{"document_id": "1957_1_1002_1019_EN", "year": 1957, "text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1957]\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF EXCESS PROFITS TAX,\n\nWEST BENGAL\n\nti.\n\nTHE RUBY\n\nGENERAL INSURANCE CO., LTD.\n\n(BHAGWATI,\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR and\n\nJ. L. KAPUR JJ.)\n\nExcess Profits Tax-Insurance company-Premium receipts-\n\nRscrve for unexpired risks on pending policies-Whether \"accruing liability''-iVhether could be deducted as a debt-Excess Profits Tax\n\nAct, 1940 (XV of 1940), SS. 4, 6, rr. I, 2 of Sch. Il-Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (XI of 1922), s. 10(7), r. 6 of the Sch.\n\nThe respondent was a company carrying on life, fire, marine anJ general insurance business, and the question for detennination related to the assessment of excess profits tax on its income other th:'!n life insurance.\n\nThe n1ethod adopted by the company with respect to fire insurance policies was that while the premiums received were all of them included in the assets of the year, a portion thereof, 40 per cent., was treated as reserye for unexpired risks on the outstanding policies, and sho\\\\-n as a liability. The appellant; the Co1nmissioner for Excess Profits 'fax, claimed that the sum set apart as reserve for unexpired risks was liable to be deducted under r. 2 of Sch. II of the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940, fron1 out of the capital en1ployed in business for that year.\n\nThe respondent, \\Vhile maintaining that all the premiu1ns received must be treated as capital under r. 1 of Sch. II to the Act contended that the provision for unexpired risks was only a contingent liability and that a liability under a contract of insurance whereunder risk had not .materialised could not be hcl. Lid.\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAiJar].\n\nThe Commilsianer\n\nof Excess Prqfits Tax/.WtJt Bengal v.\n\nThe Ruby General\n\nIn.st.ranee Co. Ltd.\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAljar J.\n\ninsurance whereunder risk had not materialised, cannot be held to be a debt, and is therefore not an .. accruing liability v1ithin the rule. In. support of this position, he relies on the decisions in Webb v. Stenton ( 1 ) and Israelson v. Dawson (Port of Manchester Insurance Co., Ltd., Garnishees) ( ').\n\nIn Webb v. Stenton (1 ), the question was whether a sum which was payable to the judgment-debtor under a trust deed but which had not become due could be attached in the ha.nds of the trmtees as a debt owin\" or accruing within 0. 45, R. 2 of the English Rules f Practice. In holding that it codd not be, Lindley L.J. observed :\n\n\"] should say, apart from any authority, that a debt legal or equitable can be attached whether it he a debt owing or accruing ; but it must be debt, and a debt is a sum of money which is now payable or will become payable in the future by reason of a present oblig'.ltion, debitr) [•912] A.C. -143; 6 T. C. 59.\n\n(z) [•9\\6] 2 All E. R. 728.\n\npurposes of assessing the taxable profits for purposes appellant that if that liability is a present liability for of income-tax, it must logically be the same for purposes of excess profits tax, and must therefore be deducted under r. 2 of Sch. II to the Act. That woi1ld be so, if the scheme and framework of the Excess Profits Tax Act were the same as those of the Incometax Act.\n\nBut the fact is that the Excess Profits Tax Act differs in material respects from the Income-tax Act, and the principles applicable in the assessment of profits under s., 10 of the latter enactment cannot necessarily be held to be applicable in the ascertainment of the capital employed under rr. 1 and 2 of Sch. II to the former Act.\n\nThe object of the Excess Profits Tax Act is to tax profits of a business when thev overflow a certain level.\n\nThat level is determined thu's : A certain period called the standard period is taken; the capital invested and the profits made in the business during that year are ascertained, and the standard profits are. worked out in relation to those two factors.\n\nThen, the capital actually employed in business during the chargeable accounting period is ascertained. If the capital is the same as that employed in the standard period, then there is no further problem; but if it is more, then the standard profits are increased, and if it is less, they are reduced pro tanto.\n\nThus, the whole scheme of the Act is to tax profits above a certain level, and that level will move upwards or downwards as the capital employed may be more or less.\n\nIt is the this that constitutes the distinguishing feature of the Excess Profits Tax Act, and it is the determination of the capital actually employed in business that forms one of the most important and arduous tasks in the ascertainment of taxable profits under the Act.\n\nRule I of Sch. II to the Act enumerates three categories of properties, which are to be included in the computation of capital. It is to be noted that this rule does not adopt any legalitic or conventio11a! notion of what is technically termed 'capital'; but it proceeds on a factual basis to include whatever is utilised in business, whether it be tangible rroperty or intangible\n\nThe Commissioner\n\nof Excess Pro.fits Tax, West Bengal v.\n\nThe Ruby General Insurance Cn. Ltd.\n\nV enkatarama\n\nAryar ].\n\nThe Commissioner\n\nof ExcesJ Profit!\n\nTax, Wot Bengal\n\nThe Ruby Gerural In:.uranu Ca. Ltd.\n\nVenkalarama\n\nAijiarJ.\n\nproperty.\n\nThe object of the provision is clearly to confer a benefit on the assessee by enabling him to retain at least in part the profits realised by him by investment of additional capital.\n\nThen there is r. 2, which provides for certain '.:leductions being made out of capital. Omitting for the present \"accruing liabilities'', which form the subject of the present controversy, the other two items mentioned therein are borrowed money and debts, and the reasons for their exclusion from capital falling within r. 1 would appear to be this : Money borrowed and cjebts incurred for the purpose of the business must have been utilised in it, and would be included in the capital employed as defined in r. 1.\n\nThe policy of the law being to give some relief to an assessee who invests additional capital in his business, the reason of it requires that that should be limited to capital contributed by the assessee himself. Otherwise, the benefit intended to be given te him might be abused, and the object of the legislation defeated by large scale employment of borrowed capital. Burrowed money and debt are therefore to be deducted out of what is capital within r. 1. \\Ve now come to the expression \"accruing liabilities\".\n\nWhat does it precisely import?\n\nTo decide that. we must have regard to the scope and purpose of rr. 1 and 2 of Sch. II to the Act and to the context and setting of the expression.\n\nIt has been already pointed out that the object of the Act is to tax profits which overflow a certain line indicated by what is termed \"standard profits\", that the location of that line varies with the capital employed, that the scheme of r. 1 is on a factual basis to treat as capital all assets tangible and intangible which are thrown into a business and contribute to the earning of profits and to exclude therefrom under r. 2 that part of it which came in as a result of borrowing.\n\nNow, obviously, a deduction under r. 2 can only relate to what is capital under r. 1, and that must be a really profit-earning asset, whether tangible or not.\n\nBorrowed money to be deducted under r. 2 is money borrowed for the purpose of the business, and which has gone to swell the capital under r. 1.\n\nThat is also the position as regards debts.\n\nAnd\n\naccrumg liabilities which are liable to be deducted under r. 2 must also be of the same character as borrowed money and debts with which they are associated on the principle of noscitur a sociis.\n\nThey must be such as can be said to have been utilised in the business and formed part of the really effective\n\ntracfo1g assets during the chargeable accounting period.\n\nIf that is the correct approach, as we conceive it is, the question to be considered is neither, on the one hand, whether the liability amounts in law to a debtfor if it is capable of being utilised in business and is so utilised, it will fall under r. 2, even though it is not strictly speaking a debt; nor, on the other hand, whether it is a liability which has been treated as one for the purpose . of assessing income-tax.\n\nIn assessing income from business under s. 10 of the Income-tax Act, what is allowed as a deduction is any liability incurred solely and exclusively for the purpose of the business, and when that has not matured, its value is to be determined according to rules of accountancy and deducted.\n\nBut when a deduction is claimed under r. 2, what has to be seen is whether the obligation is such that it could be regarded as an asset used in the business, such as could conceivably contribute to its profits. If that is riot established, then it cannot be included as capital under r. 1, and cannot be deducted therefrom under r. 2 as an accruing liability. It should not be overlooked that a deduction under s. 10 of the Income-tax Act and that under r. 2 of Sch. II to the Act proceed on totally different lines and have different objects in view. Under s. 10, the deduction is claimed by the assessee, and that has the effect, when allowed, of reducing the taxable profits.\n\nUnder r. 2, it is claimed by the department, and if allowed, it will enhance the liability of the assessee by reducing the capital under r. 1. Incidentally, how inappropriate the principle liad down in Sun Insurance\n\nOffice v. Clari,: ( 1 ) would be if it is applied for determinin; r the question of capital employed in business for\n\nth~ purpose of Excess Profits Tax Act will be seen from\n\n(1) [1952) A. C. 443, 6 T.C. 59. !i-61 S. C. India/59\n\nT1\" Commissio., r\n\n4 Excess Profits Tax, West Bengal\n\nv Th• Ruby General Insuranu Co. Ltd.\n\nV 1 nkalarama Aiyar ].\n\nThe Consinislioner\n\nof Excess Profit; Tax, West Bengal\n\n\" The Ruby General lnsuranet Co. Lid.\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAi.var].\n\nthe fact that one of the grounds on which the decision therein was based was that 40 per cent. of the premiums received and set apart as reserve for unexpired risks was unearned income, and could not therefore be regarded as profits for the purpose of the Act. If that were the true position under the Excess Profits Tax Act, then the reserve could not be included in the capital of the business, and, indeed. that was one of the contentions urged by the learned Solicitor-General.\n\nBut that was not the stand taken by the department before the Tribunal and that is directly opposed to the plain language of r. 1 of Sch. II, under which all the premiums thrown into the business would be capital employed in the business. That clearly shows how unsafe it will be to adopt the principles laid down for the purpose of assessing business profits under the income tax Act to a determination of the question of the capital employed under the Excess Profits Tax Act.\n\nIn this view, is the reserve for unexpired risks an \"accruing liability\" within r. 2?\n\nThe decision in Sun Insurance Office v.\n\nClark ( 1 ) that it should be allowed as a deduction was based on two grounds. One was that it should be regarded as \"unearned income\", and for the reasons already stated, it cannot avail when the question is one of determining capital under the Act. And the other was that the reserve represents a liability in the nature of unpaid price of property included in the trading acsets.\n\nBut apart from the fact that we have to strain the analogy in applying it to the present situation, can that liability be held to be of the character contemplated by r. 2? Can it be said that the reserve for unexpired risk was, like borrowed money and debt, part of the real trading assets of the business? The answer must clearly be in the negative.\n\nThe reserve liability could not factually be said to have contributed to the running of the business or the earning of profits. It was something in the air, and. could have had no effect in the working of the concern, during the chargeable accounting period. It cannot therefore be held to be an\n\n\"accruing liability\" within r. 2 of Sch. II to the Act.\n\n(1) [1912] A. C. 443, 6 T.C. 56.\n\nA case very much in point is the decision in Northern Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners( 1 ).\n\nThere, the question arose whether a conditional liability under a contract was an \"accruing liability\" within the corresponding provision in the English Excess Profits Tax Act. The .facts were tlut on December 16, 1939, an agreement was entered into between the Ministry of Aircraft Production and a company engaged in manufacturing aluminium products 'and supplying them to manufacturers of aircraft for the Government, wherein it was provided that the prices which the latter was then charging to its customers should be reduced for the period July 1, 1939, to June 30, 1940, and that the amount by which the prices paid to the company were in excess of the reduced prices should be paid by the company to the Ministry. The agreement further provided that negotiations should be started not later than June 30, 1940, for determining the rates to be charged for the periods following June -30, 1940._ The agreement was, in fact, concluded only on October 12, 1942, whereby the prices to be charged by the company were fixed for the years 1941, 1942 and 1943. In accordance with the agreement entered into on October 12, 1942, a sum of £2,743,469 was repaid by the company to the Ministry in 1943 being the difference between the price paid by the customers and that fixed in the agreement. This amount was actually allowed as a deduction in the assessment of the business income for purposes of income-tax, and the dispute related to the question whether it could be deducted in assessing the excess profits tax as an \"accruing liability\" of the company for the chargeable accounting period which was January 1 to December 31, 1941. It was held by the Court of Appeal that there was, in fact, no agreement between the parties during the chargeable accounting period, and that therefore no liability was incurred. In the alternative, it was held that even if the agreement dated December 16, 1939, could be construed as amounting to a conditional agreement for the period subsequent to June 30, 1940, the obligation created thereby could not be\n\n(1) [1946) 1 All. E. R. 546, 554\n\n• Th• Commissioner of ExceJS Profits Tax, WeJI Bengal v.\n\nThe Ruby General imurance Co. Ud.\n\nVenkataram!I\n\nAryar J.\n\nThi Ctnmniss iontr\n\nof Excess Pro.fits Tax, Wljt Bengal v TM Ruby General lmurance Co. LJd.\n\nVtnkatarama\n\nAi)>ar J.\n\nregarded as an accruing liability within the rule in question. Lord Greene M.R. stated the reason thus :\n\n\"A purely conditional liability, which may or may not mature, is not one which falls within that language,. for this reason : Quite apart from the actual words,. it would be contrary to the whole conception underlying these capital provisions because a purely conditional liability, which may or may not eventuate, is not a thing which affects a company's capital position, any more than a conditional receipt can affect its capital position. A receipt which may or may not be received, according as some event does or does not happen, is not a thing with which you can earn profits. It is the possibility of earning profits on your real capital that these capital provisions are concerned with. Therefore, in my opinion, even if one could spell such a hypothetical and conditional contract out of these words, the result would not give rise to an accruing liability within the meaning of the section.\" This decision was taken in appeal to the House of Lords and was affirmed. Vide Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Northern Aluminium Co. Ltd.( 1 ).\n\nThis decision establishes that a conditional liability under a concluded contract-it is on that footing that the second point arose for decision-was not an accruing liability for the purposes of the Excess Profits Tax Act, as the same had no effect on the actual capital position of the company, and the fact that it was allowed for purposes of income-tax did not affect the position under the Excess Profits Tax Act.\n\nThe learned Solicitor-General sought to distinguish this decision on the , ground that it did not relate to an insurance business, whereas it was contended that Sun Insurance Office v. Clark(') directly dealt with the question now 1mder consideration whether reserves for unexpired risks in pending policies were liabilities which could be deducted. We do not see how it makes any difference in the construction of r. 2 of Sch. II to the Act that 1\"' # the liability sought to be deducted arises under an ' insurance policy and not under some other contract.\n\n(1) [1947] 1 All E.R. 608.\n\n(•) [1912] A.C. 443, 6 T.C. 59.\n\nWe are of opinion that the principles bid down in Northern Aluminium Co., Ltd. v.\n\nInland Revenue Commissioners(\n\n1 ) and fo!cmd Revenue Commissioners v. ·N orthem Aluminium Co., Ltd.( 2 ) are applicable to the decision of the present case, and that a contingent liability in respect of unexpired risk is not an \"accruing liability\" within r. 2 of Sch. II to the Act.\n\nThe decision appealed from is correct, and this appeal must accordingly be dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nTHE MEMBER FOR THE BOARD OF\n\nAGRICULTURAL INCOME-TAX, ASSAM\n\nSMT. SINDHURANI CHAUDHURANI\n\n(with connected appeals)\n\n(BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR and\n\nJ. L. KAPUR\n\nJ. L. KAPUR J J.)\n\nSalami-lndicia--lf capital income-tax-Assam Agricultural 1939), s. 2(a) (i).\n\nrrceipt-Liability to agricultural Income-tax Act (Assam IX of\n\nThe true indicia of salami are ( 1) its single. nonrecurring character and (2) payment prior to the cre.'.ltion of the tenancy.\n\nIt is the consideration paid by the tenant for being let into po'session and can be neither rent nor re\\'enue but is a capital receipt in the hands of the landlord.\n\nKamakshya Narain Singh v. The Commissioner of Income Tax (l. Lid.\n\nVenkatarama", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18166, "end_char": 18212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Relying on this circumstance, counsel for the respondent contends that however liberally the expression \"accruing liabilities\" might be construed, it cannot be interpreted so as to take in liabilities which do not bear the character of debts, and that a liability under a contract of\n\nThe Commissioner\n\nof Eicms Pfqfil& T1J11, West Bengal\n\nThe Ruby General\n\nInsurance Ct>."}}, {"text": "Venkatarama\n\nAljar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18320, "end_char": 18338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commilsianer\n\nof Excess Prqfits Tax/.WtJt Bengal v.\n\nThe Ruby General\n\nIn.st.ranee Co. Ltd.\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAljar J.\n\ninsurance whereunder risk had not materialised, cannot be held to be a debt, and is therefore not an .. accruing liability v1ithin the rule.", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama\n\nAljar"}}, {"text": "Lindley", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18954, "end_char": 18961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In holding that it codd not be, Lindley L.J. observed :\n\n\"] should say, apart from any authority, that a debt legal or equitable can be attached whether it he a debt owing or accruing ; but it must be debt, and a debt is a sum of money which is now payable or will become payable in the future by reason of a present oblig'.ltion, debitrodies corporate known as Majlis to discharge respectively the functions assigned to them by the Act with reference to Sunni waqfs and Shia waqfs.\n\nSection 27 provides that the general superintendence of all waqfs in the State shall be vested in the Majlis, whicli will - day routine administration of one business or the other.\n\nThere was a provision in . the Managing Agency agreement under which every member of the firm of Managing Agents was authorised to exercise all the powers of the Managing Agents.\n\nAccording to the case of the authorised Controller, trouble arose between the members of the different branches of the family of Managing Agents sometime in 1950-51 when it came to light that Onkarmal Khetan had surreptitiously withdrawn large sums of money from the accounts of the various businesses in . which the members of the Khetan family were interested as Managing Agents, and this led to certain ·· suits being instituted against Onkarmal Khetan.\n\nThe latter, in his turn, retaliated by bringing suits for the appointment of a Receiver, or for restraining the holding of a general meeting of one of . the mills, and instituting certain other preceedings stated to be of an obstructive nature and calculated to create an impasse in the working of the mills.\n\nKamla Prasad\n\nK!rtlan\n\nv •.\n\nS. K. Das].\n\nKam/a Pra.wlli\n\nKhttan\n\n1\"he Union of India\n\nS. tr. DaJ J.\n\nThe petitioners on the contrary alleged that when the balance sheet of the lshwari Khetan Sugar Mills Ltd., for the financial year 1950-51 was published in June 1952, it \\Vas discovered that some of the Directors including the. authorised Controller had utilised the funds of the Company for their personal gain and had committed breaches of certain provisions of the Indian Companies Act.\n\nThis led to Suit No. 4 of 1952 brought by the petitioners against some of the Directors, including the authorised Controller, for an order of permanent injunction restraining the said Directors from exercising any. powers .as Directors of petitioner No. 2 and also for a. declaration that a notice calling the . twenty-fourth ordiriary general meeting of the Company to be held on July 9, 1952, was illegal and invalid.\n\nIn that suit, an ex parte order of injunction was made against the Directors concerned on July 8,\n\n1952. That order was, however, subsequently vacated as being without jurisdiction and a fresh order was made on June 3, 1953. In the affidavit filed on behalf\n\nof the authorised Controller, it has been stated that on legal advice obtained by the defendants of that suit to the effect that the ex parte order of injunction dated July 8, 1952, ws without jurisdiction, the twenty-fourth . ordinary general meeting of the Company was held on July 9, 1952, and the shareholders unanimously passed a resolution in that meeting approving and adopting the Directors' report and the audited balance sheet of the Company as on October 9, 1951. The fresh temporary order of injunction which was passed by the Civil Judge, Deoria, on June 3, 1953, was confirmed by the High Court of Allahabad by its order dated September 14, 1953.\n\nFeeling that the order of stay would completely dislocate the affairs of the Company, the shareholders themselves called an extraordinary general meeting which was held on November 9, 1953, and at that meeting the authorised Controller and certain other persons were re-elected as Directors of the Company, subject to the condition that if the Court decided in Suit No. 4 of 1952 that the said Directors had not ceased to be Directors, the resolution would be ineffectual to that extent. There\n\nwere several proceedings in the High Court of Allahabad in connection with Suit No. 4 of 1952, and in one of them the High Court was moved for an expeditious hearing of the suit, and such a direction was made by the High Court.\n\nUnfortunately, however, for reasons which need not be stated here, Suit No. 4 of 1952 is still awaiting trial and on July 31, 1956, petitioner No. 1 obtained an ex parte order from the said High Court adjourning the hearing of the suit. The case of the authorised Controller is that petitioner No. 1 having realised that he is not supported by the majority of shareholders and cannot, therefore, legally represent the Company, is delaying the hearing of Suit No. 4 of 1952 on one ground or another.\n\nWhile all this legal tussle, with allegations and counter allegations made by the parties, was going on in the arena of the Courts of law, certain other events happened to which a reference must now be made. The petitioners allege that the authorised Controller, finding that the majority of the shareholders and Directors were not in favour of his managing the Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills Ltd. moved the Ministry of Food, through his grandson Durga Prasad Khetan and another gentleman related to him, for passing orders under ss. 15 and 17 of the Act. On November 8, 1952, a communication was received from the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Government of India, wherein was stated :-\n\n\"The Government of India consider that if on account of the failure of the parties concerned to compose their differences and inability to take timely and proper steps to arrange for normal working of the mills, the mills are not able to start work in time during the 1952-53 season, or are unable to work at all, it will result in a substantial fall in the production of sugar without due justification.\n\nSuch a result will lead to the conclusion that the mills are being managed in a manner likely to damage the interests of a substantial body of consumers besides cane growers and mill workers.\" The communication contluded with the statement that, in the circumstances stated above, the Government of India would be constrained to order an investigation\n\nKamla PrOJDl/\n\nKhr:a.\n\nThe U11io11 of India\n\nS. K. Das].\n\nKamlo Prasad\n\nKMon\n\nv. . The Union of India\n\nS. K. Das J.\n\ninto the matter and, if necessary, to undertake the management of the said mills.\n\nIt may be stated here that the communication was in respect of both the Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills Ltd. and the Maheshwari Khetan Sugar Mills Ltd ..\n\nOn December 18, 1952, the Central Government did actually pass an order under sub-s. ( 4) of s. 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, under which the authorised Controller was empowered to exercise certain functions of control in respect of the Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills Ltd., the functions of control being stated in detail in notification No. S.R.O. 2073 of even date.\n\nOn December 23, 1952, Onkarmal filed a writ petition to this Court against the aforesaid order of the Central Government and asked for an interim direction staying the operation of the order.\n\nThis Court gave a direction expediting the hearing of the petition, and further directed that the accounts of the petitioner Company be audited periodically by a Government or private auditor at the instance of Onkarmal.\n\nThe writ petition itself could not, however, be heard in time and was late-r dismissed on May 14, 1954, as having become infructuous in . the meantime.\n\nOn July 30, 1953, the , Central Government passed an order under s. 15 of the Act in respect of several mills, including the Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills Ltd.\n\nUnder that order the Central Government appointed three independent persons for . making a full and complete investigation into the circumstances of each of the industrial undertakings referred to therein. Then, on November 14, 1953, the Central Government made an order under s. 18A of the Act, by which the authorised Controller was. appointed to take over the management of the Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills Ltd.\n\nIt may be stated here that the Act was amended in 1953 by Act 26 of 1953. By that amendment, s. 17 was omitted and a new chapter, viz., Chapter IIIA, was inserted.\n\nThis new chapter contained s. 18A under which the Central Government passed its. order dated November 14, 1953. The order stated that it shall have effect for a period of one year.\n\nIn December 1953 came the decision of this Court in . Dwarkadas Shrinit1as of .\n\nBombay v. The Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd. (1).\n\nThat decision pronounced on Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution . with . reference to the validity of the Sholapur Spinnifi)fS':tnd.; Weaving .· Company (Emergency Provisions) Ordinance II of 1950 and ActXXVIII of 1950. As a result, presumably, of that decision, on May 21, 1954, the Central Government cancelled all appointments of authorised Controllers under the provisions of the Act, and on such cancellation the management of the\n\nindustrial undertaking vested again in the owner of the undertaking.\n\nThe case of the petitioners is that in spite of the cancellation the authorised Controller continued to remain in possession of the undertaking in question.\n\nOn July 16, 1954, the Central Government again passed an order under sub-s. ( 4) of s. 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, thereby again giving the authorised Controller Certain functions of control in respect of the Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills -Ltd.\n\nOn September 19, 1954, there was another investigation under s. 15 of the Act by a panel of officers and it is stated that they recommended that the Central Government should take over the management. of the Mills for a period of three years.\n\nOn January 31, 1955, the present pedtioners filed a writ petition iii this Court in respect of the order passed by the Central Government on July 16, 1954. This is the writ petition which, after necessary amendments, is now under consideration before us, the amendments having been necessitated by reason of certain subsequent notifications made by the Central Government. These Nubsequent notifications are-( 1) the notifications made on November 8, 1955, by which the earlier order made on July 16, 1954, was cancelled and a fresh order made under s. 18A of the Act ; and (2) the amending order dated November 7, 1956-to both of which a reference has been made in the first paragraph of this judgment. By reason of these subsequent notifications, the order dated July 16, 1954, no longer exists, and the writ petition which was originally directed against that order stands in need of amendment.\n\n(1)[1954] S.C.R. 674.\n\nKomla PrtJJati\n\nKhetan\n\nTll4 U11ion of India\n\nS. K. DtJJ J.\n\nK amla Prasad\n\nKhttan v.\n\nTire Union of India\n\nS. K. Da, ].\n\nThe petitioners have prayed for an amendment of the original writ petition and also for permission to urge fresh grounds to challenge the validity of the two notified orders, one dated November 8, 1955, and the other dated November 7, 1956.\n\nBy an order of the Judge-in-Chambers dated February 18, 1957, the petition for amendment and for urging additional grounds was directed to be heard along with the main petition under Art. 32. But before that date, i.e., on November 5, 1956, when the stay application of the petitioners was heard, the following direction was given by this Court-\n\n\"The hearing of the main petition under Art. 32 to be expedited ....................... .It will be open to the petitioners to challenge that the appointment of R, B. Kedar Nath Khetan, if again made, is also bad.\" In view of the aforesaid directions, we have treated the main petition under Art. 32 as a petition against the latest order passed by the Central Government appointing the authorised Controller to take over the management of the undertaking, and we have also permitted the petitioners to urge fresh grounds in support of their petition.\n\nHaving indicated in the preceding paragraphs the necessary background against which the dispute between the parties has to be considered, we proceed now to a consideration of the grounds on which the petitioners challenge the validity of the orders dated November 8, 1955, and November 7, 1956.\n\nIt is necessary to clear the ground by stating at the very outset that learned counsel for the petitioners has not challenged the validity of s. 18A of the Act under which the impugned orders were made.\n\nWe have already stated that Chapter !!IA of the Act was inserted by the Amending Act 26 of 1953.\n\nArticle 31B of the Constitution was enacted by the Constitution (First Amendment Act, 1951, which states, inter alia, that none of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any of the provisions thereof shall be deemed to be void, or ever to have become void, on the ground that such Act, Regulation or provision is\n\ninconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of this Part\n\n(meaning Part III) of the Constitution. The Ninth Schedule was added to by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955.\n\nItem No. 19 of the Ninth Schedule is now Chapter IIIA of the Act as inserted by the Industries (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 1953. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has frankly conceded that in view of these amending provisions, he is not now in a position to challenge the validity of s. 18A of the Act.\n\nTherefore, the principal question for our consideration is the validity of the impugned orders made under that section.\n\nLearned counsel for the petitioners has attacked the two orders on the following grounds :\n\n(1) the order of November 8, 1955, is not a lawful order, as it does not fulfil one of the essential requirements of s. 18A of the Act under which it purports to have been made ;\n\n(2) even assuming that the order was a good order when it was made, s. 18A of the Act does not authorise an extension of the peri0d during which the . order is to remain in force, in the manner in which the extension was made on November 7, 1956, and such extension did not compiy with one of the essential requirements of s. 21 of the General Clauses Act, (No. X of 1897) ; and ·\n\n(3) in any event, the order is not a bona fide order in that the Central Government appointed the very person who was mismanaging the undertaking, who was one of the parties to a pending dispute, and against whom .an order of injunction had been passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction.\n\nThese three grounds we now propose to examine in the order in which we have set them out.\n\n(1) We must first read s. 18A of the Act so far as it is relevant for our purpose. The section states-\n\n\"If the Central Government is of opinion that- ( a) ............. .\n\n(b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation has been made under section 15 (whether or not any directions have been issued to the\n\nK amla Prasad\n\nKhetan\n\nThe Union of India\n\nS. K. Das].\n\n19~7\n\nKamla Prmad\n\nKht14n\n\nT/r• Union of lrulia\n\nS. K. Dos:f.\n\nundertaking in pursuance of section 16, is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest, the Central Government may, by notified order, authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of the undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole or any part of the undertaking such functions of conrtol as may be specified in the order.\n\n(2) Any notified order issued under sub-section (1) shall have effect for such period not exceeding five years as may be specified in the order : Provided that the Central Government, if it is of opinion that it is expedient in public interest so to do, may direct that any such notified order shall continue to have effect after the expiry of the period of five years aforesaid for such further period as may be specified in the direction and where any such direction is issued; a copy thereof shall be laid, as soon as may be, before both Houses of Parliament.\" The argument before us is that for the application of\n\ncl. (b) of sub-s. (I) of s. IBA, the two esential requirements are-(i) an investigation under s. 15 of the Act and (ii) the opinion of the Central Government that the industrial undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest. Learned counsel for the petitioners has conceded that before the order dated November 8, 1955, was made, there was an investigation under s. 15 of the Act in respect of the industrial undertaking in question, and the first requirement was thus fulfilled.\n\nLearned counsel has, however, very strongly submitted that the second requirement was not fulfilled in the present case, because the authorised Controller himself was in charge of the undertaking from December 18, 1952, till November 8, 1955 (when the impugned order was made) with a small break of less than two months only between the two dates, May 21, 1954, when all appointments under the Act were cancelled and July 16, 1954, when a fresh order under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 was made, and\n\neven during this short period the case of the petitioners is that the authorised Controller continued in posses~ sion.\n\nFounding himself on these circumstances, learned counsel for the petitioners contends that it was rationally and logically impossible for the Central Government to be of opinion that the industrial undertaking was being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the public interest, before the impugned order was made.\n\nWe are unable to accept this argument as correct.\n\nWe have already referred to the legal tussle which was going on between the parties with regard to the management of the industrial undertaking in question.\n\nThe Central Go\\'l:rnment very rightly pointed out in their kttcr dated November 8, 1952, that the result of tk differences b::tween the partie:; wa~ Ekc!y to be a stoppage of the mill and a fall in the production of sugar with consequential detriment to the interests of the industry concerned and the interests of a substantial body of consumers, cane growers and mill workers.\n\nIn view of the litigatio!l which was pending between the partie,:, the likelihooLl of the dangers at which the Centra I Govermcnt hinted in 1952 must have continued to exist~ as long as the management was not fully and completely taken over by the authorised Controller.\n\nIn Dt'.cember 1952, the order passed under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 merely gave some functions. of control to the authorised Controller ; it did not vest the management in him.\n\nThis distinction between exercising certain functions of control, however, drastic the functions may be, on an order made under sub-s. ( 4) of s. 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act and the taking over of the management of the whole of an undertaking. on an order under s. ISA of the Act is a real distinction which must be bOrne in mind, as it has a bearing on the argument advanced before us.\n\nSub-section ( 4) of s. 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act,\n\n1946; authorises the Controller to exercise, with respect to the whole or any part of the undertaking, such functions of control as may be provided by the order ; s. ISA of the Act is in wider terms and empowers the 8-61 S. C. India.'59\n\nKam/a Prasad\n\nKhetan\n\nThe Union of India\n\nS.K.Das J.\n\nKam/a Prasad\n\nKhetan .. 7 he !Jn ion of India\n\nS. K. Da>].\n\nCentral Government to authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of the undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole or any part of the undertaking such functions of control as may be specified in the order.\n\nSection !SB of the Act states the effect of a notified order under s. ISA; in sub-s. (!), els. (a) to (e), is stated the effect of taking over the management, and in subs. (3) is stated the effect of merely giving functions of control-a distinction which is clear! y drawn in the section itself.\n\nIt Is not difficult to conceive that in a particular industrial undertaking the mere giving of some functions of control may not be enough to meet the situation which has arisen and it may be necessary for the Central Government to pass an order taking over the management of the whole of the undertaking.\n\nIn the case under our consideration, in December, 1952, certain functions of control were vested in the authorised Gmtroller, but the management of the whole undertaking was not taken over.\n\nThis continued till an investigation was ordered under s. 15 of the Act on July 30, 1953. Then, on November 14, !953, the authorised Controller was directed to take over the management of the whole of the industrial undertaking. This order was however cancelled on May 21, 1954, and under s. !SF of the Act, the effect of the cancellation was to vest the management of the undertaking again in its owner the expression 'owner' meaning,. under s. 3 (f) elf the Act, the person who, or the authority which, has the ultimate contrd over the affairs of the undertaking and, where the said affairs are entrusted to a manager, managing director or managing agent, such manager, managing director or managing agent.\n\nTherefore, the legal effect of the cancellation on May 21, 1954, was to vest the management of the Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills Ltd., in the Directors and Managing Agents who were quarrelling amongst themselves.\n\nOn behalf of the petitioners, it has been pointed ou't that Kedar Nath Khetan, the erstwhile authorised Controller, continued to remain in possession in spite of the cancellation order. In an affidavit filed on behalf of the Central Government, it\n\nis stated that after the cancellation order, Kedar Nath Khetan, the erstwhile authorised Controller, informed the Government of India that he was continuing in management in a capacity other than that of autho- . rised Controller. The affidavit filed on behalf of the authorised Controller states, however, that between the time the Central Government directed him to hand over possession to the Directors and the time when he was again appointed on July 16, 1954, the management of the Company remained in the hands of the Directors who were in possession of the undertaking.\n\nIt is not necessary for us to pronounce on these disputed facts.\n\nIt is abundantly clear from the affidavits filed that peace amongst the Directors or in the family of the Managing Agents had not been restored bv the time the cancellation order was made on May Zl, 1954.\n\nSuit No. 4 of 1952 was still pending, and the tussle between the parties was going on.\n\nThis was the position when another order was made um\\er the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, on July 16, 1954.\n\nThis was followed by a second in\\'estigation under s. 15 of the Act in September, 1954.\n\nPetitioner No. 1 was still pursuing what he conceived to be his legal remedy by filing a writ application in respect of the order elated July 16, 1954, in this Court and also in other proceedings arising out of Suit No. 4 of 1952, in the High Court of Allahabad. In these circumstances, the Central Government made the impugned order dated November 8, 1955. Having regard to the circumstances just stated, it is, we think, idle to contend that the Central Government had no materials before it for . arriving at the opinion that the industrial undertaking was being managed in a manner highly detrimental to public interest.\n\nThe Central Government might reasonably have felt that the order elated July 16, 1954, which vested certain functions of control only, was not enough to meet the situation and a more drastic step was necessary. It is worthy of note that in the affidavit filed on behalf of the Centr'll Government it is stated that the affairs of the industrial • undertaking were investigated a second\n\nKam/a Prasad Khetan v • The Union of Idia\n\nS. K. Dns J.\n\nKamla PraJad\n\nKhetan\n\nThe Union of India\n\nS. K. Das J.\n\ntime under s. 15 of the Act in September I954, and the panel of officers who held that investigation recommended that Government should take over the management of the industrial undertaking for a period of three years.\n\nIt is on that recommendation that the Central Government passed the impugned order on November B, 1955.\n\nWe are unable to accept the argument of learned counsel for. the. petitioners that one of the essential requirements of cl. (b) of sub-s. ( 1) of s. IBA of the Act was not fulfilled before the order dated November B, 1955, was made.\n\nLearned counsel for the petitioners has drawn our attention to those statements in the affidavit filed on behalf of the Central Government which referred to the improvement in management, after the undertaking was taken over by the authorised Controller.\n\nIn that affidavit, it is stated :\n\n \"I say that by virtue of the order issued by the Government of India under s. 3( 4) of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, the Government of India had taken over only the supervisory control and the said Kedar Nath Khetan had only powers to issue directions to the management.\n\nThe management was with the old management and the Government of India or the authorised Controller had no effective functioning in the management as the authorised Controller could not manage the undertaking. I say that in view of the continued litigation referred to in detail in the affidavit of the intervener dated 25th October, 1956, it was apparent that the mill was. being managed in a manner highly detri-. mental ro the interests of the undertaking and that it was necessary to pass the order under s. IBA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951.\n\nI say that after the management was taken over by Shri Kedar Nath Khetan, the Government has reason to believe that the management has improved and has saved further deterioration.\"\n\nIn another parr of the same affidavit, it is stated that the mill earned a profit during 1953-54 and in 1954-55 also the mill was likely to make a net profit of\n\nRs. 84,321.\n\nWe see nothing in these statements from which it can be inferred that the recorded opinion of the Central Government in the order dated November 8, 1955, that the industrial undertaking . was being managed in a manner highly detrimental to public interest contained a palpably false statement.\n\nThe crux of the matter was the dispute inter se amongst the Directors and the Managing Agents, leading to protracted and harassing litigation', some of which was. still pending ; that was the real cause of the trouble, and we think that the Central Government had enough materials for its opinion that the industrial undertaking in question was being managed in a manner highly .detrimental to public interest .\n\n. (2) w c now turn to the amending order of November 7, 1956.\n\nThe amending order is in these terms:\n\n\"In the said order in sub-clause (ii) of clause 1 and clause 2 for the words 'one year', the words 'two years' shall be substituted.\" Section 21 of the General Clauses Act states :\n\n\"Where, by any Central Act or Regulation, a power to issue notifications, orders, rules, or bye-laws is conferred, then that power includes a pov.:er, exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions (if any), to add to, amend, vary or rescind any . notific_ations, orders, rules or bye-laws so issued.\"\n\nThe argument of learned counsel for the petitioners is that neither s. 18A of the Act nor s. 21 of the General Clauses Act save the ·. amending order of November 7, ··· 1956.\n\nThere has been some argument before us with regard to the proviso .to sub-s. (2) of . s. 1'8/\\ of the Act, which we have quoted in extenso in an . earlier part of this . judgment.\n\nThat proviso, it is contended by learned counsel for the petitioners, refers only to an . order which is initially made for a period of five years, or, alternatively, which comes to an end on the expiry of a perioo of five years.\n\nAccording to him, the proviso empowers the Central Government to continue the order after the expiry of a period of\n\nKam/a Prasad\n\nKhelan\n\nThe Union of lndia\n\nS. K. Das].\n\nKanda Pra; ad\n\nKhdan\n\nTke Union of India\n\nii. K. Das].\n\nfive years for such further period as may be specified in the direction given by the Central Government, and the only safeguard is that a copy of the direction is to be laid before both Houses of Parliament. The argument of learned counsel for the petitioners proceeds to state that the proviso has no application in the present case where the original order was made for a period of one year only and the amending order merely continued it for another year.\n\nIn the view which we. have . taken of the substantive provisions of sub-s. (I) of s. 18A of the Act and s. 21 of the General Clauses Act, we do not think it necessary to make any pronouncement with regard to the true scope and effect of the aforesaid proviso. In our opinion, the amending order is protected under s. 21 of the General Clauses Act read with sub-sec. (I) of s. ISA of the Act.\n\nSection 21 of the General Clauses Act says, inter alia, that the power to issue an order under any Central . Act includes a power to amend the order ; but this power is subject to a very important qualification and the qualification is contained in the words 'exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions (-if any)'.\n\nThere is no dispute before us that the amending order was made in the same manner as the original order, that is, by means of a notified order.\n\nAs no sanction is necessary for an order under s. 18A, the only question before us is whether the amending order complied with the like conditions under which the original order was made.\n\nWe have already stated what are the two essential requirements of an order under cl. (b) of sub-s. ( 1) of s. !SA of the Act. The argument of learned counsel for the petitioners is that those two essential conditions must be fulfilled again before any amendment of the order can be made ; this, he urges, is the true scope and effect of the expression 'subject to the like condiiions (if any)' occurring in s. 21 of the General Clauses Act.\n\nWe agree with learned counsel for the petitioners that the power to amend, which is included in the power\n\nto. make the order, is exercisable in the like manner and suh:cer to the like sanction and conditions (if any) as govern the lnaking of the original order ; this is stated by the section itself. It becomes necessary, however, to understand clearly . the true nature of the conditions\n\nwhich have to be fulfifled before an order under cl. (b) of ;, ub-!;. (1) of s. 18A of the Act can be made. Once\n\nthe true nature of those conditions is appreciated, there is in our opinion little difficutl:y left in the application of s. 21 of the General Clausl'.s Act. Now, the first condition in cl. (b) of sub-s. ( 1) of s. 18A of the Act is that the industrial undertaking must he one in respect of which an investigation has been maered that s. 21 of the General Clauses Act embodies a rule of construction, and that rule must have reference to the context and subjectmatter of the particular statute to which it is being applied ; for example, s. 18A of the Act does not prescribe any conditions for the cancellation of an order made under that section, but s. 18F does and the power of cancellation referred to in s. 21 of the General Clauses Act must have reference to s. 18F.\n\nSimilarly, an order of amendment made becomes an order under s. 18A and is subject to all the conditions mentioned therein, including the condition mentioned in sub-s. (2).\n\nA refernece wls made in this connection to a decision of this Court in jtrawboard Manufacturing Co. v. Gutta 138\n\nKam/a Prasad\n\nKhetan\n\nTht Union of lndiw\n\nS. K.Das].\n\nKamla Prasad\n\nKMtan\n\nThi Union of India\n\nS. K. DasJ.\n\nMill Workers' Union('). In that case, the State Government of Uttar Pradesh had referred an industrial dispute to the Labour Commissioner on February 18, 1950, and directed that the award should be submitted not later than April 5, 1950.\n\nThe award, however, was . made on April 13, and on April 26 the Governor issued a notification extending the time for making the award up to April 30, 1950. It was held by this Court that the State Government had no authority whatever to extend the time and the adjudicator became functus officio on the expiry of the time fixed in the original order of reference and the award was, therefore, one made without jurisdiction and a nullity.\n\nIt was further held that s. 14 of the U. P. General Clauses Act did not in terms or by necessary implication give any such power of extension of time to the State Government.\n\nIt was argued on behalf of the State Government in that case that. the order of April 26, 1950, could be supported with reference to s. 21 of the U. P. General Clauses Act.\n\nBut this Court rejected the argument and held that the power of amendment and modification conferred by s. 21 of the U. P. General Clauses Act could not be exercised so as to have retrospective operation. We do not think that the principle of that decision has any application in the\n\np~sent ase. But as already stated by us, the prov1s1on m s. 21 of the General Clauses Act embodies a rule of construction, and the implied power of amendment therein embodied must be determined with reference to the context and subject-matter of the provisions of the principal statute. In the present case, that rule of construction applies, but it does so with reference to the context and subject-matter of ss. 15, 16 and 18A of the Act.\n\n(3) We now turn to the third and last question which has been agitated before us.\n\nLearned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the impugned orders are not bona fide orders.\n\nHe has submitted that the authorised Controller was one of the parties to the dispute which led to so much protracted litigation.\n\n(1) [1953] S.C.R. 439.\n\nHe has pointed out that there was an order of injunction against him. He has also referred to certain other circumstances arising out of other activities of the authorised Controller and relating to income-tax demarn; ls against him. He has submitted that the authorised Controller ceased to be a Director by reason of breaches of certain provisions of the Indian Companies Act committed by him. These submissions have been very seriously contested in the affidavit filed on behalf of the authorised Controller. On the materials before us, it is neither possible nor desirable that Wt should make any pronouncement with regard to these disputed questions of fact.\n\nIt is sufficient to state that the selection of a suitable person to be the authorised Controller rests with the Central Government and it may be presumed that the Central Government knows best the needs of the particular industry and of its own subjects and the suitability of the person to be appointed as authorised Controller. Having regard to the facts and circumstances to which we have already made a reference, it cannot be said that the appointment of Kedar Nath Khetan as the authorised Controller in this particular case was made for some ulterior purpose, that is, a purpose other than the purpose of achieving the objects for which the impugned order was. passed.\n\nThe primary concern of the Central Government was to see that the mills were managed in a manner which was not detrimental to public interest, and having regard to the experience of Kedar Nath Khetan in the industry in question, it was open to the Central Government to select him as the most suitable person to be appointed as the .authorised Controller, notwithstanding that he was a party to the dispute. The test to be applied in cases of this nature, where lack of good faith in the Central Government is pleaded, is not whether a better or more independent man was or might be available ; nor is it the duty of the Court to subject the selection made by the Central Government to another and independent test of propriety and suitability, for the Court has really no materials for such a test.\n\nThe test to be applied is whether the\n\nKam/a Prasad\n\nKhttan\n\nTll4 Union of lnditl\"\n\nS. K. DasJ.\n\nKam/a Prasad\n\nKhetan\n\nv. 7'ht flnion of India\n\nS. K. DruJ.\n\nSarkar],\n\nappointment was made for some ulterior purpose, some purpose other than the object for which the law, under which the impugned order is made, was enacted. In our view, the petitioners have completely failed to satisfy that test in the present case.\n\nFor the reasons given above, we hold that the order made on November 8. 1955. and the amending order dated November 7, 1956, are both valid in law, and the petitioners have not made out any case of a violation of their fundamental right.\n\nIn conclusion, it may be stated that on behalf of the authoris.ed Controller a preliminary objection was also taken that petitioner No. l was not legally competent to represent petitioner No. 2.\n\nHaving regard to our decision on merits, it is unnecessary to say anything more about this preliminary objection. It was stated at the Bar that this preliminary objection has also been taken in Suit No. 4 of 1952. As that suit is still pending, we have thought it fit to refrain from. expressing any opinion on the preliminary objection.\n\nThe result is that there is no merit in the petition which is dismissed with costs in favour of the respondent, the Union of India. The authorised Controller, who iptervened at his own risk, must bear his own costs.\n\nSARKAR J.-I have had the privilege of reading the judgment just delivered by my brother S. K. Das.\n\nI regret that on one of the questions that arise in this matter I have come to entertain a different opinion.\n\nIn this judgment I will say a few words on that question only. With the rest of the judgment of S. K. Das J.\n\nI am in entire agreement. He has dealt with the facts very fully and therefore I do not propose to state them myself.\n\nThe Central Government had by an order published in the Official Gazette of November 8, 1955, and made in exercise of the power conferred by s. 18A of the Industries (Development & Regulation) Act, 1951 (LXV of 1951), authorised Kedar Nath Khetan who has been allowed to intervene in these proceedings to take\n\nover the management of Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills Limited, an industrial concern then in the management of its directors. The order provided that it was to have effect for a period of one year commencing on the date of its publication in the Official Gazette. By another order made on November 7, 1956, the Central Government directed that in the order of November 8, 1955, for the words \"one year\" the words 'two years' should be substituted.\n\nThe effect of this latter order was that Kedar Nath Khetan was to be in management of the Mills up to November 7, 1957. The question is whether the order of November 7, 1956 was a valid order. The latter order is onlv an amendment of the earlier order. Had the Centrai Government then any power so to amend ?\n\nSection 18A does not expressly confer any power to amend an order once it is made under it. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, however, provides that a power of amendment shall exist in certain circumstances. The only question therefore is whether s. 21 of the General Clauses Act justifies the amendment made in this case. Section 21 is in these terms :\n\n\"Where, by any (Central Act) or Regulation, a power to (issue notifications), orders, rules or bye-laws is conferred then that power includeS' a power, exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions (if any), to add to , amend, vary or resci1nd any (notifications), orders, rules or bye-laws so\n\n(issued).\" Under this section a Notification or an Order once issued can be amended only \"in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions (if any)\".\n\nThis means that the power of amendment can be exercised only in the same manner and subject to the same sanction and conditions, if any were imposed, in which the power to make the order could be exercised under the main Act. Was the order of NQvember 7, 1956, then made in the same manner and subject to the same sanction and conditions under which an order under s. 18A of th~ main Act could be made?\n\nUnder s. 18A the power to authorfae a person to take over the management of an undertaking can be\n\nKam/a Prasad\n\nKhetan\n\nThe Union of India\n\nSarkar].\n\nK amla Prasad\n\nKhetan\n\nThe Union qf Indio\n\nSarkar J.\n\nexercised only by a notified order, that is to say an order notified in the Official Gazette. This is the manner of the exercise of the power. The amending Order had been made in the same manner.\n\nThis requirement of s. 21 of the General. Clauses Act, therefore, was fulfilled in this case.\n\nSection 18A does not provide for any sanction being obtained before the exercise of the power conferred by it. The amending Order, therefore, did not need any sanction, and no question of satisfying any requirement as to any sanction arises.\n\nThe difficulty has arisen as to the last requirement specified in s. 21, namely, that indicated by the words 'subject to like conditions'.\n\nSection ISA of the main Act so far as relev3nt for the present purpose is in these terms :\n\n\"If the Central Government 1s of opinion that ................... .\n\n(a) ................................ ..\n\n(b) an industrial undertaking in respect of which an invtstigation has been made under s. 15 .......... is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest, the Central Government may, by a notified order, authorise any person or .............. to take over the management of .......... the undertaking .............. \"\n\nLearned counsel for the petitioner formulated his argument in this way.\n\nHe said that the right to exercise the power conferred by s. IBA arises only on two conditions being fulfilled, namely, (a) the existence of an industrial undertaking in respect of which an investigation had been made under s. 15, and (b) the Central Government being of opinion that such an undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the industry or to public interest.\n\nIt was said that in this case the second condition was not present when the order for amendment of the earlier order was made and thc; refore it is invalid. I agree that the second condition was not present when the amending order was made.\n\nThe reason is this.\n\nSection 18A contemplates the taking over of manage' ment of an undertaking by a person authorised by the Government.\n\nIt, therefore, contemplates a state of\n\naffairs in which the management is not in such a person.\n\nIt follows that it contemplates management in a manner highly detrimental to the industry or public interest by a person other than that appointed by the Government under the Act.\n\nIn this case at the date of the amendment the management was in the person appointed by the Government by its earlier order of November 7, 1955, and, therefore, the Government could not at the date of the amending order have been of opinion that the management was by a person other than that appointed by it and such management was in a mann.er highly detrimental to the industry or to public. interest.\n\nIn my view, howevtr, when s. 21 of the General Clauses Act makes the power to amend exercisable subject to the like conditions as in the main Act, it does not contemplate those conditions upon the fulfilment of which the right to issue the order arises under the main Act. If this were so, the power of amendment conferred by s. 21 would have been wholly redundant and unnecessary. If the conditions upon the fulfilment of which the right to exercise the power arose under the main Act existed, then the Government could have instead of amending the order made a fresh order under s. 14 of the General Clauses Act, if necessary, rescinding the earlier order. Therefore, it seems to me that the provision in s. 21 of the General Clauses Act that the power of amendment shall be exercisable subject to like conditions does not refer to conditions upon the existence of which the right to exercise the power arises under the main Act.\n\nIn my view the conditions referred to in s. 21 are the conditions to which the order issued under the main Act must be made subject.\n\nThus, in this case sub-s. 2 of s. 18A provides that \"any notified order issued under sub-section (1) shall have effect for such period not exceeding five years as may be specified in the order\". The effect of this sub-section is that the order made under s. 18A must be subject to the condition that it cannot ha,•e effect for a longer period than 5 years.\n\nWhen, therefore, an order once made under s. 18A is sought to be amended with the\n\nKam!a Prasad\n\nKhetan\n\nThe Union of India\n\nSarhlr j.\n\nJramla Prasad\n\nTibetan\n\n.v.\n\nThi Union qf lwdia\n\n&.rluJr ].\n\naid derived from s. 21 of the General Clauses Act, the amendment must observe the condition laid down in sub-s. (2) of s. 18A. Such amendment is subject to the conditions in the main Act. The amendment cannot, therefore, extend the operation of the order beyond the period of five years mentioned in the main Act.\n\nIn the present case the amending order of November 7, 1956, complied with this condition and, therefore, it was properly made in compliance with the provisions of s. 2.1 of the General Clauses Act.\n\nFor this reason, in my view the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the amending order was invalid must fail.\n\nI, therefore, agree with the orJer proposed by S. K. Das J.\n\nPetition dismissed.\n\nGIPN-54-61 S. C. India/59-9-12-59 1,000.", "total_entities": 275, "entities": [{"text": "KAMLA PRASAD KHET", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 48, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "May I,\n\nKAMLA PRASAD KHET AN\n\nTHE UNION OF INDIA\n\n(and connected petitions)\n\n(S. R. DAS c. J., JAFER IMAM, s. K. DAS,\n\nGoVINDA MENON and A. K. SARKAR J J.)\n\n[1957)\n\nIndustrial undertaking, control of-Central Government taking over management by notified order-Atnendment of such order by another-Validity-'Like conditions', Meaning of-Appointment of Controller-Bona fides-The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act (LXV of 1951), as amenqed by Amrnding Act, 26 of 1953, ss.", "canonical_name": "Kamla PrtJJad\n\nKhetan"}}, {"text": "AN\n\nTHE UNION OF INDIA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 49, "end_char": 71, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE UNION OF INDIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 110, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. K. Das J. Sarkar", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAFER IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 128, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SYED JAFFER IMAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GoVINDA MENON", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 155, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GoVINDA MENON", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. K. SARKAR J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 160, "end_char": 174, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.K. SARKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Industries (Development and Regulation) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 399, "end_char": 442, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 18A, 15, 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 498, "end_char": 513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gcneral Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 514, "end_char": 533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 547, "end_char": 552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Gcneral Clauses Act", "statute": "Gcneral Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "November 8, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 581, "end_char": 597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a notified order dated November 8, 1955, the Government of India took over the managen1ent of certain Sugar Mills under s. 18A(l) (b) of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, for one year and vested it in a Controller."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 603, "end_char": 622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a notified order dated November 8, 1955, the Government of India took over the managen1ent of certain Sugar Mills under s. 18A(l) (b) of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, for one year and vested it in a Controller."}}, {"text": "s. 18A(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 678, "end_char": 687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Gcneral Clauses Act", "statute": "Gcneral Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 699, "end_char": 748, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 839, "end_char": 844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Gcneral Clauses Act", "statute": "Gcneral Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 864, "end_char": 882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was preceded by an investigation under s. 15 of the Act and the Central Government had materials before it to be of the opinion that the management was being conducted in a manner highly detrimental to the undertaking and to public interest."}}, {"text": "November 7, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1046, "end_char": 1062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 7, 1956, this order was amended extending the Controller's management for a further period of two years."}}, {"text": "s. 18A(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1231, "end_char": 1243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Gcneral Clauses Act", "statute": "Gcneral Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "Govinda Menon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1504, "end_char": 1517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held, per S. R. Das C. J., Jafer Imam, S. K. Das and Govinda Menon J J.-that s. 18A of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, read with ss.", "canonical_name": "GoVINDA MENON"}}, {"text": "s. 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1528, "end_char": 1534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Gcneral Clauses Act", "statute": "Gcneral Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1542, "end_char": 1591, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 15 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1603, "end_char": 1616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1730, "end_char": 1736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2262, "end_char": 2267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2275, "end_char": 2294, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 18A(I} (b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2477, "end_char": 2490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3057, "end_char": 3062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3070, "end_char": 3089, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3107, "end_char": 3113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industries (Development and Regulation) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3121, "end_char": 3164, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3725, "end_char": 3735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3743, "end_char": 3764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Purshottam Tricumdas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3809, "end_char": 3829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Tricumdas, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath, f. B. Dadachanji and P. L. Vohra, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "S. N. Andley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3831, "end_char": 3843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Tricumdas, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath, f. B. Dadachanji and P. L. Vohra, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3845, "end_char": 3859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Tricumdas, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath, f. B. Dadachanji and P. L. Vohra, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "f. B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3861, "end_char": 3877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Tricumdas, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath, f. B. Dadachanji and P. L. Vohra, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "P. L. Vohra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3882, "end_char": 3893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Tricumdas, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath, f. B. Dadachanji and P. L. Vohra, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3916, "end_char": 3930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, Porus A. Mehta and R.H. Dhebar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Porus A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3960, "end_char": 3974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, Porus A. Mehta and R.H. Dhebar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R.H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3979, "end_char": 3990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, Porus A. Mehta and R.H. Dhebar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "M. L. Misra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4013, "end_char": 4024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. L. Misra, Advocate-General, U. P., and C. P. Lal, for the Intervener."}}, {"text": "C. P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4055, "end_char": 4064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. L. Misra, Advocate-General, U. P., and C. P. Lal, for the Intervener."}}, {"text": "J. Jafar Imam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4130, "end_char": 4143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of S. R. Das C.- J. Jafar Imam, S. K. Das and Govinda Menon JJ."}}, {"text": "S. K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4145, "end_char": 4154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of S. R. Das C.- J. Jafar Imam, S. K. Das and Govinda Menon JJ.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Das J. Sarkar"}}, {"text": "S. K. Das J. Sarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4194, "end_char": 4213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by S. K. Das J. Sarkar J. delivered a separate judgment.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Das J. Sarkar"}}, {"text": "Kamla PrtJJad\n\nKhetan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4257, "end_char": 4278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kamla PrtJJad\n\nKhetan\n\nThe Union.ef India\n\nS. K. DAs J.-On November 8, 1955, the Ministry s. K Da.s J. of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, published a notified order, in exercise of the powers conferred on that Government by section ISA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, hereinafter referred to as the Act, authorising one Shri Kedar Nath Khetan of Padrauna, called the\n\nKt11r.fo Prasad\n\nKMtan\n\nTltt Union of India\n\nS IC Dai .1\n\nauthorised Controller, to take over the management of the Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills Ltd., Lakshrniganj, Deoria, subject to certain conditions.", "canonical_name": "Kamla PrtJJad\n\nKhetan"}}, {"text": "S. K. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4300, "end_char": 4309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kamla PrtJJad\n\nKhetan\n\nThe Union.ef India\n\nS. K. DAs J.-On November 8, 1955, the Ministry s. K Da.s J. of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, published a notified order, in exercise of the powers conferred on that Government by section ISA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, hereinafter referred to as the Act, authorising one Shri Kedar Nath Khetan of Padrauna, called the\n\nKt11r.fo Prasad\n\nKMtan\n\nTltt Union of India\n\nS IC Dai .1\n\nauthorised Controller, to take over the management of the Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills Ltd., Lakshrniganj, Deoria, subject to certain conditions.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Das J. Sarkar"}}, {"text": "Ministry s. K Da.s J. of Commerce and Industry, Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4338, "end_char": 4405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kamla PrtJJad\n\nKhetan\n\nThe Union.ef India\n\nS. K. DAs J.-On November 8, 1955, the Ministry s. K Da.s J. of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, published a notified order, in exercise of the powers conferred on that Government by section ISA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, hereinafter referred to as the Act, authorising one Shri Kedar Nath Khetan of Padrauna, called the\n\nKt11r.fo Prasad\n\nKMtan\n\nTltt Union of India\n\nS IC Dai .1\n\nauthorised Controller, to take over the management of the Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills Ltd., Lakshrniganj, Deoria, subject to certain conditions."}}, {"text": "Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4512, "end_char": 4561, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Kedar Nath Khetan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4620, "end_char": 4637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kamla PrtJJad\n\nKhetan\n\nThe Union.ef India\n\nS. K. DAs J.-On November 8, 1955, the Ministry s. K Da.s J. of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, published a notified order, in exercise of the powers conferred on that Government by section ISA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, hereinafter referred to as the Act, authorising one Shri Kedar Nath Khetan of Padrauna, called the\n\nKt11r.fo Prasad\n\nKMtan\n\nTltt Union of India\n\nS IC Dai .1\n\nauthorised Controller, to take over the management of the Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills Ltd., Lakshrniganj, Deoria, subject to certain conditions."}}, {"text": "Deoria", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4826, "end_char": 4832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kamla PrtJJad\n\nKhetan\n\nThe Union.ef India\n\nS. K. DAs J.-On November 8, 1955, the Ministry s. K Da.s J. of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, published a notified order, in exercise of the powers conferred on that Government by section ISA of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, hereinafter referred to as the Act, authorising one Shri Kedar Nath Khetan of Padrauna, called the\n\nKt11r.fo Prasad\n\nKMtan\n\nTltt Union of India\n\nS IC Dai .1\n\nauthorised Controller, to take over the management of the Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills Ltd., Lakshrniganj, Deoria, subject to certain conditions."}}, {"text": "Kamlaprasad Khetan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5325, "end_char": 5343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l before us is one Kamlaprasad Khetan, who states that he is a Director and shareholder of the second petitioner, which is the Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills Ltd.\n\nThe Union of India was and is the only respondent.", "canonical_name": "Kamla PrtJJad\n\nKhetan"}}, {"text": "Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5433, "end_char": 5464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l before us is one Kamlaprasad Khetan, who states that he is a Director and shareholder of the second petitioner, which is the Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills Ltd.\n\nThe Union of India was and is the only respondent."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5470, "end_char": 5484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l before us is one Kamlaprasad Khetan, who states that he is a Director and shareholder of the second petitioner, which is the Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills Ltd.\n\nThe Union of India was and is the only respondent.", "canonical_name": "Union of lrulia"}}, {"text": "October 1, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5535, "end_char": 5550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an order dated October 1, 1956, this Court permitted the said authorised Controller to intervene, with the result that both the Union of India and the authorised Controller have been heard in opposition to the petition."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5648, "end_char": 5662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By an order dated October 1, 1956, this Court permitted the said authorised Controller to intervene, with the result that both the Union of India and the authorised Controller have been heard in opposition to the petition."}}, {"text": "Khetan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6847, "end_char": 6853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Four members of the Khetan family\n\nconstituted the Managing Agency firm, of which Kedar Nath Khetan (later appointed as the authorised Controller) was one and Onkarmal Khetan (now deceased), father of petitioner Karola Prasad Khetan, was another."}}, {"text": "Onkarmal Khetan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6986, "end_char": 7001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Four members of the Khetan family\n\nconstituted the Managing Agency firm, of which Kedar Nath Khetan (later appointed as the authorised Controller) was one and Onkarmal Khetan (now deceased), father of petitioner Karola Prasad Khetan, was another.", "canonical_name": "Onkarmal Khetan"}}, {"text": "Karola Prasad Khetan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7039, "end_char": 7059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Four members of the Khetan family\n\nconstituted the Managing Agency firm, of which Kedar Nath Khetan (later appointed as the authorised Controller) was one and Onkarmal Khetan (now deceased), father of petitioner Karola Prasad Khetan, was another.", "canonical_name": "Kamla PrtJJad\n\nKhetan"}}, {"text": "Ishwari Kheian Sugar Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7127, "end_char": 7158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Managing Agents managed two Mills, known as the Ishwari Kheian Sugar Mills Ltd., Lakshmiganj, and the Maheshwari Khetan Sugar Mills\n\nT l., Ramkola, District Deoria."}}, {"text": "Lakshmiganj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7160, "end_char": 7171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Managing Agents managed two Mills, known as the Ishwari Kheian Sugar Mills Ltd., Lakshmiganj, and the Maheshwari Khetan Sugar Mills\n\nT l., Ramkola, District Deoria."}}, {"text": "Maheshwari Khetan Sugar Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7181, "end_char": 7210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Managing Agents managed two Mills, known as the Ishwari Kheian Sugar Mills Ltd., Lakshmiganj, and the Maheshwari Khetan Sugar Mills\n\nT l., Ramkola, District Deoria."}}, {"text": "Ramkola", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7218, "end_char": 7225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Managing Agents managed two Mills, known as the Ishwari Kheian Sugar Mills Ltd., Lakshmiganj, and the Maheshwari Khetan Sugar Mills\n\nT l., Ramkola, District Deoria."}}, {"text": "Morarji Gokul Das Spinning and Weaving Mills, Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7431, "end_char": 7483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the present case with the Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills Ltd. The Managing Agents were also partners in the firms of managing agents of certain other companies, namely, Morarji Gokul Das Spinning and Weaving Mills, Bombay, and Laxmidevi Sugar Mills Ltd., Deoria."}}, {"text": "Laxmidevi Sugar Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7489, "end_char": 7515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the present case with the Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills Ltd. The Managing Agents were also partners in the firms of managing agents of certain other companies, namely, Morarji Gokul Das Spinning and Weaving Mills, Bombay, and Laxmidevi Sugar Mills Ltd., Deoria."}}, {"text": "Rai Bahadur Kedar Nath Khetan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7746, "end_char": 7775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the affidavit in opposition filed on behalf of the authorised Controller, it is stated that the Khetan famiily was in the beginning a mere trading family, but \"due to the initiative, business acumen and imagination of Rai Bahadur Kedar Nath Khetan, various manufacturing concerns including several sugar factories grew up\" ; and it was under his direction that the other members of the family, including Onkarmal Khetan, were put in charge of the day-t<>- day routine administration of one business or the other."}}, {"text": "Kamla Prasad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8990, "end_char": 9002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kamla Prasad\n\nK!rtlan\n\nv •.\n\nS. K. Das].", "canonical_name": "Kamla PrtJJad\n\nKhetan"}}, {"text": "K!rtlan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9004, "end_char": 9011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kamla Prasad\n\nK!rtlan\n\nv •.\n\nS. K. Das]."}}, {"text": "S. K. Das", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9019, "end_char": 9028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kamla Prasad\n\nK!rtlan\n\nv •.\n\nS. K. Das].", "canonical_name": "S. K. Das J. Sarkar"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9467, "end_char": 9480, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "July 9, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9864, "end_char": 9876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "twenty-fourth ordiriary general meeting of the Company to be held on July 9, 1952, was illegal and invalid."}}, {"text": "July 8,\n\n1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9994, "end_char": 10007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that suit, an ex parte order of injunction was made against the Directors concerned on July 8,\n\n1952."}}, {"text": "June 3, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10115, "end_char": 10127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That order was, however, subsequently vacated as being without jurisdiction and a fresh order was made on June 3, 1953."}}, {"text": "July 8, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10331, "end_char": 10343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the affidavit filed on behalf\n\nof the authorised Controller, it has been stated that on legal advice obtained by the defendants of that suit to the effect that the ex parte order of injunction dated July 8, 1952, ws without jurisdiction, the twenty-fourth ."}}, {"text": "October 9, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10621, "end_char": 10636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ordinary general meeting of the Company was held on July 9, 1952, and the shareholders unanimously passed a resolution in that meeting approving and adopting the Directors' report and the audited balance sheet of the Company as on October 9, 1951."}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10761, "end_char": 10784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fresh temporary order of injunction which was passed by the Civil Judge, Deoria, on June 3, 1953, was confirmed by the High Court of Allahabad by its order dated September 14, 1953."}}, {"text": "September 14, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10804, "end_char": 10822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fresh temporary order of injunction which was passed by the Civil Judge, Deoria, on June 3, 1953, was confirmed by the High Court of Allahabad by its order dated September 14, 1953."}}, {"text": "November 9, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10997, "end_char": 11013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Feeling that the order of stay would completely dislocate the affairs of the Company, the shareholders themselves called an extraordinary general meeting which was held on November 9, 1953, and at that meeting the authorised Controller and certain other persons were re-elected as Directors of the Company, subject to the condition that if the Court decided in Suit No."}}, {"text": "July 31, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11666, "end_char": 11679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 of 1952 is still awaiting trial and on July 31, 1956, petitioner No."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Food", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12453, "end_char": 12469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners allege that the authorised Controller, finding that the majority of the shareholders and Directors were not in favour of his managing the Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills Ltd. moved the Ministry of Food, through his grandson Durga Prasad Khetan and another gentleman related to him, for passing orders under ss."}}, {"text": "Durga Prasad Khetan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12492, "end_char": 12511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners allege that the authorised Controller, finding that the majority of the shareholders and Directors were not in favour of his managing the Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills Ltd. moved the Ministry of Food, through his grandson Durga Prasad Khetan and another gentleman related to him, for passing orders under ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 15 and 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12575, "end_char": 12588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 8, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12604, "end_char": 12620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 8, 1952, a communication was received from the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Government of India, wherein was stated :-\n\n\"The Government of India consider that if on account of the failure of the parties concerned to compose their differences and inability to take timely and proper steps to arrange for normal working of the mills, the mills are not able to start work in time during the 1952-53 season, or are unable to work at all, it will result in a substantial fall in the production of sugar without due justification."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12660, "end_char": 12713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 8, 1952, a communication was received from the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Government of India, wherein was stated :-\n\n\"The Government of India consider that if on account of the failure of the parties concerned to compose their differences and inability to take timely and proper steps to arrange for normal working of the mills, the mills are not able to start work in time during the 1952-53 season, or are unable to work at all, it will result in a substantial fall in the production of sugar without due justification."}}, {"text": "U11io11 of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13524, "end_char": 13540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The communication contluded with the statement that, in the circumstances stated above, the Government of India would be constrained to order an investigation\n\nKamla PrOJDl/\n\nKhr:a.\n\nThe U11io11 of India\n\nS. K. Das]."}}, {"text": "S. K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13542, "end_char": 13551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The communication contluded with the statement that, in the circumstances stated above, the Government of India would be constrained to order an investigation\n\nKamla PrOJDl/\n\nKhr:a.\n\nThe U11io11 of India\n\nS. K. Das].", "canonical_name": "S. K. Das J. Sarkar"}}, {"text": "Maheshwari Khetan Sugar Mills Ltd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13809, "end_char": 13842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be stated here that the communication was in respect of both the Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills Ltd. and the Maheshwari Khetan Sugar Mills Ltd ..\n\nOn December 18, 1952, the Central Government did actually pass an order under sub-s. ( 4) of s. 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, under which the authorised Controller was empowered to exercise certain functions of control in respect of the Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills Ltd., the functions of control being stated in detail in notification No."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13940, "end_char": 13944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 23, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14243, "end_char": 14260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 23, 1952, Onkarmal filed a writ petition to this Court against the aforesaid order of the Central Government and asked for an interim direction staying the operation of the order."}}, {"text": "Onkarmal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14262, "end_char": 14270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 23, 1952, Onkarmal filed a writ petition to this Court against the aforesaid order of the Central Government and asked for an interim direction staying the operation of the order.", "canonical_name": "Onkarmal Khetan"}}, {"text": "May 14, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14745, "end_char": 14757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The writ petition itself could not, however, be heard in time and was late-r dismissed on May 14, 1954, as having become infructuous in ."}}, {"text": "July 30, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14811, "end_char": 14824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 30, 1953, the , Central Government passed an order under s. 15 of the Act in respect of several mills, including the Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills Ltd.\n\nUnder that order the Central Government appointed three independent persons for ."}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14873, "end_char": 14878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 14, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15181, "end_char": 15198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then, on November 14, 1953, the Central Government made an order under s. 18A of the Act, by which the authorised Controller was."}}, {"text": "s. 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15243, "end_char": 15249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15473, "end_char": 15478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15572, "end_char": 15578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dwarkadas Shrinit1as", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15781, "end_char": 15801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dwarkadas Shrinit1as of ."}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15893, "end_char": 15900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "May 21, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16127, "end_char": 16139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result, presumably, of that decision, on May 21, 1954, the Central Government cancelled all appointments of authorised Controllers under the provisions of the Act, and on such cancellation the management of the\n\nindustrial undertaking vested again in the owner of the undertaking."}}, {"text": "July 16, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16529, "end_char": 16542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 16, 1954, the Central Government again passed an order under sub-s. ( 4) of s. 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, thereby again giving the authorised Controller Certain functions of control in respect of the Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills -Ltd."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16610, "end_char": 16614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills -Ltd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16765, "end_char": 16796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 16, 1954, the Central Government again passed an order under sub-s. ( 4) of s. 3 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, thereby again giving the authorised Controller Certain functions of control in respect of the Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills -Ltd."}}, {"text": "September 19, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16802, "end_char": 16820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 19, 1954, there was another investigation under s. 15 of the Act by a panel of officers and it is stated that they recommended that the Central Government should take over the management."}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16860, "end_char": 16865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 31, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17046, "end_char": 17062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 31, 1955, the present pedtioners filed a writ petition iii this Court in respect of the order passed by the Central Government on July 16, 1954."}}, {"text": "s. 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17593, "end_char": 17599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Komla PrtJJati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17965, "end_char": 17979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Komla PrtJJati\n\nKhetan\n\nTll4 U11ion of India\n\nS. K. DtJJ J.\n\nK amla Prasad\n\nKhttan v.\n\nTire Union of India\n\nS. K. Da, ]."}}, {"text": "S. K. DtJJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18011, "end_char": 18021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Komla PrtJJati\n\nKhetan\n\nTll4 U11ion of India\n\nS. K. DtJJ J.\n\nK amla Prasad\n\nKhttan v.\n\nTire Union of India\n\nS. K. Da, ].", "canonical_name": "S. K. Das J. Sarkar"}}, {"text": "amla Prasad\n\nKhttan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18028, "end_char": 18047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Komla PrtJJati\n\nKhetan\n\nTll4 U11ion of India\n\nS. K. DtJJ J.\n\nK amla Prasad\n\nKhttan v.\n\nTire Union of India\n\nS. K. Da, ].", "canonical_name": "Kamla PrtJJad\n\nKhetan"}}, {"text": "S. K. Da", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18073, "end_char": 18081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Komla PrtJJati\n\nKhetan\n\nTll4 U11ion of India\n\nS. K. DtJJ J.\n\nK amla Prasad\n\nKhttan v.\n\nTire Union of India\n\nS. K. Da, ].", "canonical_name": "S. K. Das J. Sarkar"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18512, "end_char": 18519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "November 5, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18552, "end_char": 18568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But before that date, i.e., on November 5, 1956, when the stay application of the petitioners was heard, the following direction was given by this Court-\n\n\"The hearing of the main petition under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18716, "end_char": 18723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "B. Kedar Nath Khetan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18840, "end_char": 18860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32 to be expedited ....................... .It will be open to the petitioners to challenge that the appointment of R, B. Kedar Nath Khetan, if again made, is also bad.\""}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18968, "end_char": 18975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19667, "end_char": 19673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IA of the Act was inserted by the Amending Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19767, "end_char": 19813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 31B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19827, "end_char": 19838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IA of the Act was inserted by the Amending Act", "statute": "IA of the Act was inserted by the Amending Act"}}, {"text": "First Amendment Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19892, "end_char": 19917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20000, "end_char": 20014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "First Amendment Act, 1951", "statute": "First Amendment Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20313, "end_char": 20327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "First Amendment Act, 1951", "statute": "First Amendment Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20411, "end_char": 20425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "First Amendment Act, 1951", "statute": "First Amendment Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Amendment Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20516, "end_char": 20535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20694, "end_char": 20700, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act, 1953", "statute": "Amendment Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "s. 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21044, "end_char": 21050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act, 1953", "statute": "Amendment Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "s. 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21175, "end_char": 21181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act, 1953", "statute": "Amendment Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21430, "end_char": 21435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act, 1953", "statute": "Amendment Act, 1953"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21443, "end_char": 21462, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21895, "end_char": 21901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22132, "end_char": 22142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Union of lrulia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22287, "end_char": 22302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19~7\n\nKamla Prmad\n\nKht14n\n\nT/r• Union of lrulia\n\nS. K. Dos:f.\n\nundertaking in pursuance of section 16, is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest, the Central Government may, by notified order, authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of the undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole or any part of the undertaking such functions of conrtol as may be specified in the order.", "canonical_name": "Union of lrulia"}}, {"text": "S. K. Dos", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22304, "end_char": 22313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19~7\n\nKamla Prmad\n\nKht14n\n\nT/r• Union of lrulia\n\nS. K. Dos:f.\n\nundertaking in pursuance of section 16, is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the scheduled industry concerned or to public interest, the Central Government may, by notified order, authorise any person or body of persons to take over the management of the whole or any part of the undertaking or to exercise in respect of the whole or any part of the undertaking such functions of conrtol as may be specified in the order.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Das J. Sarkar"}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22346, "end_char": 22356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23306, "end_char": 23316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Any notified order issued under sub-section (1) shall have effect for such period not exceeding five years as may be specified in the order : Provided that the Central Government, if it is of opinion that it is expedient in public interest so to do, may direct that any such notified order shall continue to have effect after the expiry of the period of five years aforesaid for such further period as may be specified in the direction and where any such direction is issued; a copy thereof shall be laid, as soon as may be, before both Houses of Parliament.\""}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23468, "end_char": 23473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23809, "end_char": 23814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 18, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24128, "end_char": 24145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned counsel has, however, very strongly submitted that the second requirement was not fulfilled in the present case, because the authorised Controller himself was in charge of the undertaking from December 18, 1952, till November 8, 1955 (when the impugned order was made) with a small break of less than two months only between the two dates, May 21, 1954, when all appointments under the Act were cancelled and July 16, 1954, when a fresh order under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 was made, and\n\neven during this short period the case of the petitioners is that the authorised Controller continued in posses~ sion."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26100, "end_char": 26104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26388, "end_char": 26392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.K.Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26724, "end_char": 26731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'59\n\nKam/a Prasad\n\nKhetan\n\nThe Union of India\n\nS.K.Das J.\n\nKam/a Prasad\n\nKhetan .. 7 he !", "canonical_name": "S. K. Das J. Sarkar"}}, {"text": "S. K. Da", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26783, "end_char": 26791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn ion of India\n\nS. K. Da>].", "canonical_name": "S. K. Das J. Sarkar"}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27911, "end_char": 27916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 14, !", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27955, "end_char": 27969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then, on November 14, !"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28299, "end_char": 28303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May Zl, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29861, "end_char": 29873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is abundantly clear from the affidavits filed that peace amongst the Directors or in the family of the Managing Agents had not been restored bv the time the cancellation order was made on May Zl, 1954."}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30143, "end_char": 30148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31318, "end_char": 31323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November B, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31838, "end_char": 31854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "b) of sub-s. ( 1) of s. IBA of the Act was not fulfilled before the order dated November B, 1955, was made."}}, {"text": "s. 3( 4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32234, "end_char": 32242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "25th October, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32774, "end_char": 32792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I say that in view of the continued litigation referred to in detail in the affidavit of the intervener dated 25th October, 1956, it was apparent that the mill was."}}, {"text": "Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32977, "end_char": 33026, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "clause 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34238, "end_char": 34246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34251, "end_char": 34259, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34331, "end_char": 34341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34349, "end_char": 34368, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34782, "end_char": 34788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34804, "end_char": 34809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34817, "end_char": 34836, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "November 7, ···", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34867, "end_char": 34882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "amending order of November 7, ··· 1956."}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34976, "end_char": 34980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36072, "end_char": 36078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36094, "end_char": 36099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36107, "end_char": 36126, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36304, "end_char": 36309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36317, "end_char": 36336, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36383, "end_char": 36393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36401, "end_char": 36420, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36927, "end_char": 36933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37476, "end_char": 37481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37489, "end_char": 37508, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37980, "end_char": 37986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38139, "end_char": 38144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38229, "end_char": 38235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38352, "end_char": 38357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38370, "end_char": 38380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40227, "end_char": 40232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40469, "end_char": 40475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40489, "end_char": 40499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40599, "end_char": 40604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40907, "end_char": 40912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41047, "end_char": 41053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41201, "end_char": 41207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41381, "end_char": 41391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41510, "end_char": 41515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41546, "end_char": 41552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41635, "end_char": 41640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41911, "end_char": 41916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42055, "end_char": 42060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42160, "end_char": 42166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42410, "end_char": 42416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42987, "end_char": 42993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 15, 16 and 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43158, "end_char": 43176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. K. Da", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 44235, "end_char": 44243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v •.\n\nTll' Union of India\n\nS. K. Da, ]. ·", "canonical_name": "S. K. Das J. Sarkar"}}, {"text": "s. 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44834, "end_char": 44840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45052, "end_char": 45057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 15, 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45503, "end_char": 45513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45654, "end_char": 45659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 14, I953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46341, "end_char": 46358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The management was taken over on November 14, I953, but the order was cancelled on May 21, I954, and the management vested in the owner."}}, {"text": "May 21, I954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46391, "end_char": 46403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The management was taken over on November 14, I953, but the order was cancelled on May 21, I954, and the management vested in the owner."}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46466, "end_char": 46471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47193, "end_char": 47199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47238, "end_char": 47243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47251, "end_char": 47270, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47363, "end_char": 47368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47540, "end_char": 47545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47553, "end_char": 47572, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47618, "end_char": 47623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47953, "end_char": 47958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47966, "end_char": 47985, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48156, "end_char": 48162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48270, "end_char": 48276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48327, "end_char": 48332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48340, "end_char": 48359, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 18F", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48383, "end_char": 48389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48453, "end_char": 48459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. K.Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48722, "end_char": 48730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A refernece wls made in this connection to a decision of this Court in jtrawboard Manufacturing Co. v. Gutta 138\n\nKam/a Prasad\n\nKhetan\n\nTht Union of lndiw\n\nS. K.Das].", "canonical_name": "S. K. Das J. Sarkar"}}, {"text": "S. K. DasJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48775, "end_char": 48786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kamla Prasad\n\nKMtan\n\nThi Union of India\n\nS. K. DasJ.\n\nMill Workers' Union(').", "canonical_name": "S. K. Das J. Sarkar"}}, {"text": "State Government of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 48830, "end_char": 48863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case, the State Government of Uttar Pradesh had referred an industrial dispute to the Labour Commissioner on February 18, 1950, and directed that the award should be submitted not later than April 5, 1950."}}, {"text": "April 30, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49168, "end_char": 49182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "made on April 13, and on April 26 the Governor issued a notification extending the time for making the award up to April 30, 1950."}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49492, "end_char": 49497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49511, "end_char": 49530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "April 26, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49723, "end_char": 49737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the order of April 26, 1950, could be supported with reference to s. 21 of the U. P. General Clauses Act."}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49776, "end_char": 49781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "General Clauses Act", "statute": "General Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49795, "end_char": 49814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49921, "end_char": 49926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "General Clauses Act", "statute": "General Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49940, "end_char": 49959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50159, "end_char": 50164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "General Clauses Act", "statute": "General Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50172, "end_char": 50191, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 15, 16 and 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50512, "end_char": 50530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "General Clauses Act", "statute": "General Clauses Act"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51248, "end_char": 51261, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S. K. DruJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 53172, "end_char": 53183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The test to be applied is whether the\n\nKam/a Prasad\n\nKhttan\n\nTll4 Union of lnditl\"\n\nS. K. DasJ.\n\nKam/a Prasad\n\nKhetan\n\nv. 7'ht flnion of India\n\nS. K. DruJ.\n\nSarkar],\n\nappointment was made for some ulterior purpose, some purpose other than the object for which the law, under which the impugned order is made, was enacted.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Das J. Sarkar"}}, {"text": "November 8. 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53505, "end_char": 53521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the reasons given above, we hold that the order made on November 8."}}, {"text": "SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 54436, "end_char": 54442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SARKAR J.-I have had the privilege of reading the judgment just delivered by my brother S. K. Das.", "canonical_name": "SARKAR"}}, {"text": "s. 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55017, "end_char": 55023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 55210, "end_char": 55244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Central Government had by an order published in the Official Gazette of November 8, 1955, and made in exercise of the power conferred by s. 18A of the Industries (Development & Regulation) Act, 1951 (LXV of 1951), authorised Kedar Nath Khetan who has been allowed to intervene in these proceedings to take\n\nover the management of Ishwari Khetan Sugar Mills Limited, an industrial concern then in the management of its directors."}}, {"text": "November 7, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 55734, "end_char": 55750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The effect of this latter order was that Kedar Nath Khetan was to be in management of the Mills up to November 7, 1957."}}, {"text": "Centrai Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 55893, "end_char": 55911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Had the Centrai Government then any power so to amend ?"}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55942, "end_char": 55953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56034, "end_char": 56044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 56052, "end_char": 56071, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56194, "end_char": 56199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 56207, "end_char": 56226, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56270, "end_char": 56280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57164, "end_char": 57170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57209, "end_char": 57215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57397, "end_char": 57403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K amla Prasad\n\nKhetan\n\nThe Union qf Indio\n\nSarkar J.\n\nexercised only by a notified order, that is to say an order notified in the Official Gazette.", "canonical_name": "SARKAR"}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57625, "end_char": 57630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57700, "end_char": 57711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58009, "end_char": 58014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section ISA of the main Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 58083, "end_char": 58110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58372, "end_char": 58377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Section ISA of the main Act", "statute": "Section ISA of the main Act"}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58957, "end_char": 58962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Section ISA of the main Act", "statute": "Section ISA of the main Act"}}, {"text": "Section 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59388, "end_char": 59399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 7, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 59912, "end_char": 59928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this case at the date of the amendment the management was in the person appointed by the Government by its earlier order of November 7, 1955, and, therefore, the Government could not at the date of the amending order have been of opinion that the management was by a person other than that appointed by it and such management was in a mann.er highly detrimental to the industry or to public."}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60217, "end_char": 60222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 60230, "end_char": 60249, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60517, "end_char": 60522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60772, "end_char": 60777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 60785, "end_char": 60804, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60898, "end_char": 60903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 60911, "end_char": 60930, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61165, "end_char": 61170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61281, "end_char": 61285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61289, "end_char": 61295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61513, "end_char": 61519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61658, "end_char": 61664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kam!a Prasad\n\nKhetan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61699, "end_char": 61719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When, therefore, an order once made under s. 18A is sought to be amended with the\n\nKam!a Prasad\n\nKhetan\n\nThe Union of India\n\nSarhlr j.\n\nJramla Prasad\n\nTibetan\n\n.v.", "canonical_name": "Kamla PrtJJad\n\nKhetan"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 61725, "end_char": 61739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When, therefore, an order once made under s. 18A is sought to be amended with the\n\nKam!a Prasad\n\nKhetan\n\nThe Union of India\n\nSarhlr j.\n\nJramla Prasad\n\nTibetan\n\n.v.", "canonical_name": "Union of lrulia"}}, {"text": "Jramla Prasad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61752, "end_char": 61765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When, therefore, an order once made under s. 18A is sought to be amended with the\n\nKam!a Prasad\n\nKhetan\n\nThe Union of India\n\nSarhlr j.\n\nJramla Prasad\n\nTibetan\n\n.v.", "canonical_name": "Kamla PrtJJad\n\nKhetan"}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61830, "end_char": 61835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 61843, "end_char": 61862, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 18A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61932, "end_char": 61938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62291, "end_char": 62295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 62305, "end_char": 62324, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]} {"document_id": "1957_1_1081_1092_EN", "year": 1957, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS. 1081\n\nNARAYAN BHASKAR KHARE\n\nTHE ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA\n\n(and connected petition)\n\n(S. R.\n\nDAS c. J.,\n\nBHAGWATI, JAFER IMAM, s. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR, GAJENDRAGADKAR and\n\nA. K. SARKAR JJ.)\n\nPresident, Election of-Doubts and Disputes relating to such election-Jurisdiction and Power of Supreme Court, when can be exercised-'Election', Meaning of-Constitution of India, Arts. 71, 62--The Presidential and Vice-Presidential Election Act, 1952 (XXXI of 1952), s. 14.\n\nThe petitioners entertained grave doubts as to the 'propriety of holding the Presidential election before the general elections had been completed throughout the entire territory of India and, by applications filed under Aft. 71 (I ) of the Constitution as citizens. of India, invoked the jurisdiction and power of the Supreme Court thereunder to inquire into such doubts and sought for an order restraining the .Election Commission from taking the poll in connection with the election of the President, fixed for May 6, 1957, till the general elections in the Union territory of Himachal Pradesh and in two Lok Sabha Constituencies of the State of Punjab, which were still to be held, had been completed. The expiry of the term of office of the then President which caused the Presidential election was to come . about on the mid-night of May 12, 1957. One of the petitioners alleged that he was a candidate for the Presidential election and the time intervening between the date when he received his nomination paper and the date fixed for the filing of it was too short to enable him to file it within time and the case of the other was that he was a prospective candidate for election to . the Lok Sabha from one of the Punjab Constituencic>, where election was yet to be held, and would be prevented from exercising his right to vote for the election of the President.\n\nHeld, that the present petitions were premature and mmt be dismissed.\n\nThe jurisdiction and power conferred o; i the Supreme Court by Art. 71(1) of the Constitution to inquire into and decide doubts and disputes arising out of and in connection with the elccti::>n of the President can be exrdsed only after a particular\n\ncandidat~ has been declared elected and on an election petition filed under s. 14 of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Ekction Act of 1952.\n\nThe word 'election' in Art. 71 of the Constitution is used in the wider sense to denote the entire process of election culminating 3-81 S. C. India/59\n\nMays.\n\nNarayan Bhaskar\n\nJr hare\n\nThe Election Commission of\n\nIndia\n\nDase. 7,\n\nin a candidate being declared elected and doubts and disputes arising out of and in connection with such election must include all doubts and disputes relating to any particular stage of it.\n\nN. P. Ponnuswamy v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency, (1952) S.C.R. 218, referred to.\n\nIt is a well recognised principle of the law of election that an election cannot be held up to facilitate the ventilation of individual grievances in derogation of the interest of the people in general and Art. 62 of the Constitution, which requires that the election of President must be completed within the time fixed by it and has been conceived in such interest, is mandatory in character.\n\nORIGINAL JuR1smcnoN : Petitions No. 63 and 64 of 1957.\n\nPetitions under Article 71 ( l) of the Constitution of India for clarification of doubts in connection with the election of the President.\n\nR. V. S. Mani and /. R. V. Sastri, for the petitioner in Petition No. 63 of 1957.\n\nR. Patnaik, for the petitioner m Petition No. 64 of 1957.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, G. N.\n\nJoshi, Porus A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents ( Caveators) in both the petitions.\n\n1957. May 3: The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAs C. J.-The petitioners in the above petitions have moved this Court to exercise the jurisdiction and power vested in it by and under Art. 71 ( l) of the Constitution of India and to inquire into and decide what has been described as a \"grave doubt\" in connection with the 'election of the President of India and to direct the Election Commission not to proceed with the polling in connection with the said election which has been fixed for May 6, 1957, but to hold the same after duly completing all the elections to the Lok Sabha and the Legislatures in all the States of the Indian Union including the Union territory. The first main petition was presented on April 26. 1957, and the second on April 29, 1957. Alo:-ig with each of the said petitions has been filed a Civil Miscellaneous Petition asking for a stay of the polling for the Presidential election fixed\n\nfor May 6, 1957. In the first main petition the Returning Officer has not been made a party, but in the second petition he has been impleaded as a respondent.\n\nThe. learned Attorney-General has appeared on behalf of the Election Commission and has waived the service of notice. We can, therefore, dispose of all the petitions before us.\n\nThere is no dispute as to the material facts which may shortly be stated as follows :\n\nAfter the general elections in all the States and Union territories of India, except in the Union territory of Himachal Pradesh, which is to return four members to the Lok Sabha and in two constituencies in the State of Punjab, the old Lok Sabha was dissolved on April 4, 1957 and the New Lok Sabha was constituted on April 5, 1957, under s. 73 of the Representation of the People Act (XLIII of 1951). As required by s. 4 of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Election Act, 1952 (XXXI of 1952), the Election Commission issued a notification in the official Gazette appointing April 16, 1957, as the last date for making nominations, April 17, 1957, as the date for the scrutiny of the nominations, April 20, 1957, as the last date for the withdrawal of candidatures, May 6, 1957, as the polling date and May 10, 1957, as the date for the counting of the 'votes and the declaration of the result. The terin of office of the present President is due to expire on the mid-night of May 12, 1957. The reason for fixing the abn\\'e time schedule obviously was that the Presidential election should he completed before the term of office of the present President expired.\n\nAfter the notification constituting the new Lok Sabha was published in the Press on April 7, 1957, the petitioner in the first petition applied to the Election Commission for the supply of the nomination papers, which he eventually received at Nagpur in the afternoon of April 10, 1957. This left a period of five days for the filing of the nomination paper before the Returning Officer at New Delhi. The petitioner submits that the time was too short and he was prevented from filing his nomination paper due to want of time. He\n\nNarayan Bhaskar\n\nKhare y.\n\nThe Election Commission of\n\nIndio\n\nDas C.J.\n\nNarayan Bhaskar n- ...\n\nT.t Ekctilative Assemblies of the States.\"\n\nOn 0'1e side it is said that the electoral college is to consist of those members falling under clauses (a) and (b), who are elected at the crucial date. that !s to sa':, the date when the election is to take place. Suppose, it is said, that the term of the President's office expires during the currency of the life of Parliament. as it\n\nmay well do in cases contemplated by Art. 62(2) and suppose there are vacancies in Parliament or in the Legislature of one or more States, surely the election of the President required by Art. 62(1) to be held before the expiry of the term of the outgoing President cannot be held up until the vacancies are filled up. On the other hand it is contended that the electoral college must be constituted after the elections in all States and Union territories are completed and should consist of all the elected members falling within both the categories.\n\nInasmuch as elections have not taken place at all in Himachal Pradesh and in two constituencies of the State of Punjab, the electoral college cannot be constituted until after those members are also elected, It is pointed out that though on the present occasiolil only four members of Himachal Pradesh and only two members in the State of Punjab have not been elected, nevertheless, if the objection of the petitioners is not now heeded any party in power may in future arrange for the election of its own nominee as President by postponing the elections in several States, where. it may not expect to get a majority of seats. It is said that on March 28, 1957 some members of the then Lok Sabha had raised a question as to the danger and impropriety of holding the election of the President before the completion of the elections throughout the territory of India.\n\nBoth the petitioners share the same view and contend that a. \"grave doubt\" has arisen in connection with the dection of the President and that such a doubt must, under Art. 71, be inquired into and decided by this Court. The extreme contention put forward on behalf of the petitioners is that it does not matter whether the doubt is well founded or not or whether it is good, had or indifferent; this Court is bound to inquire into :11HI decide the same as soon as a doubt arises and a citizen brings it before this Court for resolution thereof. For the purpose of this case it is not necessary for m to express any opinion on the merits of the respective contentions for these petitions may well be disposed of on a narrower preliminary ground.\n\nJtfOTqan Bha.rkOT\n\nKlun\n\nT Ju Eltailln Commission of India\n\nDas C.].\n\nN ar, where election was yet to be held, and would be prevented from exercising his right to vote for the election of the President."}}, {"text": "Art. 71(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2008, "end_char": 2018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2272, "end_char": 2277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 71", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2365, "end_char": 2372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Narayan Bhaskar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2501, "end_char": 2516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Narayan Bhaskar\n\nJr hare\n\nThe Election Commission of\n\nIndia\n\nDase.", "canonical_name": "NARAYAN BHASKAR KHARE"}}, {"text": "Election Commission of\n\nIndia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2531, "end_char": 2560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Narayan Bhaskar\n\nJr hare\n\nThe Election Commission of\n\nIndia\n\nDase.", "canonical_name": "Election Commission of\n\nIndia"}}, {"text": "Art. 62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3065, "end_char": 3072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 71", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3327, "end_char": 3337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3350, "end_char": 3371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "R. V. S. Mani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3451, "end_char": 3464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. V. S. Mani and /. R. V. Sastri, for the petitioner in Petition No."}}, {"text": "R. V. Sastri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3472, "end_char": 3484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. V. S. Mani and /. R. V. Sastri, for the petitioner in Petition No."}}, {"text": "R. Patnaik", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3534, "end_char": 3544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Patnaik, for the petitioner m Petition No."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3593, "end_char": 3607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, G. N.\n\nJoshi, Porus A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents ( Caveators) in both the petitions."}}, {"text": "G. N.\n\nJoshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3637, "end_char": 3649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, G. N.\n\nJoshi, Porus A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents ( Caveators) in both the petitions."}}, {"text": "Porus A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3651, "end_char": 3665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, G. N.\n\nJoshi, Porus A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents ( Caveators) in both the petitions."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3670, "end_char": 3682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, G. N.\n\nJoshi, Porus A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents ( Caveators) in both the petitions."}}, {"text": "Art. 71", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3933, "end_char": 3940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3953, "end_char": 3974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 26. 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4462, "end_char": 4476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first main petition was presented on April 26."}}, {"text": "April 29, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4496, "end_char": 4510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1957, and the second on April 29, 1957."}}, {"text": "April 4, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5356, "end_char": 5369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no dispute as to the material facts which may shortly be stated as follows :\n\nAfter the general elections in all the States and Union territories of India, except in the Union territory of Himachal Pradesh, which is to return four members to the Lok Sabha and in two constituencies in the State of Punjab, the old Lok Sabha was dissolved on April 4, 1957 and the New Lok Sabha was constituted on April 5, 1957, under s. 73 of the Representation of the People Act (XLIII of 1951)."}}, {"text": "April 5, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5411, "end_char": 5424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no dispute as to the material facts which may shortly be stated as follows :\n\nAfter the general elections in all the States and Union territories of India, except in the Union territory of Himachal Pradesh, which is to return four members to the Lok Sabha and in two constituencies in the State of Punjab, the old Lok Sabha was dissolved on April 4, 1957 and the New Lok Sabha was constituted on April 5, 1957, under s. 73 of the Representation of the People Act (XLIII of 1951)."}}, {"text": "s. 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5432, "end_char": 5437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5445, "end_char": 5477, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5510, "end_char": 5514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Presidential and Vice-Presidential Election Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5522, "end_char": 5575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Election Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5596, "end_char": 5615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As required by s. 4 of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Election Act, 1952 (XXXI of 1952), the Election Commission issued a notification in the official Gazette appointing April 16, 1957, as the last date for making nominations, April 17, 1957, as the date for the scrutiny of the nominations, April 20, 1957, as the last date for the withdrawal of candidatures, May 6, 1957, as the polling date and May 10, 1957, as the date for the counting of the 'votes and the declaration of the result."}}, {"text": "May 10, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5901, "end_char": 5913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As required by s. 4 of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Election Act, 1952 (XXXI of 1952), the Election Commission issued a notification in the official Gazette appointing April 16, 1957, as the last date for making nominations, April 17, 1957, as the date for the scrutiny of the nominations, April 20, 1957, as the last date for the withdrawal of candidatures, May 6, 1957, as the polling date and May 10, 1957, as the date for the counting of the 'votes and the declaration of the result."}}, {"text": "April 7, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6346, "end_char": 6359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the notification constituting the new Lok Sabha was published in the Press on April 7, 1957, the petitioner in the first petition applied to the Election Commission for the supply of the nomination papers, which he eventually received at Nagpur in the afternoon of April 10, 1957."}}, {"text": "Election Commission", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6413, "end_char": 6432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the notification constituting the new Lok Sabha was published in the Press on April 7, 1957, the petitioner in the first petition applied to the Election Commission for the supply of the nomination papers, which he eventually received at Nagpur in the afternoon of April 10, 1957.", "canonical_name": "Election Commission of\n\nIndia"}}, {"text": "Nagpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6506, "end_char": 6512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the notification constituting the new Lok Sabha was published in the Press on April 7, 1957, the petitioner in the first petition applied to the Election Commission for the supply of the nomination papers, which he eventually received at Nagpur in the afternoon of April 10, 1957."}}, {"text": "April 10, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6533, "end_char": 6547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the notification constituting the new Lok Sabha was published in the Press on April 7, 1957, the petitioner in the first petition applied to the Election Commission for the supply of the nomination papers, which he eventually received at Nagpur in the afternoon of April 10, 1957."}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6652, "end_char": 6661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This left a period of five days for the filing of the nomination paper before the Returning Officer at New Delhi."}}, {"text": "Narayan Bhaskar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6793, "end_char": 6808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He\n\nNarayan Bhaskar\n\nKhare y.\n\nThe Election Commission of\n\nIndio\n\nDas C.J.\n\nNarayan Bhaskar n- ...\n\nT.t Ekcti receive all the documents of title including the mortgage bond duly discharged. But the appellant, for reasons of his own, went on postponing the payment of the mortgage money on some pretext or the other. On being pressed for the mortgage-deed, duly discharged, being handed over to the complainant, and as a result of a protracted correspondence, the appellant sent, to the complainant, on June 26, 1952, a number of documents including \"cancelled mortgage documents.\" It should be added here that the mortgage transaction of Rs. 5,500, ha• l been entered into by the owner of the property in order to discharge previous mortgages on the same property.\n\nAll these documents had to be withdrawn from the High Court where they had been in the custody of the Court as already indicated.\n\nUnfortunately, Sundararajayya died on June 28, 1952. As a result of further correspondence, the complainant came to realise, to his cost, that the mortgage debt of Rs. 5,500 had not been paid to the mortgagee, as arranged between the appellant and the complainant who had put him in funds with the express purpose of obtaining a clear title to the property which he had agreed to purchase. Thus, the complainant was reduced to the necessity of filing a regular petition of complaint in the High Court on November 14, 1952. In that petition of complaint, the complainant made copious quotations from the letters addressed by the appellant to him and made reference to the fact that the mortgagee had already instituted a suit in court for recoverv of the mortgage mane.,', and had impleaded the compbinant as party defenchnt to the rnit. The gravamen of the charge against the appelbnt was that he had not discharged the outstanding mortgage on the property purchased, for which he had been supplied with ample funds by the complainant\n\nand that he had not disclosed how and . in what manner, the complainant's money, meant for the purpose, had been utilized by the appellant.\n\nIn answer to the notice issued to him on February 16, 1953, the appellant submitted a long statement by way of an explanation which runs into about 43 pages in print, which is more in the nature of an argument in justification of his conduct than a statement of facts.\n\nThe High Court referred the complaint, for inquiry and report, to the Bar Council. Three members of the Council constituted the Tribunal which held a very elaborate inquiry. After recording both oral and documentary evidence, the Bar Council made its report on May 5, 1954, holding that :\n\n' ...... both the charges have been fully established and that the respondent has not only not used the moneys of the complainant for the purpose for which the, money was sent, but that the respondent has not accounted at all for the sum of rupees, 5,000; which was\n\nndmittedly cashed by him and brought into his bank account though not in his professional account.\"\n\nIn course of its report, the Tribunal found that the appellant had received all the amounts sent by the complainant, as set out above. It also pointed out that an unfortunate feature of the case was that the mortgage bound in question which was one of the \"cancelled mortgage documents'', had not been produced before it.\n\nThe non-production of the crucial document was explained to the Tribunal by counsel for the complainant. It was. stated that the mortgagedccd in question, along with other document>, had been\n\nleft by the complainant with his counsel ancl that thewhole bundle of papers inclucling tho>e documents had \"disappeared from his office\".\n\nOne can onlv surmise as to who may have been responsible fo~ secreting those documents, or for who>e benefit. thev h:id been stolen away, as alleged by counsel for the complainant.\n\nAnother ugly aspect of the proceedings was that a number of letters, admittedly written by the appelbnt to the complainant in connection with the tramaction of sale. had been found bv the High Court to have been 4-81 !;. C. Ind1a'59.\n\nMr.'C'\n\nTht Advocat ..\n\nGeneral of Madras\n\nSinha].\n\nMr.'C' ....\n\nTire A.duocate-- G,:vra/ of Madrdl\n\n9inhaJ.\n\ntampered with or bodily substituted.\n\nThe Tribunal observed with particular reference to exhibit C-12, which was alleged to have been substiruted for the original, that the learned counsel for the complainant had not persisted in the charge that it had been substituted; and that he did not press the charge that there had been certain alterations in some other letters which formed part of the voluminous correspondence that passed between the appellant and the complainant.\n\nIt may be observed here that no specific \"charge\" had been drawn up against the appellant in respect of those\n\nletters.\n\nHence, when the Tribunal stated that the 'charge' had been withdrawn, it only meant to s2y that the learned counsel for the complainant did not persist in his allegations about those alterations or the wholesale substirution of exhibit C-12 about which we will have to say something more in the course of this judgment.\n\nThe Tribunal examined, in some detail, the particular defence of the appellant with reference to the sp<\":rific charges mac.le Jgainst hin1 in respect of the sum. of Rs. 5,600, admittedly sent by the complainant for the specific purpose of discharging the mortgage encumbrance on the purchased property. It appears to have been the appellant's case that the demand draft for Rs. 5,500, dated Octo'ier 24, 1951, had been sent to him through Sundararajayya, and that the appellant, after getting the amount of the draft credited to his personal account. kept only Rs. 500 for pa::- ment to the vendor and made over to Sundararajayya the rem'aining 5,000 rupees in cash. It was not his case that the complainant had instructed him to pay to Sundararajavya the 5,000 rupees, alleged by him to have been r\"id to Sundararajayya. It was not c-.en his case that he had taken anv receipt for the s.id sum from Sundararaiayya, though he alleged that he had given a receipt to Sundararajayya for the much smaller sum of Rs. 500 which he admitterl to have kept in his hands on account of the complainant for pavment to the venssession they arc seized, is not discrimin2tive in character and does not violate equal protcCtion of law guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nBudhan Chaudhury and Others v. The State of Bihar, (1955) I S.C.R. 1045, applied.\n\nPurushottam Govindji Halai v. Shri B. M. Desai, (1955) 2 S.C.R. 889 and A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. M. Venkitachalam Potti and another (1955) 2 S.C.R. 1196, referred to.", "total_entities": 90, "entities": [{"text": "Narayan Bhaskar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 15, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Narayan Bhaskar\n\nKhare\n\nTk Election Commission oj'\n\nIndia\n\nDasC.J.\n\nMay6\n\nconstituencies and different dates have to be fixed for holding the actual elections in different constituencies according to the various exigencies relating to the particular lccalities in which the constituencies are situate."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 444, "end_char": 451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "be calculated", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 598, "end_char": 611, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "'C'", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 848, "end_char": 853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Presidential and Vice-Presidential Election Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 861, "end_char": 914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "THE ADVOCATE-GENERAL OF MADRAS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1402, "end_char": 1432, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE ADVOCATE-GENERAL OF MADRAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1435, "end_char": 1448, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B. JAGANNADHADAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1454, "end_char": 1459, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2349, "end_char": 2366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant preferred an appeal by special leave and this Court, being apprised of the order passed by the Madras High Court, issued a Rule under r. 30, 0."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2409, "end_char": 2422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Supreme Court Rules."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court Rules", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3082, "end_char": 3101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IV of the Supreme Court Rules should be treated as a natural sequel to proceedings in the High Court under the Bar Councils Act and although an order made by the High Court under that Act is not to be automatically followed by this Court, it is not necessary that this Court should start a fresh inquiry on evidence."}}, {"text": "March 23, 1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4017, "end_char": 4031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XVI of 1942, decided on March 23, 1943, In re: D. A. Slianmugasundaraswami, an Advocate, Misc."}}, {"text": "D. A. Slianmugasundaraswami", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4040, "end_char": 4067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XVI of 1942, decided on March 23, 1943, In re: D. A. Slianmugasundaraswami, an Advocate, Misc.", "canonical_name": "D. A.\n\nShanmughasundaraswami"}}, {"text": "January 24, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4119, "end_char": 4135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "X of 1948, decided on January 24, 1949, In the matter of Mr. 'G', a Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court, (1955) 1 S.C.R. 490 and In the matter of 'D', an Advocate of the Supreme Court, (1955) 2 S.C.R. 1006, referred to."}}, {"text": "(1955) 1 S.C.R. 490", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4203, "end_char": 4222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1955) 2 S.C.R. 1006", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4283, "end_char": 4303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "M. S. K. Aiyanger", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4514, "end_char": 4531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. S. K. Aiyanger, for the appellant ."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4649, "end_char": 4666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr.'C' v.\n\nTJ.e Advocate- General of Madrar\n\nMr.•C•\n\nThe Advocale- Cemral of MadraJ\n\nSinha:J.\n\nR. Ganapathy Iyer and T. M. Sen, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "T. M. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4671, "end_char": 4680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr.'C' v.\n\nTJ.e Advocate- General of Madrar\n\nMr.•C•\n\nThe Advocale- Cemral of MadraJ\n\nSinha:J.\n\nR. Ganapathy Iyer and T. M. Sen, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4771, "end_char": 4776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSINHA J.-This appeal by special leave and the summons under rule 30 of Order IV of the Supreme Court Rules, 1950, have been heard together and will be disposed of by this Judgment.", "canonical_name": "SINHA"}}, {"text": "Order IV of the Supreme Court Rules, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4842, "end_char": 4883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "December 3, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5307, "end_char": 5323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Full Bench of the Madras High Court, presided over by the Chief Justice of that Court, by its judgment and order, dated December 3, 1954, has directed that the appellant's name be removed from the roll of advocates of the Madras High Court, for \"grave professional misconduct\"."}}, {"text": "K. T. Appannah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5755, "end_char": 5769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the appellant was engaged by one K. T. Appannah, ordinarily residing in Bangalore city, who will hereinafter be referred to as the complainant, to complete a transaction of sale between the complainant and the owner of a house property in the city of Madras, whom we shall call, in the course of this judgment, as the vendor, after scrutinizing the title deeds in respect of the property which was the subiectmatter of the transaction of sale."}}, {"text": "Bangalore city", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5794, "end_char": 5808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the appellant was engaged by one K. T. Appannah, ordinarily residing in Bangalore city, who will hereinafter be referred to as the complainant, to complete a transaction of sale between the complainant and the owner of a house property in the city of Madras, whom we shall call, in the course of this judgment, as the vendor, after scrutinizing the title deeds in respect of the property which was the subiectmatter of the transaction of sale."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5973, "end_char": 5979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the appellant was engaged by one K. T. Appannah, ordinarily residing in Bangalore city, who will hereinafter be referred to as the complainant, to complete a transaction of sale between the complainant and the owner of a house property in the city of Madras, whom we shall call, in the course of this judgment, as the vendor, after scrutinizing the title deeds in respect of the property which was the subiectmatter of the transaction of sale."}}, {"text": "Sundararajayya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6422, "end_char": 6436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A retired Government servant named Sundararajayya who was a relation of the complainant, and used to live near about the appellant's residence, had also helped the complainant in acquiring the property, and in that connection, used to give instructions to the appellant\n\non behalf of the complainant.", "canonical_name": "Sundararajayya"}}, {"text": "May 11, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6691, "end_char": 6703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 11, 1951, the complainant sent, by way of a demand draft, the' sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "June 26, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7867, "end_char": 7880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In due course, on or about June 26, 1951, a demand draft in the name of the appellant, for Rs."}}, {"text": "August 21, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8043, "end_char": 8058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On August 21, 1951, a cheque for Rs."}}, {"text": "September 26, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8087, "end_char": 8105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,200, on September 26, 1951, a cheque for Rs."}}, {"text": "October 19, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8136, "end_char": 8152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "500, and on October 19, 1951, a demand draft for Rs."}}, {"text": "July 9, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8381, "end_char": 8393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 9, 1951, the saledeed was executed by some of the executants, and on September 6, 1951, it was executed by the remaining executant, and registered."}}, {"text": "September 6, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8455, "end_char": 8472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 9, 1951, the saledeed was executed by some of the executants, and on September 6, 1951, it was executed by the remaining executant, and registered."}}, {"text": "Octoher 24, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8589, "end_char": 8605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hence, it would appear that between May 11, 1951, and Octoher 24, 1951, the complainant had paid to the appellant, the sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8825, "end_char": 8829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "June 26, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9796, "end_char": 9809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On being pressed for the mortgage-deed, duly discharged, being handed over to the complainant, and as a result of a protracted correspondence, the appellant sent, to the complainant, on June 26, 1952, a number of documents including \"cancelled mortgage documents.\""}}, {"text": "June 28, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10229, "end_char": 10242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Unfortunately, Sundararajayya died on June 28, 1952."}}, {"text": "November 14, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10695, "end_char": 10712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus, the complainant was reduced to the necessity of filing a regular petition of complaint in the High Court on November 14, 1952."}}, {"text": "February 16, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11409, "end_char": 11426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In answer to the notice issued to him on February 16, 1953, the appellant submitted a long statement by way of an explanation which runs into about 43 pages in print, which is more in the nature of an argument in justification of his conduct than a statement of facts."}}, {"text": "May 5, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11899, "end_char": 11910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After recording both oral and documentary evidence, the Bar Council made its report on May 5, 1954, holding that :\n\n' ...... both the charges have been fully established and that the respondent has not only not used the moneys of the complainant for the purpose for which the, money was sent, but that the respondent has not accounted at all for the sum of rupees, 5,000; which was\n\nndmittedly cashed by him and brought into his bank account though not in his professional account.\""}}, {"text": "s2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14164, "end_char": 14166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Octo'ier 24, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14790, "end_char": 14807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5,500, dated Octo'ier 24, 1951, had been sent to him through Sundararajayya, and that the appellant, after getting the amount of the draft credited to his personal account."}}, {"text": "Sundararajayya", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15014, "end_char": 15028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "500 for pa::- ment to the vendor and made over to Sundararajayya the rem'aining 5,000 rupees in cash."}}, {"text": "Sundararajavya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15136, "end_char": 15150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was not his case that the complainant had instructed him to pay to Sundararajavya the 5,000 rupees, alleged by him to have been r\"id to Sundararajayya.", "canonical_name": "Sundararajayya"}}, {"text": "Sundararaiayya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15299, "end_char": 15313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was not c-.en his case that he had taken anv receipt for the s.id sum from Sundararaiayya, though he alleged that he had given a receipt to Sundararajayya for the much smaller sum of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Sundararajayya"}}, {"text": "Sundararajayy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16430, "end_char": 16443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5,000, to Sundararajayy:i, out of the demand draft for Rs.", "canonical_name": "Sundararajayya"}}, {"text": "6-9-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18263, "end_char": 18271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After deep consideration of all the circumstances, we are clearly of opinion that this letter must have been introduced into the bundle of documents with the complainant's advocate at or about the same time, when the respondent made the interpolations in the letters dated 6-9-1951 and 6-10-1951, (exhibits C-10 and C-11 ).\""}}, {"text": "6-10-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18276, "end_char": 18285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After deep consideration of all the circumstances, we are clearly of opinion that this letter must have been introduced into the bundle of documents with the complainant's advocate at or about the same time, when the respondent made the interpolations in the letters dated 6-9-1951 and 6-10-1951, (exhibits C-10 and C-11 ).\""}}, {"text": "Bar Council Tribtmal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18689, "end_char": 18709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has been suggested that the inquiry by the Bar Council Tribtmal was ''rambling and roving\"."}}, {"text": "July 22, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18871, "end_char": 18884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears from the ordt; r slmt maintained by the Tribunal that charges were framed on July 22, 1953."}}, {"text": "September 27, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19696, "end_char": 19714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the appellant submitted a long \"written answer\" on September 27, 1953."}}, {"text": "Gopalapuram", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21074, "end_char": 21085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The charges framed against the appellant were in these terms :\n\n\"That you Mr. 'C', in acting for the petitioner as his advocate in the matter of scrutinising the title deeds of No .. 104-A. Lloyds Road, Gopalapuram, Madras, and putting through the sale of the said premises in petitioner's favour, received from the petitioner Rs."}}, {"text": "October 24, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22406, "end_char": 22422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This could have been a complete answer to the charge, if it had been found as a fact that out of the demand draft dated October 24, 1951, of Rs."}}, {"text": "Bar Council Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22590, "end_char": 22610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But as found by the Court below confirming the conclusions of the Bar Council Tribunal, the appellant had failed to establish by reliable evidence that the sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "21-11-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25285, "end_char": 25295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As already stated, I was not placed with the requisite funds on and after 21-11-1951.\""}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26583, "end_char": 26588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "e\n\nSinha J.\n\nMr. 'G'\n\nThe Advocate9 Genera!", "canonical_name": "SINHA"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29410, "end_char": 29415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Should this Court initiate independent proceedings in the sense of making fresh inquiry after recording evidence pro and con, and then come to its conclusions, or, should this Court proceed upon the inquiry already made by the High Court through the Bar Council Tribunal, and record its orders after gmng the Advocate concerned an opportunity of being heard against similar orders being passed by this Court, in view of the consideration that an advocate of this Court may be entitled to practise in any of the subonlinate courts , in India even though he may not be borne on the roll of advocates of any particular High Court?"}}, {"text": "Maurice Gw", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30404, "end_char": 30414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court consisting of Sir Maurice Gw, er, Chief Justice, Sir S. Varadachariar and Sir Torick Ameer Ali lJ. dealt with his case."}}, {"text": "S. Varadachariar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30439, "end_char": 30455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court consisting of Sir Maurice Gw, er, Chief Justice, Sir S. Varadachariar and Sir Torick Ameer Ali lJ. dealt with his case."}}, {"text": "Torick Ameer Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30464, "end_char": 30480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court consisting of Sir Maurice Gw, er, Chief Justice, Sir S. Varadachariar and Sir Torick Ameer Ali lJ. dealt with his case."}}, {"text": "Madras Bar Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30843, "end_char": 30861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then, the matter was dealt with by the High Court on a report made by the Tribunal of the Madras Bar Council, to the effect that the\n\n(1) Ca.;"}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 31337, "end_char": 31357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the course of their short order, the Federal Court made the following observations :\n\n\"Having regard to the decision of the High Court of Madras in a matter which may be regarded as analogous (In re an Advocate I. L. R. 46 Mad."}}, {"text": "March 22, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32591, "end_char": 32605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1948, the appellant moved the Federal Court for re-instatement as an advocate of that Court in view of the fact that he had been re-instated by the Madras High Court bv its order dated March 22, 1948."}}, {"text": "D. A. Shanmugasundaraswami", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33184, "end_char": 33210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "r\n\nIn another case, In re : D. A. Shanmugasundaraswami ( 1 ), an Advocate, coming again from the Madras High Court, a similar proceeding followed.", "canonical_name": "D. A.\n\nShanmughasundaraswami"}}, {"text": "D. A.\n\nShanmughasundaraswami", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33307, "end_char": 33335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One D. A.\n\nShanmughasundaraswami, .", "canonical_name": "D. A.\n\nShanmughasundaraswami"}}, {"text": "Kania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33807, "end_char": 33812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As that advocate was also borne on the roll of advocates of the Federal Court, summons under Order IV, rule 29, of the rules of that Court was issued, and the Federal Court consisting of Kania, Chief Justice, Fazl Ali, Patanjali Sastri, Mahajan and B. K. Mukherjee\n\nJT."}}, {"text": "Fazl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33829, "end_char": 33837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As that advocate was also borne on the roll of advocates of the Federal Court, summons under Order IV, rule 29, of the rules of that Court was issued, and the Federal Court consisting of Kania, Chief Justice, Fazl Ali, Patanjali Sastri, Mahajan and B. K. Mukherjee\n\nJT."}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33839, "end_char": 33855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As that advocate was also borne on the roll of advocates of the Federal Court, summons under Order IV, rule 29, of the rules of that Court was issued, and the Federal Court consisting of Kania, Chief Justice, Fazl Ali, Patanjali Sastri, Mahajan and B. K. Mukherjee\n\nJT."}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33857, "end_char": 33864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As that advocate was also borne on the roll of advocates of the Federal Court, summons under Order IV, rule 29, of the rules of that Court was issued, and the Federal Court consisting of Kania, Chief Justice, Fazl Ali, Patanjali Sastri, Mahajan and B. K. Mukherjee\n\nJT."}}, {"text": "B. K. Mukherjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33869, "end_char": 33884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As that advocate was also borne on the roll of advocates of the Federal Court, summons under Order IV, rule 29, of the rules of that Court was issued, and the Federal Court consisting of Kania, Chief Justice, Fazl Ali, Patanjali Sastri, Mahajan and B. K. Mukherjee\n\nJT."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 35019, "end_char": 35036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court dealt with the case of an advocate of the Bombay High Court, who was also enrolled as a senior advocate of this Court That case is Jn the matter of Mr. 'G'."}}, {"text": "Order IV of Supreme Court Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36599, "end_char": 36630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": ".A.dvocatr Central of Madras", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 39515, "end_char": 39543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As already indicated, it was rather unfortunate that the appellant, after being once struck off the roll of advocates of the Madras High Court, and of the Federal Court, should have been reinstated, and thus been enabled to deal\n\n.1957\n\nMr. •c•\n\nThe .A.dvocatr Central of Madras\n\nSinha].·"}}, {"text": "Order IV of the Supreme Court Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39821, "end_char": 39856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "BABULAL AMTHALAL MEHTA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 40515, "end_char": 40537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BABULAL AMTHALAL MEHTA\n\nTHE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, CALCUTTA\n\n(S. R. DAS C.J., JAFER IMAM, s. K. DAS,\n\nGovINDA MENON and A. K. SARKAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, CALCUTTA", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 40543, "end_char": 40573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BABULAL AMTHALAL MEHTA\n\nTHE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, CALCUTTA\n\n(S. R. DAS C.J., JAFER IMAM, s. K. DAS,\n\nGovINDA MENON and A. K. SARKAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40576, "end_char": 40585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BABULAL AMTHALAL MEHTA\n\nTHE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, CALCUTTA\n\n(S. R. DAS C.J., JAFER IMAM, s. K. DAS,\n\nGovINDA MENON and A. K. SARKAR JJ.)", "canonical_name": "S. R. DAS"}}, {"text": "JAFER IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40592, "end_char": 40602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BABULAL AMTHALAL MEHTA\n\nTHE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, CALCUTTA\n\n(S. R. DAS C.J., JAFER IMAM, s. K. DAS,\n\nGovINDA MENON and A. K. SARKAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "s. K. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40604, "end_char": 40613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BABULAL AMTHALAL MEHTA\n\nTHE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, CALCUTTA\n\n(S. R. DAS C.J., JAFER IMAM, s. K. DAS,\n\nGovINDA MENON and A. K. SARKAR JJ.)", "canonical_name": "S. R. DAS"}}, {"text": "GovINDA MENON", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40616, "end_char": 40629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BABULAL AMTHALAL MEHTA\n\nTHE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, CALCUTTA\n\n(S. R. DAS C.J., JAFER IMAM, s. K. DAS,\n\nGovINDA MENON and A. K. SARKAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "A. K. SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40634, "end_char": 40646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BABULAL AMTHALAL MEHTA\n\nTHE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, CALCUTTA\n\n(S. R. DAS C.J., JAFER IMAM, s. K. DAS,\n\nGovINDA MENON and A. K. SARKAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Sea Customs-Goods", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40653, "end_char": 40670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sea Customs-Goods sei%ed in reasonable belief that they are 1muggled goods-Burden of proof-If violative of equal protection of law-Sea Customs Act (VII of 1878), as amended by Amending Act (XX!"}}, {"text": "Burden of proof-If violative of equal protection of law-Sea Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40728, "end_char": 40799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40866, "end_char": 40887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40889, "end_char": 40896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40899, "end_char": 40910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40924, "end_char": 40935, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41220, "end_char": 41227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "(1955) 2 S.C.R. 889", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 41381, "end_char": 41400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1955) 2 S.C.R. 1196", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 41469, "end_char": 41489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]} {"document_id": "1957_1_1110_1122_EN", "year": 1957, "text": "Mr. c\n\nTht Advocate- Geiieral of Madras\n\nSinha J.\n\nM'!Y B.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1957]\n\nwith clients who have to trust their legal advisers with moneys in the course of their fiduciary relationship.\n\nThese protracted proceedings against the appellant leading up to the summons under rule 30 of Order IV of the Supreme Court Rules have ended in the removal of the appellant's name from the roll of advocates of the High Court and of this Court, but only after the complainant has lost his good money.\n\nIt is clear, therefore, that the continuance of the appellant in the legal profession is a serious menace to the profession itself, which requires a high degree of integrity of character and sense of responsibility in which the appellant has been found singularly lacking.\n\nIn view of these considerations, the appeal must be dismissed and the rule made absolute with the result that the appellant's name shall stand removed from the roll of advocates of this Court.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nBABULAL AMTHALAL MEHTA\n\nTHE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, CALCUTTA\n\n(S. R. DAS C.J., JAFER IMAM, s. K. DAS,\n\nGovINDA MENON and A. K. SARKAR JJ.)\n\nSea Customs-Goods sei%ed in reasonable belief that they are 1muggled goods-Burden of proof-If violative of equal protection of law-Sea Customs Act (VII of 1878), as amended by Amending Act (XX! of 1955), 1. 178-A-Constitution of India, Art. 14.\n\nSection 178-A of the Sea Customs Act which places the burden of proving that any of the goods mentioned in the section and reasonably believed to smuggled are not really so on the person from whose p:>ssession they arc seized, is not discrimin2tive in character and does not violate equal protcCtion of law guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nBudhan Chaudhury and Others v. The State of Bihar, (1955) I S.C.R. 1045, applied.\n\nPurushottam Govindji Halai v. Shri B. M. Desai, (1955) 2 S.C.R. 889 and A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. M. Venkitachalam Potti and another (1955) 2 S.C.R. 1196, referred to.\n\n1 ...\n\nWilliam N. McFerland v. American Sugar Refining Co., (1916) 241 U.S. 79, W. D. Manley v. State of Georgia, (1929) 279 U.S. 1 and Tot v. United States, (1943) 319 U.S. 463, held inapplicable.\n\nConsequently, in a case where the Collector of Customs on the failure of a person, from whose possession certain diamond pieces were seized, to prove that they were not. smuggled goods but were legally imported into India, confiscated the diamonds under ss. 167(8) and 167(39) of the Sea Customs Act, no violation of the fundamental right conferred by Art. 14 of .. the Constitution occurred.\n\nORIGINAL JuRISDICTION : Petition No. 98 of 1956.\n\nPetition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for enforcement of fundamental rights.\n\nN. C. Chatterjee and S. C. Majumdar, for the petitioner. P. A. Mehta, R. Ganapathy Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5 .\n\n1957. May 8. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ·\n\nBabula! Amlhalol\n\n.llehta\n\nThe Co/lerlor of Customs, Caku1111\n\nGoVINDA MENON, J.-This application under Art. 32 Go,.indaMmonJ. of the Constitution raises the question of the constitutionality of s. 178-A, inserted in the Sea Customs Act, (VIII of 1878), s. 14 of the Amending Act XXI of 1955, and the chief ground on which it is sought to be struck down is that it offends Art. 14 of the Constitution. From the affidavits of both the parties to which there are annexures the following facts emerge : The petitioner carries on business as a broker in diamonds and precious stones in Calcutta and, according to him, he enjoys credit and reputation in the market as a well-known and respectable broker of such goods. On May 4, 1955, the Rummaging Inspector (Intelligence), Customs House, Culcutta, Respondent No. 3, armed with a search warrant from the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, Respondent No. 4, searched the residential room of the petitioner, situated at No. 32, Sir Hariram Goenka Street, Calcutta, and after a minute search of the steel almirah in which according to the statement of the petitioner, he used to keep his stock in trade and finding none there questioned him as to where he had secreted the diamonds to which the\n\nBabula[ Amihalal\n\nMehta\n\nTht Collector of Cw toms, Calcutta\n\nGovinda Menon J.\n\nreply given by him was in the negative. Thereupon a wall almirah, wherein washed clothes, and other articles were stored, was searched and therein in an old jacket 475 pieces of diamonds were discovered along with one piece of synthetic stone. A statement signed by him was taken from which we find that his explanation for the possession was that Rs. 10,000/- worth of diamonds were received by him from M/s. Ratilal Amritlal, of 89 Zaveri Bazar, Bombay, and the rest were purchased locally in Calcutta.\n\nHe did not remember the names and address of the parties from whom the local purchases were made, nor did ht have in his possession any documents covering the purchase.\n\nThereafter the Rummaging Inspector escorted the petitioner to the Customs House where the Assistant Collector, Customs, asked him to produce evidence showing that the goods were not smuggled goods hut were legally imported on payment of duty.\n\nThe Assistant Collector then permitted the petitioner to go and gave him time 'till May 7, 1955, to produce evidence showing that the goods were imported on payment of customs duty and under a valid import licence. On the same day, i.e., May 4, 1955, a notice was served on the pel'itioner by the Customs authorities stating that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the goods seized by the Rummaging Inspector had been illegally imported into India and, therefore, before further action was taken under ss. 167(8) and 167(39) of the Sea Customs Act, the petitioner should submit by May 7, 1955, any documents which might he in his possession showing that the goods in question were legally imported into India on payment of proper Customs duty and on production of a valid import trade control licence. It is also stated that if the goods were not imported by the petitioner, but were brought from another party he should submit by the same date any evidence in his possession showing the purchase of the goods. In answer to this, on behalf of the petitioner, Messrs. S. K. Sawdav and Company, a firm of Advocates, Calcutta, wrote\n\n0 to the Assistant Collector, Customs, on May 7, 1955, reciting the circumstances under which the petitioner came to\n\nbe in possession of the seized articles alleging that in the circumstances the presumption of an offence having been committed in contravention of s. 86 of the Sea Customs Act attracting a punishment under s. 167(39) of the Sea Customs Act was unwarranted and requested to be furnished with a statement of the reasons for the seizure as soon as possible. The letter went on to request for ten days' time for . procuring and producing certificates etc., from the Bombay trade and Calcutta trade about the authenticity of the petitioner's business and also how he came to be in possession of the goods.\n\nAnother letter was written by the same firm of Advocates on May 9, 1955, the details of which it is unnecessary to refer. On May 16, 1955, a further letter was written enclosing two , certificates and containing further particulars.\n\nThis also reiterated the request for the supply of specific reasons for the seizure. On May 23, 1955, the Assistant Collector replied to the Advocates informing them that the diamonds in question were seized on reasonable suspicions that the same had been imported into India illegally and as such were liable to seizure under the Sea Customs Act.\n\nFurther correspondence followed by a letter dated June 20, 1955, to which there was a reply on June 25, 1955, wherein there was a detailed reference to everything that had taken place till then and especially with regard to the earlier denial of the petitioner about there being any diamonds with him and the discovery of the same later on in a used jacket in a wall almirah. This is a comprehensive letter containing the justification for the proceedings taken by the search officers and finally the Assistant Collector observed that if the petitioner failed to submit a written explanation in time or did not appear before him when the case was fixed for hearing, the case would have to be decided on the basis of the evidence on the record without any further notice.\n\nOn July 1, 1955, Messrs. S. K. Sawday & Company wrote a further letter on behalf of the petitioner reiterating their objections and showing why action should not be taken. This was followed by letters dated July 4 and 20, 1955. A personal hearing was. granted on July 21, 1955, followed by a letter from the Advocates 5-81 S.C. India/59\n\nBabula! Amtha/al Mehta v.\n\nThe Colkctor of Customs, Calcutta\n\nGovinda Menon J.\n\nBa!ulal Amlhai.l\n\nMehltJ ...\n\nThe Colkctor of Cwtoms. Calcutlo\n\nGoriinda Merwn J.\n\ndated July 22, 1955. It is unnecessary for the present to elaborate the contents of these letters or to refer to the statement enclosed therewith from M/ s.\n\nRatilal Amritlal, Bombay .\n\nThe Collector of Customs thereupon, after considering the entire matter placed before him, passed an order dated September 12, 1955, which was despatched on November 5, 1955, containing an elaborate discussion of the various facts and circumstances and finally concluding that since the petitioner had failed to discharge the onus under s. 178-A of the Sea Customs Act in respect of the diamonds seized on May 4, 1955, orders had been passed confiscating the same under ss. 167(8) and 167(39) of the Sea Customs Act and that the confiscation would be absolute in terms of the provisions of ss. 3(2) and 4 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947. The reasons given in the above order were that the subsequent statements were contrary to what had been stated in the first instance, that at the time of the raid, an attempt was made to. hide the diamonds in a suspicious manner and lastly that the petitioner was making statements which were in the nature of an afterthought, and not supported by facts.\n\nOn account of these and other reasons the Collector was of the opinion that the presumption under s. 178-A had not been rebutted. The order stated that an appeal against it lay to the Central Board of Revenue within three months of the date of the despatch and also contained information as to the court-fee stamps etc., which would have to be affixe_d.\n\nWithout availing himself of that remedy the petitioner has come up to this Court by way of an application for a writ under Art. 32 of the Constitution.\n\nThough Mr.\n\nChatterjee faintly argued tpat the provisions of Art. 19(1)(f) and (g) and Art. 31 of the Constitution had been violated. he did not seriomlv\n\npress those contentions. The main point of the attack was centered on the contention that s. 178-A was violative of the principles of equal protection of the laws guaranteed under Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nBefore we discuss the validity of s. 178-A, it would be . useful to consider the circumstances which led to\n\n: ~\n\nthe enactment of that statutory provision and for that purpose a brief outline of t.1.e relevant sections of the Act would be necessary.\n\nSection 19 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, enables the Central Government by Notification in . the official Gazette to prohibit or restrict importation or exportation of goods into or out of India, and s. 20 enumerates the dutiable goods. When any person imports goods into India, the owner of such goods is required, after the delivery of the manifest by the master of the vessel in which they are imported, to make an entry of the goods for home consumption or warehousing by delivering to the Customs-collector a bill of entry containing particulars which shall correspond with the particulars given of the same goods in the manifest of the ship (s. 86). This is intended to give an idea to the Custoinscollector as to whether what the owner claims is different or the same as what the master of the vessel has intimated by the delivery of the manifest. On the delivery of such a bill, if any duty is payable on such goods, the same shall be assessed and it is only after payment of the duty so assessed that the owner may proceed to .clear the same (s. 87). Clearance of the goods after the payment of such duty is provided in s. 89 and if everything has been done according to law, the owner can take away the goods.\n\nC!upter XVI deals with offences and penalties and s. 16/' of the same Chapter contains three columns in a schedule, the first of which mentions the offence, the second, which does not have the force of law, gives the section of the Act to which the offence has reference and the third lays down the penalty which may be imposed. \\:Vith regard to the third column a distinction has to be rnade between the penalty to be imposed by the customs authorities and the punishment that can be imposed by a court of law for the infringement of certain provisions.\n\nOffences mentioned in entries Nos. 26, 72 and 74 to 76 (both inclusive) have. reference to prosecution :md conviction before a Magistrate, whereas most of the others concern penalties imposed by the Customs authorities: This distinction will be important when referring to s. 182. We are in this\n\nBabula/ Amlho/a/\n\nMehla\n\nThi Collettor of Ciutams, Cakutl•\n\nrind11 Mmon J.\n\nBa!ulal AmlhalaJ\n\nMehta\n\n\"· The Collector of Customs, Calattta\n\nGoouida Menon J.\n\ncase concerned with entries Nos. 8 and 39. The penalty of confiscation is provided in the third column of entry No. 8, if any goods, the importation or exportation of which is prohibited or restricted, are imported contrary to such prohibition or restriction. It lays down that in addition to the confiscation of the goods, the persons concerned shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding three times the value of the goods, or not exceeding one thousand rupees. This Court has held that the minimum is the alternative: see Maqbool Hussain v.\n\nThe State of Bombay( 1). Entry No. 39 also provides for a penalty not exceeding Rs. 500 and the confiscation of the goods if they are taken or passed out of any custom.house or wharf without an entry duly made.\n\nSmuggled goods when traced and seized come under this category. Though the word 'smuggling' is not defined in the Act, it must be understood as having the ordinary dictionary meaning namely carrying of goods clandestinely into a colmtry.\n\nChapter XVII relates to searches and recovery of smuggled goods, as well as offences, appeals, etc.\n\nSection 169 gives power to any customs officer, duly employed in the prevention of smuggling, to search anv person on board of any vessel in any part in (India) or any person who has landed from any vessel, provided that such officer has reason to believe that such person has dutiable or prohibited goods secreted about his person. A safeguard is provided under s. 170 by which any person about to be searched may require the said officer to take him, previous to search, before the nearest Magistrate or Customs-collector. The important factor in this case is that the person making the search or attempting to do it must have a reason to believe that such person has dutiable or prohibitecl goods. These two sections refer to the time at which a person brings dutiable goods into India but the later provisiom of the Chapter lay down the procedure to be followed where goods have been smuggled without being detected at the port or the wharf. Power to issue search warrants is given to any Magistrate under s. 172 which is to the following effect :\n\n{I) [1953) S. C.R. 730,742. f\n\n\"Any Magistrate may, on application by a Customs-collector, stating his belief that dutiable or prohibited goods (or any documents relating to such goods) are secreted in any place within the local limits of the jurisdiction of such Magistrate, issue a warrant to search for such goods (or documents).\n\nSuch warrant shall be executed in the same way and shall have the same effect, as a search-warrant issued under the law .relating to Criminal Procedure\".\n\nThe warrant, as will be noticed, may be issued only on the application of a Customs-collector who is a responsible senior officer and that is certainly a safeguard against indiscriminate issue of search warrants.\n\nSection 178 speaks of the seizure of goods liable to confiscation in any place either upon land or water by any officer of customs or any other person duly employed for the pre•ention of smuggling.\n\nThe impugned s. 178-A comes next which is quoted below :\n\n\"178-A(l) : Where any goods to which this section applies are seized under this Act in the reasonable belief that they are smuggled goods, the burden of proving that they are not smuggled goods shall be . on the person from whose possession the goods were seized.\n\n(2) This section shall apply to gold, gold manufactures, diamonds and other precious stones, cigarettes and cosmetics and any other goods which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf.\"\n\nThe presumption under s. 178-A is equally applicable to seizure as a result of a search warrant under s. 172 or seizure made under s. 178. How the things seized are to be dealt with can be seen from s. 179, and s. 181 lays down that when a seizure or arrest is made, a statement in writing of the reasons therefor should be given to the person who is arrested or from whom goods are seized. When an article is seized under ss. 172 and 178, except in cases falling under entries Nos. 26, 72 and 74 to 76 of s. 167, the confiscation or penalty or duty may be adjudged by the officer mentioned therein, i.e., the person from whom the articles are seized 1s entitled to an adjudication\n\nBabu/al AmJha/al Mehta v The Collector of Customs, Cai.\"utta\n\nGovinda Menon J.\n\nBobola! .ilmlMI•\n\nM1Ala\n\nv The Coll1ct1r of Cutuns. Cakulta\n\nGeuindtJ Menon.].\n\n. ,/\n\nregarding either confiscation or penalty or duty.\n\nThis gives the valuable right of having the adjudication of the claim made by a superior officer, and despite such adjudication if the confiscation is still made, under s. 188 an appeal lies from the subordinate to the Chief Customs-authority within three months from the date of such a decision.\n\nIn the present case the confiscation was made by the Collector of Customs and an appeal lay from him to the Central Board of Revenue.\n\nSection 191 enables the Central Government on the application of any person aggrieved by any decision or order passed under this Act by an officer of Customs or Chief Customs-authority and from which no appeal lies, to reverse or modify such decision or order. The outline of the various provisions above made shows that successive remedies are provided to an aggrieved person from whom articles have been seized and confiscated and the Act is a complete Code in itself affording redress and relief m case of illegal or unjustified orders.\n\nThe genesis of s. 178-A may now be considered.\n\nThe Central Government had appointed a commission known as the Taxation Enquiry Commission which by its report recommended the adoption of the principles underlying s. 178-A in order to minimize smuggling. In Vol. II of their report, Chapter VII\n\ndeals with administrative problems in regard to customs and Excise duties. At pp. 320 and 321 the Committee recommends the amendment of the Sea Customs Act, firstly to •. make smuggling a criminal offence and secondly empowering Customs officers to search premises etc. and the third recommendation is the one with which we are concerned. It is in the following terms :\n\n\"To transfer the onus of proof in respect of offences relating to smuggling to the person in whose possession any dutiable, restricted or prohibited goods are found.\" It is to implement this recommendation that s. 178-A has been enacted.\n\nSection\n\n178-A applies to diamonds and other precious stones and there has been no dispute about : .\n\nthe application of this provision to the present case.\n\nOn the facts mentioned above it is clear that the seizure has been under the Act in the reasonable belief of the Customs authorities that they are smuggled goods and, therefore, the burden of proving that they are not smuggled goods has been cast by this section on the persons from whose possession the goods are seized.\n\nNo doubt the content and import of the section are very wide. It applies not only to the actual smuggler from whose possession the goods are seized but also to those who came into possession of the goods after having purchased the same after the same has passed through many hands or agencies.\n\nFor example, if the Customs authorities have a reasonable beilef that certain goods in the possession of an innocent party are smuggled goods and the same is seized under the provisions of this Act, then the person from whose possession the goods were seized, however innocent he may be, has to prove that the goods are not smuggled articles. This is no doubt a very heavy and onerous duty cast on an innocent possessor who, for aught one knows, may have bona fide paid adequate consideration for the purchase of the articles without knowing that the same has been smuggled. The only pre-requisite for the application of the section is the subjectivity of the Customs-officer in having a reasonable belief that the goods are smuggled.\n\nA careful examination of the contents of the' somewhat lengthy petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution does not show how the impugned section offends Art. 14, and no distinct and separate ground is taken about its unconstitutionality, but Mr.\n\nChatterjee argues that the burden of proof enunciated therein is opposed to fundamental principles of natural justice as it gives an unrestricted arbitrary and naked powe; to the customs authorities without laying down any standard O( norm to be followed for exercising powers uader the section. What is urged is that whereas\n\nnder he. ordinary law the burden of proof in matters like this 1s on the party who sets up a particular case under the section that process is inverted and th~\n\nBabula/ Amlholol\n\nMehta\n\nThe Collector of Customs, Calcutlo\n\nGovinda Minon ].\n\nBabula! Amthalal\n\nMehta\n\nThe Collector of Customs, Calcutta\n\nGovinda Menon J.\n\nburden is cast on the possessor of the article to show that it was imported into India with a prope1 bill of entry and after paying the proper custom duty due.\n\nAs stated already, it is a heavy burden to be laid upon the shoulders of an innocent purchaser who might have come into possession after the article has changed many hands and this, it is alleged, invokes discrimination between him and other litigants and deprives him of the equal protection of the law guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution. A large number of cases have been cited at the Bar in support of. the. respective contentions of the parties.\n\nThe true nature, scope and effect of Art. 14 of the Constitution have been explained by different constitutional Benches of this Coun in a number of cases, namely, Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of India and Others(1 ), The State of Bombay and Another\n\nv. F. N. Balsara('), The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar('), Kathi Raning Rawat v.\n\nThe State of Saurashtra( 4 ), Lachmandas-Kewalram Ahuja and Another\n\nv. The State of Bombay('), Syed Qasim Razvi v. The State of Hyderabad and Others('), Habeeb Mohammad\n\nv. The State of Hyderabad(') and V. M. Syed Mohammed and Company v. The State of A11dhra(8 ), but it will not be necessary for us to enter upon a lengthy discussion of the matter or to refer to passages in those judgments, for the principles underlying the provisions of the Article have been summarised by a Full Bench of this Court in Bttd!ian Chaudhury and Others v. The State of Bihar(9) in the following terms :\n\n\"It is now well established that while Art. 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable cbssification for the purposes of legislation.\n\nIn order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that\n\n(1) [1950] S.C.R. HGg.\n\n(2) [•951] S.C.R. GB,, (:l) [19,; o] S.C.R. \"84. (.f) [19;,2] S.C.R. 435.\n\n(9) (19'\\5)\n\n(5) [•952] S.C.R. 710\n\n(6) [1953] S.C.R. 591\n\n() [19;3] S.C.R. 661\n\n(8) (1954] S.C.R. rn7\n\n1 s.c.R. IO-J.5 at P. 1048-1049.\n\nare grouped together from others left out of the group and (ii) that that differentia must have a rational' relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different bases, namely, geographical or according. to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. It is also well established by the decisions of this Court that Art. 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure.\"\n\nThe principle thus enunciated has been adopted . and applied by this Court in Purshottam Govindji Halai v. Shri B. M. Desai(1) and in A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v.\n\nM. Venkitachalam Patti and another(2).\n\nMr. N. C. Chatterjee appearing for the petitioner has referred us to several decisions of the Supreme Court of America, such as William N. McFerland v. American .Sugar Refining Co.( 3 ), W. D. Manley v.\n\nState of Ceorgia(4) and Tot v. United States(•). It appears to us that these decisions really turn upon the due process clause of the American Federal Constitution and cannot help in the construction of the equal protection clause of our Constitution. The contentions urged by Mr. Chatterjee as to the unconstitutionality of s. 178-A of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, will, therefore, have to be tested in the light of the principles laid down by this Court in Budhan Chowdhury's case (supra).\n\nA cursory perusal of s. 178-A will at once disclose the well defined classification of goods based on an intelligible differentia.\n\nIt applies only to certain goods described in sub-s. (2) which are or can . be easily smuggled. The section applies only to those . goods of the specified kind which have been seized under the Act and in the reasonable belief that . they are\n\n(1) [1955] 2 S. C R. 889, 8g8·899.\n\n(2) [1955] 2 S. C R 119~. 12296.\n\n(3) (1916) 241 U S 79; 60 L. Ed. 899.\n\n(4) (1929) 279 U.S. 1; 73 L. Ed 575.\n\n(5) (1943) 319 U.S. 463; 87 L. Ed. 1519.\n\nBabula/ Amthalal\n\nMehl a v.\n\nThe Col/:clor of Customs. Ca/£utta\n\nGovinda Menon J.\n\nBabu/al .Amlltalal\n\nMetlio\n\nT lu Collector of Customs, Cakutta\n\nMa7 IO.\n\nsmuggled goods. It is only those goods which answer the threefold description that come under the operation of the section. The object of the Act is to prevent smuggling. The differentia on the basis of which the goods have been classified and the presumption raised by the section obviously have - a rational relation t<> the object sought to be achieved by the Act. The presumption only attaches to goods of the description mentioned in the section and it directly furthers the object of the Act, namely, the prevention of smuggling, and that being the position the impugned section is clearly within the principle enunciated above, not hit by Art. 14. The impugned section cannot be struck down on the infirmity either of discrimination or illegal classification.\n\nConfining as it does to certain classes of goods seized by the customs authorities on the reasonable belief that they are smuggled goods, there is only a presumption which can be rebutted.\n\nIn these circumstances, there can be no doubt whatever that s. 178-A does not offend Art. 14 of the\n\nConstitmion and this petition 1s, therefore, to be dismissed with costs.\n\nPetition dismissed.\n\nMENAKURU DASARATHARAMI REDD!\n\nti.\n\nDUDDUKURU SUBBA RAO\n\n(S. R.\n\nDAS C.J., fAFER\n\nIMAM,\n\nGAJENDRACADKAR and A. K. SARKAR JJ.)\n\nHindu [Aw-Charitable Endowment-Compromise decree- Corutruction-Trust or charge-Intention of the donor-Test.\n\nA Hindu father executed a registered deed of trust giviug away his properties to public charities and appointed himself and two others as trustees.\n\nThe .son in assertion by his right to a moiety share therein started to alienate them.\n\nThere was litigation between the trustees and the son which ultimately ended in a compromise decree for .partition bet\\\\een the father and the !'011, the two other trustees having retired pending litigation.\n\nA ftei\n\nthe death of both the father and the son a suit was brought under ~~", "total_entities": 140, "entities": [{"text": "Geiieral", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 21, "end_char": 29, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. c\n\nTht Advocate- Geiieral of Madras\n\nSinha J.\n\nM'!Y B.\n\nwith clients who have to trust their legal advisers with moneys in the course of their fiduciary relationship."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 39, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. c\n\nTht Advocate- Geiieral of Madras\n\nSinha J.\n\nM'!Y B.\n\nwith clients who have to trust their legal advisers with moneys in the course of their fiduciary relationship."}}, {"text": "Order IV of the Supreme Court Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 296, "end_char": 331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "BABULAL AMTHALAL MEHTA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 990, "end_char": 1012, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BABULAL AMTHALAL MEHTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, CALCUTTA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1014, "end_char": 1048, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, CALCUTTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1051, "end_char": 1065, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAFER IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1067, "end_char": 1077, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SYED JAFFER IMAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GovINDA MENON", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1091, "end_char": 1104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GovINDA MENON", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. K. SARKAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1109, "end_char": 1125, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.K. SARKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Burden of proof-If violative of equal protection of law-Sea Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1203, "end_char": 1274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1341, "end_char": 1362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1364, "end_char": 1371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1374, "end_char": 1385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1399, "end_char": 1410, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1695, "end_char": 1702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "(1955) 2 S.C.R. 889", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1856, "end_char": 1875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1955) 2 S.C.R. 1196", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1944, "end_char": 1964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2053, "end_char": 2058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2107, "end_char": 2111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S. 463", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2151, "end_char": 2157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2395, "end_char": 2400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "smuggled goods but were legally imported into India, confiscated the diamonds under ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 167(8) and 167(39)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2433, "end_char": 2455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2467, "end_char": 2478, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2531, "end_char": 2538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2638, "end_char": 2648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2656, "end_char": 2677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2718, "end_char": 2734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee and S. C. Majumdar, for the petitioner.", "canonical_name": "N. C. Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "S. C. Majumdar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2739, "end_char": 2753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. C. Chatterjee and S. C. Majumdar, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "P. A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2775, "end_char": 2786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. A. Mehta, R. Ganapathy Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2788, "end_char": 2805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. A. Mehta, R. Ganapathy Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2810, "end_char": 2822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. A. Mehta, R. Ganapathy Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Babula! Amlhalol\n\n.llehta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2925, "end_char": 2950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ·\n\nBabula!"}}, {"text": "GoVINDA MENON", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2988, "end_char": 3001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amlhalol\n\n.llehta\n\nThe Co/lerlor of Customs, Caku1111\n\nGoVINDA MENON, J.-This application under Art.", "canonical_name": "GovINDA MENON"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3029, "end_char": 3036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3120, "end_char": 3126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3150, "end_char": 3161, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3179, "end_char": 3184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Amending Act XXI of 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3192, "end_char": 3216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3298, "end_char": 3305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amending Act XXI of 1955", "statute": "Amending Act XXI of 1955"}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3507, "end_char": 3515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the affidavits of both the parties to which there are annexures the following facts emerge : The petitioner carries on business as a broker in diamonds and precious stones in Calcutta and, according to him, he enjoys credit and reputation in the market as a well-known and respectable broker of such goods."}}, {"text": "May 4, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3642, "end_char": 3653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 4, 1955, the Rummaging Inspector (Intelligence), Customs House, Culcutta, Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Rummaging Inspector (Intelligence), Customs House, Culcutta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3659, "end_char": 3718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 4, 1955, the Rummaging Inspector (Intelligence), Customs House, Culcutta, Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3775, "end_char": 3812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3, armed with a search warrant from the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Babula[ Amihalal\n\nMehta", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4168, "end_char": 4191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32, Sir Hariram Goenka Street, Calcutta, and after a minute search of the steel almirah in which according to the statement of the petitioner, he used to keep his stock in trade and finding none there questioned him as to where he had secreted the diamonds to which the\n\nBabula[ Amihalal\n\nMehta\n\nTht Collector of Cw toms, Calcutta\n\nGovinda Menon J.\n\nreply given by him was in the negative."}}, {"text": "Govinda Menon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4229, "end_char": 4242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32, Sir Hariram Goenka Street, Calcutta, and after a minute search of the steel almirah in which according to the statement of the petitioner, he used to keep his stock in trade and finding none there questioned him as to where he had secreted the diamonds to which the\n\nBabula[ Amihalal\n\nMehta\n\nTht Collector of Cw toms, Calcutta\n\nGovinda Menon J.\n\nreply given by him was in the negative.", "canonical_name": "GovINDA MENON"}}, {"text": "Ratilal Amritlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4657, "end_char": 4673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "10,000/- worth of diamonds were received by him from M/s. Ratilal Amritlal, of 89 Zaveri Bazar, Bombay, and the rest were purchased locally in Calcutta."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4695, "end_char": 4701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "10,000/- worth of diamonds were received by him from M/s. Ratilal Amritlal, of 89 Zaveri Bazar, Bombay, and the rest were purchased locally in Calcutta."}}, {"text": "May 7, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5251, "end_char": 5262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Assistant Collector then permitted the petitioner to go and gave him time 'till May 7, 1955, to produce evidence showing that the goods were imported on payment of customs duty and under a valid import licence."}}, {"text": "ss. 167(8) and 167(39)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5680, "end_char": 5702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5714, "end_char": 5725, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S. K. Sawdav and Company", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6245, "end_char": 6269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In answer to this, on behalf of the petitioner, Messrs. S. K. Sawdav and Company, a firm of Advocates, Calcutta, wrote\n\n0 to the Assistant Collector, Customs, on May 7, 1955, reciting the circumstances under which the petitioner came to\n\nbe in possession of the seized articles alleging that in the circumstances the presumption of an offence having been committed in contravention of s. 86 of the Sea Customs Act attracting a punishment under s. 167(39) of the Sea Customs Act was unwarranted and requested to be furnished with a statement of the reasons for the seizure as soon as possible.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Sawdav and Company"}}, {"text": "s. 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6574, "end_char": 6579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6591, "end_char": 6602, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 167(39)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6633, "end_char": 6643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6655, "end_char": 6666, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "May 9, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7089, "end_char": 7100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another letter was written by the same firm of Advocates on May 9, 1955, the details of which it is unnecessary to refer."}}, {"text": "May 16, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7154, "end_char": 7166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 16, 1955, a further letter was written enclosing two , certificates and containing further particulars."}}, {"text": "May 23, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7351, "end_char": 7363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 23, 1955, the Assistant Collector replied to the Advocates informing them that the diamonds in question were seized on reasonable suspicions that the same had been imported into India illegally and as such were liable to seizure under the Sea Customs Act."}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7598, "end_char": 7609, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "June 20, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7662, "end_char": 7675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further correspondence followed by a letter dated June 20, 1955, to which there was a reply on June 25, 1955, wherein there was a detailed reference to everything that had taken place till then and especially with regard to the earlier denial of the petitioner about there being any diamonds with him and the discovery of the same later on in a used jacket in a wall almirah."}}, {"text": "June 25, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7707, "end_char": 7720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further correspondence followed by a letter dated June 20, 1955, to which there was a reply on June 25, 1955, wherein there was a detailed reference to everything that had taken place till then and especially with regard to the earlier denial of the petitioner about there being any diamonds with him and the discovery of the same later on in a used jacket in a wall almirah."}}, {"text": "July 1, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8387, "end_char": 8399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 1, 1955, Messrs. S. K. Sawday & Company wrote a further letter on behalf of the petitioner reiterating their objections and showing why action should not be taken."}}, {"text": "S. K. Sawday & Company", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8409, "end_char": 8431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 1, 1955, Messrs. S. K. Sawday & Company wrote a further letter on behalf of the petitioner reiterating their objections and showing why action should not be taken.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Sawdav and Company"}}, {"text": "July 4 and 20, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8591, "end_char": 8610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was followed by letters dated July 4 and 20, 1955."}}, {"text": "July 21, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8647, "end_char": 8660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "granted on July 21, 1955, followed by a letter from the Advocates 5-81 S.C. India/59\n\nBabula!"}}, {"text": "Ba!ulal Amlhai.l\n\nMehltJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8802, "end_char": 8826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amtha/al Mehta v.\n\nThe Colkctor of Customs, Calcutta\n\nGovinda Menon J.\n\nBa!ulal Amlhai.l\n\nMehltJ ...\n\nThe Colkctor of Cwtoms."}}, {"text": "Colkctor of Cwtoms. Calcutlo", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8836, "end_char": 8864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amtha/al Mehta v.\n\nThe Colkctor of Customs, Calcutta\n\nGovinda Menon J.\n\nBa!ulal Amlhai.l\n\nMehltJ ...\n\nThe Colkctor of Cwtoms."}}, {"text": "Goriinda Merwn", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8866, "end_char": 8880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Calcutlo\n\nGoriinda Merwn J.\n\ndated July 22, 1955."}}, {"text": "s. 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9408, "end_char": 9414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9428, "end_char": 9439, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 167(8) and 167(39)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9541, "end_char": 9563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9575, "end_char": 9586, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 3(2) and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9661, "end_char": 9675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10178, "end_char": 10184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10558, "end_char": 10565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10600, "end_char": 10610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though Mr.\n\nChatterjee faintly argued tpat the provisions of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10649, "end_char": 10662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10675, "end_char": 10682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10833, "end_char": 10839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10923, "end_char": 10930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10987, "end_char": 10993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11205, "end_char": 11215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sea Customs Act, 1878", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11223, "end_char": 11244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11258, "end_char": 11276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 19 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, enables the Central Government by Notification in ."}}, {"text": "s. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11405, "end_char": 11410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878"}}, {"text": "s. 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11853, "end_char": 11858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878"}}, {"text": "s. 87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12257, "end_char": 12262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 89", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12334, "end_char": 12339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12476, "end_char": 12481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13255, "end_char": 13261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mmon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13346, "end_char": 13350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are in this\n\nBabula/ Amlho/a/\n\nMehla\n\nThi Collettor of Ciutams, Cakutl•\n\nrind11 Mmon J.\n\nBa!ulal AmlhalaJ\n\nMehta\n\n\"· The Collector of Customs, Calattta\n\nGoouida Menon J.\n\ncase concerned with entries Nos."}}, {"text": "Collector of Customs, Calattta\n\nGoouida Menon", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13387, "end_char": 13432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are in this\n\nBabula/ Amlho/a/\n\nMehla\n\nThi Collettor of Ciutams, Cakutl•\n\nrind11 Mmon J.\n\nBa!ulal AmlhalaJ\n\nMehta\n\n\"· The Collector of Customs, Calattta\n\nGoouida Menon J.\n\ncase concerned with entries Nos."}}, {"text": "Section 169", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14533, "end_char": 14544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 170", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14896, "end_char": 14902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15543, "end_char": 15549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16289, "end_char": 16300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16501, "end_char": 16507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17072, "end_char": 17078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17152, "end_char": 17158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17181, "end_char": 17187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 179", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17249, "end_char": 17255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 181", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17261, "end_char": 17267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 172 and 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17473, "end_char": 17488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17556, "end_char": 17562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 188", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18119, "end_char": 18125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Board of Revenue", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18356, "end_char": 18380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case the confiscation was made by the Collector of Customs and an appeal lay from him to the Central Board of Revenue."}}, {"text": "Section 191", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18383, "end_char": 18394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18939, "end_char": 18945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19137, "end_char": 19143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19363, "end_char": 19374, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19801, "end_char": 19807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section\n\n178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19829, "end_char": 19841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21419, "end_char": 21426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21494, "end_char": 21501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22713, "end_char": 22720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22890, "end_char": 22897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23833, "end_char": 23840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24913, "end_char": 24920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Purshottam Govindji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25087, "end_char": 25106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and applied by this Court in Purshottam Govindji Halai v. Shri B. M. Desai(1) and in A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v.\n\nM. Venkitachalam Patti and another(2)."}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25217, "end_char": 25233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. N. C. Chatterjee appearing for the petitioner has referred us to several decisions of the Supreme Court of America, such as William N. McFerland v. American .Sugar Refining Co.( 3 ), W. D. Manley v.\n\nState of Ceorgia(4) and Tot v. United States(•).", "canonical_name": "N. C. Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of America", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25307, "end_char": 25331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. N. C. Chatterjee appearing for the petitioner has referred us to several decisions of the Supreme Court of America, such as William N. McFerland v. American .Sugar Refining Co.( 3 ), W. D. Manley v.\n\nState of Ceorgia(4) and Tot v. United States(•)."}}, {"text": "s. 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25742, "end_char": 25748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sea Customs Act, 1878", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25758, "end_char": 25779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Budhan Chowdhury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25874, "end_char": 25890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contentions urged by Mr. Chatterjee as to the unconstitutionality of s. 178-A of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, will, therefore, have to be tested in the light of the principles laid down by this Court in Budhan Chowdhury's case (supra)."}}, {"text": "s. 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25929, "end_char": 25935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878"}}, {"text": "[1955] 2 S. C R. 889", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 26287, "end_char": 26307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1955] 2 S. C R 119", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 26323, "end_char": 26342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26370, "end_char": 26374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878"}}, {"text": "S. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26409, "end_char": 26413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878"}}, {"text": "S. 463", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26447, "end_char": 26453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878", "statute": "the Sea Customs Act, 1878"}}, {"text": "Babula/ Amthalal\n\nMehl", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 26472, "end_char": 26494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Babula/ Amthalal\n\nMehl a v.\n\nThe Col/:clor of Customs."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27274, "end_char": 27281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 178", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27646, "end_char": 27652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27671, "end_char": 27678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "MENAKURU", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27782, "end_char": 27790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MENAKURU DASARATHARAMI REDD!"}}, {"text": "DASARATHARAMI REDD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27791, "end_char": 27809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MENAKURU DASARATHARAMI REDD!"}}, {"text": "DUDDUKURU SUBBA RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27817, "end_char": 27836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DUDDUKURU SUBBA RAO\n\n(S. R.\n\nDAS C.J., fAFER\n\nIMAM,\n\nGAJENDRACADKAR and A. K. SARKAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "R.\n\nDAS C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27842, "end_char": 27854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DUDDUKURU SUBBA RAO\n\n(S. R.\n\nDAS C.J., fAFER\n\nIMAM,\n\nGAJENDRACADKAR and A. K. SARKAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "fAFER\n\nIMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27856, "end_char": 27867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DUDDUKURU SUBBA RAO\n\n(S. R.\n\nDAS C.J., fAFER\n\nIMAM,\n\nGAJENDRACADKAR and A. K. SARKAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "GAJENDRACADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27870, "end_char": 27884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DUDDUKURU SUBBA RAO\n\n(S. R.\n\nDAS C.J., fAFER\n\nIMAM,\n\nGAJENDRACADKAR and A. K. SARKAR JJ.)"}}]} {"document_id": "1957_1_1122_1140_EN", "year": 1957, "text": "Babu/al .Amlltalal\n\nMetlio\n\nT lu Collector of Customs, Cakutta\n\nMa7 IO.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1957J\n\nsmuggled goods. It is only those goods which answer the threefold description that come under the operation of the section. The object of the Act is to prevent smuggling. The differentia on the basis of which the goods have been classified and the presumption raised by the section obviously have - a rational relation t<> the object sought to be achieved by the Act. The presumption only attaches to goods of the description mentioned in the section and it directly furthers the object of the Act, namely, the prevention of smuggling, and that being the position the impugned section is clearly within the principle enunciated above, not hit by Art. 14. The impugned section cannot be struck down on the infirmity either of discrimination or illegal classification.\n\nConfining as it does to certain classes of goods seized by the customs authorities on the reasonable belief that they are smuggled goods, there is only a presumption which can be rebutted.\n\nIn these circumstances, there can be no doubt whatever that s. 178-A does not offend Art. 14 of the\n\nConstitmion and this petition 1s, therefore, to be dismissed with costs.\n\nPetition dismissed.\n\nMENAKURU DASARATHARAMI REDD!\n\nti.\n\nDUDDUKURU SUBBA RAO\n\n(S. R.\n\nDAS C.J., fAFER\n\nIMAM,\n\nGAJENDRACADKAR and A. K. SARKAR JJ.)\n\nHindu [Aw-Charitable Endowment-Compromise decree- Corutruction-Trust or charge-Intention of the donor-Test.\n\nA Hindu father executed a registered deed of trust giviug away his properties to public charities and appointed himself and two others as trustees.\n\nThe .son in assertion by his right to a moiety share therein started to alienate them.\n\nThere was litigation between the trustees and the son which ultimately ended in a compromise decree for .partition bet\\\\een the father and the !'011, the two other trustees having retired pending litigation.\n\nA ftei\n\nthe death of both the father and the son a suit was brought under ~~\n\ns. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the framing of a scheme for the administration of the trust. The trial court held that the trust deed had been substituted by the compromise decree which itself created a trust and decreed the suit on that basis. On appeal by two of the defendants who were transferees in possession of some of the properties in suit, the High Court affirmed the decision of the trial court holding that the compromise decree created a trust for public charities in respect of the properties aJlotted to the third plaintiff, meaning the father.\n\nThe said defendants appealed to this Court.\n\nThe principal question for decision was one of construction of the compromise decree, whether it created a trust or a charge. The relevant terms of the compromise decree were as foJlows:-\n\n\"that as regards the aforesaid schedule property, the third plaintiff should be the 'sole trustee' tiJI his lifetime for the purpose of conducting the charities described in the trust deed, dated 17th March, 1919, and he should utilise the income derived therefrom for the charities according to the necessity and should enjoy the said property tiJI his lifetime without rights to gift, sale etc., therein ;\n\nthat after his death, the said entire property should pass on to his grandson Ramalingeswara Rao subject to the (performance of) the aforesaid kainkaryams (charities);\n\nthat if the third plaintiff should die before the expiry of the minority of the aforesaid Ramalingeswara Rao arrangement should be made fo have a guardian appointed through Court for the property made to pa.ss to the said Ramalingeswara- Rao, the said guatdian should take possession of th~ property and conduct the aforesaid charities and deliver possession of the same to the said Ramalingeswara Rao as soon as the minor attains majority ;\n\nthat, thereafter the said Ramalingeswara Rao should conduct the abovementioned charities and enjoy the properties :\"\n\nHeld, that the courts below were in error in construing the compromise decree m the way they did and the appeal must succeed.\n\nThere can be no doubt from the terms of the compromise decree read as a whole that what was intended to be created was a charge and not a trust in respect of the properties allotted to the father which retained their private character.\n\nThe principles of Hindu Law applicable to questions relating to charitable trust are weJI settled.\n\nWhether or not a dedication to charity is complete must depend on the intention of the donor which has to be gathered from the terms of the document in any particular case read as a whole. If the dedication is complete, a trust is created, if not, a charge follows.\n\nThe mere use of the word 'trust' or 'trustee' cannot by itself be conclusive as to the intention of the donor and the real test is whether private title\n\nMmakuru Dasaratharami Reddi\n\nDuddukuru Subba RM\n\nI957\n\nMenakuru Dasara\n\ntharami &ddi\n\nDuddukuru Subba Rao\n\nSUPREME COURT-REPORTS [1957]\n\nover the property is sought to be extinguished by a complete transfer of it to the charity.\n\nMaharani Hemanta Kuman' Debi v. Gauri Shankar Tewari,\n\n(1940) L.R. 68 I.A. 53, fadu Nath Singh v. Thakur Sita Ramii,\n\n(1917) L.R. 44 I.A. 187, Pande Har Narayan v. Suria Kumvari,\n\n(1921) L.R. 48 I.A. 143, Sonotun Bysock v. Sreemuti fuggulsoondree Dossee, 8 Moo. L.A. 66 and Copa/ Lal Sett v. Purna Chanrlra Bosak. (1921) L.R. 49 I.A. 100, applied .\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 185 of 1952.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated December 15, 1948, of the Madras High Court in Appeal No. 155 of 1946 arising out of the decree dated October 27, 1945, in Original Suit No. 132 of 1944.\n\nAlladi Kuppuswami and M. S. K. Sastri, for the appellants.\n\nT. V. R. Tatachari and T. M. Sen, for respondent No. 4.\n\n1957. May 10. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGajenJ, agadkar J.\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR J.-This is an appeal by defendants 47 and 48 and the principal question which is raised for our decision in the appeal is whether the properties in suit are the subject matter of public charitable trust or are merely burdened or charged with the obligation in favour of the specified charities.\n\nThe suit from which this appeal arises was filed with the sanction of the Collector under s. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the plaintiffs alleged that the properties in suit were the subject-matter of a public charitable trust and that a scheme may be framed for the administration of the said trust.\n\nThe present appellants who are in possession of a substantial portion of the properties in suit as alienees have resisted this claim. They conceded that the properties in their hands were subject to the charge in favour of the charities but they denied that the said properties were the subject-matter of a charitable trust.\n\nSeveral other pleas were made by the parties but the principal question in dispute between them was in regard to the character of the properties in suit.\n\nBoth the learned\n\n\\ .\n\ntrial judge and the High Court of Madras have upheld the plaintiff's plea. lt has been declared that the properties in question are trust properties and a direction has been issued that a scheme of management should be framed in respect of the trust with a view to carry out the charitable intentions of the settlor. It is this decree which is challenged before us by Mr. Alladi Kuppuswami on behalf of defendants 47 and 48 and his argument is that the view taken by the Courts below about the character of the properties is based upon a misconstruction of the decree in question.\n\nIn the plaint, it was alleged that one Purushottam had been earning and purchasing large properties and endowing and dedicating them for public charitable purpose since 1896.\n\nIn about 1919 Purushottam who had then become old wanted to place the charities which he had been till then personally administering on a permanent and enduring basis. That is why he executed and registered a deed of trust on March 17,\n\n1919. By this document, a trust in respect of his properties was created and three trustees were appointed to administer the trust.\n\nPurushottam himself was one of these trustees and two Advocates, Mr. Reballa Subbarayudu and Mr. C. Viswana1iha Rao, were his co-trustees. It would appear , that -Purushottam's son Ramakrishnayya did not approve of this arrangement and he began to obstruct the administration of the trust.\n\nAs a result of this obstructive attitude adopted by Ramakrishnayya, two suits had to be filed by the trustees against Ramakrishnayya and his associates who interfered with the management of the trust. These two suits were O.S. No. 599 of 1919 and O.S. No. 68 of 1920 on the files of the District'' Munsiff's Court, Kavali, and the District Court, Nellore, respectively.\n\nThey were subsequently transferred to the Sub-Court, Nellore, and numbered as O.S. No. 39 of 1921 and O.S. No. 67 of 1921 in the said Court.\n\nPending the hearing of these suits, the two advocatestrustees withdrew from the suits leaving the conduct of the suits solely in charge of Purushottam. Ultimately the two suits ended in a compromise. According to the plaint in the present suit out of the which this\n\nMenakuru Dasara.. _tharami Rtddi\n\nDuddu!curu Suhha Rao\n\nGajendragadkar J,\n\nMenakuru Dasaratharami FUdJi\n\nv Duddukuru Subba Rao\n\nGajendragadkar 7.\n\n1126 SuPREME COURT REPORTS [1957]\n\nappeal has arisen, this compromise decree was fraudulent and collusive the object of the parties being to efface the character of the trust properties completely and to create individual rights in Purushottam, his son Ramakrishnayya and the other defendents who claimed to be alienees from Ramakrishnayya. The plaint even alleged that, in persuading the Court to pass the said compromise decree, the parties effectively played fraud on the Court and the trust. Since the compromise was thus null and void, it cannot affect the original trust created by Purushottam in 1919.\n\nThat is why the plaint alleged that the properties mentioned in sch. A which were covered by the original deed ot trust of 1919 were trust properties and asked in substance for the framing of a scheme for the administration of the said trust.\n\nAt the date of this suit both Purushottam and his son Ramakrishnayya were dead.\n\nRamakrishnayya's son Ramalingeswara Rao was therefore impleaded as defendant No. I. A large number of defendants fod to be impleaded to the suit because the properties had been alienated both by Ramakrishnayya and Ramalingeswara Rao _to several purchasers.\n\nDefendants 47 and 48 were two of such purchasers. On June 7, 1942, an agreement of sale by defendant No. 1 in favour of\n\ndefendants 47 and 48 was executed and a decree for specific performance was ultimately passed in their favour. It was then that defendants 47 and 48 were impleaded to this suit on January 3, 1944.\n\nThese defendants substantially adopted the defence raised by the other contesting defendants who were already on the record. The principal contention raised on their behalf was that the compromise decree was not fraudulent or collusive, that it represented a fair and bona fide familv settlement between Purushottam and his son\n\nRmakrishnayya and as such the decree was binding\n\naginst Purushottam and tbe trust alleged to have been created by him in 1919.\n\nOn the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial judge framed ten issues. He found that the suit was competent, that the compromise decree was not shown\n\n. '\n\nto be collusive or fraudulent and it was binding on the -'\n\n( \"\n\ntrust.\n\nEven so, the said compromise decree itself created a trust in favour of public charities and in respect of the properties which had been allotted by the compromise decree to the share of Purushottam. It would be noticed that according to the plaint the trust for the administration of which a scheme was claimed by the plaintiffs was the trust created by Purushottam in 1919. Since the learned trial judge held that this trust deed had been effectively substituted . by the arrangement evidenced in the compromise decree, he proceeded to consider the effect of this compromise decree and since he thought that this compromise decree itself created a trust in substitution of the original trust of 1919 he proceeded to pass a decree in favour of the plaintiffs in respect of the substituted trust. This decree was passed on October 27, 1945. The matter was taken to the High Court of Madras by defendants 47 and 48.\n\nOn December 15, 1948, the appeal preferred by defendants 47 and 48 w:i.s dismissed and the decree passed by the trial Court w:is confirmed. The learned Judges of the High Court of Madras dealt substanfr11ly with the question of the construction of the compromise decree and, since they came to the conclusion that the said decree constitutrd a publi.c charitable trust in respect 'of the propertie~ assigned to the share of Purushottam, they saw no reason to interfere with the decree under appeal. Two other points were raised before the High Court. They were, whether the obligation arising out of the trust is annexed to the property that fell to the sh:ire of Purushottam under the compromise decree and whether the said decree was collusive and not binding on the trust. The High Court took the view that, since the compromise decree itself created a trust and it was possible to give relief to the plaintiffs on that view, it \"vas not necessary to consider the said two points.\n\nDefendants 47 and 48 then preferred the present appeal to this Court.\n\nBy our interlocutory judgment on March 30, 1955, we sent the case back to the High Court of Andhra with the direction that they should record their findings on the two additional points which were urged before them but on which they thought it\n\nMenak\"\"' Dasaralharami &ddi\n\nDuddukuro Subba Rao\n\nGaj1ndragadkar ].\n\nMtnakuru Dasara~\n\ntharami Reddi\n\nDuddukuru Subba Rao\n\nGajendragadkat\n\nunnecessary to make findings.\n\nIn pursuance of this interlocutory judgment, the High Court of Andhra to whom the proceedings were transferred owing to the creation of the new State of Andhra have now recorded their findings on the two issues in question. They have held that the obligation in question is annexed to the property that felt to the share of Purushottam under the compromise decree and they have found that the said compromise decree was not collusive and was binding on the trust.\n\nThat is how the principal question which we have to consider in the present appeal is the construction of the compromise decree in question.\n\nThe principles of Hindu Law applicable to the consideration of questions of dedication of property to charity are well settled. Dedication to charity need not necessarily be by instrument or grant. It can be established by cogent and satisfactory evidence of conduct of the parties and user of the property which show the extinction of the private secular character of the property and is complete dedication to charity.\n\nOn the other hand, in many cases Courts have to deal with grants or gifts showing dedication of property to charity. Now it is clear that dedication of a property to religious or charitable purposes may be either complete or partial. If the dedication is complete, a trust in favour of public religious charity is created. If the dedication is partial, a trust in favour of the charity is not created but a charge in favour of the charity is attached to, and follows, the property which retains its original privote and secular character. Whether or not dedication is complete would naturally be a question of fact to be determined in each case in the light of the meterial terms used in the document. In such cases it is always a matter of ascertaining the true intention of the parties; it is obvious that such intention must he gather on a fair ancl rca,.on:ible construction of the document considered as a whole.\n\nThe use of the vvord \"trustn or \"trustee\" is no douht of some help in determining such intention ; but the mere use of such words cannot be treated as decisive of the matter. Is the private title over the property intended '\n\nto be completely extinguished ? Is the title in regard to the property intended to -be completely transferred to the charity? The answer to these questions can be found not by concentrating on the significance of the use of the word \"trustee\" or \"trust\" alone but by gathering the true intent of the document consider, ed as a whole. In some cases where documents purport to dedicate property in favour of public charity, provision is made for the maintenance of the worshipper who may be a member of the family of the original owner of the property himself and in such cases the question often arises whether the provision for the maintenance of the manager or the worshipper from the income of the property indicates an intention that the property should retain its original character and should merely be burdened with an obligation in favour of the charity. If the income of the property is substantially intended to be used for the purpose of the charity and only an insignificant and minor portion of it is allowed to be used for the maintenance of the worshipper or the manager, it may be possible to take the view that dedication is complete. If, on the other hand, for the maintenance of public charity a minor portion of the income is expected or required to be used and a substantial surplus is left in the hands of the manager or worshipper for his own private purposes, it would be difficult to accept the theory of complete dedication. It is naturally difficult to lay down a general rule for the solution of the problem. Each case mmt be considered on its facts and the intention of the parties must be determined on reading the document as a whole.\n\nIn Maharani Hemanta Kumari Debi v.\n\nGauri Shankar Tewari and Others(1 ), Sir George Rankin, who delivered the judgment of the Board has observed, \"In the usual case of complete dedication made to an idol, for example, the property ceases altogether to belong to the donor, and becomes vested in the idol as a juristic person. Complete relinquishment by the owner of his proprietary right is, however, by no means the only form of dedication known to Hindu law, and is\n\n. (1) (1940) L. R. 68 I. A. 53, 63.\n\n6-81 S. C. India/ 59\n\nMmakuru Dasaralharami Reddi\n\nDuddukuru Subba Rao\n\nGajtndragadkar J.\n\nMenakuru Dasaralharami Reddi\n\nV, Dwidukuru.\n\nSuhba Rao\n\neGojtndragadkar J.\n\nvery different from anything that could ordinarily be inferred from the public user of a highway. From the standpoint of the Hindu law 'it is not essential to a valid dedication that the legal title should pass from the owner, nor is it. inconsistent with an effectual dedicarjon that the owner should continue to make any and all uses of the land which do not interfere with the uses for which it is dedicated' per Mookeriee J. in Chairman of the Howrah.\n\nMunicipality v.\n\nKhetra Krishna Mitra(')\". The learned Judge has further added that when the dedication is only partial the property in some parts of India might none the less in common parlance be described as debotter, but whether it be charged with a sum of money for the worship of an idol, or be subjected to a right of limited user on the part of the public, it would descend and be alienable in the ordinary way. The only difference, as Mr. Mayne ohserves, is that it passes with it a charge upon it.\n\nIn fadu Nath Singh v. Thakur Sita Ramji(') the Privy Council was dealing with a deed of dedication which prpvided that after the death of the grantor certain female members of his family should succeed him as managers, that half the income should be enjoyed by the managers without power of alienation, that upon the death of the named managers the Government should become manager and the whole net income should then be applied to the expenses of the temple. The Privy Council held that the deed was a valid endowment of the whole property to the temple and that the donor had no rights in it against either the idol or the managers. Dealing with the argument hat in the hands of the female members of the ;:ranwr's family liberty was given to the said members to en1oy half the income, Lord Haldane observed that \"If the income of the property had been brge, a question might have been raised, in the circumstanc<:s, as throwing some doubt upon the integrity of the settlor's intention, but, as the entire income is only 800 rupees, it is obvious that the payment to these ladies is of the most trifling kind, and certainly not an amount which one would expect in a case of that kind.\" Lord\n\n(1) (19o6) 4 Cal. L. J. 343, 3¥J,\n\n(•) (1917) L. R. 44 I. A, 187, 190.\n\nHaldane then emphasized the clear expression of the initial intention of the donor to apply the whole estate of the donor to the benefit of the temple and he added that the rest is only a gift to the idol sub modo by a direction that of the whole which had already been given part is to be applied for the upkeep of the idol itself and the repair of the temple and the other is to go for the upkeep of the managers. That is how in the end it was held that the document showed complete dedication in favour of the idol.\n\nIn Pande Har Narayan v. Surja Kunwari( 1 ), the Privy Council has observed that in determining whether the will of a Hindu gives the testator's estate to a11 idol subject to the charge in favour of the heirs of the testator or makes the gift to the idol a charge upon the estate, there is no fixed rule depending upon the use of particular terms in the will. The question depends upon the construction of the will as a whole.\n\nIn this particular case, thougli the will had provided that the property of the testator shall be considered to be property of a certain idol, there were further provisions which showed that the residue after defraying the expenses of the temple shall be used by the testator's legal heirs to meet their own expenses and it appeared that only a small proportion of the total income could be utilised for the idol whereas a large balance was available to the heirs. On these facts, it was held by the Privy Council that the intention disclosed by the document was that the heirs should take the property subject to the charge for the performance of the religious purposes named in the will.\n\nLord Shaw, who delivered the judgment of the Board, cited with approval the earlier observations of Turuer L. J. in Sonatun Bysack v.\n\nSreemuti Juggutsoondree Dossee( 2 ). Turner L. J. had stated: \"although the will purports to begin with an absolute gift in favour of the idol, it is plain that the testator contemplated that there was to be some distribution of the property according as events might turn out; and that he did not intend to give this property absolutely to the idol seems to their Lordships to be clear from the directions •·\n\n(t) (1921) L. R. 48 I. A. 143.\n\n(2) 8 Moo. I. A. 66.\n\nMenakuru DaJaratharami Reddi v.\n\nDuddukuru Subba Rao\n\nGajendragadkar ].\n\nM1nakuru Dasarath4'ami &ddi\n\nDuJdulauu Subba Rao\n\nGafendragailkar ].\n\nwhich are contained in the various clauses of the will.\"\n\nSimilarly, Gapal Lal Sett v. Purna Chandra Basak('), the Privy Council held that the will of the Hindu testatrix with which they were concerned in this case conferred the properties specified on the grandson charged with the maintenance of the worship but that no shebaitship was created. The will in question had provided that out of the income of the specified property, her grandson should perform the worship of certain family idols and that he should be in charge of the worship. The will contained no gift, express or implied, to the idols, and there was no provision for the worship after the death of the grandson. It is in the light of these decisions that we will have to construe the compromise decree in the present case.\n\nBefore considering the terms of the compromise decree, however, it would be relevant to mention some more facts, After Purushottam had executed a deed of trust in 1919, troubles arose in his own family.\n\nHis son apparently began to assert his share in the property which was the subject-matter of the said trust and he actually started to alienate his alleged undivided share in the said property. That indeed was the genesis of the two suits initially filed by the three trustees in 1919-1920.\n\nIn O.S. No. 39 of 1921 itself, an alternative claim appears to have been made by Purushottam when he was left in sole charge of the suit after the withdrawal from the suit bv his co-trustees. He claimed a declaration that hewas entitled to recover the possession of the property as mentioned in sch. A and A-1 of the claim, or, in the alternative, that he should be declared to be entitled to the title of the property jointly with his son Ramakrishnayya and the partition in the two shares of the same may be directed and he may be put in possession of such property as would fall to his share.\n\nIn other words, the first claim was based on the validity of the original trust deed created by Purushottam and the second was based on the assumption that the trust was not valid, that the property, the subject-matter of the said trust was liable to be divided between\n\n(1) (1921) L. R. 49 I. A. JOO-\n\nPurushottam and his son and a prayer was made that Purushottam should be allotted his share by a partition of all the property by metes and bounds. As a result of the compromise decree passed in this suit, the property over which Purushottam had created a trust in 1919 was divided between himself and his son Ramakrishnayya and some of the property which was not included in the trust deed of 1919 but which was also the subject-matter of the suit itself was allotted to the share of Purushottam. The property thus allotted to the share of Purushottam formed part of sch. I and it is in respect of this property that a public charitable trust has been created according to the findings of the Courts below. For the appellants, it is urged before us that this view is erroneous. We will now consider the relevant terms of the compromise decree. Clause ( 1) of the decree provides that the property described in sch. I attached to the decree should go to the share of the third plaintiff, viz., Purushottam. It appears that four items included in sch. I had been sold by defendant 1 to defendants 13 and 14; These alienees, however, agreed to give up their claim in respect of these properties. Clause\n\n( 1) then reads as follows :\n\n\"that as regards the aforesaid schedule property, the third plaintiff should be the 'sole trustee' till his lifetime for the purpose of conducting the charities described in the trust deed, dated 17th March, 1919, and he should utilise the income derived therefrom, for the charities according to the necessity and should enjoy the said property till his lifetime without rights to gift, sale etc., therein; that after his death, the said entire property should pass on to his grandson Ramalingeswara Rao subject to the (performance of) the aforesaid kaink; iryams (charities) ; that if the third plaintiff should die before the expiry of the minority of the aforesaid Ramalingeswara Rao arrangement should be made to have a guardian appointed through Court for the property made to pass to the said Ramalingeswara Rao the . said . guardian should take possession of the property\n\nMena!cuTu Da1aralharami Reddi\n\nDuddukuru SrdJba R01.10\n\nGajmdragadkar J,\n\nMenakuru DtUara\n\ntlsarami Reddi\n\nDudduku.ru Subba Rao\n\nGajendragadkar J.\n\nand conduct the aforesaid charities and deliver possession of the same to the said Ramalingeswara Rao as soon as the minor attains majority; that, thereafter the said Ramalingeswara Rao should conduct the abovementioned charities and enjoy the properties;\"\n\nThen els. (2) and (3) deal with the claims of defendant 1 and defendants 10, 11 and 12.\n\nClause (4) directs that the properties allotted to the share of the third plaintiff should be immediately delivered to him by the defendants; and cl. (5) provides that the third plaintiff should give up all other claims in respect of the suit and the parties should bear their own respective costs.\n\nAt this stage it may be relevant to refer to the particulars of charities for whose benefit admittedly the decretal provision in cl. (1) has been made.\n\nThese particulars are mentioned m para. 6 of the original deed 'of trust and it 1s not disputed that the burden imposed by cl. ( 1) of the decree ts m favour of the same charities. These charities are nme m number and they are thus enumerated m the deed of trust :\n\n\"(1) In the choultry constructed m the land m Survey No. 81, all persons who pass to and fro m Doranala Road, should be given drinks to quench thirst, everyday two brahmin travellers should be given food at noon.\n\n(2) For the purpose of Mahanaivaidyam (food offering) taking place every night to Sree Malleswaraswami Varn enshrined m the aforesaid Damaramadugu village, 12 tooms of paddy and Rs. 6 m cash should be given to the trustee of the said Devasthanam.\n\n(3) During the time of Brahmotsavam of Sri Malleswaraswami and Sri Kamakshi Thayi Garn, m Jonnavada which 1s taking place every year, Rs. 10\n\n(rupees ten) should be paid every year m respect of the Ravana Seva Ubbavam that is being conducted by the Darnaramadugu villagers. ( 4) During the Brahmotsavam time of Sri Jonnavada Kamakshi Thayi that takes place every year, ill\n\nRs. 40 (rupees forty) should be spent for 'Ekanthaseva' and the trustees should be present and see that the said Ubbayam is properly conducted.\n\n(5) Rs. 12 should be paid every year towards Deeparadhana expenses during nights to Sri Veeranjaneyaswami Varu enshrined m Pata Santhapeta, Nellore, to the trustee of the said Devasthanam.\n\n(6) From out of the said fund, Rs. 42 per year should be paid to poor Brahmin boys reading in classes commencing from fourth form and upward m the High School, towards the school fees. Now, this amount shall be paid to Amperayani Venkatakrishnayya who is reading in the Kurnool School, till he stops his study; and after he stops his study, the then trustees are hereby empowered to give the money to a poor Brahmin boy whom they consider as the suitable recipient.\n\n(7) If there should be difference of opinion, on any. matter relating to the management of the aforesaid charities, the opm1on of the majority trustees shall prevail and it will be given effect to.\n\n(8) The trustees shall exercise all powers in the matter of the management of these charities, viz., to appoint the necessary staff~ to remove them; to suspend them; to impose fine; and to make all arrangements for the staff to discharge their duties efficiently.\n\n(9) The trustees are fully empowered to now and then grant cowles in respect of the schedule-mentioned property to individuals and to have muchilikas executed and m the event of any disputes arising at any time through any person, in respect of the said property, to institute and conduct suitable proceedings in proper Courts, to get over such disputes; and also to incur the necessary expenditure from out of the income from the aforesaid endowments.\" It would be clear that cl. ( 1) of the compromise decree is the foundation of the theory that a public\n\ntrust had been created m respect of the properties allotted to the share of Purushottam. In dealing with this clause; the High Court of Madras appears to have attached considerable importance to the fact that\n\nMenakuru Dasaratharami Reddi\n\nv, Duddu/curu Subba Rao\n\nGagendragadkar J.\n\nMtnakun1 D01ara\n\nlharami &Jdi\n\nDuddulc\"\"' Subba Rao\n\nGagtndragadkar ].\n\nPurushottam had already, m unequivocal terms, expressed his intention to create a trust of his own properties in 1919. There is no doubt that the document of 1919 creates a public charitable trust. In construing cl. (1) of the compromise decree, the learned Judges of the High Court of Madras appear to have assumed that this clause was really intended to confirm the earlier creation of the trust though in respect of different properties.\n\nWith respect, in making this assumption, the learned Judges appear to have overlooked the sharp distinction between the words used in the trust deed of 1919 and in cl. ( 1) of the compromise decree.\n\nThe trust deed had appointed three trustees and by cl. (12) had specifically provided that the amounts described in the schedule and the income that will increase and accrue in future shall be utilised for the above charities onlv and it shall not be used for private purposes.\n\nIn oiher words, cl.\n\n(12) emphatically prohibits the use of the income from the proprty for any private purpose and in terms dedicates entirely the whole of the property and its income for public charitable purposes. Clause (3) of the trust deed had appointed three trustees, had provided for the management of the trust' and the keeping of the accounts.\n\nUnder this clause, all the trustees should join together and hold a meeting once a month in the choultry and examine the accounts and consider the other details of management. The deed has further provided for the appointment of other trustees in case of vacancy occurring either by death or resignation.\n\nNow let us look at cl. ( 1) in the compromise decree. It is true that the third plaintiff is described in this clause as the sole trustee till his lifetime. It is also true that, as the sole trustee, he is allowed to enjoy the said property till his lifetime \"without rights to gift, sale etc., in the same.\" The use of the word \"sole trustee\" is no doubt relevant and its full effect must be taken into account but its significance cannot be exagger'ated.\n\nIt is really difficult to understand how a sole trustee could enjoy the property. The enjoyment of the property inevitably suggests the right to enjoy the property in one's right and this notion is not easily\n\nreconcilable with the theory of complete dedication of the property in favour of charity. Even so, we will assume that the use of the word \"sole trustee\" is a factor in favour of the plaintiffs. In the same clause, there is, however, another indication which is inconsistent with this theory of complete dedication.\n\nThe income of the property has to be utilised for charities according to the necessity. The contrast between this provision and the provision in cl. (12) of the earlir.{ deed of trust is obvious. Whereas, under the earlier deed the whole of the income had to be utilised only for the purpose of charity, under cl. (1) of the decree a part of the income is to be utilised according to the need of the charity. Then, after the death of Purushottam, the clause provides that the property should pass on to his grandson Ramalingeswara Rao subject to the purpose of the aforesaid charities. The notion that the property has to pass from Purushottam to Ramalingeswara Rao is consistent with Purushottam's title to the property and is inconsistent with the title of the idol in the said property. This clause about the \n\nBlragwali].\n\nJanuary 3(}.\n\nRotan Rai\n\nv.\n\nStak -0/ Bihar\n\nreference to be incompetent and found the appellants guilty . and convicted them. ·\n\nHeld, that in a reference under s. 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure it \\Vas the duty of counsel to place, and -it was incumbent on the High Court to consider, the entire evidence and the charge as framed and placed before the jury and to come to its own conclusion, after giving due weight to the opiniOn of the trial Judge andthe ve_rdict of the jury,- nd to acquit or convict the accused of the offences of which the jury could have conYicted or acquitted him.\n\nIt_ was wrong of the High Court to pass\n\njudgent without cosidering the entire evidence.\n\nIt is not proper for the Supreme Court to adopt the procedure of considering the entire evidence and come to a conclusion which according to the provisions Of s. 307(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure the High Court should have done.\n\nAkhlakali Hayatalli v. The State of Bombay, (1954) S.C.R. 435 and Ramanugrah Singh v. The Emperor, A.l.R. 1946\n\nP.C. 151, referred to.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE\n\nJURISDICTION ·: Criminal Appeal No. 104 of 1955.\n\nAppeal by special leave . from the judgment and order dated September 9, 1953, of the Patna High Court in Jury Reference No. 1 of 1952 arising out of the Reference made on February 16, 1952, by the Assistant Sessions Judge, 2nd Court, Chapra, in connection with Sessions Trial No. 81 of 1951.\n\ns: P. Verma, for the appellants Nos. 2 and 3.\n\nB. K. Saran and R. C. Prasad, for the respondent.\n\n1957. January 30. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI J.-The appellants Nos. 2 . and 3, who are the surviving appellants after the deat)i of appellant No. 1 during the pendency of this appeal, were charged with having committed offences. under ss. 435 and 436 -0£ the Indian Penal Code and were tried by the Second Assistant Sessions Judge of Saran, Chapra, with the aid of a jury. The jury returned a majority verdict that both of them were guilty of the offences under those sections. The Assistant Sessions Judge disagreed with the said verdict and made a zeference to the High Court of Judicature at Patna\n\nunder s. 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The said reference was heard by a Division Bench of that High Court. The learned judges of the High Court overruled the contentions which were urged before them in regard to the charge to the jury being defective and further held that the reference was, in the circumstances, not competent. They, however, without anything more accepted the majority verdict and held the appellants guilty of the offences under ss. 435 and 436 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced them to six months' rigorous imprisonment each. The appeltants obtained from this Court special leave to appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitution and hence this appeal.\n\nThe facts leading up to this appeal may be shortly stated as follows :-There was a dispute between the parties as to title to plot No. llOO of village Rampur, Tel}grahi. One Kailash Rai claimed to be the owner of that plot and also claimed to be in possession of a Palani standing in a portion of that plot as also of a\n\nPunjaul, i.e., a haystack in its vicinity. There had been proceedings under s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in regard to this area leading up to a title suit being T.S. No. 58/8 of 1948/50 filed by Kailash Rai against the appellants in regard to the same. A decree had been passed on December 16, 1950, in that title suit dismissing the claim of Kailash Rai. An appeal had been filed by Kailash Rai against that decree and that appeal was pending at the date of the occurrence.\n\nOn March 4, 1951, Kailash Rai was sitting in the Palani and at about 3 to 4 p.m. a mob consisting of about 100 to 125 persons including the appellants all armed with lathis, bhallas and pharsas came to the Palani and began to demolish. the same.\n\nKailash Rai remonstrated and the deceased appellant No. 1 ordered that the Palani should be set on fire.\n\nThe appellant No. 2 thereupon set fire to the Palani with a match stick and the appellant No. 3 set fire to the Punjaul. The first information report of this occurrence was lodged at Gopalganj Police Station at 8 p.m. the same night. The officer in charge of Gopalganj Police Station investigated the case and\n\n19sr\n\nRotan Rai v.\n\nState of Bihar\n\nBhagwati J.\n\ni9S7\n\nRolan Roi\n\nv. $iott •f iluw\n\nBhagwati].\n\nchallaned the appellants charging them with having committed offences under ss. 435 and 436 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe Committing Court found a prima facie case made out against the appellants and sent them up for trial by the Assistant Sessions Judge, Second Court, Chapra, who tried them by a jury. The jury returned a majoritv verdict of guilty against the appellants.\n\nThe Assistant Sessions Judge, however, disagreed with that verdict and made a reference to the High Court stating in the letter of reference that on the evidence recorded before him the appellants had been in possession of the Palani and the Punjaul but were dispossessed of the same some time prior to the passing of the decree in the title suit on December 16, 1950, and were therefore justified in taking steps for recovery of possession thereof from Kailash Rai on March 4, 1951, and if in that process the appellants set fire to the Palani and the Punjaul they were only destroying their own property and were not guilty of the offence of committing mischief by fire as alleged by the prosecution.\n\nThe Assistant Sessions Judge tried to analyse the working of the minds of the jury in arriving at the verdict which they did and though he agreed with the alleged finding of fact reached by the jury in regard to the possession of the Palani and the Punjaul, disagreed with the law as allegedly applied by the jury and therefore disagreed with the majority verdict.\n\nWhen the reference was heard before the High Court, the counsel for the appellants only contended that the charge addressed by the Assistant Sessions Judge to the jury was defective and he did not invite the High Court, as he should have done, to consider the entire evidence and to acquit or convict the appellants of the offences of which the jury could have convicted them upon the charges framed and placed before it, after giving due weight to the opinions of the learned Sessions , Judge and the jury as required by s. 307(3) of the. Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court, therefore, only considered the obiections which had been urged by the learned counsel for the appellants . before it in regard to the charge being defective and\n\noverruled them, accepted the majority venlict, convicted the appellants and sentenced them as abm e.\n\nWe are of opinion that in so doing the High Court was clearly in error and acted in violation of the provisions of s. 307(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nSection 307(3) provides:-\n\n\"In dealing with the case so submitted the High Court may exercise any of the powers which it may exercise on an appeal, and subject thereto it shall, after considering the entire evidence and after giving due weight to the opinions of the Sessions Judge and tlie jury, acquit or convict such accused of any offence of\n\nwiuch the jury could have convicted him upon th~ charge framed and placed before it; and, if it convics him, may pass such sentence as might have bern passed by the Court of Sessions.\"\n\nWe had occasion to consider this prov!S!on in Akhlakali Hayatalli v. The State of Br>mbay (1 ) where we approved of the following observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Ramanugrah Singh v. The Emperor ( 2 ):\n\n. \"The powers of the High Court in dealing with the reference are contained in sub-section (3). It may exercise any of the powers which it might exercise upon an appeal, and this includes the power to call fresh evidence conferred by s. 428. The Court must consider the whole case and give due weight to the opinions of the Sessions Judge and jury, and then acquit or convict the accused. In their Lordships' view, the paramount consideration in the High Court must be whether the ends of justice require that the verdict of the jury should be set aside. In general, if the evidence is such that it can properly support a verdict either of guilty, or not guilty, according to the view taken of it by the trial Court, and if the jury take one view of• the evidence and the judge thinks that they should have taken the other, the view of the jury must prevail, since they are the judges of fact.\n\nIn such a case a reference is not justified, and it is onlv by accepting their view that the High Court can give \n\nBlragwali]."}}, {"text": "Rotan Rai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2031, "end_char": 2040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rotan Rai\n\nv.\n\nStak -0/ Bihar\n\nreference to be incompetent and found the appellants guilty .", "canonical_name": "Rotan Rai"}}, {"text": "s. 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2179, "end_char": 2185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2193, "end_char": 2219, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2731, "end_char": 2744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not proper for the Supreme Court to adopt the procedure of considering the entire evidence and come to a conclusion which according to the provisions Of s. 307(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure the High Court should have done."}}, {"text": "s. 307(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2865, "end_char": 2874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2882, "end_char": 2908, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3236, "end_char": 3252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "from the judgment and order dated September 9, 1953, of the Patna High Court in Jury Reference No."}}, {"text": "P. Verma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3447, "end_char": 3455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s: P. Verma, for the appellants Nos."}}, {"text": "B. K. Saran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3491, "end_char": 3502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. K. Saran and R. C. Prasad, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. C. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3507, "end_char": 3519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. K. Saran and R. C. Prasad, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "ss. 435 and 436", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3803, "end_char": 3818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3827, "end_char": 3844, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4135, "end_char": 4168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Assistant Sessions Judge disagreed with the said verdict and made a zeference to the High Court of Judicature at Patna\n\nunder s. 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure."}}, {"text": "s. 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4176, "end_char": 4182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4190, "end_char": 4216, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 435 and 436", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4629, "end_char": 4644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4652, "end_char": 4669, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4802, "end_char": 4810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rampur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5006, "end_char": 5012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "llOO of village Rampur, Tel}grahi."}}, {"text": "Tel}grahi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5014, "end_char": 5023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "llOO of village Rampur, Tel}grahi."}}, {"text": "Kailash Rai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5029, "end_char": 5040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Kailash Rai claimed to be the owner of that plot and also claimed to be in possession of a Palani standing in a portion of that plot as also of a\n\nPunjaul, i.e., a haystack in its vicinity."}}, {"text": "s. 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5252, "end_char": 5258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5266, "end_char": 5292, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "December 16, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5469, "end_char": 5486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A decree had been passed on December 16, 1950, in that title suit dismissing the claim of Kailash Rai."}}, {"text": "March 4, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5667, "end_char": 5680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 4, 1951, Kailash Rai was sitting in the Palani and at about 3 to 4 p.m. a mob consisting of about 100 to 125 persons including the appellants all armed with lathis, bhallas and pharsas came to the Palani and began to demolish."}}, {"text": "Gopalganj Police Station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6276, "end_char": 6300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The officer in charge of Gopalganj Police Station investigated the case and\n\n19sr\n\nRotan Rai v.\n\nState of Bihar\n\nBhagwati J.\n\ni9S7\n\nRolan Roi\n\nv. $iott •f iluw\n\nBhagwati]."}}, {"text": "Rolan Roi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6383, "end_char": 6392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The officer in charge of Gopalganj Police Station investigated the case and\n\n19sr\n\nRotan Rai v.\n\nState of Bihar\n\nBhagwati J.\n\ni9S7\n\nRolan Roi\n\nv. $iott •f iluw\n\nBhagwati].", "canonical_name": "Rotan Rai"}}, {"text": "iott", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6398, "end_char": 6402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The officer in charge of Gopalganj Police Station investigated the case and\n\n19sr\n\nRotan Rai v.\n\nState of Bihar\n\nBhagwati J.\n\ni9S7\n\nRolan Roi\n\nv. $iott •f iluw\n\nBhagwati]."}}, {"text": "ss. 435 and 436", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6500, "end_char": 6515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6523, "end_char": 6540, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Palani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7028, "end_char": 7034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Assistant Sessions Judge, however, disagreed with that verdict and made a reference to the High Court stating in the letter of reference that on the evidence recorded before him the appellants had been in possession of the Palani and the Punjaul but were dispossessed of the same some time prior to the passing of the decree in the title suit on December 16, 1950, and were therefore justified in taking steps for recovery of possession thereof from Kailash Rai on March 4, 1951, and if in that process the appellants set fire to the Palani and the Punjaul they were only destroying their own property and were not guilty of the offence of committing mischief by fire as alleged by the prosecution."}}, {"text": "s. 307(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8393, "end_char": 8402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8411, "end_char": 8437, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 307(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8834, "end_char": 8843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8851, "end_char": 8877, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 307(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8880, "end_char": 8894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 428", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9873, "end_char": 9879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rolan Rai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10762, "end_char": 10771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rolan Rai\n\nStal1 of Bihar\n\nBhagwali ].", "canonical_name": "Rotan Rai"}}, {"text": "Ralan Rai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10802, "end_char": 10811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ralan Rai v.\n\nSlate of Bikar\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nthe High Court considers that upon the evidence no reasonable body of men could have reached the conclusion arrived at by the jury, then the reference was justified and the ends of justice required that the verdict be disregarded.\"", "canonical_name": "RATAN RAI"}}, {"text": "Slate of Bikar\n\nBhagwatiJ.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10816, "end_char": 10842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ralan Rai v.\n\nSlate of Bikar\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nthe High Court considers that upon the evidence no reasonable body of men could have reached the conclusion arrived at by the jury, then the reference was justified and the ends of justice required that the verdict be disregarded.\""}}, {"text": "s. 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11161, "end_char": 11167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11175, "end_char": 11201, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 307(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12354, "end_char": 12363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12371, "end_char": 12397, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 307(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12892, "end_char": 12901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12909, "end_char": 12935, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 307(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13151, "end_char": 13160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13168, "end_char": 13194, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "STATE OF BIHAR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13321, "end_char": 13335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF BIHAR\n\ntJ.\n\nRAM NARESH PANDEY\n\n(With Connected Appeal)\n\n[JAGANNADHADAS,\n\nJAFER lMMAM and GovINDA\n\nMENON JJ.]", "canonical_name": "ST ATE OF BIHAR"}}, {"text": "RAM NARESH PANDEY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13342, "end_char": 13359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF BIHAR\n\ntJ.\n\nRAM NARESH PANDEY\n\n(With Connected Appeal)\n\n[JAGANNADHADAS,\n\nJAFER lMMAM and GovINDA\n\nMENON JJ.]"}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13387, "end_char": 13400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF BIHAR\n\ntJ.\n\nRAM NARESH PANDEY\n\n(With Connected Appeal)\n\n[JAGANNADHADAS,\n\nJAFER lMMAM and GovINDA\n\nMENON JJ.]"}}, {"text": "JAFER lMMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13403, "end_char": 13414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF BIHAR\n\ntJ.\n\nRAM NARESH PANDEY\n\n(With Connected Appeal)\n\n[JAGANNADHADAS,\n\nJAFER lMMAM and GovINDA\n\nMENON JJ.]"}}, {"text": "GovINDA\n\nMENON", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13419, "end_char": 13433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE STATE OF BIHAR\n\ntJ.\n\nRAM NARESH PANDEY\n\n(With Connected Appeal)\n\n[JAGANNADHADAS,\n\nJAFER lMMAM and GovINDA\n\nMENON JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13723, "end_char": 13755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13774, "end_char": 13780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13802, "end_char": 13834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "M.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14472, "end_char": 14474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution of M. and others was bunched on the first information of the first respondent, and when the matter was pending before the Magistrate in the committal stage and before any evidence was actually taken, an application for the withdrawal of M. from the prosecution wa.s made by the Public Prosecutor under s. 494 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the ground that \"on the evidence aYailable it would not be just and expedient to proceed with the prosecution of M.'' The Magistrate was of the opinion tha~ there Was no reason to withhold the consent that was applied for and accordingly he discharged the accused."}}, {"text": "s. 494", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14771, "end_char": 14777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14785, "end_char": 14811, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]} {"document_id": "1957_1_279_295_EN", "year": 1957, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 279\n\nnot think that that is the proper procedure to adopt and we therefore allow the appeal, and remand this matter to the High Court to act in accord.ance with the provisions of s. 307(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and deal with the same in accordance with law. The appellants will continue on the same bail as before.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nTHE STATE OF BIHAR\n\ntJ.\n\nRAM NARESH PANDEY\n\n(With Connected Appeal)\n\n[JAGANNADHADAS,\n\nJAFER lMMAM and GovINDA\n\nMENON JJ.]\n\nc,.iminal latl'-Proseetttion-Application for withdrawal by Pubiic Prosecutor-Consent of Court-Ftmdio11 of the Court in giving such consent--Case t1iable by a Court of Session-Whether appiic111io11 for ll'ithdrawal does not lie in the committal stage- 'Tria/', 'judgment', Meaning of-Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (.let V of 1898), s. 494.\n\nHy s .. 494 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898: \"Any Public Prosecutor may; with the consent of the Court, in cases tried by jury before the return of the Ye1dict, and in other cases before the judgment i~ pronounced, withdraw from the prosecution o( any person either generally or in respect of any one or more of the offences for which he is tried ; and upon such withdrawal.-( a) if it is made before a charge has been framed, the accused shall be discharged in respect of such offence or offences ;\n\n(h) if it is made after a charge h1s been framed. or when under this Code no charge is required, he shall be acquitted in respect of such offence or offences.\"\n\nThe prosecution of M. and others was bunched on the first information of the first respondent, and when the matter was pending before the Magistrate in the committal stage and before any evidence was actually taken, an application for the withdrawal of M. from the prosecution wa.s made by the Public Prosecutor under s. 494 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the ground that \"on the evidence aYailable it would not be just and expedient to proceed with the prosecution of M.'' The Magistrate was of the opinion tha~ there Was no reason to withhold the consent that was applied for and accordingly he discharged the accused. This order was upheld by the Sessions Judge, but on 4-100 S. C. lndia/59\n\n1957 1-- Ratan Rai v.\n\nState of Bihar\n\nBhagwatij.\n\nJanuary 31.\n\nTiu Stat• of Bihar\n\nRam Nartsh Pandt)'\n\nrcv1sron, filed by the respondents, the High Court set aside the order and directed the Magistrate to record the evidence and then consider whether it establishe:d a prima facie case against the accused.\n\nThe State appealed against the order of the High Court by special leave, while the respondents sought to support the order on the grounds ( l) that where the application for withdrawal of the prosecution is made on the ground of no evidence or no adequate or reliable evidence the Magistrate must hold a preliminary enguiry into the relevant evidence, and (2) that in a case tried by jury by a Court of Session, an application by the Public Prosecutor under s. 594 of the Code does not lie in the committal stage.\n\nHeld : ( l) Though the function of the Court in giving the consent under s. 594 of the Code is a judicial one, it is not neces~ sary that the discretion is to be exercised only with reference to 1naterial gathered by the judicial 1nethod, and what the Court has to do is to satisfy itself that the executive function of the Public Prosecutor in applying for withdrawal of the prosecution has not been improperly exercised, or that it is not an attempt to inter~ fere with the nonnal course of justice for illegitimate reasons or purposes.\n\n(2) The word \"tried\" in s. 494 of the Code is not used in any limited sense and the section is wide enough 'to cover every kind of inquiry and trial, and applicable to all cases which are capable of terminating either in a discharge or in an acquittal according to the stage at which the application for withdrawal is made.\n\nAn order of committal which terminates the proceeding so far as the inquiring Court is concerned is a \"judgment\" within the meaning of s. 494 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nGiribala Dasu v. Mad<1 Gazi, {1932) I.L.R. 60 Cal. 233, and Viswanadham v. Madan Singh, I.L.R. (1949) Mad. 64, approved.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE JURISD!crION: Criminal Appeals Nos. 53 and 54 of 1956.\n\nAppels by special leave from the judgment and order dated May 31, 1955, of the Patna High Court in Criminal Revision No. 102 of 1955, arising out of the judgment and order dated January 10, 1955, of the Court of the Sessions Judge of Manbhum-Singhbhum of Purulia in Criminal Revision No. 43 of 1954.\n\nMahabir Prasad, Advocate-General of Bih11r, T arakesh- 111ar Nath and S. P. Verma, for the appellant in Appeal No. 53 and for respondent No. 3 in Appeal No. 54.\n\nH. /. Umrigar and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appellant in Appeal No. 54.\n\nJai Gopal Sethi and Govind Saran Singh, for the respondents in Appeal No. 53 and for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 in Appeal No. 54.\n\n1957. January 31. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n]AGANNADHADAS J.-These appeals arise out of an order of discharge passed by the Subordinate Judge- Magistrate of Dhanbad under s. 494 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on his consenting to the withdrawal of the Public Prosecutor from a prosecution pending before him in so far as it was against the appellant Mahesh Desai, one of the accused therein. The prosecution wa~ launched on the first information of one Ram Naresh Pandey as against 28 persons about the commission of the murder of one Nand Kumar Chaubey, a peon of a colliery in Bagdigi, committed in the course of a serious riot on February 20, 1954. This was said to have resulted from differences between two rival labour-unions in connection with a strike. The prosecution as against most of the other persons is under various sections of the Indian Penal Code including s. 302, on the ground of their actual participation iu the commission of the murder. But as against the appellant, Mahesh Desai, it is only under s. 302/109 of the Indian Penal Code, the part ascribed to him in the first information report being that he abetted the murder by reason of certain speeches and exhortations at meetings or group-talks the day previous to the murder. The application for withdrawal as against the appellant was made on December 6, 1954, when the matter was pending before the Magistrate in the committal stage and before any evidence was actually taken. It was made by the Public Prosecutor on the ground that \"on the evidence available it would not be just and expedient to proceed with the prosecution of Sri Mahesh Desai and that therefore it was necessary to withdraw the case against Sri Mahesh Desai only\".\n\nIt was elicited in the course of the arguments before the learned Magistrate that the position of the Public\n\nTh• State of Bihar v.\n\nRam N aresh Pant!ey\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nRam NartJh Pandey\n\nJagnnaJhadas J.\n\nProsecutor was, that the evidence regarding the complicity of this accused was meagre and that there was only a single item of evidence of a dubious nature against him which was not likely to establish a prima facie case.\n\nThe learned Magistrate dealt with the matter in a fairly reasoned order and was of the opinion that there was no reason to withhold the consent that was applied for. He accordingly dis, harged the accused.\n\nThat order was upheld by the learned Sessions Judge on a revision petition against it filed jointly by the first informant in the case and by the widow of the murdered person. These private parties pursued the matter further and applied to the High Court in revision.\n\nThe iearned Chief Justice who dealt with it was of the opinion that the consent should not have been granted. Accordingly, .he set it aside.\n\nThe learned Chief Justice recognised that normally in a matter of this kind the High Court should not interfere. But he felt called upon to set aside the order on the ground. that \"there was no judicial exercise of discretion in the present case.\" He, therfore, directed that the Magistrate should record the evidence and then consider whether it establishes a prima facie case against the appellant, Mahesh Desai. The Advocate- General of the State has come up before this Court against the order' of the learned Chief Justice.\n\nLeave was granted because it was urged that the view taken by the learned Chief Justice was based on an erroneous appreciation of the legally permissible approach in a matter of this kind and that the decision of the learned Chief Justice was likely to have repercussions in the State beyond what was involved in the particular case.\n\nThe aggrieved party, Mahesh Desai, also has come up by special leave and both these appeals are disposed of by this judgment.\n\nThe question of law involved may be gathered from the following extracts from the learned Chief Justice's judgment. ' \"This is not a case where there is no evidence ; on the contrary, this is a case where there is evidence which requires judicial consideration ........ The procedure which the learned Special Magistrate followed was\n\ntantamount to considering the sufficiency or otherwise of evidence before the evidence has been heard ....... .\n\nThe function of the Court would be surrendered to the\n\nPublic Prosecutor. I do not think that s. 494 of the Code of Criminal Procedure justifies such a procedure.\"\n\nThe legal question that arises from the above . is whether where an application for withdrawal under s. 494 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is made on the ground . of insufficiency or meagreness of reliable evidence that is available, it is an improper exercise of discretion for the Court to grant consent before evidence is taken, if it was reasonably satisfied. otherwise, that the evidence, if actually taken, is not likely to result in conviction.\n\nSection 494 of the Code of Criminal Procedure runs as follows : , \"Any Publi0 Prosecutor may, with the consent of the Court, in cases tried by jury before the return of the verdict, and in other cases before the judgment is pronounced, withdraw from the prosecution of any person either generally or in respect of any .one or more of the , c 1ffences for which he is tried ; and upon such withdrawal,- ( a) if it is made before a charge has been framed, the accused shall be discharged in respect of such offence •>r offences ;\n\n(b) if it is made after a charge has been framed, or when under this Code no charge is required, he shall be acquitted in respect of such offence or offences\".\n\nThe section is an enabling one and vests in the Public Prosecutor the discretion to apply to the Court for its consent to withdraw from the prosecution of any person.\n\nThe consent, if granted, has to be followed up by his discharge or acquittal, as the case may be. The section gives no indication as to the grounds on which the Public Prosecutor may make thr.\n\napplication, or. the considerations on which the Court is to grant its consent. There can be no doubt, however, that the resultant order, on the granting of the consent, being an order of 'discharge' or 'acquittal', would :.ttract the applicability of correction by the\n\nThe State of Bihar v.\n\nRam N aresh Pandty\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nThe State of Bihar\n\nRam N are sh Pandey\n\nJagannadhadas j ..\n\nHigh Court under ss. 435, 436 and 439 or 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The function of the Court, therefore, in granting its consent may well be taken to be a judicial function.\n\nIt follows that in granting the consent the Court must exercise a judicial discretion. But it does not follow that the discretion is to be exercised only with reference to material gathered by the judicial method. Otherwise the apparently wide language of s. 494 would become considerably narrowed down in its application .. In understanding and applying the section, two main features thereof have to be kept in mind. The initiative is that of the Public Prostcutor and what the Court has to do is only to give its consent and not to determine any matter judicially. As the Privy Council has pointed out in Bawa Faqir Singh v. The King Emperor( '), \"It (section 494 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) gives a general executive discretion (to the Public Prosecutor) to withdraw from the prosecution subject to the consent of the Court, which may be determined on many possible grounds.\" The judicial function, therefore, implicit in the exercise of the judicial discretion for granting the consent would normally mean that the Court has to satisfy itself that the executive function of the Public Prosecutor has not been improperly exercised, or that it is not an attempt to interfere with the normal course of justice for illegitimate reasons .,,.or purposes.\n\nIn this context it is right to remember th.at the Public Prosecutor (though an executive officer. as stated by the Privy Council in Bawa Faqir Singh v. The King Emperor(' ) is, in a larger sense, also an officer of the Court and that he is bound to assist the Court with his fairly-considered view and the Co\\)rt is entitled to have the benefit of the fair exercise of his function.\n\nIt has also to be appreciated that in tlu&; .1:ountry the scheme of the administration of criminal justice is that the primary responsibility of prosecuting serious offences (which are classified as cognizable offences) is on the executive authorities.\n\nOnce information of the commission of any such offence reaches the constituted\n\n(1) (1938) L.R. 65 I.A. 388, 395\n\nauthorities, the investigation, including collection of the requisite evidence, and the prosecution for the offence with reference to such evidence, are the functions of the executive.\n\nBut the Magistrate also has his allotted functions in the course of these stages.\n\nFor instance, in the course of investigation, a person arrested must be brought before him within 24 hours (s. 61 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). Continuance of the arrested person in detention for purposes of investigation from time to time . has to be authorised by him (s. 167). A search can be conducted on the issue of warrant by him (s. 96).\n\nStatements of witnesses and confessions may be recorded by him (s. 164).\n\nIn an appropriate case he can order investigation or further investigation (ss. 155(2) and 202). In all these matters he exercises discretionary functions in respect of which the initiative is that of the executive but the responsibility is his. His discretion in such matters has necessarily to be exercised with reference to such material as is by then available and is not a prima f acie judicial determination of any specific issue.\n\nThe Magistrate's functions in these matters are not only supplementary, at a higher level, to those of the executive but are intended to prevent abuse. Section 494 requiring the consent of the Court for withdrawal by the Public Prosecutor is more in line with this scheme, than with the provisions of the Code relating to inquiries and trials by Court. It cannot be taken to place on the Court the responsibility for a prima facie determination of a triable issue.\n\nFor instance the discharge that results therefrom need not alwavs conform to the standard of \"no prim a f acie case\" under ss. 209(0 and 253(1) or of \"groundlessness\" under ss. 209(2) and 253(2). This is not to say that a consent is to be lightly given on the application of the . Public Prosecutor, without a careful and proper scrutmy of the grounds on which the application for consent is made.\n\nA large number of cases from the various High Courts have been cited before us. We have carefully gone through them. All of them recognise that the\n\nT ht State of Bihar v.\n\nRam Naresh Pandey\n\nJ agannadhadas J.\n\nT ht State of iJihar\n\nRam ]'{ aresh P\"ndey\n\n,]agannadlj_adas ) ~\n\nfunction of the Magistrate in giving consent is a judicial one open to correction. But in some of them there is no sufficient appreciation of the respective pos1t10ns of the Public Prosecutor and the Court, in the discharge of their functions under s. 494 as we conceive them to be. There is, however, .a general concurrence-c-at least in the later cases-that the application for consent may legitimately be made by the Public Prosecutor for reasons not confined to the judicial prospects of the prosecution. [See The King\n\nv. Moule Bux ( 1) and The King v. Parmanand(').J If so, it is clear that, what the Court has to determine, for the exercise cif its discretion in granting or withholding consent, is not a triable issue on judicial evidence.\n\nLearned counsel for the respondents has strenuously urged before us that while this may be so where the consent is applied for on other grounds, or for .other reasons, the position would not be the same, where the application for consent is made on the ground of Ho evidence or no adequate or reliable evidence. It is urged that in such a case; the Court c.an exercise its judicial function, only with reference to judicially recorded evidence as in one or other of the appropriate situations contemplated by the Code for judicial inquiry or trial. If this argument means anything it must mean that in such a situation the Court before granting consent must hold a kind of preliminary inquiry into the relevant evidence in much the same way as, for instance, when a Magistrate acting under s. 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may direct or it must mean that no consent can at all be given on such a ground and that the Court must proceed with the prosecution, and either discharge or acquit under one or other of the other sections in the Code enabling thereunto.\n\nIt appears to us that this would be engrafting on the wide terms of s. 494 an exception or a proviso limited to such a case. In our opinion, this would not be a permissible construction of the section.\n\nWe are, therefore, unable, with grct respect, to subscribe to the view taken by the learned Chief\n\n(1) A.LR. 1949 Pat. •33 (F.B.).\n\n(o) A.LR. 1949 Pat. ••>, 226 (II. B.).\n\nJustice whose judgment is under appeal, that where the application is on · the ground of inadequacy of ev.idence requiring judicial consideration, . it would .. be manifestly improper for the Court to consent to withdrawal before recording the evidence and taking it into . consideration. . We are not to be understood, however, as implying that such evidence as may already have byen recorded by the time .the application is made is not to be looked into and considered in such cases, in order tci determine the impropriety of the withdrawal as amounting to abuse or an improper iP.terference with the normal eourse of justice.\n\nLearned counsel for the respondents has raised a fresh point before . us for maintaining the order of the High Court setting aside the discharge of the appellant by the Magistrate. The po; nt being purely one of law, we have allowed it to be argued.\n\nHis contention is that in a case triable by a Court of Session,. an application by the Public Prosecutor for withdrawal with the consent of the Court does not lie in the committal stage. He lays . emphasis on the wording of s. 494 which says that \"in .. cases tried by jury, any Public Prosecutor may, with the consent of the Court, withdraw from the prosecution of any person before the return of the verdict.\" This, according to him, clearly implies that such withdrawal cannot be made until the case reaches the trial stage in the Sessions Court. He also relies on the further phrase 'in the section \"either generally 01 in respect of any one or more of the offences for which he is tried.\" The use of the word 'tried' in this phrase confirms, according to him, the contention that it is only when the case reaches the stage of trial that s. 494 can be availed of. He f the Eastern Bengal and Assam Excise Act, 1910, and, therefore, s. 3(3) of the impugned Act and the Notification were void and the Appel_late Authority not having been lawfully constituted its orders were nullities~\n\nHdd, that s. 3(3) of the Assam Revenue Tribunal (Transfer of Powers) Act, 1948, and the Notification issued by the Provincial Governn1ent thereunder were not void.\n\nThe purpose of s. 296(2) of the G.ivernment of India Ac:, 1935, simply was to authorise the Governors of certain provinces to constitute an appellate tribunal and to prescribe a timelimit upto which such tribunal was to function and not to impose either an obligation on the Provincial Legislatures to set up one or to compel them to restrict their pov;•ers of legislation under the Act.\n\nEven assuming that it did impose such an -obligation, it 111ust be held to have been in substance fully discharged by the Assam Legislature by the enactment of s. 3(3) of the .A.ssam Revenue Tribunal {Transfer_. of Powers) Act, 1948.\n\nWhat the Assam Revenue Tribunal (Transfer of Powers) Act, 1948, intended to do \\V:ts to transfer the O'.)\\\\ters tnd jurisdiction hitherto exercised by the 1\\ssam R•:\\cnu'e Tril.:unal\n\n; to the High Court and to the authority to be appointed by the 1957 Provincial overnment, and the relevat provisions of te- ct The Sia\" rif Assam make it quite clear that the Assam Legislature had applied its v. mind and clearly determined that such powers and jurisdiction A. N. Xiduldi should be distributed between the two.\n\nSub-section ( 3) of s. 3 of the Act, although not quite happily drafted, leaves no doubt that the Legislature itself constituted the appellate authority mentioned therein and what was left to cthe Provincial Government was to select the personnel thereof, conformably to the usual practice of Indian Legislatures, and, consequently, it could not be said that there was an excessive delegation of legislativ power to the Government : The word \"appointed\" does not necessarily mean alreadv appointed, it may also mean \"to i>e appointed\" at any futur~ time.\n\nThe impagned Act was in no way repugnant to the Eastern Bengal and Assam Excise Act, 1910, as modified by s. 296 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and there was no impropriety in the Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, assuming that he was the same as the Commissioner of a Division, being .appointed as the Authority to entertain appeals from the Excise Commissioner. Nor could the possibility of an appeal from the decision of any other Commissioner of a Division coming up before him affect the validity of the Notification, and it could not be held to be repugnant to s. 9(2) of that Act.\n\nC1v1L\n\nAPPELLATE JuRISDICTION : Civii Appeals Nos. 346 to 363 of 1956.\n\nAppeals under Article 132(1) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and order dated May 23. 1956, of the Assam High Court in Civil Rules Nos. 26. 31, 32 and 33 of 1956 and the Judgment and Order dated June 12, 1956, of the said High Court in Civi' Rules Nos. 45, 48, 49, 64, 65, 69, 71, 82 and 85 of 1956.\n\nS. M. Lahiri, Advocate-General of Assam, A. V.\n\nVishwanatha Sastri and Naunit Lal, for the appellant in Appeals Nos. 346 to 358. ·\n\nA. V. Vishwanatha Sastri, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed and Naunit Lal, for the appellant in Appeal No. 359 N. C. Chatterjee, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed and Narmit Lal, for the appellants in Appeals Nos. 360 and 361.\n\nFakhruddin Ali Ahmed and Naunit Lal, for the appellants in Appeals Nos. 362 and 363.\n\nThi Stat1 of .Assam\n\n•• A. N. JridUUJi\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-Gneral of India, R. Chaudhuri, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath, /. B. Dadachanii, P. L. Vohra and S. C. Das, for the respondents Nos . 1 & 2 in Appeals Nos. 346 and 359, and for respondent No. 1 in Appeal No. 347.\n\nP. R. Das, R. Chaudhuri, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath, /. B. Dadachanji, P. L. Vohra and S. C. Das, for respondent No. 1 in Appeals Nos. 349, 350, 352, 353, 355, 356, 358, 360, 361 and 362, for respondent No. 5 in Appeals Nos. 351, 357, 361' and 363 and for respondent No. 6 in Appeal No. 356.\n\nK. P. Gupta, for respondent No. 1 in Appeals Nos. 357 and 363.\n\n1957. January 31. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAs C.J.-This judgment will dispose of the above noted 18 several Civil Appeals filed in this Court on certificate of fitness granted by the High Court of Assam under Art. 132 of the Constitution of India.\n\nThe appeals Nos. 346, 347, 348, 349 and 359 are directed against the judgment of the said High Court passed on May 23, 1956, in Civil Rules Nos. 26, 31, 32 and 33 of 1956 issued by the said High Court on several petitions filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The rest of the appeals arise out of nine other Civil Rules issued in nine other similar writ applications, which were disposed of by the judgment pronounced by the said High Court on June 12, 1956, which simply followed its previous judgment dated May 23, 1956.\n\nEach of these appeals raises the question of the vires of s. 3(3) of the Assam Revenue Tribunal (Transfer of Powers) Act, 1948 (Assam Act No. 4 of 1948) which is hereinafter referred to as \"the 1948 Act\" and of the validity of the notification No. Rex. 184/52/39 issued by the Governor of Assam on July 5, 1955, in exercise of powers conferred on him by sub-s. (3) of s. 3 of the said Act appointing the Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals as the appellate authority under the 1948 Act.\n\nAll the appeals were accordingly heard together.\n\nIn order to correctly appreciate the question raised before us it is necessary at this stage to refer to certain relevant statutory provmons and rules.\n\nIn 1910 wa~ passed the Eastern Bengal and Assam Excise Act, 1910\n\n(E.B. and Assam Act 1 of 1910) which is hereinafter callc the Provincial Legislature in the provines referred t<> therein to make or not to make any law under the entries referred to above and the only effective provision of that sub-section was to authorise the Governor ro constitute a tribunal and to fix a terminus a quo up to which the Governor's tribunal could continue t<> function.\n\nLearned counsel appearing for the respondents have not sought to support the extreme construction put upon s. 2%(2) by the High Court. They have, however, pointed out that the Governor's tribunal was to continue until other provision \"in that behalf\" was made by the Provincial Legislature and contended that some meaning must be given to the words \"in that behalf\". They argued that those words related back and referred to the constitution . of the tribunal by the Governor, that. so read the meaning of the subsection plainly was that the Governor's tribunal was to continue to function until the Provincial Legislature made other provision for the constitution of a tribunal of its own. They conceded that the power of the Provincial Legislature to constitute a tribunal was not derived from s. 2% (2) but was conferred on it by ss. 99 and 100 read with the relevant entries in List II of the Seventh schedule, but they contended that the provision that until in exercise of those powers the Provincial Legislature constituted a tribunal the Governor's tribunal would continue clearly indicated that the Governor's tribunal was to be a temporary body and this circumstance impliedly imposed on the Provincial Legislature an obligation requiring it to exercise its power only for constituting a tribunal We are unable to accept this contentions. The Governor was empowered to constitute a tribunal to exercise the same jurisdiction as was, immediately before the commencement of Part III of the Government of India Act, 1935, vested in the Provincial Government. The tribunal so constituted by the Governor was to function until other provision was made \"in that behalf'. The words \"in that behai£\" need not necessarily relate back to the constitution of a tribunal. Learned counsel\n\nfor the appellants suggest that the words \"other provision in that behalf\" may grammatically refer to what preceded immediately, namely, to the exercise of the same jurisdiction. In other words they contend that the sub-section means that the Governor's tribunal would continue to exercise the jurisdiction until other provision in that behalf, that is to say, other provision for or with respect to the exercise of the same jurisdiction was made by Act of the Provincial Legislature.\n\nIt is pointed out that the construction suggested by learned counsel for the respondents would lead us to the conclusion that the intendment of the concluding part of the sub-section was to impose a fetter on the legislative powers of the Provincial Legislatures of those provinces referred to in the sub-section so that they could constitute a tribunal if they ever wanted to exercise their legislative powers under the entries mentioned above but could make no other provision with respect to the exercise of such jurisdiction as was beililg exercised by the Provincial Government at the commencement of the Government of India Act, 1935.\n\nOn this construction the Legislatures of those provinces only would be prevented from abolishing the right of final appeal, while other provinces in which the appellate jurisdiction was not, at the date of the commencement of Part III of the Government of India Act, 1935, being exercised by the local government would be free to abolish the right of final appeal. A construction which leads to such a result should, thev contend, be avoided, if possible.\n\nThe criticisms advanced against the construction put upon s. 296 (2) by the High Court which has been pressed upon us in a slightly modified form as hereinbcfore mentioned do not appear to us to be wholly untenable or devoid of substance. We need not, however, base our decision on those considerations, for on a plain reading of s. 2% (2) its purpose clearly was to authorise the Governors of certain provinces to consitute a tribunal and to prescribe a time limit up to which the tribunal so constituted by him was to exercise the appellate jurisdiction.\n\nBevond this the sub-section was not intended to go. It was not concerned with the legislative\n\nfi-100 s. CT. Tncii~/59\n\n19!!7\n\nTiu: Stall of~.4JS1J111\n\nv. ,4..N.Kitlwoi\n\nDllJ C. ].\n\nT 11' - ries for the examination of Sri. G. R. K. Tandan, Sri Lakshmi Shankar, Sri Biswahath and M. N. Dube.\n\nWith regard to Dr. D. M.\n\nKar, the interrogatories were filed in court on November 10,\n\n1951. On November 12, 1951, the accused put in an application objecting to questions Nos. 5, 6 and 9 to be put to Dr. D. M. Kar, on the ground that they are leading questions which cannot be put in examination-in-chief and stating further that the appearance of Dr. D. M.\n\nKar and Sri Kapoor for recording their evidence in person before the court is necessary and their crossexamination in court be arranged for the purpose. If that was not possible, the cross-interrogatories attached to the petition may be sent along with the interrogatories.\n\nThe learned Magistrate on that application made an order that the questions should be modified in a different language than what they have been put.\n\nThe cross-interrogatories to these witnesses were filed on subsequent dates the details of which it is unnecessary to mention. We find from the record an application by the prosecution with an order thereon dated November 14, 1951, to the effect that in addition to the important witnee.\n\nAt the stage at which the important witnesses for the prosecution were directed to be examined by interrogatories on commission, it was evident that the plea of the acclised could not have been before the court and no assumption can be made as to how the case was going to get shaped later on.\n\nThe question is whether in a prosecution like this where the Head Clerk of a Civil Surgeon's office is being arraigned for criminal breach of trust of sums during a particular period, and especially where the misappropriation, if any, could have been found out much earlier if the superior officers had been prompt in checking the registers and doing the duties assigned to them under the rules and regulations governing the office, it can be said that the trial is in strict consonance with established rules . of practice . and not in\" violation of the same, ·.where the .. important witnesses' testimony has been obtained outside the court, which has to deal with and determine the case.\n\nIt is an established and cardinal principle of Criminal jurisprudence obtainable. i.n. all systems. •of. bw that.· in criminal proceedings the evidence against the accused should be recorded. in his presence and in open court so that the accused may be enabled to challenge such parts of the statement which he wishes to challenge and the presiding officer may have the advantage and opportunity of hearing the . witness in person, noting his demeanour and finding out for himself on such observation whether what the witness deposes is true or otherwise.. There is also the further a- ries for the examination of Sri."}}, {"text": "G. R. K. Tandan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11903, "end_char": 11918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. R. K. Tandan, Sri Lakshmi Shankar, Sri Biswahath and M. N. Dube."}}, {"text": "Lakshmi Shankar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11924, "end_char": 11939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. R. K. Tandan, Sri Lakshmi Shankar, Sri Biswahath and M. N. Dube."}}, {"text": "Biswahath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11945, "end_char": 11954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. R. K. Tandan, Sri Lakshmi Shankar, Sri Biswahath and M. N. Dube."}}, {"text": "M. N. Dube", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11959, "end_char": 11969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. R. K. Tandan, Sri Lakshmi Shankar, Sri Biswahath and M. N. Dube."}}, {"text": "D. M.\n\nKar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11991, "end_char": 12001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With regard to Dr. D. M.\n\nKar, the interrogatories were filed in court on November 10,\n\n1951.", "canonical_name": "D. M.\n\nKar"}}, {"text": "November 10,\n\n1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12046, "end_char": 12064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With regard to Dr. D. M.\n\nKar, the interrogatories were filed in court on November 10,\n\n1951."}}, {"text": "November 12, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12069, "end_char": 12086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 12, 1951, the accused put in an application objecting to questions Nos."}}, {"text": "Kapoor", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12345, "end_char": 12351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5, 6 and 9 to be put to Dr. D. M. Kar, on the ground that they are leading questions which cannot be put in examination-in-chief and stating further that the appearance of Dr. D. M.\n\nKar and Sri Kapoor for recording their evidence in person before the court is necessary and their crossexamination in court be arranged for the purpose."}}, {"text": "30-11-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13861, "end_char": 13871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He should be telegraphically informed to be present on 30-11-1951, and if he cannot be available for any reason, then the interrogatories prepared by him be sent at once."}}, {"text": "Dharmanand Pant", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15514, "end_char": 15529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If that is so, no question of criminal misappropriation 7-100 S.C.India./59\n\nDharmanand Pant v.\n\nStat1 of Uttar\n\nPradesh\n\nGovinda Menon J.\n\nDharmanand Pant v.\n\nSlate of Uttar\n\nPradesh\n\nGovinda Menon ].", "canonical_name": "Dharmanand Pant"}}, {"text": "Govinda Menon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15559, "end_char": 15572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If that is so, no question of criminal misappropriation 7-100 S.C.India./59\n\nDharmanand Pant v.\n\nStat1 of Uttar\n\nPradesh\n\nGovinda Menon J.\n\nDharmanand Pant v.\n\nSlate of Uttar\n\nPradesh\n\nGovinda Menon ].", "canonical_name": "Govinda M1no11J."}}, {"text": "Slate of Uttar\n\nPradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15597, "end_char": 15620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If that is so, no question of criminal misappropriation 7-100 S.C.India./59\n\nDharmanand Pant v.\n\nStat1 of Uttar\n\nPradesh\n\nGovinda Menon J.\n\nDharmanand Pant v.\n\nSlate of Uttar\n\nPradesh\n\nGovinda Menon ].", "canonical_name": "State of Uttar\n\nPradesh"}}, {"text": "Section 503", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18303, "end_char": 18314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 506", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19740, "end_char": 19746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Uttar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20077, "end_char": 20091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the methods provided for the examination of witnesses on commission is contained in s. 506, of the Criminal Procedure Code, which is as follows:\n\n(1) The parties to any proceeding under this Code in which a commission is issued may respectively forward any interrogatories in writing which the court or Magistrate directing the commission may think relevant to the issue, and it shall be lawful for the\n\nDharmanand Paat\n\nState of Uttar\n\nPrad the Act. The Works Committee consists of reprcsentati ves of employers and workmen engaged in a particular establishmrnt and is constituted in the prescribed manner in order to promote measures for securing and preserving amity and good relations between the employers and workmen and to that end to comment upon matters of their common interest or concern and en pute consisting of a Chairman and 2 or 4 other. members\n\nas it thinks fit, charged with the duty of doing all\n\nsuch things as it thinks fit for the purpose of inducing the parties to come to a fair and amicable settlement of the dispute. If the Board succeeds in arriving at a settlement, a report thereof together with a memorandum of the settlement will be sent by it to the appropriate Government but if no such settlement is arrived at the Board will send to the appropriate Government a full report in the manner indicated above including its recommendations for the determination of the dispute. It may be noted that a reference to the Board of Conciliation is but a preliminary step for the settlement of the industrial dispute and the -report made by it in the event of a failure to bring about such settlement will furnish materials to the appropriate Government to make up its mind whether it will refer the dispute for adjudication to an Industrial Tribunal. Before, however, any such reference is made by the appropriate Government it may set up a Court of Enquiry for the purpose of enquiring into any\n\nmatter appearing to be connected with or relevant to an industrial dispute. The Court of Enquiry will enquire into those matters and report thereon to the appropriate Government within six months from the .commencement of the enquiry. That report will furnish materials to the appropriate Government for finally .determining whether the industrial dispute shall be referred by it for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal. It may be that the report of the Court of Enquiry discloses circumstances under which the appropriate Government considers that it is not necessary to refer the industrial dispute for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal. In that event the matter will end there and the appropriate Government may await further developments before referring the industrial dispute for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal. If, -0n the other hand, the materials embodied in the\n\nreport of the Court of Enquiry disclose circumstances which make it necessary for the appropriate Government to refer the industrial dispute for adjudication to the Industrial Tribuna~ the appropriate Government will constitute an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication\n\nNiemla Textilt\n\nFiniJhing Mills Ltd. v.\n\nThe 2n11 Punjai lnduJtrial T ribunsl\n\nBhagwati].\n\nNiemla Textile\n\nFinishing Mill< Ltd. v.\n\nThe 2nd Purefab Industrial Tribunal\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nof the industrial dispute in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The Industrial Tribunal would then adjudicate upon such dispute and submit its award to the appropriate Government.\n\nThese are the steps which are contemplated in the manner indicated in s. 10 of the Act for reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals. It is not necessary that all these steps should be taken seriatim one after tqe other.\n\nWhether one or the otht; r of the steps should be taken by the appropriate Government must depend upon the exigencies of the situation, the i1Pminence of industrial strife resulting in cessation or interruption of industrial production and breach of industrial peace endangering public tranquillity and law and order. If the matter brooks delay the appropriate Government may start conciliation proceedings culminating in a reference to a Board of Conciliation and also Court of Enquiry, if need be, before a fullfledged reference is made to an Industrial Tribunal. If, on the other hand, the matter brooks no delay the appropriate. - Government may possibly refer the dispute to a Board of Conciliation before referring it for adjudication to an Industrial Tribunal or may straightaway refer it for adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal.\n\nWhat step would be taken by the appropriate Government in the matter of the industrial dispute must, therefore, be determined by the surrounding circumstances, and the discretion vested in the appropriate Government for setting up one or the other of the authorities for the purpose of investigation and settlement of industrial disputes must be exercised by it having regard to the exigencies of the situation and the objects to be achieved. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to the setting up of one or the other of the authorities for the purpose of bringing about the desired end which is the settlement of industrial disputes and promotion of industrial peace and it is hardly legitimate to say that such discretion as is vested in the appropriate Government will be exercised \"with an evil eye and an unequal hand.\"\n\nIt is contended in the first instance that the provisions of the Act are violative of the fundamental\n\nrights enshrined in Art. 14 and Art. 19( 1) (f) and (g) of the Constitution ; that it is open to the appropriate Government to differentiate between the parties similarly placed and circumstanced in every respect and in the absence of any rules made in this behalf th<: appropriate Government has unregulated and arbitrary powers to discriminate between the parties ;\n\nth; it there is no rational basis of classification providing, different treatment for different parties and it is optn to the appropriate Government, in one case to refer the industrial dispute to a Court of Enquiry, ; and in another case to refer it to an Industrial Tri- /\n\nbunai ; and that the procedures before the Courts of Enquiry and bfore the Industrial Tribunals are different, the one before the Courts of Enquiry being less onerous and less prejudicial to the parties than that before the Industrial Tribunals. It is submitted that the reports of the Courts of Enquiry are quite innocuous whereas the awards of the Industrial Tribunals are binding on the parties and are backed up by sanctions behind them, and in regard to the periods of operation also, it is open to the appropriate Governmnlt, in one case to reduce the same to an extent which will make them negligible in point of time whereas -in another case/it is open to it to extend the periods even upto three years from the dates on which the awards came into operation and the appropriate Government may, in the exercise of its unfettered and uncontrolled discretion, adopt different measures in the case of different parties so as to discriminate between them and work to the prejudice of those less fortunately situated. It is also contended that these discriminatory provisions being inextricably interwoven with the rest of the provisions. of the Act or being such that the Central Legislature would not have enacted the rest of the provisions of the Act without including the same therein, the whole of the Act is ultra vires the Constitution./ We are unable to accept these contentions. Having regard to the provisions of the Act heteinbefore set out it is clear that s. 10 is not discriminatory in its ambit and the appropriate Government is at liberty\n\nKiemla Texti/1\n\nFinishin.~ Mills Ltd.\n\nThe 2nd Punjab Industrial Tribunal\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nNunda T 1xlilt\n\nFinishitig Mills Ltd.\n\n'\" Tht 2nd Punjab Industrial Tribunal\n\nBhagwnti].\n\nas and when the occasion arises to refer the industrial disputes arising or threatening to arise between the employers and the workmen to one or the other of the authorities according to the exigencies of the situation.\n\nNo two cases are alike in nature and the industrial disputes which arise or are apprehended to arise m particular establishments or undertakings require to be treated having regard to the situation prevailing in the same.; There cannot be any classification and the reference to one or the other of the authorities has necessarily got to be determined in the exercise of its best discretion by the appropriate Government. Such\n\ndiscretion is not an unfettered or an uncontrolled discretion nor an unguided one because the criteria for the exercise of such discretion are to be found within the terms of the Act itself.\n\nThe various authorities are to be set up with particular ends in view and it is the achievement of the particular ends that guides the discretion of the appropriate Government in the matter of setting up one or the other of them. The purpose sought to be achieved by the Act has been well defined in the preamble to the Act.\n\nThe scope of industrial disputes/ is defined in s. 2(k) of the Act and there are also provisions contained in the other sections of the Act which relate to strikes and lock-ours, lay-off and retrenchment as also the conditions of service, - etc., remaining unchanged during the pendency of proceedings. These and analogous provisions sufficiently indicate the purpose and scope of the Act as also the various industrial disputes which may arise between the employers and their workmen which may have to be referred for settlement to the various authorities under the Act. The achievement of one or the other of the objects in view by such references to the Boards of Conciliation or Courts of Enquiry or • Industrial/ Tribunals must guide and control the exercise of the discretion in that behalf by the appropriate Government and there is no scope, therefore, for the argument that the appropriate Government would be in a position to discriminate between one patty and the other.\n\nApart from the references to be thus made to the Boards of Conciliation, Courts of Enquiry or Industrial Tribunals, the appropriate Government is also given the powers to prescribe the period of duration of the award made by the Industrial Tribunal. Normally the award is to be in operation for one year from the date of its commencement. The circumstances, however, may have changed between the date of the reference and the date of the award and power is thus given to the appropriate / Government to reduce the said period and fix such period as it thinks fit.,.- Power is also given to the appropriate Government, if the circumstances warrant that decision, to extend the period of operation by any period not exceeding one year at' a time as it thinks fit before the expiry of the normal period of one year, provided however that the total period of operation of any award does not exceed three years from the date on which the same came 'into operation. This power is to be exercised, if, in the opinion of the appropriate Government, the circumstances have not so changed as to warrant the parties to the industrial dispute to ask for a change in the terms of the award and in that event the award may continue to be in operation for the maximum period of three years from the date of its commencement. The case in which there has been a material change in the circumstances on which the award has been based is mentioned in s. 19( 4) of the Act and there the appropriate Government, whether of its own motion or on an application of any of the parties bound by the award is empowered to refer the award or a part thereof to a Tribunal if it is satisfied about such material change in the circumstances for a decision. whether the period of operation should not by reason of such change be shortened and the decision of the Tribunal on such reference, subject to the provision for appeal, is declared to be final. It appears therefore, that all the various possibilities are thought of by\n\nthose who framed this legislation and wide discretion has been given to the appropriate Government to either reduce the period of operation or to extend the same having regard to the circumstances of the case or\n\nNiemla Textile\n\nFinisljing Mills ltd. v.\n\nThe 2nd Punjab Industrial Tribunal\n\nBhagwali ].\n\n.Niemla T e:xtil!\n\nFinishing }JillJ Ltd. v.\n\nThe 2nd Purifab Industrial Tribunal\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nto refer the question of the reduction of the period of operation to an Industrial. Tribunal in case there has been a material change in the circumstances on which the award was based. Here also it cannot be urged that there is an unguided and unfettered discretion in the matter of changing the period of operation of the award. The appropriate Government cannot merely by its own volition change the period without having reg:>rd to the circumstances of a particular case. There is no warrant for the suggestion that such discretion will be exercised by the appropriate Government arbitrarily or capriciously or so as to prejudice the interest of any of the parties , concerned. The basic idea underlying all the provisions of the Act is th~ settlement of industrial disputes and the promotion of industrial peace so that production may not he interrupted and the community in general may be benefited. This is the end which has gqt to be kept in view by the appropriate Government when exercising the discretion which is vested in it in the matter of making the reference to one or the other of the authorities under the Act and also in the matter of carrying out the various provisions contained in the other sections of_ the Act including the curtailment or extension of the period of operation of the award of the Industrial Tribunal. We are, of opinion that there is no substance jn the contention urged before us that the relevant provisions of the Act and in particular s. 10 thereof are unconstitutional and void as infringing the fundamental rights guaranteed under Art. 14 and Art. 19 (1) (f) and (g) of the Constitution. If these provisions are thus intra vire! there is no need to consider the further argument advanced before us that 'hese provisions are so inextricably interwoven with the other provisions of the Act or are such that the Legislature would not have enacted the other provisions of the Act without incorporating the same therein.\n\nIt is next contended that the Industrial Tribunals to whom industrial disputes are referred for adjudication by the appropriate Government are legislating in the guise of adjudication and this amounts to delegation\n\nof the powers of legislation which it was not competent to the Central Legislature to do. The argument is that the Industrial Courts are not bound to follow the provisions of the ordinary law of the land as enacted in the Indian Contract Act, the Payment of Wages Act, the Workmen's Compensation Act, the Indian Limitation. Act and the like, but are authorised by the terms of the Act to lay down their own code of conduct in regard to industrial relations and their own policy in regard to the promotion of industrial peace. This, it is submitted is legislation and the Legislature has in effect abdicated its powers in favour of the Industrial Courts. The provisions in regard to reinstatement of dismissed or discharged employees, the provisions in regard to lay-off and retrenchment and the provisions in regard to strikes and lock-outs, amongst others, are pointed out as introducing provisions contrary to the positive law of the lapd and as laying down a code of conduct or policy, and reference is made in this behalf to a decision of the Federal Court in Western India Automobile Association v. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, and Others (1 ) and two decisions of the Madras High Court, viz., The Electro Mechanical Industries Ltd., Madras v.\n\nThe Industrial Tribunal No. 2 for Engineering Firms and Type Foundries, Fort St. George, Madras, and Another(2 ) and Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. State of Madras( 3 ). It has to be remembered, however, that the functions of the Industrial Tribunals, while adjudicating upon the industrial disputes referred to them for adjudication, are quite different from those of arbitration tribunals in commercial matters. As has been observed by Ludwig Teller in 'Labour Disputes and Collective Bargaining',\n\nVol. 1, p. 536 :\n\n\"Then too, industrial arbitration may involve the extension ot an existing agreement, or the making of a new one, or in general the creation of new obligations or modifications of old ones, while commercial arbitration generally concerns itself with interpretation of\n\n(2) [1950) II M.L.J. 479\n\nNiem/a Textile Finishing Mills Ltd. v.\n\nThe 2nd Punjab Indus trial Tribunal\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\n.Niemla TexJile\n\nFiniJhing Mills Lid.\n\nThe 2nd Punjab Industrial Tribunal\n\nBhagwatiJ,\n\nexisting obligations and disputes relating to existing agreements.\"\n\nIt was also observed by the Privy Council in Labour Relations Board of Saskatchewan v. John East Iron Works, Ltd(), while referring to a claim for reinstatement by a dismissed employee as one of the typical matters in dispute between employers and employees:\n\n\"The jurisdiction of the Board (Labour Relations Board) .......... is not invoked by the employee for the enforcement of his contractual rights : those, whatever they may be, he can assert elsewhere.\n\nBut his reinstatement, which the terms of his contract of employment might not by themselves justify, is the means by which labour practices regarded as unfair are frustrated and the policy of collective bargaining as a road to industrial peace is secured. It is in the light of this new conception of industrial relations that the question to be determined by the. Board must be viewed.\"\n\nAfter quoting these observations of the Privy Council, Rajamannar,\n\nC. J., pointed out in Shru Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. State of Madras(') at p. 388:\n\n\"The essential object of all recent labour legislation has been not so much to lay down categorically the mutual rights and liabilities of employer and employees as to 'provide recourse to a given form of procedure for the settlement of disputes in the interests of the maintenance of peaceful relations between parties, without apparent conflicts such as are likely to interrupt production and entail other dangers. It is with this object that in the United States there has been legislation arranging for the adjustment of .conflicting interests by collective bargaining. In Great Britain there have been Acts like the Industrial Courts Act, 1919, which provides for Industrial Courts to enquire i11to and decide trade disputes. There is also provision for Conciliation Boards under the Conciliation Act,\n\n1896. In fact, our Industrial Disputes Act is modelled on these two British Acts.\"\n\nI•) (1949] A.C. 134.\n\nThis being the object of the enactment of the Act by the Central Legislature, the powers vested in the Industrial Tribunals in the matter of the settlement of industrial disputes referred to them for adjudication, wide though they may be but guided as they are by considerations of policy as indicated above, can . hardly be characterised as legislative powers. No doubt they lay down certain general principles to be observed in regard to the determination of bonus, reinstatement of dismissed or discharged employees and other allied topics but they are enunciated mainly with the object of promoting industrial peace while settling particular industrial disputes referred to them.\n\nThese principles or rules of conduct, though they are applied as precedents by the Industrial Tribunals while adjudicating upon other similar industrial disputes referred to them, are not rules of law strictly so-called and do not amount to legislation by the Industrial Tribunals.\n\nEven i: the analogy of the Courts of Law be applied to the Industrial Tribunals, the Industrial Tribunals at best lay down or declare what the principles or the rules of conduct governing the relations between employers and the employees should be. A declaration of the principles or rules of conduct governing the relationi between the parties appearing before the Industrial Tribunals is quite different from legislation which would be binding on all parties and indeed there is no provision in the Act which confers on the Indus.- trial Tribunals either the power to make rules which would have statutory effect or the power to legislate in regard to certain matters which crop up between employers and employees. In the absence of any such provision, the mere fact that the Industrial Tribunals, while pronouncing awards in the several industrial dispute1; referred for their adjudication by the appropriate Government, lay down certain principles or rules of conduct for the guidance of employers and employees,\n\ndoes not amount to exercise of any legislative power and no question of their being invested with any legislative powers can arise.\n\nSo far as delegated legislation is concerned, abstract definitions of the difference between the judicial and\n\nNiemla Ttxlilr\n\nFinishin.~ Mills /.Id.\n\nThe 2nd P1111iab Industrial Tribunal\n\nBhagwati ].\n\n.Nitmla Textile\n\nFinishing Mills Ltd. v.\n\nThe 2nd Punjab l1zdustrial Tribunal\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nthe legislative functions have been offered (Sec the distinction drawn by Mr. Justice Field in the Sinking- .\n\nFund cases(') ), but they are of little use when applied to a situation of complicated facts. The function of a Court is to decide cases and leading jurists recognize that in the decision of many cases a Court must fill interstices in legislation. A legislator cannot anticipate every possible legal problem ; neither can he do justice in cases after they had arisen. This inherent limitation in the legislative process makes it essential that there must be some elasticity in the judicial process. Even the ordinary courts of law apply the principles of justice, equity and good conscience in many cases ; e.g., cases in tort and other cases where the law is not codified or does not in terms cover the problem under consideration.\n\nThe Industrial Courts are to adjudicate on the disputes between employers and their workmen etc., and in the course of such adjudication they must determine the \"rights\" and \"wrongs\" of the claims made, and in so doing they are undoubtedly free to apply the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, keeping in view the further principle that their jurisdiction is invoked not for the enforcement of mere contractual rights . but for preventing labour practices regarded as unfair and for restoring industrial peace on the basis of collective barganing. The process does not cease to be judicial by reason of that elasticity or by reason of the application of the principles of justice, equity and good conscience.\n\n• It is not necessary to discuss the various authorities to which we have been referred on the nature and scope of the legislative process. Suffice it to say that there is neither legislation nor delegated legislation in the awards which are pronounced by the Industrial Tribunals while adjudicating upon the industrial disputes referred to them for adjudication and this contention is devoid of any force.\n\nIt is lastly contended that the Act was not within the legislative competence of the Central Legislature inasmuch as the definition of the term \"industry\" in\n\n(t) (1879) 99 U.S. 700, 761; 25 L. Ed. 496, 516.\n\ns. 2(j) of the Act comprises industrial as well as nonindustrial concerns and the Act which was expressly enacted with the object of investigation and settlement of industrial disputes is not covered by Entry 29 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935.\n\nThat Entry relates to \"Trade unions; industrial and labour disputes\" and it is urged that industrial disputes being the subject of legislation, there was no warrant for defining the term \"industry\" so as to include therein labour disputes and those too in non-industrial concerns.\n\nThe definition of industry contained in s. 2(j) of the Act being comprehensive enough to include labour disputes in non-industrial concerns, it is not possible to separate the ultra vires part of that definition from the intra vires part of it with the result that th.:: whole of the definition must be held to be ultra vlres and in so far as it permeated the whole of the Act, the Act as a whole should be declared void. This argument is sought to be supported by drawing our attention to certain decisions of the Industrial Tribunals which have included hospitals, educational institutions and even the business of Chartered Accountants within the definition of \"industry\" contained in the Act and it is urged that if such non-industrial concerns are also included in the definition of the term \"industry'', the Act is certainly ultra vires Entry 29.\n\nWe need not pause to consider whether the decisiom of the Industrial Tribunals above referred to are correct.\n\nTha~ will have to be done when the question is raised directly before us for adjudication. The fact that the Industrial Tribunals have put an extended construction on the term \"industry\" is no reason for holding that the definition itself is bad or ultra vires.\n\nWhat we have got to see is whether the definition of the term \"industry\" is within the legislative competence of the Central Legislature and on a prim a f acie reading of the same we are not prepared to say that the same is unwarranted or not covered by Entry 2~.\n\nA wrong application of the definition to cases which are not strictly covered by it cannot vitiate th~ definition if otherwise it is not open to challenge. lt\n\n1~57\n\nNiemla Ttxlile\n\nFinishing Mills Ltd.\n\nThe 2nd Punjab Industrial Tribunal\n\nBhagwati , J.\n\n., Viemla Teh.lt:\n\nFinishing , itills Ltd. v.\n\nThe 'l.nd Punjab Industrial Tribunal\n\nBha!.Jwati].\n\nshould be n(l(ed that, according to the preamble, the Act was enacted not only for settlement of industrial disputes but for other. purposes also. It is open to the respondents also to justify the definition of the term \"industry\" as contained in s. 2(j) of the Act by having resort to Entry 27 of the same List which refers to \"Welfare of labour ; conditions of labour ; provident funds ; employers' liability and workmen's compensation ; health insurance, including invalidity pensions ; old age pensions\". The definition of the term \"industry\" including as it does any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen, would, therfore, be justified under this Entry even if the same is not covered by Entry 29 above referred to. The Entries in the Legislative Lists should not be given a narrow construction, they include within their scope and ambit all ancillary matters which legitimately come within the topics mentioned therein. In the matters before us, moreover, the concerns or undertakings 3re all industrial concerns and fall squarely within the definition of the term \"industry\" strictly so-called and it is not open to the pursuers, situated as they are, to challenge the same. This contention also has no substance and must be rejected.\n\nIt, therfore, follows that the Act is intra vires the Constitution and Civil Appeals Nos. 333, 334 and 335 of 1955 as also Petitions Nos. 203, 182 and 65 of 1956 must be dismissed. There will, however, be one set of costs payable by the appellants in Civil Appeals Nos. 333 to 335 of 1955 to the respondents therein.\n\nSo far as Petitions Nos. 203 of 1956, 182 of 1956 and 65 of 1956 are concerned, each party will bear and pay its respective costs thereoL\n\nAppeals and petitions dismissed.\n\nGIPN-87-100 S. C. lndia/59-24-5-60-1,000.", "total_entities": 136, "entities": [{"text": "NIEMLA TEXTILE FINISHING MILLS LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 195, "end_char": 229, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Niemla Ttxlile\n\nFinishing Mills Ltd.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE 2No PUNJAB INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 235, "end_char": 269, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE 2ND PUNJAB INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "petitions) rs. R. DAS C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 299, "end_char": 325, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 327, "end_char": 335, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 358, "end_char": 369, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 390, "end_char": 419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 629, "end_char": 650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 652, "end_char": 664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 866, "end_char": 884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1099, "end_char": 1106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial\n\nDisputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial\n\nDisputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1111, "end_char": 1118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial\n\nDisputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial\n\nDisputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "List Ill of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1571, "end_char": 1640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1657, "end_char": 1686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1760, "end_char": 1775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Govinda Almon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2363, "end_char": 2376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The basic idea underlying all the provisions of the Act is the 'settlement of industrial disputes and the promotion of industrial peace so that production may not, be interrupted and the <:ommunity in general may be benefited, and the appropriate Government has, therefore, a discretion in the matter of making the reference to one or other of the authorities under the Act and also in the matter of carrying out the various provisions of the Act, including _ the curtailment or extension of the period ot\n\nDharmanand Pant\n\nState of Uttar\n\nPradesh\n\nGovinda Almon J.\n\nJanuary 10\n\nop.eratin of the ."}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2488, "end_char": 2490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Finishing Mills Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2531, "end_char": 2551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Finishing Mills Ltd. v.\n\nThe 2nd Punja6 Industrial Tribunal\n\n(2) Industrial Tribunals while settling particular industrial disputes refered to them, lay down certain general principles to be observed in regard to the determination of bonus, reinstate~ ment of dis1nissed or discharged en1ployees and other allied topics 1nainly with the object of promoting industrial peace, but these principles or rules of conduct, though they are applied as precedents by the Industrial Tribunals while adjudic.iting upon other similar industrial disputes referred to them, are not rules of la\\V and do not amount to legislation.", "canonical_name": "Finish fog Mill' ltd."}}, {"text": "List lII of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3358, "end_char": 3427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3710, "end_char": 3720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List lII of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "List lII of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3728, "end_char": 3749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Veda Vyasa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3795, "end_char": 3805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Veda Vyasa, Bhagirath Das and M. L. Kapur, for the appellants.", "canonical_name": "Veda Vyasa"}}, {"text": "Bhagirath Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3807, "end_char": 3820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Veda Vyasa, Bhagirath Das and M. L. Kapur, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "M. L. Kapur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3825, "end_char": 3836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Veda Vyasa, Bhagirath Das and M. L. Kapur, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "S. K. Kapur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3871, "end_char": 3882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Veda Vyasa, S. K. Kapur and N. H. Hingorani, for the petitioners in Petitions Nos.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Kapur"}}, {"text": "N. H. Hingorani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3887, "end_char": 3902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Veda Vyasa, S. K. Kapur and N. H. Hingorani, for the petitioners in Petitions Nos.", "canonical_name": "N. H. Hingorani"}}, {"text": "B. P. Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3993, "end_char": 4009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Veda Vyasa, Bhagirath Das and B. P. Maheshwari, for the petitioner in Petition No."}}, {"text": "S. M. Sikri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4060, "end_char": 4071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General of Punjab, Jindra Lal and T. M. Sen, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Jindra Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4101, "end_char": 4111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General of Punjab, Jindra Lal and T. M. Sen, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "T. M. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4116, "end_char": 4125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General of Punjab, Jindra Lal and T. M. Sen, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Sadhan •Chandra Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4211, "end_char": 4232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sadhan •Chandra Gupta, Bawa Shiv Charan Singh and /anardhan Sharma, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Bawa Shiv Charan Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4234, "end_char": 4256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sadhan •Chandra Gupta, Bawa Shiv Charan Singh and /anardhan Sharma, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "/anardhan Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4261, "end_char": 4277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sadhan •Chandra Gupta, Bawa Shiv Charan Singh and /anardhan Sharma, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Porus A. Mehta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4359, "end_char": 4373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Porus A. Mehta and T. M. Sen, for the Intervener in Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Veda Vyasa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4496, "end_char": 4506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Veda Vyasa, S. K. Kapur, and N. H. Hingorani, for the lnterveners in the appeals (petitioners in Petitions Nos.", "canonical_name": "Veda Vyasa"}}, {"text": "S. K. Kapur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4508, "end_char": 4519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Veda Vyasa, S. K. Kapur, and N. H. Hingorani, for the lnterveners in the appeals (petitioners in Petitions Nos.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Kapur"}}, {"text": "N. H. Hingorani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4525, "end_char": 4540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Veda Vyasa, S. K. Kapur, and N. H. Hingorani, for the lnterveners in the appeals (petitioners in Petitions Nos.", "canonical_name": "N. H. Hingorani"}}, {"text": "BttAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4692, "end_char": 4701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBttAGWATI J.-These three appeals with special leave from the orders of the High Court of Punjab and three petitions under Art."}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4767, "end_char": 4787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBttAGWATI J.-These three appeals with special leave from the orders of the High Court of Punjab and three petitions under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4814, "end_char": 4821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution challenge the vires of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4829, "end_char": 4898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5262, "end_char": 5277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were disputes between them and their workmen, and, by two notifications each dated March 4, 1955, in\n\nregard to the first two of them and by a notification dated February 25, 1955, in respect of the third, the State of Punjab, respondent No."}}, {"text": "2nd Punjab Industrial Tribunal, Amritsar", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5348, "end_char": 5388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2, referred the said disputes for adjudication to the 2nd Punjab Industrial Tribunal, Amritsar, respondent No."}}, {"text": "March 31, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5596, "end_char": 5610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "335 of 1955 filed their written statement on March 31, 1955, without prejudice to their contentions that respondent No."}}, {"text": "April 23, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5946, "end_char": 5960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "333 and 334 of 1955 were called' upon to file their written statements on or before- April 23, 1955, which they did raising the same objections as to the competency of respondent No."}}, {"text": "April 14, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6092, "end_char": 6106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 14, 1955, however, the appellants in all the three appeals filed writ petitions in the High Court under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6202, "end_char": 6210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6993, "end_char": 6997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7023, "end_char": 7028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7213, "end_char": 7227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7572, "end_char": 7590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 were industrial disputes concerning a controlled industry specified in this behalf by the Central Government and that, therefore, the appropriate Government for the purposes .of the Act so far as their mills were concerned was."}}, {"text": "Kapur", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8160, "end_char": 8165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These petitions came up for hearing before a Division Bench of the High Court consisting of the learned Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Kapur who dismissed the same in limine observing that they were premature, obviously meaning that respondent No."}}, {"text": "April 12, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8493, "end_char": 8507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that on or about April 12, 1955, a Division Bench of the said High Court consisting of the learned Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Falshaw had admitted a writ pet1t10n based on the very same grounds and bad granted a stay of proceedings before respondent No."}}, {"text": "Falshaw", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8605, "end_char": 8612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that on or about April 12, 1955, a Division Bench of the said High Court consisting of the learned Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Falshaw had admitted a writ pet1t10n based on the very same grounds and bad granted a stay of proceedings before respondent No."}}, {"text": "April 18, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8771, "end_char": 8785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It further appears that on April 18, 1955, the very same Bench which dismissed the petitions of the appellants in limine on April 15, 1955, admitted a writ petition filed by the Saraswati\n\nSugar Syndicate Ltd., inter alia, against respondent No."}}, {"text": "April 15, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8868, "end_char": 8882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It further appears that on April 18, 1955, the very same Bench which dismissed the petitions of the appellants in limine on April 15, 1955, admitted a writ petition filed by the Saraswati\n\nSugar Syndicate Ltd., inter alia, against respondent No."}}, {"text": "Saraswati\n\nSugar Syndicate Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8922, "end_char": 8953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It further appears that on April 18, 1955, the very same Bench which dismissed the petitions of the appellants in limine on April 15, 1955, admitted a writ petition filed by the Saraswati\n\nSugar Syndicate Ltd., inter alia, against respondent No."}}, {"text": "Saraswati Sugar Syndicate Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9653, "end_char": 9683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants having come to know of the order pJssed by the Division Bench of the High Court on April 18, 1955, on the writ petition of the Saraswati Sugar Syndicate Ltd., filed petitions on April 19, 1955, for review of the orders dated April 15, 1955, dismissing their writ petitions in limi1te."}}, {"text": "April 19, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9704, "end_char": 9718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants having come to know of the order pJssed by the Division Bench of the High Court on April 18, 1955, on the writ petition of the Saraswati Sugar Syndicate Ltd., filed petitions on April 19, 1955, for review of the orders dated April 15, 1955, dismissing their writ petitions in limi1te."}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10058, "end_char": 10063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 20, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10354, "end_char": 10368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court was prepared to issue notices to the respondents but was not prepared to grant the stay of further proceedings with the result that on the request of the counsel for the appellants the said petitions for review were dismissed on April 20, 1955."}}, {"text": "April 25, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10374, "end_char": 10388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 25, 1955, the appellants filed petitions in this Court for special leave to appeal under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10469, "end_char": 10477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10558, "end_char": 10563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10637, "end_char": 10644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "May 2, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10776, "end_char": 10787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Court on May 2, 1955, and an order for consolidation of these appeals was made on June 1, 1955."}}, {"text": "1, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10854, "end_char": 10861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Court on May 2, 1955, and an order for consolidation of these appeals was made on June 1, 1955."}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10907, "end_char": 10912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11025, "end_char": 11035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11043, "end_char": 11066, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11094, "end_char": 11115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11156, "end_char": 11163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Niemla Textile\n\nFinishin.I!\n\nMills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11172, "end_char": 11211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14 of the\n\nNiemla Textile\n\nFinishin."}}, {"text": "2nrl Punjab Industrial Tribunal\n\nBhawati J.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11218, "end_char": 11261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mills Ltd.\n\nThe '2nrl Punjab Industrial Tribunal\n\nBhawati J.\n\n, Viemla Textile Finishing Mills Ltd. v.\n\nThe 2nd Punjab Industrial Tribunal\n\nConstitution."}}, {"text": "October 3, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12020, "end_char": 12035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of 1955 filed in this Court on October 3, 1956, a petition under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12054, "end_char": 12061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12449, "end_char": 12456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12499, "end_char": 12526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32 of the Constitution had been filed by the Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd., on September 15, 1956, being Petition No."}}, {"text": "September 15, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12531, "end_char": 12549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32 of the Constitution had been filed by the Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd., on September 15, 1956, being Petition No."}}, {"text": "April 27, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12698, "end_char": 12712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A notification had been issued on April 27, 1956, by the State of Punjab referring the industrial disputes between them and their workmen for adjudication by the 2nd Industrial Tribunal and they asked for a writ of certiorari quashing the said reference and writs of mandamus and/or prohibition directing the State of Punjab to withdraw the said reference from the Industrial Tribunal and prohibiting the Industrial Tribunal from proceeding with the same."}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12721, "end_char": 12736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A notification had been issued on April 27, 1956, by the State of Punjab referring the industrial disputes between them and their workmen for adjudication by the 2nd Industrial Tribunal and they asked for a writ of certiorari quashing the said reference and writs of mandamus and/or prohibition directing the State of Punjab to withdraw the said reference from the Industrial Tribunal and prohibiting the Industrial Tribunal from proceeding with the same."}}, {"text": "March 21, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13163, "end_char": 13177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "65 of 1956 had been filed on March 21, 1956, by five workmen of the Indian Sugar and General Engineering Corporation Ltd., carrying on an undertaking in the name and style of the Saraswati Engineering Works."}}, {"text": "Indian Sugar and General Engineering Corporation Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13202, "end_char": 13255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "65 of 1956 had been filed on March 21, 1956, by five workmen of the Indian Sugar and General Engineering Corporation Ltd., carrying on an undertaking in the name and style of the Saraswati Engineering Works."}}, {"text": "Saraswati Engineering Works", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13313, "end_char": 13340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "65 of 1956 had been filed on March 21, 1956, by five workmen of the Indian Sugar and General Engineering Corporation Ltd., carrying on an undertaking in the name and style of the Saraswati Engineering Works."}}, {"text": "July 15, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13608, "end_char": 13621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A notification had been issued by the State of Punjab referring th~ disputes which had\n\n.arisen between them and their workmen to the 2nd Industrial Tribunal and one of the matters thus referred for adjudication was whether the workmen dismissed or discharged after July 15, 1955, should be reinstated."}}, {"text": "Attorney General of India", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14615, "end_char": 14640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Attorney General of India asked for and obtained leave to intervene on behalf of the Union of India at the hearing of the Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14700, "end_char": 14714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Attorney General of India asked for and obtained leave to intervene on behalf of the Union of India at the hearing of the Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "Niemla Textile\n\nFinishing Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15510, "end_char": 15546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be noted at the outset that the question as to the various undertakings being controlled industries and the appropriate Government for making the references of the industrial disputes arising between them and their workmen being the Union Government and not the State of Punjab which was the very basis of the writ petitions filed in the High Court and was .also one of the grounds on which special leave to\n\nNiemla Textile\n\nFinishing Mills Ltd. ,._"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15590, "end_char": 15598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 2nd Pu11jab Industrial Trib1111al\n\nBhagwati J.\n\n~Viemla Textile\n\nFinishing AJills Ltd.\n\nThe 2nd Punjab l11d11strial Tribunal\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nappeal had been obtained from this Court was ultimately abandoned in the course of the hearing before us and nothing more need be said about it.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15941, "end_char": 15948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16477, "end_char": 16489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16696, "end_char": 16708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter II of the Act sets out the authorities under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17007, "end_char": 17067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18598, "end_char": 18603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19174, "end_char": 19184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Niemla T", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19959, "end_char": 19967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Niemla T rruption Act\n\n(1) A.l.R. [1955] BoCD. ~51.\n\n(2) A.L.R. [1953) Mad.\n\ndoes not repeal s. 409 of the Indian Penal Code, and he accordingly dissented from the view taken in the case The State v. Gurcharan Singh (supra).\n\nThe Calcutta High Court in Amarendra Nath Roy\n\nv. The State( 1 ) has taken a similar view dissenting from The State v. Gurcharan Singh (supra).\n\nThere is a large body of case law in this direction and it is unnecessary to mention all except the following :\n\n(a) Mahammad Ali v. The State(2),\n\n(b) Bhup Narain Saxena v. State(3),\n\n(c) Gopal Das v. State(4).\n\nAs against all these cases the long voice of the Punjab High Court in State v.\n\nGurcharan Singh\n\n(supra) is the only dissentient one and after considering the matter carefully, it seems to us that the view taken by the Punjab High Court is not sound.\n\nWe now proceed to consider whether the two sections are identical in essence, import and content and in our opinion the argument on behalf of the State carries much force when it is suggested that by enacting the Amending Act of 1952 and creating sub-s. 4 to s. 5 the legislature specifically stated that the offence under s. 5 ( 1) ( c) is different from any previous existing offences under any penal statute and there can, therefore, be no scope for speculation about repeal.\n\nThe words used in sub-s. 4 \"any other law\" made the position quite clear and explicit.\n\nOther law does not mean identical law in which case the word 'other' will have no meaning. At an earlier stage of this judgment we have already tabulated the different elements constituting the two offences and a clear comparison and contract of these elements would show that an offence under s. 405 of the Indian Penal Code is separate and distinct from the one under s. 5 ( 1) ( c). There are three points of difference between s. 405 of the Indian Penal Code al}d s. 5 ( 1) ( c). The dishonest misappropriation contemplated in s. 405 of the Indian Penal Code is different; whereas that under section 5 ( 1 )( c) is either dishonest misappropriation or fraudulent misappropriation. The latter section is much wider in amplitude\n\n(1) A.I.R. [1955] Cal. 236.\n\n(3) A.LR. [1952] All. 35.\n\n(2) A.I.R. [1953] Cal. 681.\n\n(4) A.I.R. [19541 All. 80.\n\nOm Prakash Gupta\n\nState of U. P.\n\nGovinda Menon ].\n\nOm Prakash Guptd\n\nState of U. P.\n\nGovinda Men•n J.\n\nthon the former.\n\nIn s. 405 of the Indian Penal Code the words used are \"In violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied.\" There are no such expressions ins. 5(1)(c).\n\nIt is clear, therefore, that whereas under s. 405 of the Indian Penal Code there are three essential ingredients to constitute the offence, each one of them being separate and distinct, in s. 5 ( 1) ( c) there are only two.\n\nNow considering s. 5(1)(c) there are certain matters in it which are absent in s. 405 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe words 'dominion' and 'entrustment' connote two different things. The word 'dominion' is not in s. 5(1)(c). We have already stated that the word 'fraudulently' is not present in s. 405 and ins. S(l)(c) the gist of the offence can also be made out if the offender allows any person so to do, i.e., allows any person to derogate from the law as contemplated in the earlier portion of the section.\n\nThe meaning put on the word 'allows' would certainly be different from 'dishonest misappropriation' by the offender himself. It may be that the word can mean allowing by negligence or without any volition on the part of the offender.\n\nIt may also mean that there is some kind of pos1t1ve and tacit acquiescence necessary to bring home the offence. In any event, allowing other persons so to do does not find a place in s. 405 of the Indian Penal Code though this section also contemplates \"wilfully suffering any other person so to do.\" There is an essential difference between \"allowing\" a person and \"wilfully suffering\" a person to do a certain thing.\n\nThere can, therefore, be no doubt whatever that s. 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act creates a new offence called \"criminal misconduct\" and cannot by implication displace the offence under s. 'I05 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nIn this connection it is useful to compare ss. S(l)(a) and 5(1)(b) with ss. 161 and 162 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nAs has already been referred to, these two sections are aggravated forms of ss. 161 and 162 of the Indian Penal Code and the intention cannot be to abrogate the earlier\n\noffence by the creation of the new offence. These tw6 offences can co-exist and the one will not be considered as overlapping the other. A course . of conduct can be proved when a person is arraigned under ss. 5(l)(a) and 5(1)(b), but such a course is impossible to be let in evidence when an offence under ss. 161 and 162 is being enquired into or tried.\n\nSimilarly there are a number of elements which can be proved in an inquiry or trial under s. 5 ( 1) ( c) that cannot be le.t in by the prosecution when a person is charged for an offence under s. 405 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nIn s. 405 of the Indian Penal Code the offender must wilfully suffer another person to misappropriate the property entrusted, but in s. 5(1)(c) if he allows another person to dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriate or otherwise convert for his own use any property so entrusted, then it is an offence. There is a vast difference between wilfully suffering another and allowing a person to do a particular thing and in our view the word \"allows\" is much wider in its import.\n\nWilfully pre-supposes a i:onscious action, while even by negligence one can allow another to do a thing .\n\nIt seems to us, therefore, that the two offences are distinct and separate. This is the view taken in Amarendra Nath Roy v. The State (supra) and we endorse the opinion of the learned Jurruption Act\n\n(1) A.l."}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25264, "end_char": 25271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25384, "end_char": 25390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25398, "end_char": 25415, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25521, "end_char": 25540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Calcutta High Court in Amarendra Nath Roy\n\nv. The State( 1 ) has taken a similar view dissenting from The State v. Gurcharan Singh (supra)."}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25924, "end_char": 25941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As against all these cases the long voice of the Punjab High Court in State v.\n\nGurcharan Singh\n\n(supra) is the only dissentient one and after considering the matter carefully, it seems to us that the view taken by the Punjab High Court is not sound."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26378, "end_char": 26382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26386, "end_char": 26390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26450, "end_char": 26454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26629, "end_char": 26633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 405", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26989, "end_char": 26995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27003, "end_char": 27020, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27065, "end_char": 27069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 405", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27126, "end_char": 27132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27140, "end_char": 27157, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27163, "end_char": 27167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 405", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27226, "end_char": 27232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27240, "end_char": 27257, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27291, "end_char": 27300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Om Prakash Gupta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27540, "end_char": 27556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Om Prakash Gupta\n\nState of U. P.\n\nGovinda Menon ].", "canonical_name": "OM PRAKASH GUPTA"}}, {"text": "Govinda Men•n", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27626, "end_char": 27639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Om Prakash Guptd\n\nState of U. P.\n\nGovinda Men•n J.\n\nthon the former.", "canonical_name": "GovINDA MENON JJ."}}, {"text": "s. 405", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27665, "end_char": 27671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27679, "end_char": 27696, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 405", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27951, "end_char": 27957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27965, "end_char": 27982, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28097, "end_char": 28101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28149, "end_char": 28159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 405", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28212, "end_char": 28218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28226, "end_char": 28243, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28345, "end_char": 28355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 405", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28427, "end_char": 28433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 405", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29064, "end_char": 29070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29078, "end_char": 29095, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29349, "end_char": 29359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29367, "end_char": 29395, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29515, "end_char": 29532, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 161 and 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29607, "end_char": 29622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29630, "end_char": 29647, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 161 and 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29726, "end_char": 29741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29749, "end_char": 29766, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 5(l)(a) and 5(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30026, "end_char": 30049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 161 and 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30127, "end_char": 30142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30267, "end_char": 30271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 405", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30370, "end_char": 30376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30384, "end_char": 30401, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 405", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30407, "end_char": 30413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30421, "end_char": 30438, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30537, "end_char": 30547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31263, "end_char": 31267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31285, "end_char": 31313, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 405", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31358, "end_char": 31364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31372, "end_char": 31389, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31434, "end_char": 31444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 405", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31455, "end_char": 31461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31469, "end_char": 31486, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31510, "end_char": 31520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31644, "end_char": 31650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31658, "end_char": 31675, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Hari Shankar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32218, "end_char": 32230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are in agreement with the view expressed by Hari Shankar and Randhir ingh JJ."}}, {"text": "Randhir ingh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32235, "end_char": 32247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are in agreement with the view expressed by Hari Shankar and Randhir ingh JJ."}}, {"text": "Mul!a", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32308, "end_char": 32313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that no sanction is necessary and the view expressed by Mul!a J. to the contrary is not correct."}}, {"text": "L. J. LEACH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32487, "end_char": 32498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. J. LEACH AND COMPANY LTD."}}, {"text": "B. P.\n\nSINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32580, "end_char": 32592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(BHAGWATI,\n\nVENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR,\n\nB. P.\n\nSINHA and S. K. DAs JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Supreipe Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 33474, "end_char": 33488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In appeal before the Supreipe Court, the appellants applied for amendment of the plaint by raising, in the alternative, a claim for damages for breach of contract for nonw w, governed by the Mitakshara, to make a valid gift of a reasonable portion of the immoveable property of her husband to her daughter subsequent to the marriage ceremony, the gift in Churaman Sahu's case was made at the time of the Dwiragaman (Gowna) ceremony which was really a part of the marriage ceremony, while the gift in the present case was made some two years after the marriage. They then said : \"In the case now before us the marriage and the Gowna ceremony took place in 1938 and the document was executed in March 1940, the lapse of time between the two is too great to describe the gift to have been made on the occasion of either the marriage or the Gowna ceremony.\n\nNo authority had been placed before us supporting a gift by a widow to a daughter except at the time or on the occasion of marriage ceremony.\n\nThe ante-nuptial promise cannot be regarded as a gift having been made on the occasion of the marriage.\n\nHad it not been for the provisions contained in the Transfer of Property Act governing the Law of Gifts it might have been possible to consider the gift as having been made on the occasion of the marriage, the implementation of which was subsequent.\n\nIn view of the strict provisions of the Transfer of Property Act we can only consider the gift to have been made at the time when the deed was executed and registered.\" On the question whether the gift in favour of Kamala Devi by Sumitra Devi\n\n(1) (1912) L.R. 39 I.A. 121.\n\n(2) [19og] I.L.R. 37 Cal. 1.\n\n/( amaill Devi v.\n\nBachu Lal Gupta\n\nS. K. Das].\n\nKamala Devi\n\nv, Bachu Lal Gupta\n\n~- K. Das J.\n\nwas of a reasonable portion of her husband's properties, the learned Judges observed: \"In the present case, the value of the houses gifted was just above Rs. 18,000 which was about a fourth of the value of each share allotted ( viz., above Rs. 73,000).\n\nEven if the provmon of Rs. 10,000 made in the partition decree for meeting the marriage expenses be taken into account, we cannot say that the value of the gifted houses was disproportionate or unreasonable.\" In the result, the High Court affirmed the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge and dismissed the appeal preferred by the defendants who are the appellants here.\n\nIt is necessary to state now the contentions which have been urged before us on behalf of the appellants, and they may be put in two main categories-(a) contentions with regard to the findings of fact, and\n\n(b) contentions of law. Learned counsel for the appellants has impeached the concurrent finding of the Courts below that there was no \"sankalpa\" oi: promise of a gift of the four houses in. question at the time of the marriage ceremony which, it was alleged, was .followed by a confirmation of the gift at the Gowna ceremony. The finding has been impeached on the ground of a serious error of record said to have been committed by the High Court and on the ground of non-consideration of relevant evidence.\n\nIt has been argued before us that the proper finding should have been that Sumitra Devi made a \"sankalpa\" of the gift of the four houses in question after the Sampradan ceremony on the occasion of the marriage of Kamala Devi and that the gift was accepted bv Nand Lal on behalf of his minor daughter-in-law and that such a gift was again confirmed at the Gowna ceremony. The main contentions of law are three in number : firstly, it has been contended that even accepting the findings of the final Court of fact as correct, the gift being of a reasonable portion of the estate of Ram Kishori Lal Sao and in pursuance and fulfilment of an ante-nuptial agreement made by Sumitra Devi at the time of the final settlement of the marriage negotiations at Deoghar, was for the spiritual\n\nbenefit of Ram Kishori Lal and valid in Hindu law ; any such lapse of time as occurred in the. execution and registration of the deed of gift was immaterial, if the deed of gift was in fulfilment of the moral obligation flowing from the ante-nuptial agreement : secondly, it was suggested that Sumitra Devi got an absolute right in the properties given to her as her share on partition ; thirdly, a reference was made to section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and it has been argued that in view of the said provisions the plaintiffs-respondents were not entitled to the reliefs which they claimed. It may be stated here that arguments in the case had concluded before the Court closed for the annual vacation in 1956 and during the vacation the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, came into force on June 17, 1956.\n\nOn an application filed by the appellants, fresh arguments were heard with regard to the provisions of s. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.\n\nWe proceed now to deal with the contentions in the order in which we have stated them. First, we take up the contentions with regard to the findings of fact referred to above.\n\nIt has been pointed out to us that the learned Judges of the High Court made a serious error of record in dealing with the oral evidence as to the verbal gift said to have been made at the time of the marriage of Kamala Devi and the acceptance of such a gift by Nand Lal, father-in-law of Kamala Devi. In dealing with the oral ev.idence on this question, the learned Judges have said : \"If we leave out of account . for the present the evidence of Sumitra Devi and Bijoy as also of Kamal, who has been contradicted on a very material point by the other witnesses and also Nand Lal, father of Bijoy, we are left with Parasuram and Rash Behary. P:i.rasuram, a tenant, happens to be present at the psychological moment only for a few minutes when the Sankalpa is being made.\" The High Court clearly made a mistake in dealing with the evidence of Parasuram Sharma and confused Parasuram Sharma (witness No. 16)- with Pashupati Sarkar (witness No. 10).\n\nPashupathi Sarkar was a tenant of Sumitra Devi and it was his evidence that he went to\n\nKamala Devi v.\n\nBachu Lal Gupta\n\nS. K. Das J.\n\nKamala Dtv\n\nBachu Lal Gupta\n\nS. K. Dat J.\n\nthe place of marriage at about 12 midnight or 1 a.m. and stayed there for two minutes only and then came away. Parasuram Sharma (witness No. 16) was not a tenant of Sumitra Devi.\n\nHe was the Head Master of the Indian H.E. School at Patna, a school where Bijoy, husband of Kamala, was a pupil for two years. This Head Master said that he attended the marriage as a member of the bridegroom's party and was present when from behind the purdah Sumitra Devi made a \"sankalpa\" of the gift of four houses ; this was conveyed by Ganapati Sastri who recited \"mantras\" and was accepted by Nand Lal. It is unfortunate that the High Court confused Parasuram Sharma (witness No.\n\n16) with Pashupati Sarkar (witness No. 10), with the result that Parasuram Shanna's evidence was not properly considered by the High Court. This defect in the consideration of the evidence by the High Court is undoubtedly there.\n\nThe point for consideration is if this is a sufficient ground for departure from the ordinary rule of this Court not to go behinrl the findings of fact arrived at by the Courts below.\n\nThough the mistake made in unfortunate, we do not think that it is sufficient to disturb the finding of the Courts below or even to re-open the finding at this stage.\n\nIt is worthy of note that the learned Subordinate Judge made no mistake about Pashupati and Parasuram.\n\nHe pointed out that the witnesses examined on behalf of the appellants with regard to the verbal gift at the time of the marriage and its acceptance by Nand Lal, were mostly interested witnesses and none of them were really inrlependent.\n\nEven Parasuram Sharma, whose evidence has been placed before us by learned counsel for the appellants, cannot be said to be completely independent. He was invited to attend the marriage as a member of the bridegroom's party and he said that he overheard Sumitra Devi saying that she was making a \"sankalpa\" of the gift of four houses as promisedevidence which is not of a very satisfactory nature.\n\nThere were many other criticisms of the evidence regarding the . verbal gift at the time of the marriage ; the learned Judges of the High Court have referred to these criticisms and they accepted some of them.\n\nOne\n\nof the criticisms which g1eatly weighed with the learned Subordinate Judge was the absence of any reference to the gift of four houses in contemporaneous Court proceedings with regard to the withdrawal of Rs. 10,000 by Surnitra Devi, the sum which was set apart by the partition decree for the marriage expenses of Kamala Devi.\n\nThis criticism was not, however, fully accepted by the learned Judges of the High Court who placed greater reliance on the evidence of Rai Saheb Jogendra Nath Roy (witness No. 14) who was the most respectable and reliable witness examined on behalf of the appellants.\n\nThe evidence of this witness supported the e?idence of Sumitra Devi with regard to the promise made regarding the gift of four Asansol houses at the time of the settlement of marriage negotiations at Deoghar. There can be no doubt that Rai Saheb Jogendra Nath Roy was a very respectable witness and had no reasons to tell lies. Though he supported that part of the evidence of Sumitra Devi which relateLl to the promise of a gift of four houses at Asansol at the time of the marriage negotiations at Deoghar, he made no statement about a verbal gift having been made at the time of the marriage itself.\n\nThe witness said that he went to Sumitra Devi's house on the evening of the marriage and stayed for fifteen to twenty-five minutes only. He further said that he was not present at the time of the marriage ceremony.\n\nIt may, therefore, be that Rai Saheb Jogendra Nath Roy was not present at the time when the verbal gift was alleged to have been made.\n\nBy far and large, the learned Judge~ of the High Court did examine with care the oral , evidence with regard to the alleged verbal gift at the time of the marriage and but for the unfortunate confusion between Parasuram Sharma and Pashupati Sarkar, we do not think that the consideration of the oral evidence by the High Court is open to any other serious criticism.\n\nThe learned Judges rightly pointed out a serious discrepancy which existed between the evidence of Kamal Narayan Pandey (witness No. 8), who is said to have acted as the priest for the marriage, and the evidence of other witnesses with regard to the \"lagan\" or time\n\nt957\n\nKamala Dai\n\nB111; h:1 Lal Gup:a\n\nS. A. Das].\n\nAamala Devi\n\nv. 13!Uhu I at G\"pta\n\nS. K. Das J.\n\nSL'PREME COURT REPORTS [1957]\n\nof mrnage. faking all these circumstances into consideration, we do not think that we shall be justified in going behi::.d the finding of the Courts below that the appellants had failed to prove by satisfactory evidence that Mst. Sumitra Devi made a verbal gift of the four houses in question at the time of the marriage of her daughter Kamala Devi and that such a gift was accepted by Nancl Lal on behalf of him minor daughterin-law.\n\nIn view of this finding, the question as to whether the gift was again confirmed at the time of the Gowna cereinony does not really arise. There can be no confirmation of an act which did not itself take place.\n\nAs the appellants have impeached the finding of the Courts below with regard to the verbal gift said to have been made at the time of the marriage, the respondents have also impeached before us the finding of the High Court about an ante-nuptial agreement said to have been made at Deoghar.\n\nIt has been contended by learned counsel for the respondents that there were no compelling reasons for the High Court, which was the appellate Court, to differ from the appreciation of the oral evidence by the learned Subordinate' Judge, who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses, with regard to the question of the ante-nuptial agreement said to have been made at Deoghar. It is true that the learned Subordinate Judge did not accept the evidence of the witnesses who testified to the terms of settlement of the marriage negotiations at Deoghar.\n\nWhat tipped the scale in favour of the finding arrived at by the High Court on this point was the evidence of Rai Sahib Jogendra Nath Roy (witness No. 14).\n\nThe learned Subordinate Judge gave certain reasons for not accepting the evidence of this witness. The learned Judge~ of the High Court considered those reasons very carefully and rightly pointed out that there were no good grounds for thinking that Rai Saheb Jogendra Nath Roy had fallen a victim to lapse of memory or for holding that he was an interested witness. The evidence of Rai Saheb )ogendra Nath Roy. was considered in the context of contemporaneous Court proceedings fo1 the withdrawal of Rs. 10,000 and the learned Judges\n\nof the High Court accepted the explanatio~ which Rai Saheb Jogendra Nath Roy gave for not mentioning the promise of a gift of four houses in Asansol in the application which Sumitra Devi made for the withdrawal of the said sum of Rs. 10,000. In our opinion, the finding of the High Court as to an ante-nuptial agreement for the gift of four houses at Asansol, worth about Rs. 20,000, is not vitiated by any error of fact or law.\n\nThat finding must, therefore, be accepted as a correct finding, even though the learned Subordinate Judge came to a contrary conclusion with regard to it.\n\nHaving disposed of the contentions of fact urged before us, we proceed now to a consideration of the contentions of law. It may be convenient to dispose of, first, the argument somewhat faintly advanced on behalf of the appellants that even prior to the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Sumitra Devi had an absolute right of disposal in the share allotted to her on partitionin 1933-36 under Mitakshara law.\n\nThe question whether the share allotted to a mother on partition is stridhan or not, according to the Benares school, was left open by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Bhugwandeen Doobey v. Myna Baee (1),\n\nthe very case in which they held that property inherited by a woman was not stridhan according to the Mitakshara.\n\nIn Debi Mangal Prasad Singh v. Mahadeo Prasad Singh (2), the Allahabad High Court, after a review of all the authorities on the subject, held that it was stridhan ; but the Privy Council held that it stood on the same footing as property inherited by a woman and that it was not stridhan. The actual point decided in Debi Mangal Prasad's case was that there was no substantial difference in principle between a woman's property acquired by inheritance and that\n\nacqi; ed by partition. It is worthy of note that the part1t10n decree proceeded on the footing that Sumitra Devi would be entitled to the income from the properties allotted to her but should not be in a position to prejudice the reversioners by destroying the corpus.\n\nThe preliminary decree for partition stated : \"The Commissioner is further directed to allot as little liquid\n\n(r) [1868] 11 M.l.A. 487, 5q.\n\n(2) (1912) L.R.39 I.A 121.\n\nKamala Devi\n\nB.xhu Lal Gupla\n\nS. K. Das].\n\nKmala Dtl'i\n\nBochu Loi G.pto\n\nS. K. Das].\n\n.:ash to the share of plaintiff No. 2 (Sumitra Devi) as possible on partition and as a rule should allot such properties to her share of which she may receive income without trouble, but may not prejudice the reversioners by destroying the corpus\".\n\nIt follows, therefore, that under the Mitakshara law and also under the partition decree, Mst. Sumitra Devi did not have an absolute right or interest in the share allotted to. her on partition. Under the decision in Debi Mangat Prasad Singh\n\nv. Mahadeo Prasad Singh( 1 ), the property allotted to Mst. Suinitra Devi on partition stood on the same footing as property inherited by her from her husband.\n\nShe had no absolute right' of disposal of the property.\n\nThis brings us to a consideration · of the principal point argued before us on. behalf of -the appellants, namely, whether Sumitra. Devi was competent to make a gift of a reasonable portion of the estate of her husband to her daughter Kamala : Devi . as a marriage dowry in pursuance. and fullihnent of an ante-nuptial agreement, evea .. though the gift :was. made some two years after the .marriage .ceremony: . This point was urged before us, ; is we have already stated, prior to and irrespective of the enactment of the fiindu Succession Act, 1956.\n\nThe argument of learned counsel for the appellants was that Sumitra Devi was competent to make such a gift under the Hindu law, even as it stood prior to the enac.tment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. . We shall; therefore, deal with this point, irrespective of the provisions of . s. 14 of the Hindu Sucession Act, 1956.\n\nIt may be stated at the very outset t!).ar the concurrent finding of the Courts below was that the gift of four houses at Asansol, of a value of about Rs. 19,000, was not disproportionate or unreasonable if one had regard to the .. large extent of properties left by Ram Kishori Lal Sao on his death ; this was so even taking into consideration the sum of Rs. 10,000 which was set apart for the marriage expenses of Kamala Devi and which was withdrawn by Sumitra Devi. In our opinion, that finding is correct and must be accepted as such.\n\nTherefore, the narrow question is if Sumitra Devi was competent to n.ake the gift of four houses at\n\n(1) (1912) L.R. 39 I.A. '\"'\n\nAsansol as marriage dowry to her daughter, some two years after the marriage, in pursuance and fulfilment of the ante-nuptial agreement made at Deoghar.\n\nThere are a number of decisions bearing on the question, to which our attention has been drawn by learned counsel for the parties, and we propose now to examine some of them.\n\nIn Sardar Singh v. K11ni Behari Lal (1) it was observed : \"There can be no doubt upon a review of the Hindu law, taken in conjunction with the decided cases, that the Hindu system recognises two sets of religious acts. One is in connection with the actual obsequies of the deci::ased, and the periodical performance of the obsequial rites prescribed in the Hindu religious law, which are considered as essential for the salvation of the soul of the Jeceased. The other relates to acts which although not ;:ssential or obligatory, are still pious obenances which conduce to the bliss of the urceased's soul.\n\nIn the later case~ this distinction runs dearly through the views of the learned judges. . . . . . . . . . . . . . \\Vitl1 reference to the first class of acb, the powers of the Hindu female who holds the property are wider than in r..:spect of the acts which are :; iniply pious and if performed are meritorious so far as they ..:onduce to the piritual benefit of the c\\eceaed. In one case, if the income of the property, or the property itself, is not sufficient t<, cover the expense>, she is entitled to seli the whole of it.\n\nIn the other case, fle ca1~ alienate a small portion of the propc:rt~· for the piom or charitable purpose she may hav• in view. ' In a very early decisi011, Cossi Naut Bysack v. Ht1rroo S•ondry Dossee (2).. which was heard by the Supreme Court at Calcutta, in 1819 an.! by tl e Juclicial Committee in 1826 and quo\"d in Chura11;,,1 S1rley's Diges~ 198.\n\nKamala Der;\n\nv. 8acku Lal G., •s\n\nS. K. D1JJJ.\n\nKamala Devi\n\nBaclw Lal Gupta\n\nS. K. Das :J.\n\nbefore she attains puberty.\n\nSome of these texts have been quoted in Churaman Sahu'.< case ( 1 ) and Ram Sumran Prasad v. Govind Das (\").\n\nAccording to these texts, the marriage of a girl by her father is enjoined as a religious duty in order to prevent him from being degraded and visited with sin ; there is also direct spiritual benefit conferred upon him by such a marriage.\n\nMarriage, according to the Sastras, is a religious act ; a Sanskara for a man or woman.\n\nAccording to Manu, Chapter IT, verse 67, the sacrament of' marriage is to a female what initiation with the thread is to a male. The Mitakshara also recognises marriage as a religious obligation for both male and female ( Sundrabai /avji Dagdu Pardeshi v.\n\nShivnarayana Ridkarana ( 3 ) ). The texts also recognise that gifts can be made at the time of or on the occasion of tbe marriage or any ceremonies connected therewith, and may also be made in fulfilment of a promise made in connection with the marriage ; some decisions have gone to the extent of laying down that the moral obligatio11 continues till it is discharged or fulfilled and such fulfilment may be subsequent to the marriage : see Mitakshara, Chapter I, section VII, Placitum 5 to 14.\n\nIn Placitum 9 is quoted Manu's text: \"To the maiden sisters, let their brothers give portions out of their own allotments respectively ; to each the fourth part of the appropriate share ; and they, who refuse to give it shall be degraded.\" In Placitum 11, it is stated: \"If it be alleged, that, here also the mention of a quarter is indeterminate, and the allotment of property sufficient to defray the expenses of the nuptials is all which is meant to be expressed : the answer is no ; for there is not any proof, that the alloment of a quarter of a share is indefinite in both codes ; and the withholding of it is pronounced to be a sin.\" In Ramasami Ayyar v.\n\nVengidusami Ayyar (' ), it was observed with reference to the aforesaid passages in the Mitakshara, and also to certain passages in the Smriti Chandrika, wherein the texts of Manu, Yajnavalkya and other Smriti writers dealing with the question of\n\nl') ('909) I.L.R. 37 Cal. '• 7,\n\n(2) ('926) I.L.R !'at. 646, 681.\n\n(3) ['9n7] f.L.R. 32 Bom. s,.\n\n(1) [1898] I.L.R. 221\\.-:fad. 113, 114.\n\nallotment to be made by brothers to their maiden sisters at the time of partition, were commented upon, that with regard to the true meaning of those texts commentators were divided : some of them held that all that the texts mean is that funds required for the marriage of sisters should be provided out of their father's estate but other commentators, Vijnaneswara among them, laid down that inclusive of their marriage expenses sisters were entitled to a provision not exceeding a fourth of what they would have got had they been males.\n\nIt was further observed therein that it was not necessary to decide which of the two views was to be taken as law.\n\nSubramania Ayyar /. then said : \"Assuming that, as argued for the appellant, the view advocated by Vijnaneswara and his followers is not law, the fact that so high an authority as the author of the Mitakshara propounds a rule thus favourable to maiden daughters ought to make one hesitate to accept as sound the exceeding! y limited construction which was insisted on on behalf of the appellant and which can scarcely be said to be in itself very reasonable, viz., that the texts justify a disbursement out of the estate of only the price of things required in connection with the celebration of the marriage.\n\nIn my opinion, the better and sounder view is, as contended for the respondents, that the authorities should be understood to empower a qualified owner like Thaiyyu Ammal to do all acts proper and incidental to the marriage of a female according to the general practice of the community to which she belongs.\" It should be noted that the observations aforesaid were made in a case where a widow gave her daughter in marriage and at the time of the marriage made a gift of a portion of the lands inherited by her from her husband to her son-in-law, and the question was if the widow Thaiyyu Ammal, who was a Hindu qualified owner, had authority to make such a gift.\n\nIn Kudutamma v.\n\nNarasimla Charyulu('), the brother, as managing member of the joint family, made a gift of a reasonable portion of the joint .famiy\n\nproperties to his sisters.\n\nThe sisters were married m\n\n(1) (19-07) 17 M.L.J. 528, 531, 532.\n\nB-77 S C India/59\n\nKamala De11i\n\nBachu Lal Gupta\n\nS. 1'. Das].\n\nKamala Devi\n\nBachu Lal Guµa\n\nS. 1'. Das].\n\nthe father's lifetime but were left for some reason or other without a marriage portion.\n\nThe gift was made after the father's death and subsequent to the marriage.\n\nIt was held that the brother had authori\\y to make the gift.\n\nMiller f. observed : \"If then a brother, finding that his sister though married in his father's lifetime, has been for any reason left without a marriage portion which she ought to have receiYed, it is difficult to see how he can be held to have exceeded his powers if he makes goo;:J the deficiency out of the family property.\n\nWe are not required to hold that he is bound to do so ; we are not required to hold that his father was bound in law to give his daughter anything at her marriage ; it is only necessary for us to hold that the gift is not in excess of the powers of the brother and cannot therefore be recalled by him or avoided by his son.\" Wallis f. who concurred in the judgment, observed : \"In such a case there was, I think, a strong moral obligation on the joint family over the father as managing member to make a gift out of the joint family property on the occasion of the marriages either to the girls themselves or to their husbands as a provision for them, and the fact that the father maintained both the daughters and their husbands out of the joint family property until his death may be regarded as a continuing recognition of such moral obligation.\n\nMere neglect on the part of the joint family to fulfil a moral obligation at the time of the marriages cannot, in my opinion, be regarded as putting an end to it, and I think it continued until it was discharged by the deed of gift now sued on and executed after the father's death by his son, the !st defenrlant, who succeeded him as managing member of the joint family.\"\n\nIn Churaman Sa!ut's case('), the gift was no doubt made on the occasion of the daughter's gouma ceremony which took place some two years after the marriage, and it was held that the gowna ceremonv was a ceremony of importance, closely connected with the marriage, though it was not a ceremony necessary to complete the marriage.\n\nThe gift was upheld on that footing.\n\nWhat is worthy of note, however, is\n\n(1) (1909) I.L.R. 37 Cal. r,7.\n\nthat in Churaman Sahu's case( 1 ), the decision in Kudutamma v. Narasimha Charyttlu( 2 ) was approved, and that was a decision in which the gift was made subsequent to the marriage and not on the occasion of any particular ceremony.\n\nSundararamayya v. Sitamma(3) is another decision of some importance.\n\nThere the marriage took place about forty years before the gift and there was no evider1ce that the father had any intention to give any property at the time of the marriage.\n\nThe question was if in those circumstances the gift was valid. After referring to the decision in Churaman Sahu v. Gopi Sahu(1) and Ramasami Ayyar v. Vengidusami Ayyar('), it was observed: \"We see no reason to differ from these two decisions.\n\nThe father or the widow is not bound to give any property. There may be no legal but only a moral obligation.\n\nIt is also true .that in the case before us the father did not make any gift and discharge that moral obligation at the time of marriage.\n\nBut it is difficult to see why the moral obligation does not sustain a gift because it was not made to the daughter at the time of marriage but only some time later.\n\nThe moral obligation of the plaintiff's father continued in force till it was discharged by the gift in 1899.\" The learned Judges referred with approval to the earlier decision in Kudutamma\n\nv. Narasimha Charyulu(\").\n\nThe decision in Bhagwati Shukul v.\n\nRam /atan Tewari(\") is somewhat out of the ordinary in the sense that a widow transferred the entire property inherited by her from her husband to a blind and crippled daughter in order to get her married and supply her with a handsome dowry.\n\nIt was\n\noberved that no hard and fast rule could be laid down to define the extent and limit of the widow's power of disposing of the property inherited by her for the marriage of her daughter.\n\nThe decision of the same case when it went up in Letters Patent appeal is reported as Bliagu1ati Shukul v. Ram /atan Tewari( 8 ).\n\nThe decision of the single judge was upheld on the\n\n(r) (1909) l.L.R. 37 Cal. 1,7.\n\n'.2) (1907) r7 M.L.J. 528,531,532.\n\n(3) (19u) I.L.R. 35 Mad. 6~8,629.\n\n(4( (1898) I.L.R. 22 Mad. 113, 114. (5; A.I.R. 1922 All. 381.\n\n(6) (r922) I.L.R. 45 All. 297.\n\nKamala Devi\n\nBadia Lal Gupta\n\nS. K. DasJ.\n\nKtJmala Devi\n\nBll&hu Lal Gup10\n\nS.. K. Das],\n\nground that in order to get the girl married, it was \"a sheer necessity\" for the widow to provide a dowry of Rs. 500 or its equivalent by the gift of the property.\n\nThe property was very small in value, being in the neighbourhood of Rs. 500 only, and where under the circumstances the marriage of the girl into a suitable Brahmin family, having regard to her blindness and infirmity, necessitated the spending of the equivalent in value of that property, then the alienation was a \"sheer legal necessity.\" It should be observed here that this decision is on its peculiar facts, and other decisions do not support the >- view that an alienation of the entire property is permissible ; most of the decisions lay down that an alienation of a reasonable portion of the property is only permissible.\n\nWhat is reasonable must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.\n\nIn Vettor Ammal v. Pooch Ammal( 1 ), the gift was made some years after the marriage.\n\nThe gift was upheld and was held to be reasonable being about one-sixth of the whole property.\n\nIn Sailabala v. Baikuntha Nath('), a gift made by a widow of twelve annas share of her husband's estate on the occasion of the marriage of her daughter was supported on the ground that it was impossible to define the extent and limit of the widow's power of disposing of property inherited by her because it must depend upon the circumstances of the disposition when ever such disposition was made.\n\nIn Ram Sumran Prasad v. Gobind Das(1 ), the gift was made on the 28th July, 1901, but the marriage took place in 1899, two years earlier.\n\nThe gift was made in pursuance of an earlier promise and a verbal declaration made at the time of the Gantha Pakrai (catching hold of the skirt of the mother-in-law) performed during the marriage.\n\nOn an exhaustive review of the decisions, the case law was summarised as follows : \"The case law on the subject summarised above fully indicates the inclination of all the High Courts to uphold a gift by a widow of landed property to her daughter or son-in-law\n\n(1) (1911) 22 M.L.J. 321.\n\n(3) [1926) l.L.R. ~' Pat.646, 681.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1926 Gal. f86.\n\non the occasiun of the marriage or any ceremonies connected with the marriage and that the promise made may be fuifillcd afterwards ; and it is not essential to make a gift at the time of the marriage but that it may be made afterwards, upon the ground that the gift whu1 made fulfils the moral and religious obligation of giving a portion of the property for the\n\nbenefit of the daughter and the son-inclaw.\n\nThe only limitation placed upon this power of making a gift is that it should bear a reasonable proportion to the entire property of the deceased father and , that it should be justifiable in the circumstances of the case in terms of the principle laid down m Gossi Naut Bysack v.\n\nH11rroosoo11dfy Dossee(1 )\". In Sit/zamahalaf(S!imamma v. Kotayya(' ), Mr. fustice Venkataramana\n\nRao summarised the case law in the following words : \"Thus it will be seen that it is competent to a Hindu father to make a gift of a reasonable portion of the ancestral immoveable property to his daughters without reference to the son ; , ......... It is a power vested in the father unde( the Hindu law, which he can exercise subject to the restriction of limitations imposed on him by the said bw. The decided cases have held that the gift must he a reasonable one.\n\nThe question whether a particular gift is reasonable or not will have to be judged according to the state of the family at the time of the gift, the extent of the family immoveable propcrty, the indebtedness of the family, and the: paramourrt charges which the family was under an obligation to provide for ; and after having regard to those circumstances if the gift can be held to be reasonable such a gift ,, ill be binding on the joint\n\nfamily members irrespective of the consent of the members of the family ..... , .. li under the law .it is a moral obligation 0;1 the family to make a prov1s10n as :.nd by w:.1y of a marriage portion and such obligation continues until it is fulfilled by a reasonable provi; ion being made therefor, the fact that one of the , sons lm become iudebtcd cannot take away the power of the father to make such a gift ...... \". In Pratap Kum11ur v. Raj Bahadur Si11gi1( 3 ) the marriage took\n\n; t) 'Morley's Digest 198.\n\n(3) A.LR. 1943 Oudh 316. (2l A.I.R. 1936 Mad. 825,82;.\n\nKamala Det:i v.\n\nBachu Lal Gupta\n\nS. K. Das).\n\nKamala Devi\n\nBachu Lal Gupta\n\nS. K. Das].\n\nplace in 1923 and the gift was made in 1926.\n\nAfter examining the evidence the learned Judges held that Mst. Raj Kuer, the widow in question, did not make any \"sankalpa\" of the gift of fifteen villages at the time of her daughter's marriage.\n\nOn behalf of the plaintiffs it was argued before them that a Hindu widow could make a gift of her husband's immoveable property to her daughter only at the time of her marriage. The learned Judges repelled this contention and held that the gift made by Mst. Raj Kuer in favour of her daughter and son-in-law was valid, even though she did not make a \"sankalpa\"' at the time of marriage. In Abhesang Tirabhai v.\n\nRaisang(' ), it was held that gifts by a Hindu widow on the occasion of her daughter's marriage are valid as they are understood in Hindu law to conduce to the spiritual benefit of the widow's husband.\n\nIn Ramalinga Annavi v. Narayana Annavi( 2 ), a father made a gift to his daughter of a sum of Rs. 5,000 and a usufructuary mortgage.\n\nIt was held that the father had undoubtedly the power under the Hindu law of making within reasonable limits gifts of immoveable property to a daughter ; similarly, gifts of sums of money, if reasonable, would be upheld.\n\nAs against the very large number of decisions referred to above, the only decision which can be said to strike a dissenticnt note is the decision in Ganga Bisheslwr v. Firth; Pal('). That was a case in which one Debi Prasad executed a deed of gift of a certain share in a certain village, being the ancestral property of his family, in favour of the defendant Ganga Bisheshar, the father-in-law of his daughter, on April 25, 1872, abont two years after the marriage of the daughter.\n\nMr. Justice Spankie observed as follows : \"I understand the finding of both the lower Conrts to be that the transfer was not made for any necessary purpose allowed by the Hindu law.\n\nThe deed of gift appears to have been made by tbc father in performance of a promise to give a dowry to his daughter.\n\nBut I am not aware that the performance of such a promise can be regarded as a bwful purpose justifying alienation\n\nr1; (1012) IJ Bon1. L.H .. , u~J'l, (:1) (1380) I.L.R. 2 ;\\ll. fi:Jj,638.\n\n(2) .\\ I.R '9\" P.C. 201.\n\n)'--_,\n\nunder the Hindu law.\n\nIt was not necessary for the support of the daughter, it was not for any religious or pious work, nor was it a pressing necessity. Daughters must be maintained until their marriage and the expenses of their marriage must be paid.\n\nBut in this case the gift was not made at the time of the marriage.\n\nIt was not executed until two years after the marriage.\" There is no consideration, nor any discussion, of the texts bearing on the question, and the learned Judge did not consider the alienation from the point of view that the marriage of the daughter was a religious duty and the promise to make a gift to the daughter as her marriage portion created a moral or religious obligation in fulfilment of which it was competent for the father to execute a deed of gift in favour of the daughter of a reasonable portion of the estate.\n\nOn an examination of the decisions referred to above, the following principles clearly emerge: (1) It is the imperative religious duty and a moral obligation of a father, mother or other guardian to give a girl in marriage to a suitable husband ; it is a duty which must be fulfilled to prevent degradation, and direct spiritual benefit is conferred upon the father by such a marriage.\n\n(2) A Hindu widow in possession of the estate of her deceased husband can make an alienation for religious acts which are not essential or obligatory but are still pious observances which conduce to the bliss of the deceased husband's soul.\n\n(3) In the .case of essential or obligatory acts, if the income of the property or the property itself is not sufficient to cover the expenses, she is entitled to sell the whole Qf it; but for acts which are .. pious and which conduce to the bliss of the deceased husband's soul, she can alienate a reasonable portion of the property. ( 4) Gifts by a widow of landed property to her daughter or son-in-law on the rn;:casion of the marriage or any ceremonies connected with the marriage, are well recognised in Hindu law. (5) If a promise is made of such a gift for or at the time of the marriage, that promise may be fullilled afterwards and it is not essential to make a gift at the time of the marriage but it may be made afterwards in fulfilment of the promise. (6) Some decisions\n\nKamala Devi v.\n\nBachu I.al Gupta\n\nS. K. Das].\n\nKamala Devi v.\n\nBachu Lal Gupta\n\nS. K. Da> ].\n\ngo to the length of holding that there is a moral or religious obligation of gi1ing a portion of the joint family property for the benefit of the daug:1ter and the son-in-hw, and a gift made long after the marriage mav be supported upon the ground that the gift when made fulfils that moral or religious obligation.\n\nIn the case before us, It is not even necessary to go to the extent to which the decisions covered . by the bst item stated above (item o) have gone. The finding of the foul Court of fact is that there was an antenuptial agreement by Sumitra Devi that she would give four houses at Asansol, of the value of Rs. 20,000, to her daughter as n1arriage dowry.\n\nIt ras open to Sumitrc, Devi to fulfit tlnt promise as a religious act which conferred spiritml benefit uron her deceased husband, irrespective of the consideration whether she made a \"sankalpa\" at the time of the marriage or not. \\Ve have already stated that we concur in the finding of the Courts below that the gift was neither disproportionate nor unreasonable in extent.\n\nT~1e learned Judges of the High Court referred to s. 123 of the Transfer of Property Act which lays down that for the purpose of making a gift of immoveable property, the transfer must be effected by a registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the donor, and attested by at least two witnesses.\n\nIn one part of their judgment, they said that but for the aforesaid provisions it miht have been possible to consider the gift as having been made on the occasion of the marriage, the implementation of which was subsequent.\n\nIn our opinion, the learned fudges of the High Court were in error with regard to the scope and effect of s. 123 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is true that a gift becomes le:ally effective onlv when a registered instrument is executed in the manner laid down in that section.\n\nSction 123 doe not deal with nor does it affect the power of a Hindu widow to make an alienation of a reasonable portion of her husband's estate in favour of the daughter as marriage dowry. That right is governed by Hindu law and it is open to a widow to make an effective gift in favour of her daughter\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUP3.EM:t, COURT REPORTS 477\n\nrnbscquent to th,. marriage, if the conditions laid down by Hindu law are fulfilled.\n\nFor the reasons given above, we hold that the alienation made by Mst. Sumitra Devi in favour of her daughter Kamala Devi on March 10, 1940, was valid and binding on the reversioners.\n\nThe decision of the High Court to the contrary was erroneous in law.\n\nWe now turn to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which came into force on June 17, 1956.\n\nSection 14, on which learned counsel for the appellants has relied, is in these terms :\n\n\"(1) Any property possessed by a female Hit1du, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.\n\nExplanation.-In this sub-section, 'property' includes both moveable and immoveable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act.\n\n(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property.\"\n\nThere is no doubt that by reason of the use of the expression \"whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act\" the section is retrospective in effect. The Explanation to the section shows that \"property\" includes immoveable property acquired by a female Hindu at a partition or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage. The argument of learned counsel for the appellants is two-fold.\n\nHe has contended\n\nKamala Devi\n\nBacku Lal Gupt.1\n\nS. K. Das].\n\nKamtJla Devi v.\n\nBa;; hu Lal Gupta\n\nS. K. Das J.\n\nthat the four houses in question are now in the possession of Kamala Devi and under s. 14 Kamala Devi is a full owner of the houses ; the plaintiffs-respondents cannct therefore get the declaration which they have asked for.\n\nAlternativelv, he has contended that if Sumitra Devi is still i1; possession of the houses, she also becomes a full owner and in that event also the jJbintiffs-respondents are not entitled to the reliefs claimed.\n\nLearned counsel for the respondents has relied on sub-section (2) of s. 14 which says that nothing in sub-s. (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift, etc., where the terms of the instrument or decree, etc., prescribe a restricted estate in such property.\n\nIt is argued that Sumitra Devi got a restricted estate by the partition decree and sub-s. ( l) has no appli.cation to the estate.\n\nIt is further argued that Kamala Devi as donee could not get a larger estate 1 ban what the donor had in the property, if the view of Hindu law, as contended for by learned counsel for the respondents, is accepted as correct ; therefore, Kamala Devi is also not entitled to the benefit of sub-s. ( l) of s. 14.\n\nWe do not think that it is necessary to decide this case on the rival contentions presented to us with regard to s. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.\n\nWe have alreadv held that under Hindu law Mst. Sumitra Devi could make a gift in favour of her w, governed by the Mitakshara, to make a valid gift of a reasonable portion of the immoveable property of her husband to her daughter subsequent to the marriage ceremony, the gift in Churaman Sahu's case was made at the time of the Dwiragaman (Gowna) ceremony which was really a part of the marriage ceremony, while the gift in the present case was made some two years after the marriage.", "canonical_name": "Churaman Sa!ut"}}, {"text": "Had it not been for the provisions contained in the Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16641, "end_char": 16717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16932, "end_char": 16956, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "(1912) L.R. 39 I.A. 121", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 17140, "end_char": 17163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bachu Lal Gupta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17261, "end_char": 17276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kamala Devi\n\nv, Bachu Lal Gupta\n\n~- K. Das J.\n\nwas of a reasonable portion of her husband's properties, the learned Judges observed: \"In the present case, the value of the houses gifted was just above Rs.", "canonical_name": "Backu Lal Gupt.1"}}, {"text": "K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17281, "end_char": 17287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kamala Devi\n\nv, Bachu Lal Gupta\n\n~- K. Das J.\n\nwas of a reasonable portion of her husband's properties, the learned Judges observed: \"In the present case, the value of the houses gifted was just above Rs."}}, {"text": "Nand Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18897, "end_char": 18905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has been argued before us that the proper finding should have been that Sumitra Devi made a \"sankalpa\" of the gift of the four houses in question after the Sampradan ceremony on the occasion of the marriage of Kamala Devi and that the gift was accepted bv Nand Lal on behalf of his minor daughter-in-law and that such a gift was again confirmed at the Gowna ceremony.", "canonical_name": "Nand Lal Sao"}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19841, "end_char": 19851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19859, "end_char": 19885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20172, "end_char": 20198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "June 17, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20219, "end_char": 20232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be stated here that arguments in the case had concluded before the Court closed for the annual vacation in 1956 and during the vacation the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, came into force on June 17, 1956."}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20338, "end_char": 20343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "statute": "the Hindu Succession Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20351, "end_char": 20377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bijoy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21022, "end_char": 21027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "for the present the evidence of Sumitra Devi and Bijoy as also of Kamal, who has been contradicted on a very material point by the other witnesses and also Nand Lal, father of Bijoy, we are left with Parasuram and Rash Behary."}}, {"text": "Kamal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21039, "end_char": 21044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "for the present the evidence of Sumitra Devi and Bijoy as also of Kamal, who has been contradicted on a very material point by the other witnesses and also Nand Lal, father of Bijoy, we are left with Parasuram and Rash Behary.", "canonical_name": "Kamala : Devi"}}, {"text": "Nand Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 21129, "end_char": 21137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "for the present the evidence of Sumitra Devi and Bijoy as also of Kamal, who has been contradicted on a very material point by the other witnesses and also Nand Lal, father of Bijoy, we are left with Parasuram and Rash Behary."}}, {"text": "Parasuram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21173, "end_char": 21182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "for the present the evidence of Sumitra Devi and Bijoy as also of Kamal, who has been contradicted on a very material point by the other witnesses and also Nand Lal, father of Bijoy, we are left with Parasuram and Rash Behary.", "canonical_name": "Parasuram Shanna"}}, {"text": "Rash Behary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21187, "end_char": 21198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "for the present the evidence of Sumitra Devi and Bijoy as also of Kamal, who has been contradicted on a very material point by the other witnesses and also Nand Lal, father of Bijoy, we are left with Parasuram and Rash Behary."}}, {"text": "Parasuram Sharma", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 21400, "end_char": 21416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court clearly made a mistake in dealing with the evidence of Parasuram Sharma and confused Parasuram Sharma (witness No."}}, {"text": "Pashupati Sarkar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 21470, "end_char": 21486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "16)- with Pashupati Sarkar (witness No."}}, {"text": "Pashupathi Sarkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21506, "end_char": 21523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pashupathi Sarkar was a tenant of Sumitra Devi and it was his evidence that he went to\n\nKamala Devi v.\n\nBachu Lal Gupta\n\nS. K. Das J.\n\nKamala Dtv\n\nBachu Lal Gupta\n\nS. K. Dat J.\n\nthe place of marriage at about 12 midnight or 1 a.m. and stayed there for two minutes only and then came away.", "canonical_name": "Pashupathi Sarkar"}}, {"text": "S. K. Dat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21670, "end_char": 21679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pashupathi Sarkar was a tenant of Sumitra Devi and it was his evidence that he went to\n\nKamala Devi v.\n\nBachu Lal Gupta\n\nS. K. Das J.\n\nKamala Dtv\n\nBachu Lal Gupta\n\nS. K. Dat J.\n\nthe place of marriage at about 12 midnight or 1 a.m. and stayed there for two minutes only and then came away.", "canonical_name": "S. K. DasJ."}}, {"text": "Ganapati Sastri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22206, "end_char": 22221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Head Master said that he attended the marriage as a member of the bridegroom's party and was present when from behind the purdah Sumitra Devi made a \"sankalpa\" of the gift of four houses ; this was conveyed by Ganapati Sastri who recited \"mantras\" and was accepted by Nand Lal."}}, {"text": "Parasuram Shanna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22417, "end_char": 22433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "10), with the result that Parasuram Shanna's evidence was not properly considered by the High Court.", "canonical_name": "Parasuram Shanna"}}, {"text": "Pashupati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23013, "end_char": 23022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is worthy of note that the learned Subordinate Judge made no mistake about Pashupati and Parasuram.", "canonical_name": "Pashupathi Sarkar"}}, {"text": "Surnitra Devi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24112, "end_char": 24125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "10,000 by Surnitra Devi, the sum which was set apart by the partition decree for the marriage expenses of Kamala Devi.", "canonical_name": "Surnitra Devi"}}, {"text": "Rai Saheb Jogendra Nath Roy", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 24357, "end_char": 24384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This criticism was not, however, fully accepted by the learned Judges of the High Court who placed greater reliance on the evidence of Rai Saheb Jogendra Nath Roy (witness No."}}, {"text": "Rai Saheb Jogendra Nath Roy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25338, "end_char": 25365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may, therefore, be that Rai Saheb Jogendra Nath Roy was not present at the time when the verbal gift was alleged to have been made."}}, {"text": "Parasuram Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25657, "end_char": 25673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By far and large, the learned Judge~ of the High Court did examine with care the oral , evidence with regard to the alleged verbal gift at the time of the marriage and but for the unfortunate confusion between Parasuram Sharma and Pashupati Sarkar, we do not think that the consideration of the oral evidence by the High Court is open to any other serious criticism.", "canonical_name": "Parasuram Shanna"}}, {"text": "Pashupati Sarkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25678, "end_char": 25694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By far and large, the learned Judge~ of the High Court did examine with care the oral , evidence with regard to the alleged verbal gift at the time of the marriage and but for the unfortunate confusion between Parasuram Sharma and Pashupati Sarkar, we do not think that the consideration of the oral evidence by the High Court is open to any other serious criticism.", "canonical_name": "Pashupathi Sarkar"}}, {"text": "Kamal Narayan Pandey", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 25914, "end_char": 25934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judges rightly pointed out a serious discrepancy which existed between the evidence of Kamal Narayan Pandey (witness No."}}, {"text": "Kamala Dai", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 26088, "end_char": 26098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8), who is said to have acted as the priest for the marriage, and the evidence of other witnesses with regard to the \"lagan\" or time\n\nt957\n\nKamala Dai\n\nB111; h:1 Lal Gup:a\n\nS. A. Das]."}}, {"text": "S. A. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26121, "end_char": 26130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8), who is said to have acted as the priest for the marriage, and the evidence of other witnesses with regard to the \"lagan\" or time\n\nt957\n\nKamala Dai\n\nB111; h:1 Lal Gup:a\n\nS. A. Das].", "canonical_name": "S. K. DasJ."}}, {"text": "Aamala Devi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 26134, "end_char": 26145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aamala Devi\n\nv. 13!Uhu I at G\"pta\n\nS. K. Das J.\n\nSL'PREME COURT REPORTS [1957]\n\nof mrnage."}}, {"text": "13!Uhu I at G\"pta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26150, "end_char": 26167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aamala Devi\n\nv. 13!Uhu I at G\"pta\n\nS. K. Das J.\n\nSL'PREME COURT REPORTS [1957]\n\nof mrnage."}}, {"text": "Nancl Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26600, "end_char": 26609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sumitra Devi made a verbal gift of the four houses in question at the time of the marriage of her daughter Kamala Devi and that such a gift was accepted by Nancl Lal on behalf of him minor daughterin-law."}}, {"text": "Rai Sahib Jogendra Nath Roy", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 27816, "end_char": 27843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What tipped the scale in favour of the finding arrived at by the High Court on this point was the evidence of Rai Sahib Jogendra Nath Roy (witness No."}}, {"text": "Rai Saheb )ogendra Nath Roy", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 28246, "end_char": 28273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence of Rai Saheb )ogendra Nath Roy."}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29256, "end_char": 29282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 29795, "end_char": 29815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Debi Mangal Prasad Singh v. Mahadeo Prasad Singh (2), the Allahabad High Court, after a review of all the authorities on the subject, held that it was stridhan ; but the Privy Council held that it stood on the same footing as property inherited by a woman and that it was not stridhan."}}, {"text": "Debi Mangal Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30051, "end_char": 30069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The actual point decided in Debi Mangal Prasad's case was that there was no substantial difference in principle between a woman's property acquired by inheritance and that\n\nacqi; ed by partition."}}, {"text": "S. K. Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30666, "end_char": 30675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kamala Devi\n\nB.xhu Lal Gupla\n\nS. K. Das].", "canonical_name": "S. K. DasJ."}}, {"text": "Sumitra Devi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30761, "end_char": 30773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 (Sumitra Devi) as possible on partition and as a rule should allot such properties to her share of which she may receive income without trouble, but may not prejudice the reversioners by destroying the corpus\".", "canonical_name": "Surnitra Devi"}}, {"text": "Suinitra Devi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31275, "end_char": 31288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Suinitra Devi on partition stood on the same footing as property inherited by her from her husband.", "canonical_name": "Surnitra Devi"}}, {"text": "Sumitra. Devi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31556, "end_char": 31569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "behalf of -the appellants, namely, whether Sumitra.", "canonical_name": "Surnitra Devi"}}, {"text": "Kamala : Devi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31668, "end_char": 31681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Devi was competent to make a gift of a reasonable portion of the estate of her husband to her daughter Kamala : Devi .", "canonical_name": "Kamala : Devi"}}, {"text": "Succession Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31964, "end_char": 31984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32163, "end_char": 32189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32272, "end_char": 32277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "statute": "the Hindu Succession Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Hindu Sucession Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32285, "end_char": 32310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Supreme Court at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 34681, "end_char": 34706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a very early decisi011, Cossi Naut Bysack v. Ht1rroo S•ondry Dossee (2).. which was heard by the Supreme Court at Calcutta, in 1819 an.!"}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34782, "end_char": 34784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gifford", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34828, "end_char": 34835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by tl e Juclicial Committee in 1826 and quo\"d in Chura11;,,1 S1 ].\n\ngo to the length of holding that there is a moral or religious obligation of gi1ing a portion of the joint family property for the benefit of the daug:1ter and the son-in-hw, and a gift made long after the marriage mav be supported upon the ground that the gift when made fulfils that moral or religious obligation.\n\nIn the case before us, It is not even necessary to go to the extent to which the decisions covered . by the bst item stated above (item o) have gone. The finding of the foul Court of fact is that there was an antenuptial agreement by Sumitra Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53528, "end_char": 54105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kamala Devi v.\n\nBachu Lal Gupta\n\nS. K. Da> ]."}}, {"text": "Sumitrc, Devi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 54230, "end_char": 54243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It ras open to Sumitrc, Devi to fulfit tlnt promise as a religious act which conferred spiritml benefit uron her deceased husband, irrespective of the consideration whether she made a \"sankalpa\" at the time of the marriage or not.", "canonical_name": "Surnitra Devi"}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54642, "end_char": 54648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 54656, "end_char": 54680, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55225, "end_char": 55231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 55239, "end_char": 55263, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "now turn to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 56088, "end_char": 56130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56173, "end_char": 56183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We now turn to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "statute": "We now turn to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Backu Lal Gupt.1", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 57760, "end_char": 57776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He has contended\n\nKamala Devi\n\nBacku Lal Gupt.1\n\nS. K. Das].", "canonical_name": "Backu Lal Gupt.1"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57925, "end_char": 57930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58350, "end_char": 58355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58988, "end_char": 58993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59109, "end_char": 59114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 59122, "end_char": 59148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59509, "end_char": 59514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "statute": "the Hindu Succession Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 59522, "end_char": 59548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59805, "end_char": 59807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hindu Succession Act, 1956", "statute": "the Hindu Succession Act, 1956"}}]} {"document_id": "1957_1_479_487_EN", "year": 1957, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nGANGA RAM DAS\n\nTEZPUR KAIBART A CO-OPERATIVE\n\nFISHERY SOCIETY LTD.\n\n[S. R. DAS c. J.,\n\nBHAGWATJ, VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR, B. P .. SINHA and S. K. DAs J J.]\n\nRule 12, Assam Fishery Rules-Whether ultra vires and repugnant to s. 16 of the Assam Land Revenue Regulation, 1 of 1886.\n\nSection 16 of the Assam Land Revenue Regulation, 1 of 1886 .defines \"right of fishery\" and s. 155(f) empowers the Provincial\n\nGovernment to make rules for \"the granting of licences, or the farming of the right ........ to fish in the fisheries\". The State Government accordingly framed the Fishery Rules and r. 12 thereof provides that no fishery shall be settled otherwise than by sale except hy the State Government. It was contended that r. 12 was ultra vi1es the Provincial Government and was repugnant to s. 16 of the Regulation.\n\nHeld, that. r. 12 is not ultra vires and is not repugnant to s. 16 of the Regulation.\n\nThere is nothing in s. 16 which indicates the principles or the policy on which the rules for the acquisition of fishery rights are to be framed.\n\nThe whole thing is left to the discretion of the State Government.\n\nHeld further, that r. 12 specifically empowers the State Government to settle the fishery rights otherwise than by sale, e.g., by individual ettlements.\n\nNuruddin Ahmed v. State of Assam, A. I. R. 1956 Assam 48 overruled.\n\nState of Assam v. Keshab Prasad Singh, (1953) S. C. R. 865 not applicable.\n\n, CIVIL\n\nAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 374 of 1956.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated December 19, 1955, of the Assam High Court in Revenue Appeal No. 33(M) of 1955. Civil Rule No. 76 of 1955.\n\nFakhruddin Ali Ahmed and K. R. Chaudhry, for the .appellant.\n\nD. N. Mukherjee, for respondent No. 1.\n\nS. M. Lahiri, Advocate-General of Assam, and Naunit Lal, for respondents Nos. 2 and 3. 62\n\nGanga Ram Das\n\nT. K. Coop. Fishtr.J\n\nSociety Ltd.\n\n1957. January 29. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHAGWATI J.-This appeal with special leave arises out of a judgment of the Assam High Court in Revenue Appeal No. 33 (M) of 1955 and Civil Rule No. 76 of 1955.\n\nThe State of Assam, respondent .No. 3, had settled the Charduar Brahmaputra Fishery with the respondent No. 1 for a period of three years, viz., from April l, 1954, to March 31, 1957, at an annual zama of Rs. 19,600 under r. 12 of the Fishery Rules. The Deputy Commissioner of Darrang, respondent No. 2, received some reports against the respondent No. l alleging violation of cl. VI of the Fishery lease and also of certain other conditions of the lease.\n\nHe obtained reports from the Sub-Deputy Collector and the Extra Assistant Commissioner in regard to these allegations and came to the conclusion that respondent No. 1 had created under-lease in favour of certain persons and cancelled the settlement of the fishery. It appears that after such cancellation, respondent No. 3, purporting to act again under r. 12, settled the said fishery with the appellant with effect from May 4, 1955, and respondent No. 1 was directed to give up possession thereof with effect from that date. Respondent No. 1 thereupon obtained a Rule from the Assam High Court alleging that the said settlement was absolutely illegal anti the fishery had to be settled properly according to the rules under which these settlements are usually mde. A Revenue Appeal was also filed against the order of respondent No. 2 under rule 11 of section 1 of the Fishery Rules and both the Rule and the Revenue Appeal were heard together by the Assam High Court.\n\nThe High Court had already on August 31, 1955, delivered a judgment in Civil Rule No. 56 of 1955, Naruddin Ahmed v. State of Assam( ), declaring r. 12 of the Fishery Rules \"ultra uirt:s the State Government\" auf the amended s. 195 quoted above was not regarded\n\nGarikapatti Veeraya v.\n\nN. Subbiah Choudhury\n\nDasG.J.\n\nGarikapatti Veera;•a\n\nN. Subbiah\n\nChoudhury\n\nDas C.J.\n\nas containing anything which expressly or by necessary intendment took away the right which had vested in the respondent under old s. 195 ( 6) when the sanction had been granted against her on August 4, 1953, to have it revoked.\n\nIn Daivanayaka Reddiyar and two others v. Renukambal Ammal ('), a suit was filed on March 21, 1921, by a widow for maintenance.\n\nIt was valued at rupees 14,600 according to the provisions of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870) then in force. Under s. 13 of that Court Fees Act appeals lay to the district court or the High Court according as the value of the subject matter of the suit was below or over rupees 5,000. On April 18, 1922, the Madras Court Fees Amendment Act (V of\n\n1912) came into force. Section 7(2) of the old Court Fees Act (VII of 1870) was amended. The trial court decreed the suit on March 13, 1923. On April 19, 1923 the defentbnts filed an appeal in the High Court. In the appeal the court fee was paid on Rs. 2,633-5-4 calculated according to the valuation in terms of the amended Act.\n\nAn objection was taken on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent that the appeal did not iie to the High Court but should have been filed in the district court. The contention was that though the. suit was Yalued at more than Rs. 5,000 under the law in force at the time of filing of the plaint, yet the valuation of the suit according to the amended Court Fees Act at the time the appeal was presented would have been less than Rs. 3,000 , md, therefore, the appeal to the High Court was incompetent.\n\nThe following question was referred to the Full Bench :\n\n\"Does the appeal against the decree in a suit m which the valuation M the relief claimed according to the law in force at the date of the plaint was more than Rs. 5,000 but at tbe time of the appeal is less than Rs. 5,000 owing to the amendment of the Court Fees Act, lie to the High Court or to the District Court?\"\n\nThe Full Bench consisting of three Judges held that the appeal had properly been brought before the High Court. The Full Bench observed :\n\n(t) [1927] I.L.R. 50 Mad. 857.\n\n\"It is argued that this section does not confer any right of appeal to the High Court in definite classes of suits, but that the right of appeal is merely given to the Court authorised to hear appeals and the question of whether the Court is the District Court or the High Court depends on the valuation of the suit at the time of filing the appeal. It is difficult to treat this argument as any way distinguishing the case from that of Colonial Sugar Refining Companv v. Irving( 1 ), for, in both cases there was, when the suit was filed, a vested right of appeal to a particular tribunal, which is taken away by a subsequent enactment.\n\nAccording to the argument, when the right is taken away by a subsequent alteration in a mere fiscal enactment, the case is not the same as \\vhen the right depends on substantive law. This is untenable. It has been held by the Privy Council that this cannot be done and we are bound bv that general expression of the law and must follow it.;, Bala Prasad and others v. Shyam Behari Lal and other:( \") which was a decision by a single judge who followed the Privy Council decision does not require\n\nany further consideration and we may pass on to Ram Singha v. Shankar Daval( 3 ) which is very important. In the last mentioned case a suit for rent was filed on July 12, 1926.\n\nAt that time the North-Western Provinces Tenancy Act, 1901 (U.P. Act II of 1901) was in force. Section 177 of that Act gave a right of appeal from the decision of the Assistant Collector to the District Judge when the amount or value of the subject matter of suit exceeded Rs. 100.\n\nOn September 7, 1926, Agra Tenancy Act (U.P. Act III of 1926) came into force.\n\nIt repealed the old Act of 1901.\n\nSection 240 of the new Act reproduced s. 175 of the old Act providing that no appeal would lie from any decree or order passed by any court under this Act except as provided in this Act. The material portion of s. 242, which corresponded to s. 177 of the old Act provided as follows :-\n\n\"242 ( l). An appeal shall lie to the district judge from the decree of an assistant collector of the first\n\n(1) [1905] A.C. 369.\n\n(3) [1928) I.L.R. 50 All. g65 (F.B.)\n\n(2) [1928] 26 A.L.J. 4o6.\n\nGarikapatti Veeraya:\n\nN. Subbiah\n\nChoudhury\n\nDasC.J.\n\nt-Garikapatti Vtera1a\n\nv • .. v. Subbiah Choudhury\n\nDasC.J.\n\nclass or of a collector in any of the suits included in group A of the Fourth Sclmlule in which- ( a) the amount or value of the subject-matter exceeds rupees two hundred; or (b) ,,\n\nOn December 23, 1926, i.e., after the new Act came into force, the suit was decreed by the assistant collec- - tor. The defendant presented en appeal to the district judge. The district judge returned the me1noranJu1n of appeal. The defendant presented the memorandum before the Collector of Etawah and that officer was of opinion that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and referred the case to the High Court under s. 207 of the Agra Tenancy Act. The reference came up before a Bench of the Allahabad High Court which referred the following question to a Full Bench :\n\n\"\\Vhether the filing of an appeal is governed by the law obtaining at tbe date of the institution of a suit or by the bw that may prevail at the date of the decision o.f it, .or at the date of the filing of the appeal?\"\n\nIt will be noticed that the question definitely called for a decision as to when the right of appeal vested in the litigant. A Full Bench of three Judges presided over by Mr. Justice Sulaiman, then Acting Chief T ustice of Allahabad, expressed the following opinion :\n\n\"In our opinion the point is concluded by the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Privy Council in .the case of Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd. v.\n\nIrving( 1 ). In that case, ordinarily an appeal lay to their Lordships of the Privy Council from an order of the Supreme Court. While the matter was pending in that court, the law was amended so as to allow an appeal to the High Court. Their Lordships of the Privy Council held that the new Act could not deprive the party of his right to appeal to the Privy Council. Lord Macnaghten remarked at page 372 : 'To deprive a suitor in a pending action of an appeal to a superior tribunal which belonged to him as of right is a very different thing fwm regulating procedure'.\"\n\n(r) [1905] A.C. 369.\n\n\"That principle was reaffirmed by their Lordships in the case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v.\n\nIncome Tax Commissioner( 1 ). The principle has been followed by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Daivanayaga Reddiar v.\n\nRenukambal Ammal( ). Dalal J. has taken the same view in the case of Bala Prasad v. Shyam Behari Lal(\n\n3 ).\" The Full Bench answered the question as follows : \"Our answer to the reference is that the right to appeal to the court of the District Judge was governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit, and not by the law that prevailed at the date of its decision, or at the date of the filing of the appeal.\"\n\nIt will be noticed t11at the language of s. 242(1) of the new Act which came into force before the decree was passed was not regarded as containing anything which expressly or by necessary intendment took away the right of appeal which vested in the parties on the date of the institution of the suit on the mere ground that the decree had been made after the new amendment came into force.\n\nThis case clearly establishes that the right of appeal vests in the parties at the date of the suit and is governed by the law prevailing at that time and the date of the decree or of the filing of the appeal does not affect this right unless some subsequent enactment takes away this right expressly or by necessary intendment.\n\nIt also establishes that the wide language of s. 242(1) of the new Act, namely \"An appeal shall lie to the District Judge from the decree of an Assistant Collector .... \" could not be construed as covering the decree passed after the date of the new Act in a suit instituted before its date.\n\nA Full Bench of the Lahore High Court adopted and applied the Privy Council decision in the case of Kirpa Singh v. Ajaipal Singh and others( ). It was regarded as settled that the right of appeal was not a mere matter of procedure but was a vested right which inhered in a party from the commencement of the action in the court of first instance and that such right\n\n(1) [1927] I. L.R. g Lah. 284.\n\n(2) [1927] I.L.R. 50 Mad. 857.\n\n(3) [1928] 26 A.L.J. 406. (+) [1928] I.L.R. 10 Lah. 165 (F.B.).\n\nGarikapatti Ve.also instruc.tivec There were two windi'ng up proceedings regarding two companies,\n\n(!) [•953] S.C.R. 752.\n\nnamely, the Marwari Chamber of Commerce Ltd. and Aggarwal Chamber of Commerce Ltd.\n\nThe Official Liquidator settled the list of contributories in both cases.\n\nOn June 4, 1946, payment order for Rs. 24,005-7-3 was made by the court in the case of Marwari Chamber of Commerce Ltd.\n\nAt that time Patiala States Judicature Firman of 1999 was in force.\n\nUnder s. 44 of that Firman a certificate of fitness was required for an appeal from a judgment of a single judge only if the judgment, decree or order sought to be appealed from was made in the exercise o[ Civil Appellate Jurisdiction.\n\nAfter the payment order had been made Pepsu Ordinance (X of 2005) was pronrnlgate9.\n\nSection 52 of the Ordinance required a certificate of fitness for appeal in all cases, including the winding up cases. On February 2, 1950, an application was made in respect of the Marwari Chamber of Commerce Ltd. under s. 152 of the Civil Procedure Code for amendment of the payment order by substituting Rs. 21,805-7-3 for Rs. 24,005-7-3. On March 16, 1950, the above application was dismissed by the judge, who refused to grant the certificate of fitness; An appeal against this order refusing to amend the payment order was filed without any certificate. On May 1, 1950, that :appeal was dismissed for want of the necessary certificate. An appeal was brought to this Court on certificate qf Jitness granted by the Pepsu High Court. In tite case of Aggarwal Chamber of Commerce Ltd. the payment order was made on January 18, 1949, by tln:> Liquidation Judge, 011 .. February 19, 1949, an appeal was preferred to the High Court. At that time the Patiala States Judicature Firman 1999 was in force.\n\nThen came the Pepsu Ordinance (X of 2005). The High Court having dismissed the appeal a further appeal was filed in this Court on certificate of fitness granted by the High Court.\n\nThe question for decision was whether the appellant had a vested right of appeal to this Court in either of two cases. This Court dismissed the appeal in connectic:n with The Marwari Chamber of Commerce Ltd., not on the ground that the appellant had no vested right of appeal but, on the ground :that the application for amendment, which was filed\n\nGarikapatti V eeray a\n\nN. Subbiah Choudhury\n\nDas C.J.\n\nGarikapatti V eeraya\n\nJ{. Subbiah\n\nChoudhury\n\nDasC.J.\n\non February 2, 1950, was an independent proceeding and as that proceeding was instituted after the Pepsu\n\nOrdinance (X of 2005), came into operation, the vested right of appeal arising out of that proceeding was governed by that Ordinance and a certificate was necessary. It was observed that there was no warrant for the view that the amendment petition was a continuation of the suit or proceeding thereunder, that it was in the nature of an independent proceeding though connected with the order of which amendment was sought and that such a proceeding was governed by the law prevailing on its date, which admittedly was Pepsu Ordinance (X of 2005), which provided, under s. 52, for a certificate. The court, however, allowed the appeal in the matter of Aggarwal Chamber of Commerce Ltd. following the principle laid down in the case of Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving (supra), for in that case there was no new proceeding and the right of appeal arising out of the proceeding resulting in the payment order had vested at the commencement of those proceedings which was prior to the date when the Pepsu Ordinance (X of 2005) came into force.\n\nSimilar prin(..iple has also been adopted in cases, where court fees were increased by subsequent amendment of the Court Fees Act. Reference may be made to the cases of R. M. Seshadri v. Province Madras (1); In re Reference under section 5 of Court Fees Act( 2); Sawaldas Madhavdas v.\n\nArti Cott.on Mills Ltd. (').\n\nThere are certain other decisions which also adopted the same principle but reference will be made to them later on in connection with the question of construction of Art. 133 of the Constitution.\n\nFrom the decisions cited above the following principles clearly emerge : ( i) That the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding.\n\n(ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right.\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 543\n\n(2) I.L.R. 1955 Born. 530.\n\n(3) A.LR 1955 Born. 332; 57 Born. L.R. 394.\n\n(iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit.\n\n(iv) The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to -enter the superior court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the !is commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal. ( v) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise.\n\nIn the case before us the suit was instituted on April 22, 1949, and on the principle established by the decisions referred to above the right of appeal vested in the parties thereto at that date and is to be governed by the law as it prevailed on that date, that is to say, on that date the parties acquired the right, if unsuccessful, to go up in appeal from the sub-court to the High Court and from the High Court to the Federal Court under the Federal Court (Enlargement of Jurisdiction) Act, 1947 read with cl. 39 of the Letters Patent and ss. 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure provided the conditions thereof were satisfied. The question for our consideration is whether that right has been taken away expressly or by necessary intendment by any subsequent enactment.\n\nThe respondents to the application maintain that it has been so taken away by the provisions of our Constitution.\n\nIn construing the articles of the Constitution we must bear in mind certain cardinal rules of construction. It has been said in Hough v. Windus( 1), that \"statutes should be interpreted, if possible, so as to respect vested right.\" The golden rule of construction is that, in the absence of anything in the enactment te> show that it is to have retrospective operation, it cannot\n\n(1) [1884] 12 Q B.D. 224 at 237.\n\nGarikapatti V1erl!)'a\n\nN. Subbiah\n\nChoudhuv\n\nDasC.J.\n\nGarikapatti Ve11aya\n\nN. Subhiah\n\nChoudhury.\n\nDasC.J.\n\nbe so construed as to have the effect of altering the law applicable to a daim in litigation at the time when the Act was passed(' ). The following observation of Rankin C. J. in Sadar Ali v. Dalimuddin (supra) at page 520 is also apposite and helpful : \"Unless the contrary can be .shown the provision which takes away the jurisdiction is itself subject to the implied saving of the litiganfs right.\" In fanardan Reddy v.\n\nThe State(•) Kania C. J., in delivering the judgment of the Court observed that our Constitution is generally speaking prospective in its operation and is not to have retroactive operation in the absence of any express provision to that effect. The same principle was reiterated in Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay( 3 ) and finally in Dajisaheb Mane and Others v.\n\nShankar Rao Vithal Rao( ') to which reference will be made in greater detail hereafter.\n\nIn the next place we must take into account the surrounding circumstances that existed at the time when our Constitution makers framed the Constitution and for which provision had to be made by them. In construing the Articles relating to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court it is well to remember the several Categories of persons who were at the date of the Constitution, interested in the right of appeal from judgments, decrees or final orders of a High Court to a superior court in one way or another. There were seven categories of persons so interested, name! y- ( i) Those who were aggrieved by a judgment of a High Court in what was British India passed before the commencement of the Constitution in a civil proceeding arising out of a suit or proceeding instituted before the Constitution and who had preferred an appeal from such judgment to the Federal Court or whose appeal from such judgment to the Privy Council had stood transferred to the Federal Court and whose appeal was pending in such ro, urt immediately prior to the commencement of the Constitution ;\n\n(1) Leeds and County Ji.nk Ltd. a • .W..lker (1883) 11 Q.Jl.D. 84 at page gr ; Moon v. Durden (1848) 2 Ex:. 22-; 76'R; R., 479 at. p. 495. (2J (1950) S.C.R. 940 at PP 946-947, .. . .\n\n(3) (1951f S.C.R. 228.\n\n(4) (1955 2 S.C.R. 872 at pp. 876:877- . . . .\n\n(ii) Those who were aggrieved by a judgment passed by such a High Court before the commencement of the Constitution in such civil proceeding arising out of a suit or proceeding instituted in the court of first instance before the Constitution, but in which only an application for leave to appeal to the Federal Court had been made and such application was pending before the Federal Court immediately before the commencement of the Constitution but no appeal had actually been filed or was pending before the Federal Court at that date;\n\n(iii) Those who were aggrieved by a judgment passed by such a High Court before the Constitution in a civil proceeding arising out of a suit or proceeding instituted in the court of first instance before the Constitution and in respect of which no application for leave to appeal to the Federal Court had been made but the time for making such application had not expired at the commencement . of the Constitution;\n\n(iv) Those who may be aggrieved by a judgment passed by such a High Court after the date of the Constitution in a civil proceeding arising out of a suit or proceeding filed in the court of first inst4nce before the Constitution;\n\n(v) Those who were aggrieved by a judgment passed by. a High Court in a Princely State before the Constitution a.nd who had appealed from such judgment to the Privy Council of that State which was pending at the commencement of the Constitution;\n\n(vi) Those who were aggrieved by such a judgment of a High Court of a Princely State and who had not actually field an appeal but whose application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council of that State was pending before such Privy Council immediately before the commencement of the Constitution; and lastly .\n\n(vii) Those who may be aggrieved by the judgment of a High Court in the territory of India passed after . the commencement of the Constitution in a civil proceeding arising out of a suit or proceeding filed also after the Constitution would come into force.\n\nThe Constitution makers knew about these several categories of persons and further that, according to a\n\nGarikapatti Veeraya v.\n\nN. Subbiah\n\nChoudhuy\n\nDasC.J.\n\nGarikapatti Vetraya v. }{. Subbiali\n\nChoudhury\n\nDas C.J.\n\nseries of decisions of the highest courts, it had been firmly established that the right of appeal to the Federal Court vested in a litigant at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding in the court of first instance and not on the date of the passing of the judgment by the trial court or the High Court or of the filing of the appeal in the High Court or the Federal Court.\n\nIn other words the Constitution makers knew that the right of appeal to the Federal Court had already vested in persons falling within categories (i) to (iv) at the date of the institution in the court of first instance of the suit or proceeding to which they were parties, no matter when the judgment of the High Court was passed or was likely to be passed in future.\n\nThe Constitution makers also knew that this vested right was governed by cl. 39 of the Letters Patent read with the Federal Court (Enlargement of Jurisdiction) Act, 1947 and the Abolition of Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, 1949 and ss. 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n\nThe Constitution makers were also aware of the rights of persons who fell within categories (v) and (vi). With full knowledge of all these rights the Constitution makers made such provision as they thought fit.\n\nThe question is,-has the Constitution, expressly or by necessary intendment, taken away this vested right of appeal from any of these categorie, of persons? This leads us to examine the relevant provisions of the Constitution and other laws bearing on tpe question.\n\nArticle 395 of the Constitution repealed the Indian Independence Act, 1947 and the Government of India Act, 1935 together with all enactments amending or supplementing the latter Act, but expressly. kept alive the Abolition of Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, 1949.\n\nThe repeal of the Government of India Act, 1935 necessarily involved the abolition of the Federal Court which was .the creature of that Act. In its place the Constitution by Art. 124 has established this Court, which by Art. 129 is made a court of record with all the powers of such a court, including the power to punish for contempt 'ff itself.\n\nArticle 131 confers original jurisdiction on this Court in certain disputes\n\ntherein mentioned. Appellate jurisdiction of this Court is dealt with in Art. 132 and the following Articles.\n\nArticle 132 confers jurisdiction on this Court to entertain appeals from judgments, decrees or final orders of a High Court in the territory of India, whether in a civil or criminal or other proceeding, if the High Court certifies that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. The relevant portion of Art. 133 runs as follows : 133(1). An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India if the High Court certifies- ( a) that the amount or value of the subjectmatter of the dispute in the court of first instance and still in dispute on appeal was and is not less than twenty thousand rupees or such other sum as may be specified in that behalf by Parliament by law; or\n\n(b) that the judgment, decree or final order involved directly or indirectly some claim or question respecting property of the like amount m before the Constitution?\n\nIt is said that there is no saving provision to Art. 133 like\n\ncl. 20 of the Adaptation Order and, therefore, Art. 133 cannot be read in a restricted way. This argument is unsound and here the observations of Rankin\n\nC. J. in the Special Bench case of Calcutta referred to above become apposite, namely, that the provision which takes away jurisdiction is itself subject to the implied saving of the litigant's right.\n\nClause 20 will be meaningless if Art. LB is also not read in a restricted sense.\n\nThis restricted construction of Art. 133 will not be open to the objection that it deprives the aggrieved litigant who had filed his suit or proceeding in a princely State before the Constitution but against whom an adverse judgment, decree or final order has been made by the High Court of the corresponding Part B State for the Privy Council to which that litigant had the right to go had been abolished. Such a litigant had no vested right and therefore he can come under Art. 133 if the conditions thereof are satisfied.\n\nAs against this construction it is said that it will not help a litigant who had filed his suit before the Constitution but a,,.ainst whom an adverse order is made after the Constitution, for having on this construction a vested right of appeal he will be outside the purview of Art. 133' and he can only exercise his vested right if he can come within Art. 135. It is said that in order to come within Art. 135 the judgment, decree or final order must be passed before the commencement of the Constitution when the Federal\n\nCourt was in existence, for on the coming into force of the Constitution the Federal Court ceased to exist and\n\nthe Federal Court could not possibly exercise any jurisdiction immediately before the commencement of the . Constitution with respect to a judgment, decree or final order which had been passed after the date of the Constitution when the Federal Court ceased to exist.\n\nThis is to give Art. 135. a very narrow and limited construction which was deprecated by this Court in Daji Saheb Mane v. Shankarrao Mane (supra). Further this construction overlooks the fact that Art. 135 confers on this Court the same jurisdiction and power with respect to any matter to which the provisions of Art. 133 or Art. 134 do not apply, if the juris:l'nr ].\n\nGorikapatli V ttraya\n\nN. Subbiah\n\nChaudhury\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J,\n\nSugar Refining Company v. Irving(' ). There, the facts were that an action was commenced in the Supreme.\n\nCourt of Queensland on October 25, 1902. On that\n\ndate, according to the Order in Council dated June 30, 1860, an appeal lay to the Privy Council against the judgment of the Supreme Court. While the action was pending, the Judiciary Act, 1903 came into force on August 25, 1903, and the result of it was to abolish appeals to the Privy Council and to substitute therefor a right of appeal to the High Court of Australia in respect of matters mentioned therein.\n\nOn September 4, 1903, the Supreme Court gave judgment dismissing the action, but granted leave to the plaintiff to appeal to the Privy Council. The plaintiff having lodged an appeal pursuant to the leave, a preliminary o£jection wos raised as to its maintainability on the ground that as the judgment under appeal had been pronounced after the coming into force of the Judiciary Act, any appeal against the same would be governed by the provisions of that Act, and that, in consequence, the appeal to the Privy Council was incompetent. In overruling this contention, Lord Macnaghten observed :\n\n\"The Judiciary Act is not retrospective by express enactment or by necessary intendment. And therefore the only question is, was the appeal to His Majesty in Council a right vested in the appellants at the date of th.e passing of the Act, or was it a mere matter of procedure? It seems to their Lordships that the question does not admit of doubt. To deprive a suitor in a pending action of an appeal to a superior tribunal which belonged to him as of right is a very different thing from regulating procedure.\n\nIn principle, their Lordships see no difference between abolishing an appeal altogether and .transferring the appeal to a new tr\\bunal.\n\nIn either case there is an interference with existing rights contrary to the well-known general principle that statutes are not to be held to act retrospectively unless a clear intention to that effect is manifested.\"\n\nIt is on this decision that the entire argument in support of the petition is founded. But is it correct ?\n\nIt may look a daring and almost fatuous adventure to\n\n(1) [1905] A.C. 369.\n\nct:wass the correctness of the decision in Colonial Sugar Refining Company v. Irving (supra), especially when it has been followed by Courts in this country for well nigh half a century. But with all the respect which I have for the decision of a tribunal so august as the Privy Council an\"d of a Judge so eminent as Lord Macnaghten, I am of opinion that the decision in question cannot be supported on principle, that it is not warranted by the authorities, and cannot, therefore, be followed. .\n\nConsidering the question on principle, an appeal is a proceeding by which the correctness of the decision of an inferior court is challenged before a superior court.\n\nA right of appeal therefore can arise by its very nature only when a decision by which a litigant is aggrieved is given, and it sounds paradoxical to say that it arises\n\ne\\en before judgment in the case is pronounced. Now what reason can there be for holding that a right of appeal vests in a suitor at the commencement of the proceedings? If it is to be held not to arise on the date of judgment, then why should it be held to arise on the institution of the proceedings, and not on the date of the transaction which forms the foundation for those proceedings? If it is to be said that when a litigant commences a proceeding he acts on the expectation that a right of appeal existing under the then law with reference to that proceeding would not be tal;:en away, it could likewise be said that when a person enters into a transaction, he does so in the expectation that the right of action and of appeal in relation thereto under the then law would be available to him for the enforcement of his rights under the tramaction. And no one has asserted that a right of appeal is to be determined on the law as it stood on the date of the transaction.\n\nThen again, if the right of appeal arises at the\n\ncrn~1mencemcnt of the action, in whom does it vest, the plaintiff or the defendant, It is the suitor who i£\n\naggrieved by the decision that has a right to prefer an appeal against it, and it might, according to the result, be tither the one or the other, and if the theory that a right of appeal arises when the proceedings are\n\n'957.\n\nGarikapatti V ura.r J\n\nN. SubhW.\n\nClwudhut; J\n\nVenkatarama\n\n.dyyar ].\n\nOarikapatti V ttroya\n\nN. Suhbiah\n\nCiwudhury\n\nV tnkatarama\n\n1ty; ar :J.\n\ncommenced is to be accepted, it must be held to vest at that point of time both in the plaintiff and the defendant, and cease on the determination of the cause as regards the party who succeeds, and where the success is partial, to the extent of that success. Can anything so nebulous and contingent be regarded as a right and as a right which vests before a decision is given. The judgment in Colonial Sugar Refining Company v. Irv; ng\n\n(supra) does not disclose the reasoning on which it is based. Lord Macnaghten no doubt defers to \"a long line of authorities from the time of Lord Coke to rhe present day\", and they are presumably what are referred to in the argument of counsel at page 370.\n\nBut when examined, they do not bear on this point.\n\nLord Coke, in commenting on the Statute of Gloucester (6, Edward I, Chap. 78, s. 3) which prohibited alienations of tenement, stated :\n\n\"This extendeth to alienations made after the statute and not before; for it is a rule of law of Parliament that regularly nova constitutio f11turis forman imponere de bet, non praeteritis\" (a new statute regulates future conduct and not past ( 1 ) ) •\n\nFrom this passage, one may say that legisl;; tion do, s not affect a right of appeal, which has accrued.\n\nBut it throws no light on the question when that right accrues, whether at the commencement of the action or on the pronouncement of the decision.\n\nIn Towler v. Chatterton('), the suit was to recover an oral loan, and. -the question was whether it was hit by Lord Tenterdon's Act, which required that, to take the case out of the operation of the statute of limitation, the debt should be in writing. That Act was passed after the debt was contracted but before the action was brought thereon. It was held that having regard to the terms of the Act, it must be held to be retrospective, and that the action was not maintainable.\n\nThe decision in The Ydun( ')is similar to the one in TouJ/er v. Chatterton (supra). The plaintiffs sued for damages for the grounding of their vessel on September 13, 1893, by reason of the neglect of the defendants.\n\n(t) 2 Inst. 292.\n\n(2) (1829) 6 Bing. 253; 31 R .. R. +rr.\n\nOn December 5, 1893, the Public Authorities Protection Act came into torce, and that provided that an action against public authorities grounded on neglect or default should be commenced within six months of such neglect or default.\n\nThe suit was actually filed on November 14, 1898, and the question was whether the right which had accrued to the plaintiffs on September 13, 1893, was barred by this enactment, which came into force on December 5,\n\n1893. It was held that it was.\n\nIn Attorney-General v. Sil/em( 1 ), the point for decision was whether in exercise of a power conferred on the Court of Exchequer to frame rules for regulating practice before it, it could enact a rule providing for an appeal. The House of Lords held that it could not, because an appeal was not a matter relating to practice or procedure, and must be conferred by the legislature itself.\n\nIn In re Joseph Suche & Company Ltd.(~.), the facts were that an order was made on January 30, 1875, winding up a company t:nder the supervision of the Court.\n\nUnder the law J.s it then stood, a secured creditor was entitled to prove for the full amount of the debt without deducting the value of the securities.\n\nSubsequent to the order, s. 10 of the Judicature Act, 1875 came into operation, and under that section, the secured creditor could only prove for the balance of the claim after deducting the value of the securities.\n\nThe point in dispute was whether a secured creditor was entitled to prove for the entire debt under the law as it stood at the date of the order of winding up, -0r only for the balance of the debt after deducting the value of the security in accordance with s. 10 of the Judicature Act. It was held by Jessel M. R. that the right to prove for a debt was not a mere matter of procedure, and could not be distinguished from a right of action, and that the creditor was therefore not ffected by the change effected by s. 10 of the Judicature Act. The decision in In re Athlumney (3) is similar to the one in In re Joseph Suche and\n\n(1) [1864] 10 H.L.C 704; 11 E.R. 1200.\n\n(3) [1898) 2 Q.B. 547. fa) [1875] I Ch. D .. 48.\n\nGarikaatli V1erf!Ya\n\nN. Subbiah\n\nChoudhury\n\nV tnkatarama Ayyar ].\n\nGarikapatti Veeraya\n\nN. Suhhiah\n\nChoudhur.:'\n\nV1nkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nCompany Ltd. (supra), the question being whether the rigl1ts of a creditor who had proved for his debt could be affected by the provisions \" of a Bankruptcy Act, which came into force after proof of such debt.\n\nFollowing In re Joseph Suche & Company Ltd ... it was held that the rigbt to prove a debt was a substantive one, and was not affected by the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, which came into force after such proof.\n\nIt may be taken on these autborities that a right of appeal is a substantive right and not a mere matter of procedure, and that a legislation subsequent to tbe accrual of such a right must not be construed as taking it away, unless it does so expressly or by necessary implication. But the question still remains when that right accrues or vests; and that did not arise for determination in the authorities cited above, and indeed, does. not appear to have been the subjectmatter of any pronouncement prior to Colonial Sugar Refining Company v. Irving (supra), and the decision therein that a right of appeal vests when the action is commenced would accordingly appear to be a deduction made from the character of the right as a substantive one. But is it a right deduction to make?\n\nIt is one thing to say that right of appeal is a substantive right, and quite a different thing to hold that it vests at the date of the commencement of the proceedings.\n\nIt would be perfectly logical to hold that the right of appc:il is a substantive right and at the same time that it arises onlv when the decision which is to be appealed against i; rendered. The remit of that view will be that a right of appeal which arises when a judgment is given, would stand unimpaire 6-78 S. C. India/59\n\n'957\n\nGarikapatti Veeraya v.\n\nN. Subbiah Choudhury\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nGarikapatti Vetraya\n\nN. Subbiah\n\nChoudhury\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar ].\n\nCourt B, as held in Colonial Sugar Refining Company\n\nv. Irving (supra), but also from Court B to Court C and --{ from Court C to Court D. The decision in Colonial.\n\nSugar Refining Company v. Irving on which this conclusion in Sadar Ali v. Dalimuddin (supra) is based, is clearly no authority in support of it.\n\nBut it is said that there were before the decision in Sadar Ali v. Dalimud.'in (supra) authorities of lncEan Courts, which had held that a suit, appeal and second appeal were to be regarded as constituting one proceeding, that Sadar Ali v. Dalimuddin merely engraf:ed this principle on the decision in Colonial Sugar Refining Company v. Irving (supra), and that the dccio1on '~ come to therein was therefore well placed on principk.\n\nThese decisions, however, when examined contain little that really supports the conclusion reached in Sadar Ali v. Dalimuddin. In fact, they arc merely referred to in the judgment at pages 516 and 517 wcthout any discussion; as authorities relied on by counsel for appellant in • support of his contention that the principle of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act was :ip;1licable in the construction of the Letters Patent. The first of these decisions is Ratanchand Shrichand v.\n\nHammantrav Shivbakas ( 1 ). There, the facts were th:it a suit for Rs. 23,319 was instituted in the court of ,>-. the Principal Sadar Amin of Dhulia, and that was substantially decreed. on January 29, 1869. On March 19, 1869, the Bombay Civil Courts Act came into force, and under that Act appeals in suits exceeding Rs. 5,000 lay to the High Court of Bombay. But under the law as it stood pri01• to that date, the appeal against the judgment of the Principal Sadar Amin would have lain to the District Court. The point for decision was whether an appeal against the decree dated January 29, 1869, lay to the District Court or to the High Court.\n\nThe learned Judges held that the proper forum to which the appeal lay was the District Court. The )-.., decision was based on s. 6 of the General Clauses Act, \"'hi ch enacted that \"the repeal of any statute .... shall not affect any proceedings commenced before the repealing Act shall have come into operation.\" It was\n\n(1) [1869] 6 Born. H.C .. R. 166.\n\nobserved by, Couch C.J. that \"A suit is a judicial proceeding, and the word 'nroceedings' must be taken to include all the proceedings in the suit from the date of its institution to its final disposal, and therefore to include proceedings in appeal.\" The meaning of this passage is clearly this : The word \"proceeding\" i;; not limited to suits; it is wide enough to include appeals. Just as a right of suit which had accrued before repeal is saved by s. 6, so also is a right of appeal. This is all that the . above observation means.\n\nIt does not mean that when under this section a right -of suit is saved, a right of appeal against the decree passed therein is in addition saved. This is clear from the following observations :\n\n\"It is clear it was not the intention of the Legislature to take away the right of appeal in any case in which it existed at the date of the passing of the Bombay Court's Act.\"\n\n. \\Vhere, therefore, a suitor could not maintain a proceeding by way of appeal at the date of the repealing Act, Ratanchand Shrichand v. Hammantrav Slzivbt1kas (supra) is not authority for holding that such a right is preserved to him. as comprised in a right of suit wlJJch he had on that date.\n\nIn Chinto Joshi v. Krulmaji Narayan (1 ), proceedings in execution of a decree had been commenced when the Code of Civil Procedure, Act \\\"Ill of 1859, was in force.\n\nBy the time the properties were actually sold in execution, a new Code of Civil Procedure, Act X of 1877, had come into operation. The judgmentdebtor filed. an application to set aside the sale on the ground of irregularity, and the same was allowed. The question was whether this order was open to appeal.\n\nIt was not appealable under the Act of 1859, but was appealable under the Act of 1877.\n\nIt was held that execution proceedings for the sale of property would not be complete until the sale had taken place, and that therefore the proceedings for sale which were commenced under the Act of 1859 were governed by the provisions of that Act, and that the appeal was accordingly incompetent. I do not sec anything in\n\n{1) [187g] I.L.R. 3 Born, 01~.\n\nGarikapatti V eeraya\n\ny, N. Subbiah\n\nChoudhury\n\nV enkatarama\n\nA)J'OT ].\n\nGatikapaui V11raya\n\nN. SubbiaA\n\nChoudh\"'y\n\nV 1nkatarmna\n\n, dyyGT J.\n\nthis decision which touches the present controversy.\n\nIn the course of the judgment, West J. stated that opinion had sometimes been expressed \"that the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second \"appeal, are really but steps in a series of proceedings connected by an intrinsic unity ........ \" Are we to interpret this remark as meaning that under the law, suit, appeal, and second appeal all constitute but one proceeding ?\n\nThe observation itself merely speaks of them as steps in a series of proceedings. That is to say, they are different proceedings, but are directed to a common purpose. And are we to build on this observation, reading it along with the decision in Colonial Sugar\n\nRefining Company v. Irving\n\n(supra) the theory that when a right to file an appeal arises, it comprehends a right to tile the whole series of appeals under the law?\n\nThat will be putting the observation to a use which could not have been contemplated. On the other hand, there are the following observations at page 215 in . the same judgment, which are more germane to the present discussion :\n\n\"When judicial enquiry has reached its intended close in an adjudication, requiring thenceforward in theory only a ministerial or coercive exercise of aut\\i(}- rity to give it practical effect, the party who strives hy an appeal to unsettle again the legal relation, which in itself has h.j> the act of the Court become settled may fairly be regarded as instituting a new proceeding.\n\nSuch has been the view of some eminent authorities.\" Then, there is Deb Narain Dutt v. Narendra Krishna( 1). There, a decree was obtained under the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act VIII of 1869, and by the time execution proceedings were started, a new Act VIII of 1885 had come into operation. Sec tion 170 of the new Act prohibited the entertainment of any claim by third parties to properties attached in execution of a decree.\n\nThe point for decision was whether this provision applied to a claim preferred to the property attached in execution of the decree passed under Act VIII of 1869. It was contended in support of the maintainability of the claim that a right to prefer\n\n(1) [1889] I.L.R. 16 C•L ~67.\n\na claim existed under the provisions of Act VIII of 1869, and that under s. 6 of the General Clauss Act that right could be exercised notwithstanding the repeal of that Act. It was held that the word \"proceedings\" in the section did not include execution proceedings, and that, therefore, the matter was governed by s. 170 of the Act.\n\nThus, the authorities referred to at pages 516 and 517 in Sadar Ali v. Dalimuddin (supra) really turn on the meaning to be given to the word \"proceedings\" .in s. 6 of the General Clauses Act, and they are not of much use in deciding the question now under consideration, and the decision in Sadar Ali v. Dalimuddin\n\n(supra) must therefore be regarded as the first authority which has extended the theory of a right of appeal vesting at the date of the commencement of the act.ion to the whole series of appeafs provided by the law. The decision in Sadar Ali v. Dalimuddin (supra) was followed by a 'Full Bench of the Madras High Court in V asudeva Samiar In re (supra), Coutts Trotter C. J. observing that he woul~ be reluctant to cliffer from the Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court, and that he also agreed with the reasoning on which it was based.\n\nThe correctness of these decisions did not come up for consideration before the Judicial Committee, as their effect was promptly nullified by a further amendment of the Letters Patent giving retrospective operation to the earlier amendment of 1928. But though these decisions themselves had rpus been rendered obsolete, the tbeory enunciated therein of the right of appeal 'in all its career' vesting in the suitor at the commencement of the action has continued to possess the field of law, until it has come to be regarded as an established doctrine of our jurisprudence. For the reasons already given, that theory cannot be accepted as sound. The decisions in Sadar Ali v. Dalimt4ddin (supra), and Vasudeva Samiar In re (supra) which expressed that theory, must be held to be erroneous, and the contention of the petitioner based on those authorities that he acquired on April 22, 1949, when he instituted the :suit in the Bapatla Sub Court, a vested right of appeal\n\nGarikaJ!atti Veeraya\n\nN. Subbialt\n\nChoud/wv\n\nV mkatar ama\n\n4Y.1\"' ].\n\nGarikapatti Veeraya\n\nv. }/. Subhiah\n\nChoudhury\n\nVtnkatarama\n\n4>yar J.\n\nto the Federal Court under the then law must be rejected.\n\nBut that does not exhaust all the hurdles which the petitioner has to cross before he can reach the Constitution as the holder of a vested right, seeking protection for the same therein. Assuming that the petitioner had, as Liquidation Judge, 011 .. February 19, 1949, an appeal was preferred to the High Court."}}, {"text": "Then came the Pepsu Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 57902, "end_char": 57931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Garikapatti V eeray", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 58432, "end_char": 58451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court dismissed the appeal in connectic:n with The Marwari Chamber of Commerce Ltd., not on the ground that the appellant had no vested right of appeal but, on the ground :that the application for amendment, which was filed\n\nGarikapatti V eeray a\n\nN. Subbiah Choudhury\n\nDas C.J.\n\nGarikapatti V eeraya\n\nJ{.", "canonical_name": "Garikapatti V eeraya\n\nN. Subbiah\n\nChoudhury"}}, {"text": "Garikapatti V eeraya", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 58487, "end_char": 58507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court dismissed the appeal in connectic:n with The Marwari Chamber of Commerce Ltd., not on the ground that the appellant had no vested right of appeal but, on the ground :that the application for amendment, which was filed\n\nGarikapatti V eeray a\n\nN. Subbiah Choudhury\n\nDas C.J.\n\nGarikapatti V eeraya\n\nJ{.", "canonical_name": "Garikapatti V eeraya\n\nN. Subbiah\n\nChoudhury"}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59218, "end_char": 59223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Court Fees Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 59815, "end_char": 59829, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59930, "end_char": 59939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Court Fees Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 59943, "end_char": 59957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60183, "end_char": 60191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Court Fees Act", "statute": "Court Fees Act"}}, {"text": "April 22, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 61532, "end_char": 61546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case before us the suit was instituted on April 22, 1949, and on the principle established by the decisions referred to above the right of appeal vested in the parties thereto at that date and is to be governed by the law as it prevailed on that date, that is to say, on that date the parties acquired the right, if unsuccessful, to go up in appeal from the sub-court to the High Court and from the High Court to the Federal Court under the Federal Court (Enlargement of Jurisdiction) Act, 1947 read with cl."}}, {"text": "cl. 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61995, "end_char": 62001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 109 and 110", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62028, "end_char": 62043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 62047, "end_char": 62074, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Garikapatti V1erl!)'a\n\nN. Subbiah", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 62797, "end_char": 62830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Garikapatti V1erl!)'a\n\nN. Subbiah\n\nChoudhuv\n\nDasC.J.\n\nGarikapatti Ve11aya\n\nN. Subhiah\n\nChoudhury.", "canonical_name": "Garikapatti V eeraya\n\nN. Subbiah\n\nChoudhury"}}, {"text": "N. Subhiah", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 62872, "end_char": 62882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Garikapatti V1erl!)'a\n\nN. Subbiah\n\nChoudhuv\n\nDasC.J.\n\nGarikapatti Ve11aya\n\nN. Subhiah\n\nChoudhury.", "canonical_name": "N. Subbiah\n\nChoudhury"}}, {"text": "Kania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63342, "end_char": 63347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fanardan Reddy v.\n\nThe State(•) Kania C. J., in delivering the judgment of the Court observed that our Constitution is generally speaking prospective in its operation and is not to have retroactive operation in the absence of any express provision to that effect."}}, {"text": "Leeds and County Ji.nk Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 64882, "end_char": 64909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "y- ( i) Those who were aggrieved by a judgment of a High Court in what was British India passed before the commencement of the Constitution in a civil proceeding arising out of a suit or proceeding instituted before the Constitution and who had preferred an appeal from such judgment to the Federal Court or whose appeal from such judgment to the Privy Council had stood transferred to the Federal Court and whose appeal was pending in such ro, urt immediately prior to the commencement of the Constitution ;\n\n(1) Leeds and County Ji.nk Ltd. a • .W..lker (1883) 11 Q.Jl."}}, {"text": "(1955 2 S.C.R. 872", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 65090, "end_char": 65108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "cl. 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68187, "end_char": 68193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Abolition of Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 68292, "end_char": 68341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 109 and 110", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68346, "end_char": 68361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Abolition of Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, 1949", "statute": "the Abolition of Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 68365, "end_char": 68392, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 395", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68874, "end_char": 68885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Abolition of Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, 1949", "statute": "the Abolition of Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "Constitution repealed the Indian Independence Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 68893, "end_char": 68948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 68957, "end_char": 68986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Abolition of Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 69088, "end_char": 69137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "repeal of the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 69144, "end_char": 69187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 124", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69314, "end_char": 69322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The repeal of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "The repeal of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 129", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69360, "end_char": 69368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The repeal of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "The repeal of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Article 131", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69488, "end_char": 69499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The repeal of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "The repeal of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69638, "end_char": 69646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The repeal of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "The repeal of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Article 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69676, "end_char": 69687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The repeal of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "The repeal of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70030, "end_char": 70038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The repeal of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "The repeal of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Article 134(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70982, "end_char": 70996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71209, "end_char": 71220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71427, "end_char": 71438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Garikapatti V teraya", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71626, "end_char": 71646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Garikapatti V teraya , ..\n\nN. Subbiah\n\nChoudhury\n\nDasC.].", "canonical_name": "Garikapatti V eeraya\n\nN. Subbiah\n\nChoudhury"}}, {"text": "N. Subbiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71653, "end_char": 71663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Garikapatti V teraya , ..\n\nN. Subbiah\n\nChoudhury\n\nDasC.].", "canonical_name": "N. Subbiah\n\nChoudhury"}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71742, "end_char": 71753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 137", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71845, "end_char": 71856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 138 to 140", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72038, "end_char": 72054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72057, "end_char": 72068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72199, "end_char": 72207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 395", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72318, "end_char": 72329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 372(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73201, "end_char": 73212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "January 26, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 73338, "end_char": 73354, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "372(2), the President promulgated the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950, which came into force simultaneously with the Constitution on January 26, 1950."}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 73444, "end_char": 73471, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73496, "end_char": 73503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 73515, "end_char": 73542, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Supreme Court-", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 73902, "end_char": 73916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chapter IV of Part V of the Constitution and such rules as may, from .time to time, be made by the Supreme Court regarding\n\nappeals from the Courts of India, and to the provisions hereinafter contained, an appeal shall lie to ohe Supreme Court- ( a) from any judgment, decree or final order passed on appeal by a High Court or by any other Court of final appellate jurisdiction;\n\n(b) from any judgment decree or final order passed, by a High Court in the exercise of original civil jurisdiction; and ( c) from any judgment, decree or order, when the case, as hereinafter provided, is certified to be a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "s. 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74379, "end_char": 74385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75073, "end_char": 75079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 395", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75568, "end_char": 75576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Carikapatti Veeraya", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75735, "end_char": 75754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It, however, continued\n\nGarikapatti V eeraya\n\nN. Subbiah Choudhury\n\nDas C.J.\n\nCarikapatti Veeraya\n\nN. Subbiah\n\nChoudhury\n\nDasC.J.\n\nthe Abolition of Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, 1949, which directed that the Federal Court in addition to the powers conferred on it by the Federal Court (Enlargement of Jurisdiction) Act, 1947, would have a!!", "canonical_name": "Garikapatti V eeraya\n\nN. Subbiah\n\nChoudhury"}}, {"text": "N. Subbiah\n\nChoudhury", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75756, "end_char": 75777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It, however, continued\n\nGarikapatti V eeraya\n\nN. Subbiah Choudhury\n\nDas C.J.\n\nCarikapatti Veeraya\n\nN. Subbiah\n\nChoudhury\n\nDasC.J.\n\nthe Abolition of Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, 1949, which directed that the Federal Court in addition to the powers conferred on it by the Federal Court (Enlargement of Jurisdiction) Act, 1947, would have a!!", "canonical_name": "N. Subbiah\n\nChoudhury"}}, {"text": "Abolition of Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 75792, "end_char": 75841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Act amending or supplementing the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 76128, "end_char": 76191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 372(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76295, "end_char": 76306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act amending or supplementing the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Act amending or supplementing the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "ss. 109 and 110", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76390, "end_char": 76405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act amending or supplementing the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Act amending or supplementing the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 76409, "end_char": 76436, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "clause 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76547, "end_char": 76556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act amending or supplementing the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Act amending or supplementing the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 374(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77442, "end_char": 77453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77825, "end_char": 77833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78803, "end_char": 78811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79123, "end_char": 79131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79156, "end_char": 79164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79428, "end_char": 79436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 79557, "end_char": 79584, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79662, "end_char": 79670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "December 20, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 79923, "end_char": 79940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13,000, was dismissed by the trial court on December 20, 1946, and the High Court reversed the decree of the trial court and passed the decree in favour of the plaintiff on November 8,\n\n(1) l.L.R. 1950 Nag."}}, {"text": "Garikapatti", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 80227, "end_char": 80238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Garikapatti V \"'1!1\"\n\nN. Suhhiah\n\nChoudhury\n\nDasC.J,\n\nGari!rapatti Veeraya\n\nN. Subbiah Chuuffhury\n\nDasC.J;\n\n1949.", "canonical_name": "Garikapatti V eeraya\n\nN. Subbiah\n\nChoudhury"}}, {"text": "N. Suhhiah", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 80249, "end_char": 80259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Garikapatti V \"'1!1\"\n\nN. Suhhiah\n\nChoudhury\n\nDasC.J,\n\nGari!rapatti Veeraya\n\nN. Subbiah Chuuffhury\n\nDasC.J;\n\n1949.", "canonical_name": "N. Subbiah\n\nChoudhury"}}, {"text": "N. Subbiah Chuuffhury", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80303, "end_char": 80324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Garikapatti V \"'1!1\"\n\nN. Suhhiah\n\nChoudhury\n\nDasC.J,\n\nGari!rapatti Veeraya\n\nN. Subbiah Chuuffhury\n\nDasC.J;\n\n1949.", "canonical_name": "N. Subbiah\n\nChoudhury"}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 80345, "end_char": 80362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bombay High Court having granted a certificate of fitness, the case came up :, e:or.e this Court and will be found reported as Daji Sahcb Mane v.\n\nShankarrao.("}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80594, "end_char": 80602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "January 25, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 80893, "end_char": 80909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "133 did not apply because (i) it related expressly to appeals against any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India and (ii) on the date of the decree of the High Court the defendant had a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court and on January 25, 1950, a certificate of fitness to appeal was bound to be granted."}}, {"text": "Art. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81065, "end_char": 81073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 81332, "end_char": 81359, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81572, "end_char": 81580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82428, "end_char": 82436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1955) 2 S.C.R. 872", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 82442, "end_char": 82461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82713, "end_char": 82721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82951, "end_char": 82959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art.\n\n136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83134, "end_char": 83143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 83285, "end_char": 83312, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83959, "end_char": 83970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84020, "end_char": 84028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 133 and 134", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84094, "end_char": 84111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "GarU.apatti Veeray", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 84725, "end_char": 84743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GarU.apatti Veeray\n\nN. Subbiah\n\nChoudhury\n\nDasC.J.\n\nGarikapatti V •eraya\n\nN. Subbiah\n\nClwudhury\n\nDa<.Cj.", "canonical_name": "Garikapatti V eeraya\n\nN. Subbiah\n\nChoudhury"}}, {"text": "Garikapatti V •eraya", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 84777, "end_char": 84797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GarU.apatti Veeray\n\nN. Subbiah\n\nChoudhury\n\nDasC.J.\n\nGarikapatti V •eraya\n\nN. Subbiah\n\nClwudhury\n\nDa<.Cj.", "canonical_name": "Garikapatti V eeraya\n\nN. Subbiah\n\nChoudhury"}}, {"text": "1st February, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 86695, "end_char": 86713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But from 1st February, 1948, such a right was expressly abolished."}}, {"text": "Indian High Courts", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 86916, "end_char": 86934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From that day the Privy Council ceased to be a Court of Appeal from the Indian High Courts."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87396, "end_char": 87405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 374(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87864, "end_char": 87878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "N. Suhbiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 89275, "end_char": 89285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In other words the Full\n\nGarikapatti Veeroya\n\nN. Svbbiah\n\nChoudhury\n\nDasC.J.\n\nGarikapatti V ,,,.aya\n\nN. Suhbiah\n\nChoudlwty\n\nD., C.J.\n\nBench apparently \"thought that this case fell within the second exception mentioned by them, namely, that the court to which the appeal lay at the date of the commencement of the suit had been abolished and, therefore, the vested right of appeal ceased to exist.", "canonical_name": "N. Subbiah\n\nChoudhury"}}, {"text": "Choudlwty", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 89287, "end_char": 89296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In other words the Full\n\nGarikapatti Veeroya\n\nN. Svbbiah\n\nChoudhury\n\nDasC.J.\n\nGarikapatti V ,,,.aya\n\nN. Suhbiah\n\nChoudlwty\n\nD., C.J.\n\nBench apparently \"thought that this case fell within the second exception mentioned by them, namely, that the court to which the appeal lay at the date of the commencement of the suit had been abolished and, therefore, the vested right of appeal ceased to exist."}}, {"text": "Circuit Court of Montreal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 89799, "end_char": 89824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now turning to the facts of that last mentioned Canadian case we find that the judgment of the Circuit Court of Montreal was passed on January 5, 1921, against tlie appellant."}}, {"text": "January 5, 1921", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 89839, "end_char": 89854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now turning to the facts of that last mentioned Canadian case we find that the judgment of the Circuit Court of Montreal was passed on January 5, 1921, against tlie appellant."}}, {"text": "April 26, 1921", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 90064, "end_char": 90078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 26, 1921, the King's Bench (Appeal Side) held that no appeal lay and the judgment of the Circuit Court was final."}}, {"text": "art. 5755", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90787, "end_char": 90796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91725, "end_char": 91735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91877, "end_char": 91882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Buckmaster", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 92200, "end_char": 92210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judicial Committee accepted this contention and Lord Buckmaster who delivered the judgment of the Judicial Committee observed as follows:-\n\n\"Now this appeal had not been brought when the statute was passed, although the proceedings before the Cii; cuit Court had been instituted."}}, {"text": "s. 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92549, "end_char": 92554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Garilcapatti Veeraya", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93695, "end_char": 93715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "but that the new court which took the place of the court to which the appeal originally lay was given jurisdiction in all cases \"unless otherwise provided by this Act\" and that that very Act\n\nhaving declared the whole of the sections of the Code in which the provisions relating to the Circuit Court and rights of appeal found place to be replaced by\n\nGarikapatti V ter:l'nr ]."}}, {"text": "Supreme.\n\nCourt of Queensland", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 129671, "end_char": 129700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There, the facts were that an action was commenced in the Supreme."}}, {"text": "Judiciary Act, 1903", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 129904, "end_char": 129923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Macnaghten", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 132112, "end_char": 132122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But with all the respect which I have for the decision of a tribunal so august as the Privy Council an\"d of a Judge so eminent as Lord Macnaghten, I am of opinion that the decision in question cannot be supported on principle, that it is not warranted by the authorities, and cannot, therefore, be followed. .", "canonical_name": "Macnaghtcn"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 134038, "end_char": 134049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Garikapatti V ura.r J\n\nN. SubhW.\n\nClwudhut; J\n\nVenkatarama\n\n.dyyar ].", "canonical_name": "V enkatarama Ayyar"}}, {"text": "Gloucester", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 134926, "end_char": 134936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Coke, in commenting on the Statute of Gloucester (6, Edward I, Chap."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134961, "end_char": 134965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tenterdon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 135643, "end_char": 135652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "-the question was whether it was hit by Lord Tenterdon's Act, which required that, to take the case out of the operation of the statute of limitation, the debt should be in writing."}}, {"text": "September 13, 1893", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 136162, "end_char": 136180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiffs sued for damages for the grounding of their vessel on September 13, 1893, by reason of the neglect of the defendants."}}, {"text": "December 5, 1893", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 136289, "end_char": 136305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 5, 1893, the Public Authorities Protection Act came into torce, and that provided that an action against public authorities grounded on neglect or default should be commenced within six months of such neglect or default."}}, {"text": "November 14, 1898", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 136551, "end_char": 136568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was actually filed on November 14, 1898, and the question was whether the right which had accrued to the plaintiffs on September 13, 1893, was barred by this enactment, which came into force on December 5,\n\n1893."}}, {"text": "December 5,\n\n1893", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 136723, "end_char": 136740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was actually filed on November 14, 1898, and the question was whether the right which had accrued to the plaintiffs on September 13, 1893, was barred by this enactment, which came into force on December 5,\n\n1893."}}, {"text": "Joseph Suche & Company Ltd.(~.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 137167, "end_char": 137197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In In re Joseph Suche & Company Ltd.(~.), the facts were that an order was made on January 30, 1875, winding up a company t:nder the supervision of the Court."}}, {"text": "January 30, 1875", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 137241, "end_char": 137257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In In re Joseph Suche & Company Ltd.(~.), the facts were that an order was made on January 30, 1875, winding up a company t:nder the supervision of the Court."}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 137497, "end_char": 137502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Judicature Act, 1875", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 137510, "end_char": 137530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 137947, "end_char": 137952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Judicature Act, 1875", "statute": "the Judicature Act, 1875"}}, {"text": "Jessel M. R.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 137991, "end_char": 138003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was held by Jessel M. R. that the right to prove for a debt was not a mere matter of procedure, and could not be distinguished from a right of action, and that the creditor was therefore not ffected by the change effected by s. 10 of the Judicature Act."}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 138204, "end_char": 138209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Judicature Act, 1875", "statute": "the Judicature Act, 1875"}}, {"text": "Joseph Suche", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 138300, "end_char": 138312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision in In re Athlumney (3) is similar to the one in In re Joseph Suche and\n\n(1) [1864] 10 H.L.C 704; 11 E.R. 1200."}}, {"text": "Garikaatli V1erf!Ya\n\nN. Subbiah", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 138408, "end_char": 138439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Garikaatli V1erf!Ya\n\nN. Subbiah\n\nChoudhury\n\nV tnkatarama Ayyar ].", "canonical_name": "Garikapatti V eeraya\n\nN. Subbiah\n\nChoudhury"}}, {"text": "Garikapatti Veeraya\n\nN. Suhhiah", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 138475, "end_char": 138506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Garikapatti Veeraya\n\nN. Suhhiah\n\nChoudhur.:'", "canonical_name": "Garikapatti V eeraya\n\nN. Subbiah\n\nChoudhury"}}, {"text": "V1nkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nCompany Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 138521, "end_char": 138556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V1nkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nCompany Ltd. (supra), the question being whether the rigl1ts of a creditor who had proved for his debt could be affected by the provisions \" of a Bankruptcy Act, which came into force after proof of such debt."}}, {"text": "Joseph Suche & Company Ltd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 138771, "end_char": 138797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Following In re Joseph Suche & Company Ltd ... it was held that the rigbt to prove a debt was a substantive one, and was not affected by the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, which came into force after such proof."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 140991, "end_char": 141005, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "L.R. 54 I.A. 421", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 142843, "end_char": 142859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "GarikapattiV eeraya", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 142862, "end_char": 142881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GarikapattiV eeraya\n\nN. Suhbiah\n\nChoudhury\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar ].", "canonical_name": "Garikapatti V eeraya\n\nN. Subbiah\n\nChoudhury"}}, {"text": "United States of America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 143766, "end_char": 143790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In jurisdictions not dominated by the Privy Coun- <:il, as for example, the United States of America, it is well settled that the right of appeal is to be determined in accordance with the law as it is on the date of the judgmrnt and not as it was on the date of the commencement of the action."}}, {"text": "Corpus Juris Secundum", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 143995, "end_char": 144016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus, in Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume IV, page 63, the position is stated as follows:\n\n\"S-3-Stotutes taking effect before judgment: Except where the statute itself provides it or there is a general provision that statutes relating to the remedy shall not affect pending actions, a statute wh; ch .. gi; es, takes away, or moJifies the remedy by appeal or other mode of re\\iew applies to :ases commenced before, but in which the judgment, decree, or order sought tc; be appealed from is not rendered or made until after it goes int.o effect."}}, {"text": "section 426", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 145207, "end_char": 145218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sub Court, Bapatla", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 146419, "end_char": 146437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Giving full effect to that decision, the petitioner can only claim that when he instituted the suit in the Sub Court, Bapatla on April 22, 1949, he had , on that yar J.\n\nto the Federal Court under the then law must be rejected."}}, {"text": "yar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 165534, "end_char": 165537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Garikapatti Veeraya\n\nv. }/. Subhiah\n\nChoudhury\n\nVtnkatarama\n\n4>yar J.\n\nto the Federal Court under the then law must be rejected."}}, {"text": "Federal Court was established by the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 166034, "end_char": 166100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 167376, "end_char": 167403, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 167712, "end_char": 167722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 167975, "end_char": 167980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168614, "end_char": 168622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 169408, "end_char": 169413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Vasudeva Samiar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 169688, "end_char": 169703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is how it was understood by Coutts Trotter C.J. in Vasudeva Samiar In re (supra), wherein he summarised the effect of the decision thus :\n\nGariJ:apotti Veeraya\n\nN. Subhiah\n\nChoudhury\n\nVenkatarama\n\nA; var J.\n\nGariMpotti V1utgia\n\nN. Sobbilih\n\nChoud\"\"'7\n\nVMkalamrmna\n\nAyyar ].", "canonical_name": "V asudeva Samiar"}}, {"text": "GariJ:apotti Veeraya", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 169776, "end_char": 169796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is how it was understood by Coutts Trotter C.J. in Vasudeva Samiar In re (supra), wherein he summarised the effect of the decision thus :\n\nGariJ:apotti Veeraya\n\nN. Subhiah\n\nChoudhury\n\nVenkatarama\n\nA; var J.\n\nGariMpotti V1utgia\n\nN. Sobbilih\n\nChoud\"\"'7\n\nVMkalamrmna\n\nAyyar ].", "canonical_name": "Garikapatti V eeraya\n\nN. Subbiah\n\nChoudhury"}}, {"text": "N. Subhiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 169798, "end_char": 169808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is how it was understood by Coutts Trotter C.J. in Vasudeva Samiar In re (supra), wherein he summarised the effect of the decision thus :\n\nGariJ:apotti Veeraya\n\nN. Subhiah\n\nChoudhury\n\nVenkatarama\n\nA; var J.\n\nGariMpotti V1utgia\n\nN. Sobbilih\n\nChoud\"\"'7\n\nVMkalamrmna\n\nAyyar ].", "canonical_name": "N. Subbiah\n\nChoudhury"}}, {"text": "GariMpotti V1utgia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 169845, "end_char": 169863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is how it was understood by Coutts Trotter C.J. in Vasudeva Samiar In re (supra), wherein he summarised the effect of the decision thus :\n\nGariJ:apotti Veeraya\n\nN. Subhiah\n\nChoudhury\n\nVenkatarama\n\nA; var J.\n\nGariMpotti V1utgia\n\nN. Sobbilih\n\nChoud\"\"'7\n\nVMkalamrmna\n\nAyyar ]."}}, {"text": "Cl. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 171121, "end_char": 171127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 372(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 171246, "end_char": 171257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1955] 2 S.C.R. 872", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 171917, "end_char": 171936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Cl. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 172536, "end_char": 172542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 173044, "end_char": 173060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference might, in this connection, be made to the following observation of Patanjali Sastri J. in State of Seraikella and others v. Union of India and another(1 ) :\n\n\"The Federal Court, in which the suits were pending, and which had exclusive jurisdiction to deal with them, was abolished and a new Court, the Supreme Court of India, was created with original jurisdiction strictly limited to disputes relating to legal rights between States recognised as such under the Constitution.\""}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of India", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 173279, "end_char": 173301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference might, in this connection, be made to the following observation of Patanjali Sastri J. in State of Seraikella and others v. Union of India and another(1 ) :\n\n\"The Federal Court, in which the suits were pending, and which had exclusive jurisdiction to deal with them, was abolished and a new Court, the Supreme Court of India, was created with original jurisdiction strictly limited to disputes relating to legal rights between States recognised as such under the Constitution.\""}}, {"text": "Art. 374(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 173497, "end_char": 173508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 375", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 173844, "end_char": 173852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 174653, "end_char": 174661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 174878, "end_char": 174886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Watson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 175485, "end_char": 175491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "per Lord Watson in Salomon\n\nv. Saloman and Co.\n\nLtd. ( 1 )."}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 176636, "end_char": 176644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 177173, "end_char": 177184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 177500, "end_char": 177508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 178088, "end_char": 178096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 178392, "end_char": 178400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 178463, "end_char": 178471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 178526, "end_char": 178534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Fenkatarama Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 178677, "end_char": 178694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "133 applies to all judgments, decrees and final orders passed after the Constitution came into force,\n\nGarikapatti Vmay.-\n\nN. Subbiah\n\nChoudhury\n\nFenkatarama Ayyar J.\n\nGflTikapatti V1trqya\n\nN. Subbz\"ah\n\nChoudhury\n\nVtnkatarama\n\n,(zryar ].", "canonical_name": "V enkatarama Ayyar"}}, {"text": "Art. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 178935, "end_char": 178943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 178963, "end_char": 178971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 179031, "end_char": 179039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 179310, "end_char": 179318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 179562, "end_char": 179568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 180122, "end_char": 180130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 180298, "end_char": 180306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 180493, "end_char": 180501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 180858, "end_char": 180866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 180909, "end_char": 180917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 181448, "end_char": 181455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 374", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 181713, "end_char": 181721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 374(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 181943, "end_char": 181954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 133 and 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 181984, "end_char": 182001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 182163, "end_char": 182171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 182389, "end_char": 182397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 182885, "end_char": 182893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 183080, "end_char": 183088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 183144, "end_char": 183152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 183216, "end_char": 183224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Garilrapatci Veeraya", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 183346, "end_char": 183366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'957\n\nGarilrapatci Veeraya\n\nN. SuObiah\n\nChoudhury\n\nV 1rikatarama\n\n...f)yar J.\n\nenacting that no appeal shall lie unless the reqmrements of that Article are satisfied.", "canonical_name": "Garikapatti V eeraya\n\nN. Subbiah\n\nChoudhury"}}, {"text": "N. SuObiah\n\nChoudhury", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 183368, "end_char": 183389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'957\n\nGarilrapatci Veeraya\n\nN. SuObiah\n\nChoudhury\n\nV 1rikatarama\n\n...f)yar J.\n\nenacting that no appeal shall lie unless the reqmrements of that Article are satisfied.", "canonical_name": "N. Subbiah\n\nChoudhury"}}, {"text": "1rikatarama", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 183393, "end_char": 183404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'957\n\nGarilrapatci Veeraya\n\nN. SuObiah\n\nChoudhury\n\nV 1rikatarama\n\n...f)yar J.\n\nenacting that no appeal shall lie unless the reqmrements of that Article are satisfied."}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 183786, "end_char": 183788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 133( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 183834, "end_char": 183846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 184171, "end_char": 184179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 184212, "end_char": 184219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has been uniformly held in America that when a right of appeal is given conditioned on the subjectmatter being of a certain valuation, that provision must be interpreted as negativing a right of appeal where that condition is not satisfied."}}, {"text": "Marshall", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 184560, "end_char": 184568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Durous; eau v.\n\nUnited States('), dealing with a provision providing for an appeal when the subject-matter exceeded 2,000 dollars, Marshall C.J. observed :\n\n\" .... the Court implies a legislative exception from its constitutional appellate power in the legislative affirmative description of those powers."}}, {"text": "December 6, 1875", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 185464, "end_char": 185480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There, an action claiming 2,250 dollars was commenced on December 6, 1875."}}, {"text": "S. 231", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 185550, "end_char": 185556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 847", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 185581, "end_char": 185587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 186586, "end_char": 186613, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 186869, "end_char": 186874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "With reference to jurisdiction exercised by Court B under the repealed provisions of the Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "With reference to jurisdiction exercised by Court B under the repealed provisions of the Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Art. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 187165, "end_char": 187173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "With reference to jurisdiction exercised by Court B under the repealed provisions of the Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "With reference to jurisdiction exercised by Court B under the repealed provisions of the Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "s. 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 187408, "end_char": 187413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "With reference to jurisdiction exercised by Court B under the repealed provisions of the Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "With reference to jurisdiction exercised by Court B under the repealed provisions of the Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "s. 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 187843, "end_char": 187848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "With reference to jurisdiction exercised by Court B under the repealed provisions of the Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "With reference to jurisdiction exercised by Court B under the repealed provisions of the Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "s. 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 188401, "end_char": 188406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 188474, "end_char": 188482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 188618, "end_char": 188626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "ss. 109 and 110", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 188644, "end_char": 188659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 188756, "end_char": 188764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 189032, "end_char": 189040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 189109, "end_char": 189117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 189228, "end_char": 189236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 189420, "end_char": 189428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 189467, "end_char": 189475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 189692, "end_char": 189703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 189828, "end_char": 189842, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 109 and 110", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 189852, "end_char": 189867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 189944, "end_char": 189952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "ss. 109 and 110", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 189960, "end_char": 189975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 109 and 110", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 190097, "end_char": 190112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 190149, "end_char": 190157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 190269, "end_char": 190277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 190376, "end_char": 190384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 190503, "end_char": 190511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 190648, "end_char": 190656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 191573, "end_char": 191581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 191753, "end_char": 191761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 191793, "end_char": 191801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Garikapatti V urayo", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 192260, "end_char": 192279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7-78 S.C. fodia/59\n\nGarikapatti V urayo\n\nh N. SJibbialt\n\nChoudhufJ\n\nV enko tarama\n\n.A.var J.\n\nCarikapatti V111roya ....\n\nN. Subbiah\n\nClwudlwty\n\nVmkatarama\n\nA\"ar J.\n\n574 Sli1'REME COURT REPORTS [19571\n\ndecrees or final orders made in proceedings instituted before the Constitution when made by High Courts in Part A States, no appeal will lie against judgments in like suits instituted in Part B States, though some of them at least had a provision fur \"n appeal to an authority functioning as the Privy Council.", "canonical_name": "Garikapatti V eeraya\n\nN. Subbiah\n\nChoudhury"}}, {"text": "h N. SJibbialt", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 192281, "end_char": 192295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7-78 S.C. fodia/59\n\nGarikapatti V urayo\n\nh N. SJibbialt\n\nChoudhufJ\n\nV enko tarama\n\n.A.var J.\n\nCarikapatti V111roya ....\n\nN. Subbiah\n\nClwudlwty\n\nVmkatarama\n\nA\"ar J.\n\n574 Sli1'REME COURT REPORTS [19571\n\ndecrees or final orders made in proceedings instituted before the Constitution when made by High Courts in Part A States, no appeal will lie against judgments in like suits instituted in Part B States, though some of them at least had a provision fur \"n appeal to an authority functioning as the Privy Council."}}, {"text": ".A.var", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 192323, "end_char": 192329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7-78 S.C. fodia/59\n\nGarikapatti V urayo\n\nh N. SJibbialt\n\nChoudhufJ\n\nV enko tarama\n\n.A.var J.\n\nCarikapatti V111roya ....\n\nN. Subbiah\n\nClwudlwty\n\nVmkatarama\n\nA\"ar J.\n\n574 Sli1'REME COURT REPORTS [19571\n\ndecrees or final orders made in proceedings instituted before the Constitution when made by High Courts in Part A States, no appeal will lie against judgments in like suits instituted in Part B States, though some of them at least had a provision fur \"n appeal to an authority functioning as the Privy Council."}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 192793, "end_char": 192801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 193512, "end_char": 193520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 193611, "end_char": 193622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]} {"document_id": "1957_1_575_594_EN", "year": 1957, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nMANAK LAL v.\n\nDR. PREM CHAND\n\n(VENKATARAMA AYYAR, S. K. DAs and\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR JJ.)\n\nTribunal-Mefnber having bias against party-Whether tribu\n\n~1a\"t improperly constituted-Waiver--,_lf! hat amounts to-Effect of waiver-Failure to examine a witness-Witness no better than acComplice-Effect-Professional misconduct by advocate-Measure of punishment. r P filed a complaint of professiOnal misconduct against M, an advocate of the High Court of Rajasthan.\n\nThe Chief Justice appointed a tribunal under the Bar Councils Act for enquiry into the complaint.\n\nC, a senior advocate, . was appointed chairman of the tribunal.\n\nC had appeared once for P before the trial Court in the case out of which the complaint arose. No objection was raised as to its constitution before the tribunal.\n\nThe tribunal found M guilty of having got a false stay order in favour of his clients written by the clerk of the Court by improper means. The High Court concurred in this finding arid directed the' removal of M's name from the rolls.\n\nIt was contended on behalf of M that the tribunal was not properly constituted.\n\nHeld~ that the collstitu'.tion of thC ·tribunal suffered from a serious infirmity in that C was appointed its member and acted as its chairman.\n\nIt is well settled that every member of a tribunal that is called upon to try issues in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings must be able to act judicially; and it is of the <:sseil.ce .of _ judicial decisions and judicial administration that judges should be able to act impartially, objectively and without\n\nny bias. In such ases the test is not whether in fact a . bias has affected -the judgment; the test always is and must be whether \" litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to member of_ the tribunal might have operated against him in the final decision of the tribunal.\n\nIt is in this sense that it is <>ften' aid' that.· justice must not on.ly be done but must also appeiit to be Clone. - 1\n\n, Frome Unitwed.\n\nRer v. Williams, Ex parte Phillips [ 1914] I K. B. 608, <0xplained.\n\nThe' objection 'to the constitution:' of the tr'bunai\" can be waived. Waiver can be inferred from the failure of the party to\n\ntake·· the objection only if and after it is shown that the party\n\nF1hrUarY_ 6. '\n\nManak LIU\n\nDr. Prem CAa11d\n\nGajendragadkar J.\n\nkne\\v about the relevant facts and was aware of his right to take the objection.\n\nSince M kne\\v that C had appcued for P and 1nust be deemed to have been conscious of his legal rights, his. failure to take the object!.on before the tribunal creates an cffectiYe bar of waiver against him.\n\nVyvyan v. Vyvyan (1861) 30 Eeav. 65; 54 E. R. 813 relic,! on.\n\nEven in quasi-<:riminal proceedings all !n1portant and relevant evidence must be laid before the tribunal, but it is generally for the prosecutor to decide which witnesses are necessary for the unfolding of the case.\n\nNo aPvcrse inference can he drawn against the complainant's case for failure to exan1ine a V:itncss \\vho was. no better than an accomplice.\n\nThe order of the High Court removing l\\.fs name fro1n the :-oll of advocates is fully justified. The n1isconduct proved is of a very serious cfiaractcr.\n\nDisapproval of such unworthy conduct must be expressed emphatically as the legal profession must be saved from persons who do not feel any hesitation in corruptini public officers by unworthy and illegal nicans for the benefit of their clients .\n\n. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 246 of 1956.\n\nAppeal by special kave from the judgment and order dated the NoYember 11, 1955, of the Rajasthan High Court in Civil Misc. Case No. 3 of 1952!. C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, Veda Vyasa, S. K. Kapur and N. H. Hingorani, for the appellant.\n\nH. f. Umrigar and T. M. Sen, for the respondent No. 2.\n\n1957. February 6. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR J.-The appellant Sri Manak Lal was an advocate practising at Sojat. A complaint was filed against him under s. 13 of the Legal Practitioners /I.ct by Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi. It was alleged that the appellant was guilty of professional misconduct and the complainant requested that suitable action be taken against him in that behalf.\n\nSince the appellant was not a pledder OI a mukhtear but an advocate of the High Court of Rajasthan, the complaint was sent for enquiry to the tribunal nominated by the Chief Justice of the High Court of Rajasthan under s. 10(2)\n\nof the Bar Councils Act. The tribunal held an enquiry, recorded evidence aml came to the unanimous conclusion that the appellant-\"was guilty of professional misconduct in having got a false stay order written by the clerk by improper means and thereby he managed to take an illegal and undue advantage for his clients and therefore deserves to be punished for the same.\" When this report was received by the High Court, the matter was argued before the Court. In the result the High Court agreed with the findings made by the tribunal and directed that the appellant >hould be remO\\'ed from practice. It is against this order that by Special Leave the appellant has come to this Court.\n\nThe facts giving rise to the complaint against the appellant are very few. ft appears that there was a dispute concerning Jhalra well and certain agricultural plots surrounding the well between Pukhraj and others on the one bane! and Dr. Prem Chand and others on the other. These parties were described in the saicf proceedings as Party No. 1 and Party No. 2 respectively. The appellant was the counsel for Party No. 1.\n\nAs a result of this dispute the police presented a report in the court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate.\n\nSojat, that the dispute was likely to cause breach of peace\n\nand suggested that proceedings under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be taken. The Sub- Division:t! Magistrate drew out a preliminary order on July 5, 1951 (Ex. A-1 ). Bv this order both the parties were called upon to put in their written statements as regards their claims to possession of the property in dispute. The learned :\\fagistrate also passed an order attaching the property in dispute pemjing the decision of the proceedings umler s. 145. This was followed bv another order passed on August 9, 1951, that the crojl which was on the field shoukl be auctioned, its price deposited in court and the land itself should be given for cultivation to the: highest bidder for the next year.\n\nIt appears that the hearing of the case was fixed for August 21, 1951.\n\nMembers of Party No. 1 were aggrieved by these orders and on their behalf the appellant preferred a revision application against these orders in the court of the Sessions Judge, Pali, on August 13,\n\nMOiia! .l.41\n\nDr. Pr1m Chond\n\nGaJ1ndra,(adkar ],\n\nManak Lal\n\nDr, Prnn Chand\n\nGajmdragadkar J.\n\n1951.\n\nThe appellant presented another petition before the learned Sessions Judge on August 29, 1951. In this 11etition it was alleged that rhe crop which stood on the fields in question belonged to the cultivators described as Party No. 1, that the crop was getting spoiled and that the cultivators would be consiclcrably prejuclicecl if they were dispossessed from their bnds at that stage.\n\nOn these allegations the application prayed that an order should be passed not to auction the crop as well as the right of future culti\\ation and that liberty should be given to the cultivators to o to the well and to look after the crop pending the final disposal of their revision application before the learned Sessions Judge. The learned Sessions judge was not apparently inclined to grant c.r parte interim stay and '° on the same Jay he directed that notice of the revisiot1 application should be given to the other party and called upon the applicants to furnish talba11a ancl a copy of the application. The case then stoo,\\ adjourned for hearing on September 6, 1951.\n\nOn September 6, 1951, \\Yhcn the case w.!S called out before the learned Sessions Judge, the appellant was present. The learnccl sessions Judge found that the appellant had not submitted a copy of his application as already directed but he was told that the appellant was submitting a copy on the same day. That is why the leJrned Judge ordered that notice should be issued after the said copy was tiled. The hearing of the case was then adjourned to September 12, 1951.\n\nSo far there is no dispute about the facts. There is, however, a serious dispute as to other e\\'ents which. according to the complainant. happened on September 6,\n\n1951. The complainant's case is that, after the hearing of the case was adjourned to September 12, 1951, and notice of the application was ordered to be issued to Party No. 2, the appellant prevailed upon Shri Maghraj, clerk of the Sessions Judge's Court to prepare an actual stay order, that the said stay order was accordingly prepared and was got signed by the Reader of the Court. Then the Jppellant obtained the stay order from Shri Sheolal the despatch clerk to whoin it was entrusted by the Reader.\n\nArmed with th.is order the appellant personally took\n\nthe order to the SulvDivisional. Magistr'!te and presented it to him the next day. In due course the revision application was taken up for hearing on September 12,\n\n1951. Since no notice had been served on Party No. 2 the hearing was again adjourned to September 22,\n\n1951. It is co:-nmon ground that on September 22, 1951, it was disi:overed that a fraudulent stay order had been issued from the office of the learned Sessions Judge's Court. The learned Sessions Judge then called for explanation from Shri Maghrai and directed the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to treat the letter of September 6, 1951, containing the alleged order of stay as cancelled.\n\nItappears that as a result of the enquiry held by the learned Sessions Judge, he found that Shri Maghraj had committed a grave mistake and held that it would be enough if Shri Maghraj was fined Rs. 11/- and , administered a severe warning to behave properly in future. The complaint against the appellant is that the appellant took_ an active part in the commission of the fraud and was thus guilty of fraudulent and grossly improper conduct in the discharge of his professional duty. A false orde1 had been obtained by him by un~ fair means and so he was guilty of professional misconduct. That in substance is the case against the appellant.\n\nAs we have already indicated, many of the facts alleged in the complaint against the appellant are not in dispute. The appellant admits that he was present before the learned Sessions Judge on September 6,\n\n1951. It is not denied bv him that he took the envelope frotn the despatch clerk addressed to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sojat, and that he in fact handed over the envelope the next day in the office of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. His case, however, is that he never approached Shri Maghraj in this matter and that he;. was not in any way instrumental in getting the draft prepared. In fact, according to the appellant, he did not know the contents of the envelope and it was only on September 22, 1951, that he knew that a false order of stay had been issued by the office of the Sessions Judge by mistake. Before the tribunal, evidence was led by both the parties. The\n\nMa11ak Lal\n\nv, Dr. P\"m Chand\n\nGajendragadkar ].\n\nManak Lal\n\nDr. Prm1 Chand\n\nGaJtndragadkar ].\n\ncomplainant Dr. Prem Chand himself gave evidence and on his behalf Shri Maghraj and Shri Shcolal were examined. The appellant Manak Lal gal\"e evidence on his behalf. Both the members of the tribunal and\n\nthe learned Judges of the High Court of Rajasthan have, on the whole, accepted the complainant's version, rejected the pleas raised by the appellant and have held. that the appellant is guilty or gross professional misconduct. It is this finding which, on the merits, is challenged before us by Shri C. K. Daphtary on behalf of the appellant.\n\nShri Daphtary has also raised two points of law in support of his argument that the order passed against the appellant mmt he set aside.\n\nIt will he convenient to deal with these points first.\n\nShri Daphtary contends that the tribunal appointed by the learned Chief Justice of the High Cour: of Rajasthan to enquire into the alleged misconduc: of the appellant was improperly constituted and all proceedings taken before the tribunal, the report made by it and the subsequent order passed by the High Court pursuant to this report are all invalid.\n\nThis point arises in this way. The tribunal consisted of three members with Shri Chhangani as its Chairman. It is common ground that Shri Chhangani had filed his vakalat on behalf of Dr. Prem Chan, l in proceedings under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on August 23, 1952, and had in fact argued the case on that date. Shri Daphtary contends that since Shri Chhangani had appeared in the criminal proceedings in question for the opponent he was disqualified from acting as a member of the tribunal and this disqualification introduces a fatal infirmity in the constitution of the tribunal itself.\n\nThere is some force in this argument. It is well settled that every member of a tribunal that is called upon to try issues in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings must be :1ble to act judicially; and it is of the essence of judicial decisions and judicial administration that judges should be able to act impartially, objectively ; md without any bias. In such cases the test is not whether in fact a bias has affected the judgment; the test\n\n• f\n\nalwavs is and must be whether a litigant could reaso.nably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member of the tribunal might have operated against him in the final decision of the tribunal. It is in this sense that it is often said tbat justice must not only\n\nhe done hut must also appear to be rnse to he called Courts, haYe to act as judges of the rights of others\". In dealing with c:ises of bias attributed to members constituting tribunals, it is necessary to make a distinction between pecuniary interest and prejudice so attributed.\n\nIt is obvious that pecuniary interest, however small it may be in a ---. done but upon what might appear to be done. Nothing is to be done which creates even a suspicion that there has been an improper interference in the course of\n\njustice.\" Lush J. who agreed with Lord Hewart C.J. likewise accepted the affidavit made on behalf of the justices but observed, \"that they have placed themselves in an impossible position by allowing the clerk in those circumstances to retire with them into their consultation room.\" The same principle was enunciated with equal emphasis in Rex v. Essex fustices, Ex parte Perkins( 1). This was a dispute between a husband and his wife and it appeared that the wife had )..-., consulted the solicitor's clerk in their office about the preparation of a deed of separation from her husband and the lawyer acted in the matter for a time after which she ceased to consuH him. No mention of\n\n(1) [1927] 2 K.B. 475.\n\nthe matter was made to the solicitor himself except one very short reference to it in a weekly report from his clerk. Subsequently the solicitor acted as a clerk to the justices who tried the case.\n\nHe stated in his affidavit that, when acting as a clerk to the justices on the occasion in question, he had no knowledge that his firm had acted for the wife amt that he was in no way :idverse to the husband. It was urged that the decision of the justices should be set aside . as the justices were not properly constituted and it appears also to have been suggested that the decision might, perhaps, have been influenced by a prejudice though indirectly and to a very small extent. Rejecting the argument that the decision of the justices had been influenw.l even remotely by the impropriety alleged, Avary J. stated that \"though the clerk to the justices and the justices did not know that his firm had acted for the applicant's wife, the necessary, or at least the reasonable, impres- , ion, on the mind of the applicant would be that justice was not done seeing that the solicitor for his wife was acting with the justices and advising them on the hearing of the summons which she had taken against him.\"\n\nIt has, however, been urged before us by Shri Umrigar, on behalf of the Advocate-General, that this principle should not be applied to the proceedings before the tribunal appointed under the Bar Councils Act. He contends that the tribunal is not empowered to pass final orders on the enquiry and that the report made by the tribunal is, in every case, to be submitted to the High Court for the final decision of the High Court. We are not impressed with this argument. If it is true that in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings justice must not only be done but must appear to be done to the litigating public, it is equally true that when a lawyer is charged for professional misconduct and is given the privilege of being tried by a tribunal of the Bar Council, the enquiry before the tribunal must leave no room for a reasonable apprehension in #le mind of the lawyer that the tribunal may have\n\nbeen even indirectly influenced by any bias in the mind of any of the members of the tribunal. In the present case, we have no hesitation in assuming that when\n\n1~57\n\nManak Lal v.\n\nDr. Prem Clianct\n\nGajindr•gadkar J.\n\nMaria*. Lal\n\nDr. Prem Chand\n\nGajtndragadkilr ].\n\nShri Chhangani agreed to work as the Chairman of the tribunal, he did not remember that he had app.:arcd against the appellant's clients in the criminal proceedings under s. 145, We are told that Shri Chhrngani is a senior member of the Bar and was once Adl'ocatcGcneral of the High Court of Rajastlun.\n\nBesides he had not appeared in the case at all sta;:es but had appeared onlv once as a senior counsel to argue the matter. It is, therefore. not at all unlikely that Shri Chhangani had no personal contact with the client Dr. Prem Chand and mav not have been aware of the fact that, in the case from which the present proceedings arose, he had appeared at any stage f•.>r Dr. Prem Chand.\n\nWe arc, however, inclined to J, oJd that this fact does not in anv wav affect the legal argument urged before us by Shri Daphtary. It is 11ot\n\nShri Daphtary's case that Shri Chhangani actmlly had a bias against the appellant and that the said bias was responsible for the final report made against the appellant.\n\nIndeed it ts unnecesson for Shri Daphtary to advance such an argument.\n\nIf Shri Chhangani was disqualified from working as a member of the tribunal by reason of the fact that he , had appeared for Dr. Prem Chand in the criminal proceedings under s. 145 in question, then it would not be necessary for Shri Daphtary to prove that any prejuclice in fact had been caused or that Shri Chhangani improperly influenced the linal decision of the tribunal.\n\nActual proof of prejudice in such cases may make the appellant's case stronger but such proof is not necessary in order that the appellant should effectivelv\n\nraise the argument that the tribunal was not properly constituted.\n\nShri Umrigar, however, contended that unless prejudice is actually proved the cl1allenge to the validity of the constitution of the tribunal cannot he upheld and he sought to rely upon the decision in Rex v, Williams, Ex parte Phillips(') in support of this contention.\n\nIn this case the court was dealing with an application for' a writ of certiorari. A baker had been charged under .s. 4 of Bread Act of 18.36. It was\n\n(•) [•aqJ 1 K.n. 608.\n\nalleged .that he had sold bread otherwise than by weight and was liable to be convicted under s. 15 of the Ji.ct.\n\nIn fact he was so convicted.\n\nThereupon he obtained a 'rule nisi for a writ of certiorari to quash the conviction on the ground that one of the justices was a person concerned in the business of a baker.\n\nSection 15 disqualified persons concerned in the business of a baker to act as a justice in the trial of such cases.\n\nThis application for a writ was ultimate! y rejected by the Court. The decision of the Court, however, was based substantially on two grounds.\n\nChannel J., who delivered the principal judgment of the Court, observed that \"when objection to• a comiction is taken mere! y by a member of the public and not by a party more particularly aggrieved the granting of a certiorari is discretionary. Where the objection is by a party aggrieved, then, as a rule, a writ is issued ex debito justitiae. This position, however, is subject to the exception that a party aggrieved may by his conduct preclude himself from taking objection to the jurisdiction of an inferior Court.\" But it is significant that the second ground on which the ' judgment proceeded clearly indicates that the justice whose presence at the hearing was challenged under s. 15 of the Act by the petitioner did not apparently appear to fall within the mischief of s: 15 of the Act at all. \"I do not say\", observed Channel J., \"whether the facts shown would be enough to make him a person following or concerned in the business of a baker within the meaning of s. 15'.'. This conclusion was accepted by the two other learned judges.\n\nIt would thus appear that the decision in this case does not justify Shri Umrigar's contention that, even if the constitution of the tribunal is held to be defective or improper, the proceedings taken before the tribunal and the orders subsequently passed in pursuance of the report cannot be successfully challenged unless it is shown that the defective constitution of the tribunal had in fact led to the prejudice of the appellant. We would1 therefore, hold that Shri Daphtary is right when__ he contends that the constitution of the tribunal appointed by the Chief Ju•tic~ of the High Court ot\n\nManak Lal\n\nDr. Prem Chani\n\nGaj1ndragadkar J ..\n\ni957\n\nMano.k Lc.l\n\nDr. Prem Chand\n\nGajendra, t; o.dko.r ].\n\nRajasthan suffered from a serious infirmity in that Shri Chhangani, who had appeared for Dr. Preen Chand in the criminal proceedings in question, was appointed a member of the tribunal and in fact acted as its Chairman.\n\nThe next question which falls to be considered is whether it was open to the appellant to take this object; on for the first time before the High Court. In other words, has he or has he not waived his objection to tlie presence of Shri Chhangani in the tribunal' Shri Daphtary does not seriously contest the position that the objection could ha\\•e been effectively waived.\n\nThe alleged bias in a member of the tribunal does not render the proceedings invalid if it is shown that the objection against the presence of the member in question had not been taken by the party even though the party knew about the circumstances giving rise to the allegations about the alleged bias and was aware of his right to challenge the presence of the member in the tribunal.\n\nIt is true that waiver cannot always and in every case be inferred merely from the failure of the party to take. the objection. Waiver can be inferred only if ace! after it is shown that the party knew about the relevant facts and was aware of his right to nke the objection in question. As Sir John Romilly M. R. has observed in Vyvyan v. Vyvyan( 1 )\n\n\"waiver or acquiescence, like election, presupposes that the pcrrnn to be houncl is fully cognizant of his rights, and, that being o, he neglects to enforce them, or chooses one benefit instead of another, either, bur not both, of which he might claim\". If, in the present case, it appears that the appellant knew all the facts about the alleged disability of Shri Chhangani and was also aware that he could effectively reque,.t the learned Chief Justice to nominate some other member instead of Shri Chhangani and yet did not adopt that course, it may well be that he deliberately took a chance to obtain a report in his favour from the tribunal and when he came to know that the report had gone against him he thought bettrr .of his rights and raised this point before the High 01urt for the first\n\n(1) [1861] 30 Beav. 65, 74; :,4 E. R 813 1 81j.\n\n1957 -f-. time. In other words, though the point of law raised by Shri Daphtary against the competence of . the tribunal be sound, it is still necessary for us to consider v.\n\nDr:· Pi1m Chand whether the appellant was precluded from raising this point before the High Court by waiver or acquiescence.\n\nGajendrag.Jkar Jo From the record it is clear that the appellant never raised this point before the tribunal and the manner in which this point was raised by him even before the High Court is somewhat significant. The first ground of objection filed by the appellant against the tribunal's report was that Shri Chhangani had pecuniary and 'r personal interest in the complainant, Dr.\n\nPrem Chand. The learned fudges of the High Court have found that the allegations about the pecuniary interest of Shri Chhangani in the present proceedings are wholly unfounded and this finding has not been challenged before us by Shri Daphtary. The learned Judges of the High Court have also found that the objection was raised by .the appellant before them only to obtain an order fo1 a fresh enquiry and thus gain time. It may be conceded in favour of Shri Daphtary that the judgment of the High Court does not in terms find against the ' appellant on the ground of waiver though that no doubt appears to be the substance of their conclusion. We have, however, heard Shri Daphtary's case on the question of waiver and we have no hesitation in reaching the conclusion that the appellant waived his objection deliberately and cannot now be allowed to raise it. Shri Dapbtary does not contend that at the material time the appellant did not remember the fact that, . Shri\n\nChhangani had appeared for Dr. Prem Chand in the criminal proceedings.\n\nIndeed suth a plea cannot be raised by the appellant in view of the affidavit which the appellant sought to place before us in the present appeal.\n\nUnder this affidavit, the appellant's case appears to be that until be met his advocate Shri Murli Manohar for filing objections to the report of the tribunal, the appellant did not know that Shri Chhangani was ·\n\n\\\\'.~~\\\\~ di~(lu~\\\\fl.e.li from acting as a member of the\n\ntribunal. .. h is obvious that this ground necessarily implies that the appellant knew:; about the facts giving\n\nMonak Lal v.\n\nDr. Prnn Chand\n\nGoj1ndragadkar J.\n\nSL'PREME COURT REPORTS [1957]\n\nme to the alleged disqualification of Sliri Chhangani to act as a member of the tribunal. In substance, the contention is that thotigh the appellant knew that Shri Chhangani had appeared for Dr. Prem Chand in tbe criminal proceedings in question, he \\V:ls not aare that, in consequence. Shri Chhangani was disqualified to act as a member of the tribunol. It is this limited aspect of the matter which is pressed before us by Shri Daphtary. Shri Daphtary contends and no Joubt rigl1tly that if we are satisfied that the appellant did not know about the true legal position in this matter and his rights arising therefrom, his failure to challenge the appointment of Shri Chhangani on the tribunal would not raise an effective plea of waiver. However, in our opinion, it is very difficult to accept Shri Daphtary's argument that his client did not know the trne legal position or his rights until he met Shri Murli Manohar. No doubt the appellant is a junior at the Bar but e\\'en so he.: can cla.in1 ten years' standing at the Bar. Resides, he had the assistance of a lawyer in defending him in the present proceedings and it appears extremely difficult to assume that neither the appellant nor his lawyer knew that the presence of Shri Chhangani in the tribunal could be effectively challenged by them.\n\nWe are disposed to think that even a layman, not famibr with legal technicalities and equitable principles on which this doctrine of disability has been based, would have immediately apprehended that the lawyer who had appeared for Dr. Prem Chand was authorised to sit in judgment over the conduct of the appellant and that might cause embarassmcnt to the appellant and might lead to prejudice against him. From a purely common sense point of view of a layman, the position was patently awkward, and so, the argument that the appellant was not conscious of his legal rights in this matter appears to us to be an afterthought. Since the appellant was driven to adopt this untenable position before the High Court in seeking to raise this point for the first time at that stage, we are not surprised that the High Court took the view that the plea had been taken late in order to gain time and to secure a fresh enquiry in\n\nthe matter. Since we have no doubt that the appellant knew the material facts and must be deemed to have bcc11 conscious .of his legal rights in that i11attcr, 11is failure to take the present plea at the earlier stage of the proceedings creates an effective bar of waiver\n\nagainst him. It seems clear that the appellant wanted to take a chance to secure a favourable report from the tribunal which was constituted and when he found that he was confronted with an unfavourable report, he adopted the device of raising the present technical point.\n\nThen Shri Daphtary sought to challenge the main conclusion of the High Court that the appellant was guilty of professional misconduct on a preliminary ground. He contended that the High Court judgment shows that the iearnd Judges had considered some inadmissible evidence in the absence of the appellant\n\nand without giving him an opportunity to be heard on the said evi---."}}, {"text": "Lush", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17542, "end_char": 17546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lush J. who agreed with Lord Hewart C.J. likewise accepted the affidavit made on behalf of the justices but observed, \"that they have placed themselves in an impossible position by allowing the clerk in those circumstances to retire with them into their consultation room.\""}}, {"text": "Avary", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19044, "end_char": 19049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rejecting the argument that the decision of the justices had been influenw.l even remotely by the impropriety alleged, Avary J. stated that \"though the clerk to the justices and the justices did not know that his firm had acted for the applicant's wife, the necessary, or at least the reasonable, impres- , ion, on the mind of the applicant would be that justice was not done seeing that the solicitor for his wife was acting with the justices and advising them on the hearing of the summons which she had taken against him.\""}}, {"text": "Umrigar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19498, "end_char": 19505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has, however, been urged before us by Shri Umrigar, on behalf of the Advocate-General, that this principle should not be applied to the proceedings before the tribunal appointed under the Bar Councils Act."}}, {"text": "s. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20791, "end_char": 20797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chhrngani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20821, "end_char": 20830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Chhangani agreed to work as the Chairman of the tribunal, he did not remember that he had app.:arcd against the appellant's clients in the criminal proceedings under s. 145, We are told that Shri Chhrngani is a senior member of the Bar and was once Adl'ocatcGcneral of the High Court of Rajastlun.", "canonical_name": "Chhangani"}}, {"text": "s. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21872, "end_char": 21878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22381, "end_char": 22384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22688, "end_char": 22692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22841, "end_char": 22846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23067, "end_char": 23077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Channel", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23329, "end_char": 23336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Channel J., who delivered the principal judgment of the Court, observed that \"when objection to• a comiction is taken mere!"}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24016, "end_char": 24021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24304, "end_char": 24309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prem Chani", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24991, "end_char": 25001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We would1 therefore, hold that Shri Daphtary is right when he contends that the constitution of the tribunal appointed by the Chief Ju•tic~ of the High Court ot\n\nManak Lal\n\nDr. Prem Chani\n\nGaj1ndragadkar J ..\n\ni957\n\nMano.k Lc.l\n\nDr. Prem Chand\n\nGajendra, t; o.dko.r ].", "canonical_name": "Prem Chand\n\nGajendra"}}, {"text": "Gaj1ndragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25003, "end_char": 25017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We would1 therefore, hold that Shri Daphtary is right when he contends that the constitution of the tribunal appointed by the Chief Ju•tic~ of the High Court ot\n\nManak Lal\n\nDr. Prem Chani\n\nGaj1ndragadkar J ..\n\ni957\n\nMano.k Lc.l\n\nDr. Prem Chand\n\nGajendra, t; o.dko.r ].", "canonical_name": "GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ."}}, {"text": "Prem Chand\n\nGajendra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25047, "end_char": 25067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We would1 therefore, hold that Shri Daphtary is right when he contends that the constitution of the tribunal appointed by the Chief Ju•tic~ of the High Court ot\n\nManak Lal\n\nDr. Prem Chani\n\nGaj1ndragadkar J ..\n\ni957\n\nMano.k Lc.l\n\nDr. Prem Chand\n\nGajendra, t; o.dko.r ].", "canonical_name": "Prem Chand\n\nGajendra"}}, {"text": "Rajasthan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25084, "end_char": 25093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajasthan suffered from a serious infirmity in that Shri Chhangani, who had appeared for Dr. Preen Chand in the criminal proceedings in question, was appointed a member of the tribunal and in fact acted as its Chairman."}}, {"text": "Preen Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25177, "end_char": 25188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajasthan suffered from a serious infirmity in that Shri Chhangani, who had appeared for Dr. Preen Chand in the criminal proceedings in question, was appointed a member of the tribunal and in fact acted as its Chairman."}}, {"text": "John Romilly", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26362, "end_char": 26374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Sir John Romilly M. R. has observed in Vyvyan v. Vyvyan( 1 )\n\n\"waiver or acquiescence, like election, presupposes that the pcrrnn to be houncl is fully cognizant of his rights, and, that being o, he neglects to enforce them, or chooses one benefit instead of another, either, bur not both, of which he might claim\"."}}, {"text": "Gajendrag.Jkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27572, "end_char": 27586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gajendrag.", "canonical_name": "GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ."}}, {"text": "Dapbtary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28823, "end_char": 28831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Dapbtary does not contend that at the material time the appellant did not remember the fact that, .", "canonical_name": "Daphtary"}}, {"text": "Murli Manohar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29242, "end_char": 29255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under this affidavit, the appellant's case appears to be that until be met his advocate Shri Murli Manohar for filing objections to the report of the tribunal, the appellant did not know that Shri Chhangani was ·\n\n\\\\'.~~\\\\~ di~(lu~\\\\fl.e.li from acting as a member of the\n\ntribunal. ..", "canonical_name": "Murli Manohar"}}, {"text": "Goj1ndragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29565, "end_char": 29579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "h is obvious that this ground necessarily implies that the appellant knew:; about the facts giving\n\nMonak Lal v.\n\nDr. Prnn Chand\n\nGoj1ndragadkar J.\n\nSL'PREME COURT REPORTS [1957]\n\nme to the alleged disqualification of Sliri Chhangani to act as a member of the tribunal."}}, {"text": "Sliri Chhangani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29653, "end_char": 29668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "h is obvious that this ground necessarily implies that the appellant knew:; about the facts giving\n\nMonak Lal v.\n\nDr. Prnn Chand\n\nGoj1ndragadkar J.\n\nSL'PREME COURT REPORTS [1957]\n\nme to the alleged disqualification of Sliri Chhangani to act as a member of the tribunal."}}, {"text": "Murli Manohar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30522, "end_char": 30535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, in our opinion, it is very difficult to accept Shri Daphtary's argument that his client did not know the trne legal position or his rights until he met Shri Murli Manohar.", "canonical_name": "Murli Manohar"}}, {"text": "Court of the Sessions Judge, Pali", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 33013, "end_char": 33046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in the Court of the Sessions Judge, Pali, and the record of Case No."}}, {"text": "Sub-Divisional Magistrate, So)at.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 33107, "end_char": 33140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "134 of 1951 in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, So)at."}}, {"text": "Prem Chan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34065, "end_char": 34074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact, this argument has been characterised\n\n8-78 S. C. Indio/59\n\nManak Lal v.\n\nDr. Prem Chan-t C::; t-- Gqfr:ndragadkar J~\n\nI95i\n\nMOMk Lal\n\nDr. Prem Chand\n\nby the High Court as plausible but not sound.", "canonical_name": "Prem Chand\n\nGajendra"}}, {"text": "September 24, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34583, "end_char": 34601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This application had been made on September 24, 1951, and it requested ."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35947, "end_char": 35955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Loya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37905, "end_char": 37909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court has taken the view, and we think rightly, that the conduct of Shri Loya should also be examined as it is obvious that both Shri Loya and Shri Maghraj were interested in persuading the Sessions Judge to take the view that the fabrication of the order was due to a mistake committed by Shri Maghraj."}}, {"text": "September 6,\n\n195L", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38295, "end_char": 38313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order passed by the learned Sessions Judge on September 6,\n\n195L is clear beyond any doubt."}}, {"text": "P em Chand", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38624, "end_char": 38634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "How an order directing notice of the application to the opponent along with a copy of the application to be served on the opponent could ever have been construed to mean an order\n\n'95i\n\nManak lAl\n\nDr. P em Chand •-.- Ga1mdragadkar J.\n\nM\"\"\"k IAI\n\nDr. Prim Chand\n\ndirecting the issue of stay, it is impossible to understand."}}, {"text": "Prim Chand", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 38673, "end_char": 38683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "How an order directing notice of the application to the opponent along with a copy of the application to be served on the opponent could ever have been construed to mean an order\n\n'95i\n\nManak lAl\n\nDr. P em Chand •-.- Ga1mdragadkar J.\n\nM\"\"\"k IAI\n\nDr. Prim Chand\n\ndirecting the issue of stay, it is impossible to understand.", "canonical_name": "Prem Chand\n\nGajendra"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42524, "end_char": 42532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prem Chan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43116, "end_char": 43125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Unfortunatelv\n\n195;\n\nMano.k Lal v.\n\nDr. Prem Chand\n\nGajmdragadkar J.\n\nManak I.Al\n\nDr. Prem Chanas ].\n\ngranted as per this provision may be granted.\" An objection was also taken with regard to the description of the suit properties in the schedule.\n\nThis objection was however met by making the necessary amendment.\n\nOn December 20, 1949, the present appellant filed his written statement and, inter alia, took the objection that the suit was not maintainable against him, as the plaint disclosed no cause of action so far as he was concerned.\n\nA preliminary issue was then struck on January 19, 1950, which raised the question whether the suit as framed was tenable. against the appellant.\n\nWhen the trial of this issue began, an application was made on March 29, 1950, on behalf of the original plaintiff for permission to give further and better particulars of the claim made in the plaint, angislate conferred hv Art. 38l:i of tht Constitution had, 011 that date, come to an end.\n\n(3) Act No. X of 1954 is bad, as it purports to extend the life of Ordinance No. IX of 1949 after tht said Ordinancr had already become dead.\n\n(4) The impugned Ordinancr.- i~ bad as hcinr; repugnant to Art. 14 of the Comtitution ; and\n\n(5) The Ordinance also contravenes Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution in that it irriposes unreasonable restrictions on tht right of the petitioners to hold property.\n\nIn logical sequence, it is the third contention that should first be considered, because if Act No. X of 1954 is upheld, that must validate Ordinance No. IX of 1949 for the periods covered by the impugneJ notifications dated June 14, 1951, and June 20, 1953, and in that event, the first two contentions will not survive for determination.\n\nThe argument of the petitionerj in support of this contention is that even if either of the two notifications aforesaid is held to be bad, then the impugned Ordinance would have expired at least on June 21, 1953, if not earlier on June 21, 1951; and th3t 1 neither Act No. X of 1954 which came into force on\n\n;('57\n\nSardar lndtr Si11tft\n\nT'lte Stntt of\n\nRqiasth-:.n\n\nVmkatrama\n\nAyyar ].\n\nSmdur lnder Singh\n\nTlit StaU of\n\nRajasthan\n\nVtiikatarama\n\nA\"ar ].\n\nApril 17, 1954, nor e1en Ordinance No. III of 1954 which was promulgated on February 15, 1954, could give life to what was already dead.\n\nIt is conceded that a legislation might be retrospective ; hut it is contended that Act No. X of 1954 was not an independent legislation enacting a code of provisions which were to operate retroactively but an amendment of Ordinance No. IX of 1949, and as that Ordinance had expired by effiux of time on June 21, 1951, if the notifications dated June 14, 1951, and June 20, 1953, were bad, then there was, when Act No. X of 1954 was passed, no Ordinance in existence on which the amend ment could operate, and that it was therefore indfective.\n\nSome support for this _contention might be found in the observations of Kania C.J. in fati11dra Nath Gupta v. The Province of Bihar(1) at page 606, of Mahajan J. at pages 627628 and of Muliherjea J. at pages 643-644.\n\nThere is, however, no need to discuss the matter further, as we are of opinion that the petitioners must fail in their contentions on the first two questions.\n\nTaking the first question as to whether s. 3 of the Ordinance is had, in so far as it authorised the Rajpramukh to extend the life of the Act, the contention of the petitioners is that it is essentially a matter for legislative determination as to how long a statute should operate, that s. 3 having provided that the Ordinance should be in force for a period of two years, any extension of that period could only be made by the Legislature and not by an outside outhority, and that accordingly the power conferred by that section on the Rajpramukh to extend the period fixed therein is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.\n\nReliance is placed in support .of this contention on the decision in fatindra Nath Gupta v . .The Province of Bihar( 1). There, the question was as to the validity of a notification issued by the Government of Bihar on March 7; 1949, extending .the operation of the Bihar Maintenance of Publjc Order Act V of 1947 to Chota Nagpur Division arid the Santhal Parganas District with retrospective .effect from Mar.ch 16, 1948.\n\nSection\n\n(1) [I9f9] F.C.R. 595.\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME. COUllT REPORTS 613\n\n1 (3) of the Act had provided that it shall remain in force for a period of one year from its commencement, but that was subject to a proviso, which ran as follows :\n\n\"Provided that the Provincial Government may, by notification, on a resolution passed by the Bihar Legislative Assembly and agreed to by the Bihar Legislative Council, direct that this Act shall remain in force for a further period of one year with such modifications, if any, as may be prescribed in the notification.\" The notification in question was issued in exercise of the power conferred under this proviso, and it was held by the majority of the Court that the proviso was unconstitutional as it amounted to delegation of legislative authority, and that, therefore, the notification issued pursuant thereto was bad.\n\nThree of the learne1J(h\n\nThe State o/'\n\nRajasthan\n\nVmkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nSar.tor l11dtr Sinlh\n\nTht Stat1 of\n\nRojasl!zan\n\nV cnkatarnma\n\nAyyar J.\n\ndown in The Queen v. Burah (' ). The Act in a mandatory form stated that is shall be in force for one year only. + That being so, the power given in the proviso to reenact it for another year is legislative power and does not amount to conditional legislation.\"\n\nMukherjea J. was of the opinion that if the legislation was to take effect on the determination of some fact or condition by an extraneous authority, it would be conditional legislation, and that would be valid on the authority of the decision in The Queen v. Burah ('), but that it would not be valid if it was left to an outside authority \"to determine at some future \\date whether the Act should be extended for one year further with or without rnodificatio1h\". Faz! Ali J. took the\\ contrary view. He observed at page 646 :\n\n\"So far as the extension of the Act is concerr, ed, I am not prepared to hold that .it amounts to legislation or exercise of legisla1', e power.\n\nFrom the Act, it is clear that, though it was in the first instance to remain in force for a period of one year, the Legislature did contemplate that it might have to be extended for a further period of one year.\n\nHaving decided that it -.... might have to be extended, it left the matter of the extension to the discretion of the Provincial Government.\n\nIt 'eems to me that the Legislature having exercised its judgment as to the period for . which the- >- Act was or might have to remain in force, there was nothing wrong in its legislating conditionally and leavfing it to the discretion of the executive authority whether the Act should be extended for a further period of one year or • not. 1t would be taking a somewhat narrow view of the decision in Burah's case( 1) to hold that all that the Legislature can do when legislating conditionally, is to leave merely the time and the manner of carrying its legislation into effect to the discretion of the executive authority am] that it cannot\n\nleave any other matter to its discretion. • The extension of the Act for a further period of one year does not 'r-'-' amount to its re-enactment.\n\nIt merely amounts to a continuance of the Act for the maximum period contemplated by the 'Legislature when enacting it.\"\n\n(1) [1878] L.R. 5 I.A. 178 .\n\n• -+\n\n-~ '\n\nS.C.R.\n\n~ . '\n\n1957 , It will be noticed that the authoritY conferred on the Bihar Government by the , proviso to s. 3 was one iiot merely to extend the life of the Act as in the present case, but also to extend it with such modifications as • might be,.specified in the notification.\n\nIt is this latter clause that came in principally for attack in the judgments of the majority, and the decision that proviso\n\nSardar lnder Singh•\n\nas a whole was bad was based primarily on the view tl1at that clause was ultra vires. Ka1{ia C. J. no , doubt observed that the power to extend the operation of the .fl.ct was, even .apart from the power to modify it, a kgislati ve function.\n\nBut he also added that the power conferred by the proviso was a single one and that the power to extend the life of the Act could not be sevei\"- ed from the power to modify it.\n\nThe matter was made even 'more plain by Mukherjea J, in his judgment in State of Bombay v. Narothamdas fethabai ( 1 ).\n\nThere,. ' the Bombay High Court had held, relying on the decision in /atindra Natlz Gupta v.\n\nThe Protlince of Bihar( ')ar J.\n\n\" .\n\n,,~·if-.\n\nSmdar lnder Siu.h\n\nThr Stafr 1( R(ljasthan\n\nrenkatarama\n\n, l, yar J.\n\nway or not. It was conceded by the learmd Counsel appearing for the Province of Hihar that to authorise another body 10 modify a statute. amounts to investing that body with legislative powers.\n\nWhat the learned Counsel contended for was that rhe power of modification was severable from the power of extending the duration of the Statute and the invalidity of one part of the proviso should not affect its other part.\n\nTo this contention my answer was that the two provisions were inter-related in such manner in the statute that one could not be severed from the other.\" The decision in /11ti11dra Nath Gupta v.\n\nThe Province of Bihar ( 1) cannot therefore be regarded as a clear and direct pronouncement that a statutory provision authorising an outside authority to extend the life of a statute is per se bad.\n\nWe must now rdcr to the decision in In re Thi Delhi LattJs Act, 1912(\n\n2 ) wherein the law relating to delegated legislation was exhamtively reviewed by this Court.\n\nThat was a reference under Art. 143 of the Constitution stating a number of questions for the opinion of this Court.\n\nDue to considerable divergence of views expressed in the several judgments as to the limits of permissible delegation, no unanimity could be reached in the answers to the questions referred.\n\nBut it can be said of certain propositions of law t\\iat they had the support of the majority of the learned Judges, and one such proposition is that when an appropriate Legislature enacts a law and authorises an outside authority to bring it into force in such area or at such time as it may decide, that is conditi<>- nal and not delegated legislation, and that such legislation is valid.\n\nIn our opinion, s. 3 of the Ordinance in so far as it authorises the Rajpramukh to extend the life of the Act falls within the category of conditional legislation, and is, in consequence, intra vires.\n\nThe leading authority on the question is the decision of the Privy Council in T lze Queen v. Burah( • ).\n\nThere, the question was as to the validity of a notification issued by the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal\n\n(1) [1949] F.C.R. 595.\n\n(3) [1878] 5 I.A, 178.\n\non October 14, 1871, extending the provisions of Act No. XXII of 1869 , to :t territory known as the Jaintia and Khasi Hills in exercise of a power conferred by s. 9 of that Act, which was as follows : l\n\n\"The said Lieutenant-Governor may from time to time, by notification in the Calcutta Gazette extend mutatis mutandis all or any of the provisions contained in the other sections of this Act to the J aintia Hills, the Naga Hills, and to such portion of the Khasi Hills as for the time being forms part of British India.\"\n\nThe High Court had held by a majority that that section was ultra vires, as amounting to delegation m legislative authority.\n\nBut that decisi.on was reversed on appeal to the Privy Council, which held that it was conditional legislation, and was valid.\n\nLord Selborne stated the law thus :\n\n\"Their Lordshins agree that the Governor-General in Council could not, by any form of enactment, create in India, and arm with general legislative authoritir, a new legislative power, not created or authorised by the Councils' Act.\n\nNothing of that kind has, in their Lordships' opinion, been done or attempted in the present case.\n\nWhat has been done is this. .The Governor-General in Council has determined, in. the dt!-: and ordinary course of legislation, to remove a particular district from the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts and offices, and to place it under new Courts and offices, to be appointed by and responsible to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal ; leaving it to the Lieutenant-Governor to say at what time that change shall take place .......... The Legislature determined that, so far, a certain change should take place ; but that it was expedient to leave the time, and the manner, of carrying it into effect to the discretion of the Lieutenant-Governor ...... The proper Legislature has exercised its judgment as to place, person, laws, powers ; and the result of that judgment has been to legislate conditionally as to all these things.\n\nThe conditions having been fulfilled, the legislation is 11ow. absolute.\n\nWhere plenary powers of . legislation exist as to particular sbjects, whether in an Imperial or in a provincial Legislature, they may (in\n\nSardar lnder Singh v.\n\nThe State oj\n\nRqjasthan\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar ].\n\n'957\n\nSardar !tu/er Sinth\n\nI he State of\n\nRajastha~\n\nin1katarama\n\n.. {1:.rar J.\n\ntheir Lordships' judgment) be well exercised, either absolutely or conditionally.\n\nLegislation, conditional on the use of particular powers, or on the exercise of a limited discretion, entrusted by the Legislature to persons in whotn it places confi.Oence, is no uncon11non thing; and, in many circumstances, it may be highly convenient. The British Statute Book abounds with examples of it ; and it cannot be supposed that the imperial Parliament did not, when con, tituting the Indian Legislature, contemplate this kind of conditional legislation .ts within the scope of the legislative powers which it from time to time conferred.\"\n\nThis is clear authority that a provision in a statute conferring a power on an outside authority to bring it into force at such time as it might, in its own discretion, determine, is conditional and not delegated legislation, and that it will be valid, unless there is in the Comtitution Act any limitation on its power to enact such a legislation.\n\nThe petitioners do not dispute this.\n\nWhat they contend is that while it may be competent to the Legislature to leave it to an outside authority to decide when an enactment might be brought into force, it is not competent to it to authorise that authority to extend the life of the Act beyond the period fixed therein.\n\nOn principle, it is difficult to see wlty if the one is competent, the other is not.\n\nThe reason for upholding a legislative prov1S1on authorising an outside authority to bring an Act into force at such time as it may determine is that it must depend on the facts as they may exist at a given point of time whether the law should . then be made to operate, anJ that the decision of such an issue is best left to an executive authority.\n\nSuch legislation is termed conditional, because the Legislature has itself made the law in all its completeness as regards \"place, person, laws, powers\", leaving nothing for an outside authority to legislate on, the only function assigned to it being to bring the law into operation at such time as it might decide.\n\nAnd it can make no difference in the character of a legislation as a conditional one that the legislature, after itsdf enacting the law and fixing, on a consideration\n\nof the facts as they might have then existed, the period of its duration, confers a power on an outside authority to extend its operation for a further period if it is satisfied that the state of facts which called forth the legislation continues to subsist.\n\nIn the present case, the preamble to the Ordinance\n\nclerly recites the state of facts which necessitated the enactment of the law in question, and s. 3 fixed the duration of the Act as two years, on an une with the statement of the law in /atindra Nath Gupta v.\n\nThe State . of Bihar(2) that a power to extend the life of an epactment. cannot validly be conferred on an outside authority.\n\nIn this view, the question as to the permissible limits of delegation of legislative authority on which the judgments in In re The Delhi Laws .Act, 1912(3 ), reveal a sharp conflict of opinion does not arise for consideration, anJ we reserve, our .. opii1ion thereon ..\n\n(2) lt is next contended that the notification dated June 20, 1953, is bad, because after the Constitmioi1 came into force, the Rajpramukh derived his authority to legislate from Art. 385, and that under that Article his authority ceased when the Legislature of the State was constituted, which was in the present case, on March ?), 1952.\n\nThis argument proceeds on a misconception. :as to the true character of a notifi-· cation issued unt.ler s. 3 of the Ordinance.\n\nIt was not an independent piece of legislation such as could be enacted on I y by the then competent legislative\n\n(1) (1878] 5 L:\\. 178.\n\n(3J (1951] S.C, R: 747\n\n(o) [19.[9] F.C.R. 595.\n\nSardar lnder Sing•1\n\nThe Stale of\n\nRajasthar1\n\nVn1kntarmna\n\nJ!yyar ].\n\nSardar lnder Singh\n\nT lu Stat~ of\n\nRqjasthafl\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nauthority of the State, but merely an exercise of a power conferred by a statute which had been previously ena\\:ted by the appropriate. legislative authority.\n\nThe exercise of such a power is referable not to the legislative competence of the Rajpramukh but to Ordinance No. IX of 1949, and provided s. 3 is valid, the validity of the notification is co-extensive with that of the Ordinance.\n\nIf the Ordinance did not come to an end by reason of the fact that the authority of the Rajpramukh to legislate came to an end-and that is not and cannot be disputed-neither did the power to issue a notification which is conferred therein.\n\nThe true position is that it is in his character as the authority on whom power was conferred under s. 3 of the Ordinance that the Rajpramukh issued the impugned notification, and not as the legislative authority of the\n\nSate.\n\nThis objection should accordingly be overruled. ( 4) We shall next consider the contention that the provisions of the Ordinance are repugnant to Art. 14 of the Constitution, and that it must therefore be held to have become void.\n\nIn the argument before us, the attack was mainly directed against ss. 7 ( 1) and 15 of the Ordinance. The contention with reference to s. 7(1) is that under that section landlords who had tenants on thejr lands on April 1, 1948, were subjected to various restnct10ns in the enjoyment of their rights as owners, while other landlords were free from similar restnct10ns.\n\nThere is no substance in this contention.\n\nThe preamble to the Ordinance recites that there was\n\n:i. growing tendency on the part of the landholders to eject tenants, and that it was therefore expedient to enact a law for giving them protection ; and for granting relief to them, the Legislature had necessarily to decide from what date the law should be given operation, and it decided that it should be from April 1, 1948.\n\nThat is a matter exclusively for the Legislature to determine, and the propriety of that determination is not open to que; tion in Courts.\n\nWe should add that the petitioners sought to dispute the correctness of the recitals in the preambk.\n\nThis they clearly cannot do.\n\nVide the observations of Holmes J. in Block v. Hirsh(').\n\n(1) [1Q20] 256 U.S. 135 : 65 L. Ed. 865.\n\nA more substantial contention is the one based on s. 15, which authorises' the Government to exempt any person or class of persons from the operation of the Aa. It is argued that that section does not Jay down the principles on which exemption could be granted, and that the decision of the matter is left to the unfettered and uncanalised discretion of the Government, and is therefore repugnant to Art. 14.\n\nIt is true that that section does not itself indicate the grounds on which exemption could be granted, but the preamble to the Ordinance sets out with sufficient clearnes& the policy of the Legislature ; and as that governs s. 15 of the Ordinance, the decision of the Government thereunder cannot be said to be unguided.\n\nVide Harishanker Bag/a v. The State of Madhya Pradesh(1).\n\nBut even if s. 15 were to be held to be bad, that does not affec:t the rest of the legislation, as the matter dealt with in that section is clearly severable.\n\nIn fact, s. 15 was not in the Ordinance as it was originally enacted, and was only introduced later by Ordinance No. XII of 1949.\n\nWe must accordingly' hold that the impugned Ordinance cannot be held to be bad under Art. 14.\n\nIt is finally contnded that .the provisions of the Act are repugnant to Art. 19 (1) (f) in that they oblige the land-owners to kel\"p tenants. on their lands, thereby preventing them from themselves cultivating the same.\n\nThe object of the .Ordinance, as set out in the preamble, is clearly not to put a restriction on the right of an owner to himself cultivate the lands, but to prevent him when he had inducted a tenant on , the land from getting rid of him without sufficient cause.\n\nA law which requires that an owner who is not himself a tiller of the soil should assure to the actual tiller some fixity of tenure, cannot on that ground alone be said to b~ unreasonable.\n\nLegislation of this character has been upheld in America as not infringing any Constitutional guarantee. Thus, in Block v. Hirsh(2 ), a statute which gave a right to tenants to continue in poss.ession eYen after the expiry of the lease, was held to he valid, Holmes J. observing,\n\n(1) (1955] 1 S.C.R. 380, 388. (2) [1920] 256 U.S. 135; 65 L. Ed. 865.\n\n1957 •• Sardar lnhr Singh\n\nThe State of Rajasthan\n\nVenkataramd\n\nAyyar J.\n\nSardar Inder Singh\n\nThe State af Rajasthan\n\nVenkawrama\n\nAyya~J-\n\n\"The main point against the law is that tenants are allowed to remain in possession at the same rent that they have been paying, unless modified by the commission established by the Act, and that thus the use of the land and the right of the owner to do what he will with his own and to make what contracts he pleases are cut 1J(h\n\nThe State o/'\n\nRajasthan\n\nVmkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nSar.tor l11dtr Sinlh\n\nTht Stat1 of\n\nRojasl!zan\n\nV cnkatarnma\n\nAyyar J.\n\ndown in The Queen v. Burah (' )."}}, {"text": "Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20178, "end_char": 20183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahajan J. dealing with this question observed al page 623:\n\n\"I am further of the opinion that the power given to extend the life of the Act for another year in the context of the langmge of s. 1(3) also amounts ta .an act of legislation and does not fall under the rule laid\n\nSardar lnder Si>1J(h\n\nThe State o/'\n\nRajasthan\n\nVmkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nSar.tor l11dtr Sinlh\n\nTht Stat1 of\n\nRojasl!zan\n\nV cnkatarnma\n\nAyyar J.\n\ndown in The Queen v. Burah (' )."}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20523, "end_char": 20532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea J. was of the opinion that if the legislation was to take effect on the determination of some fact or condition by an extraneous authority, it would be conditional legislation, and that would be valid on the authority of the decision in The Queen v. Burah ('), but that it would not be valid if it was left to an outside authority \"to determine at some future \\date whether the Act should be extended for one year further with or without rnodificatio1h\".", "canonical_name": "Muliherjea"}}, {"text": "Faz! Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20988, "end_char": 20996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Faz!"}}, {"text": "Burah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21955, "end_char": 21960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1t would be taking a somewhat narrow view of the decision in Burah's case( 1) to hold that all that the Legislature can do when legislating conditionally, is to leave merely the time and the manner of carrying its legislation into effect to the discretion of the executive authority am] that it cannot\n\nleave any other matter to its discretion. •"}}, {"text": "L.R. 5 I.A. 178", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 22477, "end_char": 22492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bihar Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22585, "end_char": 22601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1957 , It will be noticed that the authoritY conferred on the Bihar Government by the , proviso to s. 3 was one iiot merely to extend the life of the Act as in the present case, but also to extend it with such modifications as • might be,.specified in the notification."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22622, "end_char": 22626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23496, "end_char": 23513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Bombay High Court had held, relying on the decision in /atindra Natlz Gupta v.\n\nThe Protlince of Bihar( ')ar J.\n\n\" .", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nRqjasthan"}}, {"text": "must now rdcr to the decision in In re Thi Delhi LattJs Act, 1912", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25776, "end_char": 25841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 143", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25966, "end_char": 25974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We must now rdcr to the decision in In re Thi Delhi LattJs Act, 1912", "statute": "We must now rdcr to the decision in In re Thi Delhi LattJs Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26656, "end_char": 26660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We must now rdcr to the decision in In re Thi Delhi LattJs Act, 1912", "statute": "We must now rdcr to the decision in In re Thi Delhi LattJs Act, 1912"}}, {"text": "[1949] F.C.R. 595", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 27058, "end_char": 27075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "October 14, 1871", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27105, "end_char": 27121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on October 14, 1871, extending the provisions of Act No."}}, {"text": "Khasi Hills", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27215, "end_char": 27226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XXII of 1869 , to :t territory known as the Jaintia and Khasi Hills in exercise of a power conferred by s. 9 of that Act, which was as follows : l\n\n\"The said Lieutenant-Governor may from time to time, by notification in the Calcutta Gazette extend mutatis mutandis all or any of the provisions contained in the other sections of this Act to the J aintia Hills, the Naga Hills, and to such portion of the Khasi Hills as for the time being forms part of British India.\""}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27263, "end_char": 27267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "J aintia Hills", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27504, "end_char": 27518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XXII of 1869 , to :t territory known as the Jaintia and Khasi Hills in exercise of a power conferred by s. 9 of that Act, which was as follows : l\n\n\"The said Lieutenant-Governor may from time to time, by notification in the Calcutta Gazette extend mutatis mutandis all or any of the provisions contained in the other sections of this Act to the J aintia Hills, the Naga Hills, and to such portion of the Khasi Hills as for the time being forms part of British India.\""}}, {"text": "Naga Hills", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27524, "end_char": 27534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XXII of 1869 , to :t territory known as the Jaintia and Khasi Hills in exercise of a power conferred by s. 9 of that Act, which was as follows : l\n\n\"The said Lieutenant-Governor may from time to time, by notification in the Calcutta Gazette extend mutatis mutandis all or any of the provisions contained in the other sections of this Act to the J aintia Hills, the Naga Hills, and to such portion of the Khasi Hills as for the time being forms part of British India.\""}}, {"text": "Selborne", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27887, "end_char": 27895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Selborne stated the law thus :\n\n\"Their Lordshins agree that the Governor-General in Council could not, by any form of enactment, create in India, and arm with general legislative authoritir, a new legislative power, not created or authorised by the Councils' Act."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28026, "end_char": 28031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Selborne stated the law thus :\n\n\"Their Lordshins agree that the Governor-General in Council could not, by any form of enactment, create in India, and arm with general legislative authoritir, a new legislative power, not created or authorised by the Councils' Act."}}, {"text": "Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28580, "end_char": 28586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the dt!-: and ordinary course of legislation, to remove a particular district from the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts and offices, and to place it under new Courts and offices, to be appointed by and responsible to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal ; leaving it to the Lieutenant-Governor to say at what time that change shall take place .......... The Legislature determined that, so far, a certain change should take place ; but that it was expedient to leave the time, and the manner, of carrying it into effect to the discretion of the Lieutenant-Governor ...... The proper Legislature has exercised its judgment as to place, person, laws, powers ; and the result of that judgment has been to legislate conditionally as to all these things."}}, {"text": "State of\n\nRajastha~", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29400, "end_char": 29419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tu/er Sinth\n\nI he State of\n\nRajastha~\n\nin1katarama\n\n.. {1:.rar J.\n\ntheir Lordships' judgment) be well exercised, either absolutely or conditionally.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nRqjasthan"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32084, "end_char": 32088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 385", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33370, "end_char": 33378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33636, "end_char": 33640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sardar lnder Sing•1", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33847, "end_char": 33866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sardar lnder Sing•1\n\nThe Stale of\n\nRajasthar1\n\nVn1kntarmna\n\nJ!yyar ].", "canonical_name": "Sardar lnder Sing•1"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34288, "end_char": 34292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34722, "end_char": 34726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34995, "end_char": 35002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "ss. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35147, "end_char": 35152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35216, "end_char": 35223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 1, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35295, "end_char": 35308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contention with reference to s. 7(1) is that under that section landlords who had tenants on thejr lands on April 1, 1948, were subjected to various restnct10ns in the enjoyment of their rights as owners, while other landlords were free from similar restnct10ns."}}, {"text": "Holmes", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36174, "end_char": 36180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vide the observations of Holmes J. in Block v. Hirsh(')."}}, {"text": "S. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36224, "end_char": 36230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36299, "end_char": 36304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36649, "end_char": 36656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36883, "end_char": 36888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37052, "end_char": 37057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37209, "end_char": 37214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37416, "end_char": 37423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37498, "end_char": 37505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 38151, "end_char": 38158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Legislation of this character has been upheld in America as not infringing any Constitutional guarantee."}}, {"text": "(1955] 1 S.C.R. 380", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 38387, "end_char": 38406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 135", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38430, "end_char": 38436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Rajasthan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 38485, "end_char": 38503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1957 •• Sardar lnhr Singh\n\nThe State of Rajasthan\n\nVenkataramd\n\nAyyar J.\n\nSardar Inder Singh\n\nThe State af Rajasthan\n\nVenkawrama\n\nAyya~J-\n\n\"The main point against the law is that tenants are allowed to remain in possession at the same rent that they have been paying, unless modified by the commission established by the Act, and that thus the use of the land and the right of the owner to do what he will with his own and to make what contracts he pleases are cut .\n\nA first information report is not a substantive piece of evidence and can onlv be used to corroborate the statement of the maker under s. 157 ~£ the Evidence Act or ID contradict it under s. 145 of that Act.\n\nIt cannot be used as evidence against the maker at the trial if he himself becomes an accused, nor to corroborate or contradict other witnesses.\n\nIt is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the innocence of an accused person is presumed till otherwise proved.\n\nIt is the duty of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused subject to any statutory exception. The maim falsus in uno, falms in omnibus has not received general acceptance in different jurisdictions in India, nor has it come to occupy the status of a rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution.\n\nAll that it amounts to is tha~ in such cases the testimony may be disregarded and not that it must be disregarded.\n\nThe doctrine merely invoh-es the question of weight of evidence which a court may apply in a given set of circumstances but it is not a mandatory rule of e, idencc.\n\nCtttMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE JultlsDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 150 of 1956.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and order dated October 18, 1955, of the Allahabad High Court in Government Appeal No. 60•of 1953 arising out of the judgment and order dated July 8, 1952, of the Court of Sessions Judge at Bareilly in Criminal.\n\nSessions Trial No. 27 of 1952.\n\nDaul•t Ram Prem and P. C. Agarwa/a, for the appellant. 5-79 S. C. India/59\n\nBaij Nath Prasad\n\nTripalhi v.\n\nTht State of Bhopal\n\nS. ti. Dass J.\n\nF1bruary 14.", "total_entities": 116, "entities": [{"text": "BAIJ NATH PRASAD TRIPATHI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 48, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAIJ NATH PRASAD TRIPATHI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF BHOPAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 50, "end_char": 69, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF BHOPAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 120, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 153, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 244, "end_char": 250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 266, "end_char": 276, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 281, "end_char": 285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 293, "end_char": 321, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 434, "end_char": 455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 459, "end_char": 466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 471, "end_char": 497, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 403", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 499, "end_char": 505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 582, "end_char": 588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 596, "end_char": 613, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 618, "end_char": 622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 630, "end_char": 658, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 951, "end_char": 958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 970, "end_char": 991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 999, "end_char": 1004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1014, "end_char": 1040, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1080, "end_char": 1087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 403(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1446, "end_char": 1455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Yusofalli Mui", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1529, "end_char": 1542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yusofalli Mui/a v. The King, A.LR. ("}}, {"text": "(1945) F.C.R. 93", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1617, "end_char": 1633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1836, "end_char": 1846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1854, "end_char": 1875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "B. D. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1920, "end_char": 1932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. D. Sharma, for the petitioners,\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, Porus: A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1956, "end_char": 1970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. D. Sharma, for the petitioners,\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, Porus: A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2007, "end_char": 2015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. D. Sharma, for the petitioners,\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, Porus: A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2020, "end_char": 2032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. D. Sharma, for the petitioners,\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, Porus: A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Baij Nath Prasad Tripathi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2433, "end_char": 2458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Baij Nath Prasad Tripathi, petitioner in Petition No.", "canonical_name": "BAIJ NATH PRASAD TRIPATHI"}}, {"text": "Bhopal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2551, "end_char": 2557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "115 of 1956, was a Sub-Inspector of Police in the then State of Bhopal."}}, {"text": "B. K. Puranik", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2599, "end_char": 2612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was prosecuted in the Court of Shri B. K. Puranik, Special Judge, Bhopal, and convicted of offences under s. 161, Indian Penal Code, and s. 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947."}}, {"text": "s. 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2669, "end_char": 2675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2677, "end_char": 2694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2700, "end_char": 2704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2712, "end_char": 2746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "March 7, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2973, "end_char": 2986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judicial Commissioner held by his judgment dated March 7, 1956, that no sanction according to law had been given for the prosecution of the petitioner and the Special Judge had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case ;, the trial was accordingly ab initia invalid and liable to be quashed."}}, {"text": "April 4, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3468, "end_char": 3481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 4, 1956, the Chief Commissioner of Bhopal passed an order under s. 7(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952, (No."}}, {"text": "s. 7(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3538, "end_char": 3545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3553, "end_char": 3585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. N. Shrivastava", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3651, "end_char": 3668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XL VI of\n\n1952) that the petitioner shall be tried by Shri S. N. Shrivastava, Special Judge, Bhopal, for certain offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act read with s. 161, Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3724, "end_char": 3752, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3763, "end_char": 3769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952", "statute": "the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3771, "end_char": 3788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "April 1, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3916, "end_char": 3929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of the petitioner is that he cannot be prosecuted and tried again for the same offences under the aforesaid order of April 1, 1956."}}, {"text": "Sudhakar Dube", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3932, "end_char": 3945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sudhakar Dube, petitioner in Petition No."}}, {"text": "S. K. Dar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4193, "end_char": 4202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was also prosecuted in the Court of Shri B. K. Puranik, Special Judge, Bhopal, on a\n\nBdij }{ ath Prasad\n\nTripa; hi\n\n\"· The Stale of Bhoal\n\nS. K. Dar].", "canonical_name": "S. K. Dar"}}, {"text": "Panna Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4358, "end_char": 4367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "charge of having accepted illegal gratification for showing official favour to one Panna Lal."}}, {"text": "February\n\n7. 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4803, "end_char": 4820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February\n\n7."}}, {"text": "s. 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4951, "end_char": 4957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4959, "end_char": 4976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4983, "end_char": 4987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4995, "end_char": 5023, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5284, "end_char": 5291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 403", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5316, "end_char": 5322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5330, "end_char": 5356, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5516, "end_char": 5525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5533, "end_char": 5565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5927, "end_char": 5938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952", "statute": "the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "section 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5940, "end_char": 5951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952", "statute": "the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "section 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5956, "end_char": 5967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952", "statute": "the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5977, "end_char": 5994, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6036, "end_char": 6045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952", "statute": "the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Corruption Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6068, "end_char": 6088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6245, "end_char": 6249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6329, "end_char": 6361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6445, "end_char": 6454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6630, "end_char": 6634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6673, "end_char": 6705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "is not necessary for our purpose to read the other sections of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6741, "end_char": 6840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "then go to the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6846, "end_char": 6895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6897, "end_char": 6906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We then go to the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "We then go to the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7048, "end_char": 7059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We then go to the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "We then go to the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7063, "end_char": 7074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We then go to the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "We then go to the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7082, "end_char": 7099, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7128, "end_char": 7137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We then go to the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "We then go to the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7402, "end_char": 7420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under section 161 or section 165 of the Indian Penal Code or under sub-section (2) of section 5 of this Act, alleged to have been committed by a public servant exce; it with the previous sanction,- ( a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government ........ , [of the] Central Government ;\n\n(b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of [a State] and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government. ............. , ["}}, {"text": "Art. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8289, "end_char": 8296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bisij Nath Priullli", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8360, "end_char": 8379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "20 of the Constitution, on which the petitioners rel v, states :\n\nBisij Nath Priullli\n\nTriJiatlti\n\nTiii Stat."}}, {"text": "S. K.Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8417, "end_char": 8425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of BllOpiil\n\nS. K.Das].", "canonical_name": "S. K. Dar"}}, {"text": "S. K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8479, "end_char": 8488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Baij Nat.~ Prasad\n\nTripa1hi\n\nThe Stale af B!wpal\n\nS. K. Das].", "canonical_name": "S. K. Dar"}}, {"text": "Section 403", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8575, "end_char": 8586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8598, "end_char": 8624, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 236", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9102, "end_char": 9113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 237", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9163, "end_char": 9174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October 3, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9646, "end_char": 9661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Privy Council decision is in Yusofalli Mulla v. The King('); the Federal Court decision in Basdeo Agarwal/a v. King-Emperor( ) ; and the decision of this Court (not yet reported) was given in Bud ha Mal v. State of Del.i ( ') on October 3, 1952."}}, {"text": "s. 403", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9759, "end_char": 9765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 403", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10356, "end_char": 10367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10369, "end_char": 10392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1945] F.C.R. 93", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10541, "end_char": 10557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11546, "end_char": 11553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 403", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11783, "end_char": 11789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11791, "end_char": 11817, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 403", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12016, "end_char": 12022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 190, 191, 192, 529 and 530", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12163, "end_char": 12193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12201, "end_char": 12227, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12727, "end_char": 12761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Baij Nath Prasad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12865, "end_char": 12881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If no Court can take cognizance of the offence~ in question without a legal sanction, it is obvious\n\nBaij Nath Prasad\n\nTri, athi\n\nThe Stal• of Bhopal\n\nS. K. Das] ..\n\nB1aij }( alh Pr a rod\n\nTri; tJthi\n\nT lw St•ll of Bhopal\n\nS. Ir.", "canonical_name": "BAIJ NATH PRASAD TRIPATHI"}}, {"text": "S. K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12915, "end_char": 12924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If no Court can take cognizance of the offence~ in question without a legal sanction, it is obvious\n\nBaij Nath Prasad\n\nTri, athi\n\nThe Stal• of Bhopal\n\nS. K. Das] ..\n\nB1aij }( alh Pr a rod\n\nTri; tJthi\n\nT lw St•ll of Bhopal\n\nS. Ir.", "canonical_name": "S. K. Dar"}}, {"text": "Section 530", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13287, "end_char": 13298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Section 529", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13509, "end_char": 13520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 190", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13604, "end_char": 13610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Braund", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13860, "end_char": 13866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As part of his arguments, learned counsel for the petitioners referred to certain observations made by Braund J. in a decision of the Allahabad High Courr, Basdeo v. Emperor ( 1 ), where the learned Judge drew a distinction between 'taking cognizance' and 'jurisdiction'."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Courr, Basdeo v. Emperor", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13891, "end_char": 13930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As part of his arguments, learned counsel for the petitioners referred to certain observations made by Braund J. in a decision of the Allahabad High Courr, Basdeo v. Emperor ( 1 ), where the learned Judge drew a distinction between 'taking cognizance' and 'jurisdiction'."}}, {"text": "s. 254", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14224, "end_char": 14230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14238, "end_char": 14264, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14563, "end_char": 14567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14575, "end_char": 14603, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "NISAR ALI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15359, "end_char": 15368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NISAR ALI v.\n\nTHE ST ATE OF JJTT AR PRADESH (BHAGWATI, B. P. SINHA and J. L. KAPUR\n\nFirst information repo1t-Repon made by accused-Use of- Burden of proof in criminal , ases-Witness disbelieved as to part of his testimony...:... Whether should be 1ejected in tote>."}}, {"text": "J. L. KAPUR", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15430, "end_char": 15441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NISAR ALI v.\n\nTHE ST ATE OF JJTT AR PRADESH (BHAGWATI, B. P. SINHA and J. L. KAPUR\n\nFirst information repo1t-Repon made by accused-Use of- Burden of proof in criminal , ases-Witness disbelieved as to part of his testimony...:... Whether should be 1ejected in tote>."}}, {"text": "s. 157", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15761, "end_char": 15767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15814, "end_char": 15820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16321, "end_char": 16326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The maim falsus in uno, falms in omnibus has not received general acceptance in different jurisdictions in India, nor has it come to occupy the status of a rule of law."}}, {"text": "Ram Prem", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17063, "end_char": 17071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Daul•t Ram Prem and P. C. Agarwa/a, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. C. Agarwa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17076, "end_char": 17088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Daul•t Ram Prem and P. C. Agarwa/a, for the appellant."}}]} {"document_id": "1957_1_657_663_EN", "year": 1957, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 657\n\nbefore, the point is really concluded by decisions of the highest tribunal, decisions which correctly lay down the law.\n\nThe result therefore is that these petitions are devoitl of all merit and must be dismissed.\n\nPetitions dismissed.\n\nNISAR ALI v.\n\nTHE ST ATE OF JJTT AR PRADESH (BHAGWATI, B. P. SINHA and J. L. KAPUR\n\nFirst information repo1t-Repon made by accused-Use of- Burden of proof in criminal , ases-Witness disbelieved as to part of his testimony...:... Whether should be 1ejected in tote>.\n\nA first information report is not a substantive piece of evidence and can onlv be used to corroborate the statement of the maker under s. 157 ~£ the Evidence Act or ID contradict it under s. 145 of that Act.\n\nIt cannot be used as evidence against the maker at the trial if he himself becomes an accused, nor to corroborate or contradict other witnesses.\n\nIt is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the innocence of an accused person is presumed till otherwise proved.\n\nIt is the duty of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused subject to any statutory exception. The maim falsus in uno, falms in omnibus has not received general acceptance in different jurisdictions in India, nor has it come to occupy the status of a rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution.\n\nAll that it amounts to is tha~ in such cases the testimony may be disregarded and not that it must be disregarded.\n\nThe doctrine merely invoh-es the question of weight of evidence which a court may apply in a given set of circumstances but it is not a mandatory rule of e, idencc.\n\nCtttMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE JultlsDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 150 of 1956.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the Judgment and order dated October 18, 1955, of the Allahabad High Court in Government Appeal No. 60•of 1953 arising out of the judgment and order dated July 8, 1952, of the Court of Sessions Judge at Bareilly in Criminal.\n\nSessions Trial No. 27 of 1952.\n\nDaul•t Ram Prem and P. C. Agarwa/a, for the appellant. 5-79 S. C. India/59\n\nBaij Nath Prasad\n\nTripalhi v.\n\nTht State of Bhopal\n\nS. ti. Dass J.\n\nF1bruary 14.\n\nNii\"ar Ali v Tiu Sl6teof Uttar Pradsh\n\nKa;.r J.\n\nCyan Clzand Mathur and C. P. Lal, for the respondtnt.\n\n1957. February 14.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKAPUR /.-The appellant along with one Qudrat Ullah was tried for the murder on one Sabir.\n\nThe latter was tried under s. 302 read with s. 114 of the Indian Penal Code for ahetment, and the former under s. 302 I.P .C.\n\nBoth the accused were acquitted by the learned Sessions Judge of Bareilly. But the State took an appeal to the Allahabad High Court against the appellant only and the judgment of acquittal in his case was reversed and he was convicted under s. 302 l.P.C. and sentenced to 'transportation for life'.\n\nAgainst the judgment of the High Court the appellant has brought this appeal hy Special Leave.\n\nThe facts which have given rise to the appeal arc that Sabir was murdered on the 11th May, 1951, at about 6-30 p.m.\n\nThe First Information Report was made by Qudrat Ullah the other accused at 6-45 p.m. the same day, i.e., within about 15 minutes of the occurrence.\n\nThe pcosccution case was shat there was an exchange of abuses between the deceased and the appellant near the shop of the First Informant, Qudrat Ullah.\n\nThe cause of the quarrei was that on the evening of the occurrence while Qudrat Ullah was sitting in his shop and the deceased was sitting just' below the shop, the appellant came out of his 'house anse injuries could be caused with a sharp-edged weapon.\n\nThe appellarn and the deceased both belong to a sect of Jogis.\n\nEvidence discloses that the deceased and the appellant were quite friendly with each other, and so were the deceased and Qudrat Ullah, who is a butcher and had a shop which is a part of his house.\n\nAdjacent to the shop is the house of the appellant. Eye witnesses of the occurrence were Yad Ali, P.W. 1, Banne, P.W. 2 and Mohd. Ahmed, P.W. 3.\n\nHaving been told by the sister of the deceased as to the occurrence, Ashraft, P.W. 4 came to the spot later and found the deceased lying unconscious.\n\nShakir, P.W. 5, younger brother of the deceased, on arriving near the shop of Qudrat\n\nUllah heard the appellant and the deceased exchanging abuses, but was not a witness of the assault as just at that time he had gone, at the reque.::t of Qudrat Ullah, to fill his Chillum for the hookka and when he came back he found the deceased lying unconscious and the appellant running away towards his house.\n\nThe evidence of Yad Ali, P. W. 1, is that he heard an exchange of abuses between the deceased and the -appellant and when he moved about 4 or 5 paces he\n\n.Nisar Ali\n\nT 1\" State •f\n\nUttar Praduh\n\nKapur J.\n\nNisar Ali v.\n\nTiu State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nKapur].\n\nsaw them grappling with each other.\n\nThe appellant had the deceased \"in his grip\", he asked Qudrat Ullah to hand over a knife to him which the latter did and with it the appellant stabbed the deceased and then went away to his house.\n\nThe statement of Banne is similar and so is the statement of Mohd.\n\nAhmed, P. W. 3.\n\nThis evidence was not accepted by the learned Sessions Judge and he acquitted both the accused.\n\nThe State took an appeal only against the appellant which was allowed by the High Court. It held\n\n\"We may concede that the eye-witnesses have falsely implicated Qudrat Ullah by deposing that he handed over his knife to the respondent on his demand.\n\nThere was no enmity between him and Sabir and he had no motive to get him killed by the respondent.\n\nIt does not at all appear probable that after abetting the murder of Sabir he at once took him on a rickshaw to the hospital and from there went at once to the police station and lodged a report against the respondent.\n\nThis conduct of Qudrat Ullah is so inconsistent with the part said to have been played by him in the occurrence that we have little hesitation in rejecting the evidence about the part played by him.\"\n\nThe High Court, however, accepted the testimony of the eye-witnesses as against the appellant's guilt and observed :\n\n\"We are satisfied that the prosecution has fully established the case against the respondent.\n\nThere is not the slightest doubt about his guilt.\n\nThe presumption of innocence has been fully rebutted by the prosecution.\n\nThe case against him does not become doubtful merely because the learned Sessions fudge said that there was a doubt about his guilt.\"\n\nThe learned Judges also came to the conclusion that the view taken by the learned trial Judge was one \"which no reasonable person could have taken.\n\nIt was a wholly erroneous view of the evidence which has resulted in gross miscarriage of justice inasmuch as a murderer escapes punishment\".\n\nIn the circumstances of the case and considering that there was some provocation, the High Court sentenced the appellant to 'transportation for life.'\n\nThere is a passage in the Judgment of the High Court which appears to us to be disconsolate and indicative of a wrong approach in deciding the guilt of an accused person.\n\nAlthough the learned Judges recognised the principle that the onus was not on the accused, yet one of the observations is such that it comes perilous! y near to putting the burden on the accused if it does not actually do so.\n\nThe High Court has said:\n\n\"The respondent himself did not have the courage to say that he did not find them at the spot. If he were innocent, he must have come out of his house immediately on hearing the noise and must have known who was present there and who was not.\"\n\nThis passage is so destructive of the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprrnknce as to the presumed innocence of an accused person till otherwise proved that it has become necessary to reiterate the rule stated by eminent authorities \" .... that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner's guilt ..... . subject to any statutory exception.\" (1)\n\nIt was next contended that the witnesses had falsely implicated Qudrat Ullah and because of that the Court should have rejected the testimony of these witnesses as against the appellant also. The well-known maxim f alsus in uno f alsus in omnibus was relied upon by the appellant.\n\nThe argument raised was that because the witnesses who had also deposed against Qudrat Ullah by saying that he had handed over the knife to the appellant had not been believed by the Courts below as against him, the High Court should not have accepted the evidence of these witnesses to convict the appellant.\n\nThis maxim has not received general acceptance in different jurisdictions in India ; nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of a rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to is that in such cases the testimony may be disregarded anJ not that' it must be disregarded.\n\nOne American author has stated :\n\n(1) Woolmington v. The Director of Public Prosecutions, 1935 A. C. 462.\n\nNisar Ali\n\nTiu Sta4 of Uttar Pradtsh\n\nKapur].\n\nNisar .Ali\n\nTht Stat1 of Uttar Pradtth\n\nKapur J,\n\n\" .... the maxim is in itself worthless ; first in point of validity ........ and secondly, in point of utility because it merely .tells the jury what they may do in any event, not what they must do or must not do, and therefore, it is a superfluous form of words.\n\nIt is also in practice pernicious ...... \" ( 1 ) The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a court may apply in a given set of circumstances but it is not what may be called \"a mandatory rule of evidence\".\n\nCounsel for the appellant drew our attention to a passage from an unreported judgment of the Privy Council, Chaubaria Singh v. Bhttneshwari Prasal Pal.\n\n\"The defendants own evidence and that of several of his witnesses is of no use to him. He cannot contend that any court of law can place reliance on the oath of people who have admittedly given false evidence upon the other branches of the case.\"\n\nThis passage is a very slender foundation, if at all, for conferring on the doctrine the status of anything higher than a rule of caution ; md the Privy Council cannot be said to have given their weighty approval to any such controversial rule which has been termed as \"worthless\", \"absolutely false as a maxim of life\" and \"in practioe pern1c10u,\" in works of undoubted authority on the law of evidence(').\n\nThe High Court was not unmindful of what the witnesses stated as to Qudrat Ullah\"s part in the commission of the offence and having taken that into consideration, it said :\n\n\"While the learned Sessions Judge wa.-; right in acquitting Qudrat Ullah, he was completely wrong in acquitting the respondent of whose guilt there was not the slightest doubt.\n\nThe direct evidence made out a clear case against him and there was no sound reason for disregarding it.\"\n\nAfter discnssing the eviden,:e of the witnesses and the discrepancies pointed out hy the appellant the High Cmrt held \"there is 11ot the slightest doubt\n\n(1) Wign1ore on Evide11cc Vol. III para Ioog.\n\n(2) '\"'igntor{' Vol. III para 1009.\n\nIt was because of the above two contentions raised by counsel for the appellant and because it was a case of reversal of a judgment of acquittal that we allowed counsel to go into the evidence which he analysed and drew our attention to its salient features and to the discrepancies in the statements of witnesses and the improbabilities of the case ; but we are satisfied that the learned Judges were justified in coming to the conclusion they did and the view of the trial judge was rightly displaced.\n\nUpon a review of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses we have come to the conclusion that the appellant was rightly convicted.\n\nThe appeal is, therefore, dismissed and the judgment of the High . Court is affirmed.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nV. C. K. BUS SERVICE LTD.\n\nti.\n\nTHE\n\nREGIONAL\n\nTRANSPORT\n\nAUTHORITY,\n\nCOIMBATORE.\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR. s. K. DAS AND\n\nGAJENDRAGADKAR JJ.)\n\nRoad Transport-Permit for stage carriage-Renewal-W he th er a continuation of the original permit-Whether subject to implied condition of validity of the original permit-Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (IV of 1939), ss. 57, 58.\n\nThe appellant was granted a permit for stage carriage hy the Regional Transport Authority under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, but on appeal to the appellate authority, the Central Road Traffic Board, by the unsuccessful applicants the order granting the permit was set aside and the order of the Central Road Traffic Board was appro\\'ed hy the Government in re\"ision.\n\nThe appellant. thereupon. moved the High Court for a writ of certi01'<1ri to quash the proceedings of the Central Road Traffic Board aned an application for renewal and granted a fresh permit to a new apiilicant. It was also contended that though the statute spoke of a renewal of a permit, that expression did not accurately bring out the true position, became in legal terminology, renewal imports that the t:ansaction which is renewed, as for example, a lease. i, to operate for a further period but on the same terms. hut that when a permit was renewed,. it was open to the authorities to impose new conditions, to alter the period during which it was to operate and generally to modify its terms. and that therefore the use of the word \"renewal\" should not lead to the inference that it was the original permit that was being continued.\n\nThere is force in these contentions, but there are other provisions bearing on this question, and when they are reviewed as a whole, it is abundantly clear that the intention of the legislature was to treat a renewal as a continuation of the previous permit.\n\nstart with, s. 58(1) enacts that a permit sh::ill be effective for the period specified therein, but this is qualified by the words \"without renewal\".\n\nTherefore, when there is a renewal, the effective period is not the original period specified, bu_t the period up to which the renewal is granted.\n\nThat indicates that the life of a renewed permit is one and continuous.\n\nThe matter is placed bevond doubt when we turn to the rules which have\n\nbeen framed under the Act.\n\nRule 184 ( 1) provides that when a renewal is granted, it shall be endorsed on the permit itself, and Form No. 33, which 1s prescribed therefor is as follows :\n\n\"This permit is hereby renewed up to the ..... . day of. ..... 19 ...... \".\n\nThus, \\hat is renewed is \"this permit\".\n\nIn this connection, reference must be made to the definition of \"permit\" in s. 2(2) of the Act as \"the document issued by a Provincial or Regional Transport Authorit:/'.\n\nRule 185 is very material for the purpose of the present rfocussion, and it runs as follows : ''If an application for the renewal of a permit has been made in accordance with these rules and the preocribcd fee paid hy the prescribed date, the permit shall continue to he effective until orders are passed on the application or until the expiry of three months from the ntinue the policy of granting temporary permits indefinitely, and accordingly granted permanent permits, to Veerappa. Then on October i4, 1949, Veerappa applied for renewal of _these permanent permits, and that was granted by the Regional Transport Authority on January 3, 1950.\n\nThe question was whether this order was bad on the ground that it was inconsistent with the decision of the High Court that it was Raman and Raman Ltd., that had obtained a valid title to the buses.\n\nThis Court held that the ownership of the buses was only one of the factors to be taken into account in granting the permits, and that as the Regional Transport Authority granted the renewal on an appreciation of all' the facts, his decision was not liable to be questioned in proceedings under Art. 226.\n\nIt should be noted that the renewal which was granted on January 3, 1950, was of permanent permits granted in pursuance of the order of the Government dated March 29, 1949, which had quite plainly declared as a matter of policy that notwithstanding the pendency of litigation between the parties, permanent permits should be granted to Veerappa.\n\nThere can be no questi1>n of implying thereafter a condition that they were subject to the decision of the Court.\n\nMoreover, the renewal was granted on January 3, 1950, after the litigation had ended on September 2, 1949, and any attack on that order could only be by\n\n19~7\n\nv. c. x. Bw Smlict\n\n/; fi. v.\n\nT!Y Stci01!Gl\n\nTrtw~ ~. c.imballWf\n\nV...,.,_11\n\n..W•J\n\nfg57\n\nV. C. Ii. H?U Strvic1\n\nLtd.\n\n\" Tht Re-gionttl\n\nTransport Au.tlwritJ Coimbatore\n\nVuJoatarama\n\nAyy11r].·\n\nFebruary 1 g,\n\nway of appeal against it, and that had not been done.\n\nWe are of opinion that the decision in Veerappa Pillai\n\nv. Raman & Raman Ltd. ( 1 ) is of no assistance to the appellant.\n\nIn the result, we affitm the decision of the High Court bot,'1 on the gr.ound th3t the renewal dated June 23, 1955, is a continuation of the permit granted on December 3, 1952, and must fall to the ground when that stood finally set aside by the judgment of the High Court in Writ Appeal No. 32 of 1954 dated March 21, 1956, and on the ground that it was an implied condition of that renewal that it was to be subject to the decision of the High Court in that appeal, and that in the event which had happened, it had ceased to be effective.\n\nThese appeals fail, and are dismissed with costs in Civil Appeal No. 323 of 1956.\n\nApf!eals dismissed ..\n\nASGARALI. NAZARALI SINGAPORA WALLA\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY\n\n(BHAGWATI,\n\n]AGANNADHAOAS,\n\nJAFER\n\nIMAM,\n\nGOVINDA MENON and J. L. KAPUR JJ.)\n\nCrirninal trial-Enactment providinK for speedy trial-Specified offences made tn'able only by Special fudges empotvcred td atvard heavier sentences-If violates equality' befo1'e the larv-Pendency of-\n\nC.'iminal !.Aw Amendment Act, (XLVI of 1952)-Constitution of India, Art. 14.\n\nThe appeilant and four others were being tried before the Presidency Magistrate, Bombay for charges under s. 161 read with 116 and further read with s. 109 or s. 114 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nDuring the pendency of the trial the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (XLVI of 1952) was enacted by Parliament and came into force on July 28, 1952. The Act provided for , the trial of all offences punishable unc!er ss. 161, 165 or 165-A, of the Indian Penal Code, or sub-s. (2) of s. 5, of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 exclusively by Special Judges and directed the transfer of all such trials pending on the date of the coming\n\n(1) [1952] S.C.R. 583.", "total_entities": 135, "entities": [{"text": "V. C. K. BUS SERVICE LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 779, "end_char": 803, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. C. K. BUS SERVICE LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE\n\nREGIONAL\n\nTRANSPORT\n\nAUTHORITY,\n\nCOIMBATORE", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 811, "end_char": 859, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY, COIMBATORE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMA AYYAR. s. K. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 862, "end_char": 890, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.K. DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 896, "end_char": 914, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1087, "end_char": 1105, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 57, 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1126, "end_char": 1136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1257, "end_char": 1275, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Central Road Traffic Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1329, "end_char": 1355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was granted a permit for stage carriage hy the Regional Transport Authority under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, but on appeal to the appellate authority, the Central Road Traffic Board, by the unsuccessful applicants the order granting the permit was set aside and the order of the Central Road Traffic Board was appro\\'ed hy the Government in re\"ision."}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1992, "end_char": 2014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the expiry of the periontinue the policy of granting temporary permits indefinitely, and accordingly granted permanent permits, to Veerappa."}}, {"text": "October i4, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32342, "end_char": 32358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then on October i4, 1949, Veerappa applied for renewal of _these permanent permits, and that was granted by the Regional Transport Authority on January 3, 1950."}}, {"text": "January 3, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32478, "end_char": 32493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then on October i4, 1949, Veerappa applied for renewal of _these permanent permits, and that was granted by the Regional Transport Authority on January 3, 1950."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32991, "end_char": 32999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "September 2, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33552, "end_char": 33569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Moreover, the renewal was granted on January 3, 1950, after the litigation had ended on September 2, 1949, and any attack on that order could only be by\n\n19~7\n\nv. c. x. Bw Smlict\n\n/; fi."}}, {"text": "V. C. Ii", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33716, "end_char": 33724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ",_11\n\n..W•J\n\nfg57\n\nV. C. Ii.", "canonical_name": "V. C. K. BUS SERVICE LTD"}}, {"text": "March 21, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34322, "end_char": 34336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32 of 1954 dated March 21, 1956, and on the ground that it was an implied condition of that renewal that it was to be subject to the decision of the High Court in that appeal, and that in the event which had happened, it had ceased to be effective."}}, {"text": "ASGARALI. NAZARALI SINGAPORA WALLA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34661, "end_char": 34695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apf!eals dismissed ..\n\nASGARALI."}}, {"text": "STATE OF BOMBAY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34701, "end_char": 34716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NAZARALI SINGAPORA WALLA\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY\n\n(BHAGWATI,\n\n]AGANNADHAOAS,\n\nJAFER\n\nIMAM,\n\nGOVINDA MENON and J. L. KAPUR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "AGANNADHAOAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34731, "end_char": 34743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NAZARALI SINGAPORA WALLA\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY\n\n(BHAGWATI,\n\n]AGANNADHAOAS,\n\nJAFER\n\nIMAM,\n\nGOVINDA MENON and J. L. KAPUR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "JAFER\n\nIMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34746, "end_char": 34757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NAZARALI SINGAPORA WALLA\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY\n\n(BHAGWATI,\n\n]AGANNADHAOAS,\n\nJAFER\n\nIMAM,\n\nGOVINDA MENON and J. L. KAPUR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "GOVINDA MENON", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34760, "end_char": 34773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NAZARALI SINGAPORA WALLA\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY\n\n(BHAGWATI,\n\n]AGANNADHAOAS,\n\nJAFER\n\nIMAM,\n\nGOVINDA MENON and J. L. KAPUR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "J. L. KAPUR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34778, "end_char": 34789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "NAZARALI SINGAPORA WALLA\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY\n\n(BHAGWATI,\n\n]AGANNADHAOAS,\n\nJAFER\n\nIMAM,\n\nGOVINDA MENON and J. L. KAPUR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Aw Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35008, "end_char": 35024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35041, "end_char": 35062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35064, "end_char": 35071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Presidency Magistrate, Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 35132, "end_char": 35161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeilant and four others were being tried before the Presidency Magistrate, Bombay for charges under s. 161 read with 116 and further read with s. 109 or s. 114 of the Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "s. 161 read with 116", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35180, "end_char": 35200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35223, "end_char": 35229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35233, "end_char": 35239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35247, "end_char": 35264, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "During the pendency of the trial the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35267, "end_char": 35336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "28, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35406, "end_char": 35414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the pendency of the trial the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (XLVI of 1952) was enacted by Parliament and came into force on July 28, 1952."}}, {"text": "ss. 161, 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35483, "end_char": 35495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "During the pendency of the trial the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952", "statute": "During the pendency of the trial the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35513, "end_char": 35530, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35549, "end_char": 35553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "During the pendency of the trial the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952", "statute": "During the pendency of the trial the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35562, "end_char": 35596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}]} {"document_id": "1957_1_678_695_EN", "year": 1957, "text": "fg57\n\nV. C. Ii. H?U Strvic1\n\nLtd.\n\n\" Tht Re-gionttl\n\nTransport Au.tlwritJ Coimbatore\n\nVuJoatarama\n\nAyy11r].·\n\nFebruary 1 g,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (i957]\n\nway of appeal against it, and that had not been done.\n\nWe are of opinion that the decision in Veerappa Pillai\n\nv. Raman & Raman Ltd. ( 1 ) is of no assistance to the appellant.\n\nIn the result, we affitm the decision of the High Court bot,'1 on the gr.ound th3t the renewal dated June 23, 1955, is a continuation of the permit granted on December 3, 1952, and must fall to the ground when that stood finally set aside by the judgment of the High Court in Writ Appeal No. 32 of 1954 dated March 21, 1956, and on the ground that it was an implied condition of that renewal that it was to be subject to the decision of the High Court in that appeal, and that in the event which had happened, it had ceased to be effective.\n\nThese appeals fail, and are dismissed with costs in Civil Appeal No. 323 of 1956.\n\nApf!eals dismissed ..\n\nASGARALI. NAZARALI SINGAPORA WALLA\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY\n\n(BHAGWATI,\n\n]AGANNADHAOAS,\n\nJAFER\n\nIMAM,\n\nGOVINDA MENON and J. L. KAPUR JJ.)\n\nCrirninal trial-Enactment providinK for speedy trial-Specified offences made tn'able only by Special fudges empotvcred td atvard heavier sentences-If violates equality' befo1'e the larv-Pendency of-\n\nC.'iminal !.Aw Amendment Act, (XLVI of 1952)-Constitution of India, Art. 14.\n\nThe appeilant and four others were being tried before the Presidency Magistrate, Bombay for charges under s. 161 read with 116 and further read with s. 109 or s. 114 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nDuring the pendency of the trial the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (XLVI of 1952) was enacted by Parliament and came into force on July 28, 1952. The Act provided for , the trial of all offences punishable unc!er ss. 161, 165 or 165-A, of the Indian Penal Code, or sub-s. (2) of s. 5, of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 exclusively by Special Judges and directed the transfer of all such trials pending on the date of the coming\n\n(1) [1952] S.C.R. 583.\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT lU:PORTS 679\n\ninto force of the Act to. Special Judges.\n\nThe Presidency Magistrate continued the trial and acquitted the appellant.\n\nUpon appeal by the State Government, the High Court held that from the date of the commencement of the Act the Presidency Magistrate lost all jurisdiction to continµe the trial and . ordered a retrial by the Special. Judge.\n\nIt was contended that the Act was void as it violated Art. 14 f the C:onstitution :\\_nd consequently could not affect the jurisdicuon of the Presidency Magistrate to continue the trial.\n\nHeld, that the Act did not violate Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nThe Legislature classified the offences punishable under ss. 161, 165 or 165-A of the Indian Penal Code or sub-s. 2 of s. 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 in one group or category. They were offences relating to bribery or corruption by public servants and were appropriately classified in, one group of category.\n\nThe classification was founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguished the offenders thus grouped together from those left out of the group. This intelligible differentia had rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act, the object being to provide for speedier trials of the said offences.\n\nBribery and corruption having been rampant nd the need for weeding them out having been urgently felt, it was necessary to enact thr measure for the purpose of eliminating all possible delay in bringing the offenders to book.\n\nThe State of Bombay v. F.\n\nN. Balsara, (1951)\n\nS.C.R. 682, Budhan Chowdhry and othe1s _v. The State of Bihar, ( 1955) S.C.R. 1945 antJ.1\n\n8hapali J.\n\naccused being committed to them for trial, and follow the procedure prescribed for the trial of warrant cases by magistrates.\n\nThe proceedings before the Special Judges were thus assimilated to those before the courts of sessions for trying cases without a jury or without the aid of assessors and the powers of appeal and revision invested in the High Court were also similarly circumscribed.\n\nAll these provisions had the necessary effect of bringing about a speedier trial of these offences and it cannot be denied that this intelligible differentia _ had rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the impugned Act.\n\nBoth these conditions were thus fulfilled and it could not be urged that the provisions of the impugned Act were in any manner violative of art. 14 of the .COnstitution.\n\nIt wa! next contended that even if the impugned Act was intra vires, the lerned Presidency Magistrate trying the case of the appellant was not divested of jurisdiction to try the same after the commencement of the impugned Act and the acquittal of the appellant recorded by him could not be set aside.\n\nReliance was placed upon s. 10 of the impugned Act in support of this contention.\n\nIt was urged that even though the case related to the offence mentioned ins. 6(1) of the Act and was thus triable exclusively by the Special Judge, no Special Judge was appointed by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette until September 26, 1952, that the arguments were concluded and the trial c3me to an end also on September 26, 1952 and the only thing which remained to be done thereafter was the pronouncement of the judgment by the learned Presidency Magistrate and that therefore even . though the case may be deemed to have been pending before the learned Magistrate there was no occasion for forwarding the same for trial to the Special Judge appointed by the State Government on September 26, 1952.\n\nWe do not accept this contention.\n\nIt cannot be denied that on July 28, 1952, the date of the commencement of the impugned Act the case of the appellant was pending before the learned Presidency Magistrate.\n\nOn that day .the prosecution had closed its case and\n\nthe appellant had not yet been called upon to enter upon his defence.\n\nThe examination of the appellant under s. 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure took place after th!i.t date.\n\nThe appellant filed his written .statement on August 14, 1952 and the addresses by the prosecution as well as the defence continued right up to September 26, 1952.\n\nThe word \"pending\" is thus defined in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Edition, Vol. III, p. 2141 :\n\n PENDING :-(1) A legal proceeding is \"pending\" as soon as commenced and until it is concluded, i.e., so long as the Court having original cognizance of it can make an order on the matters in issue, or to be dealt with, therein.\n\nSimilar are the observations of Jessel, M. R. fo re Clagttt's Estate, Fordham v. Clagett ( 1):\n\n\"What is the meaning of the word \"pending\" ?\n\nIn my opinion. it includes every insolvency in which any proceeding can by any possibility be taken.\n\nThat I think j5 the meaning of the word \"pending\" ..... .\n\n. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A cause is said to be pc:nding in a Court of justice when any proceeding can be taken in it.\n\nThat is the test.\" There is no doubt therefore that the case of the appellant was not concluded and was pending before the learned Presidency Magistrate at the date of the commencement of the impugned Act.\n\nWe were however told that as many as 40 witnesses had been examined and 226 documents exhibited in the course of the trial before the learned Presidency Magistrate and it could not have been intended by the Legislature when enacting s. 10 of the impugned Act that a case where everything had been finished except the addresses and the pronouncement of the judgment should be forwarded for trial before the Special Judge appointed under the Act.\n\nThe fallacy underlying this argument is that on July 28, 1952, when the impugned Ac_t came into operation the trial even in the restricted sense of the term had not been concluded.\n\nThe prosecution had closed its case but the appellant\n\n(1) (1882) 20 Ch. D. 637 at p. 653.\n\nAsgarali N aurali\n\nSin1aportiwall•\n\nTltt Stat1 of\n\nBombay\n\nt957\n\nAsgarali N ai:arali\n\nSingapora:waalla\n\nThe State of\n\nBomay\n\nBhafWali ].\n\nhad yet to enter upon his defence and lead evidence, if any, in reply to the case set up by, the prosecution.\n\nThe same was the position even on September 26, 1952, when by a notification in the Official Gazette the Special Judge was appointed having jurisdiction over such cases.\n\nThe notification came into operation from the commencement of September 26, 1952, which was immediately after the mid-night of September 25, 1952 and the defence address had n6t concluded by this time but was continued when the learned Presi-· dency Magistrate's Court assembled at 11 a. m. on September 26, 1952 and was concluded thereafter.\n\nThe word \"trial\" is also defined in Stroud's Judicial Dictionaty, 3rd Edition, Vol. IV, at page 3092 : TRIAL: (1) A \"trial\" is the conclusion, by a competent tribunal, of questions in issue in legal proceedings whether civil or criminal. (2) The \"trial\" (Criminal Justice Act, 1948 (11 & 12 Geo. 6. C. 58) s. 23 (1) is not complete until sentence has been passed or the offender has been ordered to be discharged (R. v. Grant (1951) 1 K. B .. 500).\n\nThe trial of the appellant therefore could not be said to have been concluded on July 28, 1952 and even on the September 26, 1952, assuming for the sake of argument that the effective commencement of the impugned Act could not be said to have come about until the Special Judge was appointed by the State Government bv notification in the Official Gazette.\n\nThis contentio~ of the appellant therefore is in any event devoid of substance.\n\nWe are aware that in cases like the present one, the provisions containecl in s. 10 of the impugned Act would work to the prejudice of the appellant in that he would be subjected to a re-trial before the Special Judge having jurisdiction over the case involving a re-hearing of the whole casewith 40 witnesses to be examined and 226 documents to be exhibited.\n\nThe time which would have to be spent, the anxiety which the appellant would have to undergo, the expenses which he would have to make in the matter of his defence by competent counsel and the possibility which he would have to face of the Special Judge trying the same coming to a conclusion different\n\n' '\n\nS.C.lt\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 695\n\nfrom the one which was reached by the learned Presidency Magistrate are all considerations which would have made us consider his case very sympathetically and try to find out ways and means whereby he would be saved these troubles and tribulations.\n\nThe words of s. 10 of the impugned Act however are very clear and categorical and are not capable of being construed in any other manner except that all cases triable by the Special Jutlgcs which were pending immediately before the commencement of the impugned Act before any magistrate must be forwarded for trial to the Special Judge having jurisdiction over such cases, the magistrates having cognizance of the same and trying them being divested of jurisdiction to proceed further with the trial thereof immediately after the commencement of the Act.\n\nThe only persons who were invested with jurisdiction to try these cases after the commencement of the impugned Act were the Special Judges having jurisdiction o\\'er the same and whatever was done by the magistrates thereafter was without jurisdiction and void.\n\nThe case of the appellant is unfortunate.\n\nFor ought we know the Special Judge trying him would acquit him of the offence with which he has been charged in the same manner as the learned Presidency Magistrate himself did, but there is no escape from the fact that he will have to face a re-trial and undergo the expenses and anxiety in defending himself over again.\n\nWe have therefore come to the conclusion that the order for re-trial of the appellant made by the High Court was correct and the appeal must be dismissed.\n\nWe hope and trust that the re-trial before the Special Judge will be conducted with all possible dispatch and the trial will be concluded as early as possible.\n\nThe appeal will accordingly stantJ.1\n\n8hapali J.\n\naccused being committed to them for trial, and follow the procedure prescribed for the trial of warrant cases by magistrates.", "canonical_name": "Astarali N azarali"}}, {"text": "8hapali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31342, "end_char": 31349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "flg\n\nAstarali N azarali\n\nSingaporawal!a\n\nv, TM State of Bombay\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nAsgarali NtJJ:atali\n\nSinzaporawalla\n\nTllL Slate of\n\nBoml>tJ.1\n\n8hapali J.\n\naccused being committed to them for trial, and follow the procedure prescribed for the trial of warrant cases by magistrates."}}, {"text": "art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32129, "end_char": 32136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32488, "end_char": 32493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Presidency Magistrate trying the case of the appellant was not divested of jurisdiction to try the same after the commencement of the impugned Act", "statute": "Presidency Magistrate trying the case of the appellant was not divested of jurisdiction to try the same after the commencement of the impugned Act"}}, {"text": "September 26, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32795, "end_char": 32813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6(1) of the Act and was thus triable exclusively by the Special Judge, no Special Judge was appointed by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette until September 26, 1952, that the arguments were concluded and the trial c3me to an end also on September 26, 1952 and the only thing which remained to be done thereafter was the pronouncement of the judgment by the learned Presidency Magistrate and that therefore even ."}}, {"text": "s. 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33650, "end_char": 33656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33664, "end_char": 33690, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Stroud", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33925, "end_char": 33931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The word \"pending\" is thus defined in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Edition, Vol."}}, {"text": "Jessel", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34250, "end_char": 34256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similar are the observations of Jessel, M. R. fo re Clagttt's Estate, Fordham v. Clagett ( 1):\n\n\"What is the meaning of the word \"pending\" ?"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35111, "end_char": 35116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Asgarali N aurali", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 35598, "end_char": 35615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Asgarali N aurali\n\nSin1aportiwall•\n\nTltt Stat1 of\n\nBombay\n\nt957\n\nAsgarali N ai:arali\n\nSingapora:waalla\n\nThe State of\n\nBomay\n\nBhafWali ].", "canonical_name": "Astarali N azarali"}}, {"text": "Asgarali N ai:arali\n\nSingapora:waalla", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 35663, "end_char": 35700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Asgarali N aurali\n\nSin1aportiwall•\n\nTltt Stat1 of\n\nBombay\n\nt957\n\nAsgarali N ai:arali\n\nSingapora:waalla\n\nThe State of\n\nBomay\n\nBhafWali ].", "canonical_name": "Asgarali N ai:arali\n\nSingapora:waalla"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nBomay\n\nBhafWali ].", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35706, "end_char": 35734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Asgarali N aurali\n\nSin1aportiwall•\n\nTltt Stat1 of\n\nBombay\n\nt957\n\nAsgarali N ai:arali\n\nSingapora:waalla\n\nThe State of\n\nBomay\n\nBhafWali ]."}}, {"text": "Criminal Justice Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36617, "end_char": 36643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36668, "end_char": 36673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Justice Act, 1948", "statute": "Criminal Justice Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37329, "end_char": 37334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Justice Act, 1948", "statute": "Criminal Justice Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38219, "end_char": 38224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1957_1_696_701_EN", "year": 1957, "text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nRAGHUBANSH LAL\n\nti.\n\nTHE STATE OF U. P.\n\n[1957]\n\n(JAGANNADHADAS,\n\nJAFER\n\nIMAM, Gov1NDA MENON and\n\nJ. L. KAPUR JJ.)\n\nCriminal Trial-Knowingly forniing record in incorrect tna1111er -Intention to cause loss or injury-Indian Penal Code, s. 218.\n\n1\"hc appellant, being a Patwari, was found to have made an incorrect entry regarding possession over certain disputed plots in the khasra for the year 1358 F, and was eonvieted under s. 218 of the Indian Penal Cod< .•\n\nHeld, that in order to sustain a conviction undc.r s. 218 of the Indian Penal Code it is not sufficient that the entry is incorrect, it is essential that the entry should have been made with intent to cause, or knowing it to be likely to cause, loss or injury to some person. The incorrect entry in regard to the year 1358 F. could not cause any loss to the complainant a~ alleged in the charge, because when the entry was alleged to be made the case under s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code had already been decided and it could not confer hereditary tenancy on the person recorded to be in occupa1ion in the year 1358 F. as s. 16 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act benefited persons recorded to be in possession in the year 1356 F. and not the year 1358 F.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE Jua1so1cT10N: Crimir.al Appeal No. 94 of 1955.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 7, 1954, of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 647 of 1952 arising out of the judgment and order dated June 7, 1952, of the Court of Sessions Judge at Ghazipur in .S. T. No. 11 of 1952.\n\nH. /. U mrigar, for the appellant.\n\nG. C. Mathur and C. P. Lal, for the respondent.\n\n1957. February 20.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKAPUR J.-This is an appeal by Special leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution of India against the J udgment of the Allahabad High Court confirming the conviction of the Appellant Raghubansh Lal under s. 218 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe offence for which the appellant was tried was, that being a Patwari of village Arazi Mafi Pandai and thus a public servant, he \"framed the khasra of 1358 F in respect of plots Nos. 170 and 74/1 of village Arazi Mafi Pandai\", which he knew \"to be incotrect with intent to cause or knowing to be likely that he would thereby cause an undue loss to Smt. Mahura Kunwar.\"\n\nThe facts out of which this appeal has arisen are these.\n\nTwo brothers, Mahadeo and Sahdeo, who were members of a joint Hindu family owned certain plots of land.\n\nMahadeo died leaving a widow Basera Kunwar, a son Damodar Pande and a daughter Mahura Kuer.\n\nSahdeo died leaving a widow Sundra Kuer.\n\nOn the death of Damodar Pande, one Ram Sewak Pande brought a suit against Smt.\n\nBesera Kunwar and Smt. Sundra Kuer for possession of zamindari property including sir and sayar left by Damodar Pande which was dismissed.\n\nOn the death of Basera Kunwar, Adit Pande son of Ram Sewak and one Ganga Pantle got their names mutated in regar'.i\n\nto this property.\n\nSmt. M:i.hura Kuar then brought a suit for possession of the estate left by Smt. Basera Kunwar against Adit Pande and Ganga Pande which was decreed on August 1, 1941.\n\nOn May 31, 1943, Smt. Mahura Kuar obtained possession through Court of this estate which included the two plots Nos. 170 and 74/1.\n\nOn February 25, 1950, Mahura Kuer made an application to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate for taking proceedings under s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code against Adit Pande and Ganga Pande. The Magistrate ordered the attachment of the land including the two plots Nos. 170 and 74/1, and it is alleged that possession of these two plots was given to Shubh Karan as sapurdar or custodian.\n\nThe property remained under attachment from March 15; 1950, to December 18, 1950, which would comprise a part of 1357 F and a pan of 1358 F.\n\nOn December 18, 1950, the proceedings taken by the Magistrate ended in favour of Mahura Kuar with the finding that ' her possession had been established.\n\nAdit Pandc and Ganga Pande were restrained from\n\nRaghuhansh Lal v.\n\nThe State of U.P.\n\nKapur J.\n\nR•1huhan.sh Lal v.\n\nT Ill 31at1 of U. P.\n\ninterfering with the possession of the lady ; and it was ordered that the attachment should end and the possession of the plots of land in dispute be handed back to Smt. Mahura Kuer.\n\nThe opposite party took a revision to the District Magistrate which was dismissed on March 28, 1951, and it is alleged that actual possession was delivered in April, 1951.\n\nFrom December 1950 to April 1951, the delivery of possession remained stayed under the District Magistrate's order.\n\nOn July 31, 1951, Smt. Mahura Kuar filed the present complaint in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate at Ghazipur under s. 218 of the Indian Penal Code against the present appellant in which after reciting the various relevant facts she alleged that the accused who was a Patwari of the village had deliberately made wrong entries in regard to the plots Nos. 170 and 74/1 and in the remarks column had entered the name of Adit Pande as being in possession, and thus he had committed an offence under s. 218 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe case was committed to the court of Session where in support of the prosecution Smt. Ma.hura Kuar herself appeared as witness No. 1 and her case was supported by two other witnesses, namely, Gouri Shankar P.W. 2 and Naresh P.W. 3.\n\nThe accused produced in defence Adit Pande, D.W. I and Ram Swamp D.W. 2.\n\nThe accused's pita in the Sessions Court was that he had come to know from Shubh Karan Chowkidar that Smt. Mahura Kuar had won the case under s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, but in spite of the order of the Magistrate he found the possession \"on the spot\" to be of Adit Panek, that he did not act according to the order of the Magistrate because he did not receive any such order and that he did not find Smt.\n\nMahura Kuar in whose favour the order was passed by the Magistrate to be in actual possession.\n\nThe learned trial court found that the accused had made incorrect entries knowing them to be incorrect with intent to cause \"gain to Adit Pande and loss to Smt.\n\nMahura Kuar\".\n\nHe, therefore, convicted the accused and sentenced him to one year's rigorous\n\nimprisonment and a fine of Rs. 200 or in default 4 months rigorous imprisonment.\n\nThe High Court confirmed the trial court's decision on the ground that the delivery of possession to the complainant Smt. Mahura Kuar was proved by the statements of the lady herself and of 'GauriShankar' and Naresh Gadaria, who had supported the statement of Mahura Kuar and had deposed that Shubh Karan sapurdar had sown barley in one field and paddy in the other and that actual physical possession was delivered to her in April 1951.\n\nOn a consideration of the evidence the High Court held that the entries were incorrect and had been made with a view to injure Mahura Kuar. !\n\nRule 60 of the U.P. Land Records Manual deals with the preparation of Khasras.\n\nThe form of the khasra contains columns showing the name of the cultivator, the name of the sub..tc:nant or tenants and entries relating to crops etc.\n\nThe rule requires that the entries shall be: made in accordance with the actual facts and provides that the Patwari is responsible for all entries and he must satisfy himself of the facts by inquiry from the persons concerned as well as by field inspection and complete the khasra by April 30th.\n\nIn the remarks column-and this is shown by the order of commitment-the entry of the years 1357 F and 1358 F was \"qabiz badastur\" (possession as before). In coming to the finding of incorrectness of the entries in the k.hasra with intent to cause injury to Smt. Mahura Kuar, the Courts below have taken into consideration the proceedings under s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Although the finding of the Magistrate in rhose proceedings was in favour of Smt. Mahura Kuar, the land in dispute had been attached and had been given for cultivation to Shubhkaran Chowkidar, and even according to the prosecutiQn case the actual physical possession did not pass to Smt. Mahura Kuar till April\n\n1951. The sapurdar, Shubhkaran, himself has not been examined as a witness, may be due to the then existing dispute between Mahura Kuar and Shubhkaran as to the produce of the land in dispute for the period of his cwtodianship.\n\nEven though the possession of the\n\nRazhubansh Lal v.\n\nTiii Stat1 of U.P.\n\nIrajnir J.\n\nRa1.hub<1ns/i Lal\n\nTM Stat1 of U. P.\n\nll\"apur ].\n\ndisputed plots is stated to have been given to the complainant in April 19.il, she was not in actual physical passession before that date, i.e., during the period the land was under attachment.\n\nFor the purposes of this case, the prosecution had to prove:-\n\n(!) that the accused knowingly framed the record ii1 an incorrect manner ; ant discretion was left to the Chief Controller of Imports tu reject any offer without assigning any reason.\n\nSubject to the terms and conditions set out .in the Notice, if ,,· contract was concluded, an import licrnce for the quantity contracted to be purchased would . be issued in favour of the buyer subject to such conditions as might be imposed by the Government of India in that behalf.\n\nIt appears that, prior to 1953, import licences were freely granted.\n\nIn 1953, licences began to be granted to established importers subject to certain conditions. lt also appears that Government decided from time to time the total quantity of the specified commodity which should be imported.\n\nThen the extent of the business of the applicant for licences during the prescribed period was taken into account and the total amount of import was then distributed pro rata amongst the se\\'tral applicants. \\Vhen it was found that even this method did not work sati; factorily, the Government decided to canalise distribution hut while canalisation was introduced in this manner, tenders were invited for import licrnces and t!1ey were considered on merits and licences granted to several claimants.\n\nIt may be that, if the LC.I. and the Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd., were amongst the applicants for licences, their competitors in the line may have found it difficult to fight with these two powerful rivals but that is very different from saying that, by the method of canalisation, ' the Government had introduced a monopoly in the import of the commodity in question.\n\nIt is also important to emphasize that the petitioner is not even an established importer.\n\nHe was granted a licence during the free period, and so it is difficult to understand his grievance that a monopolv had been\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPRE.\\1E COURT REPORTS 711\n\ncreated and that he was thereby deprived of his fundamental right to carry on his trade.\n\nGovernment found that the importers of soda ash resorted to malpractices\n\nleading to speculation, and violent fluctuations, in prices of the commodity.\n\nIt was open to the Government, and indeed national interests made it their duty, to intervene and regulate the distribution of the commodity in a suitable manner.\n\nThat is all that Government purported to do by the policy statement to which objection has been taken by the petitioner.\n\nBesides, it is difficult to entertain the argument from the present petitioner that the alleged monopoly has affected his right to carry on trade.\n\nIn substance no monopoly has been created and the petitioner's application is entirely misconceived.\n\nThe result is the petition fails and must be dismissed with costs.\n\nPetition No. 377 of 1955 is directed broadly agaimt orders of confiscation and sale passed by the relevant authorities and the petitioner claims that an appropriate writ should be issued by this Court calling upon the said authorities to forbear from giving effect to the said orders.\n\nWe have already mentioned the material facts in regard to the confiscation of the consignments of soda ash of 100 tons and 20 tons respectively which has given rise to all these proceedings.\n\nNow, the order dated May 3, 1954, has been passed by the Controller of Imports and Exports for Chief Controller of Imports and Exports and it communicates to the petitioner the decision of the Chief Controller that no licence or customs clearance permit would be granted to him against his application for and upto the licensing period July 1953.\n\nThe petitioner was, however, told that his applications for January-June 1954 licensing period would be dealt with in the normal course according to the policy contained in the Red Book.\n\nThen the order adds that it had been decided that re-validation of the licences mentioned in Annexure 'A' to the. petitioner's advocate's letter on April 20, 1954, could not be allowed. That is why the said licences were returned to tl)e petitioner. It is this latter part of the order by which the petitioner feels aggrieved and ag;•',>t which the petitioner seeks remedy by the\n\nBhat11agars and Co.\n\nLtd. v.\n\nThe U n; on of India\n\nGajendragadkar].\n\nBhatnagars and Co.\n\nLtd.\n\nThe Union of India\n\nGafendragadkar ].\n\npresent petlt10n.\n\nThe petitioner's case is that,. since he was granted licences which were to be alive for one year from FebruJry 13, 1952, the illegal seizure of the licence and the unauthorised confiscation of the consignments in question caused considerable prejudice to him. The return of the licences is poor consolation to the petitioner because the period during which the licences were to operate had already expired.\n\nHe, therefore, claims that the licences should be revalidated in the sence that the period during which he can operate upon those licence~ should be suitably extended.\n\nIt is true that if the relevant authorities were inclined to revalidate the licences in that sense, it would have been open to them to do so.\n\nBut it is difficult to understand how the petitioner can invoke the jurdiction of this Court under Art. 32 of the . Constitution for obtaining this relief.\n\nWe do not propose to discuss this matter elaborately because, in our opinion, the position in law is abundantly clear.\n\nThe authorities have found that, though the licences were obtained by the pet1t10ner in his name, h~ has been trafficking in these licences, that the consignments had been ordered by another individual Messrs.\n\nJivanlal & Co., that the said individual holds no licence for import of soda ash and as such the consignments received by the said individual are liable to be confiscated.\n\nIf the petitioner's grievance is that the view taken by the appropriate authorities in this matter is erroneous, that is not a matter which can be legitimate! y agitated before us in a petition under Art. 32.\n\nIt may perhaps be, as the learned Solicitor-General suggested, that the petitioner may have a remedy by suit for damages but that is a matter with which we are not concerned. If the goods have been seized in accordance with law and they havebeen seized as a result of the findings recorded by the relevant authorities competent to hold enquiry under the Sea Customs Act, it is not open to the petitioner to contend that we should ask the authorities to exercise discretion in favour of the petitioner and allow his licences a further lease of life.\n\nEssentially the petitioner's grievance is against the conclusions of fact reached by the relevant authorities.\n\nIf the said\n\nconclusions cannot be challenged beJore us in the present\n\nwrit petition, the petitioner would obviously not be t'!ititled to any relief of the kind claimed by him.\n\nIn the result, the petition fails and must be dismissed with costs.\n\nThat leaves two more petitions field by the petitioner, Petitions Nos. 42 of 1956 and 46 of 1956.\n\nThese petitions have been argued before us by Shri Umrigar and, on he half of the petitioner, Shri U mrigar has raised three points before us.\n\nHe contends that the Import-Export Act does not apply to soda ash and that it is every citizen's right to import and export this commodity without a licence.\n\nIf that be the true position, confiscation of the two consignments would be illegal, and so, he wants an appropriate writ from this Court against the Central Government.\n\nIn the alternative, he argues that the legislation which authorises the issue of licences amounts to a delegated legislation and as such is invalid.\n\nAgain, if legislation is invalid on the ground alleged, confiscation of the two consignments would be invalid and the petitioner would be entitled to a writ.\n\nFailing these two contentions, Shri Umrigar argues that the conclusion of the relevant authorities that his clie11t was trafficking in licences is based on no legal evidence and must, therefore, he reversed by this Court and appropriate relief given to him on the basis that the petitioner had obtained licences bona fide for his own personal use and the contrary Yiew taken by the relevant authorities and the subsequent confiscation of the consignments were illegal and 11/tra vires.\n\nWe would now briefly deal with these three points in the qrder in which they were urged before us by Shri Umrigar.\n\nThe first argument is based upon the fact that, while enacting The Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, Act No. XVIII of 1947, the provisions contained in r. 84 (2) of the Defence of India Rules have not been included in the Act and the contention, which at best may be characterised as ingenious, is that the object of omitting the said provisions while enacting the subsequent Act of 1947 was to release, from the operation of the Import Act, articles which would have fallen\n\nBhalriagars nnd C1.\n\nLtd. v.\n\nTht Umo11 of lndi•\n\nGajrndra1adkar ].\n\nBhatnsgars and Co.\n\nLtd. v.\n\nTht Union of India\n\nGajrndratadkar J.\n\nunder the said omitted provisions. R. 84 of the Defence of India Rules by sub-r. (1) defines export and import. \"Import\" means bringing into British India by sea. land or air. \"Export\" means taking out of British India by sea, land or air.\n\nThen sub-s. (2) provides: \"The Central Government may by a notified order prohibit or restrict the import or export of all goods or goods of any specified description, from or to any specified person or class of persons\".\n\nSub-r. (3) then provides: 'The Central Government may by notified order make provision for prohibiting, restricting or otherwise controlling, in all cases or in specified classes of cases, and subject to such exceptions, if any, as may be made by or under the order,-\n\n(i) the import, export, carriage coastwise or shipment as ships' stores of all goods or goods of any specified description ;\n\n(ii) the shipment of fresh water on sea-going vessels ;\n\n(iii) the bringing into any port or place in British India of goods of any specified description intended to be taken out of British India without being removed from the ship or conveyance in which they are being carried;\" Shri U mrigar contends that the import of soda ash could have been legitimately regulated under the provisions of r. 84, sub-r. (2) but since this sub-rule has not been enacted under Act XVIII of 1947, all regulations made by the Central Government and terms and conditions laid down in regard to the granting of licences are ultra vires of the Act.\n\nAct XVIII of 1947 gives substantially the same meaning to .the words \"export\" and \"import\" and the operative portion of the Act is contained in s. 3 which is the same as r. 84, sub-r. (3), of the Defence of India Rules.\n\nIn oder to make his argument plausible, Shri Umrigar •eeks to put a very narrow, artificial and unreasonable restriction upon s. 3, sub-s. (1) (a) of Act XVIII of 1947.\n\nBefore dealing with this argument, however, it would be convenient to set out the said section as under :\n\n\"3. Powers to prohibit or restrict imports and •957 exports : Bhatna1ars and C1.\n\n(1) The Central Government may, by order ;,\"' published in the official Gazette, make provision for Thl Union of India prohibiting, restricting or otherwise controlling, in all Gtefindragadkar ]. cases or in specified classes of cases, and subject to such exceptions, 1£ any, as may be made by or under the order,- ,.\n\n(a) the import, export, carnage coastwise or shipment as ships' stores of goods of any specified description ;\n\n(b) the bringing into any port or place in India of goods of any specified description intended to be taken out of India without being removed. from the ship or conveyance in which they are being carried.\n\n(2) All goods to which any order under sub-section ( 1) applies shall be deemed to be goods of which the import •or export has been prohibited or restricted under section 19 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 (VIII of 1878), and all the provisions of that Act shall have effect accordingly, except that section 183 thereof shall have effect as if for the word \"shall'' therein the word \"may\" were substituted.\n\n(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the aforesaid Act, the Centr:il Government may, by order published in the official Gazette, prohibit, restrict or impose conditions on the clearance, whether for home consumption or for shipment abroad, of any goods -or class of goods imported into India.\" Shri Umrigar contends that s. 3 (1) (a) cannot apply to the import of soda ash, because, according to him, it is only goods of a specified description which are imported or exported, carried coastwise or shipped as ships' stores that fall within the mischief of the said provision.\n\nIn other words, he reads the expression \"carriage coastwise\" and \"shipment as ships' stores\" as constituting adjectival clauses governing the words \"import\" and \"export\".\n\nIn our opinion, such a construction is wholly unreaonable. We have no doubt that this provision has to be read disjunctively and distributively, and so read, the import of goods of any specified descrip-\n\nBhatnagars and Co.\n\nLtd. v.\n\nTht Union of India\n\nGajtrulragadkar J.\n\ntion would attract the application of the said provision.\n\nIf we bear in mind the definition of the words \"import\" and \"export'', it would be obvious that articles that are carried coastwise would never fall within the category of either import or export.\n\nThe assumption that the Legislature wanted to release all kinds of goods from the application of s. 3 ( 1) (a) is, in our opinion, so completely inconsistent with the plain and natural meaning of the material clause that we have no hesitation in rejecting Shri Umrigar's argument.\n\nIf the words used in the clause are given their natural meaning, it is clear that the Legislature must have felt, in enacting this Act, that it was unnecessary to continue by reenactment the provisions of r. 84 (2) in the present Act.\n\nWhat was specifically provided in the said rule is in effect included in s. 3 (1) (a\\.\n\nWe must, therefore, hold that the argument that no licence was required for the import of soda ash and so all the orders passed by the appropriate authorities in regard to the confiscation of the consignments are in valid must fail.\n\nThe next argument is that the material provision is ultra vires as it amounts to delegated legislation.\n\nThe challenge to the validity of legislative enactments on the ground of delegated legislation often enough presents problems which are not easy of solution.\n\nThe recent history of judicial decisions, however, shows that, though there is considerable divergence of opinion in the approach to the question of dealing with such a challenge; some principles may be said to be fairly well settled.\n\nThere is no doubt that legislation which is conditional, properly so-called, must be distinguished from legislation which is delegated.\n\nShri Umrigar concedes that where the Legislature provides and lays down principles underlying the provisions of a particular statute and also affords guidance for the implementation or enforcement of the said principles, it is open to the Legislature to leave the actual implementation or enforcement to its chosen delegate.\n\nThe time when the provision should be implemented, the period during which it should be implemented or the place where it should be applied can, according to\n\nhim, in appropri:ite cases be validly left by the Legislature to its delegate.. He, however, contends that, in the impugned Act, the Legislature does not lay down principle and gives no guidance to the delegate while leaving the implementation of the statutory provisions to him and consequently the validity of the legislative enactment suffers from a serious infirmity on the ground that the Legislature has surrendered its legislative power in favour of its delegate.\n\nIn dealing with this narrow ground of challenge, it would be necessary to consider the preamble and the material provisions of the Act to find out whether questions of policy have been clearly decided by the Legislature and whether guidance has been given to the delegate in the matter of implementing the provisions of the statute.\n\nUnfortunately for Shri Umrigar his challenge to the validity of the impugned section under the Imports and Exports Act is completely covered by the decision of this Court in Harishankar Bagla v. The State of Madhya Pradesh(1 ).\n\nIn this case, ss. 3 and 4 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, were attacked as ultra vires on the ground of delegated legislation.\n\nThis challenge was repelled.\n\nIn repelling the argument of delegated legislation, Mahajan Chief Justice who delivered the judgment of the Court conceded that \"the Legislature must declare the policy of the law and the legal principles which are to control any given cases and must provide a standard to guide the officials or the body in power to execute the law\". \"The essential legislative function\", the judgment proceed~ to add, \"consists in the determination or choice of the legislative policy and of formally enacting that policy into a binding rule of conduct\".\n\nThen the learned Chief Justice referred to the fact that the Legislature has laid down such a principle and that •principle is the maintenance or increase in supply of essential commodities and of securing equitable distribution and availability at fair prices. It was held that the principle was clear and it offered sufficient guidance to the Central Government in exercising its powers under s. 3.\n\nIn other words, in considering the question as to\n\n(1) [1955] I S.C.R. 380.\n\nBhatnagars and C1.\n\nLtd. ....\n\nThe Union of lndi&\n\nGajendratadkar J.\n\nBhatttazars and Co.\n\nLtd. v. r111 Union of India\n\nG ajendra:.adkar J.\n\nwhether guidance was afforded to the delegate in bringing into operation the material provisions of the Act by laying down principles in that behalf, the Court considered the statement of the principles contained in the preamble to the Act as well as in the material provisions of s. 3 itself.\n\nThis decision shows that if we can find a reasonably clear statement of policy underlying the provisions of the Act either in the provisions of the Act or in the preamble, then any part of the Act cannot be attacked on the ground of delegated legislation by suggesting that questions of policy have been left to the delegate.\n\nTurning to the impugned sections of the present Act, it is necessary to remember that the present Act purports to continue for a limited period powers to prohibit or control imports and exports which had already been enacted by the Defence of India Act and the Rules framed thereunder.\n\nIn other words, this Act does not purport to enact the material provisions for the first time but it purports to continue the previously existing provisions in that behalf and so it would be legitimate to consider the preamble of the predecessor Act and relevant provisions in it to find out whether the Legislature has laid down clearly the policy underlying that Act and has enunciated principles for the guidance of those to whom authority to implement the Act has been delegated.\n\nThe preamble to the present Act says that it was expedient to continue for a limited period powers to prohibit, restrict or otherwise control imports and exports.\n\nThe preamble to the Defence of India Act refers to the emergency which had arisen when the Act was passed and refers, inter alia, to the necessity to take special measures to ensure the public safety and public interest.\n\nSection 2 of the sait\\ Act further provides that the \\:entral Government thought that it was essential to secure public safety and maintenance of public order and, what is more relevant and material, the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community.\n\nThus it is clear that the broad and main principle underlying the present Act, like its predecessor, was to maintain supplies essential to the life of the community.\n\nThus, if the preamble\n\nand the relevant section of the earlier Act are read in the light of the preamble of the present Act, it would he difficult to distinguish this Act from the Essential Supplies Act with which this Court was concerned in Harishan, zar Bagla's case(1).\n\nIncidentally, we may also observe that in Pannalal Binjraj v. The U11io11 of\n\nIndia(\"), where the vires of s. 5 (7-A) of the Income- Tax Act were put in issue before this Court, the challenge was repelled and during the course of the judgment delivered on December 21, 1956, the previous history of the earlier Income-Tax Acts was taken into account to decide what policy could be said to underlie the provisions of the i.mpugned section.\n\nThe last argument of Shri Umrigar is patently untenable.\n\nNo doubt Shri Umrigar began this argument by contending that the finding made against the petitioner that he was trafficking in his licences and that the consignm, ents in question did not reallv belong to him was based on no evidence but ultimately he could not help conceding the fact that there were certain circumstances on which the appropriate authorities relied against the petitioner.\n\nThe contention that a finding made by a competent authority is based on no legal evidence is easy to make but very difficult to establish.\n\nSuch a contention can succeed only when it is shown that there is really no legal evidence in support of the view taken by the appropriate authorities.\n\nIn the present case, it is impossible to accede to the assumption that there 1s no legal evidence against the petitioner.\n\nHis poor financial resources, his conduct at all material times when consignments were ordered, the suspK10ns attaching to the very existence of the firm Messrs.\n\nN. Jivanlal & Co. in Bombay and the prominent part played by this firm at all stag<:'.s of the transaction in regard to the consignments as well as the reckless allegations which were made by the petitioner before the authorities which were found to be untrue bv the appropriate authorities, cannot be summarily dismissed as being irrelevant or as not constituting legal evidence.\n\nAt the highest it may be said that there\n\n11 [19,-,11 ' s.r:.R. 380.\n\n(2) [19571 $.C.R. 231.\n\nBhatnagars a11d Co.\n\nLtd. v.\n\nThe Union of l11dia\n\nGojendragodkar ].\n\nBhatnagars and Co.\n\nLtd. v.\n\nTM Union of India\n\nCaJtndragadkar ].\n\nare some circumstances on which Shri Umrigar wants to rely in favour of the bona fides of his client whereas there is a large number of circumstances against him.\n\nIf all the appropriate authorities, on considering these circumstances, concurrently found against the petitioner, that obviously is not a matter which can be legitimately agitated in the present petition.\n\nThat is why we do not propose to deal with this aspect of the matter any further. In the result, both Petitions Nos. 42 of 1956 and 46 of 1956 fail and must be dismissed with costs.\n\nPetitions dismissed.\n\nGIP:'\\ 79 s.c. Tndi; i./.'l9\" JIJ.fi-G0-1,0flO", "total_entities": 101, "entities": [{"text": "s. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 66, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 90, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Adit Pande", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 212, "end_char": 222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in the proceedings under s. 145 Criminal Procedure Code, because according to the evidence on the record the entries were made somewhere in March and this could not have helped Adit Pande, as the magistrate had already decided the proceedings under s. 145 Criminal Procedure Code in December 1950, and had ordered possession to be delivered to the complainant ; and, therefore, this entry could not affect the result of the proceeding under s. 145 Criminal Procedure Code."}}, {"text": "s. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 284, "end_char": 290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 291, "end_char": 314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 476, "end_char": 482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 483, "end_char": 506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mathur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 513, "end_char": 519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Mathur founded his case also on s. 16 of the\n\nU.P.\n\nZamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, (U.P. Act I of 1951), which provided that a person, who was recorded as an occupant of the land for the year 1356 F and who, on the date mentioned in the section was in possession of the land, shall be deemed to be a hereditary tenant of the land."}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 545, "end_char": 550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 565, "end_char": 605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1018, "end_char": 1023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act", "statute": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act"}}, {"text": "s. 218", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1130, "end_char": 1136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act", "statute": "Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act"}}, {"text": "BHA TN AGARS AND CO. LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1444, "end_char": 1468, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHATNAGARS AND CO. LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE UNION OF INDIA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1471, "end_char": 1489, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE UNION OF INDIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1518, "end_char": 1532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE UNION OF INDIA\n\n(and connected petitions)\n\nS. R. DAs C.J.,\n\nVENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR, B. P.\n\nSrNHA, S. K. DAs and GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1535, "end_char": 1553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE UNION OF INDIA\n\n(and connected petitions)\n\nS. R. DAs C.J.,\n\nVENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR, B. P.\n\nSrNHA, S. K. DAs and GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "B. P.\n\nSrNHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1555, "end_char": 1567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE UNION OF INDIA\n\n(and connected petitions)\n\nS. R. DAs C.J.,\n\nVENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR, B. P.\n\nSrNHA, S. K. DAs and GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "S. K. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1569, "end_char": 1578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE UNION OF INDIA\n\n(and connected petitions)\n\nS. R. DAs C.J.,\n\nVENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR, B. P.\n\nSrNHA, S. K. DAs and GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ.)"}}, {"text": "GAJENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1583, "end_char": 1597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THE UNION OF INDIA\n\n(and connected petitions)\n\nS. R. DAs C.J.,\n\nVENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR, B. P.\n\nSrNHA, S. K. DAs and GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ.)", "canonical_name": "GA JENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "Import and Export, Control of-Soda ash", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1604, "end_char": 1642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Import and Export, Control of-Soda ash, if can be imported tuithout licence-Issue of licence, if amounts to delegated legislation- Trafficking in licence-Confiscation of consignments and seizure of licence by Sea Cu; toms Authorities-Issue of Writs-Policy Statement\n\nR•zhub•nsh Lal v.\n\nTiu Stat1 of U.P.\n\nKapur]."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1961, "end_char": 1975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F1lruary 21\n\nBhatna1ars and Co.\n\nLtd.\n\nTh• Union of India\n\nby GovernnJent, if."}}, {"text": "s. 3(J)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2075, "end_char": 2085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2086, "end_char": 2107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2109, "end_char": 2116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Central Board of Revenue", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2558, "end_char": 2582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner appealed to the Central Board of Revenue and thereafter moved the Government of India, but to no effect."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2608, "end_char": 2627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner appealed to the Central Board of Revenue and thereafter moved the Government of India, but to no effect."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2757, "end_char": 2764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3077, "end_char": 3087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "June 30, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3449, "end_char": 3462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was further contended that the Policy Statement made by the Government in the Press Note dated February 3, 1955, and Public Notice dated June 30, 1956, created a monopoly and infringed the petitioner's funda1nental right to carry on his trade and business and lastly, that the virtual invalidation of his licence having been improperly made should be set aside and the :;; an1e directed to be revalidated for the unexpired period."}}, {"text": "s. 3(!)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3872, "end_char": 3882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5897, "end_char": 5904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6194, "end_char": 6204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6212, "end_char": 6233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "H. J. Umrigar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6355, "end_char": 6368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. J. Umrigar and Y. Kumar, for petitioner in Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "Y. Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6373, "end_char": 6381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. J. Umrigar and Y. Kumar, for petitioner in Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "C. K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6436, "end_char": 6450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, for respondents in tions Nos."}}, {"text": "A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6480, "end_char": 6488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, for respondents in tions Nos."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6493, "end_char": 6505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, for respondents in tions Nos."}}, {"text": "B. Sen.", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6689, "end_char": 6696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "India, B. Sen.\n\nPetitions Nos."}}, {"text": "GA JENDRAGADKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6828, "end_char": 6843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBhatn11gars and Co.\n\nLtd. v.\n\nThi Union ef India\n\nGA JENDRAGADKAR J .-This is a group of five peti- Gajmdragadkar J. tions filed by the petitioners Messrs Bhatnagars & Co. Private Ltd.\n\nIn all these petitions, the pettttoner Shri B. S. Bhatnagar, Managing Director of the above company, seeks to obtain appropriate writs from this Court mainly in respect of orders which have been passed by the Sea Customs Authorities against the petitioner.", "canonical_name": "GA JENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "Messrs Bhatnagars & Co. Private Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6926, "end_char": 6962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBhatn11gars and Co.\n\nLtd. v.\n\nThi Union ef India\n\nGA JENDRAGADKAR J .-This is a group of five peti- Gajmdragadkar J. tions filed by the petitioners Messrs Bhatnagars & Co. Private Ltd.\n\nIn all these petitions, the pettttoner Shri B. S. Bhatnagar, Managing Director of the above company, seeks to obtain appropriate writs from this Court mainly in respect of orders which have been passed by the Sea Customs Authorities against the petitioner."}}, {"text": "B. S. Bhatnagar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7008, "end_char": 7023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBhatn11gars and Co.\n\nLtd. v.\n\nThi Union ef India\n\nGA JENDRAGADKAR J .-This is a group of five peti- Gajmdragadkar J. tions filed by the petitioners Messrs Bhatnagars & Co. Private Ltd.\n\nIn all these petitions, the pettttoner Shri B. S. Bhatnagar, Managing Director of the above company, seeks to obtain appropriate writs from this Court mainly in respect of orders which have been passed by the Sea Customs Authorities against the petitioner."}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7315, "end_char": 7329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This petitioner seems to feel a grievance\n\nBh•lnagars and Co.\n\nLtd. v.\n\nThi Ur.ion of India\n\nGajendragadkar J.\n\nSUPREME COURT REFORTS [1957]\n\nthat, in the matter of licences which had been issued to him for importing soda ash, he has not received a fair treatment from the appropriate authorities and, since the impugned orders were passed, he has been moving the High Court of Punjab and this Court by several petitions under the Constitution.", "canonical_name": "GA JENDRAGADKAR"}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7586, "end_char": 7606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This petitioner seems to feel a grievance\n\nBh•lnagars and Co.\n\nLtd. v.\n\nThi Ur.ion of India\n\nGajendragadkar J.\n\nSUPREME COURT REFORTS [1957]\n\nthat, in the matter of licences which had been issued to him for importing soda ash, he has not received a fair treatment from the appropriate authorities and, since the impugned orders were passed, he has been moving the High Court of Punjab and this Court by several petitions under the Constitution."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8485, "end_char": 8492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bhatnagar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8645, "end_char": 8654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Three of the petitions have been argued by Shri Bhatnagar in person."}}, {"text": "Umrigar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8790, "end_char": 8797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "42 and 46 of 1956 have been argued by Shri Umrigar on behalf of the petitioner.", "canonical_name": "U mrigar"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9246, "end_char": 9252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance of this licence, and relying on the same, consignments of soda ash to the extent of 100 tons, 200 tons and 20 tons respectively were received at Bombay ; but meanwhile the Customs Authorities had received informantion that, though the petitioner had obtained a licence in his name for the import of soda ash for such a large amount as Rs."}}, {"text": "N. Jivanlal & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9830, "end_char": 9847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the cou_rse of this investigation, certain documents were seized from the petitioner-company's office as well as from the office of one Messrs N. Jivanlal & Co. at Bombay."}}, {"text": "N. Jivanlal & Co", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10048, "end_char": 10064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It transpired that a person carrying on business in the name of Messrs. N. Jivanlal & Co., had a free hand in dealing with the licences of the petitioner and that the petitioner used only to receive commission for tile imports that he allowed to be made in the name of Messrs Bhatnagars & Co., Ltd.\n\nIn regard to the two consignments of 100 tons and 20 tons of soda ash respectively, it was found on an inspection of the documents that the same had been imported by Messrs N. Jivanlal & Co .• and since Messrs N. Jivanfal & Co., held no licence, the consignments were seized by the Collector of Customs."}}, {"text": "Bhatnagars & Co., Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10252, "end_char": 10274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It transpired that a person carrying on business in the name of Messrs. N. Jivanlal & Co., had a free hand in dealing with the licences of the petitioner and that the petitioner used only to receive commission for tile imports that he allowed to be made in the name of Messrs Bhatnagars & Co., Ltd.\n\nIn regard to the two consignments of 100 tons and 20 tons of soda ash respectively, it was found on an inspection of the documents that the same had been imported by Messrs N. Jivanlal & Co .• and since Messrs N. Jivanfal & Co., held no licence, the consignments were seized by the Collector of Customs."}}, {"text": "N. Jivanfal & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10486, "end_char": 10503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It transpired that a person carrying on business in the name of Messrs. N. Jivanlal & Co., had a free hand in dealing with the licences of the petitioner and that the petitioner used only to receive commission for tile imports that he allowed to be made in the name of Messrs Bhatnagars & Co., Ltd.\n\nIn regard to the two consignments of 100 tons and 20 tons of soda ash respectively, it was found on an inspection of the documents that the same had been imported by Messrs N. Jivanlal & Co .• and since Messrs N. Jivanfal & Co., held no licence, the consignments were seized by the Collector of Customs."}}, {"text": "November 7, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10696, "end_char": 10712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The offices of the petitioner and Messrs N. Jivanlal & Co., were raided during the course of this investigation on November 7, 1952 and FebrU1ry 6, 1953, respectively."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11178, "end_char": 11196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner then moved the Central Government against this order but on September 22, 1955, the Central Government refused to interfere."}}, {"text": "September 22, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11223, "end_char": 11241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner then moved the Central Government against this order but on September 22, 1955, the Central Government refused to interfere."}}, {"text": "March 31, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11308, "end_char": 11322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that on March 31, 1956, the Collector of Customs ordered that the goods should be."}}, {"text": "Bhatnagars and Co.\n\nLtd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11810, "end_char": 11834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhatnagars and Co.\n\nLtd. v.\n\nT tu Union of India\n\nGajendragodkar ].", "canonical_name": "Bhatnagars a11d Co.\n\nLtd."}}, {"text": "March 24, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13658, "end_char": 13672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This petition had come before this Court for hearing on March 24, 1955."}}, {"text": "K. R. Chaudhury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13679, "end_char": 13694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri K. R. Chaudhury appeared for the petitioner before this Court."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13824, "end_char": 13829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order passed by this Court would show that the learned Solic1tor- General of India made a statement to the Court indicating that the goods which had been confiscated hy the Customs Authorities would not be sold or otherwise dealt with for a month from the rlate of the communication to the petitioner of the final order that the • Central Government may pass in the revisional petition\n\npreferred by him before them."}}, {"text": "Union f India\n\nGajendragadkar ].\n\nBhatnagars and Co.\n\nLtd. v.\n\nThe", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16393, "end_char": 16459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The period of one month which is mentioned in the order w;~, the period granted to the petitioner to move\n\nBhatnagars and Co.\n\nLtd. v.\n\nThe Union f India\n\nGajendragadkar ]."}}, {"text": "Union of India\n\nGajendragadkar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16460, "end_char": 16490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhatnagars and Co.\n\nLtd. v.\n\nThe Union of India\n\nGajendragadkar ].", "canonical_name": "Union of India\n\nGajendragadkar"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16814, "end_char": 16828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In other words, if the decision of the Central Government had gone against the petitioner, the petitioner was given one month's period within which to move this Court for Special Leave and the Union of India agrec;°d not to deal with the property of the petitioner or dispose of it during that period."}}, {"text": "Tata Oil Mills C'..o. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20158, "end_char": 20184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is why the Government decided to canalise the distribution of this commodity with the assistance of two 5elling organisations of Messrs.\n\nTata Oil Mills C'..o. Ltd., and Messrs. LC.I. (India) Ltd. These two concerns had agreed to procure soda ash from suppliers selected on the basis of offers which were being invited by means of public notice which was issued on the same Litu~ tion and continued to be so thereafter, not being in any \\Vay\n\ninconsistnt \\vith the provisions of Part III of the Constitution so as to attract the operation of Art. 13, the Amending Acts \\\\ere equally valid in la\"'\n\nHeld further, that although in a proper case the High Court or this Court in the exercise of their special jurisdictions under the Constitution had po\\ver to determine how far the provisions of the Act had or had not been complied \\vith, the finding of the State Government under s. 5 of the Act that the tenant had not actually resided in the premises for a continuous period of six 1nonths immediately preceding the date of the order, and that under s. 6, the prmises had become Vl:'.cant at about the time indicated in the ord-::r, are cJnclusive and not collateral so as to be liable to be re-opened and could not, therefore, be questioned either in this Court under Art. 32 or in the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution.\n\nRai Brij Raj Krishna v. S. K. Shaw (1951)\n\nS.C.R. 145 applied.\n\nHub!i Electricity Co. Ltd. v. Province of Bombay, (1948) L.R. 76 I.A. 57, held inapplicable.\n\nMohsinali Mohomed Ali v.\n\nThe State of Bombay, (1951) 53 Bom. L.R. 94: A.1.R. 1951 Born. 303, referred to.\n\nThe \\vords \"'or other\\vise\" occurring in explanation (a) to s. 6 of the .. t\\ct could not be construed as ejusdem generis with the \\vords immediately preceding them and must be held to cover all possible cases of vacancy due to any reason whatsoever.\n\nSkinner & Co. v. Shaw & Co., (1893) 1 Ch. D. 413, referred to.\n\nAn order of requisition passed under s. 6(4)(a) of the Act \\vas not of the nature of an order passed in a judicial proceeding and the death of one of the parties could not mako it wholly in effecti\\c, the only consequence being that his name as one of\n\nthe ]XL ties to be served under s. 13 of the Act must be remon, J\n\nfrom the order.\n\nORIGINAL JuRISDICTION : Petition No. I I9 of 1955 with Petition for Sepcial Leave to Appeal No. I40 of\n\nI955 .\n\nPetition under Article 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of fundamental rights and petition under Article l 36 of the Constitution for special leave to appeal from the judgment and order dated March 29, 1955, of the Bombay High Court in appeal No. 63 of 1954\n\nHardayal Hardy and R. ]ethmalani, for the petitioner.\n\nC. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India Porus A. Metha and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent.\n\nI957 March 5.\n\nThe Judgement of the Court was delivered by\n\nSINHA J.-By this petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution and Petition No. I40 of I955 for special leave to appeal from the judgment of the Bombay High\n\nCourt dated March 29, 1955, in Appeal No. 63 of I954 confirming that of a single Judge of that Court dated April n, l 954, the petitioner challenges the constitutionality of the Bombay Land Requisition Act (Act XXXIII), I 948, hf'.reinafter referred to as \"The Act\" and the enforceability of the order dated January, 27, I954, made by the Governor of Bombay in pursuance of s. 6(4) (a) of the Act.\n\nThe petitioner is the widow of one Dharamdas Chellaram, who was a tenant of the premises in ques- ' tion. The said Dharamdas Chellaram died in November I 953, leaving him surviving his widow and a daughter.\n\nThe petitioner alleged that she had been occupying the premises irf question as a member of her husband's family since I938 and that the tenant aforesaid had at no material date ceased to occupy the premises.\n\nShe also alleged that one Narottam n~1s Dharamsey Patel was a mere lodger who vvas oc; 1'; iy~ ing a portion of the premises by leave and Jiccn. t of her husand.\n\nThe said Narottamdas had no intucst\n\nLi/avati Bai v.\n\nThe Stale ef\n\nBombay\n\nSinha],\n\nLiilavaJi Bai\n\nThr State of\n\nBomba_y\n\nSinha J.\n\nSl1PREME COURT REPORT~\n\n[1957J\n\nin the premises in question and had, as a matter of fact, vacated the portion in his occupation some time in the year 1953.\n\nOn behalf of the State of Bombay, the respondent, it has been stated on affidavit by the Accommodation Officer that it is not a fact that the petitioner resided in the premises in question and that the facts were that the said Dharctmdas, the tenant, had vacated the premises in October 19.12 and had handed over possession of the premises to the said Narottamdas Dharamsey Patel. Hence it is alleged that it was not a fact that at the time of her husband's death in November 1953 the petitioner was residing in the premises in question.\n\nThese facts had been\n\nstted before the High Court also on an affidavit made in opposition to the petitioner's case in the High Court.\n\nThe petitioner's grievance is that toward the end of January 1954 she found pasted on the outer door of the premises an order dated January 27, 1954 said to have been made by the Governor of Bombay and which is ; aid to be the occasion for her moving the High Court of Bombay for a writ of mandamus against the State of Bombay to refrain from giving eJICct to the aforesaid Order.\n\nThe Order impugned is in these terms\n\n\"No. RI\\ I 1) M-13067 Office of the Controller of Accommodation, Jehangir Building, l\\fahatma Gandhi Road, Bombay, January, 27, 195+\n\nOrder \\\\\"hcreas, on inquiry it is found that the premises spccifif'd below had become vacant in the month of October 1952 ; Now, therefore, in exercise of the powecs conferred by clause (a) of sub-section (4) of section 6 of the Bombay Lane!\n\nRequisition Act, 1948 (Bombay Act XXXIII of 1948) the Gmernment of Bombay is pkasecl to requisition the said premises for a public purpo c namely, for housing a Bombay State Government servant.\n\nPremises flat ;\\o. 3 on the 1st floor of the Building known as Hem Prabha situated at 68, Marine Drive, Bombay.\n\nBy order and in the name of Governor of Bombay.\" This Order was meant to be served on ( l) Shri Hirabhai H. Patel, admittedly the landlord of the premises,\n\n(2) Shri Narottam Dharamsey Patel aforesaid, and\n\n(3) Shri Dharamdas Chellaram, who, as already indicated, was dead at the date the Order was made.\n\nThe petitioner challenged the validity of the Order of requisition set out above.\n\nHer petition was heard by Tendolkar J. who by his judgment dated April 21, 1954, dismissed the same.\n\nThe petitioner moved this Court for an appropriate writ, direction or order under Art. 32 of the Constitution, challenging the vires of the Act, as also the legal efficacy of the Order impugned.\n\nShe also filed a petition praying for special leave to appeal from the judgment aforesaid of the Bombay High Court.\n\nBoth the matters have been heard together and will be governed by this judgment.\n\nBefore dealing with the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner, it is convenient first to set out, in so far as it is necessary, the legislative history of the law impugned and its certain salient features which are relevant for purposes of this case.\n\nThis Act was passed by the Provincial Legislature of Bombay on April l 1,\n\nl 948, on being em powered . by the Governor-General in exercise of powers conferred on him by s. 104 of the Government of India Act, l 935.\n\nInitially it was to remain in force until March, 31, 1950.\n\nBut by the amending Act, Bombay Land Requisition(Amendment) Act, 1950 (Bombay Act No. II of 1950) published on March 28, 1950, its life was extended up to the end of March 1952.\n\nBy the amending Act, ss. 8-A, 8-B and 9-A were added making substantial changes which need not be set out here, as they do not enter into the controversy.\n\nThe life of the Act was subsequently extended further, up to the end of December 1958. By the Bombay Land Requisition (Second Amendment) Act, 1950 (Act XXXIX of 1950), the Act was further amended so as to substitute the words \"the purpose of the State or any other public purpose\" for the words \"any purpose\" in s. 5 of the Act.\n\nThis was obviously done to satisfy the requirements of Art. 3 l of the\n\nLilavati Bai\n\nI~ The State of Bombay\n\nSinha].\n\nLi!at1; ti Bai\n\n\"· The State of Bombay\n\nSinha].\n\nSUPRE~, IE COCRT REPORTS [ 1q -1\n\n• :JI\n\nCor, sritution. Consequential changes \\\\ere also me.de in ss. 6 <'nd 7 of the Act.\n\nBy s. 6 of the amending Act it v:\"s proYiciccl that \"The amendments made by this ,\\ct shall be deemed to ha:e been and ahrnys to h\"YC been ll1'1c:e with effect from the 26th Janua; y\n\n1950, ..... \".\n\nTines the 2mendrnent was gi\\-en rctrospcctiYc operation.\n\nThe pru\\isions of ss. 5, 6 and\n\nI 3 UPRElE COURT REPORTS\n\n(4) \\Vhether or not an intimation µnclcr suL-section ( 1) is given and notwithsta11ding anything contained in section 5, the State Government may by order in writing --\n\n(a) icquisitiun tlie premises for the purpose ufthe State or any other public purpose and may use or deal with the premises for any such purpose in such manner as rnJy appear to it to be expedient, or\n\nProvided that where an rm\\cr is to be made under clause (a) ffquisitioninu; the premises in respect of which no intimation is gin'.ll by the landlord, the State GoYCrnment shall make such inquiry as it deems fit and make a declaration in the order that the premises were vacant or had become vacant, on or after the date referred to in sub-section ( 1) and such declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the premises were or\n\nhad so become vacant :\n\nExplanation-For the purposes of this section,- ( a) premises which art\". in the occupatir:ll of the landlord, the tenant or the sub-tenant, as tl; c case may be, shall be decm1'.d to be or become vacant when :,11ch landlord ceases to be in occupation or when such tenant or sub-tenant ceases to be in occupation upon termination of his tenancy, eviction, assignment or transfer in anv other manner of hi~ interest in the premises or otherwise, not withstanding any instrument or occupation by any other person prior to the date when wch landlord, tenant or sub-tenant so ceases to be in occupation;\n\n1 3. ( 1) Every order made under ss. 5, 6, 7, 8-A or 8-B or sub-section ( 7) of section g or section 12 shall- ( a) if it is an order of a general nature or affecting a cb:, s of persons, be published in the manner pm:cribecl by rules made in this behalf ;\n\n(b) if it is an order affecting an individual, corporation, or firm, be served in the manner provided for the service of a summons in Ruic 2 of Order XXIX or Rule 3 of Order XXX, as the case may be, in the First Schedule of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ;\n\nLi/a,, ali Bai v.\n\nThe State qf\n\nBombay\n\nSinha].\n\nLilavati Bai\n\nV, I'k State of Bombay\n\nSinha].\n\n(c) ifit is an order affecting an individual person other than a corporation or firm, be served on the person-\n\n(i) personally, by cleliverillg or tendering to him the order, or\n\n\\; i) by post, or\n\n(iii) where the person cannot be found, by leaving an authentic copy of the order with some adult male member of his family or by affixing such copy to some conspicuous ; Jart of the premises in which he is k:iown to ha\\'e last resided or carried on business or worked fo~ g-ain.\n\n(2) \\\\'here a question arises whether a person \\\\'aS duly informed of an order made in pursuance of sections :1, 6, 7, 8-A or 8-B or, sub-section (7) of section 9 or section 1 2 compliance with the requirements of subsection i 1) shall be conclusi11e proof that he was so informed ; but failure to con1ply with the said requirements shal! not preclude proof by other means that he was so informed, or affect th~ validity of the order. ............................ \". (Gnderlining ours).\n\nAt the outset it is neccss;, ry to state that the ma:n grouncls of attar, k against the constitutionality of the Act based on such fundamental rights ; ls are recognised by Ans. 19!1)([) and 31 (2) of the Constitution must be o\\erruled in view of the decision of the C01•stitution Bench r, f this Court in State of Bombay v.\n\nBhanji Munji (').\n\nIn that case this Court upheld the validity of the Act with reference to the provisions of the a; ticles aforesaid of the Constitution.\n\nBut the learned counsel for the netitioner comended that he attacked the 1'ircs of the Act on grounds other than those which had hccn speciiically dealt with by this Court in the clec; sion jus.t referred to. \\Ve now proceed to deal with those fresh grounds on their merits.\n\nIt was contended that the Act became invalid on January 26, 1950 inasmuch as it was in conflict with Art. 3r(2) of the Constitution.\n\nThe Act was, therefore, as good as dead by the time Act II of 1 950 extending the life of the Act was enacted as aforesaid. The Act being void, its extension by Act II of 1950 was equally void.\n\n(1) fI93:J] Is. c. R. 777.\n\nSimilarly, it was further argued that the amendments effected by the amending Act II of 1950 and Act XXXIX of 1950 required the assent of the President and that as admittedly no such assent had been given, they had no effect as provided in Art. 3 l ( 3) of the Constitution.\n\nThis chain of submissions is founded on the admitted non-compliance with the requirements of Art. 3 l (3).\n\nIt has not been contended that the Act when passed on April l l, r 948, was not good law. It is also clear that the Act is not covered by the provisions of cl. (6) of Art. 3 I. The Acr is thus covered by the saving clause, cl. 5(a), being an existing law other than a law to which the provisiom of cl. (6) apply. The Act, therefore, would be valid evefl if the provisions of\n\ncl. ( 2) of Art. 3 l are not in terms fully satisfied, in so far as the Act did not before its amendment bv Act XXXIX of r950 contain the expression \"for a public purpose\".\n\nAs already pointed out, this Court in the case cf T!te State of Bombay v. Blzanji Munji (1) has laid it down that the Act was 11ot invalid even after the commencement of the Constitution simply because it is not provided in express terms that the acquisition or requisition had to be for a public purpose, provided that from the whole tenor and intendment of the Act it could be gathered that the requisition was for a public purpo, e, and for the benefit of the community at large. The amending Act only made explicit what had been left to be gathered from the whole tenor of the Act, as pointed out by this Court in the case cited above. The argument that the amending Acts, II of\n\n1950 and XXXIX of 1950, required the assent of the President under cl. (3) of Art. 3 l has, therefore, no force.\n\nAct II of 1950, in so far :rs it affects the present controversy, only extended the life of the Act by two years and Act XXXIX of 1950 only made explicit what was not so in the Act as originally passed, and are not such laws as come within the purview of cl. (3) of Art. 31 inasmuch as those Act3 are merely an extension or explanatory of the substantive Act which is an existing law within the meaning of the Constitution.\n\nClause (3}\n\n11) [1955] 1 S. C.R. 777.\n\nLi/avati Bai\n\nThe State of Bombay\n\nSinha].\n\nLi!avati Bai\n\nThe State of\n\nBomhqy\n\nSinha].\n\nSUPREME COURT KEPORTS\n\nof Art. 3 r in terms applies to a law made by the legislature of a State, after the commencement of the Constitution ; whereas the Act had been passed in its substantive form in April I 948.\n\nHence, there is no difficulty in holding that the Act which was good law before the commencement of the Constitution did not become void under Art. I 3 of the Constitution, because there was nothing in the Act which was inconsistent with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. If the Act rns good law afte'!\" the commencement of the Constitution, it follows that the amendments aforesaid made in 1950, were eqnally good law, even though the assent of the President had not been obtained.\n\nSecondly, the decision of this Court in The State of Bombay v. Bhanji Mv11ji (') (snpra) itself has ruled to the contrary with reference to the provisions of Art. 31\n\n(2) . V\\'e cannot, therefore, go back upon our decision in the case aforesaid.\n\nOn these considerations the pc•ition under Art. 32 of the Constitution must fail on the ground that no fundamental rights of the petitioner as would entitle her to seek redress from this Court, h~., c been contravened.\n\nIt remains to consider the other arguments advance! on behalf of the petitioner which have a bearing on the petition for special leave to appeal from the judgement of the Bombay High Court. It has been contended that s;. 5 and 6 of the Act quoted above and underlined by us have made certain matters conclusive, so that the High Court or even this Court could not go behind the order of the State Government holding that the tenant had not resided in the premises for a continuous period of six months immediately precerling the date of the order (s. 5), or that the premises had become vacant in the month of October 19.')2, as stated in the Order impugned in thie case.\n\nIt is contended that the legislature had, by making those provisions rendering those matters conclusively proved, impaired the powers of the High Court under Art. 226 and of this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution.\n\nAnotl, r branch of the argument is that the declaration of vacancy is dependent upon a collateral facl ,-.hich has\n\n(1) [19:,51 1 $.C.R. iii\n\nto be found by the Government on such enquiry as it may deem fit and proper and its conclusion ori such a collateral fact could not be placed by the Act beyond scrutiny by the High Court or by this Court.\n\nIn this connection it was also argued that on the question of vacancy the finding of the State Government may be conclusive on the \"factual aspect\" but not on the \"legal aspect\" of the matter. In other words, it was contended that it was still open to the courts to find whether the facts found constituted in law \"vacancy\" as defined in the Act.\n\nIn this connection strong reliance was placed on the following observations of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Hubli Eiectricity Co Ltd. v. Province ef Bombay (1) at pages 65 and 66 :--\n\n\"The question what obligations are imposed on licensees by or under the Act is a question of law.\n\nTheir Lordships do not read the section as making the government the arbiter on the construction of the Act or as to the obligations it imposes. Doubtless the government must, in expressing an opinion for the purpose of the section, also entertain a view as to the question of law. But its view on law is not decisive.\n\nIf in arriving at a conclusion it appeared that the government had given effect to a wrong apprehension of the obligations imposed on the licensee by or under the Act the result would be that the Government had not expressed such an opinion as is referred to in the section.\"\n\nThere are several answers to this contention.\n\nIn the first place, it is well settled that observations made with reference to the construction of one statute cannot be appHed with reference to the provisions of another stamte which is not in pari materia with the statute which forms the subject matter of the previous decision.\n\nThe .Judicial Committee was dealing with the provisions of s. 4 (I) of the Indian Electricity Act, I 910, which did not contain the words \"conclusive evidence\"\n\nor any words to that effect.\n\nThat decision of the Judicial Committee, if it can at all be applied to the Act now before us, is against the petitioner in so far as\n\n(1) [1948] L. R. 76 I. A. 57.\n\nLilavati Bai v.\n\nThe State ef\n\nBombay\n\nSinha].\n\nLilavati Bai v.\n\nT~ Stat~ of Bombay\n\nSi.ma].\n\nit has construed the words \"opinion of the Provincial Government\".\n\nThose words or words of similar import appear in the beginning of s. 5.\n\nIn the words of the Judicial Committee, those words signify the subjective opinion of tht; Government and not an opinion subject to objective tests.\n\nThe observations quoted above only show that on a proper construction of the provisions of the statute then before the Judicial Committee, the opinion of the Government, if it was made non-justiciable, was confined to the question of whether there Lad been a wilful and unreasonably prolonged default, but did not cover the question of the opinion of Government relating to the obligations imposed by the statute on the licensee, by or under the Act.\n\nHence those observations are absolutely of no assistance to the petitioner on. the question of the full implication of the rule making certain matters \"conclusive evidence\" under the provisions of ss. 5 and 6 of the Act.\n\nThis question appears to ha\\e been canvassed in a number of cases in the High Court of Bombay.\n\nIn the case of ]agatchandra v. Bomba)' Province (1) TGndolkar J. had\n\nruled that the declaration made by the Government shall be \"conclusive evidence with regard to all facts involved in the determination of v.1cancy but that it was not conclusive with regard to the iafcrences to be drawn from or the lcg't! conseque:1ces of such focts.\n\nThe correctness of that proposition was questioned in anothc:r case before another learned J uns of the Bombay Act into force throughout the \\\\\"h<)le of Kutch \\Vi th imn1ediatc effect. The Chief Commissioner of Kutch under s. I of the Bo1nba)r Act, h;, d p0\\vers to issue the notifi.:,\\- tion making that Act operative in Kutch or in any part of Kuch and those po'\"''ers \\Vere not affectexl by r\\rt. 239 of the Con~titu tion.\n\nThe notification \\\\'as valid and the }\\ct came into force in th~ parts of the State to \\vhich the notification made it applicable.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Appeal No. 33 of 1955.\n\nCriminal\n\nAppeal under Articles 132(1) and 134(1)(c) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated June 30, 1954, of the Court of Judicial Commissioner, Kutch in Criminal Revision Application No. 13 of 1952.\n\nPorus A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar, for the appellant.\n\nH. ]. Umrigar, for the respondent.\n\n1957. March 7. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nKAPUR J.-Two important questions arise for decision in this case of a small magnitude and the State has filed this appeal not for the purpose of obtaining a conviction but because of the importance of the questions raised and implications of the judgment\n\nof the Judicial Commissioner.\n\nThe respondent was convicted of an offence under s. r2(a) of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act (Act IV of 1887 hereinafter termed the Bombay Act) as applied to Kutch and was sentenced to a fine of Rs. 50 or in default simple imprisonment for 15 days and forfeiture of the amounts recovered from the respondent at the time of the commission of the offence.\n\nHe took a revision to the Judicial Commissioner of Kutch, who held that the Act under which the respondent had' been convicted had not been validly extended to and was not in force in the State of Kutch.\n\nIt is the correctness of this decision which has been canvassed before us.\n\nThere was sufficient evidence against the respondent which was accepted by the trying magistrate ; and if the Act was validly extended to and was in operation in the State of Kutch, his conviction by the learned magistrate wa 0 , correct and his acquittal by the learned Judicial Commissioner erroneous.\n\nOnJune 7, 1951, the respondent, it was alleged committed the offence he was. charged with.\n\nHe was convicted by the magistrate on July 26, 1951, and his revision to the Sessions Judge was dismissed.\n\nHe then took a revision to the Judicial Commissioner of Kutch who allowed his petition on June 30, 1954, and granted a certificate under Arts. r 32 ( r) and r 34( l) of the Constitution.\n\nKutch before 1948 was what was called an Indian State. The Maharao of Kutch handed over the governance of the State to the Dominion of India on June r,\n\n1948 and thus the whole administration of the State passed ta the Dominion and it became a Centrally administered area. On July 3 l, r 949, the then Central Government issued under s. 4 of the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act (Act XLVII of 1947), an order called the Kutch (Application of Laws) Order, 1949.\n\nUnder\n\ncl. 3 of this order certain enactments were applied to Kutch with effect from the date of the commencement of the order.\n\nOne of these enactments was the Bombay Act.\n\nClauses 4 and 6 of this order are important and may be quoted ·\n\nThe State of Bombay v.\n\nSa/at Pragji Karamsi\n\nKapur J.\n\nTiu State of Bombay v.\n\nSalat PraJ!Ji\n\nKaramsi\n\nKapur].\n\n4. \"Except as otherwise specifically provided in the fi; st schedule to this order the .enactments applied by this order shall be construed as if references therein to the authorities and territories mentioned in the first column of the table hereunder printed were references to the authorities and territories, respectively, mentioned opposite thereto in the second column of the said table.\n\nTABLE\n\nProvincial Government, GQvernor The Chief Commissioner of Kutch. or Chief Controlling Revenue Authority. 2.\n\nGovernment Th~ Central Government or the Chief Commissioner, as the context may require. 3.\n\nHigh Court Court of the Judicial Commissioner, Kutch. 4.\n\nProvinces of India, any Province Kutch or any part thereof. of India or any part thereof. 5.\n\nThe Province or Presidency of Kutch or any part threof.\" Bombay or any part thereof.\n\n6. \"Any Court may constr•le the provisions of any enactment, rule, regulation, genet a; order or byelaw applied to Kutch or any part thereof by this order, with such modifications not affecting the substance as may be necessary or proper in the circumstances.\"\n\nOn August 1, 1949, Kutch became a Chief Commissioner's province under the States Merger (Chief Commissioner's Provinces) Order, 1949.\n\nClause 2(1)(c) of this order is as follows :\n\n\"As from the appointed day, the parts of States specified in the Second Schedule to this order shall be administered in all respects as if they were a Chief Commissioner's Province, and shall be known as Chief Commissioner's Province of Kutch.\"\n\nThe Second Schedule gives the parts of the pre-194 7 Indian States which were to comprise the Chief Commissioner's Province of Kutch.\n\nUnder cl. 4 of this Order all laws which were in force including orders made under s.4 of the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act of 194 7, were to continue in force until replaced.\n\nOn January 1, 1950, Merged States' Laws Act (Act LIX of 1949), came into force.\n\nBy this Act certain Central Acts were extended to the province of Kutch\n\nincluding the General Clauses Act (Act X of 1897).\n\nOn January 26, 1950, the Constitution of India came into force and Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950, was promulgated the same day.\n\nClause 4( 1) of this order provides :\n\n\"Whenever an expression mentioned in column 1 of the table hereunder printed occurs (otherwise than in a title or preamble or in a citation or description of an enactment) in an (existing Central or Provincial Laws) whether an Act, Ordinance or Regulation mentioned in the Schedule to this Order or not, then, unless that expression is by this Order expressly directed to be otherwise adapted or modified, or to\n\nstnd unmodified, or to be omitted, there shall be substituted therefor the expression set opposite to it in column 2 of the said Table, and there shall also be made in any sentence in which the expression occurs such consequential amendments as the rules of grammar may require.\"\n\nThe necessary portions of the table are : , Province (except where it occurs in any expression mentioned above)\n\nProvincial. ... , ............................. ..\n\nProvinces (except where it occurs in\n\nState State\n\nany expression mentioned above).\n\nStates Clauses 15 and 16 in (Part III)-Supplementary, are as follows :-\n\n15. \"Save as is otherwise provided by this Order, all powers which under any law in force in India or any part thereof were, immediately before the appointed day, vested in or exercisable by any person or authority shall continue to be so vested or exercisable until other provision is made by some legislature or authority empowered to regulate the matter m question.\"\n\n16. \"Subject to the provisions of this Order any reference by whatever form of words in any existing law to any authority competent at the date of the passing of that law to exercise any powers or authorities, or to discharge any functions, in any part of India shall, where a corresponding new authority has been constituted by or under the Constitution, have\n\nThe Stal< of\n\nBombqy\n\nSa/at Pragji\n\nKaramsi\n\nKapur].\n\nTiu State of\n\nBombay\n\nSa/oJ hagji\n\nEaramsi\n\nKapur].\n\neffect until duly repealed or amended as if it were a reference to that new authority.\" On November 28, 1950 the Chief Commissioner of Kutch issued the following notification\n\n\"In exercise of the powers vested in him under section r of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887 (IV of 1887) as applied to Kutch by the Kutch (Application of Laws) Order, 1949 the Chief Commissioner has been pleased to order that all the provisions of the said Act shall come in to force throughout the whole of Kutch with immediate effect.\"\n\nOn a consideration of all the Acts and Orders as well as the abovementioned Adaptation of Laws Order, of 1950, the learned Judicial Commissioner was of the opinion that \"all such powers vested in or exercisable by any other person or authority before 26-1-1950 ceased to be so vested or exerciscble by that person or authority\", and, therefore, only the President, whether exercising the powers himself or through the Chief Commissioner, could exercise the powers of a State Government and the Chief Commissioner himself could not.\n\nHis finding therefore was that the Chief Commissioner could not issue the above notification of November 28, 1950.\n\nIn its appeal against the Order of acquittal by the learned Judicial Commissioner, the State has raised two questions : ( l) That the Bombay Act had been validly extended to and was in force in the whole of Kutch because of the Kutch (Application of Laws) Order, 1949 and thus any contravention of that Act became punishable under the Act, and\n\n(2) That even if the Bombay Act was not thus extended to Kutch, the Act became applicable to the State of Kutch by the issuing of the notification of November 28, 1950, and therefore, the respondent was rightly convicted and the conviction was wrongly set\n\naide by the learned Judicial Commissioner.\n\n1 In order .to decide the first contention we have to see what is the effect of the various provisions of the.\n\nActs and Orders above referred to.\n\nIn cl. 4 of the\n\nJ{_utch (Application of Laws) Order, 1949, the words used are 'shall be construed as if reference therein ...... ' In our opinion all that these words mean is 'shall be reacl as' ar d if that is how these words are understood then wl1ereveT in the Bombay Act the words 'Provincial Government' arc used they have to be read as the Chief Commissioner of Kutch ; the word Government has to be read as the \"Chief Commissioner of Kutch\"; and the Province or the \"Presidency of Bombay\" as \"Kutch or any part thereof\".\n\nIf the Bombay Act is so read, then at the time when the Constitution came into force the words Provincial Government or Government or Province or Presidency of Bombay were no longer in the Act which had become applicable to the State of Kutch.\n\nOn the other hand, the words there must be taken to be Chief Commissioner of Kutch, and Kutch or any part thereof, respectively.\n\nThe fallacy in the learned Judicial Commissioner's _judgment lies in this that due effect was not given to these words which had become substituted, but emphasis was laid on the words 'shall be construed as' as if these words had been used for the purposes of interpretation of tl; c difTerent words in the Born bay Act rather than implying substitution of the corresponding words.\n\nIn this view of the matter\n\ncl. z(1)(cj of the States Merger (Chief Commissioners' Provinces) Order, 1949 which provided for the administration of the State of Kutch as if it was a Chief Commissioner's Province, would not affect the position nor would the extension of the General Clauses Act under the Merged States' Laws Act.\n\nClause 4 of the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950 only substituted in place of the words Province, Provincial and Provinces the words State or States, wherever they occurred in any existing law, and the effect of els. 15 and 16 of that order was the continuance of the powers vested in the authorities in whom they had previously been vested.\n\nThe position which therefore emerges on a combined reading of these various clauses is that in Bombay Act, as applied to Kutch, the words 'Presidency of Bombay' were to be replaced by the words 'Kutch or any part thereof' and the 'Provincial 3-99 SC India/59\n\nThe State of Bombay v.\n\nSa/at Pragji Karamsi\n\nKapur J.\n\nTh~ Statt of\n\nBomb0;_y\n\nSa!at Pragii Karamsi\n\nKapur J.\n\nGovernment' by the 'Chief Commissioner of Kutch'- and the powers which had been given to the different authorities under the different Acts were to continue to remain in the person or persons in whom they were already vested.\n\nAs the powers had been vested in the Chief Commissioner under the provisions of these various Acts and Orders, they continued to remain so vested and the General Clauses Act did not have any operational effect on these various words which were used in the Bombay Act as modified and applied to Kutch.\n\nSo understood, s. 1 of the Bombay Act would read as follows :-\n\n\"This Act mav be cited as the Bombav Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887.\n\nAll or any or' its provisions may be extended from time to time by the Chief Commissioner of Kutch by an order published in the \"Official Gazette\" to any local area in Kutch or any part thereof.\"\n\nThe Chief Commissioner of Kutch may, from time to time, by an order published as aforesaid, cancel or vary any order made by it under this section.\"\n\nThe portion of this section, vi.::., \"It extends to the city of Bombay, to the Island of Salsette, to all Railways and railway Station houses without the said citv and island and to all places not more than three miles distant from any part of such station houses respecti, ely\" would not continue in the Act as applied to Kutch because these parts are not in the State of \"Kutch or any part thereof\" and cl. 6 of the Kutch r_Application of Laws) Order, 1949 would come into operation for the purpose.\n\nIt was then contended that by the mere application of the Bombay Act to Kutch it became operative and came into force in the whole of Kutci1_.\n\nThis argument suffers from the infirmity that in its application to Kutch s. 1 of the Bombav Act would ha\\e to be excluded which would be n incorrect way of looking at the question. The true position is that the whole of the Act including amended s. 1 as given above, became applicable to Kutch and therefore a notification\n\nwas necessary before it could be brought into force in any part of Kutch. It was applied to Kutch, but its provisions were not in operation before the notification ; and in our opinion, the judgment of Baxi ]. C. in Agaria Osman A/arakhya v. The Kutch State (') which has been followed in the case now before us, to the extent that it dealt with the necessity of a notification under s. r of the Bombay Act, was correctly decided ; and therefore, the first contention raised by counsel for the appellant is unsustainable and we hold that without a notification, the Bombay Act, could not be held to have been validly applied to the State of Kutch.\n\nThis brings us to the second question, i.e., the valirlity of the notification issued on No\\-cmber 28, r 950.\n\nThe learned J uclicial Commissioner held\n\n\"The Chief Commissioner of a Part C State can act to such extent as he is authorised by the President to do.\n\nThese being the provisions of the Constitution, the Bombay :\\ct must be construed with the adaptation that the rule of construction mentioned in the Kutch (Application of Laws) Order, r 9-J.9 is deleted.\n\nHence, e\\Tn if substitution of cxpre, sion as mentioned in para -J. of the :\\dapLttion of La\\\\'s Order, r 950 is not made, the rule of construction mentioned in the\n\nKutd1 1Application of La\\\\'s) Order, 19.19 for construing\n\nthe expression 'Prmincial Go\\\"C:-rnmcnt'as the 'Chief Commissioner, Kutch' docs 1'ot sunive.\"\n\n:\\rticlc '239 of the Constitution relate.; to administration of Part C States and prmides:\n\n\"Subject to the other prmisions of this Part, a State specified in Part C of the First Schedule shall be ad ministered by the President acting, to such extent as he thinks fit, through a Chief Commissioner or a Licutenant-GO\\ernnr to be appointed by him ......... \" This Article has been relied upon for urging that in a\n\nPart C State, the administration had to be carried on by the President acting through a Chief Commissioner But this does not take away the powers -0f the Chief Commissioner gi\\en to him under any other Statute or\n\n1-A.. I. R. (1951) Kutch9.\n\nT Ji. State of Bombay v.\n\nSala! Pragji Karamsi\n\nKapur J.\n\nThe State of Bombay v.\n\nSa[at Pragji\n\nKaramsi\n\nKapur J.\n\nMarch 20\n\nOrder. The Chief Commissioner of Kutch under s. 1 of the Bombay Act, had the power to issue notifications making that Act operative in Kutch or any part of Kutch and those powers were not affected by Art. 239 of the Constitution particularly because of cl. 1 5 of the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950, which preserved these powers of the Chief Commissioner.\n\nTherefore, the notification issued by the Chief Commissioner on November 28, I 950 was valid and issued under legal authority ; and the Act came into force in the parts to which the notification made it so applicable. \\Ve have therefore, come to the conclusion that the learned Judge was in error in holding that the notification was not a valid one and in so far as that was the basis of the acquittal of the accused, the judgment under appeal must be set aside.\n\nIn the result the appeal of the State is allowed, the judgment of the learned Judicial Commissioner acquitting the respondent is set aside and that of the learned Magistrate sentencing him to a fine of Rs. 50 and sentence in default and of forfeiture restored.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nTHE NEWSPAPERS LTD. v.\n\nTHE STATE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, U.P.\n\n(BHAGWATI, B. P. SINHA and J. L. KAPUR ]].)\n\nIndustrial DisjJut.:, Mt>aning nf-Dtsp11te betu; een enlpioyer and a ringie ri.; orkn1an--TV!zether induJtrial dzspute-Governnu, nt making referer.ce on the assufn/Jtion that a dispute exsits betiveen the ernployer and hi_1 u1nrk1nen--l11hether r:alidity of the re_(erence can be questioned --U.P. Industrial Di•putes Act,\n\n1947 (U.P.\n\nXXVIII rd\" 1947), ss.2, 3-Industrial Disputes Act, 19.J.7 (XIV ef 19~ 7, s. 2 (k).\n\nA dispute bern:een an employer and a single workman dot>s not fall \\vithin the definition of \"industrial dispute\" under the L'.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. But though the applicability of the Act to an individual di;; pute as oppost>d to a dispute involving a groLp of \\l\\1orkmen is excluded, if the workmen as a body or a considerable section of them make common cause with the individual '\\York.man then such a dispute \"'ould be an industrial dispute.", "total_entities": 78, "entities": [{"text": "Sohan Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 147, "end_char": 156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "possession and that a mandamus will go only on the 19.57 supposition that there is nobody holding the office in Sohan Lal question."}}, {"text": "has Imam", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 383, "end_char": 391, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SYED JAFFER IMAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Jagan Nath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 955, "end_char": 965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the application of Jagan Nath filed under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 978, "end_char": 986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1287, "end_char": 1306, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SALAT PRAGJI KARAMSI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1308, "end_char": 1328, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SALAT PRAGJI KARAMSI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1331, "end_char": 1339, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GOVINDA MENON", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1368, "end_char": 1381, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. GOVINDA MENON", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "L. KAPUR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1389, "end_char": 1401, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.L. KAPUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Prevention ef Gambling Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1557, "end_char": 1583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "cl. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1653, "end_char": 1658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention ef Gambling Act", "statute": "Prevention ef Gambling Act"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Gambling Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1717, "end_char": 1743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1793, "end_char": 1801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Gambling Act", "statute": "Prevention of Gambling Act"}}, {"text": "State of", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1972, "end_char": 1980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of\n\nBaning nf-Dtsp11te betu; een enlpioyer and a ringie ri.; orkn1an--TV!zether induJtrial dzspute-Governnu, nt making referer.ce on the assufn/Jtion that a dispute exsits betiveen the ernployer and hi_1 u1nrk1nen--l11hether r:alidity of the re_(erence can be questioned --U.P. Industrial Di•putes Act,\n\n1947 (U.P.\n\nXXVIII rd\" 1947), ss.2, 3-Industrial Disputes Act, 19.J.7 (XIV ef 19~ 7, s. 2 (k).\n\nA dispute bern:een an employer and a single workman dot>s not fall \\vithin the definition of \"industrial dispute\" under the L'.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. But though the applicability of the Act to an individual di;; pute as oppost>d to a dispute involving a groLp of \\l\\1orkmen is excluded, if the workmen as a body or a considerable section of them make common cause with the individual '\\York.man then such a dispute \"'ould be an industrial dispute.\n\nCentral Provinces Transport Service Ltd. v. Raghunath Copa!\n\nPatwardhan, (1956) S. C. R. 956 and D N. Banerji v. P. R.\n\nMukherjee, (1953) S.C:.R. 302, rderred to.\n\nSwadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen, ( 1953) 1 L.L.J. 757, in so for as it decideci that a dispute raised by an individual workman is within an industrial dispute, disapprnved.\n\nGase-law reviewed.\n\nThe third respondent was employed as a lino typist by the appellant company but on allegations of incompetence he was dismissed from service.\n\nHis case \\\\as not taken up by any union of workers of the appllaot C'.lmpany nor by any of the unions of workmen employed in similar or allied trades, but the\n\nU.P. \\Vorking Journalists Union, Lucknow, with which the third resp ble section of them make common cause with the individual WDrkman and thus create conditions contemplated by s. 3 of the U.P. Act which is the foundation of State Governmental action under that Act.\n\nThe other provisions which follow that section only c.ubserve the carrying out of the objects of the Acts specified therein.\n\nThe use of the word workman in the singular in rr. 4, 5 and I 5 forms the basis of the argument for the inclusion of an individual dispute in the expression industrial dispute. But this suffers from more infirmities than one.\n\nRule 4 authorises a workman to (') 3 Co. Rep. 58. 76 E. R. 764.\n\napply to a conciliation Officer for the settlement of an industrial dispute.\n\nThe meaning sought to be given to this word is inconsistent with the language of the latter part of that rule ;\n\n\"or wh'ere no registered trade union of workmen exists in any concern or industry, the representatives not more than 5 in number of the workmen .......... .. duly elected.\"\n\nThe first proviso to r. 5 is no surer foundation for the argument because in the context it can only be interpreted to mean that, should there be an industrial dispute then all workmen who may individually be the cause of the dispute or are to be affected by its decision should get notices of foe proceedings. Similarly, r. r 5 only provides for the r::presentation of \"a workman\" even if he is only one by an officer of a trade union or other person mentioned in the rule.\n\nBesides, s. r 3 ( 2) of the General Clauses Act as to the interpretation of the singular and the plural considerably reduces the efficacy of the argument, which altogether loses its force in view of r. 26 which is as follows :\n\n\"During the pendency of any conciliation proceeding or proceedings before the Tribunal or an Adjudicator in respect of any dispute an employer shall not\n\n(a) alter to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the commencement of such proceedings or (b) discharge or punish, whether such punishment is by dismissal or otherwise, any workman concerned in such disp.ute save with the express permission in writing of a Conciliation Officer of the area concerned irrespective of the fact whether the dispute is pending before a Board or the Tribunal or an Adjudicator.\"\n\nThe use of the words \"workmen\" and \"workman\" in the above rule is indicative of the intention of the Act being applicable to collective disputes and not to individual ones, and this is fortified by the finality and the binding effect to awards by r. 28 and more specially by s. r8 of the Central Act which makes\n\nThe Newspapers Ltd. v.\n\nThe State ln,/ustrial\n\nTribunal, U. P.\n\nKapur J.\n\nThe .1Vewspapers\n\nLtd. v.\n\nThe State Industrial Tribunal, U. P.\n\nKaptir J.\n\nawards binding not only on the individuals present or represented but on all the workmen employed in the establishment and even on future entrants.\n\nAnother objection to reading these rules in the manner above suggested is that it would be tantamount to enlarging the scope of the expression 'industrial dispute' and the powers conferred on the State Government under s, 3 of the U.P. Act. The executive cannot under the power of framing rules and regulations clothe itself with powers which the Statute itself does not give and which are inconsistent with the interpretation put on the expression 'industrial dispute.' The cardinal rule in regard to promulgation of bye-laws or making rules is that they must be legi fidei rationi consona, and therefore all regulations which are contrary or repugnant to statutes under which they are made are ineffective. If the expression 'industrial dispute' as ordinarily understood and, construed conveys a dispute between an employer on the one hand and the workmen acting collectively on the other, then the definition of those words cannot be widened by a statutory rule or regulation promulgated under the Statute or by Executive fiat.\n\nThe notification in the present case was under s.3. ( c), ( d) and (g) and under s. 8 which deal with ( c) the appointment of industrial Courts, (d) referring any industrial disputes and (g) incidental or supplementary matters.\n\nThe Executive may in the exercise of these powers make such regulations which are necessary but under that garb it cannot extend the definition of the term industrial disputes, µor is this extended meaning necessary to subserve the objects of the Act.\n\nIn our opinion therefore rules 4, 5 and r 5 of the Rules cannot be a valid foundation for sustaining the argument raised that an individual dispute was within the definition of 'industrial dispute.' Ordinarily, an award of a tribunal binds or affects the rights of parties to the proceedings but awards of Industrial Tribunals have extended implications and may affect the rights of all workmen of a concern or undertaking and even the future entrants.\n\nThis doctrine of\n\nrepresentation which enlarges the meaning of 'parties' in the U.P. & Central Acts is an essential idea associated with industrial disputes and supports collectiveness as opposed to & individualism.\n\nSee Latham C.J. in Metal Trades Employers Association v.\n\nAmalgamated Engineering Union (1).\n\nThen there is the prohibition under r. 26 of the U.P.\n\nAct and s. 33 of the Central Act against any change in conditions of service during the pendency of the proceedings the object of which is to ensure discipline and industrial truce during that period which also supports the basic idea of collectiveness in 'industrial disputes'.\n\nIn Central Provinces Transport Services Ltd., v.\n\nRaghunath Copa! Patwardhan (2), this Court observed that decided cases in India disclose three views as to the meaning of 'industrial dispute'\n\n(i) a dispute between an employer and a single workman cannot be an \"industrial dispute\";\n\n(ii) it can be an industrial dispute ; and\n\n(iii) it cannot per se be an industrial dispute but may become one if taken up by a trade union or a number of workmen.\n\nThis Court discussed the scope of industrial dispute as defined in s. 2 (k) of the Central Act, and after referring to the conflict of judicial opinion as to its applicability to the case of a dispute between an employer and a single workman further observed :\n\n\"The preponderance of judicial opinion is clearly in favour of the last of the three views stated above, and there is considerable reason behind it.\n\nNotwithstanding that the language of s. 2(k) is wide enough to cover a dispute between an employer and a single employee, the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act does appear to contemplate that the machinery provided therein should be set in motion, to settle only disputes which involve the rights of workmen as a class and that a dispute touching the individual rights of a workman was not intended to be the subject of an adjudication under the Act, when the same had not been taken up by the union or a number of workmen.\"\n\n(') [!935] 54 C.L.R. 387.\n\n(2) [1956] S.C, R. 956.\n\nThe Newsp1pers\n\nLtd. v.\n\nThe State Industrial Tribunal, U. P.\n\nKapur J.\n\nTiu Newspapers\n\nLtd. v.\n\nThe State Industrial Tribunal U. P.\n\nKapur J.\n\nAlthough the question did not directly arise, this Court in D. N. Banerji v. P. R. Mukherjee and others(') discussed the meaning of the expression 'industrial dispute' and was of the opinion that it \"conveys the meaning to the ordinary mind that the dispute must be such as would affect large groups of workmen and employers ranged on opposite sides ...... But at the same time, having regard to the modern conditions of society were capital and labour have organised themselves into groups for the purpose of fighting their disputes and settling them on the basis of the theory that in union is strength, and collective bargaining has come to stay, a single employee's case might develop into an industrial dispute, when as often happens, it is taken up by the trade union of which he is a member and there is a concreted demand by the employees for redress\".\n\nThis view is in consonance with the basic idea under lying modern industrial legislation.\n\nThe interpretation given to the coresponding phrase \"trade dispute\" in Engfoh law and \"industrial dispute\" in Australian Law also accords with this view and m the absence of an express provision to the contrary or necessary intendment thre is no reason to give a different interpretation to the expression in the Indian Statute.\n\nAccording to English decisions an individual dispute of a workman is not included in 'trade dispute' which corresponds to 'Industrial Dispute' in the Indian Act.\n\nIn the English Trade Disputes Act of r 906 and r g I 9 as also in Reg. 58-AA of the Defence (General) Regulation, 1939, 'trade dispute' as defined in language very similar to 'industrial dispute' in the Indian Statute Dealing with a trade dispute, Lord Shaw in Conway v. Wade (') said :\n\n\"But I cannot see may way to hold that \"trade dispute\" necessarily includes accordingly every case of personal difference between any one workman and one or more of his fellows.\n\nIt is true that after a certain stage even such a dispute, although originally grounded,\n\n(1) [1953] s.c.R. 302, 3ro.\n\n(2) [1909] A.G. 506, 520.\n\nit may be, upon personal animosity, may come t be a subject in which sides are taken, and may develop into a shuation of a general aspect containing the characteristics of a trade dispute ; but until it reaches that stage I cannot hold that a trade dispute necessarily exi, ts .\"\n\nLord \\\\'right observed in National Association of Local Government Officers v. Bolton Corporation( 1).\n\n\"I think the same may be said of the Industrial Courts Act and of reg. 58-AA, in both of which the word 'trade' is used in the very wide connotation which it bears in the modern legislation dealing with conditions of employment, particularly in relation to matters of collective bargaining and the like.\"\n\nEx parte Keable Press Ltd. (2 ) was an instance of an individual dispute developing into a 'trade dispute' because of the strike by a union to enforce the reinstatement of dismissed workman.\n\nThat was how this term (trade dispute) was interpreted by the Court of Appeal in R. v. National Arbitration Tribuna/(3) after taking into consideration the definition of the word 'd. ispute,.\n\nIn Australian cases also, without specific reference to any definition of the phrase the courts have excluded individual disputes from the scope of industrial disputes. In ]umbunna Coal Mine v. Victorian Coal Miners Association (4), Griffths C. ]. observed :\n\n\"An industrial dispute exists where a considerable number of employees engaged in some branch of industry make common' cause in demanding from or refusing to their employers (whether one or more some change in the conditions of employment which is denied to them ............................................. \" Similarly in Federated Saw Mills & Co.\n\nEmployees of Australasia v. Jemes Moore & Son Properietory Ltd. (5), Griffths C. J. ga, e the characteristics of an industrial dispute as follows :\n\n\"It is necessary at the outset to consider the meaning which the term 'industrial dispute' conveyed\n\n{1) [19H) A.C. 166, 185.\n\n(3) (1951] 2 All E.R. 828.\n\n(2) ( 9H] 2 All E.R. 633. \\4) [1go8] 6 C.L.R. 309, 332.\n\n(5) [1909] 8 C.L.R. 465, 487, 488.\n\nThe Newspapm w.\n\nThe &ate Industrial\n\nTribunal, U. P.\n\nKapur].\n\nThe Newspapers\n\nL, d,\n\nThe State industrial\n\nTribunal, U. P,\n\nK:, w, rJ.\n\nin 1 goo to the minds of persons conversant with the English language .......................................... \" \"The word 'industrial' ...... denotes two qualties which distinguish them from ordinary private disputes betweenindividuals, namely, ......... (') that on one side at least of the dispute the disputants are a body of men acting collectively and not individually. \" Issacs J. in George Hudson Ltd. v. Australian Timber Workers Union (') sta tecl :\n\n\"The very nature of an 'industrial dispute', as clistingui, hecl from an individual dispute, is to obtain new industrial conditions, not merely for the specific individuals then working ......... It is a battle by the claimants, not for themselves alone and not as against the respondents alone, but by the claimants so far as they represent their class ................... \" According to Griffths C.J. \"The term \"industrial dispute\" connotes a real and substantial difference having some element of persistency, and likely, if not adjusted, to endanger the industrial peace of the community\".\n\nViele Federated Saw Mills Case (') at p. 488.\n\nThe same meaning was attached to the expression by Latham C. ]. in J\\; fetal Traders Employers Association v. Amalgamated Engineering Union (') at p. 4o3:\n\n\"Industrial disputes are essentially group contests-there is always an industrial group on at least one side. A claim of an individual employee against his employer is not in itself an industrial dispute ...... \" We shall now refer to the Indian decisions which bear on this question.\n\nRajamannar C.J. in Kandan Texti Ltd, v.\n\nThe Industrial Tribunal, Maras and another (•) held that the definition of industrial dispute is wide enough to cover a dispute between an employer and an individual workman but taking into consideration S. 18 of the Central Act he was of the opinion that such an extanded definition cannot be given to it in S. 2 (k) of the Central Act. Mack J. agreed with the decision of Rajamannar C. J. but he said that the case of an\n\n(1) [1923] 32 C.L.R. 413, 441.\n\n(3) [1935] 54 C. L. R. 387, 403.\n\n(2) [1909] 8 C.L.R. 465, 487, 488.\n\n(4) A. I. R. 1951 Madras 616.\n\nindividual workman if taken up by the worker's union makes such a dispute an industrial dispute.\n\nIn that case 1 1 items of difference were referred to the Industrial Tribunal. One of the items in dispute was the wrongful removal of a workman, Sundaram by name. In the\n\nHi2'.h Court an objection was taken to the legality of the award on the ground that no industrial dispute existed and that there was no material before the Government on the basis of which it could make a reference.\n\nIt was held that the dispute as to a single workman was not an 'industrial dispute.' Kandan Textile Ltd. case (1) was followed in United Commercial Bank Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Labour, Madras( 2 ) which was a case under s. 41 of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act and the right of appeal given to an individual employee against the order of the employer dispensing with his services under s. 41 (2) of Madras Shops and Establishments Act was challenged on the ground that it had been taken away by the Central Act.\n\nIt was held that an individual worker had the right to appeal. Vishwanatha Sastri ]. in his judgment referred with approval to the distinction made between an individual dispute and an industrial dispute in Kandan Textile Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras (supra).\n\nThe second view that such a dispute falls within the definition of the word \"industrial dispute\" is supported by a decision of a Full Bench of the Labour Appellate Tribunal-Swadeslzi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v.\n\nTheir Workmen( 3).\n\nThere the question was mainly decided on the basis of s. 33-A of the Central Act (introduced in 1950) which gives the right to an individual workman dismissed or dealt with contrary to s. 33 of the Act during an industrial dispute to raise the matter before a tribunal.\n\nThe introduction of s. 33-A would not alter the construction to be placed on the phrase 'indmtrial dispute'. On the contrary it supports the view that an individual di!.pute is not comprised in that phrase. In view of what has been said above, we are of the opinion that in so far as that case lays down\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1951 Madras 616,\n\n(o) I.L.R. [1952) Madras 43.\n\n(3)_ [1953] 1 L.L.J. 757. 4-99 s. c. l./59\n\nThe NewJpapers\n\nLtd.\n\nV, The State Industrial\n\nTribunal, U. P.\n\nKapur J.\n\nTiu Newspapers\n\nLid,\n\nV, Tht State Industrial Tribunal, U. P.\n\nKapur J.\n\nthat a dispute raised by an individual workman as to his personal grievance is within an industrial dispute, it cannot be said to have been correctly decided.\n\nThe cases which support the third view are th'! following . ]. Chowdhury v. M. C. Banne1jee(1) was a case .in which a lino operator was removed from service on the ground of his negligence and arrears of work. The matter was referred to the Industrial Tribunal under the Central Act.\n\nThe Management moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution and s. 45 of the Specific Relief Act and it was held that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the matter as on a perusal of the various sections of the Central .\\ct including ss. IO and r 8 the dispute of an individual workman was not covered bv the term 'industrial dispute'. In Bilash Chandra ,\\fitra v, Balmer Lawrie & Co. ('), a suit was brought for the recO\\ery of arrears of wages on the basis of an award of an Industrial Tribunal and one of the issues raised was whether an 'individual dispute' fell within 'industrial di; pute'. Follm, ing the judgment in ]. Chowdhwy v.\n\nJI. C.\n\nBannerje~ (1 ), Bose J. held that it did not.\n\nAnother case in which this dew was held rs N. /. Assurance Co. v. C. G. /. Tribunal (').\n\nThere the Government referred the question of dismissal of an employee of an Assurance Co. and it was not proved that his case was taken up by the employees association.\n\nThe same view was adopted in Standard Vacuum Oil Co. v. Industrial Tribunal(•).\n\nIn Lakshmi Talkies, Afadras v.\n\nMunuswami and Others('), Balakrishna Ayyar J. held that an 'industrial dispute' arises where a case of an individual workman is espoused by a union. The same view was taken in Lynus & Co. v. Hemanta Kumar Samanta(').\n\nThe view taken in these cases is in accord with the interpretation we have put on the expression 'Industrial dispute' as defined in the U.P. Act or the Central Act.\n\n(1) [1951] 55 C.W.N. 256.\n\n(4) l.L.R. [1952] T.av • .CO. 432.\n\n(o) f1952] 57 C, W.N. 169.\n\n(5) [1955] 2 L.L.J. 477.\n\n(3) [1953] I.L.R. 32 Patna 181.\n\n(6) [1956] 2 L.LJ. Ilg • . ,.··\n\nTaking into consideration the whole tenor of the Act and the decisions of this Court the decided cases to the extent that they take a contrary view, i. e., an individual dispute is comprised in an 'industrial dispute' must unless there is something peculiar as to facts , be held to have been wrongly decided.\n\nIn spite of the fact that the making of a reference by the Government under the Industrial Disputes Act is the exercise of its administrative powers, that is not destructive of the rights of an aggrieved party to show that what was referred was not an 'industrial dispute' at all and therefore the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal to make the award can be questioned, even\n\nthough the factua~ existence of a dispute may not be subject to a party's challenge.\n\nState of Madras v. C. P.\n\nSarathy(').\n\nIt may also be noted that the notification issued by the U. P. Government on January 3, 1953, already quoted proceeds on the assumption that a dispute exists between the \"employer and hi<> workmen\". The points of dispute in the reference, however, comprise the wrongful termination of the service of only Tajammul Hussain, a lino operator. The words used in the first part of the notification show that the Government was labouring under the misapprehension that this dispute was between the employer on the one hand and his workmen on the other, which, in fact it was not.\n\nTajammul Hussain could not be termed workmen (in the plural) nor could the U. P.\n\nWorking Journalists Union be called \"his workmen\" nor is there any indication that the individual dispute has got transformed into an industrial dispute.\n\nThe very basis, therefore, of the reference was bad and must be held to be so.\n\nWe would, therefore, allow this appeal with costs.\n\n1(1) [1953] S.C.R. 334, 347. 99 .\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nThe Newspapers\n\nLtd. v.\n\nThe State Industrial\n\nTribunal, U. P.\n\nKapur J.", "total_entities": 96, "entities": [{"text": "Kapur J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 47, "end_char": 55, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Kapur J.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135, "end_char": 139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 239", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 290, "end_char": 298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 343, "end_char": 348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 28, I 950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 511, "end_char": 529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, the notification issued by the Chief Commissioner on November 28, I 950 was valid and issued under legal authority ; and the Act came into force in the parts to which the notification made it so applicable."}}, {"text": "THE NEWSPAPERS LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1191, "end_char": 1209, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE NEWSPAPERS LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, U", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1215, "end_char": 1247, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, U.P", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1253, "end_char": 1261, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1263, "end_char": 1274, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B. P. SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss.2, 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1651, "end_char": 1658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1659, "end_char": 1682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1706, "end_char": 1710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1847, "end_char": 1876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "U.P. \\Vorking Journalists Union, Lucknow", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2854, "end_char": 2894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His case \\\\as not taken up by any union of workers of the appllaot C'.lmpany nor by any of the unions of workmen employed in similar or allied trades, but the\n\nU.P. \\Vorking Journalists Union, Lucknow, with which the third resp workmen\"."}}, {"text": "January 3, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33310, "end_char": 33325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may also be noted that the notification issued by the U. P. Government on January 3, 1953, already quoted proceeds on the assumption that a dispute exists between the \"employer and hi<> workmen\"."}}, {"text": "Tajammul Hussain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33538, "end_char": 33554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The points of dispute in the reference, however, comprise the wrongful termination of the service of only Tajammul Hussain, a lino operator.", "canonical_name": "Tajammul Hussain Lino"}}, {"text": "Tajammul Hussain", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33808, "end_char": 33824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tajammul Hussain could not be termed workmen (in the plural) nor could the U. P.\n\nWorking Journalists Union be called \"his workmen\" nor is there any indication that the individual dispute has got transformed into an industrial dispute.", "canonical_name": "Tajammul Hussain Lino"}}, {"text": "U. P.\n\nWorking Journalists Union", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 33883, "end_char": 33915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tajammul Hussain could not be termed workmen (in the plural) nor could the U. P.\n\nWorking Journalists Union be called \"his workmen\" nor is there any indication that the individual dispute has got transformed into an industrial dispute."}}]} {"document_id": "1957_1_770_774_EN", "year": 1957, "text": "March 26.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nTHE STATE OF\n\nUTTAR PRADESH v.\n\nMOHAMMED SA YEED\n\n(BHAGWATI, JAFER IMAM and A.K. SARKAR JJ.)\n\nSurety bond--Undertaking to forfeit sum of monty to King Emperor Qaisar-e-Hind on Jaiture to produce accused-Whether bond legal and er.Jorceable-Code of Criminal Procedure, ss. 499, 514, and 555-Adaptation ef Laws Order, 1950, cl. 4ln 1953 the respondent executed a surety bond undertaking to produce the accused before the ~1agistru.te and to forfeit Rs. 500 to King Emperor Qaisar-e-Hind as penalty if he failed to do so.\n\nUpon his failure to produce the acc; used, the !vfagistrate forfeited the bond to the extent of Rs. 300. The contenlion of the respondent \\Vas that the bond not being in favour of the Government, could not be forfeited.\n\nHeld, that the bond \\Vas a bond unknovvn to the law of the Republic of India under the Code of Criminal Procedure at the time of its execution and could not be forfeited. The respondent did not execute a bond by which he bound himself to forfeit the said sum either to the Government of the Union of India or that of the State of Uttar Pradesh. To be a valid bond, the undertaking should have been to forfeit to the Government and not to the King Emperor. The words King Emperor Qaisar-e-Hind in the bond executd by the respondent could not be read, by \\'irtue of cl. 4 of the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950, to mean Goverrunent.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. 130 of 1955.\n\nAppeal under Arti<; le 134(1) (c) of the Constitution of India from the judgment and order dated March 11, 1955, of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) at Lucknow in Criminal Revision No. 60 of 1954 arising out of the judgment and order dated February 21, 1954, of the Sessions Judge at Gonda in Criminal Appeal No. 292 of 1953.\n\nG. C. Mathur and C. P. Lal, for the appellant.\n\n1957'.\n\nMarch 26. The Judgement of the Court was delivered by IMAM J.-This is an appeal by the State of Uttar Pradesh against the decision of the Allahabad High Court on a certificate granted by that Court that the case was a fit one for appeal to this Court.\n\nThe undisputea facts are that one Mohammad Yasin was prosecuted under s. 379, Indian Penal Code.\n\nHe was released on bail. The respondent along with o;-ie\n\nRam Narain stood surety for him, having executed surety bonds under s. 499 of the Code of Criminal\n\nProcedure, undertaking to produce the accused Yasin before the Court to answer the charge and to forfeit Rs. 500 each to King Emperor Qaiser-e-Hind as a penalty if they failed to do so.\n\nYasin absconded. All attempts to secure his presence before the Court were of no avail. Consequently notices were issued under s. 514 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the sureties\n\nto show cause why their bonds should not be forfeited.\n\nThe Magistrate, after giving the matter his consideration, ordered their bonds to be forfeited to the extent of Rs. 300 each.\n\nThe respondent appealed to the Sessions Judge of Gonda who dismissed his appeal.\n\nDissatisfied with the orders of the :Magistrate and the Sessions Judge, the respondent filed a criminal revision in the High Court and Mulla J. allowerl his application and set aside the order of the Magistrate forfeiting the bond executed by him.\n\nAt the request of the Government Advocate the learned Judge granted the requisite certificate by virtue of which the present appeal is before use.\n\nThe only question for consideration is whether the bond executed by the respondent was one under the Code of Criminal Procedure and therefore capable of being forfeited in accordance with the provisions of s. 514, Criminal Procedure Code. Section 499 of the\n\nCode requires that before any person is released on bail or; released on his own bond, a bond for such sum of money as the police officer or Court, as the case may be, thinks sufficient shall be executed by such person, and, when he is released on bail, by one or more sufficient sureties conditioned that such person shall attend at the time and place mentioned in the bond, and shall continue so to attend until otherwise directed by the police officer or Court, as the case may be.\n\nIn Schedule V of the Code of Criminal Procedure various forms are set out and s. 555 of the Code provides that subject to the power conferred by s. 554 and by\n\nThe Stat• rests.\n\nOwelty of partition may be awarded to equalize the shares of the parties, and may be decreed to be a lien on the excessive allotment.\n\nThough only when necessary to a fair partition, and it should be employed as little as possible.\"\n\nThis position has been summarized in Freeman's Cotenancy and Partition ( 1886 Edition) page 676, para. 507, under the caption of \"Owelty\" :-\n\n\"Owilty\" :-\"When an equal partition cannot be otherwise made, courts of equity may ortler that a certain sum be paid by the party to whom the most valuable property has been assigned.\n\nThe sum thus directed to be paid to make the partition equal is called \"owelty\". It is a lien on the property on account of which it was granted. \"The law cannot contemplate the injustice of taking property from one person and giving it to another without an equivalent, or a sufficient security for it.\" The lien for owelty has precedence over prior mortgages and other liens existing against the cotenant against whom the owelty was awarded.\"\n\nIt is significant to note that this provision for owelty is construed as a lien which the co-sharer who is awarded owelty is deemed to acquire on an excessive allotment of property to the other co-sharer.\n\nOwelty in general and lien therefor are thus described in Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 68, s. 15 :-\n\n\"Section 15.\n\nOwelty and Lien Therefor\n\n(a) In General.\n\n(b) Liens.\n\n(a) In General.\n\nThe parties to a voluntary partition may agree to pay owelty to equalise the shares allotted.\n\nOwelty is the difference which is paid or secured by one coparcener or co-tenant to another for the purpose of equalizing a partition. The power to award\n\nT. S. SwaminathtJudayar v.\n\nThe Oj/icial Receiver of West T anjor1\n\nBkagwati].\n\nT .S .. Swamfruitha\n\nudqJar\n\nV, The O./ficial liectivtr of W tJl T anjore\n\nBhagwati].\n\nowelty has, from the earlier times, been regarded as necessary to the act of partitioning property ; and the parties to a voluntary partition may agree to the payment of owelty in order to equalize the shares allotted ; and, where the matter of making the partition is delegated to commissioners, they have the power to award owelty as a necessary incident to the partition.\n\n(b) Liens.\n\nAn agreement for owelty in a voluntary partition of land ordinarily creates a lien or charge on the land.\n\nAn agreement for owelty ordinarily creates a lien or charge on the land taken under the partition, and this lien may exist because of an express agreement between the parties providing for it or it may be implied in the absence of such express agreement.\"\n\nIt therefore follows that when an owelty is awarded to a member on partition for equalization of the shares on an excessive allotment of immovable properties to another member of the joint family, such a provision of owelty ordinarily creates a lien or a charge on the land taken under the partition. A lien or a charge may be created in express terms by the provisions of the partition decree itself.' There would thus be the creation of a legal charge in favour of the member to whom such owelty is awarded.\n\nIf, however, no such charge is created in express terms, even so the lien may exist because it is implied by the very terms of the partition in the absence of an express provision in that behalf.\n\nThe member to whom excessive allotment of property has been made on such partition cannot claim to acquire properties falling to his share irrespective of or discharged from the obligation to pay owelty to the other members.\n\nWhat he gets for his share is, therefore, the properties allotted to him subject to the obligation to pay such owelty and there is imported by necessary implication an obligation on his part to pay owelty out of the properties allotted to his share and a corresponding lien in favour of the members to whom such owelty is awarded on the properties which have fallen to his share.\n\nNot only is this the normal position on a partition decree where there is an unequal distribution of properties among the members of the joint family but even where an encumbrance has been created on a member's share before the partition is effected, the encumbrancer is postponed to the member to whom such owelty is awarded under the partition decree.\n\nA lien or a charge created in favour of a member in regard to such owelty obtains precedence over an encumbrance and there are authorities to show that such lien or charge has priority over an earlier mortgage.\n\nThe following passage from Mitra on the Law of Joint Property & Partition in British India, Second Edition, page 414, enunciates the abo\\'.e position :\n\n\"You )Nill note that sums directed to be paid for the purpose of equalizing the values of the shares are in legal languag~ called \"owelty\". The Commissioners have no authority without express authorization by the Court to award this compe.nsation. (See Rule 14, O.XXVI, C.P. Code). Where in a suit for partition the decree of the Court declares that any sum of money should be paid as owelty by one co-sharer to another the court may direct such sum to be a charge on the share allotted.\n\nI1,1 such a case should the co-sharer before partition have created any mortgage in respect of his undivided interest prior to the partition, the charge for the owelty will have precedence over the mortgage.\n\nShahebzada Mohammed Kazim Shah v.\n\nR. S. Hill (1907) I.L.R. Cal.. 388.\"\n\nTo the same effect is the passage in Mulla's Transfer of Property Act (4th Edition) at page 21 I : \"The lien of a co-sharer for owelty money on partition is entitled to precedence over pi:-ior mortgagees of property allotted to the co-sharer who is liable to pay owelty.\"\n\nShahebzada Mohammed Kazim Shah v. R. S. Hill (.') was a case where the appellants had been awarded two sums of Rs. 37,000 and Rs. 9,500 by way of owelty on partition. At the date of the partition there was\n\n( 1) LL.R. (1907) 35 Cal. 388, 39>, 393\n\n195.7\n\nT . S. Swaminathaudyar\n\nv, The Official Receiver of West T anjore\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nT. .S. Swaminatha~\n\nudt!Yar\n\nThe Olficia/ Receiver of West T anjore\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nsubsisting a mortgage on a portion of the property which was the subject-matter of partition and the question arose whether the amounts awarded by way of owelty on partition were entitled to priority over the mortgagees.\n\nIt was observed by Maclean C. J. in his judgment -\n\n\"Then arises the question of priority. To determine that question it becomes necessary•to ascertain what was the substituted property which the mortgagor took under the partition.\n\nIt is clear that all he took was the house No. 52-2 Park Street, subject to the charges of Rs. 37,000 and Rs. 9,500 in favour of the appellants ; and it can only be upon that, that the Roy mortgagees can rank as mortgages, that is, upon No. 52-2 Park Street subject to the charges created by the decree.\"\n\nStephen J., who delivered a short but concurring judgment added :\n\n\"It is quite plain that the appellant's claim, which is a charge upon the property, constitutes a deduction from the corpus of the property and is not affected by any dealings ,., ith the possession of the property on which the decision of the Judge of the Court of the first instance is based.\"\n\nThere was no doubt on the facts of this case a charge expressly created in favour of the co-sharer who had been awarded o\")'elty but that in our opinion does not make any diITerence to the position.\n\nThe moment there is a provision for such owelty made in a partition decree, the member in w:10se favour that provision has been made is entitICd to a lien or a charge over the property which has fallen to the share of the member to whom property of a higher value has been allotted.\n\nIf such a lien or a charge is expressly declared, so far so good but even if it is not so expressly declared, there is by necessary implication the creation of a lien or a charge in his favour for the amount of such owelty.\n\nThis case was followed in Poovanalingam Servai \\'.\n\nVecrai(') where Phillips J. observed as follows :\n\n\"There can be no doubt that in a partition suit all equities between the members of the coparcenary\n\n(1) 1\\.I.R. (1926) 1Lidra:> i66.\n\nshould be worked out allotting to each member the ] share to which he is equitably entitled.\"\n\nAfter quoting the passage frorri Freeman's Co-tenancy & Partition set out above, the learned Judge further observed :\n\n\"Even if there is no legal charge in the present case, yet on equitable principles such a charge can be enforced and when it comes to partitioning the property between two co-tenants, this equity should in my opinion be enforced.\"\n\nThe High Court in passing the order dated November 5, 1943, initially went wrong in holding that no charge was created in favour of the appellant / -r under the terms of the decree dated, May 9, 1938, in A.S. No. 60 of 1933.\n\nNo doubt the legal adviers of the appellants were responsible for this result in so far as they invited the Court to construe the decree as creating an express charge in fayour of the appellant.\n\nNo such express charge could be spelt out of the terms of the decree and in so far as the High Court came to the conclusion that no such express charge was created in favour of the appellant, it was u11doubtedly correct.\n\nBut, at the same time, the High Court should have considered whether bv reason of the provision for owclty contained in tl1e term's of that decree, there \\ was, under the circumstances, by necessary implication a lien or a charge created in favour of the appellant for the payment of the sum of Rs. 24,257-0-8 and interest out of the properties falling to the share of the third Defendant's branch and therein the High Court fell into an error. ' This error was again repeated by the High Court while passing the orders under appeal in A.AO. Nos.\n\n724, 725 and 726 of 1945.\n\nThe question which the High Court ought to have addressed to itself was whether in spite of the fact that no express charge was created in favour of the appellant under the terms of the ---r decree dated the 9th May, 1938, in A. S. No. 60 of 1933 for the payment of Rs. 24,257-0-8 and interest out of the properties falling to the share of the 3rd Defendant's branch, there was by necessary implication a lien or a charge created for payment of that sum by reason\n\nT. S. Swaminathaudq-Par\n\nThe 0 .fficial Receiver of West T anjor1\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nT. S.\n\nSwaminatlia~\n\nudn)'ar\n\nThe Official R...ceivtr of JV tst T anjort\n\nBhagwati].\n\nof the provision for owelty having been made in favour of the appellant by way of equalization on partition.\n\nEven if no express charge was created there was in equity a lien or a charge created on the properties falling to the share of the third Defendant's branch and he did not acquire the properties which fell to his share on such partition irrespective of or discharged from the obligation to make payment of such sum out of the same.\n\nThe appellant was, in our opinion, entitled to payment of the sum of Rs. 24,257-0-8 and interest out of the properties which fell to the share of the third Defendant's branch on partition and which came to the possession of the respondent by reason of the insolvency of Defendant No. 3 . . This position was rightly appreciated by the learned Dist. Judge when he passed orders in favour of the appellant on July I 4\n\nI 945.\n\nThe following passage from his judgment, in our opinion, truly reflects the position as it obtained between the appellant and the respondent :\n\n\"When we scrutinize these facts, the conclusion is inevitable that the claim of the Respondent to the present amounts stands 'even higher than on the basis of the priority of a charge created in insolvency administration, whether by virtue of a \"security'', a charge created by an act of Court or a \"lien\" arising from the operation of any law or statute.\n\nIn fact, it could be contended with great force that the estate in insolvency which vested in the hands of the Official Receiver consisted of certain immovable properties minus the sum directed to be paid to the present Respondent by the sale of available portions of he estate as undertaken by the Official Receiver himself.\n\nThis was because 0. S. No. 22 of 1924 on the file of the Kumbakonam Sub-Court was a suit of partition in which the present Respondent was a 'harer and partner, exactly as the 3rd Defendant's branch represented another share. In decreeing the suit, equities arose for adjustment as between the several sharers, and it was found that the 3rd Defendant's branch was liable to the present Respondent in respect of certain overdrawals of the 3rd Defendant during\n\nthe minority of the Respondent, anci for certain lease amounts due.\n\nThe Official Receiver represented the 3rd Defendant's branch in the appeal, since the insolvency had supervened.\n\nThe matter wold at once be cleared from difficulty if we assume that the decree had dealt with actual sums of money instead of immovable properties. It will be obvious, in such a case that the estate which would have vested in the Official Receiver after the Appellate decree, for administration in Insolvency, would be the amount or amounts assigned to the branches of the 3rd Defendant and plaintiff at partition, as shares, deducting amounts payable to other co-sharers including the present Respondent.\n\nMerely because the estates actually consi .ted of immovable properties while the claim of a co-sharer like the present Respondent to an adjustment on grounds of equity, was recogni;:ed in the form of a direction to pay, by sale of a necessary portion of the estate, the central fact of the situation is not changed.\n\nIn other words, the present respondent cannot be really classed as a creditor of the insolvent's branch at all.\n\nIn respect of the sums due to him under the partition decree, directed to be paid from the estates of the Plaintiff and 3rd Defendant as equitable adjustment, he has really superior title, and, assuming for a moment that the direction related instead to a specific item of immovable property, it is obvious that such an item would not have formed part of the estate in insolvency at all.\n\nAs Mr. T. S. Krishnamurthi Ayyar for the Official Receiver has frankly conceded, it is a well-known principle that in suits for partition the shares are first assigned upon the simple basis of division for adminisp:ative convenience, claims inter se being worked out by specific directions for payment.\n\nNevertheless, in law and in fact, the shares actually derived by the parties to the suit are those subject to or qualified by the directions made in adjustment.\" If this was the true position as it obtained, and we are of the opinion that it was, then, the orders under appeal passed by the High Court were clearly wrong.\n\nThere was no justification for the respondent to ask\n\nT. S. SwaminatMudayar\n\nT ht 0 fficial\n\nReceiver of West Tanjore\n\nBhagwati].\n\nT. S. Swaminathaudayar v.\n\nThe 0 Jficial\n\nReceiver of West Tanjore\n\nfor a withdrawal of the sum of Rs. 5,200 which he had earlier deposited into Court on January 9, 1942, or for the restitution of the sums of Rs. 5,500 and Rs. 26,966 and Rs. 11 together with interest thereon as claimed.\n\nThese monies had been paid by the respondent in pursl!ance of the directions contained in the decree dated May 9, 1938, in A. S. No. 60 of 1933 and they had been rightly paid by him and they could never be the subject-matter of any execution proceedings as initiated by him.\n\nApart from the question whether s. 144 read with s. 151 of the Civil Procedure Code was at all applicable in the circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that the claim made by the respondent for the aforesaid sums was absolutely unjustified. \\Ne are accordingly of the opinion that the orders passed by the High Court in A. A. 0. Nos. 724, 725 and 726 of 1945 were wrong and should be reversed.\n\nThe respondent wrote on November 21, 1953, to the Regi.rence to it will be necessary.\n\nOn September 26, 1932, a final decree for partition was passed by the learned Subordinate Judge to whom the matter had come back after the disposal of the appeal from the preliminary decree.\n\nThe appellant before us was not sati:; fied with the final decree and he preferred an appeal from it to the High Court at Madras. That Appeal was marked AS. No. 60 of 1933.\n\nThe High Court passed its judgment and decree in that appeal on May g, 1938, varying the decree of the lower court. It is necessary to refer to portions of this decree\n\nT. S. Swaminalht1udayar v.\n\nTM Official\n\n&ceiver of West T l!rzjo,,\n\nSarkar J.\n\nT. S. Swaminat.a\n\nud, 393\n\n195.7\n\nT .", "canonical_name": "775\n\nT. S. SWAMINATHAUDAYAR"}}, {"text": "T. .S. Swaminatha~", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28651, "end_char": 28669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Swaminathaudyar\n\nv, The Official Receiver of West T anjore\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nT. .S. Swaminatha~\n\nudt!Yar\n\nThe Olficia/ Receiver of West T anjore\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nsubsisting a mortgage on a portion of the property which was the subject-matter of partition and the question arose whether the amounts awarded by way of owelty on partition were entitled to priority over the mortgagees.", "canonical_name": "775\n\nT. S. SWAMINATHAUDAYAR"}}, {"text": "Maclean", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28973, "end_char": 28980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was observed by Maclean C. J. in his judgment -\n\n\"Then arises the question of priority."}}, {"text": "Stephen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29493, "end_char": 29500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Stephen J., who delivered a short but concurring judgment added :\n\n\"It is quite plain that the appellant's claim, which is a charge upon the property, constitutes a deduction from the corpus of the property and is not affected by any dealings ,.,"}}, {"text": "Poovanalingam Servai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30592, "end_char": 30612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This case was followed in Poovanalingam Servai \\'."}}, {"text": "Phillips", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30634, "end_char": 30642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vecrai(') where Phillips J. observed as follows :\n\n\"There can be no doubt that in a partition suit all equities between the members of the coparcenary\n\n(1) 1\\.I.R. (1926) 1Lidra:> i66."}}, {"text": "9th May, 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32677, "end_char": 32690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question which the High Court ought to have addressed to itself was whether in spite of the fact that no express charge was created in favour of the appellant under the terms of the ---r decree dated the 9th May, 1938, in A. S. No."}}, {"text": "T. S. Swaminathaudq", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32934, "end_char": 32953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "24,257-0-8 and interest out of the properties falling to the share of the 3rd Defendant's branch, there was by necessary implication a lien or a charge created for payment of that sum by reason\n\nT. S. Swaminathaudq-Par\n\nThe 0 .fficial Receiver of West T anjor1\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nT. S.\n\nSwaminatlia~\n\nudn)'ar\n\nThe Official R...ceivtr of JV tst T anjort\n\nBhagwati].", "canonical_name": "775\n\nT. S. SWAMINATHAUDAYAR"}}, {"text": "T. S.\n\nSwaminatlia~", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33014, "end_char": 33033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "24,257-0-8 and interest out of the properties falling to the share of the 3rd Defendant's branch, there was by necessary implication a lien or a charge created for payment of that sum by reason\n\nT. S. Swaminathaudq-Par\n\nThe 0 .fficial Receiver of West T anjor1\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nT. S.\n\nSwaminatlia~\n\nudn)'ar\n\nThe Official R...ceivtr of JV tst T anjort\n\nBhagwati].", "canonical_name": "775\n\nT. S. SWAMINATHAUDAYAR"}}, {"text": "T. S. Krishnamurthi Ayyar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36771, "end_char": 36796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Mr. T. S. Krishnamurthi Ayyar for the Official Receiver has frankly conceded, it is a well-known principle that in suits for partition the shares are first assigned upon the simple basis of division for adminisp:ative convenience, claims inter se being worked out by specific directions for payment."}}, {"text": "T. S. SwaminatMudayar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37445, "end_char": 37466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was no justification for the respondent to ask\n\nT. S. SwaminatMudayar\n\nT ht 0 fficial\n\nReceiver of West Tanjore\n\nBhagwati].", "canonical_name": "775\n\nT. S. SWAMINATHAUDAYAR"}}, {"text": "s. 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38119, "end_char": 38125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 151", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38136, "end_char": 38142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "21, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38526, "end_char": 38534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent wrote on November 21, 1953, to the Regi.nforcement of fundamental rights.\n\nN. S. Bindra, Udhai Bhan Choudhury and Gopal Singh, for the petitioners.\n\nAmar Singh S. L. Pandhi and K. L. Mehta, for the Intervener. CustodU.:; Evacwe\n\nProp111Y, Punjab. 1957, March 29.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by JagannmDwdasJ.\n\nJAGANNADHADAS J.-This is an application under Art. 32 of the Constitution by the petitioners, Amar Singh and four others, in the following circumstances.\n\nAll these five are displaced persons who owned land in the non-suburban village of Chak. No. 159-RB, Tahsil Jaranwala, District Lyallpur in Pakistan. They were also co-sharers in a joint khata owned by some evacuees in village Sultanwind, a suburb of Amritsar in East Punjab. On their displacement, they were in the first instance temporarily allotted agricultural land in Sultanwind. Having regard to their original position in the village, they were allotted in the year 1 949 a total area of 38 standard acres and 13 units of agricultural land therein.\n\nThis allotment had to be disturbed under the following circumstances. The Director-General of Relief and Rehabilitation (Additional Custodian) directed by an order dated January 7, 1950, that out of the 1,263 standard acres and 1£ units of suburban land of Amritsar, 142 standard acres and 5 units were to be allotted to allottees of Provincial Gardens. This necessitated readjustment of allotments of the suburban land of Sultanwind amongst the various groups who had quasi-permanent allotment therein.\n\nAs a result of this readjustment which had to be carried out according to certain rules and instructions the allotment of these five petitioners (as also of some others) was proposed for cancellation by the order of the Deputy Custodian, Amritsar, dated July 31, 1951. This proposal was approved by the Custodian (Financial Commissioner, Relief and Rehabilitation) on February 6, 1952, and the 1allotment was\n\ncancelled. The proposal and the order of cancellation are said to have been passed without notice to the petitioners.\n\nBeing aggrieved thereby they moved the Custodian-General of Evacuee Property for revision thereof under s. 27 of the Administration of Evacuee\n\nAmar Singh\n\nCustodiun, Evacuee\n\nProptr!J, Punjab.\n\nJagannadhadrM J.\n\nProperty Act, 1 950 (XXXI of 1950). This was dealt with by the Deputy Custodian-Genera] who dismissed the same by a fairly elaborate order dated May 1, 1954, after hearing the parties. The petitioners have come up to this Court by this application under Art. 32 of the Constitution.\n\nThe case of the petitioners is that the allotment to them was on quasi-permanent basis and that, therefore, they have acquired certain rights in the lands which constitute 'property'.\n\nThey urge that the order of the Custodian cancelling the allotment and that of the Deputy Custodian-General affirming the same are in violation of their fundamental rights to property under Arts. 19(1)(f), 31(1) and 31(2) of the Constitution.\n\nThey accordingly contend that they are entitled to have these orders quashed and their rights to property declared and protected.\n\nThat the petitioners are allottees of agricultural land on the basis of what has come to be known as quasi-permanent allotment is not disputed. It is also not disputed that cancellation thereof was under the purported exercise of powers vested in the Custodian under certain provisions of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (XXXI of 1950) and the rules framed thereunder taken with some executive instructions. It may be mentioned that the term \"quasi-permanent allotment\" appears to be a term which has come into vogue in later statutory rules and has at no time been specifica!Iy defined, though it appears to be now fairly well-understood.\n\nThe two substantial questions that arise, therefore, for consideration are ( 1) whether the rights of a quasi-permanent allot tee constitute property within the meaning of the articles above referred to, and ( 2) whether the orders of the Custodian and Deputy Custodian-General cancelling the quasi-permanent allotment amount to violation of fundamental rights contemplated by the above articles. Both these questions require a review of the Evac.uee Property Law in so far as it relates to the allotment of agricultural lands of the evacuees to displaced !and-holders and an appreciation of the background of the circumstances that necessitated it.\n\nThe Declaration of Independence and the partition of India into Pakistan and India on August r 5, r 94 7, was accompanied by mass migrations of Non-Muslims from West Punjab to East Punjab and of Muslims from East Punjab to West Punjab. These mass migrations were on a stupendous scale.\n\nAbout five million persons are said to have moved from each side to the other.\n\nThis was done in a state of panic generated by communal riots.\n\nMigrants from West Punjab reached East Punjab almost destitute.\n\nThis unprecedented situation brought in its train gigantic problems of administration relating to rehabilitation and resettlement of these persons.\n\nOne of such problems was that relating to agricultural immovable property left on either side by the migrants. For purposes of convenience persons who crossed over from East Punjab to '\\'est Punjab are referred to as evacuees and persons who came over from West Punjab to East Punjab are referred to as displaced persons. The displaced persons are said to have left in Pakistan lands of the extent of about 67 l, akh acres.\n\nThe evacuees seem to have left in East Punjab and Pepsu, lands of the extent of about 47 lakh acre'. This meant a deficit of over 20 lakh acres for resettlement.\n\nIt would appear that in the earlier stages there were attempts to settle the question by way of mutual exchanges either in iPdividually or at the govermental level and by means of inter-dominion conferences bet- .ween India and Pakistan. But for one reason or other,\n\nthese attempts appear to have failed. The various :.teps and administrative measures taken to settle the displaced agricultural population who came over from West Punjab, on the hurriedly abandoned lands of the evacuees from East Punjab, are to be found described in the Land Resettlement Manual by Shri Tarlok Singh who was the Director-General of Relief and Rehabilitation (hereinfter referred to as the Resettlement Manual). In Dunichand Hakim v. Deputy Commissioner (Deputy Custodian, Evacuee Property), K arnal ( 1), this book has been referred to by this Court as having the stamp of authority.\n\nIt can be usefully referred to not\n\n(t) [1954] S. C.R. 578.\n\nAmar Singh v.\n\nCustodian, Ev(l(, uee\n\nProper(Y, Punjab.\n\nJagannadhadas ].\n\nAmtu Singh\n\nCustodian, Evactltt\n\nProperty, Purg\"ab.\n\nJagannadhadas].\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1957 necessarily as an authority for every statement of fact or law contained therein but as a guide to appreciate the background of the problems which the administration had to face in that unprecedented situation, how the administration attempted to solve the same, what were the rules and practice which the administration normally followed and considered binding on itself, and what ideas inspired the course of legislation in this behalf. It appears therefrom that within about a month after the partition of India, the Government had to take an emergency decision to allot evacuee lands to groups of displaced persons on temporary basis.\n\nBut this was found not to satisfy the displaced landholders.\n\nThere was insistent pressure from them for such allotment as would enable them to settle on the lands of the evacuees on a permanent basis.\n\nThis led to the abandonment of the policy of temporary allotments and the introduction of a system of allotment which came to be known as quasi-permanent allotment.\n\nThis policy was announced by the Government of East Punjab in its Press Communique date.cl February 7, 1948, which is reproduced at pages 28 and 29 of the Resettlement Manual. The following extract therefrom is instructive :\n\n\"The East Punjab Government propose to replace the present system of temporary allotments of evacuee lands by a new system of allotments which will take account of the holdings of evacuees in ', yest Punjab.\n\nThe new allotments will not confer rights of ownership or permanent occupancy, but the possession of allotted will be maintained.\n\nClaims of allottees will be dealt with in accordance with decisions reached eventually regarding the treatment of evacuee property.\n\nIn the new scheme of allotments, land will be allotted only to those who, in West Punjab, were owners, occupancy tenants under the Punjab Tenancy Act, and tenants under the Colonization of Government Lands Act and to certain other classes of grantees and holders of land in West Punjab to be specified by Government.\n\nIt is proposed to give to small holders allotments of equivalent areas, while in the case of larger holders there will be graded cuts.\n\nThe definition\n\n' '\n\nof the \"Small Holders\" and the details of the graded cuts will be determined when detailed information regarding the available areas in East Punjab and the East Punjab States, the areas held by the population to be settled in East Punjab and the East Punjab States, and other relevant information becomes available.\n\nIt is intended to complete the new system of allotments in the East Punjab and the East Punjab States, not later than the 31st May, 1948. Government are, however, anxious to introduce the new scheme as early as may 'be feasible and steps to this end will be taken at once.\n\nArrangements for collecting complete information regarding the land available for allotment in East Punjab and the East Punjab States and the land abandoned by individual evacuees will be taken in hand without delay and it is hoped also to make arrangements on a reciprocal basis to secure information from records ofrights in \\'\\'est Punjab.\n\nTo ensure accurate information an Ordinance will shortly be promulgated prescribing punishment for false information regarding claims to land and action by way of forfeiture and otherwise in respect of allotments taken on false information.\n\nClaims to land will be invited on a form to be prescribed by Government.\n\nUntil the new system of allotments can be introduced, the present system of allotments will continue and allotments made to the present holders will be maintained subject to a complete scrutiny of ex1stmg allotments, cancellation of unauthorised and excessive allotments, dispossession from illicit occupation and such other adjustments as may be necessary including adjustments in the unit of allotment decided upon by Government.\" To facilitate the process of resettling the displaced persons on evacuated land on this new basis of allotment various steps became necessary. They are roughly the following. 1.\n\nRegistration and verification of land claims. 2.\n\nAssessment and valuation of such claims.\n\nAmar Singh\n\nCustodian, EvatU• Properly, Punjab.\n\nJagannadhadas J\n\nAmar Singh v.\n\nCustodian, Evacuee\n\nProperty, Punjab,\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nClassification of the villages and of lands of evacuees available for allotment. 4.\n\nAllocation of the claims to various areas with reference to such classification. 5.\n\nAllotment of lands to individuals with reference to the valuation of their claims, guided by various considerations, priorities and preferences and so forth administrati\\\"elv determined.\n\nThe basic 'idea which inspired and regulated these measures was that the displaced landholder is to be allotted (subject to graded cuts) such lal!ds out of the evacuee agricultural Lrnd which, in its extent, quality and other rdc1ant features, bear some reasonable relation and correspondence to the lands left by him in \\\\'est Punjab.\n\nAll these steps involved very elaborate administrati1e measures as indicated above. \\ \\' e are concerned in this context to trace the lcg; islation which brought about these steps and to examine whether and to what extent such legislation recognised property rights in the displaced land-holders.\n\nBut before tracing the legislative measures which brought about the quasi-permanent allotments of evacuee lands in favour of displaced land-holders from \\\\'est Punjab, it will be convenient to have a brief survey of the present Jaw in its aprlication to administration of evacuee property of all kinds in general with the history of such of the provisions therein as arc relevant for. our purpose and then to consider the rekvutory rules maue in exercise of the statutory powers, have made a differef!ce in the position arising in respect of allotments of agricultural lands granted in favour of displaced persons in East Punjab who left landed property in West Punjab.\n\nIt is, therefore, necessart to review the same.\n\nThe first measure for the resettlement of the displaced land-holders of \\'\\'est Punjab on evacuee lands was the East Punjab Refugees (Registration of Land Claims) Ordinance, 1948 (E.P. Ordinance VII of 1948) which was replaced by East Punjab Refugees (Registration of Land Claims) Act, 1948 (E.P. XII of 1948).\n\nIt is in pursuance of the rules framed under this Act that what is known as the Parcha claim and the form therefor were standardised calling for accurate information as regards quite a large number of details which had to be taken into consideration in determining the land to be allotted to a displaced land-holder.\n\nThis was followed by the East Punjab Displaced Persons (Land Resettlement) Ordinance, 1949\n\n(E.P.\n\nOrdinance XIV of i949) which was replaced by the East Punjab Displaced Persons (Land Resettlement) Act, 1949 (E. P. XXXVI of r949).\n\nThis Act was meant \"to provide for the allotment of evacuee lands in East\n\nPunjab\". The right of an allottee to possession of the\n\nland allotted subject to payment of rent, etc., to the Custodian or his right to a share in the rent from the present holder thereof (that is, the cultivating occupant), if any, and other incidents arising from such possession were specifted in this Act.\n\nIn between these two Acts, notification No. 4892/S dated July 8, 1949, was issued by the Punjab Government in exercise of the rule-making power vested in it under els. (f) and (ff)of sub-s. (2) of s. 22 of East Punjab Act XIV of 1947 as amended in 1948.\n\nThis notification sets out the statement of conditions on which the Custodian could grant allotments of land vested in him.\n\nThis notification is virtually the charter of the rights of allottees.\n\nIt is the basis of what has come to be known as the quasi-permanent allotment. In the rules set out i11 this notification a 'displaced person' i~, defined as 'a land-holder in West Punjab etc.' and it is specified that,\n\n\"an allotment sha11 be made in favour of a displaced person and for a period for which the land remains vested in the Custodian.\" The word 'allottee' is defined as including \"heirs, legal representatives and lessees of the allottee.\n\nIt ma-, r be mentioned in this context that East Punjab Displaced Persons (Land Resettlement) Act, 1949, mentioned above, which was passed shortly after these rules were notified also defines the word 'allottee' and says that allottee means \"a displaced person to whom land is allotted by the Custodian under the conditions published with East Punjab Government notification No.\n\n4.892/S dated July 8, 1949 and includes his heirs, legal representatives and sub-lessees.\" Thus the definitions of the word 'allottee' in the rules of July 8, 1949 and under the Act passed shortly thereafter recognise not only that an allotment is to be in favour of a displaced land-holder for the period the land is vested in the Custodian but that it enures for the benefit of his heirs and legal representatives.\n\nTherefore, the first incident of allotment implicit in this is the heritability of the rights of the allottee which constitute quasi-permanent allotment nuder the above mentioned notification of July 8, 1949.\n\nVarious other rights are specified in\n\nAll\"ar Singh v.\n\nCustodian, Evacuee\n\nProperty, Punjab.\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nAmar Singh\n\nCustodian, Evacuee\n\nProperty, Pu11jab.\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nels. 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 of the said notification.\n\nThese will be summarised later.\n\nBut it is to be noticed that the allotment itself is subject to resumption under\n\ncl. (6) thereof.\n\nBefore considerii:ig the nature of the interest which these various clauses of the notification confer on the quasi-permanent allottee, it is necessary to see how far this notification of July 8, 1949, is affected by subsequent legislation and the rules framed thereunder.\n\nNow the East Punjab Evacuee Property Administration Acts were repealed and replaced by Central Ordinance XXVII of 1949 and Central Act XXXI of\n\ni 950.\n\nBoth the Central Ordinance and Central Act had each a section, s. 53 and s. 55 respectively, under which the Central Government may delegate its rulemaking power to the State Government.\n\nIn exercise of such delegated power the State Government issued a notification No. 1554-Cust. dated February 6, 1950 the relevant portion of which is as follows : ' \"The Provincial Government is pleased to notify that Statement of Conditions issued by the Custodian and published under the notification No. 4.891/S and 4892 /S dated the 8th July, l 949, shall be deemed to be and shall continue to remain in force as rules framed by the Provincial Government under sub-section\n\n(z) of section 53 of the Central Ordinance No. XXVII of 1949 under delegation from the Central Government under Notification No. 3094-A/Cus/49 dated 2nd December, 1949, subject to the following modifications and amendments :\n\n(i) The rules as stated in the Statement of Conditions under notification Nos. 4891/S and 4892/S dated the 8th July, 1949, shall be called the Administration of Evacuee Property (Rural) Rules, 1949\n\n(ii) Definition.\n\n(a) The word 'ACT' defined m !he said Statement of Conditions shall mean the\n\nAdmnistration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949 \\Ordmance No. XXVII of 1949). ,, ...............................................................\n\nThe above rules of July 8, 1949, have, therefore, cominued to be operative as rules made under the\n\nCentral Ordinance. On the repeal of the Central Ordi- 1957 nance by Central Act XXXI of 1950 and by virtue of , s h 8 h fh 1 . b. fi n.maring s. 5 t ereo t ese rues contmue to e 1n orce as v. tho'ugh they are rules made under the Central Act of Custodian, Eva_cuee Property, Pun; ab. 1950.\n\nFurther, the Central Government framed rules - on .September 28, l 950, entitled Administration of Jatannadhadas J.\n\nEvacuee Property (Central) Rules, 1950, v, hich will be noticed presently.\n\nLater, in exercise of the delegated rule-making power vested in the Provincial Government under s. 55 of the Central Act, the Punjab Government framed rules dated August 29, 1951, entitled \"Instructions for review and revision• of land allotment.\" These two sets of subsequent rules w<; mld affect the rules of July, 1949, to the extent that any of them are inconsistent with the earlier rules.\n\nA comparison of the subsequent rules with the earlier rules of July 8, 1949, shows that the later rules do not concern any of the matters provided by the earlier rules of l 949 (and l 950) excepting as regards the provisions relating to resumption-which virtually is cancellation-of allotments.\n\nHence the rules of July 8, 1949, continue to be in force except to that extent, if any. The portion which has undergone, if any, variation by subsequent rules may now be noticed.\n\nThe provision for resumption in the rules published by the Punjab Government in its notification of July 8, l 949, is as follows :\n\n\"6., The Custodian, or as the case may be, the Rehabilitation Authority shall be CO{llpctent to resume, amend, withdraw, or cancel the allotment on any of the following grounds :\n\n(a) It is contrary to the orders of the East Punjab Government, or the instructions of the Financial Commissioner, Rehabilitation, or the Custodian, Evacuee Property, East Punjab ;\n\n(b) The allottee has infringed or appears to be preparing to infringe any of the terms of allotment ;\n\n(c) The allotment was obtained by false declaration or insufficient information or is contrary to the purpose of rehabilitating the displaced persons ;\n\nAmar Sin5h\n\nCustodian, Evacuee\n\nProjJttty, Punjab.\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\n( d) The area allotted or occupied by the allottee is more than he was authorised to take on allotment or occupy under the instructions issued by the East Punjab Government or the Financial Commissioner, Rehabilitation, or the Custodian, Evacuee Property, East Punjab ; . ( e) V.'here the claims of other parties with respect to the land have been established or accepted by the Custodian or the Rehabilitation Authority ;\n\n(f) \\\\Then the allottee has been convicted of an offence under the Act ; or\n\n(g) If the allottee fails to take possession of the land within the time as may be allowed by the Custodian or the Rehabilitation Authority, or after having taken possession, fails to cultivate the land or a part thereof.\"\n\nThe next set of rules arc those made nnder Central Act XXXI of 1950.\n\nRule 14 of Central Rules, 1950, is the following :\n\n\"14. (1). ·················································· ...\n\n(2) In case of an allotment granted by the Custodi:rn himself, the Custodian may eYirt a person on any ground justifying eviction of a tenant under any la\\\\· relating to the Control of Rents for the time being in force in the State concerned, or for any violation of the conditions of the allotment.\n\n(3) The Custodian may evict a person who has secured an allotment by misrepresentation or fraud or if he is found to be in possession of more than one e\\'acuee property or in occupati011 c•f accommodation in excess of his requirements.\n\n(4) ........................................••......•........... \" It wi'H b~ seen that the above proYisions are not in themsehes pm, ers of cancellation or modification of allotment bHt are supplementary thereto authorising eviction of an allottcc nndcr the circumstances indicated therein.\n\nThe next set of rules in this connection are rules dated August 29, 1951, enacted by the Punjab Government in exercise of powers delegated to it by the Central Government under s. 55 ( r) of Central Act\n\nXXXI of 1950. In so far as these rules relate to allotment~ els. (a) to \\g) of r. ( 1) thereof are virtually the same as those relating to resumption in the notification of July 8, 1949.\n\nThe additions thereto in the I 95 r rules are the following :\n\n\" ( 1) The Custodian shall be competent to cancel or terminate any allotment or vary the terms of any allotment or agreement and evict the allottee in any one of the following circumstances :\n\n. ) . \\ (a, to (g1 .............................................. , ...... .\n\n(h) that it is necessary or expedient to cancel or vary the terms of an allotment for the implementation of resettlement schemes and/or rules framed by the\n\nState Government ; or for such distribution amongst displaced persons as appears to the Custodian to be equitable and proper : or\n\n(i) that it is necessary or expedient to cancel or vary the terms or an a llntment for the preservation,\n\nur the proper administration, or the management of such property or in the interests of proper rehabilitatim1 of displaced persons.\n\n(2)' Anything done or any action taken in exercise of any power confcrrecl by the previous rules shall be deemed to have been done or taken under these rules, as if they were in force on the day on which such thing was done or action was taken.\" A dose scrutiny will show that as regards resumption or cancellation of (quasi-permanent) allotments made under the notification of July, 8, r 949, the Central Rules of 1950 do not make anv alteration by r. 14 then of but gi\\'e only supplementary powers of eviction in certain contingencies.\n\nThe rules of August 2q, 1951, made by the Punjab Go\\'ernment under delegated authority will be fou11d on comparison to be substantially the same as those enumerated in cl. (6) of July, 8, 1t149, 11otification under the heading 'Resumption' with th<' addition of els. (h) and (i) and with an additional clause gi\\'ing retrospective operation to the new rules.\n\nRule 14 of the Central Rules, l 950, has been subsequently modified by notification No. S. R. 0. l 722 dated\n\nAmar Singh\n\nCustodian, Evacute\n\nProperty, Punjab.\n\nJngannadhadas ] •\n\n.A.mar Singh v.\n\nCustodian, Er'acuu\n\nProptrty, Punjab.\n\nSCPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nOctober 29, 1951, by adding sub-r. (6) which 1s as follows :\n\n\"V\\'herc any State Government has, in exercise of the powers delegated to it, made cmy rules under clause (i) of sub-section (2) of section 56 of the Act which are inconsistent with this rule, surh rules sl:all prevail over this rule.\" This obviously is intended to indicate that if there is any inconsistency as regards the power of cancellation between the Central Rules and the latter delegated State Rules, the State Rules are to override the Central Rules.\n\nNo\\':, all these rulrs relating to the power of c&ncdlation which derive their authority from the rule making power given by the P10vincial\n\nand Central Acts must, according to the ordinary rules of construction be read so as to harmonise with the powers of cancellation under the Act itsel( It follows that r. (6) relating to resumption of allotments under the notification of July, 8, 1949, as it originally stood until February 6, 1950, must be read with s. 9-J\\ of East Punjab Act XIV of 1947 as amended in H)4B, in so far as it relates to allotment.\n\nSimilarly Central Rules of 1950, and the delegated State Rules of 1950 and 1951 must be read to harmonise with s. 12 of Central Act XXXI of 1950, in so far as they relate to allotments made urn.icr the notification of July 8,\n\n1949 Reading these powers of cancellation under the Act and the Rules together, it will be found that the power of cancellation of such allotments is wide and varied and depends to a substantial extent on administrative orders and c'onsiderations.\n\nRule 14 of Central Rules, 1950, underwent alterations in July, 1952, and February, 1953 These are subsequent to the date of cancellation of the allotment in the present c; o.se and have no direct bearing on the present case.\n\nPausing here and summarising the pe:.ition as it obtained till July 22, 1952 (when further relevant rules were framed) as regards the rights under the (quasipermanent) allotment scheme introduced by notification of July 8, 1949, may be stated thus. (References given as against each are to the relevant provisions of the notification of July 8, 1949).\n\n/ \\ ) '-\n\nr. The allottee is entitled to right of use and occupation of the property until such time as the property remains yested in the Custodian. (Clause\n\n3 (I).\n\nThe benefit of such right will enure to his heirs and successors. (Definition of 'allottee'.) 3.\n\nHis enjoyrr.ent of the property is on the basis of paying land-revenue thereupon and cesses for the time being.\n\nAdditional rent may be fixed thereupon by the Custodian. If and when he docs so, the allottee is bound to pay the same. (Clause 3(3).) 4.\n\nHe is entitled to quiet and undisturbed enjoyment of the property during that period. (Clause 8.) 5.\n\nHe is entitled to make improvements on the land with the assent of the Custodian and is entitled to compensation in the manner provided in the Punjab Tenancy Act. (Clause 7.)\n\nHe is entitled to exchange the whole or any part of the land for other evacuee land with the consent of the Custodian. ::Clause 5.) i He is entitled to lease the land for a period not exceeding three years without the permission of the Custodian and for longer period \"ith his consent.\n\nBut he is not entitled to transfer his rights by way of sale, gift, will, mortgage or other private contract. (Clause 4(c).)\n\nHis rights in the allotment are subject to the fairly extensive powers of cancellation under the Act and rules as then in force prior to July 22, 1952, on varied administrative considerations and actions such as the following Clause 6 and subsequent rules of 195r.) :-\n\n(a) That the allotment is contrary to the orders of the Punjab Gov\"ernment or the instructions of the Financial Commissioner, Relief and Rehabilitation, or of the Custodian, Evacuee Property, Punjab ;\n\n(b) That the claims of other parties with respect to the land have been established or accepted by the\n\n~ Custodian or the Rehabilitation Authority ;\n\nAmar Singh v.\n\nCustodian, Evacuee\n\nProperty, Punjab.\n\nJagannadhadas ].\n\nAmar Singh v.\n\nCustodian, Evacuee\n\nPropery, Punjab.\n\nJagannadhadas ].\n\n( c) That it is necessary or expedient to cancel or vary the terms of an allotment for the implementa- Y tion of resettlement schemes and/or rules framed by the State Government ; or for such distribution amongst displaced persons as appears to the Custodian to be equitable and proper ; ( d) That it is necessary or expedient to cancel or vary the terms of an allotment for the preservation, or the proper administration, or the management of such property or in the interests or proper rehabilitation of displaced persons.\n\nIt is noteworthy that the powers of cancellation include the liability of the allotment to be cancelled, if~ it is secured by false declaration or insufficient information, and also if the allottee is convicted under the provisions of the Evacuee Property Administration Acts. (Clause 6(c) and (f).).\n\nTaking all the above incidents together as to the position of a displaced land-holder to whom evacuee agricultural land has been allotted under the notification of July 8, 1949, there can be no doubt that he is in a definitely better legal position than the allottee of other kinds of property under Central Act XXXI of 1950 and the Central Rules of 1950, who, as already shown, is more or less in the position of a 'f-- licensee.\n\nBut even so, it is still far short of what can be considered as being in itself 'property' either in the widest sense or in a limited sense. It is very strenuously urged that though this might appear to be so if one has regard only to the legislation and to the statutory rules up to July 22, 1952, the position of such an allottee emerges more definitely and clearly in the light of further legislation and subsequently amended rules.\n\nIt is urged that this later legislation was in implementation of the original Press CommuniqueT\n\ndated February 7, 1948, which was understood to hold out the assurance of allotments conferring permanent property.\n\nOn this contention the later legislation has also been brought to our notice.\n\nIn view of the insistence with which this contention has been urged\n\nand the importance of the question it is desirable to notice the same and to consider the effect thereof without deciding whether the later legislation and the\n\nPress Communique are relevant for the decision of the matters involved in this case.\n\nThe earliest change in the pre-existing situation, as above noticed, was brought about by two notifications, S. R. 0. 1290 dated July 22, 1952, and S. R. 0. 351 dated February 13, 1953, as a result of which sub-r. (6) of r. 14 of the Central Rules of 1950 stood amended by the substitution of a new sub-rule which is as follows :\n\n\"(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in this rule, the Custodian of Evacuee Property in each of the States of Punjab and Patiala and East Punjab States Union shall not exercise the power of cancelling arry allotment of rural el'aruee property on a quasi-permanent basis, or varying the terms of any such allotment, except in the following circumstances :\n\n(i) where the allotment was made although the alluttee owned no agricultural bnd in Pakistan ;\n\n(ii) where the allottee has obtained land in .excess of the area to which he was entitled under the scheme of allotment of land prevailing at the time of\n\nallotment ;\n\n(iii) where the allotment is to be cancelled or varied- ( a) in atcordance with an order made by a competent authority under section 8 of the East\n\nPunjab Refugees (Registration of Land Claims) Act, 1948 ;\n\n(b) on account of the failure of the allottee to take possession of the allotted evacuee property within six months of the date of allotment ;\n\n(c) in consequence of a voluntary surrender of the allotted evacuee property, or a voluntary exchange\n\nwith other available rural evacuee property or a mutual exchange \\\\ith such other available property ;\n\n(d) in accordance with any general or special order of the Central Government ;\n\nAmar Singh\n\nV, Custodian, Evacuee Propm;·, Punjab.\n\nJagannadhadas ].\n\nAmar Singh\n\nCustodian. Eracuee Propert_v. Punjab.\n\nProvided that where an allotment is cancelled or varied under clause (ii), the allottee shall be entitled to retain such portion of the land to which he \\rnuld have been entitled under the scheme of quC>sipermanent allotment of land : Jaganno.1hadru J.\n\nProdded further that nothing in this sub-rule shall apply to any application for rcTision made under section 26 or section 27 of the Act, within the prescribed time, against an order passed bv a lower authority on or before 22nd July, 1052.\"\n\nThis amendment has undoubtedly the effect of modif)·- ing the po\\\\er of resumption or cancellation vested in the Custodian authorities in respect of quasipermancnt allottees by virtue of tl:c pre-existing rules and to confine such power within narrow limits as specified therein.\n\nBut whether the restrictions on this power of cancellation can be harmonised with the power to vary or cancel allotments vested in the Custodian under s. 12 of Central Act XXXI of 1950 is, a matter not without some difficulty.\n\nIt may, however be assumed that if possible, the latest amendment of r. 14 of Central Rules, 1 CJ.'JO, by the insertion of the amended sub-r. ~6) therein will ha, e to be harmonised with the main section by a proce s nf construction so as not to nullify the beneficient provisions specifically enact.res of that interest are that the ultimate ownership of the land is still recognised to be that of tile evacuee and the allotment itself is liable to resumption or canctlllation with reference to the exigencies of the administration of evacuee law.\n\nThe interest so recognised, is in its essential concept, provisional, though with a view to stabilisation and ultimate permanence. The provisional characteristic of this interest emerges from the fact that there have had to be a series of inter- Dominion conferences to settle on governmental level the problems arising out of evacuee property in either country.\n\nThe stabilisation had to await the results of such conferences. Thus both with reference to the internal necessities of the administrative problems inherent in the process of settling the displaced persons on the evacuee lands with reference to various considerations and policies and the external problem of arriving at understandings between the two governments, these rights had to be so regulated from time to time '1nd had an element of unstability, thou.!\\\"h they were being prcgressively invested with the characteristics of stability.\n\nAn interest in land owned by another in such a situation cannot be fitted into any concept of 'property' in itself.\n\nThe concept of a bundle of rights in agricultural land constituting by itself 'p, roperty' is the outcome of a stable and settled state of affairs relating to such bundle of rights.\n\nHistorical jurisprudence shows that even the concept of individual property in agricultural land was the\n\noutcome of stable and settled conditions of society.\n\nIt is also relevant to observe that the incidents of quasi-permanent allotment are entirelly statutory.\n\nSubjection to the power of cancellation by the Custodian in whom the property is vested is one of such incidents and determines the quality thereof.\n\nTherefore, having given our best consideration, we are unable to hold that the interest a of quasi-permanent allottee is 'property' within the concept of that word so as to attract the protection of fundamental rights.\n\nProperty, to fall within the scope of Art. 19(1) (f), must be capable of being the subject-matter of \"acquisition and disposal\".\n\nThe interest of the quasipermanent allottt:e arises by statutcry grant to a. specified class of persons and is not capable of acquisition by the ordinary citizen in any of the normal modes.\n\nNor is it capable of disposal by the allottee himself in the normal modes by way of sale, mortgage, gift or will.\n\nNeither is the interest of the quasi-permanent allottee such as can be brought within the scope of Art. '.:i r ( 2).\n\nArticle 3 r ( 2) as recently amended, taken with Art. 3 r ( 2A) contemplates acquisition or requisitioning (and taking possession) as a result of transfer of the ownership or of the right to possession.\n\nIt is true that the recent amendment came into operation on April 27, 1955, and the impugned orders of the Cwtodi;:m and Deputy Custodian-General are on February 6, 1952, and May l, 1954.\n\nBut in view of the word \"deemed\" in the amended Art. 3 I ( 2A) it appears likely that the amendment was intended to be retrospective.\n\nEven assuming that it is not so, the words \"taking possession\" or \"acquisition\" in Art. 31 (2) prior to the amendment are wholly inapt and inapplicable to the bundle of rights of the nature detailed above which constitute quasi-permanent tenure and it is difficult to apply to it the protection under Art. 31 (2) either as it stood before the amendment or after te amehndment.\n\nLearned counsel for the petitioners has urged that even if Arts. 19(1) (f) and 31{2) are not applicable, the\n\nAmar Singh\n\n•• Custodian, Evacuee\n\nProperty, Punjab.\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\n1957 petitioners can invoke the protection of Art. 31(1) A•w Singh which says that no person shall be deprived of his . \"· property save by authority of law.\n\nHe relies on the c;,;'j,:,\"(j,· /,,~';' judgment of one of us reported in the State of West ' Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose ('), where it was stated as .Jagaonadlwdas ]. follows :\n\n\"The word 'property' as used in Article 31 ( 1) may have been intended to be understood in a wider sense and deprivation of any individual right out of a bundle of rights constituting concrete property may be deprivation of 'property' which would require the authority of law.\"\n\nThis is a view which was not shared by the other members of the Court in that decision.\n\nIn any case it is clear that in order that Art. 3 I ( 1) may apply, it is not enough that there is 'deprivation' but it must also be deprivation without the authority if law.\n\nWhat has happened, however, in this case is not deprivation of the property without the authority of law even assuming that the bundle of rights constituting such an interest in land is 'property'. It is the working out of the right of resumption or cancellation which was one of the incidents of the property. The cancellation by the Custodian authorities was under the very law which created those rights.\n\nEven if the exercise of that authority can be made out to be wrong, it is still not open to question having regard to ss. 28 and 46 of Central Act XXXI of 1950. It is not an illegal usurpation of jurisdiction by the authorities concerned so as to constitute negation of the authority of law. In the present case what has happened is that the quasi-permanent allotment of the petitioners has been cancelled in order to work out readjustments consequent upoµ the order of the higher authority.\n\nLearned counsel for the petitioners has strenuously urged that under the qusi-permanent allotment scheme the allottee is entitled to a right to possession within the limits of the relevant notification and that such right to possession is itself 'property'. That may be so in a sense. But it does not affect the\n\n(•) [•954] S.C R. 587,673,\n\nquestion whether it is property so as to attract the protection of fundamental rights under the Constitution.\n\nIf the totality of the bundle of rights of the quasipermanent allottee in the evacuee land constituting an interest in such land, is not property entitled to protection of fundamental rights, mere possession of the land by virtue of such interest is not on any higher footing.\n\nLearned counsel has also drawn our attention to a number of Acts and notifications of the Punjab Government to show that a quasi-permanent allottee has been treated as being in the same position as an owner of land itself for various purposes.\n\nThus in r. 5 of the Land Revenue Rules under the Punjab\n\nLand Revenue Act, 1887 (Punjab Act XVII of 1887), a quasi-permanent allottee is classed with other land owners as being eligible for appointment as 2 aildars.\n\nSimilarly by virtue of rules framed under the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 (East Punjab Act L of 1948), a quasi-permanent allottee is liable to pay the cost of consolidation if such consolidation comprises lands in his occupation.\n\nThese and other such provisions, however, have no bearing on the question at issue before .us.\n\nAfter the close of the arguments before us a recent decision of the Punjab High Court reported in Suraj Parkash Kapur v.\n\nThe State oj Punjab (1) has been brought to our notice and we have given our careful consideration to the same. That decision may be right on its merits, a matter about which we express no opinion.\n\nBut, with respect, we are unable to agree with the view expressed therein that a quasi-permanent allottee has such an interest in the land allotted to him as to constitute \"property\", if it is meant to convey thereby that it is property which attracts the protection of fundamental rights under the Constitution.\n\nFor all the above reasons we are unable to hold that any fundamental right of the petitioners has been\n\n(1) (1957) LIX P.L.R. 103. S. C. lndiaJ59\n\nAmar Singh\n\nCustodian, Eva&1Jtt\n\nProperty, Pu'!iab.\n\nJagannadluidas ].\n\nAmar Singh v.\n\nCustodian, Evacuu\n\nProperty, Punjab.\n\n]aga'(lnadhadas J.\n\ninfringed.\n\nThis petition is accordingly dismissed but, in the circumstances, without costs.\n\nIn holding that quasi-permanent allotment does not carry with it a fundamental right to property under the Constitution we arc not to be supposed as denying or weakening the scope of the rights of the allottce.\n\nThese rights as recognised in the statutory rules are important and constitute the essential basis of a satisfactory rehabilitation and settlement of displaced land-holders.\n\nUntil such time as these land-holders obtain sanads to the lands, these rights are entitled to zealous protection of the constituted authorities according to administrative rules and instructions binding on them, and of the courts by appropriate proceedings where there is usurpation of jurisdiction or abuse of exercise of statutory powers.\n\nPetition dismissed.\n\nGIPN-2S-99 S. C. India/59-6-7-61-1,000", "total_entities": 210, "entities": [{"text": "801\n\nAMAR SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 45, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AMAR SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CUSTODIAN, EVACUEE PROPERTY, PUNJAB", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 50, "end_char": 85, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CUSTODIAN, EVACUEE PROPERTY, PUNJAB", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 88, "end_char": 96, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "jAGANNADHADAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 98, "end_char": 111, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "jAGANNADHADAs", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "jAFER IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 113, "end_char": 123, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SYED JAFFER IMAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MENON", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 135, "end_char": 140, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. GOVINDA MENON", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "L. KAPUR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 148, "end_char": 160, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J.L. KAPUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 285, "end_char": 306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 19(1)(f), 31(1), 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 308, "end_char": 336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Property Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 364, "end_char": 382, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 19(1)(f), 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1270, "end_char": 1288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Property Act, 1950", "statute": "Property Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1311, "end_char": 1332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 19(1)(f), 31(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1969, "end_char": 1990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2008, "end_char": 2029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Amar Siffl~", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2704, "end_char": 2715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 290\n\nAmar Siffl~\n\nCustr."}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3289, "end_char": 3302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3781, "end_char": 3791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4015, "end_char": 4022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4068, "end_char": 4078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4158, "end_char": 4165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5341, "end_char": 5351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "N. S. Bindra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5417, "end_char": 5429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. S. Bindra, Udhai Bhan Choudhury and Gopal Singh, for the petitioners."}}, {"text": "Udhai Bhan Choudhury", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5431, "end_char": 5451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. S. Bindra, Udhai Bhan Choudhury and Gopal Singh, for the petitioners."}}, {"text": "Gopal Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5456, "end_char": 5467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. S. Bindra, Udhai Bhan Choudhury and Gopal Singh, for the petitioners."}}, {"text": "Amar Singh S. L. Pandhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5491, "end_char": 5514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amar Singh S. L. Pandhi and K. L. Mehta, for the Intervener."}}, {"text": "K. L. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5519, "end_char": 5530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amar Singh S. L. Pandhi and K. L. Mehta, for the Intervener."}}, {"text": "JagannmDwdasJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5649, "end_char": 5663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JagannmDwdasJ.\n\nJAGANNADHADAS J.-This is an application under Art."}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5665, "end_char": 5678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JagannmDwdasJ.\n\nJAGANNADHADAS J.-This is an application under Art.", "canonical_name": "jAGANNADHADAs"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5711, "end_char": 5718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Amar Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5759, "end_char": 5769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32 of the Constitution by the petitioners, Amar Singh and four others, in the following circumstances.", "canonical_name": "Amar Singli"}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5960, "end_char": 5968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "159-RB, Tahsil Jaranwala, District Lyallpur in Pakistan."}}, {"text": "Sultanwind", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6047, "end_char": 6057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were also co-sharers in a joint khata owned by some evacuees in village Sultanwind, a suburb of Amritsar in East Punjab."}}, {"text": "Amritsar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6071, "end_char": 6079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were also co-sharers in a joint khata owned by some evacuees in village Sultanwind, a suburb of Amritsar in East Punjab."}}, {"text": "East Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6083, "end_char": 6094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They were also co-sharers in a joint khata owned by some evacuees in village Sultanwind, a suburb of Amritsar in East Punjab."}}, {"text": "January 7, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6547, "end_char": 6562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Director-General of Relief and Rehabilitation (Additional Custodian) directed by an order dated January 7, 1950, that out of the 1,263 standard acres and 1£ units of suburban land of Amritsar, 142 standard acres and 5 units were to be allotted to allottees of Provincial Gardens."}}, {"text": "Sultanwind", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6800, "end_char": 6810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This necessitated readjustment of allotments of the suburban land of Sultanwind amongst the various groups who had quasi-permanent allotment therein."}}, {"text": "July 31, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7136, "end_char": 7149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result of this readjustment which had to be carried out according to certain rules and instructions the allotment of these five petitioners (as also of some others) was proposed for cancellation by the order of the Deputy Custodian, Amritsar, dated July 31, 1951."}}, {"text": "February 6, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7250, "end_char": 7266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This proposal was approved by the Custodian (Financial Commissioner, Relief and Rehabilitation) on February 6, 1952, and the 1allotment was\n\ncancelled."}}, {"text": "s. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7515, "end_char": 7520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "JagannadhadrM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7606, "end_char": 7619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JagannadhadrM J.\n\nProperty Act, 1 950 (XXXI of 1950).", "canonical_name": "jAGANNADHADAs"}}, {"text": "May 1, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7769, "end_char": 7780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was dealt with by the Deputy Custodian-Genera] who dismissed the same by a fairly elaborate order dated May 1, 1954, after hearing the parties."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7878, "end_char": 7885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 19(1)(f), 31(1) and 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8283, "end_char": 8314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Declaration of Independence", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9781, "end_char": 9808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Declaration of Independence and the partition of India into Pakistan and India on August r 5, r 94 7, was accompanied by mass migrations of Non-Muslims from West Punjab to East Punjab and of Muslims from East Punjab to West Punjab."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9830, "end_char": 9835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Declaration of Independence and the partition of India into Pakistan and India on August r 5, r 94 7, was accompanied by mass migrations of Non-Muslims from West Punjab to East Punjab and of Muslims from East Punjab to West Punjab."}}, {"text": "August r 5, r 94 7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9863, "end_char": 9881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Declaration of Independence and the partition of India into Pakistan and India on August r 5, r 94 7, was accompanied by mass migrations of Non-Muslims from West Punjab to East Punjab and of Muslims from East Punjab to West Punjab."}}, {"text": "West Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9938, "end_char": 9949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Declaration of Independence and the partition of India into Pakistan and India on August r 5, r 94 7, was accompanied by mass migrations of Non-Muslims from West Punjab to East Punjab and of Muslims from East Punjab to West Punjab."}}, {"text": "Pepsu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10897, "end_char": 10902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evacuees seem to have left in East Punjab and Pepsu, lands of the extent of about 47 lakh acre'."}}, {"text": "Tarlok Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11582, "end_char": 11594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The various :.teps and administrative measures taken to settle the displaced agricultural population who came over from West Punjab, on the hurriedly abandoned lands of the evacuees from East Punjab, are to be found described in the Land Resettlement Manual by Shri Tarlok Singh who was the Director-General of Relief and Rehabilitation (hereinfter referred to as the Resettlement Manual)."}}, {"text": "Amtu Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12016, "end_char": 12026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amtu Singh\n\nCustodian, Evactltt\n\nProperty, Purg\"ab."}}, {"text": "Government of East Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13157, "end_char": 13182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This policy was announced by the Government of East Punjab in its Press Communique date.cl February 7, 1948, which is reproduced at pages 28 and 29 of the Resettlement Manual."}}, {"text": "February 7, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13215, "end_char": 13231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This policy was announced by the Government of East Punjab in its Press Communique date.cl February 7, 1948, which is reproduced at pages 28 and 29 of the Resettlement Manual."}}, {"text": "East Punjab Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13355, "end_char": 13377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following extract therefrom is instructive :\n\n\"The East Punjab Government propose to replace the present system of temporary allotments of evacuee lands by a new system of allotments which will take account of the holdings of evacuees in ', yest Punjab."}}, {"text": "East Punjab States", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14454, "end_char": 14472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The definition\n\n' '\n\nof the \"Small Holders\" and the details of the graded cuts will be determined when detailed information regarding the available areas in East Punjab and the East Punjab States, the areas held by the population to be settled in East Punjab and the East Punjab States, and other relevant information becomes available."}}, {"text": "31st May, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14737, "end_char": 14751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is intended to complete the new system of allotments in the East Punjab and the East Punjab States, not later than the 31st May, 1948."}}, {"text": "Jagannadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16302, "end_char": 16315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jagannadhadas J\n\nAmar Singh v.\n\nCustodian, Evacuee\n\nProperty, Punjab,\n\nJagannadhadas J.\n\nClassification of the villages and of lands of evacuees available for allotment.", "canonical_name": "jAGANNADHADAs"}}, {"text": "Sertember 14, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18049, "end_char": 18067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The earliest legislative measure in this behalf i; the East Punjab Evacuees' (Administration of Property) Ordinance, 1947, (E.P. Ordinance IV of 1947) dated Sertember 14, 1947, which was a simple measure definingthe terms 'evacuee', 'evacuee property', and 'Custodian of evacuee property' and other terms, and authorising the appointment of a Custodian."}}, {"text": "East Punjab Evacuee Property (Administration) Ordinance, 1949 (E.P. Ordinance IX of 1949)", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19110, "end_char": 19199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These legislati\\'e measures were in the first instance Provincial, ii:;.., East Punjab Evacuees' (Administration of Property) Act, 1g47 (E.P. XIV of 1947) ; East Punjab £, acuees' (Administration of Propert\\') (Second Amendment) Ordinance,\n\n19.1B (E.P. Ordinance XVI of 1948) ; East Punjab E\\acuees' (Administration of Property) (Second Amendment) Act, 1948 (E.P. XLIX of 1948 ) ; and East Punjab Evacuee Property (Administration) Ordinance, 1949 (E.P. Ordinance IX of 1949)."}}, {"text": "Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19308, "end_char": 19340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "These were repealed and superseded by the Administration of Evacuee Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19474, "end_char": 19554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19603, "end_char": 19627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 5 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19743, "end_char": 19754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "statute": "Central Act XXXI of 1950"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20159, "end_char": 20177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tltey are under the general superintendence and control of a Custodian-General appointed by the Central-Government \\\\ho has, for his assistance, Deputy and Assistant Custodian-Generals, who are also appointed by the Central Government."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20238, "end_char": 20242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "statute": "Central Act XXXI of 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20336, "end_char": 20340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "statute": "Central Act XXXI of 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20426, "end_char": 20430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "statute": "Central Act XXXI of 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20457, "end_char": 20461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "statute": "Central Act XXXI of 1950"}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20540, "end_char": 20549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "statute": "Central Act XXXI of 1950"}}, {"text": "JagannadhadlU", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20706, "end_char": 20719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JagannadhadlU J.\n\nduties of the Custodian generally and declares that he may take such measures as he considers necessary or expedient for the purposes of securing, administering, preserving and managing any evacuee property and generally for the purposes of enabling him satisfactorily to discharge any of the duties imposed on him by or under the Act, and may, for any such purpose as aforesaid, do all acts and incur all expenses necessary or incidental thereto.", "canonical_name": "jAGANNADHADAs"}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21250, "end_char": 21255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21258, "end_char": 21272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21502, "end_char": 21512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21837, "end_char": 21842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 12(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22000, "end_char": 22008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 24 to 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23825, "end_char": 23837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23840, "end_char": 23850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24013, "end_char": 24023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "East Punjab Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24518, "end_char": 24533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24946, "end_char": 24956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "East Punjab Act", "statute": "East Punjab Act"}}, {"text": "See Central Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25116, "end_char": 25137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25156, "end_char": 25180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25293, "end_char": 25303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "statute": "Central Act XXXI of 1950"}}, {"text": "Punjab Act XIV of 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25600, "end_char": 25622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25724, "end_char": 25729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Act XIV of 1947", "statute": "Punjab Act XIV of 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26032, "end_char": 26037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Act XIV of 1947", "statute": "Punjab Act XIV of 1947"}}, {"text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26344, "end_char": 26368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26430, "end_char": 26435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "statute": "Central Act XXXI of 1950"}}, {"text": "Thus it will be seen that while the earliest East Punjab Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26761, "end_char": 26827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "East Punjab Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27446, "end_char": 27467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "East Punjab Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27483, "end_char": 27498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "These two words were for the first time defined only by the amending East Punjab Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27592, "end_char": 27682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28412, "end_char": 28436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28445, "end_char": 28452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "statute": "Central Act XXXI of 1950"}}, {"text": "July 8, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29074, "end_char": 29086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These changes were apparently necessitated by the fact that, in between, Punjab Government notification dated July 8, 1949, came into operation providing for what has become subsequently known as quasi-permanent allotment."}}, {"text": "Jagunnadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29309, "end_char": 29322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jaganrwdhadas ],\n\nAmar Singh\n\nCustodian, Evacuee\n\nProfurty, Pury°ab,\n\nJagunnadhadas J.\n\nSUPRE11E COURT REPORTS\n\nThe provisions of that notification and the legal effect thereof will be noticed in due course."}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29947, "end_char": 29951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "East Punjab Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29957, "end_char": 29972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "East Punjab Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30015, "end_char": 30036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "East Punjab Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30061, "end_char": 30076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30111, "end_char": 30115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "East Punjab Act", "statute": "East Punjab Act"}}, {"text": "East Punjab Ordinance", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30434, "end_char": 30455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30885, "end_char": 30909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab Act XIV of 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31121, "end_char": 31143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31335, "end_char": 31340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab Act XIV of 1947", "statute": "Punjab Act XIV of 1947"}}, {"text": "Esta Punjab Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31354, "end_char": 31369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 55, 56 and 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31386, "end_char": 31402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Esta Punjab Act", "statute": "Esta Punjab Act"}}, {"text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31406, "end_char": 31430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Amar Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33551, "end_char": 33561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 0 such a situation it would prima facie be difficult to\n\n7-99 s.c.!./59\n\nAmar Singh\n\nCustoC.ian, Eva.:11e8\n\nProperty, Punjab.", "canonical_name": "Amar Singli"}}, {"text": "August 6, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34278, "end_char": 34292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned that there appear to be certain rules made by the East Punjab Government dated August 6, 1948, under East Punjab Act XIV of i :14 7 as amended in 1948 relating to cancellation of allotments."}}, {"text": "East Punjab Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34300, "end_char": 34315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36158, "end_char": 36175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4892/S dated July 8, 1949, was issued by the Punjab Government in exercise of the rule-making power vested in it under els. ("}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36266, "end_char": 36271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "East Punjab Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36275, "end_char": 36290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Both the Central Ordinance and Central Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38775, "end_char": 38817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38838, "end_char": 38843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Both the Central Ordinance and Central Act", "statute": "Both the Central Ordinance and Central Act"}}, {"text": "s. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38848, "end_char": 38853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Both the Central Ordinance and Central Act", "statute": "Both the Central Ordinance and Central Act"}}, {"text": "February 6, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39063, "end_char": 39079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "dated February 6, 1950 the relevant portion of which is as follows : ' \"The Provincial Government is pleased to notify that Statement of Conditions issued by the Custodian and published under the notification No."}}, {"text": "8th July, l 949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39300, "end_char": 39315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4.891/S and 4892 /S dated the 8th July, l 949, shall be deemed to be and shall continue to remain in force as rules framed by the Provincial Government under sub-section\n\n(z) of section 53 of the Central Ordinance No."}}, {"text": "section 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39448, "end_char": 39458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Both the Central Ordinance and Central Act", "statute": "Both the Central Ordinance and Central Act"}}, {"text": "Statement of Conditions shall mean the\n\nAdmnistration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39922, "end_char": 40011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40278, "end_char": 40302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40352, "end_char": 40356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "statute": "Central Act XXXI of 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40790, "end_char": 40795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "statute": "Central Act XXXI of 1950"}}, {"text": "August 29, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40857, "end_char": 40872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later, in exercise of the delegated rule-making power vested in the Provincial Government under s. 55 of the Central Act, the Punjab Government framed rules dated August 29, 1951, entitled \"Instructions for review and revision• of land allotment.\""}}, {"text": "July 8, l 949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41666, "end_char": 41679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The provision for resumption in the rules published by the Punjab Government in its notification of July 8, l 949, is as follows :\n\n\"6.,"}}, {"text": "Amar Sin5h", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42316, "end_char": 42326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Custodian, or as the case may be, the Rehabilitation Authority shall be CO{llpctent to resume, amend, withdraw, or cancel the allotment on any of the following grounds :\n\n(a) It is contrary to the orders of the East Punjab Government, or the instructions of the Financial Commissioner, Rehabilitation, or the Custodian, Evacuee Property, East Punjab ;\n\n(b) The allottee has infringed or appears to be preparing to infringe any of the terms of allotment ;\n\n(c) The allotment was obtained by false declaration or insufficient information or is contrary to the purpose of rehabilitating the displaced persons ;\n\nAmar Sin5h\n\nCustodian, Evacuee\n\nProjJttty, Punjab.", "canonical_name": "Amar Singli"}}, {"text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43154, "end_char": 43178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Rules, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43192, "end_char": 43211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44307, "end_char": 44312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44321, "end_char": 44332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "July, 8, r 949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45761, "end_char": 45775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A dose scrutiny will show that as regards resumption or cancellation of (quasi-permanent) allotments made under the notification of July, 8, r 949, the Central Rules of 1950 do not make anv alteration by r. 14 then of but gi\\'e only supplementary powers of eviction in certain contingencies."}}, {"text": "August 2q, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45935, "end_char": 45950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rules of August 2q, 1951, made by the Punjab Go\\'ernment under delegated authority will be fou11d on comparison to be substantially the same as those enumerated in cl. ("}}, {"text": "section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46735, "end_char": 46745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July, 8, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 47444, "end_char": 47457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No\\':, all these rulrs relating to the power of c&ncdlation which derive their authority from the rule making power given by the P10vincial\n\nand Central Acts must, according to the ordinary rules of construction be read so as to harmonise with the powers of cancellation under the Act itsel( It follows that r. (6) relating to resumption of allotments under the notification of July, 8, 1949, as it originally stood until February 6, 1950, must be read with s. 9-J\\ of East Punjab Act XIV of 1947 as amended in H)4B, in so far as it relates to allotment."}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47524, "end_char": 47528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "East Punjab Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47535, "end_char": 47550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Similarly Central Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47622, "end_char": 47645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47733, "end_char": 47738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Similarly Central Rules", "statute": "Similarly Central Rules"}}, {"text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47742, "end_char": 47766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "July 8,\n\n1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 47840, "end_char": 47853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly Central Rules of 1950, and the delegated State Rules of 1950 and 1951 must be read to harmonise with s. 12 of Central Act XXXI of 1950, in so far as they relate to allotments made urn.icr the notification of July 8,\n\n1949 Reading these powers of cancellation under the Act and the Rules together, it will be found that the power of cancellation of such allotments is wide and varied and depends to a substantial extent on administrative orders and c'onsiderations."}}, {"text": "Central Rules, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48109, "end_char": 48128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Clause\n\n3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48828, "end_char": 48837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Rules, 1950", "statute": "Central Rules, 1950"}}, {"text": "Clause 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49176, "end_char": 49187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49281, "end_char": 49289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49460, "end_char": 49468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49593, "end_char": 49601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 4(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49870, "end_char": 49881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 22, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50022, "end_char": 50035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His rights in the allotment are subject to the fairly extensive powers of cancellation under the Act and rules as then in force prior to July 22, 1952, on varied administrative considerations and actions such as the following Clause 6 and subsequent rules of 195r.) :-"}}, {"text": "Clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50111, "end_char": 50119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 6(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51455, "end_char": 51466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51779, "end_char": 51803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "February 13, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53124, "end_char": 53141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "351 dated February 13, 1953, as a result of which sub-r. (6) of r. 14 of the Central Rules of 1950 stood amended by the substitution of a new sub-rule which is as follows :\n\n\"(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in this rule, the Custodian of Evacuee Property in each of the States of Punjab and Patiala and East Punjab States Union shall not exercise the power of cancelling arry allotment of rural el'aruee property on a quasi-permanent basis, or varying the terms of any such allotment, except in the following circumstances :\n\n(i) where the allotment was made although the alluttee owned no agricultural bnd in Pakistan ;\n\n(ii) where the allottee has obtained land in .excess of the area to which he was entitled under the scheme of allotment of land prevailing at the time of\n\nallotment ;\n\n(iii) where the allotment is to be cancelled or varied- ( a) in atcordance with an order made by a competent authority under section 8 of the East\n\nPunjab Refugees (Registration of Land Claims) Act, 1948 ;\n\n(b) on account of the failure of the allottee to take possession of the allotted evacuee property within six months of the date of allotment ;\n\n(c) in consequence of a voluntary surrender of the allotted evacuee property, or a voluntary exchange\n\nwith other available rural evacuee property or a mutual exchange \\\\ith such other available property ;\n\n(d) in accordance with any general or special order of the Central Government ;\n\nAmar Singh\n\nV, Custodian, Evacuee Propm;·, Punjab."}}, {"text": "Patiala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 53412, "end_char": 53419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "351 dated February 13, 1953, as a result of which sub-r. (6) of r. 14 of the Central Rules of 1950 stood amended by the substitution of a new sub-rule which is as follows :\n\n\"(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in this rule, the Custodian of Evacuee Property in each of the States of Punjab and Patiala and East Punjab States Union shall not exercise the power of cancelling arry allotment of rural el'aruee property on a quasi-permanent basis, or varying the terms of any such allotment, except in the following circumstances :\n\n(i) where the allotment was made although the alluttee owned no agricultural bnd in Pakistan ;\n\n(ii) where the allottee has obtained land in .excess of the area to which he was entitled under the scheme of allotment of land prevailing at the time of\n\nallotment ;\n\n(iii) where the allotment is to be cancelled or varied- ( a) in atcordance with an order made by a competent authority under section 8 of the East\n\nPunjab Refugees (Registration of Land Claims) Act, 1948 ;\n\n(b) on account of the failure of the allottee to take possession of the allotted evacuee property within six months of the date of allotment ;\n\n(c) in consequence of a voluntary surrender of the allotted evacuee property, or a voluntary exchange\n\nwith other available rural evacuee property or a mutual exchange \\\\ith such other available property ;\n\n(d) in accordance with any general or special order of the Central Government ;\n\nAmar Singh\n\nV, Custodian, Evacuee Propm;·, Punjab."}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54036, "end_char": 54045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jaganno.1hadru", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 54906, "end_char": 54920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Provided that where an allotment is cancelled or varied under clause (ii), the allottee shall be entitled to retain such portion of the land to which he \\rnuld have been entitled under the scheme of quC>sipermanent allotment of land : Jaganno.1hadru J.\n\nProdded further that nothing in this sub-rule shall apply to any application for rcTision made under section 26 or section 27 of the Act, within the prescribed time, against an order passed bv a lower authority on or before 22nd July, 1052.\""}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55026, "end_char": 55036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55040, "end_char": 55050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "22nd July, 1052", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 55149, "end_char": 55164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Provided that where an allotment is cancelled or varied under clause (ii), the allottee shall be entitled to retain such portion of the land to which he \\rnuld have been entitled under the scheme of quC>sipermanent allotment of land : Jaganno.1hadru J.\n\nProdded further that nothing in this sub-rule shall apply to any application for rcTision made under section 26 or section 27 of the Act, within the prescribed time, against an order passed bv a lower authority on or before 22nd July, 1052.\""}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55600, "end_char": 55605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 55609, "end_char": 55633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56450, "end_char": 56455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "statute": "Central Act XXXI of 1950"}}, {"text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 56459, "end_char": 56483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Amar Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 56851, "end_char": 56861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "r957\n\nAmar Singh The next important legislative .", "canonical_name": "Amar Singli"}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56994, "end_char": 56999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "statute": "Central Act XXXI of 1950"}}, {"text": "8, --Y1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 58254, "end_char": 58264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "under the Punjab Government notification dated July 8, --Y1949, has been acquired by the Central Government excepting certain specified categories in respect of which proceedings were pending."}}, {"text": "Governments of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 58829, "end_char": 58849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section r 3 of the Act provides as follows : \"There shall be paid to an evacuee compensation in respect of his property acquired under section r 2 in accordance with such principles a.nd in such manner as may be agreed upon between the Governments of India 4,-and Pakisthan.\""}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58870, "end_char": 58880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59134, "end_char": 59138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59180, "end_char": 59189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 59374, "end_char": 59394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 1 o is important and provides inter alia that where any immovable property has been allotted to a displaced person by the Custodian under conditions published by the notification of the Government of Punjab Ko."}}, {"text": "Section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59974, "end_char": 59984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60025, "end_char": 60034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60315, "end_char": 60320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 21, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 60733, "end_char": 60745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rules have been made by the Central Government called the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955 published by notification dated May 21, 1955."}}, {"text": "Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 61532, "end_char": 61593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 61608, "end_char": 61627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A scrutiny of the sanad which is printed at page 70, Appendix VII, of the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955 issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Rehabilitation , shows that it is only under this sanad that an allottee obtains permanent property in the land which originally belonged to the evacuee and which was allotted to him under the quasi-permanent allotment scheme."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Rehabilitation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 61629, "end_char": 61655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A scrutiny of the sanad which is printed at page 70, Appendix VII, of the Displaced Persons Compensation and Rehabilitation Rules, 1955 issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Rehabilitation , shows that it is only under this sanad that an allottee obtains permanent property in the land which originally belonged to the evacuee and which was allotted to him under the quasi-permanent allotment scheme."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62766, "end_char": 62773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Great stress is laid on the fact that under the scheme of Central Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 62811, "end_char": 62880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62938, "end_char": 62943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Great stress is laid on the fact that under the scheme of Central Act", "statute": "Great stress is laid on the fact that under the scheme of Central Act"}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63042, "end_char": 63046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Great stress is laid on the fact that under the scheme of Central Act", "statute": "Great stress is laid on the fact that under the scheme of Central Act"}}, {"text": "Amar Singli", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 63456, "end_char": 63467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Stress is also laid on the fact that he can apply for transfer of the property to himself under r. 72(2) of the rules made under the Act in payment of compensation payable to him in lieu of his property left in West Punjab and that such application for transfer is normally to be granted and a sanad issued\n\nAmar Singli\n\nCustodian, Evacuee\n\nProper(y, Punjab.", "canonical_name": "Amar Singli"}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63856, "end_char": 63860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Great stress is laid on the fact that under the scheme of Central Act", "statute": "Great stress is laid on the fact that under the scheme of Central Act"}}, {"text": "Central Act XLIV of 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 63866, "end_char": 63890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64425, "end_char": 64430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XLIV of 1954", "statute": "Central Act XLIV of 1954"}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64578, "end_char": 64583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XLIV of 1954", "statute": "Central Act XLIV of 1954"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64636, "end_char": 64641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XLIV of 1954", "statute": "Central Act XLIV of 1954"}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64684, "end_char": 64689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XLIV of 1954", "statute": "Central Act XLIV of 1954"}}, {"text": "Section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64775, "end_char": 64785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Act XLIV of 1954", "statute": "Central Act XLIV of 1954"}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66703, "end_char": 66708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IO of Central -f Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 67242, "end_char": 67262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Jaganna.Jhat", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 67637, "end_char": 67649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jaganna."}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70402, "end_char": 70412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70918, "end_char": 70927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70967, "end_char": 70973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "April 27, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 71182, "end_char": 71196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that the recent amendment came into operation on April 27, 1955, and the impugned orders of the Cwtodi;:m and Deputy Custodian-General are on February 6, 1952, and May l, 1954."}}, {"text": "May l, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 71297, "end_char": 71308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that the recent amendment came into operation on April 27, 1955, and the impugned orders of the Cwtodi;:m and Deputy Custodian-General are on February 6, 1952, and May l, 1954."}}, {"text": "Art. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71359, "end_char": 71365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71529, "end_char": 71536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71747, "end_char": 71754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71883, "end_char": 71894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72052, "end_char": 72062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72376, "end_char": 72386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72755, "end_char": 72761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "ss. 28 and 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 73415, "end_char": 73428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Act XXXI of 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 73432, "end_char": 73456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Land Revenue Rules under the Punjab", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 74785, "end_char": 74820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab Act XVII of 1887", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 74846, "end_char": 74869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "East Punjab Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 75108, "end_char": 75123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 75428, "end_char": 75445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the close of the arguments before us a recent decision of the Punjab High Court reported in Suraj Parkash Kapur v.\n\nThe State oj Punjab (1) has been brought to our notice and we have given our careful consideration to the same."}}]} {"document_id": "1957_1_837_853_EN", "year": 1957, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nA. V. FERNANDEZ\n\nTHE STATE OF KERALA\n\n(BHAGWATI,\n\nJAGANNADHADAS,-\n\nJAFEK IMAM,\n\nGovINDA MENON and J. L. KAPUR JJ.)\n\nSales Tax-Assessment-Gross and net turnover-Purchase of copra-Sale of oil both inside and outside the State-Deductions -Assessable turnover-Constitution of India, Art. 28(r..Travancore- Cochin General Sales Tax Act, 1125 (Act Xi of 1125 M.E.), ss. 2(i) (k), 3, 2(r..Travancore-Cochin General Saks Tax Rules, 1950, \"· 7(k), 20(2).\n\nThe business of the appellant consisted in the purchase of copra, manufacture of cocoanut oil and cake therefrom and sale of oil and cake to parties inside the State of Travancore-Cochin and sale of oil to parties outside the State.\n\nBefore the coming into force of the Constitution of India, under the provisions of the Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax Act, 1125, and the rules made thereunder, for the pus poses of assessment to sales tax, the appellant was entitled to include in his gross turnover the total value of the oil sold by him whether inside the State or outside the State and to deduct therefrom the whole of the value of the copra purchased by him.\n\nSub.iequently, in 1951, the Act was amended by the addition of s. 26 which, inter alia, provided : \"Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act. . . . a tax on tl:ie sale or purchase of any goods shall not, after the 31st day ot March, 1951, be imposed where such sale or purchase takes place in the course of inter-State trade .... \".\n\nFor the year 1951-1952, the Saks Tax Officer assessed the appellant to sales tax on a net assessable turnover by taking the value of the whole of the copra purchased by him, adding thereto the respective values of tile oil and the cake sold inside the State and deducting only the value of the copra corresponding to the oil sold inside the State. It was contended for the appellant that in the calculation of the net tusnover, he was entitled to include the total value of the oil sold\n\nby him, both inside and outside the State, and deduct thuefrom the total value of the copra purchased by him, and further that, under the crriding provision of the Act under s. 26, he was entitled to have th value of the oil sold outside the State clcch 1 ctcd.\n\nHeld, that the calculation made by the Sales Tax Officer of the net tll&nover was correct.\n\nThe non-obstante provision contained in s. 26 of the Act has the effect of taking transactions relating to inter.State trarle out of the purview of the Act and they arc cxduded in the calculation\n\nA.pn1 2.\n\n1957 of the gross turnover as well_ as the ner turnover on v.'hich sales tax can be assessed.\n\nA. V. Fmiamk<\n\nAsrvani Kumar Ghosh v. Arabinda Bose, (1953) S.C.R. I, T~ Stale of K1rala relied 011.\n\nBhagwaJi J.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JupJSDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 232 of 1955.\n\nAppeal under Article 132(1) of the Constitution of India from the Judgment and Order dated November 24, 1954, of the former Travancore-Cochin High Coun in Original Petition No. 53 of 1954.\n\nT. N. St-11, irrespective of the fact whether these sales were effected inside the State or outside the State and deduct therefrom the total value of copra purchased by him from which the whole quantity of oil sold by him was manufactured, viz., Rs. 7,16,048-1-4. The resultant figure, according to him, represents the net assessable turnover on which the Sales Tax Authorities would be entitled to\n\ntsSess him to sales tax if the position in law was as is stood before the .amendment of the Act by the Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, • 1951.\n\nHe next contends that s •. 26 which was added to the Act by the Trav.mcore-Cochin General Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1951, prohibits the levy amongst others of a tax on the sale or purchase .of goods where such sale or purchase takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. This is an overriding provision which, it is contended, entitled him to deduct the value of the oil sold outside the State, viz., Rs. 3,67,816.l(}.1, from the assessable turnover arrived at as above. The result of this mode of calculation is that he claims to deduct from the gross turnover the whole of the purcha5e ptice of copra, viz.1\n\nRs. 7,16,048-1-4 and not the purchase price of copra which can be allocated to his sales of oil inside fhe State.\n\nThe Sales Ta)(: Authorities, on the other hand, conterd that the appellant is not entitled to take into\n\n.t. V. Fernantla\n\nY>: The State ofKeroJd\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nA.I'.~ ....\n\nTn, Stab •f Xtml•\n\nB /oagra\"1i J.\n\ncomputation at all his sales of oil outside the State and is also not entitled to deduct from his gross turnover the purchase price of copra allocated to the oil sold to persons outside the State. They claim to lift the whole of these sales of oil outside the State inclusive of the purchase price of the copra which can be allocated to them out of the calculations of the net turnover because of the provisions of s. 26 set out above, relying upon the non-obstante provision contained therein, viz., \"Not•Nithstanding anything contained in this Act, a tax on the sale or purchase of goods shall not be imposed under this Act where such sale or purchase takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce.\"\n\nWe have to decide which of these calculations of the net turnover is correct having regard to the relevant provmons of the Act and the rules made thereunder.\n\nThe definition of \"sale\" contained in s. 2(j) is wide enough to include the sales of oil manufactured by the appellant whether these sales are effected inside the State or outside the State. The definition of \"turnover\" contained in s. 2(k) of the Act also makes no distinction between the sales inside the State and outside the State. The \"turnover\" is there defined as the aggregate amount for which goods are either bought or sold by a dealer and that definition comprises within its scope both these types of sales whether inside the State or outside the State. This turnover of a dealer is under s. 3, sub-s. ( 4) to be determined in accordance with such rules as may be prescribed.\n\nRule 4 made by the Government under the rulemaking power prescribes that the gross turnover of a dealer for the purposes of the rules shall be the amount for which the goods are sold by him. This rule also does not make any distinction between sales inside the State or outside the State. After having thus provided for the inclusion of all sales within the gross turnover. r. 7 provides that the tax or taxes under s. 3 (which is the c11arging section) shall be levied on the net turnover of a Jcaler. 3uch net turnover is to be arrived at aftei deducting from the gross turnover various.\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COU~T REPORTS 845\n\namounts specified in els. (a) to (k) thereof and cl. (k) provides that a registered manufacturer of cocoanut and/or groundnut oil and cake will be entitled to deduct from his gross turnover such amounts as are mentioned in r. 20 subject to the conditions specified therein. The deduction under r. 20 is available to a dealer who manufactures cocoanut/ groundnut oil and cake from cocoanut and/or copra or groundnut and/or kernel purchased by him anq he is entitled to deduct the vah.Je of the cocoanut and/or copra or groundnut and/or kernel purchased and converted by him into oil and cake provided that the amount for which the oil is sold is included in his turnover. Here also we find no distinction made between sales inside the State or outside he State.\n\nOn a prim a f acie reading of these provlSlons contained in the Act and the rules made thereunder it would appear that a manufacturer of cocoanut or groundr:ut oil and cake would be entitled to include in his gross turnover thr: total value of the oil sold by him whether inside the State or outside the State and to deduct from such gross turnover the whole of the value of the copra purcha:; ed by him and converted into oil and cake irrespective of the fact whether such oil or cake was sold by him inside the State or outside the State.\n\nThe onlv thing which he had to do under r. 20, sub-r.\n\n(2) was to include the amount for which the oil is sold in his turnover and he would then under r. 7(1)(k) be entitled tc, deduct from his gross turnover the whole of the price of the copra purchased and converted by him into oil and cake, again irrespective of the fact whether the same had been sold by him inside the State or outside the State.\n\nThis was certainly the position as it obtained prior to the addition of the s. 26 to the Act by the Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1951.\n\nWe have, therefore, to consider what is the impact of s. 26 on the other provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder.\n\nThe High Court decided against the appellant observing that the definitions given in s. (2)(j) and (k) of the Act applied only in the absence of \"anything\n\n.d. V. Forna.uftr.\n\n\"· Th# Stau of Kera/a\n\nBli8gwati ].\n\nA. V. Fernattdli\n\nv. 1\"M State oj K\"aJa\n\nBhagwati ,1.\n\nrepugnant in the su\\Jitct or context\", and on a perusal of the relevant provmions of the Act and the rules made thereunder, it was of opinion that these definitions were clearly inapplicable for the following reasons :\n\n\"There can be no doubt that what has been intended is a taxation of copra at the purchase point and the avoidance of sales tax in respect of the oil extracted by a registered manufacturer from such copra to the extent of the value of the copra used for the said manufacture in all those cases where but for the concession he would have been liable to pay both the purchase tax on copra and the sales tax on oil under the Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax Act, 1125.\n\nIn other words, the object is the avoidance of a double taxation by the State, one at the purchase point of copra and the other at the sale point of oil, and it is impossible to invoke the definition and say that the concession will be available to a registered manufacturer even in those cases where only one and not both the taxes can be realized from him under the provisions of the Act.\"\n\nThe answer given by the learned counsel tor the appellant to the above reasoning was that in fiscal statutes what you have got to look to is not the spirit of the statute but the letter of the law; and if you could not bring a particular tax within the letter of the law, the subject could not be made liable for the same.\n\nOur attention was drawn in this . connection to the observations of Lord Rmse! of Killowen in lrzland Revenue Commissioners v. Duke of Westminster( 1 ) :\n\n\"I confess that I view with disfavour the doctrine that in taxation cases the subject is to be taxed if in accordance with a Couit's view of what it considers the sub•tance of the tramaction, the Court thinks that the case falls within the contemplation or spirit of the statute. The subject is not mxable by inference or by\n\nanalogy, but only by the plain words of a statute applicable to the facts and circumstances of his case.\" As Lord Cairns said many years ago in Partington v.\n\nThe Attorney General(') :-\"As I understand the\n\n(!) [1936] A. C. 1, 04.\n\n(•) (1869) 4 ILL. 100, 102.\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORT..S\n\nS47 \\ principle of all fiscal legislation it is this : if the person sought to be taxed comes wi.thi.n the letter of the law he must be taxel'l, however gn:at the hardship .may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the .other had, if the Crown, seeking to recover the! t~, cannot bnng the subject within the letter of the law, the subjct is free, however apparently within the spirit of the law the case might otherwise appear to be.\"\n\nThe passage was quoted with approval by the Privy Council in the Bank of Chettinail v. Income Tax Commissioner(') and the Privy Council registered its protest against the suggestion that 'in revenue cases \"the substance of the matter\" may be regarded as distinguished from the strict legal position. (See also F. L. Smith & Co. v. F. Greenwood(2)) It is no doubt true that in construing fiscal statutes and in determining the liability of a subject to tax one must have regard to the strict letter of the law and not merely to the spirit of the statute or the substance of the law. If the Revenue satisfies the Court that the case falls strictly within the provisions of the law, the subject can be taxed. If, on the other hand, the, case is not covered within the four corners of the provisions of the taxing statute, no tax can be imposed by inference or by analogy or by trying to probe into the intentions of the legislature and by considering what was the substance of the matter. We must of necessity, therefore, have regard to the actual provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder before we can come to the conclusion that the appellant was liable to assessment as contehded by the Sales Tax Authorities.\n\nIt may be noted at the outset that the main bulk of the Sales Tax Acts enacted by the various Provincial Legislatures was enacted before the Constitution.\n\nThere were on the Statute Book various Sales Tax Acts enacted by the Provincial Legislatures; viz., Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947, Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941, Madhya Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1947, Madras Sales Tax Act, 1939, Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1948, Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947, East Punjab Generl Sales Tax Act, 1948, and clie Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act,\n\n(1) A.'I. R. (1940) P. C. 183.\n\n(2) VIII T. C. 193, 2o6.\n\nA, V. Ftrnilndt~\n\nT Ill Stale of K wal(J\n\nB/iagwati ].\n\nA. V. Fernanthi:\n\nThe Stale 6f KeraJ.a\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1957] I 1948,-all of which levied sales tax on a more or less uniform basis bringing within their ken not only the sales which were actually effected within the territory but also sales where adopting the nexus theory even one of the ingredients of sale was found to have taken place within the territory.\n\nThe Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947, and the Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act, 1950, also followed the same pattern. When the Constitution came to be inaugurated on January 26, 1950, Art. 286(2) laid down restrictions on the State Legislatures to enact laws imposing or authorising the imposition of tax on the sale or purchase of goods in certain cases therein specified, so that after January 26, 1950, no State could impose a tax on the sale or purchase of goods falling within these categories. The\n\nSales .Tax Acts enacted by the various Provincial Legislatures had, therefore, to be brought in line with this provision of the Comtitution and various expedients were devised by the State Legislatures in order to effectuate this object.\n\nThis object was sought to be achieved in the main bulk of the Sales Tax Acts by adding towards the end of the Acts sections like s. 26 of the Travancore- Cochin General Sales Tax Act, 1125, incorporating therein the terms of Ar 286 of the Constitution. The non-obstante provision was thus enacted in the main bulk of the Sales Tax Acts which laid down : \"Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act the tax on the sales or purchase of goods shall not be imposed under this Act where .............. (and the provisions of Art. 286 were in terms incorporated therein).\"\n\nA different expedient was adopted in the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947 and the Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act, 1950. The Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947, had incorporated therein an addition to the charging section (section 3 of the Act) and s. 3 (1-A) which was inserted by s. 3 of the Assam Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1947 (Assam Act IV of 1951) was to the following effect :\n\n\"Nothing in sub-section (1) shall, except in cases covered by the first proviso to sub-section (12) of section ?, of th:s Act be deemed to render any dealer\n\nliable to tax on the sale of goods where such sale takes place : ( 1) outside the State of Assam; .\n\n(2) in the course of the import o~ the goods. mto, or export of the goods out of, the terntory of India; or\n\n(3) in the course of inter-State trade or commece except in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide.\"\n\nThe Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act, 1950 had a similar provision incorporated in its definition of sale given in s. 2(k) of the Act. The Explanation (2) which was substitution for the original Explanation (2) by s. 2 of the Hyderabad General Sales Tax (Amrndrr.cnt) Act, 1950 (Hyderabad -Act XXXIr of 1950) read as under: Explanation (2)-\"Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law for the time being in force, a transfer of goods in respect of which no tax can be imposed by reason of the provision contained m Article 286 of the Constitution, shall no!: be deemed to be \"sale\" within the meaning of this clat:se.\"\n\nA further expedient which was adopted in this connection may be noted in r. 5 of the Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1952, enacted under the Bombay Saks Tax Act, 1952-(Bombay Act XXIV of 1952), which authorised the deduction of certain sales coming within Art. 286 of the Constitution while calculating the taxable turnover of a dealer.\n\nWe are not called upon to express any opm10n as to whether the incorporation of the provisions of Art. 286 of the Constitution in the charging section as it was done in the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947, or in the definition of \"sale\" as it was done in the Hyderabad Grneral Sales Tax Act, 1950, or even in the rules in regard to the calculation of taxable turnover as it was done in the Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1952, had the effect of\n\nking the sales falling withi°: the categories 5pecified m Art. 286 out of the purview of the respective Sales Tax Acts, so that they would not be included at all within the calculation of the net turnover on which only the sales tax could be levied.\n\nWhat was done in the instant case before us as in the bulk of the Sales\n\nA. V. F1rnmu/4\n\nTli• Stak of .Kerak\n\nBhap; ati].\n\nA. V.\n\nFernand#~ v.\n\nThe State of K1rala\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nTax Acts above noted was the incorporation of those prov1S1ons of Art. 286 of tk Constitution therein by adding a non-obstante provision at the end of the respective Sales Tax Acts in the manner above indicated. The definition of \"sale\" was not amended nor was the charging section. The rules as to the calculation of the net turnover also remained the same, without any deduction in regard to sales coming within Art. 286 of the Constitution being incorporated therein, with the result that the Sales Tax Authorities founded themselves upon the non-obstante provision incorporated in the Act by the addition of s. 26 therein by the Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1951.\n\nWhat, then, is the effect of this non-obstante provision? This Court in Aswani Kumar Ghosh v. Ara bind a Bose(' ) made the following observations in connection with the non-obstante clause :\n\n\"lt should first be ascertained what the enacting p; rrt of the section provides on a fair construction of the words used according to their natural and ordinary meaning, and the non-obstante clause is to be understood as operating to set aside as no longer valid anything contained in relevant existing laws which is inconsistent with the new enactment.\" The same ratio applies to the construction of the nonobstante provision contained in s. 26 of the Act with reference to all the other provisions of the Act that preceded the same.\n\nIn our opinion, s. 26 of the Act, i1, cases falling within the categories specified under Art. 286 of the Constitution has the effect of setting at nought and of obliterating in regard thereto the provisions contained in the Act relating to the imposition of tax on the sale or purchase of such goods and in particular the provisions contained in the charging section and the provisions contained in r. 20(2) and other provrsrons which are incidental to the process of levying such tax.\n\nSo far as sales falling within the categories specified in Art. 286 of the Constitution and the corresponding s. 26 of the Act are concerned, they are, as it were,\n\n(1) f1953] S.C.R. I, 21, 22.\n\ntaken out of the purview of the Act and no effect is to be given to those provisions which would otherwise have been applicable if s. 26 had not been added to the Act. If these provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder do not apply to the sales falling within those categories, the value thereof cannot be included in the turnover of the dealer and no question woulci arise of the applicability of r. 7 (l)(k) and r. 20(2) at all to these cases.\n\nThe amount for which the oil is sold in inter-State trade or commerce would not be lawfully included in the turnover of the dealer and if the amount for which such oil is sold cannot thus be included in his turnover no occasion would arise for the deduction under r. 7(1)(k) of the value of the cocoanut and/or copra or groundnut and/or kernel purchased and converted by the dealer into such oil and cake.\n\nA distinction was sought to be made between the inclusion of the value of such oil in the turnover of the dealer for the purpose of assessment and the levy of tax thereupon. It was urged that the inclusion of such oil in the turnover for the purpose of assessment was quite distinct from the liability for tax which was the only thing prohibited by s. 26 of the Act and therefore the value of such oil could be lawfully included in the turnover involving as a necessary consequence the deduction of the value of the copra purchased by the dealer and converted by him into such oil from such turnover, the resultant turnover being the net turnover for the purposes of assessment, the value of the oil sold in the course of inter-State trade or commerce being further deducted therefrom by reason of the operation of s. 26 of the Act, thus making in effect a distinction between assessable turnover and the taxable turnover.\n\nReliance was placed in support of this position on the observations of this Court in Messrs. Chatturam Hori/ram Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bihar and Orissa(1 ) :\n\n\"As has been pointed out by the Federal Court in Chatturam v.\n\nCl.T., Bihar( 2 ) (quoting from the\n\n(I) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 290, 297,\n\n(2) [1947] F.C.R.116, 126.\n\n2~0 S. C. India/59.\n\nA. V. Fernandez\n\nTht State of Kerala\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nI95i\n\nA. V. Fernandel:\n\nThe State of Kuala\n\nBIJagwati J.\n\njudgment of Lord Dunedin in Whitney v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1) 'there are three stages in the imposition of a tax. There is the declaration of liability, that is the part of the statute which determines what person in respect of what property are liable.\n\nNext, there is the assessment.\n\nLiability does not depend on assessment. That, ex-hypothesi, has already been fixed.\n\nBut assessment particularises the exact sum which a person liable has to pay. Lastly, come the methods of recovery if the person taxed does not voluntarily pay'.''\n\nThe appelbnt, however, forgets that the three stages in the imposition of a tax which are laid down here predicate, in the first instance, a declaration of liability as the starting point. If there is a liability to tax, imposed under the terms of the taxing statute, then follo\\v the provisions in rcgJrd to the asscssrnent of such liability. If there is no liability to tax there cannot be any assessment either.\n\nSales or purchases i:-. respect of which there is no liability to tax imposed by the .statute cannot al all be included in the calculation 0f turnmTr for the purpose of assessment an: The State ofKeroJd\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nA.I'.~ ....\n\nTn, Stab •f Xtml•\n\nB /oagra\"1i J.\n\ncomputation at all his sales of oil outside the State and is also not entitled to deduct from his gross turnover the purchase price of copra allocated to the oil sold to persons outside the State."}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15394, "end_char": 15399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15892, "end_char": 15899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16087, "end_char": 16094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16455, "end_char": 16459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16959, "end_char": 16963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18953, "end_char": 18958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19091, "end_char": 19096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19402, "end_char": 19407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Fernattdli\n\nv. 1\"M State oj K\"aJa\n\nBhagwati ,1."}}, {"text": "Killowen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20920, "end_char": 20928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Killowen in lrzland Revenue Commissioners v. Duke of Westminster( 1 ) :\n\n\"I confess that I view with disfavour the doctrine that in taxation cases the subject is to be taxed if in accordance with a Couit's view of what it considers the sub•tance of the tramaction, the Court thinks that the case falls within the contemplation or spirit of the statute."}}, {"text": "Cairns", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21433, "end_char": 21439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Lord Cairns said many years ago in Partington v.\n\nThe Attorney General(') :-\"As I understand the\n\n(!) ["}}, {"text": "S47", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21613, "end_char": 21616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "were on the Statute Book various Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23433, "end_char": 23479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23527, "end_char": 23552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23592, "end_char": 23626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Madras Sales Tax Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23628, "end_char": 23654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23656, "end_char": 23682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23684, "end_char": 23710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "East Punjab Generl Sales Tax Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23712, "end_char": 23750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23761, "end_char": 23788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "V. Ftrnilndt~", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23852, "end_char": 23865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A, V. Ftrnilndt~\n\nT Ill Stale of K wal(J\n\nB/iagwati ]."}}, {"text": "Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24291, "end_char": 24316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24326, "end_char": 24363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "January 26, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24445, "end_char": 24461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the Constitution came to be inaugurated on January 26, 1950, Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 286(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24463, "end_char": 24474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act, 1950", "statute": "the Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25152, "end_char": 25157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act, 1950", "statute": "the Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Travancore- Cochin General Sales Tax Act, 1125", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25165, "end_char": 25211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25547, "end_char": 25555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act the tax on the sales or purchase of goods shall not be imposed under this Act", "statute": "Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act the tax on the sales or purchase of goods shall not be imposed under this Act"}}, {"text": "Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25636, "end_char": 25661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25670, "end_char": 25707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25713, "end_char": 25738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25802, "end_char": 25811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "The Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25828, "end_char": 25832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "The Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25861, "end_char": 25865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947", "statute": "The Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Assam Act IV of 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25912, "end_char": 25932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Assam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26214, "end_char": 26219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of th:s Act be deemed to render any dealer\n\nliable to tax on the sale of goods where such sale takes place : ( 1) outside the State of Assam; ."}}, {"text": "Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26450, "end_char": 26487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26560, "end_char": 26567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act, 1950", "statute": "The Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26659, "end_char": 26663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act, 1950", "statute": "The Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Article 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26974, "end_char": 26985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act, 1950", "statute": "The Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27164, "end_char": 27192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Saks Tax Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27212, "end_char": 27237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Act XXIV of 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27239, "end_char": 27262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27327, "end_char": 27335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act XXIV of 1952", "statute": "Bombay Act XXIV of 1952"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27507, "end_char": 27515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act XXIV of 1952", "statute": "Bombay Act XXIV of 1952"}}, {"text": "Constitution in the charging section as it was done in the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27523, "end_char": 27607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Hyderabad Grneral Sales Tax Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27662, "end_char": 27699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27793, "end_char": 27821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27900, "end_char": 27908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1952", "statute": "the Bombay Sales Tax Rules, 1952"}}, {"text": "Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27946, "end_char": 27959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28258, "end_char": 28266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V.\n\nFernand~ v.\n\nThe State of K1rala\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nTax Acts above noted was the incorporation of those prov1S1ons of Art.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28337, "end_char": 28345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Constitution therein by adding a non-obstante provision at the end of the respective Sales Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28352, "end_char": 28450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28685, "end_char": 28693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution therein by adding a non-obstante provision at the end of the respective Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Constitution therein by adding a non-obstante provision at the end of the respective Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28883, "end_char": 28888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution therein by adding a non-obstante provision at the end of the respective Sales Tax Act", "statute": "Constitution therein by adding a non-obstante provision at the end of the respective Sales Tax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29597, "end_char": 29602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29709, "end_char": 29714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29783, "end_char": 29791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30240, "end_char": 30248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30291, "end_char": 30296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30507, "end_char": 30512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31589, "end_char": 31594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32055, "end_char": 32060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1955] 2 S.C.R. 290", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 32440, "end_char": 32459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A. V. Fernandez", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32516, "end_char": 32531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Fernandez\n\nTht State of Kerala\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nI95i\n\nA. V. Fernandel:\n\nThe State of Kuala\n\nBIJagwati J.\n\njudgment of Lord Dunedin in Whitney v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1) 'there are three stages in the imposition of a tax.", "canonical_name": "A. V. FERNANDEZ"}}, {"text": "State of Kerala", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32537, "end_char": 32552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Fernandez\n\nTht State of Kerala\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nI95i\n\nA. V. Fernandel:\n\nThe State of Kuala\n\nBIJagwati J.\n\njudgment of Lord Dunedin in Whitney v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1) 'there are three stages in the imposition of a tax.", "canonical_name": "State of Ktrtda"}}, {"text": "A. V. Fernandel", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32573, "end_char": 32588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Fernandez\n\nTht State of Kerala\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nI95i\n\nA. V. Fernandel:\n\nThe State of Kuala\n\nBIJagwati J.\n\njudgment of Lord Dunedin in Whitney v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1) 'there are three stages in the imposition of a tax.", "canonical_name": "A. V. FERNANDEZ"}}, {"text": "State of Kuala", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32595, "end_char": 32609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Fernandez\n\nTht State of Kerala\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nI95i\n\nA. V. Fernandel:\n\nThe State of Kuala\n\nBIJagwati J.\n\njudgment of Lord Dunedin in Whitney v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1) 'there are three stages in the imposition of a tax.", "canonical_name": "State of Ktrtda"}}, {"text": "BIJagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32611, "end_char": 32620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Fernandez\n\nTht State of Kerala\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nI95i\n\nA. V. Fernandel:\n\nThe State of Kuala\n\nBIJagwati J.\n\njudgment of Lord Dunedin in Whitney v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1) 'there are three stages in the imposition of a tax."}}, {"text": "Dunedin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32642, "end_char": 32649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Fernandez\n\nTht State of Kerala\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nI95i\n\nA. V. Fernandel:\n\nThe State of Kuala\n\nBIJagwati J.\n\njudgment of Lord Dunedin in Whitney v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1) 'there are three stages in the imposition of a tax."}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35222, "end_char": 35227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35464, "end_char": 35469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35978, "end_char": 35986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 286", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36333, "end_char": 36341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "A. V. Fmiandtt", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36673, "end_char": 36687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. V. Fmiandtt:\n\nTJi."}}, {"text": "State of Kerala", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36695, "end_char": 36710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Kerala\n\nBhagwati ]."}}]} {"document_id": "1957_1_854_860_EN", "year": 1957, "text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nBHAGWANDAS\n\nti.\n\nTHE STATE OF RAJASTHAN\n\n(BHAGWATI and J. L. KAPUR JJ.)\n\n[1957]\n\nAppeal against acquittal-JV hen High Court may interfere-· Dying declaration-Value of-Expert evidence-Discrediting by reference to text books-Practice-Appreciation of evidence-Inter /erence by Supreme Court.\n\nThe l-Iigh Court should not set asienal Code. The Magistrate by his order dated August 5, 1953, charged the petitioner under ss. 153A and 295A and committed the petitioner to the Sessions Court of Kanpur for trial. The petitioner pleaded not guilty. The learned Sessions Judge, by his judgment dated November 16, 1953, acquitted the petitioner of the charge under s. 153A but convicted him under s. 295A and sentenced him to 18 months rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 2,000 and, in default of payment of the fine, to further rigorous imprisonment of 4 months. The petitioner filed an appeal to the High Court at Allahabad. The learned Single Judge, by his judgment dated October 25, 1956. held that the article was published with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of muslims and that the petitioner was guilty under s. 295A of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Judge, however, reduced the sentence of imprisonment to 12 months and the fine from Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 250 only. An application for certificate to appeal to this Court under Arts. 132 and 134 having been rejected by the High Court on October 30, 1956, the petitioner moved this Court for special leave to appeal from the judgment of the Allahabad High Court dated October 25, 1956.\n\nThe petitioner also on December 5, 1956, presented the present petition under Art. 32 for the reliefs mentioned above. The petitioner also made an application in this Court along with the writ petition for stay of the sentence passed on him. On December 18, 1956, both the stay application and the petition for special leave were dismissed by this Court. The petition under Art. 32 has now come up for hearing.\n\nPresumably the petitioner has surrendered and is undergoing the sentence of imprisonment.\n\nLearned counsel appearing in support of this petition urges that s. 295A of the Indian Penal Code is ultra vires and void inasmuch as it interferes with the pertitioner's right to freedom of speech :rnd expression guaranteed to him as a citizen of India by Art. 19( l) (a) of our Constitution. The contention is that this section\n\ntcannot be supported as a law imposing reasonable restnct1ons on the exercise of the right conferred by Art. 19(1) (a) as provided in cl. (2) of the said Article.\n\nLearned counsel says that the interest of public order is the only thing in cl. (2) which may possibly be relied upon by the State as affording a justification for its claim for the validity of the impugned section. A law interfering with the freedom of speech and expression and imposing a punishment for its breach may, says counsel, be \"in the interests of public order\" only if the likelihood of public disorder is made an ingredient of the offence and the prevention of public disorder is a matter of proximate ancl not remote consideration.\n\nLearned counsel points out that insulting the religion or the religious beliefs of a class of citizens of India may not lead to public disorder in all cases although it may do so in some case. Therefore, where a law purports, as the impugned section does, to authorise ' the imposition of restriction on the exercise of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression in language wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without the limitation of constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting such right, the court should not uphold it even in so far as it may be applied within the constitutionally permissible limits as it is not severable. So long as the possibility of its being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution cannot be ruled out it must, according to learned counsel, be held to be wholly unconstitutional and void.\n\nReference has been made to the cases of Ramesh Thappar v. The State of Madras( 1 ) and Brii Rushan v. The State of Delhi( 2 ).\n\nIn Ramesh Thappar's case, in exercise of powers conferred on him by s. 9(1-A) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949, the Governor of Madras, being satisfied that for the purpose of securing public safety and the maintenance of public order it was necessary so to do, prohibited the entry into or the circulation, sale or distribution in the State of Madras or any part thereof of the newspaper entitled 'Cross Roads', an English Weekly published at Bombay. < 1) 1950 s.c.R. 594.\n\n(2) 1950 s.c.R. 605.\n\nRamji Lal Modi v.\n\nTk Mate of U.P.\n\nDasC.J.\n\nRanVi Lal Modi v.\n\nTire State of U.P\n\nDtU C. J.\n\nThe impugaed section-s. 9(1-A)-was a law enacted for the purpose of securing the public safety and tht maintenance of public order. 'Public order' was said to be an expression of wide connotation and to signify that state of tranquillity which prevailed among the members of a political society as a result of the internal regulation enforced by the Government which they had established. 'Public safety' used in that section was taken as part of the wider concept of 'public order'.\n\nClause (2) of Art. 19, as it stood then, protected a law relating, inter alia, to a matter which undermined the securitv of or tended to overthrow the State.\n\nSome breach. of public safety or pubHc order may conceivalily undermine the security of or tend to overthrow the State, but equally conceivably many breaches of public sofety or public order may not have that tendency. Therefore, a law which imposes restrictions on the freedom of speech and expression for preventing a breach of public safety or public order which may not undermine the security of the State or tend to o\\erthrow the State cannot claim the protection of cl. (2) of Art. 19.\n\nSection 9(1-A) was challenged as it embraced both species of activities referred to above and as . the section was not sever th' whole section was held to be bad.\n\nIn Brij Bushan's case (supra) the validity of s. 7(1) (c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, as extended to the Province of Delhi, came up for consideration.\n\nThit section provided th3t ('t1•e Provincial Government or any uthority authorised !)y it in this behalf, if satisfied that such action is necessary for preventing or combating any activity prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of public order, may, by order in writing addressed to the . printer, publisher or editor, require that anv matter relating to a particular subject or class of subjects shall before publication be submitted for scrutiny\".\n\nIt was held by this Court (Fazl Ali f. dissenting) that inasmuch as the section authorised the imposition of restrictions on the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Art. 19(1) (a) for the purposes of preventing activities prejudicial to\n\npublic safety and maintenance of public order, it was not a law solely relating to a matter which undermined the security of or tended to overthrow the State within the meaning of cl. (2) of Art. 19 as it then stood. The principles laid down in Rome sh T hap par's case were applied to this case and the law was held to be void.\n\nThe case of Chintaman Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh(1) has also been relied upon in support of the\n\ncontention that where the language employed in the Statute is wide enough to cover restrictions on a fundamental right both within and without the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting the right and the possibility of its being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution cannot be ruled out, the law must be held to be wholly void .\n\n. After this Court decided the cases of Romesh Thappar\n\n(supra) anners, their Directors, officers, servants or agents and that the State of Bombay, its servants and agents, do allow the petitioners to carry on their trade and business of running the Prize Competition mentioned in the petition and do forbear from demanding, collecting or recovering from the petitioners any tax as provided in the impugned Act or the said Rules in respect of the said Prize Competition and that the State of Bombay do pay to the petitioners their costs of the said applications.\n\nBeing aggrieved by the decision of the trial Judge, the State of Bombay preferred an appeal on June 8, 1954.\n\nThe Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order of the trial Juclge, though on somewhat different grounds.\n\nIt differed from the learned trial Judge on the view that he had taken that there was no legislative competence in the Legislature to enact the Legislation. It held that the topic of legislation was 'gambling' and the Legislature was competent to enact it under Entry 34 of the State List.\n\nIt, however, agreed with the learned trial Judge that the tax levied under s. 12A was not a tax on gambling but that it was a tax which fell under Entry 60. It held that there was\n\nlegislative competence in the Legislature to impose that tax but that the tax was invalid because it did not comply with the restriction contained in Art. 276(2) of the Constitution.\n\nIt also took the view that the tax, ven assuming it was a tax on betting or gambling, could not be justified because it did not fall under Art. 304(b ).\n\nIt differed from the learned trial Judge when he found as a fact that the scheme underlying the prize competitions was not a lottery and came to the conclusion that the Act applied to the prize competitions of the respondents.\n\nIt held that the challenge of the petitioners to the impugned provisions succeeded because the restrictions contained in the impugned Act controlling the business of the petitioners could not be justified as the requirements of the provisions of Art. 304(b) had not been complied with.\n\nThe High Court agreed with the learned trial Judge, that the petitioners' prize competitions were their \"business\" which was entitled to the protection guaranteed under the Constitution. It took the view that although the activity of the petitioners was a lottery, it was not an activity which was against public interest and, therefore, the provisions of Part XIII of the Constitution applied to the respondents' business.\n\nBeing aggrieved by the said judgment of the Court of Appeal, the appellant applied for and obtained under Arts. 132(1) and 133(1) of the Constitution a certificate of fitness for appeal to this Court and hence this appeal before us.\n\nThe principal question canvassed before us relates to the validity or otherwise of the impugned Act. The Court of Appeal has rightly pointed out that when the validity of an Act is called in question, the first thing for the court to do is to examine whether the Act is a law wit~ respect to a topic assigned to the particular Legislature which enacted it. If it is, then the court is next to consider whether, in the case of an Act passed by the Legislature of a Province (now a State), its operation extends beyond the boundaries of the Province or the State, for under the provisions conferring legislative powers on it such Legislature can only make a law for its territories or any part thereof\n\nThe State of Bomba; v.\n\nR. M. D. Chamarbaugwata\n\nDasC.J.\n\nTIM Stai. ef\n\nBom5ay\n\nR •• W.D.C,,__\n\ntaugwa/•\n\nDasC.J.\n\nand its laws cannot, in the absence of a territorial nexus, have any extra territorial operation. If the impugned law satisfies both these tests, then finally the court has to ascertain if there is anything in any other . part of the Constitution which places any fetter on the legislative powers of such Legislature. The impugned law has to pass all these three tests.\n\nTaking the first test first, it will be recalled that the 1948 Act was enacted by the Provincial Legislature of Bombay when the Government of India Act, 1935, was in force. Under ss. 99 and 100 of that Act the Provincial Legislature of Bombay had power to make laws for the Province of Bombay or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters e1mmerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule to that Act. It will also be remembered that the 1948 Act was amended by Bombay Act XXX of 1952 after the Constitution of India had come into operation. Under Arts. 245 and 246, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the Legislature of the State of Bombay has power to make laws for the whole or any part of the State of Bombay with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The State of Bombay, which is the appellant before us, claims that the impugned Act including s. 12A is a law made with respect to topics covered by Entries 34 and 62 of List II in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution which reproduce Entries 36 and 50 of List II in the Seventh ' Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935. On the other hand, the petitioners, who are respondents before us, maintain that the impugned Act is legislation under Entries 26 and 60 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution corresponding to Entries 27 and 46 of List II in the Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, and that, in any event, s. 12A of the impugned Act, in so far as it imposes a tax, comes under Entry 60 of List II in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution corresponding to Entry 46 of List II in the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, and not under Entry 62 of List II in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution corresponding to Entry 50 of List II in the Seventh Schedule to the\n\nGovernment of India Act, 1935, and that as the tax imposed exceeds Rs. 250/- it is void under Art. 276(2) which reproduces s. 142A of the Government of India Act, 1935. Reference will hereafter be made only to the relevant Entries of List II in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, for they are substantially in the same terms as the corresponding Entries of List II in the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935.\n\nFor easy reference, the relevant Entries in List II in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution are set out below :\n\n\"26. Trade and commerce within the State subject to the provisions of Entry 33 of List III.\n\n34. Betting and gambling.\n\n60. Taxes on professions, trades, callings, and employments.\n\n62. Taxes on luxuries, including taxes on entertainments, amusements, betting and gambling.\"\n\nIn order to correctly appreciate the rival contentions and to come to a decision as to the particular Entry or Entries under which the impugned Act including s. 12A thereof has been enacted, it is necessary to examine and to ascertain the purpose and scope of the < impugned legislation.\n\nIt may be mentioned that the 1939 Act was. enacted to regulate and levy a tax on prize competitions in the Province of Bombay. It did not deal with lotteries at all. That Act was repealed by the 1948 Act which was enacted to control and to levy a tax not only on prize competitions but on lotteries also.\n\nIt is not unreasonable to conclude that the clubbing together of lotteries and prize competitions in the 1948 Act indicates that in the view of the Legislature the two topics were, in a way, allied to each other. As already indicated, the 1948 Act was amended in 1952 by Bombay Act XXX of 1952 so as to extend its operation to prize competitions contained in newspapers printed and published outside the State of Bombay. In s. 2(1)(d) of the impugned Act will be found the definition of \"prize competition\" to which reference will be made hereafter in greater detail.\n\nClause ( dd) was inserted in s. 2( 1) in 1952 defining \"promoter\".\n\nSection 3 declares that subject to the\n\nThe State of\n\nBom/)(g\n\nR. M. D. Chamarbaugwala\n\nDasC.J.\n\nTh< Stall ef\n\nBom/J'!1\n\nR. M. D. CIUJnUJr\n\nbaugroa/a\n\nD., C.J.\n\nprov1S1ons of the Act, all lotteries and all prize competitions are unlawful. This is a clear indication that the Legislature regarded lotteries and prize competitions as on the same footing and declared both of them to be unlawful, subject, of course, to the provisions of the Act. Section 4 creates certain offences in connection with lotteries and competitions punishable as therein mentioned. We may skip over ss. 5 and 6 which deal exclusively with lotteries and pass on to s. 7. Section 7 provides that a prize competition shall be deemed to be an unlawful prize competition unless a licence in respect of such competition has been obtained by the promoter thereof. There are two provisos to the section which are not material for our present purpose, Section 8 imposes certain additional penalty for contravention of the provisions of s.\n\n7. Section 9 regulates the granting of licences on such fees and conditions and in such form as may be prescribed, that is to say prescribed by rules. Section 10 makes it lawful for the Government, by general or special order, to, inter alia, prohibit the grant of licences in respect of a lottery or prize competition or class of lotteries or prize competitions throughout the State or in any area.\n\nSection 11 empowers the Collector to suspend or cancel a licence granted under this Act in certain circumstances therein specified. Section 12 authorises the levy of a tax on lotteries and prize competitions at the rate of 25% of the total sum received or due in respect of such lottery or prize competition. This section directs that the tax shall be collected from the promoter of such lottery or prize competition as the case may be. Sub-section (2) of s. 12 empowers the State Government by a Notification in the official Gazette, to enhance the rate of tax up to 50% of the total sum received or due in respect of such prize competition as may be specified in the Notification. Section 12A, which is of great importance for the purpose of this appeal, runs as follows:\n\n\"12A.\n\nNotwithstanding anything contained in section 12, there shall be levied in respect of every lottery or prize competition contained in a newspaper or publication printed and published outside the State,\n\nfor which a licence has been obtained under section 5, 6 or 7, a tax at such rates as may be specified by the\n\nState Government in a notification in the Official Gazette not exceeding the rates specified in section 12 on the sums specified in the declaration made under section 15 by the promoter of the lottery or pnze competition as having been received or due in respect of such lottery or prize competition or in a lump sum having regard to the circulation or distribution of the newspaper or publication in the State.\" Section 15 requires every person promoting a lottery or prize competition of any kind to keep and maintain accounts relating to such lottery or prize competition and to submit to the Collector statements in such form and at such period as may be prescribed. It is not necessary for the purpose of this appeal to refer to the remaining sections which are designed to facilitate the main purpose of the Act and deal with procedural matters except to s. 31 which confers power on the State Government to make rules for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Act. In exercise of powers so conferred on it, the State Government has, by Notification in the Official Gazette, made certain rules called the Bombay Lotteries and Prize Competitions Control and Tax Rules, 1952, to which reference will be made hereafter.\n\nThe petitioners contend that the object of the impugned Act is to control and tax lotteries and prize competitions. It is not the purpose of the Act to prohibit either the lotteries or the prize competitions.\n\nThey urge that the impugned Act deals .alike with prize competitions which may partake of the nature of gambling and also prize competitions which call for knowledge and skill for winning success and. in support of this contention reliance is placed on the definition of \"prize competition\" in s. 2(1)(d) of the impugned Act.\n\nWe are pressed to hold that the impugned Act in its entirety or at any rate in so far as it covers legitimate and innocent prize competition is a law with respect to trade and commerce under Entry 26 and not with respect to betting and gambling under Entry 34. They also urge that in any event the taxing provisions,\n\nTh4 State of\n\nBomb19\n\n~. M.D. Cham\"'\n\nbaugwala\n\nDasC. 7.\n\nThe Stato ef\n\nBombay\n\nR. M. D. Chamarbaugwnla\n\nDasC.J.\n\nnamely ss. 12 and 12A, are taxes on the trade of running prize competitions under Entry 60 and not taxes on betting and gambling under Entry 62. We are unable to accept the correctness of the aforesaid contentions for reasons which we proceed immediately to state.\n\nAs it has already been mentioned, the impugned Act replaced the 1939 Act which dealt only with prize competitions. Section 2(2) of the 1939 Act defined \"prize competition\" in the terms following :- 2(2) \"Prize Competition\" includes-\n\n(a) crossword prize competition, m1ssmg words competition, picture prize competition, number prize competition, or any other competition, for which the solution is prepared beforehand by the promoters of the competition or\n\n0for which the solution is determined by lot;\n\n(b) any competition in which prizes are offered for forecasts of the results either of a future event or of a past event the result of which is not yet ascertained or not yet generally known; and ( c) any other competition success in which does not depend to a substantial degree upon the exercise of skill, but does not include a prize competition contained in a newspaper or periodical printed and published outside the Province of Bombay.\" The 1948 Acts. 2(l)(d), as originally enacted, substantially reproduced the definition of \"prize competition\" as given ins. 2(2) of the 1939 Act. Section 2(1)(d) of the 1948 Act, as originally enacted, ran as follows :\n\n\"2(1) ( d) \"Prize Competition\" includes-\n\n(i) cross-word prize compet:1t1on, missing words prize competition, picture prize competition, number prize competition, or any other competition for which the solution is prepared beforehand by the promoters of the competition or for which the solution is determined by lot;\n\n(ii) any competition in which prizes are offered for forecasts of the results either of a future event or of a past event the result of which is not yet ascertained or not yet generally known; and\n\n(iii) any other competition success in which does not depend to a substantial degree upon the exercise of skill, but does not include a prize compet1t1on contained in a newspaper printed and published outside the Province of Bombay;\" The collocation of words in the first category of the definitions in both the 1939 Act and the 1948 Act as originally enacted made it quite clear that the qualifying clause \"for which the solution is prepared beforehand by the promoters of the competition or for which the solution is determined by lot\" applied equally to each of the fiye kinds of prize competitions included in that category and set out one after another in a continuous sentence. It should also be noted that the qualifying clause consisted of two parts separated from each other by the disjunctive word \"or\". Both parts of the qualifying clause indicated that each of the five kinds of prize competitions which they qualified were of a gambling nature. Thus a prize competition for which a solution was prepared beforehand was clearly a gambling prize competition, for the competitors were only invited to guess what the solution prepared beforehand by the promoters might be, or in other words, as Lord Heward C.J. observed in Coles v.\n\nOdhams Press Ltd.( 1 ), \"the competitors are invited to pay certain number of pence to have the the opportunity of taking blind shots at a hidden target.\" Prize competitions to which the second part of the qualifying dause applied, that is to say, the prize competitions for which the solution was determined by lot, was necessarily a gambling adventure. On the language used in the definition section of the 1939 Act as well as in the 1948 Act, as originally enacted, there could be no doubt that each of the five kinds of prize competitions included in the first category to each of which the qualifying clause applied was of a gambling nature. Nor has it been questioned that the third category; which comprised \"any other competition success in which does not depend to a substantial