February 21

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1956]

MESSRS MELA RAM & SONS

THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,

PUNJAB.

[S. R. DAS, C.J., BHAGWATI and VENKATARAMA

AYXAR JJ.)

Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 (XI of 1922), ss. 28, 80(1)(2), 81, 83-Assessment of Income-tax-Notice of demand-Appeal against assessmenf,-Received in Appellate Assistant Commi!sioner's Office out of time-Prayer for condonation of delay rejected-Order of Assistant Oomm.issioner dismissing an appeal as out of ti~-Whether one under s. 30( 2) or under s. 81 of the Act-Whether appeal competent therefrom.

The appellant firm filed appeals against orders assessing it to income-tax and super-tax for the years 1945·1946 and 1946·1947 beyond the time prescribed by s. 30(2) of the Income-tax Act.

The appeals were numbered, and notices were issued for their hearing under s. 31.

At the hearing of the appeals before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the Department took the objection that the appeals were barred by time. The appellant prayed for condonation of delay, but that was refused, and the appeals were dismissed as time-barred. The appellant then preferred appeals against the orders of dismissal to the Tribunal under s. 33 of the Act, and the Tribunal dismissed them on the ground that the orders of the Assistant Com missioner were in substance passed under s. 30(2) and not under s. 31 of the Act and that no appeal lay against them under s. 33 of the Act.

On a reference under s. 66(1) of the Act the High Court held that the orders of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner were made under s. 30(2) and were not appealable under s. 33 of the Act.

On appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court the question for determination was whether an order dismissing an appeal pre~ sented under s. 30 as out of time was one nuder s. 30(2) or under s. 31 of the Act because if it was the former there was no appeal pro vided against it; if it was the latter it was open to appeal under s. 33.

Held that the orders of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner fell within s. 31.

A right of appeal is a substantive right and is a creature of the statute. S. 30(1) confers on the assessee a right of appeal against certain orders and an order of assessment under s. 23 is one of them.

The oppel!ant had therefore a substantive right under s. 30(1) to prefer appeals against orders of assessment made by the Income Tax Oflicer.

An appeal presented out of time is 1m appeal and an order dismissing it as time-barred is one passed in appeal.

Section 31 is the only provision relating to the hearing and dis posal of appeals and if an order dismissing an appeal as barred by limitation as in the present case is one passed in appeal it must fall within s. 31 and as s. 33 confers a right of appeal against all orders passed under s. 31, it must also be appealable.

To fall within s. 31 it is not necessary that the order should expressly address itself to and decide on the merits of the assessment and it is sufficient that the effect of the order is to confirm the assessment as when the appeal is dismissed on a preliminary point.

An order rejecting an appeal on the ground of limitation after it had been admitted is one under s. 31, though there is no consideration of the merits of the assessment.

Held therefore that the orders of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner holding that there were no sufficient reasons for excusing the delay and rejecting the appeals as time-barred would be orders passed under s. 31 and would be open to appeal, and it would make no difference in the position whether the orders of dismissal were made before or after the appeals were admitted.

Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. Mtt. Ar. S. Ar. Arunachalam Ohettiar, ([1953] S.C.R. 463), explained.

Case-law discussed.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 17of1954.

Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 11th day of June 1951 of the Punjab

High Court in Civil Reference No. 2of1951.

Hardyal Hardy and Sardar Singh, for the appellant.

0. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India (G. N.

Joshi and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for the respondent. ·

1956. February 21.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

VENKATAr.AMA AYYAR J.--The appellant is a firm carrying on business at Ludhiana in the Punjab. The Income-tax Officer assessed its income for 1945-1946 at Rs. 71,186, and on 17-9-1947 a notice of demand was served on it for Rs. 29,857-6-0 on account of income-tax and super-tax. The appellant preferred an

Messrs Mela Ram

and Sons

The Commissioner

of Income-tax, Punjab

Messrs Mela Ram

and Sons

The Commissioner

of lnconie-tax,

Punjab

Venkatarama

Ayyar J.

appeal against the assessment, and it was actually received in the office of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on 5-ll-1947. It was then out of time by 19 days; but the appeal was registered as No. 86, and notice for hearing under section 31 was issued for 13-12-1947, and after undergoing several adjournments, it was actually heard on 1-10-1948.

For the year 1946-1,947, the Income-tax Officer assessed the income of the firm at Rs. 1,09,883, and on 29-9-1947 a notice of demand was served on it for Rs. 51,313-14-0 on account of income-tax and super-tax. The appellant preferred an appeal against this assessment, and it was actually received in the office of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on 5-ll-1947, and it was then 7 days out of time. It was registered as No. 89, and notice for hearing under section 31 was issued for 24-6-1948.

Eventually, it was heard along with Appeal No. 86 on 1-10-1948.

At the hearing, the Department took the objection that the appeals were presented out of time, and were therefore liable o be dismissed.

The appellant prayed for condonation of the delay on the ground that following on the partition of the country the conditions were very unsettled, that curfew order had been promulgated and was in force, and that the post office did not accept registered letters, and that the traffic on the Grand Trunk Road was closed, and that in view of these exceptional circumstances, it had sufficient cause for not presenting the appeals in time.

On 31-12-1948 the Appellate Assistant Commissioner passed orders in both the appeals, holding that there was not sufficient ground for condoning the delay, and rejecting them in limine. These orders were purported to be passed under section 31 read along with section 30(2).

Aga, inst these orders, the appellant preferred appeals under section 33 of the Act to the Appellate Tribunal, which by its order dated 4-4-1950 dismissed them on the ground that the orders of the Assistant Qommissioner were in substance passed under section 30(2) and not under section31, and that no appeal lay against them under section 33. On the applications of the appellant, the Tribunal referred under 1956 section 66(1) of the Income Tax Act the following M

M 1 R question for the decision of the High Court of es~d ;:,. am Punjab: v. "Whether in the circumstances of the case The Commissioner appeals lay to the Tribunal against orders of the 0/ Income-tax, Appellate Assistant Commissioner dismissing the Punjab appeals against the assessments for the years 1945- Venkatarama 1946 and 1946-1947 in limine".

AyyarJ.

The reference was heard by Khosla and Harnam Singh JJ., who held following an earlier decision of that court in Dewan Chand v. Commissioner of Incometax(1) that the orders of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner were under section 30(2) and not appealable under section 33. Certificate to appeal to this Court against this order having been refused by the High Court, the appellant applied for and obtained leave to appeal to this Court under article 136 of the Constitution, and that is how the appeal comes before us.

The provisions of the Act bearing on the question may now be referred to. Section 30(1) confers n the assessee a right of appeal against orders passed under the sections specified therein. Section 30(2) provides that the appeal shall ordinarily be presented within thirty days of the order of assessment, but the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may admit an appeal after the expiration of the period if he is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period. Section 30(3) provides that "the appeal shall be in the prescribed form and shall be verified in the prescribed manner". Section 31(1) enacts that "the Appellate Assistant Commissioner shall fix a day and place for the hearing of the appeal, and may from time to time adjourn the hearing". Section 31(3) specifies the orders that may be passed in appeals according as they are directed against orders passed under the one or the other of the sections of the Act which are specified in section 30(1). When the appeal is against an order of assessment under section 23-and this is what we are con-

(1) [1951] 20 I T.R. 621.

Messrs Mela Ram and Sons

The Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab

Venkatarama AyyarJ.

cerned with in this appeal-it is provided in section 31(3), clauses (a) and (b) that in disposing of the appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may (a) confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment, or

(b) set aside the assessment and direct the Incometax Officer to make a fresh assessment after making such further enquiry as the Income-tax Officer thinks fit. Section 33(1) enacts that,

"Any assessee objecting to an order passed by an Appellate Assistant Commissioner under section 28 or section 31 may appeal to the Appellate Tribunal within sixty days of the date on which such order is communicated to him". Stated succinctly, section 30 confers a right of appeal on the assessee, section 31 provides for the hearing and disposal of the appeal, and section 33 confers a right of further appeal against orders passed under section 31.

Now, on these provisions the question is whether an order dismissing an appeal presented under section 30 as out of time is one under section 30(2) or under section 31 of the Act. If it is the former, there is no appeal provided against it; if it is the latter, it is open to appeal under section 33. On this question, there has been a sharp conflict of opinion among different High Courts and even among different Benches of the same High Court.

The Bombay High Court has held that when an appeal is presented out of time, and there is no order of condonation of delay under section 30(2), there is, in law, no appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, and that an order by him rejecting the appeal does :q.ot fall within section 31 and is not appealable: Commissioner of Income-tax v. Mysore Iron an<l Steel Works(') and K. K.

Porbun<lerwalla v. Commissioner of Income-tax('); but that if the appeal is admitted after an order of condonation is made under section 30(2), an order subsequently passed dismissing it on the ground of limitation would be one under section 31 and would be appealable under section 33, and the result will be the same even when the appeal is admitted without

(I) [1949J 17 LT.I\. 478.

(2) [1952] 21 LT.I\. 63.

any order of condonation under section 30(2): 1956 Champalal Asharam v. Commissioner o' I ncome-tax(1). 'J Messrs Mela Ram The High Court of Allahabad has also taken the same and Sons view, and held that an order refusing to condone v. delay and rejecting an appeal before it was admitted The Commissioner was not one under section 31 and was notappealable: o/ focometax, Vide Shivnath Prasad v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Pun; ab Central and U. P. (2) and Municipal Board, Agra V • Vcukatarama Commissioner of Income-tax, U. P.(3); but that an AyyarJ. order dismissing the appeal as time-barred after it had been admitted was one under section 31 and was appeable: Mohd. Nain Mohd. Alam v. Commissioner of Income-tax(').

The High Court of Punjab has held following Shivnath Prasad v. Commissioner of Incometax, Central and U. P.(2) and Commissioner of Incometax v. Mysore Iron and Steel Works( 5) that when the Appellate Assistant Commissioner declines to condone delay and rejects the appeal, it is one under section 30(2) and not appealable.

It has further held that even if the appeal had been admitted without an order of condonation and dismissed at the hearing on the ground of limitation, it would not be under section 31, because the scheme of the Act contemplated that an order to be passed under that section must relate to the merits of the assessment.

It is on this decision that the judgment under appeal is based.

It may be mentioned that the decision in Dewan

Chand v. Commissioner of Income-tax(6) was dissented from in a recent decision of the Punjab High Court in General Agencies v. Income-tax Commissioner(7).

In Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shahzadi Begum(8), the Madras High Court has held that an order declining to excuse delay and rejecting the appeal is one under section 31, whether it is made before the appeal is admitted or after, and that an appeal which is iiled out of time is, nonetheless, an appeal for purposes of section 31, and that an order dismissing it would be appealable under section 33.

In Gour Mohan

(1) [1953) 23 I.T.R. 464.

(8) [1951) 19 I.T.R. 68.

(5) [1949] 17 I.T.R. 478.

(7) A.I R. 1956 Punjab 26.

(2) [1935] S I.T.R. 200.

(4) [1951] 19 I.T.R. 58.

(6) [1951] 20 I.T.R. ~1.

(8) [1952] 21 I.T.R. 1.

Messrs Mela Ram and Sons

The Commissioner

of lncome 4 tax,

Punjab

Venkatarama

AyyarJ.

Mullick v. OommisBioner of Agricultural Income-tax('), the Calcutta High Court has, after a full discussion, come to the conclusion that an order of dismissal on the ground of limitation at whatever stage was one which fell under section 31. It is unnecessary to refer to the views expressed in decisions of other High Courts, as the point now under discussion did not directly arise for decision therein.

The question is which of these views is the correct one to adopt. We start with this that under section 33 it is only orders uuder section 31 that are appealable. The question therefore narrows itself to this whether an order declining to condone delay and dismissing the appeal as barred by time is an order under section 31. It will be, if it is passed in appeal against an order of assessment, and is one which affirms it. Now, the conflicting views expressed by the several High Courts centre round two points: (1) when an appeal is presented out of time and there has been a refusal to condone delay under section 30(2), is an order rejecting it as time-barred one passed in appeal; and (2) if it is, is such an order one confirming the assessment within section 31(3)(a)?

On the first point, as already stated, it has been held by the Bombay High Court that while an order dismissing an appeal as time-barred after it is admitted is one under section 31, a similar order passed before it is .admitted is one under section 30(2). The ratio of this distinction is stated to be that in law there is no appeal unless 'it is presented in time, and if presented beyond time, unless the delay is excused.

In Commissioner of Income-tax v. Mysore Iron and Steel Works(•), Chagla, C.J. stated the position thus:

"An assessee has a statutory right to present an appeal within thirty days without any order being required from the Appellate Assistant .Commissioner for admission of that appeal. But if the time prescribed expires, then that statutory right to present an appeal goes; and an appeal can only be entertained provided it is admitted by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner after condoning the delay.

(1) [1952] 22 I.T.R. 181.

(2) [1949] 17 I.T.R. 476.

Therefore before an appeal could be admitted in this case, an order from the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was requisite that the delay had been condoned and it was only on such an order being made that the appeal could be entertained by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. Now section 31 deals only with such appeals which are presented within the prescribed period or admitted after the delay has been condoned, and the procedure laid down in section 31 with regard to the hearing of appeals only applies to such appeals. Therefore, in my opinion, when the Appellate Assistant Commissioner refused to condone the delay, there was no appeal before him which he could hear and dispose of as provided under section 31 of the Act. Section 33 then gives the right of appeal to the assessee from an order made by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner either under section 28 or under section 31. Therefore the Legislature did not give the right of appeal to the assessee against an order made by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner under section 30 of the Act".

Learned counsel for the appellant disputes the correctness of the last observation that an order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner refusing to condone the delay is one under section 30(2), and contends that the only order that could be passed under that section was one excusing delay, and an order refusing to condone it will fall outside it, and that such an order could only be made under section

31. We find it difficult to accede to this contention.

When power is granted to an authority to be exercised at his discretion, it is necessarily implicit in the grant that he may exercise it in such manner as the circumstances might warrant. And if the Appellate Assistant Commissioner has a discretion to excuse the delay, he has also a discretion in appropriate cases to decline to do so. We are therefore of opinion that the refusal to excuse delay is an order under section 30{2).

But the question still remains whether the view taken in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Mysore Iron

Messrs Mela Ram

and Sons

The Commissioner of Income-tax,

Punjab

Venkatarama

Ayyarj.

19j6 and Steel Works(1) and K. K. Porbunderwalla v. Gom-

Messrs Mela Ram missioner of Income-tax(') that an appeal which is filed and sons beyond the period of limitation is, in the eye of law, v. no appeal, unless and until there is a condonation of The Commissioner delay, and that, in consequence, an order passed of Inc011tax, thereon cannot be held to be passed in appeal so as to

Pun1ab fall within section 31 is right. Now, a right of appeal

Venkatarama is a substantive right, and is a creature of the statute.

Ayyar J.

Section 30(1) confers on the assessee aright of appeal against certain orders, and an order of assessment under section 23 is one of them. The appellant therefore had a substantive right under section 30(1) to prefer appeal.a against orders of assessment made by the Income-tax Officer. Then, we come to section 30(2), which enacts a period of limitation within which this right is to be exercised. If an appeal is not presented within that time, does that cease to be an appeal as provided under section 30(1 )? It is well established that rules of limitation pertain to the domain of adjectival law, and that they operate only to bar the remedy but not to extinguish the right. An appeal preferred in accordance with section 30(1) must, therefore, be an appeal in the eye of law, though having been presented beyond the period mentioned in section 30(2) it is liable to be dismissed in limine.

There might be a provision in the statute that at the end of the period of limitation prescribed, the right would be extinguished, as for example, section 28 of the Limitation Act; but there is none such here. On the other hand, in conferring a right of appeal under section 30(1) and prescribing a period of limitation for the exercise thereof separately under section 30

(2), the legislature has evinced an intention to maintain the distinction well-recognised under the general law between what is a substantive right and what is a matter of procedural law. In Nagendranath Dey v.

Buresh Chandra Dey('), Sir Dinshaw Mulla construing the word 'appeal' in the third column of article 182 of the Limitation Act observed:

"There is no definition of appeal in the Civil Pro-

(1) [1949) 17 I.T.R. 478.

(2) [1952) 21 I.T.R. 63.

(3) 59 I.A. 288, 287.

cedure Code, but their Lordships have no doubt that 1956 any. application b:y a party .to an 8:Ppellate Court, Messrs Mela Ram askmg it to set aside or revise a decision of a su borand sons dinate Court, is an appeal within the ordinary accepv. tation of the term, and that it is no less an appeal The Commissioner because it is irregular or incompetent". 0!

111e~-tax, These observations were referred to with approval Pun; ab and adopted by this Court in Raja Kulkarni and others Venkatarama

v. The State of Bombay(1). In Promotho Nath Roy v.

AyyarJ.

Wr A. Lee(~), an order dismissing an application as barred by limitation after rejecting an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act to excuse the delay in presentation was held to be one "passed on appeal" within the meaning of section 109 of the Civil Procedure Code. On the principles laid down in these decisions, it must be held that an appeal presented out of time is an appeal, and an order dismissing it as time-barred is one passed in appeal.

Then, the next question is whether it is an order passed under section 31 of the Act. That section is the only provision relating to the hearing and disposal of appeals, and if an order dismissing an appeal as barred by limitation is one passed in appeal, it must fall within section 31. And as section 33 confers a right of appeal against all orders passed under section 31, it must also be appealable. But then, it is contended that in an appeal against assessment the only order that could be passed under section 31 (3)(a) is one which confirms, reduces, enhances or annuls the assessment, that such an order could be made only on a consideration of the merits of the appeal, and that an order dismissing it on the ground of limitation is not within the section. That was the view taken in Dewan Chand v. Commissioner of lncome-tax(3). But there is practically a unanimity of opinion among all the other High Courts that to fall within the section it is not necessary that the order should expressly address itself to and decide on the merits of the assessment, and that it is sufficient that the effect of the order is to conftrm the assessment

(1) [1954] S.C.R. 884, 888.

(2) A.I.R.-1991 Cal. 415.

{S) [1951] 20 I.T.R. 621.

7956 as when the appeal is dismissed on a preliminary Messrs Mela Ram point. In Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shahzadi and Sons Begum('), Satyanarayana Rao, J. said: v. "If the appeal is dismissed as incompetent or is The Comm; ssioner rejected as it was filed out of time and no sufficient

01 Income.tax, cause was established, it results in an affirmation of Punjab the order appealed against".

venkatarama In Gour Mohan Mullick v. Commissioner of Agricul- AyyarJ. tural Income-tax(•), construing sections 34, 35 and 36 of the Bengal Agricultural Income-Tax Act which are in terms identical with those of sections 30, 31 and 33 of the Indian Income-Tax Act, Chakravarti, J. observed:

"I would base that view on the ground that the order, in effect, confirmed the assessment or, at any rate, disposed of the appeal and was thus an order under section 35, because what that section really contemplates is a disposal or conclusion of the appeal and the forms of orders specified in it are not exhaustive.

An appellate order may not, directly and by itself, confirm, or reduce or enhance or annul an assessment and may yet dispose of the appeal.

If it does so, it is immaterial whether the ground is a finding that the appeal is barred by limitation or a finding that the case is not a fit one for extension of time or both".

This reasoning is also the basis of the decisions of the Bombay and Allahabad High Courts which hold that an order rejecting an appeal on the ground of limitation after it had been admitted is one under section 31, though there is no consideration of the merits of the assessment. Thus, in K. K. Porbunderwalla v.

Commissioner of Income-tax('), Chagla, C. J. observed:

" .... although the Appellate Assistant Commissioner did not hear the appeal on merits and held that the appeal was barred by limitation his order was under section 31 and the effect of that order was to confirm the assessment which had been made by the Income-tax Officer".

In Special Manager of Court of Wards v. Commissioner

(1) [1952) 21I.T.R.1.

(2) [1952] 22 I.T.R. 181.

(8) [1952] 21 I.T.R. 68.

of Income-tax(1), the Allahabad High Court stated 1956 that the view was "possible that even though the Messrs Mela Ram period of limitation is prescribed under section 30 and Sons and the power to grant extension is also given in that v. section the power is really exercised under section 31 Tlzc Commissionef' as the Appellate Assistant Commissioner when he de- 0! 111ccme-tax, cides not to extend the period of limit a ti on may be Punjab said in a sense to have confirmed the assessment".

The respondent relied on a later decision of the Allahabad High Court in Mahabir Prasad Niranjanlal

v. Commissioner of Income-tax( 2), wherein it was held by the learned Judges, departing from the previous course of authorities of that court, that an order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner dismissing an appeal as time-barred was one under section 30(2) and not under section 31, and was therefore not appealable.

This conclusion they felt themselves bound to adopt by reason of certain observations of this Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. Mtt. Ar. S.

Ar. Arunachalam Chettiar( 3). But when read in the context Qf the point that actually arose for decision in that case, those observations lend no support to the conclusion reached by the learned Judges. There, the facts were that an appeal was preferred by the assessee under section 30(1) against an order of the Income-tax Officer, and thaL was dismissed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on 19-11-1945 as incompetent. No appeal was filed against this order, and it became final. But acting on a suggestion made in the order dated 19-11-1945, the assessee filed an original miscellaneous application before the Appellate Tribunal for relief, and by its order dated 20-2-1946 the Tribunal set aside the findings of the Income-tax Officer, and directed him to make a fresh computation. Then, on the application of the Commissioner of Income-tax. the Tribunal referred to the High Court under section 66(1) of the Income-tax Act the following question:

"Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the order of the Bench dated 20th February,

(11 [1950] 18 I.1'.R. 204, 212.

(2) [1055] 27 J.T.R 268.

(3) [1953) S.C.R. 4G3, 474-475,

Vc11katara11ia

Ayyar J.

Messrs Mtla Ram

and Sons

The Commiss, oner

of lncomctax,

Punjab

Venkatarama

AyyarJ.

1946 in the miscellaneous application is an appropriate order and is legally valid and passed within the jurisdiction and binding on the Income-tax Officer".

The High Court declined to answer this reference on the ground that the order of the Tribunal was not one passed in an appeal under section 33(1), and that in consequence, the reference under section 66(1) was itself incompetent. The correctness of this decision was challenged on appeal to this Court, and in affirming it, this Court observed:

" ........ when on 19th November 1945, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner declined to admit the appeal, the assessee did not prefer any appeal but only made a miscellaneous application before the Appellate Tribunal. There is no provision in the Act permitting such an application. Indeed, in the statement of the case the Appellate Tribunal states that in entertaining that application and correcting the error of the Income-tax Officer it acted in exercise of what it regarded as its inherent powers. There being no appeal under section 33(1) and the order having been made in exercise of its supposed inherent jurisdiction, the order cannot possibly be regarded as one under section 33(4) and there being no order under section 33(4) there could be no reference under section 66(1) or (2), and the appellate Court properly refused to entertain it".

There is, of course, nothing in the decision itself which bears on the point now under discussion. But certain observations occurring at pages 474 and 475 were referred to by the learned Judges as leading to the conclusion that an order dismissing an appeal as barred by time would fall under section 30(2). Now, those observations came to be made by way of answer to a new contention put forward by the learned Attorney-General in support of the appeal. That contention was that the miscellaneous application presented to the Tribunal might be treated as an appeal against the order dated 19-11-1945, in which case the order passed thereon on 20-2-1946 would fall under section 33(4) and the reference would be competent. In disagreeing with this contention, this 1956 Court observed that the appeal to the Appellate Assistlriessrs Mela Ram ant Commissioner was incompetent under section and Sons 30(1 ), that even if it was competent, the order dated v. 19-11-1945 was not one contemplated by section 31, The Commissioner and there could be no appeal against such an order 01 bicomta.r, under section 33(1). Now, it should be noticed that Pzmiab the question actually referred under section 66(1) was vc,, katarama the correctness and legality of the order passed in a Ayyar J. miscellaneous application and not of any order made in an appeal preferred under section 33(1). In this context, the point sought to be raised by the learned Attorney-General did not arise at all for decision, and the observations in answer thereto cannot be read as a pronouncement on the question of the maintainability of the appeal, much less as a decision that an order dismissing an appeal as barred by limitation is one under section 30(2). Accordingly, the question whether an order dismissing an appeal as barred by limitation falls under section 30(2) or section 31 remains unaffected by the observations in Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. J.vltt. Ar. S. Ar. Arunachalarn Ohettiar(1).

Then again, under the provisions of the Act, limitation is not the only preliminary ground on which an appeal could be disposed of without a considera-

; r tion of the merits. Section 30(3) provides that an "appeal shall be in the prescribed form and shall be verified in the prescribed manner". If the Appellate Assistant Commissioner holds that the appeal does not comply with the requirements of this enactment and rejects it on that ground, the order must be one made under section 31, since section 30(3) makes no provision for such an order, as does section 30(2) in the case of limitation. All the orders under section 31 being appealable under section 33, the order of dismissal for non-compliance with section 30(3) must also be appealable, and it was so decided in Maharani Gyan Manjari Kuari v. Commissioner of lncome-tax(2).

How is this view to be reconciled with the contention that section 31 contemplates only orders on the

(1) (1953] S.C.R. 463.

(2) (1944) 12 I.T.R. 50.

7956 me:r'its of the assessment and not on preliminary issues? Vide also the decision in Kunwarji Ananda v.

Mess1's Mela Ram

andSons Commissioner of Income-tax('), which was followed in v.

Maharani Gyan Manjari Kuari v. Commissioner of Th• Commissioner Income-tax('), and in Ramnarayana Das Mandal v.

oflnco"'.e-tax, Commissioner of Income-tax(').

There is thus abun- Pb dant authority for the position that section 31 should

Venkatarama be liberally construed so as to include not only orders ; lyyar J. passed on a consideration of the merits of the assessment but also orders which dispose of the appeal on preliminary issues, such as limitation and the like.

The learned Solicitor-General sought to get over these decisions by taking up the position that section 31 (3) (a) construed in its literal and ordinary sense, conferred jurisdiction on the Appellate Assistant Commissioner only to pass orders on the merits of the assessment, that it was not therefore open to him to entertain any question which did not directly relate to such merits, and that accordingly he could not hear or decide any issue of a preliminary nature such as limitation, and dispose of the appeal on the basis of the finding on that issue.

He conceded that this contention would run counter to numerous authorities, but argued that they were all wrong.

Having given due consideration to this contention, we are of opinion that it is not well-founded.

Ta.king the plea of limitation-which is what we are concerned with in this appeal-when there is a judgment or order against which the statute provides aright of appeal but none is preferred within the time prescribed therefor, the respondent acquires a valuable right, of which he cannot be deprived by an order condoning delay and admitting the appeal behind his back. And when such an order is passed ex parte, he has a right to challenge its correctness at the hearing of the appeal. That is the position under the general law (vide Krishnasami Panikondar v. Ramasami Chettiar('), and there is nothing in the provisions of the Income Tax Act, which enacts a different principle.

(1) I L.R. 11Patn•187;, A.I.R. 1981 P•tna 306; 5 I.T.C. 417.

(2) (1944) 12 I.T.R. 69.

(S) (1950) 18 I.T.R. 660.

(4) (1918) I.L.R. 41 Mad. 412; 45 I.A. 26,

Therefore, if an appeal is admitted without the fact 7956 of delay in presentation having been noticed, clearly Messrs Mela Ram it must be open to the Department to raise the objecand Sons tion at the time of the hearing of the appeal. That .... would also appear to be the practice obtaining before The Commissioner the Income-tax Tribunal, as appears from the deciof Income-tax, sions cited before us, and that, in our opinion, is right.

Pu,.jab Similar considerations would apply to other objec- Venkatarama tions of a preliminary character, such as one based Ayyar J. on section 30, sub-section (3). We should be slow to adopt a construction which deprives parties of valuable rights. We are therefore of opinion that contentions relating to preliminary issues are open to consideration at the time of the hearing of the appeal, and that the jurisdiction of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is not limited to the hearing of the appeal on the merits of the assessment only. In this view, the orders of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner holding that there were no sufficient reasons for excusing the delay and rejecting the appeals as time-barred would be orders passed under section 31 and would be open to appeal, and it would make no difference in the position whether the order of dismissal is made before or after the appeal is admitted.

The question referred must accordingly be answered in the affirmative. This appeal will therefore be allowed, and the order of the court below set aside.

The appellant will have his costs here and in the court below.

MELA RAM & SONS

THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,

PUNJAB

S. R. DAS, C.J.

BHAGWATI

Indian Income Tax Act, 1922

ss. 28, 80(1)(2), 81, 83

s. 30( 2)

s. 81

s. 30(2)

Income-tax Act

s. 31

s. 33

s. 30(2)

s. 31

s. 33

s. 66(1)

s. 30(2)

s. 33

Supreme Court

s. 30

s. 30(2)

s. 31

s. 33

s. 31

S. 30(1)

s. 23

s. 30(1)

Section 31

s. 31

s. 33

s. 31

s. 31

s. 31

s. 31

Hardyal Hardy

Sardar Singh

K. Daphtary

G. N.

Joshi

R. H. Dhebar

VENKATAr.AMA AYYAR

Mela Ram

and Sons

Commissioner

of Income-tax, Punjab

section 31

section 31

section 31

section 30(2)

section 33

section 30(2)

section 33

section 66(1)

Khosla

Harnam Singh

section 30(2)

section 33

article 136

Section 30(1)

Section 30(2)

Section 30(3)

Section 31(1)

Section 31(3)

section 30(1)

section 23

Mela Ram

Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab

Venkatarama AyyarJ.

section 31(3)

Section 33(1)

section 28

section 31

section 30

section 31

section 33

section 31

section 30

section 30(2)

section 31

section 33

Bombay High Court

section 30(2)

section 31

section 30(2)

section 31

section 33

section 30(2)

High Court of Allahabad

section 31

section 31

High Court of Punjab

section 30(2)

section 31

Punjab High Court

Madras High Court

section 31

section 31

section 33

Calcutta High Court

section 31

section 33

section 31

section 31

section 30(2)

section 31(3)(a)

section 31

section 30(2)

Chagla

section 31

section 31

section 31

Section 33

section 28

section 31

section 30

section 30(2)

section

31

section 30

section 31

Venkatarama

Ayyar

Section 30(1)

section 23

section 30(1)

section 30(2)

section 30(1 )

section 30(1)

section 30(2)

section 28

Limitation Act

section 30(1)

section 30

Dinshaw Mulla

article 182

Limitation Act

section 5

Limitation Act

section 109

section 31

section 31

section 33

section 31

section 31

Satyanarayana Rao

Punjab

venkatarama

sections 34, 35 and 36

Income-Tax Act

sections 30, 31 and 33

Income-Tax Act

Chakravarti

section 35

Bombay and Allahabad High Courts

section 31

section 31

Allahabad High Court

section 30

section 31

section 30(2)

section 31

section 30(1)

section 66(1)

Income-tax Act

Ayyar

section 33(1)

section 66(1)

19th November 1945

section 33(1)

section 33(4)

section 33(4)

section 66(1)

section 30(2)

section 33(4)

Mela Ram

section 31

section 33(1)

section 66(1)

section 33(1)

section 30(2)

section 30(2)

section 31

Section 30(3)

section 31

section 30(3)

section 30(2)

section 31

section 33

section 30(3)

section 31

section 31

lyyar

section 31

section 30

section 31


March 9

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

RAM KRISHAN AND ANOTHER v.

THE STATE OF DELHI (with connected appeal)

[1956]

[VIVIAN BosE, B. P. SINHA, JAFER IMAM and

CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]

Prevention of Corruption-"Obtains", Meaning of-Railway Servants, if public servants-Laying of traps-Propriety-Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947), s. 5(l)(d), subs.ction (2)- Indian Railways Act (IX of 1890) as amended by Act XVII of

1955. s. 187.

The appellants were suspected of exporting potatoes at conces sional rates on false declarations and Madan Lal, a Railway Officer, was deputed to assist the Police in the investigation.

In course of that investigation the appellants offered a bribe to Madan Lal for hushing up the case but he refused to accept it.

As they persisted in their offer a trap was laid in Madan Lal's house and it succeeded.

Two Police Officers and a Magistrate heard the conversation from the adjoining room and saw 'the payment of the bribe through a hole.

The appellants were charged under s. 120-B of the Indian Penal Code for criminal Conspiracy to cause the offence of criminal misconduct punishable under s. 5(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act of 194 7 to be committed by Madan Lal as also under that section read with s. 116 of the Indian Penal Code. They were convicted by the Special Judge on both the counts and their convictions were upheld by the High Court.

The contentions on their behalf were that s. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act had no application to the facts of the case, that Madan Lal was not a public servant with in the meaning of the Act and, lastly, that the laying of the trap was an invitation to commit the crime and afforded a good reason for reduction of the sentences.

Held, that the contentions were untenable and must be rejected.

That the word "obta.ins" occurring in clause (d) to subsection

(1) of s. 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act does not exclude the idea of acceptance of a bribe on offer, and a public servant, whether he simply accepts a bribe, or solicits or extorts it, thereby obtains a pecuniary e.dvantage by abusing his position as a public servant and commits an offence under that section 1 any consideration as to motive or reward for showing favour or disfavour being altogether irrelevant.

That as a result of the amendment of s. 137 of the Indian Railways Act by the Amendment Act of 1955 all railway servants have become public servants not only for the limited purposes of Ch. IX

of the Indian Penal Code but generally underthe Prevention of Cor ruption Act.

RamKrishan That it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule that the laying and another of traps, especially in cases of this nature, should be deprecated as v. constituting an invitation to commit an offence and an offence thus The State of Delhi detected does not lose its gravity thereby so as to call for a lenient sentence. Where, however, proper limits are exceeded and the money to be given as bribe is supplied by the Police, it must be severely condemned.

Brennan v. Peek ([194 7] 2 All E.R. 572), considered.

Rao Shiv Bahad1ir Singh and another v. The State of Vindhya Pradesh ([1954) S.C.R. 1098) and Ram:janam Singh v. The State of Bihar, (Cr. Appeal No. 81 of 1953), referred to.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeals Nos. 43 and 44 of 1954.

Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 23rd October 1953 of the Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court at Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 24-D of 1953 arising out of the judgment and order dated the 26th August 1953 of the Court of Special Judge, Delhi in Corruption Case No.

10 of 1953.

Jai Gopal Sethi and Naunit Lal for the Appellants in Cr. A. No. 43 of 1954.

Pritam Singh Safeer, for the Appellant in Cr. A.

No. 44 of 1954.

0. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, Porus A. Mehta, H. R. Khanna and P. G. Gokhale, for the respondent in both appeals.

1956. March 9.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

CRANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J.-Ram Kishan, the first appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 43, is a partnerproprietor in the firm of Kundan Lal Raja Ram of Saharanpur. Prem Chand, the second appellant, is a partner in the firm of Narain Prasad and Prem Chand in the same place. The appellant, Gian Chand, is the munim of a firm called Lekh Raj Shambhu Nath. Some of the Saharanpur mt'lrchants, including

Ram Krishan

and another

The State of Di:lhi

Chandrasi:khara

Aiyar J,

the three firms, were suspected of exporting potatoes at concessional rates on false declarations or certificates that they were seed potatoes. Police investigation was procee<lingin this connection at Saharanpur in October, 1951. Madan Lal, Railway Section Officer, examined as P. W. 4 in the case, was deputed by the Railway Department to assist the Special Police Establishment in the investigation. Labhu Ram, Railway Parcels clerk in the Railway at Saharanpur, was deputed by the Station Master to help the Police party.

It is alleged by the prosecution that during the progress of the investigation, and after the houses and shops of the accused persons had been searched, Ram Kishan took Labhu Ram aside and proposed that the three firms would be prepared to pay Rs. 2,000 if the case was hushed up and that Madan Lal was to be sounded.

Madan Lal refused to have anything to do with such a proposal, but as the accused persisted in their offer, it was ultimately decided that a trap should be laid for them at Delhi in Madan Lal's house.

It is unnecessary to narrate in detail the steps taken in connection with this plan. The trap succeeded.

The three accused and Labhu Ram were at Delhi on the morning of the 29th December and an increased sum of Rs. 5,000 was paid in the sha.pe of currency notes to Madan Lal by Ram Kishan while two police officers and a Magistrate were hearing the con versation from an adjoining room and saw the payment through a hole in the door.

The appellants were charged under section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code for criminal conspiracy to cause the offence of criminal misconduct punishable under section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947), to be committed by Madan Lal, one of the prosecution witnesses. They also stood charged with an offence under the same section read with section 116 of the Indian Penal Code for abetting the commission of criminal misconduct by the said Madan Lal by paying him a sum of Rs. 5,000 by way of illegal gratification, which offence was, however, not committed by him.

The Special Judge, Delhi; who tried the case, found the appellants guilty under both heads of charges.

He sentenced Ram Kishan to three months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5,000; Prem Chand

and Gian Chand to two months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000 each. He did not separately convict or sentence the accused under the head of criminal conspiracy. The High Court reduced the sentence on Gian Chand to the term of imprisonment already undergone and a fine of Rs. 500.

There is no dispute that the amount was actually paid to Madan Lal even though he said he could do nothing to help the appellants, who begged him somehow to help them out of the impending prosecution.

Evidence has also been given by the Magistrate and the police officers about the talk and the lower courts have found on the evidence of Madan Lal and Labhu Ram and the eavesdroppers that Rs. 5,000 was offered as a bribe and not as compensation money in settlement of the amounts legitimately due to the Rail., way.

An attack against the concurrent findings of fact being wholly futile in the circumstances, Mr. Sethi,

for the appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 43of1954, raised some questions of law on their behalf. His first point was that section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947), under which the accused were charged and convicted was inapplicable to the facts. His second point was that Madan Lal was not a "public servant" within the meaning of the Act and hence the charge was unsustainable. He urged a.s his third point that trap cases of this kind must be sternly discouraged and deprecated by the courts, inasmuch as opportunities for the commission of offences should not be deliberately created so that people who yield to the temptations of ordinary human nature might be punished as criminals; in other words, crimes committed under such circumstances should be regarded only as venial and not heinous.

To appreciate the first contention it is necessary to pay attention to the language of section 5 of the

Ram Krishan

and another

The State of Delhi

Chandrasekhara

Aiyar J.

Ra1n K rishan

and another v.

The State of Delhi

Cl1audrasckhara

Aiyar J,

Prevention of Corruption Act, which is in these terms:-

"S. 5(1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct in the discharge of his duty,-

(a) if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person for himself or for any other person, any gratification (other than legal remuneration) as a motive of reward such as is mentioned in section 161 of the Indian Penal Code, or

(b) if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain for himself or for any other person, any valuable thing without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate, from any person whom he knows to have been, or to be, or to be likely to be concerned in any proceeding or business transacted or about to be transacted by him, or having any connection with the official functions of himself or of any public servant to whom he is subordinate, or from any person whom he knows to be interested in or related to the person so concerned, or

(c) if he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or otherwise converts for his own use any property entrusted to him or under his control as a public servant or allows any other person so to do, or

(d) if he, by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage.

(2) Any pub1ic servant who commits criminal misconduct in the discharge of his duty shall be punishably with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.

(3) In any trial of an offence punishable under sub-section (2) the fact that the accused person or any other person on his behalf is in possession, for which the accused person cannot satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income may be

proved, and on such proof the Court shall presume, 1956 unless the . contrary is proved, that the accused per- Ram K rish an son is guilty of criminal misconduct in the discharge and another of his official duty and his conviction therefor shall v. not be invalid by reason only that it is based solely The State of Delhi on such presumption. ( 4) The provisions of this section shall be in Chand.-asekhara

d . d . f h l Aiyar J, addition to, an not m erogat10n o any ot er aw for the time being in force, 1 and nothing contained herein shall exempt any public servant from any proceeding which might, apart from this section, be instituted against him".

The object of the Act as set out in the preamble is to make more effective provision for the prevention of bribery and corruption. A new offence of criminal misconduct by a public servant is created by section 5 ad under sub-section (2) it is made punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years or with fine or with both. The offence is of four kinds or categories.

Bribery as defined in section 161 of the Indian Penal Code, if it is habitual, falls within clause (a).

Bribery of the kind specified in section 165, if it is habitual, is comprised in clause (b). Clause (c) contemplates criminal breach of trust by a public servant and the wording takes us to section 405 of the Code. It is with clause (d) that we are really concerned in the present case.

It was argued that the intention of the Act was to create by means of clause (d) an offence different from a single act of bribery and that it can come into play only when there is no offer to give and acceptance of a bribe by a public servant. Before it can be made applicable there must be proof, it was said, that the public servant adopted corrupt or illegal means and thereby obtained for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage. To force a bribe out of an unwilling person is different from the acceptance ofa bribe from a voluntary giver and that before a charge under sectiOn 5(1), sub-clause (d) could be sustained, there must be threat or inducement, or promise proceeding from the public servant or duress or extortion practised by

Ram Krishan and another v.

The State of Delhi

Chandrasekhara

Aiyar J,

him to obta.in the pecuniary advantage. This argument proceeds upon the footing that the Act seeks to create and creates an independent offence distinct from simple bribery. In one sense, this is no doubt true but it does not follow that there is no overlapping of offences.

We have primarily to look at the language employed and give effect to it. One class of cases might arise where corrupt or illegal means are adopted or pursued by the public servant to gain for himself a pecuniary ad vantage. The word "obtains", on which much stress was laid does not eliminate the idea of acceptance of what is given or offered to be given, though it connotes also an element of effort on the part of the receiver. One may accept money that is offered, or solicit payment of a bribe, or extort the bribe by threat or coercion; in each case, he obtains a pecuniary advantage by abusing his position as a public servant. The word 'obtains' is used in sections 161 and 165 of the Penal Code. The other words "corrupt or illegal means" find place in .section

162. Apart from "corrupt and illegal means", we have also the words "or by otherwise abusing his position as a public servant". If a man obtains a pecuniary ad; vantage by the abuse of his position, he will be guilty under sub-clause (d). Sections 161, 162 and 163 refer to a motive or a reward for doing or forbearing to do something, showing favour or disfavour to any person, or for inducing such conduct by the exercise of personal influence. It is not necessary for art offence under clause ( d) to prove all this. It is enough if by abusing his position as a public servant a man obtains for himself any pecuniary advantage, entirely irrespective of motive or reward for showing favour or disfavour. To a certain extent the ingredients of the two offences are common, no doubt. But to go further and contend that the offence as defined in clause (d) does not come within the meaning of bribery is to place too narrow a construction on the sub-clause. A speedy disposal of corruption cases by special courts, the benefit of investigation by higher police authorities are some of the provisions intended for the protection of public

servants prosecuted under the Act while they are 7956 subJ"ected also to increased disabilities, namely, a Ram Krishan longer term of imprisonment as punishment and the and a11other ... application of the presumption referred to in subv. clause (3).

The State of Delhi In support of the contention that Madan Lal was not a "public servant", reference was made to sec- Chandrasekltara Aiyur J. tion 137 of the Indian Railways Act.. Under the Act as it stood before it was amended by Act XVII of 1955, every railway servant was deemed to be a public servant only for the purposes of Chapter IX of the Indian Penal Code and it was provided by sub-clause

(4) that "notwithstanding anything in section 21 of the Indian Penal Code a railway servant shall not be deemed to be a public servant for any of the purposes of that Code except those mentioned in Chapter IX". The amended sub-clause (1) is in these terms:

"Every railway servant, not being a public servant as defined in section 21 of the Indian Penal Code shall be deemed to be a public servant for the purposes of Chapter IX and section 409 of that Code".

Sub-section (4) has now been omitted. The Prevention of Corruption Act provides by section 2 that "For the purposes of this Act, 'public servant' means a public servant as defined in section 21 of the Indian Penal Code". The result is that before the amendment, railway servants were treated as public servants only for the purposes of Chapter IX of the Indian Penal Code but now as the result of the amendment all railway servants have become public servants not only for the limited purposes but generally under the Prevention of Corruption Act.

It has been stated already that a trap was laid for catching the appellants and this circumstance, according to the learned counsel for the appellants, should be taken into account in the matter of sentence. In this connection, our attention was invited to the well-known and weighty observations of Lord Goddard, C.J., in Brennan v. Peek(1) where his Lord-

(1) (1947] 2 All E.R. 57~.

Ra1n K 1'ishan

and another

The Side of Delhi

Chandrasekhara AiyarJ.

ship expressed the hope that "the day is far distant when it will become a common practice in this country for police officers to be told to commit an offence themselves for the purpose of getting evidence against someone; if they do commit offences they ought also to be convicted and punished, for the order of their superior would afford no defence".

While there is much to be said in support of the opinion expressed by the learned Chief Justice, it cannot be laid d.own as an absolute rule that the laying of traps must be prohibited on the ground that by so doing we hold out an invitation for the commission of offences. The detection of crime may become difficult if intending offenders, especially in cases of corruption are not furnished opportunities for the display of their inclinations and activities. Where matters go further and the police authorities themselves supply the money to be given as a bribe, severe condemnation of the method is merited, as in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singhandanotherv. The Stateof VindhyaPradesh(').- See also Ramjanam Singh v. The State of Bihar(•).

But whatever the ethics of the question might be, there is no warrant for the view that the offences committed in the course of traps are less grave and call only for lenient or nominal sentences.

For the appellant in the connected Appeal No. 44 it was urged by his learned counsel that he was only a munim of a firm and not a partner or a proprietor as the other appellants and that it could not be stated of him that he was interested in giving or attempting to give any bribe for hushing up the case.

There is, however, the clear and definite evidence of Labhu Ram that Gian Chand came along with the appellants to him when the talk about the bribe took place.

He says that on the morning of the 29th December, 1951, the three accused who were staying at the Coronation Hotel, Delhi, told him that they had amongst themselves collected Rs. 5,000 to be paid to Madan Lal and that in the house of Madan Lal all the three accused one by one made request to Madan Lal to hush up the potato case pending against them. This

(ll [19MJ s.o.R. 1098.

(2) Or. Appeal No. 81of1953,

is corroborated by Madan Lal who states that all the 1956 three accused said that the money had been sub- Ram Krishan scribed by them jointly and requested him to accept and another the same and get the case withdrawn. The case of v.

Gian Chand does not stand on any different footing The State of Delhi from that of the other appellants. d fi d d Chandrasekhara The convictions an sentences are con rme an AiyarJ. the appeal will stand rejected.

WASIM KHAN v.

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH.

[B. P. SINHA, JAFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA

AIYAR, JJ.]

Possession, recent and unexplained of stolen goods-Presumptive evidence against prisoner not only of robbery but of murder as well.

The appellant was sentenced to death for the murder of one R e, nd also sentenced to seven years rigorous imprisonment for having robbed the murdered man of his goods. It was established by the evidence on the record that the deceased; a shop-keeper of village Jarwal had gone to Lucknow to purchase goods for his shop. On his return journey he got down from the train at about 10 p.m.

He had with him a box, a balti, a gunni bag and a jhola and other things. He engaged the appellant's cart to take him and his goods to his village. Two other persons also got on to the cart.

Neither the deceased, nor the articles which were with him nor the cart reached Jarwal. In the morning the body of the deceased was found near a bridge in the vicinity of Jarwal.

During investigation on the fourth day after the occurrence the appellant gave the key of his kothri to the police and from the kothri, a dhoti, a box, a balti, a chadar, a gunny bag and a jhola were recovered which were_identi fied as belonging to the deceased.

A big knife was also recovered from the kothri which the appellant disowned but could not explain how it was found in his home.

The appellant on examination before the Sessions Judge under s. 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure stated that the deceased asked him to take his goods in the cart at about 10 p.m. when he got down at the Railway Station.

Two other men were also in the cart who got down at the Sugar Mill gate near the Railway Station. At Raduayan Bridge three men enquired if the deceased was in the cart. The deceased responded

and got down from the cart asking the appellant to halt his cart near Ja.rwal Bazar Bridge where he waited for the deceased up to

March 12

RAM KRISHAN AND ANOTHER

THE STATE OF DELHI

VIVIAN BosE

B. P. SINHA

JAFER IMAM

CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.

s. 5(l)(d)

Indian Railways Act

s. 187

Madan Lal

s. 120

Indian Penal Code

s. 5(2)

Prevention of Corruption Act

s. 116

Indian Penal Code

s. 5(2)

Prevention of Corruption Act

s. 5

Prevention of Corruption Act

section 1

s. 137

Railways Act

State of Delhi

Jai Gopal Sethi

Naunit Lal

Pritam Singh Safeer

K. Daphtary

Porus A. Mehta

H. R. Khanna

P. G. Gokhale

CRANDRASEKHARA AIYAR

Prem Chand

Narain Prasad

Gian Chand

Lekh Raj Shambhu Nath

Ram Krishan

State of Di:lhi

Chandrasi:khara

Aiyar J

Saharanpur

Madan Lal

Labhu Ram

Ram Kishan

Labhu Ram

Delhi

section 120

Indian Penal Code

section 5(2)

Prevention of Corruption Act

section 116

Indian Penal Code

Special Judge, Delhi

Gian Chand

Sethi

section 5(2)

Prevention of Corruption Act

section 5

State of Delhi

Chandrasekhara

Aiyar

Prevention of Corruption Act

S. 5(1)

section 161

Indian Penal Code

section 5

section 161

Indian Penal Code

section 165

section 405

sections 161 and 165

Penal Code

section

162

Sections 161, 162 and 163

Chandrasekltara Aiyur

Railways Act

Chapter IX of the Indian Penal Code

section 21

Indian Penal Code

section 21

Indian Penal Code

section 409

Prevention of Corruption Act

section 2

section 21

Indian Penal Code

Indian Penal Code

Prevention of Corruption Act

Goddard

Chandrasekhara AiyarJ.

29th December, 1951

Ram Krishan

CHANDRASEKHARA

AIYAR

Jarwal

Lucknow

s. 342

Code of Criminal Procedure


SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1956]

1956 getting them. cultivated through hired labour as conn 'h

P1' 4 templated in the definition of 'private lands'. We are

Sin~~ a":<I a=he• clearly of opinion that the mortgage deed conferred v. no authority on the mortgagees to admit tenants so Musi .• of Munshi as to confer on them rights of occupancy.

Nath P,.asad In the result, we must hold that the defendants of and other. the .second party have failed to establish that they

Venkatarama have any rights of occupancy over the suit lands, and Ayyar 1. that the plaintiffs are accordingly entitled to a decree in ejectment, with future mesne profits as claimed in the plaint. This appeal is allowed, the decree of the lower court is set aside, a'nd that of the Subordinate Judge of Monghyr restored as against 2nd party defendants with costs throughout.

The suit as agairist the first party defendants is dismissed, but in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.

January 17

THE STATE OF BOMBAY

R. S. NANJI.

[S. R. DAS, ACTING c. J., BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHA-

DAS, B. P. SINHA AND JAFER !MAM JJ.)

Bombay' Land Requisition Act, 1948 (BomblJ.y Act XXXIII of 1948), s. 6 (1)-Reguisition of premises by Bombay Government for housing an officer of State Road Transport Corporation-Whether for a public purpose-1/xpression

1p'llblic purpose'-Meaninq of-Road Transpo1't Corporation Act, 1950 (Parliament Act LXIV of 1950), s. 19( 1)( c)-Corporation empowered to provide living aooommodation for its employees-Premises requisitioned for Corporation-Whether for a public purpose.

In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of s. 5 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 the Government of Bom bay requisitioned by an order dated 12th May 1952, the premises specified therein, fore. public purpose, namely, for housing an otlicer of the State Road Tiansport Corporation which is a public utility service. On a writ application under Art. 226 of the Constitution filed by the respondent the requisition order was set asiae by the Bombay High Court on the ground that the requisition was not for a public purpose and therefore oould not have been made unaer s. 5 of the Requisition Aot.

On appeal by apecial leave to the Supreme Court.

Held (1) that in the circumstances of the present case the requisition was for a public purpose and the impugned order had been wrongly set aside by the High Court;

(2) the phra.se 'public purpose' includes a purpose, that is, an object or aim, in which the gene1al interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals is directly and ----"- • vitally concerned. It is impossible to define precisely the expression 'public purpose'. In each case all the facts and circumstances will require to be closely examined to determine whether a public purpose has been established;

(3) the Corporation has power to provide for its employees suitable conditions of service including .............. . living accommodation, places for rest and recreation and other amenities vide s. 19(1)

(c) of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950;

(4) the provisions of the Road Transport Corporation Act read as a whole lead to the conclusion that if the premises specified in the impugned order had been requisitioned for the Corporation, the requisition would have been for a public purpose;

(5) in the present case the Corporation is a public utility concern and the general interest of the public is directly rmd vitally concerned with its activities and undertaking. Providing living accommodation for its employees is a statutory activity of the Corporation and it is essential for it to provide such accommodation in order to ensure efficient working of the road transport system and therefore the impugned order was validly passed under the Requisition Act.

Hamabai Framjee Petit v. Secretary oj State for India in Counci! ((1914] L.R. 42 I.A. 44), The State of Bombay v. Bhonji Munji and Another ([1955) 1 S.C.R. 777) and The State of Bombay v. Ali Giilshan ([1955) 2 S.C.R. 867), referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 235 of 1954.

On Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 26th day of February 1953 of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 120 of 1952 arising out of the Order dated the 11th day of September, 1952 of the said High Court in its Ordinary Original Jurisdiction in Misc. Application No. 216 of 1952.

M. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India ( B. Sen and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for the appellant.

Sri Narain Andley, J. B. Dadachanji and Rajinder Narain, for the respondent.

The State of

Bomay

R. S. Nanji

The State of

Bombay

R. S~ Nanji

1956. January 17. The Judgment of the Court was d-elivered by

IMAM J.-By an order dated 12th May 1952, hereinafter referred to as the impugned order the Government of the State of Bombay requisitioned under section 5 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 (Bombay Act XXXIII of 1948), hereinafter referred to as the Requisition Act, the premises specified therein. The impugned order, so far as it is relevant to the present appeal, stated,

"Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (1) of section 5 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 (Bombay Act XXXIII of 1948) the Government of Bomhay is pleased to requisition the said part of the building for a public purpose, namely, for housing an Officer of the State Road Transport Corporation which is a public utility service".

The respondent filed a writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution in the Bombay High Court and the application was heard by Tendolkar, J. who set aside the impugned order. Against his decision the appellant appealed and a Division Bench of the said Court affirmed the decision of Tendolkar, J.

The present appeal is by special leave against the decision of the High Court.

The principal ground upon which the impugned order was set aside was that the requisition was not for a public purpose and therefore could not have been validly made under section 5 of the Requisition Act.

On behalf of the appellant, the Attorney-General has urged that in the circumstances of the present case, the requisition was for a public purpose and the impugned order had been wrongly set aside by the High Court. In support of his submission he relied upon certain provisions of the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950 (LXIV of 1950), hereinafter referred to as the Act, the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Hamabai Framjee Petit v. Secretary of State for

India in Council(') and the decisions of this Court in

(1) [19H] L.B. ~2 I.A. 44.

The State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji and Another(1) and The State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan (Civil Appeal No. 229 of 1953) decided on the 4th of October 1955(9).

On the other hand, Mr. Andley, on behalf of the respondent, contended that to requisition the premises to house an employee of the State Road Transport Corporation, hereinafter referred to as the Corporation, could not be regarded as a public purpose because that was a matter in which the general interest of the community was not directly and yitally concerned. He urged that although their Lordships of the Privy Council rightly approved the observations of Batchelor, J. concerning the expression 'public purpose', they erred in their decision in Hamabai's case. In any event, Hamabai's case could be distinguished as in that case there was a scheme for constructing houses for Government servants generally and not procuring residential accommodation for one particular individual. The validity of the impugned order was also questioned by him on the ground that nothing had been established to prove that by housing an officer of the Corporation in the requisitioned premises the needs or the purposes of the Corporation would be served or that it would contribute to the efficiency of the officer concerned.

Before Tendolkar, J. two points had been raised (1) that no enquiry, as required by section 5 of the Requisition Act, was held and (2) that the impugned order was invalid as the requisition was not for a public purpose. The former question was decided against the respondent while the latter was decided in his favour. In appeal, the first point does not appear to have been put forward as there is no reference to it in the judgments of the learned Judges of the Division Bench. In this Court the only point argued was as to whether the requisition was for a public purpose or not. Before proceeding to consider that question it is necessary to make some reference to the purpose for which the Corporation is established, its composition, the extent of control exercised by the State Government over it and its activities.

(1) [1955) 1 S.C.R. 777.

(2) [1955) 2 S.C.R. 867.

The Slate of .

Bombay

R. S. Nanji

lmamJ.

The State of

Bombay

•• R. S. Nanji

ltnanl'J,

It was not disputed before us that the Corporation is a public utility concern and is governed by the provisio.ns of the Act. The purpose for which the Corporation was created may be gathered from the provisions of section 3 of the Act which enables a State Government to establish a Road Transport Corporation having regard to the advantages offered to the public, trade and industry by the development of road transport, the desirability of co-ordinating any form of road transport with any other form of transport and the desirability of extending and improving the facilities for road transport in any area and of providing an efficient and economical system of road transport service.

The Corporation consists of a Chairman and members appointed by the State Government who are removable by that authority.

Where capital is subscribed by the issue of shares under section 23 of the Act provision is made for the representation of the share-holders in the Corporation and the manner in which they are to be elected in accordance with rules to be framed under the Act.

Its Chief Executive Officer or General Manager and its Chief Accounts Officer are to be appointed by the State Government.

The other officers and servants are to be appointed by the Corporation but the conditions of appointment and service and the scales of pay shall be determined by regulations made under the Act subject to the provisions of section 34, which authorises the State Government to issue directions and general instructions to the Corporation and these instructions may include directions relating to the recruitment and conditions of service.

The Corporation is under the effective control of the State Government. In addition to what has already been mentioned when referring to the composition of the Corporation, the capital of the Corporation may be provided by the Central and State Governments in such proportion as is agreed between them.

When no such capital is provided, the Corporation may raise capital, as is authorised by the State Government, by issue of shares. These shares are guaran-

S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT ltEPORTS 23

teed by that Governm:ent. The budget of the Corporation has to be submitted to the State Government for approval and its accounts are to be audited by an auditor appointed by that Government. The balance of the net profits, after providing for various matters mentioned in section 30 of the Act, is to be made over to the State Government for the purpose of road development. The Corporation can be superseded by the State Government or that Government may, after an enquiry under section 36, authorize a person by notification in the official Gazette to take over the Corporation and administer its affairs during the period the notification is in force.

The activities of the Corporation are manifold in pursuit of which there is a statutory duty to so exercise its powers as to provide, secure or promote the provision of an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated system of road transport in the State or part. of it and in any extended area (vide section 18 of the Act). The powers of the Corporation are stated in section 19 of the Act. These powers, although not exhaustive, cover a wide field.

Particular reference need be made only to some of them.

Section 19(1) provides:

"Subject to the provisions of this Act, a Corpo ration shall have power:-

(a) .................. ..

(b) .................. ..

(o) to provide for its employees suitable conditions of service including fair wages, establishment of provident fund, living accommodation, places for rest and recreation and other amenities".

Section 19(2) exclgding the explanation to clause

(a) and some clauses with which we are not immediately concerned, states,

"Subject to the provisions of this Act, the powers conferred by sub-section (1) shall include power:-

(a) to manufacture, purchase, maintain and repair rolling stock, vehicles, appliances, plant, equipment or any other thing required for the purpose of any of the activities of the Corporation referred to in sub-section (1).

The State of

Bombay

R. S. NaKji

lmamJ.

The State oj

Bombay

R. S. Nanji

lmatnJ.

(b) to acquire and hold such property, both movable and immovable, as the Corporation may deem necessary for the purpose of any of the said activities and to lease, sell or otherwise transfer any property held by it.

(d) to purchase by agreement or to take on lease or under any form of tenancy any land and to erect thereon such buildings as may be necessary for the purpose of carrying on its undertaking."

Tf!.e provisions of the Act read as a whole lead us to the conclusion that if the premises specified in the impugned order had been requisitioned for the Corporation, the requisition would have been for a public purpose. Indeed the learned Judges of the High Court were of this opinion and Mr. Andley did not contend to the contrary. According to him, in this case, the requisition was not for the Corporation but for an employee of the Corporation and for his convenience which could not be a public purpose.

The expression 'public purpose' has been considered in many cases and it is unnecessary to refer to them except the three cases cited by the Attorney-General.

In Hamabai's case(') the observation of Batchelor, J. to the effect "General definitions are, I think, rather to be avoided where the avoidance is possible, and I make no attempt to define precisely the extent of the phrase 'public purposes' in the lease; it is enough to say that, in my opinion, the phrase, whatever else it may mean, must include a purpose, that is, an object or aim, in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals, is directly and vitally concerned" received the approval of the Privy Council. Their Lordships, however, rejected the contention that there cannot be a 'public purpose' in taking land if that land when taken is not in some way or other made -available to the public at large. This contention had been raised because the Government had resumed lands, which had been the subject of a lease and a sanad, the terms of which permitted the Government to resume the lands for any public purpose, with a view to erect

(!) [\91!1) L.R. 42 I.A. 44.

I !

thereon dwelling h<; mses for the use of Government officials as their private residence on adequate rent.

The concluding portion of the judgment of the Privy

Council is important and needs to be quoted. It stated, "But here, so far from holding them to be wrong, the whole of the learned judges, who are thoroughly conversant with the conditions of Indian life, say that they are 81).tisfied that the scheme is one which will redound to public benefit by helping the Government to maintain the efficiency of its servants. From such a conclusion their Lordships would be slow to differ, and upon its own statement it commends itself to their judgment". In Bhanji Munji' 8 case(1) the requisition was for housing a person having no housing accommodation. After considering the affidavits, the facts and the circumstances of the case, Bose, J. observed "The Constitution authorizes requisition for a public purpose. The purpose here is finding accommodation for the homeless. If, therefore, a vacancy is allotted to a person who is in fact homeless, the purpose is fulfilled". In Ali Gulshan's case(s) the requisition was for the purpose of housing a meniber of the staff of a foreign Consulate. This Court held that the requisition was for a State purpose, which it is needless to say must be regarded as a public purpose. An examination of these and other cases leads us to the conclusion that it is impossible to precisely define the expression 'public purpose'. In each case all the facts and circumstances will require to be closely examined in order to determine whether a 'public purpose' has been established. Prima facie the Government is the best judge as to whether 'public purpose' is served by issuing a requisition order, but it is not the sole judge. The courts have the jurisdiction and it is their duty to determine the matter whenever a question is raised whether a requisition order is or is not for a 'public purpose'. The cases of Hamabai, Bhanji Munji and Ali Gulshan are merely illustrative. In each of them primarily the person directly and vitally concerned would be the person to whom the residential accommodation would be

(1) [1955] 1 S.O.R. 777.

(2) [1955] 2 S.O.R. 867.

The State of

Bombay

R. S. Nanji

Imam].

The State oJ

Bombay

R. S. Nanj;

Imam}.

allotted with which prima facie the general interest of the community would not be directly concerned at all.

We must regard Hamabai's case as a decision to the effect that the general interest of the community was directly and vitally concerned with the efficiency of the Government servants because it would be to its benefit to have such servants and, therefore, providing living accommodation for them was a public purpose. The decision in Bhanji Munji's case must be read as one in which the general interest of the com munity was directly and vitally concerned with prevention of lawlessness and disease and to house the homeless in order to avoid such a contingency was a public purpose. In Ali Gulahan's case a State purpose was served because the State Government was interested in its own trade or commerce and in the efficient discharge of his duties by a foreign Consul who would be concerned with such trade or commerce.

In the present case it is possible to construe the impugned order as a requisition on behalf of the Corporation as it does not name any individual for whom the requisition is being made. In other words the requisitioned premises were at the disposal of the Corporation to house one of its officers to be named later on. Apart from that, there is a statutory power in the Corporation under section 19(l)(c) of the Act to provide living accommodation for its employees and under section 14 the Corporation appoints such number of its officers and servants as it considers necessary for the efficient performance of its functions. It may be assumed, therefore, that the Corporation appoints only such officers as are needed for the efficient discharge of its functions and that the State Government was requested to requisition some premises as living accommodation for one of them whose posting at Bombay was necessary. Indeed the affidavit of Mr. Nadkarni, Accommodation Officer of the Government of Bombay, states that the official of the Corporation has to perform his duties in Bombay. Having regard to the provisions of section 19(2)

(a) and (b) of the Act, the power in the Corporation

to provide living accommodation for its employees must be regarded as one of its statutory activities under section 19(1). The word 'acquire' may include the power to purchase by agreement but is wide enough to enable the Corporation to request the State Government to acquire property under the Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894) in order to provide living accommodation for its employees.

The activities of the Corporation under section 19(1) are so interlinked with its successful functioning as a Road Transport Corporation that requisitioning or acquisition of property to advance and ensure those activities must be regarded as for a public purpose.

It would not be sufficient to merely establish the Corporation.

It has to have an adequate and efficient staff, living accommodation for whom would be an absolute need of the Corporation.

Its officers have to be efficient in the discharge of their duties, for upon them depends the successful working of the road transport system upon which the public must rely and thus it would be directly and vitally concerned with the efficiency of the employees of the Corporation.

It was suggested that a line must be drawn somewhere, otherwise there was no guarantee to what lengths the powers of requisition might be exercised by the Government. It is sufficient to say that each case would have to be decided upon the facts and the circumstances appearing therein.

Here the Corporation is a public utility concern and the general interest of the community is directly and vitally concerned with its activities and its undertaking. A break down in the organisation of the Corporation, leading to dislocation of the road transport system would create a chaotic condition to the detriment of the interest of the community. Providing living accommodation for its employees is a statutory activity of the Corporation and it is essential for it to provide such accommodation in order to ensure an efficient working of the road transport system and it must, therefore, be held that the impugned order was validly passed under the Requisition Act.

In the result the appeal is allowed and the decision

The State of.

Bombay

R. S. Nanji

Imam].

The State of

Bombay

R. S. Nanji

lmamJ.

January 20

of the High Court is set aside.

Costs in the appeal in this Court shall be paid by the appellant to the respondent as directed by the order granting Special Leave. Each party, however, will bear his own costs in the High Court.

RAM CHANDRA PALA! AND OTHERS

THE STATE OF ORISSA AND OTHERS.

(S. R. DAS, ACTING C.J., BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHA-

DAS, B. P. SINHA AND JAFER IMAM JJ.]

Fundamental Bights, Infringement of-Acts creating virtual State monopoly in motor transport busine:s-Application of one Act to certain groups of owners and another to certain others operating different routes in different localities-If makes for discrimination and inequality-If restricts rights to hold property and practise trade and business-Notification terminating permits for taking over transp01t business, if confiscates property without cmnpensation-

Freedom of inter-state and intra-state trade, if a fundamental right- Constitution of India, hts. 14, 19(1)(!) and (g), 31(2), 301, 305- 0rissa Motor Vehicles (Regulation of Stage Carriage and Public Carrier's Services) Act, 1947 (Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947), s. 4-0rissa Motor Vehicles (Amendment) A.ct, 1948 (Orissa Act I of 1949), s. 1.

The petitioners were owners of Stage Carriage Services holding permits under the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939.

The State Government of Orissa, in pursuance of its scheme of a Nationalised State Transport as contemplated by the Orissa Motor Vehicles (Regulation of Stage Carriage and Public Carrier's Services) Act of 1947 (Orissa Act XXXVI of 194 7) and Orissa Act I of 1949, which amended the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939, issued notifications under those Acts intimating the owners of different Stage Carriage Services operating different routes within the districts of Orissa that ,.. with effect from the 1st ol January, 1955, either the Orissa Road Transport Co. Ltd., or the State Transport Service, formed under the two Acts 1 would exclusively operate the said routes. The owners impugned the Acts as unconstitutional and violative of their fundamental rights. It was contended that the two Acts, whose provisions were materially different, discriminated against them and in favour of the aforesaid transport services as also in their arbitrary application to different zones and territories of the State and contravened Art. 14 of the Constitution. It was lurther contended that the provisions of the Acts and rules framed thereunder infringed Arts- 19(1)(f) and (g) by putting restrictions on the rights to hold property and to practise trade and business, that the Notifications

Munshi

Nath P,.asad

Subordinate Judge of Monghyr

17

THE STATE OF BOMBAY

R. S. NANJI

S. R. DAS

BHAGWATI

B. P. SINHA

Land Requisition Act, 1948

s. 6

Corporation Act, 1950

Parliament Act LXIV of 1950

s. 19( 1)( c)

s. 5

Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948

Government of Bom bay

12th May 1952

Art. 226

Bombay High Court

s. 5

Supreme Court

s. 19(1)

Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950

L.R. 42 I.A. 44

[1955) 1 S.C.R. 777

[1955) 2 S.C.R. 867

M. 0. Setalvad

B. Sen

R. H. Dhebar

Narain Andley

B. Dadachanji

Rajinder Narain

State of

Bomay

R. S. Nanji

State of

Bombay

R. S~ Nanji

IMAM

Government of the State of Bombay

section 5

Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948

Bombay Act XXXIII of 1948

section 5

Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948

Bombay Act XXXIII of 1948

Government of Bomhay

State Road Transport Corporation

Article 226

Tendolkar

section 5

Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950

4th of October 1955(9)

Andley

Batchelor

Hamabai

section 5

[1955) 1 S.C.R. 777

[1955) 2 S.C.R. 867

R. S. Nanji

section 3

section 23

section 34

section 30

section 36

section 18

section 19

Section 19(1)

Section 19(2)

R. S. NaKji

State oj

Bombay

L.R. 42 I.A. 44

Bhanji Munji

Bose

Ali Gulshan

State oJ

Bombay

The State oJ

Bombay

R. S. Nanj;

Imam}.

R. S. Nanj

Ali Gulahan

section 19(l)(c)

section 14

Bombay

Nadkarni

Government of Bombay

section 19(2)

section 19(1)

section 19(1)

State of.

Bombay

RAM CHANDRA PALA

STATE OF ORISSA

JAFER IMAM

Constitution of India

Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947

s. 4

Orissa Act I of 1949

s. 1

Motor Vehicles Act

State Government of Orissa

Orissa Act I of 1949

Motor Vehicles Act

1st ol January, 1955

Art. 14