S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 701

in the proceedings under s. 145 Criminal Procedure Code, because according to the evidence on the record the entries were made somewhere in March and this could not have helped Adit Pande, as the magistrate had already decided the proceedings under s. 145 Criminal Procedure Code in December 1950, and had ordered possession to be delivered to the complainant ; and, therefore, this entry could not affect the result of the proceeding under s. 145 Criminal Procedure Code.

Mr. Mathur founded his case also on s. 16 of the

U.P.

Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, (U.P. Act I of 1951), which provided that a person, who was recorded as an occupant of the land for the year 1356 F and who, on the date mentioned in the section was in possession of the land, shall be deemed to be a hereditary tenant of the land.

But the entry complained of is not for the year 1356 F but for the year 1358 F, and this entry would not have been of any avail to Adit Pande for the purposes of s. 16 of the Zamindari Abolition Act.

In the circumstances of the case it cannot be said that an offence under s. 218 has been committed by the appellant a§ in our opinion the prosecution has failed to prove the necessary criminal intention.

In these circumstances, we would allow the appeal, set aside the order of conviction and acquit the accused.

As a consequence the bail bond shall stand cancelled.

Appeal allowed.

BHA TN AGARS AND CO. LTD.

THE UNION OF INDIA

(and connected petitions)

S. R. DAs C.J.,

VENKATARAMA

AYYAR, B. P.

SrNHA, S. K. DAs and GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ.)

Import and Export, Control of-Soda ash, if can be imported tuithout licence-Issue of licence, if amounts to delegated legislation- Trafficking in licence-Confiscation of consignments and seizure of licence by Sea Cu; toms Authorities-Issue of Writs-Policy Statement

R•zhub•nsh Lal v.

Tiu Stat1 of U.P.

Kapur].

F1lruary 21

Bhatna1ars and Co.

Ltd.

Th• Union of India

by GovernnJent, if. amounts to monopoly-.../mport and Export( Control) Act. 1947 (XVl/l of 1947), s. 3(J)(a)-Constitution of India, Art. 32.

The petitioner obtained a. licence for importing soda ash during the free licencing period in 1952.

On the basis of the licence certain consignments of soda ash were received in Bombay.

The Customs Authorities had reason to suspect that the petitioner was trafficking in his licence and on investigation found that two of the consignments had actually been imported by another party and confiscated them.

The petitioner appealed to the Central Board of Revenue and thereafter moved the Government of India, but to no effect.

The Collector of Custo1ns ordered the goods -to be auctioned.

Five petitions were filed in this court under Art. 32 of the Gonstitution seeking for the issue of appropriate writs in respect of the confiscation of the goods and seizure of the licence.

It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the In1ports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 not having re-enacted the provision!! of r. 84(2) of the Defence of India Rules, s. 3(1)(a) of the Act had no application to soda ash and no licence \Vas required to import it; that, in the alternative, legislation authorising the issue of licences amounted to delegated legislation and was, therefore, invalid.

It was further contended that the Policy Statement made by the Government in the Press Note dated February 3, 1955, and Public Notice dated June 30, 1956, created a monopoly and infringed the petitioner's funda1nental right to carry on his trade and business and lastly, that the virtual invalidation of his licence having been improperly made should be set aside and the :;; an1e directed to be revalidated for the unexpired period.

Held, that the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner must fail and the petitions n1ust be disn1issed.

The language of s. 3(!)(a) of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, !947, made it abundantly clear that it was intended to apply to the i1nport of all goods of specified description co\'ered by r. 84(2) of the Defence of India Rules including soda ash so as to render the re-c:naclJ11ent of that rule wholly unnecC'sary. The provision of the section must be rea<l Jisjuncti\'ely and distributively and it was wholly unreasonable to suggest that the wor<ls 'i1nport' and 'export' could be qualified by the expressions 'carriage coastwise' or 'shipn1ent as ships' stores' occurring in the section.

Nor could the section he helJ to be ultra vi1es on the ground of delegated legislation as the pre:unble and the relcYant sections of the .i\ct .a.s also those of the Defence of In<lia 1\ct, V:hich it purported to continue and to \vhich reference 1,, vould be perfectly legitimate, show that the Legislature had clearly indicated the policy and enunciated the principles that 1, vere to guide those entrusted with the irnplen1entation of the 1\ct \vhich had for its purpose the 1naintenancc of suppliC's essential to the con1munit}'.

Harisha11kar Bag/a v. The St, lfe of ,\fadhy.1 p,,, J,.ch. (1955) S.C.R. 380, applied.

Pannalal Binjraj v.

The Union of India, (1957) S.C.R. 233, referred to.

It was perfectly open to the Government of India to change its import and export policy with a view to adjust it to the varying needs of the country and if importers were found to resort to malpractices leading to instability of prices, it would be its duty to intervene and regulate distribution, if ne.ed be, with the assistance of importer-stockists working under its general supervision and no exception could be taken to such a policy on the ground that it created a monqpoly or infringed the fundamental right to carry on trade or business.

As, in the instant case, the goods were lawfully confiscated by the Sea Customs Authorities as a result of an investigation which they were competent to make, it was not open to the petitioner under Art. 32 of the Constitution to challenge their conclusions on the ground that they had not been properly drawn and no question, therefore, of any revalidation of his licence could at all arlse.

ORIGINAL

JURISDICTION : Petitions Nos. 377 of 1955 and 42, 46, 164 and 423 of 1956.

Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of fundamental rights.

Petitioner in person in Petitions Nos. 377 of 1955 and 164 and 423 of 1956.

H. J. Umrigar and Y. Kumar, for petitioner in Petitions Nos. 42 and 46 of 1956.

C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, for respondents in tions Nos. 42, 46 and 423 of 1956.

Porus

Peti-

C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of and R. H. Dhebar, for respondents in 377 of 1955 and 164 of 1956. .

India, B. Sen.

Petitions Nos.

1957. February 21.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Bhatn11gars and Co.

Ltd. v.

Thi Union ef India

GA JENDRAGADKAR J .-This is a group of five peti- Gajmdragadkar J. tions filed by the petitioners Messrs Bhatnagars & Co. Private Ltd.

In all these petitions, the pettttoner Shri B. S. Bhatnagar, Managing Director of the above company, seeks to obtain appropriate writs from this Court mainly in respect of orders which have been passed by the Sea Customs Authorities against the petitioner.

This petitioner seems to feel a grievance

Bh•lnagars and Co.

Ltd. v.

Thi Ur.ion of India

Gajendragadkar J.

SUPREME COURT REFORTS [1957]

that, in the matter of licences which had been issued to him for importing soda ash, he has not received a fair treatment from the appropriate authorities and, since the impugned orders were passed, he has been moving the High Court of Punjab and this Court by several petitions under the Constitution.

The present petitions .. show obvious traces of unskilled draftsmanship.

They are extremely diffused and in many places incoherent.

Statements of fact are not logically or chronologii:ally made and there is complete confusion in the narration of the story giving rise to the petitioner's claim.

In several places, the petitions refer to facts which are both irrelevant and immaterial and, often enough, the petitioner is unable to restrain himself from making unjustified and irrelevant suggestions against the authorities.

Even in regard to the claim ultimately made by the petitioner, it is not easy to find what exactly the petitioner's grievance is and what particular writ he seeks to obtain from this Court.

However, since the petitions purport to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court substantially under Art. 32 of the Constitution, it is necessary to deal with the relevant points in disposing of these petitions.

Three of the petitions have been argued by Shri Bhatnagar in person. They are Petitions Nos. 423 and 164 of 1956 and No. 377 of 1955.

Petitions Nos. 42 and 46 of 1956 have been argued by Shri Umrigar on behalf of the petitioner.

The material facts which it is essential to mention are very few and they lie within a very narrow compass.

It appears that the petitioner obtained a licence for the import of soda ash only worth about Rs. 50,00,000 during the free licensing period in 1952.

In pursuance of this licence, and relying on the same, consignments of soda ash to the extent of 100 tons, 200 tons and 20 tons respectively were received at Bombay ; but meanwhile the Customs Authorities had received informantion that, though the petitioner had obtained a licence in his name for the import of soda ash for such a large amount as Rs. 50,00,000, his capital did not exceed Rs. 15,000 and that he was in fact trafficking in these licences.

On receiving this report, investigation was made and

subsequently the matter was left in charge of the Special Police Establishment.

During the cou_rse of this investigation, certain documents were seized from the petitioner-company's office as well as from the office of one Messrs N. Jivanlal & Co. at Bombay.

The complaint made against the petitioner that he was trafficking in licences was confirmed by this investigation'. It transpired that a person carrying on business in the name of Messrs. N. Jivanlal & Co., had a free hand in dealing with the licences of the petitioner and that the petitioner used only to receive commission for tile imports that he allowed to be made in the name of Messrs Bhatnagars & Co., Ltd.

In regard to the two consignments of 100 tons and 20 tons of soda ash respectively, it was found on an inspection of the documents that the same had been imported by Messrs N. Jivanlal & Co .• and since Messrs N. Jivanfal & Co., held no licence, the consignments were seized by the Collector of Customs.

The offices of the petitioner and Messrs N. Jivanlal & Co., were raided during the course of this investigation on November 7, 1952 and FebrU1ry 6, 1953, respectively.

The goods arrived in Bombay in March and April 1953 and they were confiscated by the Collector of Customs in May and June 1953.

Subsequently, the documents including the licences which had been seized were returned to the petitioner.

The confiscation of the goods was challenged by the petitioner by preferring an appeal to the Central Board of Revenue. The said appeal was, however, dismissed.

The petitioner then moved the Central Government against this order but on September 22, 1955, the Central Government refused to interfere.

It appears that on March 31, 1956, the Collector of Customs ordered that the goods should be. auctioned.

When this order was passed, the petitioner filed one of the petitions before us.

He obtained an interim order of stay but the said order was ultimately vacated.

Broadly stated, these are the facts which give rise to the present petitions.

Though five petitions have been presented by the petitioner, his grievance substantially is against the confiscation of the consignments of soda ash and 8-79 S.C.India/59.

Bhatnagars and Co.

Ltd. v.

T tu Union of India

Gajendragodkar ].

Bhatnaf?ars and Co.

Ltd. v.

Tht Union of India

Gajendragadkar J.

against the seizure of his licences by the investigating authorities.

Each petition seeks to put the grievance of the petitioner in a different form and, though the prayers ultimately made are also not of the same pattern, in the main, the petitioner wants this Court to give himrelief against what he regards as illegal seizure of the goods and against the virtual invalidation of his licences for import.

The period during which the licences granted to him could have been operated upon has expired and the petitioner, in one of his petitions, seeks an order from this Court directing the Government to revalidate the licences so as to allow the petitioner to import the article m question during the unexpired period of his licences.

Though it would have been possible to deal with these petitions collectively by delivering a common judgment; we would prefer to deal with the matter separately and consider the points raised in each petition by itself.

Petition No. 423 of 1956 in a sense stands apart from the other petitions in the present group.

The facts which we have already mentioned are enumerated by the petitioner even in this petition but the substantial relief which he seeks to claim and which the petitioner pressed before us in his argument is in respect of his allegation that the Union of India and other respondents to the petition have acted in contempt of this Court and appropriate action should, therefore, be taken by us against the said respondents.

This contention arises in this way.

The petitioner had made a similar petition to this Court, No. 571 of 1954, in respect of one of the three consignments in question.

This petition had come before this Court for hearing on March 24, 1955. Shri K. R. Chaudhury appeared for the petitioner before this Court.

The order passed by this Court would show that the learned Solic1tor- General of India made a statement to the Court indicating that the goods which had been confiscated hy the Customs Authorities would not be sold or otherwise dealt with for a month from the rlate of the communication to the petitioner of the final order that the • Central Government may pass in the revisional petition

preferred by him before them.

Acting on this undertaking, this Court allowed the petitioner a period of one month from the date of the communication to him of the final order which the Central Government might pass on his rcvisional petition to enable him to file a petition for Special Leave to appeal if he was so advised.

Then the order recorded the undertaking given by the Solicitor-General.

Subject to this order the petition was dismissed.

However, no order was passed as to costs.

It is common ground that for several months thereafter the revisional petition preferred by the petitioner to the Central Government was not disposed of. Ultimately it was dismissed.

The petitioner seems to be under the impression that the Solicitor-General, on behalf of the Central Government, had given an undertaking that the petitioner's revisional petition would be disposed of within a certain specified time.

Indeed the petition seeks to suggest that the undertaking was that the revisional petition would be disposed immediately in a day or two, and, since the revisional petition was not disposed of within the time mentioned by the Solicitor-General, the petitioner says that all the respondents are guilty of contempt.

It is clear that the petitioner's grievance and the prayer for a writ are entirely misconceived.

The petitioner is entirely in error in assuming that, on behalf of th<.'.

Union of India. any undertaking was given that his revisional petition would be disposed of within a dav or two.

Indeed, the Solicitor-General fairlv told s that, at the time when the petitioner's earlier application was disposed of, he had expressed the hope that the petitioner's revisional petition would be dealt with by the Central Government at an early date ; but the expression of this hope had nothing to do with the undertaking which the Solicitor-General gave and which was included in the Court's order.

The petitioner presumably thinks that the Court's order required that his rcYisional petition should be disposed of by the Central Government within a month.

This asmmption is entirely unwarranted.

The period of one month which is mentioned in the order w;~, the period granted to the petitioner to move

Bhatnagars and Co.

Ltd. v.

The Union f India

Gajendragadkar ].

Bhatnagars and Co.

Ltd. v.

The Union of India

Gajendragadkar ].

this Court for Special Leave after the decision of his revisional petition by the Central Government was communicated to him. In other words, if the decision of the Central Government had gone against the petitioner, the petitioner was given one month's period within which to move this Court for Special Leave and the Union of India agrec;°d not to deal with the property of the petitioner or dispose of it during that period.

In our opinion, the order is plain and unambiguous and there is no scope for any misunderstanding whatever.

If no undertaking was given as assumed by the petitionet, it is impossible to understand how any contempt can arise on the ground that the undertaking had not been complied with.

Besides, the petitioner has not stopped to consider which person the Union of India represents as Respondent No. 1 in his petition.

He has also not paused to consider how the other respondents could be guilty of contempt.

We have no hesitation in holding that the prayer for a writ in respect of the alleged contempt made by the petitioner in this petition is thoroughly unjustified and, we regret to add, wholly irresponsible.

This was the only point which the petitioner urged before us in this petition.

The result is the petition fails and it must be dismissed with costs.

In Petition No. 164 of 1956, so far as we were able to gather, the petitioner's grievance is in respect of a policy statement made by the Government in the Press Note dated February 3, 1955 and Public Notice No. 25-ITC (PN)/56 dated June 30, 1956.

The petitioner's contention appears to be that the policy enunciated in these two documents amounts to a monopoly and he wants this Court to issue. appropriate writs terminating this monopoly and to ensure to the petitioner his fundamental right of carrying on his trade and business. In our opinion, this petition is also entirely misconceived and there is no substance in the contention raised by the petitioner.

It is hardly necessary to emphasize that, in moderrt times, the export and import policy of any democratic State is bound to be flexible.

The needs of the country, the position of foreign exchange, the need to protect nationar industries

an<l all other relevant considerations have to be examined by the Central Government from time to time and rules in regard to export and import suitably adjusted.

It would, therefore, be idle to suggest that there should be unfettered and unrestricted freedom of export and import or that the policy of the Government in regard to export and import should be fixed and not changed according to the requirements of the country.

It is in the light of this position that the policy statement in the Press Note has to be considered.

The Press Note covers several commodities, but, since we are concerned with Light soda ash in the present case, it would be relevant to refer briefly to the contents of the Press Note in regar<l to Light soda ash.

In regard to this commodity, Government have <lecided, says the Press Note, that the import should be canalised through importer-stockists who would be required to keep buffer stocks and effect sale in a manner so as to eliminate fluctuations in prices and supplies experienced by consumers in the recent past.

The Government realized that, without canalisation of distribution of this commodity, consumers were always at the mercy of the importers and even distribution of the commodity to all parts of the country where it was needed was also difficult to obtain.

That is why the Government decided to canalise the distribution of this commodity with the assistance of two 5elling organisations of Messrs.

Tata Oil Mills C'..o. Ltd., and Messrs. LC.I. (India) Ltd. These two concerns had agreed to procure soda ash from suppliers selected on the basis of offers which were being invited by means of public notice which was issued on the same <lay as the Press Note.

Then the Press Note concludes that soda ash so imported woulJ be stocktl1 at convenient centres anJ sold in accordance with the general directions that may be issued by the Government from time to time.

The sale price would be fixeJ by the Government on f.o.r. Port basis and the importer-stockists would be 'paid remuneration for their services at the rate of 12!% of the landed cost, additional profit, if any, on the transaction being made over to Government.

The Public Notice

Bhatnagars and Co.

Ltd. v.

The Union of India

Gajmdragad/rar :J.

19J7

B!wtnagars and Ca.

Ltd. v. rnr Union of India

r; ajtnr/ragadk.ar J.

which was issued about the same time gives the relevant particulars in regard to the import of soda ash and other commodities.

Tenders were invited and cl. 4 of the Public Notice shows that the offerer whose offer was accepted by the Chief Controller of Imports would be required to enter into a contract of sale within ten days of the acceptance of the offer with the importer-distributor selected by the Government in that behalf.

No dou\>t discretion was left to the Chief Controller of Imports tu reject any offer without assigning any reason.

Subject to the terms and conditions set out .in the Notice, if ,,· contract was concluded, an import licrnce for the quantity contracted to be purchased would . be issued in favour of the buyer subject to such conditions as might be imposed by the Government of India in that behalf.

It appears that, prior to 1953, import licences were freely granted.

In 1953, licences began to be granted to established importers subject to certain conditions. lt also appears that Government decided from time to time the total quantity of the specified commodity which should be imported.

Then the extent of the business of the applicant for licences during the prescribed period was taken into account and the total amount of import was then distributed pro rata amongst the se\'tral applicants. \Vhen it was found that even this method did not work sati; factorily, the Government decided to canalise distribution hut while canalisation was introduced in this manner, tenders were invited for import licrnces and t!1ey were considered on merits and licences granted to several claimants.

It may be that, if the LC.I. and the Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd., were amongst the applicants for licences, their competitors in the line may have found it difficult to fight with these two powerful rivals but that is very different from saying that, by the method of canalisation, ' the Government had introduced a monopoly in the import of the commodity in question.

It is also important to emphasize that the petitioner is not even an established importer.

He was granted a licence during the free period, and so it is difficult to understand his grievance that a monopolv had been

S.C.R.

SUPRE.\1E COURT REPORTS 711

created and that he was thereby deprived of his fundamental right to carry on his trade.

Government found that the importers of soda ash resorted to malpractices

leading to speculation, and violent fluctuations, in prices of the commodity.

It was open to the Government, and indeed national interests made it their duty, to intervene and regulate the distribution of the commodity in a suitable manner.

That is all that Government purported to do by the policy statement to which objection has been taken by the petitioner.

Besides, it is difficult to entertain the argument from the present petitioner that the alleged monopoly has affected his right to carry on trade.

In substance no monopoly has been created and the petitioner's application is entirely misconceived.

The result is the petition fails and must be dismissed with costs.

Petition No. 377 of 1955 is directed broadly agaimt orders of confiscation and sale passed by the relevant authorities and the petitioner claims that an appropriate writ should be issued by this Court calling upon the said authorities to forbear from giving effect to the said orders.

We have already mentioned the material facts in regard to the confiscation of the consignments of soda ash of 100 tons and 20 tons respectively which has given rise to all these proceedings.

Now, the order dated May 3, 1954, has been passed by the Controller of Imports and Exports for Chief Controller of Imports and Exports and it communicates to the petitioner the decision of the Chief Controller that no licence or customs clearance permit would be granted to him against his application for and upto the licensing period July 1953.

The petitioner was, however, told that his applications for January-June 1954 licensing period would be dealt with in the normal course according to the policy contained in the Red Book.

Then the order adds that it had been decided that re-validation of the licences mentioned in Annexure 'A' to the. petitioner's advocate's letter on April 20, 1954, could not be allowed. That is why the said licences were returned to tl)e petitioner. It is this latter part of the order by which the petitioner feels aggrieved and ag;•',>t which the petitioner seeks remedy by the

Bhat11agars and Co.

Ltd. v.

The U n; on of India

Gajendragadkar].

Bhatnagars and Co.

Ltd.

The Union of India

Gafendragadkar ].

present petlt10n.

The petitioner's case is that,. since he was granted licences which were to be alive for one year from FebruJry 13, 1952, the illegal seizure of the licence and the unauthorised confiscation of the consignments in question caused considerable prejudice to him. The return of the licences is poor consolation to the petitioner because the period during which the licences were to operate had already expired.

He, therefore, claims that the licences should be revalidated in the sence that the period during which he can operate upon those licence~ should be suitably extended.

It is true that if the relevant authorities were inclined to revalidate the licences in that sense, it would have been open to them to do so.

But it is difficult to understand how the petitioner can invoke the jurdiction of this Court under Art. 32 of the . Constitution for obtaining this relief.

We do not propose to discuss this matter elaborately because, in our opinion, the position in law is abundantly clear.

The authorities have found that, though the licences were obtained by the pet1t10ner in his name, h~ has been trafficking in these licences, that the consignments had been ordered by another individual Messrs.

Jivanlal & Co., that the said individual holds no licence for import of soda ash and as such the consignments received by the said individual are liable to be confiscated.

If the petitioner's grievance is that the view taken by the appropriate authorities in this matter is erroneous, that is not a matter which can be legitimate! y agitated before us in a petition under Art. 32.

It may perhaps be, as the learned Solicitor-General suggested, that the petitioner may have a remedy by suit for damages but that is a matter with which we are not concerned. If the goods have been seized in accordance with law and they havebeen seized as a result of the findings recorded by the relevant authorities competent to hold enquiry under the Sea Customs Act, it is not open to the petitioner to contend that we should ask the authorities to exercise discretion in favour of the petitioner and allow his licences a further lease of life.

Essentially the petitioner's grievance is against the conclusions of fact reached by the relevant authorities.

If the said

conclusions cannot be challenged beJore us in the present

writ petition, the petitioner would obviously not be t'!ititled to any relief of the kind claimed by him.

In the result, the petition fails and must be dismissed with costs.

That leaves two more petitions field by the petitioner, Petitions Nos. 42 of 1956 and 46 of 1956.

These petitions have been argued before us by Shri Umrigar and, on he half of the petitioner, Shri U mrigar has raised three points before us.

He contends that the Import-Export Act does not apply to soda ash and that it is every citizen's right to import and export this commodity without a licence.

If that be the true position, confiscation of the two consignments would be illegal, and so, he wants an appropriate writ from this Court against the Central Government.

In the alternative, he argues that the legislation which authorises the issue of licences amounts to a delegated legislation and as such is invalid.

Again, if legislation is invalid on the ground alleged, confiscation of the two consignments would be invalid and the petitioner would be entitled to a writ.

Failing these two contentions, Shri Umrigar argues that the conclusion of the relevant authorities that his clie11t was trafficking in licences is based on no legal evidence and must, therefore, he reversed by this Court and appropriate relief given to him on the basis that the petitioner had obtained licences bona fide for his own personal use and the contrary Yiew taken by the relevant authorities and the subsequent confiscation of the consignments were illegal and 11/tra vires.

We would now briefly deal with these three points in the qrder in which they were urged before us by Shri Umrigar.

The first argument is based upon the fact that, while enacting The Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, Act No. XVIII of 1947, the provisions contained in r. 84 (2) of the Defence of India Rules have not been included in the Act and the contention, which at best may be characterised as ingenious, is that the object of omitting the said provisions while enacting the subsequent Act of 1947 was to release, from the operation of the Import Act, articles which would have fallen

Bhalriagars nnd C1.

Ltd. v.

Tht Umo11 of lndi•

Gajrndra1adkar ].

Bhatnsgars and Co.

Ltd. v.

Tht Union of India

Gajrndratadkar J.

under the said omitted provisions. R. 84 of the Defence of India Rules by sub-r. (1) defines export and import. "Import" means bringing into British India by sea. land or air. "Export" means taking out of British India by sea, land or air.

Then sub-s. (2) provides: "The Central Government may by a notified order prohibit or restrict the import or export of all goods or goods of any specified description, from or to any specified person or class of persons".

Sub-r. (3) then provides: 'The Central Government may by notified order make provision for prohibiting, restricting or otherwise controlling, in all cases or in specified classes of cases, and subject to such exceptions, if any, as may be made by or under the order,-

(i) the import, export, carriage coastwise or shipment as ships' stores of all goods or goods of any specified description ;

(ii) the shipment of fresh water on sea-going vessels ;

(iii) the bringing into any port or place in British India of goods of any specified description intended to be taken out of British India without being removed from the ship or conveyance in which they are being carried;" Shri U mrigar contends that the import of soda ash could have been legitimately regulated under the provisions of r. 84, sub-r. (2) but since this sub-rule has not been enacted under Act XVIII of 1947, all regulations made by the Central Government and terms and conditions laid down in regard to the granting of licences are ultra vires of the Act.

Act XVIII of 1947 gives substantially the same meaning to .the words "export" and "import" and the operative portion of the Act is contained in s. 3 which is the same as r. 84, sub-r. (3), of the Defence of India Rules.

In oder to make his argument plausible, Shri Umrigar •eeks to put a very narrow, artificial and unreasonable restriction upon s. 3, sub-s. (1) (a) of Act XVIII of 1947.

Before dealing with this argument, however, it would be convenient to set out the said section as under :

"3. Powers to prohibit or restrict imports and •957 exports : Bhatna1ars and C1.

(1) The Central Government may, by order ;,"' published in the official Gazette, make provision for Thl Union of India prohibiting, restricting or otherwise controlling, in all Gtefindragadkar ]. cases or in specified classes of cases, and subject to such exceptions, 1£ any, as may be made by or under the order,- ,.

(a) the import, export, carnage coastwise or shipment as ships' stores of goods of any specified description ;

(b) the bringing into any port or place in India of goods of any specified description intended to be taken out of India without being removed. from the ship or conveyance in which they are being carried.

(2) All goods to which any order under sub-section ( 1) applies shall be deemed to be goods of which the import •or export has been prohibited or restricted under section 19 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 (VIII of 1878), and all the provisions of that Act shall have effect accordingly, except that section 183 thereof shall have effect as if for the word "shall'' therein the word "may" were substituted.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the aforesaid Act, the Centr:il Government may, by order published in the official Gazette, prohibit, restrict or impose conditions on the clearance, whether for home consumption or for shipment abroad, of any goods -or class of goods imported into India." Shri Umrigar contends that s. 3 (1) (a) cannot apply to the import of soda ash, because, according to him, it is only goods of a specified description which are imported or exported, carried coastwise or shipped as ships' stores that fall within the mischief of the said provision.

In other words, he reads the expression "carriage coastwise" and "shipment as ships' stores" as constituting adjectival clauses governing the words "import" and "export".

In our opinion, such a construction is wholly unreaonable. We have no doubt that this provision has to be read disjunctively and distributively, and so read, the import of goods of any specified descrip-

Bhatnagars and Co.

Ltd. v.

Tht Union of India

Gajtrulragadkar J.

tion would attract the application of the said provision.

If we bear in mind the definition of the words "import" and "export'', it would be obvious that articles that are carried coastwise would never fall within the category of either import or export.

The assumption that the Legislature wanted to release all kinds of goods from the application of s. 3 ( 1) (a) is, in our opinion, so completely inconsistent with the plain and natural meaning of the material clause that we have no hesitation in rejecting Shri Umrigar's argument.

If the words used in the clause are given their natural meaning, it is clear that the Legislature must have felt, in enacting this Act, that it was unnecessary to continue by reenactment the provisions of r. 84 (2) in the present Act.

What was specifically provided in the said rule is in effect included in s. 3 (1) (a\.

We must, therefore, hold that the argument that no licence was required for the import of soda ash and so all the orders passed by the appropriate authorities in regard to the confiscation of the consignments are in valid must fail.

The next argument is that the material provision is ultra vires as it amounts to delegated legislation.

The challenge to the validity of legislative enactments on the ground of delegated legislation often enough presents problems which are not easy of solution.

The recent history of judicial decisions, however, shows that, though there is considerable divergence of opinion in the approach to the question of dealing with such a challenge; some principles may be said to be fairly well settled.

There is no doubt that legislation which is conditional, properly so-called, must be distinguished from legislation which is delegated.

Shri Umrigar concedes that where the Legislature provides and lays down principles underlying the provisions of a particular statute and also affords guidance for the implementation or enforcement of the said principles, it is open to the Legislature to leave the actual implementation or enforcement to its chosen delegate.

The time when the provision should be implemented, the period during which it should be implemented or the place where it should be applied can, according to

him, in appropri:ite cases be validly left by the Legislature to its delegate.. He, however, contends that, in the impugned Act, the Legislature does not lay down principle and gives no guidance to the delegate while leaving the implementation of the statutory provisions to him and consequently the validity of the legislative enactment suffers from a serious infirmity on the ground that the Legislature has surrendered its legislative power in favour of its delegate.

In dealing with this narrow ground of challenge, it would be necessary to consider the preamble and the material provisions of the Act to find out whether questions of policy have been clearly decided by the Legislature and whether guidance has been given to the delegate in the matter of implementing the provisions of the statute.

Unfortunately for Shri Umrigar his challenge to the validity of the impugned section under the Imports and Exports Act is completely covered by the decision of this Court in Harishankar Bagla v. The State of Madhya Pradesh(1 ).

In this case, ss. 3 and 4 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, were attacked as ultra vires on the ground of delegated legislation.

This challenge was repelled.

In repelling the argument of delegated legislation, Mahajan Chief Justice who delivered the judgment of the Court conceded that "the Legislature must declare the policy of the law and the legal principles which are to control any given cases and must provide a standard to guide the officials or the body in power to execute the law". "The essential legislative function", the judgment proceed~ to add, "consists in the determination or choice of the legislative policy and of formally enacting that policy into a binding rule of conduct".

Then the learned Chief Justice referred to the fact that the Legislature has laid down such a principle and that •principle is the maintenance or increase in supply of essential commodities and of securing equitable distribution and availability at fair prices. It was held that the principle was clear and it offered sufficient guidance to the Central Government in exercising its powers under s. 3.

In other words, in considering the question as to

(1) [1955] I S.C.R. 380.

Bhatnagars and C1.

Ltd. ....

The Union of lndi&

Gajendratadkar J.

Bhatttazars and Co.

Ltd. v. r111 Union of India

G ajendra:.adkar J.

whether guidance was afforded to the delegate in bringing into operation the material provisions of the Act by laying down principles in that behalf, the Court considered the statement of the principles contained in the preamble to the Act as well as in the material provisions of s. 3 itself.

This decision shows that if we can find a reasonably clear statement of policy underlying the provisions of the Act either in the provisions of the Act or in the preamble, then any part of the Act cannot be attacked on the ground of delegated legislation by suggesting that questions of policy have been left to the delegate.

Turning to the impugned sections of the present Act, it is necessary to remember that the present Act purports to continue for a limited period powers to prohibit or control imports and exports which had already been enacted by the Defence of India Act and the Rules framed thereunder.

In other words, this Act does not purport to enact the material provisions for the first time but it purports to continue the previously existing provisions in that behalf and so it would be legitimate to consider the preamble of the predecessor Act and relevant provisions in it to find out whether the Legislature has laid down clearly the policy underlying that Act and has enunciated principles for the guidance of those to whom authority to implement the Act has been delegated.

The preamble to the present Act says that it was expedient to continue for a limited period powers to prohibit, restrict or otherwise control imports and exports.

The preamble to the Defence of India Act refers to the emergency which had arisen when the Act was passed and refers, inter alia, to the necessity to take special measures to ensure the public safety and public interest.

Section 2 of the sait\ Act further provides that the \:entral Government thought that it was essential to secure public safety and maintenance of public order and, what is more relevant and material, the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community.

Thus it is clear that the broad and main principle underlying the present Act, like its predecessor, was to maintain supplies essential to the life of the community.

Thus, if the preamble

and the relevant section of the earlier Act are read in the light of the preamble of the present Act, it would he difficult to distinguish this Act from the Essential Supplies Act with which this Court was concerned in Harishan, zar Bagla's case(1).

Incidentally, we may also observe that in Pannalal Binjraj v. The U11io11 of

India("), where the vires of s. 5 (7-A) of the Income- Tax Act were put in issue before this Court, the challenge was repelled and during the course of the judgment delivered on December 21, 1956, the previous history of the earlier Income-Tax Acts was taken into account to decide what policy could be said to underlie the provisions of the i.mpugned section.

The last argument of Shri Umrigar is patently untenable.

No doubt Shri Umrigar began this argument by contending that the finding made against the petitioner that he was trafficking in his licences and that the consignm, ents in question did not reallv belong to him was based on no evidence but ultimately he could not help conceding the fact that there were certain circumstances on which the appropriate authorities relied against the petitioner.

The contention that a finding made by a competent authority is based on no legal evidence is easy to make but very difficult to establish.

Such a contention can succeed only when it is shown that there is really no legal evidence in support of the view taken by the appropriate authorities.

In the present case, it is impossible to accede to the assumption that there 1s no legal evidence against the petitioner.

His poor financial resources, his conduct at all material times when consignments were ordered, the suspK10ns attaching to the very existence of the firm Messrs.

N. Jivanlal & Co. in Bombay and the prominent part played by this firm at all stag<:'.s of the transaction in regard to the consignments as well as the reckless allegations which were made by the petitioner before the authorities which were found to be untrue bv the appropriate authorities, cannot be summarily dismissed as being irrelevant or as not constituting legal evidence.

At the highest it may be said that there

11 [19,-,11 ' s.r:.R. 380.

(2) [19571 $.C.R. 231.

Bhatnagars a11d Co.

Ltd. v.

The Union of l11dia

Gojendragodkar ].

Bhatnagars and Co.

Ltd. v.

TM Union of India

CaJtndragadkar ].

are some circumstances on which Shri Umrigar wants to rely in favour of the bona fides of his client whereas there is a large number of circumstances against him.

If all the appropriate authorities, on considering these circumstances, concurrently found against the petitioner, that obviously is not a matter which can be legitimately agitated in the present petition.

That is why we do not propose to deal with this aspect of the matter any further. In the result, both Petitions Nos. 42 of 1956 and 46 of 1956 fail and must be dismissed with costs.

Petitions dismissed.

GIP:'\ 79 s.c. Tndi; i./.'l9" JIJ.fi-G0-1,0flO

s. 145

Criminal Procedure Code

Adit Pande

s. 145

Criminal Procedure Code

s. 145

Criminal Procedure Code

Mathur

s. 16

s. 16

s. 218

BHA TN AGARS AND CO. LTD

THE UNION OF INDIA

S. R. DAs C.J.

VENKATARAMA

AYYAR

B. P.

SrNHA

S. K. DAs

GAJENDRAGADKAR

Import and Export, Control of-Soda ash

Union of India

s. 3(J)(a)

Constitution of India

Art. 32

Central Board of Revenue

Government of India

Art. 32

s. 3(1)(a)

June 30, 1956

s. 3(!)(a)

Art. 32

Article 32

Constitution of India

H. J. Umrigar

Y. Kumar

C. K. Daphtary

A. Mehta

R. H. Dhebar

B. Sen.

GA JENDRAGADKAR

Messrs Bhatnagars & Co. Private Ltd.

B. S. Bhatnagar

Gajendragadkar

High Court of Punjab

Art. 32

Bhatnagar

Umrigar

Bombay

N. Jivanlal & Co.

N. Jivanlal & Co

Bhatnagars & Co., Ltd.

N. Jivanfal & Co.

November 7, 1952

Central Government

September 22, 1955

March 31, 1956

Bhatnagars and Co.

Ltd.

March 24, 1955

K. R. Chaudhury

India

Union of India

Gajendragadkar

Union of India

Tata Oil Mills C'..o. Ltd.

LC.I. (India) Ltd.

B!wtnagars

cl. 4

Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd.

May 3, 1954

April 20, 1954

FebruJry 13, 1952

Art. 32

Jivanlal & Co.

Art. 32

Customs Act

U mrigar

contends that the Import-Export Act

Gajrndratadkar

British India

s. 3

s. 3

Central Government

section 19

Sea Customs Act, 1878

section 183

s. 3

Gajtrulragadkar

s. 3

s. 3

ss. 3 and 4

Mahajan

s. 3

Union of lndi&

Gajendratadkar

s. 3

Section 2

Act from the Essential Supplies Act

Harishan, zar Bagla

s. 5

December 21, 1956

Bhatnagars a11d Co.

Ltd.


• ' I

I .,.

S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 721

LILAVATI BAI

THE STATE OF BOl\fBAY

(S. R. DAS c. ]., VENKATARAMAAYYAR, B. P. SINHA,

S. K. DAs and GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ.)

Premises, Requisition rif-Constitutional ,1alidity of enactment- Order of Government on declaration of vacancy-Enforceabilit;·- Findings, if liable to be reopened-Power of C:ourt-Tenancy, when can be deemed to have been terminated-Ejusdem generis, applicability of-Death of a party before the passing of the Order-Ejfect- Bombay Land Requisition Act (XXXIII of 1948), as amended by ·-..( Amendment Act II of 1950 and Second Ame?dment Act XXXIX ef 1950, ss. 5, 6, 6 Explanation (a)-Constitutzon of Indza, Arts. 19(1) (f), 31, 32, 226.

By these t'.vo petitions, the petitioner challenged the constitutional validity of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, as amended by the two amending Acts of 1950, and the enforceability .of an order of requisition made by the Governor of Bombay under s. 6 (4) (a) of the Act.

The petitioner a' the widow of the tenant claimed to be in possession, while the case made on behalf of the Government was that the tenant had before his death vacated the premises and handed ovc.r possession to a lodg.o:r.

A copy of the order of requisition was affixed to the premises and the petitioner moved the High Court for a writ of inandamus, but the petition was dismissed. The Act was passed by the State Legislature on April I l, 1948, and by the first amending Act its life was extended for two years and by the second the vvords "the purpose of the

State or any other public purpose" 'vere substituted for the \VOrds "any purpose" occurring in s. 5 o[ the Act \Vith retrospective effect from the date of the Constitution.

The Act came up for consideration in a previous decision of this Court and arguments were confined to grounds other than those spocifically covered by that decision. It was contended on behalf. of the petitioner that the Act was in conflict with Art. 31 (2) and.became invalid at the cor:imencement of the Constitution and the c..mending Acts, for which the assent of the President had admittedly not been obtained, were ineffective under Art. 31(3) of the Constitution .

It was further contended that ss. 5 and 6 of the Act which made the relevant findings of the Government conclusive had the effect of impairing the powers of the Court, that it was nevertheless open to the. Court to judge whether the facts found constituted yacany. in law . and, lastly that the order in questi.on \vas

ineffective as the tenant was dead on the date it v1as made.

Hdd1 that the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner must be negatived.

March 5.

Lilavati Bai v.

The State of Bombay

'fhc constitutional validity of the Act \Vas no longer open to question under Arts. 19(1)(f) and 31 (2) of the Constitution in vie\v of the decision of this Court in State of Bombay v.

Bhanji Munji (1955) 1 S.C.R. 777

'fhe J\ct, \vhich did not oliviously come \Nithin the mischief of cl. (6) of Art. 31, fell within the saving clause, cl. 5(a), of the Article and \Vas an existing law \Vitbin the meaning of the

Constitution and, therefore, valid at the commencement of the Constitution, although it did not contain the expression "for a public purpose" as required by cl. (2) of the i\rticle.

Clause (3) of the Article, \vhich in terms applied to la\VS made after the commencement of the Constitution, had no application to the an1cnding Acts v:hich \Vere in no \vay concerned \\'ith the n1ain substantive provisions of the Act already pa5sed, and the \Vant of the President's assent in no \Vay affected their validity.

As the Act was valid at the commencement of the Con':>Litu~ tion and continued to be so thereafter, not being in any \Vay

inconsistnt \vith the provisions of Part III of the Constitution so as to attract the operation of Art. 13, the Amending Acts \\ere equally valid in la"'

Held further, that although in a proper case the High Court or this Court in the exercise of their special jurisdictions under the Constitution had po\ver to determine how far the provisions of the Act had or had not been complied \vith, the finding of the State Government under s. 5 of the Act that the tenant had not actually resided in the premises for a continuous period of six 1nonths immediately preceding the date of the order, and that under s. 6, the prmises had become Vl:'.cant at about the time indicated in the ord-::r, are cJnclusive and not collateral so as to be liable to be re-opened and could not, therefore, be questioned either in this Court under Art. 32 or in the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution.

Rai Brij Raj Krishna v. S. K. Shaw (1951)

S.C.R. 145 applied.

Hub!i Electricity Co. Ltd. v. Province of Bombay, (1948) L.R. 76 I.A. 57, held inapplicable.

Mohsinali Mohomed Ali v.

The State of Bombay, (1951) 53 Bom. L.R. 94: A.1.R. 1951 Born. 303, referred to.

The \vords "'or other\vise" occurring in explanation (a) to s. 6 of the .. t\ct could not be construed as ejusdem generis with the \vords immediately preceding them and must be held to cover all possible cases of vacancy due to any reason whatsoever.

Skinner & Co. v. Shaw & Co., (1893) 1 Ch. D. 413, referred to.

An order of requisition passed under s. 6(4)(a) of the Act \vas not of the nature of an order passed in a judicial proceeding and the death of one of the parties could not mako it wholly in effecti\c, the only consequence being that his name as one of

the ]XL ties to be served under s. 13 of the Act must be remon, J

from the order.

ORIGINAL JuRISDICTION : Petition No. I I9 of 1955 with Petition for Sepcial Leave to Appeal No. I40 of

I955 .

Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of fundamental rights and petition under Article l 36 of the Constitution for special leave to appeal from the judgment and order dated March 29, 1955, of the Bombay High Court in appeal No. 63 of 1954

Hardayal Hardy and R. ]ethmalani, for the petitioner.

C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India Porus A. Metha and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent.

I957 March 5.

The Judgement of the Court was delivered by

SINHA J.-By this petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution and Petition No. I40 of I955 for special leave to appeal from the judgment of the Bombay High

Court dated March 29, 1955, in Appeal No. 63 of I954 confirming that of a single Judge of that Court dated April n, l 954, the petitioner challenges the constitutionality of the Bombay Land Requisition Act (Act XXXIII), I 948, hf'.reinafter referred to as "The Act" and the enforceability of the order dated January, 27, I954, made by the Governor of Bombay in pursuance of s. 6(4) (a) of the Act.

The petitioner is the widow of one Dharamdas Chellaram, who was a tenant of the premises in ques- ' tion. The said Dharamdas Chellaram died in November I 953, leaving him surviving his widow and a daughter.

The petitioner alleged that she had been occupying the premises irf question as a member of her husband's family since I938 and that the tenant aforesaid had at no material date ceased to occupy the premises.

She also alleged that one Narottam n~1s Dharamsey Patel was a mere lodger who vvas oc; 1'; iy~ ing a portion of the premises by leave and Jiccn. t of her husand.

The said Narottamdas had no intucst

Li/avati Bai v.

The Stale ef

Bombay

Sinha],

LiilavaJi Bai

Thr State of

Bomba_y

Sinha J.

Sl1PREME COURT REPORT~

[1957J

in the premises in question and had, as a matter of fact, vacated the portion in his occupation some time in the year 1953.

On behalf of the State of Bombay, the respondent, it has been stated on affidavit by the Accommodation Officer that it is not a fact that the petitioner resided in the premises in question and that the facts were that the said Dharctmdas, the tenant, had vacated the premises in October 19.12 and had handed over possession of the premises to the said Narottamdas Dharamsey Patel. Hence it is alleged that it was not a fact that at the time of her husband's death in November 1953 the petitioner was residing in the premises in question.

These facts had been

stted before the High Court also on an affidavit made in opposition to the petitioner's case in the High Court.

The petitioner's grievance is that toward the end of January 1954 she found pasted on the outer door of the premises an order dated January 27, 1954 said to have been made by the Governor of Bombay and which is ; aid to be the occasion for her moving the High Court of Bombay for a writ of mandamus against the State of Bombay to refrain from giving eJICct to the aforesaid Order.

The Order impugned is in these terms

"No. RI\ I 1) M-13067 Office of the Controller of Accommodation, Jehangir Building, l\fahatma Gandhi Road, Bombay, January, 27, 195+

Order \\"hcreas, on inquiry it is found that the premises spccifif'd below had become vacant in the month of October 1952 ; Now, therefore, in exercise of the powecs conferred by clause (a) of sub-section (4) of section 6 of the Bombay Lane!

Requisition Act, 1948 (Bombay Act XXXIII of 1948) the Gmernment of Bombay is pkasecl to requisition the said premises for a public purpo c namely, for housing a Bombay State Government servant.

Premises flat ;\o. 3 on the 1st floor of the Building known as Hem Prabha situated at 68, Marine Drive, Bombay.

By order and in the name of Governor of Bombay." This Order was meant to be served on ( l) Shri Hirabhai H. Patel, admittedly the landlord of the premises,

(2) Shri Narottam Dharamsey Patel aforesaid, and

(3) Shri Dharamdas Chellaram, who, as already indicated, was dead at the date the Order was made.

The petitioner challenged the validity of the Order of requisition set out above.

Her petition was heard by Tendolkar J. who by his judgment dated April 21, 1954, dismissed the same.

The petitioner moved this Court for an appropriate writ, direction or order under Art. 32 of the Constitution, challenging the vires of the Act, as also the legal efficacy of the Order impugned.

She also filed a petition praying for special leave to appeal from the judgment aforesaid of the Bombay High Court.

Both the matters have been heard together and will be governed by this judgment.

Before dealing with the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner, it is convenient first to set out, in so far as it is necessary, the legislative history of the law impugned and its certain salient features which are relevant for purposes of this case.

This Act was passed by the Provincial Legislature of Bombay on April l 1,

l 948, on being em powered . by the Governor-General in exercise of powers conferred on him by s. 104 of the Government of India Act, l 935.

Initially it was to remain in force until March, 31, 1950.

But by the amending Act, Bombay Land Requisition(Amendment) Act, 1950 (Bombay Act No. II of 1950) published on March 28, 1950, its life was extended up to the end of March 1952.

By the amending Act, ss. 8-A, 8-B and 9-A were added making substantial changes which need not be set out here, as they do not enter into the controversy.

The life of the Act was subsequently extended further, up to the end of December 1958. By the Bombay Land Requisition (Second Amendment) Act, 1950 (Act XXXIX of 1950), the Act was further amended so as to substitute the words "the purpose of the State or any other public purpose" for the words "any purpose" in s. 5 of the Act.

This was obviously done to satisfy the requirements of Art. 3 l of the

Lilavati Bai

I~ The State of Bombay

Sinha].

Li!at1; ti Bai

"· The State of Bombay

Sinha].

SUPRE~, IE COCRT REPORTS [ 1q -1

• :JI

Cor, sritution. Consequential changes \\ere also me.de in ss. 6 <'nd 7 of the Act.

By s. 6 of the amending Act it v:"s proYiciccl that "The amendments made by this ,\ct shall be deemed to ha:e been and ahrnys to h"YC been ll1'1c:e with effect from the 26th Janua; y

1950, ..... ".

Tines the 2mendrnent was gi\-en rctrospcctiYc operation.

The pru\isions of ss. 5, 6 and

I 3 <eftcr the amc,, dmcnts aforesaid \omitting the portions not necessary for our purpose) arc in these terms :-

".' ( 1) If in the opinion of the State Government it is necessary or expedient so to do, the State GoYernment may by order in writing requisition any land for puij, ose of the State or 01ry other jJUb/ic jm1j1osc :

Provided that no building or part thereof wherein the O\\ner, the lanc:jord or the tenant, as the case may be, has actually resided for a continuous periorl of six months immediately preceding the date of the order shall be requisitioned under this section. ( 2) Where any building or pan thereof is to be requisitioned under sub-section (r), the State GO\ernmcnt shall make such enquiry as it deems fit and make a declaration in the order or requisition that the owner, the landlord or the tenant, as the case may be, has not actually resided therein for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the order and such declaration shall lie conclusive evidnzce that the owner, landlord or tenant has not so resided.

6. ( 1) If any premises situate in an area specified by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette, are vacant on the elate of such notification and wherever any such premises are vacant or become yacant after such date by reason of the landlord, the tenant or the wb-tenanL as the case may be, ceasing to occupy the premises or by reason of the release of th" premise' from requisition or by reason of the premises bf'ing nc\\ly erected or reconstructed or for any other reason the l; mdlorcl of such premises shall give intimation thereof in the prescribed form to an officer authorised in this behalf by the State Government.

S.C.R. :c>UPRElE COURT REPORTS

(4) \Vhether or not an intimation µnclcr suL-section ( 1) is given and notwithsta11ding anything contained in section 5, the State Government may by order in writing --

(a) icquisitiun tlie premises for the purpose ufthe State or any other public purpose and may use or deal with the premises for any such purpose in such manner as rnJy appear to it to be expedient, or

Provided that where an rm\cr is to be made under clause (a) ffquisitioninu; the premises in respect of which no intimation is gin'.ll by the landlord, the State GoYCrnment shall make such inquiry as it deems fit and make a declaration in the order that the premises were vacant or had become vacant, on or after the date referred to in sub-section ( 1) and such declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the premises were or

had so become vacant :

Explanation-For the purposes of this section,- ( a) premises which art". in the occupatir:ll of the landlord, the tenant or the sub-tenant, as tl; c case may be, shall be decm1'.d to be or become vacant when :,11ch landlord ceases to be in occupation or when such tenant or sub-tenant ceases to be in occupation upon termination of his tenancy, eviction, assignment or transfer in anv other manner of hi~ interest in the premises or otherwise, not withstanding any instrument or occupation by any other person prior to the date when wch landlord, tenant or sub-tenant so ceases to be in occupation;

1 3. ( 1) Every order made under ss. 5, 6, 7, 8-A or 8-B or sub-section ( 7) of section g or section 12 shall- ( a) if it is an order of a general nature or affecting a cb:, s of persons, be published in the manner pm:cribecl by rules made in this behalf ;

(b) if it is an order affecting an individual, corporation, or firm, be served in the manner provided for the service of a summons in Ruic 2 of Order XXIX or Rule 3 of Order XXX, as the case may be, in the First Schedule of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ;

Li/a,, ali Bai v.

The State qf

Bombay

Sinha].

Lilavati Bai

V, I'k State of Bombay

Sinha].

(c) ifit is an order affecting an individual person other than a corporation or firm, be served on the person-

(i) personally, by cleliverillg or tendering to him the order, or

\; i) by post, or

(iii) where the person cannot be found, by leaving an authentic copy of the order with some adult male member of his family or by affixing such copy to some conspicuous ; Jart of the premises in which he is k:iown to ha\'e last resided or carried on business or worked fo~ g-ain.

(2) \\'here a question arises whether a person \\'aS duly informed of an order made in pursuance of sections :1, 6, 7, 8-A or 8-B or, sub-section (7) of section 9 or section 1 2 compliance with the requirements of subsection i 1) shall be conclusi11e proof that he was so informed ; but failure to con1ply with the said requirements shal! not preclude proof by other means that he was so informed, or affect th~ validity of the order. ............................ ". (Gnderlining ours).

At the outset it is neccss;, ry to state that the ma:n grouncls of attar, k against the constitutionality of the Act based on such fundamental rights ; ls are recognised by Ans. 19!1)([) and 31 (2) of the Constitution must be o\erruled in view of the decision of the C01•stitution Bench r, f this Court in State of Bombay v.

Bhanji Munji (').

In that case this Court upheld the validity of the Act with reference to the provisions of the a; ticles aforesaid of the Constitution.

But the learned counsel for the netitioner comended that he attacked the 1'ircs of the Act on grounds other than those which had hccn speciiically dealt with by this Court in the clec; sion jus.t referred to. \Ve now proceed to deal with those fresh grounds on their merits.

It was contended that the Act became invalid on January 26, 1950 inasmuch as it was in conflict with Art. 3r(2) of the Constitution.

The Act was, therefore, as good as dead by the time Act II of 1 950 extending the life of the Act was enacted as aforesaid. The Act being void, its extension by Act II of 1950 was equally void.

(1) fI93:J] Is. c. R. 777.

Similarly, it was further argued that the amendments effected by the amending Act II of 1950 and Act XXXIX of 1950 required the assent of the President and that as admittedly no such assent had been given, they had no effect as provided in Art. 3 l ( 3) of the Constitution.

This chain of submissions is founded on the admitted non-compliance with the requirements of Art. 3 l (3).

It has not been contended that the Act when passed on April l l, r 948, was not good law. It is also clear that the Act is not covered by the provisions of cl. (6) of Art. 3 I. The Acr is thus covered by the saving clause, cl. 5(a), being an existing law other than a law to which the provisiom of cl. (6) apply. The Act, therefore, would be valid evefl if the provisions of

cl. ( 2) of Art. 3 l are not in terms fully satisfied, in so far as the Act did not before its amendment bv Act XXXIX of r950 contain the expression "for a public purpose".

As already pointed out, this Court in the case cf T!te State of Bombay v. Blzanji Munji (1) has laid it down that the Act was 11ot invalid even after the commencement of the Constitution simply because it is not provided in express terms that the acquisition or requisition had to be for a public purpose, provided that from the whole tenor and intendment of the Act it could be gathered that the requisition was for a public purpo, e, and for the benefit of the community at large. The amending Act only made explicit what had been left to be gathered from the whole tenor of the Act, as pointed out by this Court in the case cited above. The argument that the amending Acts, II of

1950 and XXXIX of 1950, required the assent of the President under cl. (3) of Art. 3 l has, therefore, no force.

Act II of 1950, in so far :rs it affects the present controversy, only extended the life of the Act by two years and Act XXXIX of 1950 only made explicit what was not so in the Act as originally passed, and are not such laws as come within the purview of cl. (3) of Art. 31 inasmuch as those Act3 are merely an extension or explanatory of the substantive Act which is an existing law within the meaning of the Constitution.

Clause (3}

11) [1955] 1 S. C.R. 777.

Li/avati Bai

The State of Bombay

Sinha].

Li!avati Bai

The State of

Bomhqy

Sinha].

SUPREME COURT KEPORTS

of Art. 3 r in terms applies to a law made by the legislature of a State, after the commencement of the Constitution ; whereas the Act had been passed in its substantive form in April I 948.

Hence, there is no difficulty in holding that the Act which was good law before the commencement of the Constitution did not become void under Art. I 3 of the Constitution, because there was nothing in the Act which was inconsistent with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. If the Act rns good law afte'!" the commencement of the Constitution, it follows that the amendments aforesaid made in 1950, were eqnally good law, even though the assent of the President had not been obtained.

Secondly, the decision of this Court in The State of Bombay v. Bhanji Mv11ji (') (snpra) itself has ruled to the contrary with reference to the provisions of Art. 31

(2) . V\'e cannot, therefore, go back upon our decision in the case aforesaid.

On these considerations the pc•ition under Art. 32 of the Constitution must fail on the ground that no fundamental rights of the petitioner as would entitle her to seek redress from this Court, h~., c been contravened.

It remains to consider the other arguments advance! on behalf of the petitioner which have a bearing on the petition for special leave to appeal from the judgement of the Bombay High Court. It has been contended that s;. 5 and 6 of the Act quoted above and underlined by us have made certain matters conclusive, so that the High Court or even this Court could not go behind the order of the State Government holding that the tenant had not resided in the premises for a continuous period of six months immediately precerling the date of the order (s. 5), or that the premises had become vacant in the month of October 19.')2, as stated in the Order impugned in thie case.

It is contended that the legislature had, by making those provisions rendering those matters conclusively proved, impaired the powers of the High Court under Art. 226 and of this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution.

Anotl, r branch of the argument is that the declaration of vacancy is dependent upon a collateral facl ,-.hich has

(1) [19:,51 1 $.C.R. iii

to be found by the Government on such enquiry as it may deem fit and proper and its conclusion ori such a collateral fact could not be placed by the Act beyond scrutiny by the High Court or by this Court.

In this connection it was also argued that on the question of vacancy the finding of the State Government may be conclusive on the "factual aspect" but not on the "legal aspect" of the matter. In other words, it was contended that it was still open to the courts to find whether the facts found constituted in law "vacancy" as defined in the Act.

In this connection strong reliance was placed on the following observations of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Hubli Eiectricity Co Ltd. v. Province ef Bombay (1) at pages 65 and 66 :--

"The question what obligations are imposed on licensees by or under the Act is a question of law.

Their Lordships do not read the section as making the government the arbiter on the construction of the Act or as to the obligations it imposes. Doubtless the government must, in expressing an opinion for the purpose of the section, also entertain a view as to the question of law. But its view on law is not decisive.

If in arriving at a conclusion it appeared that the government had given effect to a wrong apprehension of the obligations imposed on the licensee by or under the Act the result would be that the Government had not expressed such an opinion as is referred to in the section."

There are several answers to this contention.

In the first place, it is well settled that observations made with reference to the construction of one statute cannot be appHed with reference to the provisions of another stamte which is not in pari materia with the statute which forms the subject matter of the previous decision.

The .Judicial Committee was dealing with the provisions of s. 4 (I) of the Indian Electricity Act, I 910, which did not contain the words "conclusive evidence"

or any words to that effect.

That decision of the Judicial Committee, if it can at all be applied to the Act now before us, is against the petitioner in so far as

(1) [1948] L. R. 76 I. A. 57.

Lilavati Bai v.

The State ef

Bombay

Sinha].

Lilavati Bai v.

T~ Stat~ of Bombay

Si.ma].

it has construed the words "opinion of the Provincial Government".

Those words or words of similar import appear in the beginning of s. 5.

In the words of the Judicial Committee, those words signify the subjective opinion of tht; Government and not an opinion subject to objective tests.

The observations quoted above only show that on a proper construction of the provisions of the statute then before the Judicial Committee, the opinion of the Government, if it was made non-justiciable, was confined to the question of whether there Lad been a wilful and unreasonably prolonged default, but did not cover the question of the opinion of Government relating to the obligations imposed by the statute on the licensee, by or under the Act.

Hence those observations are absolutely of no assistance to the petitioner on. the question of the full implication of the rule making certain matters "conclusive evidence" under the provisions of ss. 5 and 6 of the Act.

This question appears to ha\e been canvassed in a number of cases in the High Court of Bombay.

In the case of ]agatchandra v. Bomba)' Province (1) TGndolkar J. had

ruled that the declaration made by the Government shall be "conclusive evidence with regard to all facts involved in the determination of v.1cancy but that it was not conclusive with regard to the iafcrences to be drawn from or the lcg't! conseque:1ces of such focts.

The correctness of that proposition was questioned in anothc:r case before another learned J u<lge of that Court, Shah J., who referred it to be determined b,· a larger Bench. Chagla C. J. and Gajcndragadkar J. (now one of us) examined that question in some detail and O\erruled the decision of Tendolkar J. (Vide 1Hohsinali Mohomed Ali v. The State of Bomba_y(')). The Bombay High Court in the last r1entioned case held that on a declaration being made by the State Government that there "as a vacancy, it was conclusive both as t0 the facts and the constituent elements of "vacancv". ; tS understood under the Act.

The High Court reiie,'l in this connection on the observations of the Judicial

(1) ,.\.LR. 1950 Il•Jn1. 144.

(2) [1951] 53 Boin.L.H. ~.J.; :\.I.R. :951 Born. 303.

Committee of the Privy Council in Moosa Goo/am Arif!

v. Ebrahim Goolam Ariff(1) and of Lord Cairns in Peel's case(2), and of Lord Parker of. Waddington in Bowan v. Secular Society Ltd. (3).

In this connection the learned counsel for the petitioner also pressed in aid of his agrument the well known distinction between the jurisdiction of a court or authority to decide a certain fact as one of the issues in the controversy and certain collateral facts on which the jurisdiction to determine the controversy could arise.

It was argued that the finding on the question of vacancy by the State Government was a "jurisdictional fact" in the sense that unless it was found that there was a vacancy, the jurisdiction of the State Government to make the declaration and to requisition the premises could not arise.

This aspect of the matter has been considered by this Court in the case of Rai Brij Raj Krishna v. S. K. Shaw & Brutlzers (4).

That case concerned the construction of the p!'ovi-sions sion .. of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction)

Control Act (Bihar Act III) of 190 This Court held that the Controller had been vested with the jurisdiction to determine all questions including the question whether or not there was non-payment of rent and on finding that there was default in the payment of rent, with the jurisdiction to order eviction of the tenant.

The finding of the question of default was not a jurisdictional finding n the sense in which learned counsel for the petitioner asks us to hold with reference to the finding of the State Government in this case that there has been '.l vacancy.

In the reported case this Court held further that even if the Controller had wrongly decided the question of defatilt in the payment of rent, his effective order on the question of eviction could not be challenged in a court of law.

Mr. Justice Fazl Ali delivering the judgment of the court made reference to the well known observations of Lord Esher, M.R. in the case of Queen v. Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income tax(5) and to

(1) [1912] L.R. 39 I.A. 237

(2) [18G7J L.R. 2 Ch. App. 674.

(3) [1917] A.C 406.

(4) [:951] S.C.R. 145.

(5) [1888] 21 Q.B.D. 313, 319.

Lilavati Bai

The Stale OJ

Bombay

Sinha].

Lilavati Bai v.

TJ, e State qf

Bombay

Sinha].

the observations of the Privy Council in the case of the Colonial Bank of Australasia v.

Willan(').

After referring to those observations and to the provisions of the statute then before the Court, this Court held that the Act empowered the Controller alone to decide whether or not there was non-payment of rent and that decision was essential to his order for eviction of the tenant under s. r r.

That decision of the Controller, the Court further held, could not be challenged in a court of law.

The decision of this Court just referred to is an apt illustration of the rule which applies with equal force to the provisions of the Act now before us.

The Act has made a specific provision to the effect that the determination on the questions referred to in ss. 5 and 6 of the Act by the State Government shall be conclusive evidence of the declaration so made.

But that does not mean that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 or of this Court under Art. 32 or on appeal has been impaired.

In a proper case the High Court or this Court in the exercise of its special jurisdiction under the Constitution has the power to determine how far the provisions of the statute have or have not been complied with. But the special powers aforesaid of this Court or of the High Court cannot extend to reopening a finding by the State Government under s. 5 of the Act that the tenant has not actually resided in the premises for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the elate of the order or under s. 6 that the premises had become vacant at about the time indicated in the order impugned.

Those are not collateral matters which could on proper evidence be reopened by the courts of law.

The legislature in its wisdom has maclc those declarations conclusive and it is not for this Court to question that wisdom.

As an offshoot of the agrument that we have just been examining it was contended on behalf of the petitioner that Explanation :a) to s. 6 quoted above contemplates a vacancy when a tenant (omitting other words not necessary) "Ceases to be in occupation upon

(1) [1H-;+} 5 l'.C: 1-17·4-t-3

' •

termination of his tenancy, eviction, or assignment or transfer in any other manner of his interest in the premises or otherwise".

The argument proceeds further to the effect that in the instant case admittedly there was no termination, eviction, assignment or transfer and that the words "or otherwise" must be construed as ejusdem generis with the words immediately preceding them ; and that therefore on the facts as admitted even in the affidavit filed on behalf of the Government there was in law no vacancy.

In the fir$t place, as already indicated, we cannot go behind the declaration made by the Government that there v1as a vacancy.

In the second place, the rule of ejusdem generis sought to be pressed in aid of the petitioner can possibly have no application.

The legislature has been cautious and thorough-going enough to bar all avenues of escape by using the words "or otherwise".

Those words arc not words of limitation but of extension so as to cover all posible ways in which a vacancy may occur.

Generally speaking, a tenant's occupation of his premises ceases when his tenancy is terminated by acts of parties or by operation of law or by eviction by the landlord or by assignment or transfer of the tellant's interest.

But the legislature, when it used the words "or otherwise", apparently intended to cover other cases which may not come within the meanint, of the preceding clauses, for example, a case where the tenant's occupation has ceased as a result of trespass by a third party. The frgislature, in our opinion, intended to cover all lJo;; sible cases of vacancy occurring due to any reasons whatsoever.

Hence, far from using those words ejusdem generis with the preceding clauses of the explanation, the legislature used those words in an all inclusive sense.

No decided case of any court, holding that the words "or otherwise" have ever been used in the sense contended for on behalf of the petitioner, has been brought to our notice.

On the other hand, by way of illustration of decisions to the contrary may be cited the case of Skinner & Co.

v. Shew & Co. (').

In that case the Court of Appeal

[1) [1893] 1 Ch. D .. p3. 2-99 s. c. I./59

Lilavati Bai v.

The State of Bombay

Sinha].

Lilavati Bai

The State of

Bomba)'

Sinha],

had to consider the words of s. 32 of the Patents, Designs & Trade Marks Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Viet. c.57), to the following effect :-

"\\There any person claiming to be the patentee of any invention, by circulars, advertisements or otherwise threatens any other person with any legal d. ,, procee mgs ............... .

Their Lordships repelled the contention that the words "or otherwise" occurring in that section had to be read ejusdem generis with "circulars", and "advertisements".

They observed that by so doing they will be cutting down the intendment of the provisions of the statute when clearly the words "or otherwise" had been used with a contrary intention.

The rule of ejusdem generis is intended to be applied where general words have been used following particular and specific words of the same nature on the established rule of construction that the legislature presumed to use the general words in a restricted sense; that is to say, as belonging to the same genus as the particular and specific words.

Such a restricted meaning has to be given to words of general import only where the context of the whole scheme of legislation requires it.

But where the context and the object and mischief of the enactment do not require such restricted meaning to be attached to words of general import, it becomes the duty of the courts to give those words their plain and ordinary meaning. In our opinion, in the context of the object and mischief of the enactment there is no room for the application of the rule of ejusdem generis.

Hence it follows that the vacancy as declared by the order impugned in this case, even though it may not be covered by the specific words used, is certainly covered by the legal import of the words "or otherwise".

The only other contention which remains to be dealt with is that the order impugned in this case is not enforceable because it was directed against the petitioner's husband, who was dead at the date of the order, besides the other two persons indicated in it who were not concerned with the premises.

In our opinion, there is no substance in this contention either.

An order like the one passed under s. 6(4) (a) of the Act

is not in the nature of an order in judicial proceedings between the Government on the one hand and other parties named. If the proceedings were intended by the Act in the sense of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings between named parties, it may have been legitimately argued that an order passed against a dead man is a complete nullity.

But the order proceeds on the basis that the tenant had ceased to be in occupation of the premises in October 1952, apparently by reason of the fact that he had handed over possession of the premise~ to the so called "lodger" or "paying guest".

Admittedly the petitioner's husband died after October 1952.

The occupation by the said Narottamdas Dharamsey Patel was in the nature of an unauthorised occupation. The fact that the petitioner's husband was dead on the date of the order impugned has only this effect that in so far as it mentions his name as one of the persons to be served under s. I 3 of the Act should be erased from the order.

But even so, it does not affect the enforceability of the same.

S. 13 lays down the different modes of service of an order passed under the Act according as the order is of a general nature or affecting a class of persons or an individual, corporation or firm.

We are here concerned with the ca5e of an individual and the section lays down that it can be served either personally by delivering or tendering the order to him or by post or where he cannot be found, by affixing a' copy of the order to some conspicuous part of the premises in which he is known to have last resided.

As the petitioner's husband had died before the date of the order impugned, it could affect only the so called "lodger" who had been, on the findings, left in occupation of the premises after October I 952. He has not made any complaint about non-service. The only other person who could be affected by the order, if at all, is the petitioner herself.

She has admitted that she came to know of the order in questiou at about the time it had been made, because she found a copy of the order affixed at the outer door of the premises.

Thus admittedly, the petitioner had timely notice of

Li/1JDaJi Bai v.

TM Stale ef

Bombay

Sinha].

Lilai'ali Baj

Tk Stole ef

llomba;

Sin.ha J~

March 7.

the order impugned.

Hence in the instant case there is no need to apply the rule of conclusive proof as laid dmrn in sub-s.(2) of s. 13.

In any event, as the concluding words of the section have provided, any irregularity or failure to comply with the requirements of the section cannot "affect the validity of the order".

As all the g, rounds urged in support of the petitions fail, they are dismissed with costs, one set.

Petitions dismissed.

SOHANLAL

THE UNION OF INDIA

( BHAGWATI, jAGANNADHADAs, ]AFER IMAM, Gov1NDA

MENON and J. L. KAPUR JJ.)

Jl'rit f mandamus-Disputed qulstions of fact and !aw- Disf,11!e rrgarding tit/e-T11hether ronrf£1' by U!~Y of writ approj1riate -l1.litt! writ can issue to private iu_dividual-~S'tate illegally evicting jJtrso11 fronl house-.A1wther person takzug possession bona fide u:ithout !:11ou1/edge qf illegal eviction-r11hether ivrit can t"ssue against such j; enon-Consti!ution f India, Art. 226 . .J, a displaced person, "'as.found /1ri1nafacie entitled to allotment of~. house and the Accomn1odtion Officer moved his family into the house on I\1ay 10, 1952, but no letter of allotment ,\as issued to him.

Later, ,\hen certain facts became knc\vn which in tht" opinion of the Union of India disentitlcd J to the allotment, he "as informf'"<l that the house could not be allotted to him.

J \vas c, icted fr01n the house on September 27, 1952, ,...,.ithout being gi, en 1 s days notice as reqnircd hy s. 3 of the Public Premise-; Eviction Act (XXVII of i950). fhe house \Vas then allotted to S and he \\as given possession on October 3, 1952. J filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court. The High Court ordered the Union of India and also S to restore possession of the house to J. S appealed.

He!d, that the High Court erred in issuing the writ of

.111a1; da1nus.

There ,\as a secious dispute on questions of fact bet\veen the paTties and also 'vhether J had acquired any title to the property in dispute.

Proceedings by \vay of a \\Tit \\'ere not approp1iate in ;"J. case \\here the decision of the Cou;:t \Yould amount to a decree declaring a party's title and ordering restoration of poss:!ssl.nn. The proper remedy in such a case is by \\'ay 'of a title suit in 'A Civil (:011rt.

The alternati\-e remdy of obtaining relief by a

721

LILAVATI BAI

S. R. DAS

B. P. SINHA

GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ.

Amendment Act II of 1950

ss. 5, 6, 6

Arts. 19(1)

Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948

s. 6

April I l, 1948

s. 5

Art. 31

Art. 31(3)

ss. 5 and 6

The State of Bombay

Arts. 19(1)(f) and 31

(1955) 1 S.C.R. 777

Art. 31

cl. 5(a)

Art. 13

s. 5

s. 6

Art. 32

Art. 226

(1948) L.R. 76 I.A. 57

s. 6

s. 6(4)(a)

s. 13

Article 32

Hardayal Hardy

R. ]ethmalani

C. K. Daphtary

Porus A. Metha

R. H. Dhebar

SINHA

Art. 32

January, 27, I954

s. 6(4)

Dharamdas Chellaram

Narottam

Dharamsey Patel

Narottamdas

State of

Bomba_y

Sinha

Dharctmdas

Narottamdas Dharamsey Patel

High Court of Bombay

State of Bombay

section 6

Requisition Act, 1948

Bombay Act XXXIII of 1948

Hirabhai H. Patel

Narottam Dharamsey Patel

Tendolkar

Art. 32

Bombay High Court

April l 1,

s. 104

March 28, 1950

ss. 8

s. 5

Art. 3

ss. 6

s. 6

ss. 5, 6

section 5

ss. 5, 6, 7, 8

section 12

Order XXIX or Rule

First Schedule

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

section 9

section 1

January 26, 1950

Art. 3

Art. 3

Art. 3

Art. 3

cl. 5(a)

Art. 3

Art. 3

Art. 31

[1955] 1 S. C.R. 777

Li/avati Bai

State of Bombay

State of

Bomhqy

Art. 3

Art. 31

Art. 32

s. 5

October 19.')2

Art. 226

Art. 32

s. 4

Electricity Act

L. R. 76 I. A. 57

s. 5

ss. 5 and 6

TGndolkar

Shah

Chagla

Gajcndragadkar

Cairns

Peel

Parker

Fazl Ali

Esher

L.R. 39 I.A. 237

Lilavati Bai

ss. 5 and 6

Art. 226

Art. 32

s. 5

s. 6

s. 6

Lilavati Bai

State of

Bomba)'

Sinha]

s. 32

Trade Marks Act, 1883

s. 6(4)

S. 13

s. 13

SOHANLAL

UNION OF INDIA

BHAGWATI

AFER IMAM

MENON

J. L. KAPUR

Art. 226

Union of India

s. 3

Art. 226