filed a writ petition before the High Cour~\n\nunder Arts."}}, {"text": "Arts. 226 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18336, "end_char": 18353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "flay 23, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18517, "end_char": 18530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th1s 'Yrit application, along with other similar applications, was heard and decided by the High Court, as aforesaid, by its judgment da.ted ]flay 23, 1956 . ."}}, {"text": "Arts. 226 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19863, "end_char": 19880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20068, "end_char": 20081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 and 227 of the Constitution, on the ground that the order of the Excise Commissioner was vitiated byan error apparent on the face o~ the record in so far as he had misunderstood the order of the Supreme Court passed on the stay petition."}}, {"text": "December 6, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20540, "end_char": 20556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court ultimately dismissed the writ application by its order dated December 6, 1956."}}, {"text": "Si\"JJha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22204, "end_char": 22211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants and other parties preferred a.ppeals against the said order of settlement made by Si\"JJha J. the Deputy Commissioner.'", "canonical_name": "Si\"JJha"}}, {"text": "June 3, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22538, "end_char": 22550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Excise Appellate Authority who, by an order dated June 3, 1957, dismissed the o.ppea.ls."}}, {"text": "Bora", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24161, "end_char": 24165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' l l I\n\n' I 1\n\nI i 1 l\n\nJ I l l J\n\nl j\n\nxgsB order of possession which was based on a misapprehen~ sion of the order ~£the High Court maintaining status NaGendra Nlh quo ante, but apparently, no order was passed because Bora & Anotm!r • h d. 1 d b t th v. possesston a .. a rea y ."}}, {"text": "Deka", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24602, "end_char": 24606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bench,· namely, Deka J. ex~ pressed his .unwillingness to proceed with the hearing of the : case."}}, {"text": "July 15, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24738, "end_char": 24751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on July 15, 1957, until a new Bench could\n\npe constituted."}}, {"text": "August 14-, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25602, "end_char": 25618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Again on August 14-, 1957, a fresh application was made to the High Court, along with a copy of tha orders passed by the Excise Appellate Authority an~ the Deputy Commissioner, Lakhimpur, giving delivery."}}, {"text": "August 19, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25986, "end_char": 26001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ou August 19, 1957, the matter was placed before the Chief Justice sitting singly, and ho directed a rule to issue on the opposite party cited before that Court,."}}, {"text": "Noveber 3, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26391, "end_char": 26406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court closed for the long vacation on September 2, and was to re-open on\n\nNoveber 3, 1957. '"}}, {"text": "Nagendra Nath", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 26557, "end_char": 26570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".The vacancy of .the' third judge h d not been filled till then, and .as the appellants felt thant they had been wrongfully deprived of their right Nagendra Nath ... h It f Bora <So A11otlur to bold their s op,.", "canonical_name": "NAGENDRA NATH BORA & ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28306, "end_char": 28315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 22, 19?5", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28562, "end_char": 28579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 9 of the Aot, dealing with appeal and revision, has undergone a series of amendments, and the section as it has\n\nmerge.d out of the latest amendment by the Amcndtng Act-The Assam Act 23 of 1955-which received the assent of the Governor of Assam on December 22, 19?5, and was published in the ssam Gazette."}}, {"text": "Assam Revenue Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 30053, "end_char": 30075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The power of hearing appeals and revisions under the Act, has been vested successively in the Board, the Assam Revenue Tribunal, the Commissioner for Hills Division and Appeals; ."}}, {"text": "Arts. 226 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31080, "end_char": 31097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Tile Commissioner sions of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31168, "end_char": 31202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ajmer", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31493, "end_char": 31498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "missioner and the Chief Commissioner, Ajmer and \"· otherB(1) there is no inherent right in a. citizen to sell\n\nliquor."}}, {"text": "Haldane", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 33764, "end_char": 33771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the ·.observations of , Lord Haldane at p. 132, and of Lord Moulton at p. 150, in Local Government Board v. Atlidge (1), to the following effect are very apposite: .", "canonical_name": "Haldane"}}, {"text": "Moulton", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33795, "end_char": 33802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the ·.observations of , Lord Haldane at p. 132, and of Lord Moulton at p. 150, in Local Government Board v. Atlidge (1), to the following effect are very apposite: ."}}, {"text": "Haldane", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 33907, "end_char": 33914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Haldane: \"My Lor'ds, when .", "canonical_name": "Haldane"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34924, "end_char": 34934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Parliament has wisely laid down certain rules to be observed in the performance of its functions in these matters, and those rules must\n\nbe obBcrved because they are imposed by statute, and for no other reason, and whether they give much or little opportunity for what I may call quasi.litigious procedure depends solely on what Parliament has thought right.- These rules are beyond the criticism of tho Courts, and it ia not their business to add to or\n\n(I) [19f.5] A.C. 1'20. • \\ . .."}}, {"text": "Nagendra Nath", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35518, "end_char": 35531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "r even to discuss whether in\n\nI958 the opimon of the Indtvidual members of the Court Nagendra Nath they are adequate or not.\"", "canonical_name": "NAGENDRA NATH BORA & ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "s6S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37650, "end_char": 37653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38119, "end_char": 38123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "23rd 1\\rlay, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40700, "end_char": 40717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ": The amendment shall be deemed to have been made on 23rd 1\\rlay, 1956, and shall have retrospective effect since tha.t date. \""}}, {"text": "Assam High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 41264, "end_char": 41280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As would appear from the ruling of this Court at p. 304, where the provisions and effect of the Assam Revenue Tribunal (Transfer of Powers) Act, 1948, (Assam IV of 1948) have been set out, the ultimate jurisdiction to hear appeals aucl revisions, was divided between the Assam High Court and the Authority referred to in s. 3(3) of that Ad ."}}, {"text": "s. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41314, "end_char": 41321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41734, "end_char": 41741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42294, "end_char": 42303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43792, "end_char": 43797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44302, "end_char": 44306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1910] F.C.R. 84", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 44487, "end_char": 44503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Raman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46729, "end_char": 46734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "See 1n this connection, the decision of this Court m Raman l6o\n\n' ."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47335, "end_char": 47343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47492, "end_char": 47496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50505, "end_char": 50513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Nagendra Nath", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 51446, "end_char": 51459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nagendra Nath It may be that during the prolonged hearxng of these Bora & Atwt/Jer s before the High Court were counsel for the v case . . . ·", "canonical_name": "NAGENDRA NATH BORA & ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52535, "end_char": 52543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52794, "end_char": 52802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ven_katara.ma Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 53484, "end_char": 53503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ven_katara.ma Ayyar J., speakinofor the full Court, la.td d lWn four propositions Nagendra Nath\n\nbering on the character and scope of .the writ of Bora b v A\"otller ce'ftiorari as est a blisbed upon the authorities."}}, {"text": "Dharmeswar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 55018, "end_char": 55028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "668 of 1957, relating to J or hat shop, the High Court has observed as follows : · · \"The Appellate Authority further re-inforced its suspicion by mentioning that Dharmeswar, his father and brother are summoned in connection with some complaint, but that was a matter purely extraneous, to speak the least-and it could have found that the oompla.int was filed after the settlement."}}, {"text": "Garela l(alita", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 56052, "end_char": 56066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that Shri Garela l(alita, father of Shri\n\nand Others Dh'."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57437, "end_char": 57445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58066, "end_char": 58074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Denman", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 58661, "end_char": 58667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Denman C. J. while discharging the rule, made the following observations ' in the course of his judgment, which have been treated as a.uthoitative and good law even now : · · ' . \""}}, {"text": "NagetJdra Nath", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 60346, "end_char": 60360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NagetJdra Nath , . . \"", "canonical_name": "NAGENDRA NATH BORA & ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 62213, "end_char": 62220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "has never been seriously questioned in England, and that the same rules were applicable to other parts of tho Commonwealth, except in so far as they may have been modified by statute."}}, {"text": "G9ddn.rd", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63464, "end_char": 63472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "y. Northumberland Oon:pen; satton Appeal 'J'ribunal (1) ..\n\nIt arose out of an apphca.twn for an order of certiorari for quashing a decision reached by the respo11dent: Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal,: Lord G9ddn.rd C. J. began his judgment by observing that the point involved in the case was \"of the very\n\ngreates~ importance\" which had \"necessitated the examination of a large number of cases and cousidera-: tion of: the principles which apply to the doctrine of\n\ncertiorari -\".,"}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64998, "end_char": 65000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "leton", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65888, "end_char": 65893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sing .. ( leton L~ J. in the course of his judgment, observed ) that an error on the face of the proceedings, which 'i in that case was an error of law, has always been re ..\n\n1, cognized as one of the grounds for the issue of an order ( of certiorari."}}, {"text": "Denning", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 66131, "end_char": 66138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Denning L~ J. also, in the course of his\n\n\\ .. judgment, examined the question whether the High\n\nCourt could intervene to correct the decision of a statutory tribunal which is erroneous in point of la\\v."}}, {"text": "Morris", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67633, "end_char": 67639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the appeal, :Morris L. J. also examined that Tlu commissiontr question and concluded as follows;- of Hills Division . \""}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68895, "end_char": 68903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 9(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71486, "end_char": 71498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73188, "end_char": 73196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 2261", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73947, "end_char": 73957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74119, "end_char": 74127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74230, "end_char": 74238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74653, "end_char": 74661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74993, "end_char": 75004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Harries", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75027, "end_char": 75034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This power of superintendence conferred by\n\n& Appeals, Assam, article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries C .. J. in Dalmia ."}}, {"text": "Art. 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75366, "end_char": 75374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75484, "end_char": 75492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75520, "end_char": 75528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75670, "end_char": 75678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75880, "end_char": 75888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Tinsukia country spirit shop", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 76155, "end_char": 76183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "672 of 1957, relating, to the Tinsukia country spirit shop."}}, {"text": "June 7, 19'11 )957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 76927, "end_char": 76945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "f t.he shop on June 7, 19'11 )957."}}, {"text": "I High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 78760, "end_char": 78772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After having heard ,, both sides, we have come to the conclusion that no i grounds have been made out for interference by the I High Court, under its powers under arts."}}, {"text": "arts. 226 and 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78797, "end_char": 78813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Si\"ha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79820, "end_char": 79825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Si\"ha J. made by the respondents in their petition before the Assam High Court are .aceepted as true, there would be no case whatever for issuing a rule.", "canonical_name": "Si\"JJha"}}]}
{"document_id": "1958_1_1275_1287_EN", "year": 1958, "text": "s.c.n.\n\nSUPREMI~ COUR1; REI>ORTS\n\nTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH\n\nC. TOBIT AND OTHERS\n\n(S. R. DAs C. J., VENKATARAMA AIYAR, A.\" K. SARKAR and\n\nVIVIAN BOSE JJ.)\n\nCriminal Procedure-Petition of appeal-If must be accompanied b11 certified copy of jtligment or order appealed against-Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 419.\n\nThe word 'Copy' occurring in s. 419 of the Code of Criminal Procedure means a certified copy and a petition of appeal filed under that section must, therefore, be accompanied by a certified. copy of the judgment or order appealed against.\n\nRam Lal v. Ghanasharn Das, A.I.R. (1923) Lah. 150, referred to.\n\nFirm Chota Lal-Amba Parshad v. Firm Basdeo Mal-Hira Lal, A.I.R. (1926) Lah. 404, distinguished.\n\nConsequently, where a State Government filed an appeal against an order of acquittal under s. 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with a plain copy of the judgment appealed against and put in a certified copy of it after the period of limitation prescribed for the appeal had expired and the High Court dismissed the appeal as time-barred, that order 'was correct and must be affirmed.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 128 of 1955.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated February 8. 1955, of the Allahabad High Court in Government Appeal No. 165 of 1954, arising out of the judgment and order dated July 24, 1953, of the Court of the Civil and Sessions Judge at Gorakhpur in Sessions Trial No. 5 of 1953.\n\nG. C. Mathur and C. P. Lal, for the appellant.\n\n. S. N. Andley, for the respondents.\n\n1958. February 14. The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAS C. J.-The respondents before us were put up for trial for offences under ss. 147, 302, 325 and 326, Indian Penal Co4e read with s. 149 of the same Code. On July 24, 195J: the temporary Civil Sessions Judge, Gorakhpur, acqmtted them. The State of Uttar Pradesh apparently felt L/S4SCI-6(a)\n\nFel, ruary H.\n\nDctsC. J,\n\n19ii8\n\nf'lie Slate of Uttar Pmrlrli\n\nC. Tobit a.nd Otlirr1\n\nDad C. J.\n\n1276 SUi'HElllE COUHT Rl~POHTS [1968]\n\naggrieved by this acquittal and intended to appeal to the High Court under s. 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nUnder art. 157 of the Indian Limitation Act an appeal under the Code of Criminal Procedure from an order of acquittal is required to be filed within six months from the date of the order appealed from. The period of limitation for appealing from the order of acquittal passed by the Sessions Judge on July 24. 1953. therefore. expired on January 24, 1954. That day being a Sunday the Deputy Government Advocate on January 25. 1954. field a petition of appeal on behalf of that State. A plain copy of the judgment sought lo be appealed from was filed with that petition. The High Court office im mediately made a note that the copy of the judgment filed along with the petition of appeal did not appear to be a certified copy.\n\nAfter the judicial records of the case had been received by the High Court, an application for a certified copy of the judgment of the trial court was made on behalf of the State on February 12, 1954.\n\nThe certified copy was received by the Deputy Government Advocate on February 23, 1954 and he presented it before the High Court on February 25. 1954. when Harish Chandra J. made an order that the certified copy be accepted and that three days' further time be granted to the appellant for making an application under s. 5 of tlie Indian Limitation Act for condoning the delay in the tiling of the certified copy. Accordingly an application for the condonation of delay was made by the appdhint on the same day and that application was directed to b~\n\nlaid before a Division Bench for necessary orders.\n\nThe application came up for hearing before a Division Beiv; h consisting of M. C. Desai and N. U. Beg JJ. At the hearing of that application learned counsel appearing for the appellant urged that as there was, in the circumstances of this case, sufficient cause for not filing the certified copy along with the petition of appeal the delay should be condoned and that. in any event. the filing of the plain copy of the judgment of the trial court along with the petition of appeal constituted a sufficient compliance with the requirements of\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT llEPOR'J'S 1277\n\ns. 419 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. By their judgment 1968 delivered on December 7. J 954, both lhe learned Judges took Tlie Rl,, te of the view that no case had been made out for extending the CJttar PrllllMto period of limitation under s. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act c. Tobit ::.ui Olkt:• and dismissed the application an. d nothing further need be c J\n\nDQI •• said on that point. The learned judges, however, differed on the question as to whether the filing of a plain copy of the judgment appealed from was a sufficient compliance with the law. M. C. Desai J. holding that it was and N. U. Beg J. taking the contrary view.\n\nThe two Judges having differed they directed the case to be laid before the Chief Justice for obtaining a third Judge's. opinion on that question. Raghu bar Dayal J. to whom the matter was referred, by his judgment dated January 31, 1955, expressed the opinion that the word \"copy\" in s. 419 meant a certified copy, and directed bis opinion to be laid before the Division Bench. In view of the opinion of tlie third Judge, .the Division Bench held that the memorandum of appeal had not been accompanied by \"a copy\" within the meaning of s. 419 and that on February 25, 1954, when a certified copy came to be filed the period of limitation for appealing against the order of acquittal passed on July 24, 1953, had already expired and that as the application for extension of the period of limitation had been dismissed the appeal was time barred and they accordingly dismissed the appeal. The learned Judges, however, by the same order gave the appella.nt a certificate that the case was a fit one for appeal to this Court. Hence thi~ appeal.\n\nSection 419 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, under which the appeal was filed, provides as follows:_:_\n\n\"419. Every appeal shall be made in the form of a petition in writing presented by the appellant or his pleader, and every such petition shall (unless the Court to which it is presented otherwise directs) be accompained by a copy of the judgment or order appe1:1led against, and, in cases tried by a jury. a copy of the heads of the charge recorded under 11ection 367.\"\n\nThe Stale of Vttar Pradesh\n\nC. Tobit and Ot/1ers\n\nDa~ C. J.\n\nThe sole question raised in this appeal is whether this section requires a petition of appeal to be accompanied by a certified copy of the judgment or order appealed from. It will be noticed that the section requires \"a copy\" of the judgment to be filed along with the petition of appeal. There can be no doubt that the ordinary dictionary meaning of the word \"copy\" is a reproduction or transcription of an original writing. As the section does not, in terms, require a certified copy, it is urged on behalf of the appellant that the word \"copy\" with reference to a document has only one ordinary meaning, namely: a transcript or reproduction of the original document and that there bi:ing nothing uncertain or ambiguous about the word \"copy\", no question of construction or interpretation of the section can at all arise. It is contended that it is the duty of the court to apply its aforesaid: ordinary and grammatical meaning to the word \"copy\" appearing in s. 419 and that it should be held that the filing of a plain copy of the judgment along with the petition of appeal was a sufficient compliance with the requirements of that section. The matter, however, does not appear to us to be quite so simple. A \"copy\" may be a plain copy, i.e., an unofficial copy, or a cerlified copy, i.e., an official copy. If a certified copy of the judgment is annexed to the petition of appeal nobody can say that the requirements of s. 419 have not been complied with, for a certified copy is none the less a \"copy\". That being the position a question of construction does arise as to whether the word \"copy\" used in s. 419 refers to a plain copy or tQ a certified copy or covers both varieties of copy. It is well settled that \"the words of a statute, when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the Legislature Jias in view.\n\nTheir meaning i~ found not so much in a strictly grammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attainfd.\" (Maxweli's Interpretation of S!<!tutes, 10th Edition, page 52).\n\nIn order, therefore, to come to a decision as to the true meaning of a word used in a Statute one has to enquire as to the subject-matter of the enactment and the object which the Legislature had in view.\n\nThis leads us to a consideration of some of the relevant sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure and other enactments having a material bearing on the question before us.\n\nSection 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which is in Chapter XXVI headed \"Of the Judgment\", requires that the judgment in every trial in any criminal court of oria\\inal jurisdiction shall be pronounced in open court and in the language of the court. Section 367 requires every such judgment to be written by the presiding officer (or from his dictation) in the language of the court or in English. containing the point or points for determination, the decision _ thereon and the reasons for the decision. The judgment has to be dated and signed by the presiding officer in open court.\n\nExcept as otherwise provided by law, s. 369 forbids the court, after it has signed its judgment, from altering or reviewing the same except to correct mere clerical errors.\n\nAfter the judgment is pronounced and signed it has, under s. 372, to be filed with the record of proceedings and becomes a part of the record and remains in the custody of the officer who is in charge of the records. Under s. 371, when an accused is sentenced to death and an appeal lies from such judgment as of right, the court is to inform him 0£ the period within which he may, if he so wishes, prefer his appeal and when he is sentenced to imprisonment a copy of the findings and sentence must as soon as may be after the delivery of the judgment be given to him free of cost without any application.\n\nThis, however, is without prejudice to his right to obtain free of cost on an application made by him, a \"copy\" of the judgment or order and in trials by jury a \"copy\" of the heads of charge to the jury. The copy that is supplied to the accused under sub-s. (4) of s. 371 is not a full copy of the entire judgment, but the copies supplied to him under sub-ss. (I) and\n\nTlie State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nO. T-Obil onul Other8\n\nDaaO. J,\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nC. Tobit and Others\n\nDas C. J,\n\nSCPREME COURT REPORTS [1958)\n\n(2) of s. 371 on application made by him are full copies of the judgment or the heads of the charge to the jury as the case may be.\n\nThe copy of the findings and the sentence which is supplied to the accused under sub-s. (4) without his asking for the same is presumably to enable him to decide for himself whether he would appeal against his conviction and the sentence. The copies, whicli are supplied to the accused under sub-ss. (I) and (2) on his application for such copies, are obviously full copies of the entire judgment or the heads of charges as the case may be and are intended to enable him to prepare his grounds of appeal should he decide to prefer one and to file the same along with his petition of appeal as required by s. 419 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. There are no provisions corresponding to s. 371 for giving any copy of the judgment to the State for the public prosecutor representing the State in case of an acquittal. If, therefore, the State desires to file an appeal against acquittal under s. 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the State will have to procure a copy of the judgment or the heads of charge in order to enable it to file the same along with .its petition of appeal and thereby to comply with the requirements of s. 419.\n\nAccording to s. 74 of the Indian Evidence Act a judgment, being the Act or record of the act of a judicial officer, would be included in the category of public documents. Under s. 548 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if a person affected by a judgment desires to have a copy of the judge's charge to the jury or of any order or deposition or other part of the record he has the right, on applying for such copy, to be furnished therewith. A person desirous of such a copy has to apply for it to the public officer having the custody of it and, undr s. 76 of the Indian Evidence Act, such public officer is bound to give that person, on demand, a copy of it on payment of the legal fees thereof together with a certificate written at the foot of such copy that it is a true copy of such document, that is to say, to supply to the\n\n1pplicant what is known as a certified copy. Therefore, whether it is the accused person who applies for a copy under s.\n\n371. sub-ss. (I) and (2) or it is the State which applies for a copy, the copy supplied by the public officer must be a certified copy. Then when s. 419 requires that a copy of the judgment or of the heads of charge be filed along with the petition of appeal, it is not unreasonable to hold that it is the certified copy so obtained that must be filed.\n\nUnder arts. 154, 155 and 157 of the Indian Limitation Act the petition of appeal has to be filed within the time . specified in those articles. Obviously it may take a little . time to apply for and procure a certified copy. In order that the full period of limitation be available to the intending appellant s. 12 of the Limitation Act permits the deduction of the time requisite for obtaining the copy of the judgment or the heads of charge in ascertaining whether the appeal is filed within .time.\n\nA certified copy of the judgment will on the face of it show when the copy was applied for, when it was ready for delivery and when it was actually delivered and the court may at a glance ascertain what time was requisite for obtaining the copy so as to deduct the same from the computation of the period of limitation.\n\nTaking all relevant facts into consideration, namely, that a \"copy\" of the judgment has to be filed along with the petition of appeal, that the copies of the judgment which the accused gets free of cost under s. 371 (l) and (2) read with S. 76 of the Indian Evidence Act and which the State can obtain on an application made by it under s. 76 of the last mentioned Act can only be certified copies, that the tim.e requisite for obtaining such copies is to be e:itcluded from the computation of the period of limitation all quite clearly indicate that the copy to be filed with the petition of appeal must be a certified copy.\n\nSection 419 requires a copy of the judgment or order appealed against to be filed not without some purpose. That purpose becomes clear when we pass on to s. 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That section enjoins the court, on receiving the petition of appeal and copy of the judgment or order appealed from under s. 419. to peruse the same and\n\n'!'At Stau of Ullar Prllduh\n\n\"' o. 'l'obil •nd Otl!eta\n\nDuO.J,\n\nThe Slate of Uttar Pradesh\n\nC. Tobit and Othrs\n\nDas C. J.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOHTS [1958]\n\nafter perusing the same to do one of the two things, namely, if it finds that there is no sufficient ground for interfering. to dismiss the appeal summarily or when the court does not dismiss the appeal summarily, then under s. 422 to cause notice to be given to the appellant or his pleader and to such officer as the Provincial Government may appoint in this behalf, of the time and place at which such appeal will be heard and furnish such officer with a copy of the grounds of appeal and in a case of appeal under s. 417. as in the present case, to cause a like notice to be given to the accused.\n\nThe act of summarily rejecting the appeal or admitting it and issuing notice is necessarily a judicial act and obviously it must be founded on proper materials.\n\nThe authenticity or correctness of the copy of a judgment is also essential in order to enable the appellate court to make interlocutory orders which may have serious consequences.\n\nIn the case of an appeal by the accused he may ask for the stay of the execution of the order, e.g., of the realisation of the fine or he may move the court for bail.\n\nLikewise in the case of an appeal by the State, the State may ask for the accused to be apprehended and brought before the court under warrant of arrest. Orders made on these applications are all judicial acts nd accordingly it is essential that the appellate court in order to take these judicial decisions have proper materials before it.\n\nTherefore. it is of the utmost importance that the copy to be filed with the petition of appeal is a full and correct copy of the judgment or order appealed against.\n\nUnder s. 76 of the Indian Evidence Act the public officer who is to supply a copy is required to append a certificate in writing at the foot of such copy that it is a true copy and then to put the date and to subscribe the same with his name and official title. Therefore, the production of a certified copy ipso facto and without anything more will show ex facie that it is a correct copy on which the appellate court may safely act. The fact that the appellate court is by law enjoined to peruse the copy of the judgment and take judicial decision on it indicates that it must have before it a correct copy of the judgment and this\n\nfurther indicates that the copy required to be filed with the petition of appeal under s. 419 should be a certified copy which will ipso facto assure the appellate court of its correct-\n\n19/18\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nv. ness.\n\n0. Tobit and Othera It is said that the appellate court may not summarily reject or admit the appeal or make an interlocutory order until the record is produced or until a certified copy of the judgment or order is presented before it. There is no doubt that the court can under s. 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure call for the record of the case, . but the court is not bound to do so. The calling for the records in every case or\n\nkeeping the proceedings in abeyance until a .certified copy is presented before the court is bound to involve delay and there is no apparent reason why there should be any delay in disposing of criminal matters involving the personal liberty of the convicted accused. All this inconvenience may easily be obviated if s. 419 be read and understood to require a certified copy to be filed along with the petition of appeal.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellant urges that in case of urgency the court need not wait until the record or the certified copy is received, but may call upon the appellant to adduce evidence to prove the correctness of the judgment in order to induce the court to act upon it and take a judicial decision thereon.\n\nIn the first place there is no such procedure envisaged in the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the next place adoption of such a procedure may cause much delay and in the third place no question ordinarily arises under s. 419 of proving the correctness of the judgment under appeal in the way in which a document is to be proved in order to tender it in evidence in the case.\n\nBut assuming that the correctness of the judgment under appeal is to be established then as soon as the appellant is out to \"prove\" by oral evidence of witnesses the contents of the original judgment so as to establish the correctness of the plain copy filed along with his petition of appeal the question wiil immediately arise whether such evidence is admissible under the Jaw. As already stated s. 367 of the Code of Criminal Proce-\n\nDas O. J.\n\n1'he S,...of Uttar Pro.duh\n\nU. Tobit and Other8\n\nDtu C. J.\n\ndure requires the judgment to be reduced to writing. Section 91 of the Indian Evidence Act provides, inter alia, that in all cases in which any matter is requited by law to be reduced to the form of a document-and a judgment is so required'- no evidence shall be given for the proof of the terms of such matter except the document itself or secondary evidence of its contents in cases in which secondary evidence is admissible under the earlier provisions of that Act.\n\nIn the absence of the production of the original judgment if a witness is put into a witness box and is asked to say whether the copy produced befure the appellatl: court is a correct copy of the origi• nal judgment filed of record• in the trial court he will necessarily have to say that he read the original judgment and from his memory he can say that the copy correctly reproduces the text of the original judgment. This means that he will give secondary evidence as to the contents of the original judgment which under the law is required to be reduced to the form of a document.\n\nA further question will, therefore, arise if such evidence, which at best is secondary evidence, is admissible under the Indian Evidence Act.\n\nAs already stated the judgment, which under s. 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has 10 be in writing and under s. 372 has to be filed with the record of the proceedings, becomes, under s. 74 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document. As the original judgment is a public document within the meaning of s. 74, only a certified copy of such document and no other kind of secondary evidence is admissible under s. 65.\n\nThis circumstance also indicates that the word \"copy\" in s. 419 means, in the context, a certified copy and so it was held in Ral Lal v. Ghanasham Das('). The decision in Firm Clthota\n\nLal~Amba Parshad v. Firm Basdeo Mal-Hira Lal('), proceeded on its peculiar facts, namely, that no certified copy could be obtained as the original judgment could not be traced in the record and the decision can be supported on the ground that the court had, in the circumstances, dispensed with the production of a certified copy.\n\n(') A.I.R. (1923) Lah. 150, ( ') A.I.R. (1926) Lah. 404.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellant next urges that the 1958 fact that the appellate court to which the petition of appeal The State of is presented is given power to dispense with the filing of a Uttar Pradesh copy of the judgment appealed against indicates that the o. Tobit V,:nd Other.\n\nLegislature did not consider the filing of the copy to be essen- Das O. J. tial and that if the filing of the copy is not essential and copy can be wholly dispensed with, a plain copy should be sufficient for the purpose of s. 419.\n\nThis bower of dispensation had to be given to the court for very good reasons. In certain cases an order staying the operation of the order sought to be appealed from may be immediately necessary and the matter may be so urgent that it cannot brook the delay which will inevitably occur if a certified copy of the judgment or order has to be obtained. In some cases it may be that a certified copy of the same judgment is already before the same court in an analogous or connected appeal and the filing of another certified copy of that very judgment may be an unnecessary formality.\n\nThe circumstance that the court may, in urgent cases, dispense with the filing of a copy does not imply that in a case where the court does not think fit to do so it should be content with a plain copy of the document which ex facie contains no guarantee as to its correctness.\n\nReference has been made to a number of sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure where the word \"copy\" has been used and to ss. 425, 428, 442 and 511 which, it is said, talk about certified copy and on this circumstance is founded the argument that where the Legislature insists on the production of a certified copy it says so expressly and that as the word \"copy\" used in s. 419 is not qualified by the word \"certified\" the inference is irresistible that the filing of a plain copy was intended to be sufficient for the purpose of that section. Turning to the four last mentioned sections, it will be noticed that the first three sections 425, 428 and 442 do not really refer to any certified copy of any document at all.\n\nSection 425 requires that whenever a case is decided on appeal by the High Court under Chapter XXXI it shall certify\n\nThe State of Uttar PrackaA\n\nG. Tobit ancl 011•\"'\n\nDa• G. J.\n\nSUPHEME COURT REPOHTS [1958]\n\nits judgment or order to the court by which the finding, sentence or order appealed against was recorded or passed. It really means that the High Court is to formally communicate its decision on the appeal to the court against whose decision the appeal , had been taken.\n\nLikewise s. 428 requires the court taking additional evidence to certify such evidence to the appellate court. Spction 442 requires the High Court to certify its decision on revision to the court by which the finding, sentence or order revised was recorded or passed.\n\nLastly s. 511 lays down the mode of proof of a previous conviction or acquittal, namely, by the production of an extract certified under the hand of the officer having the custody of the records of the court to be a copy of the sentence or order.\n\nTherefore, the four sections relied on do not in reality refer to certified copy of a judgment or order supplied to a party on his application for such copy and consequently no argument such as has been sought to be raised is maintainable.\n\nThe question whether a copy in a particular section means a plain copy or a certified copy must depend on the subject or context in which the word \"copy\" is used in such section.\n\nIn many sections relied on, the \"copy\" is intended to serve only as a notice to the person concerned or the public and is not intended to be acted upon by a court for the purpose of making a judicial order thereon. We think that U. N.\n\nBeg J. rightly pointed out that the object and purpose of such sections are distinguishable from those of s. 419 where the copy is intended to be acted upon by the appellate court for the purpose of founding its judicial decision on it. We do not consider it. desirable on the present occasion to express any opinion as to whether any those sections relied on requires a plain copy or a certified copy. It will suffice for us to hold that so far as s. 419 is concerned, having regard to the context and the purpose of that section, the copy to be filed along with the petition of appeal must be a certified copy.\n\nWe have also been referred to several sections of the Code of Civil Procedure where tha word \"copy\" is used. We do\n\nS.C.R\n\nSUPREME COUHT REPORTS 1287\n\nnot consider it right to enter upon a discussion as to the true interpretation of the word \"copy\" occurring in any of those sections for we think that each section in each Act must, for its true meaning and effect, depend on its own language, context and setting.\n\nIn the result, for reasons stated above, we agree that the order passed by the Allahabad High Court on February 8, 1955 was correct and this appeal should be dismissed.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nSM. SAILA BALA DASSI v.\n\nSM. NIRMALA SUNDARI DASSI. AND ANOTHER\n\n(S. R. DAS c. J., VENKATARAMA AIYAR, A. K. SARKAR and VIVIAN BosE JJ.)\n\nCivil Procedure-Addition of party-Transfer pendente lite-Appeal filed by ttansferor-Ri:ght of transferee to continue appeal-Code of Civil Procedure (Act 5 of 1908); s. 146, 0. 22, r. 10 .\n\n. The second respondent sold the properties to the appellant in 1952 and the deed of sale recited that t.he properties were sold free of all enct.Jmbrances.\n\nThe first (respondent who had obtained a mortgage decree in respect of the properties in 1935 did not take any steps to have the decree drawn up as required under the Original Side Rules of the Calcutta High Court until 1954, when she commenced proceedings for sale of. the mortgaged properties. The second respondent raised the objection that the execution of the decree was barred by limita- . tion but that was. overruled by a single Judge· of the High Court and an appeal against that order was preferred by the second respondent. Apprehending that the second respondent might enter into a collusive arrangement with the first respondent with a view to defeat her rights, the appellant made an application in the High Court under 0. 22, r. 10, of the. Code of Civil Procedure praying that she might be substituted in the place of the second respondent, or in the alternative, be brought on record as additional appellant. The High Court having dismissed the application, the appellant. brought the present appeal: ·\n\nHeld, that the application could not be sustained under 0. 22, r. 10, of the Code of Civil Procedure because (1) assuming\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nv. a. Tobit and Olh.ers\n\nDaso. J.\n\nFebruary U.", "total_entities": 140, "entities": [{"text": "THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 60, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "C. TOBIT AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "C. TOBIT AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. R. DAs", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.\" K. SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 120, "end_char": 133, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.\" K. SARKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BOSE JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 139, "end_char": 154, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 276, "end_char": 302, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 419", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 320, "end_char": 326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 419", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 358, "end_char": 364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 372, "end_char": 398, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 822, "end_char": 828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 836, "end_char": 862, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1253, "end_char": 1273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1955, of the Allahabad High Court in Government Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Court of the Civil and Sessions Judge at Gorakhpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1378, "end_char": 1428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "165 of 1954, arising out of the judgment and order dated July 24, 1953, of the Court of the Civil and Sessions Judge at Gorakhpur in Sessions Trial No."}}, {"text": "G. C. Mathur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1463, "end_char": 1475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. C. Mathur and C. P. Lal, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "C. P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1480, "end_char": 1489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. C. Mathur and C. P. Lal, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. N. Andley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1513, "end_char": 1525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Andley, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1622, "end_char": 1625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAS C. J.-The respondents before us were put up for trial for offences under ss.", "canonical_name": "DAS"}}, {"text": "ss. 147, 302, 325 and 326", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1699, "end_char": 1724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1754, "end_char": 1760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1863, "end_char": 1885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Uttar Pradesh apparently felt L/S4SCI-6(a)\n\nFel, ruary H.\n\nDctsC. J,\n\n19ii8\n\nf'lie Slate of Uttar Pmrlrli\n\nC. Tobit a.nd Otlirr1\n\nDad C. J.\n\n1276 SUi'HElllE COUHT Rl~POHTS [1968]\n\naggrieved by this acquittal and intended to appeal to the High Court under s. 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure."}}, {"text": "S4S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1904, "end_char": 1907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2127, "end_char": 2133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2141, "end_char": 2167, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "art. 157", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2176, "end_char": 2184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2199, "end_char": 2213, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2234, "end_char": 2260, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "July 24. 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2471, "end_char": 2484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The period of limitation for appealing from the order of acquittal passed by the Sessions Judge on July 24."}}, {"text": "January 24, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2508, "end_char": 2524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "expired on January 24, 1954."}}, {"text": "January 25. 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2584, "end_char": 2600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That day being a Sunday the Deputy Government Advocate on January 25."}}, {"text": "February 12, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3079, "end_char": 3096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the judicial records of the case had been received by the High Court, an application for a certified copy of the judgment of the trial court was made on behalf of the State on February 12, 1954."}}, {"text": "February 23, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3168, "end_char": 3185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The certified copy was received by the Deputy Government Advocate on February 23, 1954 and he presented it before the High Court on February 25."}}, {"text": "February 25. 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3231, "end_char": 3248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The certified copy was received by the Deputy Government Advocate on February 23, 1954 and he presented it before the High Court on February 25."}}, {"text": "Harish Chandra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3255, "end_char": 3269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "when Harish Chandra J. made an order that the certified copy be accepted and that three days' further time be granted to the appellant for making an application under s. 5 of tlie Indian Limitation Act for condoning the delay in the tiling of the certified copy."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3417, "end_char": 3421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3430, "end_char": 3451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "M. C. Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3779, "end_char": 3790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The application came up for hearing before a Division Beiv; h consisting of M. C. Desai and N. U. Beg JJ."}}, {"text": "N. U. Beg", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3795, "end_char": 3804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The application came up for hearing before a Division Beiv; h consisting of M. C. Desai and N. U. Beg JJ."}}, {"text": "S 1277", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4277, "end_char": 4283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Limitation Act", "statute": "Indian Limitation Act"}}, {"text": "s. 419", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4285, "end_char": 4291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Limitation Act", "statute": "Indian Limitation Act"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4299, "end_char": 4325, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "December 7. J 954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4363, "end_char": 4380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By their judgment 1968 delivered on December 7."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4529, "end_char": 4533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4548, "end_char": 4562, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Raghu bar Dayal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5070, "end_char": 5085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raghu bar Dayal J. to whom the matter was referred, by his judgment dated January 31, 1955, expressed the opinion that the word \"copy\" in s. 419 meant a certified copy, and directed bis opinion to be laid before the Division Bench."}}, {"text": "January 31, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5144, "end_char": 5160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raghu bar Dayal J. to whom the matter was referred, by his judgment dated January 31, 1955, expressed the opinion that the word \"copy\" in s. 419 meant a certified copy, and directed bis opinion to be laid before the Division Bench."}}, {"text": "s. 419", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5208, "end_char": 5214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 419", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5460, "end_char": 5466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "February 25, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5479, "end_char": 5496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the opinion of tlie third Judge, .the Division Bench held that the memorandum of appeal had not been accompanied by \"a copy\" within the meaning of s. 419 and that on February 25, 1954, when a certified copy came to be filed the period of limitation for appealing against the order of acquittal passed on July 24, 1953, had already expired and that as the application for extension of the period of limitation had been dismissed the appeal was time barred and they accordingly dismissed the appeal."}}, {"text": "July 24, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5617, "end_char": 5630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the opinion of tlie third Judge, .the Division Bench held that the memorandum of appeal had not been accompanied by \"a copy\" within the meaning of s. 419 and that on February 25, 1954, when a certified copy came to be filed the period of limitation for appealing against the order of acquittal passed on July 24, 1953, had already expired and that as the application for extension of the period of limitation had been dismissed the appeal was time barred and they accordingly dismissed the appeal."}}, {"text": "Section 419", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5966, "end_char": 5977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5985, "end_char": 6011, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Stale of Vttar Pradesh\n\nC. Tobit", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6447, "end_char": 6479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Stale of Vttar Pradesh\n\nC. Tobit and Ot/1ers\n\nDa~ C. J.\n\nThe sole question raised in this appeal is whether this section requires a petition of appeal to be accompanied by a certified copy of the judgment or order appealed from."}}, {"text": "s. 419", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7466, "end_char": 7472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 419", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7929, "end_char": 7935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 419", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8113, "end_char": 8119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maxweli", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8662, "end_char": 8669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maxweli's Interpretation of S!<!tutes, 10th Edition, page 52)."}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9005, "end_char": 9031, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 366", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9107, "end_char": 9118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9126, "end_char": 9152, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 367", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9363, "end_char": 9374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 369", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9736, "end_char": 9742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9931, "end_char": 9937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 371", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10096, "end_char": 10102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 371", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10745, "end_char": 10751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10854, "end_char": 10876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I) and\n\nTlie State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nO. T-Obil onul Other8\n\nDaaO. J,\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nC. Tobit and Others\n\nDas C. J,\n\nSCPREME COURT REPORTS [1958)\n\n(2) of s. 371 on application made by him are full copies of the judgment or the heads of the charge to the jury as the case may be.", "canonical_name": "State of Uttar Pradesh"}}, {"text": "s. 371", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11008, "end_char": 11014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 419", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11739, "end_char": 11745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11753, "end_char": 11779, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 371", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11822, "end_char": 11828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12027, "end_char": 12033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12041, "end_char": 12067, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 419", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12266, "end_char": 12272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12288, "end_char": 12293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12301, "end_char": 12320, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 548", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12452, "end_char": 12458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12466, "end_char": 12492, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12825, "end_char": 12830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12838, "end_char": 12857, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s.\n\n371", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13224, "end_char": 13231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 419", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13374, "end_char": 13380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "arts. 154, 155 and 157", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13588, "end_char": 13610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13625, "end_char": 13639, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13891, "end_char": 13896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13904, "end_char": 13918, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 371", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14614, "end_char": 14620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14643, "end_char": 14648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14656, "end_char": 14675, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14742, "end_char": 14747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 419", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15032, "end_char": 15043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 421", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15186, "end_char": 15192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15200, "end_char": 15226, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 419", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15350, "end_char": 15356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15494, "end_char": 15497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At Stau of Ullar Prllduh\n\n\"' o. 'l'obil •nd Otl!eta\n\nDuO.J,\n\nThe Slate of Uttar Pradesh\n\nC. Tobit and Othrs\n\nDas C. J.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOHTS [1958]\n\nafter perusing the same to do one of the two things, namely, if it finds that there is no sufficient ground for interfering.", "canonical_name": "DAS"}}, {"text": "s. 422", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15760, "end_char": 15766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 417", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16053, "end_char": 16059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17164, "end_char": 17169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17177, "end_char": 17196, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 419", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17880, "end_char": 17886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17991, "end_char": 18013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fact that the appellate court is by law enjoined to peruse the copy of the judgment and take judicial decision on it indicates that it must have before it a correct copy of the judgment and this\n\nfurther indicates that the copy required to be filed with the petition of appeal under s. 419 should be a certified copy which will ipso facto assure the appellate court of its correct-\n\n19/18\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nv. ness.", "canonical_name": "State of Uttar Pradesh"}}, {"text": "Tobit", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18028, "end_char": 18033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tobit and Othera It is said that the appellate court may not summarily reject or admit the appeal or make an interlocutory order until the record is produced or until a certified copy of the judgment or order is presented before it."}}, {"text": "s. 421", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18304, "end_char": 18310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18318, "end_char": 18344, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 419", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18780, "end_char": 18786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19264, "end_char": 19290, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 419", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19419, "end_char": 19425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 367", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19975, "end_char": 19981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "U. Tobit", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20053, "end_char": 20061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As already stated s. 367 of the Code of Criminal Proce-\n\nDas O. J.\n\n1'he S,...of Uttar Pro.duh\n\nU. Tobit and Other8\n\nDtu C. J.\n\ndure requires the judgment to be reduced to writing."}}, {"text": "Section 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20138, "end_char": 20148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20156, "end_char": 20175, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21262, "end_char": 21281, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 367", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21328, "end_char": 21334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21342, "end_char": 21368, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21400, "end_char": 21406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21474, "end_char": 21479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21487, "end_char": 21506, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 74", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21595, "end_char": 21600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21701, "end_char": 21706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 419", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21766, "end_char": 21772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 419", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22797, "end_char": 22803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23725, "end_char": 23751, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 425, 428, 442 and 511", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23795, "end_char": 23820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 419", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24045, "end_char": 24051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 425, 428 and 442", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24303, "end_char": 24328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 425", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24396, "end_char": 24407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Uttar PrackaA\n\nG. Tobit", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24518, "end_char": 24550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 425 requires that whenever a case is decided on appeal by the High Court under Chapter XXXI it shall certify\n\nThe State of Uttar PrackaA\n\nG. Tobit ancl 011•\"'\n\nDa• G. J.\n\nSUPHEME COURT REPOHTS [1958]\n\nits judgment or order to the court by which the finding, sentence or order appealed against was recorded or passed."}}, {"text": "s. 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24886, "end_char": 24892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 511", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25153, "end_char": 25159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "U. N.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26044, "end_char": 26049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We think that U. N.\n\nBeg J. rightly pointed out that the object and purpose of such sections are distinguishable from those of s. 419 where the copy is intended to be acted upon by the appellate court for the purpose of founding its judicial decision on it."}}, {"text": "s. 419", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26157, "end_char": 26163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 419", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26500, "end_char": 26506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26715, "end_char": 26742, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "February 8, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27184, "end_char": 27200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the result, for reasons stated above, we agree that the order passed by the Allahabad High Court on February 8, 1955 was correct and this appeal should be dismissed."}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27336, "end_char": 27345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AND ANOTHER\n\n(S. R. DAS c. J., VENKATARAMA AIYAR, A. K. SARKAR and VIVIAN BosE JJ.)", "canonical_name": "S. R. DAs"}}, {"text": "A. K. SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27372, "end_char": 27384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AND ANOTHER\n\n(S. R. DAS c. J., VENKATARAMA AIYAR, A. K. SARKAR and VIVIAN BosE JJ.)", "canonical_name": "A.\" K. SARKAR"}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27389, "end_char": 27400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AND ANOTHER\n\n(S. R. DAS c. J., VENKATARAMA AIYAR, A. K. SARKAR and VIVIAN BosE JJ.)", "canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE JJ."}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27531, "end_char": 27554, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 146, 0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27572, "end_char": 27581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27948, "end_char": 27967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first (respondent who had obtained a mortgage decree in respect of the properties in 1935 did not take any steps to have the decree drawn up as required under the Original Side Rules of the Calcutta High Court until 1954, when she commenced proceedings for sale of."}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28510, "end_char": 28533, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28848, "end_char": 28875, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1958_1_1287_1294_EN", "year": 1958, "text": "S.C.R\n\nSUPREME COUHT REPORTS 1287\n\nnot consider it right to enter upon a discussion as to the true interpretation of the word \"copy\" occurring in any of those sections for we think that each section in each Act must, for its true meaning and effect, depend on its own language, context and setting.\n\nIn the result, for reasons stated above, we agree that the order passed by the Allahabad High Court on February 8, 1955 was correct and this appeal should be dismissed.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nSM. SAILA BALA DASSI v.\n\nSM. NIRMALA SUNDARI DASSI. AND ANOTHER\n\n(S. R. DAS c. J., VENKATARAMA AIYAR, A. K. SARKAR and VIVIAN BosE JJ.)\n\nCivil Procedure-Addition of party-Transfer pendente lite-Appeal filed by ttansferor-Ri:ght of transferee to continue appeal-Code of Civil Procedure (Act 5 of 1908); s. 146, 0. 22, r. 10 .\n\n. The second respondent sold the properties to the appellant in 1952 and the deed of sale recited that t.he properties were sold free of all enct.Jmbrances.\n\nThe first (respondent who had obtained a mortgage decree in respect of the properties in 1935 did not take any steps to have the decree drawn up as required under the Original Side Rules of the Calcutta High Court until 1954, when she commenced proceedings for sale of. the mortgaged properties. The second respondent raised the objection that the execution of the decree was barred by limita- . tion but that was. overruled by a single Judge· of the High Court and an appeal against that order was preferred by the second respondent. Apprehending that the second respondent might enter into a collusive arrangement with the first respondent with a view to defeat her rights, the appellant made an application in the High Court under 0. 22, r. 10, of the. Code of Civil Procedure praying that she might be substituted in the place of the second respondent, or in the alternative, be brought on record as additional appellant. The High Court having dismissed the application, the appellant. brought the present appeal: ·\n\nHeld, that the application could not be sustained under 0. 22, r. 10, of the Code of Civil Procedure because (1) assuming\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nv. a. Tobit and Olh.ers\n\nDaso. J.\n\nFebruary U.\n\nS aila Bala Da$$i\n\nN irmala Sundari\n\nDaasi\n\nr •nlcataratna\n\nAiyar J.\n\n1288 SUPRI<; l\\ill COURT HEPORTS [1958]\n\nthat the suit was considered as having l:een pending until the decree was dran up in 1954 no application was made to the Court where the suit was pending as provided in 0. 22, r. 10, and\n\n(ii) the application made to the appellate Court was also not within 0. 22, r. 10, as the transfer in question was made prior to the filing of the appeal and not during its pendency.\n\nThe application, however. falls within s. 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the appellant is entitled to be brought on record since an appeal is a proceeding within the meaning of that section and the right to file an appeal carries \\Vith it the right to continue an appeal which had been filed by the person under whom the appellant claims.\n\nJugaU<ishore Saraf v. Raw Cotton Ltd., (1955] 1 S.C.R. 1369, Sitharamaswami v. Lakshmi Narasimha, (1918) l.L.R. 41 Mad. 510 and Muthia Chettiar v. Govinddoss Krishnadoss, (1921) l.L.R. 44 Mad. 919, relied on.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 350 of 1957.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 6, I 956, of the Calcutta High Court on a notice of motion in Appeal No. 152 of 1955.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee and P. K. Mukherjee. for the appellant.\n\nB. Sen and P. K. Ghosh (for P. K. Bose), for respondent No. J.\n\n1958.\n\nFebruary 14.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA AIYAR J.-This is an appeal against an order of the High Court of Calcutta dated August 6, 1956, rejecting the application of the appellant to be brought on record as appellant in appeal No. 152 of 1955 pending be fore it.\n\nThe second respondent. Sudhir Kumar Mitter, was the owner of two houses, No. 86 / l, Cornwallis Street and No.\n\n7-C, Kirti Mitter Lane, Calcutta. On May 19, 1934, he exe cuted.a Mortgage for Rs. 3,000 over the said houses in favour of the first respondent, Sm. Nirmala Sundari Dassi. She instituted Suit No. 158 of 1935 on this mortgage, and obtained a preliminary decree on March 8, 1935. The matter then came before the 'Registrar for taking of accounts, and by his report dated July 23, 1935 he found that a sum of\n\nRs. 3,914-6-6 was due to her, and on that, a final decree was passed on April 20, 1936. Under r. 27 of ch. 16 of the Original Side Rules of the Calcutta High Court, a person in whose favour a decree is passed has to apply for drawing up of the decree . within four days from the date thereof. The rule then provides that \"if such application for drawing up a decree or order is not made within the time aforesaid, the decree or order shall not be drawn up except under order of Court or a Judge to be obtained, unless otherwise ordered, by a petition ex parte\". The importance of this provision is that until a decree is drawn up as mentioned therein, no certified copy thereof would be issued to the party and without such a certified copy, no execution proceedings could be taken.\n\nThe first respondent who had acted with such alacrity and speed in pqtting her mortage in suit and obtaining a decre. took no steps whatsoever to have the decree drawn up. for nearly 18 years. On May 12, 1952, the second respondent sold both the houses to the appellant herein for a sum of Rs. 60,000 which was, it is stated, utilised largely for discharging prior mortgages on which decrees had been obtained and execution proceedings taken. The deed of sale recites that the properties were sold free of all encumbrances. The first respondent who had so far taken no steps to have the decree drawn up now bestirred herself, anci' on February 17, 1954 obtained an ex parte order under r. 27 aforesaid, granting her leave to draw up and complete the decree. That having been done pursuant to the order, she filed on April 29, 1954 the final decree, and commenced proceedings for sale of the mortgaged properties.\n\nCqming to know of this, the second respondent appeared before the Registrar, and raised the objection that the execution of tf1e decree was barred by limitation. The Registrar felt some doubt in the matter, and made a special report under ch. 26, r .. 50 seeking the opinion o~ the Court on the\n\nquti9n of limitation, and the first respondent wu directed to take out a notice of motion for directions.. The matter then came before P. B. Mukharji 1. and after hearing\n\nL/S4SCI-7\n\n1953•\n\nSaila Bala Daaai\n\nNirmala Bundari\n\nDtJBs' v enkatarama\n\nAiyarJ.\n\nSaila Bula l>aaai\n\nNirmala Sundari\n\nDassi\n\nV eW:atarama\n\nAiyar J.\n\n1290 SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS [1958]\n\ncounsel for both the respondents, he held that the execution of the decree was not barred. Vide judgment reported in Nirmala Sundari v. Sudhir Kumar('). Against this judgment, the second respondent preferred Appeal No. 152 of 1955, and that is still pending.\n\nWe now come to the application, out of which the present appeal arises.\n\nOn July 25, 1956 the appellant applied to be brought on record as appellant in Appeal No. 152 of 1955. The allegations in support of the petition were that she had purchased the properties from the second respondent on May 12, 1952 free of all encumbrances, that the execution proceedings started by the first respondent were not maintainable as the decree had become time-barred, that the second respondent, Sudhir Kumar Mitter, had been conducting proceedings in opposition to the execution sale only at her instance and for her benefit, that he had filed Appeal No. 152 of 1955 aJso on her behalf, that latterly he had entered into a collusive arrangement with the first respondent with a view to defeat her rights, and that therefore it was necessary that she should be allowed to come on record as appellant so that she might protect her interests. The prayer in the petition was that she be substituted in the place of the second respondent or in the alternative, be brought on record as additional appellant.\n\nThe application was strenuously opposed by both the\n\nrespondents~ They stated that they had entered into an arrangement settling the amount due to the first respondent at Rs. 17,670, that that settlement was fair and bona fide and binding on the appellant, and that further her application was not maintainable. This application was heard by Chakra varti C. J. and Lahiri J. and by their order dated August 6, 1956, they dismissed it. The appellant then applied under Art. 133 for leave to appeal to this Court, and in rejecting that application, the learned Chief Justice observed that the original application was pressed only under 0. 22, r. 10 of the Civil Procedure Code and it was dismissed, as it was conceded that the applicant, not being a person who had\n\n(') A.I.R. 1955 Cal. 484.\n\nobtained a transfer pending appeal, was not entitled to apply 1968 on the terms of that rule, that the prayer in the alternative Saila &;;;; Daari that the applicant might be brought on record without being . . v. . substituted under 0. 22, r. 10 which merited favourable N•~::;, n11a,. consideration had not been mentioned at the previous hear- Venkatarama ing, and that no certificate could be granted under Art. 133 .A.iyar J. with a view to that point being raised in appeal, as the order sought to be appealed against was not a final order. The appellant thereafter obtained special leave to appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitution, and that is how the appeal comes before us.\n\nIt is contended on behalf of the appellant that her application is maintainable under 0. 22, r. 10 of the Civil Procedure Code, because Suit No. 158 of 1935 must be considered to have been pending until the decree therein was drawn up which was in 1954, and the transfer in her favour had been made prior thereto on May 12, 1952. The decision in. Lakshan Ohunder Dey v. Sm. Nikunjamani Dassi(') is relied on, in support of this position. But it is contended for the first respondent that even if Suit No. 158 of 1935 is considered as pending when the transfer in favour of the appellant was made, that would not affect the result as no application had been made by her to be brought on record in the original court during the pendency of the suit. Nor could the application made to the appellate Court be sustained under 0. 22, r. 10, as the transfer in favour of the appellant was made prior to the filing of that appeal and not during its pendency.\n\nThis contention appears to be well-founded; but that, however, does not conclude the matter. In our opinion, the application filed by the appellant falls within s. 146 of the Civil Procedure Code, and she is entitled to be brought on record under that section. Section 146 provides that save as otherwise provided by the Code, any proceeding which can be taken by a person may also be taken by any person claiming under him. It has been held in Sitharamaswami v. Lakshmi Narasimlza(') that an appeal is a proceeding for the purpose\n\n(1) (1923) 27 C.W.N. 755. (\") (1918} I.L.R. 41 Mad. 510.\n\nL/S4SCI-7(a}\n\nSaila Bala Dassi\n\nv. ,;._Vitt1v.tla Sundttri.\n\n]Jassi r enl:atarama\n\nAiyar J,\n\nSUPREJ'IIE COURT REPORTS [1958\n\nof this section, and that further the expression \"claiming under\" is wide enough to include cases of devolution and assignment mentioned in 0. 22, r. IO.\n\nThis decision was quoted with approval by this Court in Juga/, kishore Saraf v.\n\nRaw Cotton Co., Ltd.('), wherein it was held that a transferee of a debt on which a suit was pending was entitled to execute the decree which was subsequently passed therein, under s. 146 of the Civil Procedure Code as a person claiming under the decree-holder, even though an application for execution by him would not lie under 0. 21, r. 16, and it was further observed that the words \"save as otherwise provided\" only barred proceedings, which would be obnoxious to some provision of the Code. It would follow from the above authorities that whoever is entitled to be but has not been brought on record under 0. 22, r. 10 in a pending suit or proceeding would be entitled to prefer an appeal against the decree or order passed therein if his assignor could have filed such an appeal, there being no prohibition against it in the Code, and that accordingly the appellant as an assignee of the second respondent of the mortgaged properties would have been entitled to prefer an appeal against the judgment of P. B.\n\nMukharji J.\n\nIt is next contended that s. 146 authorises only the initiation of any proceeding, and that though it would have been competent to the appellant to have preferred an appeal against the judgment of P. B. Mukharji J. she not having done so was not entitled to be brought on record as an appellant to continue the appeal preferred by the second respondent. We are not disposed to construe s: 146 narrowly in the manner contended for by counsel for tlie first respondent.\n\nThat section was introduced 'tot the first time in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 with the object of facilitating the exercise of rights by persons .in w)lom they come to be vested by devolution or assignment, and being a beneficent provision should be construed liberally and so as to advance justice and not in a restricted or technical sense. It has been held by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Muthiah Chettiar v. Govinddoss Krishnadoss(') that the assignee of a\n\n(') [1955) 1 $.C.R, 1369. (') (1921) I.L.R. 44 Mad. 919.\n\npart of a decree is entitled to continue an execution applica tion filed by the transferor-decree-holder. Vide also Moidin Kutty v. Doraiswamy('). The right to file an appeal must therefore be• held to carry . with it the right to conti, nue an appeal which had been filed by the person under wh(j)m the applicant claims, and the petition of the appellant to be brought on record as an appellant in Appeal No. 152 of 1955 must be held to be maintainable under s. 146.\n\nIt remains to consider whether, on the merits, there should be an order in favour of the appellant. Of that, we have no doubt whatsoever. The proceedings in which she seeks to intervene , arise in execution of a mortgage decree.\n\nShe has purchased the properties comprised in the, decree for Rs. 60,000 under a covenant that they are free from encumbrances. And after her purchase, the first respondent has started proceedings for sale of the properties, nearly 18 years after the decree had been passed.\n\nThe appellant maintatns that the execution proceedings are barred by limitation, and desires to be heard on that question. It is true that P. B.\n\nMukharji J. has rejected this contention, but a reading of his judgment shows-and that is what he himself observes-,.that there are substantial questions of law calling for decision.\n\nEven apart from the plea of limitation, there is aiso a question as to the amount payable in discharge and satisfaction of the decree obtained by the first respondent in Suit No. 158 of 1935. Both the respondents claim that they have settled it at Rs. 17,670, But it is stated for the appellant that under the decree which is . sought to be executed the amount recoverable for principal and interest will .not exceed Rs, 6,000.\n\nIn the affidavit of Sanjit Kumar Ghose dated December 20,\n\n1956, fih:d on behalf of. the. first respondent, particufars 'are given as to how the sum of Rs. 17,670 was madeup. It wilt be seen therefrom that a sum of Rs. 7,200 is claimed for interest up to March 8, 1956, calculating it not at the rate provided in the final decree but at the contract rate. Then a sum of Rs. 5,000 is included as for costs incurred by the\n\n(') IL, R 1952 Mac;!. 622.\n\nSaila Bala Da.'8i\n\nN irmala S1tndari\n\nDa&\"i\n\nT' enlcatarama\n\nAiyar J.\n\n8m7a Bala l!aa8i'\n\nv, NirmaTa Sundari\n\nDaasi\n\nVenkatarama\n\n.Aiyar J.\n\nmortgagee in suits other than Suit No. 158 of 1935 and in proceedings connected therewith.\n\nThe appellant contends that the properties in her hands could, under no circumstances, be made liable for this amount. A sum of Rs. 1,750 is agreed to be paid for costs in the sale reference, in the proceedings before P. B. Mukbarji J. and in Appeal No. 152 of 1955.\n\nAsks the appellant, where is the sttlement in this, and how can it bind me? It is obvious that there are several substantial questions arising for determination in which the appellant as purchaser of the properties is vitally interested, and indeed is the only person interested. As a purchaser pendente lite, she will be bound by the proceedings taken by the first respondent in execution of her decree, and justice requires that she should be given an opportunity to protect her rights.\n\nWe accordingly set aside the order of the Court below dated August 6, 1956 and direct that the appellant be brought on record as additional appellant in Appeal No. 152 of 1955.\n\nAs Sudhir Kumar Mitter, the appellant now on record, bas dropped. the fight with the first respondent, we conceive that no embarrassment will result in there being on record two appellants with conflicting interest. But, in any event, the Court can, if necessary, take action suo motu either under 0. 1, r. JO or in its inherent jurisdiction and transpose Sudhir Kumar Mitter as second respondent in the appeal, as was done in In re Mathews. Oates v. Mooney('), and Vanjiappa Goundan v. Annamalai Chettiar('). As for costs, the Appellant should, in terms of the order of this Court granting her leave to appeal, pay the contesting respondent her costs in this appeal. The costs of and incidental to the application in Appeal No. 152 of 1955 in the High Court will abide the result of that appeal.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n(') (1905) 2 Ch. 460.\n\n(') (1939) 2 M.L.J. 551.", "total_entities": 60, "entities": [{"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 379, "end_char": 399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the result, for reasons stated above, we agree that the order passed by the Allahabad High Court on February 8, 1955 was correct and this appeal should be dismissed."}}, {"text": "February 8, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 403, "end_char": 419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the result, for reasons stated above, we agree that the order passed by the Allahabad High Court on February 8, 1955 was correct and this appeal should be dismissed."}}, {"text": "SM. SAILA BALA DASSI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 489, "end_char": 509, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SM. SAILA BALA DASSI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SM. NIRMALA SUNDARI DASSI. AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 514, "end_char": 552, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SM. NIRMALA SUNDARI DASSI AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 555, "end_char": 564, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. K. SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 591, "end_char": 603, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.K. SARKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 608, "end_char": 623, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 750, "end_char": 773, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 146, 0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 791, "end_char": 800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1167, "end_char": 1186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first (respondent who had obtained a mortgage decree in respect of the properties in 1935 did not take any steps to have the decree drawn up as required under the Original Side Rules of the Calcutta High Court until 1954, when she commenced proceedings for sale of."}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1729, "end_char": 1752, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2067, "end_char": 2094, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2121, "end_char": 2143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "22, r. 10, of the Code of Civil Procedure because (1) assuming\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nv. a. Tobit and Olh.ers\n\nDaso."}}, {"text": "Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2253, "end_char": 2258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.\n\nFebruary U.\n\nS aila Bala Da$$i\n\nN irmala Sundari\n\nDaasi\n\nr •nlcataratna\n\nAiyar J.\n\n1288 SUPRI<; l\\ill COURT HEPORTS [1958]\n\nthat the suit was considered as having l:een pending until the decree was dran up in 1954 no application was made to the Court where the suit was pending as provided in 0.", "canonical_name": ".A.iyar"}}, {"text": "s. 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2715, "end_char": 2721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2725, "end_char": 2752, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "(1955] 1 S.C.R. 1369", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3063, "end_char": 3083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3447, "end_char": 3463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee and P. K. Mukherjee."}}, {"text": "P. K. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3468, "end_char": 3483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee and P. K. Mukherjee."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3505, "end_char": 3511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen and P. K. Ghosh (for P. K. Bose), for respondent No."}}, {"text": "P. K. Ghosh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3516, "end_char": 3527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen and P. K. Ghosh (for P. K. Bose), for respondent No.", "canonical_name": "P. K. Ghosh"}}, {"text": "P. K. Bose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3533, "end_char": 3543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen and P. K. Ghosh (for P. K. Bose), for respondent No.", "canonical_name": "P. K. Ghosh"}}, {"text": "Sudhir Kumar Mitter", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3892, "end_char": 3911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sudhir Kumar Mitter, was the owner of two houses, No.", "canonical_name": "Sudhir Kumar Mitter"}}, {"text": "Nirmala Sundari Dassi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4130, "end_char": 4151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nirmala Sundari Dassi.", "canonical_name": "Nirmala Sundari Dassi"}}, {"text": "March 8, 1935", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4244, "end_char": 4257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "158 of 1935 on this mortgage, and obtained a preliminary decree on March 8, 1935."}}, {"text": "July 23, 1935", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4350, "end_char": 4363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter then came before the 'Registrar for taking of accounts, and by his report dated July 23, 1935 he found that a sum of\n\nRs."}}, {"text": "April 20, 1936", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4460, "end_char": 4474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3,914-6-6 was due to her, and on that, a final decree was passed on April 20, 1936."}}, {"text": "May 12, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5368, "end_char": 5380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 12, 1952, the second respondent sold both the houses to the appellant herein for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "February 17, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5807, "end_char": 5824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first respondent who had so far taken no steps to have the decree drawn up now bestirred herself, anci' on February 17, 1954 obtained an ex parte order under r. 27 aforesaid, granting her leave to draw up and complete the decree."}}, {"text": "April 29, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5988, "end_char": 6002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That having been done pursuant to the order, she filed on April 29, 1954 the final decree, and commenced proceedings for sale of the mortgaged properties."}}, {"text": "P. B. Mukharji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6517, "end_char": 6531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "26, r .. 50 seeking the opinion o~ the Court on the\n\nquti9n of limitation, and the first respondent wu directed to take out a notice of motion for directions.. The matter then came before P. B. Mukharji 1.", "canonical_name": "P. B.\n\nMukharji"}}, {"text": "S4S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6556, "end_char": 6559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Saila Bala Daaai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6572, "end_char": 6588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and after hearing\n\nL/S4SCI-7\n\n1953•\n\nSaila Bala Daaai\n\nNirmala Bundari\n\nDtJBs' v enkatarama\n\nAiyarJ.\n\nSaila Bula l>aaai\n\nNirmala Sundari\n\nDassi\n\nV eW:atarama\n\nAiyar J.\n\n1290 SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS [1958]\n\ncounsel for both the respondents, he held that the execution of the decree was not barred.", "canonical_name": "Saila Bala Daaai"}}, {"text": "enkatarama", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6616, "end_char": 6626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and after hearing\n\nL/S4SCI-7\n\n1953•\n\nSaila Bala Daaai\n\nNirmala Bundari\n\nDtJBs' v enkatarama\n\nAiyarJ.\n\nSaila Bula l>aaai\n\nNirmala Sundari\n\nDassi\n\nV eW:atarama\n\nAiyar J.\n\n1290 SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS [1958]\n\ncounsel for both the respondents, he held that the execution of the decree was not barred."}}, {"text": "Saila Bula", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6637, "end_char": 6647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and after hearing\n\nL/S4SCI-7\n\n1953•\n\nSaila Bala Daaai\n\nNirmala Bundari\n\nDtJBs' v enkatarama\n\nAiyarJ.\n\nSaila Bula l>aaai\n\nNirmala Sundari\n\nDassi\n\nV eW:atarama\n\nAiyar J.\n\n1290 SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS [1958]\n\ncounsel for both the respondents, he held that the execution of the decree was not barred.", "canonical_name": "Saila Bala Daaai"}}, {"text": "Nirmala Sundari", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6656, "end_char": 6671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and after hearing\n\nL/S4SCI-7\n\n1953•\n\nSaila Bala Daaai\n\nNirmala Bundari\n\nDtJBs' v enkatarama\n\nAiyarJ.\n\nSaila Bula l>aaai\n\nNirmala Sundari\n\nDassi\n\nV eW:atarama\n\nAiyar J.\n\n1290 SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS [1958]\n\ncounsel for both the respondents, he held that the execution of the decree was not barred.", "canonical_name": "Nirmala Sundari Dassi"}}, {"text": "Chakra varti", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8433, "end_char": 8445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This application was heard by Chakra varti C. J. and Lahiri J. and by their order dated August 6, 1956, they dismissed it."}}, {"text": "Lahiri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8456, "end_char": 8462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This application was heard by Chakra varti C. J. and Lahiri J. and by their order dated August 6, 1956, they dismissed it."}}, {"text": "August 6, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8491, "end_char": 8505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This application was heard by Chakra varti C. J. and Lahiri J. and by their order dated August 6, 1956, they dismissed it."}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8559, "end_char": 8567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9293, "end_char": 9301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ".A.iyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9302, "end_char": 9309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "133 .A.iyar J. with a view to that point being raised in appeal, as the order sought to be appealed against was not a final order.", "canonical_name": ".A.iyar"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9493, "end_char": 9501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10681, "end_char": 10687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10781, "end_char": 10792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S4S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11113, "end_char": 11116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Saila Bala Dassi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11125, "end_char": 11141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L/S4SCI-7(a}\n\nSaila Bala Dassi\n\nv. ,;._Vitt1v.tla Sundttri.", "canonical_name": "Saila Bala Daaai"}}, {"text": "s. 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11653, "end_char": 11659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P. B.\n\nMukharji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12482, "end_char": 12497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "22, r. 10 in a pending suit or proceeding would be entitled to prefer an appeal against the decree or order passed therein if his assignor could have filed such an appeal, there being no prohibition against it in the Code, and that accordingly the appellant as an assignee of the second respondent of the mortgaged properties would have been entitled to prefer an appeal against the judgment of P. B.\n\nMukharji J.\n\nIt is next contended that s. 146 authorises only the initiation of any proceeding, and that though it would have been competent to the appellant to have preferred an appeal against the judgment of P. B. Mukharji J. she not having done so was not entitled to be brought on record as an appellant to continue the appeal preferred by the second respondent.", "canonical_name": "P. B.\n\nMukharji"}}, {"text": "s. 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12528, "end_char": 12534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13026, "end_char": 13052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13357, "end_char": 13374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has been held by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Muthiah Chettiar v. Govinddoss Krishnadoss(') that the assignee of a\n\n(') [1955) 1 $.C.R, 1369. (') ("}}, {"text": "s. 146", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13966, "end_char": 13972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Civil Procedure Code, 1908", "statute": "the Civil Procedure Code, 1908"}}, {"text": "Sanjit Kumar Ghose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15260, "end_char": 15278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the affidavit of Sanjit Kumar Ghose dated December 20,\n\n1956, fih:d on behalf of."}}, {"text": "December 20,\n\n1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15285, "end_char": 15303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the affidavit of Sanjit Kumar Ghose dated December 20,\n\n1956, fih:d on behalf of."}}, {"text": "Saila Bala", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15690, "end_char": 15700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Saila Bala Da.", "canonical_name": "Saila Bala Daaai"}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15718, "end_char": 15720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P. B. Mukbarji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16141, "end_char": 16155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,750 is agreed to be paid for costs in the sale reference, in the proceedings before P. B. Mukbarji J. and in Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "P. B.\n\nMukharji"}}, {"text": "Sudhir Kumar Mitter", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16862, "end_char": 16881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Sudhir Kumar Mitter, the appellant now on record, bas dropped.", "canonical_name": "Sudhir Kumar Mitter"}}, {"text": "Sudhir Kumar Mitter", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17215, "end_char": 17234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, r. JO or in its inherent jurisdiction and transpose Sudhir Kumar Mitter as second respondent in the appeal, as was done in In re Mathews.", "canonical_name": "Sudhir Kumar Mitter"}}]}
{"document_id": "1958_1_1295_1331_EN", "year": 1958, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUH'l' REPORTS\n\nK. S. SRINIVASAN\n\nUNION OF INDIA\n\n(S. R. DAS C.J., VENKATARAMA AlYAR, s. K. DAS,\n\nA. K. SARKAR and VIVIAN BosE, JJ.)\n\nUnion Service, Termination of-Servant in quasi-permanent status-Post kept in abeyance-Ordered to carry the status while officiating in new appointment under miisapprehension- Validity-Test--Consultation with Federal Public Service CommisS!ion1 if mandat01rY-Servant, if entitled to Constitutional protection-Constitution of India, Art, 311(2)-Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1947, rr. 3, 4 and 6(1).\n\nThe appellant held the post of a Public Relations Officer, AU India Radio, and was declared to be in quasi-permanent Service under r. 3. of the Central Civil Service (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949. As a measure of war economy the Government decided to hold the post \"in abeyance\" and the appellant was appointed to officiate as Assistant Staion\n\nDirector in a temporay capacity and was ordered to carry with him his quasi-permanent status wh.iie holding his new post. On the objection of the Union Public Service Commission, however, the service of the appellant was terminated and he was appointed to a temporary past of Assistant Information Officer . which belonged to a lower grade. The appellant moved the High Court for a writ of certiorari. His contentilon was that as, admittedly, he had not been called upon to show cause, Art. 311(2) of the Constitution was vio~ lated. It was contended on behalf of the respondent that the order permitting the appellant to carry his quasi-permanent status to his new post having been made under a misapprehension that the post of Assistant Station Director belonged to the same grade as that of the Public Relations Officer, his service was terminable under the relevant Service Rules:\n\nHel'd (per Das, C. J., Venkatarama Aiyar, S. K. Das and A. K. Sarkar, JJ., Bose, J. Dissenting), that the post of Assistant Station Director was not a post in the same grade as that of the Public Relat:ons Officer and under the relevant Service Rules he could not carry his quasi-permanent status to the new post; as the order . permitting the appellant to carry 'his quasi--permarJent status was passed under a misapprehension and was not intended to confer on him that status independently in the new post, his service was terminable under r. 6(1) of the Rules.\n\nIt is well settled that. if a servant has no right to the post and his service can be terminated under the Service Rules, Art. 311 (2) is not attracted. Consequently, the appellant who was appointed on a purely temporacy capacity, could not seek. the protection of Art. 311 (2). ·\n\n19J8\n\n.February 18.\n\nK. B. Srinivasan\n\nUnion of India\n\nParshotam Lal Dhinura v. Union of India, [1958] S.C.R. 828, relied on.\n\nAdmission is not conclusive proof of the matter admitted although it may in certain circumstances operate as an estoppel. In the present case, as the appellant was in no way misled as to his quasi-permanent status by the errom!<lus\n\norder of the Government, no question of estoppel could arise.\n\nHeld, further, that the word 'reduction' in cl. (ii) of r. 6(1) of the Rules is not necessarily confined to abolition but also includes keeping iri abeyance of posts and the Nord 'certify' occurring. therein does not necessarily imply tQat a formal order is essential.\n\nThe same scale of pay is not the only test for finding out if a particular post belongs to the same grade as another within the meaning of the proviso to cl. (ii) of r. 6(1) of the Service Rules, nor does the tact that the two belong to the same class determine the question.\n\nQuasi-permanent status is a creature Of the Rules and a servant who seeks the benefit of r. 3 must be held to be bound by the proviso to r. 4(b) of the Rules.\n\nState of U. P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, [1958] S.C.R. 533, neid inapplicable.\n\nPer Bose, J .-The order of. the Government permitting the appellant to carry with him the quasi-permanent status he had in his former post was clearly intended to confer on the appellant quasi-permanent status in his new post and the Government could not be allowed to go back upon it although it may have acted under a m, istake, subsequently discovered.\n\nThe Commissioner of Police, Bombay\n\nv. Gordhandas Bhanji, [1952] S.C.R. 135, applied.\n\nMoreover, under r. 4(a) of the Rules the Government had tire power to confer such a status without any previous consultation with the Federal Public Service Commission as required by r. 4(b) of the Rules, the words 'is required to be made' occurring in that rule being only directory and not mandatory.\n\nStte of U. P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, [1958] S.C.R. 533, Biswanath Khemka v. The Kinu Emperor, [1945] F.C.R. 99 and Montreal Street Railway Company v. Normandin, [1917] A.C. 170, relied on.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 78 of 1957 and Petition No. 81 of 1956.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated Novembet 25, 1955, of the Punjab High Court in Civil Writ No. 209-D of 1955.\n\nK. S. Krishnaswamy Aiyanger and C. V. L. Narayan, for 1958\n\nhe appellant.\n\nK. s. Srinivasan v.\n\nP.A. Mehta, R. Ganilpathy Iyer and R. H.\n\nDhebar, Unioo of lndi\" for the respondent.\n\n1958. February 18. The Judgment of Das C. J., Venkarama Aiyar, S.K. Das and Sarkar, 1JJ., was delivered by S.K. Das J. Bose J. delivered a separate judgment.\n\nS. K. DAs J.-On May 1, 1946, Shri K. S. Srinivasan, s. K. Da• J. appellant before us, was appointed to a post of Liaison Officer, All India Radio, on a pay of Rs. 350 per month in the scale of Rs. 350-20-450-25/2-550. The appoint\n\nment was made on the recommendation of the then Federal Public Service Commission, and the advertisement or memorandum of information for candidates, as it is more properly called, issued by the Publfo Service Commission when calling for applications for the said post, rela:ted tt> the recruitment for nine posts of Listeners' Research Officers and nine posts of Liaison Officers, All India Radio. It was stated in the said memorandum that the posts were permanent and pensionable, but would be filled on a temporary basis; the memorandwit further stated that if the persons doncerned were retained in service and confirmed in the posts, they would be -allowed pensionary benefits and would ailso be eligible to contribute . to the General Provident Fund. In the first instance the appointments were made on probation for six m011ths subject to termination on certain conditions mention ed .in para. 4 of the memorandum, whiab. need not be set out at this stage. The duties of .a Liaison. Officer were stated in para. 5 of the memorandum, the main duty being. to organise and conduc~ publicity for the programmes and other activities of a Radio Station. The designation Liaison Offieer was Jater changed to Public Relations Officer,\n\nand atong with other posts of Listener Research Officer and Assistant Station Director, the posts of Public Relations Officers were upgraded to Rs. 450-25-500-30-800 with effect ftom Januitty 1, 1947. On May 23, 1952, .the Director General, All India Radio, passed an order bearing No. 2(1)\n\nK. S. Sriniva.san\n\nUnion of India\n\n8. K.Da11J.\n\nSUPRE111E COURT REPORTS [1958]\n\nA I 50 in which it was stated that whereas the appellant had been in continuous Government service for more than three years and a declaration had been issued to him in pursuance of rr. 3 and 4 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, and whereas an a;;>pointment to the post of Public Relations Officer was required to be made in con\n\nsultation with the Union Public Service Commission and their concurrence to the! appointment had been obtained, the appellant wa; s appointed to the Public Relations Officer's grade in a quasi-permanent capacity with effect from May 1, 1949.\n\nOn September 3, 1952, however, the appellant received an order from the said Director-General in which it was stated that his services would not be required after October 6, 1952.\n\nThe appellant was naturally taken by surprise on receipt of this order and made a representation on September 8, 1952, in which he stated that as a quasi-permanent Public Relations\n\nOfficer he had a claim to an alternative post in the same grade, so long as any post in the si.1ne grade was held by a Government servant not in permanent or quasi-permanent service. On September 13, 1952, the appellant was informed by means of an order that he wais appointed to officiate as Assistant Station Director, Madras (the appellant was then working as Public Relations Officer, All India Radio, Madras) in a purely temporary capacity until further orders. On September 19, 1952, the appellant was informed that his representation dated September 8, 1952, Wll!l under consideration and a suggestion was made that in the meantime he should apply for one of the posts of Assistant Station Directors which had been advertised by the Union Public Service Commission. Then, on October 4, 1952, the appellant submitted a further representation in which he said that under the rules in question, namely the Central Civil Service '(Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, he was entitled to be retained in service in a post of the same grade and under the same appointing authority; and it was, therefore, not necessary that he should be re-selected for the post of Assistant Station .Director by the Union Public Service Commission. In\n\nthe concluding paragraph of his representation the appellant stated that in deference to the suggestion made in the letter of the Director-Gener~! dated September 19, 1952, he was enclosing an application to the Union Public Service Com mission for the post of Assistant Station Director and if, after due consideration, the Director-General decided that the appellant should apply for the post of Assistant Station Director, his application should be forwarded to the Union Public Service Commission. While Government was consider\n\ning the representation of the appellant, the Union Public Commission interviewed in March, 1953, candidates for the posts of Assistant Station Directors. The appellant appeared before the Commission on March 26, 1953. On April 18, 1953, the appellant was informed that the Union Public SerVice Com mission had not selected him and the appellant was aigain informed that \"it was not possible to continue him in service.\"\n\nTheappellant made fresh representations to the effect that the order purporting to terminate his service on the ground that the Union Public Service Commission had not selected him for the post of Assistant_ Station Director, was an illegal order inasmuch as the appellant held a quasipermanent\n\nstatus a.nd was entitled to hold a post in the grade of Assistant\n\nStation Directors, as .long as anyone not in permanent or quasi-permanent service continued to hold such a post. To these representations the appellant received a reply to the effect that Government had decided to keep in abeyance the post of Public Relations Officer held by hiln and therefore it was not possible to retain him in that post and the appellant was given an opportunity to show cause why his service should not be termiyated on the expiry of the period of notice with effect from July 18, 1953. A reply wag asked for within 15 days. In reply, the appellant again pointed out that having been given a quasi-permanent status he was entitled to be retaJined in service under the rules governing Government servants holding such status, and the termination of his service would be in violation of Article 3 U of the\n\nK. 8. 8rinivaBan\n\nUni<m of India\n\n8.K.DOBJ.\n\nK. S. Srint!lMan\n\nUnion of India\n\nConstitution. Gn July 3, 1953, the appellant received a memorandum dated June 9, 1953. This memorandum said:\n\n\"Shri Srinivasan's representation has nnw been considered by Government. As the posts of Public Relations Officers form a cadre by themselves and do not belong to the cadre of Assistant Station Directors, he cannot claim any protection in the post bf Assistant Station Director on irccount of his being quasi-permanent as Public Relations Officer. Shri Srinivasan may please be informed accordingly.\"\n\nOn July 10, 1953, the appellant made a fresh representation, this time to the Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, in which he repeated his former objections and contended that the proposed termination of his service was irregular, unjust and illegal. He submitted that the order terminating his service was in contravention of Art. 311 of the Constitution and - he further sa, id that \"though the posts of Public Relations Officer and Assistant Station Director were not declared to be in the same cadre, there can be no dispute that the posts are in the same grade.\" On August 17, 1953, the appellant received a memorandum to the effect that the notice of the termination of his service as Assistant Station Director dated April 18, 1953, as subsequently amended by corrigenda dated May 12, 1953, and July 3, 1953, was withdrawn, and it also stated that the notide dated May 26, 1953, asking the appellant to show cause why his service should not be terminated was cancelled. This was followed by an order dated December 14, 1953. This order has an important bearing on the points urged befure us and must be quoted in fu!J.:\n\n\"S. Noc 41(R) Government of India, Director General, All India Ral.lio.\n\nNo. 1(113)-SII52.\n\nNew Delhi, the 14th December, 1953.\n\nORDER.\n\nIn this Directorate Order No. 2(1)-A/50, dated the 23rd May, 1952, Shri K.\n\nSrinivasan, then officiating Public\n\nRelations Officer, AU India Radio, was appointed to that post in a quasi-permanent capacity with effect from the lst May, 1949.\n\nSubsequently, in August 1952, all posts of Public Relations Officers, except the one in the External Services Division, were held in abeyance. As the post of Public Relations Officer belongs to the same grade as Assistant Station Director calrrying 'identidal scales of pay Shri Srinivasan was appointed Assistant Station Director in the External Services Division with effect from the 22nd September, 1952. Under the prvision contained. in the Ministry of Home Affairs Office Memorandum No. 54/136/\n\n51-NGS, dated the 24th April, 1952, Shri Srinivasan will carry with him the quasi-permanent stait!us of his former . pt>st of Public Relations Officer while holding the po'st of Assistant Station Director.\n\n.• (Sd.) M. Lal,\n\n.Diretor-General.\" A copy of the order w~ also sent, fo the Secretary, Union Public Service Commission. Unfortunately, the appellant soon found that his troubles did not end with the order dated December 14, 1953. On August 31, 1955, the appellant was informed by the then Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 'that Union Public Service Commission had objected to his appointment as ssistant Station Director, holding that such appointment was contrary to the regulations; the appellant was then asked that he should relinquish the post of Assistant Station Director and accept\n\na temporary post of Assistant Information Officer in the Press Information Bureau or, in the alternative, he should \"clear out\". It may be stated here that the. post of Assistant Information Officer offered to the appellant carried a scale of pay lower thain that of an Assistant Station Pirector, namely Rs. 350-25-500-30-620. As this new offer deprived the appellant of his quasi-permanent status and' also amounted to a reduction in his rank, the-appellant immedia~ tely sent fresh representations to the Home Minist.ey, Director-General, and the Minister for Information and Bt'Qadcasting. On September 7, 1955, the appellant received the final\n\nK. S. fli1tiooa•\n\nUni<m of India\n\nS.K.DMJ.\n\nK. 8. 8rinivaaan\n\nUnion of India\n\nS.K.DMJ.\n\norder of Gbvernment, which is the order complained of in the present appeal. That order was in these terms:\n\n\"Shri Srinivasan was declared quasi-permanent in the grade of Public Relations Officer, All India Radio (Rs. 450-\n\n25-500-EB-30-800) with effect from the 1st May, 1949. In 1952, all the posts of Public Relations Officer excepting one in the External Services Division were held in abeyance as a measure of economy. The only post that survived the ecbnomy drive was assigned to the permanent incnmbent.\n\nShri Srinivasan would have had to be retrenched in 1952; for quasi-permanency does not preclude retrenchment and .there was no other officer in the grade of Public Relations Officer who was non-quasi-permanent Mid who could have been discharged in preference to him. He was irregularly transferred as Asst. Station Director, in an officiating capacity. He applied for one of the posts of Assistant Station Director when they were adertised by the Union Public Service Commission in 1953, but was rejected. Subsequently, he was allowed to carry a:lso irregularly, the quasi-permanent status in the grade of Public Relations Officer while holding the post of Assistant Station Director, vide Directorate General, All India Radio's order No. 1 (113) SI/52 dated the 14th December, 1953.\n\nThe Union Public Service Commission have not accepted this transfer as it is in contravention of the Union Public Service Commission (Consultation) Regulations. Since he has been rejected for the post of Assistant Station Director in an open selection and also since the Union Public Service Commission have not accepted his transfer, the Government of India regret that they are unable to allow him to continue in the post of Assistant Station Director. He is, therefore, required fo relinquish charge of the post of Assistant Station Director immediately.\n\n\"To save him the ha!rdship of retrenchment, the question of offering Shri Srinivasan alternative employment has been considered. There is no intention of reviving the posts of Public Relations Officer -that were held in abeyance in\n\n1952. For publicity and public relations work of All India\n\nRadio, a few posts of Assistant Information Officer in the scale of Rs. 350-25-500.EB-30-620 have been sanctioned on the strength of the Press Information Bureau and it is proposed to absorb him on temporary basis, against one of these posts. The absorption in this post also, is subject to the approval by the Union Public Service Commission to whom a reference has been made. Meanwhile, after relinquishing the charge of the post of Assistant Station Director, he should . report himself for duty to the Principal Information Officer, Press Information Bureau, New Delhi. The question of fixation of his pay in the grade of Assistant Information Officer, with a view to protecting his present salary will be taken up after he has joined duty.\"\n\nThe appellant continued to make some more representations which were, however, rejected, arnd on October 11, 1955, an order was palssed transferring the appellant to the Press\n\nInformation Bureau as officiating Assistant Information Officer with immediate effect and the appellant was directed to hand over charge ol the post of Assistant Station Director immediately and to take over his pt>st in the Press Infonnation Bureau forthwith. The validity of this order, which is also challenge<i in the present appea!I, necessarily depends on the validity of the earlier order dated September _7, 1955.\n\nThe appellant refused to accept the lower post of Assistant Press Information Officer and on October 19, 1955, he made over charge under protest. On November 25, 1955, the appellant filed a petition, numbered Writ Petition 209-D of 1955 in the Punjab High Court in which he prayed for the issue of a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ for quashing the orders dated September 7, 1955, a:nd October\n\n11, 1955, and asked for an order directing his rdnstatement as Assistant Station Director in the External Services Division of the All India Radio, the post which he was holding when the orders complained of were passed. This petition was summarily dismissed by the Punjab High Court on the same date. The appellant then moved the said High Court\n\nJ(. S. Srt'.nivaaan\n\nUnion of India\n\nS. K. DaaJ,\n\nK. 8. Sri11il:a$an.\n\nv. l.i11ion of lndla\n\nS. K. Da•J.\n\nfor a cerifitoate for leave to appeal to this Court. That application was also dismissed on March 16, 1956. Thereupon, the appellant moved this Court for Specii1l Leave and obtained such leave on April 23, 1956. While moving the application for special leave, learned counsel for the appellant stated that without prejudice to the contentions of either party, the appellant would take up the post of Assistant Information Officer in the Press Information Bureau pending disposal of the appeal.\n\nOn April 22, 1956, the appellant also filed a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution and in this petition the appellant has challenged the order dated September 7, 1955, on the ground that the order violates the provisions of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution.\n\nThe present judgment will govern the appeal by special leave as also the petitibn under Art. 32 of the Constitution.\n\nIt will be convenient to take up the appeal first. The main question for decision in the appeal is .whether the impugned orders violate the constitutional guarantee given by Art. 311(2) to the appellant, who is ad'mittedly the holder of a civil post under the Union. The true scope and effect of Art. 311 of the Constitution was 'fully considered in w recent judgment of this Court in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India('), pronounced on November 1, 1957, and it was there 'held by the majority as follows (we are quoting such observations only as have a bearing on the present case):\n\n\"Shortly put, the principle is that when a servant has a right to a post or to a rank either under the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, or under the rules gt>verning the conditions of his service, the termination of the service of such a servant or his reduction to a lower post is by itself and prima facie a punishment, for it operates as a forfeiture of his right to hold that post or that rank and to get the emoluments and other benefits attached thereto. But if the servant has no right to the post, as where he is appointed to a post, permanent or temporary, either on proba.-\n\n(1) [19581 S.C.R 828.\n\n8.C.R.\n\nSUPBEME COURT REPOR'rs 1305\n\ntion or on an officiating basis and whbse temporary service has not ripened into a quasi-permanent service as defined in the Temporary Service Rules, the termination of his employment does not deprive him of any right and cannot, therefore, by itself, be a punishment. One test for determining whether the termination of the service of a government servant is by way of punishment is to ascertain whether the servant, but for such termination, had the right to hold the post. If he had a right to the post as in the three oases hereinbefore mentioned, the termination of his service .will by itself be a punishment and he will be entitled to the protection of Art. 311. Jn other words and broadly speaking, Art.\n\n31 I <2) will apply to those cases where the government servant. had he .been employed by a private employer, would be entitled to maintain an action for wrongful dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. To put it in another way, if the government has, by contract, express or implied, or, under the rules, the right to terminate the employment at any time, then such termination in the manner provided by the contract or the rules is, prima f acie and per se, not a punishment and does not attract the provisions of Art. 311.\"\n\nTherefore, the critical question is-did the appellant have a right to the post of Assistant Station Director, which he was holding, when the impugned orders were passed? If he\n\nhad! such a right, the impugned orders will undoubtedly be bad because they deprive the appellant of that' right inasmuch as they terminate his service in the post he was holding and reduce him tb a lower post. Admittedly, there was no proceeding against the appellant for disc.iplinary action and he had no opportunity of showing cause against any su, ch action. lf, on the contrary, the appellant had no right to the post he was holding and under the rules governing the conditions of his service his service was liable to be terminated, then the appellant is not entitled to the protection of Art. 311. On behalf of the appellant the contention is that under the Civil Services <Temporary Service) Rules, 1949 he held a. quasi-\n\nL/S4SCI-8\n\nK. S. 8rinfrasa.11,\n\nU1'ion of India\n\ns. K. D<BJ.\n\nK. S. Sri1tfoa, t1n\n\nU1iion of lrulia\n\n8. K. Das .J.\n\npermanent status in the post of Public Rela:tions Officer to which he was first appointed and he carried that status to the post of Assistant Station Director to which he was later appointed; therefore, he had a right <?f which he could not be deprived except in accordance with those rules, and the impugned orders were passed in derogation of those rules.\n\nFurthermore, it is contended on behalf of the appellant that the Union Public Service Commission failed to appreciate\" the correct legal position and their opinion, officious or otherwise, was neither decisive nor binding on Government or the appellant.\n\nOn behalf of the Union of India. respondent before us, it has been conceded that the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules. l 949 are the relevant rules governing the conditions of the appellant's service. But the argument is that the impugned orders are in consonance with those rules and the service of the appellant who was in quasi-permanent service in the post of Public Relations Officer was liable to termination under r. 6(1)(ii), because (I) a reduction had occurred in the number of posts of Public Relations Officers available for Government servants not in permanent service, and (2) the post of Assistant Station Director to which the appellant was appointed in a purely temporary capacity was not a post of the same grade a.s the specified post held by the appellant so as to entitle him to the benefit of the proviso to r. 6(l)(ii). On behalf of the respondent it has been further submitted that the order dated December 14, 1953 was issued under a misapprehension and when the correct position was rightly pointed out by the Union Public Service Commission, Government passed the impugned order of September 7, 1955 and by way of mitigating the hardship of the appellant who was faced with . the prospect of immediate unemployment offered him the post of Assistant Inform®on Offi0er--a post created for the performance of duties similar to those of the whilom Public Relations Officer.\n\nThese are the rival contentions which fall for consideration by us. We must at this stage read the relevant\n\nS.C.H.\n\nSUPR]!; ME COURT REPORTS 1307\n\nrules called the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service)\n\nRules, 1949~ hereinafter to be referred to as the Temporary\n\nService Rules. Rule 2 defines certain terms used in the Temporary Service Rules. We are concerned with two of such terms-\"Quasi-permanent service\" and \"specified posts\".\n\n\"Quasi-permanent service\" means \"temporary service commencing from the date on , which a declaration issued under rule 3 takes effect and consisting of periods of duty and leave (other than extraordinary leave)_ after that date\"; \"specified post\" means \"the particular post, or the particular grade of posts within a cadre, in respect of which a Government servant is decfared to be quasi-permanent under rule 3\". Rule 3. which we must read in full, is in these terms:\n\n\"A Government servant shall be deemed to be in quasipermanent service:\n\n(i) if he has been in continuous Government service for more than three years, _and\n\n(ii) if the appointing authority, being satisfied as to his suitability in respect of age, qualifications, work and character for employment in a quasi-permanent capacity, has issued a declaration to that effect, in accordance with such instructions as the Governor-Generali may issue from time to time.\"\n\nRules 4 and 6(1), are also important for our purpose and must be reproduced in full.\n\n\"Rule 4. (a) A declaration issued under rule 3 shall specify the particular post or the particular grade of posts within a cadre, in respect of which it is issued, and the date from which it takes effect.\n\n(b) Where recruitment to a specified post is required to be made in consultation with the Federal Public Service Commission no such declaration shall be issued except after\n\nconsultation with the Commission.\"\n\n\"Rule 6. (]) The service of a Government servant ill quasi-permanent service shall be liable to termination-\n\n(i) in the same circumstances and in the same manner L/S4SCI-8(a)\n\nK. S. Srinivaan\n\nv. lln-ion, of i'ltdU.\n\n8. K. DasJ.\n\n19fJ8\n\nK. 8. Bl'iniva8an ,., Uni1>n of India\n\n8. K. Da8J.\n\n1308 SUPHEMg COUHT REPORTS [ l 958 J\n\nas a Government servant in permanent service, or\n\n(ii) when the appointing authority concerned has certifi ed that a reduction ha6 occurred in the number of posts available for Government servants not in permanent service:\n\nProvided that the service of a Government servant in quasi-permanent service shall not be liable to termination under cl. (ii) so long as any post of the same grade and under the same appointing authority as the specified post held by him, .continues to be held by a Government servant not in permanent or quasi-permanent service:\n\nProvided further that as among Government servants in quasi-permanent service whose specified posts are o_f the same grade and under the same appointing authority, termination of servioe consequent on reduction of posts shall ordinarily take place in order of juniority in the list referred to in r. 7.\"\n\nAs rule 6(1) refers to r. 7, we may as well quote that rule.\n\n\"Rule 7. (l) Subject to the provision of this rule. a Government serva.nt in respect of whom a declaration has been made under rule 3, shall be eligible for a permanent appointment on the occurrence of a vacancy in the specified posts which may be reserved for being filled from among persons in quasi-permanent service. in accordance with such instructions as may be issued by the Governor-\n\nGeneral in this behalf from time to time.\n\nExplanation: -No such declaration shall confer upon any person a right to claim a permanent appointment to any post.\n\n(2) Every appomt111g authority shall, from time to time, after consultation with the appropriate Departmenta1! Promotions Committee. prepare a list, in order of precedence, of persons in quasi-permanent service who are eligible for a permainent appointment. Jn prcpalring such a list, the appointing authority shall consider both the seniority and the merit of the Government servants conrerned. All permanent appointments which are reserved under sub-rule (1) under the conUrol of any such appointing thority shall be made in accordance with such list : Provided that the Government may order that permanent appointment to any grade or post may be marle purely in order of seniority.\"\n\nNow, it is beyond dispute and in fact admitted that the appellalnt held a quasi-permanent stats in the grade of posts known as Public Relations Officers. The order dated May 23, 1952, stated in clear terms that (i) a declaration had been issued in respedt of the appellamt in pursuance 0f rr. 3 ai; id 4 of the Temporary Service Rules, (ii) concurrence of the Union Public Service Commission had been obtained and (iii) the grade of posts in respect of which the appellant held quasi-permanent status was the Public Relations Officers' grade. Under r. 4 a declaration issued under r. 3 shall specify the particular post or the particular grades of posts within a cadre in respect of which it is issued and the date from which it takes effect. A 'cadre', according to Fundamental Rule 9(4), means the strength of a service or a part of a service sanctioned as a separate unit.\n\nSome indication of what is meant by a grade can be obtained from art. 29 of the Civil Service Regulations : that article states-\n\n\"29. Grade and Class-Appointments are said to be in the same \"Class\" when they are in the same Department, and bear the same designation, or have been declared by the Government of Ind'ia to be in the same class. Appointments in the same class are sometimes divided into \"Grades\" according to pay.\n\nNote: -Appointments do not belong to the same Class or Grade unless they have been so constituted or recognised by proper authority. There are no Classes or Grades of Ministerial Officers.\"\n\nIt is, therefore, clear that so far as the posts known as Public Relations Officers, All India Radio, are concerned, they formed a grade and the appella111t held a quasi-permanent status in that grade.\n\nRule 6(1) of the Temporary Servic~ Rules lays down\n\n1.?58\n\nK, S. Sriniv(J, Ba.n,\n\nv. !Union of In4ia\n\n,</, K. Da• J.\n\n1o:; s\n\nK. 8. Srin; vMa.n\n\nTlnion of India\n\nS. K. Da8 J.\n\n13.IO\n\nSUPHEME COUHT HEPOHTS [1958]\n\nhow the service of a Government servant in quasi-permanent service can be terminated. We are concerned in this case with cl. (ii) of the said rule. That clause says that the service of a Government servant in quasi-permanent service can be terminated \"when the appointing authority concerned ha:s certified that a reduction has occurred in the number of posts available for Government servants not in permanent service\". Learned counsel for the appellant has very strongly submitted that there was no reduction within the meaning of the clause in the present case, far Jess any certificJation of such reduction. Learned counsel for the respondent has urged with equal vehemence that there was a reduction within the meaning of the clause and the appointing authority had certified such reduction.\n\nBefore considering the true scope and effect bf the relevant clause, it is necessary to say a few words about the Temporary Service Rules. At the same time the Rules were published, Government also issued a memorandum explanatory of the Rules. It wa:s therein stated that the term 'quasipermanent' service had been evolved with the object of attaching certain benefits to such service and with regard to r. 4(a) the memorandum stated-\"Under Rule 4(a) a Government servant has to be declared as quasi-permanent in respect of a particular post; sudh a post may be an isolated one or it may be a post in a cadre consisting of several posts. In ca'Se where a cadre is split up into several grades it may belong to one such grade within the cadre. A Government servant who is declared as quasi-permanent in respect of a particular post may be shifted from one post to another within the cadre or grade conoerned due to reduction in post or other causes. Such shifting d'oes not affect\n\nliis rights.\" As to r. 6(1) the memorandum gave the following explanation: This rule relates to the security of tenure of a quasi-permanent Government servant. It should be noted that except in the event of :educti.on in the number of posts in the cadre or grade concerned, the termination of service of a quasi-permanent Government servant will have to be\n\nS.C.R SUPRTlVJE COUR'l' REPORTS 1311\n\nmade in the same maner as the case of permanent Government servant. For example, if the services are to be terminated on grounds of indiscipline or inefficiency, it will be necessary to institute formal proceedings against him. He has also got a superior right of retention in service over that of purely temporary employees, in the grade in which he \"!s quasi-permanent.\n\nThe question before us is whether the impugned order of September 7, 1955, was in consonance with r. 6(1). This question has two aspects-first, the true scope and effect of\n\ncl. (ii) and second, the effect of the proviso thereto.\n\nWe take up first cl. (ii). Was there a reduction in the present case within the meaning of cl. (ii)? We think that the answer must be in the affirmative. In the order dated December 14, 1953, which was an order in favour of the appellant, it was clearly stated that in August 1952, all the posts of Public Relations Officers, except the one in the External Services Division, were held in abeyance. In the impugned order of September 7, 1955, it was stated that in 1952 all the posts of Public Relations Officers excepting one in the External Services Division were held in abeyance alS a measure of economy and the only post that survived the economy drive was assigned. to a permanent incumbent. In his representation dated July 10, 1953, the appeMant himself admitted tha:t as per Director General, All India Radio's memorandum dated May 21, 1953, he was informed that \"it was decided to keep the post in abeyance\". Learned counsel for the appellant has sought to draw a distinction between 'keeping aJ post in beyance' and 'reducing a post' and has suggested that the latter expression means abolishing a post permanently or temporarily whereas the former expression merely suggests not filling the post for the time being.· Words and phrases necessarily take their meaning from the context in which they aire used . .In cl. (ii) the expression used is \"reduction ....... .'. in the number of posts available for Government servants not in permanent service.\" Learned counsel for the respondent has rightly pointed out that the entire\n\n19/il\n\nK. S. Srinivasa•\n\nUnion of India\n\nS. K. DaaJ,\n\n19/iS\n\nK. 8. Srini'IJMa.n\n\nv. fl'llion of India\n\nS. K. TJasJ.\n\nSUPREME COUR1' REPORTS [tn58]\n\nclause should be read to understand what is meant by reduction, and in that context, reduction is not necessarily confined to abolition, permanent or otherwise. He has given an illustration to clarify the meaning. Assume that the permanent holder of a post goes on deputation; the post then becomes availble for temporary or quasi-permanent officers. When, however, the permanent man returns from deputation, there is a reduction in the num_ber of posts available for Government servants not in permanent service. We agree with learned counsel for the respondent that the word reduction in the context of cl. (ii) is not necessarily confined to abolition, and keeping certain posts in abeyance comes within the expression. It may be further pointed out that in the order of September 7. 1955, it was clearly stated that Government had no intention of reviving the posts of Public\n\nRelations Officers kept in abeyance since 1952; therefore, for all practial purposes the posts have been abolished.\n\nWe do not think that there is any charm in the word 'certifies' which occurs in cl. \"(ii). It is clear that the appellant was informed, as far back as May, 1953, by a memorandum from the appointing authority that it was decided to keep the post (which the appellant held) in abe)lance.\n\nThere is nothing in the clause which prevents the appointing authority from certifying by means of a memorandum instead of by a mere formal order.\n\nNow, we come to the far more imporllant question of the effect of the proviso to cl. (ii\\. The crucial point in that connection is whether the post of Assistant Station Director, to which the appellant was appointed in a purely temporary caipacity on September 13, 1952, was a post within the same grade or cadre as the posts of Public Relations Officer. If it is in the same grade or within the same cadre, the appellant will retain his quasi-permanent status and the shifting, to use the words of the explanatory memorandum quoted earlier, will not affect his rights. This point has caused us considerable anxiey, and on a very careful consideration we\n\nhav~ reluctantly but ineluctably come to the conclusion that\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUHT R~PORTS\n\nthe post of Assistant Station Director is not in the same grade or oadre as the posts of Public Relations Officers.\n\nOn this point it is necessry to refer to some earlier history regarding the reorganisatibn of the All India Radio in 1944. The reorganisation, as enunciated in letter No. K-\n\n404 /2397 dated December 15/28, 1944 from the Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, was in three parts : (I) revision of the scales of pay of certain existing posts, (2) creation of some additional posts; and\n\n(3) creation of certain new categories of posts.\n\nThe posts of Liaison Officer and Listeners' Research Officer came within the third category and nine posts were created under each head. The posts of Assistant Station Directors came within the first two categories. In 1950 Government made necessary declaration in respect of the cadres 'on the programme side of the All India Radib in their letter No. 17(83) I 49-BI dated March 20, 1950. The cadres so constituted included that of Assistant Station Directors : that cadre consisted of the following posts : (a) Assistant Station Directbrs;\n\n(b) Instructor (Programmes); (c) Assistant Director of Programmes; (d) :j:., istener Research Officer; (e) Officer on Special Duty (Kashmir); and (f) Officer Special Duty (Hyderabad)- the last two being temporary. The Public Relations Officers were not put in the cadre of Assistant Station Directbrs.\n\nExactly, the same position is envisaged in paragraph 129 of Chapter IV, Section I, of the A.LR. Manual, Vol. I. Under Fundamental Rule 9(3l)(c) a \"post is said to be on the same time-scale as another post on a time-sdale if the two timescales are identical and the posts fall within a cadre, or clas in a cadre, such cadre or class having been created in order to fill all posts involving duties of approximately the same ch.aracter or degree of responsibility, in a service or establishment or group of establishments\". It is worthy of note that two conditions must be fulfilled for the application of Fundamental Rule 9(3l)(c) : one is that the two time-scales must be identical a'nd the other is that the two posts must fall in the same cadre or class in a cadre. Paragraph 129 referred tb above states in terms that only four categories of-posts men-\n\nJ!/.j8\n\nK. S. f:lrinivruan\n\nUnion of Jndi\"\n\n8. K. n,,. .T.\n\nK. S. Sri11iva., an\n\nUnion of India\n\nS. ](, Das .T.\n\n1:114 SUI>HEME COUHT Hl~POHTS [1958]\n\ntioned therein fall within the cadre of As., istant Station Directors, and those categories do not include Public Relations Officers. Learned Counsel for the appellant has referred us to Appendix I of the A.I.R. Manual, Vol. II, which gives the scales of pay and classification of posts in the All India Radio. He has pointed out that in that appendix the posts of Assistant Station Directors (no. 77), Listener Research Officer\n\n(no. 78) and Public Relations Officer <ito. 79) all come within Central Services, Class 11. and bear the same scale of pay and they also belong to the Programme side. We have already pointed out that the same scale of pay is not the only test; nor does the fact that all the above mentioned posts belong to Class II determine the question whether they belong to the same grade or cadre. We have referred to the constitution of the cadre of Assistant Station Directors in 1950, which shows clearly enough that Public Relations Officers do not belong to that cadre. Many anomalous results will follow if the scale of pay or classification of the service, wen> taken to be the sole test for determining whether the posts belong to the same grade or cadre. The appendix referred to by !eared counsel for the appellant shows that the post of Assistant Director of Monitoring Services bears the same scale of pay and also belongs to Class II; yet it is not suggested that that post has any cadre or grade affinity with the posts of Assistant Station Directors. A chemist (no. 106) and an A'8istant Engineer (no. 105) have the same scales of pay and both belong to Class II; but they do not belong to the same grade or cadre; otherwise a strange result will follow in that a chemist holding a quasi-permanent status will be entitled to be appointed as an Engineer. on the reduction of the chemist's post.\n\nOn behalf bf the appellant it has been next argued that the order dated December J 4; I 95J. contains a olear admission to the effect that the post of Public Relations Officer\n\nbelongs to the same grade as Assistant Station Director, and the order shows that it was made after unofficial consultation\n\nwith the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. It is contended that this ad'mission should be accepted as an admission of falct and held binding on the respondent, particularly when the respondent has not produced the particular order by which a separte cadre, if any, of Public Relations Officers might have been created, in order to disprove the correctness of the admission.\n\nWe a.re unable tO accept this argument. An admission is not conclusive proof of the matter admitted, though it may in certain circumstances operate as an estoppel. It is not suggested that a question of estoppel arises in this case (a point which we shall again advert tb); at best, it may be said that the respondent having once admitted that the post of Public Relations Officer belonged to the same grade, the admission casts upon the respondent the burden of proving .that what was dt; liberately asserted on December 14, 1953, is not a fact.\n\nIt is unfortunate that this case was summarily dismissed in the High Court and the respondent was not called upon to make an affidavit and file the necessary documents at that stage. We have now a copy of the letter dated December 15/28, 1944 by which the nine new posts of liaison officer Oater designated as Public Relations Officer) were created and the letr dated March 20, 1950, by which the cadre of Assistant Station Directors was deolared. These letters we have already rekrred to, and they leave little room for doubt in the matter: they show clearly enough that the posts of Public Relations Officers do not belong to the same grade or cadre as the posts of Assistant Station Directors. As. a matter of fact, the respondent said so in the memorandum of June 9, 1953, though later, on December 14, 1953, a different statement was made. It has been submitted before us that even in the impugned order of September 7, 1955, the respondent does not say that a mistake was made; the respondent merely states that the appellant was irregulaJrly transferred as Assistant Station Director and was irregularly allowed. to carry a quasi-permanent status to the new post. We think\n\nK. R. Sriniva.sn.n\n\nv. [l nion of India\n\nS. K. Das .T.\n\nK. R. Sriniva.aan\n\nUnio-n of India\n\n8. K. V....T.\n\nthat the impugned order of September 7, 1955, must be read as a whole, and so read, it shows that Government had earlier made mistake in thinking that the posts of Public Relations Officers belonged to the same grade or cadre as the posts of Assistant Station Direcltors, and the mistake was rectified when the Union Public Service Commission pointed it out.\n\nWe shall now consider the further question if the order dated December 14. 1953, can be read a's a separate or independent declaration in favour of the appellant in respect of the post of an Assistant Station Director, under rr. 3 and 4(a) of the Temporary Service Rules. We shall consider this question from four points of view : (I) whether on the terms of the order itself, it can be read as an independent declaration under the relevant rules; ('.~) whether the relevant authority intended the order as an independent declaration under rr. 3 and 4(a) and if the parties thereto understood the order\n\nin that sense; (3) if the order is so read, whether consultation with the Public Service Commission was necessary under r. 4(b); and (4) whether any estoppel arises out of the order.\n\nIt seems to us that the order itself is very clear and if it is contrasted with the earlier order dated May 23, 1952 (by which a declaration was indeed made in favour of the appellant under rr. 3 and 4 of the Temporary Service Rules in respect of the post of Public Relations Officer), it is at once clear that the order dated December lfl, 1953, is not a declaration under rr. 3 and 4 of the said rules. What does the order state in terms? Firstly, it states that the appellant was appointed in a quasi-permanent capacity to the post of Public Relations Officer; secondly, it states that all the posts of Public Relations Officer are held in abeyance except.one; thirdly, it states that as the post of Public Relations Officer belonged to the same grade as Assistant Station Director carrying identical scales of pay, the appellant was appointed as Assistant Station Director in September 1952; and fourthly, it states that under the instructions contained in a particular office memorandum issued from the Ministry of Home Affairs the appellant was entitled to carry the qumi-permanent status of\n\nS.C.H.\n\nSUPHEME COUH'l' REPORTS\n\n.1-:U7\n\nhis former post of Public Rel<itions Officer while holding the post of AssistanrStation Director. The order means what it in terms states and must operate according to its tenor; and if the order is read as a whole, without stralining or perverting the language, it seems dear that it is not a declaration under rr. 3 and 4 of the Temporary Service Rules. It merely gives effect to the instructions contained in the Home Office memorandum referred to therein and states that the appellant will carry with him his quasi-permanent status of the former post\n\nwhile holding the post of Assistant Station Director. It is obvious that there cannot be declaration of quasi-permanent status in two posts of different grarles or different cadres simultaneously and at the same time. The order dated December 14, 1953, makes it abuntantly clear t\\lat the appellant retained his quasi-permanent status in the former post of Public Relations Officer and on the mistaken view that the post of Public Relations Officer belonged to the same grade as Assistant Station Director, he was allowed to carry the same status while holding the new post. This is sufficiently borne out by a reference to the Home Office memorandum No. 54/ 136/51 N.G.S. dated April 24, 1952, a copy of which has been placed before us. That memorandum said, \"The undersigned is directed to say that a question has been raised whether a quasi-permanent Government servant on transfer from one office to another, should be allowed to retain a lien\n\non the post to which he has been appointed in a quasipermanent capacity. A reference in this connection is invited to sub-paragraph (c) of the Explanatory Memorandum of Rule 2 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, under which a government servant who is declared as quasi-permanent in respect of ai particular post can be shifted from one post to another within the cadre or grade concerned due to reduction or other causes without his rights being affected. In other words, .if a quasi-permanent employee is transferre<l from one office to another . within the same grade, he will carry with him his quasi-permanent status.\" The order dated December 14, 1953, purported to give effect\n\nK. S. Stinh:al!t1n\n\nUnum of India\n\nS. K . .lirr,, J.\n\n1YJ8\n\nK. 8. Sn'.nitYMtUt ...\n\nUnirm of India\n\nS. K. Dru J.\n\n1318 SUPHElVIE COUHT HEPORTS [1958j\n\nto the decision embodied in the aforesaid memorandum, and was in no sense an independent de.claration under rr. 3 and 4 of the Ter.1porary Service Rules. If it were an independent declaration in respect of a different and new post, a reference\n\nt<J the office memorandum was wholly unnecessary; it was equally unnecessary to recite that the appellant held a quasipermanent status in his former post and that the former post belonged to the same grade as the new post and, therefore, he carried his former status to the latter post. In the order itself there is no reference to rr. 3 and 4 a:nd it is in sharp contrast to the order dated May 23, 1952, which was indeed a declaration under the S3Jid rules. To hold that the order dated December 14. 1953, is an independent declaration under rr. 3 and 4 is to run counter to the entire tenor of the doooment.\n\nIt is worthy of note that under r. 4(a), a declaration issued under r. 3 shall specify the particular post or particular grade of posts within a cadre in respect of which it is issued and the date from which it is to take effect. The order dated December 14, 1953, does not state that the appellant is declared to hold a quasi-permanent status with regard to the post of Assistant Station Director; M the contrary, it states that he carrie~ with him the quasi-permanent status of his former post. H the order dated December 14, 1953, were an independent declaration in respect of the post of Assistant Station Director. it would have specified that post and also the date with effect from which the order was to take effect in regard to that post. We are therefore satisfied that the order dated December 14, 1953 cannot, on its terms. be treated as a declaration under rr. 3 and 4 of the Temporary Service Rules.\n\nIt may be stated here that learned counsel for the appellant did not urge that the order dated December 14, 1953, was an independent declaration under rr. 3 and 4 or that his client understood the order in that sense. It is also evident from the various documents in the record that the order was never intended to be a declaration under rr. 3 and 4 of the Temporary Service Rules; and the appellant himself took the\n\norder as merely giving effect to the office memorandum cited therein, the main plank of the appellant's case being that the post of Assistant Station Director is in the same grade as the post of Public Relations Officer. The appellant was appointed to officiate as Assistant Station Director in a purely temporary capacity until further orders on September 13, 1952.\n\nEven before that date the appellant was asked to apply for the post of an Assistant Station Director through the Public Service Commission. On June 9, 1953, long after the appellant had been appointed to officiate as Asistant Station Director, he was told! that he could not claim any protection in the post of Assistant Station Director on account of his quasi-permanent status as Public Relations Officer. Even in the letter which the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting wrote to the Public Serv!ce Commission on June 22, 1954, it was stated : \"The Commission were not consulted at the time of shifting of quasi-permanent status of Shri Srinivasan from the grade of Public Relations Officer to that of Assistant Station Director in view of the provision of sub-para. (c) of the Explanatory Memorandum of Rule 2 of the Central Civil Service (Temporary Service) Rules which states that a Government servant who is declared as quasi-permanent in respect of a particular post may be shifted from one post to another within the cadre or grade concerned due to reduction in the number of posts or other causes. Such shifting does not affect his rights. As the posts of Assistant Station Director and Public Relations Offioer cc; rry the same grade of pay, consultation with the Commission in this case was not considered necessary\". This letter makes it abundantly dear that the appropriate authority never intended the order dated December 14, 1953 to be .a declaraition under rr. 3 and 4 of the Temporaqr Service Rules.\n\nEven the appellant did not take the order in that sense.\n\nIn all his representations, theappellant's plea was that the post of Public Relations Officer in which he held a quasipermanent status was in the same grade as that of Assistant Station Director and therefore he carried his status in the former post to his new post. He never pleaded anywhere\n\nf.?!j8\n\n.A .. S. •'-'rin.itWJan\n\nUn.ion of India\n\nS. K. D1.,, J.\n\n19)~\n\n]\\. S. 8rinirn,1ci.n\n\nVo l!1timt n.f lnclia.\n\nSUPREME CUUHT REPOHTS ll!)58].\n\nthat the order dated December 14, 1953, was an independent declaration in respect of the post of Assistant Station Director. We refer first to para. 17 of the appellant's writ petition to the Punjab High Court. In that paragnph the appellant s>iid: \"That after four months' careful consideration and discussion between the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Home Ministry and the Union Public Service Commission, Government issued an order dated 14-12-'53 declaring that the petitioner will carry quasi-permanent status in his new post of Assistant Station Director as per rules relating to the transfer of quasi-permanent officers,\" In paragraph 30 the appellant again stated that the post of Assistant Station Director and Public Relations Officer were constituted and recognised to be in the same grade and' under r. 2(c) of the Temporary Service Rules the shifting from one post to another in the same grade did not affect his status; in other words, the appellant also understood the order dated December 14, l953, not as an independent order declaring his quasi-permanent status in the post of Assistant Station Director. but merely as giving effect to r. 2(c) of the Temporary Service Rules by reason of the fact, which now appears to be incorrect. that the post of Public Relations Officer was in the same grade as that of Assistant Station Director. Even in his statement of the case, the appellant stated-\"It may. be emphasised that the Government in their order dated J 4-l 2-'53 reiterated the appellant's quasi-permanent. status in the post of Assistant Station Director, not on the basis of the appellant's reprsentation but on the authority of the Home Ministry's order No. 54/136/51-NGS, dated 24-4-'52 relating to the' lien of quasi-permanent employees\".\n\nThe reference to the Home Ministry's office memorandum shows how the appellant understood the order dated December 14, 1953.\n\nRule 4(b) of the Temporary Service Rules states that when recruitment to a specified post is required to he made in consultation with the Public Service Commission, no declaration under rr. 3 and 4(a) shall be issued except after\n\nconsultation with the Commission. In the view which we have taken of the order dated December 14. 1953, it is not really necessary to decide in the present case whether the provisions of r. 4(b) are merely directory or manda:tory. It is sufficient to state that the Public Service Commission was not consulted before the order dated December 14, 1953, was issued, and the appointing authority did not intend the order as a declarntion under rr. 3 and 4(a). In State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava(') it has been held that the provisions of Art. 320(3)(c) of the Constitution. as respedts consultation of the Public Service Commission on all disciplinary matters affecting a person serving the Government of India or a State\n\nGovernment, are not mandatory in spite of the use of the word 'shall' therein. That decision is founded on the following grounds : (I) the proviso to Art. 320 itself indicates that in certain cases or classes of cases the Commission need not be consulted; (2) the requirement of consulting the Commission does not extend to making the advice of the Commission binding on Government as respects disciplinary matters; and\n\n(3) on a proper construction of the Article, it does not confer any right or privilege on an individual public servant. We may point out that none of these grounds have any application so far as r. 4(b) of the Temporary Service Rules is concerned. Article 320 may not be mandatory as against the President; but a subordinate appointing authority who has to make a declaration under the rules cannot ignore or abrogate the very rules under which he has to make the declaration. Quasi-permanent status is a creature of the rules, and .r. 4(b) requires that no declaration under r. 3 shall be made except after consultation with the Public Service Commission\n\n(when recruitment to a specified post is required to be made in consultation with the Public Servic:e Commission).\n\nAn officer cannot claim th'e benefit of r. 3 and ignore at the. same time the condition laid down in r. 4(b); in other words, he cannot claim the benefit of a part of the rules and refuse to be bound by the conditions of the other part. (') [1958] S.C.R. 5.'t.'l\n\nL/S4SCI-9\n\nJ9; l8\n\nK. 1't. 8n'nf1a.an\n\nU11.ion nj lmlia\n\n8. K. Das J.\n\nK.8. Srinivasan\n\nUnion of India\n\n8.K.Da.J.\n\nNow. as to estoppcl : in our view .. the appellant was not misled in any way as to his quasi-permanent status-a! status which he undoubtedly held in the post of Public Relations Officer; the mistake that was made was in thinking that the post of Assisla!nt Station pirector was in the same grade as that of Public Relations -Officer and then giving effect to the Home office memorandum, referred to previously, on the basis of that mistake. We do not think that any question of estoppel really arises, and in fairness to learned counsel for the appellant it must be stated that he has not founded the case on estoppel.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellant has contested the correctness of the opinion of the Union Public Service Commission and has suggested that the Commission had indulged in an officious opinion, because under the Union Public Service Commission (Consultation) Regulations. it was not necessary to consult the Commission. Our attention has been drawn to Regulation 3, which reads as follows so far as it is relevant for our purpose-\n\n\"'3. Jt shall not be necessary to consult the Commission in regard to the selection for appointment-\n\n(a) to a Central Service, Class I, of any Officer in .the Armed Forces of the Union or any officer who is already a member of an All India Service_. Central Service. Class I, a Railway Service, Class I.\n\n(b) to a Central Servioe. Class II, of any officer from another Service. Class I or from a Central Service, Class JI or of any officer in the Armed Forces of the Union or of a Railway Service, Class JI;\n\nNote: -·-In this regulation. the term 'officer\" does not include a person in 'temporary employment'.\"\n\nThe correspbndence with the Union Public Service Commission has now been. placed before us. That correspondence shows that the Union Public Service Commission took the view that Regulation 3 did not apply to an officer whb was in 'temporary employment' in the sense in which that expression\n\nwas used when the Regulations were made, and \"quasipermanent servant\" a.s defined in the Temporary Service Rules also meant temporary service, but subject to certain benefits in the matter of leave etc., and certain safeguards in the matter of termination of service.\n\nWhether the Union Public Service Commission is right in this view or not we are not called upon to decide, particularly when the Union Public Service Commission is not before us. It is enough for us to hold that the post of Assistant Station Director is not a pbst in the same grade or cadre as that of the Public Relat; ons Officer. That being the position, the appellant had no quasi-permanent status in the post of Assistant Station Director and his service was liable to be terminated when there was a reduction in the number of posts of Public Relations Officers within the meaning of cl. (ii); nor was he enHtled\n\nto the benefit of the proviso to cl. (ii) so far. as the post of Assistant Station Director was concerned.\n\nFor the reasons given above, we hold that there has been no violation of the constitutional guarantee nder Art. 311(2) in the case of the appellant. The appeal must, therefore, be dismissed.\n\nAs to the petition under Art. 32 pf the Constitution, we do not think that there has been any .such discrimination against the appellant as is contemplated by Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It is true that others who did not hold a quaBi-permanent status were subsequently appointe4 as Assistant Station Director through selection by the Union Public Service Commission. We can only say that it is unfortunate that the appellant was not so selected; but that does not involve. the breach of a•ny fundamental right.\n\nIn conclusion we wish to say that apart from any con, sideration of mere legal right, this is a hard case. The appellant was in service for about nine years without any blemish and his service was terminated on the reduction of certain\n\nposts~ he was told-wrongly it now appears-that he had a quasi-permanent status in the post of Assistant Station Director. The appellant states that the Union Public Service Com-\n\nL/S4SCI-9(a)\n\nK.R. lirini11n.8<1n\n\nUnion <1 India\n\nR.K. Da•.J.\n\nK. 8. 8ri1livasan\n\nUnion of Jmli\"\n\nS.K.DasJ.\n\nBMe J,\n\ni:l24\n\nSUPRE~LE COURT REPORTS [1958]\n\nmission did not consider his suitability for the post of Assistant Station Director, because he claimed quasi-permanent status in that post. The correspondence with the Union Public Service Commission shows that the appellant's case was not considered' from the promotion quota of 20 per cent because he held a post which was not (to use an expression of the Commission) 'in the field for promotion'. If the appellant is right in his statement that he was not considered for direct recruitment because he claimed quasi-permanent status, then obviously there is an apparent injustice; the appellant is then deprived of consideration of his clim both from the promotion and direct quotas. We invite the attention of the authorities concerned to this aspect of the case and hope that they will consider the appellant's case sympathetically and give him proper relief.\n\nWith these observations, we dismiss the appeal and the petition, but in the circumstances there will be no order for costs.\n\nBosE J .-With great respect I disagree.\n\nThe ppellant's services as Public Relations Officer, All India Radio, were terminated because of the reduction in that post. There was no other post of equal status in that grade or cadre, so I agree that he had no right to any continuance of employment.\n\nBut he was appointed to officiate as Assistant Station Director in a purely temporary capacity \"until further orders\", on September 13, 1952. (Order No. 1 (101)-51/52).\n\nLater, on December 14, 1953, further orders were passed by the same authority (Order No. (113)-51/52). These orders confirm'ed the order appointing the appellant Assistant Station Director and concluded-\n\n\"Under the provision contained in the Ministry of Home Affairs Office Memorandum No. 54/136/51-NGS, dated the 24th April, 1952, Shri Srinivasan will carry with him the quasi-permanent status of his former post of Public Relations Officer while holding the post of Assistant Station\n\nDirector.\"\n\nThis order is a \"further order\" and, in my judgment, it clearly and unequivocally makes him \"quasi-permanent\" in the new post.\n\nIt is true that this was done under a mistake which was discovered at a Ia.ier date but the mistake is that of Government and others cannot be made to suffer because of the unilateral mistake of Government. I had occasion to observe, while delivering the judgment of the Court in The Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji('), that-\n\n\"Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order' of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do\" (and I add in this case, \"what he subsequently discovered\"). \"Public orders made by public authorities arc~ meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself\".\n\nThe principle underlying those observations applies with equal force here.\n\nHere is a man who was in no way at fault. He had served faithfully in various capacities from May 1, 1946.\n\nHis services were terminated on September 3, 1952, with effect from October 6, 1952. That was not his fault nor wa:s it the fault of Government. It was just the fortunes of war.\n\nThe post was \"reduced\" and there was no more room for him. No one can quarrel with that.\n\nBut before the termina.tion took effect he was continued in service in another post on September 13, 1952, in a purely temporary capacity \"until further orders''. There was consequently no break and he was still in service on December 14, 1953, when he was told that he was quasi-permanent in the post of Assistant Station Director.\n\nHe accepted this position and acted on it and continued to serve in it for nearly two years. That, naturally enough.\n\n, ( 1) [1952] S.C.R. 135, 140.\n\nK. S. SrinifJa8a11\n\nUni01> of India\n\nB08eJ.\n\n/9!j8\n\nK • .'\\,'. Srt'11ivusaii\n\nU11iun (4 /1ulia\n\nSUPREME COUHT REPORTS [1958]\n\nhas lessened his chances of seeking other employment because after a man reaches a certain age it becomes increasingly difficult to find new employment. I do not say this was Government's fault, for no one can be blamed for not knowing where they arc in this wilderness of rules and regulations and coined words and phrases with highly technical and artificial meanings; and I think Government did all they could to assuage the hardships of an unfortunate situation.\n\nBut equally. it was not the appellant's fault and in a case like this, a broad equity requires that the one least at fault should not be made to suffer.\n\nThe old technically rigid conceptions of contra.ct and equity have given place in modern times to a juster appreciation of justice, and the fusion of law and equity in one jurisdiction has resulted in the emergence of a new equity in England more suited to modern ideas of human needs and human values. Lord Denning has cited instance after instance in his book \"The Changing Law\" to show how this has come about and how it is still in the process of formation, flexible and fluid with the drive behind to do real justice between man and man, and man and the State, ra.ther than to continue to apply a set of ancient hide-bound technicalities forged and fashioned in a wholly different world with a different conscience and very different evaluations of human dignity and human rights. At pp. 54 and 55 Lord Denning. sums up this new orientation in legal thinking thus:\n\n\"In coming to those decisions, the Courts expressly applied a. doctrine of equity which says a court of equity will not allow a person to enforce his strict legal rights when it would be inequitable to allow him to do so.\n\nThis doctrine warrants the proposition that the courts will not allow a. person to go back on a promise which was intended to be binding, intended to be acted on, and has in fact been acted on.\"\n\n1 am not advocating sudden and wild departure from doctrines and precedents that have been finally settled but\n\nI do contend that we, the highest Court in the land giving 1958 final form and shape to the laws of this country, should ad- 8 8 _ . K\" . nnit7fl&Jn minister them with the same breadth of vision and underv. standing of the needs of the times as do the Courts in Union of India England. The underlying principles of justice have not Bose J. cha.nged but the complex pattern of life that is never static requires a fresher outlook and a timely and vigorous moulding of old principles to suit new conditions and ideas and ideals. It is true that the Courts do not legislate but it is not true that they do not mould and make the law in their processes of interpretation.\n\nNow, what was the position here when looked at broadly and fairly as an upright and just juryman of plain commonsense and understanding would do? Here was a man with several years of service and with no blemish on his conduct and reputation. He was about to lose his job. Government felt that that was hard and sought ways and means to right a wrong-not wrong in the legal sense, for no one was at fault, but wrong in the deeper understanding of men who fook. with sympathy at the lot of those who have to suffer for no fault of theirs. Government found, or thought they found, that they could put him in' another post and they actually did so. They found that in his old post he had certain protections and they wanted and intended that he should continue to have them. Under r. 3 of the Temporary Service Rules they found that they could give him those protections in a very simple way, namely, by issuing a declaration that he was quasi-permanent in bis new post. He was fully eligible for it. He had been in continuous Government service for more than three years. The appointing authority was satisfied of his qualifications, work and character for employment in a quasi-permanent capacity. The tatters of Government to the Union Public Service Commission bear that out, quite apart from the orders of September 13, 1952, and December 14, 1953, which would not have been made if Government had not considered him a fit and proper person. How can it be contended that Government did not in-\n\n19/iS\n\nK. 8, 8rittii:a.'1an.\n\nUniun of lmliu\n\nlJO$e J.\n\nSUPRJ<;\"JE COURT REPOBTS [1958]\n\ntend him to have a quasi-permanent position in his new post simply because they said that they wanted him to have the same protections as he had before? It is not the mere form of the words that matters but the meaning that they were intended to convey and do convey.\n\nI am not concerned at this stage with whether Government was mistaken in thinking that it could confer this status on him but with what they intended to do as a fact and what they actually did do.\n\nThey said that he \"will carry with him the quasi-perma- nent status of his former post of Public Relations Officer while holding the post of Assistant Station Director.\" What else can this mean?- especially when coupled with their previous conduct showing their anxiety to do the just and right thing by this unfortunate man, except that beca.use he was protected before he will continue to be protected in the same way. With the deepest respect I consider it ultra technical and wrong to construe this as conditional on Government haVing the power. The point at this stage is not whether Government had the right and the power but what they intended; and about that I have no doubt whatever. They wanted, and intended, and were straining every nerve, to do the right and just thing by him and to give him the same status as he had before, in the matter of pay, in the matter of s.; n.ice and in the protections that he had in his other post.\n\nThe interpretations that' Government put upon their order at a later date are not relevant to coqstrue it but it is a -matter of satisfaction that Government themselves viewed their action in the same light as I am doing .now. In their reply to the Public Service Commission dated June 22, 1954; Government said-\n\n\"The Commission were not consulted at the time of shifting of quasi; permanent status of Shri Srinivasan from the grade of Public Relations Officer to that of Assistant s v \" tatron rrector ....... ,,. . . . . ' ' ' ·; 1.it is clear to me that Government intended, not merely to move him .from one .post to the other, but als6 to shift the'\n\n. status and that can mean nothing less than that they intended him to have this status in the new post.\n\nI turn next to the powers of Government. I agree that if they had no power their action would be of no avail however well they may have meant. But r. 4(a) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, gives them that power. It says that :\n\nI \"A declaration issued under rule 3 shall specify the particular post.. ............. in respect of which it is issued.\" It does not require the declaration to be couched in any particular form of words or in the shape of a magic incanta- tion. All that it requires is a simple declaration and that declaration is to be found in the order of December 14, 1953.\n\n The only question then is. whether r. 4(b) renders the declaration null and void because the Public Service Commission was not consulted. The rule runs-\n\n\"Where recruitment to a specified post is required to be made in consultation with the .Federal Public' Service Commission, no such declaration shall be issued except after consultation with the Commission,\" ·\n\nThe essence of the prohibition lies in the words underlined :\n\n\"Is required to be made.\" Just what do these words mean?\n\nNow I have no doubt that in the ordinary way these words should be construed to mean what they say. But so, I would have thought at first blush, do the words in Art. 320(3) of the Constitution. They are equally emphatic. They are equally imperative. But this Court held in the $tate of\n\nU:P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava('), after a careful examination of the whole position, that they do not mean what they seem to say and. that they are directive only and not mandatory. ·\n\nNor is this Court alone in so thinking.\n\nThe Federal Court construed a similar provision in s. 256 of the Government of India Act, 1935, in the same way : (Biswanath Khemka v. The King Emperor)('); and so did the Privy Council in a Cai1adian case in Montreal Street Railway Com-\n\n(') [1958] S.C.R. 533.\n\n(') [1945] F.C.R. 99.\n\n. 1958\n\nK. S. 'Srinivasan\n\nUnion of India\n\nBose J.\n\nK. S. S•iniva.mn\n\nUnion vf India\n\nBoae J.\n\npany v. Normandin('). Their Lordships said at page 175 that when a statute prescribes a, formality for the performance of a public duty, the formality is to be regarded as directory only if to hold it as mandatory would. cause serious general inconvenience or inju, tice. Will it not cause injustice here?\n\nWhy should we take a narrower view of a mere set of rules than this Court and the Federal Court and the Privy Council have taken of the Cons{itution and the Act of a Legislature and even of a supreme Parliament?\n\nWhy should we give , greater sanctity and more binding force to rules and regulations than to our own Constitution? Why should be hesitate to do justice with firmness and vigour?\n\nIf we apply the same principles here, then the words \"required to be made\" in r. 4(b) lose their sting and the way is free and open for. us to do that justice for which the Courts exist.\n\nHere is Government straining to temper justice with mercy and we, the Courts, are out Shylocking Shylock in demanding a pound of flesh, and why? because \"t'is writ in the bond.\" I will have none of it. Ali I can see is a man who has been wronged and I can see a plain way out. I would take it.\n\nI am not quarrelling with the interpretation which the Public Service Commission has placed upon these rules. I have no doubt that they should be observed, and are meant to be observed; and I have equally rio doubt \"that there are constitutional sanctions which can be applied if they are flouted. But the sanction is political and not judicial and an act done in contravention of them cannot be challenged in a Court of Law. It is legally valid. Also, the fact that Government would not have acted in this way if they had realised that they were under a directive duty of the Constitution to consult the Union Public Service Commission first cannot alter the character of their act or affect its legal consequences. They had the power and they exercised it, conse> quently, their act became binding despite their mistake. That\n\nis how I would interpret the law and administer justice.\n\n(') [1917) A.C. 170\n\nI would allow the appeal and the petition with costs.\n\nBY COURT: The appeal and the petition are dismissed.\n\nThere will be no order as to costs.\n\nAppeal and Petition di.imissed.\n\nKASHINATH SANKARAPPA WANI v.\n\nNEW AKOT COTTON GINNING & PRESSING CO., LTD.\n\n(BHAGWkTI, J. L. KAPUR and GAJENoRAGADKAR JJ.)\n\nLimitation-Suit on deposit receipt-Acknowledgment of iiability-EUidence-Balance sheet obtained from Registrar of Companies-Admissibility-Presumption. of awthenticitu andi corr.ectness-Commercial Documents Evidence Act (XXX of 1939), s. 3(b).\n\nThe appellant advanced various sums of money to the respondent, in lieu of which the respondent passed a deposit receipt for 12 months from August 1, 1939 to July 31, 1940. On June 16, 1944 the appellant filed a suit to recover the amount with interest on the allegation that the amount became due on May 17, 1941 when the demand for the amount was made and limitation for the suit expired on May 17. 1944 and the suit was filed on the reopening day of the Court thE>reafter.\n\nThe appellant also relied upon the acknowledgments of his debt by the i:espondent in the resolution passed by the Board of Directors on May 20, 1941 and in the balance sheet of the respondent for the year 1940-41 dated October 10, 1941:\n\nHeld, that the suit was barred by limitation as the monies due under the deposit receipt became payable on July :n, 1941 and as no 'agreement had been proved th<it the monies due under the deposit receipt were re-payable on demand.\n\nHeld further, that limitation was not saved by tile alleged. acknowledgments.\n\nThe resolution Qf the Board of Directors merely proposed a settlement of a claim of the appellant, which, if accepted by the appe}lant, was to be placed before a general meeting of the share-holders. The resolution onfy referred to a past liability of the respondent to the appellant and it could not be construed\n\n19ii8\n\nK. IS. Srinii-a.san\n\nUiii011. of India\n\nBu•e J,\n\nFebruary 18.", "total_entities": 180, "entities": [{"text": "K. S. SRINIVASAN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 49, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. R. Sriniva.sn.n", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 51, "end_char": 65, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Un.ion of India", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 82, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. K. SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 115, "end_char": 127, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. K. SARKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 132, "end_char": 148, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 459, "end_char": 480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AU India Radio", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 629, "end_char": 643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant held the post of a Public Relations Officer, AU India Radio, and was declared to be in quasi-permanent Service under r. 3."}}, {"text": "Union Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1063, "end_char": 1094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the objection of the Union Public Service Commission, however, the service of the appellant was terminated and he was appointed to a temporary past of Assistant Information Officer ."}}, {"text": "Art. 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1403, "end_char": 1414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1814, "end_char": 1817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended on behalf of the respondent that the order permitting the appellant to carry his quasi-permanent status to his new post having been made under a misapprehension that the post of Assistant Station Director belonged to the same grade as that of the Public Relations Officer, his service was terminable under the relevant Service Rules:\n\nHel'd (per Das, C. J., Venkatarama Aiyar, S. K. Das and A. K. Sarkar, JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1826, "end_char": 1843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended on behalf of the respondent that the order permitting the appellant to carry his quasi-permanent status to his new post having been made under a misapprehension that the post of Assistant Station Director belonged to the same grade as that of the Public Relations Officer, his service was terminable under the relevant Service Rules:\n\nHel'd (per Das, C. J., Venkatarama Aiyar, S. K. Das and A. K. Sarkar, JJ.,", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama Aiyar"}}, {"text": "S. K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1845, "end_char": 1854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended on behalf of the respondent that the order permitting the appellant to carry his quasi-permanent status to his new post having been made under a misapprehension that the post of Assistant Station Director belonged to the same grade as that of the Public Relations Officer, his service was terminable under the relevant Service Rules:\n\nHel'd (per Das, C. J., Venkatarama Aiyar, S. K. Das and A. K. Sarkar, JJ.,", "canonical_name": "S.K. Das J. Bose"}}, {"text": "A. K. Sarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1859, "end_char": 1871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended on behalf of the respondent that the order permitting the appellant to carry his quasi-permanent status to his new post having been made under a misapprehension that the post of Assistant Station Director belonged to the same grade as that of the Public Relations Officer, his service was terminable under the relevant Service Rules:\n\nHel'd (per Das, C. J., Venkatarama Aiyar, S. K. Das and A. K. Sarkar, JJ.,", "canonical_name": "A. K. SARKAR"}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1878, "end_char": 1882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose, J. Dissenting), that the post of Assistant Station Director was not a post in the same grade as that of the Public Relat:ons Officer and under the relevant Service Rules he could not carry his quasi-permanent status to the new post; as the order .", "canonical_name": "Bose"}}, {"text": "Officer and under the relevant Service Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2009, "end_char": 2053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2490, "end_char": 2498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Officer and under the relevant Service Rules", "statute": "Officer and under the relevant Service Rules"}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2633, "end_char": 2641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Officer and under the relevant Service Rules", "statute": "Officer and under the relevant Service Rules"}}, {"text": "K. B. Srinivasan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2671, "end_char": 2687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. B. Srinivasan\n\nUnion of India\n\nParshotam Lal Dhinura v. Union of India, [1958] S.C.R. 828, relied on.", "canonical_name": "K. R. Sriniva.sn.n"}}, {"text": "Quasi-permanent status is a creature Of the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3620, "end_char": 3669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Per Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3863, "end_char": 3871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Bose, J .-The order of."}}, {"text": "Federal Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4441, "end_char": 4474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Moreover, under r. 4(a) of the Rules the Government had tire power to confer such a status without any previous consultation with the Federal Public Service Commission as required by r. 4(b) of the Rules, the words 'is required to be made' occurring in that rule being only directory and not mandatory."}}, {"text": "[1945] F.C.R. 99", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4711, "end_char": 4727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "K. S. Krishnaswamy Aiyanger", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5031, "end_char": 5058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Krishnaswamy Aiyanger and C. V. L. Narayan, for 1958\n\nhe appellant."}}, {"text": "C. V. L. Narayan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5063, "end_char": 5079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Krishnaswamy Aiyanger and C. V. L. Narayan, for 1958\n\nhe appellant."}}, {"text": "R. Ganilpathy Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5139, "end_char": 5157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. s. Srinivasan v.\n\nP.A. Mehta, R. Ganilpathy Iyer and R. H.\n\nDhebar, Unioo of lndi\" for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. H.\n\nDhebar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5162, "end_char": 5175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. s. Srinivasan v.\n\nP.A. Mehta, R. Ganilpathy Iyer and R. H.\n\nDhebar, Unioo of lndi\" for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Venkarama Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5259, "end_char": 5274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Das C. J., Venkarama Aiyar, S.K. Das and Sarkar, 1JJ.,", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama Aiyar"}}, {"text": "S.K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5276, "end_char": 5284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Das C. J., Venkarama Aiyar, S.K. Das and Sarkar, 1JJ.,", "canonical_name": "S.K. Das J. Bose"}}, {"text": "Sarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5289, "end_char": 5295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Das C. J., Venkarama Aiyar, S.K. Das and Sarkar, 1JJ.,"}}, {"text": "S.K. Das J. Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5320, "end_char": 5336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by S.K. Das J. Bose J. delivered a separate judgment.", "canonical_name": "S.K. Das J. Bose"}}, {"text": "S. K. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5372, "end_char": 5381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. DAs J.-On May 1, 1946, Shri K. S. Srinivasan, s. K. Da• J. appellant before us, was appointed to a post of Liaison Officer, All India Radio, on a pay of Rs.", "canonical_name": "S.K. Das J. Bose"}}, {"text": "K. S. Srinivasan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5406, "end_char": 5422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. DAs J.-On May 1, 1946, Shri K. S. Srinivasan, s. K. Da• J. appellant before us, was appointed to a post of Liaison Officer, All India Radio, on a pay of Rs.", "canonical_name": "K. R. Sriniva.sn.n"}}, {"text": "s. K. Da•", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5424, "end_char": 5433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. DAs J.-On May 1, 1946, Shri K. S. Srinivasan, s. K. Da• J. appellant before us, was appointed to a post of Liaison Officer, All India Radio, on a pay of Rs.", "canonical_name": "S.K. Das J. Bose"}}, {"text": "Publfo Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5798, "end_char": 5823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appoint\n\nment was made on the recommendation of the then Federal Public Service Commission, and the advertisement or memorandum of information for candidates, as it is more properly called, issued by the Publfo Service Commission when calling for applications for the said post, rela:ted tt> the recruitment for nine posts of Listeners' Research Officers and nine posts of Liaison Officers, All India Radio."}}, {"text": "All India Radio", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5985, "end_char": 6000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appoint\n\nment was made on the recommendation of the then Federal Public Service Commission, and the advertisement or memorandum of information for candidates, as it is more properly called, issued by the Publfo Service Commission when calling for applications for the said post, rela:ted tt> the recruitment for nine posts of Listeners' Research Officers and nine posts of Liaison Officers, All India Radio."}}, {"text": "May 23, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7042, "end_char": 7054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 23, 1952, .the Director General, All India Radio, passed an order bearing No."}}, {"text": "K. S. Sriniva.san", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7130, "end_char": 7147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2(1)\n\nK. S. Sriniva.san\n\nUnion of India\n\n8.", "canonical_name": "K. R. Sriniva.sn.n"}}, {"text": "K.Da11J.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7168, "end_char": 7176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.Da11J.\n\nSUPRE111E COURT REPORTS [1958]\n\nA I 50 in which it was stated that whereas the appellant had been in continuous Government service for more than three years and a declaration had been issued to him in pursuance of rr."}}, {"text": "May 1, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7797, "end_char": 7808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appointment had been obtained, the appellant wa; s appointed to the Public Relations Officer's grade in a quasi-permanent capacity with effect from May 1, 1949."}}, {"text": "September 3, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7814, "end_char": 7831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 3, 1952, however, the appellant received an order from the said Director-General in which it was stated that his services would not be required after October 6, 1952."}}, {"text": "October 6, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7974, "end_char": 7989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 3, 1952, however, the appellant received an order from the said Director-General in which it was stated that his services would not be required after October 6, 1952."}}, {"text": "September 8, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8092, "end_char": 8109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was naturally taken by surprise on receipt of this order and made a representation on September 8, 1952, in which he stated that as a quasi-permanent Public Relations\n\nOfficer he had a claim to an alternative post in the same grade, so long as any post in the si.1ne grade was held by a Government servant not in permanent or quasi-permanent service."}}, {"text": "September 13, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8360, "end_char": 8378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 13, 1952, the appellant was informed by means of an order that he wais appointed to officiate as Assistant Station Director, Madras (the appellant was then working as Public Relations Officer, All India Radio, Madras) in a purely temporary capacity until further orders."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8495, "end_char": 8501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 13, 1952, the appellant was informed by means of an order that he wais appointed to officiate as Assistant Station Director, Madras (the appellant was then working as Public Relations Officer, All India Radio, Madras) in a purely temporary capacity until further orders."}}, {"text": "All India Radio, Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8563, "end_char": 8586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 13, 1952, the appellant was informed by means of an order that he wais appointed to officiate as Assistant Station Director, Madras (the appellant was then working as Public Relations Officer, All India Radio, Madras) in a purely temporary capacity until further orders."}}, {"text": "September 19, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8644, "end_char": 8662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 19, 1952, the appellant was informed that his representation dated September 8, 1952, Wll!l under consideration and a suggestion was made that in the meantime he should apply for one of the posts of Assistant Station Directors which had been advertised by the Union Public Service Commission."}}, {"text": "October 4, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8956, "end_char": 8971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then, on October 4, 1952, the appellant submitted a further representation in which he said that under the rules in question, namely the Central Civil Service '(Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, he was entitled to be retained in service in a post of the same grade and under the same appointing authority; and it was, therefore, not necessary that he should be re-selected for the post of Assistant Station .Director by the Union Public Service Commission."}}, {"text": "Union Public Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9984, "end_char": 10007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While Government was consider\n\ning the representation of the appellant, the Union Public Commission interviewed in March, 1953, candidates for the posts of Assistant Station Directors."}}, {"text": "March 26, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10141, "end_char": 10155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant appeared before the Commission on March 26, 1953."}}, {"text": "April 18, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10160, "end_char": 10174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 18, 1953, the appellant was informed that the Union Public SerVice Com mission had not selected him and the appellant was aigain informed that \"it was not possible to continue him in service.\""}}, {"text": "July 18, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11218, "end_char": 11231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To these representations the appellant received a reply to the effect that Government had decided to keep in abeyance the post of Public Relations Officer held by hiln and therefore it was not possible to retain him in that post and the appellant was given an opportunity to show cause why his service should not be termiyated on the expiry of the period of notice with effect from July 18, 1953."}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11531, "end_char": 11540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "8rinivaBan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11557, "end_char": 11567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8rinivaBan\n\nUni<m of India\n\n8.K.DOBJ.", "canonical_name": "8rinivaBan"}}, {"text": "8.K.DOBJ", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11585, "end_char": 11593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8rinivaBan\n\nUni<m of India\n\n8.K.DOBJ."}}, {"text": "K. S. Srint!lMan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11596, "end_char": 11612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Srint!lMan\n\nUnion of India\n\nConstitution.", "canonical_name": "K. R. Sriniva.sn.n"}}, {"text": "Srinivasan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11746, "end_char": 11756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This memorandum said:\n\n\"Shri Srinivasan's representation has nnw been considered by Government.", "canonical_name": "K.\n\nSrinivasan"}}, {"text": "July 10, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12145, "end_char": 12158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 10, 1953, the appellant made a fresh representation, this time to the Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, in which he repeated his former objections and contended that the proposed termination of his service was irregular, unjust and illegal."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Home Affairs", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12231, "end_char": 12255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 10, 1953, the appellant made a fresh representation, this time to the Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, in which he repeated his former objections and contended that the proposed termination of his service was irregular, unjust and illegal."}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12470, "end_char": 12478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "August 17, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12714, "end_char": 12729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 17, 1953, the appellant received a memorandum to the effect that the notice of the termination of his service as Assistant Station Director dated April 18, 1953, as subsequently amended by corrigenda dated May 12, 1953, and July 3, 1953, was withdrawn, and it also stated that the notide dated May 26, 1953, asking the appellant to show cause why his service should not be terminated was cancelled."}}, {"text": "May 12, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12927, "end_char": 12939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 17, 1953, the appellant received a memorandum to the effect that the notice of the termination of his service as Assistant Station Director dated April 18, 1953, as subsequently amended by corrigenda dated May 12, 1953, and July 3, 1953, was withdrawn, and it also stated that the notide dated May 26, 1953, asking the appellant to show cause why his service should not be terminated was cancelled."}}, {"text": "July 3, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12945, "end_char": 12957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 17, 1953, the appellant received a memorandum to the effect that the notice of the termination of his service as Assistant Station Director dated April 18, 1953, as subsequently amended by corrigenda dated May 12, 1953, and July 3, 1953, was withdrawn, and it also stated that the notide dated May 26, 1953, asking the appellant to show cause why his service should not be terminated was cancelled."}}, {"text": "May 26, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13015, "end_char": 13027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 17, 1953, the appellant received a memorandum to the effect that the notice of the termination of his service as Assistant Station Director dated April 18, 1953, as subsequently amended by corrigenda dated May 12, 1953, and July 3, 1953, was withdrawn, and it also stated that the notide dated May 26, 1953, asking the appellant to show cause why his service should not be terminated was cancelled."}}, {"text": "December 14, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13156, "end_char": 13173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was followed by an order dated December 14, 1953."}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13363, "end_char": 13372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "New Delhi, the 14th December, 1953."}}, {"text": "K.\n\nSrinivasan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13480, "end_char": 13494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2(1)-A/50, dated the 23rd May, 1952, Shri K.\n\nSrinivasan, then officiating Public\n\nRelations Officer, AU India Radio, was appointed to that post in a quasi-permanent capacity with effect from the lst May, 1949.", "canonical_name": "K.\n\nSrinivasan"}}, {"text": "22nd September, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14036, "end_char": 14056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the post of Public Relations Officer belongs to the same grade as Assistant Station Director calrrying 'identidal scales of pay Shri Srinivasan was appointed Assistant Station Director in the External Services Division with effect from the 22nd September, 1952."}}, {"text": "M. Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14367, "end_char": 14373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Lal,\n\n.Diretor-General.\""}}, {"text": "August 31, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14593, "end_char": 14608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 31, 1955, the appellant was informed by the then Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 'that Union Public Service Commission had objected to his appointment as ssistant Station Director, holding that such appointment was contrary to the regulations; the appellant was then asked that he should relinquish the post of Assistant Station Director and accept\n\na temporary post of Assistant Information Officer in the Press Information Bureau or, in the alternative, he should \"clear out\"."}}, {"text": "September 7, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15568, "end_char": 15585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 7, 1955, the appellant received the final\n\nK. S. fli1tiooa•\n\nUni<m of India\n\nS.K.DMJ."}}, {"text": "8rinivaaan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15671, "end_char": 15681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8rinivaaan\n\nUnion of India\n\nS.K.DMJ.", "canonical_name": "8rinivaBan"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15683, "end_char": 15697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8rinivaaan\n\nUnion of India\n\nS.K.DMJ.", "canonical_name": "Un.ion of India"}}, {"text": "1st May, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15972, "end_char": 15985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "450-\n\n25-500-EB-30-800) with effect from the 1st May, 1949."}}, {"text": "14th December, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16984, "end_char": 17003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 (113) SI/52 dated the 14th December, 1953."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17345, "end_char": 17364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since he has been rejected for the post of Assistant Station Director in an open selection and also since the Union Public Service Commission have not accepted his transfer, the Government of India regret that they are unable to allow him to continue in the post of Assistant Station Director."}}, {"text": "October 11, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18702, "end_char": 18718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant continued to make some more representations which were, however, rejected, arnd on October 11, 1955, an order was palssed transferring the appellant to the Press\n\nInformation Bureau as officiating Assistant Information Officer with immediate effect and the appellant was directed to hand over charge ol the post of Assistant Station Director immediately and to take over his pt>st in the Press Infonnation Bureau forthwith."}}, {"text": "September _7, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19184, "end_char": 19202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The validity of this order, which is also challenge<i in the present appea!I, necessarily depends on the validity of the earlier order dated September _7, 1955."}}, {"text": "October 19, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19298, "end_char": 19314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant refused to accept the lower post of Assistant Press Information Officer and on October 19, 1955, he made over charge under protest."}}, {"text": "November 25, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19354, "end_char": 19371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 25, 1955, the appellant filed a petition, numbered Writ Petition 209-D of 1955 in the Punjab High Court in which he prayed for the issue of a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ for quashing the orders dated September 7, 1955, a:nd October\n\n11, 1955, and asked for an order directing his rdnstatement as Assistant Station Director in the External Services Division of the All India Radio, the post which he was holding when the orders complained of were passed."}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19449, "end_char": 19466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 25, 1955, the appellant filed a petition, numbered Writ Petition 209-D of 1955 in the Punjab High Court in which he prayed for the issue of a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ for quashing the orders dated September 7, 1955, a:nd October\n\n11, 1955, and asked for an order directing his rdnstatement as Assistant Station Director in the External Services Division of the All India Radio, the post which he was holding when the orders complained of were passed."}}, {"text": "S. Srt'.nivaaan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19969, "end_char": 19984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Srt'.nivaaan\n\nUnion of India\n\nS. K. DaaJ,\n\nK. 8."}}, {"text": "S. K. DaaJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20002, "end_char": 20012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Srt'.nivaaan\n\nUnion of India\n\nS. K. DaaJ,\n\nK. 8.", "canonical_name": "S.K. Das J. Bose"}}, {"text": "S. K. Da•J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20058, "end_char": 20069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. l.i11ion of lndla\n\nS. K. Da•J.\n\nfor a cerifitoate for leave to appeal to this Court.", "canonical_name": "S.K. Das J. Bose"}}, {"text": "April 22, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20569, "end_char": 20583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 22, 1956, the appellant also filed a petition under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20627, "end_char": 20634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20796, "end_char": 20811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20922, "end_char": 20929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21126, "end_char": 21137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21248, "end_char": 21256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "November 1, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21395, "end_char": 21411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "311 of the Constitution was 'fully considered in w recent judgment of this Court in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India('), pronounced on November 1, 1957, and it was there 'held by the majority as follows (we are quoting such observations only as have a bearing on the present case):\n\n\"Shortly put, the principle is that when a servant has a right to a post or to a rank either under the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, or under the rules gt>verning the conditions of his service, the termination of the service of such a servant or his reduction to a lower post is by itself and prima facie a punishment, for it operates as a forfeiture of his right to hold that post or that rank and to get the emoluments and other benefits attached thereto."}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22872, "end_char": 22880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art.\n\n31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22919, "end_char": 22927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23442, "end_char": 23450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24227, "end_char": 24235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S4S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24365, "end_char": 24368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24377, "end_char": 24381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. D", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24415, "end_char": 24419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the appellant the contention is that under the Civil Services <Temporary Service) Rules, 1949 he held a. quasi-\n\nL/S4SCI-8\n\nK. S. 8rinfrasa.11,\n\nU1'ion of India\n\ns. K. D<BJ.", "canonical_name": "K. DasJ."}}, {"text": "K. S. Sri1tfoa", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24425, "end_char": 24439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Sri1tfoa, t1n\n\nU1iion of lrulia\n\n8.", "canonical_name": "K. R. Sriniva.sn.n"}}, {"text": "K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24467, "end_char": 24473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Das .J.\n\npermanent status in the post of Public Rela:tions Officer to which he was first appointed and he carried that status to the post of Assistant Station Director to which he was later appointed; therefore, he had a right <?", "canonical_name": "K. DasJ."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25110, "end_char": 25124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the Union of India."}}, {"text": "S4S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28548, "end_char": 28551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. S. Srinivaan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28560, "end_char": 28575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The service of a Government servant ill quasi-permanent service shall be liable to termination-\n\n(i) in the same circumstances and in the same manner L/S4SCI-8(a)\n\nK. S. Srinivaan\n\nv. lln-ion, of i'ltdU.\n\n8.", "canonical_name": "K. R. Sriniva.sn.n"}}, {"text": "K. DasJ.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28604, "end_char": 28612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. DasJ.\n\n19fJ8\n\nK. 8.", "canonical_name": "K. DasJ."}}, {"text": "Bl'iniva8an", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28627, "end_char": 28638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bl'iniva8an ,.,"}}, {"text": "K. Da8J.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28663, "end_char": 28671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Da8J.\n\n1308 SUPHEMg COUHT REPORTS [ l 958 J\n\nas a Government servant in permanent service, or\n\n(ii) when the appointing authority concerned has certifi ed that a reduction ha6 occurred in the number of posts available for Government servants not in permanent service:\n\nProvided that the service of a Government servant in quasi-permanent service shall not be liable to termination under cl. (", "canonical_name": "K. DasJ."}}, {"text": "art. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31817, "end_char": 31824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of Ind'ia", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32049, "end_char": 32069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Grade and Class-Appointments are said to be in the same \"Class\" when they are in the same Department, and bear the same designation, or have been declared by the Government of Ind'ia to be in the same class."}}, {"text": "S. Sriniv(J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32637, "end_char": 32648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rule 6(1) of the Temporary Servic~ Rules lays down\n\n1.?58\n\nK, S. Sriniv(J, Ba.n,\n\nv. !"}}, {"text": "Union of In4ia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32661, "end_char": 32675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Union of In4ia\n\n,</, K. Da• J.\n\n1o:; s\n\nK. 8.", "canonical_name": "Un.ion of India"}}, {"text": "S. K. Da8", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32737, "end_char": 32746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Srin; vMa.n\n\nTlnion of India\n\nS. K. Da8 J.\n\n13.IO\n\nSUPHEME COUHT HEPOHTS [1958]\n\nhow the service of a Government servant in quasi-permanent service can be terminated.", "canonical_name": "S.K. Das J. Bose"}}, {"text": "May 21, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36404, "end_char": 36416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his representation dated July 10, 1953, the appeMant himself admitted tha:t as per Director General, All India Radio's memorandum dated May 21, 1953, he was informed that \"it was decided to keep the post in abeyance\"."}}, {"text": "K. S. Srinivasa•", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37114, "end_char": 37130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned counsel for the respondent has rightly pointed out that the entire\n\n19/il\n\nK. S. Srinivasa•\n\nUnion of India\n\nS. K. DaaJ,\n\n19/iS\n\nK. 8.", "canonical_name": "K. R. Sriniva.sn.n"}}, {"text": "Srini'IJMa.n", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 37174, "end_char": 37186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Srini'IJMa.n\n\nv. fl'llion of India\n\nS. K. TJasJ.\n\nSUPREME COUR1' REPORTS [tn58]\n\nclause should be read to understand what is meant by reduction, and in that context, reduction is not necessarily confined to abolition, permanent or otherwise."}}, {"text": "S. K. TJasJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37210, "end_char": 37222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Srini'IJMa.n\n\nv. fl'llion of India\n\nS. K. TJasJ.\n\nSUPREME COUR1' REPORTS [tn58]\n\nclause should be read to understand what is meant by reduction, and in that context, reduction is not necessarily confined to abolition, permanent or otherwise.", "canonical_name": "S.K. Das J. Bose"}}, {"text": "September 7. 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38029, "end_char": 38046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be further pointed out that in the order of September 7."}}, {"text": "March 20, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40388, "end_char": 40402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "17(83) I 49-BI dated March 20, 1950."}}, {"text": "K. S.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41724, "end_char": 41729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Paragraph 129 referred tb above states in terms that only four categories of-posts men-\n\nJ!/.j8\n\nK. S. f:lrinivruan\n\nUnion of Jndi\"\n\n8.", "canonical_name": "K. DasJ."}}, {"text": "K.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 41763, "end_char": 41765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. n,,.", "canonical_name": "K."}}, {"text": "K. S. Sri11iva", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 41776, "end_char": 41790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".T.\n\nK. S. Sri11iva.,", "canonical_name": "K. R. Sriniva.sn.n"}}, {"text": "Ministry of Information and Broadcasting", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 44007, "end_char": 44047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf bf the appellant it has been next argued that the order dated December J 4; I 95J. contains a olear admission to the effect that the post of Public Relations Officer\n\nbelongs to the same grade as Assistant Station Director, and the order shows that it was made after unofficial consultation\n\nwith the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting."}}, {"text": "December 15/28, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45151, "end_char": 45171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have now a copy of the letter dated December 15/28, 1944 by which the nine new posts of liaison officer Oater designated as Public Relations Officer) were created and the letr dated March 20, 1950, by which the cadre of Assistant Station Directors was deolared."}}, {"text": "June 9, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45692, "end_char": 45704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a matter of fact, the respondent said so in the memorandum of June 9, 1953, though later, on December 14, 1953, a different statement was made."}}, {"text": "K. R. Sriniva.sn.n", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 46110, "end_char": 46128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We think\n\nK. R. Sriniva.sn.n\n\nv. [l nion of India\n\nS. K. Das .T.\n\nK. R. Sriniva.aan\n\nUnio-n of India\n\n8.", "canonical_name": "K. R. Sriniva.sn.n"}}, {"text": "S. K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 46151, "end_char": 46160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We think\n\nK. R. Sriniva.sn.n\n\nv. [l nion of India\n\nS. K. Das .T.\n\nK. R. Sriniva.aan\n\nUnio-n of India\n\n8.", "canonical_name": "S.K. Das J. Bose"}}, {"text": "K. R. Sriniva.aan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 46166, "end_char": 46183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We think\n\nK. R. Sriniva.sn.n\n\nv. [l nion of India\n\nS. K. Das .T.\n\nK. R. Sriniva.aan\n\nUnio-n of India\n\n8.", "canonical_name": "K. R. Sriniva.sn.n"}}, {"text": "K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 46205, "end_char": 46207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. V....T.\n\nthat the impugned order of September 7, 1955, must be read as a whole, and so read, it shows that Government had earlier made mistake in thinking that the posts of Public Relations Officers belonged to the same grade or cadre as the posts of Assistant Station Direcltors, and the mistake was rectified when the Union Public Service Commission pointed it out.", "canonical_name": "K."}}, {"text": "December 14. 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46639, "end_char": 46656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We shall now consider the further question if the order dated December 14."}}, {"text": "December lfl, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 47692, "end_char": 47710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 and 4 of the Temporary Service Rules in respect of the post of Public Relations Officer), it is at once clear that the order dated December lfl, 1953, is not a declaration under rr."}}, {"text": "April 24, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49740, "end_char": 49754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "54/ 136/51 N.G.S. dated April 24, 1952, a copy of which has been placed before us."}}, {"text": "K. S. Stinh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50722, "end_char": 50733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order dated December 14, 1953, purported to give effect\n\nK. S. Stinh:al!t1n\n\nUnum of India\n\nS. K ."}}, {"text": "S. K . .lirr", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50757, "end_char": 50769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order dated December 14, 1953, purported to give effect\n\nK. S. Stinh:al!t1n\n\nUnum of India\n\nS. K ."}}, {"text": "S. K. Dru", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50822, "end_char": 50831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sn'.nitYMtUt ...\n\nUnirm of India\n\nS. K. Dru J.\n\n1318 SUPHElVIE COUHT HEPORTS [1958j\n\nto the decision embodied in the aforesaid memorandum, and was in no sense an independent de.claration under rr.", "canonical_name": "S.K. Das J. Bose"}}, {"text": "S3J", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51565, "end_char": 51568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 53544, "end_char": 53569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even before that date the appellant was asked to apply for the post of an Assistant Station Director through the Public Service Commission."}}, {"text": "Public Serv!ce Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 53922, "end_char": 53947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even in the letter which the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting wrote to the Public Serv!ce Commission on June 22, 1954, it was stated : \"The Commission were not consulted at the time of shifting of quasi-permanent status of Shri Srinivasan from the grade of Public Relations Officer to that of Assistant Station Director in view of the provision of sub-para. ("}}, {"text": "June 22, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53951, "end_char": 53964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even in the letter which the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting wrote to the Public Serv!ce Commission on June 22, 1954, it was stated : \"The Commission were not consulted at the time of shifting of quasi-permanent status of Shri Srinivasan from the grade of Public Relations Officer to that of Assistant Station Director in view of the provision of sub-para. ("}}, {"text": "Un.ion of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 55340, "end_char": 55355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He never pleaded anywhere\n\nf.?!j8\n\n.A .. S. •'-'rin.itWJan\n\nUn.ion of India\n\nS. K. D1.,,", "canonical_name": "Un.ion of India"}}, {"text": "S. K. D1", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 55357, "end_char": 55365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He never pleaded anywhere\n\nf.?!j8\n\n.A .. S. •'-'rin.itWJan\n\nUn.ion of India\n\nS. K. D1.,,", "canonical_name": "S.K. Das J. Bose"}}, {"text": "S. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55383, "end_char": 55387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Home Ministry", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 55780, "end_char": 55835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that paragnph the appellant s>iid: \"That after four months' careful consideration and discussion between the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Home Ministry and the Union Public Service Commission, Government issued an order dated 14-12-'53 declaring that the petitioner will carry quasi-permanent status in his new post of Assistant Station Director as per rules relating to the transfer of quasi-permanent officers,\" In paragraph 30 the appellant again stated that the post of Assistant Station Director and Public Relations Officer were constituted and recognised to be in the same grade and' under r. 2(c) of the Temporary Service Rules the shifting from one post to another in the same grade did not affect his status; in other words, the appellant also understood the order dated December 14, l953, not as an independent order declaring his quasi-permanent status in the post of Assistant Station Director."}}, {"text": "December 14, l953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 56465, "end_char": 56482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that paragnph the appellant s>iid: \"That after four months' careful consideration and discussion between the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Home Ministry and the Union Public Service Commission, Government issued an order dated 14-12-'53 declaring that the petitioner will carry quasi-permanent status in his new post of Assistant Station Director as per rules relating to the transfer of quasi-permanent officers,\" In paragraph 30 the appellant again stated that the post of Assistant Station Director and Public Relations Officer were constituted and recognised to be in the same grade and' under r. 2(c) of the Temporary Service Rules the shifting from one post to another in the same grade did not affect his status; in other words, the appellant also understood the order dated December 14, l953, not as an independent order declaring his quasi-permanent status in the post of Assistant Station Director."}}, {"text": "24-4-'52 relating", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 57174, "end_char": 57191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "54/136/51-NGS, dated 24-4-'52 relating to the' lien of quasi-permanent employees\"."}}, {"text": "Art. 320(3)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58139, "end_char": 58153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 320", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58474, "end_char": 58482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 320", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58993, "end_char": 59004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S4S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59784, "end_char": 59787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Srinivasan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 59858, "end_char": 59868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Srinivasan\n\nUnion of India\n\n8.K.Da.", "canonical_name": "K.\n\nSrinivasan"}}, {"text": "8.K.Da", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 59886, "end_char": 59892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Srinivasan\n\nUnion of India\n\n8.K.Da."}}, {"text": "Art. 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62958, "end_char": 62969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63068, "end_char": 63075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63202, "end_char": 63217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Union Public Service Com-", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 63954, "end_char": 63979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant states that the Union Public Service Com-\n\nL/S4SCI-9(a)\n\nK.R. lirini11n.8<1n\n\nUnion <1 India\n\nR.K. Da•.J.\n\nK. 8."}}, {"text": "S4S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63983, "end_char": 63986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K.R. lirini11n.8<1n", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 63995, "end_char": 64014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant states that the Union Public Service Com-\n\nL/S4SCI-9(a)\n\nK.R. lirini11n.8<1n\n\nUnion <1 India\n\nR.K. Da•.J.\n\nK. 8."}}, {"text": "R.K. Da•.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64032, "end_char": 64043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant states that the Union Public Service Com-\n\nL/S4SCI-9(a)\n\nK.R. lirini11n.8<1n\n\nUnion <1 India\n\nR.K. Da•.J.\n\nK. 8."}}, {"text": "8ri1livasan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 64051, "end_char": 64062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8ri1livasan\n\nUnion of Jmli\"\n\nS.K.DasJ.\n\nBMe J,\n\ni:l24\n\nSUPRE~LE COURT REPORTS [1958]\n\nmission did not consider his suitability for the post of Assistant Station Director, because he claimed quasi-permanent status in that post."}}, {"text": "S.K.DasJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64080, "end_char": 64089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8ri1livasan\n\nUnion of Jmli\"\n\nS.K.DasJ.\n\nBMe J,\n\ni:l24\n\nSUPRE~LE COURT REPORTS [1958]\n\nmission did not consider his suitability for the post of Assistant Station Director, because he claimed quasi-permanent status in that post.", "canonical_name": "S.K. Das J. Bose"}}, {"text": "BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65128, "end_char": 65132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BosE J .-With great respect I disagree.", "canonical_name": "Bose"}}, {"text": "Ministry of Home Affairs Office", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 65838, "end_char": 65869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These orders confirm'ed the order appointing the appellant Assistant Station Director and concluded-\n\n\"Under the provision contained in the Ministry of Home Affairs Office Memorandum No."}}, {"text": "May 1, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 67298, "end_char": 67309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He had served faithfully in various capacities from May 1, 1946."}}, {"text": "K. S. SrinifJa8a11", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 68065, "end_char": 68083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. SrinifJa8a11\n\nUni01> of India\n\nB08eJ.\n\n/9!j8\n\nK • .'\\,'.", "canonical_name": "K. R. Sriniva.sn.n"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 69047, "end_char": 69054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The old technically rigid conceptions of contra.ct and equity have given place in modern times to a juster appreciation of justice, and the fusion of law and equity in one jurisdiction has resulted in the emergence of a new equity in England more suited to modern ideas of human needs and human values."}}, {"text": "Denning", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 69121, "end_char": 69128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Denning has cited instance after instance in his book \"The Changing Law\" to show how this has come about and how it is still in the process of formation, flexible and fluid with the drive behind to do real justice between man and man, and man and the State, ra.ther than to continue to apply a set of ancient hide-bound technicalities forged and fashioned in a wholly different world with a different conscience and very different evaluations of human dignity and human rights."}}, {"text": "Union of India England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 70477, "end_char": 70499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "standing of the needs of the times as do the Courts in Union of India England."}}, {"text": ".Federal Public' Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 75504, "end_char": 75539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rule runs-\n\n\"Where recruitment to a specified post is required to be made in consultation with the .Federal Public' Service Commission, no such declaration shall be issued except after consultation with the Commission,\" ·\n\nThe essence of the prohibition lies in the words underlined :\n\n\"Is required to be made.\""}}, {"text": "Art. 320(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75910, "end_char": 75921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 256", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76316, "end_char": 76322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 76330, "end_char": 76359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1945] F.C.R. 99", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 76532, "end_char": 76548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "K. S. 'Srinivasan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 76559, "end_char": 76576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1958\n\nK. S. 'Srinivasan\n\nUnion of India\n\nBose J.\n\nK. S. S•iniva.mn\n\nUnion vf India\n\nBoae J.\n\npany v. Normandin(').", "canonical_name": "K. R. Sriniva.sn.n"}}, {"text": "K. S. S•iniva.mn\n\nUnion vf India", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 76603, "end_char": 76635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1958\n\nK. S. 'Srinivasan\n\nUnion of India\n\nBose J.\n\nK. S. S•iniva.mn\n\nUnion vf India\n\nBoae J.\n\npany v. Normandin(')."}}, {"text": "BHAGWkTI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78993, "end_char": 79001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(BHAGWkTI, J. L. KAPUR and GAJENoRAGADKAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "J. L. KAPUR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79003, "end_char": 79014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(BHAGWkTI, J. L. KAPUR and GAJENoRAGADKAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "GAJENoRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79019, "end_char": 79033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(BHAGWkTI, J. L. KAPUR and GAJENoRAGADKAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Commercial Documents Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 79224, "end_char": 79257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 3(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79273, "end_char": 79280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Commercial Documents Evidence Act", "statute": "Commercial Documents Evidence Act"}}, {"text": "May 17, 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 79584, "end_char": 79596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 16, 1944 the appellant filed a suit to recover the amount with interest on the allegation that the amount became due on May 17, 1941 when the demand for the amount was made and limitation for the suit expired on May 17."}}, {"text": "May 17. 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 79676, "end_char": 79688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 16, 1944 the appellant filed a suit to recover the amount with interest on the allegation that the amount became due on May 17, 1941 when the demand for the amount was made and limitation for the suit expired on May 17."}}, {"text": "May 20, 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 79896, "end_char": 79908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant also relied upon the acknowledgments of his debt by the i:espondent in the resolution passed by the Board of Directors on May 20, 1941 and in the balance sheet of the respondent for the year 1940-41 dated October 10, 1941:\n\nHeld, that the suit was barred by limitation as the monies due under the deposit receipt became payable on July :n, 1941 and as no 'agreement had been proved th<it the monies due under the deposit receipt were re-payable on demand."}}, {"text": "October 10, 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 79979, "end_char": 79995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant also relied upon the acknowledgments of his debt by the i:espondent in the resolution passed by the Board of Directors on May 20, 1941 and in the balance sheet of the respondent for the year 1940-41 dated October 10, 1941:\n\nHeld, that the suit was barred by limitation as the monies due under the deposit receipt became payable on July :n, 1941 and as no 'agreement had been proved th<it the monies due under the deposit receipt were re-payable on demand."}}]}
{"document_id": "1958_1_1331_1339_EN", "year": 1958, "text": "s:c.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1331\n\nI would allow the appeal and the petition with costs.\n\nBY COURT: The appeal and the petition are dismissed.\n\nThere will be no order as to costs.\n\nAppeal and Petition di.imissed.\n\nKASHINATH SANKARAPPA WANI v.\n\nNEW AKOT COTTON GINNING & PRESSING CO., LTD.\n\n(BHAGWkTI, J. L. KAPUR and GAJENoRAGADKAR JJ.)\n\nLimitation-Suit on deposit receipt-Acknowledgment of iiability-EUidence-Balance sheet obtained from Registrar of Companies-Admissibility-Presumption. of awthenticitu andi corr.ectness-Commercial Documents Evidence Act (XXX of 1939), s. 3(b).\n\nThe appellant advanced various sums of money to the respondent, in lieu of which the respondent passed a deposit receipt for 12 months from August 1, 1939 to July 31, 1940. On June 16, 1944 the appellant filed a suit to recover the amount with interest on the allegation that the amount became due on May 17, 1941 when the demand for the amount was made and limitation for the suit expired on May 17. 1944 and the suit was filed on the reopening day of the Court thE>reafter.\n\nThe appellant also relied upon the acknowledgments of his debt by the i:espondent in the resolution passed by the Board of Directors on May 20, 1941 and in the balance sheet of the respondent for the year 1940-41 dated October 10, 1941:\n\nHeld, that the suit was barred by limitation as the monies due under the deposit receipt became payable on July :n, 1941 and as no 'agreement had been proved th<it the monies due under the deposit receipt were re-payable on demand.\n\nHeld further, that limitation was not saved by tile alleged. acknowledgments.\n\nThe resolution Qf the Board of Directors merely proposed a settlement of a claim of the appellant, which, if accepted by the appe}lant, was to be placed before a general meeting of the share-holders. The resolution onfy referred to a past liability of the respondent to the appellant and it could not be construed\n\n19ii8\n\nK. IS. Srinii-a.san\n\nUiii011. of India\n\nBu•e J,\n\nFebruary 18.\n\nKaahinatA Sanl:arappa Wani\n\nNew Akol Collon Ginning &: PresMng\n\nOo., Ltd.\n\nBluI/Jwati J.\n\nas an acknowledgment of the liability of tlte respondent unde~ the deposit recelipt in question.\n\nA copy of the balance sheet of 1940-41 obtained, from the Registrar of Companies which was tiled in the case was wrongly rejected by the High Court as inadmissible on the ground that no evidence was adduced to prove it. This copy was admissible under s. 3(b) of the Commercial \"Documents Ev:iden0e Ao!.\n\nUnder that section the Court could nlso raise a presumption as regards the balance sheet having been duly made by or under the appropriate authority or in regard to the statements contained therein. The presumption was not compulsory, but was discretionary with the Court. In the circumstances of this case. where there were facVions in the Company and the regularity of the meeting at which the balance sheet was passed was in dispute. the High Court would have been perfectly justified in not raising the presumption.\n\nConsequently, the acknowlerl11meni in the balance sheet was of no avail to the appellant.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 77 of 1954.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated August 25, 1949, of the former Nagpur High Court in First Appeal No. 91 of 1945 arising out of the judgment and decree dated July 31. 1945, of the Court of Second Additional District Judge, Akola in Civil Suit No. 7-B of 1944.\n\nC. B. Agarwa/a and Ratnaparkhi A. G. for the appellant.\n\nVeda Vyasa and Ganpat Rai, for the respondent.\n\n1958. February 18. The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J.-This appeal with a certificate under s. 109(a) read with s. 1 IO of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908) is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the Nagpur High Court dismissing the appeal of the appellant and confirming the dismissal of his suit by the learned Second Additional District Judge, Akola.\n\nThe appellant, who was the plaintiff in the trial court filed in the Court of the First Additional District Judge,\n\nAkola, Civil Suit No. ;:: of 1944 against the respondent a limited company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act of 1882, which owned a Ginning and Pressing Factory\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREl\\U~ COURT REPORTS 1333\n\nand carried on business of ginning and pressing cotton a.t 1958 Akot in District Akola. KCUJhi'IUlf; h Sanlcarappa W a.ni The appellant alleged that he was one of the creditors New A~':,;1 Cotton of the company which used to borrow money from him for Ginning cf: Pres1i1111 about 35 years past. He claimed to have acted as Banker of\n\n00 ·• Ltd. the company and the sums borrowed from him were entered Blwfl'i'<lti •1 in the account books of the company in two khatas, one known as current account or \"chalu khata\" and the other described as \"fixed deposit khata\". An account used. to be made up at the end of every year and the a.mount found due at the foot of the account was entered in the balance-sheet of the company which was adopted at the Annual General Meeting of the company. Deposit receipts also used to be passed for the amounts standing in the fixed dep0sit khata from time to time and at the end of the year ending July\n\n1939, a sum of Rs. 79,519-12-9 was found due by the company to him on both these accounts. On January 15, .1940, the company passed a deposit receipt in his favour for this amount which he demanded from the company by his letters dated May 10, 1941 and May 17, 1941. The company failed and neglected to pay the said amount with the resut that he filed on June 16, 1944, a suit against the company for recovery of a sum of s. 1,03,988 made up of Rs. 79,519-12-9 for principal and Rs. 24,468 as interest from August l, 1939, to January 15, 1944.\n\nThe claim as laid in the plaint was that all these amounts which bad been borrowed by the company from him were payable on demand to be made by him as creditor and they were deposits with the company, but in order that the company may not be compelled to pa, y a big sum on demand, items in the current account were being transferred to the fixed deposit account from time to time.\n\nThe amounts of these deposits being thus payable on demand the cause of action accrued to him on May 17, 1941, and limitation for the suit expired on May 17, 1944. But, as the courts were closed on tha.t day, the suit was filed on the first\n\n19/iS\n\nKai:; hin'llh Sa.nkarappa lVaui •.\n\nNew Akot CottO'fl, Cinning &t Presainu\n\nCo., Ltd.\n\nBlia[Jwati J.\n\nSUPl{Ei\\'!E UOUR'r REPORTS [1958]\n\nopening day i.e:, June 16, l\\144, and limitation was therefore saved by s. 4 of the Limitation Act. He also relied upon the acknowledgments of his debt made by the company in (a) the resolution passed by the Board of Directors on May 20, 1941, (bl the balance-sheet of the company for the year 1940- 41 dated October 10, 1941, and for the years 1941-42 and J 942-43, and (c) the entry in the khata of the plaintiff in the books of the company made on or about July 31, 1941, and signed by the Chairman of the company. He further relied upon an application made under s. 162 of the Companies Act to liquidate the company on June 16, 1941, which a.pplication was however dismissed by the court on June 16, 1944, stating that as he was bona fide prosecuting this application for the same relief as claimed in the suit and as the court was unable to entertain the appliation because the debt was disputed by the company, he was entitled to deduct from the period of limitatiorl, the time spent by him under s. 14 of the Limitation Act.\n\nThis claim of the appellant was contested by the respondent mainly on the ground that the suit was barred by the law of limitation. Both the courts below negatived his claim. The trial court dismissed his suit and the High Court, oh appeal, dismissed his appeal and confirmed the dismissal of his suit by the trial court; hence this appeal.\n\nThe only question which arises for our consideration in this appeal is .whether the. appellant's suit was barred by limitation. The appellant, in the first instance, relied upon the deposit receipt which was passed by the company in his favour on January 15, 1940. This receipt (Ex. P-1) evidenced a deposit of Rs. 79,519-12-9 for 12 months from August 1, 1939, to July 31, 1940, and the amount at the foot thereof became due and payable by the respondent to him on July 31, 1940. The appellant, however, sought to extend the commencement of the period of limitation to May 17, 1941, on the ground that the monies, the subject-matter of that deposit receipt, were payable to him on demand, that such demand was made by him on May 17, 1941, and that therefore that\n\ns.c.n.\n\nSUPRE111E COURT :REPORTS\n\nwas the dale for the commencement of the period of limita-\n\n/!JSR tion. No !!A.press agreement in this behalf could be proved Ka,, Jd11<11/1 by him nor could an agreement be implied from the course -~\" 11 l-n\"'Pt'.' Wm•; of dealings between him and \"the company for the period of °!'.\"111• .Hot Cullu11 5 d h' h h d )\" d b h Uh11ti n!J :f: Prt~1Jiu9 2 years unng w 1c t e et! mgs contmue etween t e\n\n1.,,., !H. parties. As a matter of fact. such an agreement. either express or implied, was negatived by the very terms of the deposit receipt which. apart from mentioning that the monies were received by the company as deposit for 12 months from August I, 1939, to July 31. 1940, contained on the reverse a note that interest would cease on due date. This was sufficient to establish that the amount due at the foot of the deposit receipt became due and payable on the due date mentioned therein and that there was no question of the amount being payable at any time thereafter on demand being made in this behalf by the creditor.\n\nThe course of dealings between the parties also negatived any such agreement because it appears from the record tha.t such deposit receipts were passed by the company in his favour from time to time, each of such receipts being for a fixed period in the same terms as the deposit receipt in question and the receipts containing similar notes on the reverse that interest would cease on due date. Both the courts below were therefore right in coming to the conclusion that there was no agreement of the kind put forward by the appellant that the monies due at the foot of the deposit receipt in question were re-payable on demand and that monies due at the foot thereof became due and payable by the company to him on July 31, 1940.\n\nThe next question to consider is whether the bar of limitation which set in on July JI, 1943, was saved by reason of the circumst<111ces set out in the plaint for a.voidance of the same. Out of the three acknowledgments of debt pleaded by the appellant the third was abandoned by him in the course of the hearing and the only two acknowledg- . ments which were pressed were (a) the resolution passed by tlte Board of Directors on May 20, 1941, and (b) the balancesheet of the company for the year 1940-41 dated October 10,\n\nJJ/tflfjll'llf i ,) ,\n\n1336 (l958]\n\n1941. Jt may be nokd that he made no auempt at all to\n\nKM1'i>weh prove the balance-sheets of the company for the years 1941- Sanknrappa Trani 42 and l942-43.\n\nv. l\\T evi A kut Coffm1 Ginning &; Prcssi11fJ\n\nCo., Ltd.\n\nBl1ll{l11mti .I.\n\nin regard to the resolution passed by the Board of Directors on May 20, 1941, the position is that at that meet\n\ning one Pandurang Narsaji Hadole, who was one of the Directors of the company, made a reference to a proposed settlement of the claim of the appellant for a sum of Rs. 67,939 as found due at the end of July 1936, which had been resolved upon by the Board of Directors on December 22, 1936, but had not been accepted by the appellant. The resolution then requested the appellant to inform the company again if even then he was prepared to abide by the terms of that proposed settlement which would be plnced before the general meeting of all the share-holders of the company if a reply was received from him in the affirmative.\n\nThis resolution of the Board of Directors was alleged by the appellant to be an acknowledgment of a subsisting liability in regard to the debt due by the company to him at the foot of the deposit receipt in question. We do not see how it could ever be spelt out as such acknowledgment. The contents of the resolution only referred to a past liability of the company to the appellant and there was nothing therein which could be a.ny stretch he construed as referring to the liability of the company, to him at the foot of the deposit receipt dated January 15, 1940. Our attention was drawn to the deposit receipts which had been passed by the company in favour of the appellant on May 30. 1935, October 18.\n\n1936, and November 30, 1938, each of which was for a. sum of Rs. 47,500. No connection was. however. established between the sum of Rs. 47,500 the subject-matter of these receipts, and the sum of Rs. 79,519-12-9, the subject-matter of the deposit receipt in question and in the absence of any such connection having been established the appellant could not avail himself of the alleged acknowledgment of liability contained in the resolution of the Board of Directors dated May 20. 1941, even if it could perchance be construed as\n\nRC.R.\n\nSUP1lEME COURT REPORTS 1337\n\nan acknowledgment of a subsisting liability. This resolution 1958 of the Board of Directors dated May 20, 1941, could not, Kaakinatk therefore,. avail the appellant as an acknowledgment of his Sankara~~ Wani debt.\n\nNew Akot Cotton Ginning cb Pressing In reg:rd to the balance-sheet of the company for the Co., Ltd. ye1r 194041 dated October 10, 1941. it is to be noted that, Bhagwat.i J. even though the appellant app ied before the trial court for filing the balance-sh<:et of 1940-41 on April 28, 1945, he expressly stated that he did not want to adduce any oral evidence to prove .it. He was, however, aliowed to file the same. But it was. realised later that the balance-sheet did not prove itse'f and he therefore made another application on July l l, t 945, for permission to file a copy from the Registrar 9f Companies and contended that this proved itselt This document was, howev(:r, rejected by the trial court as file:i too late. When the appeal came up for hearing before the High Court, it was contended on behalf of the appellant that the copy which was adduced from the. office of the Registrar was admissible in evidence but that evidence was rejected by the High Court on a consideration of ss. 65 and 74(2) of the Evidence Act. The attention of the High Court was evidently not drawn to the Commercial Documents Evidence Act (XXX of 1939) which has amended the Law of Evidence with resp;:ct to certain commercial documents.\n\nSection 3 of that Act enacts that \"for the purposes of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and notwithstanding anything contained therein, a Court:\n\n(a) .................................................................... .\n\n(b) may presume, within the meaning of that Act, in relat10n to documents included in Pt. II of the Schedule: - • That any document purporting to be a document included in Part I or Part II of the Schedule, as the case may be, and to have been duly made by or under the appropriate authority, was so made and that the statements contained therein are accurate.\"\n\nItem No. 21 in Pt. II of the Schedule menti.ons:-\n\nL/S4SCI-10\n\n1958 \"Copy, certified by the Registrar of Companies of the\n\nKaskinaJh Balance Sheet, Profit and Loss Account, and audit report of Bankarappa Wani a company, filed with the said Registrar under the Indian v.\n\nNewAko!Cotl\"\" Companies Act, 1913 and the rules made thereunder.\" Ginning Prusing\n\nGo., Ltd,\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nIf the attention of the High Court had been drawn to this provision of law. we are sure, it would not have rejected the copy of the balance-sheet obtained by the appel:ant from the office of the Registrar of Companies.\n\nWe are of the opinion that the copy should have been admitted in evidence and we do hereby admit the same.\n\nThe appellant contends that that balance-sheet which was signed by the Directors contained an acknowledgment of the debt due by the company to the appellant for the sum of Rs. 67,939 as and by way of fixed deposit and that was sufficient to save the bar of limitation.\n\nThe question therefore arises whether any nresumption can be raised as regards the balance-sheet having been duly made by or under the appropriate authority or in regard to the accuracy\n\nof the statement contained therein under s. 3(b) of the Commercial Documents Evidence Act (XXX of 1939).\n\nIt is to be noted that this presumption is not compulsory as in the case of s. 3(a) of the Act; it is discretionary with the court. The difficulty in the way of the appellant here is however insuperable because we find that there were factions in the company at or about the relevant time.\n\nA Directors' meeting was held on April 27, 1941, and the resignation of the appellant as the Chairman was accepted and another person was appointed in his place.\n\nA second meeting was called for May 17, 1941, but it had to be adjourned for want of a quorum. The adjourned meeting was held on May 20, 1941, but no balance-sh.eel was passed at that meeting. There is nothing on the record to show that there was another meeting of the Board of Directors for passing the balance-sheet of the company for the year 1940-\n\n41. A general meeting of the Shareholders was called for November 16, 1941, to pass the balance-sheet. This also had to be adjourned to the following day for want of a quorum.\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPRK\\lE COURT HRPOHTS\n\nAt the adjourned meeting the shareholder~ then present 19.; r;, refused lo pass the accounts and it was not till some five g,,,, J.inof/i weeks later, namely on Dec.:.nhcr 30. 1941. that the rival So;•k•11\"'l'P\" lfn;,; faction met and passed. the. accounts. But his meting only Sei,, _-i1.'.;;1 Oottnn\n\npurpoted to be a cont111uat1on of the meetmg which had to Oinninff .c- Prc~\"i••rt be adjourned for want of a quorum and that dearly was Co.\n\nLtd. irregular because the adjourned meeting had to -be called within twentyfour hours. It did not purport to be a fresh meeting convened after due notice. etc. Under the circumstances, it could not be urged that the balance-sheet was duly passed.\n\nEven if the attention of the Hi!zh Court had been drawn to the provision's of s. 3 <b) of the Commerci; tl Documents Evidern:e Act. \\XXX of I 939l it would have been perfectly justified in not raising the presumption in regard to the balance-sheet having been duly made by or under the appropriate authority and in regard to the accuracy of the statement contained therein.\n\nWe are, therefore, of the opinion that this alleged acknowledgment also is of no avail to the appellant.\n\nIn regard to s. 14 of the Indian Limitation Act which was sought to be relied upon by the appellant, it may be shortly stated that the liquidation proceedings had not been filed in the courts beow and there is nothing to show that the requirements of s. 14 were at all satisfied. No cogent argument has been advanced before us on behalf of the appellant which would induce us to hold that the conclusion reached by the High Court in this behalf was incorrect in any manner whatever.\n\nOn all the above grounds we have come to the conclusion that the appellant's claim was clearly time-barred and the dismissal of his suit by the trial court as well as the dismissal of his appeal by the High Court were in order.\n\nThis appeal will therefore stand dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 69, "entities": [{"text": "KASHINATH SANKARAPPA WANI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 215, "end_char": 240, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KASHINATH SANKARAPPA WANI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "NEW AKOT COTTON GINNING & PRESSING CO., LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 245, "end_char": 288, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NEW AKOT COTTON GINNING & PRESSING CO. LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "L. KAPUR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 305, "end_char": 313, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.L. KAPUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Commercial Documents Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 523, "end_char": 556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 3(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 572, "end_char": 579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Commercial Documents Evidence Act", "statute": "Commercial Documents Evidence Act"}}, {"text": "August 1, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 722, "end_char": 736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant advanced various sums of money to the respondent, in lieu of which the respondent passed a deposit receipt for 12 months from August 1, 1939 to July 31, 1940."}}, {"text": "July 31, 1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 740, "end_char": 753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant advanced various sums of money to the respondent, in lieu of which the respondent passed a deposit receipt for 12 months from August 1, 1939 to July 31, 1940."}}, {"text": "June 16, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 758, "end_char": 771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 16, 1944 the appellant filed a suit to recover the amount with interest on the allegation that the amount became due on May 17, 1941 when the demand for the amount was made and limitation for the suit expired on May 17."}}, {"text": "May 17, 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 883, "end_char": 895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 16, 1944 the appellant filed a suit to recover the amount with interest on the allegation that the amount became due on May 17, 1941 when the demand for the amount was made and limitation for the suit expired on May 17."}}, {"text": "May 17. 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 975, "end_char": 987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 16, 1944 the appellant filed a suit to recover the amount with interest on the allegation that the amount became due on May 17, 1941 when the demand for the amount was made and limitation for the suit expired on May 17."}}, {"text": "May 20, 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1195, "end_char": 1207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant also relied upon the acknowledgments of his debt by the i:espondent in the resolution passed by the Board of Directors on May 20, 1941 and in the balance sheet of the respondent for the year 1940-41 dated October 10, 1941:\n\nHeld, that the suit was barred by limitation as the monies due under the deposit receipt became payable on July :n, 1941 and as no 'agreement had been proved th<it the monies due under the deposit receipt were re-payable on demand."}}, {"text": "October 10, 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1278, "end_char": 1294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant also relied upon the acknowledgments of his debt by the i:espondent in the resolution passed by the Board of Directors on May 20, 1941 and in the balance sheet of the respondent for the year 1940-41 dated October 10, 1941:\n\nHeld, that the suit was barred by limitation as the monies due under the deposit receipt became payable on July :n, 1941 and as no 'agreement had been proved th<it the monies due under the deposit receipt were re-payable on demand."}}, {"text": "KaahinatA Sanl:arappa Wani", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1994, "end_char": 2020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KaahinatA Sanl:arappa Wani\n\nNew Akol Collon Ginning &: PresMng\n\nOo.,"}}, {"text": "s. 3(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2433, "end_char": 2440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3098, "end_char": 3126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "C. B. Agarwa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3428, "end_char": 3440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Agarwa/a and Ratnaparkhi A. G. for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Ratnaparkhi A. G.", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3447, "end_char": 3464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Agarwa/a and Ratnaparkhi A. G. for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Veda Vyasa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3485, "end_char": 3495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Veda Vyasa and Ganpat Rai, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3500, "end_char": 3510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Veda Vyasa and Ganpat Rai, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3606, "end_char": 3614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J.-This appeal with a certificate under s. 109(a) read with s. 1 IO of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908) is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the Nagpur High Court dismissing the appeal of the appellant and confirming the dismissal of his suit by the learned Second Additional District Judge, Akola.", "canonical_name": "Bhagwat.i J."}}, {"text": "s. 109(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3656, "end_char": 3665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3676, "end_char": 3680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3687, "end_char": 3714, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Nagpur High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3789, "end_char": 3806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J.-This appeal with a certificate under s. 109(a) read with s. 1 IO of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908) is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the Nagpur High Court dismissing the appeal of the appellant and confirming the dismissal of his suit by the learned Second Additional District Judge, Akola."}}, {"text": "First Additional District Judge,\n\nAkola", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4026, "end_char": 4065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, who was the plaintiff in the trial court filed in the Court of the First Additional District Judge,\n\nAkola, Civil Suit No. ;::"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4165, "end_char": 4178, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "January 15, .1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5299, "end_char": 5316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 15, .1940, the company passed a deposit receipt in his favour for this amount which he demanded from the company by his letters dated May 10, 1941 and May 17, 1941."}}, {"text": "May 10, 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5441, "end_char": 5453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 15, .1940, the company passed a deposit receipt in his favour for this amount which he demanded from the company by his letters dated May 10, 1941 and May 17, 1941."}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5627, "end_char": 5631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "August l, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5712, "end_char": 5726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "24,468 as interest from August l, 1939, to January 15, 1944."}}, {"text": "January 15, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5731, "end_char": 5747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "24,468 as interest from August l, 1939, to January 15, 1944."}}, {"text": "May 17, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6283, "end_char": 6295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The amounts of these deposits being thus payable on demand the cause of action accrued to him on May 17, 1941, and limitation for the suit expired on May 17, 1944."}}, {"text": "Blia[Jwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6469, "end_char": 6479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, as the courts were closed on tha.t day, the suit was filed on the first\n\n19/iS\n\nKai:; hin'llh Sa.nkarappa lVaui •.\n\nNew Akot CottO'fl, Cinning &t Presainu\n\nCo., Ltd.\n\nBlia[Jwati J.\n\nSUPl{Ei\\'!E UOUR'r REPORTS [1958]\n\nopening day i.e:, June 16, l\\144, and limitation was therefore saved by s. 4 of the Limitation Act."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6591, "end_char": 6595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6603, "end_char": 6617, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7086, "end_char": 7092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7100, "end_char": 7113, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "June 16, 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7142, "end_char": 7155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He further relied upon an application made under s. 162 of the Companies Act to liquidate the company on June 16, 1941, which a.pplication was however dismissed by the court on June 16, 1944, stating that as he was bona fide prosecuting this application for the same relief as claimed in the suit and as the court was unable to entertain the appliation because the debt was disputed by the company, he was entitled to deduct from the period of limitatiorl, the time spent by him under s. 14 of the Limitation Act."}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7522, "end_char": 7527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7535, "end_char": 7549, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "January 15, 1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8141, "end_char": 8157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, in the first instance, relied upon the deposit receipt which was passed by the company in his favour on January 15, 1940."}}, {"text": "Pandurang Narsaji Hadole", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11374, "end_char": 11398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. l\\T evi A kut Coffm1 Ginning &; Prcssi11fJ\n\nCo., Ltd.\n\nBl1ll{l11mti .I.\n\nin regard to the resolution passed by the Board of Directors on May 20, 1941, the position is that at that meet\n\ning one Pandurang Narsaji Hadole, who was one of the Directors of the company, made a reference to a proposed settlement of the claim of the appellant for a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "December 22, 1936", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11637, "end_char": 11654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "67,939 as found due at the end of July 1936, which had been resolved upon by the Board of Directors on December 22, 1936, but had not been accepted by the appellant."}}, {"text": "May 30. 1935", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12675, "end_char": 12687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Our attention was drawn to the deposit receipts which had been passed by the company in favour of the appellant on May 30."}}, {"text": "October 18.\n\n1936", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12689, "end_char": 12706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1935, October 18."}}, {"text": "November 30, 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12712, "end_char": 12729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1936, and November 30, 1938, each of which was for a. sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Kaakinatk", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13393, "end_char": 13402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This resolution 1958 of the Board of Directors dated May 20, 1941, could not, Kaakinatk therefore,."}}, {"text": "Bhagwat.i J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13645, "end_char": 13657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "it is to be noted that, Bhagwat.i J. even though the appellant app ied before the trial court for filing the balance-sh<:et of 1940-41 on April 28, 1945, he expressly stated that he did not want to adduce any oral evidence to prove .it.", "canonical_name": "Bhagwat.i J."}}, {"text": "July l l, t 945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14017, "end_char": 14032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "realised later that the balance-sheet did not prove itse'f and he therefore made another application on July l l, t 945, for permission to file a copy from the Registrar 9f Companies and contended that this proved itselt This document was, howev(:r, rejected by the trial court as file:i too late."}}, {"text": "ss. 65 and 74(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14478, "end_char": 14494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Commercial Documents Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14579, "end_char": 14612, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14713, "end_char": 14722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act, 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14772, "end_char": 14797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S4S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15349, "end_char": 15352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872", "statute": "the Indian Evidence Act, 1872"}}, {"text": "Bankarappa Wani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15489, "end_char": 15504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "II of the Schedule menti.ons:-\n\nL/S4SCI-10\n\n1958 \"Copy, certified by the Registrar of Companies of the\n\nKaskinaJh Balance Sheet, Profit and Loss Account, and audit report of Bankarappa Wani a company, filed with the said Registrar under the Indian v.\n\nNewAko!Cotl\"\" Companies Act, 1913 and the rules made thereunder.\""}}, {"text": "Companies Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15581, "end_char": 15600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ginning Prusing\n\nGo., Ltd", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15633, "end_char": 15658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ginning Prusing\n\nGo.,"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15661, "end_char": 15669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd,\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nIf the attention of the High Court had been drawn to this provision of law.", "canonical_name": "Bhagwat.i J."}}, {"text": "s. 3(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16500, "end_char": 16507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "Commercial Documents Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16515, "end_char": 16548, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 3(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16641, "end_char": 16648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 27, 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16889, "end_char": 16903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Directors' meeting was held on April 27, 1941, and the resignation of the appellant as the Chairman was accepted and another person was appointed in his place."}}, {"text": "November 16, 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17430, "end_char": 17447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A general meeting of the Shareholders was called for November 16, 1941, to pass the balance-sheet."}}, {"text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPRK\\lE COURT HRPOHTS", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17550, "end_char": 17580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPRK\\lE COURT HRPOHTS\n\nAt the adjourned meeting the shareholder~ then present 19.;"}}, {"text": "Dec.:.nhcr 30. 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17743, "end_char": 17762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "r;, refused lo pass the accounts and it was not till some five g,,,, J.inof/i weeks later, namely on Dec.:.nhcr 30."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18353, "end_char": 18357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18769, "end_char": 18774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18789, "end_char": 18803, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19007, "end_char": 19012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1958_1_1340_1354_EN", "year": 1958, "text": "Fd>ruorg 18.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1958]\n\nSHRI CHINT AMAN RAO AND ANOTHER\n\nTHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH\n\n(B. P. SINHA, JAHR !MAM and SUBBA RAO JJ.)\n\n\\Vorker-Test for determining-Sattedars contractina to supply bidis to bidi factoTy andl coolies of such Sattedars-If\n\nworkers in the factory-Factories Act (LXIII of 1948). ss. 2(1). 62, 63 and 92.\n\nThe appellant was the manager of a liidi factory which had contracts with certain independent contractors, known as Sattedars, for the supply of bidis. The Sattedars undertook to supply the bidis by manufacturing them in their own factories or by entrusting the work to third parties. at a pvice to be paid by the management after delivery and approval. The Inspector of Factories found working in the appellant's factory certain Sattedars and their coolies who had come to deliver bidis manufactured by them. The appellant was prosecuted and convicted under s. 92, Factories Act for violation of the proV'isions of ss. 62\n\nand 63 for failure to maintain the .register of adult workers and for allowing the workers to work in the factory without making beforehand the entries of their attendance in the reis' ter:\n\nHeld, that the Sattedars and their coolies were not workers wtithin 'he definition in s. 2(1) of the Act and. therefore, the noninclusion of their names in the register or lthe absence of entries in regard to them therein did not constitute an offence under s. 92 of the Act. To determine whether a person emptoye, j is a worker the. test is whether or not the employer had oontTol and supervision over the manner in which the work was to be done, The Sattedars were not under the control of the factory management and could manufacture the bidis wherever they pleased.\n\nThe coolies were neither employed by the management directly nor were they employed by the management through the Sattedars.\n\nDharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra, P9571 S, C, R, 152, applied.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 93 of 1955.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 16, 1954, of the former Nagpur High Court in Criminal Revision No. 295 of 1954, arising out of the judgment and order dated March 8, 1954, of the Second Additional Sessions Judge at Sagar in Criminal Appeal No. 368 of 1953, against the order dated August 5, 1953, of the Judge Magistrate. Sagar. in Criminal Case No. 146 of 1953.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee and Rameslnvar Nath, for the appellants.\n\nI. N. 'Shroff, for the respondent.\n\n1958. February 18. The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSUBBAI RAO J.-This appeal by Special Leave is directed against the Order of the High Court of1Judicature at Nagpur and raises the question of construction of some of the provisions of the Factories Act (LXIII of 1948) (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Before posing the questions raised it would be convenient and useful at the outset to state the facts either found by the High Court or admitted by the parties.\n\nMessrs. Brijlal Manila! and Company is a bidi factory situated in Sagar. The I st Appella.nt, Chintamanrao, is the Managing-Partner of the. firm while the 2nd appellant, Kantilal, is its active Manager. The Company manufactures bidis. The process of manufacture, so far as is relevant to the question raised, is carried out in two stages.\n\nThe first stage: The management enters into a contract with independent contractors, known as Sattedars, for the supply of bidis locally. The documents embodying the terms of the contract entered into by the Sattedars were not produced in th~ case. But the terms of the contract are not in dispute. The Management supplies tobacco to the .Sattedars and in some cases bidi leaves. Some of the Sattedars maintain a. small factory where they get bidis manufactured by engaging coolies. Others give tobacco and bidi leaves to outsiders who prepare bidis in their houses.\n\nAfter bidis are rolled in the Sattedars collect the bidis so manufactured and take them to the factory directly or through coolies where they are sorted and checked by the workers in, the factory.\n\nThe selected or approved bidis are separately packed in bundles of IO and 25 and taken 'by the Sattedars or the coolies in gauze trays to tandul and left there. The rejected bidis, commonly known as 'chhant' are again rebundled by the Sattedars and delivered to the factory. The management\n\nL/S4SCI-11 (11)\n\n8/iri Okintaman\n\nRao & Another\n\nThe State of Madhya l'radf!llt\n\nSuhbti Rao J.\n\n8kri Ohinblma:•\n\nRao &r AnolJu, r\n\nThe State of Matlhya Praduh\n\nSubbaRaoJ.\n\n1342 SUPRElliE COURT REPORTS (1958]\n\npays the Sattedars the cost of the manufacture of bidis after deducting therefrom the cost of tobacco supplied to them.\n\nThereafter the second stage of the process of the manufacture begins in the factory. It is carried out exclusively by the labourers employed in the factory. It consists of warming of bidis to give taste, wrapping them in tissue papers, labelling and finally bundling them in the 'Pudas'. The finished product is then marketed. Jlrom the aforesaid description of the dual process of manufacture of bidis it is manifest that a Sattedar is only an independent contractor, who undertakes to do a specific job of work, i.e., the supply of bidis. directly or indirectly through his coolies, by manufacturing theni either in his own factory or by entrusting the work to third parties, at a price to be paid by the management after delivery and approval. He (Sattedar) or his coolies neithec work in the appellants' factory nor are they subject to tl-:e supervision or control of the appellants. The coolies or the third parties, to whom the work of making of bidis is en trusted by the Sattedars, are employed by the Sattedars and are paid by them. None of them works in the factory though they bring bidis to the factory for delivery in accordance with the terms of the contract. It may also be pointed out that the factory employs workers who are under the direct control and supervision of the factory management and who attend to the second part of the process of manufacture described above.\n\nOn December 9, 1952, Sri B. V. Desai, the Inspector of Factories, Madhya Pradesh, Nagpur, visited the factory at\n\n5-30 p.m. At the time of his inspection he found the following persons in the factory :\n\nl. Pirbaksha, son of Amir.\n\n2. Abdul Sagir, son of Sk. Alam.\n\n3. Deviprasad. son of Uddam.\n\n4. Ramshankar, son of Mulchand.\n\n5. Gopal, son of Mulchand.\n\n6. Nirpat, son of Bhagirath.\n\n7. Ramchand, son of Gyan.\n\n8. Gotiram, son of Lila.\n\n9. Basodi, son of Gulu.\n\nOf the aforesaid persons, Deviprasad, Nirpat and Gotiram are Sattedars a.nd the rest are coolies employed by the Sattedars .. The Inspector found the first seven persons sorting out bidis and packing them into bundles of 10 and 25 in the premises and the last two bringing the bidis to\" the room in jali for warming; The said facts are practically admitted by some of the aforesaid persons, who ga.ve evidence in the case, and they explained that they came to the factory on that day for delivering the bidis manufactured. by them to the factory.\n\nThereafter .the Chief Inspector of Factories filed a complaint in the Court of the Judge-Magistrate, Sagar, against the appellants for violation of the provisfons of ss. 62 and 63 of the Act, under the former for failure to n; iaintain the register of adult workers with all the prescribed entries duly filled in and under the latter for allowing the workers to work in the factory without making beforehand the entries of their attendance in the register of adult workers. The Judge-Magistrate, Sagar, held that the appellants contravened the provisions of the aforesaid sections and on that finding convicted them under s. 92 of the Act and directed them to pay a fine of Rs. 50 and Rs. 25 respectively. On appeal the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Sagar, confirmed the conviction of the 2nd appellant for contravening the provisions of ss. 62 and 63 but set •aside that of the lst appellant in regard to s. 6~ but confirmed the conviction for contravening s. 63 of the Act. The Revision Petition filed by the appellants in the High Court of Judicature at Nagpur was dismissed. As aforesaid with Special Leave of this Court, this appeal was filed against the Order of the High Court.\n\nThe conflicting contentions of the parties may l>riefly be stated. The learned counsel for the appellants contends that a Sattedar is an independent contractor, who undertakes to do a specific job of work for other persons without submitting himself to their control, and that he or his . employee is itot a worker within the defulltion of s: 2(1) of the Act and therefore the appellants are not under duty to coply with\n\nShri Ohintaman\n\nRao&. Another\n\nThe Stal,,, of Madhya Prad .. T.\n\n8ul>ba Rao J,\n\nSliri Cltinfnman.\n\nRao .v. , 11wther\n\n~'he 8tuJe Qj ,1/adliyn Prw.:'-<Jh\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\n1344 SUPRK\\fE COURT REPORTS [1958]\n\nthe conditions of ss. 62 or 63 in respect of them. Whereas the learned Counsel for the State argues that the definition of the word 'worker' is comprehensive enough to take in all persons who work in the factory. whether employed by the factory or not.\n\nThe answer to the question raised turns upon the construction of the relevant provisions of the Act. They read:\n\nSection 62. Register of adult workers:\n\nThe manager of every factory shall maintain a register of adult workers, to be available to the Inspector at all times during working hours, or when any work is being carried on in the factory, showing-\n\n(a) the name of ea.ch adult worker in the factory;\n\n(b) the nature of his work:\n\n(c) the group, if any, in which he is included;\n\n(d) where his group works on shifts, the relay to • which he is allotted;\n\n(e) such other particulars as may be prescribed:\n\nProvided that, if the Inspector is of opinion that any muster roll or register maintained as part of the routine of a fa.ctory gives in respect of any or all the workers in the factory the particulars required under this section, he may, by order in writing, direct that such muster roll or register shall to the corresponding extent be maintained in place of, and be treated as, the register of adult workers in that factory.\n\nSection 63. Hours of work to correspond with notice under Section 61 and register under Section 62-\n\nNo adult worker shall be required or allowed to work in any factory otherwise than in accordance with the notice of periods of work for adults displayed in the factory and the entries made before-hand against his name in the register of adult workers of the factory.\n\nSection 92. General penalty for offences.\n\nSave as is otherwise expressly provided in this Act and subject to the provisions of section 93, if in, or in respect of, any factory there is any contravention of any of the provisions of. this Act or. of any rule made thereunder or of\n\nany order in writing given thereunder, the occupier and manager of the factory shall each be guilty of an offence and punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months or with fine which may extend to five. hundred rupees or with both, and if the contravention is continued after conviction, with a. further fine which may extend to seventy-five rupees for each day on which the contravention is so continued.\n\nSection 2(1) 'worker' means a. person employed, directly or through any agency, whether for wages or not, in any manufacturing process, or in cleaning any part of the machinery r premises used for manufacturing process, or in any other kincf of work incidental to, or connected with, the manufacturing process, or the subject of the manufacturing process.\n\nSection 2(m) \"factory\" means any premises including the precincts thereof-\n\n(i) Whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on, or\n\n(ii) Whereon twenty or more workers .are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power, or is. ordinarily so carried on, .................................... :\n\nSection 2(n) \"occupier\" of a factory means the person who has ultimate control over the affairs of the factory,\n\nThe gist of the aforesaid provisions relevant to the question raised may be stated thus: The .Manager of a factory-factory is defined under the Act as the premises wherein a specified number of workers are working and in any part of which a manufacturing process is carried on, with or without the aid of power-shall maintain a register of adult workers working in that factory, show1ng the necessary particuJars mentioned in s. 62 of the Act.\n\nSkri OMntama\" Rao er. AllOtw\n\n\"' The Staid of Madhya Praduh\n\n&diba Rao J.\n\nJY.i8\n\nfJ'hri Cld11tama.n\n\nRew &, A1wll1er\n\nv. 'l'lie St<1fo uf Madhya. PradEtA\n\nSttLba Ruo J.\n\nl34(i\n\nSUPHEME COUHT REPOHTS [1958]\n\nadult worker shall be required or allowed to work in any such factory otherwi.se than in accordance with the notice of periods of work for adults displayed in the factory and the entries made beforehand against his name in the register of adult workers of the factory. If there is any contravention of the said provisions, the occupier, who is defined as a person who has ultimate control over the affairs of the factory, and the manager are guilty of offences punishable under the Act.\n\nAdmittedly the names of the 9 persons, stated supra, were not entered in the register of adult workers maintained by the factory. Neither any notice of the periods of work allotted to them was displayed in the factory nor any entries made beforehand against their names in the register of adult workers of the factory.\n\nThe appellants, therefore, would have certainly contravened the provisions of the Act, if, in fact, the said persons were workers in the factory as defined under the Act.\n\nThis takes us to the consideration of the definition of the term 'worker' under the Act. 'Worker' is defined to mean a person employed, directly or through any agency, whether for wages or not, in any manufacturing process. It is and it cannot be disputed that the making of bidis is a manufacturing process. But is a Sa, ttedar a person 'employed', directly or through agency, within the meaning of the definition \"employed\". The concept of employment involves three in gredients: (I) employer (2) employee and (3) the contract of employment. The employer is one who employs, i.e., one who engages the services of other persons. The employee is one who works for another for hire. The employment is the contract of service _between the employer and the employee whereunder the employee agrees to serve the em\n\nployer subject to his control and supervision. Can it be said that a Sattedar is employed by the management of the fac tory to serve under it? There is a well understood distinction between a contractor and a workman and between contract for service and contract of service. In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (Third Edition, Volume I, Page 616) the distinction between a. contractor and a workman is brou&ht out in bold relief in the following manner :\n\n\"Of course, every person who makes _an agreement with another for the doing of work is a contractor, in a general sense; but as used in Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897\n\n(60 & 61 Viet., c. 37), s. 4 \"contractpr\" and \"WORKMAN\" \"have come to have a more restricted and distinctive meaning,\" and \"contractor\" means 'one who makes an agreement to carry out certain work specified, but not on a contract of service'.\"\n\nThe same idea is repeated in a different terminology thus:\n\n\"A 'contractor' is a person who, in the pursuit of an independent business, undertakes to do specific jobs of work for other persons, without submitting himself to their control in respect to the details of the work\".\n\nThere is, therefore, a clear-cut distinction between a contractor and a workman. The identifying mark of the latter is that he should be under the control and supervision of the employer in respect of the details of the work. This Court in Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra(') in the context of the definition of \"workman\" under the Industrial Disputes Act (XIV of 1947) made the following observations at page 157:\n\n\"The essential condition of a person being a workman within the terms of this definition is that he should be employed to do the work in that industry, that there should be, in other words, an employment of his by the employer and that there should be the relationship between the employer and him as between employer and employee or master and servant. Unless a person is thus employed there can be no question of his bCing a workman within the definition of the term as contained in the Act.\"\n\nElaborating the point further, Bbagwati J. who delivered\n\n<') (1957] $.C.R. 152.\n\n19Ji8\n\nSkri Ohintaman\n\nRao &: Another\n\n. v.\n\nThe State of M adliya Pradull\n\nSubbaRao J,\n\nShri Chintaman\n\n&w fh .Another\n\nThe Stale of Madhya Pra<i\"h\n\nSubia Rao J,\n\nthe jud!l\"'1ent on behalf of the Court proceeded to state:\n\n\"The test which is uniformly applied in order to determine the relationship is the existence of a right of control in respect of the manner in which the work is to be done.\"\n\nAfter oonsideri~ the Case-la~ on the subject the learned Iudge restated the principle a.t page 160 thus:\n\n\"The principle which emerges from these authorities is that the prima facie test for the determination of the relationship between master and servant is the existence of the right in the master to supervise and control the work done by the servant not only in the matter of directing what work the servant is to do but also the manner in which he shall do his work, or to borrow the words of Lord Uthwa.tt at page 23 in Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Coggins and Griffith (Liverpool) Ltd., and another ([19471 I A.C. 1, 23), \"The proper test is whether or not the hirer had authority to control the manner of execution of the act in question.\"\n\nAfter noticing the subsequent trend. of decisions wherein it is observed that the test of control is not one of universal application, the learned Judge expresses his view thus:\n\n\"The correct method of approach, therefore, would be l'O consider whether having regard to the nature of the work there was due control and supervision by the employer ......\n\n\" ... _ .. _ ....................................... .\n\nThere is no reason why the test laid down by this Court in the context .of. the definition of 'workman' under the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947, cannot be invoked or applied for ascertaining whether a person is a 'worker' under the Act.\n\nIf the test be appiled, it is not possible to hold that Sattedars in the present case, having regard to the nature of the work undertaken by them and the terms whereunder their services were engaged, a.re \"workers\" within the meaning of the definition under the Act. .It has been established in the present case that the Sattedar is only an indep, endent contractor and the agreement between the tnanagement and the Sa.ttedar is '\n\nonly that the Sattedar should receive tobacco from the management and supply them rolled in bidis for cqnsideration. He\n\ni& not under the control of the factory management and he can manufacture bidis wherever he pleases. It is immaterial to the management whether he makes the bidis in his own factory or distributes. tobacco to different individuals for making bidis under a separate agrment entered into by him with them. The management cannot regulate the manner of discharge of his work. His liability is discharged by his supplying bidis and delivering them in the factory. The terms of the contract between the management and the Sattedar, as disclosed in the evidence, do not enjoin on the latter to work in the factory. His only obligation is to deliver bidis at the factory. That would be an obligation imposed on any contractor who undertakes to supply and deliver the goods to the other party. We, therefore, bold that the Sattedars in this case were not employed by the management as workers but were only indepcpdent :contractors who performed their part of the act bf tt)aking '?idis. and delivering them at\n\nth~ factory. · ·\n\nIf the Satt(!dars, i.e., three out of the nine persons found at the factory, were' oot workers within the meaning of the Act, can it be said that the other persons, .who were coolies . . .\n\nI employed by the Sattedars to enable them to keep up their contract with t, he management of the factory, were workers as defined under the Act?' A \"worker\" under the def4iition means a person employed, directly or through any agency.\n\nThe words 'directly or through any agency' indicate that the emplo'yment is by the management directly or through some kind of employment agency and in either case there i& a contract of employment between the management and the persons employed .. Admittedly the coolies were not employed by the management; there was no privity of contract between them and the management. It is not disputed that the coolies were not employed by the Sattedars for or on behalf of the management of the factory. They were employed by the Sattedars on their own acaunt and they paid them for .the\n\nl!JJ8\n\nShri Chiutaman Roo &: Another\n\nv. 2' he State of M rulkya Pradesh\n\nSubba l!ao J.\n\n1!J; J8\n\n::ihri'. CltintamtHi\n\nRM 4: Anotlu!.r ...\n\nTlw Stale Qj Jlarlhya Prade8/t.\n\nSu.bba llim .T.\n\n1350 SUl'REllfE OOUHT REPORTS [1958]\n\nwork extracted from them. On the aforesaid facts it is obvious that the coolies were not employed by the management directly nor were they employed by the management through the agency of Sattedars. If so, it follows that coolies employed by the Sattedars are not workers within the meaning of the definition in the Act.\n\nThe evidence discloses a third category of persons who took some part in the manufacturing process of bidis. They were the persons to whom the Sattedars distributed tobacco for making bidis in their respective homes. It does not appear from the evidence that any one of the nine persons found in the factory belongs to that category. That apart those persons cannot, in any sense of the term, be called the persons employed by the management directly or through any agency.\n\nThat that should be the construction of the provisions of s. 2(1) of the Act is reinforced by other relevant provisions of the Act. Chapter 6 is headed \"Working hours of Adults\". Section 51 prescribes the weekly hours of work for a worker. Section 52 provides that no adult worker shall be required or allowed to work in a factory on the first day of the week and if he is made to work on that day for the substitution of another holiday in its place. Section 53 gives compensatory holiday to a worker who is made to work on a regblar holiday. Section 54 fixes the daily hours of work and s. 55 intervals for rest. Section 56 limits the spreadover of period of work for an adult worker to 10! hours in a day, including the intervals for rest. Sections 57, 58, and 59 deal with night shifts prohibition of overlaping shifts and extra wages for overtime. Section 60 prohibits double em ployment. i.e., employment of the same worker in a factory on any day on wch he. has already been working in any other factory. Section 61 enjoins qn the management of the factory to display and maintain the notice of periods of work for adults, showing clearly for every day the periods during which the adult workers may be required lo work and directs\n\nthat the said notice shall be such that the workers working for those periods would not be working in ontravention of any of the provisions of SS. 51, 52, 54, 55, 56 and 58 of the Act. Section 62, for breach of which provisions the prosecution was launched in the present' case, imposes a duty bn the manager of every factory to maintain a register of adult workers, showing .the name of each adult worker in the factory, the nature of his work, the group, if any, in which he is included, where his group works on shifts, the relay to which he is allotted and such other particulars as may be prescribed. Section 63' directs that the hours of work of an adult worker should correspond with the particulars given . in the notice under s. 6 l u.nd the reiister under s. 62. Section 92 constitutes the contravention of any of the provisions of the Act or any rules made thereunder an offence punishable with imprisonment or fine or with both .. the scheme of the aforesaid provisions indicates that the workmen in the factQry are under the direct supervision and control of the management. The conditions of service are statutorily regulated and the ma.nagement is to conform to the rules laid down at the risk of being penalised for dereliction of any of the statutory duties. The management obviously cannot fix the working\n\nhours, weekly holidays, arrange for night shifts and comply with other statutory requirements, if the persQns like the Sattedars, working in their factories and getting their work done by others or through coolies, are workers within the meaning of the Act. It is well nigh impossible for the management of the factory to regulate their work or to comply with the mandatory provisions of the Act. The said provisions, therefore, give a clear indication that a worker under the definition of the Act is a person who enters into a contract of service under the management and does not include an independent contractor or his coolies or servants who are not under the control and supervision of the employer.\n\nThei:e is a. conflict of decisions between the Allahabad and the Nagpur High Court~ on the construction of s. 2(1) of the Act. A Divisional Bench of the Nagpur High Court\n\nShri Chintaman Rao th A nather\n\nTlie Stat' of Madhya Pra<W; ih\n\n,<fohha Rao .T.\n\n19.>8\n\nSl1ri Ohintawon Jff1.0 d: Ano(/11.r ,._\n\nTIH' 8/A, ff' of\n\nfmll•11a Prarfl'.li\n\n.':• 11hbn Rno ./.\n\n1352 SOPRE~IE COUllT REPORTS [1958)\n\nin Prm•i11cia/ Gm•emment, Central Provinces and Berar v.\n\nRobinson(') considered the scope .of the definition of the word \"worker\" in the Factories Act. There the facts were: On November l 0, 1943, a new battery of boilers was being erected. on the premises of the Jubbulpore Electric Supply Co. in order to supply energy to the New Ordnance Factory at Khamaria.\n\nThe work of erectiop. was entrusted to Messrs. Babcock and )Vilcox of Calcutta. The persons who were employed by Messrs. Babcock and Wilcox were found working in the premises of the Electric Supply Co. in contravention of the provisions of the Factories Act.\n\nThe question was whether the employees of an independent .contractor were workers as defined under s. 2(1) of the Act.\n\nPollock J. who delivered the judgment of the Division Bench stated at page 44 thus:\n\n\"The definition of \"worker\" is a very wide one, and it is wide enough, in our opinion, to include persons employed in repairing machinery or putting up new machinery, even if such a machinery is not in actual use at the time.\"\n\nIt may be noticed that no contention was raised in that case that the persons found in the factory were not the employees of Jubbulpore Electric Supply Co. The only question raised and decided was whether the persons employed in repairing the machinery or putting up new ma.chinery were persons engaged in any manufacturing process or any work incidental to or connected with it. The question now raised was not before the learned Judge and therefore there was no occasion for them to express any opinion thereon. The fact that if this question was raised and decided in the way we did, the conclusion of the learned Judges would have been different cannot make the said decision an authority on a point not raised or decided upon by the learned Judges.\n\nAnother Bench of the Nagpur High Court in The State\n\nv. liwabhai(') gave a. wide connotation to the word \"employed\" under s. 66(l)(b) of the Factories Act. The learned\n\n(') I.L.R. (1947] Nagpur 43. (') l.L.R. (1953] Nagpur 67.\n\nJudges observed that the word \"employed\", in their opinion, did not only connote employed on wages but also being occuP..ied or engaged in some form of activity. If the learned Judges meant by that observation that if a person is found engaged in some form of activity in a factory, irrespecte of whether there was any contract of employmeAt or not between him and the employer, he is a worker, we should express our respectful dissent from the said observa.tion. But, on the other hand, if they had only emphasized on the fact, which is obvious from the provisions of s. 2(1), that the employment need not be for wages, the statement is unobjectionable.\n\nThe decision in State v. Shri Krishna Prasad Dar(') need not be considered in detail as the learned Judges therein accepted the same interpretation that we have placed on the provisions of s. 2(1) of the Act and came to the conclusion, on the facts of that' case, that the persons therein were workers of the factory.\n\nWe, therefore, hold that neither the Sattedars nor the coolies found by the Inspector to be working in the factory were workers, as they were not employed by the factory.\n\nAs they were not workers, the non-inclusion of their names in the register of adult workers or the absence of any entries in regard to them in the .said register would not constitute an offence under s. 92 of the Act.\n\nBefore leaving. this case we would like to make one observation. Our decision is not intended to lay down a general proposition that under no circumstances a Sattedar can be considered to be a worker within the meaning of its definition in the Act.\n\nWhether a particular person, under whatever designation he may be known, is a worker or not under the Act depends upon the terms of the contract entered into between him and the employer. In the case before us no attempt has been made by the prosecution to establish that the Sa.ttedars were employed by the management for\n\n(') A.I.R. (1954] Allahabad 44.\n\n19.5/i\n\n811ri Cltinlfnn,, n\n\nllfln & A 1wtl1f'r , .. '1 1'1e 8111-h o/' Jind/11111 l'rade•ll.\n\nShri Chintnm.nn\n\nRnn &: A)u1/lu,,.\n\nv. 'l'ltt S!fllfrf ; l{rullt!ff1 J'-rml1.<fi\n\nS1d1hri Jf11n .1.\n\ndoing work in the factory. The uncontradicted evidence is that they were independent contractors who came to the factory to deliver the bidis or sent their coolies to do the same. Our decision is. therefore, confined to the facts of this case.\n\nIn the result we allow the appeal and set aside the convictions of the appellants under s. 92 of the Act and the sentences imposed upon them. The fines if paid, will be refunded.\n\nA ppea/ allowed .", "total_entities": 121, "entities": [{"text": "CHINT AMAN RAO AND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 49, "end_char": 75, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHINT AMAN RAO AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 77, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 107, "end_char": 118, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 291, "end_char": 304, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 322, "end_char": 330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 907, "end_char": 912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 914, "end_char": 927, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 62\n\nand 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 964, "end_char": 978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1249, "end_char": 1256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1421, "end_char": 1426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2413, "end_char": 2429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee and Rameslnvar Nath, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Rameslnvar Nath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2434, "end_char": 2449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee and Rameslnvar Nath, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "I. N. 'Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2472, "end_char": 2485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. N. 'Shroff, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "SUBBAI RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2581, "end_char": 2591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSUBBAI RAO J.-This appeal by Special Leave is directed against the Order of the High Court of1Judicature at Nagpur and raises the question of construction of some of the provisions of the Factories Act (LXIII of 1948) (hereinafter referred to as the Act).", "canonical_name": "Subba l!ao J."}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2769, "end_char": 2782, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Brijlal Manila", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3007, "end_char": 3021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Messrs. Brijlal Manila!"}}, {"text": "Sagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3065, "end_char": 3070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Company is a bidi factory situated in Sagar."}}, {"text": "Chintamanrao", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3093, "end_char": 3105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The I st Appella.nt, Chintamanrao, is the Managing-Partner of the."}}, {"text": "Kantilal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3169, "end_char": 3177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "firm while the 2nd appellant, Kantilal, is its active Manager."}}, {"text": "S4S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4398, "end_char": 4401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Madhya", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4449, "end_char": 4464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The management\n\nL/S4SCI-11 (11)\n\n8/iri Okintaman\n\nRao & Another\n\nThe State of Madhya l'radf!llt\n\nSuhbti Rao J.\n\n8kri Ohinblma:•\n\nRao &r AnolJu, r\n\nThe State of Matlhya Praduh\n\nSubbaRaoJ.\n\n1342 SUPRElliE COURT REPORTS (1958]\n\npays the Sattedars the cost of the manufacture of bidis after deducting therefrom the cost of tobacco supplied to them."}}, {"text": "Suhbti Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4477, "end_char": 4487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The management\n\nL/S4SCI-11 (11)\n\n8/iri Okintaman\n\nRao & Another\n\nThe State of Madhya l'radf!llt\n\nSuhbti Rao J.\n\n8kri Ohinblma:•\n\nRao &r AnolJu, r\n\nThe State of Matlhya Praduh\n\nSubbaRaoJ.\n\n1342 SUPRElliE COURT REPORTS (1958]\n\npays the Sattedars the cost of the manufacture of bidis after deducting therefrom the cost of tobacco supplied to them."}}, {"text": "Sattedar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5151, "end_char": 5159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jlrom the aforesaid description of the dual process of manufacture of bidis it is manifest that a Sattedar is only an independent contractor, who undertakes to do a specific job of work, i.e., the supply of bidis.", "canonical_name": "Sattedars"}}, {"text": "Sattedars", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5705, "end_char": 5714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The coolies or the third parties, to whom the work of making of bidis is en trusted by the Sattedars, are employed by the Sattedars and are paid by them.", "canonical_name": "Sattedars"}}, {"text": "December 9, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6120, "end_char": 6136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 9, 1952, Sri B. V. Desai, the Inspector of Factories, Madhya Pradesh, Nagpur, visited the factory at\n\n5-30 p.m. At the time of his inspection he found the following persons in the factory :\n\nl. Pirbaksha, son of Amir."}}, {"text": "B. V. Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6142, "end_char": 6153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 9, 1952, Sri B. V. Desai, the Inspector of Factories, Madhya Pradesh, Nagpur, visited the factory at\n\n5-30 p.m. At the time of his inspection he found the following persons in the factory :\n\nl. Pirbaksha, son of Amir."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6183, "end_char": 6197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 9, 1952, Sri B. V. Desai, the Inspector of Factories, Madhya Pradesh, Nagpur, visited the factory at\n\n5-30 p.m. At the time of his inspection he found the following persons in the factory :\n\nl. Pirbaksha, son of Amir."}}, {"text": "Nagpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6199, "end_char": 6205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 9, 1952, Sri B. V. Desai, the Inspector of Factories, Madhya Pradesh, Nagpur, visited the factory at\n\n5-30 p.m. At the time of his inspection he found the following persons in the factory :\n\nl. Pirbaksha, son of Amir."}}, {"text": "Abdul Sagir", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6351, "end_char": 6362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Abdul Sagir, son of Sk."}}, {"text": "Deviprasad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6385, "end_char": 6395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Deviprasad.", "canonical_name": "Deviprasad"}}, {"text": "Ramshankar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6415, "end_char": 6425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramshankar, son of Mulchand."}}, {"text": "Gopal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6448, "end_char": 6453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopal, son of Mulchand."}}, {"text": "Nirpat", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6476, "end_char": 6482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nirpat, son of Bhagirath.", "canonical_name": "Nirpat"}}, {"text": "Ramchand", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6506, "end_char": 6514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramchand, son of Gyan."}}, {"text": "Gotiram", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6533, "end_char": 6540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gotiram, son of Lila.", "canonical_name": "Gotiram"}}, {"text": "Basodi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6559, "end_char": 6565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Basodi, son of Gulu."}}, {"text": "Deviprasad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6607, "end_char": 6617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Of the aforesaid persons, Deviprasad, Nirpat and Gotiram are Sattedars a.nd the rest are coolies employed by the Sattedars .. The Inspector found the first seven persons sorting out bidis and packing them into bundles of 10 and 25 in the premises and the last two bringing the bidis to\" the room in jali for warming; The said facts are practically admitted by some of the aforesaid persons, who ga.ve evidence in the case, and they explained that they came to the factory on that day for delivering the bidis manufactured.", "canonical_name": "Deviprasad"}}, {"text": "Nirpat", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6619, "end_char": 6625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Of the aforesaid persons, Deviprasad, Nirpat and Gotiram are Sattedars a.nd the rest are coolies employed by the Sattedars .. The Inspector found the first seven persons sorting out bidis and packing them into bundles of 10 and 25 in the premises and the last two bringing the bidis to\" the room in jali for warming; The said facts are practically admitted by some of the aforesaid persons, who ga.ve evidence in the case, and they explained that they came to the factory on that day for delivering the bidis manufactured.", "canonical_name": "Nirpat"}}, {"text": "Gotiram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6630, "end_char": 6637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Of the aforesaid persons, Deviprasad, Nirpat and Gotiram are Sattedars a.nd the rest are coolies employed by the Sattedars .. The Inspector found the first seven persons sorting out bidis and packing them into bundles of 10 and 25 in the premises and the last two bringing the bidis to\" the room in jali for warming; The said facts are practically admitted by some of the aforesaid persons, who ga.ve evidence in the case, and they explained that they came to the factory on that day for delivering the bidis manufactured.", "canonical_name": "Gotiram"}}, {"text": "Court of the Judge-Magistrate, Sagar", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7199, "end_char": 7235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter .the Chief Inspector of Factories filed a complaint in the Court of the Judge-Magistrate, Sagar, against the appellants for violation of the provisfons of ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 62 and 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7295, "end_char": 7308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7751, "end_char": 7756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Second Additional Sessions Judge, Sagar", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7849, "end_char": 7888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Sagar, confirmed the conviction of the 2nd appellant for contravening the provisions of ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 62 and 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7971, "end_char": 7984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8039, "end_char": 8043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8091, "end_char": 8096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Nagpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8162, "end_char": 8196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Revision Petition filed by the appellants in the High Court of Judicature at Nagpur was dismissed."}}, {"text": "Ohintaman\n\nRao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8746, "end_char": 8760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "employee is itot a worker within the defulltion of s: 2(1) of the Act and therefore the appellants are not under duty to coply with\n\nShri Ohintaman\n\nRao&.", "canonical_name": "CHINT AMAN RAO AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "ba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8810, "end_char": 8816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another\n\nThe Stal,,, of Madhya Prad .. T.\n\n8ul>ba Rao J,\n\nSliri Cltinfnman."}}, {"text": "Sliri Cltinfnman.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8821, "end_char": 8838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another\n\nThe Stal,,, of Madhya Prad .. T.\n\n8ul>ba Rao J,\n\nSliri Cltinfnman."}}, {"text": "Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8840, "end_char": 8843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rao .v. ,"}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8895, "end_char": 8904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "11wther\n\n~'he 8tuJe Qj ,1/adliyn Prw.:'-<Jh\n\nSubba Rao J.\n\n1344 SUPRK\\fE COURT REPORTS [1958]\n\nthe conditions of ss.", "canonical_name": "Subba l!ao J."}}, {"text": "ss. 62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8963, "end_char": 8969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9312, "end_char": 9322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10239, "end_char": 10249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10297, "end_char": 10307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10327, "end_char": 10337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10608, "end_char": 10618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 93", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10736, "end_char": 10746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11323, "end_char": 11335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(m)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11680, "end_char": 11692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(n)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12265, "end_char": 12277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12804, "end_char": 12809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "OMntama\" Rao", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12828, "end_char": 12840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Skri OMntama\" Rao er."}}, {"text": "&diba Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12884, "end_char": 12893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AllOtw\n\n\"' The Staid of Madhya Praduh\n\n&diba Rao J.\n\nJY.i8\n\nfJ'hri Cld11tama.n\n\nRew &, A1wll1er\n\nv. 'l'lie St<1fo uf Madhya."}}, {"text": "SttLba Ruo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12979, "end_char": 12989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PradEtA\n\nSttLba Ruo J.\n\nl34(i\n\nSUPHEME COUHT REPOHTS [1958]\n\nadult worker shall be required or allowed to work in any such factory otherwi.se than in accordance with the notice of periods of work for adults displayed in the factory and the entries made beforehand against his name in the register of adult workers of the factory."}}, {"text": "Stroud", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15100, "end_char": 15106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (Third Edition, Volume I, Page 616) the distinction between a. contractor and a workman is brou&ht out in bold relief in the following manner :\n\n\"Of course, every person who makes _an agreement with another for the doing of work is a contractor, in a general sense; but as used in Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897\n\n(60 & 61 Viet.,"}}, {"text": "Compensation Act, 1897", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15420, "end_char": 15442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15468, "end_char": 15472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Compensation Act, 1897", "statute": "Compensation Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "Dharangadhara Chemical", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16207, "end_char": 16229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court in Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra(') in the context of the definition of \"workman\" under the Industrial Disputes Act (XIV of 1947) made the following observations at page 157:\n\n\"The essential condition of a person being a workman within the terms of this definition is that he should be employed to do the work in that industry, that there should be, in other words, an employment of his by the employer and that there should be the relationship between the employer and him as between employer and employee or master and servant."}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16323, "end_char": 16346, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bbagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16934, "end_char": 16942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Elaborating the point further, Bbagwati J. who delivered\n\n<') (1957] $.C.R. 152."}}, {"text": "Ohintaman", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16997, "end_char": 17006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19Ji8\n\nSkri Ohintaman\n\nRao &: Another\n\n.", "canonical_name": "CHINT AMAN RAO AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "State of M adliya Pradull", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17034, "end_char": 17059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nThe State of M adliya Pradull\n\nSubbaRao J,\n\nShri Chintaman\n\n&w fh .Another\n\nThe Stale of Madhya Pra<i\"h\n\nSubia Rao J,\n\nthe jud!l\"'1ent on behalf of the Court proceeded to state:\n\n\"The test which is uniformly applied in order to determine the relationship is the existence of a right of control in respect of the manner in which the work is to be done.\"", "canonical_name": "State of M adliya Pradull"}}, {"text": "SubbaRao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17061, "end_char": 17069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nThe State of M adliya Pradull\n\nSubbaRao J,\n\nShri Chintaman\n\n&w fh .Another\n\nThe Stale of Madhya Pra<i\"h\n\nSubia Rao J,\n\nthe jud!l\"'1ent on behalf of the Court proceeded to state:\n\n\"The test which is uniformly applied in order to determine the relationship is the existence of a right of control in respect of the manner in which the work is to be done.\"", "canonical_name": "Subba l!ao J."}}, {"text": "Chintaman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17079, "end_char": 17088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nThe State of M adliya Pradull\n\nSubbaRao J,\n\nShri Chintaman\n\n&w fh .Another\n\nThe Stale of Madhya Pra<i\"h\n\nSubia Rao J,\n\nthe jud!l\"'1ent on behalf of the Court proceeded to state:\n\n\"The test which is uniformly applied in order to determine the relationship is the existence of a right of control in respect of the manner in which the work is to be done.\"", "canonical_name": "CHINT AMAN RAO AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Subia Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17135, "end_char": 17144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nThe State of M adliya Pradull\n\nSubbaRao J,\n\nShri Chintaman\n\n&w fh .Another\n\nThe Stale of Madhya Pra<i\"h\n\nSubia Rao J,\n\nthe jud!l\"'1ent on behalf of the Court proceeded to state:\n\n\"The test which is uniformly applied in order to determine the relationship is the existence of a right of control in respect of the manner in which the work is to be done.\"", "canonical_name": "Subba l!ao J."}}, {"text": "Uthwa.tt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17887, "end_char": 17895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After oonsideri~ the Case-la~ on the subject the learned Iudge restated the principle a.t page 160 thus:\n\n\"The principle which emerges from these authorities is that the prima facie test for the determination of the relationship between master and servant is the existence of the right in the master to supervise and control the work done by the servant not only in the matter of directing what work the servant is to do but also the manner in which he shall do his work, or to borrow the words of Lord Uthwa.tt at page 23 in Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Coggins and Griffith (Liverpool) Ltd., and another ([19471 I A.C. 1, 23), \"The proper test is whether or not the hirer had authority to control the manner of execution of the act in question.\""}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18663, "end_char": 18686, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Chiutaman Roo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21384, "end_char": 21397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were employed by the Sattedars on their own acaunt and they paid them for .the\n\nl!JJ8\n\nShri Chiutaman Roo &: Another\n\nv. 2' he State of M rulkya Pradesh\n\nSubba l!ao J.\n\n1!J; J8\n\n::ihri'."}}, {"text": "State of M rulkya Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21419, "end_char": 21444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were employed by the Sattedars on their own acaunt and they paid them for .the\n\nl!JJ8\n\nShri Chiutaman Roo &: Another\n\nv. 2' he State of M rulkya Pradesh\n\nSubba l!ao J.\n\n1!J; J8\n\n::ihri'.", "canonical_name": "State of M adliya Pradull"}}, {"text": "Subba l!ao J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21446, "end_char": 21459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were employed by the Sattedars on their own acaunt and they paid them for .the\n\nl!JJ8\n\nShri Chiutaman Roo &: Another\n\nv. 2' he State of M rulkya Pradesh\n\nSubba l!ao J.\n\n1!J; J8\n\n::ihri'.", "canonical_name": "Subba l!ao J."}}, {"text": "s. 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22456, "end_char": 22463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22577, "end_char": 22587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22638, "end_char": 22648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22850, "end_char": 22860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22942, "end_char": 22952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22987, "end_char": 22992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23013, "end_char": 23023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 57, 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23141, "end_char": 23156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23251, "end_char": 23261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23410, "end_char": 23420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SS. 51, 52, 54, 55, 56 and 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23781, "end_char": 23810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23823, "end_char": 23833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24244, "end_char": 24254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24373, "end_char": 24377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24404, "end_char": 24409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24411, "end_char": 24421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25718, "end_char": 25727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thei:e is a. conflict of decisions between the Allahabad and the Nagpur High Court~ on the construction of s. 2(1) of the Act."}}, {"text": "Nagpur High Court~", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25736, "end_char": 25754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thei:e is a. conflict of decisions between the Allahabad and the Nagpur High Court~ on the construction of s. 2(1) of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25778, "end_char": 25785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chintaman Rao", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25848, "end_char": 25861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Divisional Bench of the Nagpur High Court\n\nShri Chintaman Rao th A nather\n\nTlie Stat' of Madhya Pra<W; ih\n\n,<fohha Rao .T.\n\n19.>8\n\nSl1ri Ohintawon Jff1.0 d: Ano(/11.r ,._", "canonical_name": "CHINT AMAN RAO AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Ohintawon", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25937, "end_char": 25946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Divisional Bench of the Nagpur High Court\n\nShri Chintaman Rao th A nather\n\nTlie Stat' of Madhya Pra<W; ih\n\n,<fohha Rao .T.\n\n19.>8\n\nSl1ri Ohintawon Jff1.0 d: Ano(/11.r ,._", "canonical_name": "CHINT AMAN RAO AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26206, "end_char": 26219, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "l 0, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26255, "end_char": 26264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There the facts were: On November l 0, 1943, a new battery of boilers was being erected."}}, {"text": "Khamaria", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26421, "end_char": 26429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on the premises of the Jubbulpore Electric Supply Co. in order to supply energy to the New Ordnance Factory at Khamaria."}}, {"text": "Babcock", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26479, "end_char": 26486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was entrusted to Messrs. Babcock and )Vilcox of Calcutta."}}, {"text": "Vilcox", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26492, "end_char": 26498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was entrusted to Messrs. Babcock and )Vilcox of Calcutta."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26502, "end_char": 26510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was entrusted to Messrs. Babcock and )Vilcox of Calcutta."}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26676, "end_char": 26689, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26791, "end_char": 26798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pollock", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26812, "end_char": 26819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pollock J. who delivered the judgment of the Division Bench stated at page 44 thus:\n\n\"The definition of \"worker\" is a very wide one, and it is wide enough, in our opinion, to include persons employed in repairing machinery or putting up new machinery, even if such a machinery is not in actual use at the time.\""}}, {"text": "Jubbulpore Electric Supply Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27250, "end_char": 27280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be noticed that no contention was raised in that case that the persons found in the factory were not the employees of Jubbulpore Electric Supply Co. The only question raised and decided was whether the persons employed in repairing the machinery or putting up new ma.chinery were persons engaged in any manufacturing process or any work incidental to or connected with it."}}, {"text": "Nagpur High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27901, "end_char": 27918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another Bench of the Nagpur High Court in The State\n\nv. liwabhai(') gave a. wide connotation to the word \"employed\" under s. 66(l)(b) of the Factories Act."}}, {"text": "s. 66(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28002, "end_char": 28013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28021, "end_char": 28034, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28677, "end_char": 28684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28953, "end_char": 28960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29455, "end_char": 29460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30258, "end_char": 30260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30610, "end_char": 30615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1958_1_1355_1383_EN", "year": 1958, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1355\n\nTHE TATA IRON & STEEL CO., LTD. v.\n\nTHE STATE OF BIHAR\n\n(S. R. DAS C. J., VENKATARAMA AIYAR, S. K. DAS,\n\nA. K. SARKAR and VIV!AN BOSE J.J.) Sales Tax-Provincial legislation imposing tax in certain circumstances-Validity-Power of Provincial Legislature-Retrospective levy, legality of-Theory of territorial nexus, if applicable -Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 (No. XIX of 1947) as amended by Bihar Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1948 (VI of 1949), ss .. 4(1), 2(g).\n\nThe appellant company, carrying on business as manufacturer of iron and steel, with its factory and works at J amshedpur in Bihar, was assessed to sales tax for two periods prior to the Constitution, under the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 (No. XIX of 1947). enacted by the Bihar Legislature in exercise of its exclusive power under the Government of India-Act, 1935.\n\nThe company used to send its goods from J amshedpur to various parts of India.\n\nIn the railway receipt the company itself figured as the consignee, it paid the freight and the receipt was sent either to its branch offices or bankers to be handed over to the purchaser when he paid the price.\n\nFrom the amounts shown as gross tum-over in the two returns for the two periods, the company claimed deduction of certain amounts, being the valuable consideration for the goods manufactured in Bjhar but sold, delivered and consumed outside, on the ground that in none of the transactions in respect of the said sums did property in the goods pass to the purchasers in Bihar.\n\nThe appellant claimed further deductions on account of the railway freight paid by it.\n\nThe Sales Tax Officer disallowed both the claims and added the amounts of sales tax realised by the ap~Jlant from its purchasers to the taxable turnover.\n\nThe company appealed against the orders of assessment, but the Commissioner of Sales Tax dismissed its appeals.\n\nThe Board of Revenue, in revision. confirmed the orders of the Commissioner with certain modifications and remanded the matters to the Sales Tax Officer.\n\nOn the appellant's application for reference of certain questions of law, the Board referred them to the High Court.\n\nOne of them related to the legality of adding the Sales Tax to the tum-over and was answered in favour of the appellant and the respondent did not appeal.\n\nThe other questions decided by the High Court against the appellant related to the vires of the Act and the validity of retrospective levy of sales tax under s. 4(1) of the Act.\n\nThe appellant's contentions in the appeals were that the tax levied under s. 4(1) read with s. 2(g) second .proviso, cl. (II), of the Act, was not, a sales tax within the meaning of Entry 48 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, but was in the nature of excise duty\n\nFebruary 19.\n\n1938 which a rrovincial legislature had no power to impose, that the theory o territorial nexus was inapplicable to sales tax and, in Th• Tata Iron & any case, there was no real or sufficient nexus in the present cases\n\nSteel Co., Ltd. and that retrospective levy of the sales tax under s. 4(1) of the v.\n\nAct destroyed the indirect nature of the tax, thus making it a Th• Statt of Bihar direct tax on the dealer which could not be passed on to the consumer:\n\nHeld, (per Das, C.J., Venkatarama Aiyar, S. K. Das and A. K. Sarkar, JJ., Bose, J. dissenting), that the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant must be negatived.\n\nThe provisions of s. 4(1) read withs. 2(g), second proviso, of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, as amended by the Bihar Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1948, (VI of 1949), were within the legislative competence of the Legislature of the Province of Bihar. Both before and after the amendment, the word 'sale' as used in s. 4( 1) and as defined by s. 2(g) of the Act, meant the transfer of property in the goods sold. The second proviso added by the amending Act did not extend that meaning so as to include a contract of sale.\n\nWhat it actually did was to lay down certain circumstances in which a sale, although completed elsewhere, was to be deemed to have taken place in Bihar. Those circumstances did not constitute the sale, but only located the situs of the sale.\n\nSales Tax Officer, Pilibhit v. Messrs. Budh Prakash Jai Prakash, [1955] 1 S.C.k. 243, distinguished.\n\nNor was it correct to contend that the tax levied under s. 4 ( 1) read with s. 2(g) of the Act was in the nature of excise duty.\n\nUnder cl. (ii) of the second proviso to s. 2(g) of the Act the producer or manufacturer became liable to pay the tax not because he produced or manufactured the goods but because he sold them.\n\nProvince of Madras v. Boddu Paidanna and Sons. [1942] F.C.R. 90 and Governor General v. Province of Madras, (1945) L.R. 72 I.A. 91, referred to.\n\nThere can be no doubt that the theory of territorial nexus does apply to sales tax legislation.\n\nAlthough sales tax can be levied only on a completed sale, this theory has its use in indicating the circumstanees in which the tax may be enforced in a particular case.\n\nOne or more of the several ingredients of a sale may furnish the connection between the taxing State and the sale.\n\nState of Bombay v. United Motors (India) Ltd., [1953] S.C.R. 1069, Poppatlal Shah v. The State of Madras, [1953] S.C.R. 677 and The State of Bombay v. R. M. D. Chamarbaugwala, [1957] S.C.R. 874, relied on.\n\nBengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bihar, [1955] 2 S.C:R. 603, considered.\n\nCase law reviewed.\n\nAs in a sale of goods, the goods must necessarily play an 1958 important part, the circumstances mentioned in the proviso to s. 2(g) of the Act, namely, the presence of the goods in Bihar at The Tata Iron & the date of the agreement of sale or their production or manu- Steel Co., Ltd. facture there must be held to constitute a sufficient nexus between v. the taxing province aild the sale wherever that might take place. The State of Bihar Governor General v. Raleigh Investment, [1944] F.C.R. 229, relied on.\n\nProvince. of Madras v. Boddu Paidanna and Sons, [1942] F.c..R. 90, distinguished.\n\nIt would not be correct to contend that the theory of nexus might lead to multiple taxation or obstruct inter-State trade.\n\nArticle 286(2) of the Constitution and the relevant entries in the Legislative List are a complete safeguard to any such contingency.\n\nAlthough as a matter of economic theory, sales tax may be an indirect tax realisable from the consumer, it need not be legally so and is not so ui1.der the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947, which imposes the primary liability on the seller.\n\nA buyer, moreover, is not bound to pay sales tax over and above the agreed sale price unless he is by contract bound to do so.\n\nThere can, therefore, be no scope for the argument that the retrospective enforcement of the tax under s. 4 ( 1 ) of the Act could destroy the character of the taX or that it was beyond the legislative competence of the Bihar Legislature.\n\nLove v. Norman Wright (Builders) Ltd., L.R. (1944) 1 K.R. 484, referred to.\n\nPer Bose, J.-Sales tax can be imposed only on the sale. lt is, therefore, wrong to look to the goods or the agreement to 3ell or any other elements that constitute a sale in order to impose the tax.\n\nA State can tax a sale of goods that takes place within its boundary. It has no power to tax extra-territorially, and since a completed sale can have only one situs no State Legislature can be allowed to break up a sale into its component parts, which are separate and distinct from the sale itself, and by an application <; if the theory of nexus claim that the sale wholly took place within 1t.\n\nThe nexus can only be in respect of the entire sale, wherever it may take place and not of its several parts.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos~ 412 and 413 of 1956.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 17, 1955, of the Patna High Court in M.J.C. No. 577 of 1953, made on reference by the Board of Revenue, Bihar in Appeals Nos.· 495 and 496 of 1952.\n\n1958 M.C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, Rajeshwari Prasad and S. P. Varma, for the appellant.\n\nThe Tata Iron &:\n\nSteel co., Ltd.\n\nMahabir Prasad, Advocate-General for the State of v.\n\nBihar and R. C. Prasad, for the respondent.\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\n1958. February 19. The Judgment of Das, C.J., Venkatarama Aiyar, S.K. Das and Sarkar, JJ. was delivered by Das C.J. Bose, J. delivered a separate judgment.\n\nDas c. J.\n\nDAS C.J.-These two appeals, which have been filed with the special leave granted by an order made by this Court on April 3, 1956~ and which have been consolidated together by the same order, are directed against the judgment pronounced by the Patna High Court on October 17, 1955, in Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 577 of 1953, deciding certain questions referred to it by the Board of Revenue, Bihar under s. 25 of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 (No. XIX of 1947) hereinafter referred to as the 1947 Act. The said references arose out of two orders passed by the Board of Revenue in revision of two sales tax assessment orders made against the appellant company.\n\nThe appellant company is a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act. Its registered office is in Bombay; its factory and works are at Jamshedpur in the State of Bihar and its head sales' office is in Calcutta in the State of West Bengal. It has store yards in the States of Madras, Bombay, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Hyderabad, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab and Andhra. It carries on business as manufacturer of iron and steel and is a registered dealer under the 1947 Act, the registration No. being S.C. 905. Its course of dealing is thus described in the judgment under appeal :-\n\n\"The intending purchaser . has to apply for a permit to the Iron and Steel Controller at Calcutta, who forwards the requisition to the Chief Sales Officer of the asscssee working in Calcutta. The Chief Sales Officer thereafter makes a \"works order\" and forwards it to Jamshedpur. The \"works order\" mentions the complete specification of the goods required.\n\nAfter the receipt of the \"works order\" the Jam- 19ss shedpur factory initiates a \"rolling\" or \"manu- - facturing\" programme. After the goods are manu- The Tata Iron . &\n\nf: d h J h d f: d h . .\n\nSteel Co., Lrd. acture , t e ams e pur actory sen s t e mvo1ce v. to the Controller of Accounts who prepares the The state of Bi/Jar\" forwarding notes, and on the basis of these forwarding notes, railway receipts are prepared. The goods are Das c. J. loaded in the wagons at Jamshedpur and despatched to various stations, by the consignee in the railway receipt is the assessee itself and the freight also is paid by the assessee. The railway receipts are sent either • to the branch offices of the assessee or to its bankers, and after tlie purchaser pays the amount of.consideration, the railway receipt is delivered to him. These facts are admitted and the correctness of these facts are not disputed by the State of Bihar.\"\n\nThe appellant company was separately assessed for two periods : (1) from July 1, 1947 to March 31, 1948, and (2) from April 1, 1948 to March 31, 1949. For the first period the appellant company filed a return under s. 12(1) of the 1947 Act before the Sales Tax Officer showing a gross turnover of Rs. 12,80,15,327-8-5.\n\nFrom this gross turnover the appellant company claimed to deduct a sum of Rs. 2,88,60,787-13-0 being the amount of valuable consideration for the goods manufactured at Jamshedpur in the State of Bihar but sold, delivered and consumed outside that State on the ground that in none of the transactions in respect of the said sum did the property in the goods pass to the purchasers in the State of Bihar. The appellant company further claimed a deduction of Rs. 1,10,87,125-13-0 on account of railway freight, actually paid by it for the despatch of the goods. The Sales Tax Officer, by his assessment order dated July 22, 1949, disallowed both the claims for deduction and on the other hand added a sum of Rs. 13,66,496-11-0, being the amount of sales tax realised by the appellant company from its purchasers, to its taxable turnover and assessed the appellant company to sales tax amounting to Rs. 15,31,374-5-9. For the second period the appellant company filed a return showing a gross turnover of Rs. 21,64,45,450-0-0.\n\n19ss From this gross turnover the appellant company - claimed a deduction of Rs. 10,71,66,233-11-0 being\n\nr;~ a:;\n\n171~ & the amount of valuable consideration for goods manu- ,. ;·· factured at Jamshedpur in the State of Bihar, but The srare of Bihar sold, delivered and consumed outside that State on the\n\nDas C.J.\n\nsame ground as hereinbefore mentioned.\n\nThe appellant company also claimed a deduction of Rs. 40,89,973-9-0 on account of railway freight actually paid by it for the despatch of the goods. The Sales Tax Officer by his assessment order dated September 24, 1949, disallowed both the claims and added the sum of Rs. 22,37,919-4-0, being the amount of sales tax realised by the appellant company from its purchasers, to its taxable turnover and assessed the appellant company to sales tax amounting to Rs. 28,30,458-6-0.\n\nAgainst these two assessment orders the appellant company preferred two appeals under s. 24 of the 1947 Act to the Commissioner of Sales Tax of Chota Nagpur who, on April 29, 1950, dismissed both the appeals. The appellant company went up to the l3oard of Revenue on two revision applications against the two orders of the Commissioner. The Board of Revenue, by its order dated August 30, 1952, confirmed the orders of the Commissioner with certain modifications and remanded the cases to the Sales Tax Officer. The appellant company applied under s. 25 of the 1947 Act to the Board of Revenue in Reference Cases Nos. 495 and 496of1952 for reference of certain questions. of law to the High Court. By a common order dated October 5, 1953, made in the said two references the Board of Revenue referred the following questions of law to the High Court for it<; decision :\n\n\"(I) Is the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947, as amended jn 1948, ultra vires the Provincial Legislature in view of the extended meaning of the expression taxes . on sale of goods given in the Act in the light of the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935?\n\n(2) Are the provisions of section 2(g) of the 1947 Act ultra vires the Provincial Legislature?\n\n(3) Is it legal to include sales tax in the taxable 19ss turnover of an assessee like the petitioner ?\n\n(4) Was the Bihar Sales Tax (Amendment) Act The Tata Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. of 1948 legally extended to Chotanagpur ? v.\n\n(5) Were the levy and collection of saleS' taxes The state of Bihar for periods prior to the 26th January 1950, under th.e Sales Tax Act then in force rendered illegal by the Das c. 1 provisions of the Constitution ?\n\n(6) Was the Commissioner, who passed orders, in appeal, after the Constitution came into force, bound to decide the appeal according to the provisions of the Constitution in respect of taxes levied or sought to be levied for periods prior to the 26th January, 1950. when the Constitution came into force ?\" Out of these six questions, question No. 3 was decided in favour of the appellant company and the respon-:- dent State has not preferred any appeal against that decision or questioned its correctness. Question No. 4 was not pressed before the High Court and does not survive before us.. Questions Nos. 1, 2, 5 and 6 were decided against the appellant company and the two consolidated appeals are directed against the High Court's decision on these questions. It will be noticed that questions Nos. 1 and 2, in effect, raise the same problem, namely, as to the vires of the 1947 Act and questions Nos. 5 and 6 are concerned with the validity of the retrospective levy of sales tax by reason of the amendment of s. 4 of the 1947 Act.\n\nThe following points, as formulated by the learned Attorney-General appearing for the appellant company, have been urged before us in support of these appeals : . \"(1) The tax levied under s. 4(1) read with s. 2(g), second proviso, cl. (ii), is not a tax on sale within the meaning of Entry 48 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of . India Act. 1935.\n\n(2) The doctrine of nexus is not applicable. to sales tax.\n\n(3) In any event the nexus in the present case -is not real and sufficient but is illusory. ·\n\n(4) Having regard to the provisions of the law - mentioned above, the tax levied is in the nature of The Tara Iron & duty of excise rather than a tax on sale.\n\nSteel Co. Ltd.\n\n(5) Th t t\" 1 b f th ; e re rospec ive evy y reason o e The state ; I Bihar amendment of s. 4(1) destroys its character as a sales tax and makes it a direct tax on the dealer Das c. J. instead of an indirect tax to be passed on to the consumer.\"\n\nIn order to appreciate the arguments that have been advanced before us on the points noted above, it is necessary to refer to the relevant statutory provisions, which were in force at the material times.\n\nSection 99, of the Government of India Act, 1935, authorised a Provincial Legislature, subject to the provisions of that Act, to make laws for the Province or for any part thereof. Section 100(3) of that Act provided that, subject to the 'two preceding sub-sections, the Provincial Legislature had, and the Federal Legislature had not, power to make laws for any Province or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II of the Seventh Schedule to that Act. The matter enumerated in Entry 48 in List II was as follows: \"Taxes on the sale of goods and on advertisements.\" It is in exercise of this legislative power that the Provincial Legislature of :Sihar passed the 1947 Act which received the assent of the Governor General on June 21, 1947, and came into force on July I, 1947, by virtue of a notification made in the official gazette under s. I (3) of the said Act.\n\nThe relevant portion of s. 4(1) of the 1947 Act, which was the charging section, was, prior to its amendment hereinafter mentioned, expressed in the following terms :- \"Subject to the provisions of sections 5, 6, 7 and '8 and with effect from such date as the Provincial Government may, by notification in the official\n\nazette, appoint, being not earlier than 30 days after the date of the said notification, every dealer whose\n\ngros turnover during the year immediately preceding the commencement of this Act on sales which had taken place both in and outside Bihar exceeded\n\nRs. 10,000 shall be liable to pay tax under this Act\n\n1958 on sales which have taken place in Bihar after the date was notified.\" The Tata Iron & It should be noted that, although the 1947 Act came Steel co., Ltd. into force on July 1, 1947, by virtue of a notification v.\n\nB\"h published in the official gazette under S. 1(3) thereof, The Stare::._{ .I ar the charging section quoted above did not come into .Das c. 1. operation because, by its own terms, it required a further notification in the official gazette to bring it into effect. For some reason, not apparent on the record, the. Provincial Government. .did not .issue any notification as contemplated by s. 4(1). To cure this omission Ordinance III of 1948 was promulgated by the Governor amending s. 4(l)(a) of the 1947 Act.\n\nSection 4(1 ), as amended, read as follows :-\n\n\"Subject to the provisions of sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 and with effect from the commencement of this Act, every dealer, whose turnover during the year immediately preceding the date of such commence~ ment, on sales whichhave taken-pfacebothill\"··arrd outside Bihar exceeded Rs. 10,000, shall be liable to pay tax under this Act on sales which have taken place in Bihar on and from the date of such commencement.\"\n\nOn March 22, 1949, Ordinance III of 1948 was replaced by Bihar Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1948 (VI of 1949) hereinafter referred to as the amending Act. Section 16 of this amending Act provided that the substituted s. 4(1) should form part of the 1947 Act and should always be deemed to have formed part thereof with effect from its commencement, that is to say, from July l; 1947, as hereinbefore mentioned.\n\nTwo things should be noted, namely, (l) that the person sought to be charged was every dealer Whose gross \"turnover\" during the specified period on \"sales\" which had taken place both in and outside Bihar exceeded Rs. 10,000 and (2) that the liability to pay tax was on \"sales\" which had taken place in Bihar on and from the date .of such commencement.\n\nThis takes us back to s. 2(g) which defines \"sale 0 • The material part of the defi.mtion of \"sale\", previous\n\nto the amendment made by the amending Act, read as follows : TheTata/ro11&\n\n\"'S I, . h II.\n\n. I ..\n\nSteel co LM a e means, wit a its grammatica variations v.\" and cognate expressions, any transfer of property in The Stott of Bilw goods for cash or deferred payment or other valuable\n\nDas C.J. consideration, including a transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of contract but does not include a mortgage, hypothecation, charge or pledge :\n\nProvided ................................................................... .\n\nProvided further that notwithstanding any thing to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930 (III of 1930), the sale of any goods which are actually in Bihar at the time when, in respect thereof, the contract of sale as defined in section 4 of that Act is made, shall, wherever the said contract of sale is made, be demed for the purpose of this Act to have been made in Bihar.\n\n\" ................ ; .................................................................. .\n\nSection 2 of the amendin$ Act amended s. 2(g) of the 1947 Act by substitutmg a new proviso to cl. (g) for the original second proviso thereto. The material part of s. 2(g), thus amended, read as follows :\n\n\" 'Sale' means, with all its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, any transfer of property in goods for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration, including a transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of contract but does not include a mortgage, hypothecation, charge, or pledge : Provided ................................................................ .\n\nProvided further that notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930 (III of 1930), the sale of any goods-\n\n(i) which are actually in Bihar at the time when, in respect thereof, the contract of sale as defined in section 4 of that Act is made, or\n\n(ii) which are produced or manufactured in Bihar by the producer or manufacturer thereof, shall, wherever the delivery or contract of sale is made, he\n\ndeemed for the purposes of this Act to have taken 1958 place in Bihar.\n\n\" The Tata Iron & •...••••••••••••••.•.••.••..•••...•.•••••• ················•··.················ S IC L d The amending Act by s. 3 substituted for .the old tee v~··\n\n• sub-s. (1) of s. 4 of the 1947 Act the followmg sub- The State of Bihar section, namely :\n\n\"(1) Subject to the provisions of sections 5, 6, 7 Das. c. J. and 8 and with effect from the commencement of this Act, every dealer whose gross turnover during the year immediately preceding the date of such com- , mencement, on sales which have taken place both in and outside Bihar exceeded Rs. 10,000 shall be liable to pay tax under this Act on sales which have taken place in Bihar on and from the date of such commencement: provided that the tax shall not be payable on sales involved in the execution of a contract which is shown to the satisfaction of the Commissioner to have been entered into by the dealer concerned on or before the 1st day of October, 1944.\" - Although the amending Act received the assent of the Governor General on March 15, 1949, it came into force on October 1, 1948, as provided ins. (2) thereof.\n\nSection 16 of the amending Act, however, provided that the amendment made by s. 3 should form part and should be deemed always to have formed part of the 1947 Act as if the said Act had been enacted as so amended from the commencement thereof, that is to say, from July 1, 1947. The 1947 Act was further amended in 1951 by Bihar Act VII of 1951 and again in 1953 by Bihar Act XIV of 1953, but we are not, in the present case, concerned with those amendments.\n\nAlthough the charging section, namely, s. 4(1), as amended, operates from July 1, 1947, the definition of\n\n\"sale\", as amended, became operative only from October 1, 1948. Therefore, the definitio11 of \"sale\", as it stood prior to the amendment, was applicable to all sales made by the appellant throughout the first period hereinbefore mentioned, i.e., the period from July 1, 1947 to March 31, 1948 and also to those made during the period from April l, 1948 to October 1, 1948, which was only a portion of the second\n\nt9ss period hereinbefore mentioned and the amended defi-\n\nTh< Tata Iron & nition' applied to all sales made by the appellant\n\nS I during .the remaining port_ ion ofthe second period; i.e., tee Co., Ltd. fi v. rom October 1, 1948 to March 31, 1949.\n\nTile State 01 Bihar Bearing in mind the relevant provisions of the 1947 Act as they stood both before and after the amend- Das C. J, ment and the period of their applicability we now proceed to consider the points urged before us by the learned Attorney General appearing for the appellant company.\n\nRe. Points Nos. 1 and 4 : It will be convenient to take up those two points together for they have been dealt with together by the learned Attorney General.\n\nThe validity of s. 4(1) read with s. 2(g), second proviso, is challenged in two ways. In the first place it is urged that s. 100(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 read with Entry 48 in List II of the Seventh Schedule thereto authorised the Legislature of Bihar to make a law with respect to tax on the sale of goods. \"Sale of Goods\", as a legal topic, has well defined and well understood implications both in English and Indian Law. The English Common Law relating to sale of goods has been codified in the English Sale of Goods Act, 1893.\n\nIJ?. India the matter was originally governed by the provisions of Chapter VII of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Those provisions have since been replaced by the Indian Sale of Goods Act, Act III of 1930. Our attention has been drawn to s. 4 of the Indian Sale of Goods Act which clearly makes a distinction between a sale and an agreement for sale. It is pointed out that that section groups \"sales\" and \"agreements to sell\" under the single generic name of \"contract of sale\", following in this respect the scheme of English Sale of Goods Act, 1893, and that it treats \"sales\" and \"agreements to sell\" as two separate categories, the vital point of distinction between them being that whereas in a sale there is a transfer of proP€lrtY in goods from the seller to the buyer, there is none in an agreement to sell. It is then urged, on the authority of a decision of this Court in the Sale Tax Officer, Pilibhit v. Messrs. Budh Prakash\n\nJai Prakash (1) that there having thus existed at at'it.? . the time of the enactment of the Government of India Th r. --l . & Act, 1935, a well defined and well established distin~- seel\":;,., ··~d. tion between a \"sale\" and an \"agreement to sell\" 1t v. would be proper to interpret the expression \"sale of The State of Bihar goods\" in Entry 48 in the sense in which it was used - in legislation both in England and in India and to Das c. J. hold that it authorised an imposition of a tax only when there was a completed sale . involving the transfer of title in the goods sold. Reference is then made to the decision of the Federal Court in the case of Province of Madras v. Boddu Paidanna and Sons (2) where the Federal Court at page 101 observed that in the case of sales tax the liability to tax arose \"on the occasion of a sale\" which Patanjali Sastri C. J. in his judgment in the Sate of Bombay v.\n\nUnited Motors (India) Ltd. (3) described as \"the taxable event.\" The argument is that the Bihar Legislature could only make a law imposing a tax on the sale of g19ods, that is to say, on a concluded sale involving the transfer property in the goods sold from the seller to the buyer as contemplated by the Sale of Goods Act. The Bihar Legislature could not, by giving an extended difinition to the word \"sale\" extend its legislative power under Entry 48 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, so as to impose a tax on anything. which is short of a sale. For our present purpose no exception need be taken to the proposition thus formulated and indeed in Budh Prakash Jai Prakashs case (') this Court struck down . that part of the definition of \"sale\" in s. 2(h) of the Uttar Pradesh Sales .Tax Act,\n\n1948, which enlarged the definition of \"sale\" so as to include \"forward contracts\". But is. the position the same here ? We think not. It will be noticed. that s. 4(1) imposed on the dealer the liability to pay a tax on \"sale\" as defined in s. 2(g). Both before and after the amendment of s. 2(g) the principal part of the definitiqn meant the transfer of the property in goods.\n\nAll that the second proviso did was not to extend the\n\n(1) [1955] I S.C.R. 1143, 1147. (II) [19411] F.C.R go.\n\n(3) [1953] S.C.R. 1o69, 1088.\n\n1958 definition of \"sale\", but only to locate the \"sale\" in\n\n].• ~-1 certain circumstances mentioned in that proviso in ne , ata ron & Bih Th b . fJi b\"Ji . d 4(1) . d sreel co Lt, ar. e as1s o a 1 ty un er s. remame as v.\" \"· before, namely, to pay tax on \"sale\". The fact of 11,. stat• of Blhar the goods being in Bihar at the time of the contract of\n\nDas C. J. sale or the production or manufacture of goods in Bihar did not by itself constitute a \"sale\" and did not by itself attract the tax. The taxable event •still remained the \"sale,. resulting in the transfer of ownership in the thing sold from the seller to the buyer. No tax liability actually accrued until there was a concluded sale in the sense of transfer of title.\n\nIt was only when the property passed and the \"sale\" took place that the liability for paying sales tax under the 1947 Act arose.\n\nThere was no enlargement of the meaning of \"sale\" but the proviso only raised a fiction on the strength of the facts mentioned therein and deemed the \"sale\" to have taken place in Bihar.\n\nThose facts clid not by themselves constitute a \"sale\"\n\nbut those facts were used for locating the situs of the :sale in Bihar.\n\nIt follows, therefore, that the provi- -sions of s. 4(1) read with s. 2(g), second proviso, were well within the legislative competency of the Legislature of the Province ofBihar.\n\nThe vires of s. 4(1) read with s. 2(g), second proviso, is also questioned on the ground that it is in reality not a tax on the sale of goods but is in substance a <luty of excise within the meaning of Entry 45 in List l of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, with respect to which the Provincial Legislature could not, under s. 100 of that Act, make any law. Our attention is drawn to cl. (ii) of the second proviso which contemplated a sale of the goods by the producer or manufacturer thereof. It is urged that, according to this clause, tax was not imposed on all sales of goods produced or manufactured in Bihar, but was imposed only on those goods produced or manufactured in Bihar which were sold by the producer or manufacturer. It is pointed out, as and by way of an illustration, that if the goods produced or manufactured in Bihar were taken out of the Province -0f Bihar and then gifted away by the producer or\n\nmanufacturer to a person outside Bihar and that t9ss person sold the goods, he would not be liable under the TM 7l , 1i & proviso. This argument, however, overlooks the fact Stee:; o, r~; d that under cl. (ii) the producer or manufacturer became\n\nv. ' liable to pay the tax not because he produced' or The State of Bihar manufactured the goods, but because he sold the goods. - In other words the tax was laid on the producer or Da1 c. 1 manufacturer only qua seller and not qua manufacturer or producer as pointed out in Boddu Paidanna's case (1). In the words of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Governor General v. Province of Madras (2), \"a duty of excise is primarily a duty levied on a manufacturer or producer in respect of the commodity manufactured or produced. It is a tax on goods and not on sales or the proceeds of sale of goods.\" If the goods produced or manufactured in Bihar were destroyed by fire before sale the manufacturer or producer would not have been liable to pay any tax under s. 4(1) read With s. 2(g), second proviso. As Gwyer C.J. said in Boddu Paidanna's case (1) at page 102 the manufacturer or producer would be \"liable, if at a11, to a sales tax because he sells and not because he manufactures or produces; and he would be free from liability if he chose to give away everything which came from his factory.\" In our judgment both lines of the argument advanced by the learned Attorney General in support of points J and 4 are untenable and cannot be accepted.\n\nRe; point No. 2 : The theory of nexus has been applied in support of tax legislation in more cases than one, not only in this country but also in Australia and England. In Wanganui-Rangitikei Electric Power Board v~ Australian Mutual Provident Spciety (3) Di; xon J. observed :\n\n\"So long as the statute selected some fact or circumstance which provided some relation or connection with New South Wales, and adopted this as the ground of its interference, the validity of an enactment.. ...... would not be open to challenge.\"\n\n(1) [19411) F.C.R. go\n\n(2) [1945] L.R. 72 I, A. 91, 103 {3) [1934) 50 C.L.R. 581, 6oo.\n\nM2SC61X-2\n\n1958 The same learned Judge in Broken Hill South Ltd. v.\n\n• T--1 Commissioner of Taxation (N. S.\n\nW.) ('), said at Tru~ ala ron & 375 Steel Co., Ltd. page : . . . . . v. \"Jf a connection exists, 1t 1s for the legislature to Th• srme of Bihm decide how far it should go in the exercise of its\n\nlJa.~ C. J. powers. As .in other matters of jurisdiction or authority courts must be exact in distinguishing between ascertaining that the circumstances over which the power extends exist and examining the mode in which the tower has been exercised. No doubt there must be some relevance to the circumstance in the exercise of the power. But it is of no importance upon the question of validity that the liability imposed is, or may be, altogether disproportionate to the territorial connection.\" Even the dissenting Judge Rich J. accepted the theory of nexus at page 361 :\n\n\"I do not deny that once any connection with New South Wales appears, the legislature of the State may make that connection the occasion or subject of the imposition of a liability. But the connection with New South Wales must be a real one and the liability sought to be imposed must be pertinent to that connection.\" The Estate Duty Assessment Act 1914-1928 which charged estate duty on moveable properties situate abroad which had passed from a deceased person domiciled in Australia, by gift inter vivos made by him within a year of his death was not struck down for extra territoriality but was upheld as constitutional in The Trustees Executors and Agency Co.\n\nLtd. v. The Federal Commissioner of Taxation(').\n\nThe nexus theory was applied in full force in Governor General v. Raleigh Investment Co.('); Wallace Brothers and Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay City (4) and A. H. Wadia v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay('). In Raleigh Investment Co.'s case (3) the assessee company was a company incorporated in England. Its registered office was in England.\n\nIt held shares in nine Sterling Companies incorporated\n\n(1) [1937156 C.L.R. 237.\n\n(2) [1933] 49 C.L.R. 220.\n\n(3) [1944 F.C.R. 029.\n\n(4) [1948] F.C.R. 1-\n\n(5) [194BJ F.C.R. 121in England. Those nine Sterling Companies carried 19ss on business in British India and earned income, profits or gains in British India and declared and paid divi- The Tata Iron & d d E 1 d h h Id 1 d\" h Steel Co. Ltd. en s m . ng an to its s are o ers me u mg t e\n\nv. ' assessee company. The assessee company was The state of Biltc.r charged to income-tax under s. 4(1) of the Indian - Income-tax Act. It should be noted that the Das c. J. assessee company was not resident in British India, carried on no business in British India and made no income, profits or gains out of any business carried on by it in British India. It invested its money and acquired shares in England in the nine\n\nSterling Companies which were English Companies. It was only when those nine Companies declared and paid dividends in England that the assessee company really earned its income, profits or gains, out of its investments in England in shares of nine Sterling\n\nCompanies. The circumstance that the nine Sterling Companies derived their income, profits or gains, out of business carried on by them in British India out of which they paid dividends to the assessee company was regarded as sufficient nexus so as to fasten the tax liability on the assessee company in respect of the income, profits or gains, it derived from the nine Sterling Companies. Even such a distantly derivative . connection with the source of income was held 1,1.s a sufficient nexus to enable the British Indian tax authorities to charge the assessee company with income-tax.\n\nThe conclusions reached by Spens C. J. in Raleigh Investment Co's. case {1) are formulated thus at page 253 :\n\n\"If some connection exists, the legislature is not compelled to measure the taxation by the degree of benefit received in particular cases by the taxpayer.\n\nThis affects the policy and not the validity of the legislation\".\n\nIn Wallace Brothers case {2) the connection of the assessee company with British India was not so remote as in Raleigh Investment Co's. case (1), for in'the former case the assessee company was a partner in a\n\n(1) [1944] F.C.R. 229\n\n(2) [1948] F.C.R. 1.\n\n1958 firm which carried on business in British India but Th ~-i & that connection was held to be sufficient nexus to\n\n8;,.1°~0.:d. bring to Britsh Indian tax not only the income, v. profits or gams made by the assessee as a partner in The Stare of Bihar the firm but also its income, profits or gains which - accrued without British India in the previous year. In Da3 c. 1 Wadia's case ('), also an income-tax case, it was held that a law imposing a tax cannot be impugned on the ground that it is extra territorial, if there is a connection between a person who is subjected to a tax and the country which imposes that tax. The connection must, however, be a real one and the liability sought to be imposed must be pertinent to that connection.\n\nAt page 140 Chief Justice Kania observed :\n\n\"Generally, States can legislate effectively only for their own territories, but for purposes of taxation and similar matters, a State makes laws designed to operate beyond its territorial limits.\"\n\nThe learned Attorney General points out that the three last mentioned cases in which the nexus theory was applied were income-tax cases and submits that that principle cannot be extended to sales tax laws.\n\nHe points out that in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v.\n\nThe State of Bihar (2) this Court expressly left open the question, whether the theory of nexus applied to legislation with respect to sales tax. The passage at page 639 relied upon by the learned Attorney General only refers to the fact that the different State Legislatures considered themselves free to make a law imposing tax on sales or purchases of goods provided the State concerned had some territorial nexus with such sales or purchases and went on to say that the question whether they were right or wrong in so doing had not been finally decided by the courts.\n\nThat passage, properly understood, can hardly be said to indicate that the theory of nexus does not apply to sales tax legislation at all. The drift of the meaning of the passage was that the sufficiency of the different nexi relied on by the different States has not been tested by the courts.\n\nThe passage strongly relied upon by the learned Attorney General is to be\n\n(1) [1948) F.C.R. m.\n\n(>) [1955) 2 S.C.R. 603.\n\nfound at page 708 where Bhagwati J. after referring ms to the earlier cases, observed :\n\n.\"It is a mot point whether. this theory of trrir;:e:; a~0.~'~;/ tonal connection or nexus which has been mamly v. applied in income-tax cases, is also applicable to sales The. State of Bilrcr tax legislation, the sphere of income-tax legislation and sales tax legislation being quite distinct. Whereas DaJ c. J. in the case of income-tax legislation the tax is levied either on a person who is within the territory by exercising jurisdiction over him in personam or upon income which has accrued or arisen to him or is deemed to have or arisen to him or has been derived by him from sources within the territory and it is, therefore, germane to enquire whether any part of such income has accrued or arisen or has been derived from a source within the territory, in the case of sales tax legislation it is the sale or purchase of goods which is the subject-matter of taxation and it cannot be predicated that the sale or purchase takes place at one or more places where the necessary ingredients of sale happen to be located. The theory of territorial connection or nexus was not put to the test at any time prior to the enactment of the Constitution and it is not necessary also for us to give a definite pronouncement on the subject.\" Apart from the fact that the concluding words in the passage quoted above may be read as indicating that the observations were obiter, it appears to us to be too late in the day to contend that the theory of nexus does not apply to sales tax legislation at all.\n\nIndeed an examination of the decisions of this Court will clearly show that the applicability of the theory of nexus to sales tax legislation has been clearly recognised by this Court.\n\nIn The State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd. (1) this Court had to interpret the true meaning of the explanation to Art. 286(I)(a) of the Constitution. That explanation created a fiction locating the situs of a sale or purchase in the State in which the\n\ngoods had actually been delivered as a result of such sale or purchase for the pur.pose of consumption in that\n\n(1) 11953] s.c.R. 1069, 1088.\n\n19'8 State notwithstanding the fact that, under the general law relating to sale of goods, the property in the goods Th< Tota Iron & had, by reason of such sale or purchase, passed in\n\nSteel Co., Ltd. another State. This Court by a majority then held\n\nIhe sra1;~, Bihor that in view of the fiction created by the explanation the sale which was in reality an inter-State sale be- Da1 c. J. came an intra-State sale and consequently the delivery and consuming State had the right to impose tax on that sale. It is true that that decision has been departed from the Bengal Immunity Co.'s case (') on the question of the interpretation of Art. 286 of the Constitution, but on the point we are now discussing that . decision clearly implies a recognition of the applicability of the nexus theory to the imposition of sales tax.\n\nThe observations of Patanjali Sastri C. J. on the question of nexus in that case cannot, therefore, be said to be unnecessary for the decision of that case.\n\nIn Poppat/al Shah v. The State of Madras (2) Mukherjea J. delivering the unanimousjudgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court definitely applied the theory of nexus to sales tax legislation. Support for that conclusion was found directly in the decision of the Judicial Committee in Wallace Brothers and Co.\n\nLtd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay City (')\n\nwhich, it was said, had been applied by this Court to sales tax legislation in the United Motors' case('), but it is quite clear that the decision had, independently of the United Motors' case (') adopted the principle of Wallace Brothers and Co.'s case (') to sales tax legislation. In a recent case, The State of Bombay v. R.M.D.\n\nChamarbaugwala ('), which was concerned with tax on cross-word competition, this Court applied the theory of nexus and upheld the legislative competency of the Bombay Legislature to impose tax on the gambling competitions. At page 901 this Court said :\n\n\"The doctrine of territorial nexus is well established and there is no dispute as to the principles. As enunciated by learned counsel for the petitioners, if there is a territorial nexus between the person sought to be charged alJ.d the State seeking to tax him the\n\n(1) [1955) • S.C.R. 6o3.\n\n(•) [1953) S.C.R. 677-\n\n(3) [1948] F.C.R. I.\n\n(4) [1948] $.C.R. 1069, 1oll8. (iii [•9a7l s.c.R. 874, gOJ.\n\ntaxing statute may be upheld. Sufficiency of the 19ss territorial connection involve a consideration of two TM 111 i & .. elements, namely, (a) the connection must be real and s1,,1°c:. '~d. not illusory and (b) the liability sought to be imposed\n\nv. • must be pertinent to that connection. It is conceded Th•StateofBihar that it is of no importance on the question of validity that the liability imposed is or may be altogether dis- Dai c. J. proportionate to the territorial connection. In other words, if the connection is sufficient in the sense mentioned above, the extent -or such connection affects merely the policy and not the validity of the legislation.\" Applying these principles to the facts of that case this Court came to the conclusion that they constituted sufficient territorial nexus which entitled the State of Bombay to impose a tax on the gambling that took place within its boundaries and that the law could not be struck down on the ground of extra-territoriality.\n\nIt is not necessary for us on this occasion to lay down any broad proposition as to whether the theory of nexus, as a principle of legislation, is applicable to all kinds of legislation. It will be enough, for disposing of the point now under consideration, to say that this Court has found no apparent reason to confine its application to income-tax legislation but has extended it to sales tax and to tax on gambling and that we see no cogent reason why the nexus theory should not be applied to sales tax legislation.\n\nThe learned Attorney General submits that the theory of nexus cannot be applied to sales tax legislation because such legisJation is concerned with a tax on the transaction of sale, that is to say, a completed sale and to break up a sale into its component parts and to take one or more of such parts and to apply the theory to it will mean that the State will be entitled to impose a tax on one or more of the ingredients or constituent elements of the transaction of sale which by itself or themselves will not amoup.t to a ale. This argument overlooks the fact that the provisions of the sales tax legislation we are considering limit its charging section to \"sale\".\n\nIn order to attract the charging section there must be a completed\n\n19ss sale involving the transfer of property in the goods sold from the seller to the buyer. The nexus theory The Tata Iron & does not impose the tax. It only indicates the Steel co., Ltd. circumstance in which a tax imposed by an act of the ri .. Statevf Bihar Legislature may be enfoced in a particular cae and - unless eventually there 1s a concluded sale m ihe Da.i c. J. sense of passing of the property in the goods no tax liability attaches under the Act. One or more of the several ingredients constituting a sale only furnished the connection between the taxing State and the \"sale\". The learned Attorney General also said that one and the same transaction of sale may be taxed by different States by applying the nexus theory and there will be multiple taxation which will obstruct the free flow of inter-State trade. There is no force in this argument, for Art. 286(2) of the Constitution, as it stood originally, was a complete safeguard against such eventuality and after the amendment of that Article and the relevant entries in the Legislative List such contingency will not arise. In our opinion the arguments advanced by the learned Attorney General on this point cannot be accepted.\n\nRe. point No. 3: The learned Attorney General next contends that in any case the nexus must be real and pertinent to the subject-matter of taxation. He contends that the presence of the goods in Bihar referred to in the old second proviso, which is reproduced in\n\ncl. (i) of the second proviso as amended, is of no consequence. The production or manufacture, according to him, has no connection with and never enters into the transactions of sale. He relies on the observations of Chief Justice Gwyer in Boddu Paidanna's case('), at page 102, namely, that \"a sale had no necessary connection with manufacture or production.\" That observation was made by the learned Chief Justice in order to emphasise the fact that the tax levied on the first sale by the manufacturer or producer was a tax imposed on him qua seller and not qua manufacturer or producer. The question whether the fact of production or manufacture of goods may legitimately form.a nexus between the transaction of sale and the taxing\n\n(1) [1942] F.C.R. go.\n\nState was not in issue in that case at all. It is un- 19ss necessary in this case to lay down any hard and fast - test as to the sufficiency of nexus which will enable a The Tata Iron &.\n\nState to impose a tax or to enumerate the instances Steel co., Lid. of such connection. For the purpose of the present The st;; e of Bihar case it is sufficient to state that in a sale of goods the goods must of necessity play an important part, for Da1 c. 1. it is the goods in which, as a result of the sale, the property will pass. In our view the presence of the goods at the date of the agreement for sale in the taxing State or the production or manufacture in that State of goods the property wherein eventually passed as a result of the sale wherever that might have taken place, constituted a sufficient nexus between the taxing State and the sale.\n\nIn the first case the goods are actually within the State at the date of the agreement for sale and the property in those goods will generally pass within the State when they are ascertained by appropriation by the seller with the assent of the purchaser and delivered to the purchaser or his agent. Even if the property in those goods passes outside. the State the ultimate sale\n\nrelaes to those very goods. In the second case the goods, wherein the title passes eventually outside the State, are produced or manufactured in Bihar and the sale wherever that takes place is by the same person who produced or manufactured the same in Bihar. The producer or manufaturer gets his sale price in respect of goods which were in Bihar at the date when the important event of agreement for ale was made.or which were produced or manufactured in Bihar. These are relevent facts on which the State could well fasten its tai. If the facts in the Raleigh Investment Co.'s ('), were sufficient nexus there is no reason why the facts mentioned in the proviso should not also be sufficient. Whatever else may or may not constitute a sufficient nexus, we are of opinion that the two cases with which we are concerned in this case are sufficient to do so. .\n\nRe. point No. 5 : The argument on this point is that sales tax is an indirect tax on the consumer. The\n\n(I) [1944) F.C.R. 229.\n\n1958 idea is that the seller will pass it on to his purchaser and collect it from them. If that is the nature of the The Tta Iro11 & sales tax thn, urges the learne~ Attorney General, it\n\nStu o., Ltd. cannot be imposed retrospectively after the sale\n\nThe State f Bihar transaction has been concluded by the passing of title from the seller to the buyer, for it cannot, at that Das c. J. stage, be passed on to the purchaser. According to him the seller collects the sales tax from the purchaser on the occasion of the sale. Once that time goes past, the seller loses the chance of realising it from the purchaser and if it cannot be realised from the purchaser, it cannot be called sales tax. In oui: judgment this argument is not sound. From the point of view of the economist and as an economic theory, sales tax may be an indirect tax on the consumers, but legally it need not be so. Under the 1947 Act the primary liability to pay the sales tax, so far as the State is concerned, is on the seller. Indeed before the amendment of the 1947 Act by the amending Act the sellers had no authority to collect the sales tax as such from the purchaser. The seller could undoubtedly have put up the price so as to include the sales tax; which he would have to pay but he could not realise any sales tax as such from the plirchaser. That circumstance could not prevent the sales tax imposed on the seller to be any the less sales tax on the sale of goods. The circumstance that the 1947 Act, after the amendment, permitted the seller who was a registered dealer to collect the sales tax as a tax from the purchaser does not do away with the primary liability of the seller to pay the sales tax.\n\nThis is further made clear by the fact that the registered dealer need not, if he so pleases or chooses, collect the tax from the purchaser and sometimes by reason of competition with other registered dealers he may find it profitable to sell his goods and to retain his old customers even at the sacrifice of the sales tax. This also makes it clear that the sales tax need not be passed on to the purchasers and this fact does not alter the real nature 1\n\nof the tax which, by the express provisions of the law, is cast upon the seller. The buyer is under no liability to pay sales tax in addition to the agreed sale price\n\nunless the contract specifically provides otherwise. ms See Love v. Norman Wright (Builders) Ltd.('). If -- that be the true view of sales tax then the Bihar TM Tata Iron & Legislature acting within its own legislative field had Steel co., Ltd. the powers of a sovereign legislature and could make The Sta;; of Bihar its law prospectively as well as retrospectively.\n\nWe do not thinlC that there is any substance in this con- Das c. 1. tention either.\n\nFor reasons stated above none of the contentions urged by the learned Attorney General in support of these appeals can be sustained. The result, therefore, is that these appeals must be dismissed with costs.\n\nBOSE J.-,.-With great respect I cannot agree. It Bose 1 will not be necessary to elaborate my point of disagreement at length because this is pre-Constitution legislation and much of what we decide in this case will pot affect . post-Constitution Acts.\n\nPut very shortly, my view is this. First, a State can only impose a tax on the sale of goods. It has no power to ta, x extra territorially, therefore it can only tax sales that occur in the State itself. With great respect I feel . it is fallacious to look to the goods, or to the elenients that constitute a sale, because the power to tax is limited to 'the sale and the tax is not . on the goods or on the agreement fo sell or on the price as such but only' on . the sale. Therefore, unless the sale itself takes place in the State, the State cannot tax.\n\nThat brings me to the next point, the situs of a sale. Now I know that this is a matter on which many . different , views are possible but what is clear to me is that a sale cannot have more than one situs. It is not a mystical entity that can be one in many and many in one at one and the same time, here, there and everywhere all at once : nor is it a puckish elf that pops up now here, now there and next everywhere; It is a very mundane business transaction, of the earth, earthy. Itcan have only one existence ai; id pne situs.\n\nOpinions may differ on where that is and how. it is to be determined, but it is our duty, as the supreme authority on the law of the land, to choose\n\n(1) L.R. (1944) I K.B. 484.\n\n1958 one of those .many views and say that that is the law of out land and that in India the situs is determined The Tata Iron 4 in this way or that and, having determined it, make\n\nSteel 0 ·• Ltd. it uniform for the whole country.\n\nThe Stare ~I Bthar I am conscious that the selection must be arbitrary, - but for all that, it must be made. Left to myself, I Bose 1. would have preferred Cheshire's view about the proper law of the contract set out by him in Chapter VITI of his book on Private International Law, 4th edition. I referred to this in The Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Lt.d. v. Harnam _Singh ('). I qoute him again :\n\n\"The proper law is the law of the country in which the contract is localised. Its localisation will be indicated by what may be called the grouping of its element.s as reflected in its formation and in its terms. The country in which its elements are most densely grouped will represent its natural seat\".\n\nHe is not dealing with this question. He is dealing with International Law and the difficulties that arise in dealing with conti'acts whose elements are grouped in different States with different, and often conflicting, laws. He is developing the theme that for any one contract there should be but one law to govern it in all its stages and that the most logical conclusion is to select the law of the country in which the contract has its natural seat. But whether his view is accepted or any of the others that he discusses, he stresses the need for one objective rule and contends strongly that tlie choice should not be left to the parties to the deal, even as I say that it should not be left to the States.\n\nHe quotes an American Judge, at page 203 of his book, who says that -\n\n\"Some law must impose. the obligation, and the parties have nothing whatsoever to do with that, no more than with whether their acts are torts or crimes.\"\n\nNow none of that is of immediate application here but it contains the germ of an idea and points to the embarrassment and folly of letting differing laws run amuck in governing a single transaction. Followipg up that thought I would say that we are dealing here with a Constitution Act that speaks with one voice\n\n( ) [1955] • S.C.R. 402, 418.\n\nand authority throughout the land. It tells the various 19ss States, as one day some international voice that will\n\n11 71 rule tpe world will say_ to the peoples i~ it, \"you may 11:e/~:.:';~/· do this and may not do that\"· and \"this\" and \"that\" ' mean, but one. thing everywhere. One writ runs The State of Bihar throughout the land and it has but' one meaning and . one voice. \"When I say that you may only legislate Bose J. for your. own territory and that you may tax certain sales, you must realise that the meaning that I give to 'sale' is the meaning that my Supreme Court shall give to it and that it cannot mean differing things in different areas; and you must realise that the only sales that you may tax are the ones that lie in your own territory. My Supreme Court shall determine where a sale is. situated and once that is determined it cannot be situated any where else. If it does not happen to be in your territory you cannot tax it.\"\n\nOur presnt Constitution id not adopt Cheshire's view. It made another choice. In the old Explanation to Art. 286 (now repealed). it selected the place where the goods are actually delivered, as a direct result of the sale or. purchase,·· as the situs.\n\nWell, so be it. That is as good as any other and I would have been as happy to select that as any of the other possibilities. But what I do most strongly press is that a Constitution Act canriot be allowed to speak with different voices in different parts of the land and that a mundane business concept well known and well understood cannot be. given an ethereal omnipresent quality that enables a horde of hungry hawks to swoop down and devour it simultaneously all over the land : \"some sale; some hawks\" as Winston Churchill would say.\n\nI would therefore reject the nexus theory in so far as it means that any one sale can have existence and entity simultaneously in many different places. The States may tax the sale but may not disintegrate it and, under the guise of taxing the sale in truth and in fact, tax its various elements,. one its head and one its tail, one its entrails and one its limbs by a legislative fiction that deems that the whole is within its claws simply because, after tearing it apart, it finds a hand\n\n19$8 or a foot or a heart or a liver still quivering in its - grasp. Nexus, of course, there must be but nexus of 17w r0 •• Iron d & the entire entity that is called a sale, wherever lt is 81\" C•., Lt deemed to be situate. Fiction again. Of course, it is Ih• stat• of Bihar fiction, but it is a fiction as to situs imposed by the - Constitution Act and by the Supreme Court that Bos. J. speaks for it in these matters and only one fiction, not a dozen little ones.\n\nMy point is simple. If you are allowed to tax a dog it must be within the -territorial limits of your taxable jurisdiction. You cannot tax it if it is born elsewhere and remains there simply because its mother was with you at some point of time during the period of gestation. Equally, after birth, you cannot tax it simply because its tail is cut off (as is often done in the case of certain breeds) and sent back to the fond owner, who lives in your jurisdiction, in a bottle of spirits, or clippirigs of its hair. . There is a nexus of sorts in both cases but the fallacy lies in thinking that the entity is with you just because a part that is quite different from the whole was once there. So with a sale of a motor car started and concluded wholly and exclusively in New York or London or Timbuctoo. You cannot tax that sale just because the vendor lives in Madras, even if the motor car is brought th\\:re arid even assuming there is no bar on international sales, for the simple reason that what you are entitled to tax is the sale, and neither the owner nor the car, therefore unless the sale is situate in your territory, there is no real nexus. And once it is determined objectively by the Constitution Act or in Supreme C<iurt how and where the sale is situate, its situs is fixed and cannot be changed thereafter by a succession of State legislatures each claiming a different situs by the convenient fiction of deeming.\n\nThe only question is whether it is too late in the day to take this view .because of our previous decisions and those of the Federal Court. I say not, for though there is a consensus of opinion that there must be a territorial nexus and that it must not be illusory, no decision that I _know of says that when you are given the right to tax a certain thing which is a composite\n\nentity, quite separate and distinct from the various t9'8 elements of which it is composed, you may tear that whole apart and seize on some element that is quite r; e;;~/'~~/'\n\na different thing from that which you are entitled to\n\nv. ·• • tax and hold that the taxable entity is in your State TM state of Bihar simply because at some relevant point or time one of the ingredients that went to make up the whole but Bou J. which is a separate and distinct thing from the whole, as diffrent from it as chalk is frdm cheese, happened to be within your clutches. I do not intend to analyse the cases on this point because it is pointless to pursue a matter that will only be of academic interst.\n\nAll I will do therefore is to say that the question of nexus has been ref erred to in the following cases and that none of them reaches. a decision on this particular point. These cases are Governor-General in Council v ..\n\nRaleigh Investment Co., Ltd. ( 1), A.H. Wadia v.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax, Bombay CZ), Poppatlal Shah v. The State of Madras (3), State of Trm•ancore-.\n\nCochin v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashew Nut Factory ( 4), and The Bengal Immunity Co., Ltd. v. The State of Bihar (').\n\nI would allow the appeals.\n\nORDER OF THE COURT In view of the opinion of the majority, the appeals are dismissed with costs.\n\n(1) (1944] F.C.R. 229, 247, 253.\n\n(2) [1948] F.C.R. 121, 153, 154, 165.\n\n(3) [1953] S.C.R. 677.\n\n(4) (1954) S.C.R. 53, 101.\n\n(5) [1955] 2 s.c.R. 003, 708, 768, 769.\n\nA.ppea/J diJmissed.", "total_entities": 207, "entities": [{"text": "THE TATA IRON & STEEL CO., LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 36, "end_char": 66, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE TATA IRON & STEEL CO. LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF BIHAR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 90, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF BIHAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. R. DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. K. SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 141, "end_char": 153, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. K. SARKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIV!AN BOSE J.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 158, "end_char": 174, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 364, "end_char": 389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "J amshedpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 602, "end_char": 613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant company, carrying on business as manufacturer of iron and steel, with its factory and works at J amshedpur in Bihar, was assessed to sales tax for two periods prior to the Constitution, under the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 (No."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 617, "end_char": 622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant company, carrying on business as manufacturer of iron and steel, with its factory and works at J amshedpur in Bihar, was assessed to sales tax for two periods prior to the Constitution, under the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947 (No."}}, {"text": "Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 703, "end_char": 728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bihar Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 763, "end_char": 780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "enacted by the Bihar Legislature in exercise of its exclusive power under the Government of India-Act, 1935."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 930, "end_char": 935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The company used to send its goods from J amshedpur to various parts of India."}}, {"text": "Bjhar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1345, "end_char": 1350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the amounts shown as gross tum-over in the two returns for the two periods, the company claimed deduction of certain amounts, being the valuable consideration for the goods manufactured in Bjhar but sold, delivered and consumed outside, on the ground that in none of the transactions in respect of the said sums did property in the goods pass to the purchasers in Bihar."}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2471, "end_char": 2478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2566, "end_char": 2573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2584, "end_char": 2591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2686, "end_char": 2754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "February 19.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2794, "end_char": 2806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "II), of the Act, was not, a sales tax within the meaning of Entry 48 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, but was in the nature of excise duty\n\nFebruary 19."}}, {"text": "Steel Co., Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3028, "end_char": 3043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1938 which a rrovincial legislature had no power to impose, that the theory o territorial nexus was inapplicable to sales tax and, in Th• Tata Iron & any case, there was no real or sufficient nexus in the present cases\n\nSteel Co., Ltd. and that retrospective levy of the sales tax under s. 4(1) of the v.\n\nAct destroyed the indirect nature of the tax, thus making it a Th• Statt of Bihar direct tax on the dealer which could not be passed on to the consumer:\n\nHeld, (per Das, C.J., Venkatarama Aiyar, S. K. Das and A. K. Sarkar, JJ.,"}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3095, "end_char": 3102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3279, "end_char": 3282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1938 which a rrovincial legislature had no power to impose, that the theory o territorial nexus was inapplicable to sales tax and, in Th• Tata Iron & any case, there was no real or sufficient nexus in the present cases\n\nSteel Co., Ltd. and that retrospective levy of the sales tax under s. 4(1) of the v.\n\nAct destroyed the indirect nature of the tax, thus making it a Th• Statt of Bihar direct tax on the dealer which could not be passed on to the consumer:\n\nHeld, (per Das, C.J., Venkatarama Aiyar, S. K. Das and A. K. Sarkar, JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3290, "end_char": 3307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1938 which a rrovincial legislature had no power to impose, that the theory o territorial nexus was inapplicable to sales tax and, in Th• Tata Iron & any case, there was no real or sufficient nexus in the present cases\n\nSteel Co., Ltd. and that retrospective levy of the sales tax under s. 4(1) of the v.\n\nAct destroyed the indirect nature of the tax, thus making it a Th• Statt of Bihar direct tax on the dealer which could not be passed on to the consumer:\n\nHeld, (per Das, C.J., Venkatarama Aiyar, S. K. Das and A. K. Sarkar, JJ.,"}}, {"text": "S. K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3309, "end_char": 3318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1938 which a rrovincial legislature had no power to impose, that the theory o territorial nexus was inapplicable to sales tax and, in Th• Tata Iron & any case, there was no real or sufficient nexus in the present cases\n\nSteel Co., Ltd. and that retrospective levy of the sales tax under s. 4(1) of the v.\n\nAct destroyed the indirect nature of the tax, thus making it a Th• Statt of Bihar direct tax on the dealer which could not be passed on to the consumer:\n\nHeld, (per Das, C.J., Venkatarama Aiyar, S. K. Das and A. K. Sarkar, JJ.,", "canonical_name": "S. R. DAS"}}, {"text": "A. K. Sarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3323, "end_char": 3335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1938 which a rrovincial legislature had no power to impose, that the theory o territorial nexus was inapplicable to sales tax and, in Th• Tata Iron & any case, there was no real or sufficient nexus in the present cases\n\nSteel Co., Ltd. and that retrospective levy of the sales tax under s. 4(1) of the v.\n\nAct destroyed the indirect nature of the tax, thus making it a Th• Statt of Bihar direct tax on the dealer which could not be passed on to the consumer:\n\nHeld, (per Das, C.J., Venkatarama Aiyar, S. K. Das and A. K. Sarkar, JJ.,", "canonical_name": "A. K. SARKAR"}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3342, "end_char": 3346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose, J. dissenting), that the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant must be negatived.", "canonical_name": "Bose"}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3457, "end_char": 3464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 4( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3746, "end_char": 3754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3773, "end_char": 3780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4355, "end_char": 4359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4375, "end_char": 4382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4469, "end_char": 4476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1942] F.C.R. 90", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4670, "end_char": 4686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1945) L.R. 72 I.A. 91", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4731, "end_char": 4753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5587, "end_char": 5594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1944] F.C.R. 229", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5944, "end_char": 5961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6182, "end_char": 6196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6473, "end_char": 6498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6783, "end_char": 6787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Per Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6997, "end_char": 7005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Bose, J.-Sales tax can be imposed only on the sale."}}, {"text": "Board of Revenue, Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7931, "end_char": 7954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "577 of 1953, made on reference by the Board of Revenue, Bihar in Appeals Nos.·"}}, {"text": "M.C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7999, "end_char": 8012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1958 M.C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, Rajeshwari Prasad and S. P. Varma, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Rajeshwari Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8042, "end_char": 8059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1958 M.C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, Rajeshwari Prasad and S. P. Varma, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. P. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8064, "end_char": 8075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1958 M.C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, Rajeshwari Prasad and S. P. Varma, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Tata Iron &:\n\nSteel co., Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8101, "end_char": 8130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tata Iron &:\n\nSteel co., Ltd.\n\nMahabir Prasad, Advocate-General for the State of v.\n\nBihar and R. C. Prasad, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Mahabir Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8132, "end_char": 8146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tata Iron &:\n\nSteel co., Ltd.\n\nMahabir Prasad, Advocate-General for the State of v.\n\nBihar and R. C. Prasad, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "C. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8199, "end_char": 8208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tata Iron &:\n\nSteel co., Ltd.\n\nMahabir Prasad, Advocate-General for the State of v.\n\nBihar and R. C. Prasad, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8235, "end_char": 8249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Bihar\n\n1958."}}, {"text": "S.K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8316, "end_char": 8324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Das, C.J., Venkatarama Aiyar, S.K. Das and Sarkar, JJ.", "canonical_name": "S. R. DAS"}}, {"text": "Sarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8329, "end_char": 8335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Das, C.J., Venkatarama Aiyar, S.K. Das and Sarkar, JJ."}}, {"text": "Das C.J. Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8358, "end_char": 8371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by Das C.J. Bose, J. delivered a separate judgment."}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8662, "end_char": 8678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das c. J.\n\nDAS C.J.-These two appeals, which have been filed with the special leave granted by an order made by this Court on April 3, 1956~ and which have been consolidated together by the same order, are directed against the judgment pronounced by the Patna High Court on October 17, 1955, in Miscellaneous Judicial Case No."}}, {"text": "October 17, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8682, "end_char": 8698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das c. J.\n\nDAS C.J.-These two appeals, which have been filed with the special leave granted by an order made by this Court on April 3, 1956~ and which have been consolidated together by the same order, are directed against the judgment pronounced by the Patna High Court on October 17, 1955, in Miscellaneous Judicial Case No."}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8827, "end_char": 8832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8840, "end_char": 8865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9149, "end_char": 9162, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9192, "end_char": 9198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Its registered office is in Bombay; its factory and works are at Jamshedpur in the State of Bihar and its head sales' office is in Calcutta in the State of West Bengal."}}, {"text": "Jamshedpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9229, "end_char": 9239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Its registered office is in Bombay; its factory and works are at Jamshedpur in the State of Bihar and its head sales' office is in Calcutta in the State of West Bengal."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9295, "end_char": 9303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Its registered office is in Bombay; its factory and works are at Jamshedpur in the State of Bihar and its head sales' office is in Calcutta in the State of West Bengal."}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9320, "end_char": 9331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Its registered office is in Bombay; its factory and works are at Jamshedpur in the State of Bihar and its head sales' office is in Calcutta in the State of West Bengal."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9369, "end_char": 9375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has store yards in the States of Madras, Bombay, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Hyderabad, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab and Andhra."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9398, "end_char": 9411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has store yards in the States of Madras, Bombay, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Hyderabad, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab and Andhra."}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9413, "end_char": 9422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has store yards in the States of Madras, Bombay, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Hyderabad, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab and Andhra."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9424, "end_char": 9438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has store yards in the States of Madras, Bombay, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Hyderabad, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab and Andhra."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9440, "end_char": 9446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has store yards in the States of Madras, Bombay, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Hyderabad, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab and Andhra."}}, {"text": "Andhra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9451, "end_char": 9457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has store yards in the States of Madras, Bombay, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Hyderabad, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab and Andhra."}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10937, "end_char": 10951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These facts are admitted and the correctness of these facts are not disputed by the State of Bihar.\""}}, {"text": "July 1, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11028, "end_char": 11040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant company was separately assessed for two periods : (1) from July 1, 1947 to March 31, 1948, and (2) from April 1, 1948 to March 31, 1949."}}, {"text": "March 31, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11044, "end_char": 11058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant company was separately assessed for two periods : (1) from July 1, 1947 to March 31, 1948, and (2) from April 1, 1948 to March 31, 1949."}}, {"text": "April 1, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11073, "end_char": 11086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant company was separately assessed for two periods : (1) from July 1, 1947 to March 31, 1948, and (2) from April 1, 1948 to March 31, 1949."}}, {"text": "March 31, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11090, "end_char": 11104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant company was separately assessed for two periods : (1) from July 1, 1947 to March 31, 1948, and (2) from April 1, 1948 to March 31, 1949."}}, {"text": "s. 12(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11170, "end_char": 11178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 22, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11887, "end_char": 11900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sales Tax Officer, by his assessment order dated July 22, 1949, disallowed both the claims for deduction and on the other hand added a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "September 24, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12857, "end_char": 12875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sales Tax Officer by his assessment order dated September 24, 1949, disallowed both the claims and added the sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13220, "end_char": 13225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chota Nagpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13278, "end_char": 13290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against these two assessment orders the appellant company preferred two appeals under s. 24 of the 1947 Act to the Commissioner of Sales Tax of Chota Nagpur who, on April 29, 1950, dismissed both the appeals."}}, {"text": "April 29, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13299, "end_char": 13313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against these two assessment orders the appellant company preferred two appeals under s. 24 of the 1947 Act to the Commissioner of Sales Tax of Chota Nagpur who, on April 29, 1950, dismissed both the appeals."}}, {"text": "August 30, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13512, "end_char": 13527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Board of Revenue, by its order dated August 30, 1952, confirmed the orders of the Commissioner with certain modifications and remanded the cases to the Sales Tax Officer."}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13682, "end_char": 13687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October 5, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13856, "end_char": 13871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a common order dated October 5, 1953, made in the said two references the Board of Revenue referred the following questions of law to the High Court for it<; decision :\n\n\"(I) Is the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947, as amended jn 1948, ultra vires the Provincial Legislature in view of the extended meaning of the expression taxes ."}}, {"text": "Is the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14010, "end_char": 14042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Act in the light of the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14191, "end_char": 14262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14291, "end_char": 14303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Act in the light of the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Act in the light of the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Chotanagpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14569, "end_char": 14580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(4) Was the Bihar Sales Tax (Amendment) Act The Tata Iron & Steel Co., Ltd. of 1948 legally extended to Chotanagpur ?"}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14710, "end_char": 14723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15822, "end_char": 15826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16034, "end_char": 16041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16052, "end_char": 16059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16157, "end_char": 16173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16635, "end_char": 16642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16998, "end_char": 17008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17017, "end_char": 17046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 100(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17179, "end_char": 17193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Provincial Legislature of :Sihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17650, "end_char": 17682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is in exercise of this legislative power that the Provincial Legislature of :Sihar passed the 1947 Act which received the assent of the Governor General on June 21, 1947, and came into force on July I, 1947, by virtue of a notification made in the official gazette under s. I (3) of the said Act."}}, {"text": "June 21, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17756, "end_char": 17769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is in exercise of this legislative power that the Provincial Legislature of :Sihar passed the 1947 Act which received the assent of the Governor General on June 21, 1947, and came into force on July I, 1947, by virtue of a notification made in the official gazette under s. I (3) of the said Act."}}, {"text": "July I, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17794, "end_char": 17806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is in exercise of this legislative power that the Provincial Legislature of :Sihar passed the 1947 Act which received the assent of the Governor General on June 21, 1947, and came into force on July I, 1947, by virtue of a notification made in the official gazette under s. I (3) of the said Act."}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17922, "end_char": 17929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Province or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II of the Seventh Schedule to that Act", "statute": "Province or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II of the Seventh Schedule to that Act"}}, {"text": "sections 5, 6, 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18096, "end_char": 18112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Province or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II of the Seventh Schedule to that Act", "statute": "Province or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II of the Seventh Schedule to that Act"}}, {"text": "Tata Iron", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18609, "end_char": 18618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tata Iron & It should be noted that, although the 1947 Act came Steel co., Ltd. into force on July 1, 1947, by virtue of a notification v.\n\nB\"h published in the official gazette under S. 1(3) thereof, The Stare::._{"}}, {"text": "S. 1(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18793, "end_char": 18800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19140, "end_char": 19147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19234, "end_char": 19244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4(1 )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19263, "end_char": 19276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 5, 6, 7 and 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19340, "end_char": 19362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 22, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19725, "end_char": 19739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 22, 1949, Ordinance III of 1948 was replaced by Bihar Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1948 (VI of 1949) hereinafter referred to as the amending Act."}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19875, "end_char": 19885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19937, "end_char": 19944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July l; 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20090, "end_char": 20102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 16 of this amending Act provided that the substituted s. 4(1) should form part of the 1947 Act and should always be deemed to have formed part thereof with effect from its commencement, that is to say, from July l; 1947, as hereinbefore mentioned."}}, {"text": "s. 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20507, "end_char": 20514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21210, "end_char": 21233, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21372, "end_char": 21381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provided further that notwithstanding any thing to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "statute": "Provided further that notwithstanding any thing to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21611, "end_char": 21620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provided further that notwithstanding any thing to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "statute": "Provided further that notwithstanding any thing to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930"}}, {"text": "s. 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21649, "end_char": 21656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provided further that notwithstanding any thing to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "statute": "Provided further that notwithstanding any thing to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930"}}, {"text": "s. 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21775, "end_char": 21782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provided further that notwithstanding any thing to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "statute": "Provided further that notwithstanding any thing to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930"}}, {"text": "Provided further that notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22215, "end_char": 22315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22460, "end_char": 22469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provided further that notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "statute": "Provided further that notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930"}}, {"text": "IC L d The amending Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22819, "end_char": 22842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22846, "end_char": 22850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IC L d The amending Act", "statute": "IC L d The amending Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22902, "end_char": 22906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IC L d The amending Act", "statute": "IC L d The amending Act"}}, {"text": "sections 5, 6, 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23013, "end_char": 23029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IC L d The amending Act", "statute": "IC L d The amending Act"}}, {"text": "1st day of October, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23623, "end_char": 23647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "10,000 shall be liable to pay tax under this Act on sales which have taken place in Bihar on and from the date of such commencement: provided that the tax shall not be payable on sales involved in the execution of a contract which is shown to the satisfaction of the Commissioner to have been entered into by the dealer concerned on or before the 1st day of October, 1944.\" -"}}, {"text": "March 15, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23725, "end_char": 23739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Although the amending Act received the assent of the Governor General on March 15, 1949, it came into force on October 1, 1948, as provided ins. ("}}, {"text": "October 1, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23763, "end_char": 23778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Although the amending Act received the assent of the Governor General on March 15, 1949, it came into force on October 1, 1948, as provided ins. ("}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23811, "end_char": 23821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IC L d The amending Act", "statute": "IC L d The amending Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23888, "end_char": 23892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bihar Act VII of 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24134, "end_char": 24155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bihar Act XIV of 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24177, "end_char": 24198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24310, "end_char": 24317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Act XIV of 1953", "statute": "Bihar Act XIV of 1953"}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25514, "end_char": 25521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25532, "end_char": 25539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 100(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25620, "end_char": 25629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25637, "end_char": 25666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25704, "end_char": 25720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26020, "end_char": 26037, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act, 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26132, "end_char": 26157, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Those provisions have since been replaced by the Indian Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26159, "end_char": 26232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26283, "end_char": 26287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Those provisions have since been replaced by the Indian Sale of Goods Act", "statute": "Those provisions have since been replaced by the Indian Sale of Goods Act"}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26302, "end_char": 26319, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "English Sale of Goods Act, 1893", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26565, "end_char": 26596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27389, "end_char": 27396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tion between a \"sale\" and an \"agreement to sell\" 1t v. would be proper to interpret the expression \"sale of The State of Bihar goods\" in Entry 48 in the sense in which it was used - in legislation both in England and in India and to Das c. J. hold that it authorised an imposition of a tax only when there was a completed sale ."}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27825, "end_char": 27841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference is then made to the decision of the Federal Court in the case of Province of Madras v. Boddu Paidanna and Sons (2) where the Federal Court at page 101 observed that in the case of sales tax the liability to tax arose \"on the occasion of a sale\" which Patanjali Sastri C. J. in his judgment in the Sate of Bombay v.\n\nUnited Motors (India) Ltd. (3) described as \"the taxable event.\""}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28196, "end_char": 28213, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28347, "end_char": 28415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Budh Prakash Jai Prakashs", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28578, "end_char": 28603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For our present purpose no exception need be taken to the proposition thus formulated and indeed in Budh Prakash Jai Prakashs case (') this Court struck down ."}}, {"text": "s. 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28679, "end_char": 28686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28715, "end_char": 28722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28885, "end_char": 28892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tax Act,\n\n1948", "statute": "Tax Act,\n\n1948"}}, {"text": "s. 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28966, "end_char": 28973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tax Act,\n\n1948", "statute": "Tax Act,\n\n1948"}}, {"text": "s. 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29014, "end_char": 29021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tax Act,\n\n1948", "statute": "Tax Act,\n\n1948"}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30476, "end_char": 30483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30494, "end_char": 30501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30621, "end_char": 30628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30639, "end_char": 30646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "List l of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30822, "end_char": 30889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30957, "end_char": 30963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List l of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "List l of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Boddu Paidanna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32077, "end_char": 32091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In other words the tax was laid on the producer or Da1 c. 1 manufacturer only qua seller and not qua manufacturer or producer as pointed out in Boddu Paidanna's case (1)."}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32570, "end_char": 32577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32588, "end_char": 32595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gwyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32616, "end_char": 32621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Gwyer C.J. said in Boddu Paidanna's case (1) at page 102 the manufacturer or producer would be \"liable, if at a11, to a sales tax because he sells and not because he manufactures or produces; and he would be free from liability if he chose to give away everything which came from his factory.\""}}, {"text": "Australia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33208, "end_char": 33217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 : The theory of nexus has been applied in support of tax legislation in more cases than one, not only in this country but also in Australia and England."}}, {"text": "New South Wales", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33448, "end_char": 33463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Wanganui-Rangitikei Electric Power Board v~ Australian Mutual Provident Spciety (3) Di; xon J. observed :\n\n\"So long as the statute selected some fact or circumstance which provided some relation or connection with New South Wales, and adopted this as the ground of its interference, the validity of an enactment.. ...... would not be open to challenge.\""}}, {"text": "Rich", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34504, "end_char": 34508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even the dissenting Judge Rich J. accepted the theory of nexus at page 361 :\n\n\"I do not deny that once any connection with New South Wales appears, the legislature of the State may make that connection the occasion or subject of the imposition of a liability."}}, {"text": "Estate Duty Assessment Act 1914", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34879, "end_char": 34910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Raleigh Investment Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 35504, "end_char": 35526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Raleigh Investment Co.'s case (3) the assessee company was a company incorporated in England."}}, {"text": "[1944 F.C.R. 029", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 35750, "end_char": 35766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1948] F.C.R. 1", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 35773, "end_char": 35788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "British India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35882, "end_char": 35895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Those nine Sterling Companies carried 19ss on business in British India and earned income, profits or gains in British India and declared and paid divi- The Tata Iron & d d E 1 d h h Id 1 d\" h Steel Co. Ltd. en s m ."}}, {"text": "state of Biltc.r", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36131, "end_char": 36147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessee company was The state of Biltc.r charged to income-tax under s. 4(1) of the Indian - Income-tax Act."}}, {"text": "s. 4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36176, "end_char": 36183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36200, "end_char": 36214, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Spens", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37379, "end_char": 37384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The conclusions reached by Spens C. J. in Raleigh Investment Co's."}}, {"text": "Raleigh Investment Co", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37394, "end_char": 37415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The conclusions reached by Spens C. J. in Raleigh Investment Co's."}}, {"text": "Wallace Brothers", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37690, "end_char": 37706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Wallace Brothers case {2) the connection of the assessee company with British India was not so remote as in Raleigh Investment Co's."}}, {"text": "[1944] F.C.R. 229", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 37901, "end_char": 37918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1948] F.C.R. 1", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 37924, "end_char": 37939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Wadia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 38315, "end_char": 38320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Da3 c. 1 Wadia's case ('), also an income-tax case, it was held that a law imposing a tax cannot be impugned on the ground that it is extra territorial, if there is a connection between a person who is subjected to a tax and the country which imposes that tax."}}, {"text": "Kania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38715, "end_char": 38720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At page 140 Chief Justice Kania observed :\n\n\"Generally, States can legislate effectively only for their own territories, but for purposes of taxation and similar matters, a State makes laws designed to operate beyond its territorial limits.\""}}, {"text": "[1955) 2 S.C.R. 603", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 40160, "end_char": 40179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40206, "end_char": 40214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "found at page 708 where Bhagwati J. after referring ms to the earlier cases, observed :\n\n.\"It is a mot point whether."}}, {"text": "DaJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40574, "end_char": 40577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whereas DaJ c. J. in the case of income-tax legislation the tax is levied either on a person who is within the territory by exercising jurisdiction over him in personam or upon income which has accrued or arisen to him or is deemed to have or arisen to him or has been derived by him from sources within the territory and it is, therefore, germane to enquire whether any part of such income has accrued or arisen or has been derived from a source within the territory, in the case of sales tax legislation it is the sale or purchase of goods which is the subject-matter of taxation and it cannot be predicated that the sale or purchase takes place at one or more places where the necessary ingredients of sale happen to be located."}}, {"text": "Art. 286(I)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42086, "end_char": 42100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bengal Immunity Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 42931, "end_char": 42950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that that decision has been departed from the Bengal Immunity Co.'s case (') on the question of the interpretation of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43003, "end_char": 43011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43395, "end_char": 43404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Poppat/al Shah v. The State of Madras (2) Mukherjea J. delivering the unanimousjudgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court definitely applied the theory of nexus to sales tax legislation."}}, {"text": "Wallace Brothers and Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 43638, "end_char": 43662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Support for that conclusion was found directly in the decision of the Judicial Committee in Wallace Brothers and Co.\n\nLtd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay City (')\n\nwhich, it was said, had been applied by this Court to sales tax legislation in the United Motors' case('), but it is quite clear that the decision had, independently of the United Motors' case (') adopted the principle of Wallace Brothers and Co.'s case (') to sales tax legislation."}}, {"text": "United Motors", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 43800, "end_char": 43813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Support for that conclusion was found directly in the decision of the Judicial Committee in Wallace Brothers and Co.\n\nLtd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay City (')\n\nwhich, it was said, had been applied by this Court to sales tax legislation in the United Motors' case('), but it is quite clear that the decision had, independently of the United Motors' case (') adopted the principle of Wallace Brothers and Co.'s case (') to sales tax legislation."}}, {"text": "Bombay Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 44210, "end_char": 44228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a recent case, The State of Bombay v. R.M.D.\n\nChamarbaugwala ('), which was concerned with tax on cross-word competition, this Court applied the theory of nexus and upheld the legislative competency of the Bombay Legislature to impose tax on the gambling competitions."}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44880, "end_char": 44882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 45526, "end_char": 45541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Applying these principles to the facts of that case this Court came to the conclusion that they constituted sufficient territorial nexus which entitled the State of Bombay to impose a tax on the gambling that took place within its boundaries and that the law could not be struck down on the ground of extra-territoriality."}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47823, "end_char": 47834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1944) F.C.R. 229", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 51379, "end_char": 51396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bihar TM Tata Iron & Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 53865, "end_char": 53897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If -- that be the true view of sales tax then the Bihar TM Tata Iron & Legislature acting within its own legislative field had Steel co., Ltd. the powers of a sovereign legislature and could make The Sta;; of Bihar its law prospectively as well as retrospectively."}}, {"text": "Steel co., Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 53942, "end_char": 53957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If -- that be the true view of sales tax then the Bihar TM Tata Iron & Legislature acting within its own legislative field had Steel co., Ltd. the powers of a sovereign legislature and could make The Sta;; of Bihar its law prospectively as well as retrospectively."}}, {"text": "Sta;; of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 54015, "end_char": 54029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If -- that be the true view of sales tax then the Bihar TM Tata Iron & Legislature acting within its own legislative field had Steel co., Ltd. the powers of a sovereign legislature and could make The Sta;; of Bihar its law prospectively as well as retrospectively."}}, {"text": "Cheshire", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 56289, "end_char": 56297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "would have preferred Cheshire's view about the proper law of the contract set out by him in Chapter VITI of his book on Private International Law, 4th edition."}}, {"text": "Followipg up that thought I would say that we are dealing here with a Constitution Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 57985, "end_char": 58071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 58429, "end_char": 58443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One writ runs The State of Bihar throughout the land and it has but' one meaning and ."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 58696, "end_char": 58709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "own territory and that you may tax certain sales, you must realise that the meaning that I give to 'sale' is the meaning that my Supreme Court shall give to it and that it cannot mean differing things in different areas; and you must realise that the only sales that you may tax are the ones that lie in your own territory."}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59187, "end_char": 59195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "what I do most strongly press is that a Constitution Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 59466, "end_char": 59522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Winston Churchill", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 59847, "end_char": 59864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "given an ethereal omnipresent quality that enables a horde of hungry hawks to swoop down and devour it simultaneously all over the land : \"some sale; some hawks\" as Winston Churchill would say."}}, {"text": "Bos", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60748, "end_char": 60751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Of course, it is Ih• stat• of Bihar fiction, but it is a fiction as to situs imposed by the - Constitution Act and by the Supreme Court that Bos.", "canonical_name": "Bose"}}, {"text": "New York", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 61608, "end_char": 61616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So with a sale of a motor car started and concluded wholly and exclusively in New York or London or Timbuctoo."}}, {"text": "London", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 61620, "end_char": 61626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So with a sale of a motor car started and concluded wholly and exclusively in New York or London or Timbuctoo."}}, {"text": "Timbuctoo", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 61630, "end_char": 61639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So with a sale of a motor car started and concluded wholly and exclusively in New York or London or Timbuctoo."}}, {"text": "And once it is determined objectively by the Constitution Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 61990, "end_char": 62051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Supreme C", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 62058, "end_char": 62067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And once it is determined objectively by the Constitution Act or in Supreme C<iurt how and where the sale is situate, its situs is fixed and cannot be changed thereafter by a succession of State legislatures each claiming a different situs by the convenient fiction of deeming."}}, {"text": "(1944] F.C.R. 229", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 63965, "end_char": 63982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1948] F.C.R. 121", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 63999, "end_char": 64016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1958_1_1384_1394_EN", "year": 1958, "text": "19S8\n\nFebruary 20.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nBAI HIRA DEVI AND OTHERS\n\n[1958]\n\nTHE OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE OF BOMBAY\n\n(BHAGWATI, J. L. KAPUR and GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ.)\n\nEvidence-Deed of gift-Donor adjudged insolwnt-Offici.:JI Assignee challenging giftt-lf donees ntitled to lead evidence showing gift to be transfer for consideration-Whether Official Assignee representative in interest of iolvent-Evidenct Act, .s. 92.-Presidency-towns Insolvency Act (Ill of 1909), s. 55.\n\nOne D executed, on May 22, 1950, a deed of gift in favour of the appellants, his wife and sons.\n\nUpon the application of his creditors D was adjudged an insolvent on August 21, 1951 and his esUjte vested in the respondent. On September 26, 1951, the respondent took out a notice of motion under s. 5 5 of the Presidency-tOJ''IlS Insolvency Act for a declaration that the dced of gift was void.\n\nIn reply the appellants pleaded that the transaction, though it purported to be a gift, was in reality a transfer for valuable. consideration.\n\nThe respondent objected that th<> evidence which the appellants sought to lead in support of their plea was inadmissible under s. 92 of the Indian Evidence Act:\n\nHeld, that s. 92 of the Evidence Act was not applicable to the proceedings and the appellants were entitled to lead evidence in support of the plea raised by them.\n\nSection 92 is only applicable to cases as between parties to an instrument or their representatives in interest.\n\nWhere, however the dispute is between a stranger to an instrument and a party to it or his representative in interest, s. 92 is inapplicable, and both tlte stranger and the party or his representative are at liberty to lead evidence of oral agreement notwithstanding the fact that such evidence if believed, may contradict, vary, add to or subtract from its terms.\n\nIn the present case, though the appellants were the representatives in interest of the insolvent the respondent, when he made the petition under s. 5 5 of the Presidency-towns Insolvency Act, was not acting as a representative in interest of the insolvent, and, therefore, the proceedings were not between the parties to the instrument or their representatives in .interest.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 197 of 1956.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated August 6, 1954, of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 30 of 1954, arising out of the judgment and order dated January 28, 1954, of the said High Court in Insolvency No. 74 of 1951.\n\nM. C. SetalVad, Attorney-General for India, S. N. 1958 Andley and J. B. Dadachanji, for the appellants.\n\nBal Hira Devi Purshottam Tricumdas and I. N. Shroff, for the and Others respondent. v. 1958 February 20. The following Judgment of the The Officialb .\n\nCourt was delivered by ' Assignee of Bom a}\n\nGAJENDRAGADK.AR J .-This appeal by special leave Gajendragadkar I. arises from the notice of motion taken out by the respondent official assignee under s. SS of the Presidencytowns Insolvency Act against the appellants for a declaration that a deed of gift executed by the insol:·\n\nvent Daulatram Hukamchand on May 22, 1950, in favour of the appellants was void. It appears that some creditors of Daulatram filed .a petition in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Insolvency Case No. 74 of 1951, for an order that the said Daulatram be adjudged insolvent as he had given notice of suspension of payment of the debts on August 2, 1951. Daulatram was adjudicated insolvent on August 21, 1951, with the result that the estate of the insolvent vested in the respondent under s. 17 of the Act. On September 26, 1951, the respondent took out the present notice of motion. The impugned deed of gift has been executed by the insolvent in favour of his wife and three sons who are the appellants before us. In reply to the notice of motion appellants 1 to 3 filed a Joint affidavit setting out the facts and circumstances under which the said deed of gift had been executed by the insolvent in their favour. In substance, the appellants' case was that, though the document purported to be a gift, it was really a transaction supported by valuable consideration and as such it did not fall within • the mischief of s. 55 of the Act. At the hearing . of this notice of motion before Mr. Justice Coyajee, when the appellants sought to lead eidence in support of this plea, the respondent objected and urged that the evidence which the appellants wanted to lead was inadmissible under s. 92 of the Indian Evidence Act.\n\nThe learned Judge, however, overruled the respondent's objection and allowed the appellants to lead\n\nM2SC/61 X-3\n\n19ss their evidence. In the end the learned Judge did not accept the appellants' contention and, by his Bal Hira Deii judgment delivered on January 28, 1954, he granted\n\nand Others the declaration claimed by the respondent under s. 55\n\nThe ffecial of the Act.\n\nAisignee of Bombay Against this judgment and order the appellants - preferred an appeal (No. 30 of 1954) which was heard GaJmdro¥cdkarJ. by Chagla C. J. and Shah J. The learned Judges took the view that Mr. Justice Coyajee had erred in law in allowing oral evidence to be led by the appel !ants in support of their plea that the transaction evidenced by the deed of gift was in reality a transfer for consideration. The learned Judges held that the gift in question had been executed by the donor in favour of the donees out of natural love and affection and that, under s. 92, it was not open to the appellants to lead evidence to show that the transaction was supported not by the consideration of natural love and affection but by another kind of valuable consideration. On this view of the matter the learned Judges did not think it necessary to consider the oral evidence actually led by the appellants and decide whether Mr. Justice Coyajee was right or not in rejecting the said evidence on the merits. That is how the appeal preferred by the appellants was dismissed on August 6, 1954. On September 23, 1954 the application made by the appellants for a certificate was rejected by the High Court at Bombay; but special leave was granted to the appefiants by this Court on November 3, 1954, and that is how the appeal has come before us for final disposal.\n\nThe principal point which arises in this appeal is whether the appellants were entitled to lead oral evidence with a view to show the real nature of the impugned transaction. In deciding this question, it would be necessary to consider the true scope and effect.of SS. 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act.\n\nChapter VI of the Evidence Act which begins with s. 91 deals with the exclusion of oral by documentary evidence. Section 91 provides that, \"when the terms of a contract, or of a grant, or of any other disposition of property, have been reduced to the form of a document,\n\nand in all cases in which any matter is required t9ss by law. to be reduced to the form of a document, no evidence shall be oiven in proof of the terms of such Bai Hira Devi c,. and OlherJ contract, grant or other disposition of property, or of v such matter, except the document itself, or secondary TM Official evidence of its contents. in cases in which secondary A1111111e of Bombay evidence is admissible under the provisions herein- - before contained.\" The normal rule is that the con- GaJendrqadkar 1. tents 9f a document must be proved by primary evidence which is the document itself in original.\n\nSection 91 is based on what is sometimes described as the \"best evidence rule\". The best evidence about the contents of a document is the document itself and . it is the production of the document that is required by s. 91 in proof of its contents. In a sens~. the rule enunciated by s~ 91 can be said to be an exclusive rule inasmuch as it excludes the admission of oral evidence for proving the contents of the document except in cases where secondary evidence is allowed to be led under the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act.\n\nSection 92 excludes the evidence of oral agreements and it applies to cases where the terms of contracts, grants or other dispositions of property have been proved by the production of the relevant documents themselves under s. 91; in other words, it is after the document has been produeed to prove its terms under s. 91 that the provisions of s. 92 come into operation for the purpose of excfoding evidence of any oral agreement or statement, for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to or subtracting from its terms.\n\nThe application of this rule is limited to cases as between parties to the instrument or their representa .tives-in-interest. There are six provisos to this section with which we are not concerned in the present appeal. It would be noticed that ss. 91 and 92 in effect supplement each other. Section 91 would be frustrated without the aid of s. 92 and s. 92 would be inoperative without the aid of s. 91. Since s. 92 excludes the admission of oral evidence for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding'to or subtracting from the terms of the document properly proved\n\n1958 under s. 91, it may be said that it makes the proof of the document conclusive of its contents. Like s. 91, Bai Hira Devi s. 92 also can be said to be based on the best evidence and Others v. rule. The two sections, however, differ in some material The Official particulars. Section 91 applies to all documents, A<signu of Bombay whether they purport to dispose of nghts or not, . . -- whereas s. 92 applies to documents which can be desc,.,.ndraKasikar J. cribed as dispositive. Section 91 applies to documents which are both bilateral and unilateral, unlike s. 92 the application of which is confined only to bilateral documents. Section 91 lays down the rule of universal application and is not confined to the executant or executants of the documents.\n\nSection 92, on the other hand, applies only between the parties to the instrument or their representatives-in-interest. There is no doubt that s. 92 does not apply to strangers who are not bound or affected by the terms of the document.\n\nPersons other than those who are parties to the document are not precluded from giving extrinsic evidence to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the .terms of the document. It is only where a question aries about the effect of the document as between the parties or their representatives-in-interest that the rule enunciated by s. 92 about the exclusion of oral agreement can be invoked. This position is made absolutely clear by the provisions of s. 99 itself.\n\nSection 99 provides that \"persons who are not parties to a document or their representatives-inmterest, may give evidence of any facts tending to &how contemporaneous agreement varying the terms of the document\". Though it is only variation which is specifically mentioned in s. 99, there can be no doubt that the third party's right to lead evidence which is recognised by s. 99 w<111ld include a right to lead evidence not only to vary the terms of the document, but to contradict the said terms or to add to or subtract from them .. If that be the true position, before considedng the effect of the provisions of s. 92 in regard to the appellants' right to lead oral evidence, it would be necessary to examine whether s. 92 applies at all to the present proceedings between the official assignee who is the respondent and the\n\ndonees from the insolvent who are the appellants 1958 before us.\n\nBai Hira Devi Does the official assignee represent the insolvent, and Others and can he be described as the representative-inv. interest of the insolvent, when he moves the The Official Insolvency Court under s. 55 of the Presidency-towns Assignee of Bombay Insolvency Act ? It is true that, under s. 17 of the 0 . ndr-dk J Act, on the making of an order of adjudication, the a, e aga ar property of the insolvent wherever situate vests in the official assignee and becomes divisible among his creditors; but the property in respect of which a declaration is claimed by the official assignee under s. 55 has already gone out of the estate of the insolvent, and it canriot be said to vest in the official assignee as a result of the order of adjudication itself.\n\nBesides, when the official assignee makes the petition under s. 55 he does so obviously and solely for the benefit of the creditors. An insolvent himself has, and can possibly have, no right to challenge the transfer effected by him. In this respect the official assignee has a higher title than the insolvent and, when, under s. 55, h1;; challenges any transfer made by the insolvent, he acts not for the insolvent or on his behalf, but in the interest of the whole body of the insolvent's creditors. In theory and on principle, as soon as an order of adjudication is made, all procee<lings in regard to the estate of the insolvent come under the control of the Insolvency Court. It may be said that the official assignee in whom the estate of the insolvent vests is to guard not ~:mly the interests of the creditors of the insolvent but also \"public morality and the interest which every member of the public has in the observance of commercial morality\" (1).\n\nThere is no doubt that it is the Insolvency Court alone which has jurisdiction to annul the insolvent's transactions, whether the case is governed by the Presidency-towns Insolvency Act or by the Provincial Insolvency Act; and so the proceedings taken under s. 55 cannot be deemed to be proceedings taken for and on behalf of the insolvent at all.\n\n(1) \"The Law of Insolvency in India\"-By Rt. Hon. Sir D. F. Mulla,\n\nKt.-2nd\"1!.d., p. 23 1.\n\n1958 The provisions of s. 55 themselves support the same conclusion. Under s. 55, any transfer of pro Bai Hira Devi perty not being a transfer made before and in consiand Othm deration of marriage or made in favour of a purchaser Th• ffelal or encumbrancer in good faith and for valuable A•signee of Bombay consideration shall, if the transferor is adjudged insolvent within two years of the date of transfer, be Gajendra1adkar J. void against the official assignee. This section, like s. 53-A of the Provincial Insolvency Act, makes the impugned transfers voidable at the instance of the official assignee or the receiver. The transfers in question are not declared void as between the parties themselves; they are avoided by the official assignee or the receiver and their avoidance is intended to ensure for the benefit of the whole body of the creditors of the insolvent. The relevant sections of the two Insolvency Acts in effect require the Insol vency Courts to set aside the impugned transactions in exercise of the Insolvency Courts' exclusive jurisdiction in that behalf. The obvious object of these provisions is to bring back to the insolvent's estate, property which has left the estate by the impugned act of the insolvent himself and make the said property available for distribution amongst his creditors. It would, therefore, be impossible to hold that, when the official assignee makes a petition under\n\n~- 55 of the Act, he is acting as a representative-in interest of the insolvent.\n\nIn this connection it would be relevant to remem ber that, in cases governed by the Presidency-towns Insolvency Act, the practice in Calcutta and Bombay consistently allows a creditor who has proved his debt to file a petition to set aside the transfer under s. 55 of the Act if he shows that the official assignee, on being tendered a reasonable indemnity has un reasonably refused to make an application. Similarly, under s. 54-A of the Provincial Insolvency Act, a creditor himself can make the application if the receiver refuses to take any action. Now, if an application is made by a creditor for setting aside a voluntary transfer effected by the insolvent, there can be no doubt that the creditor is not the representativein-interest of the insolvent and the creditor would t9ss obviously not be affected by the provisions of s. 92 of the Indian Evidence Act. It would really be Bal Hira D.i•i and Others anomalous if s. 92 were to apply to proceedings v. instituted by the official assignee under s. 55 though The Official the said section cannot and would not apply to similar Assignee of Bombay proceedings instituted by a creditor, Having regard to - the object with which s. 55 has been enacted, the Gajendragadkar J. nature of the proceedings taken under it, and the nature and effect of the final order which is contemplated under it, it is clear that, like the creditor who may apply, the official assignee also cannot be said to be the representative-in-interest of the insolvent in these proceedings. If that be the true position, s. 92 cannot apply to the present proceedings between the respondent and the appellants; and so there can be no doubt that the respondent would not be precluded from leading evidence of an oral agreement for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to or subtracting from the terms of the impugned document.\n\nThe question raised by Shri Purushottam which still remains to be considered js whether the appellants who undoubtedly are the representatives-ininterest of the insolvent can avoid the application of s. 92. In our opinion, the answer to this question must be in favour of the appellants. It is urged before us by Shri Purushottam that the scheme of the relevant provisions of Ch. VI of the Indian Evidence Act is inconsistent with the appellants' contention that they can lead oral evidence about the alleged agreement which may tend to change the character of the transaction itself. Shri Purushottam bases his argument mainly on the provisions of s. 91 read withs. 99 of the Act. He contends thats. 91 requires the production and proof of the document itself for the purpose of proving the contents of the document; and by necessary implication all evidence about any oral agreement which may affect the terms of the document is excluded by s. 91 itself. We are not impressed by this argument. As we have already observed, ss. 91 and 92 really supplement each other.\n\nIt is because s. 91 by itself wquld not have excluded\n\n1958 evidence of oral agreements which may tend to vary the terms of the document that s. 92 has been Bai Biro De>'i enacted; and if s. 92 does not apply in the present and Others case, there is no other section in the Evidence Act\n\nThe ffecial which can be said to exclude evidence of the a&re Assignee of Bombayment set up by the appellants. What s. 91 proh1b1ts is the admission of oral evidence to prove the contents Gajendragadkcr J. of the document. In the present case, the terms of the document are proved by the production of the document itself. Whether or not the said terms could be varied by proof of an oral agreement is a .matter which is not covered by s. 91 at all. That is the subject-matter of s. 92; and so, if s. 92 does not apply, there is no reason to exclude evidence about an oral agreement solely on the ground that if believed the said evidc;_nce may vary the terms of the transaction. Shri Purushottam also relied upon the provisions of s. 99.\n\nHis argument is that it is only presons who are not parties to a document or their representatives-in-interest who ; ire allowed by s. 99 to give evidence of facts tending to show a contemporaneous agreement varying the terms of the document. Jn other words, the effect of s. 99 is not only to allow strangers to lead such evidence, but to prohibit parties or their representatives-in-interest from leading such evidence independently of the provisions of s. 92 of the Evidence Act. We do not read s .. 99 as laying down any such prohibition by necessary implication. As a matter of fact, from the terms of s. 92 itself, it is clear that strangers to the document are outside the scope ofs. 92; buts. 99 has presumably been enacted to clarify the same position.\n\nIt would be unreasonable, we think, to hold that s. 99 was intended not only to clarify the position with regard to the strangers to the document, but also to lay down. a rule of exclusion of oral evidence by implies. tion in respect of the parties to the document or their representatives-in-interest. Jn our opinion, the true position is that, if the terms of any transfer reduced to writing are in dispute between a stranger to a document and a party to it or his representatjve-ininterest, the restriction imposed by s. 92 in regard to\n\nthe exclusion of evidence of oral agreement is in- 1958 applicable; and both the stranger to the document and the party to the document or his representative- Bai Hira Devi and Others ii:-interest are at liberty to lead evidence of oral ,, agreement notwithstanding the fact that such evi- The Offecial dence, if believed, may contradict, vary, add to or Assignee of Bombay subtract from its terms. The rule of exclusion enunciated bys. 92 applies to both parties to the document GajendragqdkarJ.\n\nand is based on the doctrine of mutuality. It .would be inequitable and unfair to enforce that rule against a party to a document or his representative-in-interest in the case of a dispute between tfie said party or his representative-in-interest on the one hand and the stranger on the other. In dealing with this point we may incidentally refer to the relevant statement of the law by Phipson in his treatise on \"Evidence\" :\n\n\"Where the transaction has been reduced into writing merely by agreement of the parties\", it is observed, \"extrinsic evidence to contradict or vary the writing is excluded only in proceedings between such parties or their privies, and not in those between strangers, or a party and a stranger; since strangers cannot be precluded from proving the truth by the ignorance, carelessness, or fraud of the parties (R. v.\n\nCheadle, 3 B. and Ad. 833); nor, in proceedings be- . tween a party and a stranger, will the former be estopped since there would be no mutuality\"(1): The result is that s. 92 is wholly inapplicable to the present proceedings and so the appellants are entitled to lead evidence in support of the plea raised by them. It appears that the attention of the learned Judges who heard the appeal in the High Court at Bombay was not drawn to this aspect of the matter.\n\nThat is why they proceeded to deal with the question about the admissibility of oral evidence led 'by the appellants on the assumption that s. 92 applied~\n\nWe must accordingly set aside the decree passd by the court of appeal in the High Court at Bombay and send the appeal back to that Court for disposal on the merits in accordance with law. In the circumstances\n\n(i) Phipson on Evidence-,-9th Ed., p. 602.\n\nBui Hfra Devi\n\nand Others\n\n\"· The Official Assignee of Bt'1nbay\n\nGajendragadkar J.\n\nFebruary 20.\n\nof this case, we think that the fair order as to costs of this appeal would be that the costs should abide the final result in the appeal before the High Ccurt at Bombay.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nCase remanded.\n\nKANAIYALAL CHANDULAL MONIM v.\n\nINDUMATI T. POTDAR AND ANOTHER\n\n(B. P. SINHA, JAFER IMAM SUBBA RAO JJ.)\n\nMunicipal Law-Water Supply-Landlord withholding essential supply-Tenant not in enjoyment after enactment-Conviction of landlord-Legality-Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act (Bom. LVll of 1947), s. 24.\n\nSection 24( 1) of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, provides: \"No landlord either himse![ or through any person acting or purporting to act on his behalf shall without just or sufficient cause cut off or withhold any essential supply or service enjoyed by the tenant in respect of the premises let to him.\" By Explanation II : \"For the purposes of this section, withholding any essential supply or service shall include acts or omissions attributable to the landlord on account of which the essential supply or service is cut off by the local authority or any other competent autliority.\"\n\nThe appeallant was prosecuted under s. 24 of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, on J complaint by the tenant, the first respondent, on June 14, 1954, for having refused or neglected to have water connection made for the premises.\n\nThe water supply to the premises was cut off by the Municipality in 1947 due to the default in payment of the municipal taxes by the predecessor-intitle of the appellant, but the tenants, including the first -respondent, continued in occupation of the premises without having the use of municipal wator s11pply.\n\nIt was contended for the appellant that his conviction was invalid because ( 1) he was not liable for the default made by his predecessor-in-title, and (2) in any case, s. 24 was not applicable inasmuch as the supply of municipal water was not\n\nen joyed by the first respondent when the Act came into force :", "total_entities": 140, "entities": [{"text": "BAI HIRA DEVI AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 43, "end_char": 67, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAI HIRA DEVI AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE OF BOMBAY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 77, "end_char": 108, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE OF BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 123, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "L. KAPUR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 124, "end_char": 132, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.L. KAPUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 137, "end_char": 155, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 402, "end_char": 407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Presidency-towns Insolvency Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 409, "end_char": 440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 456, "end_char": 461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Presidency-towns Insolvency Act", "statute": "Presidency-towns Insolvency Act"}}, {"text": "August 21, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 630, "end_char": 645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Upon the application of his creditors D was adjudged an insolvent on August 21, 1951 and his esUjte vested in the respondent."}}, {"text": "September 26, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 690, "end_char": 708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 26, 1951, the respondent took out a notice of motion under s. 5 5 of the Presidency-tOJ''IlS Insolvency Act for a declaration that the dced of gift was void."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 759, "end_char": 763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Presidency-towns Insolvency Act", "statute": "Presidency-towns Insolvency Act"}}, {"text": "IlS Insolvency Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 789, "end_char": 807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1130, "end_char": 1135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IlS Insolvency Act", "statute": "IlS Insolvency Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1143, "end_char": 1162, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1176, "end_char": 1181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IlS Insolvency Act", "statute": "IlS Insolvency Act"}}, {"text": "Section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1330, "end_char": 1340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IlS Insolvency Act", "statute": "IlS Insolvency Act"}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1563, "end_char": 1568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IlS Insolvency Act", "statute": "IlS Insolvency Act"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1955, "end_char": 1959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. C. SetalVad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2472, "end_char": 2486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. SetalVad, Attorney-General for India, S. N. 1958 Andley and J. B. Dadachanji, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "S. N. 1958 Andley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2516, "end_char": 2533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. SetalVad, Attorney-General for India, S. N. 1958 Andley and J. B. Dadachanji, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "J. B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2538, "end_char": 2554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. SetalVad, Attorney-General for India, S. N. 1958 Andley and J. B. Dadachanji, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Bal Hira Devi Purshottam Tricumdas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2577, "end_char": 2611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bal Hira Devi Purshottam Tricumdas and I. N. Shroff, for the and Others respondent."}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2616, "end_char": 2628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bal Hira Devi Purshottam Tricumdas and I. N. Shroff, for the and Others respondent."}}, {"text": "GAJENDRAGADK.AR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2774, "end_char": 2789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Court was delivered by ' Assignee of Bom a}\n\nGAJENDRAGADK.AR J .-This appeal by special leave Gajendragadkar I. arises from the notice of motion taken out by the respondent official assignee under s. SS of the Presidencytowns Insolvency Act against the appellants for a declaration that a deed of gift executed by the insol:·\n\nvent Daulatram Hukamchand on May 22, 1950, in favour of the appellants was void.", "canonical_name": "GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ."}}, {"text": "SS of the Presidencytowns Insolvency Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2929, "end_char": 2969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Daulatram Hukamchand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3061, "end_char": 3081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Court was delivered by ' Assignee of Bom a}\n\nGAJENDRAGADK.AR J .-This appeal by special leave Gajendragadkar I. arises from the notice of motion taken out by the respondent official assignee under s. SS of the Presidencytowns Insolvency Act against the appellants for a declaration that a deed of gift executed by the insol:·\n\nvent Daulatram Hukamchand on May 22, 1950, in favour of the appellants was void."}}, {"text": "May 22, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3085, "end_char": 3097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Court was delivered by ' Assignee of Bom a}\n\nGAJENDRAGADK.AR J .-This appeal by special leave Gajendragadkar I. arises from the notice of motion taken out by the respondent official assignee under s. SS of the Presidencytowns Insolvency Act against the appellants for a declaration that a deed of gift executed by the insol:·\n\nvent Daulatram Hukamchand on May 22, 1950, in favour of the appellants was void."}}, {"text": "Daulatram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3171, "end_char": 3180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that some creditors of Daulatram filed .a petition in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Insolvency Case No."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3206, "end_char": 3240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that some creditors of Daulatram filed .a petition in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Insolvency Case No."}}, {"text": "August 2, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3397, "end_char": 3411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "74 of 1951, for an order that the said Daulatram be adjudged insolvent as he had given notice of suspension of payment of the debts on August 2, 1951."}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3549, "end_char": 3554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "SS of the Presidencytowns Insolvency Act", "statute": "SS of the Presidencytowns Insolvency Act"}}, {"text": "s. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4183, "end_char": 4188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Coyajee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4262, "end_char": 4269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of this notice of motion before Mr. Justice Coyajee, when the appellants sought to lead eidence in support of this plea, the respondent objected and urged that the evidence which the appellants wanted to lead was inadmissible under s. 92 of the Indian Evidence Act."}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4450, "end_char": 4455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4463, "end_char": 4482, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bal Hira Deii", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4703, "end_char": 4716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the end the learned Judge did not accept the appellants' contention and, by his Bal Hira Deii judgment delivered on January 28, 1954, he granted\n\nand Others the declaration claimed by the respondent under s. 55\n\nThe ffecial of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4828, "end_char": 4833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "GaJmdro¥cdkarJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4981, "end_char": 4996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "30 of 1954) which was heard GaJmdro¥cdkarJ. by Chagla C. J. and Shah J. The learned Judges took the view that Mr. Justice Coyajee had erred in law in allowing oral evidence to be led by the appel !"}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5000, "end_char": 5006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "30 of 1954) which was heard GaJmdro¥cdkarJ. by Chagla C. J. and Shah J. The learned Judges took the view that Mr. Justice Coyajee had erred in law in allowing oral evidence to be led by the appel !"}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5017, "end_char": 5021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "30 of 1954) which was heard GaJmdro¥cdkarJ. by Chagla C. J. and Shah J. The learned Judges took the view that Mr. Justice Coyajee had erred in law in allowing oral evidence to be led by the appel !"}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5431, "end_char": 5436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "August 6, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5938, "end_char": 5952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is how the appeal preferred by the appellants was dismissed on August 6, 1954."}}, {"text": "September 23, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5957, "end_char": 5975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 23, 1954 the application made by the appellants for a certificate was rejected by the High Court at Bombay; but special leave was granted to the appefiants by this Court on November 3, 1954, and that is how the appeal has come before us for final disposal."}}, {"text": "High Court at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6053, "end_char": 6073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 23, 1954 the application made by the appellants for a certificate was rejected by the High Court at Bombay; but special leave was granted to the appefiants by this Court on November 3, 1954, and that is how the appeal has come before us for final disposal."}}, {"text": "November 3, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6140, "end_char": 6156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 23, 1954 the application made by the appellants for a certificate was rejected by the High Court at Bombay; but special leave was granted to the appefiants by this Court on November 3, 1954, and that is how the appeal has come before us for final disposal."}}, {"text": "SS. 91 and 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6490, "end_char": 6503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter VI of the Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6526, "end_char": 6556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6575, "end_char": 6580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter VI of the Evidence Act", "statute": "Chapter VI of the Evidence Act"}}, {"text": "Section 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6639, "end_char": 6649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter VI of the Evidence Act", "statute": "Chapter VI of the Evidence Act"}}, {"text": "Section 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7406, "end_char": 7416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter VI of the Evidence Act", "statute": "Chapter VI of the Evidence Act"}}, {"text": "s. 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7623, "end_char": 7628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7942, "end_char": 7952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8167, "end_char": 8172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8258, "end_char": 8263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8287, "end_char": 8292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 91 and 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8717, "end_char": 8730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8764, "end_char": 8774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8814, "end_char": 8819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8824, "end_char": 8829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8870, "end_char": 8875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8883, "end_char": 8888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9056, "end_char": 9061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9151, "end_char": 9156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bai Hira Devi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9158, "end_char": 9171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Like s. 91, Bai Hira Devi s. 92 also can be said to be based on the best evidence and Others v. rule.", "canonical_name": "BAI HIRA DEVI AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9172, "end_char": 9177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9325, "end_char": 9335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9444, "end_char": 9449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ",.ndraKasikar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9490, "end_char": 9503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ",.ndraKasikar J. cribed as dispositive."}}, {"text": "Section 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9530, "end_char": 9540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9610, "end_char": 9615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9682, "end_char": 9692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9807, "end_char": 9817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9950, "end_char": 9955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10379, "end_char": 10384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10499, "end_char": 10504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10514, "end_char": 10524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10790, "end_char": 10795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10888, "end_char": 10893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11130, "end_char": 11135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11235, "end_char": 11240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11619, "end_char": 11624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11708, "end_char": 11713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12008, "end_char": 12013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12234, "end_char": 12239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12500, "end_char": 12505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13394, "end_char": 13399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "D. F. Mulla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13538, "end_char": 13549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sir D. F. Mulla,\n\nKt.-2nd\"1!.d.,"}}, {"text": "s. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13600, "end_char": 13605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13652, "end_char": 13657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13877, "end_char": 13883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under s. 55, any transfer of pro Bai Hira Devi perty not being a transfer made before and in consiand Othm deration of marriage or made in favour of a purchaser Th• ffelal or encumbrancer in good faith and for valuable A•signee of Bombay consideration shall, if the transferor is adjudged insolvent within two years of the date of transfer, be Gajendra1adkar J. void against the official assignee."}}, {"text": "Gajendra1adkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13990, "end_char": 14004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under s. 55, any transfer of pro Bai Hira Devi perty not being a transfer made before and in consiand Othm deration of marriage or made in favour of a purchaser Th• ffelal or encumbrancer in good faith and for valuable A•signee of Bombay consideration shall, if the transferor is adjudged insolvent within two years of the date of transfer, be Gajendra1adkar J. void against the official assignee.", "canonical_name": "GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ."}}, {"text": "s. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14063, "end_char": 14068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15214, "end_char": 15222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection it would be relevant to remem ber that, in cases governed by the Presidency-towns Insolvency Act, the practice in Calcutta and Bombay consistently allows a creditor who has proved his debt to file a petition to set aside the transfer under s. 55 of the Act if he shows that the official assignee, on being tendered a reasonable indemnity has un reasonably refused to make an application."}}, {"text": "s. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15340, "end_char": 15345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15505, "end_char": 15510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15915, "end_char": 15920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15928, "end_char": 15947, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16007, "end_char": 16012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16087, "end_char": 16092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16266, "end_char": 16271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16294, "end_char": 16308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would really be Bal Hira D.i•i and Others anomalous if s. 92 were to apply to proceedings v. instituted by the official assignee under s. 55 though The Official the said section cannot and would not apply to similar Assignee of Bombay proceedings instituted by a creditor, Having regard to - the object with which s. 55 has been enacted, the Gajendragadkar J. nature of the proceedings taken under it, and the nature and effect of the final order which is contemplated under it, it is clear that, like the creditor who may apply, the official assignee also cannot be said to be the representative-in-interest of the insolvent in these proceedings.", "canonical_name": "GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ."}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16630, "end_char": 16635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Purushottam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16972, "end_char": 16983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question raised by Shri Purushottam which still remains to be considered js whether the appellants who undoubtedly are the representatives-ininterest of the insolvent can avoid the application of s. 92."}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17144, "end_char": 17149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "VI of the Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17324, "end_char": 17353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17593, "end_char": 17598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "VI of the Indian Evidence Act", "statute": "VI of the Indian Evidence Act"}}, {"text": "s. 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17887, "end_char": 17892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "VI of the Indian Evidence Act", "statute": "VI of the Indian Evidence Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 91 and 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17969, "end_char": 17982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "VI of the Indian Evidence Act", "statute": "VI of the Indian Evidence Act"}}, {"text": "s. 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18028, "end_char": 18033, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "VI of the Indian Evidence Act", "statute": "VI of the Indian Evidence Act"}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18156, "end_char": 18161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "VI of the Indian Evidence Act", "statute": "VI of the Indian Evidence Act"}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18202, "end_char": 18207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "VI of the Indian Evidence Act", "statute": "VI of the Indian Evidence Act"}}, {"text": "s. 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18418, "end_char": 18423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkcr", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18490, "end_char": 18504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What s. 91 proh1b1ts is the admission of oral evidence to prove the contents Gajendragadkcr J. of the document.", "canonical_name": "GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ."}}, {"text": "s. 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18738, "end_char": 18743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18782, "end_char": 18787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18800, "end_char": 18805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19034, "end_char": 19039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19174, "end_char": 19179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19315, "end_char": 19320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19498, "end_char": 19503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19649, "end_char": 19654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19854, "end_char": 19859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20326, "end_char": 20331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "GajendragqdkarJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20826, "end_char": 20842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "92 applies to both parties to the document GajendragqdkarJ.\n\nand is based on the doctrine of mutuality.", "canonical_name": "GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ."}}, {"text": "Phipson", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21231, "end_char": 21238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In dealing with this point we may incidentally refer to the relevant statement of the law by Phipson in his treatise on \"Evidence\" :\n\n\"Where the transaction has been reduced into writing merely by agreement of the parties\", it is observed, \"extrinsic evidence to contradict or vary the writing is excluded only in proceedings between such parties or their privies, and not in those between strangers, or a party and a stranger; since strangers cannot be precluded from proving the truth by the ignorance, carelessness, or fraud of the parties (R. v.\n\nCheadle, 3 B. and Ad.", "canonical_name": "Phipson"}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21859, "end_char": 21864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22292, "end_char": 22297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Phipson", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22522, "end_char": 22529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the circumstances\n\n(i) Phipson on Evidence-,-9th Ed.,", "canonical_name": "Phipson"}}, {"text": "Bui Hfra Devi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22562, "end_char": 22575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bui Hfra Devi\n\nand Others\n\n\"· The Official Assignee of Bt'1nbay\n\nGajendragadkar J.\n\nFebruary 20.", "canonical_name": "BAI HIRA DEVI AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "High Ccurt at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22809, "end_char": 22829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of this case, we think that the fair order as to costs of this appeal would be that the costs should abide the final result in the appeal before the High Ccurt at Bombay."}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22929, "end_char": 22940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KANAIYALAL CHANDULAL MONIM v.\n\nINDUMATI T. POTDAR AND ANOTHER\n\n(B. P. SINHA, JAFER IMAM SUBBA RAO JJ.)"}}, {"text": "JAFER IMAM SUBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22942, "end_char": 22962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KANAIYALAL CHANDULAL MONIM v.\n\nINDUMATI T. POTDAR AND ANOTHER\n\n(B. P. SINHA, JAFER IMAM SUBBA RAO JJ.)"}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23182, "end_char": 23187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 24( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23190, "end_char": 23204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23212, "end_char": 23272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23848, "end_char": 23853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "statute": "the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23861, "end_char": 23921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "June 14, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23978, "end_char": 23991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeallant was prosecuted under s. 24 of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, on J complaint by the tenant, the first respondent, on June 14, 1954, for having refused or neglected to have water connection made for the premises."}}, {"text": "s11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24377, "end_char": 24380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "statute": "the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24556, "end_char": 24561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "statute": "the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947"}}]}
{"document_id": "1958_1_1394_1401_EN", "year": 1958, "text": "Bui Hfra Devi\n\nand Others\n\n\"· The Official Assignee of Bt'1nbay\n\nGajendragadkar J.\n\nFebruary 20.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958]\n\nof this case, we think that the fair order as to costs of this appeal would be that the costs should abide the final result in the appeal before the High Ccurt at Bombay.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nCase remanded.\n\nKANAIYALAL CHANDULAL MONIM v.\n\nINDUMATI T. POTDAR AND ANOTHER\n\n(B. P. SINHA, JAFER IMAM SUBBA RAO JJ.)\n\nMunicipal Law-Water Supply-Landlord withholding essential supply-Tenant not in enjoyment after enactment-Conviction of landlord-Legality-Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act (Bom. LVll of 1947), s. 24.\n\nSection 24( 1) of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, provides: \"No landlord either himse![ or through any person acting or purporting to act on his behalf shall without just or sufficient cause cut off or withhold any essential supply or service enjoyed by the tenant in respect of the premises let to him.\" By Explanation II : \"For the purposes of this section, withholding any essential supply or service shall include acts or omissions attributable to the landlord on account of which the essential supply or service is cut off by the local authority or any other competent autliority.\"\n\nThe appeallant was prosecuted under s. 24 of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, on J complaint by the tenant, the first respondent, on June 14, 1954, for having refused or neglected to have water connection made for the premises.\n\nThe water supply to the premises was cut off by the Municipality in 1947 due to the default in payment of the municipal taxes by the predecessor-intitle of the appellant, but the tenants, including the first -respondent, continued in occupation of the premises without having the use of municipal wator s11pply.\n\nIt was contended for the appellant that his conviction was invalid because ( 1) he was not liable for the default made by his predecessor-in-title, and (2) in any case, s. 24 was not applicable inasmuch as the supply of municipal water was not\n\nen joyed by the first respondent when the Act came into force :\n\n Held: (1) that though the appellant might not have been 1958 directly responsible for the cutting off of the supply of municipal water, it was within his power to get the supply rstored by the Kanaiyalal Municipality on payment of the prescribed fee and m so far as he' Chand11lal Monim omitted to do so, such an omission was attributable to him within v.\n\nExplanation II of s. 24 of the Act, and therefore he was with- Indumati T. Potdar holding iln essential supply within the meaning of s. 24 ( 1 ) of the and Another Act;\n\n(2) that under s. 24 of the Act the essential supply shoui<l have been available for the use of the tenant at some time when the Act was in force, and as, in the instant case, the first respon dent was not in enjoyment of the supply of municipal water at any time after the coming into effect of Act, the appellant could not be convicted under that section.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 65 of 1956.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated April 22, 1955, of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Revision Application No. 449 of 1955, arising out of the judgment and order dated March 24, 1955, of the Court of the Presidency Magistrate, Seventh Court, Dadar, Bombay in Case No. 215/S of 1955.\n\nRameshwar Nath, S. N. Andley and J. B. Dadachanji, for the appellant.\n\nT. Satyanarayan, for respondent No. L N .. S. Bindra and R. H. Dhebar, for respondent No .. 2.\n\n1958. February 20. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SINHA J.-The only question for determination in this appeal, is whether an offence punishable under s. 24(1)(4) of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act L VII of 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), has been brought home to the appellant.\n\nThe facts of this case are short and simple. The appellant is the owner, by purchase in 1945, of certain premises situate in Vile Parle, Bombay. Under the predecessor-in-title of the appellant, was a tenant, named Thirumal Rao Potdar, in respect of a room in\n\nSinha J.\n\n19ss those premises, at a monthly rent of Rs. 20 including . water rate of Rs. 2.\n\nAfter the appellant's purchase,\n\nC' Kdanla1y1 ~~ 1 • the tenant aforesaid continued to hold the tenancy ''\"\" \"\" momm h Th \"d . d . v. on t ose very terms. e sat premises use to enjoy f,, dumati r. Potdar the amenity of water supply from a municipal tap.\n\nand Anorh., As the appellant's predecessor-in-title had made default\n\nSi11/ia J. in payment of municipal taxes, the water supply had been.cut off by the Municipality early in May, 1947.\n\nSince after that, the tenants including the said Thirumal Rao, had the use of well water only from a neighbouring tenant. Thirumal Rao died in or about the year 1950, and his widow, the first respondent, continued in occupation of the premises, without having the use of municipal water supply though she continued to pay the orginal rent plus annas IO more by way of 'permitted increase'. Thus, the landlordthe appellant-went on receiving the monthly rent of Rs. 20-10-0 from the first respondent without giving her the benefit of water supply from the municipal tap. The Act came into force on February 13,\n\n1948. The tenancy appears to have been recorded in her name some time in 1951. Nothing appears to have happened until April, 1954, when the first respondent brought it to the notice of the Municipal authorities that the supply of water from the municiapal tap had been stopped since 1947. The Municipality answered the first respondent's complaint by a letter dated May 24, 1954, saying that the water connection could be restored on payment of Rs. 11-4-0 only, being the fee for doing so, if the owners consent was produced.\n\nBefore receiving this answer from the Municipality, the tenant got a letter written to the appellant, through a pleader, asking him to refund Rs. 72 being the amount charged for water supply at Rs. 2 per month, which was included in the total rent aforesaid for three years after the tenancy had been mutated in her name. The letter also stated that the supply of water had been withheld by the landlord by allowing the Municipality to disconnect the water connection for non-payment of municipal dues. The landlord was also called upon to get the water connection restored, and if he failed to do so, prosecution under\n\ns. 24 of the Act was threatened. As the appellant had 1958 refused or neglected to have the water connection . restored, the tenant filed petition of complaint on ch ~\"';'ra;, 1 .\n\nJune 14, 1954, for the prosecution of the appe!lant a \"~. onim undet s. 24 of the Act. The appellant was convicted Indumati r. Potdar after a trial by the 7th Presidency Magistrate, Dadar' and A11other by.his judgment and order dated March 24, 1955. He was sentenced to undergo one day's simple imprisonment, and to pay a fine of Rs. 150, and in default of\n\npayment, to undergo one month's simple imprisonment. The appellant moved the High Court of Bombay in revision against the order of conviction and sentence aforesaid. The matter was heard by a judge sitting singly, who summarily rejected the application by an order dated April 22, 1955. The appellant moved the High Court for a certificate that this was a fit case for appeal to this Court, which was refused by a Division Bench on May 16,\n\n1955. Thereafter, the appellant moved this Court for special leave which was granted on October 10,\n\n1955. Hence, this appeal.\n\nThe learned counsel for the appellant raised a number of contentions against the conviction and sentence imposed upon the appellant, but in the view we take of the provisions of s. 24 of the Act, it is not necessary to pronounce upon all those contentions.\n\nThe most important question which we have to determine in this appeal,, is whether the constituent elements of an offence under s. 24(1), have been made out on the facts found in this case. Section 24 is in these terms :\n\n\"24.\n\n(1) No landlord either himself or through any person acting or purporting ib act on his behalf shall without just or sufficient cause cut off or withhold any essential supply or service enjoyed by the tenant in respect of the premises let to him.\n\n(2) A tenant in occupation of the premises may, if the landlord has contravened the provisions of ub section (1), make an application to the Court for a direction to restore such supply or service.\n\n(3) If the Court on inquiry finds that the tenant has been in enjoyment of the essential supply or\n\nSi11haJ.\n\nI95s service and that it was cut off or withheld by the landlord without just or sufficient cause, the Court\n\nK~\"\",;~·~ 1 . shall make an order directing the landlord to restore Chan \"~\n\n0\"'\"' such supply or service before a date to be specified in Indumati r. Potdar the order.\n\nAny landlord who fails to restore the and Another supply or service before the date so specified shall for each day during which the default continues theres;11ha 1. after be liable upon a further direction by the Court to that effect to fine which may extend to one hundred rupees. ·\n\n(4) Any landlord, who contravenes the provisions of sub-section (1) shall, on conviction, be punishaeJe with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months or with fine or with both.\n\nExplanation I.-In this section essential supply or service includs supply of water, electricity, lights in passages and on staircases, lifts and conservancy or sanitary service.\n\nExplanation 11.-For the purposes of this section, withholding any essential supply or service shall include acts or omissions attributable to the landlord on account of which the essential supply or services cut off by the local authority or any other competeht authority.\" The explanation II was inserted by s. 16 (2) of the Amending Act, namely, Bombay Act 61 of 1953, and the explanation I, as it now stands, was the only explanation before the amending Act was passed. It has not been.denied before us that the supply of tap water is an essential supply, and that is beyond controversy in view of explanation I. What has bee\" argued, is that the supply of municipal water had been cut off by the Municipality as a result of the dafault in payment of municipal dues, by the appellant's predecessor-in-title.\n\nIt may be that the appellant was not to blame for the default in payiµent of municipal dues, but it was open to him to pay Rs. 11-4-0 and have the water connection restored.\n\nHe may not have been directly responsible for the cutting off of the supply of municipal water, but it was within his power to get the supply restored by the Municipality on payment of the prescribed fee. Hence,\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME <; OURT REPORTS 1399\n\nin so far as the appellant omitted to do so, such an 1958 omission is attributable to him within the meaning of explanation II which was inserted into the Act in h !niatt1t .\n\n1953. There can, therefore, be no doubt that the c a u a Momm appellant was continuing to withhold an essential IndumativT. Potda supply within the meaning of s. 24, as it stood in and Anotlter 1953.\n\nBut that is not the only essential ingredient of the Sinha J. offence created by s. 24. In order to attract the provisions of that -section, it is also necessary that the second ingredient of the offence, should be there, namely, that that essential supply-tap water supply by the Municipality-should have been enjoyed by the tenant. Is it enough that this essential supply should have been \"enjoyed\" by the tenant at any past time, however remote, or that it should have been \"enjoyed\" at any time after the coming into effect of the Act ?\n\nWe are assuming for the purposes of this decision that the first respondent was the tenant at all material times.\n\nIn our opinion, the section makes it essential that the particular essential supply should have been available for the use of the tenant at some time when the Act was in force.\n\nIf, on the other hand, the section were construed in the sense that the supply should have been \"enjoyed\" at some time in the remote past, that is, before the Act was enforced, the act of the landlord, when it was committed, may .not have been penal; but the same act would become penal on the coming into effect of the Act. In that sense, it would amount to ex post facto legislation, and we cnnot accede to the argument that such was the intention of the Legislature-an intention which would cme within the prohibition of Art. 20(1) of the Constitution.\n\nBut it has been said that the expression \"enjoyed by the tenant\" in s. 24, does not necessarily mean that the tenant should have physically made use of the essential supply, and that the requirements of the section are satisfied if the tenant had the right vested in him to call for such a supply. In other words, the argument is that the word \"enjoyed\" does not import physical use of the amenity in question, but\n\nt958 the juridical aspect of it in the sense that the supply . of the water, was one of the rights vested in the tenant.\n\nch!:t\"~'f\"}; 1 . On this construction, if the tenant had, as in this case • ~. omm the first respondent had, the right to enjoy the supply\n\nln4urruzti T. Potdar of water, that would amount to her having \"enjoyed\"\n\nan4 Another the supply, and, thus, both the requirements of s. 24\n\nSinha J. would be fulfilled. In our opinion, it would be straining the language of the ection to say that \"enjoyed\" should mean \"had the right to enjoy\". If that was the intention of the Legislature, those words would have been different. That this was not the intention of the Legislature, becomes clear on an examination of the terms of sub-s. (3) of that section. It speaks of \"the tenant has been in enjoyment of the essential supply or service and that it was cut off or withheld by the landlord\" which imports recent \"enjoyment\" until the supply was cut off, /and not \"enjoyment\" in the remote past. If the intention was that \"enjoyment\" should have been at any time in the past, irrespective of the consideration when the Act came into force, the Legislature would have used some other words to indicate that intention, even assuming that the Legislature could have done so. But it was suggested that sub-s. (1) of s. 24, was self-contained, and that it was not necessary to construe its terms in the light of the provisions of sub-ss. (2) and (3) which go together.\n\nBl!lt it is clear from the terms of sub-s. (2) that it cannot come into operation without the landlord having contravened the provisions of sub-s. (1). Therefore, the provisions Qf s. 24 have to be construed as a whole, in order to find out the true•intention of the Legislature.\n\nIt may also be pointed out that it is doubtful whether, before the second explanation was inserted into the section, as aforesaid, in 1953, the cutting off of the water supply by the Municipality, or the omission of the landlord to take steps to have the connection restored, would have come within the mischief of the penal section. Supposing the second explanation was not there, could the prosecution attribute the cutting off of the connection oy the Municipality, and the subsequent refusal of the landlord\n\nto get the connection restored, as an act or omis- 1958 sion of the landlord within the meaning of&. 24(1) ? .\n\nIt has got to be remembered that the provisior.s of Ch ~nal.~>;~~ 1 .. 24 b dd. . l h anuu\"' monm. s. are ment to .e an a 1_hona guarantee tC? t e v. tenant, of his contmued enjoyment of the rights Jndumati r. Potdar created in his favour by the contract of tenancy apart a; d Another from his rights under the general law. The landlord could not only be penalized for having interrupted the enj e>yment of any one of these essential rights, the tenant could approach the court under sub-ss. (2) and\n\n(3) of the section, to issue a mandate to the landlord to restore the supply or the service before a specified date, the infringement of wh'ich would entail the liability to recurring fines until the mandate had been carried out by the landlord. These are provisions of an exceptional character, meant to be in force for a specified period during which the Legislature thought it advisable and expedient to provide for such extraordinary remedies. Such remedies which are inroads upon the landlord's freedom of action, have to be construed strictly in accordance with . the words actually used by the Legislature, and they cannot be given an extended meaning.\n\nIn view of these considerations, it must be held that the complainant-the first respondent-has not shown. that she had enjoyed the amenity of the supply of tap water from the Municipality at any time after the Act came into force, and as that is one of the two essential conditions for the application of the section, it must be held that the offence under s. 24(1) of the Act, has not been brought home to the appellant. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed, and the conviction and sentence are set aside ..\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nM2SC61 X-4", "total_entities": 55, "entities": [{"text": "Bui Hfra Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 13, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bui Hfra Devi\n\nand Others\n\n\"· The Official Assignee of Bt'1nbay\n\nGajendragadkar J.\n\nFebruary 20."}}, {"text": "High Ccurt at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 277, "end_char": 297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of this case, we think that the fair order as to costs of this appeal would be that the costs should abide the final result in the appeal before the High Ccurt at Bombay."}}, {"text": "KANAIYALAL CHANDULAL MONIM", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 333, "end_char": 359, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KANAIYALAL CHANDULAL MONIM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "INDUMATI T. POTDAR AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 364, "end_char": 394, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "INDUMATI T. POTDAR AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 397, "end_char": 408, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAFER IMAM SUBBA RAO JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 410, "end_char": 434, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 650, "end_char": 655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 24( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 658, "end_char": 672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 680, "end_char": 740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1316, "end_char": 1321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "statute": "the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1329, "end_char": 1389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "June 14, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1446, "end_char": 1459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeallant was prosecuted under s. 24 of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, on J complaint by the tenant, the first respondent, on June 14, 1954, for having refused or neglected to have water connection made for the premises."}}, {"text": "s11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1845, "end_char": 1848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "statute": "the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2024, "end_char": 2029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "statute": "the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Kanaiyalal Municipality", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2359, "end_char": 2382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended for the appellant that his conviction was invalid because ( 1) he was not liable for the default made by his predecessor-in-title, and (2) in any case, s. 24 was not applicable inasmuch as the supply of municipal water was not\n\nen joyed by the first respondent when the Act came into force :\n\n Held: (1) that though the appellant might not have been 1958 directly responsible for the cutting off of the supply of municipal water, it was within his power to get the supply rstored by the Kanaiyalal Municipality on payment of the prescribed fee and m so far as he' Chand11lal Monim omitted to do so, such an omission was attributable to him within v.\n\nExplanation II of s. 24 of the Act, and therefore he was with- Indumati T. Potdar holding iln essential supply within the meaning of s. 24 ( 1 ) of the and Another Act;\n\n(2) that under s. 24 of the Act the essential supply shoui<l have been available for the use of the tenant at some time when the Act was in force, and as, in the instant case, the first respon dent was not in enjoyment of the supply of municipal water at any time after the coming into effect of Act, the appellant could not be convicted under that section."}}, {"text": "Chand11lal Monim", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2436, "end_char": 2452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended for the appellant that his conviction was invalid because ( 1) he was not liable for the default made by his predecessor-in-title, and (2) in any case, s. 24 was not applicable inasmuch as the supply of municipal water was not\n\nen joyed by the first respondent when the Act came into force :\n\n Held: (1) that though the appellant might not have been 1958 directly responsible for the cutting off of the supply of municipal water, it was within his power to get the supply rstored by the Kanaiyalal Municipality on payment of the prescribed fee and m so far as he' Chand11lal Monim omitted to do so, such an omission was attributable to him within v.\n\nExplanation II of s. 24 of the Act, and therefore he was with- Indumati T. Potdar holding iln essential supply within the meaning of s. 24 ( 1 ) of the and Another Act;\n\n(2) that under s. 24 of the Act the essential supply shoui<l have been available for the use of the tenant at some time when the Act was in force, and as, in the instant case, the first respon dent was not in enjoyment of the supply of municipal water at any time after the coming into effect of Act, the appellant could not be convicted under that section."}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2541, "end_char": 2546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indumati T. Potdar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2586, "end_char": 2604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended for the appellant that his conviction was invalid because ( 1) he was not liable for the default made by his predecessor-in-title, and (2) in any case, s. 24 was not applicable inasmuch as the supply of municipal water was not\n\nen joyed by the first respondent when the Act came into force :\n\n Held: (1) that though the appellant might not have been 1958 directly responsible for the cutting off of the supply of municipal water, it was within his power to get the supply rstored by the Kanaiyalal Municipality on payment of the prescribed fee and m so far as he' Chand11lal Monim omitted to do so, such an omission was attributable to him within v.\n\nExplanation II of s. 24 of the Act, and therefore he was with- Indumati T. Potdar holding iln essential supply within the meaning of s. 24 ( 1 ) of the and Another Act;\n\n(2) that under s. 24 of the Act the essential supply shoui<l have been available for the use of the tenant at some time when the Act was in force, and as, in the instant case, the first respon dent was not in enjoyment of the supply of municipal water at any time after the coming into effect of Act, the appellant could not be convicted under that section.", "canonical_name": "INDUMATI T. POTDAR AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2656, "end_char": 2661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2708, "end_char": 2713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Presidency Magistrate, Seventh Court, Dadar, Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3349, "end_char": 3400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "449 of 1955, arising out of the judgment and order dated March 24, 1955, of the Court of the Presidency Magistrate, Seventh Court, Dadar, Bombay in Case No."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3429, "end_char": 3443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rameshwar Nath, S. N. Andley and J. B. Dadachanji, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. N. Andley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3445, "end_char": 3457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rameshwar Nath, S. N. Andley and J. B. Dadachanji, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "J. B. Dadachanji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3462, "end_char": 3478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rameshwar Nath, S. N. Andley and J. B. Dadachanji, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "T. Satyanarayan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3500, "end_char": 3515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. Satyanarayan, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "S. Bindra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3543, "end_char": 3552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L N .. S. Bindra and R. H. Dhebar, for respondent No .. 2."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3557, "end_char": 3569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L N .. S. Bindra and R. H. Dhebar, for respondent No .. 2."}}, {"text": "SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3658, "end_char": 3663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SINHA J.-The only question for determination in this appeal, is whether an offence punishable under s. 24(1)(4) of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act L VII of 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), has been brought home to the appellant.", "canonical_name": "SINHA"}}, {"text": "s. 24(1)(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3758, "end_char": 3769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4062, "end_char": 4068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant is the owner, by purchase in 1945, of certain premises situate in Vile Parle, Bombay."}}, {"text": "Thirumal Rao Potdar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4139, "end_char": 4158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the predecessor-in-title of the appellant, was a tenant, named Thirumal Rao Potdar, in respect of a room in\n\nSinha J.\n\n19ss those premises, at a monthly rent of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Thirumal Rao Potdar"}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4185, "end_char": 4190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the predecessor-in-title of the appellant, was a tenant, named Thirumal Rao Potdar, in respect of a room in\n\nSinha J.\n\n19ss those premises, at a monthly rent of Rs.", "canonical_name": "SINHA"}}, {"text": "Thirumal Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4769, "end_char": 4781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since after that, the tenants including the said Thirumal Rao, had the use of well water only from a neighbouring tenant.", "canonical_name": "Thirumal Rao Potdar"}}, {"text": "February 13,\n\n1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5316, "end_char": 5334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Act came into force on February 13,\n\n1948."}}, {"text": "May 24, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5696, "end_char": 5708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Municipality answered the first respondent's complaint by a letter dated May 24, 1954, saying that the water connection could be restored on payment of Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6478, "end_char": 6483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6728, "end_char": 6733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indumati r. Potdar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6774, "end_char": 6792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was convicted Indumati r. Potdar after a trial by the 7th Presidency Magistrate, Dadar' and A11other by.his judgment and order dated March 24, 1955.", "canonical_name": "INDUMATI T. POTDAR AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "7th Presidency Magistrate, Dadar", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6814, "end_char": 6846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was convicted Indumati r. Potdar after a trial by the 7th Presidency Magistrate, Dadar' and A11other by.his judgment and order dated March 24, 1955."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7094, "end_char": 7114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant moved the High Court of Bombay in revision against the order of conviction and sentence aforesaid."}}, {"text": "April 22, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7288, "end_char": 7302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter was heard by a judge sitting singly, who summarily rejected the application by an order dated April 22, 1955."}}, {"text": "May 16,\n\n1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7449, "end_char": 7462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant moved the High Court for a certificate that this was a fit case for appeal to this Court, which was refused by a Division Bench on May 16,\n\n1955."}}, {"text": "October 10,\n\n1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7546, "end_char": 7563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, the appellant moved this Court for special leave which was granted on October 10,\n\n1955."}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7764, "end_char": 7769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7972, "end_char": 7980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8034, "end_char": 8044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9877, "end_char": 9882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11141, "end_char": 11146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11264, "end_char": 11269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 20(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12542, "end_char": 12552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12643, "end_char": 12648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13387, "end_char": 13392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14316, "end_char": 14321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14650, "end_char": 14655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16894, "end_char": 16902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1958_1_1402_1410_EN", "year": 1958, "text": "Febr11ary 25•\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nSHREEMATI KASH! BAI v.\n\nSUDHA RANI GROSE AND OTHERS\n\n[1958]\n\n(BHAGWA T, L. KAPUR and GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ.)\n\nAdverse possession-Coal mine-Trespass and intermittent working-Whether can constitute adverse possession.\n\nThe appellants and the respondents were lessees of coal mining rights in adjoining areas.\n\nIn 1917, the predecessors in interest of .the appellants trespassed into a portion of the lands leased to the predecessors in interest of the respondents, sank two inclines and two airshafts and dug out coal therefrom.\n\nThere were no mining operations till 1923 when they were restarted and continued till 1926, and were re-commenced in 1931 and carried on till 1933. In 1939 the mine was worked for a short time. lu 1944 the operations were recommenced by the appellants. In 1945 the respondents brought a suit for fixation of the intermediate boundary, for possession of the area trespassed upon and for compensation for coal illegally removed by the appellants. The\n\nappellants contended, inter alia, that they had been in sole, ex, elusive, uninterrupted possession of the area in dispute openly to the knowledge of the respondents and had acquired title by adverse possession:\n\nHeld, that the intermittent working of the _mine in the manner and for the period carried out by the appellants or their predecessors in interest was wholly insufficient to establish possession which could constitute adverse possession.\n\nDuring the period when there were no mining operations no kind of possession of the appella.'lts was proved and the presumption that during such periods possession reverted to the true owner was not rebutted.\n\nNageshwar Bux Roy v. Bengal Coal Co., [1930] L.R. 58 I.A. 29 and Secretary of State for India v. Debendra Lal Khan, [1933] L.R. 61 I.A. 78, distinguished.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 118-119 of 1956.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decrees dated September 27, 1951, of the Patna High Court in Appeal from Original Decrees Nos. 252 and 254 of 1948, arising out of the judgment and decrees dated May 11, 1948, of the Court of Subordinate Judge, Dhanbad in Title Suits Nos. 16 and 50 of 1945 respectively.\n\n1958 . . M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, K.shitindra Nath Bhattacharya, S. N. Andley, J.B. Dadachan.ifi and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant.\n\nShreematl Kami Bal N. C. Chatterjee, S. C; Bannerjee and P. R. Chatterjee, v. for respondents Nos. 7 to 1.3.\n\nSudha Rani Ghose and Others.· P. K. Chatterjee, for respondents Nos. 2-4 and 6 (Minors).\n\nGauri Dayal, for respondent No. 5.\n\n1958. February 25.' The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKAPUR J.-In these two appeals brought by leave of the Patna High Court against a judgment and two decrees of that court a common and the sole question for decision is one of adverse possession. two cross suits were brought in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Dhanbad, raising common questions of fact and law. The appellant and respondent Manilal Becharlal Sengvi were defendants in one (Suit No. 16 of 1945) and plaintiffs in the other (Suit No. 50 of 1945). Respondents Nos. 1-3 were the plaintiffs in the former suit and defendants in the latter. The other respondents were defendants in the latter suit and were added as plaintiffs i:tt the appellate stage under O. l, r.10, CodeofCivilProcedurein the appeal taken against the decision in the former suit. Both the suits were decreed against the appellant and respondent Manilal. Becharlal Sengvi who took two appeals to the High Court at Patna. Both these appeals were dismissed by one judgment dated September 27, 1951, but two decrees were drawn up. Against this judgment and these decrees the appellant , has brought two appeals to this Court which were consolidated and will be disposed of by this judgment.\n\nThe facts necessary for the decision of these two appeals are that on November 26, 1894 Ganga Narayan\n\nSingh, a zamindar and proprietor of pargana Katras granted to Ram Dayal Mazumdar a lease of \"the coal and coal mining rights\" in two plots of land, one.in moua Katras and the other in mouza Bhupatdih. On November 6, 1894 he granted a similar lease in plots\n\nKapurJ.\n\n1958 contiguous to the plots in the lease mentioned above to Bhudar Nath Roy. In Suit No. 32of1896 boundas~,·~~;;. ries between these two sets of plots were fixed and \"'v'.\n\n0 ' this was shown in. a map which was incorporated in sudlra Rani Gho,. the decree passed m that suit. On the death of Ram . and Others Dayal, his sons Prafulla, Kumud, Sarat, Sirish and Girish inherited the leasehold rights which they on Kapur J.\n\nOctober 19, 1918, granted by means of a registered patta and kabulliat to Lalit Mohan Bose for a term of 999 years. One Bennett who along with one Bellwood had obtained a coal mining lease from Raja Sakti\n\nNarayan Singh of Katrasgarh on September 5, 1917, trespassed on the northern portion of the land within the area leased to Lalit Mohan Bose and sank two inclines and two airshafts and dug out coal from this area.\n\nThis gave rise to a dispute between the parties which was amicably settled and the area trespassed was returned to the possession of Lalit Mohan Bose. This fact was denied by the appellant and Manila! Becharlal Sengvi respondent in their written statement and in their plaint. Lalit Mohan Bose died in 1933 leaving a will of which the executors were his widow, Radha Rani and his brother Nagendra Nath Bose. They leased out 17 bighas of land in possession of Lalit Mohan Bose to Keshabji Lalji in 1933. The remaining portion of the area leased to Lalit Mohan Bose was given on lease on March 15, 1938, to Brojendra Nath Ghose and Vishwa Nath Prasad respondents and to Ram Chand Dubey but the possession thereof had been given to them in July 1938 and they (the above two respondents) and Ram Chandra Dubey carried on colliery business in the name and style of West Katras Colliery. On the death of Ram Chandra Dubey his estate was inherited by his sons and widow who on June, 25, 1944, sold their right, title and interest to Nagendra Nath Bose. These three, i.e., Brojendra Nath Ghose, Vishwa Nath Prasad and Nagendra Nath Bose were the plaintiffs in Suit No. 16 of 1945.\n\nAs stated above Raja Sakti Narayan Singh leased an area of 256 bighas to Bennett and Bellwood on September 5, 1917, and they assigned their rights to\n\nthe New Katras Coal Company Limited. This Com- 1958 pany worked the coal mine for some time but went into liquidation and in Execution Case No. 293 of 'i!;~\";'; 1922 the right, title and interest of the company were ,, v . a sold and purchased by Nanji Khengarji father-in-law sudha &,,1 Ghose of Shrimati Kashi Bai appellant and by one Lira and Others Raja. In August 1923 Nanji Khengarji and Lira Raja effected a partition, the western portion of the leased 'Kapur J. coal field fell to the share of Nanji Khengarji and the eastern portion to Lira Raja. The former carried on the business in the name and style of Khengarji Trikoo & Co. and the Colliery came to be known as Katras New Colliery. On the death of Nanji Khengarji in 1928 his son Ratilal Nanji inherited the estate and on his death in September 1933 the estate passed to the appellant Sreemati Kashi Bai, widow of Ratilal.\n\nIn December 1944 she (Sreemati Kashi Bai) entered into a partnership with Manilal Becharlal Sengvi respondent.\n\nOn March 24, 1945 Brojendra Nath Ghose, Vishwa Nath Prasad and Nagendra Nath Bose respondnts Nos. 1-3 as plaintiffs Nos. 1-3 brought a suit (Suit No. 16 of 1945) against Sreemati Kashi Bai, defendant No. 1, now appellant and against Manilal Becharlal Sengvi defendant No. 2 now respondent No. 10 for fixation of the intermediate boundary and for possession of the area trespassed upon by the defendants and for compensation for coal illegally removed by the latter and also for an injunction. They alleged that the defendants had wrongfully taken possession of the area in dispute shown in the map attached to the plaint and had illegally removed coal from their mine. The defendants in their written statement of June 29, 1945, denied the allegaticns made by the plaintiffs. They pleaded that the area in dispute was acquired by Nanji Khengarji and Lira Raja and had been worked by them and they had been in sole, exclusive, uninterrupted and undisturbed possession of the area openly to the knowledge of the plaintiffs in that suit and had therefore acquired title by adverse possession. The claim of ownership which they had set up as a result\n\nSlzree111ati\n\nKashi Bai v.\n\nSudha Rani Ghose\n\nand Others\n\nKapur J.\n\nof acquisition from Bennett and Bellwood was negatived by the courts below and is no longer in dispute before us, the sole point that survives being one of adverse possession.\n\nThe cross suit No. 50 of 1945 was brought by the defendants in Suit No. 16 of 1945, i.e., Shrimati Kashi Bai (appellant) and Manila! Becharlal Sengvi\n\n(respondent) against the three plaintiffs of Suit No. 16 of 1945 (respondents Nos. 1 to 3) and against heirs of Lalit Mohan Bose and against Purnendu Narayan\n\nSingh son of the original grantor Raja Sakti Narayan Singh. The allegations by the plaintiff in this suit (No. 50 of 1945) were the same as their pleas as defendants in Suit No. 16 ofl945. The two suits were tried together with common issues. The learned Subordinate Judge decreed Suit No. 16 of 1945 and dismissed Suit No. 50 of 1945 which were thus both decided in favour of respondents Nos.\n\nI to 3. He held that the land in suit was included in the area leased to respondents Nos. 1 to 3, i.e., Brojendra Nath, Vishwa Nath Prasad and Nagendra Nath Bose and therefore the area in which two inclines of seam No. 9 were situate formed part of the area leased to them and that encroachment by the appellant and Manila!\n\nBecharlal Sengvi respondent on the land in dispute was proved. As to adverse possession he held that the two inclines and airshafts had been sunk in 1917 by Bennett in seam No. 9; that there had been no continuous working of the seam by Khengarji Trikoo & Co., except from the year 1923 to 1926 and from 1931 to 1933, working was again begun in 1939 but how long it was continued had not been proved and that the working of this seam had restarted in 1944.\n\nHe also found that the disputed area was confined to seam No. 9. From these facts he was of the opinion that there was no dispossession .of the respondents Nos.\n\nI to 3 and no adverse possession had been established as against them. He further held that the working of a part of seam (No. 9) would not give to the trespasser the right to the entire seam even if continuous possession was proved. In regard to\n\ncompensation the learned Subordinate Judge held that\n\nrespondents Nos. 1 to 3 were entitled to it as from 19ss December 1944 and the amount would be determined by the appointment of a Commissioner in a subsequent Sllret'!'IJ''. proceeding.\n\nXaahi Bai The High Court on appeal confirmed the findings of su& J:ini Ghose the trial Court and held that the land in dispute was and Others part of the land leased to. respondents Nos. 1 to 3; that the appellant and Manilal Becharlal Sengvi Kapur J. respondent had encroached upon the land in dispute; that the working of the seam had not been continuotls and it had only been worked for the periods mentioned above. The High Court also held that even if there was continuous possession and working of the mine no title by _adverse possessi@n could be acquired to the whole of the mine.. In the High Court the validity of the lease in favour of the respondents Nos. 1 to 3 was raised because of s. 107 of the Transfer of Property Act but as the question had not been raised or agitated in the trial Court, the High Court allowed defendants 4 to 10 of Suit No. 50 of 1945 to be added in the appeal arising out of Suit No. 16of1945 \"for complete adjudication of the issues and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings.\" This question is also no. longer in dispute before us. The appellant has brought two appeals against the judgment and two decrees of the High Court of Patna. As the question of ownership of the land in dispute has been decided in favour -of the respondents by both the courts below, that question has not been raised before us and the controversy between the parties is confined solely to the question of adverse possession. On behalf of the appellant the learned Attorney- General submitted that the carrying on of the mining operations in the area in dispute even though intermittent as found by the courts below could only lead to one inference that the possession of the area as well as of the mine was of the appellant and as she had prescribed for the requisite period of 12 years, her possession had matured into ownership by adverse possession. In our opinion the operations carried on by the appellant were inconsistent with the continuous, open and hostile possession or with the assertion of\n\n1958 hostile title for the prescribed period of 12 years necessary to constitute adverse Pf>SSession. It was\n\nre,:~; 1 ; contended that for the purpose of adverse possession\n\nas~. a in regard to a coal mine it was not necessary that it sudha Rani Ghose should have been worked for 12 years continuously\n\nand Others and it was sufficient if the appellant had carried on mining operations for a period of 12 years even with Kapur J. long stoppages as in the instant case. But we are unable to accept this contention. Even though it may not be necessary for the purpose of establishing adverse possession over a coal mining area to carry on mining operation continuously for a period of 12 years, continuous possession of the mining area and the mine would be a necessary ingredient to establish adverse possession. What has been proved by the appellant is that the two inclines opened by Bennett were worked in 1917 or 1918 by the predecessor in interest of the appellant, there were no mining operations till 1923 when they were restarted and were continued till 1926. The operations ceased in 1926 and were recommenced in 1931 and carried on till 1933 when they ceased again till 1939 and whether they were carried on in 1939 or not is not quite clear but there were no operations from 1939 to 1944 when they were recommenced by the appellant. During the period when there were no mining operations no kind of possession of the appellant has been proved and thus the presumption of law is not rebutted that during the period when the operations had ceased to be carried on the possession would revert to the true owner.\n\nNageshwar Bux Roy v. Bengal Coal Co. (') which was relied upon by the learned Attorney-General does not support his contention. In that case the company claiming adverse possession had placed facts which were consistent with the assertion of rights to minerals in the whole village to which the company claimed adverse possession. They openly sank pits at three different places, two of them being l /2 mile distant from the 3rd. The company selected the places where they were to dig up the pits at their own discretion,\n\n(I) [1930] L.R. 58 I.A. 29.\n\n\" ' ' /\n\nbrought their plant or machinery on the ground 1958 and erected bungalows for their employees. There was no concealment on the part of the company and s;;;;; m;~: they behaved openly as persons in possession of not v. one pit but all. mineral fields underlying the whole Sudha Rani Ghose village and . they throughout claimed to be entitled to and Others sink pits any where in the village they chose. The company was under a bona fide belief that under their Kapur 1 lease they were entitled to work the minerals any where in the area. In these circumstances the P_rivy Council held the suit to be barred by Art: 144 of the Limitation Act as the company had been in adverse possession of the minerals under the whole village for more than 12 years. It was pointed out by Lord Macmillan at p. 35, \"possession is a question of fact and the extent of possession may be an inference of fact\". And at p. 37 it was observed :\n\n\"Their Lordships are not at all disposed to negative or to weaken the principle that as a general rule where title is founded on an adverse possession the title will be limited to that area of whtch actual possession has been enjoyed. But the application of this general rule must depend upon the facts of the particular case.\"\n\nThe finding in favour of adverse possession in that case must be confined to the facts of that partiCular case.\n\nAnother case relied upon by the learned Attorney- General was Secretary of State for India v. Debendra Lal Khan (1). There a zamindar claimed title to a fishery in a navigable river by adverse possession against the Crown. If was held that possession may be adequate in continuity so as to be adverse even though the proved acts of possession do not cover every moment of the period. That was a case dealing with fisheries. It is true that to establish adverse possession nature of possession may vary. In the instant case no such possession has been proved which taking into consideration the nature of possession and the nature of the object possessed would lead to the only inference that the. appellant had perfected her\n\n(1) [1933] LR. 61 J.A. 78.\n\n1958 title y averse possession. Intermittent working of\n\nSilmmatl the Illlfi:e m the m!lnner nd for the period described K\"'\"' Bat abve is wholly u.1suffic1ent to establish possession v. which would constitute adverse possession or would sodila Rani Ghos• lead to an inference of adverse possession and we are\n\nand 011wr.r in agreement with the view expressed by the High\n\nKap11r J.\n\nMarch 10 ..\n\nCourt and would therefore dismiss these appeals with costs. . One set of costs between the two appeals except as to Court-fees.\n\nAppeals dismissed .\n\nEARNEST JOHN WHITE v.\n\nMRS. KATHLEEN OLIVE WHITE AND OTHERS\n\n(BHAGWATI, J. L. KAPUR and GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ.)\n\nDivorce-Adultery-Standard of proof-Principle-Direct evidence if imperative-Finding of fact when can be interferred with-Divorce Act (IV of 1869), u. 14 and 1.\n\nThe appellant sued his wife for dissolution of marriage on the ground of adultery. ·\n\nOn the evidence the trial coun found that it wa5 not possible to bold that adultery had been committed, though it found that one of the letters contained \"a large substratum of truth\". The High Coun in appeal concurred with the decision.\n\nOn appeal to the Supreme Coun it was contended for the appellant that the finding of the courts below was vitiated because certain pieces of evidence had been Misread, and some others ignored. As a matter of legitimate and proper inference the Coun should not have arrived at any other conclusion, but that the wife was guilty of adultery with respondent No. 2. The evidence showed that the wife went to Patna and stayed in a hotel with respondent No. 2 under an assumed name, that they occupied the same room in the hotel, that the conduct of the respondent indicated a guilty inclination, and that so far as the wife was concerned, her conduct wa! entirely consistent with her guilt:\n\nHeld, that, the nature of the evidence adduced was such a.s would satisfy the requirements of s. 14 of the Divorce Act, and that the finding of the Couns below that an inference of adultery\n\ncould not be drawn therefrom must. be set aside.\n\nAlthough it is not usual for the Supreme Coun to interfere", "total_entities": 94, "entities": [{"text": "REPORTS\n\nSHREEMATI KASH! BAI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 29, "end_char": 57, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHREEMATI KASHI BAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SUDHA RANI GROSE AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHA RANI GHOSE AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "L. KAPUR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 110, "end_char": 118, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.L. KAPUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 123, "end_char": 141, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "L.R. 58 I.A. 29", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1718, "end_char": 1733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L.R. 61 I.A. 78", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1796, "end_char": 1811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1829, "end_char": 1857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2207, "end_char": 2221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, K.shitindra Nath Bhattacharya, S. N. Andley, J.B. Dadachan.ifi and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K.shitindra Nath Bhattacharya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2251, "end_char": 2280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, K.shitindra Nath Bhattacharya, S. N. Andley, J.B. Dadachan.ifi and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. N. Andley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2282, "end_char": 2294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, K.shitindra Nath Bhattacharya, S. N. Andley, J.B. Dadachan.ifi and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "J.B. Dadachan.ifi and", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2296, "end_char": 2317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, K.shitindra Nath Bhattacharya, S. N. Andley, J.B. Dadachan.ifi and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2318, "end_char": 2332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, K.shitindra Nath Bhattacharya, S. N. Andley, J.B. Dadachan.ifi and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Shreematl Kami Bal N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2354, "end_char": 2389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shreematl Kami Bal N. C. Chatterjee, S. C; Bannerjee and P. R. Chatterjee, v. for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "S. C; Bannerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2391, "end_char": 2406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shreematl Kami Bal N. C. Chatterjee, S. C; Bannerjee and P. R. Chatterjee, v. for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "P. R. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2411, "end_char": 2427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shreematl Kami Bal N. C. Chatterjee, S. C; Bannerjee and P. R. Chatterjee, v. for respondents Nos.", "canonical_name": "P. R. Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "Sudha Rani Ghose", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2464, "end_char": 2480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sudha Rani Ghose and Others.·"}}, {"text": "P. K. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2494, "end_char": 2510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. K. Chatterjee, for respondents Nos.", "canonical_name": "P. R. Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "Gauri Dayal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2554, "end_char": 2565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gauri Dayal, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "KAPUR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2664, "end_char": 2669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKAPUR J.-In these two appeals brought by leave of the Patna High Court against a judgment and two decrees of that court a common and the sole question for decision is one of adverse possession.", "canonical_name": "KAPUR"}}, {"text": "Manilal Becharlal Sengvi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3006, "end_char": 3030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant and respondent Manilal Becharlal Sengvi were defendants in one (Suit No.", "canonical_name": "Manilal Becharlal Sengvi Kapur"}}, {"text": "Manilal. Becharlal Sengvi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3492, "end_char": 3517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both the suits were decreed against the appellant and respondent Manilal.", "canonical_name": "Manilal Becharlal Sengvi Kapur"}}, {"text": "September 27, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3623, "end_char": 3641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both these appeals were dismissed by one judgment dated September 27, 1951, but two decrees were drawn up."}}, {"text": "November 26, 1894", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3905, "end_char": 3922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts necessary for the decision of these two appeals are that on November 26, 1894 Ganga Narayan\n\nSingh, a zamindar and proprietor of pargana Katras granted to Ram Dayal Mazumdar a lease of \"the coal and coal mining rights\" in two plots of land, one.in moua Katras and the other in mouza Bhupatdih."}}, {"text": "Ganga Narayan\n\nSingh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3923, "end_char": 3943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts necessary for the decision of these two appeals are that on November 26, 1894 Ganga Narayan\n\nSingh, a zamindar and proprietor of pargana Katras granted to Ram Dayal Mazumdar a lease of \"the coal and coal mining rights\" in two plots of land, one.in moua Katras and the other in mouza Bhupatdih."}}, {"text": "Ram Dayal Mazumdar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4000, "end_char": 4018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts necessary for the decision of these two appeals are that on November 26, 1894 Ganga Narayan\n\nSingh, a zamindar and proprietor of pargana Katras granted to Ram Dayal Mazumdar a lease of \"the coal and coal mining rights\" in two plots of land, one.in moua Katras and the other in mouza Bhupatdih."}}, {"text": "November 6, 1894", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4142, "end_char": 4158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 6, 1894 he granted a similar lease in plots\n\nKapurJ.\n\n1958 contiguous to the plots in the lease mentioned above to Bhudar Nath Roy."}}, {"text": "Bhudar Nath Roy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4266, "end_char": 4281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 6, 1894 he granted a similar lease in plots\n\nKapurJ.\n\n1958 contiguous to the plots in the lease mentioned above to Bhudar Nath Roy."}}, {"text": "Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4499, "end_char": 4502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the death of Ram ."}}, {"text": "Dayal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4516, "end_char": 4521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Others Dayal, his sons Prafulla, Kumud, Sarat, Sirish and Girish inherited the leasehold rights which they on Kapur J.\n\nOctober 19, 1918, granted by means of a registered patta and kabulliat to Lalit Mohan Bose for a term of 999 years."}}, {"text": "Prafulla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4532, "end_char": 4540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Others Dayal, his sons Prafulla, Kumud, Sarat, Sirish and Girish inherited the leasehold rights which they on Kapur J.\n\nOctober 19, 1918, granted by means of a registered patta and kabulliat to Lalit Mohan Bose for a term of 999 years."}}, {"text": "Kumud", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4542, "end_char": 4547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Others Dayal, his sons Prafulla, Kumud, Sarat, Sirish and Girish inherited the leasehold rights which they on Kapur J.\n\nOctober 19, 1918, granted by means of a registered patta and kabulliat to Lalit Mohan Bose for a term of 999 years."}}, {"text": "Sarat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4549, "end_char": 4554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Others Dayal, his sons Prafulla, Kumud, Sarat, Sirish and Girish inherited the leasehold rights which they on Kapur J.\n\nOctober 19, 1918, granted by means of a registered patta and kabulliat to Lalit Mohan Bose for a term of 999 years."}}, {"text": "Sirish", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4556, "end_char": 4562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Others Dayal, his sons Prafulla, Kumud, Sarat, Sirish and Girish inherited the leasehold rights which they on Kapur J.\n\nOctober 19, 1918, granted by means of a registered patta and kabulliat to Lalit Mohan Bose for a term of 999 years."}}, {"text": "Girish", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4567, "end_char": 4573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Others Dayal, his sons Prafulla, Kumud, Sarat, Sirish and Girish inherited the leasehold rights which they on Kapur J.\n\nOctober 19, 1918, granted by means of a registered patta and kabulliat to Lalit Mohan Bose for a term of 999 years."}}, {"text": "Kapur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4619, "end_char": 4624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Others Dayal, his sons Prafulla, Kumud, Sarat, Sirish and Girish inherited the leasehold rights which they on Kapur J.\n\nOctober 19, 1918, granted by means of a registered patta and kabulliat to Lalit Mohan Bose for a term of 999 years."}}, {"text": "October 19, 1918", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4629, "end_char": 4645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Others Dayal, his sons Prafulla, Kumud, Sarat, Sirish and Girish inherited the leasehold rights which they on Kapur J.\n\nOctober 19, 1918, granted by means of a registered patta and kabulliat to Lalit Mohan Bose for a term of 999 years."}}, {"text": "Lalit Mohan Bose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4703, "end_char": 4719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Others Dayal, his sons Prafulla, Kumud, Sarat, Sirish and Girish inherited the leasehold rights which they on Kapur J.\n\nOctober 19, 1918, granted by means of a registered patta and kabulliat to Lalit Mohan Bose for a term of 999 years."}}, {"text": "Bennett", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4749, "end_char": 4756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Bennett who along with one Bellwood had obtained a coal mining lease from Raja Sakti\n\nNarayan Singh of Katrasgarh on September 5, 1917, trespassed on the northern portion of the land within the area leased to Lalit Mohan Bose and sank two inclines and two airshafts and dug out coal from this area."}}, {"text": "Bellwood", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4776, "end_char": 4784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Bennett who along with one Bellwood had obtained a coal mining lease from Raja Sakti\n\nNarayan Singh of Katrasgarh on September 5, 1917, trespassed on the northern portion of the land within the area leased to Lalit Mohan Bose and sank two inclines and two airshafts and dug out coal from this area."}}, {"text": "Raja Sakti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4823, "end_char": 4833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Bennett who along with one Bellwood had obtained a coal mining lease from Raja Sakti\n\nNarayan Singh of Katrasgarh on September 5, 1917, trespassed on the northern portion of the land within the area leased to Lalit Mohan Bose and sank two inclines and two airshafts and dug out coal from this area."}}, {"text": "Narayan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4835, "end_char": 4848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Bennett who along with one Bellwood had obtained a coal mining lease from Raja Sakti\n\nNarayan Singh of Katrasgarh on September 5, 1917, trespassed on the northern portion of the land within the area leased to Lalit Mohan Bose and sank two inclines and two airshafts and dug out coal from this area."}}, {"text": "Katrasgarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4852, "end_char": 4862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Bennett who along with one Bellwood had obtained a coal mining lease from Raja Sakti\n\nNarayan Singh of Katrasgarh on September 5, 1917, trespassed on the northern portion of the land within the area leased to Lalit Mohan Bose and sank two inclines and two airshafts and dug out coal from this area."}}, {"text": "September 5, 1917", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4866, "end_char": 4883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Bennett who along with one Bellwood had obtained a coal mining lease from Raja Sakti\n\nNarayan Singh of Katrasgarh on September 5, 1917, trespassed on the northern portion of the land within the area leased to Lalit Mohan Bose and sank two inclines and two airshafts and dug out coal from this area."}}, {"text": "Becharlal Sengvi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5250, "end_char": 5266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Becharlal Sengvi respondent in their written statement and in their plaint.", "canonical_name": "Becharlal Sengvi"}}, {"text": "Radha Rani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5410, "end_char": 5420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lalit Mohan Bose died in 1933 leaving a will of which the executors were his widow, Radha Rani and his brother Nagendra Nath Bose."}}, {"text": "Nagendra Nath Bose", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5437, "end_char": 5455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lalit Mohan Bose died in 1933 leaving a will of which the executors were his widow, Radha Rani and his brother Nagendra Nath Bose.", "canonical_name": "Nagendra Nath Bose"}}, {"text": "Keshabji Lalji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5528, "end_char": 5542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They leased out 17 bighas of land in possession of Lalit Mohan Bose to Keshabji Lalji in 1933."}}, {"text": "March 15, 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5635, "end_char": 5649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The remaining portion of the area leased to Lalit Mohan Bose was given on lease on March 15, 1938, to Brojendra Nath Ghose and Vishwa Nath Prasad respondents and to Ram Chand Dubey but the possession thereof had been given to them in July 1938 and they (the above two respondents) and Ram Chandra Dubey carried on colliery business in the name and style of West Katras Colliery."}}, {"text": "Brojendra Nath Ghose", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5654, "end_char": 5674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The remaining portion of the area leased to Lalit Mohan Bose was given on lease on March 15, 1938, to Brojendra Nath Ghose and Vishwa Nath Prasad respondents and to Ram Chand Dubey but the possession thereof had been given to them in July 1938 and they (the above two respondents) and Ram Chandra Dubey carried on colliery business in the name and style of West Katras Colliery.", "canonical_name": "Brojendra Nath Ghose"}}, {"text": "Vishwa Nath Prasad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5679, "end_char": 5697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The remaining portion of the area leased to Lalit Mohan Bose was given on lease on March 15, 1938, to Brojendra Nath Ghose and Vishwa Nath Prasad respondents and to Ram Chand Dubey but the possession thereof had been given to them in July 1938 and they (the above two respondents) and Ram Chandra Dubey carried on colliery business in the name and style of West Katras Colliery.", "canonical_name": "Vishwa Nath Prasad"}}, {"text": "Ram Chand Dubey", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5717, "end_char": 5732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The remaining portion of the area leased to Lalit Mohan Bose was given on lease on March 15, 1938, to Brojendra Nath Ghose and Vishwa Nath Prasad respondents and to Ram Chand Dubey but the possession thereof had been given to them in July 1938 and they (the above two respondents) and Ram Chandra Dubey carried on colliery business in the name and style of West Katras Colliery.", "canonical_name": "Ram Chandra Dubey"}}, {"text": "Ram Chandra Dubey", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5837, "end_char": 5854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The remaining portion of the area leased to Lalit Mohan Bose was given on lease on March 15, 1938, to Brojendra Nath Ghose and Vishwa Nath Prasad respondents and to Ram Chand Dubey but the possession thereof had been given to them in July 1938 and they (the above two respondents) and Ram Chandra Dubey carried on colliery business in the name and style of West Katras Colliery.", "canonical_name": "Ram Chandra Dubey"}}, {"text": "West Katras Colliery", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5909, "end_char": 5929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The remaining portion of the area leased to Lalit Mohan Bose was given on lease on March 15, 1938, to Brojendra Nath Ghose and Vishwa Nath Prasad respondents and to Ram Chand Dubey but the possession thereof had been given to them in July 1938 and they (the above two respondents) and Ram Chandra Dubey carried on colliery business in the name and style of West Katras Colliery."}}, {"text": "June, 25, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6019, "end_char": 6033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the death of Ram Chandra Dubey his estate was inherited by his sons and widow who on June, 25, 1944, sold their right, title and interest to Nagendra Nath Bose."}}, {"text": "Vishwa Nath Prasad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6136, "end_char": 6154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These three, i.e., Brojendra Nath Ghose, Vishwa Nath Prasad and Nagendra Nath Bose were the plaintiffs in Suit No.", "canonical_name": "Vishwa Nath Prasad"}}, {"text": "Raja Sakti Narayan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6239, "end_char": 6263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As stated above Raja Sakti Narayan Singh leased an area of 256 bighas to Bennett and Bellwood on September 5, 1917, and they assigned their rights to\n\nthe New Katras Coal Company Limited."}}, {"text": "New Katras Coal Company Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6378, "end_char": 6409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As stated above Raja Sakti Narayan Singh leased an area of 256 bighas to Bennett and Bellwood on September 5, 1917, and they assigned their rights to\n\nthe New Katras Coal Company Limited."}}, {"text": "Nanji Khengarji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6621, "end_char": 6636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a sold and purchased by Nanji Khengarji father-in-law sudha &,,1 Ghose of Shrimati Kashi Bai appellant and by one Lira and Others Raja."}}, {"text": "Shrimati Kashi Bai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6671, "end_char": 6689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a sold and purchased by Nanji Khengarji father-in-law sudha &,,1 Ghose of Shrimati Kashi Bai appellant and by one Lira and Others Raja.", "canonical_name": "Shrimati Kashi Bai"}}, {"text": "Lira", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6711, "end_char": 6715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a sold and purchased by Nanji Khengarji father-in-law sudha &,,1 Ghose of Shrimati Kashi Bai appellant and by one Lira and Others Raja."}}, {"text": "Raja", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6727, "end_char": 6731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a sold and purchased by Nanji Khengarji father-in-law sudha &,,1 Ghose of Shrimati Kashi Bai appellant and by one Lira and Others Raja."}}, {"text": "Lira Raja", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6768, "end_char": 6777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In August 1923 Nanji Khengarji and Lira Raja effected a partition, the western portion of the leased 'Kapur J. coal field fell to the share of Nanji Khengarji and the eastern portion to Lira Raja."}}, {"text": "Khengarji Trikoo & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6990, "end_char": 7012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The former carried on the business in the name and style of Khengarji Trikoo & Co. and the Colliery came to be known as Katras New Colliery."}}, {"text": "Ratilal Nanji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7119, "end_char": 7132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the death of Nanji Khengarji in 1928 his son Ratilal Nanji inherited the estate and on his death in September 1933 the estate passed to the appellant Sreemati Kashi Bai, widow of Ratilal.", "canonical_name": "Ratilal Nanji"}}, {"text": "Sreemati Kashi Bai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7224, "end_char": 7242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the death of Nanji Khengarji in 1928 his son Ratilal Nanji inherited the estate and on his death in September 1933 the estate passed to the appellant Sreemati Kashi Bai, widow of Ratilal.", "canonical_name": "Sreemati Kashi Bai"}}, {"text": "Sreemati Kashi Bai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7285, "end_char": 7303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In December 1944 she (Sreemati Kashi Bai) entered into a partnership with Manilal Becharlal Sengvi respondent.", "canonical_name": "Sreemati Kashi Bai"}}, {"text": "March 24, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7378, "end_char": 7392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 24, 1945 Brojendra Nath Ghose, Vishwa Nath Prasad and Nagendra Nath Bose respondnts Nos."}}, {"text": "Brojendra Nath Ghose", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7393, "end_char": 7413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 24, 1945 Brojendra Nath Ghose, Vishwa Nath Prasad and Nagendra Nath Bose respondnts Nos.", "canonical_name": "Brojendra Nath Ghose"}}, {"text": "Vishwa Nath Prasad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7415, "end_char": 7433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 24, 1945 Brojendra Nath Ghose, Vishwa Nath Prasad and Nagendra Nath Bose respondnts Nos.", "canonical_name": "Vishwa Nath Prasad"}}, {"text": "Nagendra Nath Bose", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7438, "end_char": 7456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 24, 1945 Brojendra Nath Ghose, Vishwa Nath Prasad and Nagendra Nath Bose respondnts Nos.", "canonical_name": "Nagendra Nath Bose"}}, {"text": "Sreemati Kashi Bai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7545, "end_char": 7563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "16 of 1945) against Sreemati Kashi Bai, defendant No.", "canonical_name": "Sreemati Kashi Bai"}}, {"text": "June 29, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8089, "end_char": 8102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendants in their written statement of June 29, 1945, denied the allegaticns made by the plaintiffs."}}, {"text": "Shrimati Kashi Bai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8858, "end_char": 8876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "16 of 1945, i.e., Shrimati Kashi Bai (appellant) and Manila!", "canonical_name": "Shrimati Kashi Bai"}}, {"text": "Manila! Becharlal Sengvi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8893, "end_char": 8917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "16 of 1945, i.e., Shrimati Kashi Bai (appellant) and Manila!", "canonical_name": "Manilal Becharlal Sengvi Kapur"}}, {"text": "Purnendu Narayan\n\nSingh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9060, "end_char": 9083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 to 3) and against heirs of Lalit Mohan Bose and against Purnendu Narayan\n\nSingh son of the original grantor Raja Sakti Narayan Singh."}}, {"text": "Brojendra Nath", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9577, "end_char": 9591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 to 3, i.e., Brojendra Nath, Vishwa Nath Prasad and Nagendra Nath Bose and therefore the area in which two inclines of seam No.", "canonical_name": "Brojendra Nath Ghose"}}, {"text": "Manila", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9789, "end_char": 9795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9 were situate formed part of the area leased to them and that encroachment by the appellant and Manila!"}}, {"text": "Becharlal Sengvi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9798, "end_char": 9814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Becharlal Sengvi respondent on the land in dispute was proved.", "canonical_name": "Becharlal Sengvi"}}, {"text": "Xaahi Bai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10907, "end_char": 10916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Xaahi Bai The High Court on appeal confirmed the findings of su& J:ini Ghose the trial Court and held that the land in dispute was and Others part of the land leased to."}}, {"text": "ini Ghose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10974, "end_char": 10983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Xaahi Bai The High Court on appeal confirmed the findings of su& J:ini Ghose the trial Court and held that the land in dispute was and Others part of the land leased to."}}, {"text": "Manilal Becharlal Sengvi Kapur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11125, "end_char": 11155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 to 3; that the appellant and Manilal Becharlal Sengvi Kapur J. respondent had encroached upon the land in dispute; that the working of the seam had not been continuotls and it had only been worked for the periods mentioned above.", "canonical_name": "Manilal Becharlal Sengvi Kapur"}}, {"text": "s. 107", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11604, "end_char": 11610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11618, "end_char": 11642, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "High Court of Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12060, "end_char": 12079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant has brought two appeals against the judgment and two decrees of the High Court of Patna."}}, {"text": "Kapur", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13349, "end_char": 13354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was\n\nre,:~; 1 ; contended that for the purpose of adverse possession\n\nas~. a in regard to a coal mine it was not necessary that it sudha Rani Ghose should have been worked for 12 years continuously\n\nand Others and it was sufficient if the appellant had carried on mining operations for a period of 12 years even with Kapur J. long stoppages as in the instant case.", "canonical_name": "KAPUR"}}, {"text": "L.R. 58 I.A. 29", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 15082, "end_char": 15097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15734, "end_char": 15748, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Macmillan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15886, "end_char": 15895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was pointed out by Lord Macmillan at p. 35, \"possession is a question of fact and the extent of possession may be an inference of fact\"."}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17836, "end_char": 17844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KATHLEEN OLIVE WHITE AND OTHERS\n\n(BHAGWATI, J. L. KAPUR and GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Divorce Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18003, "end_char": 18014, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Supreme Coun", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18385, "end_char": 18397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal to the Supreme Coun it was contended for the appellant that the finding of the courts below was vitiated because certain pieces of evidence had been Misread, and some others ignored."}}, {"text": "Patna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18772, "end_char": 18777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence showed that the wife went to Patna and stayed in a hotel with respondent No."}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19149, "end_char": 19154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Divorce Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19162, "end_char": 19173, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1958_1_1410_1422_EN", "year": 1958, "text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958)\n\n1958 title y averse possession. Intermittent working of\n\nSilmmatl the Illlfi:e m the m!lnner nd for the period described K\"'\"' Bat abve is wholly u.1suffic1ent to establish possession v. which would constitute adverse possession or would sodila Rani Ghos• lead to an inference of adverse possession and we are\n\nand 011wr.r in agreement with the view expressed by the High\n\nKap11r J.\n\nMarch 10 ..\n\nCourt and would therefore dismiss these appeals with costs. . One set of costs between the two appeals except as to Court-fees.\n\nAppeals dismissed .\n\nEARNEST JOHN WHITE v.\n\nMRS. KATHLEEN OLIVE WHITE AND OTHERS\n\n(BHAGWATI, J. L. KAPUR and GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ.)\n\nDivorce-Adultery-Standard of proof-Principle-Direct evidence if imperative-Finding of fact when can be interferred with-Divorce Act (IV of 1869), u. 14 and 1.\n\nThe appellant sued his wife for dissolution of marriage on the ground of adultery. ·\n\nOn the evidence the trial coun found that it wa5 not possible to bold that adultery had been committed, though it found that one of the letters contained \"a large substratum of truth\". The High Coun in appeal concurred with the decision.\n\nOn appeal to the Supreme Coun it was contended for the appellant that the finding of the courts below was vitiated because certain pieces of evidence had been Misread, and some others ignored. As a matter of legitimate and proper inference the Coun should not have arrived at any other conclusion, but that the wife was guilty of adultery with respondent No. 2. The evidence showed that the wife went to Patna and stayed in a hotel with respondent No. 2 under an assumed name, that they occupied the same room in the hotel, that the conduct of the respondent indicated a guilty inclination, and that so far as the wife was concerned, her conduct wa! entirely consistent with her guilt:\n\nHeld, that, the nature of the evidence adduced was such a.s would satisfy the requirements of s. 14 of the Divorce Act, and that the finding of the Couns below that an inference of adultery\n\ncould not be drawn therefrom must. be set aside.\n\nAlthough it is not usual for the Supreme Coun to interfere\n\non questions of fact, were, howeer, the. cou~ .below iore or 1958 misconstrue important pieces of evidence m arnving at therr finding and this Court is of the opinion that no tribunal could have Whit~- coiiie to such a find on the evidence taken as a whole, such v. finding was liable to be interferred with by this Court.\n\nWhitt\n\nHeld, further, that the words \"satisfied on the evidence\" in s. 14 of the Divorce Act, 1869, imply that it is the duty of the Court to pronounce a decree only when it is satisfied that the case has been proved beyond reasonable <4>ubt as to the commission o[ a matrimonial offence.\n\nThe evidence must be clear and satisfactory beyond mere balance of probabilities. It is not necessary and rarely possible. to prove the issue by any direct evidence.\n\nThe rule laid down in Preston /ones v. Preston /ones, [1951] A.C. 391, lays down the principle that should be followed by the courts under s. 7 of the Divorce Act.\n\nState of Madras v. A. Vaidanatha Iyer, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 61, Purvez Ardeshir Poonawala v. The State of Bombay, Cr. A. 122 of 1954, decided on December 20, 1957, Stephen Seneviratne v.\n\nThe King, A.I.R. 193~.C. 289, Mordaunt v. Moncrieffe, (1874) _30 I:.T. 649 and Gower v. Gower, [1950] 1 All. E.R. 804, referred._ to.\n\nLoveden v. Loveden, (1810) 161 E.R. 648; (1810) 2 Hag.\n\nCon. 1, 3, referred to. Preston /ones v. Preston /ones, (1951] A.C. 391, relied upon.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 19 of 1956.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated July 21, 1954, of the Patna High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 24 of 1951, arising out of the judgment and decree dated May 15, 1951, of the said High Court in Matrimonial Suit No. 2of1950.\n\nM. C. SetQJvad, Attorney-General for India, N. C.\n\nChatterjee and P. K. Chatterjee, for the appellant.\n\nBoth the Courts below have failed to draw the proper inference of the commission of adultery, which should legitimately have been drawn from the facts proved.\n\nBoth the Single Judge and theppeal Court failed to take into consideration some pieces of evidence and certain other dieces of evidence which were equally important ha been misread and misconstrued and as a matter of legitimate and proper inference .thelower cour:ts. should not have arrived at any other\n\nWhite\n\nv. White\n\nconclusion but that the wife was guilty of adultery and in such case the interference with the finding of facts below by the Supreme Court will be called for.\n\nState of Madras v. A. Vaidanatha Iyer, A.LR. 1958 S.C. 61 and Stephen Seneviratne v. The King, A, I.R.\n\n1936 P. C. 289.\n\nN.C. Chatterjee cntinued. The judgment of the High Court suffers from certain serious infirmities and this Court should not act on the rigid principle that finding of fact should not be interfered with in the final court of appeal.\n\nSir William Scott's dictum in Loveden v. Loveden,\n\n(1810) 161 E.R. 648, as to \"the guarded discretion of a reasonable and just man\" does not mean there should be satisfactory evidence of the commission of a matrimonial offence. Lord MacDermott has pointed out in Preston Jones v. Preston Jones, L.R. [1951] A.C. 391, that if a judge is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to the commission of the matrimonial offence relied on by the petitioner as ground for .divorce, he must surely be \"satisfied\" within the meaning of the enactment, and no less so in cases of adultery where the circumstances are such as t<> -involve the paternity of a child. To succeed on an issue of adultery it is not necessary to prove the direct fact of, or even all act of adultery in time and place.; for if it were so, in many few cases would that proof be attainable. It has been pointed out in a number of cases that rarely the parties are surprised in a direct act of adultery and such evidence will have to be disbelieved.\n\nRydon on Divorce, 6th Edn., P. 115; Douglas v. Douglas, [1951] P. 85 : [1950] 2 All E.R. 748.\n\nIn nearly every case the fact of adultery is inferred from circumstances which lead to it by fair inference as a necessary conclusion. Unless it is so held there will absolutely be no protection to marital rights. Allen v. Allen, [1894] P. 248, approving Loveden v. Loveden.\n\nCounsel then cited Davis v. Davis, [1950] P. 125 :\n\n(1950) I All E.R. 40. In that case Bucknill, L. J., and Somervell, L. J., held that when husband petitions for divorce on the ground of wife's cruelty, it is\n\n'1nnecessary to introduce any question of the standard of proof required of a criminal charge. Denning, L. J., emphasised that a suit for divorce is a civil and not a criminal proceeding.\n\nThe same standard of proof as that required in criminal cases is not .needed. The stringency of proof required in a criminal court is not m:cessarily called for in divorce suit. Lord Merriman's dictum quoting Churchman v. Churchman, [1945] P. 44, that the same strict proof is required in the case of matrimonial offence as is required in connection with criminal offence has been too widely expressed and should be read in the light of later judgments.\n\nRecent judgment of the Court of Appeal (Bucknill, L. J., and Denning L. J.,) lays down the correct law in Gowerv. Gower, [1950] 1 All E.R. 804, that the correct approach has been laid down by Denning, L. J., who observed that the court should not be irrevocably committed to the view that a charge of adultery must be regarded a criminal charge, to be proved beyondall reasonable doubt. All that the statute requires is that the court must be satisfied on the evidence that the case of the petitioner pas been proved and it is submitted that Denning, L J., has enunciated the correct principle and the statute lays down a standard and puts adultery on the same footing as cruelty, desertion or unsoundness of mind.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee cited also Mordaunt v. Moncrieffe,\n\n[1874] 30 I:,.T. 649. . .\n\nS. P~ Varma, for-the respondent. The burden of proof is on the person alleging adultery and there is always a presumption of innocence. In any event on a petition for divorce some strict proof is required of adultery as is required in a criminal case before a rson is found guilty. Ginesi. v. Ginesi, [1948] P. 179 : [1948] 1 All E.R. 373. Applying the dictum of Lord Merriman in Churchman v. Churchman, [1945] P. 44, the trial court was not satisfied of the guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. It is for the trial judge to decide an issue of fact; unless he has misdirected himself his finding should not be disturbed.\n\nR. Patnaik, for co-respondent No. 1. Submitted thai\n\n1958.\n\nWhite\n\nWhit~\n\n\"1958\n\nWhUe\n\nH'hite\n\n/<apur J.\n\nthe evidence in the case falls far short of the standard of proof required.\n\n1958. March 10. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKAPUR J.-This is an appeal with a certificate under s. 56 of the Divorce Act (IV of 1869) (hereinafter called the Act) against a judgment and decree dated July 21, 1954, of the High Court of Patna dismissing the husband's suit. The husband who is the appellant sued his wife who is respondent No. 1 for dissolution of marriage on the ground of her adultery with two <:o-respondents now respondents Nos. 2 and 3. The suit was tried in the High Court by Shearer J., who dismissed the suit and this decree was on appeal <:onfirmed by the Appeal Court. The question as to the legality of the certificate granted was raised but in the view that we have taken it is not necessary to decide this question.\n\nThe husband was married to the wife at Kharagpur on February 3, 1943, and there is no issue of the marriage. The parties therafter resided at \"Rose Villa\" at Samastipur and respondent No. 2 was residing with his mother in an adjoining house called \"Sunny Nook\". The husband alleged various acts .of adultery between the wife and the other two repsondents. As regards allegations of adultery of the wife with respondent No. 3, the High Court has found .against the husband and these findings have not been -challenged before us.\n\nThe allegations of adultery between the wife and respondent No. 2 were also held not proved. In appeal before us the h\"tisband has confined his case to the acts of adultery alleged to have been committed at the Central Hotel, Patna where the wife and respondent No. 2 are alleged to have resided together between July 25, 1950 and July 28, 1950, under the assumed names of Mr. and Mrs. Charles Chaplin. The wife pleaded that she came to Patna solely with the object of haviqg her tooth extracted and returned to Samastipur tlie same day and that she had to come alone as in spite of her request the husband refused to accompany her.\n\nRespondent No. 2 pleaded that he came to Patna with his mother \"in connection with seeking employment under the Superintendent of Police, Anti-Smuggling Department, also in connection with mother's tooth trouble and for household shopping\". He also pleaded that he stayed with his mother in the same room under his own name and not under an assumed' name.\n\nThe trial judge found that the wife and respondent No. 2 and the latter's mother stayed in two rooms iii the Hotel Nos. 9 & 10 froni July 25, 1950 to July 28,\n\n1950. He accepted the testimony of the Manager of the Hotel, Cardoza P. W. 3 and also of the sweeper Kira Ram P. W. 4. He found that the wife and respondent No. 2 were seen by Kira Ram in room No. 10 and also that the party, i.e., the wife, respondent No. 2 and the latter's mother were served rooming tea in one room which they had together but he did not infer any acts of adultery from this conduct. The document Ex. 8, dated November 22, 1950, but actually 'Written earlier was held by the learned Judge to contain \"a large substratum of truth\". The Appeal Court (S. K. Das C. J. and Ramaswami J.) agreed with the findings of the trial judge but they also were unable to draw the inference of the commission of adultery from the evidence. In appeal it was contended that the findings of the courts below were vitiated bacause certain pieces of evidence had been misread, some ignored and as amatter of legitimateandproper inference the court should not have arrived at any other conclusion but that the wife was guilty of adultery with respondent No. 2.\n\nThis Court will not ordinarily interfere with :findings of fact given by the trial judge and the Appeal Court but if iii giving the :findings the Courts ignore certain important pieces of evidence and other pieces of evidence which are equally important are shown to have been misread and misconstrued and this Court comes to the conclusion that on the evidence taken as a whole on tribunal could properly as a matter of legitimate inference arrive at the conclusion that it has, interference by this Court will be called for. [See\n\nWhite v. White\n\nKapur/.\n\nWhite v. iVhite\n\nKapurJ.\n\nState of Madras v. A. Vaidanatha Iyer ('); Purvez Ardeshir Poonawala v.\n\nThe State of Bombay (2); Stephen Seneviratne v. The King (')J.\n\nThe Central Hotel, Patna, which is alleged to be the scene of adultery by the wife had only 10 rooms, which were all single, but whenever necessary additional beds were put in. At the relevant time M. C. Cardoza P. W. 3 was employed as its Manager, Kira Ram P. W.4 as a sweeper, Abdul Aziz P. W. 5 and Usman Mian P. W. 6 as bearers. Kira Ram identified the wife as the lady who had stayed at the hotel with respondent No. 2 but the other hotel servants although they were shown the photograph of the wife and also saw her in court wereunable to recognise her as the person who stayed with respondent No. 2.\n\nBut they did. identify him as the gentleman who had stayed in the hotel along with two ladies.\n\nExamined by counsel Kira Ram stated: Q. \"(Pointing out to the wife) I ask you, do you know this lady ? A. Yes. Q. Did they ever visit your hotel ? A. Yes.\n\nQ. How long ago ? A. About 9 or 10 months ago. Q. How long did they stay there ?\n\nA. About 4 or 5 days. Q. What room did they occupy?\n\nA. Room No. 10\".\n\nHe was unable to say as to the number of beds in room No. 10 nor is there any other evidence in regard to this.\n\nHe also stated : ' Q. \"During their stay for these 4 or 5 days in your hotel, did you go to clean their bath room ? A.\n\nYes. Q. Did you see them in that room whenever you went ? A. Yes, whenever I used to go to sweep the room I found Memsaheb and Saheb there.\" Questioned by the Court the witness said : Q. \"Can you remember was there any other Memsaheb with these two ? A. There was another Memsaheb who lived in room No. 9.\n\nQ. What was she like young Memsaheb or what ?\n\nA. She was not very old, but she was old.\"\n\n(1) A. I. R. 1958 S.C. 61, 64. ·\n\n(2) Cr. A. 122 of 1954, decided on December 20, 1957.\n\n{3) A. I. R. 1936 P .C. 089, 099.\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1417 ' And this obviously refers to respondent No. 2's mother. The evidence of Kira Ram therefore shows that the wife and respondent No. 2 occupied one room, room No. 10. No question was put to this witness as to his hours of duty nor was the manager Cardoza asked anything about it but another witness Abdul Aziz bearer P.W. 5, was ked about it as follows : Q. \"What are the hours of work of the sweeper ?\n\nA. He comes at 7 a.m. and he leaves in the evening.\n\nHe sometimes goes away at about 11 and 11-30 a.m. or 12 noon\".\n\nSimilarly no questions were put to Kira Ram about the state of habillement of the wife and respondent No. 2 and the witness never deposed about this fact.\n\nThe learned trial Judge erroneously thought that when Kira Ram spoke of the wife and respondent No. 2 he \"speaks as if 'they' were fully dressed and not en\n\ndeshabille\" and the Appeal Court took this finding to be \"as if this witness's evidence showed that both of them were fully dressed\". The Appeal Court also seems to have misdirected itself in regard to the duty hours.\n\nIt said \"the sweeper concedes that he was on duty from 6 a.m. to 11 a.m.\" There is also evidence which has not been rejected that morning tea Was served to all the three, i.e., the wife, respondent No. 2 and the mother of the latter in the same room. The statement of Kira Ram that the wife and respondent No. 2 occupied the same room receives corroboration from Ex. 6 the hotel bill and receipt dated July 29, 1950\n\nfor room No 10 in the name of Mr. and Mrs. Charles Chaplin. This document even though contempo~ raneous with the events under consideratiOn and strongly corroborative of Kira Ram's evidence and of the statement of Cardoza that when Mr. and Mrs.\n\nCharles Chaplin \"stayed in the hotel, they stayed in their own room\" does not seem to have been brought to the notice of either of the Courts below. Because of the infirmities pointed out above the import of the testimony of Kira Ram which has in the main been accepted by both the Courts below has been missed and its necessary consequences ignored.\n\nM2SC/61PX-5\n\nWhite v.\n\nWhite\n\nKapur/.\n\nWhite\n\nWhite\n\nKapurJ.\n\n[1958J\n\nThen there. is the evidence as to disappearance of the entry in the Hotel Visitor's Book which was in the handwriting of respondent No. 2. This entry was in the assumed name of Mr. and Mrs. Charles Chaplin from Hong Kong but when he (respondent No. 2) was asked to fill in the Foreigner's form the entry was changed from Hong Kong to Samastipur. The entry itself could not be produced in Court because as deposed by Cardoza, respondent No. 2 came to the hotel and by managing to send the hotel servant away from the room where the Visitor's Book was kept, he tore off . the pages containing this entry. This fact receives support from the complaint which Cardoza made to the police on December 5, 1950, and the entry in regard to this complaint made in the Station House Diary of the same date. Both these documents have been produced as Exs. 1/1 and 1/2. The significance of this piece of evidence lies in the fact that it was done after the husband started collecting evidence of adultery and after he and his sister had inspected the entry which according to his statement was in the handwriting of respondent No. 2.\n\nThe reason of the wife's visit to Patna was tooth trouble. After her tooth was extracted she did not see her Dentist again even though he had asked her to do so. Her version is that she returned to Samastipur the same evening which the Courts below have not accepted. Thus it shows that she stayed on at the Central Hotel, Patna for four days with respondent No. 2 without any reason being given by her and so far as the hotel bill and receipt Ex. 6 goes, the hotel charges for her stay were paid by \"Charles Chaplin\", i.e., respondent No. 2 and not by her. This fact has again escaped the notice of both the Courts below.\n\nAnd this is more in consonance with guilt than .innocence of the wife.\n\nThere are then the statements of J. A. Baker P.W. 8 and T. H. O'Connor P.W. 9 to the effect that in September 1950, at the house of O'Connor respondent No. 2 in the presence of these two witnesses boasted of his having had a good time with the wife and that \"she was a remarkable lady\". Respondent No. 2\n\nhad also love letters purporting to be from the wife, parts of which he read out to these witnesses. They repeated the story to the husband which set him thinking. Shearer J. held this part of the evidence to be true and the Appeal Court also accepted it bt construed it as showing that there was no adulterous connection at that time, i.e., in September or it had ended at the instance of the wife. Even as it is this finding is not destructive of the husband's case as to adultery at Patna in the month of July; on the other hand it supports adulterous relations.\n\nThe presence of the mother of respondent No. 2 might have been, a shield against the commission of adultery at Patna but the document Ex. 8 which has been accepted by the Courts below to have a substratum of truth just strip~ it away. This document is indicative of the mother's attitude towards the wife. The following extract from this document is relevant as showing that she wanted the wife for her son:\n\n\" 'How nice it would have been if you had married my :; on David'. On another occasion while having tea along with her she begged me to leave my husband and go away with her son who was ruining his life and health and could not settle down to a job as he could not bear to see me married to another man.\" The presence of the mother would thus be no impediment to adulterous relations between the two. The wife in the witness box wholly denied the episode of the Central Hotel including her stay there, which has deprived the Courts of her explanation. We are, therefore.. unable to get any assistance from her or . as a matter of that from respondent No. 2 ai to what happened in the hotel at Patna.\n\nThe appellant contends that the only conclusion to be arrived at upon the evidence taken as a whole is that the wife was guilty of adultery with respondent No. 2. In other words the evidence was ia quality and quantity such that it satisfies the requirements of s. 14 of the Act which provides :\n\nS. 14 \"In case the Court is satisfied on the\n\n195S\n\nWhite\n\nWhite\n\nKapurJ.\n\nWhite v.\n\nWhite\n\nKapur J.\n\nevidence that the case of the petitioner has been proved ....................................................................... \".\n\nThe important words requiring consideration are\n\n\"satisfied on the evidence\". These words imply that the duty of the Court is to pronounce a decree if satisfied that the case for the petitioner has been proved but dismiss the petition if not so satisfied. In s. 4 of the English Act, Matrimonial Causes Act of 1937 the same words occur and it has been there held that the evidence must be clear and satisfactory beyond the mere balance of probabilities and conclusive. in the sense that it will satisfy what Sir William Scott described in Loveden v. Loveden ('), as \"the guarded discretion of a reasonable and just man\". Lord MacDermott referring to the description of Sir \\Villiam Scott said in Preston Jones v. Preston Jones (2):\n\n\"The jurisdiction in divorce involves the status of the parties and the public interest requires that the marriage bond shall not be set aside lightly or without strict enquiry. The terms of the statute recognise this plainly, and I think it would be quite out of keeping with the anxious nature of its provisions to hold that the court might be \"satisfied\" in respect of a ground for dissolution, with something less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. I should, perhaps, add that I do not base my conclusion as to the appropriate standard of proof on any analogy drawn from the criminal law.\n\nI do not think it is possible to say, at any rate since the decision of this House in Mordaunt v. Moncrieffe(') that the two jurisdictions are other. than distinct.\n\nThe true reason, as it seems to me, why both accept the same general standard-proof beyond reasonable doubt-lies not in any analogy but in the gravity and public importance of the issue with which each is concerned.\"\n\nThe Act lays down in s. 7 that Courts in all suits and proceedings under the Act shall act and give relief on principles and rules which in the opinion of the\n\n(1) (1810) 161 E. R. 648, 649; (1810) 2 Hag. Con. 1, 3.\n\n(2) [1951] A.C. 391, 417.\n\n(3) (1874) 30 L.T. 649.\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT.REPORTS 1421\n\nCourt are as nearly as may be conformable to the principles and rules on which the Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes in England for the time being acts and gives relief. In our opinion the rule laid down by the House of Lords would provide the principle and rule which Indian Courts should apply to cases governed by the Act and the standard of proof in divorce cases would therefore be such that if the judge is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to the commission of the matrimonial offence he would be satisfied within the meaning of s. 14 of the Act. The two jurisdictions, i.e., matrimonial and criminal are distinct jurisdictions but the terms of s. 14 make it plain that when the Court is to be satisfied on the evidence in respect of matrimonial offences the guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt and it is on that principle that the Courts in India would act and the reason for adopting this standard of proof is the grave consequence which follows a finding of guilt in matrimonial causes.\n\nGower v. Gower (1) was pressed before us by counsel for the appellant as to the approach that the court should have to a matrimonial offence. But in view of the decision in Preston Jones Case (2) it is unnecessary to discuss that case.\n\nIn a suit based on a matrimonial offence it is not necessary and it is indeed rarely possible to prove the issue by any direct evidence for in very few cases can such proof be obtainable.\n\nThe question to be decided in the present case therefore, is whether on the evidence which has been led, the court can be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that adultery was committed by the wife with respondent No. 2 at Patna between July 25, 1950, and July 28, 1950. In our opinion the facts proved are quantitatively and qualitatively sufficient to satisfy the test laid down by the House of Lords in Preston Jones Case (2). The wife went to Patna and stayed with respondent No. 2 under an assumed name. They occupied the same room, i.e., room No. 10. There was undoubtedly a guilty inclination and passion indicated by the conduct of respondent No. 2 and there is no contrary indication as to\n\n(I) [•!)50) I All E. R. 804. (~) [1951) A. c. 391, 417,\n\nWhite\n\nWhite\n\nKapurJ.\n\nJVlrlle\n\nWhite\n\nK(:pur J.\n\nMarch 11.\n\nthe inclination and conduct of the wife. On the otaer hand her conduct as shown by the evidence is so entirely consistent with her guilt as to justify the conclusion of her having committed adultery with respondent No. 2 and therefore the finding of the Courts below as to the guilt should be reversed.\n\nWe would therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and pass a decree nisi for dissolution of marriage. As adultery has been proved respondent No. 2 shall pay the costs in this Court and in the Courts below.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nM. P. V. SUNDARARAMIER & CO.\n\nTHE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH\n\n& ANOTHER (with connected petitions) (S. R. DAS C. J., VENKATARAMA AlYAR, S. K. DAS,\n\nA. K. SARKAR and\n\nVIVIAN BosE JJ.)\n\nSales Tax-Inter-State sales-Sale outside State but goods delivered for consumption within State-Competence of States to levy tax-Conditional legislation-Power of Parliament to authorise such taxation-President's Adaptatiori Order-Scope of- } Nature of-Retrospective operation-Enactment unconstitutional in part-Effect-Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 (Mad. 9 of 1939), as adapted to Andhra, ss. 2(h), 22-.Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956 (7 of 1956), s. 2-.Constitution of India, Arts. 246, 286, 301, 372, Sch. VII, List I, Entry 42, List II, Entry 54.\n\nThe petitioners were dealers cai; rying on business in the City of Madras in the sale and purchase of yarn. The dealers in the State of Andhra used to place orders for the purchase of yarn with the petitioners in Madras, where the contracts were concluded and the goods were delivered ex-godown at Madras and thereafter despatched to the purchasers who would take delivery of them within their State. The present dispute related to sales in which property in the goods sold passed outside the State of Andhra, but the goodi theiruelves were actually delivered as a result", "total_entities": 83, "entities": [{"text": "EARNEST JOHN WHITE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 577, "end_char": 595, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "EARNEST JOHN WHITE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MRS. KATHLEEN OLIVE WHITE AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 600, "end_char": 636, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MRS. KATHLEEN OLIVE WHITE AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 639, "end_char": 651, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "L. KAPUR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 652, "end_char": 660, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.L. KAPUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 665, "end_char": 683, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Divorce Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 806, "end_char": 817, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Supreme Coun", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1188, "end_char": 1200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal to the Supreme Coun it was contended for the appellant that the finding of the courts below was vitiated because certain pieces of evidence had been Misread, and some others ignored."}}, {"text": "Patna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1575, "end_char": 1580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence showed that the wife went to Patna and stayed in a hotel with respondent No."}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1952, "end_char": 1957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Divorce Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1965, "end_char": 1976, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2551, "end_char": 2556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Divorce Act, 1869", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2564, "end_char": 2581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3079, "end_char": 3083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Divorce Act, 1869", "statute": "the Divorce Act, 1869"}}, {"text": "Divorce Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3091, "end_char": 3102, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "December 20, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3246, "end_char": 3263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. 122 of 1954, decided on December 20, 1957, Stephen Seneviratne v.\n\nThe King, A.I.R. 193~.C. 289, Mordaunt v. Moncrieffe, (1874) 30 I:.T. 649 and Gower v. Gower, [1950] 1 All."}}, {"text": "May 15, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3795, "end_char": 3807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "24 of 1951, arising out of the judgment and decree dated May 15, 1951, of the said High Court in Matrimonial Suit No."}}, {"text": "M. C. SetQJvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3866, "end_char": 3880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. SetQJvad, Attorney-General for India, N. C.\n\nChatterjee and P. K. Chatterjee, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3903, "end_char": 3908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. SetQJvad, Attorney-General for India, N. C.\n\nChatterjee and P. K. Chatterjee, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "N. C.\n\nChatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3910, "end_char": 3927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. SetQJvad, Attorney-General for India, N. C.\n\nChatterjee and P. K. Chatterjee, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "N. C.\n\nChatterjee"}}, {"text": "P. K. Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3932, "end_char": 3948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. SetQJvad, Attorney-General for India, N. C.\n\nChatterjee and P. K. Chatterjee, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4578, "end_char": 4591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "should not have arrived at any other\n\nWhite\n\nv. White\n\nconclusion but that the wife was guilty of adultery and in such case the interference with the finding of facts below by the Supreme Court will be called for."}}, {"text": "N.C. Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4734, "end_char": 4749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.C. Chatterjee cntinued.", "canonical_name": "N. C.\n\nChatterjee"}}, {"text": "William Scott", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4971, "end_char": 4984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sir William Scott's dictum in Loveden v. Loveden,\n\n(1810) 161 E.R. 648, as to \"the guarded discretion of a reasonable and just man\" does not mean there should be satisfactory evidence of the commission of a matrimonial offence.", "canonical_name": "\\Villiam Scott"}}, {"text": "MacDermott", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5200, "end_char": 5210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord MacDermott has pointed out in Preston Jones v. Preston Jones, L.R. [1951] A.C. 391, that if a judge is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to the commission of the matrimonial offence relied on by the petitioner as ground for .divorce, he must surely be \"satisfied\" within the meaning of the enactment, and no less so in cases of adultery where the circumstances are such as t<> -involve the paternity of a child."}}, {"text": "Bucknill", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6433, "end_char": 6441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case Bucknill, L. J., and Somervell, L. J., held that when husband petitions for divorce on the ground of wife's cruelty, it is\n\n'1nnecessary to introduce any question of the standard of proof required of a criminal charge."}}, {"text": "Somervell", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6454, "end_char": 6463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case Bucknill, L. J., and Somervell, L. J., held that when husband petitions for divorce on the ground of wife's cruelty, it is\n\n'1nnecessary to introduce any question of the standard of proof required of a criminal charge."}}, {"text": "Denning", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6652, "end_char": 6659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Denning, L. J., emphasised that a suit for divorce is a civil and not a criminal proceeding."}}, {"text": "Merriman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6929, "end_char": 6937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Merriman's dictum quoting Churchman v. Churchman, [1945] P. 44, that the same strict proof is required in the case of matrimonial offence as is required in connection with criminal offence has been too widely expressed and should be read in the light of later judgments."}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7917, "end_char": 7933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee cited also Mordaunt v. Moncrieffe,\n\n[1874] 30 I:,.", "canonical_name": "N. C.\n\nChatterjee"}}, {"text": "S. P~ Varma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7997, "end_char": 8008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P~ Varma, for-the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. Patnaik", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8617, "end_char": 8627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Patnaik, for co-respondent No."}}, {"text": "KAPUR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8860, "end_char": 8865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKAPUR J.-This is an appeal with a certificate under s. 56 of the Divorce Act (IV of 1869) (hereinafter called the Act) against a judgment and decree dated July 21, 1954, of the High Court of Patna dismissing the husband's suit."}}, {"text": "s. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8912, "end_char": 8917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Divorce Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8925, "end_char": 8936, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "High Court of Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9037, "end_char": 9056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKAPUR J.-This is an appeal with a certificate under s. 56 of the Divorce Act (IV of 1869) (hereinafter called the Act) against a judgment and decree dated July 21, 1954, of the High Court of Patna dismissing the husband's suit."}}, {"text": "Shearer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9312, "end_char": 9319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was tried in the High Court by Shearer J., who dismissed the suit and this decree was on appeal <:onfirmed by the Appeal Court."}}, {"text": "Kharagpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9599, "end_char": 9608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The husband was married to the wife at Kharagpur on February 3, 1943, and there is no issue of the marriage."}}, {"text": "February 3, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9612, "end_char": 9628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The husband was married to the wife at Kharagpur on February 3, 1943, and there is no issue of the marriage."}}, {"text": "Samastipur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9718, "end_char": 9728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The parties therafter resided at \"Rose Villa\" at Samastipur and respondent No."}}, {"text": "Charles Chaplin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10475, "end_char": 10490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 are alleged to have resided together between July 25, 1950 and July 28, 1950, under the assumed names of Mr. and Mrs. Charles Chaplin."}}, {"text": "July 25, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11213, "end_char": 11226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9 & 10 froni July 25, 1950 to July 28,\n\n1950."}}, {"text": "July 28,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11230, "end_char": 11238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9 & 10 froni July 25, 1950 to July 28,\n\n1950."}}, {"text": "Kira Ram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11341, "end_char": 11349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He accepted the testimony of the Manager of the Hotel, Cardoza P. W. 3 and also of the sweeper Kira Ram P. W. 4."}}, {"text": "Kira Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11416, "end_char": 11424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 were seen by Kira Ram in room No."}}, {"text": "November 22, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11669, "end_char": 11686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8, dated November 22, 1950, but actually 'Written earlier was held by the learned Judge to contain \"a large substratum of truth\"."}}, {"text": "S. K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11808, "end_char": 11817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appeal Court (S. K. Das C. J. and Ramaswami J.) agreed with the findings of the trial judge but they also were unable to draw the inference of the commission of adultery from the evidence.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Das"}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11828, "end_char": 11837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appeal Court (S. K. Das C. J. and Ramaswami J.) agreed with the findings of the trial judge but they also were unable to draw the inference of the commission of adultery from the evidence."}}, {"text": "M. C. Cardoza", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13218, "end_char": 13231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the relevant time M. C. Cardoza P. W. 3 was employed as its Manager, Kira Ram P. W.4 as a sweeper, Abdul Aziz P. W. 5 and Usman Mian P. W. 6 as bearers."}}, {"text": "Abdul Aziz", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13299, "end_char": 13309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the relevant time M. C. Cardoza P. W. 3 was employed as its Manager, Kira Ram P. W.4 as a sweeper, Abdul Aziz P. W. 5 and Usman Mian P. W. 6 as bearers."}}, {"text": "Usman Mian", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13322, "end_char": 13332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the relevant time M. C. Cardoza P. W. 3 was employed as its Manager, Kira Ram P. W.4 as a sweeper, Abdul Aziz P. W. 5 and Usman Mian P. W. 6 as bearers."}}, {"text": "Memsaheb", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14380, "end_char": 14388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. Yes, whenever I used to go to sweep the room I found Memsaheb and Saheb there.\""}}, {"text": "Saheb", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14393, "end_char": 14398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. Yes, whenever I used to go to sweep the room I found Memsaheb and Saheb there.\""}}, {"text": "Cardoza", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15069, "end_char": 15076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No question was put to this witness as to his hours of duty nor was the manager Cardoza asked anything about it but another witness Abdul Aziz bearer P.W. 5, was ked about it as follows : Q. \"What are the hours of work of the sweeper ?"}}, {"text": "July 29, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16277, "end_char": 16290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 the hotel bill and receipt dated July 29, 1950\n\nfor room No 10 in the name of Mr. and Mrs. Charles Chaplin."}}, {"text": "Hong Kong", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17171, "end_char": 17180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This entry was in the assumed name of Mr. and Mrs. Charles Chaplin from Hong Kong but when he (respondent No."}}, {"text": "December 5, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17645, "end_char": 17661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This fact receives support from the complaint which Cardoza made to the police on December 5, 1950, and the entry in regard to this complaint made in the Station House Diary of the same date."}}, {"text": "J. A. Baker", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 18810, "end_char": 18821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There are then the statements of J. A. Baker P.W. 8 and T. H. O'Connor P.W. 9 to the effect that in September 1950, at the house of O'Connor respondent No."}}, {"text": "T. H. O'Connor", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 18833, "end_char": 18847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There are then the statements of J. A. Baker P.W. 8 and T. H. O'Connor P.W. 9 to the effect that in September 1950, at the house of O'Connor respondent No."}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21021, "end_char": 21026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21056, "end_char": 21061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21550, "end_char": 21554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Matrimonial Causes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21575, "end_char": 21597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "\\Villiam Scott", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21964, "end_char": 21978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord MacDermott referring to the description of Sir \\Villiam Scott said in Preston Jones v. Preston Jones (2):\n\n\"The jurisdiction in divorce involves the status of the parties and the public interest requires that the marriage bond shall not be set aside lightly or without strict enquiry.", "canonical_name": "\\Villiam Scott"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23024, "end_char": 23028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23435, "end_char": 23442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT.REPORTS 1421\n\nCourt are as nearly as may be conformable to the principles and rules on which the Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes in England for the time being acts and gives relief."}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23854, "end_char": 23859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23970, "end_char": 23975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Preston Jones", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24498, "end_char": 24511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But in view of the decision in Preston Jones Case (2) it is unnecessary to discuss that case."}}, {"text": "July 28, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25005, "end_char": 25018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 at Patna between July 25, 1950, and July 28, 1950."}}, {"text": "M. P.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26136, "end_char": 26141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. P. V. SUNDARARAMIER & CO."}}, {"text": "STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 26170, "end_char": 26193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH\n\n& ANOTHER (with connected petitions) (S. R. DAS C. J., VENKATARAMA AlYAR, S. K. DAS,\n\nA. K. SARKAR and\n\nVIVIAN BosE JJ.)"}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26233, "end_char": 26242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH\n\n& ANOTHER (with connected petitions) (S. R. DAS C. J., VENKATARAMA AlYAR, S. K. DAS,\n\nA. K. SARKAR and\n\nVIVIAN BosE JJ.)", "canonical_name": "S. K. Das"}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMA AlYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26250, "end_char": 26267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH\n\n& ANOTHER (with connected petitions) (S. R. DAS C. J., VENKATARAMA AlYAR, S. K. DAS,\n\nA. K. SARKAR and\n\nVIVIAN BosE JJ.)"}}, {"text": "S. K. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26269, "end_char": 26278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH\n\n& ANOTHER (with connected petitions) (S. R. DAS C. J., VENKATARAMA AlYAR, S. K. DAS,\n\nA. K. SARKAR and\n\nVIVIAN BosE JJ.)", "canonical_name": "S. K. Das"}}, {"text": "A. K. SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26281, "end_char": 26293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH\n\n& ANOTHER (with connected petitions) (S. R. DAS C. J., VENKATARAMA AlYAR, S. K. DAS,\n\nA. K. SARKAR and\n\nVIVIAN BosE JJ.)"}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26299, "end_char": 26310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH\n\n& ANOTHER (with connected petitions) (S. R. DAS C. J., VENKATARAMA AlYAR, S. K. DAS,\n\nA. K. SARKAR and\n\nVIVIAN BosE JJ.)"}}, {"text": "ss. 2(h), 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26710, "end_char": 26722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Nature of-Retrospective operation-Enactment unconstitutional in part-Effect-Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939", "statute": "Nature of-Retrospective operation-Enactment unconstitutional in part-Effect-Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26724, "end_char": 26759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26773, "end_char": 26777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956", "statute": "Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26779, "end_char": 26800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 246, 286, 301, 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26802, "end_char": 26826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26943, "end_char": 26949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners were dealers cai; rying on business in the City of Madras in the sale and purchase of yarn."}}, {"text": "Andhra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27012, "end_char": 27018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The dealers in the State of Andhra used to place orders for the purchase of yarn with the petitioners in Madras, where the contracts were concluded and the goods were delivered ex-godown at Madras and thereafter despatched to the purchasers who would take delivery of them within their State."}}]}
{"document_id": "1958_1_1422_1495_EN", "year": 1958, "text": "JVlrlle\n\nWhite\n\nK(:pur J.\n\nMarch 11.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1958]\n\nthe inclination and conduct of the wife. On the otaer hand her conduct as shown by the evidence is so entirely consistent with her guilt as to justify the conclusion of her having committed adultery with respondent No. 2 and therefore the finding of the Courts below as to the guilt should be reversed.\n\nWe would therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and pass a decree nisi for dissolution of marriage. As adultery has been proved respondent No. 2 shall pay the costs in this Court and in the Courts below.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nM. P. V. SUNDARARAMIER & CO.\n\nTHE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH\n\n& ANOTHER (with connected petitions) (S. R. DAS C. J., VENKATARAMA AlYAR, S. K. DAS,\n\nA. K. SARKAR and\n\nVIVIAN BosE JJ.)\n\nSales Tax-Inter-State sales-Sale outside State but goods delivered for consumption within State-Competence of States to levy tax-Conditional legislation-Power of Parliament to authorise such taxation-President's Adaptatiori Order-Scope of- } Nature of-Retrospective operation-Enactment unconstitutional in part-Effect-Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 (Mad. 9 of 1939), as adapted to Andhra, ss. 2(h), 22-.Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956 (7 of 1956), s. 2-.Constitution of India, Arts. 246, 286, 301, 372, Sch. VII, List I, Entry 42, List II, Entry 54.\n\nThe petitioners were dealers cai; rying on business in the City of Madras in the sale and purchase of yarn. The dealers in the State of Andhra used to place orders for the purchase of yarn with the petitioners in Madras, where the contracts were concluded and the goods were delivered ex-godown at Madras and thereafter despatched to the purchasers who would take delivery of them within their State. The present dispute related to sales in which property in the goods sold passed outside the State of Andhra, but the goodi theiruelves were actually delivered as a result\n\nof the sale for consumption within that State.\n\nAfter the coming 1958 into force of the Constitution of India the President in the - exercise of the powers conferre4 by Art. 372(2) made Adaptation M. P. v. Sundara- Orders with reference to the Sales Tax Laws of all the States, ram/er &: Co. and as rgards the Madra5 General Sales Tax Act, 1939, he issued •· an Ame11dment inserting a new section, s. 22 in that Act, which The State oJ was a verbatim reproduction of the Explanation to Art 286( 1 )(a) Andhra Praderh of the Constitution.\n\nOn July 13, 1954, the Board of Revenue (Commercial Taxes) in the State of Aqdhra, acting on the decision in The State of Bombay and another v. The United Motors (India) Ltd., and others, {1953] S.C.R. 1069, called upon dealers in the State of Madras to submit returns of their turnover of sales in which goods were delivered in the State of Andhra for consumption. Thereupon they filed the present petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution challenging the demand on the grounds, inter aUa, that the sales proposed to be taxed were inter-State sales and that they were immune from taxation under Art 286(2) of the Constitution. While the petitions were pending the Supreme Court pronounced on September 6, 1955, its judgment in The Bengal Immunity Company Umited v. The State of Bihar and others, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 603, according to which the petitioners were not liable to be taxed. But before final orders were passed on the petitions Parliament passed Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956, s. 2 whereof provided that no law of a State imposing or authorising the imposition of tax on inter-State sales during the period between April 1, 1951, and September 6, 1955, shall be deemed to be invalid or ever to have been invalid merely by reason of the fact that the sales took place in the course of the inter-State trade.\n\nThat section further provided that taxes levied or collected on such sales during the aforesaid period shall be deemed to have been validly levied or collected. It was the contention of the State of Andhra that by reason of the aforesaid provision it had the right to impose tax on inter-State sales during the aforesaid period. On the other hand the petitioners contended, inter alia, that ( 1) s. 22 of the Madras General Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956, which gave validity to laws which imposed a tax, did not authorise the imposition, (2) the Sales Tax Laws Validation Act was ultra vires Art. 286(2), (3) s. 22 of the Madras Act was not a \"law of a State\" within Art. 286(2) ands. 2 of the impugned Act, ( 4) the impugned Act only validated levies already made and did not authorise the initiation of fresh proceedings for imposing tax, (5) s. 22 having been unconstitutional, when it was enacted and therefore void, no proceedings could be taken thereunder on the basis of the Validation Act, as the effect of unconstitutionality of the law was to efface it out of the statute book, and ( 6) the proposed levy was bad as infringing the Rule which provided that the sale of yam could be taxed only at one point. It was also contended that under the Constitution it was only the Parliament that has the competence to impose tax on inter-State sales and that the Sales Tax Laws Validation As:st\n\n1958 was bad in that it 11:ave validity to the laws of the State to impose the tax: M. P. V. Sundara- Held (Sarkar J. (iissenting), thats. 22 of the Madras General ramter & Co.\n\nSales Tax Act, 1939, did in fact impose a tax on the class of sales v. covered by the Explanation to Art. 286(1)(a) but that it was ThtJStateof conditional on the ban enacted on Art 286(2) being lifted by law Andhra Pradesh of Parliament as provided therein, and that it was therefore validated by s. 2 of the Sales Tax Laws Validation Act. 1956. .\n\nThe construction put upon the Explanation to Art. 286( 1) (a) of the Constitution in The Bengal Immunity Company case that it merely prohibited the outside States from imposing a tax on the class of sales falling within the Explanation and did not confer on the delivery State any power to impose a tax on such sales has no application to a taxing statute of a State the object of which was primarily to confer power on the State to levy and collect tax.\n\nSection 22 and s. 2(h) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act must be read together as defining the sales which are taxable under the Act.\n\nMettur Industries Ltd. v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 362, The Mysore Spinning an(l Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Madras, A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 368 and Dial Das v. P. S. Talwalkar, A.J.R. )957 Bom. 71, approved.\n\nMathew v. Travancore-Cochin Board of Revenue, A.LR. 1957 T. C. 300, Cochin Coal Co. Ltd. v. The State of Travancore- Cochin, (1956) 7 Sales Tax Cases 731 and The Government of Andhra v. Nooney Govindarajulu, (1957) 8 Sales Tax CllSCs 297, disapproved.\n\nQueen v. Burah, (1878) 5 I.A. 178 and In re The Drihi £awg Act, 1912, etc. [1951] S.C.R. 747, relied on: Held (Per S. R. Das, C. J., Venkatarama Aiyar, S. K. Das and Vivian Bose, JJ.) that (I) the Sales Tax Lawa Validation Act, 1956, is in substance one lifting the ban on taxatiOn of inter- State sales and is within the authority conferted on .P .trliament under Art 286(2) and further that under that provision it waa competent to Parliament to enact a law with retrospective operation.\n\nP11njab Province v. Dau/at Singh, (1946) L.R. 73 I.A. 59, distinguished.\n\nThe United Province v. Atiqa Begum, (1940] F.C . .R. 110, applied.\n\n(2) the Adaptation Order made by the President under Art. 372(2) is valid and is not open to attack on the ground that it goes 1!4yond the limits contemplated by that Article.\n\n(3) the eiqiression \"law of a State\" in Art. 286(2) ands. 2 of the Sales Tax Laws Validation Act means whatever operatoS as law in the State, and that s. 22 of the Madras General Sale& Tax Act is a law within those enactments.\n\n( 4) s. 2 of the Sales Tax Laws Validation Act validates not only the levies already collected but also authorises the imposition of tax on sales falling within the Explanation which had taken place during the period specified in s. 2. The Act is not a temporary Act though its operation is limited to sales taking place within a specified period.\n\nDial Das v. P. S. Talwalkar, A.I.R. 1957 Born. 71, in so far as it held that it was not competent to the State to start fresh proceedings for assessment, disapproved.\n\n(5) though s. 22 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act was unconstitutional when enacted the effect of the unconstitu tionality was not to efface it out of the stawte books. Unconstitutionality might arise either because the law is in respect of a matter not within the competence of the legislature or because the matter itself being within the competence., its provisions offend some constitutional restrictions. While a law which is not within the competence of the legislature is a nullity a law on a topic within its competence but repugnant to any constitutional prohibition is only une!lforceable. In the latter class of legislation when once the constitutional prohibition is removed the law becomes enforceable without re-enactment. Where an enactment is unconstitutional in part but valid as to the rest, assuming that the two portions are severable, it cannot be held to have been wiped out of the statute book, as admittedly it must remain there for the purpose of enforcement of the valid portion.\n\nMoreover in the view that the impugned law is conditional legislation it cannot be held to have become non est.\n\n\n(6) under Entry 42 in List I, Sch. VII of the Constitution, legislation with respect to inter-State trade and commerce is exclusively within the competence of Parliament.\n\nUnder Entry 54, List II, taxes on sale of goods is within the exclusive competence of the State Legislature, and reading the two Entries together Entry 42 must be construed as excluding the power to tax sale of goods, The scheme of the Entries in the Lists is that taxation is regarded as a distinct matter and is separately set oot.\n\nEntry 42, List I, must therefore be construed as not including the power to impos~ tax on inter-State sales.\n\n(7) the proposed imposition does not infringe the rule that the sales of yams should be subject to taxation at a single point because the proposed levy is by the State of Andhra and the rule in question prohibits only multiple taxation in the same State.\n\nPer Sarkar J .-The Sales Tax Act does not authorise the taxation of a sale under which goods are delivered in the State of\n\nM. P. V. Sundara\n\nr.amier & Co. v.\n\nThe State of Andhra Pradesh\n\nI 958 Andhra but the property in them passes putside that State.\n\nThe Explanation in s. 22 of the Act only contemplates a State other n-t. P. V. Sundara than Andhra as the State inside which a sale shall be deemed to\n\nramler & Co. have taken place.\n\nThe words \"for the purposes of clause (a) (i)\" v. have the same meaning in the Explanation in Art. 286( I) as in The State of the Explanation in s. 22 of the Act, and the present case is not Andhra Pradesh distinguishable from the decision in The Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. The State of Bihar and others, [11955] 2 S.C.R. 603.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Petitions Nos. 220, 222, 240 and 380 to 395 of 1955.\n\nPetitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.\n\n1957. Dec. 10, II, 1'2, 13, 17, 18, 19.\n\n1958. Jan. 7, 8, 9.\n\nD. Narsa Raju, Advocate-Genera/for the State of Andhra Pradesh and T. M. Sen, for the respondent. The petitions are premature and incompetent as the facts -0f each transaction of sale are yet to be investigated .and it is not possible to know the character of each sale, nor can it be determined which sales can be and which cannot be taxed by Andhra Pradesh.\n\n(CHIEF JUSTICE.\n\nYou should be reasonably satisfied that the sales are of such a nature that you can levy tax on them before you issue a notice.\n\nBOSE J.\n\nYou must state the facts on which you think you can tax the sales.\n\nS. K. DAS J. Your stand is that all transactions could be taxed by the delivery State.] D. Narsa Raju. My State is taxing under the decision of this Court in the United Motors case ((1953]\n\nS.C.R. 1069).\n\n(Upon the counsel for the petitioners stating that if) he would confine his arguments to the imposition of tax on Explanation sales only, which some, of the transactions indisputably were, the Court indicated that it would hear the petitions.] K. S. Krishnaswami Iyengar, N. Srinivasan and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the petitioners. The Andhra (Madras) Act does not seek to tax Explanation sales\n\nat all. It talks of \"property passing\" only and as 19ss such A:ndhra can tax only such sales where property M. P. v. Sundarapasses m Andhrfl. See Poppatlal Shah v. . State of ra,;, ier & co.\n\nMadras, ([1953) S..C.R. 677). Section 22 does not v. enlarge the definition of sales; it only restricts the TllL State of power of teh State to tax. The explanation to s. 22, Andhra Pradesh like the explanation to Art. 236(1), is merely for th'e purpose of defining what is an outside sale and not for determining what is an. inside sale. See Bengal Immunity Company case ([1955) 2 S.C.R. 603 at 640). The power of the President under Art. 372(2) being merely to bring the State laws into conformity with Art. 286, s. 22, which was introduced by the Presidential Adaptation Order under Art. 372(2), cannot be construed as permitting the imposition of tax on Explanation sales which was prohibited by Art. 286. If s. 22 was construed to permit such imposition it was unconstitutional, illegal and void and must be deemed to be non\n\nest; See Bengal Immunity Company case ((1955] 2 S.C.R. 603 at 667). What did not exist could not be validated. ·\n\nThe Sales Tax Laws (Validation) Act, 1956, was not valid legislation under Art. 286(2). Article 286(2) only empowers Parliament to lift the ban on the imposition of tax on inter-State sales and after it has lifted the ban the State legislature may impose the tax. Parliament is not competent to impose sales tax; such power is vested only in the State legislatures. Article 286.(2) does not give Parliament power to validate or ratify laws of the State legislatures. The power under Art. 286(2) can be exercised only once and finally and fully, not partially. Parliament can only lift the .ban as from the day the power is exercised and not retrospectively. Punjab Province v. Daulat Singh, (73 I.A. 59); Behram Khurshed Pesikaka v. The State of Bombay ([1955) 1 S.C.R. 613, 654 and 655). The case of Dial Das v. Talwalkar (A.l.R. 1957 Born. 71) has been wrongly decided. But even this decision helps the petitioners in so far as it lays down that where tax had neither been collected nor levied the Validation Act did not confer power to assess or levy. The Whole\n\n19ss pelicy of the Validation Act was to save the State from disgorging the tax illegally collected. Both levy M. P. V. sundaraand collection must be within the period specified in\n\nramhr&Co. s. 2 of the Act. Mettur Industries Ltd. v. The State of Th• ;,~1• of Madras (A.LR. 1957 Mad. 362) and Mysore ,.Spinning Andhra Pradesh anil Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer (A.l.R. 1957 Mad. 368) are against the petitioners.\n\nR. Ganapathy Iyer followed.\n\nSection 22 of the Andhra (Madras) Act did not enlarge the powers of taxation. Mathew v. Travancore-Cochin Board of Revenue (A.I.R. 1957 T.C. 300). The validation being for a temporary period which expired on September 6, 1955, no action can be taken after that date under the validated laws. Kesavan Madhava Menon v.\n\nThe State of Bombay, ([1951] S.C.R. 228, 234, 235), S. Krishnan v. The State of Madras,\n\n([1951] S.C.R. 621), and State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh, ([1955] 1 S. C. R. 893). The tax being a single point tax under the Act, and the petitioners having already paid the tax at the time of the purchase of the yarn from the Mills, no second tax was payable. TheAndhra (Madras) Act being a new Act the tax on yarn is hit by the Essential Commodities Act (52 of 1952) read with Art. \"286(3) of the Constitution. Petitioners are not dealers in Andhra Pradesh and cannot be assessed.\n\nThere are no sales in Andhra; all sales being in Madras.\n\nV. L. Narasimhamoorthy, J. B. Dadachanji and Rameshwar Nath, for the Mysore Spinning & Mfg. Co., Ltd., and Minerva Mills Ltd., (Interveners), supported the petitioners. Section 22 does not authorise the imposition of tax on Explanation sales. It could not have been the intention of the President to allow the State to add a new category of sales-the .Explanation Sales-to be taxed. The language of Art. 286(2) indicates that the lifting of the ban is a condition precedent to legislation by the States imposing tax on inter-State sales. Alternatively, the power to tax inter-State sales is with Parliament under Entry 97 of List I of Schedule VII of the Constitution. Section 22 was wiped out and obliterated by the judgment in the\n\n' . \\ Bengal Immunity Company case. , See Behr, am Khur- 1958 shed Pesikaka v.\n\n\nThe State of Kera/a, ([1957] S.C.R. 837) ..\n\nN. A. Palkhiwala, J. B. DadachanJi and Rames!iwar Nath, for Tata Iron & Steel Co., Ltd., (Intervener).\n\nThere must be a factual levy before Parliament can validate it.\n\n\nThere is a vital difference between retrospective and retroactive operation. There is no power in Parliament • to validate ex post facto a violation of Art. 286(2).\n\nParliament must first lift the ban and then the State legislation may come imposing tax on inter-State sales.\n\nParliament is competent to prevent what otherwise would have been a violation of the Constitution, but it is not competent to condone an accomplished violation. Section 2 of the Validating Act will operate only where taxes have already been collected or have been been finally assessed.\n\nP. N.\n\nBhagwati and I. N. Shroff, for Pashebbhai Patel & Co., Ltd., (Intervener) supported the petitioners.\n\nD. Narsq Raju, Advocate-General of Andhra Pradesh and T. M. Sen, for the respondents. Article 372(2) must take regard of the provision of the Constitution to bring the State laws into conformity with which the power of adaptation is to be exercised. That provision\n\n1958 is Art. 286. Implicit in Art. 286(1) is the recog- - nition that the delivery State alone may tax. The M. P .. v. Sundara- President would be acting within his power to enable\n\nramier 4c Co. h d l\" S S h · d t e e 1very tate to taxuc power is m accor - The ;; ate of ance with the provisions of the Constitution. The ( Andhra Pradesh power of the legislature to bring the laws in accordance with the Constitution is conferred upon the President. Consequently, the explanation to s. 22 can be read along with the definition of sale and it does add to that definition by bringing Explanation sales within it.\n\nK. V. Subramania Iyer, D. N. Mukherjee and B. N. Ghosh, for Madura Mills Co., Ltd., (Intervener).\n\nThe Adaptation Order made by the President is not 'law of a State' within the meaning of the Validating Act. 'Law of a State' in the Validating Act must mean the same thing as in Art. 286(2). The President exercising power under Art. 372(2) is .not controlled by Art. 286; he exercises a power which belongs to the President and not a power on behalf of the State.\n\nSection 22 of the Andhra (Madras) Act is not law made by the State Legislature and is not validated by the Validating Act. The power of imposition of sales • tax on inter-State sales was taken away from the States. The ban under Art. 286(2) is only in respect of existing laws; there is no power in the States to enact laws imposing tax on inter-State sales. The power to impose tax on inter-St&te sales is within the exclusive domain of Parliament under Entry 42 of List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and Entry 54 of List II must be construed as not including such power. A reference to Art. 301 reinforces this interpretation. The freedom under Art. 301 includes freedom from sales tax. See The Commonwealth v. The State of South Australia,\n\n(38 C.L.R. 408). The Validation Act is not legislation within Entry 42. See Bank of N. S. W. v.\n\nThe Commonwealth, (76 C. L. R. l, 381), Robbins v. Taxing District of Shelby County ([1877] 30 L. Ed. 694); McLeod v. Dilworth Co. ([1944] 88 L. Ed. 1304).\n\nC. K.\n\nDaphtary, Solicitor-General of India. G. N.\n\nJoshi and T. M. Sen, for the Union of India (Intert9ss vener). The Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956, is - valid legislation under Art. 286(2). In effect and in M. P. !' Sundara substance the Validation Act is a law which removes ramier &: Co. the ban imposed by Art. 286(2), and is not really a The s; te of Validating Act. Article 286(2), in respect of existing Andlzra Pradesh laws, merely said that they should not be effective or operative. It did not take away the competency of the legislatures to make laws providing for taxes on inter-State sales. Such a law may be against the provision of the Constitution, but that does not repeal or obliterate it. It is only in abeyance. See Bhikaji Narain Dhakras and others v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and another;([1955]-2 S.C.R. 589, 600).\n\nLegislative power generally includes the power to legislate retrospectively. There is no limitation in Art. 286(2) as respect~ retrospective legislation.\n\nParliament could, therefore, lift the ban retrospec:- tively. Section 22 is a piece of conditional legislation. As soon as the ban under Art. 286(2) was lifted by Parliament it came into operation. The Validation Act is .not a temporary statute. A temponary statute is one which says that it is to be effective for a particular period. The Validating Act operates even now and is effective, though it is in respect of sales of a particular period. It is open to the States to initiate proceedings now for taxing the Explanation sales made during the period mentioned in s. 2 even tl\\ough no such proceedings had been taken during that period. Entry 42 of List I which reads :\n\n\"Inter-State trade and commerce\" does not confer any power of taxation on Parliament. In the scheme . of our Constitution a general Entry does not include the power of taxation. Taxes, duties, etc., are enumerated in a separate group in Entries 82-92 in List I.\n\nV. K. T. Chari, Advocate-General for the State of Madras, B. R. Gopalakrishnan and T. M. Sen for the State of Madras (Intervener). In construing s. 22. of the Andhra (Madras) Act regard rrrust be had to the law as it stood till September 6, 1955, when judgment was delivered in the Bengal Immunity Company case. In view of the decision in the United Motors\n\n19ss case ([1953] S.C.R. 1069, 1085, 1086, 1093, 1094), - Explanation sales were regarded as 'inside sales' in the M. P. !' Sundara delivery State, and the delivery State was entitled to\n\n\nTransport Authority v. James Brown & Som; Ltd. ([1953] Northern Ireland Reports 79).\n\nSection 2 of the Validating Act refers to such a law.\n\nMahabir Prasad, Advocate-General for the State of Bihar, Rajeshwar Prasad and S. P. Varma, for the State of Bihar (Intervener); G. C. Mathur and C. P.\n\nLal, for the State of Uttar Pradesh (intervener) supported the respondents and the Union of India.\n\nR. Ganapathy Iyer, for the petitioners, replied.\n\nK. V. Subramania Iyer, for Madura Mills Co., Ltd., (Intervener), also replied with the permission of the Court.\n\n1958. March 11. The judgment of Das C. J., Venkatarama Aiyar, S. K. Das and Vivian Bose, JJ. was delivered by Venkatarama Aiyer J.\n\nSarkar J. delivered a separate judgment.\n\nVenkatarama VENKATARAMA AIYAR J.-The petitioners are deal-\n\nAiya~ J. ers carrying on business in the City of Madras in the sale and purchase of yarn, and they have filed the present applications under Art. 32 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ of prohibition or other appropriate writ restraining the State of Andhra from taking proceedings for imposing tax on certain sales effected by them in favour of merchants who are residing or carrying on business in what is now the State of Andhra Pradesh, on the ground, inter alia, that the said sales were made in the course of inter-State trade, and that no tax could be levied on them by reason of the prohibition contained in Art. 286(2) of the Constitution.\n\nThe course of dealings between the parties resulting\n\nin the above sales has been set out in para. 5 in Peti- 1958 tion No. 220 of 1955. It is therein stated that the dealers in Andhra would place orders for the purchase M. P .. v. Sundaraof yarn with the petitioners in Madras, that the conramie::~ Co. tracts would be concluded at Madras, that the goods The state of would be delivered ex-godown at Madras and would Anilhra Pradesh\n\nthereafter be despatched to the purchasers either by lorries or by rail as might be directed by them, that Venkatarama when the goods were sent by rail, the railway receipts Aiyar J. would be taken either in the name of the consignees, and sent to them by post or in the name of the consignor and endorsed to the purchasers and delivered to them in Madras or sent to them by post endorsed in favour of a bank and the purchasers would take delivery of those receipts after payment to the bank. It is said that in all cases price of the goods was paid in Madras. - On the above llegations, it is manifest that the sales mentioned therein are not all of the same kind,, and in point of law, the incidents attaching to them might be different. A consideration of the validity of the imposition with reference to the several classes of sales mentioned abqve would be wholly airy and pointless without a determination of the facts relating to them, which, however, have not been investigated.\n\nCounsel for the pe_titioners, however, concedes that the dispute in these proceedings is confined to the proposed imposition of tax, in so far as it relates to sales of the character mentioned in the Explanation to Art. 286(1)(a), that is to say, sales in which the property in the goods sold passed outside the State of Andhra but the goods themselves were actually delivered as a result of the sale for consumption within that State.\n\nThese sales have been referred to in the arguments before us as •'Explanation sales\", and it will be conveniet. to adopt that expression in ref erring to them in this judgment.\n\nIt will be seen that the above sales would all of them have been intra-State, so long as the Andhra State formed part of the composite State of Madras and questions of the character now agitated before us. could not then have arisen. On September 14, 1953,\n\nM2SC (1)/61--6\n\n1958 Parliament enaJed the Andhra State Act (30 of 1953), whereby a separate State called the State of Andhra M. P. v. Sundarawas constituted incorporating therein territories which\n\nram/er v\"' co. had previously thereto formed part of the State of {\n\nThe s1;1, of Madras, and this Act came into force on October l, Andhra Pradesh 1953. Under s. 53 of the Andhra State Act, the laws in force in the territories in the Andhra State prior to Venkataroma its constitution are to continue to be in force even Aiyar J. thereafter and one of those laws is the Madras General Sales Tax Act (Madras 9 of 1939), hereinafter referred to as the Madras Act. Section 54 of the Andhra State Act conferred on the Government a power to adapt laws for the purpose of facilitating the application of any law previously made, and in exercise of the power conferred by this section, an Adaptation Order was passed on November 12, 1953, whereby the word \"Andhra\" was substituted for the word \"Madras\" in the Madras Act. We shall hereafter refer to the Madras Act as continued and applied in the State of Andhra as the Andhra (Madras) Act.\n\nIt will be convenient at this stage to refer to the relevant provisions of this Act. The preamble to the Act states that \"it is expedient to provide for the levy of a general tax on the sale of goods in the State of Madras\". \"Sale\" is defined in s. 2(h), omitting what is not material, as meaning \"every transfer of the property in goods by one person to another in the course of trade or business for cash or for deferred pay ment or other valuable consideration.\" Section 2(i) defines \"turnover\" as \"the aggregate amount for which goods are either bought by or sold by a dealer, whether for cash or for deferred payment or other valuable consideration\". Section 3 is the charging section and provides that every dealer shall pay for each year tax on his total turnover for such year. By the Madras General Sales Tax (Amendment) Act , No. 25 of 1947, a new Explanation was added to the definition of \"sale\", and it is as follows : Explanation 2 : \"Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930, the sale or purchase of any goods shall be deemed, for\n\n19S8 the purposes of this Act, to hve taken place in this Province, wherever the contract of sale or purchase might have been made- M. P. v. sumJar:ir.amier & Co.\n\n(a) if the goods were actually in this Province at v. the time when the contract of sale or purchase in The siate of respect thereof was made, or Andhra Pradesh\n\n(b) in case the contract was for the sale or purchase of future goods by description, then, if the goods are actually produced in this Province at any time after the contract of sale.or purchase in respect thereof was made.\" This amendment came into force on January 1, 1948.\n\nIn Poppatlal Shah v. The .State of Madras(1), this Court had to consider the scope of the definition of \"sale\" in s. 2(h) and of Explanation 2, and it was therein held that though the power to tax a sale was really a power to tax a transaction of sale and a -law imposing such tax would be competent if any of the ingredients of sale had taken place within the State,\n\nthe Madras Act had, by its definition of \"sale\" in s. 2(h) prior to the enactment of Explanation 2, imposed a tax only when the property in the goods passed within the State, and that in respect of sales which had taken place prior to the amendment, the tax would be unauthorised if the property in the goods passed outside the State of Madras.\n\nIt was also observed that after the amendment came into force, a tax on a sale which came within Explanation 2 would\n\nbe valid. That was the position in law under the Madras Act prior to the enactment of the Constitution.\n\nIt is now necessary to ref er to the changes effected in the law by the Constitution, Article 286, which is relevant for the present purpose, is as follows ·: 286(1). \"No law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes place- ( a) outside the State; or\n\n(b) in the course of the import of the goods into, or export of the goods out of, the territory of India.\n\n(t) [ 1953] S. C.R. 677.\n\n18a\n\nVenkatarama AiyarJ.\n\n1958 Explanation.-For the purposes of sub-clause (a), - a sale or purchase shall be deemed to have taken M. P .. v. Sundaraplace in the State in which the goods have actually\n\nramier & Co. b d 1 d d\" 1 f h I v. een e ivere as a 1rect resu t o sue sa e or pur- The state of chase for the purpose of c0, nsumption in that State, Andhra Pradesh notwithstanding the fact that under the general law relating to sale of goods the property in the goods Venkararama has by reason of such sale or purchase passed in Aiyar J. another State.\n\n(2) Except in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide, no law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of any goods where such sale or purchase takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce :\n\nProvided, that the President may by order direct that any tax on the sale or purchase of goods which was being lawfully levied by the Government of any State immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall, notwithstanding that the imposition of such tax is contrary to the provisions of this clause, continue to be levied until the thirty-first day of March, 1951.\n\n(3) No law made by the Legislature of a State imposing, or authorising the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of any such goods as have been declared by Parliament by law to be essential for the life of the community shall have effect unless it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent.\" 1o~ Article 372(2) enacts that,\n\n\"For the purpose of bringing the provisions of any law in force in the territory of India into accord with the provisions of this Constitution, the President may by order make such adaptations and modifications of such law, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary or expedient, and provide that the law shall, as from such date as may be specified in the order, have effect subject to the adaptations and modifications so made, and any such adaptation or modification shall not be questioned in any court of law.\" In exercist> of the power conferred by this provision.\n\nthe President made Adaptation Orders with reference 19ss to the Sales Tax of Laws all the States, and as regards - the Madras Act, he issued on July 2, 1952, the Fourth M. P .. v. Sundara-\n\nAmendment inserting a new section, s. 22 in that Act. ranuer &: Co.\n\nIt runs as follows : The ;, te of \"Nothing contained in this Act shall be deemed AndhraPradesh to impose or authorise the imposition of a tax on the sale or purchase of any goods where such sale or Venkatarama purchase takes place- Atyar J.\n\n(a) (i) outside the State of Madras, or\n\n(ii) in the course of import of the goods into the territory of India or of the export of the goods out of such territory, or\n\n(b) except in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide, after the 31st March, 1951, in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, and the provisions of this Act shall be read and construed accordingly.\n\nExplanation :-For the purposes of cl. (a) (i) a sale -0r purchase shall be deemed to have taken place in the State in which the goods have actually been delivered as a direct result of such sale or purchase for the purpose of consumption in that State, notwithstanding the fact that under the general law relating to sale of goods the property in the goods has by reason of such sale or purchase passed in another State.\"\n\nIt will be noticed that the Explanation to Art. 286\n\n_-< (l)(a) is reproduced verbatim in s. 22 of the Madras Act. The true meaning and scope of this Explanation came up for consideration before this Court in The State uf Bombay and another v. The United Motors India Ltd., and others (1). Therein, it was held by a majority that though the sales falling within the Explanation would, in fact, be in the course of inter-\n\nState trade, they became, by reason of the fiction introduced therein, invested with the character of intra-State sales, and would be liable to be taxed by the State within which the goods were delivered for consumption. Acting on this judgment, the Board of Revenue (Commercial Taxes) Andhra State, issued a\n\n(1) I19Sll s.c.R. 1069.\n\n1958 notification on July 13, 1954, calling upon dealers to submit returns of their turnover of sales in which M. P._ v. Sundaragoods were delivered in the Andhra State for consumpramier v & co. tion, and a copy thereof was sent to the Madras Yarn\n\nThe 81~1, of Merchants' Association, of which the petitioners arP, Andhra Pradesh members. The Association disputed the liability of the Madras dealers to pay any tax in respect of the Venkalarama sales to the Andhra dealers, and after some corres- Aiyar J. pondence, the Andhra State finally issued on June 30,\n\n1955, notices to the petitioners to send their returns of turnover by July 15, 1955, failing which it was stated that assessments would be made on the best judgment basis, and that, further, the dealers would be liable to the penalties prescribed by the law (Vide Annexure H to the petition). Thereupon, the petitioners have filed the present petitions challenging the validity of the demand made by the Andhra State on the ground, inter alia, that the sales proposed to be taxed were inter-State sales, and that they were immune from taxation under Art. 286(2). These petitions were filed on various dates in July and Augnst, 1955.\n\nWhile they were pending, the question of the true scope of the Explanation to Art. 286(1)(a) came up again for consideration before this Court in The Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. The State of Bihar and others (')- By its judgment dated September 6, 1955 this Court held, again by a majority, that the sales falling within the Explanation being inter-State in character, could not be taxed by reason of Art. 286(2), unless Parliament lifted the ban, that the Explanation to Art. 286(l)(a) controlled only that clause and did not limit the operation of Art. 286(2), and that the law had not been correctly laid down in The United Motors case (2).\n\nOn the decision in The Bengal Immunity Company case(') it cannot be doubted that the claim of the Andhra State to tax Explanation sales would be unconstitutional, and indeed, that was admitted by the State in a statement filed on October 21, 1955, wherein it was stated that having regard\n\n\n(2) [1953] S.C.R. 1069.\n\n• ..\n\nto the decision aforesaid, the petitions might be allow- 1958 ed but without costs. Before final orders were passed -- on the petitions, however, the Sales Tax Validation M.P._v. Sundara- Ordinance No. III of 1956, was promulgated on ramier & Co . . v.\n\nJanuary 30, 1956, and that was later replaced by the The State of Sales Tax Laws Validation Act (7 of 1956) and that Andhra Pradesh came into force on March 21, 1956. Section 2 of this Act runs as follows : Venkatarama Aiyar I. \"Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court no law of a State imposing, or authorising the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of any goods where such sale or purchase took place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce during the period between the 1st day of April, 1951, and the 6th day of September, 1955, shall be deemed to be invalid or ever to have been invalid merely by reason of the fact that such sale or purchase took place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce; and all such taxes levied or collected or purporting to have been levied or collected during the aforesaid period shall be deemed always to have been validly levied or collected in accordance with law.\" On February 19, 1957, the Andhra State which has become the State of Andhra Pradesh under s. 3(1) of the States Reorganisation Act (37 of 1956) filed a fresh statement that by reason of the Validation Act the State was entitled to impose tax on the Explanation sales, which had taken place during the period between the 1st day of April, 1951, and the 6th day of September, 1955 (which will hereinafter be referred to as the specified period), and that the petitions should therefore be dismissed.\n\nThe petitioners challenge the correctness of this position. They contend that the Andhra (Madras) Act does not, in fact, impose a tax on the Explanation sales, and that, in consequence, the Validation Act can have no effect on it; that the Validation Act is itself unconstitutional and void; that the Act even if valid, does not validate s. 22 of the Andhra (Madras) Act; that it validates only levies and collections of tax already made, and does not authorise the initiation\n\n1958 of fresh proceedings for assessment of tax or for realisa- - tion of the same; that even if the Act authorised M. P. ~· Sundarafresh imposition of taxes, that could not be done . ramie;:\" Co. without further legisltion pursuant thereto by the\n\nTh• stat• of State, and that no action could be taken on the basis AndhraPradesh of s. 22 of the Andhra (Madras) Act, as, being unconstitutional when enacted, it was for all purposes non est; Venkatarama that tax on the sale of yam could under the Act be Aiyar J. levied only at a single point and the State of Madras having imposed a tax on the sale of goods now proposed to be taxed, the Andhra State could not impose a tax once again on the sale of the self-same goods, and that, further, the tax on yam would, so far as the Andhra State is concerned, be bad as being hit by the Essential Commodities Act (52 of 1952), read with Art. 286 (3).\n\nIt must be mentioned that similar to the Adaptation Order which enacted s. 22 in the Madras Act, there were Adaptation Orders by the President with reference to the Sales Tax Laws in all the States, and provisions similar to s. 22 were enacted therein. As any decision by this Court on the questions raised in the petitions must conclude similar questions under the laws of other States, those States applied for and obtained permission to intervene in these proceedings, and we have heard the Advocates-General of Madras, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar on the questions. As the main point for determination is the vires of the Sales Tax Laws Validation Act (which will hereinafter be referred to as the impugned Act), the Union of India has intervened, and the learned Solicitor-General has addressed us on the questions relating to the validity of that Act. Certain assessees who are interested in the decision of the above questions also applied for and obtained permission to intervene, and they are the Mysore Spinning and Manufacturing . Co., the Minerva Mills, Ltd., the Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., and the Madura Mills Co, Ltd., and counsel appearing for them have, in general, s1,1pported the petitioners, Counsel for the Madura Mills Co. Ltd., raised a further contention different from and inconsistent with\n\nthe position taken by the petitioners and other inter- 19ss veners, and that is that under Entry 42 in List I of - the Seventh Schedule to.the Constitution, inter-State M.P •. v.sundarad d . h l - . d . f h ram1er & Co. tra e an commerce 1s t e exc us1ve omam o t e v.\n\nUnion Legislature, that tax on inter-State sales is The state of comprised therein, that the States have accordingly Andhra Pradesh no power to tax such sales, and that Parliament is not competent to authorise them to impose such a tax, Ve11katarama and that, accordingly, the impugned Act is wholly Aiyar misconceived and inoperative. _ On these contentions, the questions that arise for our determination are : (I) Whether the Andhra (Madras) Act, in fact, imposes a tax on the class of sales falling within the Explanation to Art. 286 (l)(a) ; (II) Whether the impugned Act is ultra vires on the ground that it is not authorised by the terms of Art. 286(2) ; (III) (a) Whether s. 22 of the Andhra (Madras) Act is within the protection of the impugned Act, and (III) (b) Whether the impugned Act validates only levies and collections made during the specified period, or whether it authorises the imposition and collection of taxes on such sales in future ; (IV) Whether s. 22 of the Madras Act was null and void on the ground that it was in contravention of Art. 286(2), and whether the proceedings sought to be taken thereunder on the strength of the impugned Act are incompetent ; (V) Whether tax on inter-State sales is within the exclusive competence of Parliament, and whether the impugned Act, is in consequence, bad as authorising the States to levy tax ; (VI) Whether the proposed imposition of tax is illegal on the ground that successive sales of yarn are subject under the law to be taxed at only one point, and as the State of Madras has already taxed the present sales, the State of Andhra cannot again levy a tax on them; and (VII) Whether the proposed imposition of tax on yarn by the Andhra State is hit by the Essential Commodities Act, read with Art. 286(3), and is illegal ?\n\n1958 (I) : The first question that falls to be determined - is whether the Andhra (Madras) Act, in fact, imposes a M. P. v. Sundaratax on the Explanation sales. Only if it does that,\n\nramie~. & co. would the further questions as to the vires and the\n\nThe state ef operation of the impugned Act arise for consideration.\n\nAndhro Prades/1 We have already referred to the relevant provisions of the Madras Act and to the decision of this Court in Venkatarama Poppatlal Shafi v. The State of Madras('), wherein it Aiyar J. was held that under the definition of \"sale\" in s. 2(h) of that Act and apart from the Explanations to it which are not material for the present discussion, power had been taken by the Province of Madras to tax only sales in which property in the goods passed inside the State. It must, therefore, be taken that under the Act, as it stood prior to the Constitution, the State of Madras had no power to impose a tax on sales of the kind mentioned in the Explanation to Art. 286(l)(a).\n\nNow, the question is whether, the Adaptation Order of the President (Fourth Amendment) dated July 2, 1952, has, by the insertion of s. 22 in the Madras Act, altered ... the position. The contention of the respondent is that it has, because it has bodily incorporated the Explanation to Art. 286 (l)(a) in the section itself, and as under that Explanation, all sales falling within its ambit would be sales inside the State of Madras, they became taxable as sales within the definition in s. 2 (h) of the Madras Act; and that accordingly under s. 22 of the Andhra (Madras) Act the Explanation sales become taxable by the Andhra State as sales within ...._ that State.\n\nThe petitioners dispute this position, and contend ' that that is not the true effect of the Explanation, and that porperly construed, it does not authorise the imposition of any tax which was not leviable under the provisions of the Act, prior to its enactment. It is argued that the object of Art. 286 of the Constitution was merely to impose restrictions on the power which the States had under Entry 54 in List II to enact laws imposing tax on sales, and that, in that context, the true scope of the Explanation to Art. 286(l)(a) was that it merely took away from the State its power to\n\n(1) [1953] S.C.R. 677.\n\ntax a sale in which the property passed inside it if t9ss the goods were actually delivered under the sale for consumption in another State and not to confer on the M. P. !' Sundaradelivery State a power to tax such a sale, and that the ramie~ &: co. Explanation in s. 22 which is, word for word, a repro- The s1~1e oJ duction of the Explanation to Art. 286 (1 )(a) must be Andhra Pradesh, construed as having the same import. Reliance is placed in support of this contentipn on the following Venkataramo• observations of this Court in The Bengal Immunity Aiyar J ..\n\nCompany case(1) at p. 640 : ·\n\n\"In clause (l)(a) the Constitution makers have placed a ban on the taxing power of the States with respect to sales or purchases which take place outside. the State. If the matter had been left there the ban would have been imperfect, \"for the argument would have still remained as to where a particular sale or purchase took place. Does a sale or purchase take place at the place where the contract or sale is made, or where the property in the goods passes or where the goods are delivered ? These questions are answered by the Explanation.\n\nThat Explanation is •for the purposes of sub-clause (a)', i.e., for the purpose of explaining which sale or purchase is to be regarded as having taken place outside a State. By saying that a parti-· cular sale or purchase is to be deemed to take place in a particular State the Explanation only indica, tes that such sale or purchase has taken place outside all other States. The Explanation is neither an Exception nor a Proviso but only explains what is an outside sale referred to in sub-clause (a). This it does by creating a fiction, That fiction is only for the purposes of subclause (a) and cannot be extended to any other purpose.\n\nIt should be limited to its•avowed purpose., To say that this Explanation confers legislative power on what for the sake of brevity has been called the delivery State is to use it for a collateral purpose which is not permissible. Further, it is utterly illogical and untenable to say that article 286 which was introduced in the Constitution to place restrictions on the legislative powers of the States, by a side wind, as it were,.\n\n\n19ss gave enlarged legislative powers to the State of delivery M P Sunda by an explanation sandwiched between two restrictions.\n\n;.,;,;~ & co.'\"\" This co_nstruction runs countr to the entire scheme of v. the article and the explanation and one may see no The Stai. of justification for imputing such indirect and oblique AndhraPratlesh purpose to this article.\"\n\nYenkatarama Now, the contention of the petitioners is that these Alyar J. observations are decisive of the present controversy, because the same provision expressed in ipsissima verba cannot have one meaning in Art. 286(I)(a) and quite a different one in s. 22 of the Madras Act; and on the construction put by this Court on the Explanation to Art. 286(I)(a), the Explanation of s. 22 to the Andhra (Madras) Act must be interpreted as prohibiting States other than Andhra from taxing sales under which goods are delivered for consumption outside those States, even though property passed inside them and not as authorising the State of Andhra to tax sales in which goods are delivered therein for consumption, even though property in the goods passed outside that State. It is argued that this conclusion is reinforced by the opening words of s. 22, viz., \"Nothing contained in this Act shall be deemed to impose or authorise the imposition of a tax on the sale or purchase of any goods\". The effect of this, it is said, is to impose a restriction on the power which the State previously possessed, of taxing sales coming within the definition ins. 2(h) and not to enlarge it The decision in Government of Andhra v. Nooney Govindarajulu(_') is cited in support of these contentions.\n\nThe error in this argument lies in this that it focusses attention exclusively on the terms in which the Explanations are couched in Art. 286(I)(a) and in s. 22 and completely orlooks the fundamental difference in the context and setting of these two enactments. The scope and purpose of Art. 286 have been considered at length in the decisions of this Court in The United Motors case(2) as also in The Bengal Immunity Company case('), and it is sufficient to briefly recapitulate them. Under Entry 48 in List II of the\n\n(1) (1957) 8 Sal'\" Tax Cases 097. (o) [1953) S.C.R. 1o6g.\n\n(3) [1955) 2 S.C.R. 6o3.\n\nSeventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, t95! 1935, the Provincial Legislature had the exclusive - competence to enact a law imposing a tax on the sale M. P. v. Sundaraof goods, and under s. 99(1 ), such a law could be made ramler & co. \"for the Province or for any part thereof\". In Wallace The ; te of Brothers & Co., Ltd., v. Income-tax Commissioner (1), Andhra Pradesh. the question arose as to the validity of certain provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act, which sought to Venkatarama tax non-resident foreigners in respect of their foreign Aiyar J,. income. The Indian Legislature had under Entry 54 in List I of the Government of India Act power to enact laws imposing tax on income other than agricultural income, and under s. 99(1) the law could be made \"for the whole of British India or for any part thereof\". It was held by the Privy Council that the requirements of s. 99 were satisfied if . there was sufficient territorial connection between the State imposing the tax and the. person who was sought to be taxed, and the receipt of income by the assessees in British India furnished sufficient nexus to give validity to the legislation imposing tax on their foreign income.\n\nIf this doctrine of nexus is applicable to laws imposing tax on sales-and it was applied by this Court to those laws in the United Motors case(2) at p. 1079 and in Poppatlal Shah's case(') at pp. 682-683-then it would\n\nbe competent to the State to. enact a law imposing a tax on salesnot merely when the property in the. goods passed within the State but even when it did not, if there was sufficient connection between the State and the transaction of sale, such as the presence of the goods in the State at the .date of agreement, as was held recently by this Court in Tata Iron & Steel Co.\n\nLtd.,.v. State of Bihar(4). In fact, acting on the nexus theory the Legislatures of the States enacted Sales Tax Laws adopting Qne or more of the nexi as the basis of taxation. This resulted in multiple taxation, as a consequence of which the free ftow of commerce between the States became obstructed and the larger economic interests of the country suffered. It was to repair this mischief that the Constitution, while\n\n(1) [1948] L.R; 75 I.A. 86.\n\n(3) [1953] S.C.R. 677.\n\n(2) [1953] s.c.R; 1o6g.\n\n(4) [ 1958] S.C.R. 1355.\n\n19ss retaining the power in the States to tax sales under - Entry 54 in List II sought to impose certain restric- M. P •. v. Sundarations on that power in Art. 286. One of those\n\nramierv~ co. restrictions is contained in Art. 286(1)(a) which\n\nThe State of prohibits a State from taxing outside sales. The Andhra Pradesh Explanation now under consideration is attached to this provision, and it is in this context, viz., in its Venkatarama setting in an Article, the object of which was to impose Aiyar 1 fetters on the legislative powers of the States, that this Court observed that though positive in form, it was in substance negative in character, and that its true purpose was not to confer any fresh power of taxation on the State but to restrict the power which it previously had under Entry 54.\n\nThese considerations will clearly be inapposite in construing a taxing statute like the Madras Act, the object of which is primarily to confer power on the State to levy and collect tax. When we find in such .a statue a provision containing a prohibition followed by an Explanation which is positive in its terms, the true interpretation to be put on it is that while the prohibition is intended to prevent taxation of outside sales on the basis of the nexus doctrine, the Explanation is intended to authorise taxation of sales falling within its purview, subject of course to the other provisions of the Constitution,. such as Art. 286(2). It should be remembered that unlike the Constitution, the law of a State can speak only within its own territories. It cannot operate either to invest .another State with a power which it does not possess, or divest it of a power which it does possess under the Constitution.\n\nIts mandates can run only within its own borders. That being the position, what purpose would the Explanation serve in s. 22 of the Madras Act, if it merely meant that when goods are delivered under a contract of sale for consumption in the State of Madras, the outside State in which property in the goods passes has no power to tax the sale '1 That is not the concern of the State of Madras, and indeed, the. Legislature of Madras , would be incompetent to enact such a law. In its context and setting, therefore, the Explanation to s. 22 must. mean that it\n\nauthorises the State of Madras to impose a tax on sales 1958 falling within its purview. Thus, while in the context -. - of Art. 286(l)(a) the Explanation theret9 could be M.P. !'- Sundaraconstrued s purely negative in character though ramie:&: Co. positive in form, it cannot be so construed in its The stte of setting in s. 22 of the Madras Act, where it must have Andhra Pradesh a positive content. - Nor is there much force in the contention that the Venkatarama b fli ~~ .non-o stante clause in s. 22 has only the e ect of subtracting something from the power to tax . conferred on the State by the charging section, s. 3, read with s. 2(h) and not of adding to it. In Aswini Kumar Ghosh and another v. Arbinada Bose and another(1), it was observed by this Court that \"the enacting part of a statute must, where it is clear, be taken to control the non-obstante clause where both cannot be read harmoniously\". Now, as the Explanation lays down in clear and unambiguous terms that the sales of the character mentioned therein are to be deemed to have taken place inside the State in which goods are delivered for consumption, full effect must be given to it, and its operation cannot be cut down by reference to -the non-obstante clause. It cannot be put against this construction that it renders the non-obstante cJause ineffective and useless. According to the definition in $. 2(h}, a sale in which property passes inside the State of Madras will be liable to be taxed, even though the goods are delivered for consumption outside that State, but under the Explanation such a sale will be deemed to have taken place in the outside State in which goods are delivered for consump\n\ntion, and therefore the State of Madras will have no power to tax it. The purpose which the non-obstante clause serves is to render the Explanation effectwe\n\nagainst the definition in s. 2(h) and not to render it ineffective in its own sphere,· as determined on its terms.\n\nBut it is.contended that in order to reach this result it was necessary that the Explanation to s. 22 should have been made a part of the definition of \"sale\" under s. 2(h), because under s. 3, which is the charging\n\n(1) [1953] S.C.R. 1, 24-\n\n19ss section, it is the turnover of sales that is subject to - tax, that sale for the purpose :Jf that section is only M. P .. v. Sundarawhat is defined as \"sale\" under s_ 2(h), and that the\n\nramie:& Co.\n\nExplanation sales not having been brought within\n\nThe State of that definition, no charge could be imposed thereon.\n\nAndhra Pradesh The Explanation in s.\" 22, it is argued, cannot override s. 2(h), and if its object was to confer on the State a Venkatarama power to tax sales falling within its ambit, that has Aiyar 1 not, in fact, been achieved. It is pointed out by way of contrast that in the Sales tax Laws of some other States, such as Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, the Explanation has been added to the definition of sale.\n\nNow, a contention that what the Legislature intended to bring about it has failed to do by reason of defective draftsmanship is one which can only be accepted in the last resort, when there is no avenue left for escape from that conclusion. But that clearly is not the position here.\n\nSection 22 opens with the words \"Nothing contained in this Act\", and that means that that section is to be read as controlling, inter alia, the definition of sale in s. 2(h). Otherwise, sales in which property passes in Madras but delivery is outside that State would be taxable under s. 2(h) and under s. 3, even though they are within the prohibition enacted in s. 22_ If the provisions of s. 22 are effective for the purpose of limiting the operation of s. 2(h), we do not see any difficulty in construing the Explanation therein as equally effective for the purpose of enlarging it. Again, it is a rule of construction well-established that the several sections forming part of a statute should be read, unless there are compelling reasons contra, as constituting a single scheme and construed in such manner as would give effect to all of them- On this principle, s. 2(h) and s. 22 must be read together as defining what are sales, which are taxable under the Act and what are not, and so read, the Explanation really means that in sales in which goods are delivered for consumption in the State of Madras, the property therein shall be deemed to have passed inside 'that State, notwithstanding that it has, under the Sale of Goods Act, passed outside that State. On this construction, those I I !\n\n' \\\n\nsales will fall within the definition in s. 2 (h) and will 19ss be taxable. The contentiqn of the. petitioners highly P v. s da technical and based on the non-insertion of the M~0;,,1;, ;\n\n1 (;0~ 0 • Explanation in s. 2 (h) must, in our opinion, be rejected\n\nv. as unsound.\n\nVlze.Stateof It is next contended that the power of the President Andhra Pradesh under Art. 372 (2) is merely to bring the provisions Venkatarama of the State laws into conformity with Art. 286, and Alyar 1. that having regard to the interpretation put on that Article in Tlte Bengal Immunity Company case (1), the Explanation in s. 22 would be valid in so far as it prohibits the State of Madras from imposing a tax on sales in which goods are delivered outside Madras, though property therein passed inside that State, but that in so far as it makes taxable sales in which property passes outside the State of Madras but the goods themselves are deliyered for consumption in Madras, it is much more than bringing the State law into conformity with Art. 286, and is, in consequence, unauthorised and bad. It is argued that such a provision could be enacted by the Legislature of Madras, as was in fact, done by the legislatures of many of the States but the President could not do it in exercise of the special and limited power conferred on him by Art. 372 (2). That power is merely, it is contended, to take the definition of \"sale\" in s. 2 (h) of the Madras Act, strike out therefrom whatever is repugnant to Art. 286, such as sales in which goods are delivered for consumption outside Madras, and leave it there and not to add to it.\n\nWe are not satisfied that that is a correct view to take of the powers of the President under Art. 372 (2).\n\nIt is to be observed that Art. 286 (1) (a) and the Explanation thereto form, in their setting in a taxing statute, integral parts of and different facets of the same concept. Sales in which. proprerty passes outside the State of Madras but delivery for consumption is inside Madras are at once inside sales for Madras and outside sales for the other States. Now, if in exercise of the power to adapt, the enactment -or the Explanation is requisite to give effect to one aspect of that\n\n(1) [1955)2 S.C.R. 603.\n\nM2SC/61-7\n\nM. P. V. S1111dara~\n\nromier &: Co.\n\nThe Stale of Andhra Pradesh\n\nVenkataranza\n\nAiyar J.\n\nconcept, that is, for prohibiting the State of Madras from taxing sales when goods are delivered outside, we fail to see why it should not operate to give effect to the other aspect of the concept which is so integrally connected with it, viz., taxing of sales in which goods are delivered for consumption in the State of Madras, if its language is comprehensive and wide enough to include such sales. We find it difficult to hold that the self-same Explanation is intra vires the powers of the President in so far as it prohibits the State from taxing sales, in which. goods are delivered outside the State but is ultra .viresfa so far as it authorises that State to tax sales. in which goods are delivered inside it. It should be remembered in this connection that the power which the President has under Art. 372 (2) to adapt is the legislative power of the State whose law is adapted, and that includes the power to repeal and amend any provision. Provided that the Jaw as adapted is within the legislative competence of the State and its enactment is in the process of bringing the State law into conformity with Art. 286, it seems to 115 that it is within the ambit of the power conferred by Art. 372 (2). The question, however, is of academic interest, because of the concluding words of Art. 372 (2), which enact that no adaptation order made under that provision shall be liable to be questioned. It was suggested for the petitioners that these words would have no application when the adaptation order went beyond the terms of Art. 372 (2), and that it was open to them to challenge its validity on the ground that it amounted to more than bringing the existing law into conformity with Art. 286.\n\nWe are unable to agree. If the adaptation order is within the scope of Art. 372 (2), then it is valid of its own force, and does not require the aid of a clause such as is contained in the concluding portions thereof. It is only when the adaptation amounts to something more than merely bringing the State law into conformity with the Constitutional provisions that there can arise a need for such a clause. In our opinion, the effect of the concluding words of Art. 372 (2) is to • I\n\nI ' \\_\n\nrender the question of the validity of the adaptation non-justiciable. The Adaptation Order in question must, accordingly, be held to be not open to attack on the ground that it goes beyond the limits contemplated by Art. 372 (2).\n\nIt is then argued that even though the Adaptation Order of the President might not be open to question even if it had imposed for the first time a tax on sales which had not been previously imposed by the Act, nevertheless in deciding whether it does, in fact, impose such a tax, it would be relevant to take into account that the object of Art. 372 (2) was only to bring the State laws into conformity with the Constitution and that, in consequence, the Explanation in s. 22 must be construed as having the same meaning as the Explanation in Art. 286 (I) (a). This would, no doubt, be a legitimate consideration in interpreting the language of the Explanation, but then, it must be remembered that at the time when the Adaptation Order was made, the true interpretation of the Explanation to Art. 286 (1) (a) had not been the subjectmatter of any decision, and it is therefore difficult to impute to the framers of s. 22 the construction put by this Court on the Explanation to Art. 286 (1) (a) in The Bengal Immunity Company case (1) any more than the one put on it in The United Motors case (2). We are therefore thrown back on the language of the Explanation itself to discover its true scope. If, in enacting the Explanation, the Adaptation Order merely intended to prohibit the State of Madras from imposing tax on sales under which goods are delivered for consumption outside that State even though property therein passed inside that State, it would clearly have expressed that intention in words to the following effect : \"For the purposes of clause (a) (i), a sale under which goods are delivered for consumption outside the State of Madrs shall be deemed to have taken place outside that\n\nState, notwithstanding that property in those goods passed inside that State\". But the language of the Explanation is general, and fixes the situs of sales of\n\n(1) (1655] 2 S.C.R. 603.\n\n18+\n\n(2) [1953] s.c.R. 1069.\n\nM. P. V. Sundararamkr & Co. v. 'J'lieState of Andhm Pradesh\n\nVellkatarama\n\nAlyar J.\n\n1958 an inter-State character in the State in which goods - are actually delivered for consumption. Under this .If. P. r Sundara- Explanation, a sale under which goods are delivered\n\nramier & Co. outside the State of Madras will be an outside sale for v.\n\nThe star. <if that State even though property in the goods passed A11dhra Pradesli inside that State, and likewise, a sale under which goods are delivered inside the State of Madras will be Venkatarama an inside sale for that State, even though property in Aiyar J. the goods passed outside that State. As the language of the Explanation is general and of sufficient amplitude not merely to restrict but also to add to the power of the State to tax Explanation sales, and as the reasons for construing it as purely restrictive in Art. 286 (I) (a) are, as already stated, without force in their application to a taxing statute, we must give full effect to the words of the enactment, and hold that they operate to confer on the State a power to tax Explanation sales.\n\nThere is one other contention relating to this aspect of the matter, which remains to be considered, and that is that even if the Explanation could be construed as authorising the imposition of a tax on the sales mentioned therein, a reading of the section as a whole makes it clear that, in fact, no such tax was imposed, as it expressly enacts that \"Nothing contained in this Act shall be deemed to impose tax on inter-State sales\". The argument is that the Explanation sales being inter-State sales and the section having exempted them from taxation, they go out of the statute book altogether, and do not exist for the purpose of the impugned Act.\n\nWe are unable to agree with this contention. Article 286 (2) consists of two parts, one imposing a. restriction on the power possessed by the States to tax sales under Entry 54 in so far as such sales are in the course of inter-State trade and commerce and another, vesting in Parliament a power to enact a law removing that restriction. If s. 22 had merely enacted that portion of Art. 286 (2) which prohibited imposition of taxes on inter-State sales, that might have furnished some plausible ground for the contention now urged by the petitioners: but it enacts both the parts of Art. 286 (2),\n\ns.c.n.\n\nSUPHE~IE COURT REPORTS 1453 • the restriction imposed therein and also the condition\n\n'9:S8 on w?i.ch that restriction is to cease, viz., Parlament M. P. v. Su1tdamprov1dmg otherwise by law. Taken along with the ramia.;. co. admitted power of the States to impose tax on sales v. under Entry 54, the true scope of s. 22 is that it does The State of impose a tax on the Explanation sales, but the impo- Audhra Pradesh siti:m is to take effect only when Parliament lifts the Veukatarama ban.\n\nIn other words, it is a piece of legislation Aiyar f. imposing tax in praesenti but with a condition annexed that itia to come into force in futuro as and when\n\nParliament so provides. It is not contended that there is in the Constitution any inhibition against conditional legislation. In The Queen v. Burah ('), it was held by the Privy Council that a legislature acting within the ambit of authority conferred on it by the Constitution has the power to enact a law .either absolutely or conditionally, and that position has been repeatedly affirmed in this Court. Vide In re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912, etc.(') and Sardar Inder Singh v. State of Rajasthan (').\n\nIt would clearly be within the competence of the Madras Legislature to enact a law imposing a tax on sales conditional on the br.n enacted in Art. 286(2) being lifted by Parliamentary legislation, and that, in our opinion, is all that has been done in s. 22. The ~Iadras Act defines the event on which the tax becomes payable and the person from whom and the rate at which it has to be levied, and forms a complete. code on the topic under considerntion. It could have no immediate operation by reiJ.son of the bar imposed by Art. 286(2), but when once that is removed by a law of Parliament, there is no impediment to its being enforced. That satisfies all the requirements of a conditional legislation. But it was argued that s. 22 of the ;\\Iadras Act could not be so con5trued, because it was not open to the President acting in exercise of the power conferred on him under Art. 372 (2) to impose a conditional levy ; nor would it be competent to the Legislature of Madras to make a levy conditional or otherwise, unless Parliament had authorised it. 'Ve see no force in this argument. As\n\n(1) (1878) L.R. 5 I.A. 178.\n\n(2) [1951] S.C.R. 747. (J) [1957] s.c.R. 605.\n\n. SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [1958] =\n\nI958 Art. 286(2) is itself in two parts, one a restriction on ir P ;-; the power of the State and the other, a condition on ' ,.; n;;, :'darawhich such restriction will cease to operate, an adapv.\"' o. tation made pursuant theretO must also be similar in\n\nTlee state of . its contents. Nor is there in Art. 286 (2) any prohibi- And/Jra Pradesh tion of any legislation by the State Legislature against enacting laws imposing tax on inter-State sales. It J' enkatara1na Aiyar J. merely enacts that such law can have no effect. The words \"No law of a State shall impose\" mean only that no such law shall be effective to impose a tax.\n\nIt is also contended that under the Sales Tax Acts, the levy of tax is annual and the rules contemplate submission of quarterly returns and payment of taxes every quarter on the admitted turnover, and that a conditional legislation under which payment of tax will become enforceable in futuro would be inconsiotent with the scheme of the Act and the rules. But this argument, when examined, comes to no more than this that the existing rules do not provide a machinery for the levy and the collection of taxes which might become payable in future; when Parliament lifts the ban.\n\nAssuming that tJ:iat is the true position, that does not affect the factum of the imposition, which is the only point with which we are now concerned.\n\nThat the States will have to frame rules for realising the tax which becomes now payable is not a ground for holding that there is, in fact, no imposition of tax.\n\nIt should also be mentioned in this connection that the l.'!Iadras Act makes a clear distinction between sales which are outside the operation of the Act, and sales which are within its operation but are exempt from taxation. Section 4 provides that the provisions of the Act shall not apply to the sale of electrical energy, motor spirit, manufactured tobacco. and certain other articles. In contrast to this is . the language of s. 22, which expressly enacts that the Act shall not be deemed to impose a tax on inter-State sales, except in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide. \\Ve are of_ opinion that, on the true construction of s. 22 of the Act, there is an imposition of tax on Explanation sales but that it could he enforced only when Parliament so provides.\n\nWe have so far considered the question on principle 1958 and on the language of the statute. We may now - refer to. the decisions of the High Courts, wherein this M. P. r Suntlaraquestion has been considered. In Mettur Industries ra11Uer& Co.\n\nLtd. v. State of Madras('), the point directly arose for The ;, te of decision as to whether s. 22 of the Madras Act did, in Andhra Pradesh fact, levy a tax on the Explanation sales so as to fall within the protection of the Sales Tax Laws Validation Vmkatarama Act. It was held that the Explanation to s. 22 had Aiyar J. the effect of rendering the sale one inside the State so as to fall within the definition of that word in s. 2 (h), and that it was taxable. Next in point of time is the decision of the Bombay High Court in Dial Das v. P.\n\nS. Talwalkar (2) in which the question arose with reference to s. 46 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act (Born. ill of 1953), corresponding to s. 22 of the Madras Act.\n\nIt was held that it did impose a tax, though it was to -0perate only if Parliament so provided. Then, there are two decisions of the Travancore-Cochin High Court, Mathew v. Travancore-Cochin Board of Revenue (3) and Cochin Coal Co., Ltd. v. State of Travancore-Cochin (4), in which it was held that s. 26 of the Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax Act corresponding to s. 22 of the Madras Act, had not the .effect of imposing, of its own force, a tax on the Explanation sales, and thedecision in Mettur Industries Ltd. v. Madras State (supra) was not followed. In The Mysore Spinning and Manufacturing Co.,. Ltd. v. -F Deputy CommercialTaxOfficer, Madras(') the Madras High Court re-affirmed the view which it had taken in Mettur Industries Ltd. v. State of Madras (supra), and held that s. 22 had the effect of imposing a tax on the Explanation sales. In The Government of Andhra v._ Nooney Govindarajulu (supra), the true effect of s. 22 of the Madras Act came up for consideration before the Andhra High Court, and it was held therein, differing from Mettur Industries Ltd. v. State of Madras (') .and Dial Das v. P.S, Talwalkar (2) that in view of the observations of this Court as to the scope of the\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 362.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1957 Born. 71.\n\n(3) A.LR. 1957 T.C. 300.\n\n(4) (1956) 7 sales Tax Cases 731.\n\n(5) A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 368.\n\nM.P. V Snndararamiercl: Co. v.\n\nThe State of Andhra Pradesh\n\nJ.:'e11katarama\n\nAiyar J.\n\nExplanation in Art. 286 (1) (a), the Explanation in s. 22 could not be construed as imposing a tax on the sales mentioned therein, and that that conclusion also followed on the opening words of the section that \"Nothing contained in this Act shall be deemed to impose, or authorise the imposition of a tax .................. \". For the reasons already given, we are anable to agree with the decisions in Mathew v. Travancore-Cochin Board of Revenue ('), Cochin Coal Co. Ltd .. v. State ofTravancore-Cochin (2) and The Government of Andhra v. Nooney Govindarajulu ('). We are of opinion that the law has been correctly laid down in Mettur Industries Ltd. v. State of Madras (4) and Dial Das v. P. S. Talwalkar ('). We\n\naccordinly hold that s. 22 operated to impose a tax falling within the Explanation, subject to authorisation by Parliament as provided in Art. 286 (2). In this view, the contention urged on behalf of the States that the Explanation to Art. 286 (1) (a), being a provision of the Constitution, operated by its own force to impose a tax on the sales covered by it, and did not require to be supplemented by any State legislation to become effective, does not call for any detailed consideration. Suffice it to say that it cannot be maintained if the true scope of Art. 286 is to define and limit the powers of State Legislatures with reference to imposition of sales tax and not to itself impose it. (II) That brings us on the to next question which is whether the impugited Act, Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, is ultra vires on the ground that it is not authorised by the terms of Art. 286 (2). Now, it is a well-known rule of interpretation that in order to understand the true nature and scope of an Act it is necessary to ascertain what the evils were which were intended to be redressed by it . The starting point of the trouble which ultimately led to the enactment of the impugned Act is the Explanation to Art. 286 (1) (a). which came into force on January 26, 1950. The terms in which it is worded undoubtedly suggest that sales\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1957 T.C. 300.\n\n(2) (1956) 7 Sales Tax Caoa 731.\n\n(3) (1957) 8 Sales Tax C..es 297. (4) A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 362.\n\n<5) A.I.R. 1957 Bom. 71. •\n\nof the description mentioned therein are to b~ treated\n\n195S as sales inside the delivery State for purposes of taxa- -- nda tion. That is how it would seem to have been under- M. P. r !'~ ,,_ stood in the Adaptation Order under which s. 22 was ram\"~.\n\n0 inserted in the Madras Sales Tax Act and in the She State of Adaptation Orders relating to the Sales Tax Laws of Andhra Pradesh other States; for, as already stated, in a taxing statute the language of the Explanation can only mean that Venkatarama a sale falling within its purview is an inside sale Aiyar J. enabling the State to tax it. In The United Motors case (1), the construction put by this Court on the Explanation was that though but for it the sales mentioned therein would be in the course of intei'- State trade and commerce, its effect was to convert them into intra-State sales, so as to bring them within the taxing power of the delivery State. It was only later that this Court held finally in The Bengal lmmu- . nity Company case (2) that the Explanation sales were not divested of their character as inter-State sales as the Explanation to Art. 286 (1) (a) did not. govern Art. 286 (2), and that in the absence of Parliamentary legislation as contemplated by Art. 286 (2), taxation of sales falling within its purview would be unconstitutional. This judgment was delivered on September 6, 1955.\n\nBut acting on the apparent tenor and import of the Explanation and the construction put upon it in The United Motors case (1), the States in India had been levying taxes on the sales falling within its purview.\n\nThe position on Septembr 6, 1955, was that the States had imposed and collected large amounts. by way of tax on Explanation sales; that there were proceedings pending for assessment of tax on such sales; and that apart from this, the States would hkve been entitled to take, but for the decision in The Bengal Immunity Company case (2), proceedings for the assessment of tax in respect of those sales. Now, the result of the decision in The Bengal Immunity Company case (2) was that the levy of the tax on the ·\n\nExplanation sales became unauthorised and the States were faced with large claims for restitution of the\n\n(1) [1953] S, C.R. 1069.\n\n\n1158 amounts realised, involving threat to their economic - stability. It should also be mentioned that quite a M. P. ~· ralarge number of dealers had, acting under provisions\n\nram•~.\n\n0 • of the Sales Tax Acts which empowered them to pass The State of the tax on, collected it from their purchasers for the AndhraPradesh purpose of payment to the State, and as after the decision in The Bengal Immunity Company case (') Venkatarama they could no longer be called upon to pay it, they Aiyar J. stood to make an unjust gain of it.\n\nThese were the evils which called for redress, and it was to remedy them that Parliament enacted the Sales Tax Validation Ordinance No.\n\nIII of 1956, and eventually replaced it by the impugned Act. Section 2 of the.Act provides that no law of a State imposing a tax on sales which took place in the course of interstate trade or commerce between April l, 1951, and September 6, 1955, shall be deemed to be invalid or ever to have been invalid merely by reason of the fact that such sales were in the course of inter-State trade.\n\nThe section further provides that all taxes levied or collected under such a law during the specified period shall be deemed to have been validly levied or collected. The policy behind the Act is obviously to declare the law as interpreted in The United Motors case (2) as the law governing sales falling within the Explanation up to the date of the judgment in The Bengal Immunity Company case(') and to give effect to the law as laid down in that decision for the sales effected subsequent thereto.\n\nThe question is whether this Act is unconstitutional as being ultra vires the powers of Parliament under Art. 286 (2). The petitioners maintain that it is, and put forward several grounds in support of that position. It is firstly contended by them that under Entry 54 in List II, the power to make laws in respect of tax on sales is vested exclusively in the States, that the power which is conferred on Parliament under Art. 286 (2) is only to enact a law directing or permitting the States to impose a tax on inter-States sales and not to itself enact a law with reference thereto, that the impugned Act being one to validate Sales\n\n(1) [1955] o S.C.R. 6o3. (•) [1953] S.C.R. 106g.\n\n,. <\n\n--•\n\nTax Laws is substantive in character and is not 19ss authorised by the terms of Art. 286 (2) and is, in - consequence, unconstitutional. It is argued that to. M. P. ~· Sundaravalidate is to confirm or ratify, and that can be only ramie~~ Co. in respect of acts which one could have himself per- The state of formed, and that if Parliament cannot enact a law Andhra Pradesh relating to sales tax, it cannot validate such a law either, and that such a law is accordingly unauthorised Venkatarama and void. The only basis for this contention in the Aiyar J.\n\nAct is its description in the Short Title as the \"Sales Tax Laws Validation Act\" and the marginal note to s. 2, which is similarlyworded. But the true nature of a law has to be determined not on the label given to it in the statute but on its substance. Section 2 of the impugned Act which is the only substantive enactment therein makes no mention of any validation. It only provides that no law of a State imposing tax on sales shall be deemed to be invalid merely because such sales are in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. The effect of this provision is merely to liberate the State laws from the fetter placed on them by Ad. 286 (2) and to enable such laws to operate on their own terms. The true scope of the impugned Act is, to adopt the language of this Court in the decisions in The United Motors case (1) and The Bengal Immunity Company case (2), that it lifts the ban imposed on the States against taxing inter-State sales and not that it validates or ratifies any such law.\n\nConsidering the legislation on its substance, we have no doubt that it is within the scope of the authority conferred on Parliament by Art. 286 (2) and is not ultra vires. · It is next contended that the impugned Act is wholly retrospective in character in that it operates\n\non sales which took place during the specified period, and that such a legislation is, having regard to the intendment of Art. 286 (2), outside its terms. It is argued that this Article, to start with, enacts a restriction on the power of the State to impose taxes on inter-State sales and then vests in Parliament a power\n\n(1) (1953] S.C.R. 1o69.\n\n(2) (1955] 2 S.C; R. 603. 185\n\n1958 to remove that restriction, and that in logical sequence - therefore, there should first be a legislation by Parlia- M. P. v. Sundarament authorising the States to impose a tax on interramler & co.\n\nState sales and then a law of the State made in v.\n\nThe state of accordance therewith, and that that order having been Andhra Pradesh reversed in the present case, the impugned Act is unconstitutional. We do not agree with this conten- Venkatarama tion. Article 286(2) merely provides that no law of a Alyar 1 State shall impose tax on inter-State sales \"except in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide\".\n\nIt places no restrictions on the nature of the law to be passed by Parliament. On the other hand, the words \"in so far as\" clearly leave it to Parliament to deoide on the form and nature of the law to be enacted by it.\n\nWhat is material to observe is that the power conferred on Parliament under Art. 286 (2) is a legislative power, aad such a power conferred on a Sovereign Legislature carries with it authority to enact a law either prospectively or retrospectively, unless there can be found in the Constitution itself a limitation on that power. Now, there is nothing express in Art. 286 (2) imposing a restriction on the power of Parliament to enact a law with retrospective operation. But it is argued forthe petitioners that such a restriction is to be implied from the scheme of it, which is that there is a prohibition on the power of the State to enact a law imposing tax on inter-State sales, unless Parliament lifts the ban, and it is said that a prohibition operates only in futuro and therefore a law removing that prohibition must also operate in futuro. The decision of the Privy Council in Punjab Province v. Dau/at Singh (') is relied on in support of this proposition. There, the question arose with reference to the validity of a mortgage of agricultural lands in the Punjab executed in the year 1933.\n\nSection 13-A of the Punjab Alienation of Land Act which came into fo_rce in 1939 enacted that transfer of a land by a member of an agricultural tribe in favour of another member of the tribe was void if the transferee was a benamidar for a person who was not a member of that tribe, whether such transfer was\n\n(1} (1946) L.R. 73 I.A. 59\n\n/\" •\n\n....\n\n' \\\n\nmade before or after the Act. The mortgagee institut- 1958 ed a suit, challenging the vires of this section on the - ground that it contravened s. 298 (1) of the Govern- M. P. v. swu1arament of India Act, 1935, which provided that no ramie~.&C'o. subject of His Majesty domiciled in India shall be Tire state of prohibited from acquiring, holding or disposing of AndhraPradesh property on grounds only of religion, place of birth or descent. The mortgagor in reply relied on s. 298 (2) Vellkatarama which enacted that nothing in that section shall affect Atyar J. the operation of any law which prohibits the sale or mortgage of agricultural land situate in any particular area and owned by a person belonging to the agriculturist class. In rejecting this contention, the Privy Council observed that what was saved by s. 298 (2) was a law prohibiting certain kinds of transfers, that the word \"prohibition\" could properly apply only to . acts to be done in futuro, and that the impugned provision, s. 13-A, was intra vires -the Constitutional provision in so far as it prohibited transfers after the date of its enactment, but to the extent that it avoided transfers which had taken place prior to that date, it was ultra vires. This decision proceeded solely on the connotation of the word \"prohibits\" in s. 298 (2) of the Government of India Act, and can be of no assistance in the construction of Art. 28.6 (2), wherein that word does not occur. And even on the substance of it, we see no real analogy between the case in Punjab Province v. Dau/at Singh (1) and the present.\n\nThere, the law which was authorised bys. 298 (2) was one prohibiting certain transfers; here the law which Parliament is authorised to make is one not prohibitingthe States from imposing tax on inter-State sales, but permitting them to do so. While a law prohibiting transfers must be prospective, a law authorising imposition of tax need not be. It can be both prospective and retrospective.\n\nA decision more directly in point is the one in The United Provinces v. Atiqa _Begum (2).\n\nThere, the question arose on the construction of s. 292 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which enacted that, \"Notwithstanding the repeal by this Act of the\n\n(1) (1946) L. R. 73 I.A. 59.\n\n(ll) [1940) S. C.R. uo.\n\n19ss Government of India Act, but subject to the other - provisions of this Act, all the law in force in British M. P. v. Sundara- India immediately before the commencement of\n\nramter & Co, Part III of this Act shall continue in force in British\n\nThe s:;,,. 01 India until altered or repealed or amended by a com- Antlhra Pradesh petent Legislature or other competent authority.\"\n\nThe Legislature of the United Province had enacted Venkatarama a law modifying the pre-existing law relating to the Atyar J. payment of rents by tenants to landlords and giving it retrospective operation. The question was whether the enactment was repugnant to s. 292 which had provided that the pre-existing law was to continue in force until it was altered. It was held that the power of a legislature to pass a law included a power to pass it retrospectively, and that the words of s. 292 did net operate to impose any restriction on that power, and that the legislation was intra vires.\n\nIn our opm1on, the principle of this decision is applicable to the present case, and the impugned Act cannot be . held to be bad on the ground that it is retrospective in operation.\n\nIt is next contended that the impugned Act is ultra vires, inasmuch as it is much more than a mere retrospective law, and that it is really a piece of ex post facto legislation, which is not. authorised by Art. 286 (2).\n\nThe argument in support of this contention may thus be stated : A State legislature is competent under Entry 54 in List II to enact a law taxing sale of goods, and when such a law is made to operate retrospectively it.may not be open to challenge on constitutional grounds, though its propriety may be open to question on grounds of policy.\n\nParliament has no competence to enact laws in respect of tax on sales falling within Entry 54 in List II, but Art. 286 (2) confers on it a power to authorise the States to impose a tax on inter-State sales;. The impugned Act does not do that, but validates ex post facto laws of States imposing such a tax retrospectively for the specified period. Such a general law may be intra vires the States but not Parliament, nor is it one which can be justified by the power granted to it to \"provide otherwise\". It is therefore unconstitutional and void. In\n\nour opinion, this argument is only an amalgam of the . t9ss two contentions already dealt with, and does not - require further detailed consideration. The impugned M. !ra- Act, though it is in name a validating Act, is in e;. essence a law lifting the ban under Art. 286 (2), and if The State of no limitation on the character of that law could . be AndhraPradesh spelt out of the language of that Article, then it 'must be upheld as within the authority conferred by it.\n\nYenkatara,,,,.\n\nIt is also argued that even if the power to make a Atyar 1' law conferred on Parliament under Art. i86 (2) comprehends a power to enact a law with retrospective operation, that power cannot extend to authorising what is unconstitutional, and that as s. 22 of the Madras Act and the corresponding provisions in the statutes of other States were unconstitutional and illegal when made as contravening the prohibition enacted in Art. 286 (2), the impugned Act must be held to be unauthorised and bad in that it seeks to give effect to those provisions. But this is to beg the very question which we have to decide. If it is competent to the legislatures of the States to enact a law imposing a tax on inter-State sales to take effect when Parliament so provides, there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal either in s. 22 of the Madras Act or in the corresponding provisions in the Acts of other States. If conditional legislation is valid, as we have held it is, then s. 22 is clearly intra vires, and the . foundation on which this contention of the petitioners rests, disappears and it must fall to the ground. In the result, we are of opinion that the impugned Act is intra vires, and is not open to challenge on any of the ounds put forward by the petitioners. (III) (a). We have now to consider the contention that even if the impugned Act is valid, that would not give efficacy to s. 22 of the Madras Act or the corresponding provisions in the laws of other States which came in by adaptation under Act. 372 (2). The ground urged in support of this contention is that the expression \"law of a State\" in Art. 286 (2) has a technical import, and means a law which is enacted by the legislature of a State in the manner prescribed by the Constitution and open to challenge in courts if\n\n1958 it is unconstitutional, that that expression occurring -- in s. 2 of the impugned Act must bear the same N. P. ~· sundarameaning which it has in Al; t. 286 (2) as it was enacted\n\nramier & Co. h h \"t ' d h d v. pursuant to t e aut on y contame t erem, an The State of that s. 22 of the Madras Act is not a law of that\n\nA1dlira Pradesh description, as it was made by the President in exercise of the special power conferred on hlm by Art.\n\nYenkatarama 372 (2), and is, as provided therein, not open to attack\n\nA;,.., J. in a court of law.\n\nWe do not see why we should restrict the connotation of the words \"law of a State\" in the manner contended above. The law of a State signifies in its ordinary acceptation, whatever is an expression of the legislative, as distinguished from the executive or judicial power of a State. Its normal mode under the Constitution is no doubt that it is enacted by the legislature of the State constituted in accordance with the procedure prescribed therein. But that is not the only mode in which the legislative power of the State could be exercised. Under Art. 213, the Governor is authorised, subject to the conditions laid down therein, to issue Ordinances which have the force of law, and these Ordinances are clearly laws of the State and not the less so by reason of their not having been passed by the State legislature.\n\nUnder Art. 252, it is open to Parliament acting on resolutions of the legislatures of two or more States, to enact laws on subjects which are within the exclusive competence of the States, a recent instance of such legislation being Act 42 of 1955, the validity of which was the subject of consideration in R. M. D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India('). Can it be contended that these are not laws of the States for which they were enacted, because they were not passed by the legislatures of those States ? We entertain no doubt that by the expression \"Jaw of a State\" in Art. 286 (2) and s. 2 CJf the impugned Act is meant whatever operates as law in the state, and that s. 22 of the Madras Act is a law within those enactments. Nor does it affect this conclusion that that law may not be open to challenge in a court of law. A right to challenge a\n\n(1) [1957] S.C.R. 930.\n\n-•·\n\nlaw must depend on the provisions of the Constitution 1958 governing the matter, and if those provisions enact - that t s n_ot open to questio~ in a court of law '!r M~;:;, ~~:, a that 1t is liable to be questioned only on certam v. specified grounds, that will not have the effect of 771e State of depriving a statute duly enacted of its character as A.lllllira Pradesh law. We are also not satisfied that a law as adapted under Art. 372 (2) is not open to attack on the ground Venkatara111a that it contravenes some constitutional provision.\n\nA.iyarj.\n\nWe are disposed to think that the concluding words of Art. 372 (2) preclude an attack on the Adaptation Order only on the ground that it does more than merely bringing the State law into conformity with the Constitution and is, in consequence, ultra vires the powers conferred by that article. In the result, we must hold that s. 22 of the Madras Act is within the protection afforded by s. 2 of the impugned Act. (III) (b) : The next contention of the petitioners that falls to be considered is whether even on the footing that the impugned Act is intra vires the powers of Parliament under Art. 286 (2), the proceedings which are proposed to be taken by the State of Andhra against them for assessment of tax are incompetent, because the Act validates only levies .or collections made during the specified period but does not authorise the initiation of fresh proceedings for levy or collection of tax. It is contended that though s. 2 of the impugned Act consists of two clauses, one giving effect to laws of States imposing tax on inter-State sales in so far as they took place during the specified period and the other validating levy or collection of tax made during that period, the first clause has no independent operation, the only purpose which it serves being to lead up to the second which is the only effective clause in the section. It is argued that if the intention of the legislature was not merely to validate the levies or collections already made but also to maintain the laws in force so as to enable the States to take fresh proceedings for assessment and levy of tax, then there was no need whatsoever for the second clause, as , effectuation of the Act would automatically validate the levies and collections made thereunder. It is said\n\nM2SC/61-8\n\nSUPRE~E COURT REPORTS [1958[\n\n19ss that the object of the legislation was only to see that - the States had not to refund amounts collected by M. P. ~· Sundarathem, and that for achieving that object it was ranuer & Co. necessary only to give effect tp the second clause. The The;;.,, of decisio 1 idn Dialdas v. P.rt~· Tathlwalkatt~') already citehi~' -..., Andlira Pratfesh was re te on as suppo mg e Ptl 1 toners on t s point. Venkatarama\n\nAiyar J.\n\nIn our judgment, the language of the enactment is too clear and unambiguous to admit of this contention. If the purpose of the enactment is what the petitioners contend it to be, then nothiug would have been easier for the legislature than to have so framed the section as to confine its operation to levies or collections already made, without giving effect to the law itself. On the contention of the petitioners, the first clause has to be discarded as wliolly inoperative, and we should be loth to adopt a construction which leads to that result. It is true that on the contention of the State that the first clause has independent operation the second clause would be unnecessary, as even without it, the result sought to be achieved by it must follow on the first clause itself. But it is to be noted that the first clause has reference to the exercise of legislative power while the second is concerned with administrative action, and it is possible that the second clause might have been enacted by way of abundant cautiori. It is nothing strange or unusual for a legislature to insert a provision ex abundanti cautela, so as to disarm possible objection; but it is inconceivable that i, t should enact a provision which is wholly inoperative.\n\nOf two alternative constructions of which one leads to the former and the other involves the latter result, there cannot be any question that it is the former that is to be preferred. Nor is it permissible to cut down the plain meaning of the terms of the statute on considerations of policy behind the legislation.\n\nBut even from that point of view, there was the fact that there were dealers who had collected taxes from their purchasers for payment to the State, but were relieved of\n\n(I) A.I.R. 19~7 Bom. 71.\n\n......\n\nthat obligation by the judgment in The Bengal Immu- 1958 nity Company case (1) and that, further, to validate - only levies and collections made would give an advan- M. P. !' Sundara tage to those who evaded the law as then understood, ramier & Co. over those who loyally obeyed it. It follows that we The ;; ate of are unable to agree with the decision in Dialdas Andhra Pradesh\n\nv. P. S. Talwalkar (2), in so far as it held that it was not competent to the State to start fresh proceedings Venkatarama for assessment of tax on the strength of the impugned Aiyar J.\n\nAct. In our opinion, the true construction of s. 2 is that the two clauses therein are as indicated by the conjunction, distinct and independent in their operation, and that the laws of the States are kept in force in respect of sales which had taken place during the specified period, and that proceedings in respect thereof for assessment are within the protection of the Act. It was next argued that the impugned Act is a temporary statute, as its operation is limited to sales which took place during the specified period, and that period having expired, no proceedings could now be taken on the strength of the provisions of that Act, and reliance was placed on the observations of this Court in Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay (3), in support of . this position. But the impugned Act is in no sence a temporary Act. Its life is not limited to any specified period.\n\nIt is a permanent statute operating on all sales which took place during the specified period. The fallacy in this contention of the petitioners lies in mixing up the period, the sales during which are brought within the operation of the Act, with the period of the operation of the Act itself.\n\nThe former may be said to be temporary, but the latter clearly is not. (IV) It is next contended that even if the impugned Act authorised starting of fresh proceedings for assessment of tax on the Explanation sales which had taken place during the specified period, no action in that behalf could be taken under s. 22 of the\n\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1957 Born. 71.\n\n(3) [1951] S.C.R. 228, 235.\n\n19ss Andhra (Madras) Act, because it was, when it was - enacted, repugnant to Art. 286 (2) of the Constitution, M. P. !'- Sundara and was therefore void. It is argued that a statute\n\nramier & Co. which is unconstitutional is a nullity and must be\n\nThe ;; ate of treated as non est and that the impugned Act could Andhra Pradesh not infuse life into it. It may be open, it is said, to the Legislature of the State of Andhra to enact a Venkatarama fresh law giving it even retrospective operation as Aiyor J. provided in the impugned Act, but in the absence of such a legislation, the provisions of the Act as they stood prior to the impugned Act are incapable of enforcement. It would be sufficient answer to this contention that s. 22 of the Madras Act is only a piece of conditional legislation, imposing tax on inter- State sales when Parliament should enact a law lifting the ban, and if such legislation is competent as we have held it is, then no question of unconstitutionality of the section when it was enacted could arise. But it would be more satisfactory to decide the point on its own merits, as the question raised has been, of late, the subject of considerable discussion in this Court.\n\nNow, in considering the question as to the effect of unconstitutionality of a statute, it is necessary to remember that unconstitutionality might arise either because the law is in respect of a matter not within the competence of the legislature, or because the matter itself being within its competence, its provisions offend some constitutional restrictions. In a Federal Constitution where legislative powers are distributed between different bodies, the competence of the legislature to enact a particular law must depend upon whether the topic of that legislation has been assigned by the Constitution Act to that legislature. Thus, a law of the State on an Entry in List I, Sch. VII of the Constitution would be wholly incoinpetent and void. But the law may be on a topic within its competence, as for example, an Entry in List II, but it might infringe restrictions imposed by the Constitution on the character of the law to be passed, as for example, limitations enacted in Part III of the Constitution. Here also, the law to the extent of the repugnancy will be\n\nvoid. Thus, a legislation on a topic not within the 19ss competence of the legislature and a legislation within its competence but violative of constitutional limita- M. P. Sundarations have both the same reckoning in a court of law; ramier & Co. they are both of them unenforceable. But does it The ;; ate 01 follow from this that both the laws are of the same Andltra Pradesh quality and character, and stand on the same footing for all purposes ? This question has been the subject Venkatarama of consideration in numerous decisions in the American Aiyar J.\n\nCourts, and the preponderance of authority is in favour of the view that while a law on a matter not within the competence of the legislature is a nullity, a law on a topic within its competence but repugnant to the constitutional prohibitions is only unenforceable.\n\nThis distinction has a material bearing on the present discussion. If a law is on a field not within the domain of the legislature, it is absolutely null and void, and a subsequent cession of that field to the legislature will not have the effect of breathing life into what was a still-born piece of legislation and a fresh legislation on the subject would be requisite.\n\nBut if the law is in respect of a matter assigned to the legislature but its provisions disregard constitutional prohibitions, though the law would be unenforceable by reason of those prohibitions, when once they are removed, the law will become effective without re-enactment.\n\nWilloughby on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. I, at p. 11 says :\n\n\"The validity of a statute is to be tested by the constitutional power of a legislature at the time of its enactment by the legislature, and, if thus tested it is beyond the legislative power, it is not rendered valid, without re-enactment, if later, by constitutional amendment, the necessary legislative power is granted.\n\nHowever, it has been held that where an act is within the general legislative power of the enacting body, but is rendered unconstitutional by reason of some .adventitious circumstance, as for example, when a State legislature is prevented from regulating a matter by reason of the fact that the Federal\n\n1958 Congress has already legislated upon that matter, or - by reason of its silence is to be construed as indicating M. P. r Sundarathat there should be no regulation, the act does not\n\nramier & Co. d b d d b \" d 'f hi v. nee to e re-enacte m or er to e en1orce , 1 t s TheStateof cause of its unconstitutionality is removed.\" AndhraPradesh In Cooley on Constitutional Law at p. 201, it is stated that \"a finding of unconstitutionality does not Venkatarama destroy the statute but merely involves a refusal to AiyarJ. --\" . k h emorce 1t\". In Wil erson v. Ra rer ('), the State of Kansas had enacted a law in 1889 forbidding the sale of intoxicating liquor. This was bad in so far as it related to sales in the course of inter-State trade, as it was in contravention of the Commerce Clause. But in 1890, the Congress passed a law conferring authority on the States to enact prohibition laws. The question was whether a prosecution under the law of 1889 in respect of a breach of that law subsequent to the Congress legisfation in 1890 was maintainable.\n\nRepelling the contention that the statute of 1889 was a nullity when it was passed and could not be enforced without re-enactment, the Court observed :\n\n\"This is not the case of a law enacted in the unauthorized exercise of a power exclusively confided to Congress, but of a law which it was competent for the State to pass, but which could not operate upon articles occupying a certain situation until the passage of the Act. of Congress. That Act in terms removed the obstacle, and we perceive no adequate ground for adjudging that a re-enactment of the state law was required before it could have the effect upon imported which it had always had upon domestic property.\" It should be noted that in this case the law of 1889 applied to intra-State sales also, and it was admittedly valid to that extent. The impugned legislation was therefore unconstitutional only in part. Rottschafer after referring to the conflict of authorities on this question in the States, refers to the decision in Wilkerson v. Rahrer (') as embodying the better view.\n\nVide American Constitutional Law, 1939 Edn. p. 39.\n\nA similar view was taken in Ulster Transport\n\n(1) (1891) 140 U. S. 545: 35 L. Ed. 572.\n\nAuthority v. James Brown & Sons Ltd. (1). There, 1958 construing s. 5(1) of the Act of 1920 which enacts that - \"any law made in contravention of the restrictions M. P. \"!'- Sundara- . d b h' b . h 11 c •t tram1er & Co. llllpose y t is su -section s a so iar as 1 con ra- _ v. venes these restrictions, be viod\", Lord MacDermott Tiie State of L. C. J. observed : AndhraPradeslt \"I am not aware of any authority for the view I h h. 1 h Yellkatarama that anguage sue as t is necessan y means t at Aiyar J. contravention must produce an actual gap in the statute book in the sense that the measure concerned, or some specific part thereof, simply drops out of the authorized text. As well as this vertical severability, if I may so describe it, I see no reason why, if the circumstances warrant such a course, the terms of section 5(1) should not be sufficiently met by what I may call a horizontal severance, a severance that is which, without excising any of the text, removes from its ambit some particular subject-matter, activity or application. This, I think, would give effect to the words 'so far as it contravenes' without impinging on the meaning.or weight to be attached to the word 'void'.\" It will be noted that this decision also deals with a statute which was in part unconstitutional.\n\nComing to the authorities of this Court where this question has been considered : In Behram Khurshed Pesikaka v. The State of Bombay (2)the question arose with reference to the Bombay Prohibition Act of 1949 which, subject to certain exceptions provided therein, prohibited the consumption of liquor. In The State of Bombay and another v. F. N. Balsara (3) this Court had held that this provision was obnoxious to Art. 19(1 )(g) of the Constitution in so far as it related to medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol. The appellant was prosecuted for the offence of consuming liquor, and his defence was that he had taken medicine containing alcohol. The point in dispute was whether the burden was upon_ the appellant to prove that he had taken such a medicine or for the prosecution to show that he had not. This\n\n(1) (1953) Northern Ireland Reports 79\n\n(2) (1955) 1 S. C.R. 613, 654.\n\n(3) (1951) S. C.R. 682.\n\n1958 Court held that the onus was on the prosecution, - and the same not having been discharged, the appel- M. P. ~\"\"/;\"'alant was entitled to be acquitted. In the course of the\n\nramie:.\n\n0 • Judgment, Mahajan C. J. made the following observa- The Stat• of tions, which are relied on by the petitioners : Andhra Pradesh \"The constitutional invalidity of a part of section 13(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act having been Venkatareinca declared by this Court, that part of the section ceased Aiyar J. to have any legal effect in judging cases of citizens and had to be regarded as null and void in determining whether a citizen was guilty of an offence.\" It must be observed that the question of the constitutionality of the Act did not arise directly for determination and was incidentally discussed as bearing on the incidence of burden of proof. And further, these observations have reference . to the enforceability of the provisions of the Bombay Prohibition Act, while the bar under Art. 19 continued to operate. There was no question of the lifting of ban imposed by Art. 19, and the question as to the effect of lifting of a ban did not arise for decision. In the context in which they occur, the words \"null and void\" cannot be construed as implying that the impugned law must be regarded as non est so as to be incapable of taking effect, when the bar is removed. They mean nothing more than that the Act is unenforceable by reason of the bar.\n\nIn A. V. Fernandez v. State of Kera/a (1) the question arose with reference to the Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax Act and the Rules made thereunder.\n\nPrior to the Constitution, the assessees were liable to pay tax on the total turnover of sales including those inside the State and those outside the State. Where the sales were of cocoanut oil, there was a provision for deduction of the price paid for the purchase of copra from the total turnover. After the corning into force of the Constitution, a new section, s. 26, corresponding to s. 22 of the Madras Act, was introduced incorporating therein the provisions of Art. 286, and consequent thereon, the sales which took place outside the State were excluded from the turnover. On this,\n\n(1) [1957] S.C.R. 837.\n\n.--J\n\na question arose as to the quantum of deduction to 19ss which the assessee was entitled in respect of his purchase of copra. He claimed that he was entitled to M. P. !\"- !\"':f:radeduct the price paid for copra not only in respect of ramie~\n\n0 • oil which was sold inside the State but also oil sold The s; ate of outside the State. This contention was rejected by Andhra Pradesh the High Court, which limited the deduction to purchase of copra relating to the sales inside the State, Venkatarama and in affirming that decision, this Court observed : Aiyar 1• \"In our opinion, section 26 of the Act, in cases falling within the categories specified under Article 286 of the Constitution has the effect of setting at nought and of obliterating in regard thereto the provisions contained in the Act relating to the imposition of tax on the sale or purchase of such goods and in particular the provisions contained in the charging section and the provisions obtained in rule 20(2) and other provisions which are incidental to the process of levying such tax. So far as sales falling within the categories specified in Article 286 of the Constitution and the corresponding section 26 of the Act are concerned, they are, as it were, taken out of the purview of the Act and no effect is to be given to those provisions which would otherwise have been applicable if section 26 had not beeri added to the Act.\" On the strength of the above observations, the petitioners contend that the provisions relating to inter-State sales must be treated as non-existent,, and that, therefore, a fresh enactment of the statute would be necessary to bring them into operation. Here again, the point for decision was only as to the effect of the ban under Art. 286 on the transactions which came within its purview. That ban had not then been lifted and the effect of the lifting of such a ban on the existing law did not fall to be considered. We are unable to read the observations relied on by the petitioners as implying that s. 22 of the Madras Act must be taken to have been blotted out of the statute book.\n\nA case directly in point is Bhikaji Narayan Dhakras and others v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and another (1). There, the question arose with reference\n\n\n19ss to the C. P. & Berar Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1947 (Act 3 of 1948). That Act had amended s. 43 of\n\nM.P.~. Sundarathe Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, by introducing proviron11er & Ca. sions which authorised the Provincial Government The ste 01 \"to take up the entire motor transport business in the Andhra Pradesh Province and run it in competition with and even to the exclusion of motor transport operators\".\n\nThese Venkatarama provisions, though valid at the time when they were Ai.var 1 enacted, became void on the coming into force of the Constitution as infringing the rights of citizens to carry on business, protected by Art. 19(1)(g). The Constitution, however, was amended on June 18, 1951, and Art. 19(6) was amended so as to authorise the State to carry on business \"to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise\". Subsequent to this amendment, the Government issued a notification under s. 43 of the Amendment Act of 1948, and it was the validity of that notification that was in issue.\n\nThe contention was that as s. 43 of the Act of 1948 had become void at the date of the Constitution, a notification issued by the Government under that section after the date of the amendment of the Constitution was not valid, as it must be taken to have become non est. It was held by this Court that s. 43 of the Act of 1948 could not be held to have been effaced out of the statute book, because it continued to operate on transactions prior to the coming into force of the Constitution, and that even after the Constitution, it would be operative as against non-citizens, that the consequence of s. 43 being repugnant to Art. I 9(')(g) was that it could not be enforced so long as the prohibition contained therein was in force, but that when once that prohibition had been removed as it was by the First Amendment, the provisions of that Act which had been dormant all the time became active and enforceable.\n\nThe result of the authorities may thus be summed up : Where an enactment is unconstitutional in part but valid as to the rest, assuming of course that the two portions are severable, it cannot be held to have been wiped out of the statute book as it admittedly must remain there for the purpose of enforcement of\n\nthe valid portion thereof, and being on the statute 19ss book, even that portion which is unenforceable on the -· ground that it is unconstitutional will operate Proprio M. P. ': S.::dara·\n\nvigore when the Constitutional bar is removed, and ram•e;. ·\n\n0 there is no need for a fresh Legislation to give effect The state of thereto. On this view, the contention of the petition- AndhraPradesh ers with reference to the Explanation in s. 22 of the Madras Act must fail. That Explanation operates, as Ve';/:;; r;_m\"' already stated, on two classeS{ of transactions. It renders taxation of sales in which the property in the\n\ngoocs passes in Madras but delivery takes place outside Madras illegal on the ground that they are outside sales falling within Art. 286{1)(a). It also authorises the imposition of tax on the sales in which the property in the goods passes outside Madras but goods are delivered for consumption within Madras. It is valid in so far as it prohibits tax on outside sales, but invalid in so far as sales in wbielYgoods are delivered inside the State are concerned; becuse such sales are hit by Art. 286(2).\n\nT)J.e fact that 'it, is invalid as to a part has not the effect of obliterating it out of the statute book, because it is valid as to a part and has to remain in the statute book for being enforced as to that part.\n\nThe result of the enactment of the impugned Act is to lift the ban under Art. 2.S6{2), and the consequence of it is that that portion of the Explanation which relates to sales in whkh property passes outside Madras but the goods are delivered inside Madras and which was unenforceable before, became valid and enforceable.\n\nIn this view, we do not feel called upon to express any opinion as to whether it would make any difference in the result if the impugned provision was unconstitutional in its entirely.\n\nThere is one other aspect of the que:; tion to which reference must be made. The decisions in Behr am Khurshed Pesikaka v. The State of Bombay (1) and Bhikaji Narain Dhakras and others v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and another (2) both turn on the construction of Art. 13 of the Constitution, which enacts that laws shall be void to the extent they are\n\n(I) [1955] I S.C.R. 613.\n\n\n1958 repugnant to the provisions of Part III. We are - concerned in these petitions not with infringement M. P. \".' sundaraof any of the provisions of Part III but of Art. 286(2),\n\nramie:.'1 co. and the point for our decision is as to the effect f the The sr e 0 infringement of that provision. Art. 286(2) does not AndhraPradesh provide that a law which contravenes it is void, and when regard is had to the context of that proviSion, it Venkatarama is difficult to draw the inference that that is the' Aiyar J. consequence of contravention of that provision, Art. 372(1) provides for the continuance in force of all laws existing at the date of the Constitution. The proviso to Art. 286(2) enacts that the President may by an order continue the operation of the Sales Tax .\n\nLaws up to March 31, 1951, and Art, 286(2) itself enacts that no law of a State shall impose a tax. In the context in which they occur, the true meaning to be given to these words is, as already observed, that no law of a State shall be effective to impose a tax; that is to say, the law cannot be enforced in so far as it imposes such a tax. Whether we consider the question on broad principles as to the effect of\"unconstitutionality of a statute or on the language of Art. 286(2), the conclusion is inescapable that s. 22 of the Madras Act and the corresponding provisions in the other statutes cannot be held to be null and void and non est by reason of their being repugnant to Art. 286(2) and the bar under that Article having been now removed, there is no legal impediment to effect being given to them. (V) We shall now deal with the contention of the learned counsel for the Madura Mills Ltd., who struck a 'new path cutting across the lines on which the petitioners and the other interveners proceeded. He contended that the decisive factor in the determination of the question was Entry 42 in List I of the Seventh Schedule, \"Inter-State trade and commerce\", that under that Entry, Parliament had the exclusive power to enact laws in respect of inter-State trade and commerce and that included power to impose a tax on inter-State sales, that the States had therefore no competence under the Constitution to enact a law imposing tax on such sales, that the laws passed\n\nby the States after the Constitution imposing such a 19ss tax were ultra vires and void, that the impugned Act -Uni/ii purporting to give effect to such laws was likewise M. P. ~· c \"*\"' ultra vires and in operative, and that, in consequence, ram.ie:.\n\n0 • the proceedings sought to be taken under s. 22 of the The state of Madras Act and the corresponding provisions in the A.ndhra Pradesh sister Acts of other States were unauthorised and illegal. The argument in support of this contention . Venkatarama was as follows : Entry 42 in List I is based on the A.iyar 1• Commerce Clause of the American Constitution, Art. I, s. 8 that \"The Congress shall have powet to regulate commerce among the several States\", and . that has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United\n\nStates as meaning that the Stat.s have no power to enact a law imposing a tax on the carrying on of inter-State trade [Vide Robins v. Taxing District of Shelby County(1), or imposing tax on inter-State sales [Vide McLeod v. Dilworth Co. (2)]. The contents of Entry 42 are the same as those of the Commerce Clause, and it must therefore be construed as of the same effect. It is also a well-established rule of construction that the Entries in the Legislative Lists must be interpreted liberally and in a wide sense.\n\nThe true interpretation therefore to be put upon Entry 42 is that Parliament has, and therefore, in view of the non-obstante clause in Art. 246(1) and of the words \"subject to\" in Art. 46(3), the States have not, the power to impose tax on inter-State sales.\n\nArticle 301 which provides that trade and commerce in the territory of India shall be free is also intended to achieve the same result. It reproduces s. 92 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, and the authorities on that section have held that imposition of a tax on inter-State trade would be obnoxious to that provision. That the freedom in Art. 301 includes freedom from taxation is also implicit in Art. 304 (a) in which an exception to Art. 301 is made in respect of the imposition of tax on goods imported from other States. The result is, it is argued, that after the Constitution no law of a State can impose a tax on.\n\n(1) (1887) 120 U.S. 489; 30 L. Ed. 694.\n\n(2) (1944) 322 U.S. 327; 88 L. Ed. 1230+\n\n19ss inter-State sales, and in consequence, s. 22 of the -- Madras Act, which came into force after the Constitu- '1 P. !\"1;\"'\"\" tion, would, if it is consttued as imposing a tax, be\n\nramier\n\n0 • bad, and the impugned Act which proceeds on the Y.\n\nThe State of view that the States have the power to enact Jaws Andhra Pradesh imposing a tax on inter-State sales and seeks to give\n\neffoct to them would also be unconstitutional and lcnkatarama void.\n\nAiyar 1 This contention suffers, in our opinion, from serious infirmities. It overlooks that our Constitution was not written on a tabula rasa, that a Federal Constitution had be;;; n established upder the Government of India Act, 1935, and though that has undergone considerable change by way of repeal, modification and addition, it still remains the framework on which the present Constitution is built, and that the provisions of the Constitution must accordingly be read in the light of the provisions of the Government of India Act. It fails to give due weight to the setting of the relevant provisions of the Constitution and the interpretation whioh is to be put upon them in their context. In the Government of India Act, 1935, there was no Entry corresponding to Entry 42 in List I of the Constitution. But there was in List II, Entry 48 which corresponds to Entry 54 in the Constitution. It is not in dispute that under Entry 48 the States had power to pass a law imposing a tax on inter-State sales, because the terms of the Entry are wide and would include inter-State as well as intra-State sales. It was on this view that the Provinces had enacted laws 'imposing tax on inter-State sales. Then the Constitution came into force, and it included for the first time a new Entry 42 in List I. It also reproduced Entry 48 in Entry 54 in List II in terms, for our purposes, identical. Having regard to the connotation of that Entry in the Government of India Act, 1935, one would have expected that if it was intended by the Constitution-makers that the States should be deprived of the power to tax \"inter-State sales which they had under Entry 48 in the Government of India Act, that would have been made clear in the Entry itself. It is material to•note that while Entry in the Government\n\nof India Act was \"Taxes on the sale of goods 1958 and n dvertisen:e!1t\", Entry 54 in ist II of the M. P. v. sundara- Constitut10n as ongmally enacted was ' Taxes on the ramier & co. sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers\". v.\n\nThus, the Constitution did limit the scope of Entry 48 The State of by excluding from it newspapers, and if _it was its Andhra Pradesh intention to exclude inter-State sales from its purview, nothing would have been easier for it than to have Venkatarama AiyarJ. said so, insteaq of leaving that result to be inferred on a construction of Entry 42 in List I in the light of the American authorities on the Commerce Clause. This is strong indication that Entry 42 is not to be read as including tax on inter-State sales. This conclusion is further strengthened, when regard is had to the scheme of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule and the principle underlying the enumeration of heads of legislation therein.\n\nIn List I, Entries 1 to 81 mention the several matters over which Parliament has authority to legislate. Entries 82 to 92 enumer11te the taxes which could be imposed by a law of Parliament. An examination of these two groups cf Entries shows that while the main subject of legislation figures in the first group, a tax in relation thereto is separately-__ mentioned in the second. Thus, Entry 22 in List I is\n\n\"Railways\", and Entry 89 is \"Terminal taxes on goods or passengers, carried by railway, sea or air; taxes on railway fares and freights\". If Entry 22 is r to be construed as involving taxes to be imposed, then Entry 89 would be superfluous. Entry 41 mentions \"Trade and commerce with foreign countries; -import and export across customs frontie~\". If these expressions are to be interpreted as includfog duties to be levied in respect of that trade and commerce, then Entry 83 which is \"Duties of customs including export duties\" would be wholly redundant. Entries 43 and 44 relate to incorporation regulation and winding up of corporations. Entry 85 provides separatdy for Corporation tax. Turning to List II; Entries 1 to 44 form one group mentioning the subjects on which the States could legislate. Entries 45 to 63 in that List form another gronp, and they deal with\n\n19ss taxes. Entry 18, for example, is \"Land\" and Entry 45 is \"Land revenue\".\n\nEntry 23 is \"Regulation of M. P. v. Sundaramines\" and Entry 50 is \"Taxes on mineral rights\".\n\nramler&Co.\n\nTh b 1 . d . . h . f h v e a ove ana ys1s-an 1t 1s not ex austive o t e Tbe site 0 Entries in the Lists-leads to the inference that taxa- AndhraPradesh tion is not intended to be comprised in the main subject in which it might on an extended construction Venkatarama be regarded as included, but is treated as a distinct Aiyar J. matter for purposes of legislative competence. And this distinction is also manifest in the language of Art. 248, Cls. (1) and (2), and of Entry 97 in List I of the Constitution. Construing Entry 42 in the light of the above scheme, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the power of Parliament to legislate on inter-State trade and commerce under Entry 42 does not include a power to impose a tax on sales in the course of such trade and commerce.\n\nArticle 286 has a direct bearing on the point now under discussion. It imposes various restrictions on the power of the State to enact laws imposing taxes on sale of goods and one of those restrictions has reference to taxes on inter-State sales, vide Art. 286(2).\n\nIt is implicit in this provision that it is the States that have got the power to impose a tax on such sales, as there can be no question of a restriction on what does not exist. That is how Art. 286(2) has been construed by this Court both in The United Motors Case(') and in The Bengal Immunity Company case (2). It was observed therein that under Entry 54, as under Entry 48 of the Government of India Act, the power to tax sales rested with the States, and that Art. 286(2) was enacted with the object of avoiding multiple taxation of inter-State sales in exercise of the power conferred by that Entry .. This again strongly supports the conclusion that Entry 54 must be interpreted as including the power to tax inter-State sales and Entry 42 as excluding it.\n\nIn order to get over this hurdle, learned counsel put forward the contention that Art . 286(2) had reference only to laws which were in existence at the time when the Constitution came in, o force, and that the\n\n(1) [1953) S.C.R. 1o69.\n\n(o) [1955) o S.C.R. 003.\n\n.,,.\n\npower given to Parliament was one to continue those 1958 laws. Reference was made to the proviso to Art. 286(2) which authorised the President to direct that the M. P. V. Sundarataxes which were being levied by the State before the rllltlie~~ co. commencement of the Constitution might be conne s1att! of tinued to be levied until March 31, 1951, and it was ArulluaPradesh said that the power conferred under Art. 286(2) was -· of the same character, and that it merely enabled Venkatarama Parliament to continue pre-Constitution laws.\n\nAiyar J.\n\nNow, it cannot be disputed that the language of Art. 286(2) would,.in terms, comprehend future legislation. Language similar to the one used in Art. 286(2) is also to be found in Art. 287, and there, it clearly has reference to laws to be enacted after the Constitution.\n\nIndeed, it was conceded that on the wording of Art. 286(2) both existing and future legislation would be included. But it was contended that its operation should be limited to existing laws, because as Entry 42 in List I includes tax on inter-State sales, any law of the State subsequent to the Constitution imposing such a tax would be incompetent. This, however, is petitio principii. The point for decision is whether tax on inter-State sales is included within Entry 42. The inference to be drawn from the plain language of Art. 286(2) is that it is not. It is no answer to this to say that Entry 42 includes it, and that, therefore, the meaning of Art. 286(2) should be cut down. We cannot accede to such a contention.\n\nTo sum up : (1) Entry 54 is successor to Entry 48 in the Government of India Act, and it would be legitimate to construe it as including ta~ on inter- State sales, unless there is anything repugnant to it in the Constitution, and there is none such. (2) Under\n\nthe scheme of the Entries in the Lists, taxation is regarded as a distinct matter and is separately set out. (3) Article 286(2) proceeds on the basis that it is the States that have the power to enact laws imposing tax on inter-State Sales. It is a fair inference to draw from these considerations that under Entry 54 in List II the States are competent to enact laws imposing tax on inter-State sales.\n\nWe must now consider the arguments that have\n\nM2SC/61-9\n\n1958 been put forward as supporting the opposite conclu-\n\nM. P. v. Sundarasion,.\n\nI~ is o/stly contended that the Entries in the rami\" & co.\n\nLegislative Lists must be construed broadly and not v. narrowly or in a pedantic manner, and that, in The State of accordance with this principle, Entry 42 should be Andhra Pradesh construed, there being no limitation contained therein,\n\nVenkatarama as inclusive of the power to tax sales in inter-State trade and commerce. The rule of construction relied on is no doubt well-established; but the question is as to the application of that rule in the present case. The\n\nAiyar J.\n\nquestion here is not simpliciter whether a particular piece of legislation falls within an Entry or not. The point in dispute before us is whether between two Entries assigned to two different Legislatures the particular subject of legislation falls within the ambit of the one or the other. If Entry 42 in List I is to be construed liberally, so must Entry 54 in List II be, and the point is not settled by reference to Art. 246, Cls. (I) and (3) and to the pril).ciple laid down in Union Colliery Company of British. Columbia\n\nv. Bryden (') that where there is a conflict of jurisdiction between a Central and a Provincial Legislature, it is the law of the Centre that must prevail.\n\nArt. 246, Cls. (1) and (3) have to be invoked only if there is a conflict as to the scope of two Entries in the two Lists and not otherwise. What has therefore first to be decided is whether there is any conflict between Entry 42 in List I and Entry 54 in List II. If there is not, the application of the non-obstante clause in Art. 246(1) or of the words \"subject to\" in Art. 246(3) does not arise.\n\nThere is another rule of construction also wellsettled that the Entries in two Legislative Lists must be construed if possible so as to avoid a conflict. In Province of Madras v.\n\nBoddu Paidanna and Sons (') the question was as to whether the first sals by a manufacturer of goods were liable to be taxed by the Province under Entry 48 in List II, or whether it was really a tax on excise which was within the exclusive competence of the Centre under Entry 45\n\nin List I. It was held by the Federal Court that the\n\n(1) (1899) A.G. 580.\n\n(2) 1942 F.C.R. go.\n\n.....\n\nS.C.ll.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1483\n\ncerrect approach to the question was to see whether it 1958 was possible to effect a reconciliation between the - two Entries so as to avoid a conflict and overlapping, M. P. v. Sundara. and that, in that view, though excise duty might in ramier & co. v. an extended sense cover the first sales by the manu- The state of facturer, in the context of entry 48 in List II it AndhraPradesh should be held not to include it, and that therefore the Province had the right to tax the first sales. This Venkatarama view was approved by the Privy Council in Governor- Aiyar J.\n\nGeneral in Council v. Province of Madras (1). If it is possible therefore to construe Entry 42 as not including tax on inter-State sales, then on the principle enunciated in Province of Madras v. Boddu Paidanna and Sons (2) and Governor-General in Council v.\n\nProvince of Madras (1) we should so construe it, as that will avoid a conflict between the two Entries.\n\nIt was also argued in support of the contention that Entry 42 in List I must be held to include the power to tax, that that was the interpretation put by the American authorities on the Commerce Clause, and that there was no reason why a different construction should be put on Entry 42 in List I of our Constitution. It is true that our Constitution-makers had before them the Commerce Clause and the authorities thereon, but it is a mistake to suppose that they intended to bodily transplant that clausein Eatry 42.\n\nWe had in the Government of India Act, 1935, a fullfledged Federal Constitution in force in this Country, and what the Constitution-makers did was to draw from other Federal Constitution of the world, adapt and modify the provisions so as to suit our conditions and fit them in our Constitution. In this new context, those provisions do not necessarily mean what they meant in their old setting. The threads were ' no doubt taken from other Constitutions, but when they were woven into the fabric of our Constitution, their reach and their . complexion underwent changes.\n\nTherefore, valuable as the American decisions are as showing , how the question is dealt with in a sister\n\n(1)(1945) L.R. 72 I.A. 91 . (2)(1942) F.C.R. go. 188\n\n1958 Federal Constitution, great care should be taken in -- applying them in the interpretation of our Constitu- M. P. ~· Sundaration. We should not forget that it is our Constitution\n\nramie~.& co. that we are to interpret, and that interpretation must\n\nThe state of depend on the context and setting of the particular Andhra Pradesh provision which has to be interpreted. Applying these principles and having regard to the features already Venkatarama set out, we must hold that Entry 42 in List I is not to Aiyar J. be interpreted as including taxation. The same remarks apply to the argument based upon s. 92 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act and Art. 301 of our Constitution. We should also add that Art. 304(a) of the Constitution cannot be interpreted as throwing any light on the scope of Art. 301 with reference to the question of taxation, as it merely reproduces s. 297(l)(b) of the Government of India Act, and as there was no provision therein corresponding to Art. 301, s. 297(l)(b) could not have implied what is now sought to be inferred from Art. 304 (a).\n\nIn the result, we are of opinion that if the States had the power under Entry 54 to impose a tax on inter-State sales subject only to the restriction enacted in Art. 286(2), then by virtue of the impugned Act such law is rendered operative and proceedings taken thereunder are valid. We have reached this conclusion on a construction of the statutory provisions bearing on the question without reference to the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution which, proceeding on the view that the States had the power to tax inter- State sales under Entry 54, has amended the Constitution, and has vested the power to tax inter-State sales in the Centre. (VI) Another contention urged by the petitioners is that the levy of tax proposed to be made by the Andhra State on the sale of yarn by them to dealers in the State of Andhra is illegal, because under the Madras Act and the Rules made thereunder, where there are successive sales of yarn the tax can be imposed at only one point, and as the Government of Madras had already imposed a tax on the sale within that State, a second levy on the self-same goods by the\n\nState of Andhra is unauthorised, and that therefore\n\n....\n\n the threatened proceedings for assessment are incom- 1958 petent. This contention is clearly untenable. When the Madras Act provides for a single levy on succes- M. P. !' Sundara- . 1 f h 1 li t l ramier & Co. s1ve sa es o yarn, it can ave on y app cation o sa es v in the State of Madras, as it would be incompetent to The s1~1e of the Legislature of Madras to enact a law to operate in An.ihraPradesh another State. But it is argued that s. 53 of the Andhra State Act, 1953 on its /true interpretation Venkatarama enacts that though for political purposes Andhra is to Aiyar J. be regarded as a separate State, for the enforcement of laws as they stood on that date it should be deemed to be a part of the State of Madras. We do not agree with this interpretation. In our opinion, s. 53 merely provides that the laws in existence in the territories which were constituted into the State of Andhra should continue to operate as before. In fact, by an Adaptation Order issued on November 12, 1953, even the name of Andhra was substituted for Madras in the Madras General Sales Tax Act. There is no substance in this contention. (VII) Lastly, it is argued that the Essential Commodities Act enacted by Parliament in exercise of the power conferred by Art. 286 (3) has declared that yarn is an essential commodity,· and that if the Madras Act, is to be construed as a fresh enactment for the Andhra State by reason of ss. 53 and 54 of the Andhra State Act and the Adaptation Order dated November 12, 1953, then it would be bad inasmuch as the procedure prescribed in that provision had not been followed. The basis of this contention is that the Madras Act as applied to the Andhra State is a new Act for purposes of Art. 286 (3), but that is not so. The Madras Act was in force in the territories which now form part to the Andhra State until October I, 1953, and thereafter that Act continues to be in operation by force of s. 53 of the Andhra State Act. Moreover, the Madras Act became operative in the new State of Andhra not under any law passed by the Legislature of the State of Andhra but under s. 53 of a law enacted by Parliament and therefore Art. 286 (3) has no application. We should add that the Essential Commodities Act (LU of 1952) ha~ itself\n\nM. P. V. Sundarabeen repealed and is no longer in operation. This contention of the petitioners also should be rejected.\n\nThe petitioners sought to raise certain other contentions such as that they are not \"dealers\" in the Andhra State, and that the Explanation to s. 22 had no application to the sales sought to be taxed, as the\n\nramier &: Co. v. .\n\nThe State of Antlhra Pradesh\n\nvenkatarama goods were delivered qot in the State of Andhra but Aiyar J. in Madras. But these are questions which ought properly to be raised before the assessing authorities, and cannot be gone into in these proceedings.\n\nScrkorJ.\n\nIn the result, the petitions fail and are rejected. The petitions have had a chequered career, their fortunes fluctuating with changes in the interpretation of the law and in the law itself. In the circumstances, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.\n\nSARKAR J.-The petitioners who are dealers in cotton yarn carrying on business in the city of Madras had sold goods to various persons in the State of Andhra. This State, the respondent in these petitions, demanded taxes on these sales under the provisions of the Sales Tax Act applying to its territories. The petitioners challenged the respondent's right to tax the sales, and filed these petitions for writs of prohibition or other suitable writs restraining the respondent from levying and collecting the tax. The Act mentioned various kinds of sales which could be taxed under it. The procedures followed by the petitioners in effecting the sales were diverse and have not yet been ascertained, and it is not possible without such ascertainment to decide whether they are or are not taxable under the provisions of the Act read with other relevant laws. To avoid this difficulty it has been agreed between the parties that the only question that will be decided on these petitions is whether the respondent can tax a sale under which the property in the goods sol<I passed outside the State of Andhra but the goods were delivered in that State for consumption there. Before proceeding to discuss this question it is necessary to refer to certain antecedent events.\n\nOn January 26, 1950, the Constitution of India was\n\n...\n\npromulgated. It continued the laws previously in 19ss force '-in the territories of India subject, to . its provisions. Article 372 (2) of the Constitution provides M. P. Sundarathat ram1er cl Co. ' \"For the purpose of bringing the provisions of The State of any law in force in the territory of India into accord A11dhr11 Pradesh with the provisions of this Constitution, the President may by order make such adaptations and modifications SarkarJ. of such law, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary or expedient.\" Article 286 of the Constitution as it stood prior to its amendment in 1956, that being what this case is concerned with, contained the following provisions :\n\n\"Art. 286 (1) No law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes place-·\n\n(a) outside the State; or\n\n(b) in the course of the import of the goods into, or export of the goods out of, the territory of India.\n\nExplanation.-For the purposes of sub-clause (a), a sale or purchase shall be deemed to have taken place in the State in which the goods have actually been delivered as a direct result of such sale er purchase for the purpose of consump~ tion in that State notwithstanding the fact that under the general law relating to sale of goods the property in the goods has by reason of such sale or purchase passed in another State.\n\n(2) Except in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide, no law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale -or purchase of any goods where such sale of purchase takes\n\nplace in the course of inter-State trade or commerce : ,,..\n\nIn the year 1939 the legislature of Madras had enacted the Madras General Sale~ Tax Act attd this was continued in force by the Constitution after its promulgation .. In order to bring its provisions into accord with the Constitution, the President under his power mentioned earlier, passed on July 2, 1952, the Adaptation of Laws (Fourth Amendment) Order which\n\n1958 added a new section to the Madras Act, beings. 22. - The terms of this section are important in this case M. P. v. Sundaraand will be set out later.\n\nramie:.\"' co.\n\nThe effect of the Explanation in Art. 286(I)(a) came\n\nTh• State of up for consideration by this Court in the case of The AmlhraPradesh State of Bombay v. The United Motors (India) Ltd.(').\n\nThis Court held' by its judgment pronounced by a majority, on March 30, 1953, that a State could tax a sale under which goods were delivered within its territories for consumption there though the property in the goods passed beyond its territories and a provision in a State statute purporting to levy such a tax did not contravene Art. 286.\n\nSarkar I.\n\nAndhra is a new State which came into existence on October 1, 1953. It was created by the Andhra State Act, 1953, largely out of territories previously belonging to the State of Madras. Later, the new State came to be designated as the State of Andhra Pradesh but I will refer to it as the State of Andhra or simply Andhra. Section 53 of the Andhra State Act provided that the laws in force prior to the Constitution of the State of Andhra in the territories included in it, were thereafter to continue in force there. The Madras General Sales Tax Act therefore became applicable to the State of Andhra and it became so applicable with the new s. 22 previously added to it. Subsequently, the Madras Act as applying in the State of Andhra was, to suit the latter State, adapted by substituting for the name Madras the name Andhra wherever it occurred in that Act. I will hereafter call this Act the Sales Tax Act.\n\nSometime in the year 1954 the respondent, the State of Andhra, issued notices to the petitioners demanding taxes under its Sales Tax Ad. As I have earlier stated the petitioners challenged the right of the respondent to levy the tax and certain correspondence follow.::d.\n\nAs the respondent insisted on collecting the tax, the petitioners instituted the present proceedings in July and August, 1955.\n\nWhile these proceedings were pending, the question of the effect of Art. 286 again came up for consideration\n\n(1) £1953] s.c.R. lo6g.\n\n... ,\n\n by this Court in the case of the Bengal Immunity 1958 Company Ltd. v. The State of Bihar ('). This Court by - its judgment pronounced again by a majority on M. P. ~· sundara- September 6~' 1955, held that until Parliament by' law ram•~:~ co . . made in 'the.exercise of powers vested in it under The State of Art. ~86 ~:fj oifierwise provided, no State could impose Andhra Pradesh any'tax on asale or purchase of goods when such sale or purchase took place . in the course of inter-State Sarkar 1 . trade oi: cdmljl.erce and the majority decision in the\n\n~State. of.Bombay v. The United.Motors (India) Ltd. (2) in so far . as .it decided to the C<?ntrary could not be accepted anq further that the explanation in Art. 286(1)(a) did .not confer my right on the State in which the goods were delivered under a sale, to tax it . . notwithsta'.!}ding that the pFbperty in the goods passed in another State:\n\n' In view of this decision the respondent was advised that it could not Qppose the petitions and on October 211 1955; i~ ~.ctually filed sttments _in these. proceedmgs submtttmg that the petitions mtght be allowed, 'Before however the petitions could be heard and dispoS'ed. of, an Ordinance called the Sales Tax\n\nLaws VaUdation Ordinance, 1956, was promulgated by the President on January 30, 1956. This Ordinance was lat.er, on March 21, 1956, replaced by the Sales Trut Laws Validation Act, 1956. Both these enactments were in identicalterms. The bperative provision of the Validation Act is set out below.\n\ni. \"Notwithtanding any judgment, decree or order of any court no law of a State imposing, or authorising the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of any goods where such sale or purchase took place in the course of inter-State trade or coinmcrce during the period between the 1st day of April, 1951, and the 6th day of September, 1955, shall be deemed to be invalid or ever to have been invalid merely by reasorr of the fact that such sale or purchase took place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce; and all such taxes levied or collected or purporting to have been levied or coJlected during tlie\n\n(t) (1955]2 6o3.\n\n(2) {1953] 1o69 ..\n\n1958 aforesaid period shall be deemed always to have been validly levied or collected in accordance with law.\" M. P. v. Sundara- The respondent was advised that the' Validation Act ranJier &: Co. v. had changed the situation and in view of it the peti- Th• stat• of tions could no longer succeed. Thereupon, the res- Andhra Pradesh pondent on February 19, 1957, filed fresh statements\n\nSarkarJ. submitting that the petitions should be dismissed.\n\nThe , petitions have now come up for hearing in these circumstances.\n\nThe validity of the Validation Act jtself has been challenged. But I do not think it necessary to decide that question. I will assume that that Act is perfectly valid. It does not however itself levy any tax. Its only effect, so far as these cases are concerned, is to permit the Sales Tax Act to operate to tax sales which took place in: the course of trade between Andhra and any other State between certain dates. I will not refer to these dates hereafter for what I have to say applies to sales between them only. As has been agreed between the parties, as mentioned at the commencement of this judgment, the only question that we have to decide is whether a sale under which.the goods were delivered in Andhra for consumption there though property in them passed in Madras, can be taxed by the respondent. Such a sale would no doubt be a sale in the course of trade between Andhra and Madras. It is said that such a sale cannot be 1aXed by the respondent notwithstanding the Validation Act, because the Sales Tax Act does not purport to tax it.\n\nDoes the Sales Tiµ: then contain any provision taxing such a sale ? Now the Ad authorises the levy of a tax on sales as defined in it. A sale is defined in s. 2(h) of the Act. It is not disputed however that that definition does not include a sale under which goods are delivered in Andhra for consumption lb.ere but property in them passes ift Madras and no further reference to that section is therefore necessary. It is however said that the effect of the Explanation. in s. 22 is to make such a sale, a sale withinthe meaning of the Act and therefore liable to be taxed under it.\n\nSo I proceed to examine that section.\n\nSection 22 as it stood at the relevant time reads thus :\n\n• •\n\nS. 22. \"Nothing contained in this Act shall be 1958 deemed to impose or authorise the imposition of, a - tax on the sale or purchase of any goods, where such M. P. ~· Sundarasale or purchase takes place ramier & Co. v. (a)(i) outside the State cf Andhra, or Th(State o\n\n(ii) in the course of the import of the goods into Andhra Pradesh the territory of India or of the export of the goods out of such territory, or\n\n(b) except in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide, after the 31st day of March 1951 in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, and the provisions of this Act shall be read and construed accordingly. ·\n\nExplanation.--For the purposes of clause (a)(i), a sale or purchase shall be deemed to have taken place in the State in which the goods have actually been delivered as a direct result of such sale or purchase for the purpose of consumption in that State, notwithstanding the fact that under the general law relating to sale of goods, the property in the goods has by reason of such safe or purchase passed in another State.\" Does the Explanation in this section then say that when under a sale goods are delivered in Andhra, the sale shall be deemed to have taken place there though the property in the goods may have passed in another State, for example, Madras ? It no doubt says, without specifying any particular State, that a sale shall be deemed to have taken place in the State in which the goods were delivered under it though the property in them has passed in another State. But it seems to me impossible from the language used to say that it contemplted a case in which the goods were delivered in Andhra though property in them passed in another State. For the sake of clarity I have left out in what I have just said the term as to consumption in the State in which the goods were delivered and\n\no question as to such consumption is in dispute in these cases.\n\nThe Explanation opens with the words \"For the purposes of clause (a)(i)\". What then is that clause ?\n\nSarkar\n\n1958 It only contains the words \"outside the State of . - Andhra\". It completes the sentence part of which M. P. r Sundarahas preceded it. The complete sentence says,\n\nramier&Co.\n\nN hi hi A h 11 be d d ot ng m t s ct s a eeme to impose,\n\nThe;,~,, of or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or .Andhra Pradesh purchase of any goods, where such sale or purchase takes place Sarkar J. (a)(i) outside the State of Andhra.\n\nIt then says that no tax shall be levied under the A.ct on a sale which takes place outside Andhra. It is after this that the Explanation comes and starts with the words \"for the purposes of clause (a)(i)\". These words must therefore mean, for the purpose of explaining which sale is to be regarded as having taken place outside Andhra. The Explanation then is for this purpose. I will now turn to the remaining and the substantive portion of t!le Explanation.\n\nThat must explain when a sale is to be regarded as having taken place outside Andhra. The substantive portion of the Explanation however mentions a sale which is to be deemed to have taken place inside a\n\nState. Keeping its purpose in mind, it must be taken by saying that a certain sale is to be deemed inside a State, to say that it is outside the State of Andhra. 1t follows that the Explanation does not contemplate that the State inside which a sale is to be deemed to have taken place can be the State of Andhra. That State cannot be the State of Andhra, for then the Explanation would not show when a sale is to be deemed to be outside Andhra and that by its language is the only purpose for which it is enacted. Therefore the Explanation can only be read as contemplating a\n\nState other than Andhra as the State inside which a sale shall be deemed to have taken place. This is the inevitable result produced by the opening words of the Explanation understood according to their plain meaning. So the Explanation, omitting portions of it for the sake of clarity can only be read in the manner shown below : For the purposes of clause (a)(i) a sale or purchase shall be deemed to have taken place in the State being a State other than Andhra, in which the goods have\n\n... \\_\n\nbeen actually delivered notwithstanding that the 1958 property in the goods has passed in the State of -- Andhra. .\n\nM. P. r- S1!nd'!!!!.:.\n\nI therefore find it impossible to say that the Explanaramier & Co. tion states.that a sale shall be deemed to have taken The; iateof place inside Andhra if under it the goods have been AndhraPradesh delivered there though the property in them passed in another State. The Explanation does not hence, in sarkarJ. my view, authorise the taxation of a sale under which goods are delivered in Andhra though property in them passed in Madras .\n\nThe view that I have taken of the purpose of the Explanation in s. 22 was taken of the purpose of the Explanation in Art. 286(l)(a) in the Bengal Immunity Company case (1). It was said at p. 646 of the report, \"Here the avowed purpose of the Explanation is to explain what an outside sale referred to in sub-clause\n\n(a) is\". The language of the Explanations and the setting of each in its respective provisions are identical. That language must therefore have the same meaning. It is said that the consideration that prevailed with the Court in the Bengal Immunity Company case (1) in dealing with Art. 286 cannot apply in dealing with s. 22 for the latter is a provision in a taxing statute which the former is not. But I do not see that this comment, even if justified, would lead to a different meaning being put on words used when they occur in a. taxing statute from that ... when they occur in a statute which does not purport to levy a tax. As a matter of language only, words must have the same meaning. The words \"for the purpose of clause (a)(i)\" must therefore have the same meaning in the Explanation in Art. 286(1)(a) as in the Explanation in s. 22. I am unable to distinguish the present case from the Bengal Immunity Company case (1) for the purpose of determining the meaning of the words used.\n\nIt is then said that the Explanation in s. 22 has two face ts; that when it talks of a sale inside one State, it at the same time necessarily talks of a sale outside all other States. Therefore it is said that when under a\n\n(1) (1955] 2 s.c.R. 603.\n\n1958 sale goods are delivered in Andhra but property in\n\n.,1 P v s a them passes outside Andhra, the Explanation at the raiie~ ;~; rasame time makes such a sale inside Andhra and v. outside all other States. I do not follow this. Why The State of should the Explanation in this Andbra Act be Andhra Pradesh concerned with saying when a sale shall be deemed to have taken place outside all other States ? Andhra cannot of course legislate for any other State. Nor is there anything in this Act which makes it necessary for the purposes of it to say when a sale shall be deemed to be outside all other States. ft follows therefore that a construction cannot be put on the language used in the Explanation which produces the result of showing a sale to be inside Andhra and so outside all other States. Further, as I have earlier pointed out, the words \"For the purposes of clause (a)(i)\" with which the Explanation starts, show conclusively that it is necessarily confined to a sale under which goods are delivered in a State other than Andhra and the property in the goods passes in Andhra. It is no objection to this reading of the Explanation to say that the Andhra Act would then be saying when a sale is to be deemed to have taken place inside another State and it has no power to do so as it can legislate only for itself and for no other State. Such an objection would be pointless because Andhra by saying that a sale shall be deemed to have taken place inside another State is only legislating for itself and only saying that such a sale is therefore an outside sale so far as it is concerned and cannot be taxed in view of s. 22(a) of its Act. It may be that it is possible in construing the Explanation in Art. 286(J)(a) to conceive of two facets because that dealt with all States or any two States at a time and for all these the Constitution was fully competent to lay down the Jaw. That however is not possible when construing a law passed by a State legislature. Such Jaw cannot regulate the Jaws of other States. And in this case the conception is further impossible because the language shows that the Explanation is for explaining when a sale is to be deemed to have taken place outside the State of Andhra. It is not meant to\n\nSarkar/.\n\n...\n\nlo\\;,-\n\nexplai11 when it is deemed to have taken place outside 1958 any State whatsoever that State ma)'.· be. I am there- M. P. v. Sundarafore unable to see that the Explanation has any facet ramier & co. showing what would be a sale inside Andhra. v.\n\nThe conclusion that T reach is that the Sales Tax The State oJ Act with which these cases are concerned does not Andhra Pradesh authorise the taxing of a sale under which goods are Sarkar J. delivered in Andhra but the property in them passes in Madras. In this view of the matter I do not think it necessary to discuss the various other grounds on which the respondent's right to tax these sales was also challenged. In the result I would allow these petitions.\n\nBY COURT : In view of the opinion of the majority, the petitions are dismissed. The parties are to bear their own costs.\n\nPetitions dismissed.\n\nVIRSA SINGH v.\n\nTHE STATE OF PUNJAB (JAFER IMAM, GAIENDRAGADKAR and VIVIAN\n\nBOSE JJ.)\n\nCriminal Trial-Culpable homicide amounting to murder- Prosecution to prove-Presence and Nature of Injury-Intention to cause that Particular Injury, which was 118<1 accidental or unintentional and was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature-Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 300, 3rdly.\n\nThe accused thrust a spear into the abdomen of the deceased.\n\nThis injury caused his death.\n\nIn the opinion of the doctor the injury was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. It was found by the Sessions Judge that the accused intended tc cause grievous hurt only.\n\nIn his opinion however the third clause of s. 300 Indian Penal Code applied.\n\nHe accordingly convicted and sentenced the accused under s. 302 Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe High Court upheld the conviction. It was argued that the third clause of s. 300 Indian Penal Code did not apply as it was not proved that the accused intended to inflict a\n\nMarch II.", "total_entities": 607, "entities": [{"text": "M. P. V. SUNDARARAMIER & CO", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 637, "end_char": 664, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M. P. V. SUNDARARAMIER & CO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ANOTHER (with connected petitions) (S. R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 698, "end_char": 743, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. K. SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 782, "end_char": 794, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.K. SARKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 800, "end_char": 815, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BosE JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 2(h), 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1211, "end_char": 1223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Nature of-Retrospective operation-Enactment unconstitutional in part-Effect-Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939", "statute": "Nature of-Retrospective operation-Enactment unconstitutional in part-Effect-Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1225, "end_char": 1260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1274, "end_char": 1278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956", "statute": "Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1280, "end_char": 1301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 246, 286, 301, 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1303, "end_char": 1327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1444, "end_char": 1450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners were dealers cai; rying on business in the City of Madras in the sale and purchase of yarn."}}, {"text": "Andhra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1513, "end_char": 1519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The dealers in the State of Andhra used to place orders for the purchase of yarn with the petitioners in Madras, where the contracts were concluded and the goods were delivered ex-godown at Madras and thereafter despatched to the purchasers who would take delivery of them within their State."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2038, "end_char": 2059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 372(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2119, "end_char": 2130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "General Sales Tax Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2267, "end_char": 2294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2348, "end_char": 2353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "General Sales Tax Act, 1939", "statute": "General Sales Tax Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Art 286( 1 )(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2436, "end_char": 2451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "General Sales Tax Act, 1939", "statute": "General Sales Tax Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "July 13, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2492, "end_char": 2505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 13, 1954, the Board of Revenue (Commercial Taxes) in the State of Aqdhra, acting on the decision in The State of Bombay and another v. The United Motors (India) Ltd., and others, {1953] S.C.R. 1069, called upon dealers in the State of Madras to submit returns of their turnover of sales in which goods were delivered in the State of Andhra for consumption."}}, {"text": "Board of Revenue (Commercial Taxes) in the State of Aqdhra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2511, "end_char": 2569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 13, 1954, the Board of Revenue (Commercial Taxes) in the State of Aqdhra, acting on the decision in The State of Bombay and another v. The United Motors (India) Ltd., and others, {1953] S.C.R. 1069, called upon dealers in the State of Madras to submit returns of their turnover of sales in which goods were delivered in the State of Andhra for consumption."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2903, "end_char": 2910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "General Sales Tax Act, 1939", "statute": "General Sales Tax Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Art 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3086, "end_char": 3096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "General Sales Tax Act, 1939", "statute": "General Sales Tax Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3155, "end_char": 3168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While the petitions were pending the Supreme Court pronounced on September 6, 1955, its judgment in The Bengal Immunity Company Umited v. The State of Bihar and others, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 603, according to which the petitioners were not liable to be taxed."}}, {"text": "September 6, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3183, "end_char": 3200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While the petitions were pending the Supreme Court pronounced on September 6, 1955, its judgment in The Bengal Immunity Company Umited v. The State of Bihar and others, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 603, according to which the petitioners were not liable to be taxed."}}, {"text": "[1955] 2 S.C.R. 603", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3287, "end_char": 3306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3480, "end_char": 3484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But before final orders were passed on the petitions Parliament passed Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956", "statute": "But before final orders were passed on the petitions Parliament passed Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "April 1, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3618, "end_char": 3631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But before final orders were passed on the petitions Parliament passed Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956, s. 2 whereof provided that no law of a State imposing or authorising the imposition of tax on inter-State sales during the period between April 1, 1951, and September 6, 1955, shall be deemed to be invalid or ever to have been invalid merely by reason of the fact that the sales took place in the course of the inter-State trade."}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4207, "end_char": 4212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But before final orders were passed on the petitions Parliament passed Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956", "statute": "But before final orders were passed on the petitions Parliament passed Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Madras General Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4220, "end_char": 4270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4409, "end_char": 4420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madras General Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956", "statute": "the Madras General Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4426, "end_char": 4431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madras General Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956", "statute": "the Madras General Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4484, "end_char": 4495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madras General Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956", "statute": "the Madras General Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4662, "end_char": 4667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madras General Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956", "statute": "the Madras General Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "M. P. V. Sundara-", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5299, "end_char": 5316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also contended that under the Constitution it was only the Parliament that has the competence to impose tax on inter-State sales and that the Sales Tax Laws Validation As:st\n\n1958 was bad in that it 11:ave validity to the laws of the State to impose the tax: M. P. V. Sundara- Held (Sarkar J. (iissenting), thats. 22 of the Madras General ramter & Co.\n\nSales Tax Act, 1939, did in fact impose a tax on the class of sales v. covered by the Explanation to Art.", "canonical_name": "M. P. V. SUNDARARAMIER & CO"}}, {"text": "Sarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5323, "end_char": 5329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also contended that under the Constitution it was only the Parliament that has the competence to impose tax on inter-State sales and that the Sales Tax Laws Validation As:st\n\n1958 was bad in that it 11:ave validity to the laws of the State to impose the tax: M. P. V. Sundara- Held (Sarkar J. (iissenting), thats. 22 of the Madras General ramter & Co.\n\nSales Tax Act, 1939, did in fact impose a tax on the class of sales v. covered by the Explanation to Art.", "canonical_name": "Sarkar"}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5393, "end_char": 5412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5494, "end_char": 5508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act, 1939", "statute": "Sales Tax Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Art 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5571, "end_char": 5581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act, 1939", "statute": "Sales Tax Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5691, "end_char": 5695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act, 1939", "statute": "Sales Tax Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Art. 286( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5788, "end_char": 5800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act, 1939", "statute": "Sales Tax Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Bengal Immunity Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5832, "end_char": 5855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "286( 1) (a) of the Constitution in The Bengal Immunity Company case that it merely prohibited the outside States from imposing a tax on the class of sales falling within the Explanation and did not confer on the delivery State any power to impose a tax on such sales has no application to a taxing statute of a State the object of which was primarily to confer power on the State to levy and collect tax."}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6199, "end_char": 6209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act, 1939", "statute": "Sales Tax Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "s. 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6214, "end_char": 6221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act, 1939", "statute": "Sales Tax Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "S. R. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6945, "end_char": 6954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1951] S.C.R. 747, relied on: Held (Per S. R. Das, C. J., Venkatarama Aiyar, S. K. Das and Vivian Bose, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "S. R. Das"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6963, "end_char": 6980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1951] S.C.R. 747, relied on: Held (Per S. R. Das, C. J., Venkatarama Aiyar, S. K. Das and Vivian Bose, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama AiyarJ."}}, {"text": "K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6985, "end_char": 6991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1951] S.C.R. 747, relied on: Held (Per S. R. Das, C. J., Venkatarama Aiyar, S. K. Das and Vivian Bose, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Vivian Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6996, "end_char": 7007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1951] S.C.R. 747, relied on: Held (Per S. R. Das, C. J., Venkatarama Aiyar, S. K. Das and Vivian Bose, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "VIVIAN BosE JJ."}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Lawa Validation Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7027, "end_char": 7062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7195, "end_char": 7205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sales Tax Lawa Validation Act, 1956", "statute": "the Sales Tax Lawa Validation Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "(1946) L.R. 73 I.A. 59", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7355, "end_char": 7377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 372(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7516, "end_char": 7527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sales Tax Lawa Validation Act, 1956", "statute": "the Sales Tax Lawa Validation Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7680, "end_char": 7691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sales Tax Lawa Validation Act, 1956", "statute": "the Sales Tax Lawa Validation Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7791, "end_char": 7796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sales Tax Lawa Validation Act, 1956", "statute": "the Sales Tax Lawa Validation Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7873, "end_char": 7877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sales Tax Lawa Validation Act, 1956", "statute": "the Sales Tax Lawa Validation Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8098, "end_char": 8102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8396, "end_char": 8401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Per Sarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10382, "end_char": 10392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Sarkar J .-The Sales Tax Act does not authorise the taxation of a sale under which goods are delivered in the State of\n\nM. P. V. Sundara\n\nr.amier & Co. v.\n\nThe State of Andhra Pradesh\n\nI 958 Andhra but the property in them passes putside that State."}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10656, "end_char": 10661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10915, "end_char": 10927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10966, "end_char": 10971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11012, "end_char": 11026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "286( I) as in The State of the Explanation in s. 22 of the Act, and the present case is not Andhra Pradesh distinguishable from the decision in The Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. The State of Bihar and others, [11955] 2 S.C.R. 603."}}, {"text": "1955] 2 S.C.R. 603", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 11136, "end_char": 11154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11251, "end_char": 11261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11269, "end_char": 11290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "D. Narsa Raju", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11397, "end_char": 11410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Narsa Raju, Advocate-Genera/for the State of Andhra Pradesh and T. M. Sen, for the respondent.", "canonical_name": "D. Narsa Raju"}}, {"text": "State of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11436, "end_char": 11459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Narsa Raju, Advocate-Genera/for the State of Andhra Pradesh and T. M. Sen, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "T. M. Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11464, "end_char": 11473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Narsa Raju, Advocate-Genera/for the State of Andhra Pradesh and T. M. Sen, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "BOSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11904, "end_char": 11908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BOSE J.\n\nYou must state the facts on which you think you can tax the sales."}}, {"text": "D. Narsa Raju", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12069, "end_char": 12082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Narsa Raju.", "canonical_name": "D. Narsa Raju"}}, {"text": "K. S. Krishnaswami Iyengar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12430, "end_char": 12456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Krishnaswami Iyengar, N. Srinivasan and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the petitioners."}}, {"text": "N. Srinivasan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12458, "end_char": 12471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Krishnaswami Iyengar, N. Srinivasan and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the petitioners."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12476, "end_char": 12493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Krishnaswami Iyengar, N. Srinivasan and R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the petitioners.", "canonical_name": "R. Ganapathy Iyer"}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12802, "end_char": 12812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12940, "end_char": 12945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 236(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12986, "end_char": 12997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1955) 2 S.C.R. 603", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 13145, "end_char": 13164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 372(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13207, "end_char": 13218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13277, "end_char": 13285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13287, "end_char": 13292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 372(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13358, "end_char": 13369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13472, "end_char": 13480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13485, "end_char": 13490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1955] 2 S.C.R. 603", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 13642, "end_char": 13661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13792, "end_char": 13803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13805, "end_char": 13819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14083, "end_char": 14094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14200, "end_char": 14211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1955) 1 S.C.R. 613", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 14471, "end_char": 14490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14975, "end_char": 14979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But even this decision helps the petitioners in so far as it lays down that where tax had neither been collected nor levied the Validation Act", "statute": "But even this decision helps the petitioners in so far as it lays down that where tax had neither been collected nor levied the Validation Act"}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15224, "end_char": 15241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Ganapathy Iyer followed.", "canonical_name": "R. Ganapathy Iyer"}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15253, "end_char": 15263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But even this decision helps the petitioners in so far as it lays down that where tax had neither been collected nor levied the Validation Act", "statute": "But even this decision helps the petitioners in so far as it lays down that where tax had neither been collected nor levied the Validation Act"}}, {"text": "[1955] 1 S. C. R. 893", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 15718, "end_char": 15739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Act being a new Act the tax on yarn is hit by the Essential Commodities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15940, "end_char": 16015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "V. L. Narasimhamoorthy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16202, "end_char": 16224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. L. Narasimhamoorthy, J. B. Dadachanji and Rameshwar Nath, for the Mysore Spinning & Mfg."}}, {"text": "B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16229, "end_char": 16242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. L. Narasimhamoorthy, J. B. Dadachanji and Rameshwar Nath, for the Mysore Spinning & Mfg.", "canonical_name": "B. Dadachanji"}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16247, "end_char": 16261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. L. Narasimhamoorthy, J. B. Dadachanji and Rameshwar Nath, for the Mysore Spinning & Mfg.", "canonical_name": "Rames!iwar Nath"}}, {"text": "Mysore Spinning & Mfg. Co., Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16271, "end_char": 16303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. L. Narasimhamoorthy, J. B. Dadachanji and Rameshwar Nath, for the Mysore Spinning & Mfg."}}, {"text": "Minerva Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16309, "end_char": 16327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Co., Ltd., and Minerva Mills Ltd., (Interveners), supported the petitioners."}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16371, "end_char": 16381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act being a new Act the tax on yarn is hit by the Essential Commodities Act", "statute": "Act being a new Act the tax on yarn is hit by the Essential Commodities Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16601, "end_char": 16612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act being a new Act the tax on yarn is hit by the Essential Commodities Act", "statute": "Act being a new Act the tax on yarn is hit by the Essential Commodities Act"}}, {"text": "Schedule VII", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16837, "end_char": 16849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act being a new Act the tax on yarn is hit by the Essential Commodities Act", "statute": "Act being a new Act the tax on yarn is hit by the Essential Commodities Act"}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16871, "end_char": 16881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act being a new Act the tax on yarn is hit by the Essential Commodities Act", "statute": "Act being a new Act the tax on yarn is hit by the Essential Commodities Act"}}, {"text": "N. A. Palkhiwala", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17062, "end_char": 17078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "See Behr, am Khur- 1958 shed Pesikaka v.\n\nThe State of Kera/a, ([1957] S.C.R. 837) ..\n\nN. A. Palkhiwala, J. B. DadachanJi and Rames!iwar Nath, for Tata Iron & Steel Co., Ltd., (Intervener)."}}, {"text": "B. DadachanJi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17083, "end_char": 17096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "See Behr, am Khur- 1958 shed Pesikaka v.\n\nThe State of Kera/a, ([1957] S.C.R. 837) ..\n\nN. A. Palkhiwala, J. B. DadachanJi and Rames!iwar Nath, for Tata Iron & Steel Co., Ltd., (Intervener).", "canonical_name": "B. Dadachanji"}}, {"text": "Rames!iwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17101, "end_char": 17116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "See Behr, am Khur- 1958 shed Pesikaka v.\n\nThe State of Kera/a, ([1957] S.C.R. 837) ..\n\nN. A. Palkhiwala, J. B. DadachanJi and Rames!iwar Nath, for Tata Iron & Steel Co., Ltd., (Intervener).", "canonical_name": "Rames!iwar Nath"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17384, "end_char": 17395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17670, "end_char": 17679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P. N.\n\nBhagwati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17797, "end_char": 17812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. N.\n\nBhagwati and I. N. Shroff, for Pashebbhai Patel & Co., Ltd., (Intervener) supported the petitioners."}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17817, "end_char": 17829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. N.\n\nBhagwati and I. N. Shroff, for Pashebbhai Patel & Co., Ltd., (Intervener) supported the petitioners."}}, {"text": "Pashebbhai Patel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17835, "end_char": 17851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. N.\n\nBhagwati and I. N. Shroff, for Pashebbhai Patel & Co., Ltd., (Intervener) supported the petitioners."}}, {"text": "D. Narsq Raju", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17906, "end_char": 17919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Narsq Raju, Advocate-General of Andhra Pradesh and T. M. Sen, for the respondents.", "canonical_name": "D. Narsa Raju"}}, {"text": "Article 372(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17992, "end_char": 18006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18180, "end_char": 18188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18202, "end_char": 18213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18656, "end_char": 18661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. V. Subramania Iyer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18785, "end_char": 18806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. V. Subramania Iyer, D. N. Mukherjee and B. N. Ghosh, for Madura Mills Co., Ltd., (Intervener)."}}, {"text": "D. N. Mukherjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18808, "end_char": 18823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. V. Subramania Iyer, D. N. Mukherjee and B. N. Ghosh, for Madura Mills Co., Ltd., (Intervener)."}}, {"text": "B. N. Ghosh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18828, "end_char": 18839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. V. Subramania Iyer, D. N. Mukherjee and B. N. Ghosh, for Madura Mills Co., Ltd., (Intervener)."}}, {"text": "Madura Mills Co., Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18845, "end_char": 18867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. V. Subramania Iyer, D. N. Mukherjee and B. N. Ghosh, for Madura Mills Co., Ltd., (Intervener)."}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19063, "end_char": 19074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 372(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19113, "end_char": 19124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19147, "end_char": 19155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19250, "end_char": 19260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act is not law made by the State Legislature and is not validated by the Validating Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19284, "end_char": 19371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19479, "end_char": 19490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act is not law made by the State Legislature and is not validated by the Validating Act", "statute": "Act is not law made by the State Legislature and is not validated by the Validating Act"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19731, "end_char": 19747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act is not law made by the State Legislature and is not validated by the Validating Act", "statute": "Act is not law made by the State Legislature and is not validated by the Validating Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19854, "end_char": 19862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act is not law made by the State Legislature and is not validated by the Validating Act", "statute": "Act is not law made by the State Legislature and is not validated by the Validating Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19913, "end_char": 19921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act is not law made by the State Legislature and is not validated by the Validating Act", "statute": "Act is not law made by the State Legislature and is not validated by the Validating Act"}}, {"text": "C. K.\n\nDaphtary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20264, "end_char": 20279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K.\n\nDaphtary, Solicitor-General of India."}}, {"text": "G. N.\n\nJoshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20309, "end_char": 20321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. N.\n\nJoshi and T. M. Sen, for the Union of India (Intert9ss vener)."}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20383, "end_char": 20418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20449, "end_char": 20460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956", "statute": "The Sales Tax Laws Validation Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Sundara substance the Validation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20488, "end_char": 20524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20581, "end_char": 20592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sundara substance the Validation Act", "statute": "Sundara substance the Validation Act"}}, {"text": "Article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20643, "end_char": 20657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sundara substance the Validation Act", "statute": "Sundara substance the Validation Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21216, "end_char": 21227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sundara substance the Validation Act", "statute": "Sundara substance the Validation Act"}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21330, "end_char": 21340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sundara substance the Validation Act", "statute": "Sundara substance the Validation Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21405, "end_char": 21416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sundara substance the Validation Act", "statute": "Sundara substance the Validation Act"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21838, "end_char": 21842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "V. K. T. Chari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22208, "end_char": 22222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "are enumerated in a separate group in Entries 82-92 in List I.\n\nV. K. T. Chari, Advocate-General for the State of Madras, B. R. Gopalakrishnan and T. M. Sen for the State of Madras (Intervener)."}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22249, "end_char": 22264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "are enumerated in a separate group in Entries 82-92 in List I.\n\nV. K. T. Chari, Advocate-General for the State of Madras, B. R. Gopalakrishnan and T. M. Sen for the State of Madras (Intervener)."}}, {"text": "B. R. Gopalakrishnan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22266, "end_char": 22286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "are enumerated in a separate group in Entries 82-92 in List I.\n\nV. K. T. Chari, Advocate-General for the State of Madras, B. R. Gopalakrishnan and T. M. Sen for the State of Madras (Intervener)."}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22353, "end_char": 22358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22841, "end_char": 22850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mahabir Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22896, "end_char": 22910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahabir Prasad, Advocate-General for the State of Bihar, Rajeshwar Prasad and S. P. Varma, for the State of Bihar (Intervener); G. C. Mathur and C. P.\n\nLal, for the State of Uttar Pradesh (intervener) supported the respondents and the Union of India."}}, {"text": "Rajeshwar Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22953, "end_char": 22969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahabir Prasad, Advocate-General for the State of Bihar, Rajeshwar Prasad and S. P. Varma, for the State of Bihar (Intervener); G. C. Mathur and C. P.\n\nLal, for the State of Uttar Pradesh (intervener) supported the respondents and the Union of India."}}, {"text": "S. P. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22974, "end_char": 22985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahabir Prasad, Advocate-General for the State of Bihar, Rajeshwar Prasad and S. P. Varma, for the State of Bihar (Intervener); G. C. Mathur and C. P.\n\nLal, for the State of Uttar Pradesh (intervener) supported the respondents and the Union of India."}}, {"text": "G. C. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23024, "end_char": 23036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahabir Prasad, Advocate-General for the State of Bihar, Rajeshwar Prasad and S. P. Varma, for the State of Bihar (Intervener); G. C. Mathur and C. P.\n\nLal, for the State of Uttar Pradesh (intervener) supported the respondents and the Union of India."}}, {"text": "C. P.\n\nLal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23041, "end_char": 23051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahabir Prasad, Advocate-General for the State of Bihar, Rajeshwar Prasad and S. P. Varma, for the State of Bihar (Intervener); G. C. Mathur and C. P.\n\nLal, for the State of Uttar Pradesh (intervener) supported the respondents and the Union of India."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23148, "end_char": 23165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Ganapathy Iyer, for the petitioners, replied.", "canonical_name": "R. Ganapathy Iyer"}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23343, "end_char": 23346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of Das C. J., Venkatarama Aiyar, S. K. Das and Vivian Bose, JJ."}}, {"text": "S. K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23373, "end_char": 23382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment of Das C. J., Venkatarama Aiyar, S. K. Das and Vivian Bose, JJ.", "canonical_name": "S. R. Das"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Aiyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23421, "end_char": 23438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by Venkatarama Aiyer J.\n\nSarkar J. delivered a separate judgment.", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama AiyarJ."}}, {"text": "Venkatarama VENKATARAMA AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23485, "end_char": 23514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Venkatarama VENKATARAMA AIYAR J.-The petitioners are deal-\n\nAiya~ J. ers carrying on business in the City of Madras in the sale and purchase of yarn, and they have filed the present applications under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23686, "end_char": 23693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Andhra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23795, "end_char": 23810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ of prohibition or other appropriate writ restraining the State of Andhra from taking proceedings for imposing tax on certain sales effected by them in favour of merchants who are residing or carrying on business in what is now the State of Andhra Pradesh, on the ground, inter alia, that the said sales were made in the course of inter-State trade, and that no tax could be levied on them by reason of the prohibition contained in Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24169, "end_char": 24180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24745, "end_char": 24756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is therein stated that the dealers in Andhra would place orders for the purchase M. P .. v. Sundaraof yarn with the petitioners in Madras, that the conramie::~ Co. tracts would be concluded at Madras, that the goods The state of would be delivered ex-godown at Madras and would Anilhra Pradesh\n\nthereafter be despatched to the purchasers either by lorries or by rail as might be directed by them, that Venkatarama when the goods were sent by rail, the railway receipts Aiyar J. would be taken either in the name of the consignees, and sent to them by post or in the name of the consignor and endorsed to the purchasers and delivered to them in Madras or sent to them by post endorsed in favour of a bank and the purchasers would take delivery of those receipts after payment to the bank.", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama AiyarJ."}}, {"text": "Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24812, "end_char": 24817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is therein stated that the dealers in Andhra would place orders for the purchase M. P .. v. Sundaraof yarn with the petitioners in Madras, that the conramie::~ Co. tracts would be concluded at Madras, that the goods The state of would be delivered ex-godown at Madras and would Anilhra Pradesh\n\nthereafter be despatched to the purchasers either by lorries or by rail as might be directed by them, that Venkatarama when the goods were sent by rail, the railway receipts Aiyar J. would be taken either in the name of the consignees, and sent to them by post or in the name of the consignor and endorsed to the purchasers and delivered to them in Madras or sent to them by post endorsed in favour of a bank and the purchasers would take delivery of those receipts after payment to the bank.", "canonical_name": "Aiyar"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25841, "end_char": 25855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "September 14, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26478, "end_char": 26496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 14, 1953,\n\nM2SC (1)/61--6\n\n1958 Parliament enaJed the Andhra State Act (30 of 1953), whereby a separate State called the State of Andhra M. P. v. Sundarawas constituted incorporating therein territories which\n\nram/er v\"' co. had previously thereto formed part of the State of {\n\nThe s1;1, of Madras, and this Act came into force on October l, Andhra Pradesh 1953."}}, {"text": "Parliament enaJed the Andhra State Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26520, "end_char": 26558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26771, "end_char": 26773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Parliament enaJed the Andhra State Act", "statute": "Parliament enaJed the Andhra State Act"}}, {"text": "s. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26858, "end_char": 26863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Parliament enaJed the Andhra State Act", "statute": "Parliament enaJed the Andhra State Act"}}, {"text": "Andhra State Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26871, "end_char": 26887, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27161, "end_char": 27171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Parliament enaJed the Andhra State Act", "statute": "Parliament enaJed the Andhra State Act"}}, {"text": "Andhra State Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27179, "end_char": 27195, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "November 12, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27412, "end_char": 27429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 54 of the Andhra State Act conferred on the Government a power to adapt laws for the purpose of facilitating the application of any law previously made, and in exercise of the power conferred by this section, an Adaptation Order was passed on November 12, 1953, whereby the word \"Andhra\" was substituted for the word \"Madras\" in the Madras Act."}}, {"text": "shall hereafter refer to the Madras Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27517, "end_char": 27556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27880, "end_char": 27887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We shall hereafter refer to the Madras Act", "statute": "We shall hereafter refer to the Madras Act"}}, {"text": "Section 2(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28100, "end_char": 28112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We shall hereafter refer to the Madras Act", "statute": "We shall hereafter refer to the Madras Act"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28290, "end_char": 28299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We shall hereafter refer to the Madras Act", "statute": "We shall hereafter refer to the Madras Act"}}, {"text": "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28583, "end_char": 28661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "January 1, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29304, "end_char": 29319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This amendment came into force on January 1, 1948."}}, {"text": "s. 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29436, "end_char": 29443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "statute": "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Indian Sale of Goods Act, 1930"}}, {"text": "s. 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29742, "end_char": 29749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30346, "end_char": 30357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 30699, "end_char": 30704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No law of a State shall impose, or authorise the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of goods where such sale or purchase takes place- ( a) outside the State; or\n\n(b) in the course of the import of the goods into, or export of the goods out of, the territory of India."}}, {"text": "Venkatarama AiyarJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30738, "end_char": 30757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "18a\n\nVenkatarama AiyarJ.\n\n1958 Explanation.-For the purposes of sub-clause (a), - a sale or purchase shall be deemed to have taken M. P .. v. Sundaraplace in the State in which the goods have actually\n\nramier & Co. b d 1 d d\" 1 f h I v. een e ivere as a 1rect resu t o sue sa e or pur- The state of chase for the purpose of c0, nsumption in that State, Andhra Pradesh notwithstanding the fact that under the general law relating to sale of goods the property in the goods Venkararama has by reason of such sale or purchase passed in Aiyar J. another State.", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama AiyarJ."}}, {"text": "Venkararama", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31205, "end_char": 31216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "18a\n\nVenkatarama AiyarJ.\n\n1958 Explanation.-For the purposes of sub-clause (a), - a sale or purchase shall be deemed to have taken M. P .. v. Sundaraplace in the State in which the goods have actually\n\nramier & Co. b d 1 d d\" 1 f h I v. een e ivere as a 1rect resu t o sue sa e or pur- The state of chase for the purpose of c0, nsumption in that State, Andhra Pradesh notwithstanding the fact that under the general law relating to sale of goods the property in the goods Venkararama has by reason of such sale or purchase passed in Aiyar J. another State.", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama AiyarJ."}}, {"text": "Article 372(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32281, "end_char": 32295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "July 2, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33043, "end_char": 33055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the President made Adaptation Orders with reference 19ss to the Sales Tax of Laws all the States, and as regards - the Madras Act, he issued on July 2, 1952, the Fourth M. P .. v. Sundara-\n\nAmendment inserting a new section, s. 22 in that Act."}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33124, "end_char": 33129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "31st March, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33643, "end_char": 33659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ranuer &: Co.\n\nIt runs as follows : The ;, te of \"Nothing contained in this Act shall be deemed AndhraPradesh to impose or authorise the imposition of a tax on the sale or purchase of any goods where such sale or Venkatarama purchase takes place- Atyar J.\n\n(a) (i) outside the State of Madras, or\n\n(ii) in the course of import of the goods into the territory of India or of the export of the goods out of such territory, or\n\n(b) except in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide, after the 31st March, 1951, in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, and the provisions of this Act shall be read and construed accordingly."}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34248, "end_char": 34256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34295, "end_char": 34300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Board of Revenue (Commercial Taxes) Andhra State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34877, "end_char": 34925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Acting on this judgment, the Board of Revenue (Commercial Taxes) Andhra State, issued a\n\n(1) I19Sll s.c."}}, {"text": "June 30,\n\n1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35514, "end_char": 35528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Association disputed the liability of the Madras dealers to pay any tax in respect of the Venkalarama sales to the Andhra dealers, and after some corres- Aiyar J. pondence, the Andhra State finally issued on June 30,\n\n1955, notices to the petitioners to send their returns of turnover by July 15, 1955, failing which it was stated that assessments would be made on the best judgment basis, and that, further, the dealers would be liable to the penalties prescribed by the law (Vide Annexure H to the petition)."}}, {"text": "15, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35599, "end_char": 35607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Association disputed the liability of the Madras dealers to pay any tax in respect of the Venkalarama sales to the Andhra dealers, and after some corres- Aiyar J. pondence, the Andhra State finally issued on June 30,\n\n1955, notices to the petitioners to send their returns of turnover by July 15, 1955, failing which it was stated that assessments would be made on the best judgment basis, and that, further, the dealers would be liable to the penalties prescribed by the law (Vide Annexure H to the petition)."}}, {"text": "Andhra State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 35928, "end_char": 35940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon, the petitioners have filed the present petitions challenging the validity of the demand made by the Andhra State on the ground, inter alia, that the sales proposed to be taxed were inter-State sales, and that they were immune from taxation under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36074, "end_char": 36085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36236, "end_char": 36250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36566, "end_char": 36577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36637, "end_char": 36651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36715, "end_char": 36726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "United Motors", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36785, "end_char": 36798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "286(2), and that the law had not been correctly laid down in The United Motors case (2)."}}, {"text": "October 21, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37040, "end_char": 37056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the decision in The Bengal Immunity Company case(') it cannot be doubted that the claim of the Andhra State to tax Explanation sales would be unconstitutional, and indeed, that was admitted by the State in a statement filed on October 21, 1955, wherein it was stated that having regard\n\n(2) [1953] S.C.R. 1069."}}, {"text": "March 21, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37537, "end_char": 37551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nJanuary 30, 1956, and that was later replaced by the The State of Sales Tax Laws Validation Act (7 of 1956) and that Andhra Pradesh came into force on March 21, 1956."}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37553, "end_char": 37562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1st day of April, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37895, "end_char": 37917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 2 of this Act runs as follows : Venkatarama Aiyar I. \"Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court no law of a State imposing, or authorising the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of any goods where such sale or purchase took place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce during the period between the 1st day of April, 1951, and the 6th day of September, 1955, shall be deemed to be invalid or ever to have been invalid merely by reason of the fact that such sale or purchase took place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce; and all such taxes levied or collected or purporting to have been levied or collected during the aforesaid period shall be deemed always to have been validly levied or collected in accordance with law.\""}}, {"text": "6th day of September, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37927, "end_char": 37953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 2 of this Act runs as follows : Venkatarama Aiyar I. \"Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court no law of a State imposing, or authorising the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of any goods where such sale or purchase took place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce during the period between the 1st day of April, 1951, and the 6th day of September, 1955, shall be deemed to be invalid or ever to have been invalid merely by reason of the fact that such sale or purchase took place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce; and all such taxes levied or collected or purporting to have been levied or collected during the aforesaid period shall be deemed always to have been validly levied or collected in accordance with law.\""}}, {"text": "February 19, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38335, "end_char": 38352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 19, 1957, the Andhra State which has become the State of Andhra Pradesh under s. 3(1) of the States Reorganisation Act (37 of 1956) filed a fresh statement that by reason of the Validation Act the State was entitled to impose tax on the Explanation sales, which had taken place during the period between the 1st day of April, 1951, and the 6th day of September, 1955 (which will hereinafter be referred to as the specified period), and that the petitions should therefore be dismissed."}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38422, "end_char": 38429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "States Reorganisation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38437, "end_char": 38462, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39169, "end_char": 39174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39642, "end_char": 39647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40140, "end_char": 40165, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40190, "end_char": 40198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40277, "end_char": 40282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40430, "end_char": 40435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 40728, "end_char": 40741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As any decision by this Court on the questions raised in the petitions must conclude similar questions under the laws of other States, those States applied for and obtained permission to intervene in these proceedings, and we have heard the Advocates-General of Madras, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar on the questions."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 40746, "end_char": 40751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As any decision by this Court on the questions raised in the petitions must conclude similar questions under the laws of other States, those States applied for and obtained permission to intervene in these proceedings, and we have heard the Advocates-General of Madras, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar on the questions."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 40921, "end_char": 40935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the main point for determination is the vires of the Sales Tax Laws Validation Act (which will hereinafter be referred to as the impugned Act), the Union of India has intervened, and the learned Solicitor-General has addressed us on the questions relating to the validity of that Act."}}, {"text": "Mysore Spinning and Manufacturing . Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 41206, "end_char": 41245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Certain assessees who are interested in the decision of the above questions also applied for and obtained permission to intervene, and they are the Mysore Spinning and Manufacturing ."}}, {"text": "Minerva Mills, Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 41251, "end_char": 41270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Co., the Minerva Mills, Ltd., the Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., and the Madura Mills Co, Ltd., and counsel appearing for them have, in general, s1,1pported the petitioners, Counsel for the Madura Mills Co. Ltd., raised a further contention different from and inconsistent with\n\nthe position taken by the petitioners and other inter- 19ss veners, and that is that under Entry 42 in List I of - the Seventh Schedule to.the Constitution, inter-State M.P •. v.sundarad d ."}}, {"text": "Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 41276, "end_char": 41304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Co., the Minerva Mills, Ltd., the Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., and the Madura Mills Co, Ltd., and counsel appearing for them have, in general, s1,1pported the petitioners, Counsel for the Madura Mills Co. Ltd., raised a further contention different from and inconsistent with\n\nthe position taken by the petitioners and other inter- 19ss veners, and that is that under Entry 42 in List I of - the Seventh Schedule to.the Constitution, inter-State M.P •. v.sundarad d ."}}, {"text": "Madura Mills Co, Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 41314, "end_char": 41335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Co., the Minerva Mills, Ltd., the Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., and the Madura Mills Co, Ltd., and counsel appearing for them have, in general, s1,1pported the petitioners, Counsel for the Madura Mills Co. Ltd., raised a further contention different from and inconsistent with\n\nthe position taken by the petitioners and other inter- 19ss veners, and that is that under Entry 42 in List I of - the Seventh Schedule to.the Constitution, inter-State M.P •. v.sundarad d ."}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41386, "end_char": 41388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madura Mills Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 41431, "end_char": 41452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Co., the Minerva Mills, Ltd., the Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., and the Madura Mills Co, Ltd., and counsel appearing for them have, in general, s1,1pported the petitioners, Counsel for the Madura Mills Co. Ltd., raised a further contention different from and inconsistent with\n\nthe position taken by the petitioners and other inter- 19ss veners, and that is that under Entry 42 in List I of - the Seventh Schedule to.the Constitution, inter-State M.P •. v.sundarad d ."}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41639, "end_char": 41655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "v.sundarad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 41696, "end_char": 41706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Co., the Minerva Mills, Ltd., the Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., and the Madura Mills Co, Ltd., and counsel appearing for them have, in general, s1,1pported the petitioners, Counsel for the Madura Mills Co. Ltd., raised a further contention different from and inconsistent with\n\nthe position taken by the petitioners and other inter- 19ss veners, and that is that under Entry 42 in List I of - the Seventh Schedule to.the Constitution, inter-State M.P •. v.sundarad d ."}}, {"text": "Union Legislature", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 41790, "end_char": 41807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "f h ram1er & Co. tra e an commerce 1s t e exc us1ve omam o t e v.\n\nUnion Legislature, that tax on inter-State sales is The state of comprised therein, that the States have accordingly Andhra Pradesh no power to tax such sales, and that Parliament is not competent to authorise them to impose such a tax, Ve11katarama and that, accordingly, the impugned Act is wholly Aiyar misconceived and inoperative. _"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42319, "end_char": 42327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42438, "end_char": 42449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42470, "end_char": 42475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42763, "end_char": 42768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42851, "end_char": 42862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43520, "end_char": 43545, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 286(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43557, "end_char": 43568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Whether the proposed imposition of tax on yarn by the Andhra State is hit by the Essential Commodities Act", "statute": "Whether the proposed imposition of tax on yarn by the Andhra State is hit by the Essential Commodities Act"}}, {"text": "have already referred to the relevant provisions of the Madras Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43927, "end_char": 43993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44154, "end_char": 44161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We have already referred to the relevant provisions of the Madras Act", "statute": "We have already referred to the relevant provisions of the Madras Act"}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 44476, "end_char": 44491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It must, therefore, be taken that under the Act, as it stood prior to the Constitution, the State of Madras had no power to impose a tax on sales of the kind mentioned in the Explanation to Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 286(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44574, "end_char": 44588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We have already referred to the relevant provisions of the Madras Act", "statute": "We have already referred to the relevant provisions of the Madras Act"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44723, "end_char": 44728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We have already referred to the relevant provisions of the Madras Act", "statute": "We have already referred to the relevant provisions of the Madras Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44877, "end_char": 44885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We have already referred to the relevant provisions of the Madras Act", "statute": "We have already referred to the relevant provisions of the Madras Act"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45079, "end_char": 45083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45134, "end_char": 45139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45554, "end_char": 45562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45778, "end_char": 45792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46141, "end_char": 46146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46185, "end_char": 46187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46224, "end_char": 46232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47948, "end_char": 47959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "M P Sunda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 48158, "end_char": 48167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19ss gave enlarged legislative powers to the State of delivery M P Sunda by an explanation sandwiched between two restrictions."}}, {"text": "Alyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48523, "end_char": 48528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yenkatarama Now, the contention of the petitioners is that these Alyar J. observations are decisive of the present controversy, because the same provision expressed in ipsissima verba cannot have one meaning in Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 286(I)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48669, "end_char": 48683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48713, "end_char": 48718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286(I)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48802, "end_char": 48816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48837, "end_char": 48842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49301, "end_char": 49306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286(I)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49875, "end_char": 49889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49897, "end_char": 49902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50030, "end_char": 50038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1955) 2 S.C.R. 6", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 50326, "end_char": 50343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50348, "end_char": 50395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 99(1 )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50544, "end_char": 50553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act", "statute": "Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50804, "end_char": 50818, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "List I of the Government of India Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50967, "end_char": 51004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 99(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51090, "end_char": 51098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List I of the Government of India Act", "statute": "List I of the Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "British India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 51139, "end_char": 51152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Indian Legislature had under Entry 54 in List I of the Government of India Act power to enact laws imposing tax on income other than agricultural income, and under s. 99(1) the law could be made \"for the whole of British India or for any part thereof\"."}}, {"text": "s. 99", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51237, "end_char": 51242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List I of the Government of India Act", "statute": "List I of the Government of India Act"}}, {"text": "Poppatlal Shah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51712, "end_char": 51726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If this doctrine of nexus is applicable to laws imposing tax on sales-and it was applied by this Court to those laws in the United Motors case(2) at p. 1079 and in Poppatlal Shah's case(') at pp."}}, {"text": "19ss", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 52668, "end_char": 52672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19ss retaining the power in the States to tax sales under - Entry 54 in List II sought to impose certain restric- M. P •. v. Sundarations on that power in Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52823, "end_char": 52831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52889, "end_char": 52903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "These considerations will clearly be inapposite in construing a taxing statute like the Madras Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 53471, "end_char": 53569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54099, "end_char": 54110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "These considerations will clearly be inapposite in construing a taxing statute like the Madras Act", "statute": "These considerations will clearly be inapposite in construing a taxing statute like the Madras Act"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54508, "end_char": 54513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "These considerations will clearly be inapposite in construing a taxing statute like the Madras Act", "statute": "These considerations will clearly be inapposite in construing a taxing statute like the Madras Act"}}, {"text": "Legislature of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 54800, "end_char": 54821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Legislature of Madras , would be incompetent to enact such a law."}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54924, "end_char": 54929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55074, "end_char": 55088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55273, "end_char": 55278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Venkatarama b fli", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 55405, "end_char": 55422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nor is there much force in the contention that the Venkatarama b fli ~~ .non-o stante clause in s. 22 has only the e ect of subtracting something from the power to tax .", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama AiyarJ."}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55450, "end_char": 55455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55572, "end_char": 55576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55588, "end_char": 55595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56819, "end_char": 56826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57005, "end_char": 57010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57074, "end_char": 57081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57097, "end_char": 57101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57546, "end_char": 57553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58168, "end_char": 58178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58334, "end_char": 58341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58453, "end_char": 58460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58471, "end_char": 58475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58532, "end_char": 58537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58560, "end_char": 58565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58625, "end_char": 58632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59037, "end_char": 59044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59049, "end_char": 59054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 59391, "end_char": 59408, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59518, "end_char": 59522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59692, "end_char": 59696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59839, "end_char": 59847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59937, "end_char": 59945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Tlte Bengal Immunity Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 60024, "end_char": 60052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that having regard to the interpretation put on that Article in Tlte Bengal Immunity Company case (1), the Explanation in s. 22 would be valid in so far as it prohibits the State of Madras from imposing a tax on sales in which goods are delivered outside Madras, though property therein passed inside that State, but that in so far as it makes taxable sales in which property passes outside the State of Madras but the goods themselves are deliyered for consumption in Madras, it is much more than bringing the State law into conformity with Art."}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60082, "end_char": 60087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60502, "end_char": 60510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60802, "end_char": 60810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60891, "end_char": 60895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60965, "end_char": 60973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61186, "end_char": 61194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61227, "end_char": 61235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S1111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61732, "end_char": 61737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62619, "end_char": 62627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62930, "end_char": 62938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63010, "end_char": 63018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63107, "end_char": 63115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63349, "end_char": 63357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63509, "end_char": 63517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63591, "end_char": 63599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63982, "end_char": 63990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64231, "end_char": 64239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64587, "end_char": 64595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64716, "end_char": 64721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64789, "end_char": 64797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65039, "end_char": 65047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65162, "end_char": 65167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65225, "end_char": 65233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67033, "end_char": 67041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67969, "end_char": 67980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68265, "end_char": 68270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68306, "end_char": 68314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68507, "end_char": 68515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68619, "end_char": 68621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68844, "end_char": 68849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Vide In re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 69588, "end_char": 69623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 69733, "end_char": 69751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would clearly be within the competence of the Madras Legislature to enact a law imposing a tax on sales conditional on the br.n enacted in Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69826, "end_char": 69837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vide In re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "Vide In re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69936, "end_char": 69941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vide In re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "Vide In re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70210, "end_char": 70221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vide In re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "Vide In re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70412, "end_char": 70417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vide In re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "Vide In re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70561, "end_char": 70569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vide In re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912", "statute": "Vide In re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "(1878) L.R. 5 I.A. 178", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 70781, "end_char": 70803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70894, "end_char": 70905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71191, "end_char": 71199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "enkatara1na Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71345, "end_char": 71362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It J' enkatara1na Aiyar J. merely enacts that such law can have no effect.", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama AiyarJ."}}, {"text": "Iadras Act makes a clear distinction between sales which are outside the operation of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 72477, "end_char": 72570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72643, "end_char": 72652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Iadras Act makes a clear distinction between sales which are outside the operation of the Act", "statute": "Iadras Act makes a clear distinction between sales which are outside the operation of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72848, "end_char": 72853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Iadras Act makes a clear distinction between sales which are outside the operation of the Act", "statute": "Iadras Act makes a clear distinction between sales which are outside the operation of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73064, "end_char": 73069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Iadras Act makes a clear distinction between sales which are outside the operation of the Act", "statute": "Iadras Act makes a clear distinction between sales which are outside the operation of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73535, "end_char": 73540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Iadras Act makes a clear distinction between sales which are outside the operation of the Act", "statute": "Iadras Act makes a clear distinction between sales which are outside the operation of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73745, "end_char": 73750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73870, "end_char": 73874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 73950, "end_char": 73967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Next in point of time is the decision of the Bombay High Court in Dial Das v. P.\n\nS. Talwalkar (2) in which the question arose with reference to s. 46 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act (Born."}}, {"text": "s. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74050, "end_char": 74055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74122, "end_char": 74127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Travancore-Cochin High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 74281, "end_char": 74309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then, there are two decisions of the Travancore-Cochin High Court, Mathew v. Travancore-Cochin Board of Revenue (3) and Cochin Coal Co., Ltd. v. State of Travancore-Cochin (4), in which it was held that s. 26 of the Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax Act corresponding to s. 22 of the Madras Act, had not the .effect of imposing, of its own force, a tax on the Explanation sales, and thedecision in Mettur Industries Ltd. v. Madras State (supra) was not followed."}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74447, "end_char": 74452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74517, "end_char": 74522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 74810, "end_char": 74827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd. v. -F Deputy CommercialTaxOfficer, Madras(') the Madras High Court re-affirmed the view which it had taken in Mettur Industries Ltd. v. State of Madras (supra), and held that s. 22 had the effect of imposing a tax on the Explanation sales."}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74936, "end_char": 74941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75082, "end_char": 75087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Andhra High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 75143, "end_char": 75160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In The Government of Andhra v._ Nooney Govindarajulu (supra), the true effect of s. 22 of the Madras Act came up for consideration before the Andhra High Court, and it was held therein, differing from Mettur Industries Ltd. v. State of Madras (') .and Dial Das v. P.S, Talwalkar (2) that in view of the observations of this Court as to the scope of the\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1957 Mad."}}, {"text": "M.P. V Snndararamiercl: Co. v.\n\nThe", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 75497, "end_char": 75532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.P. V Snndararamiercl: Co. v.\n\nThe State of Andhra Pradesh\n\nJ.:'e11katarama\n\nAiyar J.\n\nExplanation in Art."}}, {"text": "State of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 75533, "end_char": 75556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.P. V Snndararamiercl: Co. v.\n\nThe State of Andhra Pradesh\n\nJ.:'e11katarama\n\nAiyar J.\n\nExplanation in Art.", "canonical_name": "State of Antlhra Pradesh"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75600, "end_char": 75608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75637, "end_char": 75642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76324, "end_char": 76329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76441, "end_char": 76449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76538, "end_char": 76546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76864, "end_char": 76872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Laws Validation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 77080, "end_char": 77109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77182, "end_char": 77190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Laws Validation Act", "statute": "Sales Tax Laws Validation Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77514, "end_char": 77522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Laws Validation Act", "statute": "Sales Tax Laws Validation Act"}}, {"text": "January 26, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 77557, "end_char": 77573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "which came into force on January 26, 1950."}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78024, "end_char": 78029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Laws Validation Act", "statute": "Sales Tax Laws Validation Act"}}, {"text": "Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 78760, "end_char": 78766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was only later that this Court held finally in The Bengal lmmu- ."}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78904, "end_char": 78912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78937, "end_char": 78945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79023, "end_char": 79031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Septembr 6, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 79388, "end_char": 79404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The position on Septembr 6, 1955, was that the States had imposed and collected large amounts."}}, {"text": "Parliament enacted the Sales Tax Validation Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 80627, "end_char": 80680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80747, "end_char": 80756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Parliament enacted the Sales Tax Validation Ordinance", "statute": "Parliament enacted the Sales Tax Validation Ordinance"}}, {"text": "April l, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 80895, "end_char": 80908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Act provides that no law of a State imposing a tax on sales which took place in the course of interstate trade or commerce between April l, 1951, and September 6, 1955, shall be deemed to be invalid or ever to have been invalid merely by reason of the fact that such sales were in the course of inter-State trade."}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81686, "end_char": 81694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82003, "end_char": 82011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82358, "end_char": 82366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "M. P.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 82437, "end_char": 82442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. P. ~· Sundaravalidate is to confirm or ratify, and that can be only ramie~~ Co. in respect of acts which one could have himself per- The state of formed, and that if Parliament cannot enact a law Andhra Pradesh relating to sales tax, it cannot validate such a law either, and that such a law is accordingly unauthorised Venkatarama and void."}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Laws Validation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 82884, "end_char": 82913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82940, "end_char": 82944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Laws Validation Act", "statute": "Sales Tax Laws Validation Act"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83088, "end_char": 83097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Laws Validation Act", "statute": "Sales Tax Laws Validation Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83968, "end_char": 83976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84230, "end_char": 84238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84946, "end_char": 84960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85406, "end_char": 85414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85693, "end_char": 85701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 86398, "end_char": 86404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There, the question arose with reference to the validity of a mortgage of agricultural lands in the Punjab executed in the year 1933."}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86433, "end_char": 86443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1946) L.R. 73 I.A. 59", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 86747, "end_char": 86769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 298", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86932, "end_char": 86938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 86982, "end_char": 86997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 298", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87263, "end_char": 87269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India Act, 1935", "statute": "India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Atyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87343, "end_char": 87348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The mortgagor in reply relied on s. 298 (2) Vellkatarama which enacted that nothing in that section shall affect Atyar J. the operation of any law which prohibits the sale or mortgage of agricultural land situate in any particular area and owned by a person belonging to the agriculturist class."}}, {"text": "s. 298", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87606, "end_char": 87612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India Act, 1935", "statute": "India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87786, "end_char": 87791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India Act, 1935", "statute": "India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "s. 298", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88094, "end_char": 88100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88188, "end_char": 88195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 292", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88901, "end_char": 88907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 88915, "end_char": 88944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1946) L. R. 73 I.A. 59", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 89018, "end_char": 89041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of India Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 89074, "end_char": 89097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Part III of this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 89259, "end_char": 89279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 292", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89711, "end_char": 89717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part III of this Act", "statute": "Part III of this Act"}}, {"text": "s. 292", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89935, "end_char": 89941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part III of this Act", "statute": "Part III of this Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90431, "end_char": 90439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90898, "end_char": 90906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91602, "end_char": 91610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92079, "end_char": 92084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92255, "end_char": 92263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92644, "end_char": 92649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92797, "end_char": 92802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93216, "end_char": 93221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93438, "end_char": 93446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93685, "end_char": 93689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93896, "end_char": 93901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 213", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94713, "end_char": 94721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 252", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94991, "end_char": 94999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95558, "end_char": 95566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95575, "end_char": 95579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95658, "end_char": 95663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96296, "end_char": 96304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96475, "end_char": 96483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96748, "end_char": 96753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96809, "end_char": 96813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97013, "end_char": 97021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97354, "end_char": 97358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Andlira Pratfesh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 98554, "end_char": 98570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of decisio 1 idn Dialdas v. P.rt~· Tathlwalkatt~') already citehi~' -..., Andlira Pratfesh was re te on as suppo mg e Ptl 1 toners on t s point."}}, {"text": "Venkatarama\n\nAiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 98625, "end_char": 98643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Venkatarama\n\nAiyar J.", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama AiyarJ."}}, {"text": "Bengal Immu- 1958 nity Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 100462, "end_char": 100492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "......\n\nthat obligation by the judgment in The Bengal Immu- 1958 nity Company case (1) and that, further, to validate - only levies and collections made would give an advan- M. P. !'"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101037, "end_char": 101041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "impugned Act is in no sence a temporary Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 101778, "end_char": 101821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102481, "end_char": 102486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But the impugned Act is in no sence a temporary Act", "statute": "But the impugned Act is in no sence a temporary Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102630, "end_char": 102638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "But the impugned Act is in no sence a temporary Act", "statute": "But the impugned Act is in no sence a temporary Act"}}, {"text": "ramier & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 102735, "end_char": 102747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is argued that a statute\n\nramier & Co. which is unconstitutional is a nullity and must be\n\nThe ;; ate of treated as non est and that the impugned Act could Andhra Pradesh not infuse life into it."}}, {"text": "Aiyor", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103050, "end_char": 103055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be open, it is said, to the Legislature of the State of Andhra to enact a Venkatarama fresh law giving it even retrospective operation as Aiyor J. provided in the impugned Act, but in the absence of such a legislation, the provisions of the Act as they stood prior to the impugned Act are incapable of enforcement.", "canonical_name": "Aiyar"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103281, "end_char": 103286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Willoughby", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 106308, "end_char": 106318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, Vol."}}, {"text": "United States", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 106346, "end_char": 106359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, Vol."}}, {"text": "Rottschafer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 108946, "end_char": 108957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rottschafer after referring to the conflict of authorities on this question in the States, refers to the decision in Wilkerson v. Rahrer (') as embodying the better view."}}, {"text": "S. 545", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109234, "end_char": 109240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109323, "end_char": 109330, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "MacDermott Tiie", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 109576, "end_char": 109591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "h 11 c •t tram1er & Co. llllpose y t is su -section s a so iar as 1 con ra- _ v. venes these restrictions, be viod\", Lord MacDermott Tiie State of L. C. J. observed : AndhraPradeslt \"I am not aware of any authority for the view I h h. 1 h Yellkatarama that anguage sue as t is necessan y means t at Aiyar J. contravention must produce an actual gap in the statute book in the sense that the measure concerned, or some specific part thereof, simply drops out of the authorized text."}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110078, "end_char": 110090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1 )(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110971, "end_char": 110985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "(1955) 1 S. C.R. 613", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 111429, "end_char": 111449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111684, "end_char": 111691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "0 • Judgment, Mahajan C. J. made the following observa- The Stat• of tions, which are relied on by the petitioners : Andhra Pradesh \"The constitutional invalidity of a part of section 13(b) of the Bombay Prohibition Act having been Venkatareinca declared by this Court, that part of the section ceased Aiyar J. to have any legal effect in judging cases of citizens and had to be regarded as null and void in determining whether a citizen was guilty of an offence.\""}}, {"text": "section 13(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111846, "end_char": 111859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112469, "end_char": 112476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112554, "end_char": 112561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113455, "end_char": 113460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113479, "end_char": 113484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113559, "end_char": 113567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 114075, "end_char": 114089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This contention was rejected by Andhra Pradesh the High Court, which limited the deduction to purchase of copra relating to the sales inside the State, Venkatarama and in affirming that decision, this Court observed : Aiyar 1• \"In our opinion, section 26 of the Act, in cases falling within the categories specified under Article 286 of the Constitution has the effect of setting at nought and of obliterating in regard thereto the provisions contained in the Act relating to the imposition of tax on the sale or purchase of such goods and in particular the provisions contained in the charging section and the provisions obtained in rule 20(2) and other provisions which are incidental to the process of levying such tax."}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114287, "end_char": 114297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114365, "end_char": 114376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114825, "end_char": 114836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114879, "end_char": 114889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115069, "end_char": 115079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115445, "end_char": 115453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 115719, "end_char": 115724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116059, "end_char": 116064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sundarathe Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 116076, "end_char": 116111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh Province", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 116262, "end_char": 116285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "sions which authorised the Provincial Government The ste 01 \"to take up the entire motor transport business in the Andhra Pradesh Province and run it in competition with and even to the exclusion of motor transport operators\"."}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116592, "end_char": 116605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sundarathe Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "Sundarathe Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "June 18, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 116649, "end_char": 116662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Constitution, however, was amended on June 18, 1951, and Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116668, "end_char": 116678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sundarathe Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "Sundarathe Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 116881, "end_char": 116886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sundarathe Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "Sundarathe Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117009, "end_char": 117014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sundarathe Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "Sundarathe Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117284, "end_char": 117289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117582, "end_char": 117587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "AndhraPradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 118589, "end_char": 118602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On this view, the contention of the petition- AndhraPradesh ers with reference to the Explanation in s. 22 of the Madras Act must fail."}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118644, "end_char": 118649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118961, "end_char": 118969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119324, "end_char": 119335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119627, "end_char": 119633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 119634, "end_char": 119636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120329, "end_char": 120336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120613, "end_char": 120624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120741, "end_char": 120752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 372(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121007, "end_char": 121018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121126, "end_char": 121137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "March 31, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 121234, "end_char": 121248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Laws up to March 31, 1951, and Art, 286(2) itself enacts that no law of a State shall impose a tax."}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121694, "end_char": 121705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121742, "end_char": 121747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121906, "end_char": 121917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Madura Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 122107, "end_char": 122124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V) We shall now deal with the contention of the learned counsel for the Madura Mills Ltd., who struck a 'new path cutting across the lines on which the petitioners and the other interveners proceeded."}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122341, "end_char": 122357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 123002, "end_char": 123007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 123327, "end_char": 123331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of the United\n\nStates", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 123455, "end_char": 123490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United\n\nStates as meaning that the Stat.s have no power to enact a law imposing a tax on the carrying on of inter-State trade [Vide Robins v. Taxing District of Shelby County(1), or imposing tax on inter-State sales [Vide McLeod v. Dilworth Co. (2)]."}}, {"text": "Art. 246(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124136, "end_char": 124147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 46(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124181, "end_char": 124191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124261, "end_char": 124272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124411, "end_char": 124416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124618, "end_char": 124626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124678, "end_char": 124686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124716, "end_char": 124724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. 489", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124920, "end_char": 124926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 327", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124961, "end_char": 124967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 125030, "end_char": 125035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 125642, "end_char": 125671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 126142, "end_char": 126171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Having regard to the connotation of that Entry in the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 126830, "end_char": 126913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "of India Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 127238, "end_char": 127250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 128088, "end_char": 128104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Entry in the Government\n\nof India Act", "statute": "Entry in the Government\n\nof India Act"}}, {"text": "ramler&Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 129639, "end_char": 129649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ramler&Co."}}, {"text": "Art. 248", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 130085, "end_char": 130093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 130439, "end_char": 130450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 130691, "end_char": 130702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 130896, "end_char": 130907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 131171, "end_char": 131182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 131840, "end_char": 131851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132035, "end_char": 132037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132149, "end_char": 132160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 132218, "end_char": 132240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "286(2) was -· of the same character, and that it merely enabled Venkatarama Parliament to continue pre-Constitution laws."}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132335, "end_char": 132346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132431, "end_char": 132442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 287", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132466, "end_char": 132474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132606, "end_char": 132617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133087, "end_char": 133098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133212, "end_char": 133223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133658, "end_char": 133672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135049, "end_char": 135057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135314, "end_char": 135322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 246(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135642, "end_char": 135653, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 246(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135686, "end_char": 135697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "had in the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 137773, "end_char": 137813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1945) L.R. 72 I.A. 91", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 138453, "end_char": 138475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139110, "end_char": 139115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139170, "end_char": 139178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 304(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139224, "end_char": 139235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139316, "end_char": 139324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 297(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139393, "end_char": 139405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139493, "end_char": 139501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 297(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139503, "end_char": 139515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139578, "end_char": 139586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139754, "end_char": 139765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 140578, "end_char": 140598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "VI) Another contention urged by the petitioners is that the levy of tax proposed to be made by the Andhra State on the sale of yarn by them to dealers in the State of Andhra is illegal, because under the Madras Act and the Rules made thereunder, where there are successive sales of yarn the tax can be imposed at only one point, and as the Government of Madras had already imposed a tax on the sale within that State, a second levy on the self-same goods by the\n\nState of Andhra is unauthorised, and that therefore\n\n....\n\n the threatened proceedings for assessment are incom- 1958 petent."}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 140971, "end_char": 140973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 141085, "end_char": 141087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "An.ihraPradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 141149, "end_char": 141163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 f h 1 li t l ramier & Co. s1ve sa es o yarn, it can ave on y app cation o sa es v in the State of Madras, as it would be incompetent to The s1~1e of the Legislature of Madras to enact a law to operate in An.ihraPradesh another State."}}, {"text": "s. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 141201, "end_char": 141206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Andhra State Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 141214, "end_char": 141236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 141544, "end_char": 141549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Andhra State Act, 1953", "statute": "the Andhra State Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "Andhra was substituted for Madras in the Madras General Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 141776, "end_char": 141845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 141925, "end_char": 141950, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 142011, "end_char": 142019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Andhra was substituted for Madras in the Madras General Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Andhra was substituted for Madras in the Madras General Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 53 and 54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 142177, "end_char": 142190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Andhra was substituted for Madras in the Madras General Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Andhra was substituted for Madras in the Madras General Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Andhra State Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 142198, "end_char": 142214, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 142476, "end_char": 142484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Andhra was substituted for Madras in the Madras General Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Andhra was substituted for Madras in the Madras General Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Andhra State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 142584, "end_char": 142596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Madras Act was in force in the territories which now form part to the Andhra State until October I, 1953, and thereafter that Act continues to be in operation by force of s. 53 of the Andhra State Act."}}, {"text": "October I, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 142603, "end_char": 142618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Madras Act was in force in the territories which now form part to the Andhra State until October I, 1953, and thereafter that Act continues to be in operation by force of s. 53 of the Andhra State Act."}}, {"text": "s. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 142685, "end_char": 142690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Andhra was substituted for Madras in the Madras General Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Andhra was substituted for Madras in the Madras General Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Andhra State Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 142698, "end_char": 142714, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 142862, "end_char": 142867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 142913, "end_char": 142921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "should add that the Essential Commodities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 142949, "end_char": 142994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "M. P. V. Sundarabeen", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 143020, "end_char": 143040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We should add that the Essential Commodities Act (LU of 1952) ha~ itself\n\nM. P. V. Sundarabeen repealed and is no longer in operation.", "canonical_name": "M. P. V. SUNDARARAMIER & CO"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 143285, "end_char": 143290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We should add that the Essential Commodities Act", "statute": "We should add that the Essential Commodities Act"}}, {"text": "State of Antlhra Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 143375, "end_char": 143399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Antlhra Pradesh\n\nvenkatarama goods were delivered qot in the State of Andhra but Aiyar J. in Madras.", "canonical_name": "State of Antlhra Pradesh"}}, {"text": "SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 143895, "end_char": 143901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SARKAR J.-The petitioners who are dealers in cotton yarn carrying on business in the city of Madras had sold goods to various persons in the State of Andhra.", "canonical_name": "Sarkar"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 145190, "end_char": 145211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 145342, "end_char": 145353, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "M. P. Sundarathat ram1er cl Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 145387, "end_char": 145418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Article 372 (2) of the Constitution provides M. P. Sundarathat ram1er cl Co. ' \"For the purpose of bringing the provisions of The State of any law in force in the territory of India into accord A11dhr11 Pradesh with the provisions of this Constitution, the President may by order make such adaptations and modifications SarkarJ. of such law, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary or expedient.\""}}, {"text": "Article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 145758, "end_char": 145769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 145918, "end_char": 145926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(I)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 147471, "end_char": 147485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "March 30, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 147690, "end_char": 147704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court held' by its judgment pronounced by a majority, on March 30, 1953, that a State could tax a sale under which goods were delivered within its territories for consumption there though the property in the goods passed beyond its territories and a provision in a State statute purporting to levy such a tax did not contravene Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 147961, "end_char": 147969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 147972, "end_char": 147978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarkar I.", "canonical_name": "Sarkar"}}, {"text": "October 1, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 148034, "end_char": 148049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Andhra is a new State which came into existence on October 1, 1953."}}, {"text": "was created by the Andhra State Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 148054, "end_char": 148095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 148307, "end_char": 148317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "It was created by the Andhra State Act, 1953", "statute": "It was created by the Andhra State Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "Andhra State Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 148325, "end_char": 148341, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 148627, "end_char": 148632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "It was created by the Andhra State Act, 1953", "statute": "It was created by the Andhra State Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "Madras the name Andhra wherever it occurred in that Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 148789, "end_char": 148844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Act the Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 148873, "end_char": 148894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 149366, "end_char": 149374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act the Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Act the Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 150154, "end_char": 150168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ordinance called the Sales Tax\n\nLaws VaUdation Ordinance, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 150627, "end_char": 150689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sales Trut Laws Validation Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 150807, "end_char": 150843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Xed by the respondent notwithstanding the Validation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 153067, "end_char": 153123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 153336, "end_char": 153343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Xed by the respondent notwithstanding the Validation Act", "statute": "Xed by the respondent notwithstanding the Validation Act"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 153655, "end_char": 153660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Xed by the respondent notwithstanding the Validation Act", "statute": "Xed by the respondent notwithstanding the Validation Act"}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 153804, "end_char": 153814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Xed by the respondent notwithstanding the Validation Act", "statute": "Xed by the respondent notwithstanding the Validation Act"}}, {"text": "S. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 153867, "end_char": 153872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Xed by the respondent notwithstanding the Validation Act", "statute": "Xed by the respondent notwithstanding the Validation Act"}}, {"text": "31st day of March 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 154358, "end_char": 154380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nothing contained in this Act shall be 1958 deemed to impose or authorise the imposition of, a - tax on the sale or purchase of any goods, where such M. P. ~· Sundarasale or purchase takes place ramier & Co. v. (a)(i) outside the State cf Andhra, or Th(State o\n\n(ii) in the course of the import of the goods into Andhra Pradesh the territory of India or of the export of the goods out of such territory, or\n\n(b) except in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide, after the 31st day of March 1951 in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, and the provisions of this Act shall be read and construed accordingly. ·"}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 158187, "end_char": 158189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 158706, "end_char": 158711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 158759, "end_char": 158773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 159240, "end_char": 159248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 159278, "end_char": 159283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 159758, "end_char": 159772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 159798, "end_char": 159803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 159994, "end_char": 159999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Why The State of should the Explanation in this Andbra Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 160434, "end_char": 160492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Andhra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 161599, "end_char": 161605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such an objection would be pointless because Andhra by saying that a sale shall be deemed to have taken place inside another State is only legislating for itself and only saying that such a sale is therefore an outside sale so far as it is concerned and cannot be taxed in view of s. 22(a) of its Act."}}, {"text": "s. 22(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 161835, "end_char": 161843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286(J)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 161919, "end_char": 161933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "VIVIAN\n\nBOSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 163394, "end_char": 163406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "VIRSA SINGH v.\n\nTHE STATE OF PUNJAB (JAFER IMAM, GAIENDRAGADKAR and VIVIAN\n\nBOSE JJ.)", "canonical_name": "VIVIAN BosE JJ."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 163672, "end_char": 163689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 300, 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 163709, "end_char": 163718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 164056, "end_char": 164062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 164063, "end_char": 164080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 164148, "end_char": 164154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 164155, "end_char": 164172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 164252, "end_char": 164258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 164259, "end_char": 164276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}]}
{"document_id": "1958_1_1495_1504_EN", "year": 1958, "text": "s.c.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1495\n\nexplai11 when it is deemed to have taken place outside 1958 any State whatsoever that State ma)'.· be. I am there- M. P. v. Sundarafore unable to see that the Explanation has any facet ramier & co. showing what would be a sale inside Andhra. v.\n\nThe conclusion that T reach is that the Sales Tax The State oJ Act with which these cases are concerned does not Andhra Pradesh authorise the taxing of a sale under which goods are Sarkar J. delivered in Andhra but the property in them passes in Madras. In this view of the matter I do not think it necessary to discuss the various other grounds on which the respondent's right to tax these sales was also challenged. In the result I would allow these petitions.\n\nBY COURT : In view of the opinion of the majority, the petitions are dismissed. The parties are to bear their own costs.\n\nPetitions dismissed.\n\nVIRSA SINGH v.\n\nTHE STATE OF PUNJAB (JAFER IMAM, GAIENDRAGADKAR and VIVIAN\n\nBOSE JJ.)\n\nCriminal Trial-Culpable homicide amounting to murder- Prosecution to prove-Presence and Nature of Injury-Intention to cause that Particular Injury, which was 118<1 accidental or unintentional and was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature-Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 300, 3rdly.\n\nThe accused thrust a spear into the abdomen of the deceased.\n\nThis injury caused his death.\n\nIn the opinion of the doctor the injury was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. It was found by the Sessions Judge that the accused intended tc cause grievous hurt only.\n\nIn his opinion however the third clause of s. 300 Indian Penal Code applied.\n\nHe accordingly convicted and sentenced the accused under s. 302 Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe High Court upheld the conviction. It was argued that the third clause of s. 300 Indian Penal Code did not apply as it was not proved that the accused intended to inflict a\n\nMarch II.\n\n1958 bodily injury that was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature as s. 300 lndim Penal Code third clause states, Virsa Singh \"If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any v. person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient Tlie State of Punjab in the ordinary course of nature to cause death\" : Held, that the prosecution must prove the following before it can bring a case under s. 300 Indian Penal Code third clause.\n\n(1) It must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present.\n\n(2) The nature of the injury must be proved; these are purely objective investigations. ( 3) It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended. ( 4) It must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.\n\nThis part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender.\n\nThe third clause of s. 300 Indian Penal Code consists of two parts.\n\nUnder the firsi part it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict the injury that is found to be present and under the second part it must be proved that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.\n\nThe words \"and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted\" are merely descriptive.\n\nAll this means is, that it is not enough to prove that the injury found to be present is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature; it must in addition be shown that the injury found to be present was the injury intended to be inflicted. Whether it was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature is a matter of inference or deduction from the proved facts about the nature of the injury and has nothing to do with the question of intention.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 90...of 1957.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated November 21, 1956, of the Punjab High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 326 of 1956 arising out of the judgment and order dated June 26, 1956, of the Court of the Sessions Judge at Ferozepore in Sessions Case No. 8 of 1956. Jai Gopal Sethi and R. L. Kohli, for the appellant.\n\nN. S. Bindra and T. M. Sen, for the respondent.\n\n1958. March 11. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n' ,.\n\nBOSE J.-The appellant Virsa Singh has been 1958 sentenced to imprisonment for life under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code for the murder of one Khem Singh.\n\nVlrsa Singh He was grantd pcial leave to appeal by this Court The 8101;01 Punjab but the leave is limited to\n\n\"the question that on the finding accepted by the Bose J.\n\nPunjab High Court what offence is made out as having been committed by the petitioner.\"\n\nThe appellant was tried with five others under ss. 302/149, 324/149 and 323/149 Indian Penal Code.\n\nHe was also charged individually under s. 302.\n\nThe others were acquitted of the murder charge by the first Court but were convicted under ss. 3i6, 324 and 323 read with s. 149, .Indian Penal Code: On appeal to the High Court they were all acquitted.\n\nThe appellant was convicted by the first Court under s. 302 and his conviction and sentence . were upheld by the High Court.\n\nThere was only one injury on Khem Singh and both Courts are agreed that the appellant caused . it. It was caused as the result of a spear thrust and the doctor who examined Khem Singh, while he was still alive, said that it was\n\n\"a punctured wound 2\" x r transverse in direction on the left side of the abdominal wail in the lower part of the iliac region just above the inguinal canal.\n\nHe also said that \"Three coils of intestines were coming out of the wound.\"\n\nThe incident occurred about 8 p. m. on July 13,\n\n1955. Khem Singh died about 5 p. m. the following day.\n\nThe doctor who conducted the post-mortem described the injury as-\n\n\"an oblique incised stitched wound 2f on the lower part of left side of belly, 1!\" abov~ the left inguinal ligament. The injury was through the hole thickness of the abdominal wall. Peritonitis was present and there was digested food in that cavity.\n\nFlakes of pus were sticking round the small intestines M2SC (Part X)/61-10\n\n19ss and there were six cuts ........... at various places, and digested food was flowing out from three cuts.\" Ylrsa Singh The doctor said that the injury was sufficient to cause The Stat;~! Punjab death in the ordinary course of nature.\n\nThe learned Sessions Judge found that the appel- Bose J. !ant was 21 or 22 years old and said-\n\n\"When the common object of the assembly seems to have been to cause grievous hurts only, I do not suppose Virsa Singh actually had the intention to cause the death of Khem Singh, but by a rash and silly act he gave a rather forceful blow, which ultimately caused his death. Peritonitis also supervened and that hastened the death of Khem Singh. But for that Khem Singh may perhaps not have died or may have lived a little longer.\" Basing on those facts, he said that the case fell under s. 300, 3rdly and so he convicted under s. 302, Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe learned High Court Judges considered that \"the whole affair was sudden and occurred on a chance meeting.\" But they accepted the finding that the appellant inflicted the injury on Khem Singh an<l accepted the medical testimony that the blow was a fatal one.\n\nIt was argued with much circumlocution that the facts set out above do not disclose an offence of murder because the prosecution has not proved that there was an intention to inflict a bodily injury that was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Section 300, 3rdly was quoted :\n\n\"If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death . \" It was said that the intention that the section requires must be related, not only to the bodily injury inflicted, but also to the clause, \"and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.\" This is a favourite argument in this kind of case but is fallacious. If there is an intention to inflict an injury that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSBPREME COURT REPORTS 1499\n\ncourse of nature, then the intention is to kill and in 19ss that event, the \"thirdly\" would be unnecessary because the act would fall under the first part of the Vlrsa Singh section, namely- TlieStat; f Pun}ob \"If the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death.\" Bose 1.\n\nJn our opinion, the two clauses are disjunctive and separate. The first is subjective to the offender :\n\n\"If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person.\"\n\nIt must, of course, first be found that bodily injury was caused and the nature of the injury must be established, that is to say, whether the injury is on the leg or the arm or the stomach, how deep it penetrated, whether any vital organs were cut and so forth. These are purely objective facts and leave no room for inference or deduction : to that extent the enquiry is objective; but when it comes to the question of intention, that is subjective to the offender and it must be proved that he had an intention to cause the bodily injury that is found to be present.\n\nOnce that is found, the enquiry shifts to the next clause-\n\n\" and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.\" The first part of this is descriptive of the earlier part of the section, namely, the infliction of bodily injury with the intention to inflict it, that is to say, if the circumstances justify an inference that a man's intention was only to inflict a blow on the lower part of the\n\nleg, or some lesser blow, and it can be shown that the blow landed in the region of the heart by accident, then, though an injury to the heart is shown to be present, the intention to inflict an injury in that region, or of that nature, is not proved. In that case, the first part of the clause does not come into play. But once it is proved that there was an intention to inflict the injury that is found to be present, then the earlier part of the clause we are now examining - M2SC (Part X)/61-11\n\n19ss \"and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted\" is merely descriptive. All it means is that it is not Vlr1a Singh enough to prove that the injury found to be present\n\n77ie s1.,;~, Punjab is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of\n\n_ na, ture; it must in addition be shown that the injury Bose J. is of the kind that falls within the earlier clause, namely, that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted. Whether it was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature is a matter of inference or deduction from the proved facts about the nature of the injury and has nothing to do with the question of intention.\n\nIn considering whether the intention was to inflict the injury found to have been inflicted, the enquiry necessarily proceeds on broad lines as, for example, whether there was an intention to strike at a vital or a dangerous spot, and whether with sufficient force to cause the kind of injury found to have been inflicted.\n\nIt is, of course, not necessary to enquire into every last detail as, for instance, whether the prisoner intended to have the bowels fall out, or whether he intended to penetrate the liver or the kidneys or the heart. Otherwise, a man who has no knowledge of anatomy could never be convicted, for, if he does not know that there is a heart or kidney or bowels, he cannot be said to have intended to injure them. Of course, that is not the kind of enquiry. It is broadbased and simple and based on commonsense : the kind of enquiry that \"twelve good men and true\" could readily appreciate and understand.\n\nTo put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under s. 300, \"3rdly\";\n\nFirst, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present; Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These are purely objective investigations.\n\nThirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended.\n\n--•,\n\nOnce these three elements are proved to be present, 19ss the enquiry proceeds further and, Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the Virsa Singh type just dscribed. made up of the thee elemens set The Stat:~! Punjab -0ut above is sufficient to . cause death m the ordinary _ -course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely Bose J. objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender.\n\nOnce these four elements are established by the prosecution (and, of course, the burden is on the prosecution throughout ) the offence is murder under s. 300, 3rdly. It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter that there )Vas no intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature (not that there is any real distinction between the two). It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the enquiry .is purely objective and the -only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference,. the injury is sufficient in the -ordinary course of nature to cause death. No one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder.\n\nIf they inflict injuries of that kind, they must face the consequences; and they can only escape if it can be shown, or reasonably deduced that the 'injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional.\n\nWe were referred to a decision of Lord Goddard in R. v. Steane (') where the learned Chief Justice says that where a particular intent must be laid and charged, that particular intent must be proved. Of course it must, and of course it must be proved by the prosecution. The only question here is, what is the extent and nature of the intent that s. 300 3rdly requires, and how is it to be proved ?\n\nThe learned counsel for the appellant next relied on a passage where the learned Chief Justice says that :\n\n(1) [1947] 1 All K R, 813, 816.\n\nVirsa Singh\n\nVo Tiie Stale of\n\nPunjab\n\nBose J.\n\n\"if, on the totality of the evidence, there is room for more than one view as to the intent of the prisoner, the jury shoul~ be directed that it is for the. prosecution to prove the intent to the jury's satisfaction, and if, on a review of the whole evidence, they either think that the intent did not exist or they are left in doubt as to the intent, the prisoner is entitled to be acquitted.\" We agree that that is also the law in India. But so is this. We qoute a few sentences earlier from the same learned judgment :\n\n\"No doubt, if the prosecution prove an act the natural consequences of which would be a certain result and no evidence or explanation is given, then a jury may, on a proper -direction, find that the prisoner is guilty of doing the act with the intent alleged.\" That is exactly the position here. No evidence or explanation. is given about why the appellant thrust a spear, into the abdomen of the deceased with such force that it penetrated the bowels and three coils of the intestines came out of tl; le wound and that digested food oozed out from cuts in three places. In the absence of evidence, or reasonable explanation, that the prisoner did not intend to stab in the stomach with a degree of force sufficient to penetrate that far into the body, or to indicate that his act was a regrettable accident and that he intended otherwise, it would be perverse to conclude that he did not intend to inflict the injury that he did. Once that intent is established (and no other conclusion is reasonably possible in this case and in any case it is a question of fact), the rest is a matter for objective determination from the medical and other evidence about the nature and seriousness of the injury.\n\nThe learned counsel for the appellant referred us to Emperor v. Sardarkhan Jaridkhan (')where Beaman J. says that-\n\n\"Where death is caused by a single blow, it is always much more difficult to be absolutely certain what degree of bodily injury the offender intended.\"\n\nWith due respect to the learned Judge he has linked\n\n{<) (1917) LL.R. 41 Born. 23, 29.\n\n-->\n\nup the intent required with the seriousness of the injury, and that, as we have shown, is not what the section requires. The two matters are quite separate and distinct, though the evidence about them may sometimes overlap. The question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict a serious injury or a trivial one but whether he intended to inflict the injury that is proved to be present. If he can show that he did not, or if the totality of the circumstances justify such an inference, then, of course, the intent that the section requires is not proved. But if there is nothing beyond the injury and the fact that the appellant inflicted it, the only possible inference is that he intended to inflict it. Whether he knew of its seriousness, or intended serious consequences, is neither here nor there. The question, .so far as the intention is concerned, is not whether he intended to\n\nkill, or to inflict an injury of a particular degree of seriousness, but whether he intended to inflict the injury in question; and once the existence of the injury is proved the intention to cause it will be presumed unless the idence or the circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion. But whether the intention is there or not is one of fact and not one of law. Whether the wound is serious or otherwise, and if serious, how serious, is a totally separate and distinct question and has nothing to do with the question whether the prisoner intended to inflict the injury in question.\n\nIt is true that in a given case the enquiry may be linked up with the seriousness of the injury. For example, if it can be proved, or if the totality of the circumstances justify an inference, that the prisoner only intended a superficial scratch and that by accident his victim stumbled and fell on the sword or spear that was used, then of course the offence is not murder. But that is not because the prisoner did not intend the injury that he intended to inflict to be as serious as it turned out to be but because he did not intend to inflict the injury in question at all. His intention in such a case would be to inflict a totally different injury. The difference is not one of law but\n\nVirsa Singh\n\nTile State of Punjab\n\nBose J.\n\nVirsa Singh\n\nThe Stale of Punjab\n\nBose J.\n\nMarch 19.\n\none' of .fact; and whether the conclusion should be one way or .the the~ is a matter of prof, where necessary, by ca, lling Ih aid all reasonable mferences of fact in the absence of direct testimony. It is not one for guess-work and fanciful conjecture.\n\nThe appeal is dismissed.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nBALA SUBRAHMANYA RAJARAM v.\n\nB.C.\n\nPATIL AND OTHERS (JAFER IMAM, SUBBA RAo and VIVIAN BOSE JJ.)\n\nWages-If include bonus awarded by Industrial Court-Payment of Wages Act (/J1of1936), s. 2(vi), JJ.\n\nThe Industrial Court, Bombay, awarded bonus equal to 4! months' wages to the operatives of the Tata Mills Ltd. and directed that those operatives who were no longer in the service of the Mills should be paid the bonus in one lump sum by a fixed date and in such cases claims in writing should be made to the Manager of the Mills. The operatives who made a claim before the date fixed were duly paid but payment was r.efused to operatives who applied after that date. The operatives who had been refused payment made applications to the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act. The Mills contended that the Authority had no jurisdiction to entertain the application, but the contention was rejected. The Mills filed a writ petition before the Bombay High Court which was dismissed by a Single Judge and an appeal against that decision was also dismissed by a Division Bench: Held, that the bonus awarded by the Industrial Court was not wages within the meaning of s. 2 (vi) of the Payment of Wages Act and as such the Authority had no jurisdiction to entertain the application made to it under s. 15 of the Act. Though such bonus was remuneration it was not remuneration payable on the fulfilment of the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, as required by s. 2 (vi).\n\nF. W. Heilgers cl Co. v. N. C. ChalSJavarthi, [1949] F.C.R 356, followed.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 35 & 36 of 1954.\n\n.... '", "total_entities": 66, "entities": [{"text": "Andhra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 270, "end_char": 276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I am there- M. P. v. Sundarafore unable to see that the Explanation has any facet ramier & co. showing what would be a sale inside Andhra."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 395, "end_char": 409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nThe conclusion that T reach is that the Sales Tax The State oJ Act with which these cases are concerned does not Andhra Pradesh authorise the taxing of a sale under which goods are Sarkar J. delivered in Andhra but the property in them passes in Madras."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 528, "end_char": 534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nThe conclusion that T reach is that the Sales Tax The State oJ Act with which these cases are concerned does not Andhra Pradesh authorise the taxing of a sale under which goods are Sarkar J. delivered in Andhra but the property in them passes in Madras."}}, {"text": "VIRSA SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 890, "end_char": 901, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIRSA SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF PUNJAB (JAFER IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 906, "end_char": 937, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF PUNJAB (JAFER IMAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BOSE JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 966, "end_char": 974, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BOSE JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1236, "end_char": 1253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 300, 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1273, "end_char": 1282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1620, "end_char": 1626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1627, "end_char": 1644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1712, "end_char": 1718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1719, "end_char": 1736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1816, "end_char": 1822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1823, "end_char": 1840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2017, "end_char": 2023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2030, "end_char": 2040, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Virsa Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2062, "end_char": 2073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1958 bodily injury that was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature as s. 300 lndim Penal Code third clause states, Virsa Singh \"If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any v. person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient Tlie State of Punjab in the ordinary course of nature to cause death\" : Held, that the prosecution must prove the following before it can bring a case under s. 300 Indian Penal Code third clause.", "canonical_name": "VIRSA SINGH"}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2216, "end_char": 2231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1958 bodily injury that was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature as s. 300 lndim Penal Code third clause states, Virsa Singh \"If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any v. person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient Tlie State of Punjab in the ordinary course of nature to cause death\" : Held, that the prosecution must prove the following before it can bring a case under s. 300 Indian Penal Code third clause."}}, {"text": "s. 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2368, "end_char": 2374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2375, "end_char": 2392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3082, "end_char": 3088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3089, "end_char": 3106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Jai Gopal Sethi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4279, "end_char": 4294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jai Gopal Sethi and R. L. Kohli, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. L. Kohli", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4299, "end_char": 4310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jai Gopal Sethi and R. L. Kohli, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "N. S. Bindra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4332, "end_char": 4344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. S. Bindra and T. M. Sen, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "T. M. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4349, "end_char": 4358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. S. Bindra and T. M. Sen, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "BOSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4447, "end_char": 4451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BOSE J.-The appellant Virsa Singh has been 1958 sentenced to imprisonment for life under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code for the murder of one Khem Singh.", "canonical_name": "BOSE JJ."}}, {"text": "Virsa Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4469, "end_char": 4480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BOSE J.-The appellant Virsa Singh has been 1958 sentenced to imprisonment for life under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code for the murder of one Khem Singh.", "canonical_name": "VIRSA SINGH"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4536, "end_char": 4542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4550, "end_char": 4567, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Khem Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4590, "end_char": 4600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BOSE J.-The appellant Virsa Singh has been 1958 sentenced to imprisonment for life under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code for the murder of one Khem Singh."}}, {"text": "Vlrsa Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4603, "end_char": 4614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vlrsa Singh He was grantd pcial leave to appeal by this Court The 8101;01 Punjab but the leave is limited to\n\n\"the question that on the finding accepted by the Bose J.\n\nPunjab High Court what offence is made out as having been committed by the petitioner.\"", "canonical_name": "VIRSA SINGH"}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4763, "end_char": 4767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vlrsa Singh He was grantd pcial leave to appeal by this Court The 8101;01 Punjab but the leave is limited to\n\n\"the question that on the finding accepted by the Bose J.\n\nPunjab High Court what offence is made out as having been committed by the petitioner.\"", "canonical_name": "BOSE JJ."}}, {"text": "ss. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4908, "end_char": 4915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4941, "end_char": 4958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5000, "end_char": 5006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "ss. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5100, "end_char": 5105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5131, "end_char": 5137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5140, "end_char": 5157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5266, "end_char": 5272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "July 13,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5843, "end_char": 5851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The incident occurred about 8 p. m. on July 13,\n\n1955."}}, {"text": "Ylrsa Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6415, "end_char": 6426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ylrsa Singh The doctor said that the injury was sufficient to cause The Stat;~!", "canonical_name": "VIRSA SINGH"}}, {"text": "s. 300, 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7126, "end_char": 7135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7166, "end_char": 7172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7174, "end_char": 7191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 300, 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7724, "end_char": 7738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10588, "end_char": 10590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12119, "end_char": 12125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 300, 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13105, "end_char": 13114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Goddard", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14191, "end_char": 14198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We were referred to a decision of Lord Goddard in R. v. Steane (') where the learned Chief Justice says that where a particular intent must be laid and charged, that particular intent must be proved."}}, {"text": "s. 300", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14499, "end_char": 14505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15174, "end_char": 15179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We agree that that is also the law in India."}}, {"text": "Beaman", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16559, "end_char": 16565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned counsel for the appellant referred us to Emperor v. Sardarkhan Jaridkhan (')where Beaman J. says that-\n\n\"Where death is caused by a single blow, it is always much more difficult to be absolutely certain what degree of bodily injury the offender intended.\""}}, {"text": "Virsa Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19004, "end_char": 19015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The difference is not one of law but\n\nVirsa Singh\n\nTile State of Punjab\n\nBose J.\n\nVirsa Singh\n\nThe Stale of Punjab\n\nBose J.\n\nMarch 19.", "canonical_name": "VIRSA SINGH"}}, {"text": "SUBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19467, "end_char": 19476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BALA SUBRAHMANYA RAJARAM v.\n\nB.C.\n\nPATIL AND OTHERS (JAFER IMAM, SUBBA RAo and VIVIAN BOSE JJ.)"}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BOSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19481, "end_char": 19492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BALA SUBRAHMANYA RAJARAM v.\n\nB.C.\n\nPATIL AND OTHERS (JAFER IMAM, SUBBA RAo and VIVIAN BOSE JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Wages-If include bonus awarded by Industrial Court-Payment of Wages Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19499, "end_char": 19570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 2(vi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19584, "end_char": 19592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Wages-If include bonus awarded by Industrial Court-Payment of Wages Act", "statute": "Wages-If include bonus awarded by Industrial Court-Payment of Wages Act"}}, {"text": "Payment of Wages Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20155, "end_char": 20175, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20342, "end_char": 20359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Mills filed a writ petition before the Bombay High Court which was dismissed by a Single Judge and an appeal against that decision was also dismissed by a Division Bench: Held, that the bonus awarded by the Industrial Court was not wages within the meaning of s. 2 (vi) of the Payment of Wages Act and as such the Authority had no jurisdiction to entertain the application made to it under s. 15 of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20563, "end_char": 20567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Wages-If include bonus awarded by Industrial Court-Payment of Wages Act", "statute": "Wages-If include bonus awarded by Industrial Court-Payment of Wages Act"}}, {"text": "Payment of Wages Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20580, "end_char": 20600, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20693, "end_char": 20698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20875, "end_char": 20879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1949] F.C.R 356", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 20933, "end_char": 20949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20962, "end_char": 20990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos."}}]}
{"document_id": "1958_1_1504_1513_EN", "year": 1958, "text": "Virsa Singh\n\nThe Stale of Punjab\n\nBose J.\n\nMarch 19.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958]\n\none' of .fact; and whether the conclusion should be one way or .the the~ is a matter of prof, where necessary, by ca, lling Ih aid all reasonable mferences of fact in the absence of direct testimony. It is not one for guess-work and fanciful conjecture.\n\nThe appeal is dismissed.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nBALA SUBRAHMANYA RAJARAM v.\n\nB.C.\n\nPATIL AND OTHERS (JAFER IMAM, SUBBA RAo and VIVIAN BOSE JJ.)\n\nWages-If include bonus awarded by Industrial Court-Payment of Wages Act (/J1of1936), s. 2(vi), JJ.\n\nThe Industrial Court, Bombay, awarded bonus equal to 4! months' wages to the operatives of the Tata Mills Ltd. and directed that those operatives who were no longer in the service of the Mills should be paid the bonus in one lump sum by a fixed date and in such cases claims in writing should be made to the Manager of the Mills. The operatives who made a claim before the date fixed were duly paid but payment was r.efused to operatives who applied after that date. The operatives who had been refused payment made applications to the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act. The Mills contended that the Authority had no jurisdiction to entertain the application, but the contention was rejected. The Mills filed a writ petition before the Bombay High Court which was dismissed by a Single Judge and an appeal against that decision was also dismissed by a Division Bench: Held, that the bonus awarded by the Industrial Court was not wages within the meaning of s. 2 (vi) of the Payment of Wages Act and as such the Authority had no jurisdiction to entertain the application made to it under s. 15 of the Act. Though such bonus was remuneration it was not remuneration payable on the fulfilment of the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, as required by s. 2 (vi).\n\nF. W. Heilgers cl Co. v. N. C. ChalSJavarthi, [1949] F.C.R 356, followed.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 35 & 36 of 1954.\n\n.... '\n\nAppeals from the judgments and order dated August . 28, 1952, of the Bombay High Court in Appeals Nos. 34 and 35 of 1952,. arising out of the orders dated January 24, 1952, of the said High Court exercising its Civil Original Jurisdiction in. Misc.\n\nApplications Nos. 302 of 1951 and 303, 304 and 305 of 1951 respectively.\n\nR. J. Kolah, B. Narayanaswami, J. B. Dadachanji, S. N. Andley and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant.\n\nH. N. Sanyal, Addi. Solicitor-General of India, N. P. Nathwani and R. H. Dhebar, for respondent No. 3 in C. A 35 & No. 5 in C. A. 36.\n\nD. H. Buch and Naunit Lal, for respondent No. 2 in C. A. 35 & Nos. 2-4 in C. A. 36.\n\n1958. March 19.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBOSE J.-These appeals arise out of petitions made ta the Bombay High Court under Art. 226 for writs of certiorari.\n\nThe. appellant is the Mana$er of the Tata Mills Limited, which carries on busmess in the manufacture and sale of textile. goods in Bombay and as such is responsible for the payment of wages under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936.\n\nThe first respondent was the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act at the times material to these appeals. The sixth respondent' is the present Authority. The Authority is entrusted with the duty of deciding cases falling within the purview of the Act.\n\nThe second, third, fourth and fifth respondents are employees in the Mills.\n\nA dispute arose about a claim made by the operatives of the Mills for a bonus for the year 1948. This was referred to the Industrial Court at Bombay which made an award on April 23, 1949, and awarded a bonus equivalent to four and a half months' wages subject to certain conditions of which only the sixth is material here. It runs as follows :\n\n\"Persons who are eligible for bonus but who are\n\nBala Subrahmanya Ra}arom ,,, B. C. Patil and Others\n\nBose J.\n\n19S8\n\nBala Subrah~ manya Rajaram\n\n\"· B. C. Patil andOtherJ\n\nBoseJ.\n\nnot in the service of the Mill on the date of the payment shall be paid in one lump sum by the 30th November, 1949. In such cases, claims in writing should be made to the Manager of the Mill concerned.\"\n\nThose operatives who made a claim before the date fixed above were duly paid but payment was refused to the third respondent, who applied much later, on the ground that the condition subject to which the award was made was not fulfilled.\n\nThe third respondent thereupon made an application before the first respondent, the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act.\n\nSimilar claims were made by the second, fourth and fifth respondents for a bonus for the year 1949. The Industrial Court awarded a bonus equal to two months' wages and in the sixth condition put the date as December 31, 1950.\n\nBy this time Labour Appellate Tribunals came into existence, so both sides filed appeals against the award to the Labour Appellate Tribunal of Bombay. The appeals failed and the award was upheld.\n\nAfter that, the matter followed the same pattern.\n\nRespondents 2, 4 and 5 applied for their bonus after December 31, 1950. The Mills refused to pay and these respondents applied to the first respondent, the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act.\n\nThe two sets of claims, that is to say, the claim of the third respondent for a bonus for the year 1948 and the claims of the second, fourth and filth respondents for bonuses for the year 1949, were heard together.\n\nThe appellant contested these applications on two grounds. He questioned the jurisdiction of the Authority to entertain the petitions made to it. He also contended that, in any event, as the condition subject to which the award was made, namely, an application on or before November 30, 1949, was not fulfilled, the claim for a bonus did not lie.\n\nThe first respondent held that it had jurisdiction and, after hearing the parties on the merits, decreed the various claims.\n\n\\-.\n\nThe appellant thereupon filed writ petitions in the High Court. They were heard and dismissed by Coyajee J.\n\nAn appeal was then filed in the same High Court and heard t!y the Chief Justice and Bhagwati J. They held that the questions raised were covered by an earlier decision of theirs in .another , case dated March l l, 1952, and, following that decision, dismissed the appeals without hearing further arguments, as counsel on both sides agreed that the matter was covered by the earlier decision. The appellant then applied for a certificate for leave to appeal here. This was granted by Chagla C. J. and Dixit J. on February 2, 1953.\n\nThe first question that we have to decide is. whether the first respondent bad jurisdiction to entertain the petitions made to him as the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act. This depends on whether these bonuses are \"wages\" within the meaning of the definition in s. 2(vi) of the Act\n\nThe scope of the Authority's jurisdiction is set out in s. 15 of the Act. It is to hear and decide.\n\n(1) all claims arising out of deduction from wages, and\n\n(2) all claims regarding delay in the payment of wages.\n\nTherefore, unless these bonuses are \"wages\" within the meaning of the Act, the Authority will have no jurisdiction.\n\nThe definition of \"wages\" in s. 2(vi) of the Act is long and complicated but leaving aside the clauses in it that are not material for our present purpose, it run~-\n\n\" 'Wages' means all remuneration ........ which would, if the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable, whether conditionally upon regular attendance, good work or conduct or other behaviour of the person employed, or otherwise, to a person employed in respect of this employment or of work done in such employment, and includes any bonus or other additional remuneration\n\nBala Subrah manya Rafaram v.\n\nB. C. Patil and Others\n\nBose J.\n\nB•la Subrahmanya Rajaram v.\n\nB. C. Patil and Others\n\nBoseJ.\n\nof the nature aforesaid which would be so payable and any sum payable to such person by reason of the termination of his employment, but does not include ................ \" . and then five matters that are not included are set out.\n\nNow consider this clause by clause. \" 'Wages' means all remuneration.\" Is bonus a remuneration ?\n\nWe think it is. Remuneration is only a more formal version of \"payment\" and payment is a recompense for service rendered.\n\nNow it is true that bonus in the abstract need not be for services rendered and in that sense need not be a remuneration ; for example, there is a shan:holder's bonus in certain companies, and there is a life insurance bonus and so forth.\n\nBut that is not the kind of bonus contemplated here because the kind of remuneration that the definition contemplates is one that is payable.\n\n\"in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment.\" Therefore, the kind of bonus that this definition contemplates is one that is remuneration for services rendered or work done. Accordingly, it is a \"remuneration\" and as the definition includes all remuneration of a specified kind, we are of opinion that bonus of the kind contemplated here falls within the clause that says it must be \"remuneration.\"\n\nNext comes a clause that limits the kind of remuneration, for, though the opening words . are \"all remuneration\" the words that follow limit it to all remuneration of the kind specified in the next clause, that is, to remuneration\n\n\"which would be payable if the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled.\"\n\nNow the question is whether the kind of bonus con- 4...,... templated by this definition must be a bonus that is payable as a clause of the contract of employment. We think it is, and for this reason.\n\nIf we equate \"bonus\" with \"remuneration\", the\n\n..,\n\n, ..\n\ndefinition says clearly enough that the bonus must be such that it is payable \"if the terms of the contract are fulfilled\", that is to say , it will not be payable if the terms are not fulfilled.\n\nNow, we can understand a position where a statute declares that whenever the terms of the contract of employment are fulfilled the bonus shall be payable; equally, we can envisage a situation in which an employer engages to pay a bonus should the terms\n\nof the contract of employment be fulfilled, by a separate and independent agreement that is not part of the contract of employment. In either case, the matter could be said to fall within this part of the definition. But we can see no way in which a bonus can be said to be payable if and when the terms of the contract of employment are fulfilled outside these two cases (namely, legislation, or a separate contract that is not part of the contract of employment), except when it is payable by reason of a term, express or implied, in the contract of employment itself. In any event, if there are such cases, the present is nocone of them, for the bonus here is payable under an award of an Industrial Court and has nothing to do with the fulfilment or otherwise of the terms of the contract of employment, except indirectly.\n\nIt was argued that as an Industrial Court can direct payment of bonus should an industrial dispute arise in that behalf, the matter falls within the definition. But does it ? 0™=. of the matters that an Industrial Court might take into consideration before awarding a bonus is whether all the terms of the contract of employment have been duly fulfilled and it is possible that such a Court might refuse to award a bonus in cases where the terms were not fulfilled, but it would not be bound by such a consideration and its right to make an award of bonus is not conditional on the fulfilment of the terms of the contract of employment, whereas, under the definition, that is an essential irgredient. Therefore, even if due fulfilment of the terms of the contract of employment was to be one of the reasons for the award, the bonus so awarded would not be payable because the terms of the contract\n\nBala Subrahmanya Rajaram v.\n\nB. C. Patil and Others\n\nBoseJ.\n\nBala Subrahmanya Rojaram v.\n\nB. C. Patil and Others\n\nBostJ.\n\nhad been fulfilled but because of an industrial dispute and because in order to settle it, the Court awarded the bonus.\n\nIt is not necessary to analyse the definition any further (except for one clause) because, even if all the other ingredients are present, the clause we have just considered would exclude a bonus of the kind we have here, that is to say, a bonus awarded by an Industrial Court.\n\nThe clause we have yet to examine is this :\n\n\"and includes any bonus or other additional remuneration of the nature aforesaid which would be so payable.\" It was contended that the words \"and includes any bonus\" stand by themselves and that the words that follow must be disregarded when bonus is under consideration because they relate only to \"additional remuneration\" and not to \"bonus\".\n\nNow, it may be possible to say that the words \"of the nature aforesaid\" only govern the words \"additional remuneration\" and that they do not apply to \"bonus\", with the result that the inclusion clause \"and includes any bonus etc.\" would refer to two separate things, namely,\n\n(1) bonus and .\n\n(2) other additional remuneration of the nature aforesaid. ' In our opinion, the clause means-\n\n(1) \"bonus ................ which would be so payable\", and\n\n(2) \"other additional remuneration of the nature aforesaid which would be so payable.\" If that is correct, then the words \"which would be so payable\" throw us back to the earlier part of the definition and we reach the position that the kind of bonus that is included by the inclusion clause is the kind that would be payable \"if the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, are fulfilled.\"\n\nThere is another reason for reaching this conclusion. The opening words of the definition make it clear that \"wages\" means remuneration that is payable when the terms of the contract of employment are fulfilled. Therefore, that is something certain.\n\n... •.\n\n- .\n\nOne knows ahead of time that if the terms of the contract are fulfilled, then the bonus is payable. It may be that the exact amount has yet to be determined but the fact that bonus is payable and car1 be claimed as soon as the terms of the contract are fulfilled is a matter that can be predicated beforehand, that is to say, even before the terms of the contract are fulfilled, or indeed, even btfore the work has started if the contract is made that far ahead. But that is not the case when bonus is awarded by an Industrial Court, for there it is impossible to say ahead of time whether bonus will be awarded or. not; indeed, at the time the contract is entered into, it would be impossible to say whether such a claim could be laid at all because a difference of opinion between one worker and his employer about the right to bonus would not necessarily lead to an industrial dispute. When an Industrial Court awards a bonus, independent of any contract, it does so only if there is an available surplus for a distribution of bonus and the amount of the award would depend on the extent of the surplus available for that purpose. Therefore, the fulfilment or otherwise of the terms of the contract of employment is not an essential ingredient of an award of an Industrial Court.\n\nIn F. W. Heilgers & Co. v. N. C. Chakravarthi (1), the learned Judges of the Federal Court held that a bonus not payable under a contract of employment does not fall within the definition of ''wages\" ins. 2(vi) of the Payment of Wages Act, as it stood before the amendment in 1957. We are concerned with the old definition here and not the amended one, so the present case is, in our opinion, covered by that authority.\n\nIt is true that no bonus had been awarded in Heilgers' case (1) and that therefore there was no ascertained sum, whereas there is one in the present case, or rather a sum that is ascertainable, but that was only one of the grounds on which the learned Judges proceeded. They held that in order to bring a particular\n\n(1) (1949) F.C.R. 356, 360.\n\nBala Subrahma11ya Rajaram v.\n\nB. C- Patil and Others\n\nBose J.\n\nBala Subrah manya Ra}aram v.\n\nB. C. Patil and Olhefs\n\nBost I.\n\npayment under the definition of \"wages\", two things are necessary-\n\n\"(l) a definite sum, and .\n\n(2) a contract indicating when the sum becomes payable\"; and they said-\n\n\"It is obvious that unless there is an express provision for paying a stipulated sum, the definition will not cover such a payment.\"\n\nThe bonus in the present case is not , payable because of a contract but because of the a.ward of an Industrial Court. Therefore, according to the Federal Court, it is not \"wages\" within the meaning of the Payment of Wages Act. .\n\nIn 1957 the definition was amended and the following was added: \"' ' d' Id wages means ........ an me u es\n\n(c) any additional remuneration payable under the terms of employment (whether called a bonus or by any other name);\n\nbut does not include-\n\n(l) any bonus (whether under a scheme of profit sharing or otherwise) which does not form part of remuneration payable under the terms of employment. ........... \" The change would have been unnecessary had the law been otherwise under the old definition; nor is it possible to say that the clause was added by way of abundant caution because the Federal Court decided otherwise in 1949. In view of this amendment, and in view of the Federal Court's decision, we do not feel justified in taking a different view, especially as we think the decision was right.\n\nThe learned Judges of the Bombay High Court tried to distinguish the Federal Court's judgment on the ground that no bonus had been declared there and so there was no ascertained sum, but, as we have pointed out, the ratio of the decision covers the present case and, in any case, that is our view quite apart from their conclusion.\n\nOn this view, it is not necessary to consider the other points that were argued because, if the definition of \"wages\", as it stood before the amendment, is not wide enough to include a bonus of the kind we have here, namely, one payable under u.n award of an\n\nIndustrial Court, then, the Authority under the , Payment of Wages Act had no jurisdiction to entertain the petitions made to it under s. 15 of the Act.\n\nThe appeals are allowed with costs. The decisions of the learned High Court Judges are set aside and also the decrees of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act. There will be only one set of costs.\n\nAppeals allowed .\n\nBala Subrahmanya Rajaran v.\n\nB. C. Patil and Others\n\nBoseJ.", "total_entities": 59, "entities": [{"text": "Virsa Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 11, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Virsa Singh\n\nThe Stale of Punjab\n\nBose J.\n\nMarch 19."}}, {"text": "Bose J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 41, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Bose J.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BALA SUBRAHMANYA RAJARAM", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 384, "end_char": 408, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Bala Subrah~ manya Rajaram", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B.C.\n\nPATIL AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 413, "end_char": 435, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B.C. PATIL AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SUBBA RAo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 449, "end_char": 458, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "K. SUBBA RAO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Wages-If include bonus awarded by Industrial Court-Payment of Wages Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 481, "end_char": 552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 2(vi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 566, "end_char": 574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Wages-If include bonus awarded by Industrial Court-Payment of Wages Act", "statute": "Wages-If include bonus awarded by Industrial Court-Payment of Wages Act"}}, {"text": "Industrial Court, Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 585, "end_char": 609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Industrial Court, Bombay, awarded bonus equal to 4!"}}, {"text": "Tata Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 676, "end_char": 691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "months' wages to the operatives of the Tata Mills Ltd. and directed that those operatives who were no longer in the service of the Mills should be paid the bonus in one lump sum by a fixed date and in such cases claims in writing should be made to the Manager of the Mills."}}, {"text": "Payment of Wages Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1137, "end_char": 1157, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1324, "end_char": 1341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Mills filed a writ petition before the Bombay High Court which was dismissed by a Single Judge and an appeal against that decision was also dismissed by a Division Bench: Held, that the bonus awarded by the Industrial Court was not wages within the meaning of s. 2 (vi) of the Payment of Wages Act and as such the Authority had no jurisdiction to entertain the application made to it under s. 15 of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1545, "end_char": 1549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Wages-If include bonus awarded by Industrial Court-Payment of Wages Act", "statute": "Wages-If include bonus awarded by Industrial Court-Payment of Wages Act"}}, {"text": "Payment of Wages Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1562, "end_char": 1582, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1675, "end_char": 1680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1857, "end_char": 1861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1949] F.C.R 356", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1915, "end_char": 1931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1944, "end_char": 1972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "R. J. Kolah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2344, "end_char": 2355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. J. Kolah, B. Narayanaswami, J. B. Dadachanji, S. N. Andley and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. Narayanaswami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2357, "end_char": 2373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. J. Kolah, B. Narayanaswami, J. B. Dadachanji, S. N. Andley and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "J. B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2375, "end_char": 2391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. J. Kolah, B. Narayanaswami, J. B. Dadachanji, S. N. Andley and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. N. Andley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2393, "end_char": 2405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. J. Kolah, B. Narayanaswami, J. B. Dadachanji, S. N. Andley and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2410, "end_char": 2424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. J. Kolah, B. Narayanaswami, J. B. Dadachanji, S. N. Andley and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "N. Sanyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2449, "end_char": 2458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. N. Sanyal, Addi."}}, {"text": "N. P. Nathwani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2494, "end_char": 2508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Solicitor-General of India, N. P. Nathwani and R. H. Dhebar, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2513, "end_char": 2525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Solicitor-General of India, N. P. Nathwani and R. H. Dhebar, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "D. H. Buch", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2581, "end_char": 2591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. H. Buch and Naunit Lal, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2596, "end_char": 2606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. H. Buch and Naunit Lal, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "BOSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2727, "end_char": 2731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBOSE J.-These appeals arise out of petitions made ta the Bombay High Court under Art.", "canonical_name": "Bose J."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2808, "end_char": 2816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tata Mills Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2880, "end_char": 2898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appellant is the Mana$er of the Tata Mills Limited, which carries on busmess in the manufacture and sale of textile."}}, {"text": "Bombay and as such is responsible for the payment of wages under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2974, "end_char": 3069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Payment of Wages Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3121, "end_char": 3141, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Industrial Court at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3528, "end_char": 3554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was referred to the Industrial Court at Bombay which made an award on April 23, 1949, and awarded a bonus equivalent to four and a half months' wages subject to certain conditions of which only the sixth is material here."}}, {"text": "April 23, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3578, "end_char": 3592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was referred to the Industrial Court at Bombay which made an award on April 23, 1949, and awarded a bonus equivalent to four and a half months' wages subject to certain conditions of which only the sixth is material here."}}, {"text": "Bala Subrahmanya Ra}arom", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3801, "end_char": 3825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It runs as follows :\n\n\"Persons who are eligible for bonus but who are\n\nBala Subrahmanya Ra}arom ,,, B. C. Patil and Others\n\nBose J.\n\n19S8\n\nBala Subrah~ manya Rajaram\n\n\"· B. C. Patil andOtherJ\n\nBoseJ.\n\nnot in the service of the Mill on the date of the payment shall be paid in one lump sum by the 30th November, 1949.", "canonical_name": "Bala Subrah~ manya Rajaram"}}, {"text": "B. C. Patil", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3830, "end_char": 3841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It runs as follows :\n\n\"Persons who are eligible for bonus but who are\n\nBala Subrahmanya Ra}arom ,,, B. C. Patil and Others\n\nBose J.\n\n19S8\n\nBala Subrah~ manya Rajaram\n\n\"· B. C. Patil andOtherJ\n\nBoseJ.\n\nnot in the service of the Mill on the date of the payment shall be paid in one lump sum by the 30th November, 1949."}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3854, "end_char": 3858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It runs as follows :\n\n\"Persons who are eligible for bonus but who are\n\nBala Subrahmanya Ra}arom ,,, B. C. Patil and Others\n\nBose J.\n\n19S8\n\nBala Subrah~ manya Rajaram\n\n\"· B. C. Patil andOtherJ\n\nBoseJ.\n\nnot in the service of the Mill on the date of the payment shall be paid in one lump sum by the 30th November, 1949.", "canonical_name": "Bose J."}}, {"text": "Bala Subrah~ manya Rajaram", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3869, "end_char": 3895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It runs as follows :\n\n\"Persons who are eligible for bonus but who are\n\nBala Subrahmanya Ra}arom ,,, B. C. Patil and Others\n\nBose J.\n\n19S8\n\nBala Subrah~ manya Rajaram\n\n\"· B. C. Patil andOtherJ\n\nBoseJ.\n\nnot in the service of the Mill on the date of the payment shall be paid in one lump sum by the 30th November, 1949.", "canonical_name": "Bala Subrah~ manya Rajaram"}}, {"text": "Payment of Wages Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4478, "end_char": 4498, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Labour Appellate Tribunal of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4842, "end_char": 4877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By this time Labour Appellate Tribunals came into existence, so both sides filed appeals against the award to the Labour Appellate Tribunal of Bombay."}}, {"text": "Payment of Wages Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5152, "end_char": 5172, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "November 30, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5665, "end_char": 5682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also contended that, in any event, as the condition subject to which the award was made, namely, an application on or before November 30, 1949, was not fulfilled, the claim for a bonus did not lie."}}, {"text": "Coyajee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5967, "end_char": 5974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were heard and dismissed by Coyajee J.\n\nAn appeal was then filed in the same High Court and heard t!y the Chief Justice and Bhagwati J. They held that the questions raised were covered by an earlier decision of theirs in .another , case dated March l l, 1952, and, following that decision, dismissed the appeals without hearing further arguments, as counsel on both sides agreed that the matter was covered by the earlier decision."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6063, "end_char": 6071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were heard and dismissed by Coyajee J.\n\nAn appeal was then filed in the same High Court and heard t!y the Chief Justice and Bhagwati J. They held that the questions raised were covered by an earlier decision of theirs in .another , case dated March l l, 1952, and, following that decision, dismissed the appeals without hearing further arguments, as counsel on both sides agreed that the matter was covered by the earlier decision."}}, {"text": "March l l, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6182, "end_char": 6197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were heard and dismissed by Coyajee J.\n\nAn appeal was then filed in the same High Court and heard t!y the Chief Justice and Bhagwati J. They held that the questions raised were covered by an earlier decision of theirs in .another , case dated March l l, 1952, and, following that decision, dismissed the appeals without hearing further arguments, as counsel on both sides agreed that the matter was covered by the earlier decision."}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6462, "end_char": 6468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was granted by Chagla C. J. and Dixit J. on February 2, 1953."}}, {"text": "Dixit", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6479, "end_char": 6484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was granted by Chagla C. J. and Dixit J. on February 2, 1953."}}, {"text": "February 2, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6491, "end_char": 6507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was granted by Chagla C. J. and Dixit J. on February 2, 1953."}}, {"text": "Payment of Wages Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6668, "end_char": 6688, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 2(vi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6780, "end_char": 6788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6857, "end_char": 6862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(vi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7162, "end_char": 7170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Payment of Wages Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15408, "end_char": 15428, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Heilgers", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15656, "end_char": 15664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that no bonus had been awarded in Heilgers' case (1) and that therefore there was no ascertained sum, whereas there is one in the present case, or rather a sum that is ascertainable, but that was only one of the grounds on which the learned Judges proceeded."}}, {"text": "(1949) F.C.R. 356", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 15932, "end_char": 15949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Payment of Wages Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16592, "end_char": 16612, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Payment of Wages Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18070, "end_char": 18090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18155, "end_char": 18160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Payment of Wages Act", "statute": "Payment of Wages Act"}}, {"text": "Payment of Wages Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18319, "end_char": 18339, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1958_1_1150_1155_EN", "year": 1958, "text": "Bombay Dyri!SQ <b\n\nMtJ/nujar.Mdinq .co.1W.\n\n\\\".\n\nThe State o/ Bum.bay umd Ol/u:r8\n\nVnkaWama\n\nAiytn' J.\n\nJanVGry 22.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1958]\n\nstated above. The appeal succeeds in part, but as it is stated that \"unpaid accumulations\" form by far the most substantial portion of the claim, we direct the respondents to pay half the costs of the appellant here and in the Court below.\n\nAppeal allowed in part.\n\nRAJA GANGA PRATAP SINGH\n\nTHE ALLAHABAD BANK LTD., LUCKNOW\n\n\\S. R. DAS C. J., VENKATARAMA AIYAll, B. P. SINHA,\n\nJ. L. KAPUR and A. K. SARXAll JI.)\n\nStatute, Constitutional validity of-Whether a question of inteTPretation of the Conltitution-Severabilitl/, if 1hottld be considered before deciding question of validitv-Dutii of Court\n\n-Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908), s. 113 proviso-Con1Utution of India, An. 228.\n\nThe respondent, a scheduled bank, sued the appellant for recovery of money under a mortgage. The appellant claimed reduction of the debt under the Uttar Pradesh Zamlndari Debt Reduction Act, 1953. An advance or debt due to a scheduled bank was excluded from the definition of \"debt\" lliven In the Act. The appellant contended that the definition In so far as It excluded certain debts offended Art. 14 of the Constitution as it made an arbitrary distinction between several cluses of debton.\n\nThe appellant applied to the court under the proviso to 1. 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure prayinc that a case be stated for the opinion of the High Court as to the validity of the impugned portion of the definition. The Court rejected the application. The appellant made an application in revision to the High Court and also an application under Art. 22.8 of the Constitution for withdrawing the case for a decision of the question of the validity of the definition. The Higb Court dismiased the aPplications. The Courts below held that in eitber view of the question as to the validity of the impu&ned portion of the definition, the appellant would be left without the remedy which he sought, because that portion of the definition was not severable from the rest and the whole definition would have to be excluded and therefore it was not necessary to decide that question to dispose of the case :\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME coun:r REPORTS 1151\n\nHeld, that the question raised by the appellant came both 1968 within the proviso to s. 113 of the Code and Art. 228 of the Con- . - stitution. The question whether the impugned part of the defini-8\".111 8 . alt:lp tion contravened Art. 14 was a question as to the interpretation \"\"\" of the Constitution and that question must be decided first. The PT.e.Ji.kabad question of severability could arise only after that question had Bank Lt<l been decided and the impugned part field invalid, Luolma111 .,\n\nCIVJL APPELLATE JuRJSDJCTTON: Civil Appeal No. 357 of 1957.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated February 28, 1956, of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) in Misc. Case No. 4 of 1955 and Civil Revision No. 189 of 1955, arising out of the order dated August 6, 1955 of the Civil Judge, Sitapur in Suit No. 16 of 1953.\n\nVidya Sagar. for the appellant.\n\nIqbal Ahmad, S. N. Andley and Rameshwar Nath, for the respondent.\n\n1958, January 22. The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKAR J.-The respondent, a scheduled bank, sued the SarkGr J. appellant in the court of the Civil Judge, Sitapur m Uttar Pradesh, for the recovery of money due under an instrument of mortgage. The appellant contested the suit on several grounds one of which was that he was entitled to relief under the Uttar Pradesh Zamindar's Debt Reduction Act (U.P.\n\nXV of 1953) which reduced the amount recoverable on a debt as defined in it. Now a debt was defined in the Act in these terms:\n\n2(f) : \"debt\" means an advance in cash or in kind and includes any transaction which is in substance a debt but does not include an advance as aforesaid made on or after the first day of July, 1952 or a debt due to-\n\n'U) the Central Government or Government of any\n\nState;\n\n(ii) a local authority;\n\n(iii) a scheduled bank;\n\n(iv) a co-operative society; and\n\nRaj\" f)anga Pralap\n\nSingh\n\nThe .1lllahabwl &•nk Ltd.,\n\nLucknow\n\nSUPHEME COURT REPORTS [1958]\n\n(v) a waqf, trust or endowment for a charitable or religious purpose only.\n\n(vi) a person, where the debt was advanced on his behalf by the Court of Wards to a ward.\n\nAs the respondent was a scheduled bank the debt due to it from the appellant was not a debt within this definition and consequently, no relief would appear to be available to . the appellant under the Act in respect of that debt. The appellant, however, contended that the definition in so far as it excluded certain debts offended Art. 14 of the Constitution in as much as it made an arbitrary distinction between several classes of debtors and denied the excluded debtors, the equal protection of the law and that hence that portion of the definition which excluded certain debts was invalid and should be struck out and the rest of the definition should be left as operative. If the appellant\\ contention was justified, the definition would have to run as follows:\n\n\"debt\" means an advance in cash CJr in coin and includes any transaction which is in substance a debt, and would then include the debt due by the appellant to tte respondent. If this was the correct position, then the appellant would be entitled to all the reliefs granted by the Act.\n\nThis defence, therefore, raised a question as to the vali-· <lity of a provision in the Act. So the appellant made an applicatibn to the Civil Judge, Sitapur, under the proviso to s. 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure asking him to state a case for the opinion of the High Court at Allahabad to which he was subordinate as to the invalidity of the impugned portion of the definition. That proviso is in these terms:\n\nProvided that where the Court is satisfied that a case pending before it involyes a question as to the validity of any Act, Ordinance or Regulation or of any provision contained in an Act, Ordinance or Regulation, the determination of which .is necessary for the disposal of the case, and is of opinion that such Act, Ordinance, Regulation or provision is invalid or inoperative, but has not been so declared by the High Court to\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPRFJl\\IE COUR'f REPORTS 1153\n\nGanga Prnla7 Sing!,\n\nwhich that Court is subordinate or by the Supreme Court, the Court shall state a case setting out its opinion and the reasons Baja therefor, and refer the same for the opinion of the High Court.\n\nThe learned Civil Judge took the view that the impugned ponion of the definition infringed art. 14 of the Constitution\n\nThe .t1.Zlal1\"bw\n\nBank L~I ..\n\nJA,,; k/,,.·.;·\n\na~ it made an <irbitrary distinction between several classes of debtors and was therefore invalid, but he held that it was not ne&ssary for the disposal of the case to decide such question\n\nt~ invalidity because even if it was decided in favour of the appellant, the result would be to exclude the entire definition from the Act as the offending portion was not severable from the rest and the appellant would, therefore, be in any event left without the protection of the Act. In this view of the matter he held that the proviso to s. 113 of the Code did no't apply and dismissed the application under it.\n\nThe appellant then made an application to the High Court at Allahabad for a revision of the order of the learned CiviLJudge. He at the same time made another application to the High Court under Art. 228 of the Constitution. That Mticle is in these terms:\n\nIf the High Court is satisfied that a case pending in a court subordinak to it' involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution the determination nf which is necessary for the disposal of the case. it shall withdraw the case and may-\n\n(a) either dispose of the case itself, or\n\n(b) determine the said question of law and return the case to the court from which the case has been so withdrawn together with <i copy of its judgment on such question, and the\n\n.~<iid court shall on receipt thereof proceed to dispose of the case in conformity with such judgment.\n\nThe appeilant in the latter application prayed that the High Court might be pleased to withdraw the case and either dispose it of itself, or determine the question of the validity of the definition of debt in the Act and return the case to the court\n\nSa'rl:nr .1.\n\n1968 of the Civil Judge, Sitapur, for final disposal in accordance &; a c;,,.,.. P\"\"°I' with such determination .\n\n• 'liftflh Th< ; ilnM•~ The High Court disposed of both the applications by one f::.!'4\" judgment. It held that there was no dispute as to the constitutional principle which was clear, namely, that every citizen was entitled to the equal protection of the laws and that any enactment which infringed that principle, is to that extent void, and that the only dispute was whether the impugned portion of the definition of a \"debt\" in the Act was severable from the rest and that was not a question of the interpretation of any provision of the Constitution but one of the construction of the Act itself. The High Court also held that even if any question of the interpretation of the Cons.titution arose, a determination of that question was not necessary for the disposal of the case. In this view of the matter the High Court dismissed the application in revision and also that under Art.\n\n228. From this judgment the present appeal has been filed.\n\nSar/car J.\n\nIt seems clear to us that the question raised by the appellant in this case comes within the proviso to s. 113 of the Code . as also art. 228 of the Constitution. The question contemplated by the proviso to s. 113 of the Code is as to the validity of an Act or of a provision in it while Art. 228 of the Constitution has in view a question as to the interpretation of the Constitution. Now the question raised in the present case is as to the validity of a provision in the Zamindar's Debt Reduction Act This question is, however, also a question as to the interpretation of the Constitution, for the validity of the provision is challenged on the ground that it contravenes an article of the Constitution.\n\nThe point that really arises in this appeal is whether it is necessary for the disposal of the case to decide the question of the validity of a portion of the definition of a debt in the Act. All other conditions necessary for an order being made under the proviso to s. 113 of the Code or Art. 228 of the Constitution exist and as to this there is no serious dispute. It is l9S8 not necessary for us therefore to discuss these conditions.\n\nRaja Ganga Pratap\n\nSingh The courts below held that in either view of the question v.\n\nThe .AUaliabad of the validity of the impugned portion of the difinition of a Bank Ltd., debt, the appellant would be without the remedy which he Lucknoto sought, because that portion of the definition was not sever Sarkar J. able from the rest, and therefore it was not necessary to decide that question to dispose of the case. We are unable to agree with this view. The question of the validity of the defini\n\ntion in so far as it excluded certain debts having been raised .and pressed by the appellant, it had . to be decided by the court. Without a decision of that question the case could not be disposed of. The fact that in the view of the court the impugned part of the definition was not severable from the rest and therefore in any view of the questioo as to the validity of the impugned part, the appellant would not get any relief, did not alter the position. The question a.s to the severability of the impuped part of the definition from the rest would arise only after it had been decided that the impugned part was invalid and so to be able to say that the impugne'd part of the definition was not severable from the rest, it had first to be held that that part was invalid. It could not be said that as the impugned part wa~ not severable from the rest it was not necessary for the disposal of the case to decide the question of the validity of the impugned part. We, therefore, bold that it is necessary to decide the question of the validity of the impugned part of the definition to dispose of the case.\n\nThis appeal is hence allowed. The High Court will withdraw the case and either dispose it of itself or determine 'the question o~ the validity of the definition of a debt in the Zamindar's Debt Reduction Act and return the case to the Civil Judge, Sitapur, for disposal in accordance with its deter- . mination of the question. The appellant wilf get the costs of\n\nthis appeal.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 45, "entities": [{"text": "RAJA GANGA PRATAP SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 413, "end_char": 436, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAJA GANGA PRATAP SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE ALLAHABAD BANK LTD., LUCKNOW", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 438, "end_char": 470, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE ALLAHABAD BANK LTD., LUCKNOW", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 473, "end_char": 482, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA,\n\nJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 510, "end_char": 526, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "L. KAPUR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 527, "end_char": 535, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.L. KAPUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 747, "end_char": 770, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 113", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 784, "end_char": 790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "appellant claimed reduction of the debt under the Uttar Pradesh Zamlndari Debt Reduction Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 928, "end_char": 1026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1225, "end_char": 1232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The appellant claimed reduction of the debt under the Uttar Pradesh Zamlndari Debt Reduction Act, 1953", "statute": "The appellant claimed reduction of the debt under the Uttar Pradesh Zamlndari Debt Reduction Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1390, "end_char": 1417, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1674, "end_char": 1681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The appellant claimed reduction of the debt under the Uttar Pradesh Zamlndari Debt Reduction Act, 1953", "statute": "The appellant claimed reduction of the debt under the Uttar Pradesh Zamlndari Debt Reduction Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "s. 113", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2351, "end_char": 2357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 228", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2374, "end_char": 2382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2498, "end_char": 2505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench)", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2914, "end_char": 2950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated February 28, 1956, of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) in Misc."}}, {"text": "Vidya Sagar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3114, "end_char": 3125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vidya Sagar."}}, {"text": "Iqbal Ahmad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3147, "end_char": 3158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Iqbal Ahmad, S. N. Andley and Rameshwar Nath, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. N. Andley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3160, "end_char": 3172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Iqbal Ahmad, S. N. Andley and Rameshwar Nath, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3177, "end_char": 3191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Iqbal Ahmad, S. N. Andley and Rameshwar Nath, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3286, "end_char": 3292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKAR J.-The respondent, a scheduled bank, sued the SarkGr J. appellant in the court of the Civil Judge, Sitapur m Uttar Pradesh, for the recovery of money due under an instrument of mortgage.", "canonical_name": "SARKAR"}}, {"text": "SarkGr", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3339, "end_char": 3345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSARKAR J.-The respondent, a scheduled bank, sued the SarkGr J. appellant in the court of the Civil Judge, Sitapur m Uttar Pradesh, for the recovery of money due under an instrument of mortgage.", "canonical_name": "SARKAR"}}, {"text": "Debt Reduction Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3615, "end_char": 3633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": ".1lllahabwl &•nk Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4158, "end_char": 4179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now a debt was defined in the Act in these terms:\n\n2(f) : \"debt\" means an advance in cash or in kind and includes any transaction which is in substance a debt but does not include an advance as aforesaid made on or after the first day of July, 1952 or a debt due to-\n\n'U) the Central Government or Government of any\n\nState;\n\n(ii) a local authority;\n\n(iii) a scheduled bank;\n\n(iv) a co-operative society; and\n\nRaj\" f)anga Pralap\n\nSingh\n\nThe .1lllahabwl &•nk Ltd.,\n\nLucknow\n\nSUPHEME COURT REPORTS [1958]\n\n(v) a waqf, trust or endowment for a charitable or religious purpose only."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4720, "end_char": 4727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civil Judge, Sitapur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5580, "end_char": 5600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So the appellant made an applicatibn to the Civil Judge, Sitapur, under the proviso to s. 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure asking him to state a case for the opinion of the High Court at Allahabad to which he was subordinate as to the invalidity of the impugned portion of the definition."}}, {"text": "s. 113", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5623, "end_char": 5629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5633, "end_char": 5660, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "High Court at Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5711, "end_char": 5734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So the appellant made an applicatibn to the Civil Judge, Sitapur, under the proviso to s. 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure asking him to state a case for the opinion of the High Court at Allahabad to which he was subordinate as to the invalidity of the impugned portion of the definition."}}, {"text": "Ordinance or Regulation or of any provision contained in an Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5984, "end_char": 6047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ganga Prnla7 Sing", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6331, "end_char": 6348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That proviso is in these terms:\n\nProvided that where the Court is satisfied that a case pending before it involyes a question as to the validity of any Act, Ordinance or Regulation or of any provision contained in an Act, Ordinance or Regulation, the determination of which .is necessary for the disposal of the case, and is of opinion that such Act, Ordinance, Regulation or provision is invalid or inoperative, but has not been so declared by the High Court to\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPRFJl\\IE COUR'f REPORTS 1153\n\nGanga Prnla7 Sing!,"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6394, "end_char": 6407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "which that Court is subordinate or by the Supreme Court, the Court shall state a case setting out its opinion and the reasons Baja therefor, and refer the same for the opinion of the High Court."}}, {"text": "art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6639, "end_char": 6646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ordinance or Regulation or of any provision contained in an Act", "statute": "Ordinance or Regulation or of any provision contained in an Act"}}, {"text": "s. 113", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7249, "end_char": 7255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 228", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7518, "end_char": 7526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art.\n\n228", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9442, "end_char": 9451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 113", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9624, "end_char": 9630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art. 228", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9653, "end_char": 9661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 113", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9727, "end_char": 9733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 228", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9808, "end_char": 9816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Debt Reduction Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10005, "end_char": 10023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 113", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10496, "end_char": 10502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Debt Reduction Act", "statute": "Debt Reduction Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 228", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10518, "end_char": 10526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Debt Reduction Act", "statute": "Debt Reduction Act"}}, {"text": "Raja Ganga Pratap", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10669, "end_char": 10686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Ganga Pratap\n\nSingh The courts below held that in either view of the question v.\n\nThe .AUaliabad of the validity of the impugned portion of the difinition of a Bank Ltd., debt, the appellant would be without the remedy which he Lucknoto sought, because that portion of the definition was not sever Sarkar J. able from the rest, and therefore it was not necessary to decide that question to dispose of the case.", "canonical_name": "RAJA GANGA PRATAP SINGH"}}, {"text": "Sarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10972, "end_char": 10978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Ganga Pratap\n\nSingh The courts below held that in either view of the question v.\n\nThe .AUaliabad of the validity of the impugned portion of the difinition of a Bank Ltd., debt, the appellant would be without the remedy which he Lucknoto sought, because that portion of the definition was not sever Sarkar J. able from the rest, and therefore it was not necessary to decide that question to dispose of the case.", "canonical_name": "SARKAR"}}, {"text": "Debt Reduction Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12470, "end_char": 12488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1958_1_1156_1211_EN", "year": 1958, "text": "Fcbntarz.1 4.\n\nll56 SUPRE;\\'lE COURT REPORTS\n\nWORKMEN OF DIMAKUC!-Jl TEA ESTATE\n\n~ ..\n\nTHE MANAGEMENT OF DIMAKUCHI\n\nTEA ESTATE\n\n[HJJSj\n\nIS. R. DAs C. J.. S. K. DAS and A. K. SARKAR JJ.1\n\nIndustriaL Dispute-Defi,-nition, Interpretation of-Test- 'tl1111 pers07t.'. JVleaning of-Industrial Disputes Act, lfl-17 (Act XIV of 1947, s. 2(k). .\n\nThe question for decision in this appeal was whether a dispute raised by the workmen relating to a person who was not a workman could be an industrial dispute as defined i:y s. 2{kj of .the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as it stood before the am- E:ndments of 1956. The appellants, v.1ho were the workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate, espoused the cause of one Dr. K. P.\n\nBanerjee, Assistant Medical Officer. \\Vho had been dismissed unheard with a month's salary in lieu of notice but v.rho had accepted such payment and left the garden and the dispute raised was ultimately referred by the Government for adjudication under s. 10 of the Act. Both the Tribunal and the Appellate Industrial Tribunal took the vie\\\\' that as Dr. Banerjee was not a \\Vorkman v.rithin the meaning of the Act, the dispute v:as\n\nnot an industrial dispute as defined by s. 2(k).\n\nHeld, (per Das, C.J., and S.K. Das, J., Sarkar J, dissenting) that the expression 'any person' occurring in s. 2 {k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, cannot be given its ordinary mean ing and must be rr:ad and 1Jnderstood in the context of the Act and the object the Legislature had in viev.·. Nor can it be equated either with the \\?Ord 'v,'orkn1an' or 'employee'.\n\nThe two tests of an industrial dispute as defined by the section must, therefore, be-(1) the dispute n1ust be a real dispute, capable of being settled by relief given by one party to the other, and (2) the person in repect of whom the dispute is raised must be one in Vihose employment. non-employment, terms uf employment, or conditions of labo.ur (as the case may be). the parties to the dispute have a direct or substantial interest, and this must depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.\n\nApplying these tests, the dispute in the present case which \\Vas in respect of a person \\Vho \\Vas not a workman and belonged to a different category altogether, could not be said to be a dispute within the meaning of s. 2(k) of the Act and the appeal must fail. ...\n\nNarendra Kuniar Sen v. A.U India h1(lvstrial Disputes (Labour Appellate) Tribunal, 11~53) 55 Born. L.R. 125 approved.\n\nWestern India Automobile Association v. The Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, [1949.J 'F.C.R. 321, distinguished.\n\nCase-law discussed.\n\nPer Sarkar, J.-There is no reason why the words 'any person in s. 2(k) of the Act should not be given their natural meaning so as to include an employee who is not a workman within the meaning of the Act. Consequently, a dispute concerning a person who is not a workman may be an industrial dispute within that section.\n\nThe primary object which the Act has in view is the preservation of the industrial peace.\n\nThe Act does not make the interest of the workmen in the dispute a condition of the existence of an industrial dispute.\n\nSuch interest is incapable of definition and to make it a condition of an industrial dispute would d.efeat the object of the Act.\n\nWestern India Automobile Associ'<ition v. The Industrial Tribunal of Bombay, [1949] F.C.R. 321; Narendra Kumar _Sen v.\n\nThe All India Industrial Disputes (Labour Appellate) Tribunal,\n\n(1953) 55 Bom. L.R. 125 and United CommerCial Bank Ltd. v.\n\nKedar Nath Gupta, (1952) 1 L.L.J., 782, referred to.\n\nEven assuming that the workmen must be interested in order that there can be an industrial dispute, the present case satisfies that test and falls within the purview of s. 2(k) of the Act.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JurusmcrION: Civil Appeal No. 297 of 1956. .\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 30, 1955, of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of\n\nIndia, Calcutta in Appeal No. Cal. 220 of 1954.\n\nC. B. Aggarwala and K. P. Gupta, for the appellants.\n\nPurslzottam Tricumdas for N.\n\nC. Chatterjee, P. K.\n\nGoswami, S. N. Mukherjee and B. N. Ghosh, for the respondent.\n\n1958. Fabruary 4. The Judgment of Das, C. J., and S. K.\n\nDas, J., was delivered by S. K. Das, J. Sarkar, J., delivered a separate Judgment.\n\nworkmen vj of Dimakuchi Tea E8!ate\n\nT!te Manago,,•nt ·\"f Dimaku.; hi Tea E•fatt\n\nS. K. DAs J.-This appeal by special leave raises a quess. K. Daa 1. tion of some nicety and of considerable importance in the matter of industrial relatioos in this country. The question is the true scope and effect of the definition clause in s. 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The question has arisen in the following circumstances.\n\n1968 The appellants before us are the workmen of the Dima- WoroJ kuchi tea estate represented by the Assam Chah Karmachari Dima~\n\nTUI 11,,,,,.\n\nSangha, Dibrugarh. The respondent is the management of\n\nT• the Dimakuchi tea estate, district Darrang in Assam. One Dr.\n\nTM :J,=:;:\" of K. P. Banerjee was appointed assistant medical Officer of the\n\n2'11J B- Dimakuchi tea estate with effect from November l, 1950. He s. K.DaaJ. was appointed subject to a satisfactory medical report and on probation for three months. It was stated in his letter of appointment: \"While you are on probation or trial, your suitability for permanent employment will be considered. If during the period of probation you are considered unsuitable for employment, you will receive seven days' notice in writing terminating your appointment. If you are guilty of misconduct, You are liable to instant dismissal. At the end of the period of probation, if you are considered suitable, you will be confirmed in the garden's service.\" In February 1951 Dr.\n\nBanerjee was given an increment of Rs. 5 per mensum, but on April 21. Dr. Banerjee received a letter from one Mr. Boroth. manager of the tea estate, in which it was stated : \"It has been found necessary to terminate your services with effect from the 22nd instant. You will of course receive one month's salary in lieu of notice.\" As no reas()llS were given in the notice of termination, Dr. Banerjee wrote to the manager to find out why his services were being terminated. To this Dr. Banerjee received a reply to this effect: \"The reasons for your discharge\n\nare on the medical side, which are outside my jurisdiction, best kn~ to Dr. Cox but a main.reason is because of the deceitful manner in which you added figures to the require ments of the last medical indent after it bad been signed by Dr. Cox, evidence of which is in my hands.\"\n\nThe cause of Dr. Banerjee was then espoused by the Mangaldai Circle of the Assam Chah Karmachari Sangha and the secretary of that Sangha \\vrote to the manager of the Dimakuchi tea estate, enquiring about the reasons for Dr. Banerjee's discharge. The manager wrote back to say that Dr. K. P.\n\nBanerjee was discharged on the ground of incompetence in\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUHT REPOR'rS 1159\n\nhis medical duties and the chief medical officer <Dr. Cox) had 19&& found that Dr. Baner1'ee was incompetent and did not have Wmkm<11 of Dimakwt.4i sufficient \"knowledge of simple everyday microscopical and Tea Eetcl4 laboratory work which befalls the lot of every assistant medi- •· . , The MGnagtnnl of cal offi.cer 111 tea garden practice.\" lt was further stated that Dimat.., oM • Dr. Banerjee gave a faulty. inexpert and clumsy quinine in- Tea Eetot• jection to one Mr. Peacock. an assistant in the Dimakuchi s. K. D114 J. te<l estate, which produced an extremely acute and severe illness very nearly causing a paralysis of the patient's leg. The reasons given by the manager for the termination of the services of Dr. K. P. Banerjee did not satisfy the appellants herein and certain conciliation proceedings, details whereof are not necessary for our purpose. were unsuccessfully held over the question of the termination of the service of Dr. Banerjee.\n\nThe matter was then referred to a Board known as the tripartite Appellate Board consisting of the Labour Commissioner, Assam, and two representatives of the Assam branch of the Indian Tea Association and the Assam Chah Kannachari Sangha respectively. This Board recommended that Dr. Banerjee should be reinstated with effect from the date of his discharge. After the recommendation of the Board, the respondent he.rein appears to Ii.ave offered a sum equal to 28 month's salary and° allowances in lieu of re-instatement; to this, however. the appellants did not agree. In the meantime, Dr. K. P.\n\nBanerjee received' a sum of Rs. 306-1-0 on May 22, 1951 and left the tea garden in question. Then, on December 23, 1953. the G•wernment of Assam published a notification in which it was staled that whereas an industrial dispute had arisen between the appellants and the respondent herein and whereas. it was expedient that the dispute should be referred for ad-' judic:11ion to a Tribunal constituted under s. 7 of the Act, the Governor of Assam was pleased to refer the dispute to Shri U. K. Gohain. Additional District and Sessions Judge. under d. k) of sub-s. (I) of s. IO of the Act. The dispute which was thus referred to the Tribunal was described in these terms:\n\n?'1'c; rkr11t;'1~ of\n\nDim 1 ik.telii Te\" !:_Nste\n\nv. - TJ1e _,\\la11r19.; mcnt\n\nDi1m~/.,'11.chi 'J'ui FhtaW\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOHTS trn5s]\n\n\"(i) Whether the management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate was justified in dismissing Dr. K. P. Banerjee. A. M. O.?\n\n(ii) If not. is he entitled to re-instatement or any other relief in lieu thereof?\"\n\nBoth parties filed written statements before Mr. Gohain and ihe respondent took the pica that Dr. K.P. Banerjee was not a \"workman· within the meaning of the Act; therefore. there was no industrial dispute in the sense in which that exprc.<Sion was defined in the Act and the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make an adjudication on merits. Mr. Gohain took up as a preliminary point the question if Dr. Banerjee was a \"workman\" within the meaning of the Act and came to a conclusion which may be best expressed in his own words:\n\n\"Dr. rlauerjee being not a 'workman', his case is not one of an \"industrial dispute\" under the Industrial Disputes Act and his case is therefore beyond the jurisdiction of this Tribunal and the Tribunal has therefore no jurisdiction to give any relief to him.\"\n\nThere was then an appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Calcutta. That Tribunal affirmed the finding of Mr. Gohain to the effect that Dr. Banerjee was not a workman within the meaning of the Act, The Appellate Tribunal then said:\n\n\"A dispute between the employers and employees to be an industrial dispute within the meaning of section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, must be between the employers and the workmen. There cannot be any industrial dispute between the employers and the employees who are not workmen.\"\n\nThe appeal was accordingly dismissed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The appellants herein then moved this Court for special leave and by an order dated March 14, 1956. special leave was granted, but was \"limited to the question whether a dispute in relation to a person who is not a workman falls within the scope of the definition of industrial dispute contained ins. 2 (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.\"\n\nIt is clear from what has been stated above that the\n\nquestion whether Dr. K. P. Banerjee is or is not a workman 1958 within the meaning of the Act is no longer open to the parties Workmen of and we must proceed on the footing that Dr. K. P. Banerjee Dlmakuelii was not a workman within the meaning o.f the Act and then Toa :itaU decide the question if the dispute in relation to the termination Tlit Ma...;, gen~;11 of of his service still fell within the scope of the definition of the D; maktl/e!, expression \"industrial dispute\" in the Act. \"\" • • We proceed now to read the definition clause the inters. K. Da•J. pretation of which is the only question before us. That definition clause is in these terms:\n\n\"S. 2 (k): \"Industrial dispute\" means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen. which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour. of any person;\" It must be stated here that the expression \"workman\" is also defined in the Act, and the definition which is relevant fon our purpose is the one previous to the amendments of t 956; therefore, in reading the various sections or' the Act, we shall read them as they stood prior to the amendments of 1956 and refer to the amendments only when they have a bearing on the question before us. The definition of 'workman' as it stood at the relevant time stated:\n\n\"S. 2(s): \"Workman\" means any person employed (including an apprentice) in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward and includes, for the purposes of any proceedings under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, a workman discharged during that dispute, but does not include any person employed in the naval, military or air service of the Government.\" Now, the question is whether a dispute in relation to a person who is not a workman within the meaning of the Act still falls within the scope of the definition clause in s. 2(k).\n\nIf we analyse the definition clause it falls easily and naturally into three parts: first, there must be a dispute or difference; second, the dispute or difference must be between employers and employers. or between employers and\n\nJ, l'(D)3SCT--9\n\n1968 workmen or between workmen and workmen; third, the disw .,.hoeio af pute or difference must be connected with the employment or m ... h<Ai\n\nT\"' •- non-employment or the terms of employment or with the ., \"· of conditions l>f labour, of any person. The first part obviously\n\n2'Ao m::::::\" refers to the factum of a real or substantial dispute; the second 2'• •- part to the parties to the dispute; and the third to the subject\n\n8. x. Dru J. matter of that dispute. That subject matter may relate to any of two matters-(i) employment or non-employment, and (ii) terms of empll>yment or conditions of labour, of any person.\n\nOn behalf of the appellants it is contended that the conditions referred to in the first and second parts of the definition clause are clearly fulfilled in the present case, because there is a dispute or difference over the termination of service of Dr. K. P. Banerjee and the dispute or difference is between the employer, namely, the management of the Dimakucbl tea estate on one side. and its workmen on the other. even taking the expression \"workmen\" in the restricted sense in which that expression is defined in the Act. The real diffi. culty arises when we come to the third part of the definition clause.\n\nLeai:ned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the expression \"of any person\" occurring in the third part of the definition clause is an expression of very wide impl)rt and there are no reasons why the words \"any person\" should be equated with \"any workman\", as the Tribunals below have done. The argument is that inasmuch as the dispute or difference between the employer and the workmen is connected with the non-employment of a person called Dr. K. P. Banerjee (even though he was not a workman). the dispute is an industrial dispute within the meaning of the definition clause. At first sight, it does appear that there is Cl>nsiderable force in the argument advanced on behalf of the appellants. It is rightly pointed out that the definition clause does not contain any words of qualification or restriction in respect of the expression \"any person\" occurring in the third part, and if any limitations as to its scope are to be imposed. they must be such as can be reasonably inferred from the definition clause itself or other provision of the Act.\n\nA little careful consideration will show, however, that 1968 the expression \"any person\" occurring in the third part of the Wore.en of\n\nDimafcuclt i definition clause cannot mean anybody and everybody in this 'l'fa Eatau wide world. First of all, the subject matter of dispute must T' 11 \"· ,1 . l (\"\") f 11e ma....,....U o1 relate to (1) employment or non-emp oyment or n terms o Di1na\"1<CM . employment or conditions of labour of any person~ these ne- Tea Ealalt cessarily import a limitation in the sense that a person in :;. K. Du• J. respect of whom the employer-employee relation never existed or can never possibly exist cannot be the subject mat\n\nter of a dispute between employers and workmen. Secondly, the definition clause must be read in the contex of the subject matter and scheme of the Act, and consistently with the objects and other provisions of the Act. It is well settled that \" the words of a statute. when there is a doubt about their meaning are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the Legislature has in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strictly grammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained.\" (Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, 9th Edition, p. 55).\n\nIt is necessary, therefore, to take the Act as a whole and examine its salient provisions. The long title shows that the obje.ct of the Act is \"to make provision for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes, and for certain other purposes.\" The preamble states the same object and s. 2 of the Act which contains definitions states that unkm\n\nthere is anything repugnant in the subject or context, certain expressions will have certain meanings. Chapter 11 refers to the authorities set up under the Act, such as, Works\n\nComm; ttees, Conciliation Officers. Boards of Conciliation.\n\nCourts of Enquiry, and Industrial Tribunals. The primary duty of a Works Committee is to promote measures for securing and preserving amity and good relations between the employer and his workmen and. to that end, to comment\n\nL,'P(D)it''WT-H( a)\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOUTS [1958]\n\n1968 upon matters of their common interest or concern and en w.,...,_ of deavour to compose any material difference of opinion in Di...kuMi Tea E..,,. respect of such matters, Conciliation Officers are charged\n\nv. with the duty of mediating in and promoting the settlement '1'111 MBMgem••• of . . C 1 1 be Di\"\"'kuc/>i of mdustnal disputes. A Board of onc1 iat10n may a so Tto E.,,,.. constituted for the same purpose, namely, for promoting the s. K. IJa• J. settlement of an industrial dispute. A Court of Enquiry may be appointed for enquiring into any matter which appears to be connected with or relevant to an industrial dispute.\n\nSection 7 of the Act empowers the appropriate Government to constitute one or more Tribunals for the adjudication of industrial disputes in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Chapter III ontains provisions relating to the reference of industrial disputes to Boards of Conciliation. Courts of Enquiry or Industrial Tribunals, and the reference in the present case was made under s. 10 of that Chapter. Under s. IO(c) of the Act where an appropriate Government is of opinion that any industrial disputes exist or are apprehend ed, it may. at any time, by order in writing, refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant 1tl the dispute to a Tribunal for adjudication. Chapter IV of the Act deals with procedure. powers and duties of the au thorities set up under the Act. Where an industrial dispute has heen referred to a Tribunal for adjudication, s. 15 re quires that the Tribunal shall bold its proceedings expeditiously and shall as soon as practicable on the conclusion thereof submit its award to the appropriate Government. Section 17 lays down inter alia that the award of a Tribunal shall within a period of one month from the date of its receipt by the appropriate Government be published in such manner as it thinks fit. Section 17-A lays down that the award of a Tribunal shall become enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication under s. 17; it also contains certain other provisions which empower the appro priate Government to modify or reject the award. Section 18 is important for our purpose, and in so far as it relates\n\nta awards it states that an award which has become enforce able shall be binding on-\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPCRTS 1165\n\n(a) all parties to the industrial dispute;\n\nJ9S3 . - Wo•hlM of\n\n(b) all other parties summoned to appear in the pro- Di111aheAO 1 T\"i B~ ceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the Tribuna re- .,. cords the opinion that they were so summoned withoitt pro The~ el per cause; T111 Biia#\n\n(c) where a party referred to under clause (a) or Clause 8 K Dtu J.\n\n(b) is an employer, his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates; and\n\n(d) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is composed of workmen, all persons who are employed in the establishment or part of establishment as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all persons who subsequently beoome employed in that establishment or part.\n\nSection 19 lays down the period of operation of settlements and awards and states inter alia that aiI1 award shall, subject _to the provisions of the section, remain in operation for a period of one year. Chapter V of the Act deals with strikes and lock-outs, Chapter V-A with lay-off and retrenchment, Chapter VI with penalties and Chapter VII with miscellaneous ma.tters. It is important to note that tpough in the definition of \"lock-out\", s. 2 (1) of the Act, and \"strike\", s. 2(q). of the Act, the expression 'any person' has been used, in ss. 22(2) and 23 of the Act which deal with 'look-out\" and \"strike\", only the word 'workmen' has been used. Section 33 provides that during the pendency of any conciliation proceedings or any proceedings before a tribunal of any industrial dispute, no employer shall (a) alter to the prejudice of the workmen concerned, the conditions of their service etc. or\n\n(b) discharge or punish by dismissal or otherwise any workman concerned in the dispute. Section 33 A, however, uses the word 'employee', but read with s. 33, the word employee must mean there a w, orkman. Section 36 which deals with representation of parties ha:s some bearing on the question beft>re us. It lays down that a workman who is a party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any proceeding under the Act by-\n\n(a) an officer of a registered trade union of which he is w..- •! a member; (b) an officer of a federation of trade unions to which fl< Ma;;,_ 01 the trade union referred to in clause (a) is affiliated; and\n\nD;...ahM.\n\nTw E..;.\n\n(c) where the worker is not a member of any trade union, by an officer of any trade union connected with, or &.K.Da•J. th . . hi by any o er workman employed m the industry m w ch the worker is employed and authorised in such manner as may be prescribed.\n\nAn employer who is a party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any proceedings under the Act by-\n\n(a) an officer of an association of employers of which he is a member;\n\n(b) an officer of a federation of associations of employers to which the association referred to in clause (a) is affiliated; and\n\n(c) where the employer is not a member of any association of employers, by an officer of any association of employers connected with, or by any other employer engaged in, the industry in which the employer is engaged and authorised in sudh manner as may be prescribed.\n\nSub-section (3) of s. 36 states that no party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner in any conciliation proceedings under the Act or in any proceedings before a court. Sub-section (4) states thirt in any proceeding before a Tribunal a party to a dispute may be represented by a legal practitioner with the consent of the other parties to the proceeding and with the leave of the Tribunal The point to note is that there is no particular provision for the representation of a party other than a workman or an employer, presumably because under the second part of the definition clause the parties to an industrial dispute can only be employers and employers, employers and workmen or workmen and workmen.\n\nThus, an examination of the salient provisions of the Act shows that the principal objects of the Act are-\n\n(1) the promotil:>n of measures for securing and preserv- 196& ing amity and good relations between the employer and Worhaca o/ workmen; ~-=-\n\n(2) an investigation and settlement of industrial disputes, The .If~ of between employers and employers, employers and workmen, Di~ or workmen and wl:>rkmen, with a right of representation by Tea \"'* a registered trade union or federation of trade unions or ass. K. Dae J. sociation of employers or a federation of ass1:>ciatio!l8 of emloyers;\n\n(3) prevention of illegal strikes and lock-outs;\n\n(4) relief to workmen in the matter of lay-off and retrenchment; and\n\n(5) collective bargaining.\n\nThe Act is primarily meant for regulating the relations of employers and workmen-past, present and future. It draws a distinction between 'workmen' as such and the managerial or supervisory staff, and confers benefit on. the former only.\n\nIt is in the context of all these provisions of the Act that the definition clause in s. 2(k) has to be interpreted. It seems fairly obvious to us that if the expression \"any person\" is given its ordinary mea!ning, then the definition clause will be so wide as to become inconsistent not merely with the objects and other provisions 1:>f the Aot, but also with the other parts of that very clause. Let us see how the definition clause works if the expression \"any person\" occurring therein is given its ordinary meaning. The workmen may then raise a dispute about a person with whom they have no possible Cl:>mmunity of interest; they may raise a dispute about the employment of a person in another industry or a different establishment..;....a dispute in which their own employer is not in a position to give any relief, in the matter of employment or non-employment or the terms 1:>f employment or conditions of labour of such a person. In order to make our meaning clear we may take a more obvious example. Let WI assume that for s1:>me reason or other the workmen of a particular industry raise a dispute with their employer about the employment or terms of employment of the District Map trate or District Judge of the district in which the industry\n\n1958 is situate. It seems clear to us that though the District Mugis-·\n\nWork...,. of trate br District Judge undoubtedly comes within the ex-\n\n~;:;.z: pression \"any persbn\" occurring in the definition clause, a\n\nv. dispute a!bout his employment or tenns of employment is not Ta. :i::z:;.f of an industrial dispute; firstly, because such a dispute does not\n\nTea EJ...,, come within the scope of the Act, having regard to the defis. K. Da• J. nition of the words \"emplllyer\", \"industry\", and 'workman\" and also to other povisions of the Act; secondly, there is no possible community of interest between the District Magistrate or District Judge on the bne hand and the disputants, employer and workmen, on the other. The absurd results that will follow such an interpretation have been forcefully expressed by Chagla C. J., in his decision in Narendra Kumar\n\nSen v. All India Industrial Disputes (Labour Appellate) Tribunal('):\n\n\"If \"any person\" were to be read as an expression without any limitation and qualification whatsoever, then we must not put even. any territorial restriction on that expression. In other words, it would be open to the workmen not only to raise a dispute with regard to the tenns of employment of persons employed in the same industry as themselves, not only to raise a dispute with regard to the tenns of employment in corresponding or similar industries, not only a dispute with regard to the tenns of employment of people employed in our country, but the terms of employment of any workman or any labourer anywhere in the world. The proposition has only to be stated in order to make one realise how entirely untenable it is.\"\n\nTake, for example, anbther case where the workmen raise an objection to the salary or remuneration paid to a Manager or Chief Medical Officer by the employer but without claiming any benefit fur themselves, and let us assume that a dispute or difference arises between the workmen on one side and the employer on the other over such an objection. If such a dispute comes within the definition clause and is referred to an industria 1 tribunal for adjudication, the parties\n\n(r) [1953] 55 Born. L.R. 125, 129, 130.\n\nS.C.-R SUPR.EMB COURT REPORTc 116!1\n\nto the dispute will be the employer on one side and his work- 1958 men on the other. The Manager or the Chief Medical Officer ll'<wlomen of b h Vimakuchi cannot obviously be a party tb the dispute, ecause e is not Tea Elllat• a 'workman' within the meaning of the Act and there is no Th 111\"· ,, • 1 • e: anagement o; dispute between him and his employer. That bemg tlie pos1- Dimak.ichi tion, the award, if any, given by the Tribunal will be bind- Tea Eatatt ing, under cl. (a) of s. 18, on the parties to the dispute and ,9, K. Das J. not on the Manager or the Chief Medidal Officer. It is extremely doubtful if in the circumstances stated. the Tribunal can summon the Manager or the Chief Medical Officer as a party to the dispute, because there is no dispute between the Manager or Chief Medical Officer on one side and his emloyer on the other. Furthermore, s. 36 of the Act does not provide for representation of a person who is not a party to the dispute. If, therefore, an award is made by the Tribunal in the case which we have taken by way of illustration, that award, though binding on the employer, will not be binding on the Manager or Chief Medicat Officer. It should be obvious that the Act could not have contemplated an eventuality of this kind, which does not promote any of the objects of the Act, but rather goes against them.\n\nWhen these difficulties were pointed out to learned counsel for the appellants, he conceded that some limitations must be put on the width of the expression \"any person\" oc• curring in the definition clause. He formulated four such limitations :\n\n(1) The dispute must be a real and substantial one in respect of which one of the parties to the dispute can give relief to the other; e.g., when the dispute is between workmen and employer, the employer must be in a position to give relief to the workmen. This, according to learned counsel for the appellants, will exclude those cases in which the workmen ask for something which their employer is not in a position to give. It would also exclude mere ideological differences or controversies.\n\n(2) The industrial dispute if raised by workmen must relate to the particular establishment or part of establishment\n\n19SB in which the workmen are employed so that the definition w.,.,,,,,. .. •/ clause may be consistent with s. 18 of the Act.\n\nDimaku<lu • Tea E1tate\n\n(3) The dISpute must relate to the employment, non-em-\n\n'l'he Man; g.,..nt of ployment or the terms of employment or with the conditions\n\nDimal:troAi of labour of any person, but such person must be an em-\n\nTea E8tate ployee discharged or in service or a candidate for employs. K. D .. J. ment. Aocording to learned counsel for the appellants, the person about whom the dispute has arisen need not be a workman within the meaning of the Act, but he must answer to the description of an employee, discharged or in service, or a candidate for employment.\n\n(4) The workmen raising the dispute must have a nexus with the dispute, either because they are personally interested or because they have taken up the cause of another per- ,; on in the general interest of labour welfare. The further argument of learned counsel for the appellants is that even imposing the aforesaid four limitations on the width of the expression \"any person\" occurring in the definition clause, the dispute in the present case is an industrial dispute within the meaning of s. 2 (le) of the Aot, because (1) the employer could give relief in the matter of the termination bf service of, Dr. K.P. Banerjee, (2) Dr. K.P. Banerjee belonged to the same establishment, namely, the same tea garden,\n\n(3) the dispute related to a discharged employee (though not a workman) and (4) the workmen raising the dispute were vitally interested in it by reason of the fact that Dr. Banerjee (it is stated) belonged to their trade union and the dismissal of an employee without the formulation of a charge and without giving him an opportunity to meet any charge was a matter of general interest to all workmen in the same establishment.\n\nWe now propose to examine the question whether the limitations formulated by learned counsel for the appellants are the only true limitations to be imposed with regard to the definition clause. In doing so we shall also consider what is the true scope and effect bf the definition clause and what are the correct tests to be applied with regard to it. We think that there is no real difficulty with regard to the first\n\nS.C.R..\n\nSUPR~ME COURT REPORTS 1171\n\ntwo Jimitations. They are, we think, implicit in the definition 1958 clause itself. It is obvious that a dispute between employers Workmen of JJimak'UCki and employers, employers and workmen, or between work- Tea Eslale men and workmen must be a real dispute capable of set- The ; nagement of tlement or adjudication by directing one of the parties to the ~!i dispute to give necessary relief to th'e other. It is also obvi- . b dir tl L.\n\n8. K. Das J. ous that the parties to the dispute must e ec y or suustantially interested therein, so that if workmen raise a dispute, it must relate to the establishment or pa:rt of establish- .men in which they are employed. With regard to limitation (3), while we agree that the expression 'any person' cannot be completely equated with 'any workman' as defined in the Act, we think that the limitation formulated by learned counsel for the appellants is much too widely stated and is not quite correct. We recognise that if the expression 'any person' means 'any workman' within the meaning of the Act, then it is difficult to understa11d why the Legislature instead of using the expression 'any workman' used the much wider expression 'any person' in the third part of the definition clause.\n\nThe very circumstance that in the second part of the defini\n\ntion clause the expression used is \"between emyloyers and workmen or between workmen and workmen\" while in the third part the expression used is \"any person\" indicates that the expression \"any person\" cannot be completely equated with 'any workman'. The reason for the use of the expression \"any person\" in the definition clause is, however, not far to seek. The word 'workman' as defined in the Act (before the amendments of 1956) included, for the purposes of any proceedings under the Act in relation to an industrial dispute, a workman discharged during the dispute. This definition corresponded to s. 2 (j) of the old Trade Disputes Act, 1929 except that the words \"including an apprentice\" were inserted and the words \"industrial dispute\" were substituted for the words \"trade dispute\". It is worthy of note that in the Trade Disputes Act, 1929, the word 'workman' meant any person employed in any trade or industry to do any skilled\n\n117:!\n\nSUPREME COUR1' REPORTS [1948)\n\n1958 or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward. It is iv orkm•~ of clear enough that prior to I 956 when the definition of 'work Dimakuchi Tea E•tate man' in the Act was further widened to include a person dis.\n\nThe .Ma~·,,,..nt •! missed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a\n\nDimai11chi consequence of the dispute or whose dismissal, discharge or Tt.aEWite • • retrenchment led to the dispute, a workman who had been du;. 8• K. Das J. charged earlier and not during the dispute was not a workman within the meaning of the Act. If the expression. \"any person\" in the third part of the definition ctause were to be strictly equated with 'any workman'. then there could be no industrial dispute, prior to 1956, with regard to a workman who had been discharged earlier than the dispute, even though the discharge itself had led to the dispute. That seems to be the reason why the Legislature used the expression 'any person' in the third part of the definition clause so as to put it beyond any doubt that the non-employment of such a dismissed workman was also within the ambit of an industrial dispute. There Wll'S a wide gap between a 'workman' and an 'employee' under the definition of the word 'workman' in s. 2(s) as it stood prior to 1956; all existins workmen were no doubt employees; but all employees were not workmen. The supervisory staff did not come within the definition. The gap has been reduced to some extent by the amendments of 1956; part of the supervisory staff (who draw wages not exceeding five hundred rupees per mensem) and those who were otherwise workmen but were discharged or dismissed earlier have also come within the definition. If and when the gap is completely bridged. 'workmen' will be synonymous with 'employees', whether engaged in any skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work, etc.\n\nBut till the gap is completely obliterated, there is a distinotion between workmen and non-workmen and that distinotion has an important bearing on the question before us.\n\nLimitation no. (3) as formulated by learned counsel for the appellants ignores the distinction altogether and equates 'any person' with 'any employee'-past, present or future: this\n\nwe do not think is quite correct or consistent with the other 1958 provisions of the Act. The Act avowedly gives a restricted work\"\"\" of meaning to the word 'workman' and almost all the provif.~':'1.\":};; sions of the Act are intended to confer benefits on that class v. l d . . f k 7' It;; llfonagenumt of of persons who genera ly answer to the escr1pt1on o wor - n;,,,,,/,1tclii men. The expression 'any person' in the definition clause 'fea 8-'10'' means, in our opinion, a person in whose employment, or\n\n8. K. .Tia.~ .1. non-employment, or terms of employment, or conditions of labour the workmen as a class have a direct or substantial interest-with whom they have, under the scheme of the Act, a community of interest. Our reason for so holding is not merely that the Act makes a distinction between workmen and non-workmen, but because a dispute to be a real dispute must be one in which the parties to the dispute have a direct or substantial interest. Can it be said that workmen as a class are directly or substantilly interested in the employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour of persons who belong to the supervisory staff and are, under the provisions of the Act, non-workmen on whom the Act has conferred no benefit, who cannot by themselves be parties to an industrial dispute and for whose representation the Act makes no particular provision?\n\nWe venture to think that the answer must be in the negative. Limitation (4) formulated by learned counsel for the appellants is also too generally stated. We recognise that solidarity of labour or general interest of labour welfare may furnish, in some cases, the necessary nexus of direct or substantial interest in a dispute between employers and workmen, but the principle of solidarity of the labour movement or general welfare of labour must be based on or correlated to the principle of community of interest; the workmen can raise a dispute in respect of those persons only in the employment or non-employment or the tenns of employment or the conditions of labour of whom they have a direct or substantial interest. We think that Chagla CJ .. correctly put the crucial test when he said in Narendra Kumar Sen v. All India Industrial Disputes (Labour Appellate) Tribunal('). ( ') [195~] 55 Born. \"L.R. 125. 129, 130.\n\nSUPRE~IE COURT REPORTS [1958]\n\n1968 \"Therefore, when s. 2 (kJ speaks of the employment or\n\nWor'lom.n of non-employment or the terms of employment or the condi-\n\nDimaku~Tii fib f nJ h I Tea E\"\"'\" hons o a our o any person, It can o y mean t e emp oyv. ment or non-employment or the terms of employment or the Tiu! .Management of . . • Dimal .. chi cond1hons of labour of only those persons m the employment Tea E&ate or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the s. K. n .. J. conditions of Jabour of whom the workmen themselves are directly and substantially interested. If the workmen have no direct or substantial interest in the employment or non-employment of a person or in his terms of emplt>yrnent or his conditions of labollr, then an industrial dispute cannot arise with regard to such person.\"\n\nWe reach the same conclusion by approaching the question from a somewhat different standpoint. Ordinarily, it is\n\nonly the aggrieved party who can raise a dispute; but an 'industrial dispute' is put on a collective basis, because it is now settled that an individual dispute, not espoused by others of the class to which the aggrieved party may belong, is not an industrial dispute within the meaning of s. 2 (k), As Isaacs J. observed in the Australian case of George Hudson Ltd. v. Australian Timber Workers' Union('):\n\n\"The very nature of an 'industrial dispute' as distinguished from an individual dispute, is to obtain new industrW conditions, not merely for the specific individuals then working from the specific individuals then employing them, and not for the moment only, but for the class of employees from the class of employers ....................... . It is a battle by the claimants, not for themselves alone.\"\n\nSection 18 of the Act supports the aforesaid observations, in so far as it makes the award binding not merely on the parties to the dispute, but where the party is an employer, on his heirs, successors or assigns and where the party is composed of workmen, on all persons employed in the establishment and all persons who subsequently become employed therein. If, therefore, the dispute is a collective dispute, the party raising the dispute must have either a direct interest in the subject matter of dispute or a substantial interest therein in the sense that the class to which the aggrieved party be-\n\n(') 32. C.L.R. 413, 441.\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPRElVIE COURT REPORTS 1175\n\nlongs is substantially affected thereby. It is the community of interest of the class as a whole-class of employers or class of workmen-which furnishes the real nexus between the dis-\n\nJr°'\"'\"\"\" of Dimak1tclli TeaEstaie pute and the parties to the dispute. We see no insuperable v. diffi ul , b . , . f h' The M11nage111t11t -Of c ty m t e practica I application o t 1s test. In a case r1im.a.kwlii where the party to the dispute is composed of aggrieved workl'ea Estak men themselves and the subject matter of dispute relates to S.K. Da$ J. them or any of them, they clearly have a direct interest in the dispute. Where, h'owever, the party to the dispute also composed of workmen, espouse the cause of another person whose employment, or non-employment, etc., may prejudicially affect their interest, the workmen have a substantial in terest in the subject matter of dispute. In both such cases, the dispute is an industrial dispute.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellants has also drawn our attention to the definition of a 'trade dispute' in the Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926. That definition is also in the same terms, but with this vital difference that the word 'workmen' means there \"all personsemployed in trade or industry whether or not in the employment of the employer with whom the trade dispute arises.\" It is obvious that the very wide definition of the word 'workmen' determines the ambit of the definition of a 'trade dispute' in the Trade Unions Act, 1926.\n\nThe provisions of that Act have different objects in view, one of which is the expenditure of the funds of a registered Trade Union 'on the conduct of trade disputes on behalf of the Trade Union or any member thereof. We do not think that that definition for the purposes of an Act like the Trade Unions Act is of any assistance in construing the definition in the Act with which we are now concerned, even though the words employed are the same; for, one thing, the meaning of the word 'workman' completely changes the ambit of the definition clause, and for another, the objects, scheme and purpose of the two Acts are not the same. For the same reasons, we do not think that with regard to the precise prob Iem before us much m; sistance can be obtained by a detailed\n\n19ii8 examination of English, American or Australian decisions\n\nWorkm1m of given with regard to the terms of the statutes in force in Din•rtJ•uchi h E h A be • ed r,,, Estate t ose countries. ac . ct must mterpret on its own\n\n,._ tenns-pcularly when the definition of a 'workman' varies T!1s: J.fa11ngcmrnt (lf f h • d' fr Dimahchi rom statute to statute and, wit changmg ct>n ttJons, om\n\nTh< sta.te time to time. and country to country.\n\nS. K. Da~ J.\n\nThe interpretation of s. 2(k) of the Act has been the subject of consideration in various Indian decisions frt>m different points of view. Two recent decisions of this Court considered the question if an individual dispute of a workman was within the definition of an industrial dispute. The decisitm in C. P. Transport Services Ltd. v. Raghunathl'), related to the C. P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act (No. XXIII of 1947) and the decision in Newspapers Ltd. v.\n\nState Jndu,-trial Tribunal, U. P.('). to the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act (No. XXVIH of 1947). Both these decisions considered s. 2(k) of the Act. but with reference to a different problem. The definition clause in s. 2(kl was considered at some length by the Federal Court in Western India Automobile Association v. The Industrial Tribunal, Bom bayC). and learned counsel for the appellants has placed great reliance on some of the cbservations made therein. The question which fell for dec.ision in that case was whether \"industrial dispute\" included within its ambit a dispute with regard to re-instatement of certain dismissed workmen. It was held that re-instatement was connected with non-employment and, therefore, fell within the words of the definition. It appears that the finding of the Court from which the appeal was preferred to the Federal Court was that the workmen whose re-instatement was in question were discharged during the dispute and were. therefore, workmen within the meaning of the Act. Therefore. the problem of interpretation with which we are faced in this oase was not the problem before their Lordships of the Federa:I Court. The observations on which learned counsel for the appellants has relied are these:\n\n\"The question for determination is whether the defini-\n\n( ') [1956] S.C.R. 956.\n\n(') A.LR. (1957) S.C. 532.\n\n(') (1949] F.C.R 321. 329-330. 346~147.\n\ntion of the expression \"industrial dispute\" given in the Act 1968 includes within its ambit, a dispute in regard to re-instate- Wor.l:tmn of d f th d fin.\n\nDi'1114lc!Wii .ment of dismissed employees ......... The wor s o e e 1-.\n\nTe.a Estate tion may be paraphrazed thus: \"any dispute which has con- , _ M v _ ,, _ • . p,.., anagemtnl o1 nection with the workmen bemg m, or out of service or emp- Dimalcucki loyment\". \"Non-employment\" is the negative of \"employ Tea state ment\" and would mean that disputes of workmen out of ser s.K. Das J. vice with their employers are within the ambit of the defini tion. It is the positive or the negative act of an employer that leads to employment or to non-employment. It may relate to an existing employment or to a contemplated employment, or it may relate to an existing fact of non-employment or a contemplated non-employment. The following four illustrations elucidate this point: (l) An employer has already employed a person and a trade union says \"Please do not employ him\".\n\nSuch a dispute is a dispute as to employment or in connection with employment. (2) An employer gives notice to a union saying tha:t he wishes to employ two particular persons. The union says \"no\". This is a dispute as to employment. It arises out of the desire of the employer to employ certain persons. (3) An employer may dismiss a man, or decline to em loy him. This matter raises a dispute as to non-employment.\n\n(4) An employer contemplates turning out a number of people who a!I'e already in his employment. It is a dispute as t~ contemplated non-employment. \"Employment or non-em- . ployment\" constitutes the subject matter of one class of in\n\ndustrial disputes, the other two classes of disputes being those connected with the terms of employment and the conditions of labour. The failure to employ or the refusal to employ are actions on the part of the employer which would be covered by the terms \"employment or non-employment\". Re-instatement is connected with non-employment and is therefore within the words of the definition.\"\n\n................................................... •-........ ' ............... .\n\n\"It was contended that the re-instatement of the discharged workmen was not an industrial dispute because if the\n\nLJP(D)3SCl-10\n\nfr o-rktrteu uj\n\nll78 Slil'RE:ME COUilT REl'ORT::;\n\n[J 958]\n\nunion represented Lhe discharged employees, they were not workmen within the definition of that word in the Industrial\n\n1;;'.;\"';~~~; Disputes Act. This argument is unsound. We see no difficulty v. in the respondents (unionl taking up the cause of the dis- Tf,,· Jbuwocu•wl of l km d th d' b till d \"al fh\"mahudii c 1arged Wbr en an e 1spute emg s an m ustrt 2\"•a Eetak dispute between the employer and the workmen. The nons.K. D\"' J. employment \"of any persott\" can amount to an industrial dispute between the employer and the workmen, falling imder the definition of thM word in the Industrial Disputes Act.\n\nIt was argued that if the respondents represented the undischarged employees, there was no dispute between them and the employer. That again is fallacious, because under the definition of industrial dispute. it is not necessary that the parties to the proceedings can be the disoharged workmen only. The last words in the definition of industrial dispute, viz., \"any person\" are a complete answer to this argument of the appellants.\" It is true that two of the illustrations~ Nos. (2) and (3)-given in the aforesaid observations seem to indicate that there can be an industrial dispute relating to persons who are not strictly speaking \"workmen\"; but whether those persons would answer to such description or what community of interest the workmen had with them is not stated and in any view we do not think that illustrations given to elucidate a different problem can be taken as determinative of a problem which was not before the court in that case.\n\nA reference was also made to the decision of this Court in D. N. Banerjee v. P. R. Mukherjee('). The question there was whether the expression \"industrial dispute\" included disputes between municipalities and their employees in branches of work analogous to the ca'Trying on of a tarde or business .\n\n. More in point is the decision of the Full Bench of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in a number of appeals reported in 1952 Labour Appeal Cases. p. 198. where the question now before us arose directly for decision. The same question arose for decision before the All India Industrial Tribunal <Bank Disputes) and the majPrity of members (Messrs. K. C.\n\n(') [1953] S.C.R. 302.\n\n8.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT R.EPOHT8 1179\n\nSen and J. N. Majumdar) expressed the view that a dispute w; s between employers and workmen might relate to employ- WMkmw of ment or non-employment or the terms of emplt>yment or con- ¥';:E\":f:.{i ditions of labour of 'persons who were not workmen, and the , v. . . . .\n\n I . 'I he Man<J{feme11I of words 'any person· used m the defi111t1on clause were e, ast1c Dimal:uchi enough to include an officer, that is, a member of the super- Pea E•talc visory staff. The majority view will be found in Chap. X of s.K. Das J. the Report. The minority view was expressed by Mr~ N.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar, who said:\n\n\"It is fairly clear to my mind that \"any person\" in the • Act means anyone who belongs to the employer class or the workmen class and the cases in whose favour or against whom can be said to be adequately presented by the group ot category of persons to which he belongs.\n\nAs stated already it should be remembered that the cases relied upon for the view that 'any person' may mean others also besides the workmen were all cases relating to workmen. They were discharged or dismissed workmen and when their cases were taken up by the Tribunal the point\n\nwas raised that they had ceased to be workmen and were therefore outside the sebpe of tbe Act. This argument was repelled.\n\nIn my opinion, there is no justification for treating such cases as authorities for the wider proposition that a valid industrial dispute can be raised by workmen about the employment or non-employment of somC4:)ne else who does not belong and never belonged to their class or category.\n\nMy view therefore is that the Act does not apply to cases of non-workmen, or officers, if they may be so ca>Iled.\"\n\nBoth these views as also other decisions of High Courts and awards of Industrial Tribunals, were considered by the Full Bench of the Labour Appellate Tribunal and the Chainnan of the Tribunal (Mr. J. N. Majumdar) itcknowledged that his earlier view was not correct and expressed bis opinion, con curred in by all the other members of the Tribunal, at p. 210-\n\n1968 \"l am, therefore, of opinion that the expression 'any Workmen of person' has to be interpreted in terms of 'workmen'. The Dimakm:hi words 'any person' cannot have, in my opinion, their widest Tea E8'au amplitude, as that would create incongruity and repl!gnancy Th• .Jlan:;,,.., .. of in the provisions of the Act. They are to be interpreted in a\n\n~imai manner that persons, who would come within that expression, JwE8'ae can at some stage or other, answer the description of work s.K. v .. J. man as defined in the Act.\"\n\nIt is necessary to state here that earlier a rnntrary view had been taken by the Calcutta High Court in Bir/a Brothrrs,\n\nLtd. v. Modak('), by Banerjee J. in The Dalhousie Jute Co.\n\nLtd. v. S. N. Modak('), and by the Industrial Tribunal, Madras, in East India Industries (Madras) Ltd. v. Their Work men('). It is necessary to emphasise here two considerations which have generally weighed with some of the learned Judges in support of the view expressed by them; these two\n\n- considerations are that (!) normally workmen will not raise a dispute in which they are not directly or substantially in terested and (2) Government will not make a reference unless\n\nthe dispute is a real or substantial one. We think that these two considerations instead of leading to a strictly grammatical or etymological interpretation of the expression \"any pers1>n\" occurril)g in the definition clause should lead, on the contrary, to an interpretation which, to use the words of Maxwell, is to be found in the subject or in the occasion on which the words aJre used lllld the object to be attained by the statute.\n\nWe are aware that anybody may be a potential wt>rkman and the concept of \"a. potential workman\" introduces an element of indefiniteness and uncertainty. We also agree that the expression \"any person\" is co-existensive with any workman, potential or otherwise. We think, however, that the crucial test is one of community of interest and the person regarding whom the dispute is raised must be one in whose employment, non-anployment, terms of employment or conditions of labour (as the case may be) the parties to the\n\n(1) I.L.R. (1948) 2 Cal. 209.\n\n(\") [19111) 1 IL.J. 145.\n\n(') [1952] L.L . .J. 122.\n\ndispute have a direct or substantial interest. Whether such direct or substantial interest has been established in a particular case will depend on its facts and circumstances.\n\n195S\n\nWorkmonof DiMku.eM 'l'da J!Jstak Two other later decisions have also been brought to our The M~gemen~ o notice: Prahlad Rai Mills v. State of Uttar Pradesh(') in lj, imaEkuchi • ea #al• which Bhargava J. expressed the view that the expression 'any person' in the definition clause did not mean a work- B.K. Da•?J man and the decision in Narendra Kumar Sen v. All India Industrial Disputes (Labour Appellate) Tribunai(2), rt'ing the .decision of Chagla C. J. and Shah J: from which we have already quoted some extracts.\n\nAn examination of the decision referred to above undoubtedly discloses a divergence of opinion: two views have been expressed, one based on the ordinary meaning of the expression 'any person' and the other based on the context, with reference to the subject of the enactment and the objects which the legislature has in view. For the reasons which we have already given, we think that the latter view is correct.\n\nTo summarise. Having regard to the scheme and objects of the Act, and its other provisions, the expression 'any person' in s. 2(k) of the Act must be read subject to such limitations and qualifications as arise from the context; the two crucial limitations are (1) the dispute must be a real dispute between the parties to the dispute (as indicated in the first two parts Of the definition clause) so as to be capable of settlement or adjudication by one party to the dispute giving necessary relief to the other, and (2) the person regarding whom the dispute is raised must be one in whose employment, nonemployment, terms of employment, or conditions of labour (as the case may be) the parties to the dispute have a direct or substantial interest. In the absence of such interest the dispute cannot be said to be a real dispute between the parties.\n\nWhere the workmen raise a dispute as against their employer, the person regarding whose employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour the dispute is raised need not be, strictly speaking, a 'workman' \"thin the\n\n(') A.I.R. (1955) N.U.C.\n\nAllahabad 664.\n\n( 2) (1953) 55 Born. 1 R. 125.\n\nJ!lJS\n\nJY orl'fneti of DitMk1l-chi T e-1i. Elt<lte\n\nTlie .Marutg1~1rnt of\n\nJJim, alatcl1i Tv.i. Elate\n\nS.K. /Jo, J.\n\nSU.PHE.ME COURT H.EPORTS [1958]\n\nmeaning of the Act but must be one in whose employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour the workmen as a class have a direct or substantial interest.\n\nJn the case before us, Dr. K. P. Banerjee was not a 'workman'. He belonged to the medical or t_echnical staffa different category altogether from workmen. The appellants had no direct, nor substantial interest in his employment or non-employment, and even assuming that he was a member of the same Trade Union, it cannot be said, on the tests laid down by us, that the dispute regarding his termination of service was an industrial dispute within the meaning of s. 2(k) of the Act.\n\nThe result. therefore, is that the appeal fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of this case there will be no order for costs.\n\nSARKAR J.--On November 1, 1950, Dr. K. P. Banerjee was appointed the Assistant Medical Officer of the Dimakudhi Tea Estate, whose management is the respondent in this appeal. On April 21, 1951, the respondeni .terminated Dr. Banerjee's service with effect from the next day and he was offered one month's salary in lieu of notice. He accepted this salary and later left the Tea Estate. The workmen of the Tea Estate raised a dispute concerning the dismissal of Dr. Banerjee. On December 23, 1953, the Government of Assam made an order of reference for adjudication of the dispute by the Industrial Tribunal under the provisions of s.\n\n10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The order of reference was in the following terms\n\nWhereas an industrial dispute has arisen in the matters specified in the schedule below between:\n\n(!) The workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate. P.O. Dimakuchi, District Darrang, Assam represented by the Secretary, Assam Chah Karmachari Sangha, I.N.T.U.C. Office, P.O.\n\nDibrugarh, Assam and,\n\n(2) The management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate, P.O.\n\nDimakuchi, District Darrang, Assam whose agents are Messrs.\n\nWilliamson Magor and Company Limited, Calcutta.\n\nAnd whereas it is considered expedient by the Govt. of 1958 Assam to refer the said dispute for adjudication to a Tri.bunal Worktnµi of IXmalDuchi -constituted under section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, Tea Estate 1947 (Act XIV of 1947) Th6Maemenlof\n\nNow. therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by ~':;; -clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 10, as amended, of _the\n\nIndustrial Disputes Act <XIV of 1947), the Governor of Assam is pleased to refer the said dispute to Sri Uma Kanta Gohain, Additional District and Sessions Judge (retired) who has been appointed to constitute a Tribunal under the provisions of the said Act.\n\nSCHEDULE\n\n(i) Whether the management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate was justified in dismissing Dr. K. P. Banerjee, A. M. O.?\n\n(ii) If not, is he entitled to re-instatement or any other relief in lieu thereof?\n\nThe Tribunal held that Dr. Banerjee was not a workman :as defined in the Act and, therefore, the dispute referred was not an industrial dispute and consequently it had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon such a dispute. Tb'e workmen pre ferred an appeal. to the Labour Appellate Tribunal. That Tribunal dismissed the appeal holding that Dr. Banerjee was not a workman within the definition of that term in the Act and as the dispute was connected with his employment or non-employment, it was not an industrial dispute, and was therefore beyond the jurisdiCtion of the Industrial Tribunal.\n\nFrom that decision the present appeal by the workmen of the Tea Estate arises with leave granted by this -Court under Art. 136 of. the Constitution~ In granting the leave this Court limited it to the question whether a dispute in relation to a person who is not a workman, falls within the scope of the definition of \"Industrial Dispute\" contained in s. 2(k) of the Act. That, therefore, is the only question before us.\n\nSection 2(k) is in these terms:\n\n\"Industrial dispute means any dispute or difference between employers and employers or between employers and\n\nSarkar J.\n\nJf orkmtn of IJimakueki\n\nPee EMle v.\n\nTl\" Jf•·••uof J}r'm.nkuehi\n\n1-ea Edak\n\nSo-rkar J.\n\nworkmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or. non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person.\"\n\nThe. dispute that was raised was between an employer, the respondent in this appeal and its workmen, the appellants before us and concerned the employment or nonemployment of Dr. Banerjee, a person employed by the same employer but who was not a workman. The question that we have to decide has arisen because of the use of the words \"any person\" in the definition. These words are quite general and very wide and according to their ordinary meaning include a person who is not a workman. If this meaning is given to these words, then the dispute that arose concerning Dr.\n\nBanerjee's dismissal would be an industrial dispute because the dispute would then be clearly within s. 2(k). This indeed is not disputed. Unless there are reasons to the contrary these words have to be given their ordinary meaning. In Bir/a Brothers Ltd. v. Modak(') and in Western India Automobile Association v. Industrial Trilnmal of Bombay(') it was held that the \\vords Hany person\" Y.'ere not meant to refer only to workmen as defined in the Act but were wide and general and would include others who were not such workmen. In The Dalhousie lute Co. Ltd. v. S. N. Modak('), Banerjee J. said, \"Any person means whatever individual is chosen.\n\nI see no reason to restrict the meaning of the word 'person'.\" The same view was expressed in East India Industries (Madras) Ltd. v. Their Workmen('), which was the decision of an Industrial Tribunal. There is then some support for the view that the words 'any person' should have no restriction put upon them.\n\nIt is pointed out on behalf of the respondent that it is not its contention that the words 'any person' should be understood as referring only to a \"workman\" as defined in the Act but that those words should include all persons of\n\n(') I.L.R. (1948) 2 Cal. 209.\n\n(') [1949] F.C.R. 321.\n\n(') [1951] 1 L.L.J. 154.\n\n(') [1952] 1 L.L.J. 122.\n\nthe workman class and so they would include discharged 1956 workmen. It is then stated that the first two of the cases men• w orlmim of tioned above were concerned with a dispute regarding dis f.':E=i charged workmen and did not therefore decide that the Y. • • 'l'hs M anagemuit of words 'any person' included all.\n\nIt is no doubt true that IXmak<uchi these cases were concerned with a dispute regarding discharg Te\" E•lal< cd workmen but I do not understand the decision to have Sarkar .1. proceeded on that basis. Sen 1. said in Birla Brothers case(') (p 213) that, \"It cannot be argued that workmen dismissed prior to the Act are not 'persons' \". Anfi in the Western India Automoble Association case('), it was said (p. 346-7).\n\n\"It was contended that the reinstatement of the dis charged workmen was not an industrial dispute because if the union represented the discharged employees, they were not workmen within the definition of that word in the Indus trial Disputes Act. This argument is unsound.\n\nWe see no difficulty in the respondents {union) taking up the cause of . . the discharged workmen and the dispute being still an industrial dispute between the employer and the workmen. The non-employment \"of any person\" can amount to an indus trial dispute between the employer and the workmen, falling under the definition of that word in the Industrial Disputes Act. It was argued that if the respondents represented the undischarged employees, there was no dispute between them and the employer. That again is fallacious, because under the definition of industrial dispute, it is not necessary that the parties to the proceedings can be the discharged workmen only. The last words in the definition of industrial dispute, viz., \"any person\", are a complete answer to this argument of the appellants.\"\n\nThe last two of the cases mentioned earlier were not how ever concerned with any dispute regarding discharged work men. In The Dalhousie Jute Co. case(') the dispute was with regard to the employment of persons who sought employment as workmen and in the East India Industries (Madras) Ltd. case('} the dispute concerned the dismissal of a member of\n\n(') I.L.R. (1948) 2 Cal. 209.\n\n(\"). [1949] F.C.R. 321,\n\n(') [1951] 1 L.L.J. 145.\n\n(4) [1952] 1 L.L.J. 122.\n\n1~68 the supervisory staff, that is, another employee of the same wori,..,. of employer who was not a workman. It is however said that Dii in none of these cases the arguments that are now advanced Tea E.,,,,. appear to have been advanced and they were not consider-ed Tlle .Ma,.:g.,..,., of in the judgments. This comment is justified. I shall theren;....-; fore lay these cases aside in deciding the question that has Tt11 E\"°\" arisen .\n\n8irkar J. • Are there then good reasons for not giving to the words \"any persons\" their plain meaning? Several have been advanced and I shall examine them a little later. I wish now . to discuss how it is proposed to restrict the meaning of these words,. I have already stated that the contention is that the words are not confined to a workman but refer only to a person of the workman class. This, I confess, I do not fol- low. The word \"workman\" is a term defined in the Act.\n\nOutside the definition it is impossible to say who is a workman and who is not. That being so, the words \"workman dass\" would be meaningless unless they meant all persons who were workmen 'as defined in the Act. So read the words \"any person\" would niean only a workman. But it is .conceded that this is not so. And, of course, it cannot be so, for, if that was intended, there was no reason for the legislature not to have used the words \"any workman\" instead of the words \"any person\". Again if this was the intention, then a dispute concerning the dismissal of a workman would not be an industrial dispute for a dismissed workman was not a workman within the definition of . that word in the Act as it stood in 1953, that being the Act with which we life concerned. Such a result is against all conceptions of industrial disputes laws.\n\nIt is indeed not contended that a dispute concerning the dismissal of a workman would not be an industrial dispute. It therefore seems to me that the words \"any person\" cannot be said to refer only to persons of the workman cl.ass. If they cannot be restricted as being understood to refer only to a person of the workman class, it is not suggested that they can be restricted in any other manner.\n\nIt is then said that the words refer to \"workmen\". dis-\n\nS.O.R SUPRE~IK COURT H.EPOl-nS 1187\n\nmissed as well as in employment as also those, who in future, 1958 become \"workmen\"'. Again I am in difficulty.\n\nSo underll'orl, mon of l l d h ks JJimalmcl1i stood the words wou d not me u e a person w o see em- . 7.'ea l!Jatat• ployment as a workman because he has not become a workv. • . • . 'Plw .illam.aae11ient <U man tdl he is employed. That bemg so, it would have to be Dimakucki said that a dispute raised by workmen in employment when 1'rnEstatc new workmen are to be appointed, that only those of the Sirkar J. candidates as agree to join their union should be appointed and others should not be, would not be an industrial dispute.\n\nThat again seems to me to be against all conceptions of industrial dispute laws. Furthermore, I am wholly unable to appreciate what is meant by a dispute concerning a person, who is not at the time the dispute arises, a workman but in future becomes one. When is. such a person to become a workman? I find no answer. Again, is it to be said that whether a dispute is an industrial dispute or not may have to depend on future circumstances for there is no knowing whether the person concerning whom the dispute arises will later become a workman or not? .If he becomes one, there can be no dispute concerning him referable to a point of time before he became one, and, if he does not, he cannot be one who in future becomes a workman.\n\nIt is said that the words \"any person\" were used instead of the word workffian because it was intended to include within them persons who had been dismissed before the dispute arose and who were not within the definition of workmen in the Act as it stood in 1953. If that was the reason, why could not the legislature use the words \"workmen and dismissed workmen?\" There was nothing to prevent that being done. In fact the definition of \"workman\" has been amended in 1956 to include workmen discharged in consequence of an industrial dispute or whose discharge has led to that dispute. So, as the definition now stands, it includes persons dismissed before the dispute arose. Yet the words \"any person\" have been !aft untouched in s. 2 (k) .and not been replaced by the word workman. This, to my mind,\n\nIVM/cmeno/ Dimak\"\"\"i\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORT [1958]\n\nshows that it was not the intention to confine the words \"any person\" to workmen in employment or discharged.\n\nTea E<taJ• But it is said that the words \"any person\" were left in p/,. Ma~,.,...,.1 of the Act because it was intended to include not only workmen\n\nDimakuchi in employment and dismissed workmen but also persons Tea E•tate who in future become workmen. It is said that, that this is BirkarJ. so appears from s. 18 of the Act.\n\nI shali presently consider this section but I desire to observe now that this argument much weakens the argument noticed in the preceding paragraph, for if the words \"any person\" were used so that persons who in future become workmen might be included in them, they could not have been used to avoid such dismissed workmen as were not workmen as defined in the Act being excluded from them. It seems to me that if it is argued that the words \"any person\" were used so that persons who in future become workmen may be included in them, it cannot be argued that those words were used instead of the word \"workman\" because it was intended to include within them certain dismissed workmen who were not workmen within the definition of that term in the Act as it stood in 1953.\n\nComing now to s. 18 it is in these terms:\n\nA settlemem arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under this Act or an a ward which has become enforceable sha II be binding on-\n\n( a) all parties to the industrial dispute;\n\n(b) all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the Board or Tribunal, as the case may be, records the opinion that they were so summoned without proper cause;\n\n(c) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is an employer, his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates;\n\n(d) where a party roferred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is composed of workmen, all persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part.\n\nI entirely fail to see how that section assists at all in finding 1958 out who were meant to be included in the words \"any per- Workmen of son\". Is it to be said that s. l8(d) by making the award -';;:.::;: binding on those who become in future employed in the v,\n\nl. h km d' h h The Management of estab is ment as wor en, 1n icates t at sue persons are Dimakuchi treated in the same. way as workmen in actual employment Tea Estate and therefore it must have been iq.tended to include them Sirkar J_ within the words \"any person\" along with present and dismissed workmen. I am wholly unable to agree. The object of s. 18(d) is quite clear. The Act is intended to compose a dispute between an employer and his workmen by a settlement or an award brought about by the machinery provided in it and the period during which an award or a settlement is to remain in. force is also provided. The idea behind s. 18 is that whoever takes up appointment as a workman in the establishment to which the dispute relates during the time when the award or settlement is in force, would be bound by it. If it were not so, the award or settlement would have little effect in settling a dispute, for any newly recruited work men could again raise the dispute. Any one - having any experience of industries knows that workmen are largely a shifting population and that the need for replacement of the workmen leaving and for addition to the strength of the workmen employed, is not infrequent. To meet the exigency arising from this need and to make the award or settlement effective it was necessary to enact s. 18(d). Its object was not to place workmen in em]11.oyment and, workmen recruited in future in the same position for all purposes of the Act. On the. same reasoning, in view of s. 18(a), it has to be said that it was the intention of the Act to give the heirs, successors or assignees of an employer the same position for all purposes of the Act as that of the employer. But that would be absurd. Section 18(d) deals with a person who in future becomes employed. The section does not say employed as a workman but I will assume that that is what is meant.\n\nI do not understand what is meant by saying that such a person is within the words \"any person\" in s. 2(k). What is the point of time that\n\n1968 has to be considered? If it is after he has become employed, Workma\" of then he is a workman and admittedly within the words \"any DiflllJh<hi person\". Is it to be said that before such employment also TCJJvEBlate he is within the meaning of those words. But it is difficult to Th• Ma':fi:• of follow this. It is conceivable that any person whatsoever\n\nima i may in future be employed as a workman for there is noth- <• EBla•• ing in the quality of a human being that marks him out as a Birkar J. workman. In this way the words \"any person\" would include all. That, however, is not meant, for it will defeat the very argument based on s. 18(d). Is it to be said then, only such future workmen are meant as apply for jobs as such? But the section makes no reference to such people at all and cannot therafore be of any assistance in showing that it was intended that such applicants would be included within the words \"any person\". I am therefore wholly unable to accept the argument that s. 18(d) shows that future workmen were intended to be included within the words \"any person\".\n\nI wish also to say this. Assume that s. 18(d) shows that it was intended to include within the words \"any person\" one who in future becomes a workman. But where is the reason for saying that the words do not also include others? Section\n\n18 provides none.\n\nI proceed now to discuss the reasons advanced for restricting the generality of the words \"any person\". They were put as follows :\n\nl. In certain sections of the Act the words \"any person\" have been used but there the rwerence is to worknien, and therefore iri s. 2(k) the words \"any person\" should mean persons of the workman class.\n\n2. The scheme anlt the purpose of the Act generally and the object of .the Act specially being to benefit workmen, the words \"any person\" should be confined to people of the workman class.\n\n3. The word \"dispute\" in s. 2(k) itself indicates that the person raising the dispute must be interested in the dispute and therefore since the dispute must concern the employment, non-employment, terms of employment or the conditions of labour of a person, that person must be of the workman class.\n\nThe first reason, then, is that in certain sections, the 19.; t\n\nWorkmen of\n\nDimakuch>\n\nPea Eslate\n\nv. 7'1•e Management of\n\nDi11111kuc1'i\n\nAct uses the words \"any person\". I will assume that by the use of these words only workmen are intended to be referred to in these sections. But the question arises why is such intention to be inferred? Clearly, because the context requires it. I will refer to some of these sections to make my point clear. Section 2(1) defines a lock-out as \"the closing of a place of employment, or the suspension of work, or the refusal by the employer to continue to employ any number of persons employed by him\". Section 2(q) defines a strike as \"a cessation of work by a body of persons employed in any industry acting in combination, or a concerted refusal, or a refusal under a common understanding, of any number ·\n\nof persons who are or have been so employed to continue to work or to accept employment.\" Lock-outs and strikes are dealt with in ss. 22. 23 and 24 of the Act. Section 22(2) says that no employer carrying on any public utility service shall lock-out any of his workmen except on certain condi~ tions mentioned in the section. Section 23 says that no employer of any workman employed in any industrial establishment shall declare a lock-out during the periods mentioned in the section. Section 24 states that a strike or a lock-out shall be illegal if commenced or declared in contravention of s. 22 or s. 23. The definitions of lock-outs and strikes are for the purposes of ss. 22, 23 and 24. There are other sections in which lock-outs and strikes are mentioned but they make no difference for our present purpose. The lock-outs and strikes dealt with in ss. 22(2), 23 and 24 are lock-outs of and strikes by. workmen. It may hence be said that in s. 2(1) and (q1 by the word person a workman is meant. Therefore it is these sections, viz., 22(2), 23 and 24, which show what the meaning of the word 'person' in the definitions is.\n\nI would like lo point out in passing that s. 22(1) says that no person employed in a public utility service shall go on strike except on certain conditions and there is nothing in the Act to show that the word \"person\" in s. 22(1) means only a workman.\n\nProceedin~ however with the point we are concerned with,\n\nPea Eslate\n\nSirlcar j,\n\n1958 the question is, is there any provision in the Act which\n\nwo, kman of would show that the words \"any person\" in s. 2(k) were\n\n1;.':::'l:!'~ meant only to refer to persons of the workman class.\n\nI have v. not been able to find any and none has been pointed out.\n\nTli.e Management of , .\n\nDimakuchi Therefore the fact that m s. 2, sub-ss. (]) and (q) the word Tw Estak ''persons\" means workmen is no reason for concluding that\n\nSarkar J. the same word must be given the same restricted meaing in s. 2(k). The position with regard to s. 33A, in which the word\n\nernploye~ has to be read as meaning a workman because of s. 33, is the same and does not require to be dealt with specially. I may add that if it has tq be said that because in certain other sections the word \"person\" has to be understood as referring to a workman only, in s. 2(k) also the same word must have the same meaning, then we have to read the words \"any person\" in s. 2(k) as meaning only a workman as defined in the Act.\n\nThis however is not the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent. I may further say that it was not contended that the word \"person\" in s. 2, sub-ss. (1) and (q) and the word employee in s. 33A has to be read as including not only a workman in employment but also a discharged workman and a person who in future becomes a workman, and it seems to me that such a contention would not have been possible.\n\nI proceed now to deal with the second group of reasons based on the object and scheme of the Act. It is said that the Act makes a distinction between employees who are workmen and all other employees, and that the focus of the Act is on workmen and it was intended mainly for them. This was the view taken in United Commercial Bank Ltd. v.\n\nKedar Nath Gupta('). I will assume all this. It may also be true that the Act is not much concerned with employees other than workmen. But I am unable to see that all this is any reason for holding that the words \"any person\" must mean a person of the workman class.\n\nThe d(lfinition in s. 2(k) would be fully concerned with workmen however the\n\n(') [1952] 1 L.L.J. 782.\n\nwords \"any person\" in it may be understood because the dis- 1968 pute will be one to which a workman is a party. Is it to be Workmen of d d f km Dimakuchi said that the Act would cease to be mten e or wor en Tea E/JlaU or the focus of it displaced from workmen or that the distincv. . .\n\nThe Management of t10n between workmen and other employees would vamsh Dimakuehi if a dispute relating to the dismissal of one who is not a ea Estate workman is held to be an industrial dispute, even though Sarkar J. the dispute is one to which workmen are parties? I am unable to subscribe to such art argument. But it is said that in such a case the workmen would not be interested in the dispute, the dispute would not really be with them and they would not be in any real sense of the word parties to it. So put the argument comes under the last of the three reasons earlier stated, namely, that in order that there may be an industrial dispute the workmen must be interested in that dispute.\n\nThis contention I will consider later. It is also said in the\n\nUnited Commercial Bank Case(') that the main purpose of the Act is to adjust the relations between employers and workmen by securing for the latter the benefit provided by the Act. It is really another way of saying that the workmen must be interested in the dispute, for if they are not interested no benefit .can accrue to them from an adjustment o1 it. This, as I have said, I will discuss. later.\n\nIt is also said that the Act is for the benefit of workmen and therefore if a dispute concerning a person who is not a workman, is an industrial dispute capable of being resolved by adjudication under the Act, then, if the award goes in favour of the workmen raising it, a benefit would result to a person whom the Act did not intend to .benefit. So it is said, an industrial dispute cannot be a dispute concerning one who is not a workman. But the benefit resulting to the person in such a case would only be incidental. The workmen themselves would also be benefited by it at the same time. To adopt this argument would be to deprive the workmen of this benefit and there is no justification for doing so. How the workmen would be benefited would appear later when I discuss the question of the workmen's interest in the dispute.\n\n( 1)[1952] 1 L.L.J. 782.· L/P(fl)3SCI-ll\n\n1968 I will show later that if the workmen were not interested in\n\nll'Mkmeno/ the dispute so that they could get no benefit under it, there Di....w.hi would be no. reference by the Government and there would '1'et(E81Dl< ... be no benefit to a person who was not a workman. Further.\n\n'1'1\"' AfJt::::s::::M' of I am unable to agree that the Act is intended to confer\n\n'1'\"' Estate benefit on workmen. Its object is admitted by all to pre-\n\nBarkor J. serve industrial peace. It may confer some benefit on workmen but at the same time it takes away their power and right to strike and puts them under a disadvantage.\n\nWe were referred' to the note of dissent to the award of the majority of tbe All India Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes), dated July 31, 1950. This note was by Mr. Chandra Sekhar Aiyer who later became a Judge of this Court. In that note he expressed the view that \"any person\" in s. 2(k) means any one who belongs to 'the employer class or the workmen class and the cases in whose favour or against whom, can be said to be adequately represented by the group or category of persons to which he belongs. I have already stated my difficulties in agreeing that the words \"any person\" mean only persons of the workman class. I will presently deal with the reasoning on which Mr. Aiyer bases his view but I wish to say now that it seems to me that the words \"any person\" cannot refer to anyone belonging to the employer class becl'use the dispute must be in connection with the employment, non-employment, or terms of employment or the conditions of labour of any person and it is not possible to conceive of any such thing in connection with a person in his capacity as an employer.\n\nMr. Aiyar first stated that a necessary limitation to be put on the words \"any person\" is that the person should have something to do with the particular establishment where the dispute has cropped up.\n\nHe said that it could not be that the workmen in Bank A could raise a valid and legitimate industrial dispute with their employer because some one in Bank B had not been treated well by his employer. Assume this is so.\n\nBut it does not follow that an industrial dispute must be one concerning a person of the workman class alone, for a person having something to do with an establishment\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORT 1195\n\nneed not necessarily belong to the workman class. An officer 1968 in an establishment where the dispute crops up would be as Wor'lerMnoJ much a person having something to do with that establish ~!='11:':: ment as a workman there and, therefore, even assuming that v. the limitation suggested by Mr. Aiyar applies, there would The ff.':::fueri;:.m of be nothing in it to prevent an industrial dispute concerning Pea Ealale him arising. The question is not whether the person con- SarkarJ. cerning whom an industrial dispute may arise. has to be employed in the establishment where the dispute arises, but whether he must belong to what has been called the workman class. The decison of the former question which has not arisen in ttis case, is of no help in deciding the question that has arisen and I do not therefore feel called upon to express any opinion with regard to it.\n\nMr. Aiyar next referred to a case where workmen of a Bank raise a dispute with that Bank about an employee of the Bank who was not ai workman, for example an officer who had been dismissed. He assumed that the Bank and the officer had no dispute as between themselves. In his view, if in such a case the dispute was an industrial dispute and could be made the subject matter of an award by an Industrial Tribunal, the award would not be binding on the officer because he had no concern with the dispute. According to him, it would be absurd to suggest that the Bank was under an obligation to give effect to the award. Therefore, in his view, such a dispute would not be an industrial dispute. Now, whether the award would be binding on the officer or not, would depend on whether he could be made a party to the dispute under s. 18(b). It is not necessary to discuss that question now. But assume that the award was not binding on the officer. Why should not the Bank be under an obligation to give effect to the award in so far as it lay in its power to do so? If the dispute was an industrial dispute; the award would be binding on the Bank and it must give effect to it. Then the argument comes to this that the dispute is not an industrial dispute because the award\n\n1196 SUPREl\\iE COURT REPORTS [1958]\n\n1968 would not, as assumed, be binding on the officer concerning W\"\"k\"\"'••f whom the dispute arose.\n\nI cannot accept this view. Take Dimaltui/ti h\" A 1 · TG<t Esia\"' t is case. n emp oyer d1sm1sses five of his workmen. The v. workmen dismissed make no grievance. Three months later T/1e .1.,!ana(fement of . . . . 1Jimakuc1'i the employer d1sm1sses twenty five more and again neither Tea Esia\"' the dismissed workmen nor the workmen in employment\n\nSarkar J. raise any dispute. Two months after the second dismissal the employer dismisses fifty workmen. These workmen make no complaint and leave.\n\nThe workmen in employment now begin to take notice of the dismissals and think that the employer is acting on a set policy and raise a dispute about all the dismissals.\n\nThe dispute is then referred for adjudication and an award is made in favour of the workmen.\n\nAssume that all the dismissed workmen could be made parties to the adjudication proceedings but for one reason or another, were not made parties. This award would not be binding on the dismissed workmen and certainly not on those who had been dismissed on the two earlier occasions. They would not be covered by any of the provisions of s. 18.\n\nIs it to be said that for that reason the dispute is not an industrial dispute?\n\nI am wholly unable to agree. Such a dispute would be entirely within the definition even on the assumption that the words \"any person\" mean only persons of the workman class.\n\nIt follows, therefore, that in order to decide whether a dispute is or is not an industrial dispute, the question whether the award would be binding on tbe person concerning whose employment the dispute was raised, is no test.\n\nI therefore find nothing in the minute of dissent of Mr. Aiyar to justify the putting of any restriction on the plain meaning of the words \"any person\" in s. 2(k). As I shall show later, if certain disputes concerning foremen who are not workmen and who I will assnme would not be bound by the award, are not to be industrial disputes, the object of the Act would clearly be defeated.\n\nI cannot therefore agree that the fact that an award is not binding on one affords a reason for holding that there cannot be an industrial dispute concerning him.\n\nThe matter was put from another point of view. It is\n\naid that if workmen could raise an industrial dispute with 1958 their employer concerning the salary of a manager, who wa~ Wurk\"ie\" of d d d d. h Dimakucki not a workman, an an awar was ma e 1rectmg t e em- Tea Bstaie ployer to pay a smaller salary to the manager, the employer v. ,, Tlie Manageme1tt o1 would be bound by the award but not the manager. Then Dimakuchi it is said, suppose the employer had made a contract with Tea E•tat• the manager to employ him at the higher salary for a number SarkarJ. of years. It is pointed out that in such a case the awarr\n\nbeing binding on the employer, he would be compelled to commit a breach of his contract and be liable to the manager in damages. It is said that it could not have been the intention of the Act to produce a result whereby an employer would become liable in damages and therefore such a dispute cannot be an industrial dispute. But I do not agree that the employer would be liable in damages. The award being binding on him under the Act, the performance of his contract with the manager would become unlawful after the award and therefore void under s. 56 of the Contract Act.\n\nThe employer would not, by carrying out the award, be committing any breach of contract nor would he be liable in damages.\n\nTo hold that the dispute contemplated is an industrial dispute, would not produc.:: the absurd result suggestecl.\n\nThe reason suggested for not holding that dispute to be an industrial dispute, therefore, fails.\n\nTake another case.\n\nSuppose there was a dispute between two employers A and B concerning the wage to be paid by B to his workmen, A complaining that B was paying too high wages, and the dispute was referred for adjudication by a Tribunal and an award was made that B should reduce the wages of his workmen. Assume the workmen were not parties to the dispute and were not made parties even if it was possible to do so.\n\nThe award would not be binding on the workmen concerned under s. 18. None the less it cannot be said that the dispute was not an industrial dispute. It completely satisfies the definition of an industrial dispute even on the basis that the words 'any persons\" mean only workmen. So again it would appear that the\n\nwords may include one on whom the award would not be binding.\n\nWorkmen.of\n\nDim.akuchi\n\nTea Es'416 v.\n\nI may add here, though I do not propose to decide the\n\nTh< .Mnagem•'!' o/ question it being wholly unnecessary for the case before us D•makucln . ' Tea EBlaJ• that 1t seems to me that when a dispute concerns a person whe-\n\n80,,,,,, J. ther a workman or not, who is not a party to the dispute, he can, under s. 18(b), be properly made a party to appear in the proceedings arising out of that dispute. I find nothing in that section to prevent such a course being adopted. If he is made a party, there is no doubt that the decision, whichever way it went, would be most satisfactory to all concerned. If this is the right view, then all arguments based on the fact that the words \"any person\" can only include one on whom the award would be binding would disappear, for on being made a party the award would be binding on that person. It would on the contrary show that it was intended that the words \"any person\" should include one who is not a party to the dispute, and therefore not in the workman class.\n\nAn argument based on s. 33 was also advanced. That is this. The section provides that during the pendency of conciliation proceedings or proceedings before a Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute the conditions of service of workmen concerned in the dispute cannot be changed by the employer, nor such workmen dismissed or otherwise punished by him except with the permission of the Board or Tribunal.\n\nIt is said that this section shows that it was intended to protect only workmen and therefore the words \"any person\" in s. 2(k) should be understood as meaning workmen only. I do not follow this argument at all. Section 33 gives protection to workmen concerned in the dispute which can only mean workmen who are parties to the dispute. A workman concerning whom a dispute arises may or may n:ot be a party to the dispute. The object of the section is clear. If workmen could be punished during the pendency of the proceedings, then no workman would raise a dispute or want to take part in the proceedings under the Act concerned with its adjudication.\n\nFurther, such punishment would surely give\n\nrise to another dispute.\n\nAU this would defeat the entire object of the Act which is to compose disputes by settlement or adjudication. Section 33 gives protection to workmen who are parties to the dispute and does not purport to concern itself with the person concerning whom the dispute arises.\n\nSuch being the position, the section can throw no light on the meaning of the words \"any person\" in s. 2(k). Suppose a workman was dismissed and thereupon a dispute arose between the employer and the other workmen in employment concerning such dismissal. Such a dispute would be undoubtedly an industrial dispute. And it is none the less so, though no protection can be given to the dismissed workman under s. 33 for he is already dismissed.\n\n Reference was also made to s. 36 which provides for the representation of the parties to a dispute in a proceeding arising under the Act out of such dispute. Sub-section (1) of s. 36 provides how a workman, who is a party, shall be represented and sub-section (2) provides bow an employer who is likewise a party, shall be represented. The section does not provide for representation of any other person. It is said that this shows that the words \"any person\" must mean only. a workman, because they must mean an employee, past, present or future and only such employees as are workmen can be parties to the dispute under the definitibn.\n\nI am unable to agree. Section 36 provides for the representation of workmen besides employers and of no one else, because no one but a party need be represented in the proceedings and under the definition, a party to an industrial dispute must either be an employer or a workman. This section has nothing to do with the person concerning whom the dispute arises. If, however, he is also a party to the dispute, then the section makes a provision for his representation in the proceedings arising out of that dispute as such a party and not as one concerning whom the dispute has arisen. I have . earlier said that there may be a case in which though the person concerning whom the dispute arises is a workman, still he may not be a party to it.\n\nThe fact that besides an\n\nWorkmen of\n\n.Dima!tucM\n\nTtaEetau\n\nThe Managemind tf\n\nDima!tucM\n\nP.aEatala\n\nSarkar J.\n\n1200 SUPREl\\fE COURT REPORTS (1968}\n\n1958 employer, the Act makes provision for the representation in\n\nWorkmeno/ the proceedings arising out of an industrial dispute of work-\n\n1i-~-; a;::;:;; men alone does not show that an industrial dispute can only\n\nv. arise concerning a workman.\n\nIn my view, therefore s. 36 Ph<Managemtnto/ . f . . fi d\" h . f h d Dim•l:uchi 1s o no asst.stance m n mg out t e meamng o t e wor s PeaE#alt \"any person\".\n\nSarkar J, I come now to the last of the reasons advanced for restricting the natural meaning of the words \"any person\". It is said that the word dispute in the definition shows that the person raising it must have an interest in it and therefore since the dispute must concern the employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour of a person that person must be a workman.\n\nI confess I do not follow the reasoning. It is said that this is the view expressed by a Bench of the Bombay High Court consisting of Chagla C. J. and Shah J. in Narendra Kumar Sen v. The All India Industrial Disputes (Labour Appellate) Tribunal(').\n\nI have some difficulty in seeing that this is the view expressed in that case.\n\nWhat happened there was that certain workmen raised a dispute against their employer which included a demand for fixing scales of pay and for bonus not only for themselves but also for the foremen and divisional heads under the same employers who were not workmen and this dispute had been referred by the Government for adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal refused to adjudicate the dispute in so far as it concerned the pay and bonus of persons who were not workmen as, according to it, to this extent it was not an industrial dispute.\n\nThe workmen then applied to the High Court for a writ directing the Tribunal to decide the dispute relating to the claims made for the pay and bonus of the persons who were not workmen.\n\nThe- High Court held that the dispute was not an industrial dispute and refused the writ. Chagla C. J. expressed himself in these words (p. 130):\n\n\"A controversy which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour is an industrial controversy.\n\nBut it is not enough that it should be an industrial contro-\n\n(') (1953) 55 Born. L.R. 125.\n\nversy; it must be a dispute; and in my opinion it is not every 1958 controversy or every difference of opinion between work- Workmen of d' d' ff Dima1'uchi men and employers which is constituted a ispute or 1 er- Tea E8tate ence within the meaning of s. 2(k). A workman may have v. 'd l l d'ff h h' l k The Managcmenl ot t eo og1ca 1 erences wit is emp oyer; a wor man may Dimal-uchi feel sympathetic consideration for an employee in his own in- Tea Estate dustry gr in other industry; a workman may feel seriously Sarkar J. agitated about the conditions of labour outside our own country; but it is absurd to suggest that any of these factors would entitle a workman to raise an industrial dispute within the meaning of s. 2(k). The dispute contemplated by s. 2(k) is a controversy in which the workman is directly and substantially interested. It must also be a grievance felt by the workman which the employer is in a position to remedy.\n\nBoth the conditions must be present; it. must be a grievance of the workman himself; it must be a grievance which the employer as an employer is in a position to remedy or set\n\nright.\"\n\nThen he said \\p. 131):\n\n\"It is only primarily in their own employment, in their own terms of employment, in their own conditions of labour that wcrkmen are interested and it is with regard these that they are entitled to agitate by means of raising an industrial dispute and getting it referred to a Tribunal by the Government under s. 10.\"\n\nI find some difficulty in accepting all that the learned Chief Justice said. But assume he is right.\n\nHow does it follow that because an industrial dispute is one in which workmen must be interested it must be concerning themselves? I do not see that it does. Neither do I find Chagla C. J. saying so.\n\nIn the case before him the dispute concerned persons who were not workmen and he found on the facts before him that the workmen were not interested in that dispute and thereupon held that the dispute was not an industrial dispute. But that is not saying that an industrial dispute can only be a dispute concerning workmen. Even the observations that I have read .from p. 131 of the report would not support this view. It is not difficult to conceive\n\nWorkmen oJ\n\nSUPRE~IE COURT REPORTS [1958]\n\nof a dispute concerning the employment of a person who is not a workman which at the same time is one which affects\n\nn;~:~~~ the conditions of labour or terms of employment of the\n\nv. workmen themselves.\n\nI shall give examples of such disputes 1'Ae Manag.,..nt of 1 Wh I h · h \"f d DimaL.,,.,.i ater. at WIS now to pomt out IS t at even 1 an m us-\n\nTen Estai. trial dispute has to be one in which workmen are interested,\n\nSarkar J. that would be no reason for saying that it can only be a dispute concerning workmen and that therefore the words \"any person\" in s. 2(k) must mean only workmen. I also think it right to say now that this argument is not really open to the respondent, for the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is, as I have earlier stated, that the words\n\n\"any person\" do not mean a workman only but mean all persons of the workman class, or past, present and future workmen.\n\nNow I find nothing in the judgment of Chagla C. J. to show that workmen can be interested in the workman class or in past or future workmen. On the contrary he says that workmen are interested primarily-and by the word \"primarily\" I think he means, directly and substantially -only in their own employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour. Reliance on the judgment of the Bombay High Court will therefore land the respondent in contradiction.\n\nI find great difficulty in saying that it is a condition of the existence of an industrial dispute that workmen must be interested in it. The Act does not say so.\n\nBut it is .said that the word dispute in the definition implies it. No doubt. one does not raise a dispute unless he is interested in it, and as the Act must be taken to have in contemplation normal men it must have assumed that workmen will not raise a dis- pute unless they are interested in it.\n\nBut that is not to my mind saying that it i~ a condition of an industrial dispute as contemplated by the Act that workmen must be interested in it.\n\nSo to hold would, in my opinion, lead to grave difficulties and might even result in defeating the object of the Act.\n\nThis I will endeavour to show presently. What I have to say will also show that even assuming that an industrial dispute\n\nis one in which workmen have to be interested, the dispute 1968 that we have in this case concerning Dr. Banerjee's dismissal Workmenof is an industrial dispute for the appellant worlanen are ~r;;:;;:;; directly and substantially interested in it. v.\n\nThe Managemenl of The question that first strikes me, is what is the interest Dimakuehi h. h km h ?\n\nI fi d . . 'bl d fi TeaEstate w 1c wor en must ave. n 1t 1mposs1 e to e ne that interest. If it cannot be defined, it cannot of course be Sarkar J. made a condition of the existence of an industrial dispute, for we would then never know what an industrial dispute is.\n\nNow, \"interest\", as we understand that word in courts of law, means the well-known concepts of proprietary interest or interest in other recognised civil rights. Outside these the matter becomes completely at large and well nigh impossible Of definition. To say that the interest that the -workmen must have is one of the well-known kinds of interest mentioned above is, to my mind, to make the Act largely infructuous.\n\nWe cannot lose sight of the fact that the Act is not dealing with interest as ordinarily understood. It cannot be kept in mind too wel! that the Act is dealing with a new concept, namely, that of the relation between employer and employed or to put it more significantly, between capital .and labour, a concept which is undergoing a fast and elemental change from day to day. The numerous and radical amendments made in tne Act since it came on the Statute book not so long ago, testify to the fast changing nature of the concept. Bearing all these things in inind, I find it almost impossible to define adequately or with any usefulness .an interest which will serve the purposes of the Act. I feel that an attempt to do so will introduce a rigidity which will work harm and no good. Nor does it, to my mind, in any manner help to define such interest by calling it direct and :Substantial.\n\nI will illustrate the difficulty that I feel by an example or two. Suppose a workman was dismissed by the employer and the other workmen raised a dispute about it. Such a dispute comes completely within the definition even assuming that the words \"any person\" only refer to persons of the\n\n1958 workman class, as the respondent contends. There is there-\n\nWorkmen of fore no doubt that such a dispute is an industrial dispute.\n\n1?~':\";:;!\n\nThe question then is what interest have the disputing workv. men in the reinstatement of the dismissed workman if they 'l'he Management of h . ? . .\n\nDimakuchi must ave an interest. The reinstatement would not in any\n\nTea Esiate way improve their financial condition or otherwise enhance\n\nSarl:ar J. any interest of theirs in any sense of the term, in common use. The only interest that I can think of the workmen having for themselves in such a dispute is the solidarity. of labour. It is only this that if the same thing happens to any one of them, the others would rally round and by taking up his cause prevent the dismissal.\n\nApart from the Act how would the workmen have prevented the dismissal from taking effect?\n\nThey would have, if they wanted to prevent the dismissal, gone on strike and thereby tried to force the employer's hands not to give effect to 'the dismissal. That would have destroyed the industrial peace which the object of the Act is to preserve. It is in order to achieve this object that the Act recognises this dispute as an industrial dispute and provides for its settlement by the methods of conciliation or adjudication contained in it and preserves the industrial peace by preventing the parties being left to their own devices. If what I have described as solidarity of labour is to be considered as direct and substantial interest for the purposes of an industrial dispute, as I conceive is not disputed by any one, then it wilt appear that we have embarked on a new concept of interest.\n\nI will now take another case which in regard to interest is the same as the previous one. Suppose the employer engages some workmen at a low rate of wages and the other workmen raise a dispute demanding that the wages of these low paid workmen be increased. This case would be completely within the definition of an industrial dispute even according to the most restricted meaning that may be put upon the words \"any person\", namely that they refer only to workmen as defined in the Act, because the dispute concerns the terms of employment of such a workman. So this has admittedly to be\n\nheld to be an industrial dispute. What then is the interest 1958 of the workmen in this dispute? The increase in the wages Workmen of l DimakucM claimed would not in any manner improve the financia con- Tea Estale dition of the disputing workmen, nor serve any of their T' M v. ,, . tie anagemenl o1 interest as ordinarily understood. It would however help Dimakucl!i h k · h h d Tea Estate t e wor men m seemg t at t elf own wages were not re need by preventing the employer from being able to engage Barkar J. any low paid workman at all. .Apart from this I can think of no other interest that the disputing workmen may have in the dispute. If therefore it is essential that the disputing workmen must have an interest in the dispute, this must be that interest, for, as already stated, the dispute is undoubtedly an 'industrial dispute.\n\nIf this is sufficient interest to constitute an industrial dispute I fail to see why the workmen have no sufficient interest in a dispute in which they claim that a foreman who is particularly rude and brutal in his behaviour should be removed and they should have a more human foreman. This is surely a matter in which the workmen raising the dispute have a personal and immediate interest and not, as in the last case, an interest in the prevention of something happening in future, which conceivably may never happen at all.\n\nSuch an interest is plainly nearer to the ordinary kinds of interest than the interest in solidarity of labour or in the prevention of future harm which in the preceding paragraphs have been found to be sufficient to sustain an industrial dispute. The dispute last imagined would undoubtedly be an industrial dispute if the foreman was a workman for then it would be entirely within the definition of an industrial dispute. Now suppose the foreman was not a workman.\n\nCan it be said that then the dispute would not be an industrial dispute? Would the interest of the workmen in the dispute be any the less or in any way different because the foreman whose dismissal was demanded was not a workman?\n\nI conceive it impossible to say so. Therefore if interest is the test, the dispute that I have imagined would have to be\n\nWorkmen. of\n\nheld to be an industrial dispute whether or not the foreman concerned was a workman.\n\n~;:\"i Now assume that the dispute did not arise out of a\n\nTh< Ma,.;;;..,,111 of demand for the dismissal of a foreman but against his dis-\n\nDimakuchi missal on the ground that he was a particularly kind and TeaEatate h . d h km sympat et1c man an t e wor en were happy to work Sarkar J. under him. In such a case the interest of the workmen in the dispute would be the same as their interest in the dispute demanding the foreman's dismissal. They would be demanding his reinstatement in their own interest; they would be demanding it to make sure that their work would be easy and smooth and that they would be happy in the discharge of it Such a dispute therefore also has to be held to be an industrial dispute, and as in the last case, it would make no difference for this purpose that the foreman concerned was not a workman.\n\nIf this is right, as I think it is, then similarly the dispute concerning the dismissal of Dr. Banerjee would be an industrial dispute for the workmen have sufficient personal and immediate interest in seeing that they have a doctor of their liking to look after them. It is indeed the case of the workmen that by his devotion to duty and good behaviour Or.\n\nBanerjee became very popular with the workmen. Whether the contention of the workmen is justified or not and whether it would be upheld by the Tribunal or not, are who!Jy different matters and do not affect the question whether in an industrial dispute the workmen must l)e interested. It is enough to say that I find no reason to think that the appel lant had no interest in the dispute concerning the dismissal of Dr. Banerjee. Therefore, I would hold that even if it is necessary to constitute an industrial dispute that workmen must have an interest in it, the dispute before us is one in which the appellants' have a direct and substantial interest and it is an industrial dispute.\n\nFor myself however I would not make the interest of the workmen in the dispute a condition of the existence of an industrial dispute. The Act does not do so. I repeat that\n\nit would be impossible to define such interest. In my view, such a condition would defeat the object of the Act. It is said that otherwise the workmen would be able to raise disputes in which they were not interested. Supposing they did, the Government is not bound to refer such disputes for ad-\n\n)dication. Take a concrete case.\n\nSuppose the workmen raise a dispute that the manager of the concern should have a higher pay. It would be for the Government to decide whether the dispute should be referred for adjudication or not.\n\nThe Government is not bound to refer. Now, how is the Government to decide? That must depend on the Government's evaluation of the situation. That this is the intention is clear from the object that the Act has in view.\n\nI will here read from the judgment of the Federal Court in\n\nWestern India Automobile Association case(') what the object of the Act is. It was said at pp. 331-332.\n\n\"We shall next examine the Act to determine its scope.\n\nThe Act is stated in the preamble to be one providing for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes.\n\nAny industrial dispute as defined by the Act may be reported to Government who may take such steps as seem to it expedient for promoting conciliation or settlement. It may refer it to an Industrial Court for advice or it may refer it to an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. The legislation substitutes for free bargaining between the parties a binding award by an impartial tribunal. Now, in many cases an industrial dispute starts with the making of number of de. mands by workmen. If the demands are not acceptable to the employer-and that is what often happens-it results in a dismissal of the leaders and eventually in a strike. No machinery for reconciliation and settlement of such disputes can be considered effective unless it provides within its scope a solution for cases of employees who are dismissed in such conditions and who are usually the first victims in an industrial dispute. If reinstatement of such persons cannot be\n\n( 1) [1949] F.C.R. 321.\n\nWorkmen of\n\nDimaL'UChi\n\nTea Estate\n\nTke Managem•11t of\n\nDimal, ucki\n\nTeaEalale\n\nSarkarJ.\n\nWorkmen oj\n\nDi11lllkuchi\n\nTea Estate\n\n1208 SUPREi\\fE COURT REPORTS [1958]\n\nbrought about by conciliation or adjudication, it is difficult, if not impossible, in many cases to restore industrial peace which is the object of the legislation\" ..\n\nTl1' Man!;'\"\"'\"' of This is the view of the object of the Act that is accepted\n\n!j:,_'\"'!;~'(.~;• by all including the decisions in Narendra Kumar Sen's\n\nSarkar J, case(') and United Commercial Bank case('). In Narendra Kumar Sen's case(') Chagla C. J. said at p. 130:\n\n\"The Industrial Disputes Act was enacted, as Mr. Desai rightly says, to bring about industrial peace in the country, to avoid conflicts between employers and labourers, to prevent strikes and lock-outs, to see that the production in our country does not suffer by reason of constant and continuous labour troubles\".\n\nTherefore in deciding whether to refer or not, the Government is to be guided by the question whether the dispute is such as to disturb the industrial peace and hamper production.\n\nI find no difficulty in thinking that the Government would realise that there was no risk of the peace being disturbed or production being hampered by the dispute raised by the workmen demanding a higher salary for the manager, for being normal men the workmen were not likely to suffer the privations of a strike to enforce their demand for a cause of this nature. The Government must be left to decide this primary question for itself, and therefore the Government must be left to decide in each case whether the workmen had sufficient interest in the dispute. If Government thought that the workmen had no such interest as would lead them to disturb industrial peace by strike or otherwise if the dispute was not ended, the Government might not in its discretion refer the dispute for adjudication by a tribunal. It must be left free to decide as it thinks best in the interest of the country. It is not for the Court to lay down rigid principles of interest which interfere with the Government's discretion, for that might defeat the object of the Act. If the Government feels that the dispute is such that it might lead to the disruption of industrial peace, it is the policy of the Act that it should exercise its powers under it to prevent\n\n(') (1953) 55 Born. L.R. 125.\n\n(') [1962] 1 L.L.J. 782.\n\nthat. Assume a case in which the workmen raised a dispute 1958 without having what the court considers sufficient interest to Workmen of k · d 1 d' d h f h lJimal:uchi ma e it an m ustna 1spute an t ere ore, on t e matter Tea Estate\n\ncmin~ to the court the dispute was held not. to be an indus- Tlie Jlla~~Y'T'•'\"'' trial dispute. Upon that the Governments hands would JJim\"''\"c1,; be tied and it would not be able to have that dispute resolv- ~!.'ea E•tate ed by the processes contemplated in the Act. Suppose now Sarkar J. that, the workmen then go on strike and industrial peace is disturbed aad production hampered. The object of the Act would then have been defeated. And why? Because it was said that it was not a dispute in which the workmen were interested and therefore not a dispute which was capable of being adjusted under the provisions of the Act. It would be no answer to say that the workmen would not go on strike in such a case. If they would not, neither would the Government refer the dispute for adjudication under the Act and it would not be necessary for the court to decide whether the workmen were interested in the dispute or not or whether the dispute was an industrial dispute or not. Therefore, I think that it is not necessary to say that a dispute is an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act only when workmen are interested in it. Such a test of an industrial dispute would niake it justiciable by courts and also introduce a rigidity in the application of the Act which is incompatible With the fast changing concepts it has in view and so defeat the object of the Act. It is enough to assume that as normal men, workmen would not raise a dispute or threaten industrial peace on account of it unless they are interested in it.\n\nI wish however to make it.clear, should any doubt exist as to this, that I do not intend to be understood as saying that the question whether a dispute is an industrial dispute or not is never justiciable by courts of law and that a dispute is an industrial dispute only if the Government says so. Such a larger question does not arise in this case. All that I say is that it is not a condition of an industrial dispute that workmen must be interested in it and 110 question of interest\n\nJDss falls for decision by a court if it can be called upon to decide\n\nWorkm'\" of whether a dispute is an industrial dispute or not. The ques- I>i1n, tkuchi f J f\n\n J r,,,,. E,101, t10n o mterest can on y be o pract1ca value m that it helps\n\n7,\"' >l•n:g, wnt of the Governmen_t '? ecide whether a dispute should be ni 0nuk\"chi referred for ad1ud1cahon or not. 1', t: J~'J; lrtle\n\nThen it is said that if workmen were allowed to raise a dispute concerning a person who was not a workman, then it would be possible\" for such a person to have his dispute with the employer adjudicated through the workmen. This case was put. Suppose the. manager wanted his salary to be increased but could not make the employer agree to hi~ demand, he could then instigate the workmen and make them raise a dispute that his salary should be increased and if such a dispute is an industrial dispute and the award goes in favour of the workmen then the result would be that the Act could be used for settling disputes between the manager and his employer, a dispute which the Act did not intend to concern itself with.\n\nSo it is said that the words \"any person\" in s. 2(k) cannot include an employee who is not a workman.\n\nI am unable to agree. First, in interpreting an Act, the Court is not entitled to assume that persons would use its provisions dishonestly. The words in the Act cannot have a different meaning than their natural meaning because otherwise there would be a possibility of the Act being used for a purpose for which it was not meant. The remedy against this possibility is provided in the Act, in that it has given complete freedom to the Government not to refer such a dispute. It is .not necessary to meet a somewhat remote apprehension that the Act may be used for purposes other than those for which it was meant, to construe its language in a manner different from that which it plainly bears. Lastly, in doing this many cases like those earlier mentioned including the present, which are dearly cases of industrial disputes would have to be excluded in the attempt to prevent by interpretation a remote app1ehension of a misuse of the Act.\n\nThis would do more harm than good.\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPRKl\\m COUHT H.EPOR'l'S 1211\n\nI have therefore come to the conclusion that a dispute concerning a person who is not 1l workman may be an industrial dispute within s. 2(k). As it has not been said that the dispute with which we are concerned is for any other reason not an industrial dispute, I hold that the Industrial Tribunal had full jurisdiction to adjudicate that dispute and should have done so.\n\nI would therefore allow the appeal and send the case back to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication in accordance with Jaw.\n\nORDER OF THE COURT\n\nIn view of the opinion of the majority, the appeal is dismissed-: But there will be no order as to costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nSANTOSH KUMAR\n\nBHAI MOOL SINGH\n\n(S. R. DAIS C. J., VENKATARAMA AIYAR, A. K. SARKAR and\n\nVIVIAN BOSE JJ.)\n\nNegotiable Instruments-Summary Suit on dishonoured cheque-Application for leave to defend-Triable issue-Failui-e to produce documentary evidence-If 11enders defence va.gue and not bona fide-Grant of conditional leave-Discretion of Court, Interference with-Code of Civil Procedure, 0. XXXVII, rr. 2 and 3.\n\nThe respondent filed a suit against the appellant under\n\n0. XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure on the basis of a cheque for Rs. 60,000 drawn by the appellant in favour of the respondent which, on presentation to the Bank, had been dishonoured. The appellant applied under r. 3 of 0. XXXVII for leave to appear and defend the suit on the ground that the cheque had been given only as a collateral security for the price of goods supplied, that the goods had been paid for by cash payments and by other cheques 11nd that therefore the cheque in question had served its end and was without consi- L/S4SCI-2(a)\n\nJYorkmen of\n\nDimakuelfi Tea. Estate\n\nTl1e .lla1wgem•.nt uf\n\nJJimakuchi 2'ea EstaJe\n\nSutkar ./.\n\nFr-bruury 5.", "total_entities": 246, "entities": [{"text": "THE MANAGEMENT OF DIMAKUCHI\n\nTEA ESTATE", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 126, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE MANAGEMENT OF DIMAKUCHI TEA ESTATE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "IS. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 136, "end_char": 146, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "IS. R. DAs", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. K. SARKAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 168, "end_char": 184, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.K. SARKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JVleaning of-Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 263, "end_char": 299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 326, "end_char": 333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "JVleaning of-Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "JVleaning of-Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 512, "end_char": 516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "JVleaning of-Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "JVleaning of-Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 528, "end_char": 557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "the workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 632, "end_char": 667, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "WORKMEN OF DIMAKUCHl TEA ESTATE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. P.\n\nBanerjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 699, "end_char": 714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants, v.1ho were the workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate, espoused the cause of one Dr. K. P.\n\nBanerjee, Assistant Medical Officer.", "canonical_name": "K. P. Banerjee Dlmakuelii"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 959, "end_char": 964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Banerjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1061, "end_char": 1069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both the Tribunal and the Appellate Industrial Tribunal took the vie\\\\' that as Dr. Banerjee was not a \\Vorkman v.rithin the meaning of the Act, the dispute v:as\n\nnot an industrial dispute as defined by s. 2(k).", "canonical_name": "Baner1'ee"}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1180, "end_char": 1187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1298, "end_char": 1302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1314, "end_char": 1343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2294, "end_char": 2301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Per Sarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2594, "end_char": 2604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Sarkar, J.-There is no reason why the words 'any person in s. 2(k) of the Act should not be given their natural meaning so as to include an employee who is not a workman within the meaning of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2657, "end_char": 2664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1949] F.C.R. 321", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3335, "end_char": 3352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3725, "end_char": 3732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C. B. Aggarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3969, "end_char": 3984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Aggarwala and K. P. Gupta, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "K. P. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3989, "end_char": 4000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. B. Aggarwala and K. P. Gupta, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Purslzottam Tricumdas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4023, "end_char": 4044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purslzottam Tricumdas for N.\n\nC. Chatterjee, P. K.\n\nGoswami, S. N. Mukherjee and B. N. Ghosh, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "C. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4053, "end_char": 4066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purslzottam Tricumdas for N.\n\nC. Chatterjee, P. K.\n\nGoswami, S. N. Mukherjee and B. N. Ghosh, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "P. K.\n\nGoswami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4068, "end_char": 4082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purslzottam Tricumdas for N.\n\nC. Chatterjee, P. K.\n\nGoswami, S. N. Mukherjee and B. N. Ghosh, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. N. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4084, "end_char": 4099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purslzottam Tricumdas for N.\n\nC. Chatterjee, P. K.\n\nGoswami, S. N. Mukherjee and B. N. Ghosh, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "B. N. Ghosh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4104, "end_char": 4115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purslzottam Tricumdas for N.\n\nC. Chatterjee, P. K.\n\nGoswami, S. N. Mukherjee and B. N. Ghosh, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. K.\n\nDas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4188, "end_char": 4198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Das, C. J., and S. K.\n\nDas, J., was delivered by S. K. Das, J. Sarkar, J., delivered a separate Judgment.", "canonical_name": "IS. R. DAs"}}, {"text": "S. K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4221, "end_char": 4230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Das, C. J., and S. K.\n\nDas, J., was delivered by S. K. Das, J. Sarkar, J., delivered a separate Judgment.", "canonical_name": "IS. R. DAs"}}, {"text": "J. Sarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4232, "end_char": 4241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of Das, C. J., and S. K.\n\nDas, J., was delivered by S. K. Das, J. Sarkar, J., delivered a separate Judgment."}}, {"text": "workmen", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4279, "end_char": 4286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "workmen vj of Dimakuchi Tea E8!ate\n\nT!te Manago,,•nt ·\"f Dimaku.;"}}, {"text": "S. K. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4360, "end_char": 4369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "hi Tea E•fatt\n\nS. K. DAs J.-This appeal by special leave raises a quess.", "canonical_name": "IS. R. DAs"}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4604, "end_char": 4611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4619, "end_char": 4648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "K. P. Banerjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5024, "end_char": 5038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Dr.\n\nTM :J,=:;:\" of K. P. Banerjee was appointed assistant medical Officer of the\n\n2'11J B- Dimakuchi tea estate with effect from November l, 1950.", "canonical_name": "K. P. Banerjee Dlmakuelii"}}, {"text": "November l, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5134, "end_char": 5150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Dr.\n\nTM :J,=:;:\" of K. P. Banerjee was appointed assistant medical Officer of the\n\n2'11J B- Dimakuchi tea estate with effect from November l, 1950."}}, {"text": "Cox", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6405, "end_char": 6408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To this Dr. Banerjee received a reply to this effect: \"The reasons for your discharge\n\nare on the medical side, which are outside my jurisdiction, best kn~ to Dr. Cox but a main.reason is because of the deceitful manner in which you added figures to the require ments of the last medical indent after it bad been signed by Dr. Cox, evidence of which is in my hands.\""}}, {"text": "Baner1'ee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7080, "end_char": 7089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The manager wrote back to say that Dr. K. P.\n\nBanerjee was discharged on the ground of incompetence in\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COUHT REPOR'rS 1159\n\nhis medical duties and the chief medical officer <Dr. Cox) had 19&& found that Dr. Baner1'ee was incompetent and did not have Wmkm<11 of Dimakwt.4i sufficient \"knowledge of simple everyday microscopical and Tea Eetcl4 laboratory work which befalls the lot of every assistant medi- •· . ,", "canonical_name": "Baner1'ee"}}, {"text": "Peacock", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7472, "end_char": 7479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "inexpert and clumsy quinine in- Tea Eetot• jection to one Mr. Peacock."}}, {"text": "Assam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8077, "end_char": 8082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter was then referred to a Board known as the tripartite Appellate Board consisting of the Labour Commissioner, Assam, and two representatives of the Assam branch of the Indian Tea Association and the Assam Chah Kannachari Sangha respectively."}}, {"text": "Indian Tea Association", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8135, "end_char": 8157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter was then referred to a Board known as the tripartite Appellate Board consisting of the Labour Commissioner, Assam, and two representatives of the Assam branch of the Indian Tea Association and the Assam Chah Kannachari Sangha respectively."}}, {"text": "Assam Chah Kannachari Sangha", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8166, "end_char": 8194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter was then referred to a Board known as the tripartite Appellate Board consisting of the Labour Commissioner, Assam, and two representatives of the Assam branch of the Indian Tea Association and the Assam Chah Kannachari Sangha respectively."}}, {"text": "May 22, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8598, "end_char": 8610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "306-1-0 on May 22, 1951 and left the tea garden in question."}}, {"text": "December 23, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8657, "end_char": 8674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then, on December 23, 1953."}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8962, "end_char": 8966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "U. K. Gohain", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9042, "end_char": 9054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "it was expedient that the dispute should be referred for ad-' judic:11ion to a Tribunal constituted under s. 7 of the Act, the Governor of Assam was pleased to refer the dispute to Shri U. K. Gohain."}}, {"text": "Gohain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9609, "end_char": 9615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both parties filed written statements before Mr. Gohain and ihe respondent took the pica that Dr. K.P. Banerjee was not a \"workman· within the meaning of the Act; therefore.", "canonical_name": "Gohain"}}, {"text": "K.P. Banerjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9658, "end_char": 9671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both parties filed written statements before Mr. Gohain and ihe respondent took the pica that Dr. K.P. Banerjee was not a \"workman· within the meaning of the Act; therefore.", "canonical_name": "K. P. Banerjee Dlmakuelii"}}, {"text": "Gohain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9904, "end_char": 9910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Gohain took up as a preliminary point the question if Dr. Banerjee was a \"workman\" within the meaning of the Act and came to a conclusion which may be best expressed in his own words:\n\n\"Dr. rlauerjee being not a 'workman', his case is not one of an \"industrial dispute\" under the Industrial Disputes Act and his case is therefore beyond the jurisdiction of this Tribunal and the Tribunal has therefore no jurisdiction to give any relief to him.\"", "canonical_name": "Gohain"}}, {"text": "rlauerjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10094, "end_char": 10103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Gohain took up as a preliminary point the question if Dr. Banerjee was a \"workman\" within the meaning of the Act and came to a conclusion which may be best expressed in his own words:\n\n\"Dr. rlauerjee being not a 'workman', his case is not one of an \"industrial dispute\" under the Industrial Disputes Act and his case is therefore beyond the jurisdiction of this Tribunal and the Tribunal has therefore no jurisdiction to give any relief to him.\""}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10184, "end_char": 10207, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10383, "end_char": 10427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was then an appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Calcutta."}}, {"text": "section 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10691, "end_char": 10703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10711, "end_char": 10734, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "March 14, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11040, "end_char": 11054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants herein then moved this Court for special leave and by an order dated March 14, 1956."}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11270, "end_char": 11299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "K. P. Banerjee Dlmakuelii", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11539, "end_char": 11564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is clear from what has been stated above that the\n\nquestion whether Dr. K. P. Banerjee is or is not a workman 1958 within the meaning of the Act is no longer open to the parties Workmen of and we must proceed on the footing that Dr. K. P. Banerjee Dlmakuelii was not a workman within the meaning o.f the Act and then Toa :itaU decide the question if the dispute in relation to the termination Tlit Ma...;, gen~;11 of of his service still fell within the scope of the definition of the D; maktl/e!,", "canonical_name": "K. P. Banerjee Dlmakuelii"}}, {"text": "S. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12016, "end_char": 12020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "S. 2(s)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12771, "end_char": 12778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13347, "end_char": 13354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dimakucbl tea estate", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14586, "end_char": 14606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the appellants it is contended that the conditions referred to in the first and second parts of the definition clause are clearly fulfilled in the present case, because there is a dispute or difference over the termination of service of Dr. K. P. Banerjee and the dispute or difference is between the employer, namely, the management of the Dimakucbl tea estate on one side."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17601, "end_char": 17605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18813, "end_char": 18822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19199, "end_char": 19204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter IV of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19515, "end_char": 19536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19697, "end_char": 19702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IV of the Act", "statute": "Chapter IV of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19879, "end_char": 19889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IV of the Act", "statute": "Chapter IV of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20080, "end_char": 20090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IV of the Act", "statute": "Chapter IV of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20225, "end_char": 20230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IV of the Act", "statute": "Chapter IV of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20347, "end_char": 20357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter IV of the Act", "statute": "Chapter IV of the Act"}}, {"text": "Clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20878, "end_char": 20886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21331, "end_char": 21341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter V of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21536, "end_char": 21556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21774, "end_char": 21778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter V of the Act", "statute": "Chapter V of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 2(q)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21809, "end_char": 21816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter V of the Act", "statute": "Chapter V of the Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 22(2) and 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21876, "end_char": 21892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter V of the Act", "statute": "Chapter V of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21984, "end_char": 21994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter V of the Act", "statute": "Chapter V of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22325, "end_char": 22335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter V of the Act", "statute": "Chapter V of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22388, "end_char": 22393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter V of the Act", "statute": "Chapter V of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22442, "end_char": 22452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter V of the Act", "statute": "Chapter V of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23762, "end_char": 23767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Worhaca", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24708, "end_char": 24715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus, an examination of the salient provisions of the Act shows that the principal objects of the Act are-\n\n(1) the promotil:>n of measures for securing and preserv- 196& ing amity and good relations between the employer and Worhaca o/ workmen; ~-=-\n\n(2) an investigation and settlement of industrial disputes, The .If~ of between employers and employers, employers and workmen, Di~ or workmen and wl:>rkmen, with a right of representation by Tea \"'* a registered trade union or federation of trade unions or ass."}}, {"text": "K. Dae", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24997, "end_char": 25003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Dae J. sociation of employers or a federation of ass1:>ciatio!l8 of emloyers;\n\n(3) prevention of illegal strikes and lock-outs;\n\n(4) relief to workmen in the matter of lay-off and retrenchment; and\n\n(5) collective bargaining.", "canonical_name": "K. Dae"}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25552, "end_char": 25559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26499, "end_char": 26501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27530, "end_char": 27536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The absurd results that will follow such an interpretation have been forcefully expressed by Chagla C. J., in his decision in Narendra Kumar\n\nSen v. All India Industrial Disputes (Labour Appellate) Tribunal('):\n\n\"If \"any person\" were to be read as an expression without any limitation and qualification whatsoever, then we must not put even."}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29413, "end_char": 29418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29458, "end_char": 29464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a) of s. 18, on the parties to the dispute and ,9, K. Das J. not on the Manager or the Chief Medidal Officer.", "canonical_name": "K. Dae"}}, {"text": "s. 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29794, "end_char": 29799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31250, "end_char": 31255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32341, "end_char": 32345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35348, "end_char": 35352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Trade Disputes Act, 1929", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35368, "end_char": 35392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "is worthy of note that in the Trade Disputes Act, 1929", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35541, "end_char": 35595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2(s)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36964, "end_char": 36971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40329, "end_char": 40333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41496, "end_char": 41500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Isaacs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41509, "end_char": 41515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ordinarily, it is\n\nonly the aggrieved party who can raise a dispute; but an 'industrial dispute' is put on a collective basis, because it is now settled that an individual dispute, not espoused by others of the class to which the aggrieved party may belong, is not an industrial dispute within the meaning of s. 2 (k), As Isaacs J. observed in the Australian case of George Hudson Ltd. v. Australian Timber Workers' Union('):\n\n\"The very nature of an 'industrial dispute' as distinguished from an individual dispute, is to obtain new industrW conditions, not merely for the specific individuals then working from the specific individuals then employing them, and not for the moment only, but for the class of employees from the class of employers ....................... ."}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42020, "end_char": 42030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.K. Da$", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43220, "end_char": 43228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a case r1im.a.kwlii where the party to the dispute is composed of aggrieved workl'ea Estak men themselves and the subject matter of dispute relates to S.K. Da$ J. them or any of them, they clearly have a direct interest in the dispute.", "canonical_name": "IS. R. DAs"}}, {"text": "Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43737, "end_char": 43766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Trade Unions Act, 1926", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44139, "end_char": 44161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Trade Unions Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44455, "end_char": 44471, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S. K. Da~", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45375, "end_char": 45384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. K. Da~ J.\n\nThe interpretation of s. 2(k) of the Act has been the subject of consideration in various Indian decisions frt>m different points of view.", "canonical_name": "IS. R. DAs"}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45411, "end_char": 45418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We do not think that that definition for the purposes of an Act like the Trade Unions Act is of any assistance in construing the definition in the Act", "statute": "We do not think that that definition for the purposes of an Act like the Trade Unions Act is of any assistance in construing the definition in the Act"}}, {"text": "Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45765, "end_char": 45805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45917, "end_char": 45940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45994, "end_char": 46001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "(1949] F.C.R 321", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 47222, "end_char": 47238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50185, "end_char": 50208, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "All India Industrial Tribunal <Bank Disputes)", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 51729, "end_char": 51774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same question arose for decision before the All India Industrial Tribunal <Bank Disputes) and the majPrity of members (Messrs. K. C.\n\n(') [1953] S.C.R. 302."}}, {"text": "Sen", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 51880, "end_char": 51883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT R.EPOHT8 1179\n\nSen and J. N. Majumdar) expressed the view that a dispute w; s between employers and workmen might relate to employ- WMkmw of ment or non-employment or the terms of emplt>yment or con- ¥';:E\":f:.{i ditions of labour of 'persons who were not workmen, and the , v. . . . ."}}, {"text": "J. N. Majumdar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51888, "end_char": 51902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT R.EPOHT8 1179\n\nSen and J. N. Majumdar) expressed the view that a dispute w; s between employers and workmen might relate to employ- WMkmw of ment or non-employment or the terms of emplt>yment or con- ¥';:E\":f:.{i ditions of labour of 'persons who were not workmen, and the , v. . . . ."}}, {"text": "s.K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 52387, "end_char": 52395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "X of s.K. Das J. the Report.", "canonical_name": "IS. R. DAs"}}, {"text": "N.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 52450, "end_char": 52474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The minority view was expressed by Mr~ N.\n\nChandrasekhara Aiyar, who said:\n\n\"It is fairly clear to my mind that \"any person\" in the • Act means anyone who belongs to the employer class or the workmen class and the cases in whose favour or against whom can be said to be adequately presented by the group ot category of persons to which he belongs."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 54538, "end_char": 54557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is necessary to state here that earlier a rnntrary view had been taken by the Calcutta High Court in Bir/a Brothrrs,\n\nLtd. v. Modak('), by Banerjee J. in The Dalhousie Jute Co.\n\nLtd. v. S. N. Modak('), and by the Industrial Tribunal, Madras, in East India Industries (Madras) Ltd. v. Their Work men(')."}}, {"text": "Banerjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 54599, "end_char": 54607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is necessary to state here that earlier a rnntrary view had been taken by the Calcutta High Court in Bir/a Brothrrs,\n\nLtd. v. Modak('), by Banerjee J. in The Dalhousie Jute Co.\n\nLtd. v. S. N. Modak('), and by the Industrial Tribunal, Madras, in East India Industries (Madras) Ltd. v. Their Work men(').", "canonical_name": "Baner1'ee"}}, {"text": "Industrial Tribunal, Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 54673, "end_char": 54700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is necessary to state here that earlier a rnntrary view had been taken by the Calcutta High Court in Bir/a Brothrrs,\n\nLtd. v. Modak('), by Banerjee J. in The Dalhousie Jute Co.\n\nLtd. v. S. N. Modak('), and by the Industrial Tribunal, Madras, in East India Industries (Madras) Ltd. v. Their Work men(')."}}, {"text": "Maxwell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 55418, "end_char": 55425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We think that these two considerations instead of leading to a strictly grammatical or etymological interpretation of the expression \"any pers1>n\" occurril)g in the definition clause should lead, on the contrary, to an interpretation which, to use the words of Maxwell, is to be found in the subject or in the occasion on which the words aJre used lllld the object to be attained by the statute."}}, {"text": "Workmonof DiMku.eM", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 56341, "end_char": 56359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "195S\n\nWorkmonof DiMku.eM 'l'da J!Jstak Two other later decisions have also been brought to our The M~gemen~ o notice: Prahlad Rai Mills v. State of Uttar Pradesh(') in lj, imaEkuchi • ea al• which Bhargava J. expressed the view that the expression 'any person' in the definition clause did not mean a work- B.K. Da•?J man and the decision in Narendra Kumar Sen v. All India Industrial Disputes (Labour Appellate) Tribunai(2), rt'ing the .decision of Chagla C. J. and Shah J: from which we have already quoted some extracts."}}, {"text": "Bhargava", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 56533, "end_char": 56541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "195S\n\nWorkmonof DiMku.eM 'l'da J!Jstak Two other later decisions have also been brought to our The M~gemen~ o notice: Prahlad Rai Mills v. State of Uttar Pradesh(') in lj, imaEkuchi • ea al• which Bhargava J. expressed the view that the expression 'any person' in the definition clause did not mean a work- B.K. Da•?J man and the decision in Narendra Kumar Sen v. All India Industrial Disputes (Labour Appellate) Tribunai(2), rt'ing the .decision of Chagla C. J. and Shah J: from which we have already quoted some extracts."}}, {"text": "B.K. Da•?J man", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 56643, "end_char": 56657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "195S\n\nWorkmonof DiMku.eM 'l'da J!Jstak Two other later decisions have also been brought to our The M~gemen~ o notice: Prahlad Rai Mills v. State of Uttar Pradesh(') in lj, imaEkuchi • ea al• which Bhargava J. expressed the view that the expression 'any person' in the definition clause did not mean a work- B.K. Da•?J man and the decision in Narendra Kumar Sen v. All India Industrial Disputes (Labour Appellate) Tribunai(2), rt'ing the .decision of Chagla C. J. and Shah J: from which we have already quoted some extracts."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 56803, "end_char": 56807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "195S\n\nWorkmonof DiMku.eM 'l'da J!Jstak Two other later decisions have also been brought to our The M~gemen~ o notice: Prahlad Rai Mills v. State of Uttar Pradesh(') in lj, imaEkuchi • ea al• which Bhargava J. expressed the view that the expression 'any person' in the definition clause did not mean a work- B.K. Da•?J man and the decision in Narendra Kumar Sen v. All India Industrial Disputes (Labour Appellate) Tribunai(2), rt'ing the .decision of Chagla C. J. and Shah J: from which we have already quoted some extracts."}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57398, "end_char": 57405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.K.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 58541, "end_char": 58545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Elate\n\nS.K. /Jo, J.\n\nSU.PHE.ME COURT H.EPORTS [1958]\n\nmeaning of the Act but must be one in whose employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour the workmen as a class have a direct or substantial interest.", "canonical_name": "IS. R. DAs"}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59229, "end_char": 59236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 59385, "end_char": 59391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SARKAR J.--On November 1, 1950, Dr. K. P. Banerjee was appointed the Assistant Medical Officer of the Dimakudhi Tea Estate, whose management is the respondent in this appeal.", "canonical_name": "SARKAR"}}, {"text": "November 1, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 59399, "end_char": 59415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SARKAR J.--On November 1, 1950, Dr. K. P. Banerjee was appointed the Assistant Medical Officer of the Dimakudhi Tea Estate, whose management is the respondent in this appeal."}}, {"text": "Dimakudhi Tea Estate", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 59487, "end_char": 59507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SARKAR J.--On November 1, 1950, Dr. K. P. Banerjee was appointed the Assistant Medical Officer of the Dimakudhi Tea Estate, whose management is the respondent in this appeal."}}, {"text": "April 21, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 59563, "end_char": 59577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 21, 1951, the respondeni .terminated Dr. Banerjee's service with effect from the next day and he was offered one month's salary in lieu of notice."}}, {"text": "Government of Assam", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 59886, "end_char": 59905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 23, 1953, the Government of Assam made an order of reference for adjudication of the dispute by the Industrial Tribunal under the provisions of s.\n\n10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947."}}, {"text": "s.\n\n10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60016, "end_char": 60022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 60030, "end_char": 60059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate, P.O.\n\nDimakuchi, District Darrang, Assam", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 60407, "end_char": 60483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.O. Dimakuchi, District Darrang, Assam represented by the Secretary, Assam Chah Karmachari Sangha, I.N.T.U.C. Office, P.O.\n\nDibrugarh, Assam and,\n\n(2) The management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate, P.O.\n\nDimakuchi, District Darrang, Assam whose agents are Messrs.\n\nWilliamson Magor and Company Limited, Calcutta."}}, {"text": "Williamson Magor and Company Limited, Calcutta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 60510, "end_char": 60556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.O. Dimakuchi, District Darrang, Assam represented by the Secretary, Assam Chah Karmachari Sangha, I.N.T.U.C. Office, P.O.\n\nDibrugarh, Assam and,\n\n(2) The management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate, P.O.\n\nDimakuchi, District Darrang, Assam whose agents are Messrs.\n\nWilliamson Magor and Company Limited, Calcutta."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60725, "end_char": 60734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 60742, "end_char": 60765, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60910, "end_char": 60920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 60943, "end_char": 60966, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Uma Kanta Gohain", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61048, "end_char": 61064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by ~':;; -clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 10, as amended, of _the\n\nIndustrial Disputes Act <XIV of 1947), the Governor of Assam is pleased to refer the said dispute to Sri Uma Kanta Gohain, Additional District and Sessions Judge (retired) who has been appointed to constitute a Tribunal under the provisions of the said Act."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62114, "end_char": 62122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62347, "end_char": 62354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62417, "end_char": 62429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63512, "end_char": 63519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1949] F.C.R. 321", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 64639, "end_char": 64656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65192, "end_char": 65198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is no doubt true that IXmak<uchi these cases were concerned with a dispute regarding discharg Te\" E•lal< cd workmen but I do not understand the decision to have Sarkar .1.", "canonical_name": "SARKAR"}}, {"text": "Birla Brothers", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 65243, "end_char": 65257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "said in Birla Brothers case(') (p 213) that, \"It cannot be argued that workmen dismissed prior to the Act are not 'persons' \"."}}, {"text": "Western India Automoble Association", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 65374, "end_char": 65409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anfi in the Western India Automoble Association case('), it was said (p. 346-7)."}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 66063, "end_char": 66086, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Dalhousie Jute Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 66651, "end_char": 66669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In The Dalhousie Jute Co. case(') the dispute was with regard to the employment of persons who sought employment as workmen and in the East India Industries (Madras) Ltd. case('} the dispute concerned the dismissal of a member of\n\n(') I.L.R. (1948) 2 Cal."}}, {"text": "East India Industries (Madras) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 66779, "end_char": 66814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In The Dalhousie Jute Co. case(') the dispute was with regard to the employment of persons who sought employment as workmen and in the East India Industries (Madras) Ltd. case('} the dispute concerned the dismissal of a member of\n\n(') I.L.R. (1948) 2 Cal."}}, {"text": "[1949] F.C.R. 321", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 66911, "end_char": 66928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "8irkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67423, "end_char": 67429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8irkar J. • Are there then good reasons for not giving to the words \"any persons\" their plain meaning?"}}, {"text": "S.O.R SUPRE~IK COURT H.EPOl-nS 1187", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 69199, "end_char": 69234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "dis-\n\nS.O.R SUPRE~IK COURT H.EPOl-nS 1187\n\nmissed as well as in employment as also those, who in future, 1958 become \"workmen\"'."}}, {"text": "Dimakucki", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 69614, "end_char": 69623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That bemg so, it would have to be Dimakucki said that a dispute raised by workmen in employment when 1'rnEstatc new workmen are to be appointed, that only those of the Sirkar J. candidates as agree to join their union should be appointed and others should not be, would not be an industrial dispute."}}, {"text": "Sirkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 69748, "end_char": 69754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That bemg so, it would have to be Dimakucki said that a dispute raised by workmen in employment when 1'rnEstatc new workmen are to be appointed, that only those of the Sirkar J. candidates as agree to join their union should be appointed and others should not be, would not be an industrial dispute.", "canonical_name": "SARKAR"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71347, "end_char": 71351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dimakuchi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 71730, "end_char": 71739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ",.1 of the Act because it was intended to include not only workmen\n\nDimakuchi in employment and dismissed workmen but also persons Tea E•tate who in future become workmen."}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71889, "end_char": 71894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72696, "end_char": 72701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74227, "end_char": 74235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74513, "end_char": 74518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75203, "end_char": 75211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75383, "end_char": 75391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75603, "end_char": 75616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75862, "end_char": 75869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Birkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 76394, "end_char": 76400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is conceivable that any person whatsoever\n\nima i may in future be employed as a workman for there is noth- <• EBla•• ing in the quality of a human being that marks him out as a Birkar J. workman.", "canonical_name": "Birkar"}}, {"text": "s. 18(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76542, "end_char": 76550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76895, "end_char": 76903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77028, "end_char": 77036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section\n\n18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77220, "end_char": 77231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77509, "end_char": 77516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77798, "end_char": 77805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78521, "end_char": 78533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(q)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78715, "end_char": 78727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79052, "end_char": 79058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 22(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79082, "end_char": 79095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79248, "end_char": 79258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79407, "end_char": 79417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79515, "end_char": 79520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79524, "end_char": 79529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 22, 23 and 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79596, "end_char": 79613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 22(2), 23 and 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79778, "end_char": 79798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79870, "end_char": 79877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80096, "end_char": 80104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80276, "end_char": 80284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80507, "end_char": 80514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80718, "end_char": 80722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80889, "end_char": 80896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80926, "end_char": 80932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81010, "end_char": 81015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81227, "end_char": 81234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81329, "end_char": 81336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81535, "end_char": 81539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81586, "end_char": 81592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82431, "end_char": 82438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Is it to be Workmen of d d f km Dimakuchi said that the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 82629, "end_char": 82688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Barkor", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85281, "end_char": 85287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Its object is admitted by all to pre-\n\nBarkor J. serve industrial peace.", "canonical_name": "Birkar"}}, {"text": "All India Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes)", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 85534, "end_char": 85579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We were referred' to the note of dissent to the award of the majority of tbe All India Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes), dated July 31, 1950."}}, {"text": "July 31, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 85587, "end_char": 85600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We were referred' to the note of dissent to the award of the majority of tbe All India Industrial Tribunal (Bank Disputes), dated July 31, 1950."}}, {"text": "Chandra Sekhar Aiyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85623, "end_char": 85643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This note was by Mr. Chandra Sekhar Aiyer who later became a Judge of this Court."}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85740, "end_char": 85747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Aiyer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 86135, "end_char": 86140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I will presently deal with the reasoning on which Mr. Aiyer bases his view but I wish to say now that it seems to me that the words \"any person\" cannot refer to anyone belonging to the employer class becl'use the dispute must be in connection with the employment, non-employment, or terms of employment or the conditions of labour of any person and it is not possible to conceive of any such thing in connection with a person in his capacity as an employer.", "canonical_name": "Aiyer"}}, {"text": "Aiyar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 86544, "end_char": 86549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Aiyar first stated that a necessary limitation to be put on the words \"any person\" is that the person should have something to do with the particular establishment where the dispute has cropped up.", "canonical_name": "Aiyer"}}, {"text": "Pea Ealale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 87578, "end_char": 87588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "':::fueri;:.m of be nothing in it to prevent an industrial dispute concerning Pea Ealale him arising."}}, {"text": "s. 18(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88872, "end_char": 88880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dimaltui", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 89487, "end_char": 89495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Take Dimaltui/ti h\" A 1 · TG<t Esia\"' t is case."}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90552, "end_char": 90557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91200, "end_char": 91207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92763, "end_char": 92768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93609, "end_char": 93614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94270, "end_char": 94278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94991, "end_char": 94996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95500, "end_char": 95507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95592, "end_char": 95602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96213, "end_char": 96223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96475, "end_char": 96482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96782, "end_char": 96787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96846, "end_char": 96851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96996, "end_char": 97001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97480, "end_char": 97490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98623, "end_char": 98628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 99257, "end_char": 99274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is said that this is the view expressed by a Bench of the Bombay High Court consisting of Chagla C. J. and Shah J. in Narendra Kumar Sen v. The All India Industrial Disputes (Labour Appellate) Tribunal(')."}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100883, "end_char": 100890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101353, "end_char": 101360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101390, "end_char": 101397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102093, "end_char": 102098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103460, "end_char": 103467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Managemenl", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 105375, "end_char": 105385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nThe Managemenl of The question that first strikes me, is what is the interest Dimakuehi h. h km h ?"}}, {"text": "Barkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 110109, "end_char": 110115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would however help Dimakucl!i h k · h h d Tea Estate t e wor men m seemg t at t elf own wages were not re need by preventing the employer from being able to engage Barkar J. any low paid workman at all.", "canonical_name": "Birkar"}}, {"text": "Western India Automobile Association", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 114761, "end_char": 114797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I will here read from the judgment of the Federal Court in\n\nWestern India Automobile Association case(') what the object of the Act is."}}, {"text": "[1949] F.C.R. 321", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 115987, "end_char": 116004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Narendra Kumar Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 116473, "end_char": 116491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "j:,_'\"'!;~'(.~;• by all including the decisions in Narendra Kumar Sen's\n\nSarkar J, case(') and United Commercial Bank case(')."}}, {"text": "United Commercial Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 116517, "end_char": 116539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "j:,_'\"'!;~'(.~;• by all including the decisions in Narendra Kumar Sen's\n\nSarkar J, case(') and United Commercial Bank case(')."}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 116616, "end_char": 116639, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 116660, "end_char": 116665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Narendra Kumar Sen's case(') Chagla C. J. said at p. 130:\n\n\"The Industrial Disputes Act was enacted, as Mr. Desai rightly says, to bring about industrial peace in the country, to avoid conflicts between employers and labourers, to prevent strikes and lock-outs, to see that the production in our country does not suffer by reason of constant and continuous labour troubles\"."}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121818, "end_char": 121825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S 1211", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122888, "end_char": 122894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 123029, "end_char": 123036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SANTOSH KUMAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 123542, "end_char": 123555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SANTOSH KUMAR\n\nBHAI MOOL SINGH\n\n(S. R. DAIS C. J., VENKATARAMA AIYAR, A. K. SARKAR and\n\nVIVIAN BOSE JJ.)"}}, {"text": "BHAI MOOL SINGH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 123557, "end_char": 123572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SANTOSH KUMAR\n\nBHAI MOOL SINGH\n\n(S. R. DAIS C. J., VENKATARAMA AIYAR, A. K. SARKAR and\n\nVIVIAN BOSE JJ.)"}}, {"text": "S. R. DAIS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 123575, "end_char": 123585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SANTOSH KUMAR\n\nBHAI MOOL SINGH\n\n(S. R. DAIS C. J., VENKATARAMA AIYAR, A. K. SARKAR and\n\nVIVIAN BOSE JJ.)", "canonical_name": "IS. R. DAs"}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMA AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 123593, "end_char": 123610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SANTOSH KUMAR\n\nBHAI MOOL SINGH\n\n(S. R. DAIS C. J., VENKATARAMA AIYAR, A. K. SARKAR and\n\nVIVIAN BOSE JJ.)"}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BOSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 123630, "end_char": 123641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SANTOSH KUMAR\n\nBHAI MOOL SINGH\n\n(S. R. DAIS C. J., VENKATARAMA AIYAR, A. K. SARKAR and\n\nVIVIAN BOSE JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 123904, "end_char": 123927, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 124024, "end_char": 124051, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S4S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124553, "end_char": 124556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1958_1_1211_1218_EN", "year": 1958, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPRKl\\m COUHT H.EPOR'l'S 1211\n\nI have therefore come to the conclusion that a dispute concerning a person who is not 1l workman may be an industrial dispute within s. 2(k). As it has not been said that the dispute with which we are concerned is for any other reason not an industrial dispute, I hold that the Industrial Tribunal had full jurisdiction to adjudicate that dispute and should have done so.\n\nI would therefore allow the appeal and send the case back to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication in accordance with Jaw.\n\nORDER OF THE COURT\n\nIn view of the opinion of the majority, the appeal is dismissed-: But there will be no order as to costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nSANTOSH KUMAR\n\nBHAI MOOL SINGH\n\n(S. R. DAIS C. J., VENKATARAMA AIYAR, A. K. SARKAR and\n\nVIVIAN BOSE JJ.)\n\nNegotiable Instruments-Summary Suit on dishonoured cheque-Application for leave to defend-Triable issue-Failui-e to produce documentary evidence-If 11enders defence va.gue and not bona fide-Grant of conditional leave-Discretion of Court, Interference with-Code of Civil Procedure, 0. XXXVII, rr. 2 and 3.\n\nThe respondent filed a suit against the appellant under\n\n0. XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure on the basis of a cheque for Rs. 60,000 drawn by the appellant in favour of the respondent which, on presentation to the Bank, had been dishonoured. The appellant applied under r. 3 of 0. XXXVII for leave to appear and defend the suit on the ground that the cheque had been given only as a collateral security for the price of goods supplied, that the goods had been paid for by cash payments and by other cheques 11nd that therefore the cheque in question had served its end and was without consi- L/S4SCI-2(a)\n\nJYorkmen of\n\nDimakuelfi Tea. Estate\n\nTl1e .lla1wgem•.nt uf\n\nJJimakuchi 2'ea EstaJe\n\nSutkar ./.\n\nFr-bruury 5.\n\n1$ant-Osh Kumar\n\nBlu.i M ocl Singh\n\nBose J.\n\n1212 SUPREl\\fE COURT REPORTS [1958]\n\nderation. The Court held that the defence raised a triable issue but tha.t the defence was vague and was not b<>11a fide as the ap.. pellant had produced no evidence to prove his assertions and consequently granted leave to defend the suit vn the condition of the appeUant giving security for the suit amount and the costs of the suit:\n\nHeld, that the imposition of the condition was illegal and the appellant was entitled to defend the suit without giving_ the security. The object of the special procedure under 0. XXXVII of the Cod&1s ta see that a defendant does not unnecessarily prolong the lLtigation by raising untenable and frivolous defences. The test is to see whether the defence raises a real' issue and not a sham one, fa the sense that, ii the facts alleged by the defendant are established, there would be a good, or even a plausible, defence on those facts. If the Court is satisfied about that, leave must be given and given unconditionall~.\n\nHeld, further, that the Court was wrong in imposing the condition about givtlng security on the ground that for want of production Qf documentary evidence the defence was vague and not bona fide as the stage of proof can only arise after leave to appeal and defend has been granted. Though the Court is given a discretion about imposing conditions it must be exercised judicially and in consonance With principles Of natural justice.\n\nIf the discretion is exercised arbitrarily, or is based on a misunderstanding of the principles that govern its exercise then interference is called for if there has been a resultant failure of justice.\n\nClv1L APPELLATE JuR1so1cmoN: Civil Appeal No. 96 of 1957.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated December 17, 1956, of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) at Delhi in Civil Misc. No. 896-D of 1956. arising out of the judgment and order dated November 1. 1956, of the Court of Commercial Subordinate .Judge, Delhi in Suit No. 264 of 1956 under Order XXXVIl, C.P.C.\n\nA. V. Vishwanatha Sastri and Naunit Lal, for the appellant.\n\nBak/1Shi Gurchi:lran Singh and Sardar Singh, for the respondent.\n\n1958. February S. The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBosE J.-The defendan!S, Santosh Kumar and the Northern General Agencies, were granted special leave to appeal.\n\nThe plaintiff filed the suit out Qf which the appeal arises on\n\nS.C.R\n\nSUPREME COUH'L' HEPORTS\n\nthe basis of a cheque for Rs. 60,000 drawn by the defendants in favour of the plaintiff and which, on presentation to the Bank, was dishonoured.\n\nThe suit was filed in the Court of the Commercial Subordinate Judge, Delhi, under 0. XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nThe defendants applied for leave to defend the suit under r. 3 of that Order.\n\nThe learned trial Judge held that\n\n\"the defence raised by the defendants raises a triable issue,\" but he went on to hold that the defendants\n\n, \"have not placed anything on the file to show that the defence was a bona fide one.\n\nAccorddingly, he permitted the defendants\n\n\"to appear and defend the suit on the condition of their. giving security to the extent of the suit amount and the costs of the suit.\"\n\nThe defendants applied for a review but failed. They then applied under Art. 227 of the Constitution to the Delhi Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court and failed again. As a result, they applied here under Art. 136 and were granted special leave.\n\nAt first blush, 0. XXXVII, r. 2(2), appears drastically to curtail a litigant's normal rights in a Court of justice, namely to appear and defend himself as of right, if and when sued, becouse it says that when a suit is instituted on a bill of exchange, hundi or a promissory note under the provisions of sub-rule (1)-\" ...... the defendant shall not appear or defend the suit unless he obtains leave from a judge as hereinafter provided so to appear and defend.\"\n\nBut the rigour of that is softened by r. 3(1) which makes it obligatory on the Court to grant leave when the conditions set out there are fulfilled. Clause (l) runs-\n\n\"The Court shall, upon application by the defendant, give leave to appear and to defend the suit, upon affidavits which disclose such facts as would make it incumbent on the holder to prove consideration, or such other facts as the Court may deem sufficient to support the application\".\n\n19J8\n\n13antosli Kumar\n\nBliai Moo! Singh\n\nBose J.\n\nlfJ:j8\n\nSa11/..11h K 111w1r\n\nBhrli }.fool ,\"J'inyli\n\nBOJIP.J.\n\nSVPJU~ME COUH'l' l{gl'ORTS\n\nBut no sooner is the wide discretion given to the Court in r. 2\n\n(2) narrowed down by r. 3< ll than it is again enlarged in another direction by r. 3(2) which says that\n\n\"Leave to defend may be given unconditionally or subject to such terms as to payment into Court. giving security. framing and recording issues or otherwise as the Court thinks fit.\"\n\nThe learned counsel for the plaintiff argues that the discretion so conferred by r. 3(2) is unfettered and that as the discretion has been exercised by the learned trial Judge. no appeal can lie against it unless there is a \"grave miscarriage of justice or ftagrant viclation of law\" and he quotes D.N. Banerji I'. P.R.\n\nMukherjee(') and Waryam Singh v. Amamuth (').\n\nNow what we are examining here arc laws of procedure. The spirit in which questions about procedure are to be approached and the manner in which rules relating to them are to be interpreted are laid down in Sa11grum Si11g/1\n\nv. Election Tribwwl, Kotci/1, B11urey Lal Baya(\").\n\n''Now a code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is procedure, something designed to facilitate justi.;; e and further its ends; not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip peovle up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to botll sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it.\n\nNext, there must be ever present to the mind the fact that our laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their backs. that proceedings that affect their lives and properly should not continue in their absence and that they should not be precluded from participating in them.\n\nOf course. there must be exceptions and where they are clearlv defined they must be given effect to. But taken by and large,\n\n(') [1953] S.C.R. :JO~. :l05. ('l [1954) S.C.R. 565.\n\ni'l [1955] 2 S.C.R l, 8, 9.\n\nS.C.R SUPHJiJME couwr lU~POR'fS 12l5\n\nand subject to that proviso, our laws of procedure should be construed, wherever that is reas1Jnably possible, in the light of that principle.\"\n\nApplied to the present case, these observations mean that though the Court is given a discretion it must be exercised along judicial lines, and that in turn means, in consonance with the principles of natural justice that form the foundations of our laws. Those principles, so far as they touch the present matter, arc well known and have been laid down and followed in numerous cases.\n\nThe decision most frequently referred to is a decision of the House of Lords in England where a similar rule prevails. It is Jacobs v. Booth's Distillery Company('). Judgment was delivereP in 1901. Their Lordships said that whenever the defence raises a \"triable issue,\" leave must be given, and later cases say that when that is the case it must be given unconditionally, otherwise the leave may be illusory. See, for example, PowszeC'hny Bank Zwiazkowy W. Polmce v. Pa ros ('), in England and Sundaram Chettiar v. Valli A mm al (\") in India. Among oth-:r cases that udopt the \"triable issue\" test are Kiranmovee. Dassi v. J. Clwtter; ee('l. and Gopala Rao v.\n\nSubba Rao (').\n\nThe learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent relied on Gopala Rao v. Subba Rao (\"), Manohar Lal v. Na11he Mal(\"), and Shib Karan Das v. Mohammed Sadiq('). All that we need say about them is that if the Court is of opinion that the defence is not bona fide, then it can impose conditions and is not tied down to refusing leave to defend. We agree with Varadachariar J. in the Madras case that the Court has this third course open to it in a suitable case. But it cannot reach the conclusion that the defence is not bmia fide arbitrarily. It is as much bound by judicial rules and judicial procedure in reaching a conclusion of this kind as in any other matter. It is\n\n( ') (1902) 85 L.T. 262.\n\n(') [1932] 2 K.B 353.\n\n(') (1935) I.L.R. 58 Mad. 116. ('l (1945) 49 C.W.N. 246.\n\n(') A.LR. (19361 Mad. 246.\n\n(') A.LR. 1938 Lah. 548. (') A.I.R. 1936 Lah. 584.\n\nw.; s\n\nSantosh 1\\\" m.rir\n\nBhai Mool Si11li\n\nBose J,\n\nSantOJJlt Kum, ar\n\nBhai Mool Singh\n\nBuse J.\n\n1216 SUPIU<; rn COURT RI~POHTS\n\nunnecessary to examine the facts of those cases because they are not in appeal before us. We are only concerned with the principle.\n\nIt is always undesirable, and indeed impossible, to lay down hard and. fast rules in matters that affect discretion. But it is necessary to understand the reason for a special procedure of this kind in order that the discretion may be properly exercised. The object is explained in Kesavan v. South Indian Bank Ltd. ('), and is examined in greater detail in Sundaram Che/liar v. Valli A mmal (supra), to which we have just referred. Taken by and large, the object is to see that the defendant does not unnecessarily prolong the litigation and prevent the plaintiff from obtaining an early decree by raising untenable\n\nand frivolous defences in a class of cases where speedy decisions are desirable in the interests of trade and commerce. In general, therefore, the test is to see whether the defence raises a real issue and not a sham one, in the sense that, if the facts alleged by the defendant are established, there would be a good, or even a plausible, defence on those facts.\n\nNow, what is the position here? The defendants admitted execution of the cheque but pleaded that it was only given as collateral security for the price of goods which the plaintiff supplied to the defendants. They said that those goods were paid for by cash payments made from time to time and by other cheques and that therefore the cheque in suit had served its end and should now be returned. They set out the exact dates on which, according to them. the payments had been made and gave the numbers of the cheques.\n\nThis at once raised a1Y issue of fact, the truth and good faith of which could only be tested by going into the evidence and, as we have pointed out, the learned trial Judge held that this defence did raise a triable issue. But he held that it was not enough for the defendants to back up their assertions with an affidavit; they should also have produced writings and documents which they said were 111 their possession and\n\n(') I.L.R. 1950 Mad 251.\n\nS.C.R SUPlU<:i\\'lJ~ COUHT REPORTS 1217\n\nwhich they asserted would prove that the cheques and payments referred to in their defence were given in payment of the cheque in suit; and he said-\n\n\"In the absence of those documents, the defence of the defendants seems to be vague consisting of indefinite assertions ............... \"\n\nThis is a surprising conclusion. The facts given in the affidavit are clear and precise, the defence could hardly have been clearer. We find it difficult to see how a defence that, on the face of it. is clear becomes vague simply because the evidence by which it is to be proved is not brought on file at the time the defence is put in.\n\nThe learned Judge has failed to see that the stage of proof can only come after the defendant has been al.lowed to enter an appearance and defend the suit, and that the nature of the defence has to be determined at the time when the affidavit is put in. At that stage all that the Court has to determine is whether \"if the facts alleged by the defendant are duly proved\" they will afford a good, or even a plausible, answer to the plaintiff's claim. Once the Court is satisfied about that, leave cannot be withheld and no question about imposing conditions can arise; and once leave is granted, the normal procedure of a suit, so far as evidence and proof go, obtains.\n\nThe learned High Court Judge is also in error in thinking that even when the defence is a good and valid one, conditions can be imposed. As we have explained. the power to impose conditions is only there to ensure that there will be a speedy trial. If there is reason to believe that the defendant is trying to prolong the litigation and evade a speedy trial, then conditions can be imposed, But that conclusion cannot be reached simply because the defendant does not adduce his evidence even before he is told that he may defend the action.\n\nf We do not wish to throw doubt on those decisions which decide that ordinarily an appeal will not be entertained against an exercise of discretion that has been exercised along sound judicial lines. But if the discretion is exerciser!\n\n)!J:j8\n\nSantosh K umur\n\nBhai 11£ uol 8inyh\n\nBose .J,\n\nl!JJ8\n\nSrt11tosli K1tm'lr\n\nv Bltai .Jlool Singh\n\nBoe J.\n\n1''1'.bruury 6.\n\n1218 SUPHE:\\IE C'OUHT JUWOH'l'S [1958]\n\narbitrarily. or is based on a misunderstanding of the principles that govern its exercise. then interference is called for if there has been a resultant failure of justice. As we have said, the only ground given for concluding that the defence is not bona fide is that the defendant did not prove his assertions before he was allowed to put in his defence; and there\n\ni' an obvious failure of justice if judgment is entered against a. man who, if he is allowed to prove his case, cannot but succeed. Accordingly, interference is called for here.\n\nThe appeal is allowed. We set aside the orders of the High Court and the learned trial Judge and remand the case to the first Court for trial of the issues raised by the defendants. The costs of the appellants in this Court will be paid by the respondent who has failed here.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nKANT A PRASHAD\n\nDELHI ADMINISTRATION\n\n(and connected appeal)\n\n(B. P. SINHA and JAFER IMAM JJ.)\n\nCriminal Law-Grant of pardon-Power of the District Magistrate--.Case triable by Court of Special Judge-Cou1't of Session=-ConcUrrent jurisdiction to tender pardon-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (2 of 1947), s. 5(2)-Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 (46 of 1952), ss. 8(2)(3), 9-Code of Cm minal Procedure (Act 5 of 1898). ss. 337. 338.\n\nThe appellants were convicted under s. 120B and s. 224/109 of the Indian Penal Code and s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, by the Court of Special Judge constituted under the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952. It was contended I\n\nfor them that lhe conviction was bad on the ground inter alia that the pardon tendered to the approver by the Ditsrict M.agistrate under s. 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by virtue\n\nof which he was examined as a witness by the Special Judge,", "total_entities": 43, "entities": [{"text": "S 1211", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 38, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 173, "end_char": 180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SANTOSH KUMAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 686, "end_char": 699, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SANTOSH KUMAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAI MOOL SINGH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 701, "end_char": 716, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHAI MOOL SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. K. SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 756, "end_char": 768, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.K. SARKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BOSE JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 774, "end_char": 789, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1048, "end_char": 1071, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1168, "end_char": 1195, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S4S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1697, "end_char": 1700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1855, "end_char": 1859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1$ant-Osh Kumar\n\nBlu.i M ocl Singh\n\nBose J.\n\n1212 SUPREl\\fE COURT REPORTS [1958]\n\nderation.", "canonical_name": "Bose"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3880, "end_char": 3885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "A. V. Vishwanatha Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3888, "end_char": 3912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "264 of 1956 under Order XXXVIl, C.P.C.\n\nA. V. Vishwanatha Sastri and Naunit Lal, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3917, "end_char": 3927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "264 of 1956 under Order XXXVIl, C.P.C.\n\nA. V. Vishwanatha Sastri and Naunit Lal, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Sardar Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3980, "end_char": 3992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bak/1Shi Gurchi:lran Singh and Sardar Singh, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4087, "end_char": 4091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February S. The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBosE J.-The defendan!S, Santosh Kumar and the Northern General Agencies, were granted special leave to appeal.", "canonical_name": "Bose"}}, {"text": "Santosh Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4111, "end_char": 4124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February S. The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBosE J.-The defendan!S, Santosh Kumar and the Northern General Agencies, were granted special leave to appeal.", "canonical_name": "SANTOSH KUMAR"}}, {"text": "Commercial Subordinate Judge, Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4480, "end_char": 4515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was filed in the Court of the Commercial Subordinate Judge, Delhi, under 0."}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4536, "end_char": 4563, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5125, "end_char": 5133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5188, "end_char": 5205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "227 of the Constitution to the Delhi Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court and failed again."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5261, "end_char": 5269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "13antosli Kumar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6229, "end_char": 6244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19J8\n\n13antosli Kumar\n\nBliai Moo!"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9129, "end_char": 9136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision most frequently referred to is a decision of the House of Lords in England where a similar rule prevails."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9586, "end_char": 9591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "See, for example, PowszeC'hny Bank Zwiazkowy W. Polmce v. Pa ros ('), in England and Sundaram Chettiar v. Valli A mm al (\") in India."}}, {"text": "Varadachariar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10082, "end_char": 10095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We agree with Varadachariar J. in the Madras case that the Court has this third course open to it in a suitable case."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10106, "end_char": 10112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We agree with Varadachariar J. in the Madras case that the Court has this third course open to it in a suitable case."}}, {"text": "Buse", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10674, "end_char": 10678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "w.; s\n\nSantosh 1\\\" m.rir\n\nBhai Mool Si11li\n\nBose J,\n\nSantOJJlt Kum, ar\n\nBhai Mool Singh\n\nBuse J.\n\n1216 SUPIU<; rn COURT RI~POHTS\n\nunnecessary to examine the facts of those cases because they are not in appeal before us."}}, {"text": "I.L.R. 1950 Mad 251", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 12780, "end_char": 12799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Santosh K", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14927, "end_char": 14936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J:j8\n\nSantosh K umur\n\nBhai 11£ uol 8inyh\n\nBose .J,\n\nl!JJ8\n\nSrt11tosli K1tm'lr\n\nv Bltai .Jlool Singh\n\nBoe J.\n\n1''1'.bruury 6.", "canonical_name": "SANTOSH KUMAR"}}, {"text": "KANT A PRASHAD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15928, "end_char": 15942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KANT A PRASHAD\n\nDELHI ADMINISTRATION\n\n(and connected appeal)\n\n(B. P. SINHA and JAFER IMAM JJ.)"}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15991, "end_char": 16002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KANT A PRASHAD\n\nDELHI ADMINISTRATION\n\n(and connected appeal)\n\n(B. P. SINHA and JAFER IMAM JJ.)"}}, {"text": "JAFER IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16007, "end_char": 16017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KANT A PRASHAD\n\nDELHI ADMINISTRATION\n\n(and connected appeal)\n\n(B. P. SINHA and JAFER IMAM JJ.)"}}, {"text": "ConcUrrent jurisdiction to tender pardon-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16146, "end_char": 16221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16235, "end_char": 16242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "ConcUrrent jurisdiction to tender pardon-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "ConcUrrent jurisdiction to tender pardon-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "ss. 8(2)(3), 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16292, "end_char": 16306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "ConcUrrent jurisdiction to tender pardon-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "ConcUrrent jurisdiction to tender pardon-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "ss. 337", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16351, "end_char": 16358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "ConcUrrent jurisdiction to tender pardon-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "ConcUrrent jurisdiction to tender pardon-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 120B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16402, "end_char": 16409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "ConcUrrent jurisdiction to tender pardon-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "ConcUrrent jurisdiction to tender pardon-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 224", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16414, "end_char": 16420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "ConcUrrent jurisdiction to tender pardon-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "ConcUrrent jurisdiction to tender pardon-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16432, "end_char": 16449, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16454, "end_char": 16461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "ConcUrrent jurisdiction to tender pardon-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "ConcUrrent jurisdiction to tender pardon-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16469, "end_char": 16503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 337", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16750, "end_char": 16756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16764, "end_char": 16790, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}