{"document_id": "1956_1_267_287_EN", "year": 1956, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nBID! SUPPLY CO.\n\nTHE UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS.\n\n[S. R. DAS, C.J., VIVIAN BOSE, BHAGWATI, JAGAN-\n\nNADHADAS and B. P. SINHA, JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, Art. 14-Ifl, dian Income Tax Act, 1922 (XI oJ 1922), ss.5(7-A), 64(5)(b) as amended lYy Indian Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 1940 (Act XL of 1940)-Whether ultra. vires the Constitution-Transfer, Order of-B'll Central Board of Revenue under s. 5( 7-A)-Transferring assusment proceeding of petitioner from Calcutta to Ranchi-Without notice to petitioner and without giving it opportunity to make representation against such decision-Constitutionality of-Assessee, rights of-Under s. 64 of the Act.\n\nThe petitioner-a. registered firm-has its head-office in Calcutta. where its books of account a.re kept a.nd ma.inta.ined a.nd where it he.s its banking account, the members of the firm being citizens of India. Since its inception the firm has a.11 a.long been assessed to income-tax by the Inoome-Ta.x Officer, District III, Ca.lcutta..\n\nThe assessments for the yea.rs 1948-49 a.nd 1949-50 were ma.de by the Income Tax Officer, District III, Calcutta.. Notices under s. 22(2) of the Income Ta.x Act were issued to the petitioner by the Income- Tax Officer, District ill, Calcutta. to submit returns for the yea.rs 1950-51, 1951-52, 1952-53, 1953-54a.nd1954-55. The Income Ta.x Officer, District ill, Calcutta. ma.de assessment for the yea.r 1950-51 on 18-12-1954 being sa.tisfied tha.t the principa.l place of business of the petitioner wa.s in Ca.Icutta..\n\nOn the 25th Ja.nua.ry 1955 the petitioner received a. letter from the Income-Ta.x Officer, District ill, Calcutta. that in }>Ursua.nee to orders de.tad 13th December 1954 under s. 5(7-A) of the Income- Ta.x Act its assessment records were tra.nsferred from that office to the Income Ta.x Officer, Specie.I Circle, Ranchi with whom the petitioner wa.s to correspond in future rega.rding its a.ssessment v.roceed • ings. The order sta.ted tha.t the Central Boa.rd of Revenue 'hereby transfers the case of'' the petitioner. The petitionBr ha.d no previ ous notice of the intention of the IncomeTa.x a.uthorities to tra.ns!er the a.ssessment proceedings from Ca.lcutta. to Ba.nchi nor ha.d it a.n opportunity to ma.ke a.ny representa.tion a.gs.inst suJly Co. area in which that place is situate or where the business, profession, . v . or vocation is carried on at more than one place by the Income Tax The Umon °1 Ind•a Officer of the area in which the principal place of business, profes\n\nand othe1's sion or vocation is situate. In all other cases, according to sub section (2), an assessee shall be assessed by the Income-Tax Officer of the area in which he resides. If any question arises as to the place of assessment such question shall be decided, after giving the assessee an opportunity to/represent his views, by the Commissioner or Commissioners concerned or in case of disagreement between them by the Boardof Revenue. The section is imperative in terms and gives a valuable right to the assessee.\n\nBy amending the Indian Income-Tax Act 1922 by the Indian Income-Tax (Amendment) Act, 1940 (Act XL of 1940) by adding to clause (b) of sub-section (5}ofs. 64 the words \"in consequence of any transfer made under sub-section (7 A) of s. 5\" and by adding sub section (7-A) to s. 5 the benefit conferred by the provisions of sub section (1) and sub-section (2) of s. 64 is taken away and is to be deemed not to have existed at any time as regards the assessee with regard to whom a transfer is made under sub-section (7A) of s. 5.\n\nHeld that as under s. 22(2) of the Act, the notice and the return are to be confined to a particnlar assessment year, sub-section (7-A} of s. 5 contemplates the transfer of such a. \"case\" i.e. the assessment case for a particular year. The provision that such a transfer may be made \"at any stage of the proceedings\" obviously postulates proceedings actually pending and \"stage\" refers to a point in bet ween the commencement and ending of those proceedings. Fnnher the transfer contemplated by the sub-section is the transfer of a particnlar case actually pending before an Income-Tax Ollicer of one place to the Income-Tax Officer of another _place.\n\nAccordingly such an omnibus whol-1e order of transfer dated 13th December 1954 as was made in the present case is not contemplated by the sub-section and therefore the impugned order of transfer which was expressed in gener&I terms without any reference to any particular case and without any limitation ae to time was beyond the competence of the Central Board of Revenue and the petitioner was still entitled to the benefit of the Provisions of sub sections (1) and (2) of s. 64.\n\nThe impugned order is discriminatory against the petitioner and violates the fundamental right guaranteed to it by Art.14 of the • Constitution in-as-much as the income-tax authorities by an execn tive order unsupported by law picked out the present petitioner and transferred all his cases by an omnibus order unlimited in point of time, which order is ce.lcnla.ted to infti~ considerable inconvenience a.nd harassment on the petitioner.\n\nBOBE J. Section 5(7A) of the Indian Income-Tu Act is ullra vires Art. 14 of the Constitution and so is s. 64(5)(b) in so far as it\n\n....\n\nmakes an order under s. 5(7-A) as it now exists, inviolate. 1956\n\nThe power of transfer can only be conferred if it is hedged Bid i supply Co. round with reasonable restrictions, the absence or existence of which cau in the last instance be determined by the courts; and the exer- The Unio: of India cise of the power must be in conformity with the rules of natural and others justice, that is to say, the parties affected must be heard when that is reasonably possible, and the reasons for the order must be reduced, however briefly, to writing so that men may know that the powers conferred on these quasi judicial bodies are being justly and properly exercised .\n\nChiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union 1Jf India ([1950] S.C.R. 860), Budhan Chowdhry and others v. The State of Bihar ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 1045), Dayaldas Kushirann v. Commissioner of Income-Tax Central (I.L.R. [1940] Born. 650; [1940] 8-I.T.R. 139), Eshugbai Eleko's case (L, R. [1931] A.C. 662), .The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar ([1952] S.C.R. 284), Ram Prasad Narayan Saki and Another v. The State of Bihar and Others ([1953] S.C.R. 1129); Bowman's case ([1917) A.C. 406), Coal Control case ([1954] S.C.R. 803), State of Madras v. v. G. Row ([1952] S.C.R. 597), and Liversit-'the Government of India. The scope and effect of article 14, in so far as it protects all persons against discriminatory and hostile legislation, have been discussed and explained by this court in a series of cases beginning with Ohiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union\n\n1956 of India(') and ending with Budhan Chowdhry and\n\n8 . s others v. The State of Bihar(0). In the last mentioned\n\n•d• uJ>Ply Co. case a Full Bench of this court summarised the result\n\nThe uni:;, of India of the earlier decisions on this point in the words\n\nand others following:-\n\n\"It is now well-established that while article 14 Das O.J. forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and (2) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different bases; namely, geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like.\n\nWhat is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. It is also well-established by the decisions of this court that article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure\".\n\nWe have, therefore, to approach the problem posed before us bearing in mind the above principles laid down by this court in so far as they may be applicable to the facts of the present case.\n\nTurning now to the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 we find that section 64 makes provision for determining the place of assessment. By sub-section (1), where an assessee carries on a business, profession or vocation at any place, he shall be assessed by the Income-tax Officer of that area in which that place is situate or where the business, profession, or vocation is carried on at more than one place by the Incometax Officer of the area in which the principal place of business, profession or vocation is situate. In all other cases, according to sub-section (2), an assessee shall be assessed by the Income-tax Officer of the area in in which he resides. If any question arises as to the\n\n(1) [1950] 8.0.R. 869.\n\n\nplace of assessment such question shall be decided, 1956 after giving the assesse~ a.n opportunity. to. represent Bidi supply co. his views by the Comm1ss10ner or Comm1ss10ners conv. cerned or in case of disagreement between them by The Union of India.\n\nthe Board of Revenue (sub-section (3)). It is quite and others clear from the aforesaid provisions of section 64 that the Legislature considered the question of the place of assessment to be of some importance to the assessee.\n\nThe provisions. of section 64 of the Indian Income- . tax .. Act, 1922 ctme up for discussion before the Bombay High Court in Dayaldas Kushiram v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Oentral(1). At pages 657 to 658 Beaumont, C.J. observed as follows:\n\n\"In my opinion section 64 was intended to ensure that as far as practicable an assessee should be assessed locally, and the area to which an Incometax Officer is appointed must, so far as the exigencies of tax collection allow, bear some reasonable relation to the place where the assessee carried on business or resides. There is no evidence that there was any difficulty in restricting the area to which the Incometax Officer, Section II (Central), was appointed to something much narrower than the Bombay Presidency, Sind and Baluchistan. Therefore, in my opinion, Income-tax Officer, Section II (Central), is not the Income-tax Officer of the area in which the applicant's place of business is situate, and as there is such an officer in existence, namely, the Officer of Ward C, Section II, in my• opinion, it is only the latter officer who can assess the assessee\".\n\nKania, J. (as he then was) said at pages 660-661:\n\n\"A plain reading of the section shows that the same is imperative in terms. It also gives to the assessee a valuable right. He is entitled to tell the taxing authorities that he shall not be called upon to attend at different places and thus upset his business\". It will be noticed from the above passages that the learned judges treated the provisions of section 64 more as a question of right than as a matter of convenience only. It was for the above decision that the\n\n(1) I.L.R. [1940) Bom. 650; [1940] 8 I.T.R. 130.\n\nDas C.J.\n\n1956 Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 was amended by the\n\nB\"d\" 5 #I c Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1940 (Act XL ' ' \"v. Y o. of 1940), by adding to clause (b) of sub-section (5) of\n\nTh• u .. 1on of 1 .. d1a section 64 the words \"in consequence of any transfer\n\na .. dothm made under sub-section (7-A) of section 5\" and by adding sub-section (7-A) to section 5. The relevant portion of sub-section (5) of section 64 so amended reads as under:-\n\nDas C.J.\n\n\"( 5) The provisions of sub-section (l) and subsection (2) shall not apply and shall be deemed never. at any time to have applied to any assessee-\n\n(a) ················································································\n\n(b) where by any direction given or any distribution or allocation of work made by the Commissioner of Income-tax under sub-section (5) of section 5, or in consequence of any transfer made under sub-section\n\n(7-A) of section 5, a particular Income-tax Officer has been charged with the function of assessing that assessee, or\n\n(c) .................. , ........................................................... . ..\n\nIt is thus clear from this amendment that the benefit conferred by the provisions ohub-section (1) and sub- . section (2) are taken away and is to be deemed and not to have existed at any time as regards the assessee with regard to whom a transfer order is made under sub-section ('7-A) of section 5. In order, however, to deprive a particular assessee of the benefits of sub-sections (I} and (2) of section 64, there must be a valid order under section 5(7-A) and he will lose the benefit only to the extent to which that right is taken away by a valid order made under sub-section (7-A} of section 5. This takes us to the new subsection (7-A) of section 5. .\n\nSub-section (7-A) of section 5 runs as follows:-\n\n\"(7-A) The Commissioner of Income-tax may , transfer any case from one Income-tax Officer subordinate to him to another, and the Central Board of Revenue may transfer any case from any one Incometax Officer to another. Such transfer may be made at any stage of the proceedings, and shall not render\n\nnecessary the reissue of any notice already issued by 1956 the Income-tax Officer from whom the case is transnas .,,,,,1 c fe d \" i I \"r,- ; JI O, rre . v.\n\nThe sub-section in terms makes provisions for the The Union of India transfer of a \"case\". Under the Indian Income-tax and others Act, 1922 a case is started when the Income-tax Officer issues a n, otiee under section 22(2) of the Act calling upon the assessee to file hs return of his total income and total world income during the previous year and then the assessee submits his return in the prescribed form. It is quite clear from the section that the notice and the return are to be confined to a particular assessment year and the sub-section contemplates the transfer of such a \"case\", i.e., the assessment case for a particular year. The provision that such a transfer may be made \"at any stage of the proceedings\" obviously postulates proceedings actually pending and \"stage\" refers to a point in between the commencement and ending of those proceedings. Further the provision that such transfer shall not render necessary the reissue of notice already issued by the Income-tax Officer from whom the case is transferred quite clearly indicates that the transfer contemplated by the sub-section is the transfer of a particular case actually pending before an Income-Tax Officer of one place to the Income-Tax Officer of another place. The fact that in this case the Income-tax Officer, Special Circle, Ranchi issued fresh notice under section 22(2) quite clearly shows\n\nthat he did not understand that any particular pending case of this assessee had been transferred to him.\n\nEvidently he thought that the assessment of the petitioner's income, generally and as a whole, had been transferred to him and that it was, therefore, for him to initiate a case, i.e., assessment proceedings for a particular year. In our judgment such an omnibus wholesale order of transfer is not contemplated by the sub-section. It is implicit in the sub-section that the Commissioner of Income-Tax or the Central Board of Revenue, as the case may be, should before making an order of transfer of any case apply his or its mind to the necessity or desirability of the transfer\n\nDas C.J.\n\n7956 of that particular case. The fact that it is necessary or desirable to transfer a case of assessment of a Bi.-li supply Co. 1 1 v. particu ar assessee for any particu ar year does not The Union of India necessarily indicate that it is equally\" necessary or\n\n\"''d others desirable to transfer another assessment case of that assessee for any other assessment year. We are accord- Das C.J. ingly of the opinion that the impugned order of transfer, which was expressed in general terms without any reference to a.ny particular case and without any limitation as to time, was beyond the competence of the Central Board of Revenue. We did not understand the learned AttorneyGerieral to contend that such was not the correct interpretation of the sub-section.\n\nWe do not consider it necessary, for the purpose of this ca.se, to pause to consider whether the constitutionality of sub-section (7-A) of section 5 can be supported on the principle of any reasonable classification laid down by this court or whether the Act lays down any principle for guiding or regulating the exercise of discretion by the Commissioner or Board of Revenue or whether the sub-section confers an unguided and arbitrary power on those authorities to pick and choose individual assessee and place that assessee at a disadvantage in comparison with other assessees. It is enough for the purpose of this case to say that the omnibus order made in this case is not contemplated or sanctioned by sub-section (7-A) and that, therefore, the petitioner is still entitled to the benefit of the provisions of sub-sections\n\n(1) and (2) of section 64.\n\nAll assessees are entitled to the benefit of those provisions except where a particular case or cases of a particular assessee for a particular year or years is or are transferred under sub-section (7-A) of section 5, assuming that section to be valid and if a particular case or cases is or are transferred his right under section 64 still remains as regards his other case or cases.\n\nAs said by Lord Atkin in Eshugbai Eleko's case(') the executive can only act in pursuance of the powers given to it by law and it cannot interfere with the liberty, property\n\nll) IJ.R. [1931) A.O. 6G21 670.\n\nand rights of the subject except on the condition that 1956 it can support the legality of its action before the Bidi suppzy co. court. Here there was no such order of transfer as v. is contemplated or sanctioned by sub-section (7-A) The Union of Tndia of section 5 and, therefore, the present assessee still and others has the right, along with all other Bidi merchants carrying on business in Calcutta, to have his assessment proceedings before the Income-tax Officer of the area in which his place of business is situate. The income-tax authorities have by an executive order, unsupported by law, picked out this petitioner and transferred all his cases by an omnibus order unlimited in point of time. This order is calculated to inflict considerable inconvenience and harassment on the petitioner. Its books of account will have to be pro duced before the Income-tax Officer, Special Circle, Ranchi-a place hundreds of miles from Calcutta, which is its place of business. Its partners or principal officers will have to be away from the head office for a considerable period neglecting the main business of the firm.\n\nThere may be no suitable place where they can put up during that period. There will certainly be extra expenditure to be incurred by it by way of railway fare, freight and hotel expenses.\n\nTherefore the reality of the discrimination cannot be gainsaid. In the circumstances this substantial discrimination has been inflicted on the petitioner by an executive fiat which is not founded on any law and no question of reasonable classification for purposes of legislation can arise. Here \"the State\" which includes its Income-tax department has by an illegal order denied to the petitioner, as compared with other Bidi merchants who are similarly situate, equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws and the petitioner can legitimately complain of an infraction of his fun dam en tal right under article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nIt has further been urged that this order indirectly affects the petitioner's fundamental right under article l9(I)(f) and article 31.\n\nThere can be no gainsaying the fact that the order purports to deprive the petitioner of its right under section 64 to which\n\nDasC.J.\n\n1956 it would otherwise be entitled. The order of transfer . . is certainly calculated to inflict considerable incon- 8'J' Supply Co. . d h t t th t\"t\" h . v vemence an arassmen o e pe 1 1oner as eremr~. union.of India before mentioned. But in the view we have taken\n\nand others on the construction of sub-section (7-A) of section 5\n\nDas C.J. and the petitioner's rights under article 14, it is not necessary for us, on this occasion, to express any opinion on the contention that the inconvenience and harassment referred to above constitute an imposition of such an interference as amounts to an unwarranted restriction on the petitioner's rights under article 19(l)(g} or a violation of his rights under article 31.\n\nFor the reasons stated above this petition must be allowed. Accordingly the impugned order is set aside and an injunction is issued in terms of prayer ( c) of the petition. The petitioner is entitled to the costs of this applicatio\";.\n\nBOSE J.-I agree with my Lord the Chief Justice that this petition should be allowed but for different reasons. In my opinion, sections 5(7-A) and 64(5)(b) of the Indian Income-tax Act are themselves ultra vires article 14 of the Constitution and not merely the order of the Central Board of Revenue.\n\nThe only question is whether these sections contravene article 14. Despite the constant endeavour of Judges to define the limits of this law, I am unable to deduce any clear cut principle from the oftrepeated formula of classification. As I have said in another case, even the learned Judges who propound that theory and endeavour to work it out are driven to concede that classification in itself is not enough for the simple reason that anything can be classified and every discriminatory action must of necessity fall into some category of classification, for classification is nothing more than dividing off one group of things from another; and unless some difference or distinction is made in a given case no question under article 14 can arise. It is just a question of framing a set of rules.\n\nIt is elementary that no two things are exactly\n\nalike and it is equally obvious many things have features that are common. Once the lines of demar-\n\nBidi Supply Co. cation are fixed, the resultant grouping is capable of v. objective determination but the fixing of the lines is The Union of India necessarily arbitrary and to say that governments and others and legislatures may classify is to invest them with a naked and arbitrary power to discriminate as they please. Faced with the inexorable logic of this position, the learned Judges who apply this test are forced to hedge it round with conditions which, to my mind, add nothing to the clarity of the law. I will pass over the limitations with which the classification test is now judicially surrounded, namely that it must be \"reasonable'', it must not be \"discriminatory\" or \"arbitrary'', it must not b~ \"hostile\"; there must be no \"substantial discrimination\" and so forth, and will proceed at once to a rule that is supposed to set the matter at rest. The rule is taken from the American decisions and was stated thus in The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarl:ar(i);\n\n\"In order to pass the test, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely (1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those that are grouped together from others and (2) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act\".\n\nMukherjea, J. (as he then was) said at page 321 ibid that\n\n\"the classification should never be arbitrary, artificial or evasive. It must rest always upon real and substantial distinction bearing a reasonable and just relation. to the thing in respect to which the classification is made; and classification made without any reasonable basis should be regarded as invalid\".\n\nIn another case, Ram Prasad Narayan Saki and Another v. The State of Bihar and Others(9), the same learned Judge said at page 1139-\n\n\"but such selection or differentiation must not be arbitrary and should rest upon a rational basis, having regard to the object which the legislature has in view\".\n\n(1) [1952) S.O.R. 284, 334.\n\n(2) [1958) S.O.R. 1129.\n\nBose].\n\n1956 Ivor Jennings puts it another way:\n\n\"Among equals the law shall be equal and shall Bidi s\"!'ply co. be equally administered and that like shall be treated . l'k ,, The Union of India a. 1 e .\n\na\"d others With the utmost respect all this seems to me to break down on a precise analysis, for even among BoseJ. equals a large discretion is left to judges in the matter of punishment, and to the police and to the State whether to prosecute or not and to a host of officials whether to grant or withhold a permit or a licence.\n\nIn the end, having talked learnedly round and around the article we are no wiser than when we started and in the end come back to its simple phrasing-\n\n\"The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India''.\n\nThe truth is that it is impossible to be precise, for we are dealing with intangibles and though the results are clear it is impossible to pin the thought down to any precise analysis. Article 14 sets out, to my mind, an attitude of mind, a way of life; rather than a precise rule of law. It embodies a general awareness in the consciousness of the people at large of something that , exists and which is very real but which cannot be pinned down to any precise analysis of fact save to say in a given case that it falls this side of the line or that, and because of that decisions on the same point will vary as conditions vary, one conclusion in one part of the country and another somewhere else; one decision today and another tomorrow when the basis of society has altered and the structure of current social thinking is different. It is not the law that alters but the changing conditions of the times and article 14 narrows down to a question of fact which must be determined by the highest Judges in the land as each case arises. (See on this point Lord Sumner's line of reasoning in Bowman's case(')). Always there is in these cases a clash of conflicting claims and it is the core of the judicial process to arrive at an accommodation between them. Anybody can decide a question if only a single principle\n\n(1) [1917] A.C. 406, 466, 467.\n\nis in issue. The heart of the difficulty is that there 1956 is hardly any question that comes before the Courts Bidi suppty co. that does not entail more than one so-called principle. v.\n\nAs Judge Leonard Hand of the United States Court The Union of India of Appeals said of the American Constitutionand others \"The words a judge must construe are empty vessels into which he can pour anything he will\".\n\nThese rules are useful guides in some cases but they do not, in my opinion, go to the root of the matter; nor am I alone in so thinking though my approach is more direct and fundamental than is usual. Patanjali Sastri, C.J. said in The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarlcar(1) that the reported decisions \"underline the futility of wordy formulation of so-called 'tests' in solving problems presented by concrete cases\".\n\nI endeavoured to point out in my judgment in Anwar Ali Sarlcar's case(1) at page 361 that one can conceive of classifications that conform to all these rules and yet which are bad: classifications made in the utmost good faith; classifications that are scientific and rational, that will have direct and reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved and yet which are bad because despite all that the object itself cannot be allowed on the ground that it offends article 14. In such a case, the object itself must be struck down and not the mere classification which, after all, is only a means of attaining the end desired; and that, in my judgment, is precisely the point here.\n\nIt is the very point that Fazl Ali J. made in Anwar Ali Sarkar's case(1) at pages 309-310:\n\n. \"It was suggested that the reply to this query is that the Act itself being general and applicable to all persons and to all offences, cannot be said to discriminate in favour of or against any particular case or classes of persons or cases, and if any charge of discrimination can be levelled at all, it can be levelled only against the act of the executive authority if the Act is misused. This kind of argument however does not appear to me to solve the difficulty. The result of accepting it would be that even where discrimina-\n\n(1) [1952) S.C.R. 284, 297.\n\nBose J.\n\n1955 tion is quite evident one cannot challenge the Act\n\nBidi supply co. simply because it is couched in general terms; and one v. canndt also challenge the act of the executive auth- Th• Union of In4ia ority whose duty it is to administer th~ Act, becallSe\n\nandothm that authority will say:-! am not to blame as I am\n\nBos•J. acting under the Act. It is clear that if the argument were to be accepted, article I 4 could be easily defeated. I think the fallacy of the' argument lies in overlooking the fact that the 'insidious piscrimination complained of is incorporated in the Act itself', it being so drafted that whenever any discrimination is made such discrimination would be ultimately traceable to it\".\n\nNor, in the past, has this Court hesitated to strike down the Act or Order itself when it confers unrestricted power as here .. That was what. happened in the Coal Control Case('); the Order itself was struck down and not the executive action taken by virtue of the unrestricted powers conferred l:iy that law. See page 813 where it was said-\n\n\"The Order commits to the unrestrained will of a single individual the power to grant, withhold or cancel licences in any way he chooses. and there is nothing in the Order which would ensure a proper execution of the power or operate as a check upon iiijustice that might result from improper execution of the same\".\n\nSo also in the State of Madras v. V. G. Row(\"). It is true that these were cases under article 19 and not 14 of the Constitution but the principle is the same.\n\nI need not multiply instances.\n\nWhat is the position here? Here.is an Act that fixes a certain venue for assessment in section 64. That is the normal law of the land for these purposes.\n\nThe language in sub-sections (I) and (2) is mandatory: \"he shaU be assessed\".\n\nIf there is doubt or dispute about the correct venue, it can only be decided after hearing the party concerned. Then come the provisions for transfer.\n\nNow it is, I think, necessary that there should be powers of transfer and the mere conferral of such\n\n(1) [195'] s.c.B. 803..\n\n(2) [1962] S.C.B. 697.\n\npowers would not offend article 14. But, put at its 1956 lowest, it is anomalous that when similar powers are Bidi SttJ>Ply co. conferred on the High Courts and even on this Court v. under, for example, the Code of Criminal Procedure, The Union of India\n\nthey should be hedged round with limitations, whereand others as, when it comes to a Commissioner of Income-tax - or the Central Board of Revenue, no limitations BoseJ. whatever are placed upon them. Section 526 of the Criminal Procedure Code confers only limited powers of transfer on the High Court and article 136 empowers this Court to intervene should those powers be exceeded by the High Court and should this Cout in its discretion feel that that has led, or is likely to lead, to hardship and injustice or to a miscarriage of justice; and in the case of this Court a right to transfer is conferred under section 527 only when that is \"expedient in the interests of justice\". Section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code is wider but that was a law made before the Constitution and, in any case, suc.h an order would be open to review by this Court and in a suitable case, should the High Court act arbitrarily or along non-judicial lines, such as directing a transfer without recording reasons and without hearing the parties concerned when it is possible to afford them a hearing, the matter would be set right here.\n\nThere is a big difference between investing a judicial authority with such powers and other non-judicial bodies because judges must act in accordance with a recognised procedure and obey the laws of natural justice unless there is express indication to the contrary in the .statute.\n\nWhat is the position here? There is no hearing, no reasons are recorded: just peremptory orders transferring the case from one place to another without any warning; and the power given by the Act is to transfer from one end of India to the other; nor is that power unused. We have before us in this Court a case pending in which a transfer has been ordered from Calcutta in West Bengal to Ambala in the Punjab.\n\nAfter all, for whose benefit was the Constitution enacted? What was the point of making all this\n\n7956 pother about fundamental rights? I am clear that the\n\n8 .d. 5 /Pl Co Constitution is not fc~ the exclusive benefit of gov-\n\n' ' :. Y • ernments and States; it is not only for lawyers and The Union of India politicians and officials and those highly placed. It\n\nand others also exists for the common man, for the poor and the humble, for those who have businesses at stake, for Bose]. the \"butcher, the baker and the candlestick maker\".\n\nIt lays down for this land \"a rule of law\" as understood in the free democracies of the world. It constitutes India into a Sovereign Democratic Republic and guarantees in every page rights and freedom to the individual side by side and consistent with the overriding power of the State to act for the common good of all.\n\nI make no apology for turning to older democracies and drawing inspiration from them, for though our law is an amalgam drawn from many sources, its firmest foundations are rooted in the freedoms of other lands where men are free in the democratic sense of the term. England has no fundamental rights as such and its Parliament is supreme but the liberty • of the subject is guarded there as jealously as the supremacy of Parliament.\n\nThe heart and core of a democracy lies in the judicial process, and that means independent and fearless judges fre~ from executive control brought up in judicial traditions and trained to judicial ways of working and thinking. The main bulwarks of liberty and freedom lie there and it is clear to me that uncontrolled powers of discrimination in matters that seriously affect the lives and properties of people cannot be left to executive or quasi executive bodies even if they exercise quasi judicial functions because they are then invested with.an authority that even Parliament does not possess. Under the Constitution, Acts of Parliament are subject to judicial review particularly when they are said to infringe fundamen ta! rights, therefore, if under the Constitution Parliament itself has not uncontrolled freedom of action, it is evident that it cannot invest lesser authorities with that power. If the legislature itself had done here what the Cental Board of Revenue\n\nhas done and had passed an Act in the bald terms of 1956 the o.rder mde here transferring. the . case. of his Bidi supply co. petitioner, pwked out from others m a hke s1tuat10n, v. from one State to another, or from one end of India The Union of India to the other, without specifying any object and withand others out giving any reason, it would, in my judgment, have been bad. I am unable to see how the position is bettered because the Central Board of Revenue has done this ad not Parliament.\n\nI quote Mukherjea J. (as he then was) in a case which is not in point here but in a passage whose language seems apt to the present position.\n\nThe quot:ttion is from Ram Prasad Narayan Sahi v. The\n\nState of Bihar(1):\n\n\"It is impossible to conceive of a worse form of discrimination than the one which differentiates a particular individual from all his fellow subjects and visits him with a disability which is not imposed upon anybody else and against which even the right of complaint is taken away\" and again,\n\n\"It is true that the presumption is in favour of the constitutionality of a legislative enactment and it has to be presumed that a Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people.\n\nBut when on the face of a statute there is no classification at all, and no attempt has been made to select any individual or group with reference to any differentiating attribute peculiar to that individual or group and not possessed by others, this presumption is of little or no assistance\".\n\nIn the case of Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson(2) the learned Law Lords were at great pains to see whether the British Parliament had in fact left the matter under consideration there to the subjective satisfaction of a Secretary of State. 'fhere was no doubt that the British Parliament could do so because it is supreme and its action is not fettered by a written constitution; but the encroachment on the liberty of the subject was so great that the House of Lords was reluctant to reach the conclusion which it ulti-\n\n(1) [1953] S.C.R. 1129, 1143.\n\n(2) [1942] A.C. 20G.\n\nBose J.\n\n1956 mately did by a majority, that that had in fact been done; and one of the learned Law Lords, Lord Atkin, Bidi S\"pply Co.\n\nQ v. read a powerful dissenting opinion. ne of his criti- Th• Union of India cisms at page 226 was that the order of detention\n\nand others was made\n\n\"by an executive minister and not by any kind BoseJ. of judicial officer; it is not made after any inquiry as to facts to which the subject is part~ it cannot be reversed on any appeal.. .......... It is an absolute power which, so far as I know, has never been given before to the executive\".\n\nIn my opinion, that is the very point here.\n\nIn England the power can be conferred but, because it so vitally affects the liberty of the subject, the judges there fight against any interpretation that would lead to that conclusion and in the end reach it only when compelled to do so for overwhelming reasons.\n\nIn India the fundamental freedoms conferred by the Constitution are guarded with equally jealous care and it seems to me that the whole point of having this Chapter on Fundamental Rights is to ensure that the .very things that the English judges fight against in their courts will not happen here.\n\nIo England the task of the judges is to see whether their Parliament has conferred those wide powers; in India our task is to see whether the Constitution has done so. In England the conferral of those powers is never conceded unless Parliament uses clear, express and unambiguous words.\n\nIn our EJonstitution I find an absence of any such clarity; on the contrary, the whole trend of the Constitution points the other way. .\n\nIf an executive authority or a quasi judicial body, or even Parliament itself, were to be given the right to determine these matters to their subjective satisfaction, there would be no point in these fundamental rights, for the courts would then be powerless to interfere and determine whether those rights have been infringed. The whole point of the chapter is to place a limitation on the powers of all these bodies, including Parliament, save in its constituent capacity.\n\nTherefore, no power resting on the subjective satisfaction of any of these bodies can ever be conferred; the satisfaction must always be objective in the sense\n\nBidi Supply Co. in which Lord Atkin explained so that its exercise is v. open to judicial review.\n\nThe Union of India In my opinion, the power of transfer can .only be and others conferred if it is hedged round with reasonable restrictions, the absence or existence of which can in the last instance be determined by the courts; and the exercise of the power must be in conformity with the rules of natural justice, that is to say, the parties affected must be heard when that is reasonably possible, and the reasons for the order must be reduced, however briefly, to writing so that men may know that the powers conferred on these quasi judicial bodies are being justly and properly exercised.\n\nIn a democracy functioning under the Rule of Law it is not enough to do justice or to do the right thing; justice must be seen to be done and a satisfaction and sense of security engendered in the minds of the people at large in place of a vague uneasiness that Star Chambers are arising in this land. We have received a rich heritage from a very variegated past.\n\nBut it is a treasure which can only be kept at the cost of ceaseless and watchful guarding. There is no room for complacency, for in the absence of constant vigilance we run the risk of, losing it. \"It can happen here.\"\n\nI would hold for these reasons, and in particular for the reason given: by Fazl Ali J. in the passage from one of his judgments quoted above, that section 5(7-A) is ultra vires article 14 of the Constitution and so is , section 64(5)(b) in so far as it makes an order under section 5(7-A) as it now exists, inviolate.\n\nI would allow the petition.\n\nBose J.", "total_entities": 153, "entities": [{"text": "REPORTS\n\nBID! SUPPLY CO", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 45, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIDI SUPPLY CO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 48, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 96, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BOSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 98, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 119, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 142, "end_char": 158, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 161, "end_char": 182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 184, "end_char": 191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 202, "end_char": 222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss.5(7-A), 64(5)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 237, "end_char": 256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 5( 7-A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 422, "end_char": 432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 660, "end_char": 665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 736, "end_char": 744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner-a. registered firm-has its head-office in Calcutta."}}, {"text": "s. 22(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1147, "end_char": 1155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 5(7-A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1715, "end_char": 1724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2414, "end_char": 2421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2479, "end_char": 2483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2718, "end_char": 2723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "By amending the Indian Income-Tax Act 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3778, "end_char": 3820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4009, "end_char": 4013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "By amending the Indian Income-Tax Act 1922", "statute": "By amending the Indian Income-Tax Act 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4050, "end_char": 4054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "By amending the Indian Income-Tax Act 1922", "statute": "By amending the Indian Income-Tax Act 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4137, "end_char": 4142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "By amending the Indian Income-Tax Act 1922", "statute": "By amending the Indian Income-Tax Act 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4298, "end_char": 4302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "By amending the Indian Income-Tax Act 1922", "statute": "By amending the Indian Income-Tax Act 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 22(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4324, "end_char": 4332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "By amending the Indian Income-Tax Act 1922", "statute": "By amending the Indian Income-Tax Act 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4444, "end_char": 4448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "By amending the Indian Income-Tax Act 1922", "statute": "By amending the Indian Income-Tax Act 1922"}}, {"text": "13th December 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5018, "end_char": 5036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly such an omnibus whol-1e order of transfer dated 13th December 1954 as was made in the present case is not contemplated by the sub-section and therefore the impugned order of transfer which was expressed in gener&I terms without any reference to any particular case and without any limitation ae to time was beyond the competence of the Central Board of Revenue and the petitioner was still entitled to the benefit of the Provisions of sub sections (1) and (2) of s. 64."}}, {"text": "s. 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5433, "end_char": 5438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art.14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5556, "end_char": 5562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 5(7A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5889, "end_char": 5902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5946, "end_char": 5953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 64(5)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5984, "end_char": 5995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(7-A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6040, "end_char": 6049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1955] 1 S.C.R. 1045", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6804, "end_char": 6824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Eshugbai Eleko", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6932, "end_char": 6946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "650; [1940] 8-I.T.R. 139), Eshugbai Eleko's case (L, R. [1931] A.C. 662), .The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar ([1952] S.C.R. 284), Ram Prasad Narayan Saki and Another v. The State of Bihar and Others ([1953] S.C.R. 1129); Bowman's case ([1917) A.C. 406), Coal Control case ([1954] S.C.R. 803), State of Madras v. v. G. Row ([1952] S.C.R. 597), and Liversit-'the Government of India."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12042, "end_char": 12061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The expression \"the State\" used in Part III of the Constitution which deals with fundamental :tights includes, unless the context otherwise requires, the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the legislatures of each of the States and all loqal or other authorities within the territor; y of India or under the control C>t-'the Government of India."}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12087, "end_char": 12097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12628, "end_char": 12638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13482, "end_char": 13492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Turning now to the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13773, "end_char": 13819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13833, "end_char": 13843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Turning now to the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Turning now to the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14845, "end_char": 14855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14990, "end_char": 15000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15076, "end_char": 15093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tax .. Act, 1922 ctme up for discussion before the Bombay High Court in Dayaldas Kushiram v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Oentral(1)."}}, {"text": "Beaumont", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15178, "end_char": 15186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At pages 657 to 658 Beaumont, C.J. observed as follows:\n\n\"In my opinion section 64 was intended to ensure that as far as practicable an assessee should be assessed locally, and the area to which an Incometax Officer is appointed must, so far as the exigencies of tax collection allow, bear some reasonable relation to the place where the assessee carried on business or resides."}}, {"text": "section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15230, "end_char": 15240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Presidency", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15716, "end_char": 15733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no evidence that there was any difficulty in restricting the area to which the Incometax Officer, Section II (Central), was appointed to something much narrower than the Bombay Presidency, Sind and Baluchistan."}}, {"text": "Sind", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15735, "end_char": 15739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no evidence that there was any difficulty in restricting the area to which the Incometax Officer, Section II (Central), was appointed to something much narrower than the Bombay Presidency, Sind and Baluchistan."}}, {"text": "Baluchistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15744, "end_char": 15755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no evidence that there was any difficulty in restricting the area to which the Incometax Officer, Section II (Central), was appointed to something much narrower than the Bombay Presidency, Sind and Baluchistan."}}, {"text": "Kania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16088, "end_char": 16093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kania, J. (as he then was) said at pages 660-661:\n\n\"A plain reading of the section shows that the same is imperative in terms."}}, {"text": "section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16495, "end_char": 16505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16677, "end_char": 16704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16880, "end_char": 16890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16977, "end_char": 16986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17023, "end_char": 17032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17077, "end_char": 17087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17500, "end_char": 17509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17578, "end_char": 17587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18069, "end_char": 18078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18179, "end_char": 18189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(7-A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18225, "end_char": 18239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18371, "end_char": 18380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18427, "end_char": 18436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18462, "end_char": 18471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Commissioner of Income-tax", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18502, "end_char": 18528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sub-section (7-A) of section 5 runs as follows:-\n\n\"(7-A) The Commissioner of Income-tax may , transfer any case from one Income-tax Officer subordinate to him to another, and the Central Board of Revenue may transfer any case from any one Incometax Officer to another."}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax and others Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19049, "end_char": 19087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 22(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19158, "end_char": 19171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Under the Indian Income-tax and others Act, 1922", "statute": "Under the Indian Income-tax and others Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "section 22(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20291, "end_char": 20304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21216, "end_char": 21230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The fact that it is necessary or desirable to transfer a case of assessment of a Bi.-li supply Co. 1 1 v. particu ar assessee for any particu ar year does not The Union of India necessarily indicate that it is equally\" necessary or\n\n\"''d others desirable to transfer another assessment case of that assessee for any other assessment year."}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21922, "end_char": 21931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22628, "end_char": 22638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22848, "end_char": 22857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22965, "end_char": 22975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Atkin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23043, "end_char": 23048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As said by Lord Atkin in Eshugbai Eleko's case(') the executive can only act in pursuance of the powers given to it by law and it cannot interfere with the liberty, property\n\nll) IJ.R. [1931) A.O. 6G21 670."}}, {"text": "Union of Tndia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23473, "end_char": 23487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Here there was no such order of transfer as v. is contemplated or sanctioned by sub-section (7-A) The Union of Tndia of section 5 and, therefore, the present assessee still and others has the right, along with all other Bidi merchants carrying on business in Calcutta, to have his assessment proceedings before the Income-tax Officer of the area in which his place of business is situate.", "canonical_name": "Union of India"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23491, "end_char": 23500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25166, "end_char": 25176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25322, "end_char": 25332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25440, "end_char": 25450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25793, "end_char": 25802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25847, "end_char": 25857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "BOSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26426, "end_char": 26430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BOSE J.-I agree with my Lord the Chief Justice that this petition should be allowed but for different reasons.", "canonical_name": "BOSE"}}, {"text": "sections 5(7-A) and 64(5)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26552, "end_char": 26580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26595, "end_char": 26609, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26637, "end_char": 26647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Central Board of Revenue", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26700, "end_char": 26724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In my opinion, sections 5(7-A) and 64(5)(b) of the Indian Income-tax Act are themselves ultra vires article 14 of the Constitution and not merely the order of the Central Board of Revenue."}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26782, "end_char": 26792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27457, "end_char": 27467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28981, "end_char": 28990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mukherjea, J. (as he then was) said at page 321 ibid that\n\n\"the classification should never be arbitrary, artificial or evasive."}}, {"text": "Ivor Jennings", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29720, "end_char": 29733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1956 Ivor Jennings puts it another way:\n\n\"Among equals the law shall be equal and shall Bidi s\"!'ply co. be equally administered and that like shall be treated ."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30715, "end_char": 30725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31442, "end_char": 31452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sumner", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31592, "end_char": 31598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "See on this point Lord Sumner's line of reasoning in Bowman's case('))."}}, {"text": "Leonard Hand", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32076, "end_char": 32088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nAs Judge Leonard Hand of the United States Court The Union of India of Appeals said of the American Constitutionand others \"The words a judge must construe are empty vessels into which he can pour anything he will\"."}}, {"text": "United States Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 32096, "end_char": 32115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nAs Judge Leonard Hand of the United States Court The Union of India of Appeals said of the American Constitutionand others \"The words a judge must construe are empty vessels into which he can pour anything he will\"."}}, {"text": "Union of India of Appeals", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32120, "end_char": 32145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nAs Judge Leonard Hand of the United States Court The Union of India of Appeals said of the American Constitutionand others \"The words a judge must construe are empty vessels into which he can pour anything he will\"."}}, {"text": "Patanjali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32485, "end_char": 32501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patanjali Sastri, C.J. said in The State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarlcar(1) that the reported decisions \"underline the futility of wordy formulation of so-called 'tests' in solving problems presented by concrete cases\"."}}, {"text": "Anwar Ali Sarlcar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32755, "end_char": 32772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I endeavoured to point out in my judgment in Anwar Ali Sarlcar's case(1) at page 361 that one can conceive of classifications that conform to all these rules and yet which are bad: classifications made in the utmost good faith; classifications that are scientific and rational, that will have direct and reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved and yet which are bad because despite all that the object itself cannot be allowed on the ground that it offends article 14.", "canonical_name": "Anwar Ali Sarlcar"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33183, "end_char": 33193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Fazl Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33427, "end_char": 33435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is the very point that Fazl Ali J. made in Anwar Ali Sarkar's case(1) at pages 309-310:\n\n. \""}}, {"text": "Anwar Ali Sarkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33447, "end_char": 33463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is the very point that Fazl Ali J. made in Anwar Ali Sarkar's case(1) at pages 309-310:\n\n. \"", "canonical_name": "Anwar Ali Sarlcar"}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34058, "end_char": 34062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bose J.\n\n1955 tion is quite evident one cannot challenge the Act\n\nBidi supply co. simply because it is couched in general terms; and one v. canndt also challenge the act of the executive auth- Th• Union of In4ia ority whose duty it is to administer th~ Act, becallSe\n\nandothm that authority will say:-!", "canonical_name": "BOSE"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35527, "end_char": 35537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35720, "end_char": 35730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36194, "end_char": 36204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36377, "end_char": 36403, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 526", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36625, "end_char": 36636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36730, "end_char": 36741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 527", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37037, "end_char": 37048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37108, "end_char": 37118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 38204, "end_char": 38215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have before us in this Court a case pending in which a transfer has been ordered from Calcutta in West Bengal to Ambala in the Punjab."}}, {"text": "Ambala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 38219, "end_char": 38225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have before us in this Court a case pending in which a transfer has been ordered from Calcutta in West Bengal to Ambala in the Punjab."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 38233, "end_char": 38239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have before us in this Court a case pending in which a transfer has been ordered from Calcutta in West Bengal to Ambala in the Punjab."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 39370, "end_char": 39377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "England has no fundamental rights as such and its Parliament is supreme but the liberty • of the subject is guarded there as jealously as the supremacy of Parliament."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 39420, "end_char": 39430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "England has no fundamental rights as such and its Parliament is supreme but the liberty • of the subject is guarded there as jealously as the supremacy of Parliament."}}, {"text": "Cental Board of Revenue", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 40493, "end_char": 40516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the legislature itself had done here what the Cental Board of Revenue\n\nhas done and had passed an Act in the bald terms of 1956 the o.rder mde here transferring."}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40686, "end_char": 40688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "British Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 42149, "end_char": 42167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson(2) the learned Law Lords were at great pains to see whether the British Parliament had in fact left the matter under consideration there to the subjective satisfaction of a Secretary of State. '"}}, {"text": "Bidi Supply Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 44867, "end_char": 44882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, no power resting on the subjective satisfaction of any of these bodies can ever be conferred; the satisfaction must always be objective in the sense\n\nBidi Supply Co. in which Lord Atkin explained so that its exercise is v. open to judicial review."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 44970, "end_char": 44984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union of India In my opinion, the power of transfer can .only be and others conferred if it is hedged round with reasonable restrictions, the absence or existence of which can in the last instance be determined by the courts; and the exercise of the power must be in conformity with the rules of natural justice, that is to say, the parties affected must be heard when that is reasonably possible, and the reasons for the order must be reduced, however briefly, to writing so that men may know that the powers conferred on these quasi judicial bodies are being justly and properly exercised.", "canonical_name": "Union of India"}}, {"text": "section 5(7-A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46296, "end_char": 46310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46326, "end_char": 46336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 64(5)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46369, "end_char": 46385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(7-A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46423, "end_char": 46437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1956_1_288_302_EN", "year": 1956, "text": "Ajwil S\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nSUKHA AND OTHERS\n\nti.\n\nTHE STATE OF RAJASTHAN.\n\n[VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHADAS a.nd\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR, JJ.]\n\n[1956]\n\nUnlawful Assembly- 11Common intention\" and \"Common object\" -Distinction-Duty of a Court of fact-Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 8!,, 149.\n\nCommon intention reqnired by s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code and common object set out under s. 149, though they sometimes overlap, are used in different senses and should be kept distinct. In a case under s. 149 there need not be a prior concert and meeting of minds, it is enough that each has the same object in view and their number is five or more and they a.ct a.s an assembly to achieve that object.\n\nWhen a crowd assembles and there is e.n uproar and people are killed and injured, it is only natural for others to rush to the scene with whatever arms they can snatch. Some may have an unlawful motive but others may not, and in such circumstances it is impossible to say that they were all motivated by a common intention with prior concert. What a court of fact should do in such a case is to find from the evidence which of them individually had an unlaw ful object in view, or having originally a lawful object in view developed it later on into an unlawful one and if it finds that there were five or more such persons who acted together there would be an un lawful assembly.\n\nConsequently, in a case where there were circumsta.nces from which the courts of fact could deduce that an unlawful object developed with more than fi\"e to share it after the fighting started and they were satisfied that it did, there was no reason why their con current decisions should be set aside.\n\nThis court will be slow to entertain a question of prejudice when details are not furnished; also, the fact that the objection was not taken at an early stage will be taken into account.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 133 of 1955.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 10th January 1955 of the High Court of Judicature at Jodhpur in Criminal Appeals Nos. 57 & 83 of 1953 a.rising out of the judgment and order dated the 26th May 1953 of the Court of\n\nSessions Judge at Merta in Criminal Original Case\n\nNo. 1 of 1952.\n\nJai Gopal Sethi, K. R. Krishnaswami and K. R.\n\nOhaw1hry for the appellants.\n\nPorus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, for the respondent.\n\n1956. April 5.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by BosE J.-Four persons were killed about ll p.m. on the night of the 21st July 1951 and a number of others injured. This was said to be the result of a riot that occurred in the village Dhankoli. Thirty six persons were committed for trial. Of these, two died during the course of the proceedings. The remainder were all charged under section 325/149 of the Indian Penal Code and eleven were also charged under section 302/149.\n\nThe learned Sessions Judge acquitted twenty five of the charge under section 325/149 and convicted nine. He acquitted all the eleven who were charged under section 302/149 but convicted nine of them under section 325/149.\n\nThe State did not appeal against the acquittals of the twenty five under section 325/149 nor did it appeal against the acquittals of two of the eleven who were charged under section 302/149 but it appealed against the acquittals of the remaining nine who had been convicted under section 325/149. These nine convicts also appealed. The High Court therefore had two appeals before it, one against the acquittals of nine persons under section 302/149 and the other by the same persons against their convictions under section 325/149.\n\nThe High Court dismissed the appeal of the convicts and allowed that of the State. The convictions of these nine persons were accordingly altered to ones under section 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code and the lesser sentence of transportation was given to each.\n\nIt is admitted on both sides that there was bad\n\nSukha and others v.\n\nThe State of Rajasthan\n\nSukha and others\n\nThe State of Rajasthan\n\nBose}.\n\nblood in the village Dhankoli between a caste known as Baories on one side and three other castes of the village namely, Jats, Dhobis and Khaties on the other.\n\nThe case for the prosecution is that this was due to a dispute over a field that belonged to some of the Jats. There were some court proceedings about the field in which ParS!ia (one of the Baories who was killed) had appeared against the Jats. The accused Sukha, Gumana, Begla and Govinda were in particular interested in this field and so bore a grudge against Parsia.\n\nThe defence also allege enmity. Their case is that the enmity is due to the fact that the villagers decided not to employ the Baories for watch and ward work in the village as they suspected that the Baories were responsible for certain thefts that had occurred there.\n\nThe other castes in the village therefore did this work themselves by turns. This was resented by the Baories and the allegation is that the Baories were responsible for the fight and attacked some of the others in the village and that that led to a fight; but none of the appellants was concerned with it.\n\nFrom this point it will be convenient to divide the narrative into a series of numbered steps.\n\nI. On the day in question, two of the Baories, Chhotiya and Parsia, had been to. a neighbouring village to bid at an auction where the field, which according to the prosecution engendered the dispute, was being sold.\n\nThey returned to their village about 11 p.m. and ran into the accused Sukha and Gumana (both Jats). They were challenged and when they disclosed who they were, Sukha and Gumana cried out \"kill them. They had gone for the auction of the field.\" On that Sukha fired a gun which he had with him and hit Parsia on the legs. Parsia fell down and Gumana hit him over the head with a sword. He also hit Chhotiya over the head with a sword and Chhotiya also fell down. 2.\n\nParsia and Chhotiya at once cried out for help and their cries, coupled with the sound of the gun fire, brought a number of persons to the scene. The\n\nnumber varies widely. Chhotia (P.W. 8) says 30 to 35, Ruga (P.W. 1) says 50 or 60, Bedu (P.W. 2) puts it at 30 or 40 and so does Lachhuri (P.W. 10), while Ladia (P.W. 11) thinks there were as many as 100 to\n\n150.\n\nThere are other estimates too, mostly in the neighbourhood of 30 to 40, but the exact number does not matter because it is evident that a crowd assembled. Those who did the attacking are said to have been about 30 or 40 but it is clearly proved that several Baories were there and that some of them were assaulted.\n\nThe point of stressing these facts is to bring out the fact that most of the persons there did not assemble for an unlawful purpose and so did not form an unlawful assembly. The problem is to\" sort out those who formed an unlawful assembly from those who did not. Mr. Sethi argued that there is no evidence to support a finding that there was an unlawful assembly because it is impossible to determine who came to attack and who did not. But we will deal with this later. For the present, we will conti~ nue our narrative outlining the prosecution case.\n\n3. After the gun was fired and Parsia and Chhotiya struck down, a large number of persons rushed to the scene and, among them, some 30 or 40 were armed with various kinds of weapons. Of these, Kamla, Balia, Todia and Bhawana (all Jats) had pharsies, Gumana, GovindaandJodhiya (alsoJats) had swords and the rest (Jats, Dhobis and Khaties) had lathis.\n\nThese persons also attacked Chhotiya and Parsia. 4.\n\nThe cries of Chhotiya and Parsia attracted Mana, Govinda, Pemla, Ram buxa and Gangli and some others. These persons are Baories. This crowd of 30 or 40 turned on Mana and Govinda and attacked them. Sukha then fired his gun a second time and hit Mana on his left hand.\n\n5. In the meanwhile, Ganesh and his wife Seruri (Baories) arrived and said \"don't beat, don't beat\".\n\nSukha and Gumana said that they should also be beaten and thereupon these 30 or 40 persons .started to beat them too and they fell down. 6.\n\nAfter this, Parsia's wife Lachhuri came there\n\nSukh a and others\n\nThe State of Rajasthan\n\nBose].\n\nSukha and othef's\n\nThe State of\n\nRajaslhan\n\nBose J.\n\nand some 10 or 11 persons out of the original 30 or40 started to chase her. But she ran away and managed to escape with only a slight beating. 7.\n\nWhile this was happening, the five Baories who had been felled to the ground (Parsia, Ganesh, Mana, Govinda and Seruri) started to cry out.\n\nThe ten or eleven who had chased Lachhuri came back and on hearing the cries of these five on the ground, Sukha and Gumana said that they were crying and should be killed outright. On that these eleven persons divided into three groups and attacked the five on the ground as follows: Parsia was beaten by Sukha (with a pharsi), Jeewana (dangri) and Chokla (dangri).\n\nMana and Govinda were beaten by Gumana (sword), Balia (pharsi) and Jankiya and Naraina (lathis).\n\nGanesh was beaten by Bhawana (dangri), Govinda. (sword), Kumla (pha.rsi) and Begla. (dangri).\n\nAll four died on the spot.\n\nThe accused were charged as follows.\n\nOne group consisting of 25 persons were charged under section 325/149 of the Indian Penal Code for intentionally beating, along with the other accused, 1.\n\nChhotiya.\n\n2. Seruri\n\n3. Parsia 4.\n\nMana\n\n5. Govinda and 6.\n\nGanesh.\n\nAt a later stage, the following sentence was added to the charge:\n\n\"which you inflicted as a member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of its common intention\".\n\nThese twenty five were acquitted and we a.re not concerned with them except to note that they were not concerned with that part of the occurrence which we have set out as steps 6 and 7 above.\n\nThe charge against the remaining eleven can be divided into two parts. Under the first, each, except Sukha, is charged with beating the Baories Parsia, Mana, Govinda, Ganesh, Chhotiya, Seruri, etc. \"a.long\n\nwith other accused\".\n\nFive of the eleven are said to\n\nhave beaten them with \"swords and lathis\"; another five \"with lathis, etc.\" while the eleventh, Sukha, is said to have fired at Parsia and Mana \"as a result of which they fell down\". Then each charge continues-\n\n\" and when all had fallen down as a result of these injuries\".\n\nAfter that the charges divide off into three groups: One group charges (1) Gumana, (2) Naraina, (3) Balia and (4) Jankiya with beating Govinda and Mana, \"who were groaning, with lathis with intent to kill them till they were actually killed\". The next group charges (1) Jeewana, (2) Sukha and (3) Chokhla with hitting Parsia with lathi blows \"with intent to murder him till he died\". The third group charges (1) Begla,\n\n(2) Govinda, (3) Kumla and (4) Bhawana with assaulting Ganesh with lathis with intent to murder till he died.\n\nThe following sentence was also added in the end of each of these charges:\n\n\"And you did this as a member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of its common intention\".\n\nThere has been some confusion in both the Sessions Court and the High Court between \"common intention\" and \"common object\". It is true the two sometimes overlap but they are used in different senses in law and should be kept distinct. In a case of unlawful assembly or riot we are concerned with a common object. However, we are satisfied that that has not caused any prejudice.\n\nBut the reason why we have set out these charges at some length is because counsel for the appellants argued that the prosecution case is that there were two separate assemblies, one of twenty five persons to beat six specific persons and another of eleven to kill them in three groups.\n\nHe argued that the twenty five who constituted the first assembly have all been acquitted; that the only material from which an unlawful assembly can be inferred in the other case is the instigation of Sukha and Gumana for a second time after they had returned from chasing Lachhuri. That story, he said, has been disbelieved, so all must be acquitted.\n\nIt will be necessary at this stage to set out the\n\nSukha and othef's\n\nThe State of Rajasthan\n\nBose/.\n\n1956 findings of the two lower courts.\n\nThe learned Ses- - sions Judge starts by rejecting the evidence of Ruga Sukhaandothers (P.W. 1), Bodu (P.W. 2) and Bhagwatia (P.W. 3) on\n\nThe s~:te of the question of identification of any of the accused Rajasthan and the evidence of Arjun (P.W. 4) about the conspiracy to beat up the Baories. But he finds that the Bose J. evidence of the Baori witnesses, Chhotiya (P.W. 8), Lachhuri (P.W. 10), Ladia (P.W. 11), Seruri (P.W. 12), Gangli (P.W. 13) and Pemla (P.W. 14) is consistent \"so far as these 11 accused are concerned regarding their beating 4 persons to death and causing injuries to Lachhuri, Ganesh's wife, Seruri and Cbbotiya\". Later, be states-\"From the evidence of these Baori witnesses,. .............. .it is found that these eleven accused were involved in the beating of the injured persons. Whether they formed part of a bigger assembly is not now material because I have already discussed the cases of other accused and given them benefit of doubt. These eleven accused even amongst themselves being more than five in number could be regarded as members of an unlawful assembly\".\n\nBut the learned Judge only accepted this story in part. HebelievedCbbotiya (P.W. 8), Seruri (P.W. 12), Gangli (P.W. 13) and Pemla (P.W. 14) in so far as they stated that Sukba bad a gun and that Sukba used it against Parsia and Mana, but be did not accept the evidence of Chbotiya (P.W. 8) in so far as he said that Gumana hit Chbotiya with a sword. He also rejected the prosecution version that the incidents occurred in two parts, first with a bigger assembly that beat all the accused and next with a smaller one that ran after Lachhuri and beat her and then returned to beat the others to death at the instigat.ion of Sukha and Gumana.\n\nOn this part of the case, the learned Sessions Judge found that\n\n\"whatever beating was done was done immediately after the scuffle between Cbhotiya and Parsia and Sukha and Gumana and Gumana and Naraina, and those accused who had arrived on the spot.\n\nNobody instigated anybody\". (Para 103).\n\nIt was argued on behalf of the defence that the learned Sessions Judge discarded the evidence about\n\ninstigation in toto. Counsel for the State, however, contended that this passage refers to the second instigation which is said to have been given after the eleven had chased and beaten Lachhuri and returned to finish off the others who were lying on the ground.\n\nWe think that is right.\n\nIn paragraph 101 of his judgment the learned Sessions Judge set out the fact that the prosecution witnesses divide the incidents into two parts: one in which a larger assembly beat all the injured persons and the other in which eleven killed the four deceased persons at the instigation of Sukha and Gumana.\n\nIn paragraph 102 he set out reasons why he was not able to believe this story. The first was because\n\n\"Ladia (P.W. 11) did not state in his statement before the police that after beating Lachhuri, when ten or eleven persons had returned then at the instigation of Sukha and Gumana the injured were again beaten to death\".\n\nThen, after setting out four more rea::; ons, the learned Judge reached the conclusion just enumerated in paragraph 103.\n\nIn paragraph 117 he said-\n\n\"Leaving Begla and Govinda, I am fully convinced that Sukha, Gumana, Naraina, Kumla, Balia, Jeewana, Chokhla, Bhawana Khati and Jankiya did commit rioting with the common object of beating the Baories\".\n\nIn paragraph 118 he said-\n\n\"I am not convinced that the intention of all these accused was to murder the whole lot of Baories ............ \"\n\nIn para 119-\"The accused did give sound beating to the injured\".\n\nHe concluded that no common object to kill could be deduced but held that a common object to beat was olear.\n\nAs he was unable to determine which accused gave the fatal blows he convicted all under section 302 read with section 149 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nWe think it is clear from this judgment, read as a whole, that the learned Sessions Judge disbelieved\n\nSukha and others v.\n\nThe State of Rajasthat1\n\nBose j.\n\nSukha and others\n\nThe State of\n\nl?.ajastliau\n\nBose J,\n\nthe story of instigation at any stage because if he had believed even the first instigation, a common object to kill would have emerged.\n\nWe are unfortunately not able to obtain much assi.stance from the judgment of the learned High Court Judges. They have not analysed the evidence and have not reached clear findings about a common object due in some measure to the fact that they d~ not appear to have appreciated the difference between a common object and a common intention.\n\nThey hold that six witnesses can be relied on to the extent that \"the villagers were armed with guns, swords, farsies and lathis\". They do not believe all that these witnesses say because they hold\n\n\"Though, therefore, we do not believe that these eleven persons deliberately murdered the four injured Baories who were lying there saying that they should be killed, there is no doubt in our minds that these eleven persons.who have all been mentioned by these six witnesses were certainly seen taking more active part in this incident\".\n\nThen they hold- . \"We are, therefore, satisfied on the statements of these witnesses that the incident took place in the main as stated by them and that the prosecution has given the right version of the affair\".\n\nNext, they hold that the fact that a large number of villagers, including the nine appellants, turned up armed with various weapons immediately they heard the quarrel between Chhotiya and Parsia on the one aide and Gumana on the other\n\n\"shows that there must have been some consultation from before and that these persons arrived in prosecution of the common ubject ............ \".\n\nAnd they add this reason:\n\n\"There is also the evidence o.f the prosecution witnesses that as the Baories came, some one or the other of these accused incited the rest of the villagers to beat up the Baories\".\n\nFrom this they conclude that there was an unlawful assembly with the common object of beating up the Baories.\n\nThis is very unsatisfactory. The learned Judges were dealing with an appeal against an acquittal and though they have allowed the appeal they liave not been specific about which part of the evidence they rely on in support of their findings, nor do their conclusions follow logically from the premises on which they are based.\n\nTake, for example, the finding about prior consultation. In the first place, no prior consultation is required when a common object is in question. The essence of the distinction between common object and common intention lies there. In the next place, the six witnesses, who are relied on, say that a crowd of 30 or 40 persons assembled. Among that crowd were Baories because three Baories (other than Parsia and Chhotiya) were killed and others injured. It is also evident that some of these Baories must have had some sort of weapons because three of the accused had slight injuries on their prson and one a fracture. The evidence discloses that there had been thefts in the village. The uproar occurred at 11 in the night.\n\nIn those circumstances, it would be natural for the villagers to rush to the scene and arm themselves with whatever came to hand. Some may have been motivated by an unlawful motive but many would not, and to deduce a common intention with prior concert in such circumstances is impossible. A common object is different and courts of fa.ct are entitled to conclude on the evidence that has been accepted that some of those who rushed to the scene went there with the object of beating up persons whom they thought to be thieves and not merely to apprehend them or defend their properties; in other words, that some of those persons individually had an unlawful object in view. If each had the same object, then their 9bject would be common and if there were five or more with this object, then they would form an unlawful assembly without any prior concert among themselves.\n\nNext, take the High Court's finding about incitement. They have rejected the version given by the prosecution wjtnesses because they hold that the\n\nSukha and oti1ers\n\nThe State of•\n\nRajasthan\n\nBose}.\n\nSukha and others\n\n•• The State of Rajasthan\n\nBo1eJ.\n\nstory about the second beating is an improvement and also because they disbelieve the evidence that indicates that these eleven persons deliberately murdered the four injured Baories.\n\nBut the only evidence about incitement is that Sukha and Gumana called on the-others to kill Barsia, and later to kill the others. The incitement was quite clearly to kill and not merely to beat. If this is rejected, then there is no evidence about incitement, so we are left in the dark to know what the learned Judges based their conclusion on. That has left us with the task of finding whether there is, or could be, any proper basis for these convictions.\n\nNow, as we understand the learned Sessions Judge, he has believed the first part of the story which we have set out as step No. 1 except the portion that speaks about an incitement to kill. He finds that there was the meeting between Sukha and Gumana on the one side and Parsi a and Chhotiya on the other.\n\nHe says-\n\n\"lt can safely be deduced from the incidents as related by th!l witnesses in this case that in the beginning the fighting was between a couple of persons only and on hearing their cries their relatives, friends and relations and other villagers reached the spot and\n\nsome of the villagers did beat the Baories\".\n\nPausing there, it is evident that there was no unlawful assembly when the beating started; nor can it be deduced that all the persons who rushed to the scene, whether the number was 30 or 150, formed an unlawful assembly. We therefore have to scan the evidence carefully to see what happened after that. The finding is that the eleven accused who were charged for the murder were all involved in the beating of the injured persons. That satisfies one of the ingredients of rioting, namely the presence of five or more person.a. But that of course is not enough. There must, in addition, be an \"assembly\" and that assembly must have a \"common object\" and the object must be \"unlawful\".\n\nBut a common object is different from a common intention in that it does not require prior concert and\n\na common meeting of minds before the attack, and an unlawful object can develop after the people get there. It is not for us to re-assess the evidence in special leave. All we can say is tha.t there are circumstances from which courts of fact could deduce that an unlawful object developed with more than five to share it once the marpit had started; and as two courts of fact a.re satisfied that it did, there is no reason for us to interfere. Persons who had come there quite lawfully, in the first instance, thinking there were thieves could well have developed an intention to beat up the \"thieves\" instead of helping to apprehend them or defend their properties; and if five or more shared the object and joined in the beating, then the object of each would become the common object.\n\nThis is not to say that all those present were members of that assembly. The presumption of innocence would preclude such a conclusion. Those who rushed to the scene in the circumstances disclosed must be presumed to have gone there for a lawful purpose even if they were armed. The apprehension of marauders who prowl the town at night and the defence of person and property are lawful objects. But when that object is exceeded and persons begin to beat up the suspects the a.ct of beating becomes unlawful, for priva.t.e persons are no more entitled to beat and illtrea.t thieves than a.re the police, especially at a time when there is nothing beyond suspicion against them.\n\nBut if five or more exceed the original lawful object\n\nand ea.ch has the same unlawful intention in mind and they act together and join in the beating, then they in themselves form an unlawful assembly. There is no difference in principle between this and a case in which the original object was unlawful. The only difference is that a case like this is more difficult to establish and must be scrutinised with greater care.\n\nBut that scrutiny is here and we are satisfied that there is evidence in this case on which courts of fact could base the conclusion that they have reached.\n\nNow, did these eleven persons constitute an assembly or were they there individually without any\n\nSukha and others\n\nThe State of\n\nRaja•than\n\nBose].\n\n795G\n\nSukha and others\n\nThe State of\n\nRajastlian\n\nBose J,\n\ncommon factor to link them together? That, we think, is easily answered. It is clear that each (barring Sukha and Gumana who were already there) assembled at the spot because of the cries of Parsia and Chhotiya and because of the noise of the fight. That imports a common factor into their meeting and links them together as an assembly. Their object in assembling may have been innocent but the fact that a common factor like this induced them to come together constitutes them into an \"assembly\" though not, on that evidence alone, into an unlawful assembly.\n\nWe next have to see whether any of them had an unlawful object in view. The object of Sukha and Gumana was clearly unlawful. Now the evidence which has been believed shows that the other nine actually joined in the beating and that they did this after Sukha had fired his gun at Parsia and Parsia had fallen to the ground. It also shows that these others turned on Parsia's relations and friends when they came to their support. Therefore, whatever the original object of each may have been, it achieved a unity of purpose the moment the others joined in and continued to assist Sukha and Gumana and helped them to beat up the other Baories who came to Parsia's help. It is not a case of stray sporadic acts but indicates a certain continuity of purpose, each striving to achieve the same end, namely either to help Sukha and Gumana in beating up Parsia and Chhotiya and those who came to help them or to join in the beating for ends of their own. But the commonness of purpose is an inference of fact which courts of fact would be entitled to make. It does not matter whether the others joined in because of an initial instigation or whether, seeing the assault in progress, they joined in on their own account, because so long as each had the object of beating up Parsia and Chhotiya and those who came to their assistance, that would make their object common.\n\nThe distinction between the common intention required by section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and the common object set out in section 149 lies just\n\nthere. In a case under section 149 there need not be a prior meeting of minds. It is enough that each has the same object in view and that their number is five or more and that they act as an assembly to achieve that object.\n\nAll these features are to be found in that part of the evidence which has been believed. Therefore, on these findings which the courts of fact are entitled to reach, the object of the assembly was unlawful, but up to this point the highest common denominator was merely to beat and not to kill. Up to that point, the convictions of the learned Sessions Judge under section 325/149, Indian Penal Code, are unassailable.\n\nThe next question is whether, that being the case, the convictions by the High Court under section 302/149 can be upheld.\n\nNeither the Sessions Judge nor the High Court believe that there was any common intention to kill, therefore the convictions for the more serious offence can only be sustained under section 149 if it can be shown (1) that an actual killing of some of the persons attacked was likely to result from the beating which formed the common object and (2) that each person so convicted knew that that might be a likely result.\n\nNow so far as Sukha and Gumana are concerned, there can be no doubt. They started the fight with deadly weapons. Sukha fired at least twice and hit two persons. He himself may not have had an intention to kill and indeed the fact that the wounds are on non-vital parts must be used as a factor in his favour, but any person who carries a fire arm at that hour of the night and uses it and then continues a fight after an excited crowd has assembled and when at least nine of them rush in to join in the beating after his first shot must know either that somebody is likely to deal a fatal blow or at least that the cumulative effect of blows inflicted by a number of persons armed with la this is likely to cause death from shock.\n\nRiots of this kind are common and death frequently results, therefore, not only was a killing a likely consequence of such an assault conducted in this fashion but Sukha and Gumana as men of ordinary intelligence must have known that.\n\nSukha and others v.\n\nThe State of Rajasthau\n\nBoseJ,\n\nStikha and others v.\n\nThe State of Rajasthan\n\nBose J.\n\nMuch the same considerations apply in the case of the other appellants. They rushed in to hit persons who had already been fired on and who had been felled to the ground.\n\nThey were in the midst of a crowd which could hardly have been calm and impassive and they joined in with several others to beat them up. Any man of reasonable intelligence would have known that somebody would be likely to be killed in a melee like that.\n\nTherefore, the requisite knowledge can be imputed to them also.\n\nTwo questions remain.\n\nOne was directed against the reliability of that part of the evidence that has been believed.\n\nThe argument, for all its repetition, length and eloquence, was the hackneyed one that when one part of a witness' evidence is disbelieved, it is unsafe to act on the rest of his testimony. The answer is equally hackneyed, namely that judges of fact have the right to do this and that this is not a court of appeal when it acts under article 136.\n\nThe findings about this are concurrent, so, following our usual practice, we decline to review the evidence.\n\nThe other is that the absence of this in the charge occasioned prejudice. We have recently decided that we will be slow to entertain question of prejudice when details are not furnished; also the fact that the objection is not taken at an early stage will be taken into account. There is not a hint of prejudice in the petition filed by the appellants here in the High Court for leave to appeal to this Court; nor was this considered a ground for complaint in the very lengthy and argumentative petition for special leave filed in this Court. The only complaint about prejudice was on the score that there was no proper examination under section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code. We decline to allow this matter to be raised.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed.", "total_entities": 126, "entities": [{"text": "SUKHA AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 48, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUKHA AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 92, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B. 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CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Distinction-Duty of a Court of fact-Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 210, "end_char": 263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 283, "end_char": 288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Distinction-Duty of a Court of fact-Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Distinction-Duty of a Court of fact-Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 327, "end_char": 332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Distinction-Duty of a Court of fact-Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Distinction-Duty of a Court of fact-Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 340, "end_char": 357, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 390, "end_char": 396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Distinction-Duty of a Court of fact-Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Distinction-Duty of a Court of fact-Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 503, "end_char": 509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Distinction-Duty of a Court of fact-Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Distinction-Duty of a Court of fact-Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Jai Gopal Sethi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2256, "end_char": 2271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jai Gopal Sethi, K. R. Krishnaswami and K. R.\n\nOhaw1hry for the appellants."}}, {"text": "K. R. Krishnaswami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2273, "end_char": 2291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jai Gopal Sethi, K. R. Krishnaswami and K. R.\n\nOhaw1hry for the appellants."}}, {"text": "K. R.\n\nOhaw1hry", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2296, "end_char": 2311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jai Gopal Sethi, K. R. Krishnaswami and K. R.\n\nOhaw1hry for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Porus A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2333, "end_char": 2347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokhale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2352, "end_char": 2365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "21st July 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2514, "end_char": 2528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BosE J.-Four persons were killed about ll p.m. on the night of the 21st July 1951 and a number of others injured."}}, {"text": "Dhankoli", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2631, "end_char": 2639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was said to be the result of a riot that occurred in the village Dhankoli."}}, {"text": "section 325", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2780, "end_char": 2791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2803, "end_char": 2820, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2856, "end_char": 2867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 325", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2943, "end_char": 2954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3030, "end_char": 3041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 325", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3079, "end_char": 3090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 325", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3170, "end_char": 3181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3271, "end_char": 3282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 325", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3377, "end_char": 3388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3530, "end_char": 3541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 325", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3612, "end_char": 3623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3790, "end_char": 3801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3813, "end_char": 3830, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "State of Rajasthan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3967, "end_char": 3985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is admitted on both sides that there was bad\n\nSukha and others v.\n\nThe State of Rajasthan\n\nSukha and others\n\nThe State of Rajasthan\n\nBose}.", "canonical_name": "State of•\n\nRajasthan\n\nBose}."}}, {"text": "ParS!ia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4368, "end_char": 4375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were some court proceedings about the field in which ParS!ia (one of the Baories who was killed) had appeared against the Jats.", "canonical_name": "ParS!ia"}}, {"text": "Sukha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4455, "end_char": 4460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The accused Sukha, Gumana, Begla and Govinda were in particular interested in this field and so bore a grudge against Parsia.", "canonical_name": "Sukha"}}, {"text": "Gumana", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4462, "end_char": 4468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The accused Sukha, Gumana, Begla and Govinda were in particular interested in this field and so bore a grudge against Parsia.", "canonical_name": "Gumana"}}, {"text": "Begla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4470, "end_char": 4475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The accused Sukha, Gumana, Begla and Govinda were in particular interested in this field and so bore a grudge against Parsia."}}, {"text": "Govinda", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4480, "end_char": 4487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The accused Sukha, Gumana, Begla and Govinda were in particular interested in this field and so bore a grudge against Parsia.", "canonical_name": "Govinda"}}, {"text": "Parsia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4561, "end_char": 4567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The accused Sukha, Gumana, Begla and Govinda were in particular interested in this field and so bore a grudge against Parsia.", "canonical_name": "ParS!ia"}}, {"text": "Chhotiya", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5291, "end_char": 5299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. On the day in question, two of the Baories, Chhotiya and Parsia, had been to.", "canonical_name": "Chhotiya"}}, {"text": "Parsia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5304, "end_char": 5310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. On the day in question, two of the Baories, Chhotiya and Parsia, had been to.", "canonical_name": "ParS!ia"}}, {"text": "Chhotiya", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5858, "end_char": 5866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also hit Chhotiya over the head with a sword and Chhotiya also fell down.", "canonical_name": "Chhotiya"}}, {"text": "Chhotia", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6100, "end_char": 6107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chhotia (P.W. 8) says 30 to 35, Ruga (P.W. 1) says 50 or 60, Bedu (P.W. 2) puts it at 30 or 40 and so does Lachhuri (P.W. 10), while Ladia (P.W. 11) thinks there were as many as 100 to\n\n150."}}, {"text": "Ruga", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6132, "end_char": 6136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chhotia (P.W. 8) says 30 to 35, Ruga (P.W. 1) says 50 or 60, Bedu (P.W. 2) puts it at 30 or 40 and so does Lachhuri (P.W. 10), while Ladia (P.W. 11) thinks there were as many as 100 to\n\n150."}}, {"text": "Bedu", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6161, "end_char": 6165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chhotia (P.W. 8) says 30 to 35, Ruga (P.W. 1) says 50 or 60, Bedu (P.W. 2) puts it at 30 or 40 and so does Lachhuri (P.W. 10), while Ladia (P.W. 11) thinks there were as many as 100 to\n\n150."}}, {"text": "Lachhuri", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6207, "end_char": 6215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chhotia (P.W. 8) says 30 to 35, Ruga (P.W. 1) says 50 or 60, Bedu (P.W. 2) puts it at 30 or 40 and so does Lachhuri (P.W. 10), while Ladia (P.W. 11) thinks there were as many as 100 to\n\n150."}}, {"text": "Ladia", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6233, "end_char": 6238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chhotia (P.W. 8) says 30 to 35, Ruga (P.W. 1) says 50 or 60, Bedu (P.W. 2) puts it at 30 or 40 and so does Lachhuri (P.W. 10), while Ladia (P.W. 11) thinks there were as many as 100 to\n\n150."}}, {"text": "Sethi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6876, "end_char": 6881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Sethi argued that there is no evidence to support a finding that there was an unlawful assembly because it is impossible to determine who came to attack and who did not."}}, {"text": "Kamla", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7356, "end_char": 7361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Of these, Kamla, Balia, Todia and Bhawana (all Jats) had pharsies, Gumana, GovindaandJodhiya (alsoJats) had swords and the rest (Jats, Dhobis and Khaties) had lathis."}}, {"text": "Balia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7363, "end_char": 7368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Of these, Kamla, Balia, Todia and Bhawana (all Jats) had pharsies, Gumana, GovindaandJodhiya (alsoJats) had swords and the rest (Jats, Dhobis and Khaties) had lathis.", "canonical_name": "Balia"}}, {"text": "Todia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7370, "end_char": 7375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Of these, Kamla, Balia, Todia and Bhawana (all Jats) had pharsies, Gumana, GovindaandJodhiya (alsoJats) had swords and the rest (Jats, Dhobis and Khaties) had lathis."}}, {"text": "Bhawana", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7380, "end_char": 7387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Of these, Kamla, Balia, Todia and Bhawana (all Jats) had pharsies, Gumana, GovindaandJodhiya (alsoJats) had swords and the rest (Jats, Dhobis and Khaties) had lathis.", "canonical_name": "Bhawana Khati"}}, {"text": "GovindaandJodhiya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7421, "end_char": 7438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Of these, Kamla, Balia, Todia and Bhawana (all Jats) had pharsies, Gumana, GovindaandJodhiya (alsoJats) had swords and the rest (Jats, Dhobis and Khaties) had lathis."}}, {"text": "Mana", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7610, "end_char": 7614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The cries of Chhotiya and Parsia attracted Mana, Govinda, Pemla, Ram buxa and Gangli and some others.", "canonical_name": "Mana"}}, {"text": "Pemla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7625, "end_char": 7630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The cries of Chhotiya and Parsia attracted Mana, Govinda, Pemla, Ram buxa and Gangli and some others."}}, {"text": "Ram buxa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7632, "end_char": 7640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The cries of Chhotiya and Parsia attracted Mana, Govinda, Pemla, Ram buxa and Gangli and some others."}}, {"text": "Gangli", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7645, "end_char": 7651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The cries of Chhotiya and Parsia attracted Mana, Govinda, Pemla, Ram buxa and Gangli and some others."}}, {"text": "Ganesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7857, "end_char": 7863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meanwhile, Ganesh and his wife Seruri (Baories) arrived and said \"don't beat, don't beat\".", "canonical_name": "Ganesh"}}, {"text": "Seruri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7877, "end_char": 7883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meanwhile, Ganesh and his wife Seruri (Baories) arrived and said \"don't beat, don't beat\".", "canonical_name": "Seruri"}}, {"text": "Lachhuri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8105, "end_char": 8113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After this, Parsia's wife Lachhuri came there\n\nSukh a and others\n\nThe State of Rajasthan\n\nBose]."}}, {"text": "Sukh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8126, "end_char": 8130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After this, Parsia's wife Lachhuri came there\n\nSukh a and others\n\nThe State of Rajasthan\n\nBose].", "canonical_name": "Sukha"}}, {"text": "State of Rajasthan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8149, "end_char": 8167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After this, Parsia's wife Lachhuri came there\n\nSukh a and others\n\nThe State of Rajasthan\n\nBose]."}}, {"text": "State of\n\nRajaslhan\n\nBose", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8200, "end_char": 8225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sukha and othef's\n\nThe State of\n\nRajaslhan\n\nBose J.\n\nand some 10 or 11 persons out of the original 30 or40 started to chase her.", "canonical_name": "State of•\n\nRajasthan\n\nBose}."}}, {"text": "Jeewana", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8846, "end_char": 8853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On that these eleven persons divided into three groups and attacked the five on the ground as follows: Parsia was beaten by Sukha (with a pharsi), Jeewana (dangri) and Chokla (dangri).", "canonical_name": "Jeewana"}}, {"text": "Chokla", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8867, "end_char": 8873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On that these eleven persons divided into three groups and attacked the five on the ground as follows: Parsia was beaten by Sukha (with a pharsi), Jeewana (dangri) and Chokla (dangri).", "canonical_name": "Chokhla"}}, {"text": "Balia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8933, "end_char": 8938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mana and Govinda were beaten by Gumana (sword), Balia (pharsi) and Jankiya and Naraina (lathis).", "canonical_name": "Balia"}}, {"text": "Jankiya", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8952, "end_char": 8959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mana and Govinda were beaten by Gumana (sword), Balia (pharsi) and Jankiya and Naraina (lathis).", "canonical_name": "Jankiya"}}, {"text": "Naraina", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8964, "end_char": 8971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mana and Govinda were beaten by Gumana (sword), Balia (pharsi) and Jankiya and Naraina (lathis).", "canonical_name": "Naraina"}}, {"text": "Bhawana", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9004, "end_char": 9011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ganesh was beaten by Bhawana (dangri), Govinda. (", "canonical_name": "Bhawana Khati"}}, {"text": "Kumla", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9040, "end_char": 9045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "sword), Kumla (pha.rsi) and Begla. ("}}, {"text": "section 325", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9198, "end_char": 9209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9221, "end_char": 9238, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Seruri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9314, "end_char": 9320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Seruri\n\n3.", "canonical_name": "Seruri"}}, {"text": "Parsia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9325, "end_char": 9331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Parsia 4.", "canonical_name": "ParS!ia"}}, {"text": "Mana", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9336, "end_char": 9340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mana\n\n5.", "canonical_name": "Mana"}}, {"text": "Govinda", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9345, "end_char": 9352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Govinda and 6.", "canonical_name": "Govinda"}}, {"text": "Ganesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9361, "end_char": 9367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ganesh.", "canonical_name": "Ganesh"}}, {"text": "Chokhla", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10563, "end_char": 10570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The next group charges (1) Jeewana, (2) Sukha and (3) Chokhla with hitting Parsia with lathi blows \"with intent to murder him till he died\".", "canonical_name": "Chokhla"}}, {"text": "Begla", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10678, "end_char": 10683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The third group charges (1) Begla,\n\n(2) Govinda, (3) Kumla and (4) Bhawana with assaulting Ganesh with lathis with intent to murder till he died."}}, {"text": "Govinda", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10690, "end_char": 10697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The third group charges (1) Begla,\n\n(2) Govinda, (3) Kumla and (4) Bhawana with assaulting Ganesh with lathis with intent to murder till he died."}}, {"text": "Kumla", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10703, "end_char": 10708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The third group charges (1) Begla,\n\n(2) Govinda, (3) Kumla and (4) Bhawana with assaulting Ganesh with lathis with intent to murder till he died.", "canonical_name": "Kumla"}}, {"text": "Bhawana", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10717, "end_char": 10724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The third group charges (1) Begla,\n\n(2) Govinda, (3) Kumla and (4) Bhawana with assaulting Ganesh with lathis with intent to murder till he died."}}, {"text": "Sukha", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12042, "end_char": 12047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It will be necessary at this stage to set out the\n\nSukha and othef's\n\nThe State of Rajasthan\n\nBose/.\n\n1956 findings of the two lower courts.", "canonical_name": "Sukha"}}, {"text": "Ruga Sukhaandothers", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12200, "end_char": 12219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Ses- - sions Judge starts by rejecting the evidence of Ruga Sukhaandothers (P.W. 1), Bodu (P.W. 2) and Bhagwatia (P.W. 3) on\n\nThe s~:te of the question of identification of any of the accused Rajasthan and the evidence of Arjun (P.W. 4) about the conspiracy to beat up the Baories."}}, {"text": "Bodu", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12230, "end_char": 12234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Ses- - sions Judge starts by rejecting the evidence of Ruga Sukhaandothers (P.W. 1), Bodu (P.W. 2) and Bhagwatia (P.W. 3) on\n\nThe s~:te of the question of identification of any of the accused Rajasthan and the evidence of Arjun (P.W. 4) about the conspiracy to beat up the Baories."}}, {"text": "Bhagwatia", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12248, "end_char": 12257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Ses- - sions Judge starts by rejecting the evidence of Ruga Sukhaandothers (P.W. 1), Bodu (P.W. 2) and Bhagwatia (P.W. 3) on\n\nThe s~:te of the question of identification of any of the accused Rajasthan and the evidence of Arjun (P.W. 4) about the conspiracy to beat up the Baories."}}, {"text": "Rajasthan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12337, "end_char": 12346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Ses- - sions Judge starts by rejecting the evidence of Ruga Sukhaandothers (P.W. 1), Bodu (P.W. 2) and Bhagwatia (P.W. 3) on\n\nThe s~:te of the question of identification of any of the accused Rajasthan and the evidence of Arjun (P.W. 4) about the conspiracy to beat up the Baories."}}, {"text": "Arjun", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12367, "end_char": 12372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Ses- - sions Judge starts by rejecting the evidence of Ruga Sukhaandothers (P.W. 1), Bodu (P.W. 2) and Bhagwatia (P.W. 3) on\n\nThe s~:te of the question of identification of any of the accused Rajasthan and the evidence of Arjun (P.W. 4) about the conspiracy to beat up the Baories."}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12449, "end_char": 12453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But he finds that the Bose J. evidence of the Baori witnesses, Chhotiya (P.W. 8), Lachhuri (P.W. 10), Ladia (P.W. 11), Seruri (P.W. 12), Gangli (P.W. 13) and Pemla (P.W. 14) is consistent \"so far as these 11 accused are concerned regarding their beating 4 persons to death and causing injuries to Lachhuri, Ganesh's wife, Seruri and Cbbotiya\"."}}, {"text": "Chhotiya", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12490, "end_char": 12498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But he finds that the Bose J. evidence of the Baori witnesses, Chhotiya (P.W. 8), Lachhuri (P.W. 10), Ladia (P.W. 11), Seruri (P.W. 12), Gangli (P.W. 13) and Pemla (P.W. 14) is consistent \"so far as these 11 accused are concerned regarding their beating 4 persons to death and causing injuries to Lachhuri, Ganesh's wife, Seruri and Cbbotiya\"."}}, {"text": "Seruri", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12546, "end_char": 12552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But he finds that the Bose J. evidence of the Baori witnesses, Chhotiya (P.W. 8), Lachhuri (P.W. 10), Ladia (P.W. 11), Seruri (P.W. 12), Gangli (P.W. 13) and Pemla (P.W. 14) is consistent \"so far as these 11 accused are concerned regarding their beating 4 persons to death and causing injuries to Lachhuri, Ganesh's wife, Seruri and Cbbotiya\"."}}, {"text": "Gangli", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12564, "end_char": 12570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But he finds that the Bose J. evidence of the Baori witnesses, Chhotiya (P.W. 8), Lachhuri (P.W. 10), Ladia (P.W. 11), Seruri (P.W. 12), Gangli (P.W. 13) and Pemla (P.W. 14) is consistent \"so far as these 11 accused are concerned regarding their beating 4 persons to death and causing injuries to Lachhuri, Ganesh's wife, Seruri and Cbbotiya\"."}}, {"text": "Pemla", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12585, "end_char": 12590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But he finds that the Bose J. evidence of the Baori witnesses, Chhotiya (P.W. 8), Lachhuri (P.W. 10), Ladia (P.W. 11), Seruri (P.W. 12), Gangli (P.W. 13) and Pemla (P.W. 14) is consistent \"so far as these 11 accused are concerned regarding their beating 4 persons to death and causing injuries to Lachhuri, Ganesh's wife, Seruri and Cbbotiya\"."}}, {"text": "Cbbotiya", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12760, "end_char": 12768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But he finds that the Bose J. evidence of the Baori witnesses, Chhotiya (P.W. 8), Lachhuri (P.W. 10), Ladia (P.W. 11), Seruri (P.W. 12), Gangli (P.W. 13) and Pemla (P.W. 14) is consistent \"so far as these 11 accused are concerned regarding their beating 4 persons to death and causing injuries to Lachhuri, Ganesh's wife, Seruri and Cbbotiya\".", "canonical_name": "Chhotiya"}}, {"text": "HebelievedCbbotiya", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13288, "end_char": 13306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HebelievedCbbotiya (P.W. 8), Seruri (P.W. 12), Gangli (P.W. 13) and Pemla (P.W. 14) in so far as they stated that Sukba bad a gun and that Sukba used it against Parsia and Mana, but be did not accept the evidence of Chbotiya (P.W. 8) in so far as he said that Gumana hit Chbotiya with a sword."}}, {"text": "Sukba", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13402, "end_char": 13407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HebelievedCbbotiya (P.W. 8), Seruri (P.W. 12), Gangli (P.W. 13) and Pemla (P.W. 14) in so far as they stated that Sukba bad a gun and that Sukba used it against Parsia and Mana, but be did not accept the evidence of Chbotiya (P.W. 8) in so far as he said that Gumana hit Chbotiya with a sword.", "canonical_name": "Sukha"}}, {"text": "Chbotiya", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13504, "end_char": 13512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HebelievedCbbotiya (P.W. 8), Seruri (P.W. 12), Gangli (P.W. 13) and Pemla (P.W. 14) in so far as they stated that Sukba bad a gun and that Sukba used it against Parsia and Mana, but be did not accept the evidence of Chbotiya (P.W. 8) in so far as he said that Gumana hit Chbotiya with a sword.", "canonical_name": "Chhotiya"}}, {"text": "Cbhotiya", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14012, "end_char": 14020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On this part of the case, the learned Sessions Judge found that\n\n\"whatever beating was done was done immediately after the scuffle between Cbhotiya and Parsia and Sukha and Gumana and Gumana and Naraina, and those accused who had arrived on the spot.", "canonical_name": "Chhotiya"}}, {"text": "Begla", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15346, "end_char": 15351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In paragraph 117 he said-\n\n\"Leaving Begla and Govinda, I am fully convinced that Sukha, Gumana, Naraina, Kumla, Balia, Jeewana, Chokhla, Bhawana Khati and Jankiya did commit rioting with the common object of beating the Baories\"."}}, {"text": "Govinda", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15356, "end_char": 15363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In paragraph 117 he said-\n\n\"Leaving Begla and Govinda, I am fully convinced that Sukha, Gumana, Naraina, Kumla, Balia, Jeewana, Chokhla, Bhawana Khati and Jankiya did commit rioting with the common object of beating the Baories\"."}}, {"text": "Gumana", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15398, "end_char": 15404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In paragraph 117 he said-\n\n\"Leaving Begla and Govinda, I am fully convinced that Sukha, Gumana, Naraina, Kumla, Balia, Jeewana, Chokhla, Bhawana Khati and Jankiya did commit rioting with the common object of beating the Baories\".", "canonical_name": "Gumana"}}, {"text": "Naraina", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15406, "end_char": 15413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In paragraph 117 he said-\n\n\"Leaving Begla and Govinda, I am fully convinced that Sukha, Gumana, Naraina, Kumla, Balia, Jeewana, Chokhla, Bhawana Khati and Jankiya did commit rioting with the common object of beating the Baories\".", "canonical_name": "Naraina"}}, {"text": "Kumla", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15415, "end_char": 15420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In paragraph 117 he said-\n\n\"Leaving Begla and Govinda, I am fully convinced that Sukha, Gumana, Naraina, Kumla, Balia, Jeewana, Chokhla, Bhawana Khati and Jankiya did commit rioting with the common object of beating the Baories\".", "canonical_name": "Kumla"}}, {"text": "Jeewana", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15429, "end_char": 15436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In paragraph 117 he said-\n\n\"Leaving Begla and Govinda, I am fully convinced that Sukha, Gumana, Naraina, Kumla, Balia, Jeewana, Chokhla, Bhawana Khati and Jankiya did commit rioting with the common object of beating the Baories\".", "canonical_name": "Jeewana"}}, {"text": "Chokhla", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15438, "end_char": 15445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In paragraph 117 he said-\n\n\"Leaving Begla and Govinda, I am fully convinced that Sukha, Gumana, Naraina, Kumla, Balia, Jeewana, Chokhla, Bhawana Khati and Jankiya did commit rioting with the common object of beating the Baories\".", "canonical_name": "Chokhla"}}, {"text": "Bhawana Khati", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15447, "end_char": 15460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In paragraph 117 he said-\n\n\"Leaving Begla and Govinda, I am fully convinced that Sukha, Gumana, Naraina, Kumla, Balia, Jeewana, Chokhla, Bhawana Khati and Jankiya did commit rioting with the common object of beating the Baories\".", "canonical_name": "Bhawana Khati"}}, {"text": "Jankiya", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15465, "end_char": 15472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In paragraph 117 he said-\n\n\"Leaving Begla and Govinda, I am fully convinced that Sukha, Gumana, Naraina, Kumla, Balia, Jeewana, Chokhla, Bhawana Khati and Jankiya did commit rioting with the common object of beating the Baories\".", "canonical_name": "Jankiya"}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15947, "end_char": 15958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15969, "end_char": 15980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15988, "end_char": 16005, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16157, "end_char": 16161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We think it is clear from this judgment, read as a whole, that the learned Sessions Judge disbelieved\n\nSukha and others v.\n\nThe State of Rajasthat1\n\nBose j.\n\nSukha and others\n\nThe State of\n\nl?.ajastliau\n\nBose J,\n\nthe story of instigation at any stage because if he had believed even the first instigation, a common object to kill would have emerged."}}, {"text": "State of•\n\nRajasthan\n\nBose}.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20260, "end_char": 20288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They have rejected the version given by the prosecution wjtnesses because they hold that the\n\nSukha and oti1ers\n\nThe State of•\n\nRajasthan\n\nBose}.", "canonical_name": "State of•\n\nRajasthan\n\nBose}."}}, {"text": "Sukha", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20290, "end_char": 20295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sukha and others\n\n•• The State of Rajasthan\n\nBo1eJ.\n\nstory about the second beating is an improvement and also because they disbelieve the evidence that indicates that these eleven persons deliberately murdered the four injured Baories.", "canonical_name": "Sukha"}}, {"text": "Barsia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20621, "end_char": 20627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the only evidence about incitement is that Sukha and Gumana called on the-others to kill Barsia, and later to kill the others."}}, {"text": "Parsi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21260, "end_char": 21265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He finds that there was the meeting between Sukha and Gumana on the one side and Parsi a and Chhotiya on the other.", "canonical_name": "ParS!ia"}}, {"text": "Sukha", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 24560, "end_char": 24565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now, did these eleven persons constitute an assembly or were they there individually without any\n\nSukha and others\n\nThe State of\n\nRaja•than\n\nBose]."}}, {"text": "State of\n\nRajastlian\n\nBose J", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24639, "end_char": 24667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "795G\n\nSukha and others\n\nThe State of\n\nRajastlian\n\nBose J,\n\ncommon factor to link them together?", "canonical_name": "State of•\n\nRajasthan\n\nBose}."}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26653, "end_char": 26663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26671, "end_char": 26688, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26722, "end_char": 26733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26768, "end_char": 26779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 325", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27336, "end_char": 27347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27353, "end_char": 27370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27482, "end_char": 27493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27696, "end_char": 27707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29956, "end_char": 29967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30718, "end_char": 30729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1956_1_28_42_EN", "year": 1956, "text": "The State of\n\nBombay\n\nR. S. Nanji\n\nlmamJ.\n\nJanuary 20\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1956]\n\nof the High Court is set aside.\n\nCosts in the appeal in this Court shall be paid by the appellant to the respondent as directed by the order granting Special Leave. Each party, however, will bear his own costs in the High Court.\n\nRAM CHANDRA PALA! AND OTHERS\n\nTHE STATE OF ORISSA AND OTHERS.\n\n(S. R. DAS, ACTING C.J., BHAGWATI, JAGANNADHA-\n\nDAS, B. P. SINHA AND JAFER IMAM JJ.]\n\nFundamental Bights, Infringement of-Acts creating virtual State monopoly in motor transport busine:s-Application of one Act to certain groups of owners and another to certain others operating different routes in different localities-If makes for discrimination and inequality-If restricts rights to hold property and practise trade and business-Notification terminating permits for taking over transp01t business, if confiscates property without cmnpensation-\n\nFreedom of inter-state and intra-state trade, if a fundamental right- Constitution of India, hts. 14, 19(1)(!) and (g), 31(2), 301, 305- 0rissa Motor Vehicles (Regulation of Stage Carriage and Public Carrier's Services) Act, 1947 (Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947), s. 4-0rissa Motor Vehicles (Amendment) A.ct, 1948 (Orissa Act I of 1949), s. 1.\n\nThe petitioners were owners of Stage Carriage Services holding permits under the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939.\n\nThe State Government of Orissa, in pursuance of its scheme of a Nationalised State Transport as contemplated by the Orissa Motor Vehicles (Regulation of Stage Carriage and Public Carrier's Services) Act of 1947 (Orissa Act XXXVI of 194 7) and Orissa Act I of 1949, which amended the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939, issued notifications under those Acts intimating the owners of different Stage Carriage Services operating different routes within the districts of Orissa that ,.. with effect from the 1st ol January, 1955, either the Orissa Road Transport Co. Ltd., or the State Transport Service, formed under the two Acts 1 would exclusively operate the said routes. The owners impugned the Acts as unconstitutional and violative of their fundamental rights. It was contended that the two Acts, whose provisions were materially different, discriminated against them and in favour of the aforesaid transport services as also in their arbitrary application to different zones and territories of the State and contravened Art. 14 of the Constitution. It was lurther contended that the provisions of the Acts and rules framed thereunder infringed Arts- 19(1)(f) and (g) by putting restrictions on the rights to hold property and to practise trade and business, that the Notifications\n\npurporting to take away their transport business amounted to con 1956 fiscation without compensation and infringed Art. 31(2) and lastly, that th~ impugned Acts violated freedom of inter-state and intra- Ram Chandra state trade guaranteed by Art. 301 of the Constitution.\n\nPalai and others\n\nHeld, that the owners of Stage Carriage Services operating The Stat:~/ Orissa a particular route or in a particular area formed a sepe.rate group or and others class by themselves and so long as each one of such a group or class was governed by the same Act and treated alike, there could be no discrimination. The Government was the best judge as to which of the two impugned Acts, or the Act of 1939 which they sought to amend, should, in its administrative convenience, be e.pplied to a particular locality or what mode it should follow for the implementation of its scheme and such zonal or territorial divisions it thought fit to make for that purpose according to different circumstances prevailing in different localities could not be held to be either discriminatory or violative of the equal protection of law.\n\nThat' the position of the permit: holders under the two Acts was not on a par, e.nd was materially different and they fell into two distinct classes and, consequently payment of compensation under one and non-payment under the other did not make for discrimination.\n\nThat the contention that the impugned Acts created a. monopoly in favour of either the Joint-Stock Company or the State by ousting the private Stage Carriage Services from the business and thereby infringed Art. 19(1)(f) was no longer tenable in view of Art.\n\n19'( 6) of the Constitution as a.mended by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act of 1951.\n\nSaghir Ahmad v. The State of U. P. ((1955] 1 S.C.R. 707), held inapplicable.\n\nBhikaji Narain Dhakras v. The State of Madhya Pradesh ([1955] S.C.R. 589), applied.\n\nThat the provisions of the impugned Acts could not be held to contravene Arts. 19(1)(f) and 31(2) of the Constitution as the Act of 194 7 did provide for compensation for premature termination and under the Act of 1949, renewal could not be claimed as a matter of right and any deprivation of proprietary right would be by authority of law.\n\nThat freedom of inter-state or intra-state trade guaranteed by Art. 301 of the Constitution is not one of the fundamental rights that can be enforced under Art. 32 of the Constitution and Art. 305 as a.mended by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act of 1955 was a complete answer to that contention of the petitioners.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petitions Nos. 604, 605, 647-649, 663, 671 and 692 of 1954.\n\nPetitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for.the enforcement of tundamental rights.\n\nRam Ch\"nd,.a\n\nS. P. Sinha, (R. Patnaik, with him) for the petitioners in P. Nos. 604, 605, 649 and 663 of 1954.\n\nPalaiandothers M. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, (Porus\n\nTh S I v\",, 0 .\n\nA. Mehta and P.G. Gokhale, with him) for the respon- • ta e o, r.ssa d t . )) th p . . and others en S Ill a e etit1ons.\n\n1956. January 20. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI J.-These petitions under article 32 of the Constitution are filed by the owners of Stage Carriage Services plying their buses on several routes in the districts of the State of Orissa impugning the provisions of Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 and Orissa Act I of 1949 as violative of their fundamental rights.\n\nThey raise a common question of law and can be disposed of by one judgment.\n\nThe State of Orissa embarked upon a scheme of Nationalised State Transport and, as a first step towards it, enacted an Act styled the Orissa Motor Vehicles (Regulation of Stage Carriage and Public Carrier's Services) Act, 1947 (Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947), which modified the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, for the better regulation of Stage Carriage and Public Carrier's Services in the Province of Orissa.\n\nThis Act envisaged the formation of a Joint-Stock Company in which the. Central and the Provincial Governments shall together have controlling interests for providing in stages or in one stage a more efficient administration of the {lntire stage carriage and public carrier's services in the Province of Orissa. Such a Company was to be authorised to run stage carriage and public carrier's services in the Province of Orissa to the exclusion of all other persons in the routes and areas over which it extended its activities, and with that end in view, the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, were modified as therein specified.\n\nSection 4 of the Act provided that the Provincial Government may, if they think fit, by notification direct that the powers conferred by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, on a Provincial Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority shall\n\nbe held in abeyance with respect to the issue, renewal, t956 suspension or transfer of permits for stage carriage Ram Chandra services and public carrier's services. Such a notifica- Palai and others tion was to be effective according to the directions v. either in the whole of the Province or in any speci- The State o/Orissa fied area or in respect of any specified route or routes. and others - _...\n\nOn the issue of such a notification, the abovemen- Bhagwatt J. tioned powers conferred on the Provincial Transport -\n\n- ..,\n\nAuthority or the Regional Transport Authority were to be held in abeyance and all permits issued, renewed or transferred by them were to become inoperative and the Provincial Government alone was to have the power to issue or renew permits or to grant temporary permits or to suspend or to transfer permits for stage carriage services and public carrier's services.\n\nWhilst the State of Orissa was examining the question of the formation of such a Company, the merger of feudatory States of Orissa with the Province of Orissa took place on the lat January, 1948. Some of these Durbars had their own transport services and these were taken over by the State Government of Orissa. Orissa was then divided into 5 zones for the purpose of proper development of road transport, viz., Sambalpur, Keonjhar, Koraput, Ganjam and Cuttack zones. It was decided by the Government to nationalise passenger service transport in the first three zones to be run departmentally based on the nucleus services taken over from the feudatory States which had merged. In order to give effect to this decision, the Orissa Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1948 (Orissa Act I of 1949) was enacted which further amended the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, in the manner therein specified. Section I (3) of that Act provided that the remaining provisions of the Act shall come into force in such specified areas of the district or districts as the Provincial Government may by notification from time to time appoint. The Provincial Government may also by notification with draw the remaining provisions of the Act from any specified areas. It was further provided that 011 and from the date when the remaining provisions of the Act came into force in any specified areas, the\n\n1956 provisions of Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 shall be repealed in respect of the said specified areas and Rarn Chandra Palai and others when the remaining provisions of the Act were withv. drawn from any specified areas, the provisions of TheStateofOrissa Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 shall be deemed to be\n\nand others revived in the said specified areas from the date of publication of the notification of withdrawal.\n\nL .. :.: BhagwaliJ.\n\nThe effect of these provisions was that in those areas or districts where a notification under section 4(1) of the Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 was not issued, the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, continued to apply; where such a notification was issued, the provisions of Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 came to • be applied except where, by virtue of the power reserved under section 1 of Orissa Act I of 1949, the remaining provisions of that Act were brought into force by a notification issued in that behalf, in which case the provisions of Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 were repealed in respect of the said specified areas and the provisions of Orissa Act I of 1949 became applicable. These were the three distinct sets of circumstances which would prevail at a given time after the enactment of Orissa Act I of 1949 according as the relevant notifications under section 4(1) ofOrissa Act XXXVI of 1947 or under section 1(4) of Orissa \" Act I of 1949 were issued bringing particular area or areas within the operation of the said respective Acts.\n\nWhereas a Joint-Stock Company in which the Central and the Provincial Governments were together to have controlling interests was envisaged in Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947, State Transport Service was envisaged in Orissa Act I of IU49 which defined State '\"\" Transport Service to mean . a service in which the Orissa State has entire or partial financial interest and which the Provincial Government may by notification declare to be a State Transport Service for the purposes of the Act. A Joint-Stock Company was accordingly formed in 1950 which was called the Orissa Road Transport Co., Ltd. The Transport Services which were run through the Joint-Stock Company were termed the \"Rationalised Services\". The\n\nServices which were run through the State Transport 1956 Service were termed the \"Nationalised Services\".\n\nRam Chandra In pursuance of the above scheme of Nationalised Palai and others State Transport, the State Government of Orissa v. issued notifications and press notes which gave in- Th• state ofOrissa\n\ntimation to the owners of Stage Carrier Services opeand othero rating on the several routes within the districts of BhagwatiJ.\n\nOrissa that with effect from the 1st January 1955 either the Orissa Road Transport Co., Ltd., or the State Transport Service will be operating the said respective routes. That was the occasion for the above petitions being filed by the owners of the Stage Carriage Services plying their buses on the said respectiv.e routes impugning Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 and Orissa Act I of 1949 as unconstitutional and void as aforesaid.\n\n . The petitions before us are not confined to the areas and routes where only Rationalised Services or Nationalised Services are contemplated to be introduced by the State Government. Petitions Nos. 604\n\nof 1954, 648 of 1954, 664 of 1954, 666 of 1954 and 671 of 1954 are concerned with the nationalisation of the services and the routes operated upon by the petitioners in those petitions are intended to be served by the State Transport Service. Petitions Nos. 605 of 1954, 647 of 1954, 649 of 1954, 663 of 1954 and 665 of 1954 are concerned with the rationalisation of the services and the routes opeated upon by the petitioners in those petitions are intended to be served by the Orissa Road Transport Co .. , Ltd. Petition No. 692 of 1954 is not clear whether the scheme to be put into operation by the State Government in the route operated upon by the petitioner therein is intended to be nationalised or rationalised. One thing, however, is common between all these petitioners that their permits under which they have been operating their buses upon those routes for the last several years are liable to be either terminated or cancelled or are not to be renewed under the scheme of Nationalised Road Transport Services and either the State Government or the Transport Authorities will grant the permits on those routes only to the Orissa Road\n\n1956 Transport Co. Ltd., or the State Transport Service as the case may be.\n\nRam Chantlra f ed k d Palal and others The provisions o the impugn Acts were attac e v. on the ground thattherewasdiscriminationin.favour Th• Slat• o/ 0,1 .. a of the State Transport Service and the Orissa Road\n\nand other• Transport Co. Ltd. It was urged that the State could - not discriminate against persons in its own favour as BhagwatiJ. well as in favour of the Joint-Stock Company formed for carrying on motor transport business as that would be a negation of equality guaranteed under article 14 of the Constitution. It was also urged that zonal and territorial discrimination in the application of the impugned Acts arbitrarily offended against article 14 of the Constitution. A further ground of attack was that the said provisions of the impugned Acts and the rules framed thereunder infringed article 19(l)(f) and (g) of the Constitution as they put restrictions on tile citizens regarding their rights to hold property and to practice trade or business. Article 31(2) was also alleged to have been infringed because the Gazette Notification of the State of Orissa purporting to take away the petitioners' motor transport business amounted to confiscation and the interests of the petitioners in a commercial undertaking \" were purported to be acquired without making any provisions for compensation. The impugned Acts, it was alleged, also violated the guarantee of freedom of inter-State and intra-State trade embodied in article 301 of the Constitution.\n\nOur attention was drawn to the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 and Orissa Act I of 1949 regarding the issue ~ and renewal of permits. Under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the Provincial Transport Authority and the Regional Tran11port Authority were invested with the requisite powers in this behalf. Sections 47 and 55 prescribed the matters to be considered by the Regional Transport Authority in considering applications for stage carriage permits and public carrier's permits and section 58 provided for the duraion and renewal of permits. So far as renewals of permits were concerned, it was provided that, other conditions\n\nbeing equal, applications for renewal shall be given 1956 preference over new applications for permits. When Ram Chandra a notification was issued under section 4(1) of Palai and others Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947, the powers conferred on v. the Provincial Transport Authority or the. Regional Th• State of Orissa Transport Authority by the Motor Vehicles Act, andothers 1939, were held in abeyance and the Provincial Government alone was invested with the power to issue Bhagwati J. or renew permits. In the granting or refusing to grant such permits, the Provincial Government was not bound to take into consideration the matters specified in sections 47 or 55 of the Mot.or Vehicles Act, 1939. The Provincial Government was also authorised by notification to cancel any permit granted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, without following the provisions of section 60 of that Act.\n\nThe only provision which was made in section 6 of Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 in this behalf was that when a permit became inoperative under section 4(2) or was cancelled under section 5 of that Act, compensation as therein prescribed was payable to such permit holder.\n\nSections 3 and 4 of Orissa Act I of 1949 added two further clauses to sections 47 and 55 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, viz.,\n\n\"(g) other conditions being equal, in the interest of proper co-ordination of transport facilities, the expediency of giving due consideration to a State Transport Service;\n\n(h) the necessity for preventing unhealthy competition in any route or routes or area on which the State Transport Service may ply;\"\n\nIt was pointed out that the whole scheme of Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 and Orissa Act I of 1949 was to oust the owners of stage carriage service from business and create a virtual monopoly in favour of the Orissa Road Transport Co. Ltd. or the State Transport Service and thus discriminate against persons in favour of the Joint-Stock Company or the State.\n\nEven though the Provincial Government was invested with power to issue or renew the permits which would become inoperative, under section 4(2) (b) of Orissa\n\n1956 Act XXXVI of 1947, that power woul true that the words \"sanction granted\" were not v. endorsed on the note but there can be no doubt that The State of Assam the initials were appended to the note by the Governor for no other purpose than for signifying his sanction to the introduction of the Bill in the Legislative Assembly. Moreover under section 109 of that Act, if there were no other defect vitiating it, the impugned Act could not be challenged as invalid by reason only that previous sanction was not given by the Governor to the introduction of the Bill. In our judgment the first reason urged in support of the contention that the impugned Act was not enacted according to law has no force and must be rejected.\n\nThe reasons (b) to (f) may conveniently be dealt with together. It will be recalled that after the Bill had been passed by the Assam Legislative Assembly on the 28th March, 1949, it was presented to the Governor under section 75 of the Government of India Act, 1935. Under that Act the Governor could do one of four things. He could in his discretion declare that he assented in His Majesty's name to the Bill or that he withheld assent therefrom or that he reserved the Bill for the consideration of the Governor-General or he could in his discretion return the Bill together with a message requesting the Chamber or Chamhers to reconsider the Bill or any specified provisions thereof. In this case the Governor in his discretion reserved the Bill for the consideration of the Governor-\n\nGeneral and forwarded the Bill to him.\n\nUnder section 76 of that Act the Governor-General could do one of four things, namely, that he could in his discretion declare that he assented in His Majesty's name to the Bill or that he withheld assent therefrom or that he reserved the Bill for the signification of His Majesty's pleasure thereon or he could, if in his discretion he thought fit, direct the Governor to return the Bill to the Cham her or Chambers of the Provincial Legislature together with such a message as was mentioned in the preceding section. What happened in\n\nDas C.J.\n\n19s6 this case is that, in view of the impending constitu-\n\nR . 8 -. b. tional changes, the Governor-General, on the 25th a7a haire endra J 1950 d h B' h G f Narayan Bhup anuary , returne t e ill to t e overnor o v.\n\nAssam advising him to reserve the Bill for the con- Tiie State of Assam sideration of the President. While the Bill was in transit and before it was actually received by the Das C.J.\n\nGovernor, which he did on the 28th January 1950, our Constitution came into force on the 26th January 1950.\n\nOur attention is drawn to article 395 of the Constitution, whereby the Indian Independence Act, 1947 and the Government of India Act, 1935 together with all enactments, amending or supplementing the latter Act but not including the Abolition of Privy Council Jurisdiction Act, 1949, were repealed.\n\nIt is pointed out that there was no saving provision in that article and consequently it was a total repeal of the enactments referred to therein.\n\nReference is made to the well-known observations of Tindal, C. J. in Kay v.\n\nGodwin(') and the dictum of Lord Tenterden, C. J. in Surtees v. Ellison(9) and to Craies' Statute Law, 4th Edition, pp. 347 to 348 and Crawford on Statutory Construction, pp. 599 to 600, all referred to by Faz!\n\nAli, J. in Keshavan Madhava Menon v. The State of\n\nBombay(') and it is contended that the effect of the repeal of the Government of India Act, 1935 was to obliterate that Act as completely as if it had never been passed and as if it had never existed except for the purpose of those actions commenced, prosecuted and concluded whilstit was an existing law. The Bill in question not having become an Act before the 26th January 1950 the same, it is urged, must be regarded as having been wiped out of existence by reason of the repeal.\n\nThere might have been a good deal of force in this con ten ti on had there been no other provision in the Constitution keeping this Bill alive.\n\nArticle 389 of the Constitution provides that a Bill which immediately before the commencement of the Constitution was pending in the Legislature of the\n\n(ll (1830) 180 E.R. 1403; 6 Bing. 576.\n\n(2) (1829) 9 B. & 0. 750, 762; 109 E.R. 278, 279.\n\n(8) [196\\) S.O.R. 228, 237 et seq,\n\nDominion of India or in the Legislature of any Pro- 1956 vince or Indian State may, subject to any provisions R 1 Bh-. b d h h• h b . l d d . l d a a a•re en ra to t e contrary w ic may e me u e m ru es ma e Narayan BhuJ> by Parliament or the Legislature of the correspondv. ing State under this Constitution, be continued in The State of Assam Parliament or the Legislature of the corresponding - State, as the case may be, as if the proceedings taken Das C.J. with reference to the Bill in the Legislature of the Dominion of India or in the Legislature of the Province or Indian State had been taken in Parliament or in the Legislature of the corresponding State. If, therefore, the Bill with which we are concerned was pending in the Legislature of Assam immediately before the commencement of the Constitution, then clearly it was quite properly continued in the Legislature of the corresponding State.\n\nTwo questions, therefore, arise, namely ( 1) whether at the commencement of the Constitution the Bill was pending at all and (2)· if it was, whether it was pending in the Legislature of Assam.\n\nAs to (1):-Section 30 of the Government of India Act, 1935 made provision for the introduction of Bills in the Chambers of the Federal Legislature and section 73 provided for the introduction of Bills in the Chamber or Chambers of the Provincial Legislature. Section 32 of the Act laid down provisions for presentation of the Bill passed by the Federal Legislative Chambers to the Governor-General and section 75 for the presentation of the Bill passed by the Provincial Legislative Chamber or Chambers to the Governor. Broadly speaking it may be said that a Bill begins to pend with its introduction in the Legislative Chamber and it ceases to pend-(a) when it lapses under section 73(4) or (b) when the Governor declares that he assents in his Majesty's name to the Bill in which case the Bill ripens into an Act or ( c) when the Governor declares that he withholds his assent therefrom, in which case the Bill falls through or (d) when being reserved by the Governor for the consideration of the Governor-General, the Governor- General acting under section 76 declares that he assents in HisMajesty's name to the Bill, in which case also\n\n1956 the Bill becomes an Act or (e) when, having been so\n\nR . 8~ b reserved by the Governor, the Governor-General dei:'aray::s~:~· clares that he withholds his assent therefrom, in which v. case again the Bill falls through or (f) when the Bill :rh• State of Assam having been reserved by the Governor-General for\n\nDas C.J. the signification of His Majesty's pleasure thereon under section 76(1), tbe Governor under section 76(2) makes known by public notification that His Majesty had assented thereto, in which case again the Bill becomes an Act and lastly (g) when no such notification is issued by the Governor within twelve months from the date on which it was presented to the Governor, in which event also the Bill comes to an end.\n\nIn short a Bill may be said to be pending as long as it does not lapse or it does not become an Act by receiving the assent by the appropriate authority or is not terminated by the withholding of assent by such appropriate authority. The contention of the appellant is that when the Bill under consideration had been, under section 76, reserved by the Governor for the consideration of the Governor-General and sent to the Governor-General and the latter did not declare his assent in the name of His Majesty to the Bill but sent it back to the Governor, the Governor-General must be deemed to have withheld his assent from the Bill. As already stated, under section 76, the Governor-General could have declared that he assented in the name of His Majesty to the Bill or that he withheld his assent therefrom, or that he reserved the Bill for the signification of His Majesty's pleasure or he could have returned it to the Governor for being presented to the Chamber for reconsideration but he could not do anything else. Therefore, his act of returning the Bill to the Governor with the suggestion to place it before the President was, it is urged, wholly unauthorised and amounted to his withholding his assent from the Bill.\n\nWe are unable to accept this argument a.ssound. The Governor-General knew that if he declared that he withheld his assent then the Bill would come to a termination and no further step could be taken in relation to that Bill. Therefore, when the Governor-\n\nGeneral returned the Bill to the Governor with the 1956 suggestion that the same Bill be reserved for the con- R . Bh-:- b d 'd t' f th p 'd t th G G l a1a aire en ra s1 era 10n o e res1 en , e overnorenera Narayan BhuJ> quite clearly evinced an intention that the Bill should v. remain alive, for otherwise there could be no question The State of Assam of further reservation of the same Bill for the consideration of the President.\n\nThe very suggestion of the further reservation of the Bill for the consideration of the President makes it impossible for us to hold, inferentially or fictionally, as we are asked to do, that the Governor-General had withheld his assent. It is clear on the facts that the Governor- General neither assented to, nor withheld his assent from, the Bill. His action may have been unconstitutional, but it cannot be regarded as amounting to a declaration that he was withholding his assent from the Bill, for the assenting to, or the withholding of assent from a Bill postulates a conscious and positive declaration that the assent is so given or withheld.\n\nThe suggestion that the Bill be reserved for the consideration of the President clearly militates against the view that the Governor-General had, positively or even tacitly, withheld his assent from the Bill. The very suggestion indicates that the Governor-General intended that the Bill should remain pending so that it could be reserved for the consideration of the President and receive his assent or dissent. In the premises it cannot be held that the Bill ceased to be pending by reason of the assent of the Governor- General having been withheld from it.\n\nIn our view, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the Bill was pending at the date when our Constitution came into force.\n\nAs to (2):-Learned counsel for the appellant then contends that even if the Bill was pending, it was certainly not pending before the Legislature of Assam.\n\nWhat, then, was the Legislature of the Province of Assam immediately before the commencement of our Constitution? This involves a consideration of the relevant provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935. The Government of India Act, 1935 was a statute passed by the British Parliament. The\n\nDas C.J.\n\n1956 Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain\n\nR . 8 -:- b and Northern Ireland consists of the Sovereign and a1a ha.re endra h h E f h R 1 1 h L Narayan Bhup t e t ree states o t e ea m, name y, t e ords v.\n\nSpiritual and the Lords Temporal, who sit together The State of Assam iI1 the House of Lords and the elected representatives of the people, who sit in the House of Commons.\n\nDas C.J.\n\nWhen a Bill is passed by both Houses of Parliament or is passed by the House of Commons in the manner provided by Parliament Act, 1911, it becomes ready to receive the Royal assent. No Bill passed by both Houses of Parliam&nt or in the last mentioned case by the House of Commons can become law and be entered in the Statute Book without the Royal assent.\n\nIt is thus clear that, according to British Constitutional theory, the Sovereign is an integral part of Parliament. This notion is reflected in sections 17, 55 and 56 of the British North America Act, with regard to the Canadian Parliament and sections 69, 71 and 90 of the same Act with regard to the Provincial Legislatures of that Dominion. The same idea was adopted in the Government of India Act, 1935.\n\nSection 18 of this Act, as it originally stood, provided for a Federal Legislature consisting of His Majesty represented by the Governor-General and two Chambers to be known respectively as the Council of States and the House of Assembly. Section 60 provided for a Legislature for every Province consisting of His Majesty represented by the Governor and in certain Provinces two Chambers and in other Provinces one Chamber. As already stated the Province of Assam had only one Chamber, the Legislative Assembly. The legislative procedure of the Chambers of the Federal Legislature was regulated by section 30 and of the Chamber or Chambers of the Provincial Legislatures by section 73 of the Government of India Act, 1935. Procedure subsequent to the passing of the Bill by the Legislative Chamber or Chambers was governed by section 32 with regard to Bills passed by the Chambers of the Federal Legislature and by sections 75 and 76 with regard to those passed by the Chamber or Chambers of the Provincial Legislatures.\n\nIt is true that section 18 of the Government of\n\nIndia Act, 1935 was adapted. as contemplated by 1956 section 9 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, but . 8 -. h d . f . 60 f h G Ra1a ha•rebendra t ere was no a aptat10n o sect10n o t e overn- Narayan Bhup ment of India Act, 1935 which dealt with the v.\n\nProvincial Legislature. From the language used in The State of Assam section 18, as it stood before its adaptation and in section 60, it is quite clear that it was His Majesty himself, who was really a constituent part of the Legislatures, Federal and Provincial, and that he was represented by the Governor-General in relation to the Federal Legislature and by the Governor in the case of the Provincial Legislatures. His Majesty being, thus, an integral part of the Legislature, Federal and Provincial, when a Bill passed by the Chambers of the Federal Legislature or by the Chamber or Chambers of Provincial Legislatures, was presented to the Governor-General or the Governor under section 32 or sections 75 and 76 of that Act, the Legislative process went on and unless and until assent was given or withheld by the Governor-General or the Governor in the name of His Majesty there could be no escape from the position that in law and in reality the Bill was pending before His Majesty, for the Governor-General or the Governor was, under that Act, merely the agent representing His Majesty, who was an integral part of the Legislature. This was made clear by the provision that when the Gevernor-General or the Governor declared that he assented or that he withheld his assent, such declaration had to be made in the name of His Majesty.\n\nTherefore, whether the Bill was in the hands of the Governor or in the hands of the Governor-General or was in transit between the one and the other on either way, it must be taken to have been pending before His Majesty and, therefore, before the Legislature.\n\nThe declaration giving or withholding assent was undoubtedly a continuation of the legislative process and until such declaration was made by the appropriate agency in the name of His Majesty obviously the Bill was pending and where, in law and in reality, could it at that stage be pending except before His Majesty as an integral part of the Legislature? Such\n\nDas C.J.\n\n1956 being the position under article 389 read with the re-\n\nR . -. b levant provisions of the Government of India Act, a1aBhaore endra h d •t th\" B\"Jj Jd J b Narayan Bhup as we appre en\n\nI , IS 1 cou proper y e conv. tinuedin the Legislature of Assam after the commence- Th• State of Assam ment of our Constitution.\n\nUnder article 168 of\n\nDas C.J. our Constitution every State has a Legislature consisting of the Governor and in certain States two Houses and in other States, which include Assam, one House. The Bill having been passed by the Legislative Assembly of Assam before the commencement of the Constitution, all that was required to be done under the Constitution was to continue the legislative process-under article 200. It was, therefore, competent for the Governor of Assam to reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President and it was in order for the President, under article 201, to direct the Governor to return the Bill to the Legislative Assembly of the State together with the requisite message and it was quite proper for the Legislative Assembly, when the Bill was so returned, to consider it accordingly. It follows, therefore, that when the Bill was again passed by the Legislative Assembly of Assam, it was proper to represent the Bill to the President for his consideration and it was open to the President to give his assent to the amended Bill, as he, in fact, did.\n\nReliance is placed by learned counsel for the appellant on article 31(4) and to a passage in the Judgment of this court in Visweshwar Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh(') and it is contended that the word \"Legislature'', which occurs both in article 31(4) and article 389 means only the Chamber or Chambers of the Legislature and not the Governor or the Governor-General. We need not discuss the larger question as to the correct interpretation of the word \"Legislature\" as occurring in article 31(4) and suffice it to say that the very passage relied on by learned counsel makes it quite clear that the word \"Legislature\" is used in different senses in different articles and may be in different senses in different places in the same article and its meaning has to be ascertained\n\n(1) [1952] S.C.R. 1020, 103,.\n\n1956 keeping in view the subject or the context. In Tiew of the provisions of sections 18, 30 and 32 and sec- . ; 7 d 76 f h G f J d\" Raja Bhairebe11dra t10ns 60, 73, 5 an o t e overnment o n Ia Narayan Bhu:P Act, 1935 to which reference has been made, we are v. clearly of opinion that the word \"Legislature\" has The state of Assam been used in article 389 in the larger sense, namely, comprising all the units that were concerned in the entire legislative process and included His Majesty represented by the Governor-General or the Governor, as the case might be.\n\nWe find no reason to think that our Constitution intended only to keep alive the Bills which were actually pending before the Legislative Chamber or Chambers but not those which having been passed by the Legislative Chamber or Chambers had been presented to the Governor-General or the Governor and were undergoing the final legislative process and awaiting the assent of His Majesty represented by the Governor-General or Governor, as the case might be.\n\nWe are, therefore, of opinion, although for different reasons, that the High Court properly answered the first part of issue (1).\n\nRe. issue (2):-The Act having been properly passed by the Legislature of Assam, the Government of Assam was well within their rights under section 3 of the Act to declare that the estates of the tenure holders specified in the Notification vested in the State free from all encumbrances. There is no suggestion that the properties of Sm. Beda Bala Devi, the plaintiff in 'I'. S. No. 3 of 1955, were not \"estates\" within the meaning of the Act and accordingly the High Court has correctly decided this issue in favour of the State, so far as that plaintiff is concerned. The Raja, the plaintiff in T. S. No.' 1 of 1955, however, raised the contention that his properties were not \"estates\" as defined in the Act and that being the subject matter of issue ( 4), this aspect of issue (2) was also left open until the decision of issue (4). As the High Court has sent down the suit to the court of Subordiate Judge for disposal and determination of other issues, the final answer to issue (2), as regards the Raja, will depend on the determination of issue\n\n(4) and must until then be kept open.\n\nDas C.J.\n\n1956 Re. issue (3):-The Act and its amendments are - challenged on the ground that they infringe the funda-\n\nR\"f;:,~';.:'!~:J, ra mental rights of the plaintiff under article 31 (2) and v. article 14 of the Constitution. If, however, the legis- The State of Assam lation is protected under article 31-A of the Constitution then the question of infringement of funda- Das C.J. mental rights of the plaintiff under articles 31 (2) and 14willnot arise. Article 31(4) protects an Act falling within it only against the contravention of the provisions of clause (2) of that article but not of those of article 14. Article 31-A, however, protects an Act falling within it even if it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by the provisions of Part III. It is obvious, therefore, that article 31-A gives greater and wider protection than does article 31(4). If, therefore, article 31-A applies no question can arise under article 31 (2) or article 14 and in that case article 31(4) need not be invoked at all.\n\nWhat is protected by article 31-A is a law providing for the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or for the extinguishment or modification of any such rights. There is no question that the impugned Act, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has in fact received his assent and, therefore, the proviso to article 31-A does not come into play.\n\nThe only question then is-is the impugned Act a law providing for the acquisition of an estate or any rights therein? The expression \"estate\" in relation to any local area, has been made by clause (2) (a) of this article, to have the same meaning as that expression or its local equivalent has in the existing law relating to land tenures in force in that area.\n\nThe preamble to the impugned Act recites the expediency of providing for the acquisition by the State of the interests of proprietors and tenure-holders and certain other interests in the permanently settled areas and certain other estates in the districts of Goalpara, Garo Hills and Cachar in the State of Assam including their interests in forests, fisheries, hats, bazars and ferries, mines and minerals. Section\n\n3 of that Act authorizes the State Government to t9S6 dsclare, from time to time, by Notifications that the R . Bh-. b a . a7a atre en ra estate or tenure of a proprietor or tenure-holder spe- Narayan Bhup cified in the Notification shall stand transferred to v. and vest in the State free from all encumbrances. The State of Assam Section 4 lays down the consequences that are to follow. It is thus clear that the Act purports to be a law for the acquisition by the1 State of estates or tenures.\n\nThe word \"estate\" as defined in section 2(k) means lands included under one entry in any of the general registers of revenue paying and revenuefree lands prepared and maintained under the law for the time being in force by the Deputy Commissioner and includes revenue-free lands not entered in any register.\n\nUnder the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation (Reg. I of 1886) the Deputy Commissioner of every district is, by section 48, enjoined to prepare and keep in the prescribed form and manner a general register of revenue-paying estates, a general register of revenue-free estates and such other registers as the Government may direct.\n\nSection 49 provides that until such registers are prepared the Government may direct that the existing registers kept by or under the control of the Deputy Commissioner shall be deemed to be registers prepared under section 48. It will be noticed that what are to be entered in the general registers are revenue-paying or revenue-free estates. The word \"estate\" is defined by section 3(b) to include six kinds of lands described in the six' clauses therein set out. This definition does not purport to be an exhaustive definition of \"estate\" but only includes certain enumerated items within the meaning of that expression. The word \"estate\" is defined in the Goalpara Tenancy Act (Assam Act I of 1929) exactly in the same way as it is defined in the impugned Act, namely, as meaning lands included under one entry in any of the General Registers of revenue-paying or revenue-free lands prepared and maintained by the Deputy Commissioner. The properties of both the plaintiffs appellants are and have been in point of fact entered in the General Register. An \"estate\" within the meaning of the\n\nDas C.J.\n\n1956 Assam Land and Revenue Regulation I of 1886 is also\n\nR . Bh-:- b 4 ail \"estate\" within the meaning of the Goalpara a1a aJre en ra T A (A I f l .\n\nNarayan Bhuf> enancy ct ct o 929) and of the impugned Act. ...\n\nThe impugned Act, therefore, is a law providing for The State of Assam the acquisition by the State of an \"estate\" within the\n\nDas C./. meaning of article 31-A and, that being so, its constitutionality or validity cannot be questioned on the ground of any cont; avention of any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution dealing with fundamental rights. There is no dispute that the lands comprised in the trust estate of Sm. Beda Bala Devi, the plaintiff in T. S. No. 3 of 1955 is an \"estate\" as defined in each of the aforesaid statutes including the impugned Act. The question whether the amount paid by the Raja, the plaintiff in T. S. No. 1 of 1955, is revenue or tribute, whether his properties have been from before 1886 entered properly in the General Register of revenue-paying estate and whet.her such properties come within the operation of the impugned Act, are the subject matter of issue (4), but those questions have no bearing on the question whether the impugned Act is entitled to the protection of article 31-A. If the plaintiff Raja's properties are not \"estate\" as defined in the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation or the Goalpara Tenancy Act or the impugned Act, then the Notification under section 3 of the impugned Act will not affect him but that will be, not because the impugned Act is not a law providing for the State acquisition of an. \"estate\" but, bees.use the Raja's .properties are not \"estates\" within the purview of the impugned Act. The fact\n\nthat the definition of \"estate\" in the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation is only an inclusive and not an exhaustive definition, that the Raja's properties have been in fact entered in the General Register of revenue-paying lands and that the lands falling within any of the six categories enumerated in section 3(b) of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation will certainly fall within the wider ambit of the definition of \"estate\" given in the impugned Act cannot be overlooked. The impugned Act is nonetheless a law providing for State acquisition of \"estate\" even if its\n\ndefinition of \"estate\" comprises something more than 1956 what is comprised in the six categories included with- - in that term in section 3(b) of the Assam Land and RaNJa,.BhaireBbehnra R R l , f I . d h a a; yan u,,, evenue egu at10n o 1886. n our JU gment t e v. impugned Act is fully protected by article 31-A.\n\nThe State of Assam In the view we have taken on article 31-A, it is unnecessary to discuss the question of the applicability Das C.J. of article 31(4).\n\nWe have, however, to touch very briefly a few subsidiary points urged before us.\n\nIt has been said that the impugned Act constitutes a colourable exercise of legislative power, for while it purports to specify the principles on which and the manner in which the compensation is to be determined and given, it actually makes provisions which result in illusory compensation or no compensation at all.\n\nThe doctrine of colourable legislation is relevant only in connection with the question of legislative competency as explained by this Court in K. 0.\n\nGajapati Narain Deb v. State of Orissa(1). Here there is no question of any legislative incompetency. The gravamen of the present complaint is as tot.he quantum of compensation, which, in view of the article 31-A, cannot be raised.\n\nReference has been made to section 11 of the impugned Act according to which in the computation of the gross income is to be included the gross rent payable by the tenant immediately subordinate, for the agricultural years preceding the date of vesting. It is argued that the Act is vague and indefinite, because of the use of the word \"years\" in plural. The High Court has given cogent reasons, with which we agree, for holding that the word \"years\" in the plural has been retained in the Act by mistake or oversight and it should be read in the singular. Moreover, the Act has since been amended retrospectively by section 4 of Assam Act V of 1956 and the question does not arise.\n\nThe Act is also impugned on the ground of discrimination, which offends article 14 of the Constitution. This question again is not open to the appellant in view of our decision on article 31-A. Further\n\n(1) (1954] S.O.R. 1: A.LR. 1953 S 0. 375.\n\n1956 article 14 does not really help the appellant.\n\nIt 'is\n\nR . . b d said that the State can pick and choose the estate of a1a Bha.re en ra • d d 1 h f h ' f ' Narayan BhuJ> one zam1.n ar an eave out t ose o t e1r avounte v. ones, as mdeed they have since done by withdrawing Tlic State of Assam the Notification with respect to Gouripore and Prabatjoar estates. There is no force in this conten- Das C.J. tion in view of the decisions of this court in Biswambhar Singh v. The State of Orissa and others(') and Thakur Amar Singh v. State of Rajasthan(•).\n\nIt is said that the Act only applies to some Lakheraj estates, that is to say, Lakheraj estates within the boundaries of a permanently settled estate but not to other Lakheraj estates. The acquisition of Lakheraj estates within the boundaries of permanently settled estates clearly facilitates the object of acquiring permanently settled areas and such Lakheraj estates within the boundaries of permanently settled estates constitute a class distinct from other Lakheraj estates not so situate and, therefore, the charge of discrimination cannot, in view of the principles laid down by this court, apply to the impugned Act.\n\nLastly it is said that there is discrimination because of different scales of compensation which have been prescribed for different estates. It is not difficult to find a rational basis for such classification of proprietors of different income groups.\n\nWe need not, however, dilate on this point, for we have already held that the Act is not open to challenge on the ground of contravention of any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution.\n\nThere was in the Raja's T. S. No. I of 1955, a prayer for injunction restraining the State from taking possession of his estate.\n\nThe High Court has rejected that prayer on grounds which appear to us to be quite cogent and convincing and as we see no substantial risk of irreparable loss to the Raja we do not consider it right to reverse even that order of the High Court.\n\nFor reasons stated above both these appeals are dismissed with costs. As the two appeals were heard together there will be one set of costs of hearing to be apportioned equally between the two appellants.\n\n(I) [1954) S.C.R. 842.\n\n{2) [1966) 2 S.C.R. SOS, 816.", "total_entities": 204, "entities": [{"text": "303\n\nRAJA BHAIREBENDRA NARAYAN BHUP", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 65, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "303\n\nRAJA BHAIREBENDRA NARAYAN BHUP", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF ASSAM", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 85, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF ASSAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112, "end_char": 127, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 129, "end_char": 137, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. 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"end_char": 6141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Raja BhairebendM That the Act", "statute": "Raja BhairebendM That the Act"}}, {"text": "[1955) 2 S.C.R. 303", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6492, "end_char": 6511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 132", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7217, "end_char": 7228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "P. 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J.-It is intended by this judgment to dis- •· pose of both the appeals mentioned above."}}, {"text": "State of Assam", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7871, "end_char": 7885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ap- The State of Assam peals have come up before us in circumstances which may shortly be recounted."}}, {"text": "Raja Bhairabendra Narain Bhup", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8000, "end_char": 8029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 6th December 1954 the appellant Raja Bhairabendra Narain Bhup of Bijni filed T. S. 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S. No.", "canonical_name": "Beda Bala Devi"}}, {"text": "Raja", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11244, "end_char": 11248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the Raja, the plaintiff in T.S. 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Notification was published in the Assam Gazette under section 3(1) of the impugned Act declaring that the properties therein mentioned, including the properties which formed the subjectmatter of the two suits would vest in the State free from all encumbrances with effect from the 15th April 1955."}}, {"text": "section 299(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15485, "end_char": 15499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Assam Act VI of\n\n1954", "statute": "Assam Act VI of\n\n1954"}}, {"text": "Governor-General under Tlw State of Assam the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16276, "end_char": 16351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Das C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16421, "end_char": 16429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "erea er avmg een reserve v. for the consideration of the Governor-General under Tlw State of Assam the Government of India Act, 1935 and the Governor- General not having taken any constitutional action Das C.J. in respect of it, as prescribed by that Act up to the time that Act was operating, the Bill lapsed on the repeal of the Government of India Act, 1935 and the promulgation of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "Bill lapsed on the repeal of the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16517, "end_char": 16579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16970, "end_char": 16981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bill lapsed on the repeal of the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Bill lapsed on the repeal of the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16989, "end_char": 17018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 299(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18152, "end_char": 18166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18174, "end_char": 18203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Narayan BhuJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18439, "end_char": 18451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "t IS Narayan BhuJ> true that the words \"sanction granted\" were not v. endorsed on the note but there can be no doubt that The State of Assam the initials were appended to the note by the Governor for no other purpose than for signifying his sanction to the introduction of the Bill in the Legislative Assembly.", "canonical_name": "Narayan BhuJ"}}, {"text": "section 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18760, "end_char": 18771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Assam Legislative Assembly", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19268, "end_char": 19294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It will be recalled that after the 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"metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tindal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21526, "end_char": 21532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference is made to the well-known observations of Tindal, C. J. in Kay v.\n\nGodwin(') and the dictum of Lord Tenterden, C. J. in Surtees v. Ellison(9) and to Craies' Statute Law, 4th Edition, pp."}}, {"text": "Tenterden", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21584, "end_char": 21593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reference is made to the well-known observations of Tindal, C. J. in Kay v.\n\nGodwin(') and the dictum of Lord Tenterden, C. J. in Surtees v. Ellison(9) and to Craies' Statute Law, 4th Edition, pp."}}, {"text": "Faz!\n\nAli", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21757, "end_char": 21766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "599 to 600, all referred to by Faz!"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21881, "end_char": 21910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 389", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22444, "end_char": 22455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22950, "end_char": 22960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l d a a a•re en ra to t e contrary w ic may e me u e m ru es ma e Narayan BhuJ> by Parliament or the Legislature of the correspondv."}}, {"text": "Assam Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23064, "end_char": 23080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ing State under this Constitution, be continued in The State of Assam Parliament or the Legislature of the corresponding - State, as the case may be, as if the proceedings taken Das C.J. with reference to the Bill in the Legislature of the Dominion of India or in the Legislature of the Province or Indian State had been taken in Parliament or in the Legislature of the corresponding State."}}, {"text": "Section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23838, "end_char": 23848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23856, "end_char": 23885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23978, "end_char": 23988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24086, "end_char": 24096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 75", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24229, "end_char": 24239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 73(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24502, "end_char": 24515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24879, "end_char": 24889, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 76(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25351, "end_char": 25364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 76(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25385, "end_char": 25398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26033, "end_char": 26043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 76", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26368, "end_char": 26378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27361, "end_char": 27363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Narayan BhuJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27401, "end_char": 27413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bh-:- b d 'd t' f th p 'd t th G G l a1a aire en ra s1 era 10n o e res1 en , e overnorenera Narayan BhuJ> quite clearly evinced an intention that the Bill should v. remain alive, for otherwise there could be no question The State of Assam of further reservation of the same Bill for the consideration of the President.", "canonical_name": "Narayan BhuJ"}}, {"text": "This involves a consideration of the relevant provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29246, "end_char": 29339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29345, "end_char": 29374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "British Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29403, "end_char": 29421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of India Act, 1935 was a statute passed by the British Parliament."}}, {"text": "sections 17, 55 and 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30341, "end_char": 30363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "When a Bill is passed by both Houses of Parliament or is passed by the House of Commons in the manner provided by Parliament Act, 1911", "statute": "When a Bill is passed by both Houses of Parliament or is passed by the House of Commons in the manner provided by Parliament Act, 1911"}}, {"text": "sections 69, 71 and 90", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30441, "end_char": 30463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "When a Bill is passed by both Houses of Parliament or is passed by the House of Commons in the manner provided by Parliament Act, 1911", "statute": "When a Bill is passed by both Houses of Parliament or is passed by the House of Commons in the manner provided by Parliament Act, 1911"}}, {"text": "same idea was adopted in the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30545, "end_char": 30603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30606, "end_char": 30616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The same idea was adopted in the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "The same idea was adopted in the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Section 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30845, "end_char": 30855, "source": "regex", "metadata": 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"end_char": 32651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Narayan Bhup ment of India Act, 1935", "statute": "Narayan Bhup ment of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "article 389", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33943, "end_char": 33954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 168", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34237, "end_char": 34248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 200", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34634, "end_char": 34645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34806, "end_char": 34817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the 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"metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 389", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36479, "end_char": 36490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of Assam", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37371, "end_char": 37390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "issue (2):-The Act having been properly passed by the Legislature of Assam, the Government of Assam was well within their rights under section 3 of the Act to declare that the estates of the tenure holders specified in the Notification vested in the State free from all encumbrances."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37426, "end_char": 37435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Beda Bala Devi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 37625, "end_char": 37639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Beda Bala Devi, the plaintiff in 'I'.", "canonical_name": "Beda 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"metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38987, "end_char": 38997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38999, "end_char": 39009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39204, "end_char": 39214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39262, "end_char": 39275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39292, "end_char": 39302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39341, "end_char": 39351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39359, "end_char": 39369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39387, "end_char": 39400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39451, "end_char": 39461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution 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interests of proprietors and tenure-holders and certain other interests in the permanently settled areas and certain other estates in the districts of Goalpara, Garo Hills and Cachar in the State of Assam including their interests in forests, fisheries, hats, bazars and ferries, mines and minerals."}}, {"text": "Cachar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 40472, "end_char": 40478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The preamble to the impugned Act recites the expediency of providing for the acquisition by the State of the interests of proprietors and tenure-holders and certain other interests in the permanently settled areas and certain other estates in the districts of Goalpara, Garo Hills and Cachar in the State of Assam including their interests in forests, fisheries, hats, bazars and ferries, mines and minerals."}}, {"text": "Section\n\n3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40596, "end_char": 40606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40937, "end_char": 40946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41135, "end_char": 41147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41522, "end_char": 41532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41742, "end_char": 41752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41958, "end_char": 41968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42118, "end_char": 42130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Assam Act I of 1929", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42424, "end_char": 42443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Assam Land and Revenue Regulation", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42852, "end_char": 42885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43209, "end_char": 43219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Assam Land and Revenue Regulation", "statute": "Assam Land and Revenue Regulation"}}, {"text": "Beda Bala Devi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 43495, "end_char": 43509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Beda Bala Devi, the plaintiff in T. S. No.", "canonical_name": "Beda Bala Devi"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44086, "end_char": 44096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44281, "end_char": 44290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44851, "end_char": 44863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45252, "end_char": 45264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "RaNJa,", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45287, "end_char": 45293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The impugned Act is nonetheless a law providing for State acquisition of \"estate\" even if its\n\ndefinition of \"estate\" comprises something more than 1956 what is comprised in the six categories included with- - in that term in section 3(b) of the Assam Land and RaNJa,.", "canonical_name": "Raja Bha"}}, {"text": "BhaireBbehnra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45294, "end_char": 45307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BhaireBbehnra R R l , f I ."}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45422, "end_char": 45432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45485, "end_char": 45495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45574, "end_char": 45587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46342, "end_char": 46352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46402, "end_char": 46412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46992, "end_char": 47001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Assam Act V of 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47005, "end_char": 47024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47131, "end_char": 47141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Assam Act V of 1956", "statute": "Assam Act V of 1956"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47239, "end_char": 47249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Assam Act V of 1956", "statute": "Assam Act V of 1956"}}, {"text": "S 0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47294, "end_char": 47297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Assam Act V of 1956", "statute": "Assam Act V of 1956"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47310, "end_char": 47320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Assam Act V of 1956", "statute": "Assam Act V of 1956"}}]} {"document_id": "1956_1_325_357_EN", "year": 1956, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nKARANPURA DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. v.\n\nRAJA KAMAKSHYA NARAIN SINGH.\n\n[S. R. DAS, C.J., BHAGWATI and VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR JJ.]\n\nCourt of Wards-Powers-Transactions by Court of Wards- Court's power to review-Court of Wards acting on behalf of a ward and a guardian acting on behalf of a minor-Difference in the legal position of-Licences extending beyond the period of the minority of the ward-Validity-Sanction-Requirements-Ooitrt of Wards Act, 1879 (Bengal Act IX of 1879), s. 18-Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (VIII of 1890), s. 29( a).\n\nSection 18 of the Court of Wards Act, 1879, provides that the Court of Wards \"may sanction the giving of leases or farms of the whole or part of any property under its charge, and may direct the mortgage or sale of any part of such property, and may direct the doing of all such other acts as it may judge to be most for the benefit of the property and the advantage of the ward\".\n\nIn exercise of the power conferred by this section the Court of Wards sanctioned a deed of prospecting license in favour of l3, the predecessor in interest of the appellant, and the same was executed on 26-3-1915. Subsequently, on 23·11·1917 the manager of the Court of Wards executed a deed modifying the terms of the deed dated 26-3 1915, by. virtue of which the period of license could be extended up to 26-3-1951 under certain conditions. On 10-8-1937 the respondent having become major assumed management of the estate and thereafter repudiated the aforesaid deeds and contested their validity on the grounds, inter alia, (1) that the deed dated 26-3-1915 was not for the benefit of the ward as the clause therein relating to the payment of the cess was less advantageous to him than the corresponding clause in the prospecting license executed by the then proprietor of the estate on 26-11-1907 in respect of another property known as the Bokaro license, and that the Court of Wards executed the deed in question without bestowing any thought to it, (2) that the Court of Wards had no power to enter into the transaction dated 23-11-1917 as it had the effect of preventing the ward from dealing with his estate for over a period of 32 years\n\nafter he attained majority, (3) that in granting the deed dated 23-11-1917 the Court of Wards considered only the benefit of the grantee and not that of the ward and (4) that the deed was void because no sanction had been given to it by the Court of Wards, as required bys. 18 of the Court of Wards Act, 1879.\n\nHeld, (1) that the Court of Wards is not in the same position as a guardian of the properties of a minor. It is a statutory body with powers defined by the Court of Wards Act, 1879. Under s. 18\n\nApril 10\n\nKaranpura Develo.Ptnent Co.,\n\nUd.\n\nRaja K aniakshya\n\nNarain Singh\n\nof the Act the Court of Wards is given the power to jndge for itself whether a transaction entered into by it on behalf of the ward is for the benefit of the property and the advantage of the ward and its a.ct cannot be impugned in a court of law by the ward on attaining majority unless he shows that it did not act bona fide and in the interests of the ward and that its action amounted to a fraud on the power, or that it did not, in fact, apply its mind to the question whether the act was for the benefit of the property or the advantage of the ward, and that though it purported to exercise the power under s. 18, it did not, i~ fact, come to a judgment as required by the section. Its decision cannot be questioned on the ground that it was erroneous on the merits, or that it was reached without considering some aspects which ought to have been considered, unless the failure to consider them was of such a character as to amount to there being no exercise of judgment at all; Allcroft v. Lord Bishop of London: Lighton v. Lord Bishop of London, ([189i] A.O. 666), relied on.\n\n(2) that assuming that the cess clause in the deed dated 26-3-1915 was less advantageous to the ward than that in the Bokaro license, as the Court of Wards had applied its mind to the question and formed its own judgment on it, its decision is not open to question;\n\n(3) that the Court of Wards was competent to enter into the transaction dated 23-11-1917 and extend the period of license so as to enure for a period beyond the date of the ward coming of age, as s. 18 of the Act which confers authority on the Court of Wards is genera.I and unqualified in terms and there is no provi sion in the Act such as there is in s. 29(b) of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, that a lease by the Court of Wards was to enure for a period related to the minority of th'e ward;\n\n(4) that assuming that the words in s. 18 that the act should be \"for the benefit of the property and the advantage of the ward\" should he read cumulatively and not disjunctively, the deed dated 23-11-1917 satisfies the requirements of the section inasmuch as the benefits which the transaction conferred on the estate in the form of minimum ground rent, salami and royalty must also enure to the advantage of the ward who will be the person who will receive this revenue;\n\n(5) that the requirements as to sanction under s. 18 of the Act must be held to he satisfied if the transaction in all its essential particulars had been sanctioned by the Court of Wards, even though there were details to be worked out in furtherance of the sanction and the document as finally drafted had not been submitted again for its approval.\n\nA mere recital in the deed that the transaction was sanctioned is not conclusive and it must be shown that, as a matter of fact, sanction was given, and as the order of the Court of Wards dated 9-10-1917 contained the sanction to the proposal in\n\nall its essential particul&rs it was sufficient compliance with the re 1956 quirements of the section;\n\nKaranj>l4ra Gulabsingh v. Seth Gokuldas, (40 I.A. 117) and Ramkanai Singh DeTJeloj>ment Co., Deo Darpashaha v. Mathewson, (42 I.A. 97), relied on.\n\nUd. and (6) thats. 18 only requires that the transaction should be v. entered into with the sanction of the Court of Wards and if the Raja Kamakshya transaction subsequently turns out to be bad on the merits, either Narain Singh in part or in toto, it does not render the sanction originally given ineffective.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 191 & 192 of 1953.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated the 27th October 1949 of the Patna High Court in Appeals from the Original Decrees Nos. 127 & 125 of 1943 arising out of the decrees dated the 30th day of April 1943 of the Court of Additional Subordinate Judge, Hazaribagh in Suits Nos. 28 & 82 of 1940 respectively.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, N. C.\n\nChatterjee, S. Chaudhry, S. N. Mu.khe1ji and B. N.\n\nGhosh, for the appellant.\n\nAtul Chandra Gupta and Ganpat Rai, for respondents Nos. 1 & 12.\n\nAtul Chandra Gupta and I. N. Shroff, for respondents Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6 & 13.\n\nLal Narain Sinha, Bajrang Sahai and R.C. Prasad, for respondent No. 9.\n\nSanjib Chaudhry and R.R. Biswas, for respondent No. 10.\n\nSanjib Chaudhry and Ganpat Rai, for respondent No. 11.\n\nGanpat Rai, for respondents Nos. 3, 7 & 8.\n\n1956. April 10. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-These appeals raise questions as to the validity of a prospecting license granted on 26-3-1915 in favour of Messrs Bird and Co., by the Court of Wards as representing the Ram-\n\nKaranPura Develo:Pment Co.,\n\nUd.\n\nRaja Kamakshya\n\nNa rain Singh\n\nVenkata,.ama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\ngarb Estate and of two deeds dated 23-11-1917 and 1-6-1937 executed by the Court of Wards modifying the terms of the license dated 26-3-1915.\n\nThe Ramgarh Raj is an ancient principality situate in Bihar. It has three coal-fields, Bokaro Jharia, Bokaro Ramgarh and Karanpura. Of these, the Karanpura coal-fields are the largest being of the extent of 550 sq. miles, of which about 415 sq. miles belonged to the estate. On 26-11-1907 Raja Ramnarain Singh, the proprietor of the estate, granted in favour of Messrs Anderson Wright & Co., a prospecting license in respect of the Bokaro Ramgarh coal-fields, referred to in these proceeding as the Bokaro license. He was also negotiating for a similar license in respect of the Karanpura coal-fields ( vide Exhibit 155-b dated 1-12-1912), but before anything was concluded, he died on 26-1-1913 leaving him surviving his widow, Rikinath Kaur, and a minor son, Lakshminarain Singh. At the time of his death, the debts owing by the estate amounted to about Rs. 9 lakhs.\n\nOn 20-5-1913 the Court of Wards took over the management of the estate, and its first concern was to relieve it from the pressure of creditors, and for that purpose, to arrange for a loan on easy terms. It was at this juncture that Messrs Bird and Co., made an application for a prospecting license for the Karanpura coal-fields, and in reply thereto, the manager of the Court of Wards informed them on 4-9-1913 that \"the estate being involved and anxious to pay off the debts, one of the conditions of the lease would be an advance of about Rs. 8 to Rs. 11 lakhs including salami, etc., to the estate on the same terms as advanced by the Bokaro and Ramgarh Company\".\n\nThen, there were negotiations extending over several months, a good deal of correspondence and personal discussions, and eventually on 29-7-1914 the_ terms were finally agreed upon, and on 26-3-1915 the deed of prospecting license was actually executed. Its main terms were as follows: It was to be in force for a period of six years. A sum of Rs. 1,00,000 was paid as salami. The licensees were to pay a minimum\n\nground rent of Rs. 8,000 per annum commencing from the second year of the license, and if the leases were actually taken by the licensees, this amount was to be adjusted towards royalties payable thereunder.\n\nThe terms of the leases which were to be granted in pursuance of the license were firstly, the lessees• were to pay a salami at Rs. 40 per bigha, the payment to commence either when railway facilities were available for transport of coal from the mouth of the pit or after a lapse of six years after the period of the license, that is to say, after 26-3-1927, whichever was earlier; secondly, royalty was to be paid on coal, dust and coke at rates specified therein, subject to a minimum of Rs. 5 per bigha payable after the first year of the lease; and thirdly, the lessees were to pay the ceases payable under the law by the occupier or tenant of the land. As consideration for the grant of the license, Messrs Bird and Co., were to advance Rs. 9 lakhs as loan to the estate. This amount was not to carry interest and was to be discharged by adjusting the royalties which would become payable under the leases. If no. leases were taken and the license was abandoned, then the amount of the loan was to carry interest at 4! per cent per annum from that date and it had to be repaid in half-yearly instalments such that the entire debt would be discharged within a period of six years. A mortgage bond was executed on the same date as the prospecting license embodying these terms.\n\nThe next phase of the transaction begins on 3-8-1915 with Messrs Bird and Co., applying to the Court of Wards for extension of the period of the license on the ground that as the result of war conditions, new and unexpected difficulties had cropped up and that to achieve the purpose of the license, is was necessary to extend the period of six years fixed therefor.\n\nThis proposal was subjected to close scrutiny, and there was prolonged correspondence between Messrs Bird and Co., and the Court of Wards on the expediency of extending the period of license and on the terms on which such extension should be granted.\n\nUltimately, on 23-11-1917 the manager of the Court\n\nKaranpura Development Co., Ltd. v.\n\nRaja Kamakshya\n\nNarain Sing/1\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\n/{aranjura Dc.vclojnne1tt Co.,\n\nUd.\n\nRrrja /{a111aksliya\n\nNarai1i Singh\n\nVt.'11katara1na\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nof Wards executed a deed modifying the terms of the deed dated 26-3-1915.\n\nUnder this deed, the period of license was extended in the first instance from 6 to 12 years; that is to say, it would expire on 26-3-1927 instead of on 26-3-1921 as originally fixed. It was then provided that if within this extended period the licensee took a lease or leases of mines of the extent of at least 10,000 bighas, then the period of the license would be extended by a second term of 12 years; i.e., up to 26-3-1939. There was a further provision that if before 26-3-1939 the licensees took leases of at least 20,000 bighas, the period of the license would be extended by another term of 12 years, i.e., up to 26-3-1951.\n\nWhile under the prospecting license dated 26-3-1915 a minimum ground rent of Rs. 8,000 was payable from the second year, under the deed dated 23-11-1917 a minimum ground rent of Rs. 50,000 per annum at Rs. 5 per bigha on the covenanted number of 10,000 bighas was payable from the seventh to the twelfth year. These are the salient features of the license as revised by the document dated 23-ll-1917.\n\nRaja Lakshmina.rain Singh, the ward, became a major on 6-4-1919, and died shortly thereafter on 10-4-1919 leaving him surviving a minor son, Raja Kamakshya Narain Singh, the main respondent in these appeals. The Court of Wards accordingly continued in management of the estate on behalf of the Raja until 10-8-1937, when he became a major. On 14-7-1920, the appellant Company was registered under the provisions of the Indian Companies Act, and it took over the interests of Messrs Bird & Co., under the license dated 26-3-1915 as modified by the deed of variation dated 23-11-1917. In pursuance of these deeds, the Company took six leases covering in all an area of 17,539 bighas on divers dates between 17-7-1922 and 17-7-1933. Under the terms of the deed dated 23-ll-1917 the appellant would be entitled to extension of the licence from 26-3-1939 for the third period of 12 years only if it had taken lease of at least 20,000 bighas before 26-3-1939.\n\nAccordingly, it applied for and obtained three leases\n\non 2-8-1937 covering an area of 2,461 bighas, thus making up along with the six leases mentioned above, the minimum area of 20,000 bighas.\n\nThere is one more deed to which reference must now be made. Clause 6 of the deed dated 23-11-1917 provides that the minimum royalty on areas in excess of 10,000 bighas taken on lease would not be payable till 26-3-1939. Thereafter, the appellant would under this clause become liable to pay a minimum royalty for an area in excess of 10,000 bighas. The appellant applied to modify this term by postponing the date of payment by a further period of 12 years. This proposal was accepted by the Court of Wards, and on 1-6-1937 a deed was executed providing in modification of clause 6, as it stood in the deed dated 23-11-1917, that the minimum royalty for the areas in excess of 10,000 bighas was not to become payable by the company until railway facilities for transport of the coal from the mouth of the pit were available or from 26-3-1951, whichever happened earlier. These are the three transactions, which form the subjectma tter of this litigation.\n\nOn 10-8-1937 the Raja became, as already stated, a major, and assumed management of the estate. On 9-3-1939 he sent a notice to the appellant repudiating the license dated 26-3-1915 and the two deeds of variation dated 23-11-1917 and 1-6-1937 as not binding on him. The appellant in turn sent a notice on 14-5-1940 calling upon the Raja to execute a lease in respect of 250 bighas in accordance with the deeds dated 26-3-1915, 23-11-1917 and 1-6-1937, and followed it up by instituting on 8-6-1940 Title Suit No. 28 of 1940 in the court of the Subordinate Judge of Hazaribagh for compelling specific performance thereof. On 9-8-1940 the Raja filed Title Suit No. 82of1940 in the Sub-Court, Hazaribagh, and therein, he pleaded that the deed dated 26-3-1915 was void, because the Court of Wards had no power to grant a prospecting license and also because it had acted with gross negligence in granting the same; and that the deeds dated 23-11-1917 and 1-6-1937 were bad, because there was no sanction therefor as required by section 18 of the\n\nKaranpura Development Co.,\n\nUd.\n\nRaja Kamakshya\n\nNarain Singh\n\nVenkatarama Ayyarj.\n\nf{aranjiura Development Co., Ltd. v.\n\nRaja Kamakshya\n\nNarain Singh\n\nVtnkataratua\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nBengal Court of Wards Act IX of 1879, hereinafter referred to as the Act, and also because they were not for the benefit of the estate. He accordingly prayed for a declaration that the three deeds aforesaid were void, and for possession of the properties comprised in the leases, with mesne profits, past and future.\n\nBoth these suits, which were really cross-actions involving the determination of the same points, were heard together by the Subordinate Judge of Hazaribagh, and by his judgment dated 30-4-1943 he held that the deeds dated 26-3-1915 and 23-11-1917 were intra vires the powers of the Court of Wards, that they were beneficial to the estate, and were therefore valid, and he accordingly upheld the six leases granted pursuant to those deeds. He, however, held that the deed dated 1-6-1937 was not valid, both because the Court of Wards had not sanctioned it and also because it was not for the benefit of the estate. In view of this finding, he held that the clause in the lease deeds dated 2-8-1937 based on the deed dated 1-6-1937 postponing the payment of minimum royalty was bad, but that the leases themselves were otherwise valid. As a result of these findings, he granted a decree for specific performance in Title Suit No. 28 of 1940 and in Title Suit No. 82 of 1940 he awarded reliefs consequential on the invalidity of the deed dated 1-6-1937.\n\nAgainst this judgment, the Raja preferred appeals to the High Court of Patna, F. A. No. 125 of 1943 against the decree in Title Suit No. 82 of 1940 and F.A. No. 127 of 1943 against that in Title Suit No. 28 of 1940. The company also filed cross-objections in F.A. No. 125 of 1943. The learned Judges agreed with the Subordinate Judge that the Court of Wards was competent to grant a prospecting license, but they were of opinion that it had not applied its mind to certain important aspects of the transaction, that the interests of the ward had suffered in consequence, and that the deed dated 26-3-1915 was therefore not valid. Dealing next with the deed dated 23-11-1917, they held that it was void, because the Court of Wards had not sanctioned it. They also held that it\n\nwas not binding on the Raja, firstly because its terms were not beneficial to him, secondly because it had been obtained by Messrs Bird and Co., on false representation, and thirdly because Mr. MacGregor, the then manager of the Court of Wards, was acting in his own interests and adversely to those of the minor ward, and the Court of Wards had been misled by him into entering into the transaction. For these reasons, the learned Judges held that the deed dated 23-11-1937 was void and inoperative as against the ward. Then, as regards the deed dated 1-6-1937, the learned Judges agreed with the Subordinate Judge that it was invalid on both the grounds given by him.\n\nIn the result, in Title Suit No. 82 of 1940 a declaration was made that the deeds dated 26·3-1915, 26-ll-1917 and 1-6-1937 as well as the leases granted pursuant thereto were void and a decree passed in favour of the Raja for possession of the demised properties with mesne profits, past and future. Title Suit No. 28 of 1940 instituted by the appellant for specific performance and the cross-objections filed by it in F.A. No. 125 of 1943 were dismissed.\n\nAgainst this judgment, the present appeals have been preferred by the company, C.A. No. 191 of 1953 being directed against the decree in F.A. No. 127 of 1943 and C.A.\n\nNo. 192 of 1953 against the decree in F.A. No. 125 of\n\n1943. The first respondent in these appeals is the Raja of Ramgarh, the other respondents being transferees from him, and he will be referred to in this judgment as the respondent.\n\nThough the questions that were agitated by the parties in the courts below ranged over a wide area, many of them have been abandoned in the argument before us, and the scope of the controversy in these appeals has been considerably narrowed down. Thus, the appellant does not challenge the correctness of the decision of the courts below that the deed dated 1-6-1937 is not binding on the estate.\n\nMr. Atul Chandra Gupta, learned counsel for the Raja, has limited his attack on the deed dated 26-3-1915 to the ground that it was not for the benefit of the ward, because the clause therein relating to the payment of\n\nKaranpura Development Co.,\n\nUd.\n\nRaja Kamakshya Narain Singh\n\nVenkatarama AyyarJ.\n\nKaranj>Ura Deoeloj>ment Co.,\n\nUd,\n\nRaja Kamakshya\n\nNarain Singh\n\nVenkatara1na\n\nAyyarJ.\n\ncess, or more compendiously, the cess clause was less advantageous to him than the corresponding clause in the Bokaro license, and the Court of Wards executed the deed in question without bestowing any thought to it. He attacked the deed dated 23-II-1917 on the following grounds: (1) The Court. of Wards had no power to enter into a transaction, which had the effect of preventing the ward from dealing with his estate for over a period of 32 years after he attained majority, and which bound him to grant leases down to the year 1951 at the rates of salami and royalties fixed in the year 1915.\n\n(2) In granting the deed dated 23-ll-1917, the Court of Wards considered only the benefit of Messrs Bird and Co., and not of the ward.\n\n(3) The deed is void, because no sanction had been given to it by the Court of Wards, as required by section 18 of the Act.\n\nBefore dealing with these contentions on their merits, it is necessary to consider the question which was discussed at the Bar as to the grounds on which the deeds dated 26-3-1915 and 23-11-1917 are open to attack in these proceedings.\n\nA transaction entered into by a guardian on behalf of a minor will be valid and binding on the latter, only if it is for proved necessity or benefit.\n\nWhen a transaction is entered into by a Court of Wards on behalf of the ward, is its validity to be judged on the same considerations, and is it open to the ward on attaining majority to challenge it on the ground that it was not beneficial to him? The Court of Wards is not in the same position as a guardian of a minor.\n\nIt is a statutory body, and its powers are those which are conferred on it by the statute, which creates it. Section 14 of the Act provides that the Court of Wards may, acting through its manager, do all such things requisite for the proper care and management of the property as the proprietor of such property might do, if not disqualified. Section 18 enacts that:\n\n\"The Court may sanction the giving of leases or farms of the whole or part of any property under its charge, and may direct the mortgage or sale of any part of such property, and may direct the doing of all\n\nsuch other acts as it may judge to be most for the benefit of the property and the advantage of the\n\nward\".\n\nIt was in exercise of the power conferred by this sec-\n\nKaranpura Deura Deve/oj>mcnt Co.,\n\nLtd. v.\n\nRaja Kamakshya\n\nNaraiu Si11gh\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nKaranj>ura DevcloPtnent Co.,\n\nUd.\n\nRaja Kantakshya\n\nNarain Singh\n\nVenkatarania\n\nAyyar J.\n\nno such question. At a late stage, however, he applied to ame.nd the plaint so as to raise the contenttion that the deed dated 26-3-1915 was not in accordance with the Bokaro license, but that application was dismissed by the Subordinate Judge on 24-12-1942. It was contended for the appellant that the question now sought to be argued should not be allowed to be raised at this stage as it is purely one of fact, especially in view of the order utrac\n\nb h\n\neve or111cn o.J and it was this aspect that was considered y t e Ltd.\n\nCommissioner in his note. It may be mentioned that v. there was some difference of opinion among the officers Raja Itnent Co, 1\n\nUd.\n\nRaja Kamakshya\n\nNarain Singh\n\nVenkatarania\n\nAyyar J.\n\nval. We should accordingly construe the letter dated 9-10-1917 as sufficient sanction under section 18.\n\nThe learned Judges of the High Court were of the opinion that Rule 242 framed under section 70 of the Act required that the sanction should be recited in the deed, and they referred to the deed dated 26-3-1915 where that had been done. But Rule 242 applies only to leases, and is in terms inapplicable to the deed dated 23-11-1917 which is an agreement. And both sides have argued the case on the footing that the deed in question is governed by the last clause of section 18.\n\nWe have no hesitation in holding that the Board directed by its letter dated 9-10-1917 the execution of the agreement dated 23-11-1917, and that it was validly executed under section 18.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that the deed dated 23-11-1917 is not open to attack on any of the grounds urged by the respondent, and must be upheld.\n\nOne other contention of the respondent remains to be considered, and that arises on the statement of the appellant that it does not contest the finding of the High Court that the deed dated 1-6-1937 is void.\n\nIt will be recal1ed that under the deeds dated 26-3-1915 and 23-11-1917 the licensees would be entitled to an extension of the period for 12 years from 26-3-1939 to 26-3-1951 provided that they had taken on lease a minimum area of 20,000 bighas, and that the appellant had, in fact, taken on lease only a total extent of 17,539 bigh\"as under six leases during the years 1922 to 1933. It was also provided in those deeds that for the areas taken in excess of 10,000 bighas, the minimum royalty would become payable after 26-3-1939.\n\nThe appellant applied to the Court of Wards sometime in 1934 for amendment of the deeds dated 26-3-1915 and 23-11-1917 so as to provide that the payment of minimum royalty was to commence from 26-3-1951, unless railway facilities were available earlier. This was sanctioned by the Board, and the deed dated 1-6-1937 incorporates this amendment in the deeds dated 26-3-1915 and 23-11-1917.\n\nAs a condition of the grant of this concession, the Board required the appellant to take a lease of 2,461 bighas\n\n' to make up the covenanted extent of 20,000 bighas.\n\nThe appellant accordingly applied for three leases of the total extent of 2,461 bighas, and the Board gave sanction to the same on 15-7-1937, and on 2-8-1937, the lease deeds were actually executed. One of them, that relating to Mauza Saunda, contained, in accordance with the terms of the deed dated 1-6-1937, the following covenant:\n\n\"Provided always that no minimum royalty shall be payable until the expiration of 36 years from the said 26th day of March 1915 or until railway facilities shall be available as aforesaid, whichever event shall first happen\".\n\nThere is some dispute as to whether the other two leases contained similar covenants, but that is immaterial for the present discussion, because if the lease of Mauza Saunda is bad on account of the aforesaid clause as contended by the respondent, then the total area taken on lease will be less than the minimum 20,000 bighas, and the appellant will have no right to the benefit of the third extension, and the suit for specific performance must fail.\n\nNow, the contention of the respondent is that the leases dated 2-8-1937 arc bad on two grounds. He firstly argues that as the deed dated 1-6-1937 has been held to be bad, the clause in the lease providing for the postponement of payment of minimum royalty based thereon must also be held to be bad-and that is conceded by the appellant-a\"nd that as a deed cannot be held to be partly good and partly bad, the whole of it must be held to be void. The fact that a clause in a deed is not binding on the ground that it is unauthorised cannot ipso facto render the whole deed void, unless it forms such an integral part of the transaction as to render it impossible to sever the good from the bad. That is not the position here.\n\nThe effect of declaring the proviso void will leave the rest of the deed whole and intact. The leases without the proviso are perfectly valid, and indeed, they will be more advantageous to the ward.\n\nSecondly, it is contended that the sanction that was accorded by the Board was to the lease with the\n\nKaranpura Develoj>mmt Co.,\n\nlid.\n\nRaja Kamakshya Narain Singh\n\nVenkata1ama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\n. Karanpura Development Co.,\n\nUd.\n\nRaja Kamakshya Narain Singh\n\nVenkata, ama\n\nAyyar J,\n\ncovenant which has been held to be void, and that the deed without that covenant has not been sanctioned. This contention again is clearly untenable.\n\nSection 18 only requires that the transaction should be entered into with the sanction of the Board. When that has been done, the force of the section is spent.\n\nWhether the transaction turns '!mt to be good or bad on the merits can have no effect On the sanction, which had been granted before it was entered into.\n\nIf the deed is bad on the merits, it will fail on that ground and not on the ground that by reason thereof, the sanction becomes ineffective. And the result is the same whether the deed is bad in part or in toto.\n\nThe contention therefore that the lease deeds dated 2-8-1937 are inoperative must be rejected. The result is that the deeds dated 26-3-1915 and 23-11-1917 are valid but not the deed dated 1-6-1937, and that the leases granted to the appellant are valid, but the clause postponing the payment of minimum royalty in the leae deed or deeds of 2-8-1937 is inoperative.\n\nThe appeals must accordingly be allowed, the decrees of the court below set aside, and thc.se of the trial court restored. In Civil Appeal No. 191 of 1953, the appellant will have its costs both here and in the courts below.\n\nIn Civil Appeal No. 192 of 1953, the parties will bear their own costs throughout.\n\nIt must be mentioned that during the pendency of these appeals, by virtue of notifications issued under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act XXX of 1950, the Estate of Ramgarh became vested in the State of Bihar, which thereafter intervened in these appeals.\n\nAt the hearing, the State filed a memo in the following terms:\n\n\"State ofBihar recognises and accepts as valid the leases granted to the appellant Company whether granted by the Court of Wards or the Raja under the license of 26th March 1915 (as extended by the supplementary documents of 1917 and 1937).\n\nNothing in this compromise shall preclude the State of Bihar in future from modifying the terms and conditions of the leases in accordance with law empowering the State Government to do so\".\n\nThe respondent raised the contention that the State had no locus standi to intervene in these proceedings and at the stage of appeal, but in the view which we have taken of the rights of the parties, a discussion of this point is purely of academic interest.\n\nIt is sufficient to direct that the above memorandum be filed and included as part of the record.\n\nAppeals allowed.\n\nBANARSI DAS & OTHERS v.\n\nTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & OTHERS.\n\n[S. R. DAS, C.J., BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, B. P. SINHA and JAFER IMAM JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India, Arts. 14 and 16-Government's right to lay down certain qualification /01 new recruits for any appointment or employment 1mder the Governnz.ent-Candidates not possessing any fundamental right for employment.\n\nThe petitioners-Ex-patwaris under the State of Uttar Pradesh -brought the present petition under Article 32 of the Constit.ution in the Supreme Court alleging that the Provisions of arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution had been violated because they had been denied equality before the law and equal opportunity for employment under the State.\n\nPatw:i.ris numbering about 28,000 in the whole State of Uttar Pradesh had organized themselves into \"The U.P. Patwaris Associa tions\" with a view to improving their prospects and emoluments.\n\nThe association passed resolutions demanding increase in pay and allowances etc.\n\nThe Government was considering these matters when a large number of pn.twaris went on a \"pen-down strike\" with the result thl\\t the Government withdrew the recognition of the Association. The Government further published the new \"Land Records Manual\" embodying new amended rules regarding recruit ment, conditions of service and duties of patwaris. The Associ11tion protested against the revised Land Records Manual and passed 11 resolution that all patwaris should submit their resignations on the 2nd February, 1953 requesting that they should be relieved of their duties by the 4th Much, 1953 after which date they will consil4ra Gulabsingh v. Seth Gokuldas, (40 I.A. 117) and Ramkanai Singh DeTJeloj>ment Co., Deo Darpashaha v. Mathewson, (42 I.A. 97), relied on."}}, {"text": "Narain Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6170, "end_char": 6182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and (6) thats. 18 only requires that the transaction should be v. entered into with the sanction of the Court of Wards and if the Raja Kamakshya transaction subsequently turns out to be bad on the merits, either Narain Singh in part or in toto, it does not render the sanction originally given ineffective.", "canonical_name": "Naraiu Si11gh"}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6406, "end_char": 6422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal from the judgment and decree dated the 27th October 1949 of the Patna High Court in Appeals from the Original Decrees Nos."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6645, "end_char": 6659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, N. C.\n\nChatterjee, S. Chaudhry, S. N. Mu.khe1ji and B. N.\n\nGhosh, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "N. C.\n\nChatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6689, "end_char": 6706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, N. C.\n\nChatterjee, S. Chaudhry, S. N. Mu.khe1ji and B. N.\n\nGhosh, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. Chaudhry", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6708, "end_char": 6719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, N. C.\n\nChatterjee, S. Chaudhry, S. N. Mu.khe1ji and B. N.\n\nGhosh, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. N. Mu.khe1ji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6721, "end_char": 6736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, N. C.\n\nChatterjee, S. Chaudhry, S. N. Mu.khe1ji and B. N.\n\nGhosh, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. N.\n\nGhosh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6741, "end_char": 6753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, N. C.\n\nChatterjee, S. Chaudhry, S. N. Mu.khe1ji and B. N.\n\nGhosh, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Atul Chandra Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6775, "end_char": 6793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Atul Chandra Gupta and Ganpat Rai, for respondents Nos.", "canonical_name": "Atul Chandra Gupta"}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6798, "end_char": 6808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Atul Chandra Gupta and Ganpat Rai, for respondents Nos.", "canonical_name": "Ganpat Rai"}}, {"text": "I. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6863, "end_char": 6875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Atul Chandra Gupta and I. N. Shroff, for respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Lal Narain Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6916, "end_char": 6932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, Bajrang Sahai and R.C. Prasad, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Bajrang Sahai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6934, "end_char": 6947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, Bajrang Sahai and R.C. Prasad, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "R.C. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6952, "end_char": 6963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, Bajrang Sahai and R.C. Prasad, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Sanjib Chaudhry", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6988, "end_char": 7003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sanjib Chaudhry and R.R. Biswas, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "R.R. Biswas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7008, "end_char": 7019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sanjib Chaudhry and R.R. Biswas, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7101, "end_char": 7111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ganpat Rai, for respondents Nos.", "canonical_name": "Ganpat Rai"}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMA AYYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7205, "end_char": 7222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-These appeals raise questions as to the validity of a prospecting license granted on 26-3-1915 in favour of Messrs Bird and Co., by the Court of Wards as representing the Ram-\n\nKaranPura Develo:Pment Co.,\n\nUd.", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama\n\nAyyarJ."}}, {"text": "Ramgarh Raj", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7638, "end_char": 7649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Ramgarh Raj is an ancient principality situate in Bihar.", "canonical_name": "Ramgarh Raj"}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7688, "end_char": 7693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Ramgarh Raj is an ancient principality situate in Bihar."}}, {"text": "Bokaro Jharia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7721, "end_char": 7734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has three coal-fields, Bokaro Jharia, Bokaro Ramgarh and Karanpura."}}, {"text": "Bokaro Ramgarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7736, "end_char": 7750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has three coal-fields, Bokaro Jharia, Bokaro Ramgarh and Karanpura."}}, {"text": "Karanpura", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7755, "end_char": 7764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has three coal-fields, Bokaro Jharia, Bokaro Ramgarh and Karanpura."}}, {"text": "Karanpura coal-fields", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7780, "end_char": 7801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Of these, the Karanpura coal-fields are the largest being of the extent of 550 sq."}}, {"text": "Raja Ramnarain Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7923, "end_char": 7943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 26-11-1907 Raja Ramnarain Singh, the proprietor of the estate, granted in favour of Messrs Anderson Wright & Co., a prospecting license in respect of the Bokaro Ramgarh coal-fields, referred to in these proceeding as the Bokaro license."}}, {"text": "Anderson Wright & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8003, "end_char": 8024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 26-11-1907 Raja Ramnarain Singh, the proprietor of the estate, granted in favour of Messrs Anderson Wright & Co., a prospecting license in respect of the Bokaro Ramgarh coal-fields, referred to in these proceeding as the Bokaro license."}}, {"text": "1-12-1912", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8262, "end_char": 8271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was also negotiating for a similar license in respect of the Karanpura coal-fields ( vide Exhibit 155-b dated 1-12-1912), but before anything was concluded, he died on 26-1-1913 leaving him surviving his widow, Rikinath Kaur, and a minor son, Lakshminarain Singh."}}, {"text": "26-1-1913", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8320, "end_char": 8329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was also negotiating for a similar license in respect of the Karanpura coal-fields ( vide Exhibit 155-b dated 1-12-1912), but before anything was concluded, he died on 26-1-1913 leaving him surviving his widow, Rikinath Kaur, and a minor son, Lakshminarain Singh."}}, {"text": "Rikinath Kaur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8363, "end_char": 8376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was also negotiating for a similar license in respect of the Karanpura coal-fields ( vide Exhibit 155-b dated 1-12-1912), but before anything was concluded, he died on 26-1-1913 leaving him surviving his widow, Rikinath Kaur, and a minor son, Lakshminarain Singh."}}, {"text": "Lakshminarain Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8395, "end_char": 8414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was also negotiating for a similar license in respect of the Karanpura coal-fields ( vide Exhibit 155-b dated 1-12-1912), but before anything was concluded, he died on 26-1-1913 leaving him surviving his widow, Rikinath Kaur, and a minor son, Lakshminarain Singh."}}, {"text": "20-5-1913", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8507, "end_char": 8516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 20-5-1913 the Court of Wards took over the management of the estate, and its first concern was to relieve it from the pressure of creditors, and for that purpose, to arrange for a loan on easy terms."}}, {"text": "Bird and Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8743, "end_char": 8755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was at this juncture that Messrs Bird and Co., made an application for a prospecting license for the Karanpura coal-fields, and in reply thereto, the manager of the Court of Wards informed them on 4-9-1913 that \"the estate being involved and anxious to pay off the debts, one of the conditions of the lease would be an advance of about Rs."}}, {"text": "4-9-1913", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8907, "end_char": 8915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was at this juncture that Messrs Bird and Co., made an application for a prospecting license for the Karanpura coal-fields, and in reply thereto, the manager of the Court of Wards informed them on 4-9-1913 that \"the estate being involved and anxious to pay off the debts, one of the conditions of the lease would be an advance of about Rs."}}, {"text": "Bokaro and Ramgarh Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9143, "end_char": 9169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to the estate on the same terms as advanced by the Bokaro and Ramgarh Company\"."}}, {"text": "29-7-1914", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9308, "end_char": 9317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then, there were negotiations extending over several months, a good deal of correspondence and personal discussions, and eventually on 29-7-1914 the_ terms were finally agreed upon, and on 26-3-1915 the deed of prospecting license was actually executed."}}, {"text": "26-3-1927", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10145, "end_char": 10154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "40 per bigha, the payment to commence either when railway facilities were available for transport of coal from the mouth of the pit or after a lapse of six years after the period of the license, that is to say, after 26-3-1927, whichever was earlier; secondly, royalty was to be paid on coal, dust and coke at rates specified therein, subject to a minimum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Messrs Bird and Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10502, "end_char": 10521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As consideration for the grant of the license, Messrs Bird and Co., were to advance Rs."}}, {"text": "3-8-1915", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11123, "end_char": 11131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The next phase of the transaction begins on 3-8-1915 with Messrs Bird and Co., applying to the Court of Wards for extension of the period of the license on the ground that as the result of war conditions, new and unexpected difficulties had cropped up and that to achieve the purpose of the license, is was necessary to extend the period of six years fixed therefor."}}, {"text": "manager of the Court\n\nKaranpura Development Co., Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11729, "end_char": 11782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ultimately, on 23-11-1917 the manager of the Court\n\nKaranpura Development Co., Ltd. v.\n\nRaja Kamakshya\n\nNarain Sing/1\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\n/{aranjura Dc.vclojnne1tt Co.,\n\nUd."}}, {"text": "Raja Kamakshya", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11787, "end_char": 11801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ultimately, on 23-11-1917 the manager of the Court\n\nKaranpura Development Co., Ltd. v.\n\nRaja Kamakshya\n\nNarain Sing/1\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\n/{aranjura Dc.vclojnne1tt Co.,\n\nUd.", "canonical_name": "RAJA KAMAKSHYA NARAIN SINGH"}}, {"text": "26-3-1921", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12167, "end_char": 12176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under this deed, the period of license was extended in the first instance from 6 to 12 years; that is to say, it would expire on 26-3-1927 instead of on 26-3-1921 as originally fixed."}}, {"text": "26-3-1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12432, "end_char": 12441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was then provided that if within this extended period the licensee took a lease or leases of mines of the extent of at least 10,000 bighas, then the period of the license would be extended by a second term of 12 years; i.e., up to 26-3-1939."}}, {"text": "23-ll-1917.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13037, "end_char": 13048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These are the salient features of the license as revised by the document dated 23-ll-1917."}}, {"text": "Raja Lakshmina.rain Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13050, "end_char": 13075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Lakshmina.rain Singh, the ward, became a major on 6-4-1919, and died shortly thereafter on 10-4-1919 leaving him surviving a minor son, Raja Kamakshya Narain Singh, the main respondent in these appeals."}}, {"text": "6-4-1919", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13105, "end_char": 13113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Lakshmina.rain Singh, the ward, became a major on 6-4-1919, and died shortly thereafter on 10-4-1919 leaving him surviving a minor son, Raja Kamakshya Narain Singh, the main respondent in these appeals."}}, {"text": "10-4-1919", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13146, "end_char": 13155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Lakshmina.rain Singh, the ward, became a major on 6-4-1919, and died shortly thereafter on 10-4-1919 leaving him surviving a minor son, Raja Kamakshya Narain Singh, the main respondent in these appeals."}}, {"text": "Raja Kamakshya Narain Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13191, "end_char": 13218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Lakshmina.rain Singh, the ward, became a major on 6-4-1919, and died shortly thereafter on 10-4-1919 leaving him surviving a minor son, Raja Kamakshya Narain Singh, the main respondent in these appeals.", "canonical_name": "RAJA KAMAKSHYA NARAIN SINGH"}}, {"text": "Raja", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13344, "end_char": 13348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court of Wards accordingly continued in management of the estate on behalf of the Raja until 10-8-1937, when he became a major.", "canonical_name": "Raja I"}}, {"text": "14-7-1920", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13393, "end_char": 13402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 14-7-1920, the appellant Company was registered under the provisions of the Indian Companies Act, and it took over the interests of Messrs Bird & Co., under the license dated 26-3-1915 as modified by the deed of variation dated 23-11-1917."}}, {"text": "Company was registered under the provisions of the Indian Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13418, "end_char": 13489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Messrs Bird & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13525, "end_char": 13542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 14-7-1920, the appellant Company was registered under the provisions of the Indian Companies Act, and it took over the interests of Messrs Bird & Co., under the license dated 26-3-1915 as modified by the deed of variation dated 23-11-1917."}}, {"text": "17-7-1922", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13755, "end_char": 13764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance of these deeds, the Company took six leases covering in all an area of 17,539 bighas on divers dates between 17-7-1922 and 17-7-1933."}}, {"text": "17-7-1933", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13769, "end_char": 13778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance of these deeds, the Company took six leases covering in all an area of 17,539 bighas on divers dates between 17-7-1922 and 17-7-1933."}}, {"text": "23-ll-1917 the", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13814, "end_char": 13828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the terms of the deed dated 23-ll-1917 the appellant would be entitled to extension of the licence from 26-3-1939 for the third period of 12 years only if it had taken lease of at least 20,000 bighas before 26-3-1939."}}, {"text": "2-8-1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14063, "end_char": 14071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, it applied for and obtained three leases\n\non 2-8-1937 covering an area of 2,461 bighas, thus making up along with the six leases mentioned above, the minimum area of 20,000 bighas."}}, {"text": "Clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14260, "end_char": 14268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Company was registered under the provisions of the Indian Companies Act", "statute": "Company was registered under the provisions of the Indian Companies Act"}}, {"text": "1-6-1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14715, "end_char": 14723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This proposal was accepted by the Court of Wards, and on 1-6-1937 a deed was executed providing in modification of clause 6, as it stood in the deed dated 23-11-1917, that the minimum royalty for the areas in excess of 10,000 bighas was not to become payable by the company until railway facilities for transport of the coal from the mouth of the pit were available or from 26-3-1951, whichever happened earlier."}}, {"text": "clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14773, "end_char": 14781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "9-3-1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15255, "end_char": 15263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 9-3-1939 he sent a notice to the appellant repudiating the license dated 26-3-1915 and the two deeds of variation dated 23-11-1917 and 1-6-1937 as not binding on him."}}, {"text": "14-5-1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15461, "end_char": 15470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant in turn sent a notice on 14-5-1940 calling upon the Raja to execute a lease in respect of 250 bighas in accordance with the deeds dated 26-3-1915, 23-11-1917 and 1-6-1937, and followed it up by instituting on 8-6-1940 Title Suit No."}}, {"text": "8-6-1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15645, "end_char": 15653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant in turn sent a notice on 14-5-1940 calling upon the Raja to execute a lease in respect of 250 bighas in accordance with the deeds dated 26-3-1915, 23-11-1917 and 1-6-1937, and followed it up by instituting on 8-6-1940 Title Suit No."}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge of Hazaribagh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15700, "end_char": 15731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "28 of 1940 in the court of the Subordinate Judge of Hazaribagh for compelling specific performance thereof."}}, {"text": "9-8-1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15780, "end_char": 15788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 9-8-1940 the Raja filed Title Suit No."}}, {"text": "Sub-Court, Hazaribagh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15835, "end_char": 15856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "82of1940 in the Sub-Court, Hazaribagh, and therein, he pleaded that the deed dated 26-3-1915 was void, because the Court of Wards had no power to grant a prospecting license and also because it had acted with gross negligence in granting the same; and that the deeds dated 23-11-1917 and 1-6-1937 were bad, because there was no sanction therefor as required by section 18 of the\n\nKaranpura Development Co.,\n\nUd."}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16180, "end_char": 16190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "f{aranjiura Development Co., Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16283, "end_char": 16316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "f{aranjiura Development Co., Ltd. v.\n\nRaja Kamakshya\n\nNarain Singh\n\nVtnkataratua\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nBengal Court of Wards Act IX of 1879, hereinafter referred to as the Act, and also because they were not for the benefit of the estate.", "canonical_name": "f{aranjiura Development Co., Ltd."}}, {"text": "Bengal Court of Wards Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16374, "end_char": 16399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "30-4-1943", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16876, "end_char": 16885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both these suits, which were really cross-actions involving the determination of the same points, were heard together by the Subordinate Judge of Hazaribagh, and by his judgment dated 30-4-1943 he held that the deeds dated 26-3-1915 and 23-11-1917 were intra vires the powers of the Court of Wards, that they were beneficial to the estate, and were therefore valid, and he accordingly upheld the six leases granted pursuant to those deeds."}}, {"text": "-6-1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17735, "end_char": 17742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "82 of 1940 he awarded reliefs consequential on the invalidity of the deed dated 1-6-1937."}}, {"text": "High Court of Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17802, "end_char": 17821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against this judgment, the Raja preferred appeals to the High Court of Patna, F. A. No."}}, {"text": "MacGregor", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18716, "end_char": 18725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They also held that it\n\nwas not binding on the Raja, firstly because its terms were not beneficial to him, secondly because it had been obtained by Messrs Bird and Co., on false representation, and thirdly because Mr. MacGregor, the then manager of the Court of Wards, was acting in his own interests and adversely to those of the minor ward, and the Court of Wards had been misled by him into entering into the transaction."}}, {"text": "23-11-1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18986, "end_char": 18996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For these reasons, the learned Judges held that the deed dated 23-11-1937 was void and inoperative as against the ward."}}, {"text": "6-1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19077, "end_char": 19083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then, as regards the deed dated 1-6-1937, the learned Judges agreed with the Subordinate Judge that it was invalid on both the grounds given by him."}}, {"text": "26·3-1915", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19281, "end_char": 19290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "82 of 1940 a declaration was made that the deeds dated 26·3-1915, 26-ll-1917 and 1-6-1937 as well as the leases granted pursuant thereto were void and a decree passed in favour of the Raja for possession of the demised properties with mesne profits, past and future."}}, {"text": "26-ll-1917 and", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19292, "end_char": 19306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "82 of 1940 a declaration was made that the deeds dated 26·3-1915, 26-ll-1917 and 1-6-1937 as well as the leases granted pursuant thereto were void and a decree passed in favour of the Raja for possession of the demised properties with mesne profits, past and future."}}, {"text": "Raja of Ramgarh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19924, "end_char": 19939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first respondent in these appeals is the Raja of Ramgarh, the other respondents being transferees from him, and he will be referred to in this judgment as the respondent."}}, {"text": "Atul Chandra Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20457, "end_char": 20475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Atul Chandra Gupta, learned counsel for the Raja, has limited his attack on the deed dated 26-3-1915 to the ground that it was not for the benefit of the ward, because the clause therein relating to the payment of\n\nKaranpura Development Co.,\n\nUd.", "canonical_name": "Atul Chandra Gupta"}}, {"text": "Raja Kamakshya", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20705, "end_char": 20719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Kamakshya Narain Singh\n\nVenkatarama AyyarJ.\n\nKaranj>Ura Deoeloj>ment Co.,\n\nUd,\n\nRaja Kamakshya\n\nNarain Singh\n\nVenkatara1na\n\nAyyarJ.\n\ncess, or more compendiously, the cess clause was less advantageous to him than the corresponding clause in the Bokaro license, and the Court of Wards executed the deed in question without bestowing any thought to it.", "canonical_name": "RAJA KAMAKSHYA NARAIN SINGH"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama AyyarJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20734, "end_char": 20753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Kamakshya Narain Singh\n\nVenkatarama AyyarJ.\n\nKaranj>Ura Deoeloj>ment Co.,\n\nUd,\n\nRaja Kamakshya\n\nNarain Singh\n\nVenkatara1na\n\nAyyarJ.\n\ncess, or more compendiously, the cess clause was less advantageous to him than the corresponding clause in the Bokaro license, and the Court of Wards executed the deed in question without bestowing any thought to it.", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama\n\nAyyarJ."}}, {"text": "23-II-1917 on", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21087, "end_char": 21100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He attacked the deed dated 23-II-1917 on the following grounds: (1) The Court."}}, {"text": "23-ll-1917,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21472, "end_char": 21483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) In granting the deed dated 23-ll-1917, the Court of Wards considered only the benefit of Messrs Bird and Co., and not of the ward."}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21678, "end_char": 21688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22522, "end_char": 22532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22756, "end_char": 22766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23328, "end_char": 23338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23620, "end_char": 23625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contention of Mr. Gupta for the respondent is that the words \"as it may judge\" do not signify that the judgment could be made without reasonable grounds therefor, that they should be construed as meaning \"as it may on reasonable grounds judge\", and that it is therefore open to the Court to consider whether the decision of the Court of Wards was a reasonable one to come to, and that if it came to the conclusion that it was not, then to hold that it fell outside the ambit of the authority conferred by section 18."}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24107, "end_char": 24117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Venkatarama", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25166, "end_char": 25177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Venkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nKaranpura De'PeloJment Co,1\n\nUd.", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama\n\nAyyarJ."}}, {"text": "Raja Kamaksh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25222, "end_char": 25234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Kamaksh, a\n\nNarain Singh\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nused in the one sense or the other in the enactment in question must depend upon the context.", "canonical_name": "RAJA KAMAKSHYA NARAIN SINGH"}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25506, "end_char": 25516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lord Atkin who held that the words of Regulation", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25850, "end_char": 25898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Defence Regulations 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25911, "end_char": 25935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26808, "end_char": 26818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Defence Regulations 1939", "statute": "the Defence Regulations 1939"}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27418, "end_char": 27428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27944, "end_char": 27954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "London", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28936, "end_char": 28942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Acting under this section the Bishop of London decided not to take proceedings, and the correctness of this decision was challenged in an application for mandamus."}}, {"text": "Bramwell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29361, "end_char": 29369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following observations of Lord Bramwell may be quoted:\n\n\"Then it was said that there was something' he\n\n(1) [1891] A.O. 666."}}, {"text": "Kat'anjJura DeoelojJment", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29456, "end_char": 29480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kat'anjJura DeoelojJment Co.,\n\nUd."}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29524, "end_char": 29541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja [{ amakshya\n\nNarain Singh\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J,\n\nlura Deve/oj>mcnt Co.,\n\nLtd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 38310, "end_char": 38344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "45\n\nKaranj>ura Deve/oj>mcnt Co.,\n\nLtd. v.\n\nRaja Kamakshya\n\nNaraiu Si11gh\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nKaranj>ura DevcloPtnent Co.,\n\nUd."}}, {"text": "Naraiu Si11gh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 38365, "end_char": 38378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "45\n\nKaranj>ura Deve/oj>mcnt Co.,\n\nLtd. v.\n\nRaja Kamakshya\n\nNaraiu Si11gh\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nKaranj>ura DevcloPtnent Co.,\n\nUd.", "canonical_name": "Naraiu Si11gh"}}, {"text": "Raja Kantakshya", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 38438, "end_char": 38453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Kantakshya\n\nNarain Singh\n\nVenkatarania\n\nAyyar J.\n\nno such question.", "canonical_name": "RAJA KAMAKSHYA NARAIN SINGH"}}, {"text": "Venkatarania\n\nAyyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38469, "end_char": 38488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Kantakshya\n\nNarain Singh\n\nVenkatarania\n\nAyyar J.\n\nno such question.", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama\n\nAyyarJ."}}, {"text": "24-12-1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38740, "end_char": 38750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At a late stage, however, he applied to ame.nd the plaint so as to raise the contenttion that the deed dated 26-3-1915 was not in accordance with the Bokaro license, but that application was dismissed by the Subordinate Judge on 24-12-1942."}}, {"text": "Sarada Charan Mitra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 39658, "end_char": 39677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is also in evidence that the draft was sent for scrutiny to Sri Sarada Charan Mitra, a retired Judge of the Calcutta High Court, who was also the legal adviser of the Ramgarh Estate, and there is an endorsement of approval in his hand.", "canonical_name": "Sarada Charan Mitra"}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 39702, "end_char": 39721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is also in evidence that the draft was sent for scrutiny to Sri Sarada Charan Mitra, a retired Judge of the Calcutta High Court, who was also the legal adviser of the Ramgarh Estate, and there is an endorsement of approval in his hand."}}, {"text": "27-7-1914", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39870, "end_char": 39879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And finally, the Board gave sanction on 27-7-1914 not only to the agreement but to the very draft which was sent by Messrs Bird and Co., with the cess clause, as it appears in the deed of 1915."}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40888, "end_char": 40898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ofKaranpura", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 41821, "end_char": 41832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of this contention, Mr. Gupta argued that at the time of the transaction the ward had only about a year and four months to become a major, that by extending the period of the license from 6 to 36 years the agreement in question operated to tie his hands and to prevent him from dealing with his estate for a period of 32 years after he became a major, that the coal mines ofKaranpura were known to be very valuable and the transaction had the effect of binding the proprietor to grant leases down to 1951..and on the rates of salami and royalty fixed in 1907 in the Bokaro license and adopted in the deed of 1915 and that such a transaction was not within section 18."}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42105, "end_char": 42115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42751, "end_char": 42761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ayyar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 42896, "end_char": 42901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Ka1naJ; slI:; a\n\nNa-rain Singh\n\nVe11kata1a1na\n\nAyyar J.\n\nf{aranpura Development Co.,\n\nLtd. v.\n\nRaja J{a1nakshya\n\nNarain Singh\n\nVenkatara1na\n\nAyyarJ,\n\nWe are unable to agree that the transaction in question was beyond the competence of the Court of Wards for any of the above reasons.", "canonical_name": "Ayyar"}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43327, "end_char": 43337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 29(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43512, "end_char": 43525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Guardians and Wards Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43533, "end_char": 43556, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43710, "end_char": 43720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43822, "end_char": 43831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44624, "end_char": 44634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "L.R. 59 I.A. 161", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 47260, "end_char": 47276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "K aranjmra Development Co.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 47279, "end_char": 47305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K aranjmra Development Co.,\n\nUd.", "canonical_name": "K aranjmra Development Co."}}, {"text": "23-II-1917 was", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48346, "end_char": 48360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is next contended for the respondent that the deed dated 23-II-1917 was bad, because in granting an extension of the period fixed in the deed dated 26-3-1915 the Court of Wards considered only the benefit of Messrs Bird and Co., and not that of the ward, and that .therefore its act was not within the protection of section 18."}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48605, "end_char": 48615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 48991, "end_char": 48996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts on which this contention is sought to be supported are these: When Messrs Bird and Co. applied on 3-8-1915 to the Court of Wards for extension of the period of the license, they gave as a reason therefor that the conditions created by war bad greatly upset their arrangements and calculations, that in consequence they were unable to raise or transport capital to India, that they had paid under the license salami of Rs."}}, {"text": "13-8-1915", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49255, "end_char": 49264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his note dated 13-8-1915 Mr. Lister, the Deputy Commissioner, considered that this stand was \"justifiable\", and on 21-6-1916 he forwarded the proposal to the Commissioner observing that \"extension."}}, {"text": "21-6-1916", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49355, "end_char": 49364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his note dated 13-8-1915 Mr. Lister, the Deputy Commissioner, considered that this stand was \"justifiable\", and on 21-6-1916 he forwarded the proposal to the Commissioner observing that \"extension."}}, {"text": "26-6-1916", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49544, "end_char": 49553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In sending this application on to the Board of Revenue on 26-6-1916, the Commissioner endorsed this opinion,"}}, {"text": "13-6-1916", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51612, "end_char": 51621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Referring to this aspect, the Deputy Commissioner stated in his note dated 13-6-1916 that the 'experience gained in the Katras and Jharia coal mines pointed to the wisdom of granting long term license, so that the mines could be worked in the best\n\n/( aranp,.ra Development Co., Ltd. v.\n\nRaja Kamakshya\n\nNarain Singh\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nf{aranpura DJveloP1nent Co.,\n\nUd."}}, {"text": "Katras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 51657, "end_char": 51663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Referring to this aspect, the Deputy Commissioner stated in his note dated 13-6-1916 that the 'experience gained in the Katras and Jharia coal mines pointed to the wisdom of granting long term license, so that the mines could be worked in the best\n\n/( aranp,.ra Development Co., Ltd. v.\n\nRaja Kamakshya\n\nNarain Singh\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nf{aranpura DJveloP1nent Co.,\n\nUd."}}, {"text": "Venkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 51855, "end_char": 51875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Referring to this aspect, the Deputy Commissioner stated in his note dated 13-6-1916 that the 'experience gained in the Katras and Jharia coal mines pointed to the wisdom of granting long term license, so that the mines could be worked in the best\n\n/( aranp,.ra Development Co., Ltd. v.\n\nRaja Kamakshya\n\nNarain Singh\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nf{aranpura DJveloP1nent Co.,\n\nUd.", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama\n\nAyyarJ."}}, {"text": "f{aranpura DJveloP1nent Co.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 51877, "end_char": 51904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Referring to this aspect, the Deputy Commissioner stated in his note dated 13-6-1916 that the 'experience gained in the Katras and Jharia coal mines pointed to the wisdom of granting long term license, so that the mines could be worked in the best\n\n/( aranp,.ra Development Co., Ltd. v.\n\nRaja Kamakshya\n\nNarain Singh\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nf{aranpura DJveloP1nent Co.,\n\nUd.", "canonical_name": "f{aranjiura Development Co., Ltd."}}, {"text": "Raja Ku1nakshya", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 51912, "end_char": 51927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Ku1nakshya\n\nNa rain Singh\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J.\n\ninterests of the proprietor and the Jessee."}}, {"text": "D Kza,:anf>utrac\n\nb h\n\neve or111cn o.J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 54159, "end_char": 54197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If, therefore, there was a license in force for the prospecting and leasing of the mines,\n\nit would certainly be to the advantage of the estate 1956 to extend the life of that license on such terms as might be for the benefit of the estate and the lessee, D Kza,:anf>utrac\n\nb h\n\neve or111cn o.J and it was this aspect that was considered y t e Ltd.\n\nCommissioner in his note."}}, {"text": "Raja I", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 54363, "end_char": 54369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned that v. there was some difference of opinion among the officers Raja Itnent Co, 1\n\nUd.", "canonical_name": "RAJA KAMAKSHYA NARAIN SINGH"}}, {"text": "J{af'anpura Deoeloj>tnent Co", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 65119, "end_char": 65147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Kamakshya Narain Singh\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nJ{af'anpura Deoeloj>tnent Co, 1\n\nUd."}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65303, "end_char": 65313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65400, "end_char": 65410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "11-1917", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 65639, "end_char": 65646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But Rule 242 applies only to leases, and is in terms inapplicable to the deed dated 23-11-1917 which is an agreement."}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65781, "end_char": 65791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65969, "end_char": 65979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "-3-1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 66492, "end_char": 66499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It will be recal1ed that under the deeds dated 26-3-1915 and 23-11-1917 the licensees would be entitled to an extension of the period for 12 years from 26-3-1939 to 26-3-1951 provided that they had taken on lease a minimum area of 20,000 bighas, and that the appellant had, in fact, taken on lease only a total extent of 17,539 bigh\"as under six leases during the years 1922 to 1933."}}, {"text": "15-7-1937", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 67559, "end_char": 67568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant accordingly applied for three leases of the total extent of 2,461 bighas, and the Board gave sanction to the same on 15-7-1937, and on 2-8-1937, the lease deeds were actually executed."}}, {"text": "Mauza Saunda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 67657, "end_char": 67669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of them, that relating to Mauza Saunda, contained, in accordance with the terms of the deed dated 1-6-1937, the following covenant:\n\n\"Provided always that no minimum royalty shall be payable until the expiration of 36 years from the said 26th day of March 1915 or until railway facilities shall be available as aforesaid, whichever event shall first happen\"."}}, {"text": "26th day of March 1915", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 67869, "end_char": 67891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of them, that relating to Mauza Saunda, contained, in accordance with the terms of the deed dated 1-6-1937, the following covenant:\n\n\"Provided always that no minimum royalty shall be payable until the expiration of 36 years from the said 26th day of March 1915 or until railway facilities shall be available as aforesaid, whichever event shall first happen\"."}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69797, "end_char": 69807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71127, "end_char": 71136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Reforms Act XXX of 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 71155, "end_char": 71178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ramgarh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 71194, "end_char": 71201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It must be mentioned that during the pendency of these appeals, by virtue of notifications issued under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act XXX of 1950, the Estate of Ramgarh became vested in the State of Bihar, which thereafter intervened in these appeals.", "canonical_name": "Ramgarh Raj"}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 71223, "end_char": 71237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It must be mentioned that during the pendency of these appeals, by virtue of notifications issued under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act XXX of 1950, the Estate of Ramgarh became vested in the State of Bihar, which thereafter intervened in these appeals."}}, {"text": "State ofBihar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 71351, "end_char": 71364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the hearing, the State filed a memo in the following terms:\n\n\"State ofBihar recognises and accepts as valid the leases granted to the appellant Company whether granted by the Court of Wards or the Raja under the license of 26th March 1915 (as extended by the supplementary documents of 1917 and 1937)."}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 72271, "end_char": 72282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. DAS, C.J., BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, B. P. SINHA and JAFER IMAM JJ.]"}}, {"text": "JAFER IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 72287, "end_char": 72297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. DAS, C.J., BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, B. P. SINHA and JAFER IMAM JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 72304, "end_char": 72325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72327, "end_char": 72342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72632, "end_char": 72642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "arts. 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72717, "end_char": 72732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 72935, "end_char": 72948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patw:i.ris numbering about 28,000 in the whole State of Uttar Pradesh had organized themselves into \"The U.P. Patwaris Associa tions\" with a view to improving their prospects and emoluments."}}, {"text": "U.P. Patwaris Associa", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 72984, "end_char": 73005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patw:i.ris numbering about 28,000 in the whole State of Uttar Pradesh had organized themselves into \"The U.P. Patwaris Associa tions\" with a view to improving their prospects and emoluments."}}, {"text": "2nd February, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 73652, "end_char": 73670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Associ11tion protested against the revised Land Records Manual and passed 11 resolution that all patwaris should submit their resignations on the 2nd February, 1953 requesting that they should be relieved of their duties by the 4th Much, 1953 after which date they will consiVas the man beside his mind altogether for the time being? If so it would not be possible to fix him with the requisite intention. But if he had not gone so deep in drinking, and from the facts it could be found that he knew what he was about, we can apply the rule that a man is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his act or acts.\n\nOf course, we have to distinguish between motive, intention and knowledge. Motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many cases intention and knowledge merge into each other and mean the same thing more or less and intention can be presumed from knowledge.\n\nThe demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote different things. Even in some English decisions, the three ideas are used interchangeably and this has led to a certain amount of confusion.\n\nIn the old English case, Rex v. Meakin(') Baron Alderson referred to the nature of the instrument as an element to be taken in presuming the intention in these words:\n\n\"However, with regard to the intention, drunkenness may perhaps be adverted to according to the nature of the instrument used. If a man uses a stick, you would not infer a malicious intent so strongly against him, if drunk, when he made an intemperate use of it, as he would if he had used a different kind\n\n(1) [1836] 173 E.R. 131; 7 Car. & P. 295.\n\nof weapon; but where a dangerous instrument is used, which, if used, must produce grievous bodily harm, drunkenness can have no effect on the consideration\n\nBasdev\n\nv. of the malicious intent of the party.'' The state of Pepsu In a charge of murdering a child levelled against a husband and wife who we.r~ both drunk at the time, Cliandrasekhara Aiyar J.\n\nPatteson J., observed in Regina v. Gruse and Mary his wife(1)\n\n\"It appears that both these persons were drunk, and although drunkenness is no excuse for any crime wlfatever, yet it is often of very great importance in cases where it is a question of intention. A person may be so drunk as to be utterly unable to form any intention at all, and yet he may be guilty of very great violence.\"\n\nSlightly different words but somewhat more illuminating were used by Coleridge J. 1 in Reg. v. Monkhouse(2)\n\n\"The inquiry as to intent is far less simple than that as to whether an act has been committed, because you cannot look into a man's mind to see what was passing there at any given time. What he intends can only be judged of by what he does or says, and if he says nothing, then his act alone must guide you to your decision. It is a general rule in criminal law, and one founded on common sense, that juries are to presume a man to do what is the natural con sequence of his act. The consequence is sometimes so apparent as to leave no doubt of the intention.\n\nA man could not put a pistol which he knew to be loaded to another's head, and fire it off, without intending to kill him; but even there the state of mind of the party is most material to be considered. For instance, if such an act were done by a born idiot, the intent to kill could not be inferred from the act.\n\nSo, if the defendant is proved to have been intoxicated, the question becomes a more subtle one; but it is of the same kind, namely, was he rendered by intoxication entirely incapable of forming the intent charged?\"\n\n(1) [1838] 173 E.R. 610; 8 Car. & P. 541.\n\n(2) [1849] 4 Cox. C.C. 55.\n\nBasde-v\n\nThe State of Pepsu\n\nChandt'asekhara\n\nAiyar J.\n\n\"Drunkenness is ordinarily neither a defence nor excuse for crime, and where it is available as a partial answer to a charge, it rests on the prisoner to prove it, and it is not enough that he was excited or rendered more irritable, unless the intoxication was such as to prevent his re&training himself from committing the act in question, or to take away from him the power of forming any specific intention. Such a state of drunkenness may no doubt exist\".\n\nA great authority on criminal law Stephen J., postulated the proposition in this manner in Reg. v.\n\nDoherty(')-\n\n\" ........ although you cannot take drunkenness as any excuse for crime, yet when the crime is such that the intention of the party committing it is one of its constituent elements, you may look at the fact that a man was in drink in considering whether he formed the intention necessary to constitute the crime\".\n\nWe may next notice Rex v. Meade(0) where the question was whether there was any misdirection in his summing up by Lord Coleridge, J. The summing up was in these words:\n\n\"In the first place, every one is presumed to know the consequences of his acts. If he be insane, that knowledge is not presumed. Insanity is not pleaded here, but where it is part of the essence of a crime that a motive, a particular motive, shall exist in the mind of the man who does the act, the law declares this-that if the mind at that time is so obscured by drink, if the reason is dethroned and the man is incapable therefore of forming that intent, it justifies the reduction of the charge from murder to manslaughter\".\n\nDarling, J., delivering the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal affirmed the correctness of the summing up but stated the rule in his own word~ as follows: \"A man is taken to intend the natural consequences of his acts. This presumption may, be rebutted (1) in the case of a sober man, in many ways:\n\n(1) [1887] 16 Cox C.C. 806.\n\n(2) [1902] 1 K.B. 895,\n\n(2) it may also be rebutted in the case of a man who is drunk, by shewing his mind to have been so affected by the drink he had taken that he was incapable of knowing that what he was doing was dangerous, i.e., likely to inflict serious injury. If this be proved, t}le presumption that he intended to do grievous bodily harm is rebutted\".\n\nFinally, we have to notice the House of Lord's decision in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Beard(1).\n\nIn this case a prisoner ravished a girl of 13 years of age, and in aid of the act of rape he placed his hand upon her mouth to stop her from screaming, at the same time pressing his thumb upon her throat with the result that she died of suffocation. Drunkenness was pleaded as a defence. Bailhache J., directed the jury that the defence of drunkenness could only prevail if the accused by reason of it did not know what he was doing or did not know that he was doing wrong.\n\nThe jury brought in a verdict of murder and the man was sentenced to death.\n\nThe Court of Criminal Appeal (Earl of Reading C.J., Lord Coleridge J., and Sankey, J.) quashed this conviction on the ground of misdirection following Rex v. Meade(') which established that the presumption that a man intended the natural consequences of his acts might be rebutted in the case of drunkenness by showing that his mind was so affected by the drink that he had taken that he was incapable of knowing that what he was doing was dangerous.\n\nThe conviction was, therefore, reduced to manslaughter. The Crown preferred the appeal to the House of Lords and it was heard by a strong Bench consisting of Lord Chancellor, Lord Birkenhead, Earl of Reading, C.J., Viscount Haldane, Lord Denedin, Lord Atkinson, Lord Sumner, Lord Buckmaster, and Lord Phillimore.\n\nThe Lord Chancellor delivered the judgment of the court.\n\nHe examined the earlier authorities in a lengthy judgment and reached the conclusion that Rex v. Meade(9) stated the Jaw rather too broadly, though on the facts there proved the decision was right. The position \"that a person charged with a crime of violence\n\n(1) [1920j A.C. ~79.\n\n(2) [1909] 1 K.B. 896.\n\nBasdev\n\nThe State of Peps.,\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiyar J.\n\nBasdtv\n\nThe State of Pepsu\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiyar J,\n\nmay show, in order to rebut the presumption that he intended the natural consequences of his acts, that he was so drunk that he was incapable of knowing what he was doing was dangerous ................................ \" which is what is said in Meade's case, was not correct as a general proposition of law and their Lordships laid down three rules:\n\n(1) That insanity, whether produced by drunkenness or otherwise, is a defence to the crime charged;\n\n(2) That evidence of drunkenness which renders the accused incapable of forming the specific intent essential to constitute the crime should be taken into ' consideration with the other facts proved in order to determine whether or not he had this intent;\n\n(3) That evidence of drunkenness falling short of a proved incapacity in the accused to form the intent necessary to constitute the crime, and merely establishing that his mind was affected by drink so that he more readily gave way to some violent passion, does not rebut the presumption that a man intends the natural consequences of bis acts.\n\nThe result of the authorities is summarised neatly and compendiously at page 63 of Russel on Crime, tenth edition, in the following words:\n\n\"The.re is a distinction, however, between the defence of insanity in the true sense caused by excessive drunkenness and the defence of drunkenness which produces a condition such that the drunken man's mind becomes incapable of forming a specific intention. If actual insanity in fact supervenes as the result of alcoholic excess it furnishes as complete an answer to a criminal charge as insanity induced by any other cause.\n\nBut in cases falling short of insanity evidence of drunkenness which renders the accused incapable of forming the specific intent essential to constitute the crime should be taken into consideration with the other facts proved in order to determine whether or not he had this intent, but evidence of drunkenness which falls short of proving such incapacity and merely establishes that the mind of the accused was so affected by drink that he more readily gave way to some violent passion does not\n\nrebut the presumption that a man intends the natu- 7956 ral consequences of his act\".\n\nBasdev In the present case the learned Judges have found v. that although the accused was under the influence of Tile state of Pepsu drink, he was not so much under its influence that - his mind was s.o obscured by the drink that there was Chandrasekharn incapacity in him to form the required intention as Aiyar .r. stated. They go on to observe:-\n\n\"All that the evidence shows at the most is that at times he staggered and was incoherent in his talk, but the same evidence shows that he was also capable of moving himself independently and talking cohe- ,- rently as well. At the same time it is proved that he came to the darwaza of Natha Singh P. W. 12 by himself, that he made a choice for his own seat and that is why he asked the deceased to move away from his place, that after shooting at the deceased he did attempt to get away and was secured at some short distance from the darwaza, and that when secured he realised what he had done and thus requested the witnesses to be forgiven saying that it had happened from him. There is no evidence that when taken to the police station Barnala, he did not talk or go there just as the witnesses and had to be specially supported.\n\nAll these facts, in my opinion, go to prove that there was not proved incapacity in the accused to form the intention to cause bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The accused had, therefore, failed to prove such incapacity as would have been available to him as a defence, and so the law presumes that he intended the natural and probable consequences of his act, in other words, that he intended to inflict bodily injury to the deceased and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death\".\n\nOn this finding the offence is not reduced from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under the second part of section 304 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe conviction and sentence are right and the appeal is dismissed.", "total_entities": 56, "entities": [{"text": "24th August 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35, "end_char": 51, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "24th August 1954 pa§sed in Civil Miscellaneous Writ No."}}, {"text": "5th August 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 212, "end_char": 227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "45 of 1954, after their application for leave to appeal to this Court had been dismissed by that Court's order dated the 5th August 1955. '!'"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 761, "end_char": 771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "DEV\n\nTHE STATE OF PEPSU", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 894, "end_char": 917, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF PEPSU", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 934, "end_char": 958, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 802", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 995, "end_char": 1002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2081, "end_char": 2086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That insanity, whether produced by drunkenness or otherwise, is a defence to the crime charged;\n\nBanarsi Das and others v.\n\nThe State of Utta1 Pradesh\n\nand others\n\nSinha J.\n\n19.56\n\nApril 17\n\n2."}}, {"text": "Basdev", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2240, "end_char": 2246, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Basdev", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "s. 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3168, "end_char": 3174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3182, "end_char": 3199, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Pepsu High Court at Patiala", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3352, "end_char": 3379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 10th May 1955 of the Pepsu High Court at Patiala in Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "J. N. Kaushal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3557, "end_char": 3570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. N. Kaushal and Naunit Lal, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3575, "end_char": 3585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. N. Kaushal and Naunit Lal, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Porus A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3607, "end_char": 3621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3626, "end_char": 3639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Basdev", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3760, "end_char": 3766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J.-The appellant Basdev of the village of Harigarh is a retired military J amadar.", "canonical_name": "Basdev"}}, {"text": "Maghar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3877, "end_char": 3889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He is charged with the murder of a young boy named Maghar Singh, aged about 15 or 16.", "canonical_name": "Maghar Singh 1956"}}, {"text": "12th March, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4076, "end_char": 4092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All of them went to the house of the bride to take the midday meal on the 12th March, 1954."}}, {"text": "Maghar Singh 1956", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4267, "end_char": 4284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But Maghar Singh 1956 did not move.", "canonical_name": "Maghar Singh 1956"}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhara", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4505, "end_char": 4519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The injury proved Basdev f\n\n~ ~. ~ef~~ The party that had assembled for the marriage at the bride's house seems to have made itself very Chandrasekhara merry and much drinking was indulged in.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ."}}, {"text": "liyar J. pellant Jamadar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4571, "end_char": 4595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ap- ; liyar J. pellant Jamadar boozed quite a lot and he became very drunk and intoxicated."}}, {"text": "Wazir Singh Lambardar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 4768, "end_char": 4789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Sessions Judge says \"he was excessively drunk\" and that \"according to the evidence of one witness Wazir Singh Lambardar he was almost in an unconscious condition\"."}}, {"text": "PEPSU High Court at Patiala", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5057, "end_char": 5084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An appeal to the PEPSU High Court at Patiala proved unsuccessful."}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5230, "end_char": 5241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5249, "end_char": 5266, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5270, "end_char": 5281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5289, "end_char": 5306, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5342, "end_char": 5352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5360, "end_char": 5377, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5380, "end_char": 5390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Basdev", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8507, "end_char": 8513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of weapon; but where a dangerous instrument is used, which, if used, must produce grievous bodily harm, drunkenness can have no effect on the consideration\n\nBasdev\n\nv. of the malicious intent of the party.''", "canonical_name": "Basdev"}}, {"text": "Cliandrasekhara Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8680, "end_char": 8701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The state of Pepsu In a charge of murdering a child levelled against a husband and wife who we.r~ both drunk at the time, Cliandrasekhara Aiyar J.\n\nPatteson J., observed in Regina v. Gruse and Mary his wife(1)\n\n\"It appears that both these persons were drunk, and although drunkenness is no excuse for any crime wlfatever, yet it is often of very great importance in cases where it is a question of intention."}}, {"text": "Patteson", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8706, "end_char": 8714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The state of Pepsu In a charge of murdering a child levelled against a husband and wife who we.r~ both drunk at the time, Cliandrasekhara Aiyar J.\n\nPatteson J., observed in Regina v. Gruse and Mary his wife(1)\n\n\"It appears that both these persons were drunk, and although drunkenness is no excuse for any crime wlfatever, yet it is often of very great importance in cases where it is a question of intention."}}, {"text": "Coleridge", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9166, "end_char": 9175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Slightly different words but somewhat more illuminating were used by Coleridge J. 1 in Reg."}}, {"text": "Darling", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12017, "end_char": 12024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Darling, J., delivering the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal affirmed the correctness of the summing up but stated the rule in his own word~ as follows: \"A man is taken to intend the natural consequences of his acts."}}, {"text": "Bailhache", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13109, "end_char": 13118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bailhache J., directed the jury that the defence of drunkenness could only prevail if the accused by reason of it did not know what he was doing or did not know that he was doing wrong."}}, {"text": "Earl of Reading", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13403, "end_char": 13418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court of Criminal Appeal (Earl of Reading C.J., Lord Coleridge J., and Sankey, J.) quashed this conviction on the ground of misdirection following Rex v. Meade(') which established that the presumption that a man intended the natural consequences of his acts might be rebutted in the case of drunkenness by showing that his mind was so affected by the drink that he had taken that he was incapable of knowing that what he was doing was dangerous."}}, {"text": "Sankey", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13448, "end_char": 13454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court of Criminal Appeal (Earl of Reading C.J., Lord Coleridge J., and Sankey, J.) quashed this conviction on the ground of misdirection following Rex v. Meade(') which established that the presumption that a man intended the natural consequences of his acts might be rebutted in the case of drunkenness by showing that his mind was so affected by the drink that he had taken that he was incapable of knowing that what he was doing was dangerous."}}, {"text": "Birkenhead", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14005, "end_char": 14015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Crown preferred the appeal to the House of Lords and it was heard by a strong Bench consisting of Lord Chancellor, Lord Birkenhead, Earl of Reading, C.J., Viscount Haldane, Lord Denedin, Lord Atkinson, Lord Sumner, Lord Buckmaster, and Lord Phillimore."}}, {"text": "Viscount Haldane", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14040, "end_char": 14056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Crown preferred the appeal to the House of Lords and it was heard by a strong Bench consisting of Lord Chancellor, Lord Birkenhead, Earl of Reading, C.J., Viscount Haldane, Lord Denedin, Lord Atkinson, Lord Sumner, Lord Buckmaster, and Lord Phillimore."}}, {"text": "Denedin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14063, "end_char": 14070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Crown preferred the appeal to the House of Lords and it was heard by a strong Bench consisting of Lord Chancellor, Lord Birkenhead, Earl of Reading, C.J., Viscount Haldane, Lord Denedin, Lord Atkinson, Lord Sumner, Lord Buckmaster, and Lord Phillimore."}}, {"text": "Atkinson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14077, "end_char": 14085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Crown preferred the appeal to the House of Lords and it was heard by a strong Bench consisting of Lord Chancellor, Lord Birkenhead, Earl of Reading, C.J., Viscount Haldane, Lord Denedin, Lord Atkinson, Lord Sumner, Lord Buckmaster, and Lord Phillimore."}}, {"text": "Sumner", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14092, "end_char": 14098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Crown preferred the appeal to the House of Lords and it was heard by a strong Bench consisting of Lord Chancellor, Lord Birkenhead, Earl of Reading, C.J., Viscount Haldane, Lord Denedin, Lord Atkinson, Lord Sumner, Lord Buckmaster, and Lord Phillimore."}}, {"text": "Buckmaster", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14105, "end_char": 14115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Crown preferred the appeal to the House of Lords and it was heard by a strong Bench consisting of Lord Chancellor, Lord Birkenhead, Earl of Reading, C.J., Viscount Haldane, Lord Denedin, Lord Atkinson, Lord Sumner, Lord Buckmaster, and Lord Phillimore."}}, {"text": "Phillimore", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14126, "end_char": 14136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Crown preferred the appeal to the House of Lords and it was heard by a strong Bench consisting of Lord Chancellor, Lord Birkenhead, Earl of Reading, C.J., Viscount Haldane, Lord Denedin, Lord Atkinson, Lord Sumner, Lord Buckmaster, and Lord Phillimore."}}, {"text": "State of Peps", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14515, "end_char": 14528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Basdev\n\nThe State of Peps.,", "canonical_name": "State of Pepsu"}}, {"text": "Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14548, "end_char": 14553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasekhara\n\nAiyar J.\n\nBasdtv\n\nThe State of Pepsu\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiyar J,\n\nmay show, in order to rebut the presumption that he intended the natural consequences of his acts, that he was so drunk that he was incapable of knowing what he was doing was dangerous ................................ \" which is what is said in Meade's case, was not correct as a general proposition of law and their Lordships laid down three rules:\n\n(1) That insanity, whether produced by drunkenness or otherwise, is a defence to the crime charged;\n\n(2) That evidence of drunkenness which renders the accused incapable of forming the specific intent essential to constitute the crime should be taken into ' consideration with the other facts proved in order to determine whether or not he had this intent;\n\n(3) That evidence of drunkenness falling short of a proved incapacity in the accused to form the intent necessary to constitute the crime, and merely establishing that his mind was affected by drink so that he more readily gave way to some violent passion, does not rebut the presumption that a man intends the natural consequences of bis acts.", "canonical_name": "Aiyar"}}, {"text": "State of Pepsu", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14570, "end_char": 14584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasekhara\n\nAiyar J.\n\nBasdtv\n\nThe State of Pepsu\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiyar J,\n\nmay show, in order to rebut the presumption that he intended the natural consequences of his acts, that he was so drunk that he was incapable of knowing what he was doing was dangerous ................................ \" which is what is said in Meade's case, was not correct as a general proposition of law and their Lordships laid down three rules:\n\n(1) That insanity, whether produced by drunkenness or otherwise, is a defence to the crime charged;\n\n(2) That evidence of drunkenness which renders the accused incapable of forming the specific intent essential to constitute the crime should be taken into ' consideration with the other facts proved in order to determine whether or not he had this intent;\n\n(3) That evidence of drunkenness falling short of a proved incapacity in the accused to form the intent necessary to constitute the crime, and merely establishing that his mind was affected by drink so that he more readily gave way to some violent passion, does not rebut the presumption that a man intends the natural consequences of bis acts.", "canonical_name": "State of Pepsu"}}, {"text": "Meade", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14857, "end_char": 14862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandrasekhara\n\nAiyar J.\n\nBasdtv\n\nThe State of Pepsu\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiyar J,\n\nmay show, in order to rebut the presumption that he intended the natural consequences of his acts, that he was so drunk that he was incapable of knowing what he was doing was dangerous ................................ \" which is what is said in Meade's case, was not correct as a general proposition of law and their Lordships laid down three rules:\n\n(1) That insanity, whether produced by drunkenness or otherwise, is a defence to the crime charged;\n\n(2) That evidence of drunkenness which renders the accused incapable of forming the specific intent essential to constitute the crime should be taken into ' consideration with the other facts proved in order to determine whether or not he had this intent;\n\n(3) That evidence of drunkenness falling short of a proved incapacity in the accused to form the intent necessary to constitute the crime, and merely establishing that his mind was affected by drink so that he more readily gave way to some violent passion, does not rebut the presumption that a man intends the natural consequences of bis acts."}}, {"text": "Russel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15750, "end_char": 15756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The result of the authorities is summarised neatly and compendiously at page 63 of Russel on Crime, tenth edition, in the following words:\n\n\"The.re is a distinction, however, between the defence of insanity in the true sense caused by excessive drunkenness and the defence of drunkenness which produces a condition such that the drunken man's mind becomes incapable of forming a specific intention."}}, {"text": "Chandrasekharn", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17060, "end_char": 17074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Basdev In the present case the learned Judges have found v. that although the accused was under the influence of Tile state of Pepsu drink, he was not so much under its influence that - his mind was s.o obscured by the drink that there was Chandrasekharn incapacity in him to form the required intention as Aiyar .r.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ."}}, {"text": "Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17127, "end_char": 17132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Basdev In the present case the learned Judges have found v. that although the accused was under the influence of Tile state of Pepsu drink, he was not so much under its influence that - his mind was s.o obscured by the drink that there was Chandrasekharn incapacity in him to form the required intention as Aiyar .r.", "canonical_name": "Aiyar"}}, {"text": "Natha Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 17456, "end_char": 17467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the same time it is proved that he came to the darwaza of Natha Singh P. W. 12 by himself, that he made a choice for his own seat and that is why he asked the deceased to move away from his place, that after shooting at the deceased he did attempt to get away and was secured at some short distance from the darwaza, and that when secured he realised what he had done and thus requested the witnesses to be forgiven saying that it had happened from him."}}, {"text": "Barnala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17911, "end_char": 17918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no evidence that when taken to the police station Barnala, he did not talk or go there just as the witnesses and had to be specially supported."}}, {"text": "section 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18720, "end_char": 18731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18739, "end_char": 18756, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]} {"document_id": "1956_1_372_382_EN", "year": 1956, "text": "April 18\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1956)\n\nMOSEB KAKA CHOWDHRY alias MOSEB\n\nCHOWDHRY AND ANOTHER\n\nTHE STATE OF WEST BENGAL.\n\n[JAGANNADHADAS and B. P. SINHA JJ.)\n\nJ1 non-application of mind, on the part of the detaining authority, viz. the Government, which for. this pur- . pose must be taken to be different from the police.\n\nIt is also clear that the allegation of non-appliC'ation\n\nof mind by the detaining authority is without uny basis, in view of the affidavit of the Chief Secretary.\n\nThe further points that remain for consideration are those which relate to the complaint of vagueness of the grounds furnished and the alleged unsustainable claim for non-disclosure under article 22(6) of the Constitution on behalf of the detaining authority, to get over the alleged vagueness.\n\nTo appreciate the points thus raised, it is necessary to have an idea of the grounds of detention as furnished. They are to be found from the relevant communication to the detenue which is as follows:\n\n\"In pursuance of section 7 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (Act IV of 1950) you are hereby informed that the grounds on which a detention order has been made against you, by the Government of Bombay under sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of subsection (I) of section 3 of the said Act are that: With the financial help given by the Portuguese authorities you are carrying on espionage on behalf of the Portuguese Government with the help of underground workers. You are also collecting intelligence about the security arrangements on the border area and you make such intelligence available to the Portuguese authorities.\n\nThese activities which are being carried on by you with the object of causing further f_, a;:vrc11cc Joachi11t\n\nJoSssary to mention these matters to afford.\n\n•.\\\n\n' ·-\n\n1956 the petitioner reasonable opportunity to make a representation\". d Lau:rence Joachini Now the question as to whether the grounds furnishe Joseph D'Souza are vague or not, is ultimately a question that has to v. be determined on a consideration of the circumstances The State of of each case, as was pointed out by this court in the Bombay State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya(1) in the J -\n\nJ: 11 agannadl111das J. 10 owmg passage:\n\n\"The contention that the grounds are vague requires some clarification. .................... If the ground which is supplied is incapable of being understood or defined with sufficient certainty it can be called vague.\n\nIt is not possible to state affirmatively more on the question of what is vague. It must vary according to the circumstances of each case. ........... ......... If on reading the ground furnished it is capable of being intelligently understood and is sufficiently definite to furnish materials to enal:ile the detained person to make a representation against the order of detention it cannot be called vague\".\n\nIn the present ca&e, the detenue has been intimated why, in the opinion of the Government the activities of the appellant are considered prejudicial to the security of India and to the relations of India with Portugal. They are the following: 1.\n\nWith the financial help given by the Portuguese authorities, he is carrying on espionage on behalf of the Portuguese Government with the help of underground workers. 2.\n\nHe is collecting intelligence about the security arrangements on the border area and making such intelligence available to the Portuguese authorities.\n\n3. He is carrying on these activities with the object of causing further deterioration in the relations between the Portuguese Government and the Indian Government over the question of the Goan National Movement.\n\nIt is true that these allegations are not as precise and specific as might have been desired.\n\nBut having regard to the nature of the alleged activities of the ap pellant, it is not unlikely that no more could be gathered or furnished. In this context it is relevant\n\n(1) [1951] S.C.R. 167, 184.\n\n1956 to notice that the appellant himself does not appear to ha.ve felt that the grounds furnished were so vague Lrnvrcucc Joachitn h Joseph D'Souza as to am per him in his right to make a representav. tion under article 22(5) and section 7 of the Act. It The state of does not appear that he applied to the Government B\"mbay to be supplied with particulars of the grounds fur- --_nished to him.\n\nSuch a right to call for particulars - J,, ga111wuhadas J. h b Dwa1ka Prasad Laxmi. Narain v. The State of Uttar Prade•h and two others ([1954] S.C.R. 803), referred to.\n\n(15) Nor could it be contended that the impugned Act and the notifications contravened the provisions of Art. 301 of the Consti tution in view of the prnvision of Art. 304(b) which made it per missible for the State Legislature to impose reasonable restrictions in the public interest.\n\nCommonwealth of Aust..alia v. Bank of New South Wales ((1950) A.C. 235) and Hughes and Vale Proprietary Ltd. v. State of New South Wales and othe1s ([1955] A.C. 241), referred to.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petitions Nos. 585, 599, 611, 622, 625, 565, 576 of 1954 and 48, 58, 415, 416 of 1955 and IO, 16, 37, 39 and 47 of 1956.\n\nUnder Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.\n\nG. S. Pathak, Rameshwar Nath and K. R.\n\nChowdhry, for petitioners in Petitions Nos. 10, 37 and 47 of 1956.\n\nJ. N. Bannerji and V. S. Sawhney, for petitioners in Petition No. 622 of 1954.\n\nS. P. Sinha and K. R. Ohowdhry, for petitioners in Petition No. 585 of 1954.\n\nB. B. Tawakley and K. P. Gupta, for petitioners in Petitions Nos. 565 and 576 of 1954.\n\nK. R. Ohowdhry, for petitioners in Petitions Nos. 599 and 611of1954 and 58, 415 and 416 of 1955 and 16 and 39 of 1956.\n\nR. Patnaik and K. R. Ohowdkry, for petitioners in Petition No. 48 of 1955.\n\nR. Patnaik, for petitioners in Petition No. 625 of 1954.\n\nK. L. Misra, Advocate-General, U.P., K. B. Asthana and 0. P. Lal, for the State of U.P. and the Cane Commissioner, U.P. in all the Petitions.\n\n0. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, and Jagdish Chandra, for the Cane-Growers' Co-operative Development .Unions in Petitions Nos. 585 and 625 of 1954 and 10 and 47. of 1956.\n\nJagdish Chandra, for the Cane-Growers' Co-ope-_ rative Development Unions in rest of the petitions except Petition No. 37 of 1956.\n\nD. N. Mukerji, for Daurala Sugar Mills (respondent No. 4) in Petitions Nos. 611 of 1954, 58, 415 and 416 of 1955.\n\n0. N. Srivastava, for Punjab Sugar Mills in Petitions Nos. 48 of 1955 and 47of1956.\n\nA. S. Chawla, for respondent No. 3 in Petition No. 10 of 1956.\n\nGanpat Rai for respondent No. 9 in Petition No, IO of 1956.\n\nCh. Tika Rarnfi and others, etc.\n\nv. - The State of Uttar P, radesh\n\nand others\n\nCh. Tika Ramji and others, etc.\n\nv.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nafid others\n\n1956. April 24.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI J.-These Petitions under article 32 of the Constitution impugn the validity of the U.P.\n\nSugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 (U.P. Act XXIV of 1953) hereinafter called the impugned Act and the notifications dated 27th September, 1954 and 9th November, 1955 issued by the U. P. Government thereunder.\n\nThe petitioners are sugarcane growers in the several villages of the Districts of Meerut, Kheri, Gorakhpur and Deoria in the State of U.P. numbering 4,724 in the aggregate. Associated with them are the President, the Vice-Presidents and the Secretary of an association which is styled \"the Gauna Utpadak Sangh\" which is a rival body to the Co-operative Development Unions established and recognised under the impugned Act.\n\nThe notification dated 27th September, 1954, issued in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section l(a) read with sub-section 2(b) of section 16 of the impugned Act ordered that where not less than 3/4 of the cane growers of the area of operation of a Cane Growers Co-operative Society are members of the Society, the occupier of the factory for which the area is assigned shall not purchase or enter into agreement to purcha.se citne grown by a cane grower except through such Cane Growers Co-operative Society. The notification dated 9th November, 1955 was issued in exercise of the powers conferred by section 15 of the impugned Act and reserved or assigned to the !!Ugar factories mentioned in column 2 of the Schedule annexed thereto the cane purchasing centres (with the authorities attached to them) specified against them in column 3 for the purpose of supply of sugarcane during the crushing season 1955-56 subject to the conditions and explanations given therein. The former relates to the agency of supply of sugarcane to the factories and the latter relates to the creation of zones for particular factories. All the Petitions except Nos. 10 of 1956 and 37 of 1956 impugn the former notification\n\n. ?\n\nbut the grounds of attack against both are common.\n\nThe impugned Act is challenged as ultra vires the powers of the State Legislature, the subject-matter of the Act being within the exclusive field of Parliament and also as being repugnant to Act LXV of 1951 and Act X of 1955 passed by Parliament, and section 15 and section 16(l)(a) and2(b) and the notifications issued thereunder are challenged as unconstitutional inasmuch as they infringe the fundamental rights guaranteed under arttcle 14, article 19(1)(c),\n\n(f) and (g) and article 31 besides being in violation of article 301 of the Constitution. All these Petitions involve common questions of law and may be disposed of by one judgment.\n\nA short history of the legislation enacted by the Centre as well as the Province of U.P. in regard to sugar and sugarcane will be helpful for the determination of the questions arising in these Petitions. On 8th April, 193~, the Cenral Legislature passed t.he Sugar Industry (Protection) Act, 1932 (Act XIII of\n\n1932) to provide for the fostering and developmen~ of Sugar Industry in India in pursuance of the policy of discriminating protection of industries with due regard to the well being of the community.\n\nAs a result of the protection thus granted to the sugar industry, the number of sugar factories which was 31 prior thereto registered a rapid rise and by 1938 they were 139 in number. There was also a large expansion in the cultivation of sugarcane and millions of cultivators in the Province of U.P. took to growing sugarcane. In order to protect their interests and for the purpose of assuring to them a fair price for their produce, the Central Legislature enacted on 1st May, 1934 the Sugarcane Act, 1934 (Act XV of\n\n1934) to regulate the price at which sugarcane intended to be used in the manufacture of sugar might be purchased by or for factories. Sugarcane was grown in various Provinces and the declaration of controlled areas and the fixing of minimum price for the purchase of sugarcane intended for use in any factory in any controlled area was of necessity left to the Provincial Governments and the Provincial\n\nCh. Tika Ramji and others, etc. v .• The State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand others\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nCh. Tika Ramji and others, etc, v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh and others\n\nBhagwatiJ,\n\nGovernments were also empowered to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect. the objects of the Act including, in particular, the organisation of growers of sugarcane into Co-operative Societies for the sale of sugarcane to factories.\n\nWith tbe coming into operation of the Government of India Act, 1935, there was a distribution oflegislative powers between the Dominion Legislature and the Provincial Legislatures and agriculture (Entry No. 20), trade and commerce within the Province (Entry No. 27) and production, supply and distribution of goods, development of industries subject to the provision in List I with respect to development of certain industries under Dominion control (Entry No. 29) were included in List II, the Provincial Legislative List. The relevant provision in List I was contained in Entry No. 34: \"Development of industries where development under Dominion control is declared to be in the public interest\". As a result of this distribution of legislative powers, the entire subject-matter of Act XV of 1934 fell within the Provincial Legislative List. It was felt that Act XV of1934 was not sufficiently comprehensive for dealing with the problems of the sugar industry and it was found necessary to replace it by a new measure which would provide for the better organisation of cane supplies to sugar factories. The Governments of U.P. and Bihar, therefore, decided in consultation with each other to introduce legislation on similar lines for both the Provinces which together accounted for nearly 85 prtr cent. of production of sugar in India.\n\nThe U.P. Legislature accordingly enacted on 10th February, 1938 the U.P. Sugar Factories Control Act, 1938 (U.P. Act I of 1938) to provide for the licensing of the sugar factories and for regulating the supply of sugarcane intended for use in such factories and the price at which it may be purchased and for other incidental matters. This Act provided for (a) the licensing of sugar factories, (b) the regulation of the supply of sugarcane to factories, (c) the minimum price for sugarcane, ( d) the establishment of Sugar Control Board and Advisory Committee, and (e) a\n\ntax on the sale of sugarcane intended for use in factories, and repealed Act XV of 1934.\n\nThis Act was to remain in force initially until 30th June, 1947 but the period was extended to 30th June, 1950 by U.P.\n\nAct XIII of 1947 and to 30th June, 1952 by U.P. Act XXI of 1950.\n\nThe Second World War intervened and an emergency was proclaimed by the Governor-General under section 102 of the Government of India Act, 1935.\n\nThe Dominion Legislature acquired the power to make laws for the Provinces with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the Provincial Legislative List. The result was in effect to make the Provincial Legislative List also a Concurrent Legislative List for the operation of the Dominion Legislature but if any provision of a Provincial law was repugnant to any provision of the Dominion law made in exercise of that power, the Dominion law was to prevail and the Provincial law was to be void to the extent of the repugnancy. The proclamation of emergency was to operate until revoked by a subsequent proclamation and laws made by the Dominion Legislature as above were to have effect until the expiration. of a period of six months after the proclamation had ceased to operate. The Defence of India Act and the Rules made thereunder occupied the field, sugar was made a controlled commodity in the year 1942 and its production and distribution as well as the fixation ofsugarprices were regulated by the Sugar Controller thereafter. The proclamation of emergency was revo\\rnd on lst April, 1946 and the laws made by the Dominion Legislature in the field of the Provincial Legislative List were to cease to have effect after 30th September, 1946. On 26th March, 1946, the British Parliament enacted the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946 (9 & 10 Geo. 6, Chapter 39). Section 2(1)(a) provided that notwithstanding anything in the Government of India Act, 1935, the Indian Legislature shall during the period mentioned in section 4 of the Act have power to make laws with respect to the following matters:\n\n\"(a) trade and commerce (whether or not within\n\nCh. Tika Ramji and others, etc,\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand others\n\nBl!agwati J.\n\nCh. Tika Ramji and others, etc. v.\n\nTlte State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand others\n\nBhagwatiJ,\n\na Province) in, and the production, supply and distribution of, cotton and woollen textiles, paper (including newsprint), foodstuffs (including edible oil seeds and oils), petroleum and petroleum products, spare parts of mechanically propelled vehicles, coal, . tld' ,, iron, s ee an mica; ....... .\n\nThe period provided in section 4 was the period of one year beginning with the date on which the proclamation of emergency ceased to operate or, if the Governor-General by a public notification directed, a period of 2 years beginning with that date. There was a proviso to that section that if and so often as a resolution approving the extension of the said. period was passed by both Houses of Parliament, the same period shall be extended for a further period of 12 months from the date on which it would otherwise expire but it was not to continue in any case for more than 5 years from the date on which the proclamation of emergency ceased to operate.\n\nActing under the power reserved to it under section 2(1) (a) aforesaid, the Central Legislature enacted on 19th November, 1946, the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 (Act XXIV of 1946) to provide for the continuance during the limited period of powers to control production, supply and distributiOn of, and trade and commerce in, certain commodities. Section 1(3) of the Act provided that it shall cease to have effect on the expiration of the period mentioned in section 4 of the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946. In the absence of a notification by the Governor-General, the Act remained operative until 31st March, 1947 only.\n\nThe Governor-General, however, issued a notification on 3rd March, 1947 continuing its force for a period of two years from the date of the cessation of emergency. By virtue of this notification, the Act would have remained in force till 31st March, 1948. On 18th July, 1947, the Indian Independence Act was passed and India became a Dominion on 15th August, 1947.\n\nUnder section 9 read with section 19(4) of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, the Governor-General passed an order on 14th August, 1947 which substituted the\n\nwords \"Dominion Legislature\" for \"Both Houses of Parliament\" in the proviso to section 4 of India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946 and also introduced a new section 4(a) by way of adaptation providing that the powers of the Dominion Legislature shall be exercised by the Constituent Assembly. On 25th February, 1948, the Constituent Assembly passed its first Resolution extending the operation of the Act for one year up to 31st March,\n\n1949. On 3rd March, 1949, a second Resolution was passed by the Assembly extending the life of the Act by one year more up to 31st March, 1950.\n\nWith the advent of our Constitution on 26th January, 1950, Parliament was invested under article 369 with power for a period of 5 years from the .commencement of the Constitution to make laws with respect to the following matters as if they were enumerated in the Concurrent List:\n\n\"(a) trade and commerce within a State in, and the production, supply and distribution of, ........ foodstuffs (including edible oil seeds and oil), ............... \"\n\nThe life of the Act was accordingly extended from time to time up to 26th January 1955 by Acts passed by Parliament.\n\nAct XXIV of 1946 defined an essential commoditv to mean any of the following classes of commodities:\n\n\"(1) Foodstuffs,. ............... \" Food crops were defined as including crops of sugarcane.\n\nSection 3 of the Act empowered the Central Government, so far as it appeared to it to be necessary or expedient for maintaining or increasing the supply of any essential commodity or for securing its equitable disribution and availability at fair prices to provide for regulating or prohibiting' the production, supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein. On 7th October, 1950, the Central Government, in exercise of the powers conferred upon it by section 3 of the Act, promulgated the Sugar and Gur Control Order, 1950, inter alia empowering it to prohibit or to restrict the export of sugarcane from any area, to direct that no gur or sugar shall be\n\nCh. Tika Ramji and others, etc. v.\n\nThe Stat• of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand others\n\nBhagu:ati}.\n\nCh. Tika Ratnji aud others, etc. v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand otlic,.s\n\nBhag1r.:ati J,\n\nmanufactured from sugarcane except under and in accordance with the conditions specified in the licence issued in this behalf and to prohibit or to restrict the despatch of gur or sugar from any State or any area therein. Power was also given to fix minimum price of sugarcane and no person was to sell or agree to sell sugarcane to a producer and no producer was to purchase or agree to purchase sugarcane at a price lower than that notified thereunder. This power of fixing the price of sugarcane was exercised by the Central Government from time to time by issuing notifications fixing the minimum prices to be paid by the producers of sugar by vacuum pan process or their agents for sugarcane purchased by them during the 1950-51 crushing season iu various States including U.P.\n\nOn 31st October, 1951, Parliament enacted the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (Act LXV of 1951) to provide for the development and regulation of certain industries. By section 2 , of the Act it was declared that it was expedient in the public interest that the Union should take under its control the industries specified in the First SchEdule which included in item 8 thereof the industry engaged in the manufacture or production of sugar.\n\nThe Province of Bihar which, along with U.P. contributed to nearly 85 per cent. of production of sugar in India had also on its Statute Book the Bihar Sugar Factories Control Act VII of 1937. On 10th\n\nApril, 1938, a joint meeting of the U.P. and the Bihar Sugar Control Boards was held at which it was resolved that a Committee be appointed to enquire into the working of the sugarcane rnles and labour conditions prevailing in the sugar factories in the two Provinces.\n\nThe Governments of the U.P. and Bihar accepted this recommendation of the Sugar Control Boards and accordingly appointed the Khaitan Committee, (1) to examine the working of the sugarcane rules, (2) to look into the complaints of malpractices received from time to time in connection with the supply of sugarcane to the sugar factories, (3) to enquire in to the labour conditions of the sugar factories, and (4) to suggest remedial measures for the shortcomings as\n\nnoted in (1), (2) and (3) above. Shibban Lal Saxena, the present President of the Ganna Utpadak Sangh and one of the petitioners before us was also a member of that Committee. That Committee submitted its Report in 1940 recommending inter alia abolition of the dual system of supply and creation of a strong co-operative organisation of the sugarcane growers themselves as also creation of a zonal system. The Indian Tariff Board had also, in the nieanwhile, made its Report on the sugar industry in the year 1938 commending the advantages of a zonal system. There was further the report of the U. P. Sugar Industry Enquiry Committee, 1951 called the Swaminathan Committee, which also recommended the abolition of dual agencies of cane supplies to factories and commended the desirability of employing the agency of t.he Co-operative Societies for the purpose. It also recommended that the U. P. Act I of 1938 should be amended in order to make this regulation possible.\n\nAct LXV of 1951 was brought into force with effect from 8th May, 1952. In view of the same, certain provisions of U. P. Act I of 1938 became inoperative.\n\nThe U.P. Legislature, therefore, passed on 29th June, 1952 the U. P. Sugar Factories Control (Amendment) Act, 1952, deleting those provisions and putting the amended Act permanently on the Statute Book. The U. P. Act I of 1938, as thus amended, continued in force till, as a result of the prior enactment of Act LXV of 1951 and the report of the Indian Tariff Board on the Sugar Industry as well as the reports of the Khaitan Committee and the Swaminathan Committee mentioned above, the U. P. Legislature enacted the impugned Act.\n\nThe object of the enactment was stated to be as follows: \"With the promulgation of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 with effect from 8th May, 1952, the regulation of the sugar industry has become exclusively a Central subject. The State Governments are now only concerned with the supply of sugarcane to the sugar factorioes. The Bill is being introduced in order to provide for a rational distribution of sugarcane to factories, for its development on organised\n\nCh. Tika Ratnji and otlrers, etc, v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand others\n\nBhagwatij.\n\nCh. Tika Rarnji and others. etc,\n\nTlie State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand otlters\n\nBltagn:a(i J.\n\nscientific lines, to protect the interests of the ca:ne growers and of the industry and to put the new Act permanently on the Statute Book\" (Vide Statement of objects and reasons published in the U. P. Gazette Extraordinary dated 15th July, 1953). This is the impugned Act the vires of which is challenged in these Petitions. In exorcise of the rule-making power conferred by section 28 of the Act, the U.P. Government made the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Rules, 1954. The U. P. Government also, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 16 of the Act, promulgated the U.P. Sugarcane Supply and Purchase Order, 1954, which came into effect from 19th September, 1954. All these related to the supply and purchase of sugarcane in U.P.\n\nAct LXV of 1951 was amended by Act XXVI of 1953 which, by adding Chapter IIl(b), invested the Central Government inter alia with power so far as it appeared to it necessary or expedient for securing the equitable distribution and availability at fair prices of any article or class of articles relatable to any scheduled industry to provide by notified order for regulation of supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein.\n\nOn 1st April, 1955, Parliament enacted the Essential Commodit.ies Act, 1955 (Act X of 1955) to provide in the interests of the general public for the control of production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, certain commodities.· The essential commodity there was defined to mean any of the following classes of commodities:\n\n\"(v) foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds and oils;\n\n(xi) any other class of commodity which the Central Government may, by notified order declare to be an essential commodity for the purposes of this Act, being a commodity with respect to which Parlia ment has power to make laws by virtue of Entry 33 in List III in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution;'' Foodcrops were defined as inclusive of crops of sugarcane. Section 3(1) empowered the Central Government, if it was of the opinion that it was necessary or expedient to do so for maintaining or increasing the supply of any essential commodity or for securing its equitable distribution and availability at fair prices, to provide by order for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein. Section 3(2)\n\n(b) inter alia provided for the making of such an order for bringing under cultivation any waste or arable land whether appurtenant to a building or not, for the growing thereon off oodcrops generally or of specified foodcrops. Section 16 of the Act repealed (a) the Essential Commodities Ordinance, 1955, and (b) any other law in force in any State immediately before the commencement of the Act in so far as such law controlled or authorised the control of the production, supply and dist.ribution of, and trade and commerce in, any essential commodity.\n\nIn exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Act, the Central Government promulgated on 27th August, 1955 the Sugar Control Order, 1955 and the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955. The latter empowered the Central Government, after consultation with such authorities, bodies or associations as it may deem fit by notification in the official Gazette from time to time, to fix the price of sugarcane and direct payment thereof and also to regulate the movement of sugarcane. The power to regulate the movement of sugarcane comprised the power to prohibit or restrict or otherwise regulate the export of sugarcane from any area for supply to different factories and the power to direct that no gur (jaggery) or sugar shall be manufactured from sugarcane except under and in accordance with the conditions specified in a licence issued in this behalf. Clause 7 of this order provided that the Sugar and Gur Control Order, 1950, published by the Government of India in the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, S.R.O. 735 dated 7th October, 1950, and any order made by a State Government or other authority reulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution of sugarcane and trade or\n\nCli. Tika Ramji and others, etc. v.\n\nThe Stato of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand others\n\nBhagwati].\n\nCh. Tika Raniji and others, etc. v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand others\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\ncommerce therein were thereby repealed except as respect to things done or omitted to be done under any such order before the commencement of the order.\n\nThese are the 1especti ve Acts and Notifications passed by the Centre as well as the State of U. P. in regard to sugar and sngarcane.\n\nLearned counsel for the petitioners urged before us:\n\n(1) that the State of U. P. had no power to enact the impugned Act as the Act is with respect to the snbject of industries the control of which by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest within the meaning of Entry 52 of List I and is, therefore, within the exclnsive province of Parliament.\n\nThe impugned Act is, therefore, ultra vires the powers of the State Legislature and is a colourable exercise of legislative power by the State;\n\n(2) the impngned Act is repugnant to Act LXV of 1951 and Act X of 1955 and in the event of the Court holding that the impugned Act was within the legislative competence of the State Legislature, it is void by reason of such repugnancy;\n\n(3) the impugned Act stands repealed to the extent that it has been repealed by section 16 of Act X of 1955 and by clause 7 of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955, made in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of Act X of 1955;\n\n(4) the impugned Act infringes the fundamental right guaranteed by article 14 inasmuch as very wide powers are given to the Cane Commissioner which can be used in a discriminatory manner;\n\n(5) the impugned Act and the notification dated 27th September, 1954, violate the fundamental right guaranteed under article 19(l)(c) in that the Co-operative Societies are not volunt.ary organisations but a cane grower is compelled to become a member of the Society before he can sell his sugarcane to a factory;\n\n(6) the impugned Act and the notifications infringe the fundamental right guaranteed by article 19(1)(f) and (g) and article 31 of the Constitution;\n\n(7) the impugned Act is void in that it confers\n\nvery wide powers on executive officials and is a piece of delegated legislation; and\n\n(8) the impugned Act is destructive of the freedom of trade and commerce and thus is violative of article 301 of the Constitution.\n\nRe. (1): This contention relates to the legislative competence of the U.P. State Legislature to enact the impugned Act. It was contended that, even though the impugned Act purported to legislate in regard to sugarcane required for use in sugar factories, it was, in pith and substance, and in its true nature and effect legislation in regard to sugar industry which had been declared by Act LXV of 1951 to be an industry the control of which by the Union was expedient in the public interest and was, therefore, within the exclusive province of Parliament under Entry 52 of List I .. The word 'industry', it was contended, was a word of very wide import and included not only the process of m_anufacture or production but also all things which were necessarily incidental to it, viz., the raw materials for the industry as also the products of that industry and would, therefore, include within its connotation the production, supply and distribution of raw materials for that industry which meant sugarcane in relation to sugar industry.\n\nIt was also contended that in so far as the impugned Act purported to legislate in regard to sugarcane which was a necessary ingredient in the production of sugar it was a colourable exercise of legislative power by the State, ostensibly operating in its own field within Entry 27 of List II but really trespassing upon the field of Entry 52 of List I.\n\nIt was contended on behalf of the State on the other hand that, after the advent of war and the proclamation of emergency under section 102 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and by the combined operation of th.e India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946 and article 369 of the Constitution taken along with the resolutions of the Houses of Parliament extending the life of Act XXIV of 1946 up to 26th January, 1955 and the Third Constitution Amendment Act of 1954 amending Entry 33 of List\n\nCit. Tika Ramji and others, etc. ., .\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nattd others\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nCh. Tika Ramji and others, etc, v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand others\n\nIII, the Central Legislature was operating all along on what became in effect the Concurrent field even in regard to sugarcane, that the investing of the Central Government with power to legislate in this sphere of the Provincial List did not deprive the Provincial Legislature of such power and that both the Central Legislature as well as the State Legislatures had legislative competence to legislate in regard to these fields which were for the purpose of legislative competence translated into Concurrent fields and that, therefore, the U.P. State Legislature was competent to enact the impugned Act which would be valid within its own sphere except for repugnancy with any of the provisions of the Central Legislature covering the same field.\n\nThe relevant Entries in the respective Lists of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution are as follows:\n\nList I, Entry 52: Industries, the control of which by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public illterest.\n\nList II, Entry 24: Industries subject to the provisions of entry 52 of List I.\n\nEntry 27: Production, supply and distribution of goods subject to the provisions of entry 33 of List III.\n\nList III, Entry 33: As it stood prior to its amendment:- Trade and commerce in and production, supply and distribution of, the products of industries where the control of such industries by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest.\n\nEntry 33 as amended by the Constitution Third Amendment Act, 1954: Trade and commerce in, a.nd the production, supply and distribution of,- ( a) the products of any industry where the control of such industry by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest, and imported goods of the same kind as such products; _\n\n(b) foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds and oils;\n\n( c) cattle fodder, including oilcakes and other concentrates;\n\n(d) raw cotton, whether ginned or unginned, and cotton-seed; and\n\n(e) raw jute.\n\nProduction, supply and distribution of goods was no doubt within the exclusive sphere of the . State Legislature but it was subject to the provisions of Entry 33 of List III which gave concurrent powers of legislation to the Union as well as the States in the matter of trade and commerce in, and the production, supply and distribution of, the products of industries where the control of such industries by the\n\nUnion was declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest. The controlled industries were relegated to Entry 52 of List I which was the exclusive province of Parliament lea Ying the other industries within Entry 24 of List II which was the exclusive province of the State Legislature. The prnducts of industries which were comprised in Entry 24 of List II were dealt with by the State Legisl!l-tures which had under Entry 27 of that List power to legislate in regard to the production, supply and distribution of goods, goods according to the definition contained in article 366(12) including all raw materials, commodities and articles.\n\nWhen, however it came to the products of the controlled industries comprised in Entry 52 of List I, trade and commerce in, and production, supply and distribution of, these goods became the subject-matter of Entry 33 of List III and both Parliament and the State Legislatures had jurisdiction to legislate in regard thereto.\n\nThe amendment of Entry 33 of List III by the Constitution Third Amendment Act, 1954, only enlarged the scope of that Entry without in any manner whatever detracting from the legislative competence of Parliament and the State Legislatures to legislate in regard to the same. If the matters had stood there, the sugar industry being a controlled industry, legislation in regard to the same would have been in the exclusive province of Parliament and production, supply and distribution of the product of sugar industry,\n\nCh. Tika Ramji\n\nand ot/iers, etc. v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand others\n\nBhn g.,-ati J.\n\nCh. Tika Ramji and others, etc. v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh and others\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nviz., sugar as a finished product would have been within Entry 33 of List III. Sugarcane would certainly not have been comprised within Entry 33 of List III as it was not the product of sugar industry which was a controlled industry. It was only after the amendment of Entry 33 of .List III by the Constitution Third Amendment Act, 1954 that foodstuffs including edible oilseeds and oils came to be included within that List and it was possible to legislate in regard to sugarcane, having recourse to Entry 33 of List III. Save for that, sugarcane, being goods, fell directly within Entry 27 of List II and was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State Legislatures.\n\nProduction, supply and distribution of sugarcane being thus within the exclusive sphere of the State Legislatures, the U. P. State Legislature would be, without anything more, competent to legislate in regard to the same and the impugned Act would be intra vires the State Legislature.\n\nThe argument, however, was that the word 'industry' was a word of wide import and should be construed !LS including not only the process of manufacture or production but also activities antecedent thereto such as acquisition of raw materials and subsequent thereto such as disposal of the finished products of that industry. The process of acquiring raw materials was an integral part of the industrial process and was, therefore, included in the connotation of the word 'industry' and when the Central Legislature was invested with the power to legislate ih regard to sugar industry which was a controlled industry by Entry 52 of List I, that legislative power included also the power to legislate in regard to the raw material of the sugar industry, that is sugarcane, and the production, supply and distribution of sugarcane was, by reason of its being the necessary ingredient in the process of manufacture or production of sugar, within the legislativ_e compeence o~ th~ Central Legislature. Each entry m the Lists which 1s a category or head of the subject-matter of legislation must be construed not in a narrow or restricted sense but as widely as possible so as to extend to all ancillary\n\nor subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be said to be cbmprehended in it (Vide The United Provinces v. Mst. Atiqa Begum and Others(1), Thakur Jagannath Baksh Singh v. The United Provinces( 2), and Megh Raj and Another v. Allah Rakhia and Others(3)), and the topic 'industries' should, therefore, be construed to include the raw materials which are the necessary ingredients thereof and which form an integral part of the industrial process.\n\nOur attention was drawn in this connection to the definition of 'industry' in section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947):\n\n\" \"Industry\" means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen\" and also to the wide construction which was put upon the term 'industry' in the Australian Insurance Staffs' Federation\n\nv. The Accident Underwriters' Association and Others(4) where it was construed to include \"all forms of employment in which large number of persons are employed, the sudden cessation of whose work might prejudicially affect the orderly conduct of the ordinary operations of civil life\". A similarly wide interpretation was put on the word 'industry' by our Court in D. JV. Banerji v. P. R . 1llukherjee and Others(5) where the dispute was between a Municipality and its employees. These interpretations of the term 'industry', however, do not help us because in defining the word 'industry' in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as also in putting the wide construction on the term 'industry' in [1923] 33 C.L.R. 517, as well as 1953 S.C.R. 302, they were concerned mainly with the question whether an industrial dispute arose between employers and employees.\n\nWhether a particular concern came within the definition of an 'employer' was determined with respect to the criterion ultimately adopted\n\n(1) [1940] F.O.R. 110, 134.\n\n(2) i19J6] F CR. 111, 1111.\n\n\\3) [1947] P.C.R. 77.\n\n(1) [1923133 O.L.R. 517.\n\n15 [1953] 8.U R 302. 51\n\nCh. Tika Rarnji and others,' tc. v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand otheis\n\nBhag1rnti J.\n\n19>6 which was that the sudden cessation of such c r---R .. • work might prejudicially affect the orderly conduct .::i 0;:,;,.:;;:: of the ordinar~ operations of civil life and the withv. drawal of servwe would be detrimental to the indus- The S•••• of trial system of the community and might result in UttarPraduh its dislocation.\n\nWhat we are concerned with here is and others h 'd t b J not t e w1 e cons ruction to e put on t 1e term 'in- BTiagwatiJ. dustry' as such but whether the raw materials of an industry which form an integral part of the process are within the topic of 'industry' which forms the subject-matter of Item 52 of List. I as an.cillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly or reasonably be said to be comprehended in that topic and whether the Central Legislature while legislating upon sugar industry could, acting within the sphere of Entry 52 of List I, as well legislate upon sugarcane.\n\nIf both the Central Legislature and the Provincial Legislatures were entitled to legislate in regard to this subject of production, supply and distribution of sugarcane, there would arise no question of legislative competence of the Provincial Legislature in the matter of having enacted the impugned Act. The conflict, if any, arose by reason of the interpretation which was sought to be put on the two Entries, Entry 52 of List I and Entry 27 of List II put in juxtaposition with each other. It. was suggested that Item 52 of List I comprised not only legislation in regard to sugar industry but also in regard to sugarcane which was an essential ingredient of the industrial process of the manufacture or production of sugar and was, therefore, ancillary to it and was covered within the topic.\n\nIf legislation with regard to sugarcane thus came within the exclusive province of the Central Legislature, the Provincial Legislature was not entitled to legislate upon the same by having resort to Entry 27 of List II and the impugned Act was, therefore, ultra vires the Provincial Legislature.\n\nThere was an apparent conflict between the legislative powers of the Centre and of the Provinces in this respect which conflict could n-ot ha\\•e been intended and, therefore, a reconciliation was to be attempted by reading the two provisions together and by inter-\n\npreting and where necessary modifying the language of one by that of the other. Reliance was placed on the observations of the Judicial Committee in The Citizens Insurance Company of Canada v. William Parsons(1):\n\n\"In these cases it is the duty of the Courts, how ever difficult it may be, to ascertain in what degree, and to what extent, authority to deal with matters falling within these classes of subjects exists in each legislature, and to define in the particular case before them the limits of their respective powers.\n\nIt could not have been the intention that a conflict should exist; and, in order to prevent such a result, the two sections must be read together, and the language of one interpreted, and, where necessary, modified, by that of the other. In this way it may, in most cases, be found possible to arrive at a reasonable and practical construction of the language of the sections, so as to reconcile the respective powers which they contain, and give effect to all of them.\n\nIn performing this difficult duty, it will be a wise course for those on whom it is thrown, to decide each case which arises as best they can, without entering more largely upon an interpretation of the statute than is necessary for the decision of the particular question in hand\". and also at page 113:\n\n\"It is enough for the decision of the present case to say that, in their view, its authority to legislate for the regulation of trade and commerce does not comprehend the power to regulate by legislation the contracts of a particular business or trade, such as the business of fire insurance in a single province ............ \" These observations were quoted with approval by Gwyer, C. J. in Re: The Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxatio~ Act, 1938 (Central Provinces and Berar Act No. XIV of 1938)(2) and it was further held that the general power ought not to be construed as to make a nullity of a particular power conferred by the same Act and operating in the same field.\n\nThe same duty of reconciling apparently conflicting provisions was reiterated in\n\n(1) [1881] LR. 7 A.C. 96, 108.\n\n(2) (1939] F.C.R. 18, 39.\n\nCh. Tika Ramji and others, rte.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand others\n\nBit a gwati J.\n\nCh. Tika Ramji and others, etc, v.\n\nThe State of Utta,. Pradesh\n\nand others I - Bhagwati J.\n\nGovernor-General in Council v. The Province of .Madras(1):\n\n\"But it appears to them that it is right first to consider whether a fair reconciliation cannot be effected hy giving to the language of the Federal Legislative List a meaning which, if less wide than it might in another context bear, is yet one that can properly be given to it, and equally giving to the language of the Provincial Legislative List a meaning which it can properly bear\".\n\nReliance was also placed on the observations of Gwyer, C. J. quoted in Subrahmanyan Chettiar v.\n\nMuthuswami Goundan(2):\n\n\"As interpreted by the Judicial Committee, the British North America Act presents an exact analogy to the India Act, even to the overriding provisions in section 100(1) of the latter: \"The rule of construction is that general language in the heads of section 92 yields to particular expressions in section 91, where the latter are unambiguous\": per Lord Haldane in Great West Saddlery Co. v. The King(3).\n\nThe principles laid down by the Judicial Committee in a long series of decisions for the interpretation of the two sections of the Brit.ish North America Act may therefore be accepted as a guide for the interpretation of similar provisions in the Government of India Act.\" and it was contended that Entry 27 of List II should be construed in a general manner as applying to production, supply and distribution of goods in general and Entry 52 of List I should be construed as comprehending within its scope ancillary matters in relation to the controlled industries thus excluding production, supply and distribution of goods which would be thus comprised within it as ancillary matters from the sphere of Entry 27 of List II. If this construction was adopted it would avoid the apparent conflict between the two Entries and would reconcile the powers of the Provincial Legislatures with those of the Central Legislature. It was, therefore, contended that the Legislation in regard to sugarcane\n\n(1) [19f5] F.C R. 179, 191.\n\n12) [194'0] F.C.R. 188, 201.\n\n(3) [1921] 2 A.C. 91, 116.\n\nshould be considered as ancillary to the legislation in regard to sugar industry which is a controlled industry and comprised within Entry 52 of List I and should be excluded from Entry 27 of List II which should be read as covering only those categories which did not fall within Entry 52 of List I evep though on a wide construction of the words \"production, supply and distribution of goods\" they would be capable of covering the same. If this construction was put upon these two Entries, it would follow that the subject-matter of the impugned Act was within the exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament being comprised in Entry 52 of List I and was ultra vires the U.P. State Legislature.\n\nThe answer of the State of U.P. was two-fold: (1) after the advent of the Second World War and all throughout up to 1955when ActX of 1955 wasenacted by Parliament, the Centre was operating upon the Concurrent field of legislation and that whatever legisla.: tion in regard to sugarcane was enacted by the Centre as part of its legislative activities in regard to sugar was not under Entry 52 of List I but was in exercise of its legislative powers under Concurrent jurisdiction, and (2) that the impugned Act merely confined itself to legislation in regard to sugarcane and did not purport to legislate in regard to sugar which was exclusively dealt with by the Centre. There was, therefore, no trespass upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the Centre and the impugned Act was within the legislative competence of the State Legislature.\n\nAs has been noted above, the entire subject-matter of Act XV of 1934 came within the Provincial Legislative List on a distribution of legislative powers effected under the Government of India Act, 1935 and the U.P. Legislature enacted the U.P. Act I of 1938 covering the same field and repealing Act XV of 1934. Entry 27 of List II related to production, supply and distribution of goods and development of industries except in regard to controlled industries, and, in so far as in 1938 sugar was not a controlled industry, the U.P. Legislature enacted provisions for the licensing of the sugar factories and for regulating the price and supply of sugarcane intended for use in\n\nCh. Ti/1a Ramji and others, etc. v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh and others\n\nBllagwati J.\n\nCIJ. Tika Ramjl tnid others, etc, v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand others\n\nsuch factories. With the advent of War and the proclamation of emergency under section 102 of the Government of India Act, 1935, the Centre was invested with the power to make laws for the Provinces with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the Provincial Legislative List and the Central Legislature as well as the Provincial Legislatures were thus enabled to enact measures exercising concurrent jurisdiction in regard to the topics enumerated in the Provincial Legislative List.\n\nThe emergency was about to come to an end on the 1st April, 1946 and the British Parliament, therefore, on 26th March, 1946, passed the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946, under which, notwithstanding anything in the Government of India Act, 1935, the Central Legislature was, for the period specified in section 4 thereof, invested with the powers to make laws with respect to (a) trade and commerce in, and the production, supply and distribution of~ .............. .. foodstuffs, edible oilseeds and oils ................ and this provision in effect continued the power which had been vested in the Central Legislature during the emergency under section 102 of the Government of India Act, 1935. The period mentioned in section 4 of this Act was extended from time to time up to 31st March,\n\n1950. It was in pursuance of these powers that the Central Legislature enacted Act XXIV of 1946 on 16th November, 1946. The essential commodities therein comprised inter alia foodstuffs which would include sugar as well as sugarcane and both sugar and sugarcane, therefore, came within the jurisdiction of the Centre. Act XXIV of 1946 was continued in force up to 31st March, 1950 under the terms of section 4 of India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946 by the notification of the Governor- General and the resolutions passed by both the Houses of Parliament but before the expiration of this extended period the Constitution was inaugurated and under article 369 Parliament was invested with the power to make laws inter alia with respect to trade and commerce within a State and production, supply and distribution of.. .............. foodstuffs, edible oi!Eeeds\n\nand oils as if they were enumerated in the concurrent list and it was by virtue of this power that Act XXIV of 1946 was extended up to 26th January, 1955 by diverse pieces of legislation enacted by Parliament.\n\nSugar and sugarcane thus continued within the jurisdiction of the Centre right up to 26th January, 1955.\n\nWhen Entry 33 of List III was amended by the Constitution Third Amendment A,.ct, 1954,. foodstuffs including edible oilseeds and oils were included therein and both Parliament and the State Legislatures acquired concurrent jurisdiction to legislate over sugar and sugarcane. Tradeand commerce in, and production, supply and distribution of, sugar and sugarcane thus could be dealt with by Parliament as well as by the State Legislatures and it was in exercise of this jurisdiction that Parliament enacted Act X of 1955. The list of essential commodities defined in section 2 of the Act comprised foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds and oils, cattlefodder, raw cotton and cotton-seed and raw jute which were items (b), (c), (d) and (e) in Entry 33 of List III and the products of the controlled industries, coal, textiles, iron and steel, paper, petroleum and petroleum products and any other class of commodity which the Central Government may by notification or order declare to be an essential commodity for the purposes of the Act being a commodity with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws by virtue of Entry 33-of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, which were amongst the products of the controlled industries specified in the First Schedule to Act LXV of 1951.\n\nIt follows that Act X of 1955 was enacted by Parliament in exercise of the legislative powers conferred upon it by Entry 33 of List III and was an exercise of concurrent jurisdiction.\n\nIt is clear, therefore, that all the Acts and the notifications issued thereunder by the Centre in regard to sugar and sugarcane were enacted in exercise of the concurrent jurisdiction. The exercise of such concurrent jurisdiction would not deprive the Provincial Legislatures of similar powers which they had under the Provincial Legislative List and there would, there-\n\nCh. Tika Ramji and others, etc. v.\n\nTiie State of Uttar P1adesh\n\nand others\n\nBhagu:atiJ.\n\nCh. Tika Ramji\n\nand others, etc.\n\nThe State of Utta,. Pradesh\n\naud others\n\nBltagwati J.\n\nfore, be no question of legislative incompetence qua the Provincial Legislatures in regard to similar pieces of legislation enacted by the latter. The Provincial J, egislatures as well as the Central Legislature would be competent to enact such pieces of legislation and no question of legislative competence would arise.\n\nIt also follows as a necessary corollary that, even though Sligar industry was a controlled industry, none of these Acts enacted by the Centre was in exercise of its jurisdiction under Entry 52 of List I. Industry in the wide sense of the term would be capable of comprising three different aspects: (1) raw materials which are an integral part of the industrial process, (2) the process of manufacture or production, and (3) the distribution of the products of the industry. The raw materials would be goods which would be comprised in Entry 27 of List II.\n\nThe process of manufacture or production would be comprised in Entry 24 of List II except where the industry was a controlled industry when it would fall within Entry 52 of List I and the products of the industry would also be comprised in Entry 27 of List II except where they were the products of the controlled industries when they would fall within Entry 33 of List III. This being the position, it cannot be said that the legislation which was enacted by the Centre in regard to sugar and sugarcane could fall within Entry 52 of List I. Before sugar industry became a controlled industry, both sugar and sugarcane fell within Entry 27 of List II but, after a declaration was made by Parliament in 1951 by Act LXV of 1951, sugar industry became a controlled industry and the product of that industry, viz., sugar .was comprised in Entry 33 of List III taking it out of Entry 27 of List II. Even so, the Centre as well as the Provincial Legislatures had concurrent jurisdiction in regard to the same. In no event could the legislation in regard to sugar and sugarcane be thus included within Entry 52 of List I. The pith and substance argument also cannot be imported here for the simple reason that, when both the Centre as well as the State Legislatures were operating in the concurrent field,\n\nthere was no question of any trespass upon the exclusive jurisdiction vested in the Centre under Entry 52 of List I, the only question which survived being whether, putting both the pieces of legislation enacted by the Centre and the State Legislature together, there was any repugnancy, a contention which will be dealt with hereafter.\n\nA more effective answer is furnished by comparison of the terms of the U.P. Act I of 1938 with those of the impugned Act.\n\nWhereas the U.P. Act I of 1938 covered both sugarcane and sugar within its compass, the impugned Act was confined only to sugarcane, thus relegating sugar to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Centre thereby eliminating all argument with regard to the encroachment by the U.P. State Legislature on the field occupied by the Centre. The U.P.\n\nAct I of 1938 provided for the establishment of a Sugar Control Board, the Sugar Commissioner, the Sugar Commission and the Cane Commissioner. The impugned Act provided for the establishment of a Sugarcane Board.\n\nThe Sugar Commissioner was named as .such but his functions under rules 106 and 107 were confined to getting information which would lead to the regulation of the supply and purchase of sugarcane required for use in sugar factories and had nothing to do with the production or the disposal of sugar produced in the factories. The Sugar Commission was not provided for but the Cane Commissioner was the authority invested with all the powers in regard to the supply and purchase of sugarcane. The Inspectors appointed under the U.P. Act I of 1938 had no doubt powers to examine records maintained at the factories showing the amount of sugarcane purchased and crushed but they were there with a view to check the production or manufacture of sugar whereas the Inspectors appointed under the impugned Act were, by rule 20, to confine their activities to the regulation of the supply and purchase of sugarcane without having anything to do with the further process of the manufacture or production of sugar.\n\nChapter 3 of U.P. Act I of 1938, dealing with the construction and extension of sugar factories, licens-\n\nCh. Tika Ramji\n\nand others, etc. v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh and others.\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nCh. Tika Ramji\n\nand others, etc. v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand others\n\nBltagwati J.\n\ning of factories for crushing sugarcane, fixing of the price of sugar, etc., was deleted from the impugned Act. The power of licensing new industrial undertakings was thereafter exercised by the Centre under Act LXV of 1951 as amended by Act XXVI of 1953, vide sections ll(a), 12 a.nd 13, and the power of fixation of price of sugar was exercised by the Centre under section 3 of Act XXIV of 1946 by issuing the Sugar Control Order, 1950. Even the power reserved to the State Government to fix minimum prices of sugarcane under Chapter V of U.P. Act I of 1938 was deleted from the impugned Act the same being exercised by the Centre under clause 3 of Sugar and Gur Control Order, 1950, issued by it in exercise of the powers conferred under section 3 of Act XXIV of 1946.\n\nThe prices fixed by the Centre were adopted by the State Government and the only thing which the State Government required under rule 94 was that the occupier of a factory or the purchasing agent should cause to be put up at each purchasing centre a notice showing the minimum price of cane fixed by the Government meaning thereby the Centre. The State Government also incorporated these prices which were notified by the Centre from time to time in the forms of the agreements which were to be entered between the cane growers, the cane growers co-operati ve societies, the factories and their purchasing agents for the supply and purchase of sugarcane as provided in the U.P. Sugarcane Supply and Purchase Order, 1954. The only provision which was retained by the State Government in the impugned Act for the protection of the sugarcane growers was that contained in section 17 which provided for the payment of price of sugarcane by the occupier of a factory to the sugarcane growers. It could be recovered from such occupier as if it were an arrear of land revenue.\n\nThis comparison goes to show that the impugned Act merely confined itself to the regulation of the supply and purchase of sugarcane required for use in sugar factories and did not concern itself a.t all with the con trolling or licensing of the sugar factories, with the production or manufacture of sugar or with the\n\ntrade and commerce in, and the production, supply and distribution of, sugar. If that was so, there was no question whatever of its trenching upon the jurisdiction of the Centre in regard to sugar industry which was a controlled industry within Entry 52 of\n\nIist I and the U.P. Legislature had jurisdiction to enact the law with regard to sugarcane and had legislative competence to enact the impugned Act.\n\nRe. (2): It was next contended that the provisions of the impugned Act were repugnant to the provisions of Act LXV of 1951 and Act X of 1955 which were enacted by Parliament and, therefore, the law made by Parliament should prevail and the impugned Act should, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void. Before dealing with this contention it is necessary to clear the ground by defining the exact connotation of the term \"repugnancy\". Repugnancy falls to be considered when the law made by Parliament and the law made by the State Legislature occupy the same field because, if both these pieces of legislation deal with separate and distinct matters though of a cognate and allied character, repugnancy does not arise. So far as our Constitution is concerned, repugnancy is dealt with in article 254 which provides:\n\n\"254.\n\n(1) If any provision of a law made by the Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of an existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of clause (2), the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislature of such State, or, as the case may be, the existing law, shall prevail and the law made by the Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void.\n\n(2) Where a law made by the Legislature of a State specified in Part A or Part B of the First Schedule with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by\n\nCh. Tika Ramji and others, ftc. v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand others\n\nBhagwatiJ,\n\nCh. Tika Ra1nji\n\nand others, etc. v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh and others\n\nBhagu:ati J,\n\nParliament or an existing law with respect to that matter, then, the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consi deration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that State: Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State\".\n\nWe are concerned here with the repugnancy, if any, arising by reason of both Parliament and the State Legislature having operated in the same field in respect of a matter enumerated in the Concurrent List, i.e., foodstuffs comprised in Entry 33 of List III and we are, therefore, not called upon to express any opinion on the controversy which was raised in regard to the exact scope and extent of article 254(1) in regard to \"a law made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact\", as to whether the legislative power of Parliament therein refers to List I, List III and the residuary power of legislation vested in Parliament under article 248 or is confined merely to the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List (Vide A.LR. 1942 Cal. 587 contra, Per Sulaiman, J. in 1940 F.C.R. 185 at p. 226).\n\nNicholas in his Australian Constitution, 2nd ed., p. 303, refers to three tests of inconsistency or repugnancy:-\n\n(1) There may be inconsistency in the actual terms of the competing statutes (R. v. Brisbane Licensing Oourt, [1920] 28 C.L.R. 23).\n\n(2) Though there may be no direct conflict, a State law may be inoperative because the Common wealth law, or the award of the Commonwealth Court, is intended to be a complete exhaustive code (Olyde Engineering Go. Ltd. v. Oowburn, [1926] 37 C.L.R. 466).\n\n(3) Even in the absence of intention, a conflict may arise when both State and Commonwealth seek to exercise their powers over the same subject matter (Victoria v. Commonwealth, [1937] 58 C.L.R. 618; Wenn\n\nv. Attorney-General (Viet.), (1948] 77 C.L.R. 84).\n\nIsaacs, J. in Clyde Engineering Company, Limited v.\n\nOowburn(1) laid down one test of inconsistency as conclusive: \"If, however, a competent legislature expressly or implicitly evinces its intention to cover the whole field, that is a conclusive test of inconsistency where another Legislature assumes to enter to any extent upon the same field\".\n\nDixon, J. elaborated this theme in, Ex parte McLean(2):\n\n\"When the Parliament of the Commonwealth and the Parliament of a State each legislate upon the same subject and prescribe what the rule of conduct shall be, they make laws which are inconsistent, notwithstanding that the rule of conduct is identical which each prescribes, and section 109 applies. That this is so is settled, at least when the sanctions they impose are diverse. But the reason is that, by prescribing the rule to be observed, the Federal statute shows an intention to cover the subject matter and provide what the law upon it shall be. If it appeared that the Federal law was intended to be supplementary to or cumulative upon State law, then no inconsistency would be exhibited in imposing the same duties or in inflicting different penalties. The inconsistency does not lie in the mere co-existence of two laws which are susceptible of simultaneous obedience.\n\nIt depends upon the intention of the paramount Legislature to express by its enactment, completely, exhaustively, or exclusively, what shall be the law governing the particular conduct or matter to which its attention is directed.\n\nWhen a Federal statute discloses such an intention, it is inconsistent with it for the law of a State to govern the same conduct or\n\nmatter\".\n\nTo the same effect are the observations of Evatt, J. in Stock Motor Plough Ltd. v. Forsyth(3):\n\n\"It is now established, therefore, that State and Federal laws may be inconsistent, although obedience to both laws is possible.\n\nThere may even be incon-\n\n(I) [1926] 87 C.L.R. 466, 489,\n\n(2) [1930] 48 C.L.R. !72, 483.\n\n(3) (1932] 48 C.L.R. 128, 1!7.\n\nCh. Tika Ratnji and others, etc. v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\na11d others\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nCh, Tika Ramji and others1 etc. v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand others\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nsistency although each law imposes the very same duty of obedience.\n\nThese conclusions have, in the main, been reached, by aseribing \"inconsistency\" to a State law, not because the Federal law directly invalidates or conflicts with it, but because the Federal law is said to \"cover the field\".\n\nThis is a very ambiguous phrase, because subject matters of legislation bear little resemblance to geographical areas.\n\nIt is no more than a cliche for expressing the fact that, by reason of the subject matter dealt with, and the method of dealing with it, and the nature and multiplicity of the regulations prescribed, the Federal authority has adopted a plan or scheme which will be hindered and obstructed if any additional regulations whatever are prescribed upon the subject by any other authority; if, in other words, the subject is either touched or trenched upon by State authority\".\n\nThe Calcutta High Court in G. P. Stewart v. B. K.\n\nRoy Ohaudhury(') had occasion to consider the meaning of repugnancy and B. N. Rau, J. who delivered the judgment of the Court observed at page 632:\n\n\"It is sometimes said that two laws cannot be said to be properly repugnant unless there is a direct conflict between them, as when one says \"do\" and the other \"don't\", there is no true repugnancy, according to this view, if it is possible to obey both the laws. For reasons which we shall set forth presently, we think that this is too narrow a test: there may well be cases of repugnancy where both laws say \"don't\" but in different ways. For example, one law may say, \"No person shall sell liquor by retail, that is, in quantities of less than five gallons at a time\" and anotherlaw may say, \"No person shall sell liquor by retail, that is, in quantities of less than ten gallons at a time\". Here, it is obviously possible to obey both laws, by obeying the more stringent of the two, namely the second one; yet it is equally obvious that the two laws are repugnant, for to the extent to which a citizen is compelled to obey one of them, the other, though not actually disobeyed, is nullified\".\n\nThe learned Judge then discussed the various auth-\n\n(11 A.I.B. 1989 C•I. 628.\n\norities which laid down the test of repugnancy in Australia, Canada, and England and concluded at page 634:\n\n\"The principle deducible from the English cases, as from the Canadian cases, seems therefore to be the same as that enunciated by Isaacs, J. in the Australian 44 hour case (37 C.L.R. 466) if the dominant law has expressly or impliedly evinced its intention to cover the whole field, then a subordinate law in the same field is repugnant and therefore inoperative.\n\nWhether and to what extent in a given case, the dominant law evinces such an intention must necessarily depend on the language of the particular\n\nlaw\".\n\nSulaiman, J. in Shyamakant Lal v. Rambhajan Singh(1) thus laid down the principle of construct.ion in regard to repugnancy:\n\n\"When the question is whether a Provincial legislation is repugnant to an existing Indian law, the onus of showing its repugnancy and the extent to which it is repugnant should be on the party attacking its validity. There ought to be a presumption in favour of its validity, and every effort should be made to reconcile them and construe both so as to avoid their being repugnant to each other; and care should be taken to see whether the two do not really operate in different fields without encroachment. Further, repugnancy must exist in fact, and not depend merely on a possibility. Their Lordships can discover no adequate grounds for holding that there exists repugnancy between the two laws in districts of the Province of Ontario where the prohibitions of the Canadian Act are not and may never be in force: (Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for the Dominion)(~)\".\n\nIn the instant case, there is no question of any inconsistency in the actual terms of the Acts enacted by Parliament and the impugned Act. The only questions that arise are whether Parliament and the State Legislature sought to exercise their powers over the same subject-matter or whether the laws enacted\n\n(1) [1939) F.C.R. 188, 212.\n\n(2) [1896] A.O. 348, 869-70,\n\nCh. Tika Ramji a11d others, de.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand othef's\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nCh. Tika Ramji and others, etc, v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh and others\n\n' Bhagwati J,\n\nby Parliament were intended to be a complete exhaustive code or, in other words, expressly or impliedly evinced an intention to cover the whole field. It would be necessary, therefore, to compare the provisions of Act LXV of 1951 as amended by Act XXVI of 1953, Act X of 1955 and the Sugar Control Order,\n\n1955 issued thereunder with those of the impugned Act and U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954 passed thereunder.\n\nAct LXV of 1951 was an Act to provide for the development and regulation of certain industries the control of which by the Union was declared by the Act to be expedient in the public interest and it embraced the various industries mentioned in the First Schedule to the Act. The industry engaged in the manufacture or production of sugar was one of such industries and under the Act the Union acquired control over the same. The Act provided for the establishment and constitution of a Central Advisory Council for the purposes of advising it on matters concerning the development and regulation of the scheduled industries. It also provided for the establishment and constitution of Development Councils for any scheduled industry or group of scheduled industries. It further provided for the regulation of scheduled industries by registration of existing industrial undertakings and licensing of new industrial undertakings and causing investigations to be made in the scheduled industries or industrial undertakings.\n\nThese provisions were evidently intended to control the scheduled industries and if the sugar industry was one of the scheduled industries the control thereof invol.ved the development and regulation of the sugar ind•1stry and the registration and the licensing as also investigation into the affairs of the undertakings which were engaged in the production or manufacture of sugar. It did not involve the regulation of the supply and purchase of ugarcane which, though it formed an integral part of the process of manufacture of sugar, was merely the raw material for the industry and as such not within the purview of the Act.\n\nIf the Act bad remained as originally enacted the\n\nprovisions of the Act would not have been in any manner whatever repugnant to the provisions of U.P.\n\nAct I of 1938 because both the Acts covered different fields.\n\nAct XXVI of 1953, however, introduced certain amendments in the Act the relevant amendment for our purpose being section 18-G which provided as follows:-\n\n\"18-G. Power to control supply, distribution, price, etc., of certain articles.- ( I) The Central Government, so far as it appears to it necessary or expedient for securing the equitable distribution and availability at fair prices of any article or class of articles relatable to any scheduled industry, may, notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act, by notified order, provide for regulating the supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein.\n\nEp~ti~:;{.\"i~·· .thi~··· ·~~ti~~·: ... th~·. ··~·p~~·~ion 'article or class of articles' relatable to any scheduled industry includes any article or class of articles imported into India which is of the same nature or description as the article or class of articles manufactured or produced in the scheduled industry\".\n\nSugar industry being one of the scheduled industries, it was contended for the petitioners that sugarcane was an article relatable to the sugar industry and was, therefore, within the scope of section 18-G and the Central Government was thus authorised by notified order to provide for regulating the supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein.\n\nIf that was so, it was next contended, the field of legislation in regard to sugarcane was covered by this provision of the Act and was taken away from the jurisdiction of the State Legislatures, the avowed intention being to cover the whole field of such legislation. It was, however, urged on behalf of the State of U. P. that articles relatable to scheduled industry comprised only those finished products which were of the same nature or description as the article or class of articles manufactured or produced in the scheduled industry and did not comprise the raw materials for\n\nCh. T; ka Ramj;\n\nand others, etc.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand others\n\nBhagwatiJ,\n\nCh. Tika Ramji and others, etc. v.\n\nThe State o/ Uttar Pratksh\n\nand other&\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nthe scheduled industry. Reliance was placed in support of this contention on the terms of the explanation to section 18-G as also to sections 15 and 16 of the Act where the same words \"any article or class of articles relatable to that industry\" were used. In our opinion, the contention of the State is sound.\n\nThe structure of the whole Act LXV of 1951 related to the development and regulation of the scheduled industries and all the provisions which were contained in the Act including those which were introduced therein by Act XXVI of 1953 were designed for effectuating that purpose. It is significant to note that, e\\en in section 18-G, the regulation which was intended was that of the supply and distribution of the article or class of articles relatable to the scheduled industry and the production of those articles was not sought to be regulated at all.\n\nThe raw materials would certainly be essential ingredients in the process of manufacture or production of the articles in the scheduled industry but would not be of the same nature or description as the article or class of articles manufactured or produced therein.\n\nThe whole object of enactment of section 18-G was to secure the equitable distribution and availability at fair prices of such articles which by relation thereof to the article or class of articles manufactured or produced in the scheduled industry would affect such manufacture or production or the supply and distribution thereof or trade and commerce therein. Not only were the article or class of articles relatable to the scheduled industry which were themselves manufactured or produced in this country sought to be controlled in this manner but also the articles or class of articles imported into India which were of the same nature or description as the article or class of articles manufactured or produced in the scheduled industry, so that all these articles whether indigenous or imported would be controlled by the Central Government by regulating the supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein with a view to develop and regulate and thus control the scheduled industries in the public interest. Section 15 of the Act provided that where the Central Government was of the opinion that, in respect of any scheduled industry or industrial undertaking there had been or was likely to be a substantial fall in the volume of production in respect of any article or class of articles relatable to that industry or manufactured or produced in the industrial undertakings for which, having regard to the economic conditions prevailing, there was no justification, it may make or cause to be made full and complete investigations into the circumstances of the case. If, after making or causing to be made any such investigations, the Central Government was satisfied that action under section 16 was desirable it was to issue suchdirections to the industrial undertakings concerned as may be appropriate for regulating production of any article or class of articles of any industrial undertakings or fixing the standard of production, requiring the industrial undertakings to take such steps as are considered necessary to stimulate thedevelopmentofthe industry to which the undertakings relate, prohibiting the industrial undertakings from resorting to any act or practice which may reduce its production capacity and economic value and controlling the prices and regulating the distribution of any article or class of articles which has been the subject-matter of investigation. If any article or class of articles relatable to that industry could thus be the subjectmatter of investigation and if appropriate directions in the manner indicated in section 16 could be given in relation thereto, it is obvious that it would not be within the province of the scheduled industry or industrial undertakings to take such steps in regard to the controlling of the prices or regulating the distribution of these articles or class of articles unless they were within the sphere of the scheduled.- industries or industrial undertakings. Raw materials for the manufacture or production of the article or class of articles in the scheduled industry would certainly not be within this sphere and they would not be able to control the prices or regulate the distribution thereof within the meaning of section 16.\n\nCh. Tika Ramji and others, etc, v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesla\n\nand others\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nCh. Tika Ram/I and others, etc,\n\n•• The State of Uttar Pradesh and others\n\nBhagwatl J.\n\nThese articles or class of articles relatable to the scheduled industry, therefore, were finished products and not raw materials for the manufacture or production of the articles or class of articles in the scheduled industry. They were finished products of a cognate character which would be manufactured or produced in the very process of manufacture or production in the course of carrying on that scheduled industry.\n\nThe raw materials would certainly not be included within this category and sugarcane which is the raw material for the manufacture or production of sugar could, therefore, not be included in the category of the articles or class of articles relatable to the sugar industry. Section 18-G, therefore, did not cover the field of sugarcane and the Central Government was not empowered by the inttoduction of section 18-G by Act XXVI of 1953 to legislate in regard to sugarcane. The field of sugarcane was not covered by Act LXV of 1951 as amended by Act XXVI of 1953 and the legislative powers of the Provincial Legislatures in regard to sugarcane were not affected by it in any manner whatever. If the two fields were different and the Central legislation did not intend at all to cover that field, the field was clear for the operation of State legislation and there was no repugnancy at all between Act LXV of 1951 and the impugned Act.\n\nEven assuming that ugarcane was an article or class of articles relatable to the sugar industry within the meaning of section 18-G of Act LXV of 1951, it is tc be noted that no order was issued by the Central Government in exercise of the powers vested in it under that section and no question of repugnancy could ever arise because, as has been noted above, repugnancy must exist in fact and not depend merely on a possibility. The possibility of an order under section 18-G being issued by the Central Government would not be enough. The existence of such an order would be the essential prerequisite before any repugnancy could ever arise.\n\nAct X of 1955 included within the definition of essential commodity food stuffs which we have seen above would include sugar as well as sugarcane. This\n\nAct was enacted by Parliament in exercise of the concurrent legislative power under Entry 33 of List III as amended by the Constitution Third Amendment Act, 1954. Foodcrops were there defined as including crops of sugarcane and section 3(1) gave the Central Government powers to control the production, supply and distribution of essential commodities and trade and commerce therein for maintaining or increasing the supplies thereof or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices.\n\nSection 3(2)(b) empowered the Central Government to provide inter alia for bringing under cultivation any waste or arable land whether appurtenant to a building or not for growing thereon of foodcrops generally or specified foodcrops and section 3(2)(c) gave the Central Government power for controlling the price at which any essential commodity may be bought or sold. These provisions would certainly bring within the scope of Central legislation the regulation of the production of sugarcane as also the controlling of the price at which sugarcane may be bought or sold, and in addition to the Sugar Control Order, 1955 which was issued by the Central Government on 27th August, 1955, it also issued the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955, on the same date investing it with the power to fix the price of sugarcane and direct payment thereof as also the power to regulate the movement of sugarcane.\n\nParliament was well within its powers in legislating in regard to sugarcane and the Central Government was also well within its powers in issuing the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955 in the manner it did because all this was in exercise of the concurrent power of legislation under Entry 33 of List III. That, however, did not affect the legislative competence of the U. P. State Legislature to enact the law in regard to sugarcane and the only question which remained to be considered was whether there was any repugnancy between the provisions of the Central legislE.- tion and the U. P. State legislation in this behalf. As we have noted above, the U. P. State Government did not at all provide for the fixation of minimum\n\nCh. Tika Ramji and others, etc. v.\n\nTiie State of Uftar Pradesh\n\nnnd others\n\nBha gwati J.\n\nCh. Tika Ramji and others, etc, v.\n\nThe State oj Uttar Pradesh and others\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nSUPREME COURT P.EPORTS [1956]\n\nprices for sugarcane nor did it provide for the regulation of movement of sugarcane as was done by the Central Government in clauses (3) and (4) of the Sugaroane Control Order, 1955. The impugned Act did not make any provision for the same and the only provision in regard to the price of sugarcane which was to be found in the U. P. Sugarcane Rules, 1954, was contained in Rule 94 which provided that a notice of suitable size in clear bold lines showing the minimum price of cane fixed by the Government and the rates at which the cane is being purchased by the centre was to be put up by an occupier of a factory or the purchasing agent as the case may be at each purchasing centre. The price of cane fixed by Government here only meant the price fixed by the appropriatll Government which would be the Central Government, under clause 3 of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955, because in fact the U. P. State Government never fixed the price of sugarcane to be purchased by the factories. Even the provisions in behalf of the agreements contained in clauses 3 and 4 of the U. P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954, provided that the price was to be t.he minimum price to be notified by the Government subject to such deductions, if any, as may be notified by the Government from time to time meaning thereby the Central Government, the State Government not having made any provision in that behalf at any time whatever. The provisions thus made by the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955, did not find their place either in the impugned Act or the Rules made thereunder or the U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954, and the provision contained in section 17 of the impugned Act in regard to the payment of sugarcane price and recovery thereof as if it was an arrear of land revenue did not find its place in the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955.\n\nThese provisions, therefore, were mutually exclusive and did not impinge upon each other there being thus no trenching upon the field of one Legislature by the other. Our attention was drawn to the several provisions contained in the\n\nSugarcane Control Order, 1955 and the U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954 and the agreements annexed thereto and it was pointed out that they differed in material particulars, the provisions of the latter being more stringent than those of the former. It is not necessary to refer to these provisions in any detail. Suffice it to say that none of' these provisions do overlap, the Centre being silent with regard to some of the provisions which have been enacted by the State and the State being silent with regard to some of the provisions which have been enacted by the Centre. There is no repugnancy whatever between these provisions and the impugned Act and the Rules framed thereunder as also the U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954 do not trench upon the field covered by Act X of 1955. There being no repugnancy at all, therefore, no question arises of the operation of article 254(2) of the Constitution and no provision of the impugned Act and the Rules made thereunder is invalidated by any provision contained in Act LXV of 1951 as amended by Act XXVI of 1953 or Act X of 1955 and the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955 issued thereunder.\n\nRe. (3 ): It was then contended that the impugned Act stands repealed to the extent that it has been repealed by section 16 of Act X of 1955 and clause 7 of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955 made in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of Act X of 1955.\n\nSection 16 of Act X of 1955 reads as under:\n\n\"16. (1) The following laws are hereby repealed:-\n\n(a) the Essential Commodities Ordinance, 1955;\n\n(b) any other law in force in any State immediately before the commencement of this Act in so far as such law controls or authorises the control of the produotion, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, any essential commodity\".\n\nIt is submitted that the impugned Act was \"any other law'' in force in the State of U.P. immediately before the commencement of Act X of 1955 and stood repealed in so far as it controlled or authorised the\n\nCh. Tika Ramji and others, etc. v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand ot!:ers\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nCh. Tika Ramji and others, etc.\n\n•• The State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand others\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\ncontrol of production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, sugarcane which was comprised within foodstuffs an essential commodity under Act X of 1955. Clause 7 of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955 made in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Act provided:\n\n\"7. (1) The Sugar and Gur Control Order, 1950, published with the Government of India in the Ministry of Food and Agriculture S.R.O. No. 735, dated the 7th October, 1950, and any order made by a State Government or other authority regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution of sugarcane and trade or commerce therein are hereby repealed, except as respect things done or omitted to be done under any such order before the commencement of this order\".\n\nIt is submitted that the U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954, made by the U.P. Government in exercise of the powers conferred by section 16 of the impugned Act is repealed in so far as it regulates or prohibits the production, supply and distribution of sugarcane or trade and commerce therein. These are provisions for the express repeal of the impugned Act and the U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954, and if the contention of the petitioners in this behalf were accepted it would have the effect of nullifying the provisions of the impugned Act and also the impugned notifications which have been issued in exercise of the powers conferred by sections 15 and 16 of the Act.\n\nAs regards section 16 of Act X of 1955, the validity and effect thereof depends upon the construction to be put on article 254(2) and the proviso thereto.\n\nArticle 254(2) deals with repugnancy between the provisions of a law made by the State Legislature and those of an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List and provides that the law so made by the State Legislature shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in the State. A\n\nproviso, however, has been attached thereto which says that \"nothing in article 254(2) shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the State Legislature\". Ordinarily Parliament would not ha:ve the power to repeal a law pas!!ed by the State Legislature even though it be a law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List. Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1935 did not contain any such power. As was observed by this Court in Zaverbhai Amaidas v. The State of Bombay(1), this provision contained in article 254(2) \"is in substance, a reproduction of section 107\n\n(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935, the concluding portion whereof being incorporated in a proviso with further additions. Discussing the nature of the power of the Dominion Legislature, Canada, in relation to that of the Provincial Legislature, in a situation similar to that under section 107(2) of the Government of India Act, it was observed by Lord\n\nWatson in Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney- General for the Dominion(9), that though a law enacted by the Parliament of Canada and within its competence would override Provincial legislation covering the same field, the Dominion Parliament had no authority confe'rred upon it under the Constitution to ena.ct a statute repealing direc1ily any Provincial statute. That would appear to have been the position under section 107(2) of the Government of India Act with reference to the subjects mentioned in the Ooncurrent List. Now, by the proviso to article 254(2) the Constitution has enlarged the powers of Parliament, and under that proviso, Parliament can do what the Central Legislature could not under section 107(2) of the Government of India Act, and enact a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing a law of the State, when it relates to a matter mentioned in the Concurrent List. The position then is that under the Constitution Parliament can, acting under the proviso to article 2lH(2), repeal a State law\".\n\n(1) [1956] l S.C.B. 79V, 806.\n\n(2) [l-89G] A.C. 348, 67\n\nCh. Tika Ramji and others, etc. v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand others\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nCli. Tika Ramji and others, etc.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh and others\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\n438 SUPREME COUR'l' REPORTS (1956]\n\nIt is argued for the State of U.P. that, under the proviso to article 254(2), the power to repeal a law passed by the State Legislature is incidental to enacting a law relating to the same matter as is dealt with in the State legislation, and that a statute which merely repeals a law passed by the State Legislature without enacting substantive provisions on the subject would not be within the proviso, as it could not have been the intention of the Constitution that in a topic within the concurrent sphere of legislation there should be a vacuum. There is considerable force in this contention, and there is much to be said for the view that a repeal simpliciter is not within the proviso.\n\nBut it is unnecessary to base our decision on this point, as the petitioners must, in our opinion, fail on another ground. While the proviso to. article 254(2) does confer on Parliament a power to repeal a law passed by the State Legislature, that power is, under the terms of the proviso, subject to certain limitations. It is limited to enacting a law with respect to the same matter adding to, amending, varying or repealing a \"law so made by the State Legislature\". The law referred to here is the law mentioned in the body of article 254(2). It is a law made by the State Legislature with reference to a matter in the Concurrent List containing provisions repugnant to an earlier law made by Parliament and with the consent of the President. It is only such a law that could be altered, amended or repealed under the proviso. The impugned Act is not a law relating to any matter, which is the subject of an earlier legislation by Parliament. It is a substantive law covering a field not occupied by Parliament, and no question of its containing any provisions inconsistent with a law enacted by Parliament could therefore arise. To such a law, the proviso has no application and section 16 (l)(b) of Act X of 1955 and clause 7(1) of the Sugar cane Control Order, 1955 must, in this view, be held to be invalid.\n\nThere is also a further objection to which clause 7\n\n(1) of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955 is open. The\n\npower of repeal, if any, was vested in Parliament and Parliament alone could exercise it by enacting an appropriate provision in regard thereto. Parliament could not delegate this power of repeal to any executive authority. Such delegation, if made, would be void and the Central Government had no power, therefore, to repeal any order made by the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred upon it by section 16 of the impugned Act. The U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954, could not, therefore, be validly repealed by the\n\nCentral Government as was purported to be done by clause (7) of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955, and that repeal was of no effect with the result that the U.P. Sugarcane Regulation oi Supply and Purchase Order, 1954 stood unaffected thereby. The result, therefore, is that there was no repeal of the impugned Act or the U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954 by section 16 of Act X of 1955 or by clause (7) of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955 as contended by the petitioners.\n\nRe. (4): It is pointed out that the Cane Commis~ sioner declares the reserved or assigned areas for the factories and also transfers particular areas from one factory to another. He is also in sole charge and management of Cane Growers Co-operative Societies.\n\nIt is contended that the powers thus conferred upon him are so wide that they are capable of being exercised in a discriminatory manner and therefore the impugned Act infringes the fundamental right guaranteed by article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nSection 15 of the Act provides:-\n\n\"15. (1) Without prejudice to any order made under clause (d) of sub-section (2) of section 16 the Cane Commissioner may, after consulting the Factory and Canegrowers Co-operative Society in the manner to be prescribed- ( a) reserve any area (hereinafter called the reserved area), and\n\n(b) assign any area (hereinafter called an assigned area),\n\nCh. Tika Ramji and others, etc. v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand others\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nCh. Tika Ramji and others, etc, v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand others\n\nf3hagwati J,\n\nfor the purpose of the supply of cane to a factory in accordance with the provisions of section 16 during a pa1'ticular crushing season and may likewise at any time cancel such order or alter the boundaries of an area so reserved or assigned.\n\n(2) Where any area has been declared as reserved area for a factory, the occupier of such factory shall, if so directed by the Cane Commissioner, purchase all the cane grown in that area, which is offered for sale to the factory.\n\n(3) Where any area has been declared as assigned area for a factory, the occupier of such factory shall purchase such quantity of cane grown in that area and offered for sale to the factory, as may be determined by the Cane Commissioner.\n\n(4) An appeal shall lie to the State Government against the order of the Cane Commissioner passed under sub-section (I)\".\n\nRule 22 of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Rules, 1954, made by the U.P.\n\nGovernment in exercise of the rule-making power conferred by section 28 (2) of the Act however lays down the factors which are to be taken into consideration by the Cane Commissioner in reserving an area for or assigning an area to a factory or determining the quantity of cane to be purchased from an area by a factory:\n\narea,\n\n(a) the distance of the area from the factory,\n\n(b) facilities for transport of cane from the\n\n( c) the quality of cane supplied from the area to the factory in previous years,\n\n(d) previous reservation and assignment orders,\n\n(e) the quantity of cane to be crushed. in the factory,\n\n(f) the arrangements made by the factory in previous years for payment of cess, cane price and commission, and\n\n(g) the views of the Csnegrowers' Co-operative Society of the area.\n\nChapter 11 of the Rules provides for the management of the Canegrowers' Co-operative Societies by the Cane Commissioner and their supervision by him.\n\nRule 63 of that chapter however provides:-\n\n\" Rule 63.-An appeal against an order of the Cane Commissioner under the provisions of this Chapter shall lie to the State Government within one month of the date of the communication of the order to the Society or management concerned\".\n\nIt will be thus seen that the powers given to the Cane Commissioner under section 15 are well defined and have got to be exercised within the limits prescribed after consulting the factories and the Canegrowers' Co-operative Societies (Vi de section 15(1)) and any order made by the Cane Commissioner thereunder is liable to an appeal to the State Government at the instance of the party aggrieved (Vide section 15(4)).\n\nThe same is the position in regard to the orders made by the Cane Commissioner in the course of his management and supervision of the Canegrowers' Co-operative Societies and any order made by him in regard thereto is subject to appeal to the State Government at the instance of the party aggrieved (Vide Rule 63).\n\nIf this is the position, it cannot be urged that wide powers are conferred on the Cane Commissioner which can be used by him in a discriminatory manner so as to violate the fundamental right guaranteed under article 14. Any cane grower or a Canegrowers' Cooperative Society or the occupier of a factory can, if aggrieved, take an appeal to the State Government against any order passed by the Cane Commissioner and such provision is a sufficient safeguard provided in the Act and the Rules against any arbitrary exercise of those powers by the Cane Commissioner and takes them out of the ban of article 14.\n\nRe. (6): It is next contended that the impugned Act and the notification dated 27th September, 1954 violate the fundamental right guaranteed under article 19(1)(c) which is the right to form associations or unions. It is urged that the Cane Growers Co-\n\nCh. Tika Ramji •md others, etc. v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand others\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nCh. Tika Ra1nji\n\nand others, etc. v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand others\n\noperative Societies are not voluntary organisations but a cane grower is compelled to become a member of the Society before he can sell his sugarcane to a factory.\n\nThe right to form associations or unions is a positive right but in the positive right it is urged there is necessarily implied the negative aspect which means that a citizen has the right not to form associations or unions and cannot be compelled to become a member of an association or a union or a Canegrowers' Co-operative Society before he can sell his goods to the owner of a factory.\n\nReliance is placed in support of this contention on the following passage in the judgment of the Madras High Court in Indian Metal and Metallurgical Corporation v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras and Another(1):-\n\n\"In this case, however, we are concerned with a much narrower question, namely, whether an award made by the Industrial Tribunal appointed under the Industriai Disputes Act and published by the Government in accordance with the provisions of the Act can direct the management of an industry to continue to carry on any business against their will. If a citizen has got a right to carry on business, we think it follows that, he must be at liberty not to carry it on if he so chooses. A person can no more be compelled to carry on a business than a person can be compelled to acquire or hold property ........ Mr. Bhashyam was really unable to convince us how any one can be compelled to carry on a business against his will and yet be said to enjoy a right to carry on a business''.\n\nThe following passage from Strong on 'American Constitutional Law', page 774, taken from the judgment of Mr. Justice Murphy in West Virginia State Board v.\n\nBarnette(\") is also relied upon:-\n\n\"The freedom of thought and of religion as guaranteed by the Constitution against State action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all, except in so far as essential operations of government may require it for the\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1958 Mad. 98, 101.\n\n(2) 319 u.s 624, 645.\n\npreservation of an orderly society ,-as in the case of compulsion to give evidence in court\".\n\nIt is urged that, if the right to carry on business carries with it by necessary implication a right no~ to carry on business, if the right to speak freely carries with it by necessary implication the right to refrain from speaking at all, the right to form associations or unions also carries with it by necessary implication the right not to form associations or unions. In the first place, assuming that the right to form an association implies a right not to form an association, it does not follow that the negative right must also be regarded as a fundamental right. The citizens of India have many rights which have not been given the sanctity of fundamental rights and there is nothing absurd or uncommon if the positive right alone is made a fundamental right. The whole fallacy in the argument urged on behalf of the petitioners lies in this that it ignores that there is no compulsion at all on any cane grower to become a member of the Canegrowers' Co-operative Society. The very definition of a cane grower given in the impugned Act talks of \"a person who cultivates cane either by himself or by members of his family or by hired labour and who is not a member of the Canegrowers' Co-operative Society\". The Sugarcane Board is to consist of inter alia 15 members to be appointed by the State\n\nGovernment of whom 5 are to be the representatives of canegrowers and the Canegrowers' Co-operative Societies. The occupier of a factory has to maintain a register of all such canegrowers and Canegrowers' Co-operative Societies as shall sell cane to that factory.\n\nThe payment of commission on purchase of cane is to be made by the occupier of a factory in both cases, whether the purchase is made through a Canegrowers' Co-operative Society or the purchase is made direct from the canegrowers. The U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954, made in exercise of the powers conferred by section 16 of the impugned Act also talks of cane growers as well as Canegrowers' Co-operative Societies and in\n\nCh. Tika Ramji and others, etc, v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand others\n\nBhagu:ati J.\n\nCh. Tika Ramji and others, etc. v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand others\n\nBhagwatiJ,\n\nthe case of reserved areas both the cane growers and the Canegrowers' Co-operative Societies are entitled within 14 days of the issue of an order reserving an area for a factory to offer to supply cane grown in the reserved area to the occupier of the factory and Form B in Appendix II of that Order provides the form of agreement between the cane grower and the occupier of a factory.\n\nThe cane grower as well as the Canegrowers' Co-operative Society are both within the ken of the impugned Act and it cannot be urged that the object of the Act is to promote Canegrowers' Co-operative Societies to the prejudice of the cane grower himself.\n\nThe Canegrowers' Co-operative Societies are to be fostered if at all for furthering the interests of the cane growers and there is no conflict between the interests of the cane growers on the one hand and those of the Canegrowers' Co-operative Societies on the other.\n\nBoth are equally catered for by the impugned Act but it is only when the State Government feels that there are circumstances justifying the issue of an order under which the cane grown by a cane grower shall not be purchased except through a Canegrowers' Co-operative Society, the State Government, in exercise of the power reserved under section 16(2)(b) would issue an order accordingly. The impugned notification dated '27th September, 1954 specifies the circumstances under which such a prohibitory order can be made.\n\nIf the membership of a particular Canegrowers' Cooperative Society is not less than 75 per cent. of the total number of cane growerR within the particular area, then and then only it is considered expedient and desirable that all the cane purchased by an occupier of a factory from that area should be purchased only through the agency of the particular Canegrowers' Co-operative Society. It is with a view to eliminate unhealthy competition between the cane growers on the one hand and the Canegrowers' Cooperative Societies on the other and also to prevent malpractices indulged in by the occupier of a factory for the purpose of breaking up the Canegrowers'\n\nCo-operative Society that such a provision is made and a notification issued prohibiting the occupier of a. factory from making any purchases from the area except through the Ca.negrowers' Co-operative Society. It is a reasonable provision made for the benefit of the large number of persons forming the members of the Canegrowers' Co-operative Society and cannot be impugned as in any manner violative of any fundamental right of the petitioners.\n\nThere is also another fallacy in their argument and it lies in ignoring that no canegrower is prevented from resigning his membership of a Canegrowers' Co-operative Society. These are voluntary organisations which a canegrower is entitled to join or not at his choice. If he has once joined it he is also entitled to resign his membership at his choice and the only obstacle to his right of resignation, as has been laid down in the bye-laws of the Society, is the fact of his being indebted to the Society, or the fact of his oeing a surety for debt due by another member of the S_ociety. Until these debts are discharged and also until the crushing season during which the Canegrowers' Co-operative Society has entered into an agreement with the occupier of a factory is over, a member of a Society cannot resign his membership.\n\nThese restrictions do not feUer his right to resign his membership of the Society. If he became a member of the Society be is bound by the bye-laws of the Society and can only resign his membership after fulfilling all the conditions which are laid down in the bye-laws of the Society.\n\nThe cane grower, moreover, is not prevented absolutely from selling his sugarcane. The only person to whom he cannot sell his sugarcane is the owner of a factory but that does not prevent him from selling his sugarcane to any other person or for any other purpose, e.g. the manufacture or production of gur or rah or khandsari or any variety f product other than sugar. There may be of course difficulties in the matter of his being able to sell the same in\n\nCll. Tika Ramji\n\nand others, etc.\n\nThe State of Vttar Prades/&\n\nand othas\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nCh. Tika Ratnji and others, etc, v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\naud others\n\nBliagwati J.\n\nthat manner but that does not mean that there is an absolute restriction on his power of disposal of his goods unless and until he becomes a member of a Canegrowers' Co-operative Society. He is at perfect liberty not to become a member of a Canegrowers' Co-operative Society if he chooses not to do so and no power on earth can compel him to become such a member. Just as he is not bound to become a member of a Canegrowers' Co-operative Society he is equally not hound to offer his sugarcane for sale to the occupier of a factory even if he happens to be a canegrower within the area reserved for that factory.\n\nHis freedom in that behalf is absolutely unrestricted and we do not see how it can be urged that the provisions of the impugned Act and the notification dated 27th September, 1954 are violative of his fundamental right under article 19(l)(c) of the Constitution.\n\nRe. (6): It is further contended that the impugned Act and the notifications infringe -the fundamental right guaranteed under article 19(1)(f) and (g) and article 31 of the Constitution. We may refer in this context to the following passage from the judgment of this Court delivered by Mukherjea, J. (as he then was) in Messrs Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and two others('):-\n\n\"Nobody can dispute that for ensuring equitable distribution of commodities considered essential to the community and their availability at fair prices, it is quite a reasonable thing to regulate sale of these commodities through licensed vendors to whom quotas are allotted in specified quantities and who are not permitted to sell them beyond the prices that are fixed by the controlling authorities. The power of granting or withholding licenses or of fixing the prices of the goods would necessarily have to be vested in certain public officers or bodies and they would certainly have to be left with some amount of discretion in these matters. So far no exception can be taken; but the mischief arises when the power con-\n\n(!) [1954] S.C.R. 803, 811.\n\nferred on such officers is an arbitrary power unregulated by any rule or principle and it is left entirely to the discretion of particular persons to do anything they like without any check or control by any higher authority. A law or order, which confers arbitrary and uncontrolled power upon the executive in the matter of regulating trade or business in normally available commodities cannot but be held to be unreasonable. As has been held by this court in Ohintaman v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, the phrase \"reasonable restriction\" connotes that the limitation imposed upon a person in enjoyment of a right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature beyond what is required in the interest of the public. Legislation, which arbitrarily or excessively invades the right, cannot be said to contain the quality of reasonableness, and unless it strikes a proper balance between the freedom guaranteed under article 19(1)(g) and the social control permitted by clause (6) of article 19, it must be held to be wanting in reasonableness\".\n\nThe power which is given to the Cane Commissioner under section 15 of the Act for declaring reserved or assigned areas is well defined and guided by the considerations set out in Rule 22 of Chapter 6 of the U.P.\n\nSugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Rules, 1954 and is further conditioned that he has to consult the factory and the Canegrowers' Co-operative Society, and his orders made thereunder are subject to an appeal to the State Government at the instance of the party aggrieved. This cannot by any means be treated as an uncontrolled or an unfettered power without recourse to any higher authority in the event of his going wrong.\n\nThe power is not absolute nor is it unguided and, therefore, does not fall within the mischief of article 19(1)(f) and (g) and the notification dated 9th November, 1955 cannot be impugned on that ground. The same is the position with regard to notification dated 27th September, 1954. The restriction which is imposed upon the cane growers in regard to sales of their sugarcane to the occupiers of factories in areas where the membership of the\n\nCh. Tika Ramji and others, etc. v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand others\n\nBhagwati J.\n\n19S6\n\nCh. Tika Ramjl and otlrers, etc.\n\nTh• Stat• of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand others\n\nBhagwatiJ~\n\nCanegrowers' Co-operative Society is not less than 75 per cent. of the total cane growers within the area is, a reasonable restriction in the public interest designed for safeguarding the interests of the large majority of growers of sugarcane in the area and works for the greatest good of the greatest number. That being so, it comes well within the protection of article 19(6) and the impugned notification cannot be challenged as violative of the fundamental right guaranteed under article 19(1)(f) and (g). If these impugned notifications are, therefore, intra vires the State Legislature, they cannot be challenged also under article 31 as none of the petitioners is be ing deprived of his property, if any, save by authority of law.\n\n, Re. (7): It is next contended that the impugned Act is void in that it confers very wide powers on the executive officials and is a piece of delegated legislation. Our attention has not been drawn to any provisions of the impugned Aot which would amount to a delegation of legislative power to any officia.Js of the State Government. The only provisions alleged to contain such delegation of legislative power are those contained in se9tion 15 and section 16(l)(b) read with section 16(2)(b) of the impugned Act which we have dealt with above.\n\nThey are certainly no piece of delegated legislation and the vires of the impugned Act is not affected thereby.\n\nRe. (8): It is lastly contended that the impugned Act is destructive of freedom of trade and commerce and is thus violative of article 301 of the Constitution. Article 301 of the Constitution does not occur in Part III whicJ:i deals with fundamental rights but it is urged that if a law was enacted in violation of the provisions of article 301 it will be no law at all and will certainly not avail the State Government.\n\nIn effect this is an argument in furtherance of the contention in regard to article 19(l)(f) and (g) dealt with above but we shall deal with it separately as it bas been urged as an independent ground of attack\n\nI ..\n\nI i ! .r\n\nagainst the constitutionality of the impugned Act and the notifications issued thereunder. It is urged that the impugned notifications are violative of the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse embodied in article 301 of the Constitution. The petitioners are not free to sell their sugarcane to anybody other than the occupier of a factory or even to him except through the agency of a Canegrowers' Co-operative Society and are not at all entitled to sell their sugarcane to anyone outside the State. Assuming this is so, the short answer to this contention is furnished by the provisions of article 304 of the Constitution which provide:\n\n\"304. Notwithstanding anything in article 301 or article 303, the Legislature of a State may by law- ( a) ................................... .\n\n(b) impose such reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse with or within that State as may be required in the public interest: .................... \".\n\nWe may also refer in this context to the following passage from the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Commonwealth of Australia v. Bank of New South Wales(1) which was quoted with approval in the later Privy Council decision in Hughes and Vale Proprietary Ltd. v. State of New South Wales and\n\nOthers(~):-\n\n\"Every case must be judged on its own facts and in its own setting of time and circumstance, and it may be that in regard to some economic activities and at some stage of social development it might be maintained that prohibition with a view to State monopoly was the only practical and reasonable manner of regulation, and that inter-State trade, commerce and intercourse thus prohibited and thus monopolized remained absolutely free\".\n\nWe have already stated in the earlier part of this judgment that the restrictions imposed by the alleged notifications are reasonable restrictions imposed on\n\n(l) [1950] A.O. 235, 311.\n\n(2) [1955] A.O. 241.\n\nCh. Tika Ramji and others, etc, v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh and others\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nCh. Tika Ramji and others, etc. v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh and others\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nthe petitioners in the public interest. We are, therefore, of opinion that this contention also is of no avail to the petitioners.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that the impugned Act and the notifications dated 27th September, 1954 and 9th November, 1955issued thereunder were intra vireB the State Legislature and are binding on the petitioners.\n\nThe Petitions must, therefore, stand dismissed. In regard to cos ts we feel that the proper order for costs should be that Petitions Nos. 625 of 1954, 48 of 1955 and 47 of 1956 in which the President, the Vice- President and the Secretary respectively of the Ganna Utpadak Sangh are amongst the petitioners and Petition No. 37 of 1956 in which Saraya Sugar Factory is the petitioner will stand dismissed with costs, one set between all the petitions and between all the Respondents in those petitions. The parties in the rest of the Petitions will bear and pay their own respective costs of those Petitions.", "total_entities": 396, "entities": [{"text": "article 22(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 241, "end_char": 254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 344, "end_char": 357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "CH. TIKA RAMJI & OTHERS, ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 514, "end_char": 542, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CH. 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SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAFER IMAM JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 646, "end_char": 660, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SYED JAFFER IMAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 15, 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1090, "end_char": 1100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1116, "end_char": 1161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1162, "end_char": 1211, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1262, "end_char": 1268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954", "statute": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954"}}, {"text": "Commodities Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1290, "end_char": 1311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 16(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1329, "end_char": 1340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Commodities Act, 1955", "statute": "Commodities Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1383, "end_char": 1404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 19(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1406, "end_char": 1424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "September 27, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1642, "end_char": 1660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners challenged the constitutional validity of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act of 1953, and two notifications issued by the State Government on September 27, 1954 and November 9, 1955, the former under sub-sec."}}, {"text": "November 9, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1665, "end_char": 1681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners challenged the constitutional validity of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act of 1953, and two notifications issued by the State Government on September 27, 1954 and November 9, 1955, the former under sub-sec."}}, {"text": "sec. 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1728, "end_char": 1737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1741, "end_char": 1746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2097, "end_char": 2102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "agannadliadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2378, "end_char": 2391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They contended that the impugned Act was itltra vires the\n\nLaure11ce Joac/1im\n\nJoseph D'So11za\n\nTile State of Bombay\n\n]agannadliadas J.\n\nApril 24\n\nCh."}}, {"text": "Arts.14, 19(l)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2771, "end_char": 2788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2840, "end_char": 2848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3074, "end_char": 3082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3271, "end_char": 3289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "301 of the Constitution and the petitions must be dis missed;\n\n(2) that the Central Acts in respect of sugar and sugarcane and the notifications thereunder having been enacted and made by the Central Government in exercise of concurrent jurisdiction under Entry 33 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution as amended by the Constitution (Third Amendment) Act of 1954; the State Legislature was not deprived of its jurisdiction thereunder and no question of legislative incompetence of the U.P. Legislature or its trespassing upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the centre in enacting the impugned Act could arise;\n\n(3) that the provisions of the impugned Act compared to those of the Central Acts clearly showed that the impugned Act was solely concerned with the regulation o!"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3363, "end_char": 3379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "U.P. Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3583, "end_char": 3599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "301 of the Constitution and the petitions must be dis missed;\n\n(2) that the Central Acts in respect of sugar and sugarcane and the notifications thereunder having been enacted and made by the Central Government in exercise of concurrent jurisdiction under Entry 33 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution as amended by the Constitution (Third Amendment) Act of 1954; the State Legislature was not deprived of its jurisdiction thereunder and no question of legislative incompetence of the U.P. Legislature or its trespassing upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the centre in enacting the impugned Act could arise;\n\n(3) that the provisions of the impugned Act compared to those of the Central Acts clearly showed that the impugned Act was solely concerned with the regulation o!"}}, {"text": "Act compared to those of the Central Acts clearly showed that the impugned Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3748, "end_char": 3826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 254", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4113, "end_char": 4121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act compared to those of the Central Acts clearly showed that the impugned Act", "statute": "Act compared to those of the Central Acts clearly showed that the impugned Act"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4160, "end_char": 4170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "254-of the Constitution could arise where Parliamentary Legislation and State Legislation occupied different fields and de, Jt with separate and distinct matters even though of a cognate and allied character, and that where, as in the present case, there was no inconsistency in the actual terms of the acts enacted by Parliament and the State Legislature, the test of repugnancy would be whether Parliament and the State Legislature, in legislating under an entry in the Concurrent List, exercised their powers over the same subject-matter or whether the laws enacted by Parliament were intended to be exhaustive so as to cover the entire fi.e'ld;\n\n(5) that the provisions of s. lBG of Act LXV of 1951 did not cover sugarcane nor indicate the intention of the Parliament to cover the entire field of such legislation; the expression \"any article or class of articles relatable to any scheduled industry\" used in ss."}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5187, "end_char": 5192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5512, "end_char": 5517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act and the Rules made thereunder was invalidated by any of the provisions of Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6278, "end_char": 6359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1939] F.C.R. 188", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6749, "end_char": 6766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 254(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6854, "end_char": 6865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act and the Rules made thereunder was invalidated by any of the provisions of Act", "statute": "Act and the Rules made thereunder was invalidated by any of the provisions of Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 254(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7070, "end_char": 7081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Act and the Rules made thereunder was invalidated by any of the provisions of Act", "statute": "Act and the Rules made thereunder was invalidated by any of the provisions of Act"}}, {"text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7255, "end_char": 7300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 16(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7322, "end_char": 7333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954", "statute": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954"}}, {"text": "cl. 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7355, "end_char": 7363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954", "statute": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954"}}, {"text": "(1955] 1 S.C.R. 799", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7461, "end_char": 7480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 254(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7554, "end_char": 7565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954", "statute": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954"}}, {"text": "cl. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7735, "end_char": 7740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954", "statute": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7873, "end_char": 7880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954", "statute": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954"}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8043, "end_char": 8048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954", "statute": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954"}}, {"text": "Tika RamjJ", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8375, "end_char": 8385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tika RamjJ\n\nand others, etc.", "canonical_name": "Tika Rarnji"}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesli", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8409, "end_char": 8432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Uttar Pradesli\n\na1iil others\n\nand thus provided a sufficient safeguard against any arbitrary exer oise of those powers;\n\n(11) that equally unfounded was the contention that the im pugned Act and the notification dated September 27, 1954, violated the fundamental right guaranteed by Art.", "canonical_name": "State of Uttar Pradesli"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8701, "end_char": 8714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9486, "end_char": 9499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Cane growers' Co-operative Society", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9793, "end_char": 9827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19(1)(f) and (g) and the notification dated November 9, 1955, could not, therefore, be impugned on that ground;\n\n(13) that the restriction imposed by the notification dated September 27, 1954, on canegrowers in regard to sale of sugarcane to occupiers of factories in areas where the membership of the Cane growers' Co-operative Society wos not less than 75 per cent."}}, {"text": "Art. 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10052, "end_char": 10062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(l)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10083, "end_char": 10096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10241, "end_char": 10248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10562, "end_char": 10570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 304(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10620, "end_char": 10631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11076, "end_char": 11086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11094, "end_char": 11115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11174, "end_char": 11188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Pathak, Rameshwar Nath and K. R.\n\nChowdhry, for petitioners in Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "K. R.\n\nChowdhry", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11193, "end_char": 11208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Pathak, Rameshwar Nath and K. R.\n\nChowdhry, for petitioners in Petitions Nos.", "canonical_name": "K. R.\n\nChowdhry"}}, {"text": "J. N. Bannerji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11268, "end_char": 11282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. N. Bannerji and V. S. Sawhney, for petitioners in Petition No."}}, {"text": "V. S. Sawhney", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11287, "end_char": 11300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. N. Bannerji and V. S. Sawhney, for petitioners in Petition No."}}, {"text": "S. P. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11348, "end_char": 11359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinha and K. R. Ohowdhry, for petitioners in Petition No.", "canonical_name": "B. P. SINHA"}}, {"text": "K. R. Ohowdhry", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11364, "end_char": 11378, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. P. Sinha and K. R. Ohowdhry, for petitioners in Petition No.", "canonical_name": "K. R.\n\nChowdhry"}}, {"text": "B. B. Tawakley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11426, "end_char": 11440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. B. Tawakley and K. P. Gupta, for petitioners in Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "K. P. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11445, "end_char": 11456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. B. Tawakley and K. P. Gupta, for petitioners in Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "R. Patnaik", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11634, "end_char": 11644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Patnaik and K. R. Ohowdkry, for petitioners in Petition No."}}, {"text": "K. R. Ohowdkry", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11649, "end_char": 11663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Patnaik and K. R. Ohowdkry, for petitioners in Petition No.", "canonical_name": "K. R.\n\nChowdhry"}}, {"text": "K. L. Misra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11768, "end_char": 11779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. L. Misra, Advocate-General, U.P., K. B. Asthana and 0."}}, {"text": "K. B. Asthana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11805, "end_char": 11818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. L. Misra, Advocate-General, U.P., K. B. Asthana and 0."}}, {"text": "0. P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11823, "end_char": 11832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. L. Misra, Advocate-General, U.P., K. B. Asthana and 0."}}, {"text": "K. Daphtary", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11914, "end_char": 11925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, and Jagdish Chandra, for the Cane-Growers' Co-operative Development .Unions in Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "Jagdish Chandra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11959, "end_char": 11974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, and Jagdish Chandra, for the Cane-Growers' Co-operative Development .Unions in Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "D. N. Mukerji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12226, "end_char": 12239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. N. Mukerji, for Daurala Sugar Mills (respondent No."}}, {"text": "N. Srivastava", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12344, "end_char": 12357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Srivastava, for Punjab Sugar Mills in Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "A. S. Chawla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12426, "end_char": 12438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. S. Chawla, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12490, "end_char": 12500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ganpat Rai for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Ch. Tika Rarnfi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12551, "end_char": 12566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ch.", "canonical_name": "CH. TIKA RAMJI & OTHERS, ETC"}}, {"text": "State of Uttar P", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12594, "end_char": 12610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. - The State of Uttar P, radesh\n\nand others\n\nCh.", "canonical_name": "State of Uttar Pradesli"}}, {"text": "Tika Ramji", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12636, "end_char": 12646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tika Ramji and others, etc.", "canonical_name": "Tika Rarnji"}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12673, "end_char": 12695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nafid others\n\n1956.", "canonical_name": "State of Uttar Pradesli"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12805, "end_char": 12815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Meerut", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13183, "end_char": 13189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners are sugarcane growers in the several villages of the Districts of Meerut, Kheri, Gorakhpur and Deoria in the State of U.P. numbering 4,724 in the aggregate."}}, {"text": "Kheri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13191, "end_char": 13196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners are sugarcane growers in the several villages of the Districts of Meerut, Kheri, Gorakhpur and Deoria in the State of U.P. numbering 4,724 in the aggregate."}}, {"text": "Gorakhpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13198, "end_char": 13207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners are sugarcane growers in the several villages of the Districts of Meerut, Kheri, Gorakhpur and Deoria in the State of U.P. numbering 4,724 in the aggregate."}}, {"text": "Deoria", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13212, "end_char": 13218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners are sugarcane growers in the several villages of the Districts of Meerut, Kheri, Gorakhpur and Deoria in the State of U.P. numbering 4,724 in the aggregate."}}, {"text": "U.P.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13235, "end_char": 13239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners are sugarcane growers in the several villages of the Districts of Meerut, Kheri, Gorakhpur and Deoria in the State of U.P. numbering 4,724 in the aggregate."}}, {"text": "Gauna Utpadak Sangh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13391, "end_char": 13410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Associated with them are the President, the Vice-Presidents and the Secretary of an association which is styled \"the Gauna Utpadak Sangh\" which is a rival body to the Co-operative Development Unions established and recognised under the impugned Act."}}, {"text": "27th September, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13548, "end_char": 13568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The notification dated 27th September, 1954, issued in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section l(a) read with sub-section 2(b) of section 16 of the impugned Act ordered that where not less than 3/4 of the cane growers of the area of operation of a Cane Growers Co-operative Society are members of the Society, the occupier of the factory for which the area is assigned shall not purchase or enter into agreement to purcha.se citne grown by a cane grower except through such Cane Growers Co-operative Society."}}, {"text": "section 2(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13647, "end_char": 13659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13663, "end_char": 13673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "9th November, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14065, "end_char": 14083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The notification dated 9th November, 1955 was issued in exercise of the powers conferred by section 15 of the impugned Act and reserved or assigned to the !!"}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14134, "end_char": 14144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15046, "end_char": 15056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15061, "end_char": 15077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15239, "end_char": 15255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15274, "end_char": 15284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15315, "end_char": 15326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "8th April, 193~", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15649, "end_char": 15664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 8th April, 193~, the Cenral Legislature passed t.he Sugar Industry (Protection) Act, 1932 (Act XIII of\n\n1932) to provide for the fostering and developmen~ of Sugar Industry in India in pursuance of the policy of discriminating protection of industries with due regard to the well being of the community."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15825, "end_char": 15830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 8th April, 193~, the Cenral Legislature passed t.he Sugar Industry (Protection) Act, 1932 (Act XIII of\n\n1932) to provide for the fostering and developmen~ of Sugar Industry in India in pursuance of the policy of discriminating protection of industries with due regard to the well being of the community."}}, {"text": "1st May, 1934", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16425, "end_char": 16438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to protect their interests and for the purpose of assuring to them a fair price for their produce, the Central Legislature enacted on 1st May, 1934 the Sugarcane Act, 1934 (Act XV of\n\n1934) to regulate the price at which sugarcane intended to be used in the manufacture of sugar might be purchased by or for factories."}}, {"text": "Sugarcane Act, 1934", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16443, "end_char": 16462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "With tbe coming into operation of the Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17302, "end_char": 17369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Governments of U.P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18411, "end_char": 18430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Governments of U.P. and Bihar, therefore, decided in consultation with each other to introduce legislation on similar lines for both the Provinces which together accounted for nearly 85 prtr cent."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18435, "end_char": 18440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Governments of U.P. and Bihar, therefore, decided in consultation with each other to introduce legislation on similar lines for both the Provinces which together accounted for nearly 85 prtr cent."}}, {"text": "10th February, 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18686, "end_char": 18705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The U.P. Legislature accordingly enacted on 10th February, 1938 the U.P. Sugar Factories Control Act, 1938 (U.P. Act I of 1938) to provide for the licensing of the sugar factories and for regulating the supply of sugarcane intended for use in such factories and the price at which it may be purchased and for other incidental matters."}}, {"text": "Sugar Factories Control Act, 1938", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18715, "end_char": 18748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "30th June, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19353, "end_char": 19368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Act was to remain in force initially until 30th June, 1947 but the period was extended to 30th June, 1950 by U.P.\n\nAct XIII of 1947 and to 30th June, 1952 by U.P. Act XXI of 1950."}}, {"text": "30th June, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19400, "end_char": 19415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Act was to remain in force initially until 30th June, 1947 but the period was extended to 30th June, 1950 by U.P.\n\nAct XIII of 1947 and to 30th June, 1952 by U.P. Act XXI of 1950."}}, {"text": "30th June, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19449, "end_char": 19464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Act was to remain in force initially until 30th June, 1947 but the period was extended to 30th June, 1950 by U.P.\n\nAct XIII of 1947 and to 30th June, 1952 by U.P. Act XXI of 1950."}}, {"text": "section 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19585, "end_char": 19596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sugar Factories Control Act, 1938", "statute": "Sugar Factories Control Act, 1938"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19604, "end_char": 19633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "lst April, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20720, "end_char": 20735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The proclamation of emergency was revo\\rnd on lst April, 1946 and the laws made by the Dominion Legislature in the field of the Provincial Legislative List were to cease to have effect after 30th September, 1946."}}, {"text": "Dominion Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20761, "end_char": 20781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The proclamation of emergency was revo\\rnd on lst April, 1946 and the laws made by the Dominion Legislature in the field of the Provincial Legislative List were to cease to have effect after 30th September, 1946."}}, {"text": "30th September, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20865, "end_char": 20885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The proclamation of emergency was revo\\rnd on lst April, 1946 and the laws made by the Dominion Legislature in the field of the Provincial Legislative List were to cease to have effect after 30th September, 1946."}}, {"text": "26th March, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20890, "end_char": 20906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 26th March, 1946, the British Parliament enacted the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946 (9 & 10 Geo."}}, {"text": "British Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20912, "end_char": 20930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 26th March, 1946, the British Parliament enacted the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946 (9 & 10 Geo."}}, {"text": "Section 2(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21025, "end_char": 21040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21087, "end_char": 21116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21178, "end_char": 21187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21811, "end_char": 21820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22491, "end_char": 22503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "19th November, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22554, "end_char": 22573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Acting under the power reserved to it under section 2(1) (a) aforesaid, the Central Legislature enacted on 19th November, 1946, the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 (Act XXIV of 1946) to provide for the continuance during the limited period of powers to control production, supply and distributiOn of, and trade and commerce in, certain commodities."}}, {"text": "Section 1(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22812, "end_char": 22824, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22925, "end_char": 22934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "31st March, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23087, "end_char": 23103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the absence of a notification by the Governor-General, the Act remained operative until 31st March, 1947 only."}}, {"text": "3rd March, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23167, "end_char": 23182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Governor-General, however, issued a notification on 3rd March, 1947 continuing its force for a period of two years from the date of the cessation of emergency."}}, {"text": "31st March, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23349, "end_char": 23365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By virtue of this notification, the Act would have remained in force till 31st March, 1948."}}, {"text": "18th July, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23370, "end_char": 23385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 18th July, 1947, the Indian Independence Act was passed and India became a Dominion on 15th August, 1947."}}, {"text": "15th August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23457, "end_char": 23474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 18th July, 1947, the Indian Independence Act was passed and India became a Dominion on 15th August, 1947."}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23483, "end_char": 23492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 19(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23503, "end_char": 23516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Independence Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23524, "end_char": 23553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "14th August, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23595, "end_char": 23612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under section 9 read with section 19(4) of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, the Governor-General passed an order on 14th August, 1947 which substituted the\n\nwords \"Dominion Legislature\" for \"Both Houses of Parliament\" in the proviso to section 4 of India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946 and also introduced a new section 4(a) by way of adaptation providing that the powers of the Dominion Legislature shall be exercised by the Constituent Assembly."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23715, "end_char": 23724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Independence Act, 1947", "statute": "the Indian Independence Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 4(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23807, "end_char": 23819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Independence Act, 1947", "statute": "the Indian Independence Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "25th February, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23946, "end_char": 23965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 25th February, 1948, the Constituent Assembly passed its first Resolution extending the operation of the Act for one year up to 31st March,\n\n1949."}}, {"text": "31st March,\n\n1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24074, "end_char": 24091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 25th February, 1948, the Constituent Assembly passed its first Resolution extending the operation of the Act for one year up to 31st March,\n\n1949."}}, {"text": "3rd March, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24096, "end_char": 24111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 3rd March, 1949, a second Resolution was passed by the Assembly extending the life of the Act by one year more up to 31st March, 1950."}}, {"text": "Resolution was passed by the Assembly extending the life of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24122, "end_char": 24189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "31st March, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24213, "end_char": 24229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 3rd March, 1949, a second Resolution was passed by the Assembly extending the life of the Act by one year more up to 31st March, 1950."}}, {"text": "26th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24271, "end_char": 24289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With the advent of our Constitution on 26th January, 1950, Parliament was invested under article 369 with power for a period of 5 years from the .commencement of the Constitution to make laws with respect to the following matters as if they were enumerated in the Concurrent List:\n\n\"(a) trade and commerce within a State in, and the production, supply and distribution of, ........ foodstuffs (including edible oil seeds and oil), ............... \"\n\nThe life of the Act was accordingly extended from time to time up to 26th January 1955 by Acts passed by Parliament."}}, {"text": "article 369", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24321, "end_char": 24332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Resolution was passed by the Assembly extending the life of the Act", "statute": "Resolution was passed by the Assembly extending the life of the Act"}}, {"text": "26th January 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24751, "end_char": 24768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With the advent of our Constitution on 26th January, 1950, Parliament was invested under article 369 with power for a period of 5 years from the .commencement of the Constitution to make laws with respect to the following matters as if they were enumerated in the Concurrent List:\n\n\"(a) trade and commerce within a State in, and the production, supply and distribution of, ........ foodstuffs (including edible oil seeds and oil), ............... \"\n\nThe life of the Act was accordingly extended from time to time up to 26th January 1955 by Acts passed by Parliament."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24996, "end_char": 25005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Resolution was passed by the Assembly extending the life of the Act", "statute": "Resolution was passed by the Assembly extending the life of the Act"}}, {"text": "7th October, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25375, "end_char": 25392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 7th October, 1950, the Central Government, in exercise of the powers conferred upon it by section 3 of the Act, promulgated the Sugar and Gur Control Order, 1950, inter alia empowering it to prohibit or to restrict the export of sugarcane from any area, to direct that no gur or sugar shall be\n\nCh."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25465, "end_char": 25474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Stat• of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25710, "end_char": 25732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nThe Stat• of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand others\n\nBhagu:ati}.", "canonical_name": "State of Uttar Pradesli"}}, {"text": "31st October, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26641, "end_char": 26659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This power of fixing the price of sugarcane was exercised by the Central Government from time to time by issuing notifications fixing the minimum prices to be paid by the producers of sugar by vacuum pan process or their agents for sugarcane purchased by them during the 1950-51 crushing season iu various States including U.P.\n\nOn 31st October, 1951, Parliament enacted the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (Act LXV of 1951) to provide for the development and regulation of certain industries."}}, {"text": "Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26684, "end_char": 26733, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26824, "end_char": 26833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "U.P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27138, "end_char": 27142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Province of Bihar which, along with U.P. contributed to nearly 85 per cent."}}, {"text": "India had also on its Statute Book the Bihar Sugar Factories Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27204, "end_char": 27276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "10th\n\nApril, 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27293, "end_char": 27310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 10th\n\nApril, 1938, a joint meeting of the U.P. and the Bihar Sugar Control Boards was held at which it was resolved that a Committee be appointed to enquire into the working of the sugarcane rnles and labour conditions prevailing in the sugar factories in the two Provinces."}}, {"text": "Bihar Sugar Control Boards", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27348, "end_char": 27374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 10th\n\nApril, 1938, a joint meeting of the U.P. and the Bihar Sugar Control Boards was held at which it was resolved that a Committee be appointed to enquire into the working of the sugarcane rnles and labour conditions prevailing in the sugar factories in the two Provinces."}}, {"text": "Governments of the U.P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27573, "end_char": 27596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Governments of the U.P. and Bihar accepted this recommendation of the Sugar Control Boards and accordingly appointed the Khaitan Committee, (1) to examine the working of the sugarcane rules, (2) to look into the complaints of malpractices received from time to time in connection with the supply of sugarcane to the sugar factories, (3) to enquire in to the labour conditions of the sugar factories, and (4) to suggest remedial measures for the shortcomings as\n\nnoted in (1), (2) and (3) above."}}, {"text": "Shibban Lal Saxena", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28068, "end_char": 28086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shibban Lal Saxena, the present President of the Ganna Utpadak Sangh and one of the petitioners before us was also a member of that Committee."}}, {"text": "Ganna Utpadak Sangh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28117, "end_char": 28136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shibban Lal Saxena, the present President of the Ganna Utpadak Sangh and one of the petitioners before us was also a member of that Committee."}}, {"text": "Indian Tariff Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28445, "end_char": 28464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Indian Tariff Board had also, in the nieanwhile, made its Report on the sugar industry in the year 1938 commending the advantages of a zonal system."}}, {"text": "U. P. Sugar Industry Enquiry Committee, 1951", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28630, "end_char": 28674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was further the report of the U. P. Sugar Industry Enquiry Committee, 1951 called the Swaminathan Committee, which also recommended the abolition of dual agencies of cane supplies to factories and commended the desirability of employing the agency of t.he Co-operative Societies for the purpose."}}, {"text": "8th May, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29063, "end_char": 29076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Act LXV of 1951 was brought into force with effect from 8th May, 1952."}}, {"text": "29th June, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29205, "end_char": 29220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The U.P. Legislature, therefore, passed on 29th June, 1952 the U. P. Sugar Factories Control (Amendment) Act, 1952, deleting those provisions and putting the amended Act permanently on the Statute Book."}}, {"text": "U. P. Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29649, "end_char": 29666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The U. P. Act I of 1938, as thus amended, continued in force till, as a result of the prior enactment of Act LXV of 1951 and the report of the Indian Tariff Board on the Sugar Industry as well as the reports of the Khaitan Committee and the Swaminathan Committee mentioned above, the U. P. Legislature enacted the impugned Act."}}, {"text": "Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29781, "end_char": 29830, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Tika Rarnji", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30273, "end_char": 30284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tika Rarnji and others.", "canonical_name": "Tika Rarnji"}}, {"text": "15th July, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30590, "end_char": 30605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "etc,\n\nTlie State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand otlters\n\nBltagn:a(i J.\n\nscientific lines, to protect the interests of the ca:ne growers and of the industry and to put the new Act permanently on the Statute Book\" (Vide Statement of objects and reasons published in the U. P. Gazette Extraordinary dated 15th July, 1953)."}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30736, "end_char": 30746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "U.P. Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30763, "end_char": 30778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In exorcise of the rule-making power conferred by section 28 of the Act, the U.P. Government made the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Rules, 1954."}}, {"text": "U. P. Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30856, "end_char": 30872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The U. P. Government also, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 16 of the Act, promulgated the U.P. Sugarcane Supply and Purchase Order, 1954, which came into effect from 19th September, 1954."}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30918, "end_char": 30928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "19th September, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31033, "end_char": 31053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The U. P. Government also, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 16 of the Act, promulgated the U.P. Sugarcane Supply and Purchase Order, 1954, which came into effect from 19th September, 1954."}}, {"text": "1st April, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31567, "end_char": 31582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 1st April, 1955, Parliament enacted the Essential Commodit.ies Act, 1955 (Act X of 1955) to provide in the interests of the general public for the control of production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, certain commodities.·"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32233, "end_char": 32249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32332, "end_char": 32344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32722, "end_char": 32734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32964, "end_char": 32974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Ordinance, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33003, "end_char": 33040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33332, "end_char": 33341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Essential Commodities Ordinance, 1955", "statute": "the Essential Commodities Ordinance, 1955"}}, {"text": "27th August, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33392, "end_char": 33409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Act, the Central Government promulgated on 27th August, 1955 the Sugar Control Order, 1955 and the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955."}}, {"text": "Clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34147, "end_char": 34155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34240, "end_char": 34259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clause 7 of this order provided that the Sugar and Gur Control Order, 1950, published by the Government of India in the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, S.R.O. 735 dated 7th October, 1950, and any order made by a State Government or other authority reulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution of sugarcane and trade or\n\nCli."}}, {"text": "Stato of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34530, "end_char": 34552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nThe Stato of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand others\n\nBhagwati].", "canonical_name": "State of Uttar Pradesli"}}, {"text": "State of U. P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34906, "end_char": 34920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These are the 1especti ve Acts and Notifications passed by the Centre as well as the State of U. P. in regard to sugar and sngarcane."}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35807, "end_char": 35817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35842, "end_char": 35850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35933, "end_char": 35942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36029, "end_char": 36039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(l)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36268, "end_char": 36284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36554, "end_char": 36570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36583, "end_char": 36593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36849, "end_char": 36860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State Legislature to enact the impugned Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36958, "end_char": 37001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38405, "end_char": 38416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38424, "end_char": 38453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 369", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38549, "end_char": 38560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Central Legislature", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 38960, "end_char": 38979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tika Ramji and others, etc, v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand others\n\nIII, the Central Legislature was operating all along on what became in effect the Concurrent field even in regard to sugarcane, that the investing of the Central Government with power to legislate in this sphere of the Provincial List did not deprive the Provincial Legislature of such power and that both the Central Legislature as well as the State Legislatures had legislative competence to legislate in regard to these fields which were for the purpose of legislative competence translated into Concurrent fields and that, therefore, the U.P. State Legislature was competent to enact the impugned Act which would be valid within its own sphere except for repugnancy with any of the provisions of the Central Legislature covering the same field."}}, {"text": "State Legislature was competent to enact the impugned Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39498, "end_char": 39555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39753, "end_char": 39769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State Legislature was competent to enact the impugned Act", "statute": "State Legislature was competent to enact the impugned Act"}}, {"text": "Constitution Third Amendment Act, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40434, "end_char": 40472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 366(12)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41958, "end_char": 41973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "List III by the Constitution Third Amendment Act, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42385, "end_char": 42439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tika Ramji", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 42879, "end_char": 42889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tika Ramji\n\nand ot/iers, etc.", "canonical_name": "Tika Rarnji"}}, {"text": "List III by the Constitution Third Amendment Act, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43338, "end_char": 43392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "P. State Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 43851, "end_char": 43871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Production, supply and distribution of sugarcane being thus within the exclusive sphere of the State Legislatures, the U. P. State Legislature would be, without anything more, competent to legislate in regard to the same and the impugned Act would be intra vires the State Legislature."}}, {"text": "section 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45749, "end_char": 45761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45769, "end_char": 45798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46736, "end_char": 46765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ch. Tika Rarnji", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 47269, "end_char": 47284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "51\n\nCh.", "canonical_name": "CH. TIKA RAMJI & OTHERS, ETC"}}, {"text": "List II and the impugned Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49289, "end_char": 49317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Gwyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 51322, "end_char": 51327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and also at page 113:\n\n\"It is enough for the decision of the present case to say that, in their view, its authority to legislate for the regulation of trade and commerce does not comprehend the power to regulate by legislation the contracts of a particular business or trade, such as the business of fire insurance in a single province ............ \" These observations were quoted with approval by Gwyer, C. J. in Re: The Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxatio~ Act, 1938 (Central Provinces and Berar Act No."}}, {"text": "Central Provinces and Berar Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51431, "end_char": 51462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1939] F.C.R. 18", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 51777, "end_char": 51793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": ". Tika Ramji", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 51891, "end_char": 51903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand others\n\nBit a gwati J.\n\nCh.", "canonical_name": "CH. TIKA RAMJI & OTHERS, ETC"}}, {"text": "State of Utta,. Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 51929, "end_char": 51952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tika Ramji and others, etc, v.\n\nThe State of Utta,.", "canonical_name": "State of Uttar Pradesli"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 51969, "end_char": 51977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pradesh\n\nand others I - Bhagwati J.\n\nGovernor-General in Council v. The Province of .Madras(1):\n\n\"But it appears to them that it is right first to consider whether a fair reconciliation cannot be effected hy giving to the language of the Federal Legislative List a meaning which, if less wide than it might in another context bear, is yet one that can properly be given to it, and equally giving to the language of the Provincial Legislative List a meaning which it can properly bear\".", "canonical_name": "BhagwatiJ."}}, {"text": "section 100(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52707, "end_char": 52721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52804, "end_char": 52814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52851, "end_char": 52861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Haldane", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 52907, "end_char": 52914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance was also placed on the observations of Gwyer, C. J. quoted in Subrahmanyan Chettiar v.\n\nMuthuswami Goundan(2):\n\n\"As interpreted by the Judicial Committee, the British North America Act presents an exact analogy to the India Act, even to the overriding provisions in section 100(1) of the latter: \"The rule of construction is that general language in the heads of section 92 yields to particular expressions in section 91, where the latter are unambiguous\": per Lord Haldane in Great West Saddlery Co. v. The King(3)."}}, {"text": "State of U.P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 54751, "end_char": 54764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The answer of the State of U.P. was two-fold: (1) after the advent of the Second World War and all throughout up to 1955when ActX of 1955 wasenacted by Parliament, the Centre was operating upon the Concurrent field of legislation and that whatever legisla.:"}}, {"text": "Bllagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 56324, "end_char": 56333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh and others\n\nBllagwati J.\n\nCIJ.", "canonical_name": "Bllagwati"}}, {"text": "Tika Ramjl", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 56343, "end_char": 56353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tika Ramjl tnid others, etc, v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand others\n\nsuch factories.", "canonical_name": "Tika Rarnji"}}, {"text": "section 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56495, "end_char": 56506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Provincial Legislative List on a distribution of legislative powers effected under the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Provincial Legislative List on a distribution of legislative powers effected under the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 56514, "end_char": 56543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1st April, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 56955, "end_char": 56970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The emergency was about to come to an end on the 1st April, 1946 and the British Parliament, therefore, on 26th March, 1946, passed the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946, under which, notwithstanding anything in the Government of India Act, 1935, the Central Legislature was, for the period specified in section 4 thereof, invested with the powers to make laws with respect to (a) trade and commerce in, and the production, supply and distribution of~ .............. .. foodstuffs, edible oilseeds and oils ................ and this provision in effect continued the power which had been vested in the Central Legislature during the emergency under section 102 of the Government of India Act, 1935."}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 57141, "end_char": 57170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 57176, "end_char": 57195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The emergency was about to come to an end on the 1st April, 1946 and the British Parliament, therefore, on 26th March, 1946, passed the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946, under which, notwithstanding anything in the Government of India Act, 1935, the Central Legislature was, for the period specified in section 4 thereof, invested with the powers to make laws with respect to (a) trade and commerce in, and the production, supply and distribution of~ .............. .. foodstuffs, edible oilseeds and oils ................ and this provision in effect continued the power which had been vested in the Central Legislature during the emergency under section 102 of the Government of India Act, 1935."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57229, "end_char": 57238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57574, "end_char": 57585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 57593, "end_char": 57622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57648, "end_char": 57657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "31st March,\n\n1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 57707, "end_char": 57724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The period mentioned in section 4 of this Act was extended from time to time up to 31st March,\n\n1950."}}, {"text": "16th November, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 57819, "end_char": 57838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was in pursuance of these powers that the Central Legislature enacted Act XXIV of 1946 on 16th November, 1946."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58120, "end_char": 58129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "article 369", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58384, "end_char": 58395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "26th January, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 58733, "end_char": 58751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Act XXIV of 1946 was continued in force up to 31st March, 1950 under the terms of section 4 of India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946 by the notification of the Governor- General and the resolutions passed by both the Houses of Parliament but before the expiration of this extended period the Constitution was inaugurated and under article 369 Parliament was invested with the power to make laws inter alia with respect to trade and commerce within a State and production, supply and distribution of.. .............. foodstuffs, edible oi!Eeeds\n\nand oils as if they were enumerated in the concurrent list and it was by virtue of this power that Act XXIV of 1946 was extended up to 26th January, 1955 by diverse pieces of legislation enacted by Parliament."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59480, "end_char": 59489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Parliament as well as by the State Legislatures and it was in exercise of this jurisdiction that Parliament enacted Act", "statute": "Parliament as well as by the State Legislatures and it was in exercise of this jurisdiction that Parliament enacted Act"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60066, "end_char": 60082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Parliament as well as by the State Legislatures and it was in exercise of this jurisdiction that Parliament enacted Act", "statute": "Parliament as well as by the State Legislatures and it was in exercise of this jurisdiction that Parliament enacted Act"}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60182, "end_char": 60196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Parliament as well as by the State Legislatures and it was in exercise of this jurisdiction that Parliament enacted Act", "statute": "Parliament as well as by the State Legislatures and it was in exercise of this jurisdiction that Parliament enacted Act"}}, {"text": ". Tika Ramji", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 60868, "end_char": 60880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nTiie State of Uttar P1adesh\n\nand others\n\nBhagu:atiJ.\n\nCh.", "canonical_name": "CH. TIKA RAMJI & OTHERS, ETC"}}, {"text": "State of Utta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 60904, "end_char": 60917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Utta,.", "canonical_name": "State of Uttar Pradesli"}}, {"text": "Bltagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60941, "end_char": 60950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pradesh\n\naud others\n\nBltagwati J.\n\nfore, be no question of legislative incompetence qua the Provincial Legislatures in regard to similar pieces of legislation enacted by the latter.", "canonical_name": "Bllagwati"}}, {"text": "Ch. Tika Ramji", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 65265, "end_char": 65279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chapter 3 of U.P. Act I of 1938, dealing with the construction and extension of sugar factories, licens-\n\nCh.", "canonical_name": "CH. TIKA RAMJI & OTHERS, ETC"}}, {"text": "BhagwatiJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65342, "end_char": 65352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BhagwatiJ.\n\nCh.", "canonical_name": "BhagwatiJ."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65812, "end_char": 65821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66084, "end_char": 66092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66186, "end_char": 66195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67087, "end_char": 67097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 254", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68804, "end_char": 68815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69508, "end_char": 69522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 254(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70721, "end_char": 70735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 248", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70967, "end_char": 70978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sulaiman", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71088, "end_char": 71096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "587 contra, Per Sulaiman, J. in 1940 F.C.R. 185 at p. 226)."}}, {"text": "1940 F.C.R. 185", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 71104, "end_char": 71119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Nicholas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 71133, "end_char": 71141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nicholas in his Australian Constitution, 2nd ed.,"}}, {"text": "Isaacs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 71893, "end_char": 71899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Isaacs, J. in Clyde Engineering Company, Limited v.\n\nOowburn(1) laid down one test of inconsistency as conclusive: \"If, however, a competent legislature expressly or implicitly evinces its intention to cover the whole field, that is a conclusive test of inconsistency where another Legislature assumes to enter to any extent upon the same field\"."}}, {"text": "Dixon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 72241, "end_char": 72246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dixon, J. elaborated this theme in, Ex parte McLean(2):\n\n\"When the Parliament of the Commonwealth and the Parliament of a State each legislate upon the same subject and prescribe what the rule of conduct shall be, they make laws which are inconsistent, notwithstanding that the rule of conduct is identical which each prescribes, and section 109 applies."}}, {"text": "Parliament of the Commonwealth", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 72308, "end_char": 72338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dixon, J. elaborated this theme in, Ex parte McLean(2):\n\n\"When the Parliament of the Commonwealth and the Parliament of a State each legislate upon the same subject and prescribe what the rule of conduct shall be, they make laws which are inconsistent, notwithstanding that the rule of conduct is identical which each prescribes, and section 109 applies."}}, {"text": "section 109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72575, "end_char": 72586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Evatt", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 73596, "end_char": 73601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To the same effect are the observations of Evatt, J. in Stock Motor Plough Ltd. v. Forsyth(3):\n\n\"It is now established, therefore, that State and Federal laws may be inconsistent, although obedience to both laws is possible."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 74971, "end_char": 74990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Calcutta High Court in G. P. Stewart v. B. K.\n\nRoy Ohaudhury(') had occasion to consider the meaning of repugnancy and B. N. Rau, J. who delivered the judgment of the Court observed at page 632:\n\n\"It is sometimes said that two laws cannot be said to be properly repugnant unless there is a direct conflict between them, as when one says \"do\" and the other \"don't\", there is no true repugnancy, according to this view, if it is possible to obey both the laws."}}, {"text": "B. N. Rau", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75090, "end_char": 75099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Calcutta High Court in G. P. Stewart v. B. K.\n\nRoy Ohaudhury(') had occasion to consider the meaning of repugnancy and B. N. Rau, J. who delivered the judgment of the Court observed at page 632:\n\n\"It is sometimes said that two laws cannot be said to be properly repugnant unless there is a direct conflict between them, as when one says \"do\" and the other \"don't\", there is no true repugnancy, according to this view, if it is possible to obey both the laws."}}, {"text": "Australia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 76294, "end_char": 76303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "orities which laid down the test of repugnancy in Australia, Canada, and England and concluded at page 634:\n\n\"The principle deducible from the English cases, as from the Canadian cases, seems therefore to be the same as that enunciated by Isaacs, J. in the Australian 44 hour case (37 C.L.R. 466) if the dominant law has expressly or impliedly evinced its intention to cover the whole field, then a subordinate law in the same field is repugnant and therefore inoperative."}}, {"text": "Canada", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 76305, "end_char": 76311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "orities which laid down the test of repugnancy in Australia, Canada, and England and concluded at page 634:\n\n\"The principle deducible from the English cases, as from the Canadian cases, seems therefore to be the same as that enunciated by Isaacs, J. in the Australian 44 hour case (37 C.L.R. 466) if the dominant law has expressly or impliedly evinced its intention to cover the whole field, then a subordinate law in the same field is repugnant and therefore inoperative."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 76317, "end_char": 76324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "orities which laid down the test of repugnancy in Australia, Canada, and England and concluded at page 634:\n\n\"The principle deducible from the English cases, as from the Canadian cases, seems therefore to be the same as that enunciated by Isaacs, J. in the Australian 44 hour case (37 C.L.R. 466) if the dominant law has expressly or impliedly evinced its intention to cover the whole field, then a subordinate law in the same field is repugnant and therefore inoperative."}}, {"text": "Ontario", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 77727, "end_char": 77734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Their Lordships can discover no adequate grounds for holding that there exists repugnancy between the two laws in districts of the Province of Ontario where the prohibitions of the Canadian Act are not and may never be in force: (Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for the Dominion)(~)\"."}}, {"text": "[1939) F.C.R. 188", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 78199, "end_char": 78216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 78291, "end_char": 78313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand othef's\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nCh.", "canonical_name": "State of Uttar Pradesli"}}, {"text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 78810, "end_char": 78855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79124, "end_char": 79138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954", "statute": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954"}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80856, "end_char": 80866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81903, "end_char": 81913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "U. P.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 82394, "end_char": 82399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was, however, urged on behalf of the State of U. P. that articles relatable to scheduled industry comprised only those finished products which were of the same nature or description as the article or class of articles manufactured or produced in the scheduled industry and did not comprise the raw materials for\n\nCh."}}, {"text": "State o/ Uttar Pratksh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 82788, "end_char": 82810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nThe State o/ Uttar Pratksh\n\nand other&\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nthe scheduled industry.", "canonical_name": "State of Uttar Pradesli"}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82945, "end_char": 82955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 15 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82969, "end_char": 82987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83467, "end_char": 83477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84004, "end_char": 84014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85002, "end_char": 85012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 85682, "end_char": 85692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86547, "end_char": 86557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87187, "end_char": 87197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ". Tika Ram", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 87291, "end_char": 87301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tika Ramji and others, etc, v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesla\n\nand others\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nCh.", "canonical_name": "CH. TIKA RAMJI & OTHERS, ETC"}}, {"text": "Bhagwatl", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87364, "end_char": 87372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tika Ram/I and others, etc,\n\n•• The State of Uttar Pradesh and others\n\nBhagwatl J.\n\nThese articles or class of articles relatable to the scheduled industry, therefore, were finished products and not raw materials for the manufacture or production of the articles or class of articles in the scheduled industry.", "canonical_name": "BhagwatiJ."}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88073, "end_char": 88083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88203, "end_char": 88213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88854, "end_char": 88864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89199, "end_char": 89209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "List III as amended by the Constitution Third Amendment Act, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 89629, "end_char": 89694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89761, "end_char": 89773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List III as amended by the Constitution Third Amendment Act, 1954", "statute": "List III as amended by the Constitution Third Amendment Act, 1954"}}, {"text": "Section 3(2)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90046, "end_char": 90061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List III as amended by the Constitution Third Amendment Act, 1954", "statute": "List III as amended by the Constitution Third Amendment Act, 1954"}}, {"text": "section 3(2)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90284, "end_char": 90299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "List III as amended by the Constitution Third Amendment Act, 1954", "statute": "List III as amended by the Constitution Third Amendment Act, 1954"}}, {"text": "U. P. State Legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 91309, "end_char": 91332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That, however, did not affect the legislative competence of the U. P. State Legislature to enact the law in regard to sugarcane and the only question which remained to be considered was whether there was any repugnancy between the provisions of the Central legislE.- tion and the U. P. State legislation in this behalf."}}, {"text": "U. P. State Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 91593, "end_char": 91615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As we have noted above, the U. P. State Government did not at all provide for the fixation of minimum\n\nCh."}}, {"text": "Bha gwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 91745, "end_char": 91754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nTiie State of Uftar Pradesh\n\nnnd others\n\nBha gwati J.\n\nCh.", "canonical_name": "BhagwatiJ."}}, {"text": "State oj Uttar Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 91799, "end_char": 91821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tika Ramji and others, etc, v.\n\nThe State oj Uttar Pradesh and others\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nSUPREME COURT P.EPORTS [1956]\n\nprices for sugarcane nor did it provide for the regulation of movement of sugarcane as was done by the Central Government in clauses (3) and (4) of the Sugaroane Control Order, 1955.", "canonical_name": "State of Uttar Pradesli"}}, {"text": "Sugarcane Rules, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 92212, "end_char": 92233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92710, "end_char": 92718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sugarcane Rules, 1954", "statute": "Sugarcane Rules, 1954"}}, {"text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 92969, "end_char": 93014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 93487, "end_char": 93532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93565, "end_char": 93575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954", "statute": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954"}}, {"text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 94050, "end_char": 94095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 94739, "end_char": 94784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 254(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94924, "end_char": 94938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954", "statute": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954"}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95306, "end_char": 95316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954", "statute": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954"}}, {"text": "clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95338, "end_char": 95346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954", "statute": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95428, "end_char": 95437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954", "statute": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954"}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95457, "end_char": 95467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954", "statute": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954"}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Ordinance, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 95561, "end_char": 95598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96402, "end_char": 96410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Essential Commodities Ordinance, 1955", "statute": "the Essential Commodities Ordinance, 1955"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96492, "end_char": 96501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Essential Commodities Ordinance, 1955", "statute": "the Essential Commodities Ordinance, 1955"}}, {"text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 97039, "end_char": 97084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97153, "end_char": 97163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954", "statute": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954"}}, {"text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 97406, "end_char": 97451, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 15 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97695, "end_char": 97713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954", "statute": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954"}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97738, "end_char": 97748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954", "statute": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954"}}, {"text": "article 254(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97842, "end_char": 97856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954", "statute": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954"}}, {"text": "Article 254(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97883, "end_char": 97897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954", "statute": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954"}}, {"text": "article 254(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98372, "end_char": 98386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954", "statute": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954"}}, {"text": "Section 107", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98770, "end_char": 98781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 98789, "end_char": 98818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 254(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98957, "end_char": 98971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 107", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99008, "end_char": 99019, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 99032, "end_char": 99061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Dominion Legislature, Canada", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 99192, "end_char": 99220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Discussing the nature of the power of the Dominion Legislature, Canada, in relation to that of the Provincial Legislature, in a situation similar to that under section 107(2) of the Government of India Act, it was observed by Lord"}}, {"text": "section 107(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99310, "end_char": 99324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Watson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 99382, "end_char": 99388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Watson in Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney- General for the Dominion(9), that though a law enacted by the Parliament of Canada and within its competence would override Provincial legislation covering the same field, the Dominion Parliament had no authority confe'rred upon it under the Constitution to ena.ct a statute repealing direc1ily any Provincial statute."}}, {"text": "Parliament of Canada", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 99496, "end_char": 99516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Watson in Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney- General for the Dominion(9), that though a law enacted by the Parliament of Canada and within its competence would override Provincial legislation covering the same field, the Dominion Parliament had no authority confe'rred upon it under the Constitution to ena.ct a statute repealing direc1ily any Provincial statute."}}, {"text": "Dominion Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 99610, "end_char": 99629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Watson in Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney- General for the Dominion(9), that though a law enacted by the Parliament of Canada and within its competence would override Provincial legislation covering the same field, the Dominion Parliament had no authority confe'rred upon it under the Constitution to ena.ct a statute repealing direc1ily any Provincial statute."}}, {"text": "section 107(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99803, "end_char": 99817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "article 254(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99937, "end_char": 99951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "section 107(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100095, "end_char": 100109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100375, "end_char": 100384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Tika Ramji", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 100563, "end_char": 100573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tika Ramji and others, etc.", "canonical_name": "Tika Rarnji"}}, {"text": "article 254(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100741, "end_char": 100755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 254(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101519, "end_char": 101533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 254(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101905, "end_char": 101919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102558, "end_char": 102568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102597, "end_char": 102608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102734, "end_char": 102742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103211, "end_char": 103221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 103262, "end_char": 103307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 103696, "end_char": 103741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103745, "end_char": 103755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954", "statute": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954"}}, {"text": "Cane Growers Co-operative Societies", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 104084, "end_char": 104119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He is also in sole charge and management of Cane Growers Co-operative Societies."}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104335, "end_char": 104345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954", "statute": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954"}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104368, "end_char": 104378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954", "statute": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954"}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104486, "end_char": 104496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954", "statute": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954"}}, {"text": ". Tika Ramji", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 104751, "end_char": 104763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) Without prejudice to any order made under clause (d) of sub-section (2) of section 16 the Cane Commissioner may, after consulting the Factory and Canegrowers Co-operative Society in the manner to be prescribed- ( a) reserve any area (hereinafter called the reserved area), and\n\n(b) assign any area (hereinafter called an assigned area),\n\nCh.", "canonical_name": "CH. TIKA RAMJI & OTHERS, ETC"}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105015, "end_char": 105025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "U.P.\n\nGovernment", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 105855, "end_char": 105871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rule 22 of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Rules, 1954, made by the U.P.\n\nGovernment in exercise of the rule-making power conferred by section 28 (2) of the Act however lays down the factors which are to be taken into consideration by the Cane Commissioner in reserving an area for or assigning an area to a factory or determining the quantity of cane to be purchased from an area by a factory:\n\narea,\n\n(a) the distance of the area from the factory,\n\n(b) facilities for transport of cane from the\n\n( c) the quality of cane supplied from the area to the factory in previous years,\n\n(d) previous reservation and assignment orders,\n\n(e) the quantity of cane to be crushed."}}, {"text": "section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105922, "end_char": 105932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107163, "end_char": 107173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107331, "end_char": 107344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 15(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 107493, "end_char": 107506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108033, "end_char": 108043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108420, "end_char": 108430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108580, "end_char": 108596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Cane Growers Co-\n\nCh. Tika Ramji", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 108669, "end_char": 108701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is urged that the Cane Growers Co-\n\nCh."}}, {"text": ". Tika Ra1nji", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 108777, "end_char": 108790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand others\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nCh.", "canonical_name": "CH. TIKA RAMJI & OTHERS, ETC"}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 109507, "end_char": 109524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance is placed in support of this contention on the following passage in the judgment of the Madras High Court in Indian Metal and Metallurgical Corporation v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras and Another(1):-\n\n\"In this case, however, we are concerned with a much narrower question, namely, whether an award made by the Industrial Tribunal appointed under the Industriai Disputes Act and published by the Government in accordance with the provisions of the Act can direct the management of an industry to continue to carry on any business against their will."}}, {"text": "Bhashyam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 110233, "end_char": 110241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A person can no more be compelled to carry on a business than a person can be compelled to acquire or hold property ........ Mr. Bhashyam was really unable to convince us how any one can be compelled to carry on a business against his will and yet be said to enjoy a right to carry on a business''."}}, {"text": "Murphy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 110521, "end_char": 110527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following passage from Strong on 'American Constitutional Law', page 774, taken from the judgment of Mr. Justice Murphy in West Virginia State Board v.\n\nBarnette(\") is also relied upon:-\n\n\"The freedom of thought and of religion as guaranteed by the Constitution against State action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all, except in so far as essential operations of government may require it for the\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1958 Mad."}}, {"text": "s 624, 645", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110898, "end_char": 110908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Canegrowers' Co-operative Society", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 111954, "end_char": 111987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The whole fallacy in the argument urged on behalf of the petitioners lies in this that it ignores that there is no compulsion at all on any cane grower to become a member of the Canegrowers' Co-operative Society."}}, {"text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 112826, "end_char": 112871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112917, "end_char": 112927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954", "statute": "Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954"}}, {"text": "BhagwatiJ", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 113196, "end_char": 113205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand others\n\nBhagwatiJ,\n\nthe case of reserved areas both the cane growers and the Canegrowers' Co-operative Societies are entitled within 14 days of the issue of an order reserving an area for a factory to offer to supply cane grown in the reserved area to the occupier of the factory and Form B in Appendix II of that Order provides the form of agreement between the cane grower and the occupier of a factory.", "canonical_name": "BhagwatiJ."}}, {"text": "section 16(2)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 114458, "end_char": 114474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Co-operative Society are both within the ken of the impugned Act and it cannot be urged that the object of the Act", "statute": "Co-operative Society are both within the ken of the impugned Act and it cannot be urged that the object of the Act"}}, {"text": "State of Vttar Prades/", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 117370, "end_char": 117392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Vttar Prades/&\n\nand othas\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nCh.", "canonical_name": "State of Uttar Pradesli"}}, {"text": ". Tika Ratnji", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 117420, "end_char": 117433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Vttar Prades/&\n\nand othas\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nCh.", "canonical_name": "CH. TIKA RAMJI & OTHERS, ETC"}}, {"text": "Bliagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 117495, "end_char": 117504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tika Ratnji and others, etc, v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\naud others\n\nBliagwati J.\n\nthat manner but that does not mean that there is an absolute restriction on his power of disposal of his goods unless and until he becomes a member of a Canegrowers' Co-operative Society.", "canonical_name": "Bllagwati"}}, {"text": "article 19(l)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118347, "end_char": 118363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118512, "end_char": 118528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 118541, "end_char": 118551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mukherjea", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 118672, "end_char": 118681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may refer in this context to the following passage from the judgment of this Court delivered by Mukherjea, J. (as he then was) in Messrs Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and two others('):-\n\n\"Nobody can dispute that for ensuring equitable distribution of commodities considered essential to the community and their availability at fair prices, it is quite a reasonable thing to regulate sale of these commodities through licensed vendors to whom quotas are allotted in specified quantities and who are not permitted to sell them beyond the prices that are fixed by the controlling authorities."}}, {"text": "article 19(1)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120465, "end_char": 120481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120532, "end_char": 120542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 120651, "end_char": 120661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 19(1)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121342, "end_char": 121358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 121766, "end_char": 121774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand others\n\nBhagwati J.\n\n19S6\n\nCh.", "canonical_name": "BhagwatiJ."}}, {"text": "BhagwatiJ~", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 121859, "end_char": 121869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th• Stat• of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand others\n\nBhagwatiJ~\n\nCanegrowers' Co-operative Society is not less than 75 per cent.", "canonical_name": "BhagwatiJ."}}, {"text": "Canegrowers' Co-operative Society", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 121871, "end_char": 121904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th• Stat• of Uttar Pradesh\n\nand others\n\nBhagwatiJ~\n\nCanegrowers' Co-operative Society is not less than 75 per cent."}}, {"text": "article 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122237, "end_char": 122250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(1)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122357, "end_char": 122373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122503, "end_char": 122513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 16(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 123062, "end_char": 123078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16(2)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 123089, "end_char": 123105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 123399, "end_char": 123410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 123432, "end_char": 123443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 123605, "end_char": 123616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(l)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 123770, "end_char": 123786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124133, "end_char": 124144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124519, "end_char": 124530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124601, "end_char": 124612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 303", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124616, "end_char": 124627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Saraya Sugar Factory", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 126731, "end_char": 126751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "37 of 1956 in which Saraya Sugar Factory is the petitioner will stand dismissed with costs, one set between all the petitions and between all the Respondents in those petitions."}}]} {"document_id": "1956_1_43_61_EN", "year": 1956, "text": ". -\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nSRI SADASIB PRAKASH BRAHMACHARI v.\n\nTHE STATE OF ORISSA\n\n(with connected petitions)\n\n[VIVIAN BOSE, JAGANNADHADAS, B. P. SINHA, J A.FER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR, J J.]\n\nConstitution of India,· Art. 19(1)( f )-Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951 as amended by Orissa Act XVIII of 1954- Sa. 4t(l)(b), 42(7), 44(2) ands. 79(A)-Whether ultra vires the Constitution.\n\nSections 38 and 39 of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1939 (Orissa Act IV of 1939) as amended by Orissa Act XVIII of 1953 were declared unconstitutional and void by the Supreme Court in Mahant Sri J agannath Ramanuj Das v. The State of Orissa ([1954] S.C.R. 1046) on the ground that legislation in so far as it authorised the framing of a scheme by the Commissioner along with his associates and declared such determination as final without any scope for correction thereof by judicial intervention was an unreasonable restriction on the right of the head of the Math as respects his interest in the Math which is a right to hold property within the meaning of Art. 19(1)(£) of the Constitution.\n\nAfter the judgment dated 16th March 1954 delivered by the Supreme Court in the case of Mahant Sri Ja.gannath Ramamtj Das\n\nv. The State of Orissa, ([1954] S.C.R. 1046) the Orissa Legislature passed the Orissa Act XVIII of 1954 purporting to amend not the 1939 Act which was then in operation but the Orissa Act II of 195g which bad not then come into force.\n\nThe Orissa Act XVIII of 1954 received the assent of the President on the gnd December 1954 and came into force at once and thus the Orissa Act II of 1952 became pro tanto amended and modified.\n\nThe 1952 Act so amended came into force from the 1st Janu- 1955 by virtue of a notification dated 22nd December 1954 issued under the provisions of s. 1(3) thereof which provided that . the Act was to come into force on such date as the State Govern ment may by notification provide.\n\nThe five petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution in the pre sent case challenged the validity of various sections of the Orissa Act II of 1952 as amended by Act XVIII of 1954 on the principles laid down in the case of Mahant Sri J agannath Ramanuj Das v, The State of Orissa, ([1954] S.C.R. 1046).\n\nHeld, that ss. 42(1)(b), 42(7), 44(2) as well as s. 79(A) of Orlssa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951 (Orissa At II of 1952) as amended by Orissa Act XVIII of 1954 are not unconstitutional and\n\nJanuary 20\n\n1956 ultra vires and the contention that the provisions of ss. 42 and 44 of the present Act to the effect (1) that a scheme can he framed by Sri Sadasib the Commissioner alone on a report of the Assistant Commissioner Prakash on such inquiry as he thinks fit and not by the Commissioner in Brahmachari association with one or more Government Officers to be appointed v. for the purpose by the Government (2) that there is no right of suit The State of Orissa for challenging the validity or the correctness of the scheme framed\n\nht the Commissioner but there is only an appeal to the High Court, still continue to be unreasonable restrictions on the right of Matbadipathi as in the case of Mahant Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das v.\n\nThe State of Orissa [(1954) S.C.R. 1046] is without substance.\n\nIn the initial stage of the framing of the scheme under the provisions of the present Act there is first of all something in the nature of a preliminary enquiry by a judicial officer of the rank of a Munsif and this is followed by a regular and full enquiry before the Commissioner who is of the rank of a Subordinate Judge.\n\nThe enquiry before the Commissioner is assimilated to and is governed by the provisions relating to the trial of suits by enjoining that, as far as may be, it is to be in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to trial of suits. While, therefore, under the prior Act the enquiry before the Commissioner might well have been of the nature of an executive enquiry by an executive officer, the enquiry under the present Act is by itee!f in the nature of a judicial enquiry by judicial officers followed up by a right of regular appeal to the High Court.\n\nA scheme framed with reference to such a. procedure cannot ipso facto be pronounced to be in tbe nature of an unreasonable restriction on the rights of the Mabant.\n\nThe legis latnre might well have thought that instead of making the enquiry before the Commissioner more or less in the nature of a preli minary executive enquiry to be followed up by the affected l\\fahant by a regular ... suit in the Civil Court, it is much more satisfactory and in the public interests, to vest the enquiry before the Commis sioner himself with the stamp of greater Seriousness and effective ness and to assimilate the same to a regular enquiry by the judicial officer according to judicial procedure and then to provide a right of direct appeal to the High Court.\n\nThe right of appeal to the High Court is given in very wide a.nd genera.I terms because the appeal can be both on facts and on law.\n\nMtihant Sri Gadadhar Ramanuj Das v. The Province of Orissa, (I.L.R [1949] Cuttack 656), Mahant Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das v.\n\nThe State of Orissa ([1954] S.C.R. 1046) and Commissioner; Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Matth, ([1954) S.C.R. 1005], referred to.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petitions Nos. 651 of 1954 and 39, 46, 5l and 176 of 1955.\n\n- -\n\n-- f\n\n' '\n\n) -\n\nUnder Article 32 of the Constitution of India for 1956 the enforcement of fundamental rights.\n\nSri Sadasib S. P. Sinha (S. D. Sekhari, with him), for the Prakash petitioner in Petition No. 651 of 1954.\n\nBrahmachari v.\n\nS. P. Sinha (B. K. Saran and M. M. Sinha, with The State of Orissa him), for the petitioner in Petition No. 39 of 1955.\n\nB. K. Saran and M. M. Sinha, for the petitioner in Petition No. 46 of 1955.\n\nS. D. Sekhari, for the petitioner in Petition No. 51 of 1955.\n\nR. Patnaik, for the petitioner in Petition No. 176 of 1955.\n\nM. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India (R. Gana- 1 pathy Iyer and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for respondents in all the Petitions.\n\n1956. January 20. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JAGANNADHADAS J.-These are five petitions under article 32 of the Constitution by the heads of five Maths in the State of Orissa of which four known as Mahiparakash Math, Uttaraparswa Math, Dakshinaparswa Math and Radhakant Math are situated in Puri and the fifth known as Manapur Math is near Tirtol in Cuttack district. In all these petitions certain provisions of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951 (Orissa Act II of 1952) as amended by Orissa Act XVIII of 1954 are challenged as being unconstitutional and ultra vires. Since the questions raised are mostly common, all the petitions are dealt with by this single judgment.\n\nThese petitions have a background of previous history of legislation and litigation which it is necessary to set out in order that the questions raised may be properly appreciated. The first statutory interference by the Provincial Legislature with the management of Hindu religious endowments in Orissa was by the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1939\n\n(Orissa Act IV of 1939) which came into operation\n\n1956 on the 31st August, 1939. This was modelled on a\n\nSri Sadasib similar Act operating in the Province of Madras at Prakash the time. The validity of the Act as a whole as also Brahmaahari of certain provisions thereof were challenged by the v.\n\nMahan ts of the various Maths in Orissa, about 30 in Tho State of Orissa number, by instituting a suit in the year 1940. The - suit was on behalf of the individual Maths who Jagannadhadas J, fi d J f gure as p aintiffs (including three o the present petitioners, viz. Mahants of Mahiparakash Math, Dakshinaparswa Math and Radhakanta Math) and also in a representative capacity under Order I, rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code. (Vide printed record of this Court in Case No. 1 of 1950). That suit was dismissed by the District Judge of Cuttack and came up in appeal to the High Court of Orissa. The High Court upheld the validity of the Act. and of the various sections thereof by its judgment dated the 13th September, 1949, which is reported in Mahant Sri Gadadhar Ramanuj Das v. The Province of Orissa(1).\n\nAn appeal was filed therefrom to the Supreme Court in January, 1950, which was numbered as Case No. 1 of 1950. This appeal remained pending for over four years and came up for final hearing in February, 1954.\n\nDuring the period of pendency of the appeal the Orissa Legislature passed two further Acts relating to Hindu religious endowments.\n\nThe first of them was Orissa Act II of 1952 which was an Act to \"amend and consolidate the law relating to the administration and governance of Hindu religious institutions and endowments in the State of Orissa\" and which on its coming into force was intended to repeal the pre-existing Orissa Act IV of 1939.\n\nThis Act became law on the 16th February, 1952, by the assent of the President.\n\nIt did not however come into force at once on account of sub-section (3) of section I therein which provided that the Act is to \"come into force on such date as the State Government may, by notification, direct\".\n\nNo such notification was issued during the pendency of the appeal in the Supreme Court. This Act was, in fact, brought into force much later, i.e., only as from the 1st Janu-\n\n(1) I.L.R. (19491 Cuttack 61i6.\n\n. -\n\n.i.\n\nary, 1955, by a notification of the Governent ?f Orissa dated the 22nd December, 1954, published m\n\nSri Sadasib the Orissa Gazette dated the 31st December, 1954.\n\nPrakash While thus the 1952 Act remained on the statute Bralimachari book without its coming into force, other indepenv. . dent statutory provisions amending the Act of 1939 The State 01 Orissa were passed and brought into operation. The first of J -;;; a 1 them was Orissa Ordinance No. II of 1953 which was aganna ia \"s • promulgated by the Governoii of Orissa on the 16th May, 1953. This was later superseded and substituted by Orissa Act XVIII of 1953 which came into operation on the 28th October, 1953.\n\nBy these two successive Jegislative measures, the Act of 1939 was amended in certain respects and it is the Act so amended that was in operation during the period from May, 1953 to March, 1954, falling within the later portion of the pendency of Case No. 1of1950in the Supreme Court.\n\nSome time in 1953, subsequent to the month of May, the Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, appears to have initiated proceedings for the framing of schemes in respect of a number of Maths, and schemes were actually framed during this period as regards the four Maths, Mahiparakash, Uttaraparswa, Dakshinaparswa and Radhakanta comprised in Petitions Nos. 651of1954, 49, 46 and 51of1955, respectively. These schemes were brought into operation and the administration of some of these Maths was taken over by the Trustees under the schemes.\n\nThereafter Mahants of three of the affected Maths, Mahiparakash, Uttaraparswa and Radhakanta, who are also petitioners before us, filed applications under article 226 before the High Court of Orissa challenging the validity of the schemes. Those applications were dismissed by the High Court on the 17th February, 1954.\n\nMeanwhile the Mahant of Dakshinaparswa Math who was a petitioner in the High Court and also before us, filed along with another Mahant, a petition under article 32 of the Constitution to this Court on the 23rd December, 1953, challenging the Act then in force as being in violation of their fundamental rights.\n\nThis was Petition No. 405 of 1953.\n\nThis petition as\n\n1956 well as Case No. 1 of 1950, referred to above, came\n\nSri Sadasib up for hearing, together, in this Court on the 9th, I 0th Prakash and 11th February, 1954. Judgment of this Court Brahmachari therein was delivered on the 16th March, 1954, and is v. reported in Mahant Sri J agannath Ramanuj Das v. The The State o/Orissa State of Orissa('). As a result thereof, sections 38 and - 39 of Orissa Act IV of 1939 as amended in 1953, under JagannadhadasJ, which the schemes were framed were declared unconstitutional. Accordihgly, the schemes became invalid and therefore the possession of such of the Maths which had been taken over under the schemes was restored to the Mahants. (It may be mentioned in passing, in this context, that the judgment of this Court refers to Orissa Act II of 1952 as being the one in force at the time and whose provisions were under consideration by the Court. This is a slip. The Act then in force was, as already stated, the Act of 1939 as amended in 1953. That this is a slip in the judgment is admitted before us.\n\nThat does not however in any way detract from the reasoning and the binding character of the judgment, since as a fact what were really referred to were the sections of the 1939 .\n\nAct as amended in 1953). Now, after the judgment of this Court was delivered in March, 1954, the Orissa .Legislature again intervened and passed another Act,\n\nOrissa A{)t XVIII of 1954.\n\nThis Act purported to amend not the 1939 Act which was by then in operation but the 1952 Act which had not by then come into force. Orissa Act XVIII of 1954 received the assent of the President on the 2nd December, 1954; and came into force at once and therefore Orissa Act II of 1952 became pro tanto amended and modified.\n\nBy that date the 1952 Act so amended was awaiting the issue of notification under section 1(3) thereof for being brought into force. This notification, as already stated, was ultimately issued on the 22nd December, 1954, bringing Orissa Act II of 1952 as amended by Act XVIII of 1954 into force from the 1st January, 1955, and thereby repealing Orissa Act IV of 1939 as amended in 1953. The first of the petitions before us relating to Mahiparakash Math was filed in this\n\n(!) [1954] S.C R. !046\n\n. -\n\n... -\n\nCourt, anticipating this notification, while the other 7956 four were filed after the notification was issued. As Sri Sadasib already stated, all these petitions challenge the Prakash validity of various sections of Act II of 1952 as Brahmachari amended in 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the v.\n\n- ,, present Act). The challenge is entirely based upon the Tile State of Orissa principles laid down bv this Court in Mahant Sri J -;;;: a 1 Jagannath Rarnanuj Das;,., The State of Orissa(1). The aganna a as • above is the history of the relevant legislation and the connected parallel litigation.\n\nThe main attack is in respect of sections 42 and 79-A of the present Act relating to the schemes for religious institutions of the kind with which we are concerned in these petitions. There can be no doubt that the two sections apply to these Maths. The phrase \"religious institution\" occurring 'in section 42 has been defined as meaning (also) \"a math and endowments attached thereto\". A Math is \"an institution .... succession to the headship of which devolves in accordance with the directicins of the founder or is regulated by custom\" and a hereditary trustee is \"a trustee of an institution succession to whose office devolves .... .... by custom or is specifically provided for by the founder\". A Math is therefore a religious institution presided over or managed by a hereditary trustee so as to render section 42(l)(b) applicable. To appreciate the ground of attack it is necessary to trace the changes in the provisions relating to the framing of schemes for such institutions in the successive legislative measures.\n\nIn the Act as it stood in 1939 the provisions i11 this .. ,:.. behalf are sections 38, 39 and 40. Since the attack is mainly as regards the procedure for the framing of the scheme, it is sufficient to notice what the gist of these three provisions is in so far as it relates to the procedure for an enquiry to frame a scheme. Under these three sections the enquiry is to be held by the Commissioner for Endowments appointed under the Act.\n\nFor this purpose he is to function jointly with one or more persons in the service of the Crown appointed by the Provincial Government in\n\n(1) [1954] S.C.R. 1046.\n\n1956 this behalf. The enquiry has to be conducted \"in such manner as may be prescribed''. In making the S1i Sat!asib\n\nPrakash enquiry the Commissioner and the person or persons Brailmacharl associated with him therein are to consult the trustee v. and the persons having interest. After the scheme is The Stat' of Orissa settled and the order determining the scheme is ' - - published in the prescribed manner the trustee or any JagauuadlladasJ. person having interest may, within six months of the date of such publication, institute a suit in the court to modify or set aside such order. The order sett.ling a scheme is final and binding on the trustee and all persons having interest, subject to the result of the suit, if any, as above mentioned. Of course, the result of the suit itself would, under the general law, be subject to further appeal under the Civil Procedure Code in the ordinary way.\n\nChanges were made in these provisions in 1953 first by Orissa Ordinance II of 1953 and then by Orissa Act XVIII of 1953 as already stated. The modification i~ that sub-section (4) of section 39 which provided for a right of suit, by the trustee or the person interested, in the regular civil court (with the concomitant further appeals to higher courts) was deleted and the following was substituted as sub-section (4) of section 39;\n\n\"Every order under this section shall be published in the prescribed manner and the order so passed shall be final and binding on the trustee and all persons having interest''.\n\nAs a consequence thereof section 40 of the 1939 Act, which stated that \"subject to the result of the suit the order settling a scheme is final\", was omitted. ,... • The result of these two changes was that once the Commissioner with the assistance of one or more Government officers who were to be specially. nominated, settled a scheme after making the prescribed enquiry, that order was not open to any further question or correction in the ordinary courts. It was at this stage that the validity of the provisions relating to the framing of a scheme came up for consideration before this Court in March, 1954. This Court held that the legislation in so far as it authorised the\n\n- >·\n\nframing of a scheme by the Commissioner along with 7956 his associates and declared such determination as Sri Sadasib final without any scope for correction thereof by Prakash judicial intervention, was an unreasonable restriction BrahmacliMi on the right of the head of the Math with reference v. to his interest in the Math. Accordingly sections 38 The State of Orissa and 39 of the Act then in force were struck down as - t \"t t\" l d • l\"d Th t • JagannadhadasJ. uncons i u 10na an mva i . e presen prov1s10ns which are the result of a later amendment are contained in sections 42 and 44 of the present Act and are substantially different.\n\nThe relevant portions thereof are as follows:\n\n\"42.\n\n(1) Whenever there is reason to believe that in the interest of the proper administration of religious institution a scheme may be settled for it, or when not less than five persons having interest make an application in writing stating that in the interests of the proper administration of a religious institution a scheme should be settled for it, the Assistant Commissioner or the Commissioner, as the case may be, shall proceed to frame a scheme in the manners hereinafter provided- ( a) ........................... .\n\n(b) in the case of a religious institution presided over or managed by a hereditary trustee, the Assistant Commissioner shall make such encfuiry as he thinks fit and submit his report to the Commissioner who shall hold an enquiry in the manner prescribed and so far as may be, in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, relating to the trial. of suits and if he is satisfied that in the interests of the proper administration of such institution a scheme of administration should be settled, he shall consult in the prescribed manner the trustee and the persons having interest and by order set.tie a scheme of administration for the institution.\n\n(7) Every order of.. .............. the Commissioner sE)ttling a scheme under this section shall, subject to the provisions of section 44, be binding on the trustee, the Executive Officer and all persons having interest. 44.\n\n(1) ............................ .\n\nt9s6\n\n(2) Any party aggrieved by the order of the\n\nSri Sadasib Commissioner under sub-section (I) of section 42 may Prakash appeal to the High Court within thirty days from the Brahmachari date of the order or publication thereof as the case v. may be\".\n\nThe State ofOrissa The effect of these provisions of the present Act is\n\nJagannadhadasJ. (I) that a scheme can be framed by the Commissiouer\n\nalone on a report of the Assistant Commissioner on such enquiry as he thinks fit and not by the Commissioner in association with one or more Government officers to be appointed for the purpose by the Government, (2) that there is no right of suit for challenging the validity or the correctness of the scheme framed by the Commissioner but there is only an appeal to the High Court direct. It is.urged that these provisions still continue to be unreasonable restrictions on the rights of the Mathadipathi and are accordingly ultra vires and unconstitutional. In the case reported in the Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiarof Sri Shirur Mutth(') the interest of Mathadipathi in the Math has been recognised as property falling within the scope of article 19(I)(f) of the Constitution. It was recognised that the ingredients, of office and property, of duties and personal interest, are blended> together in the rights of a Mahant and that the Mahant has the right to enjoy the property or the beneficial interest so long as he is entitled to hold his office. It was recognised that the beneficial interest which the Mahant enjoys is appurtenant to his duties and that as he is in charge of a public institution, reasonable restrictions can always be placed upon his rights in the interests of the public. It was however held therein that provisions for the framing of a scheme which by its terms operate by way of unreasonable restriction would be unconstitutional and invalid. It is this principle that was applied in the next decision of this Court relating to Orissa Maths in Mahant SriJagannath Ramanuj Das v. The State of Orissa(\").\n\nThere, the validity of the then provisions of the Act, i.e., of sections 38 and 39 of\n\n(1) [1954) S.C.R. 1005.\n\n12) [1954] S.C.R. 1046.\n\n.\\. -\n\nOrissa Act IV of 1939 as amended in 1953 was ad- 1956 judged in the following terms: Sri Sadasib \"Sections 38 and 39 relate to the framing of a Prakash scheme.\n\nThe scheme can certainly be settled to en- Brahmachari sure due administration of the endowed property v. . but the objection seems to be that the Act provides for The Stat• o/Orissa the framing of a scheme not by a civil court or under JagannadhadasJ. its supervision but by the Commissioner, who is a mere administrative or executive officer. There is also no provision for appeal against his order to the court ............ We think that the settling of a scheme in regard to a religious institution by an executive officer without the intervention of any judicial tribunal amounts to an unreasonable restriction upon theright of property of the superior of the religious institution which is blended with his office. Sections 38 and 39 of the Act must, therefore, be held to be invalid\".\n\nIt is urged that though the obvious purpose of the amending Act of 1954 passed after this decision by the Supreme Court, was to remedy the defect above pointed out by providing for a right of appeal direct to the High Court from the determination of the Commissioner settling the scheme, the present provisions still continue to be unreasonable restrictions on the right of property of the Mahant. It is further urged that the initial decision in a scheme-proceeding is still on the basis of an executive enquiry by an executive officer and that in any case a direct appeal to the High Court as against the Commissioner's order cannot be as adequate a safeguard regarding the rights of the Mahan ts, as a suit and a right of appeal therefrom in the ordinary course to the higher courts would be. It is undoubtedly true that from a litigant's point of view an appeal to the High Court from the Commissioner's order is not the same as, an independent right of suit and an appeal to the higher courts from the result of that suit.\n\nBut in order to judge whether the provisions in the present Act operate by way of unreasonable restriction for constitutional purposes what is to be seen is whether the person affected gets a reasonable chance of presenting his entire case before the original tribunal which has to\n\ndetermine judicially the questions raised and whether he has a regular appeal to the ordinarily constituted Sri Sadasib\n\nPrakash court or courts to correct the errors, if any, of the\n\nBrahmachari tribunal of first instance. For that purpose it is relev. vant to notice that in the present Act, the Commis- The State 01 Orissa sioner of Endowments .has, by virtue of section 4 there-\n\n; dh d I of, to be a member of the Judicial Service (of the State) aganna a as . . not bemg below the rank of a Subordinate Judge, while under section 7 of Act IV of 1939 a Commissioner of Endowments could be a person of either the judicial or the executive service and that even where a member of the judicial service is appointed he may be a person below the rank of a Subordinate Judge.\n\nAnother important difference has also to be noticed, viz., that while under section 38 of the previous Act the enquiry has to be conducted \"in such manner as may be prescribed\" which means as prescribed by the Provincial Government by rules made under the Act and hence changeable by the Government, under the present Act, section 42(1) (b) specifically enjoins that \"the Commissioner shall hold an enquiry in the manner prescribed and so far as may be in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to the trial of suits\". It may also be noticed that before the Commissioner starts his enquiry it is expected that the Assistant Commissioner, who, by v'irtue of section 5(2), is to be a person holding a judicial office not lower in rank than that of a Munsif, is to make such enquiry as he thinks fit and submit his report. Thus in the initial stage of the framing of the scheme under the provisions of the present Act there is first of all something in the nature of a preliminary enquiry by a judicial officer of the rank of a Munsif and this is followed by a regular and full enquiry before the Commissioner who is of the rank of a Subordinate Judge. The enquiry before the Commissioner is assimilated to and is governed by the provisions relating to the trial of suits by enjoining that, as far as may be, it is to be in accordance .with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to trial of suits. While, therefore, under the prior Act the enquiry before the Commissioner might well\n\n' -\n\n\"' -\n\nhave been of the nature of an executive enquiry by 1956 an executive officer, the enquiry under the present Sri Sadasib Act is by itself in the nature of a judicial enquiry by Prakash judicial officers followed up by a right of regular Brahmachari appeal to the High Court. A schellle framed with v. reference to such a procedure cannot ipso facto be The State 01 Orissa\n\npr.onmnced tho b~ 1h'n thef hnatMurehofut nrTeahso 1 na~1 1 e tres- Jagann:;;:adasJ. trict10n on t e rig ts o t e a an . e eg1s a ure . might well have thought that, instead of mak'.ing\n\nthe enquiry before the Commissioner more or less in the nature of a preliminary executive enquiry to be followed up by the affected Mahant by way of a regular suit in the Civil Court, it is much more satisfactory and in the public interests, to impress the enquiry before the Commissioner himself with the stamp of greater seriousness and effectiveness and to assimilate the same to a regular enquiry by the judicial officer according to judicial procedure and then to provide a right of direct appeal to the High Court ..\n\nIt has been strongly urged that a mere right to appeal to the High Court would virtually be in the nature of a limited appeal confined to challenge only on certain basic matters and probably limited to questions of law.\n\nWe can find no warrant for any such apprehension. The right of appeal is given in very wide and general terms. Obviously the appeal can be both on facts and on law and would relate not merely to the merits of the sche:rµe but also to all basic matters whose determination is implicit in the very framing of a scheme. In our opinion the present provisions cannot be struck down as being in the nature of unreasonable restriction on the rights of the Mahant.\n\nTwo other minor provisions in this connection have been brought to our notice and relied upon as indicating unreasonable restriction on the rights.\n\nOne is that while under the 1939 Act the period of limitation for a right of suit was six months, the period allowed for an appeal under the present Act is only 30 days. Another is that under section 74(3) the operation of the order of the Commissioner is not to be stayed pending the disposal of the appeal. It\n\n1956 has been urged that these provisions operate very harshly against the Mahant affected by a scheme Sri Sadasib\n\nPrakash when framed. It is pointed out that as the result of Brahmachari a scheme being put into operation immediately, the v. l\\fahant may be deprived of the effective possession The State of Orissa of the Math and hence of the wherewithal to file an ·- appeal within the very short time that is allowed, as\n\nJagamiahadasJ. also of the resources to conduct the appeal in tbe High Court or to maintain himself during its pendency which may take years. There is not much force in this contention. In so far as the question of filing of an appeal is concerned, there should be no difficulty since the provisions relating to appeals in forma pauperis would be applicable and can be availed of if the circumstances call for it. In so far as any situation may arise which may call for financial facilities for the conducting of the appeal or for interim maintenance, the learned Attorney-General suggests that the appellate Court would have inherent power and discretion to give appropriate directions for supply of funds out of the trust estate and that, in any view, such power and discretion have to be implied in the provision for an appeal so that the said right of appeal may not become illusory. Having regard to the suggestion thus put forwad, which we accept, we cannot hold that the provision in section 74(3) that the operation of the order of the Commissioner framing a scheme is not to be stayed pending the disposal of the appeal, brings about an unreasonable restriction.\n\nIn this view we think that the incidental provisions above referred to do not in any way detract from the reasonableness of the main provisions.\n\nIn our opinion, therefore, the provisions in the present Act of 1952 as amended in 1954, relating to the framing of schemes are not open to any of the constitutional objections raised; and are valid.\n\nThe next point that has been urged, depends on the fact that in four of the petitions before us relating to the Maths of llfahiparakash, Uttaraparswa, Dakshinaparswa and Radhakanta, schemes were in fact framed in the year 1953 under the provisions of\n\n. ' --\n\nOrissa Act IV of 1939 as amended in 1953. It may 7956 be recalled that these provisions were held invalid Sri Sadasib by the decision of this Court in March, 1954, Prakash above referred to. It must therefore be taken that Brahmachart these schemes were void as the law then stood. It v. is with reference to that situation that the Orissa The State of Orissa Legislature by an amendment in 1954 of the 1952 - Act introduced section 79-A into this Act which runs JagannadhadasJ. as follows: \"Notwithstanding anything contained in any of the other provisions of this Act or in any judgment, decree or order of any court all schemes purporting to have been settled in pursuance of sections 38 and 39 of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1939, after the commencement of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments (Amendment) Ordinance, 1953, and before the commencement of this Act shall be deemed to have been settled under the provisions of this Act and any person aggrieved by any such scheme may within sixty days from the date of commencement of this Act prefer an appeal to the High Court and such appeal shall be dealt with and disposed of in the same manner as appeals provided for under sub-section (2) of section 44\".\n\nThis purports to revive the schemes which were pronounced to be invalid by the judgment of this Court and attempts to remove the defect noticed in the judgment of this Court by providing for a regular appeal to the High Court against that very scheme within 60 days from the date of the commencement of the Act.\n\nIt may be noticed that the schemes so revived are only those which were settled after the commencement of Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments (Amendment) Ordinance, 1953, and before the commencement of the 1952 Act, i.e., between 16th May, 1953 to 31st December, 1954, (hereinafter referred to as the specified period).\n\nThis was exactly the period within which the amendment of l939 Act made in 1953 was in force, abolishing the right of suit and making the scheme as determined by the Commissioner final and conclusive.\n\nSection 79-A in terms purports to revive the invalid scheme notwithe\n\n1956 standing any judgment, decree or order of any court, which means that though a court may have pro-\n\n5~,!~~;;, ib nolinced the scheme as voif\\ still that is deemed to be Brahmachari alive.\n\nIt has been suggested that this is directly v. flouting the decision of this Court and that the legis- Tlie State of Orissa lature has no power to declare as valid and constitu- - tional what was decided by this Court as invalid and JagannadhadasJ. unconstitutional.\n\nBut it is to be observed that the legislature does not purport to do anything of the kind.\n\nWhat it does is not to deem the schemes previously settled as having been validly settled on those very dates, under the then existing law.\n\nThis of course is beyond legislative competence since the legislature has not the power to override unconstitutionality as such.\n\nBut what the legislature has purported to do is to take up those very schemes and . deem them to have been settled under the provisions of the present Act and thereby to Jay them open to any attack available under the present law. Such a provision is not uncommon in legislative practice, and is enacted in order to avoid the public inconvenience of having to re-do what has previously been done.\n\nThe result of section 79-A is to treat the schemes framed within the specified period as schemes framed immediately after the commencement of the present Act and to impute thereto, by a fiction, compliance with the various procedural and other steps which are requisite under section 42.\n\nWe can see no reason for thinking that such a provision is not within the competence of the Legislature. It has been suggested that this is really interfering with the jurisdiction of this Court under article 32. But there is no substance in that suggestion.\n\nThe right of any person to, seek remedy under article 32 in respect of any violation of his fundamental rights is in no way curtailed or affected by the fact that a.n actual decision of this Court on an application under article 32 is, in effect, nullified by appropriate and competent legislative measures.\n\nIndeed, the right h!!, s been, in fa.ct, successfully invoked on the prior occasion and ha.a again been invoked on the present occasion. If it fails this time it is not because the right and the remedy under\n\n' -\n\narticle 32 have been taken away or affected but be- 1956 cause the unconstitutionality has been removed. Sec- Sri Sadasib tion 79-A, therefore, is not open to any objection on Prakash the ground of legislative incompetence.\n\nBrahmachari It has further been urged that to treat the scheme v. prepared with reference to the Act of 1939 as amend- The State 0/0rissa ed in 1953 as a scheme prepared under the present J -dh d J A b f fi . . ll . th f aganna a as • ct y means 0 a ct10n JS rra y lil e nature 0 deprivation of certain advantages which an aggrieved person would have had if in fact the scheme was settled under the present Act, and that therefore such\n\na scheme would still operate by way of unreasonable restriction. This contention is also without substance.\n\nIt is true that in the present Act the procedure relating to the scheme has four steps which are as follows: (I) The scheme is to be framed by a Commissioner, who is, by appointment, a judicial officer.\n\n(2) The procedure is, as far as may be, the same as that in the trial of suits.\n\n(3) There is a preliminary enquiry by the Assistant Commissioner.\n\n(4) There is an appeal t.o the High Court.\n\nOut of these four, the substantial item is the last one and that has been specifically provided for under section 79-A and a period of sixty days from the date of the commencement of the Act has been provided for the right of appeal.\n\nThere can be no complaint on this score.\n\nIt is true that the schemes under the Act then in operation, i.e., during the specified period, might possibly have been framed by (a) an executive officer, as also (b) in pursuance of procedure under the rules framed by the Executive Government which may not approximate to that of a trial of a suit.\n\nBut this was merely a theoretical possibility.\n\nIn fact, as appears from the record and, as has been stated to us by the learned Attorney-General on behalf of the State and not disputed on the other side, the Endowment Commissioner during the specified period was a Subordinate Judge of the Orissa Judicial Service.\n\nThe actual procedure which was in foree at the time under the rules as then prescribed was also in fact in\n\n1956 consonance with the trial of suits. under the Civil\n\nSri Sadasib Procedure Code.\n\nThis appears clearly from rules 51 Prakash to 109 of the Rules framed by the Governmentof Brahmachari Orissa, an official copy of which has been supplied to v. us in court by the learned Attorney-General on be- Th• State of Orissa half of the State. As regards the provision .that the - enquiry by the Commissioner under the present Act JagannadhadasJ. has to be preceded by a preliminary enquiry by an Assistant Commissi9ner who is of the rank of a Munsif, the argument that the deprivation of this feature by the deeming provision in section 79-A operates to the disadvantage of the Mahan ts is not by any means a serious point. It is to be noticed that this is setoff by the fact that schemes under the 1939 Act are framed not by the Commissioner alone but along with one or more Government officers appointed by the Government. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention that the deeming provision under section 79-A which treats the previous schemes as schemes framed under the present Act results in bringing about any substantial disadvantages to the detriment of the Mahants. We accordingly hold that section 79-A of the present Act is not open to any constitutional objection.\n\nWe are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that sections 42(l)(b), 42(7) and 44(2) as well as section 79-A of the present Act are not open to the constitutional objections raised before us. .\n\nIt may be mentioned that in the petitions before us some other provisions of the present Act have also been challenged as being unconstitutional.\n\nBut no arguments have been advanced before us in respect , _ thereof.\n\nIt may also be mentioned that the petitions before us have not raised any questions relating to the merits of the scheme in so far as any specific provisions thereof may have operated by way of unreasonable restrictions, in the light of the considerations pointed out by this Court in its judgment in the\n\nGommisijioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras\n\nv. Sri Lnkshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur\n\nMutth(').\n\nNor does it appear that any appeal as\n\n(l) (1954] S C.R. 1005.\n\n. ,\n\n- >\n\nprovided in section 79-A has been filed to the High ma Court in respect of these cases challenging the vali- Sri Sadasib dity or the propriety of the various provisions in the Prakash scheme or correctness of the decision, express or Brahmachari implied, on the basic facts which are the foundation v. of the scheme proceedings.\n\nWe express no opinion The State of Orissa on any of these matters. h da In the last of the petitions relating to Manapur Jagannad a sJ.\n\nMath, the facts appear to be slightly dissimilar but this makes no substantial or material difference. In that case the original scheme was one framed under sections 38 and 39 of the 1939 Act as they stood before their amendment in 1953 which provided for a right of suit. The scheme itself was dated the 22nd May, 1948. Previous to the framing of the scheme there appears to have been a claim by the Mahant that the institution was a private one and not a public one and that it did not fulfil the definition of the word \"Math\" under the Act. There appears to have been a compromise between the then Mahant and the public of the village in which the Math is situated, who were interested in the Math. The compromise was to the effect that the institution was to be declared a Math but that the then Mahant was to be recognised as the hereditary trustee thereof. This compromise was recognised by the Commissioner by his order dated the 12th May, 1947, formally making the above declarations. It waR 0):1: the basis of this that, later on, a scheme was framed on the 22nd May,\n\n1948. It does not appear that the Mahant filed any suit which was then available to him. But it is stated to us by the learned Advocate appearing for tlie petitioner that an application was filed in the High Court for a writ to quash the scheme, and that it was dismissed by the High Court on the 16th November,\n\n1954. The scheme became final under the original Act of 1939 as it stood before the 1953 amendment.\n\nObviously, with reference to the facts of such a case, no argument of the kind that has been addressed to us in the other four petitions was available.\n\nIn the result, therefore, all the five petitions must be dismissed with costs.", "total_entities": 170, "entities": [{"text": "SRI SADASIB PRAKASH BRAHMACHARI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 36, "end_char": 67, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SRI SADASIB PRAKASH BRAHMACHARI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BOSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 122, "end_char": 133, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 135, "end_char": 148, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JagannadhadasJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. 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"statute": "Orissa Act II of 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 79(A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2308, "end_char": 2316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Orissa Act II of 1952", "statute": "Orissa Act II of 1952"}}, {"text": "Orlssa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2320, "end_char": 2363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Orissa Act XVIII of 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2401, "end_char": 2425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 42 and 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2527, "end_char": 2540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Orissa Act XVIII of 1954", "statute": "Orissa Act XVIII of 1954"}}, {"text": "Sadasib", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2613, "end_char": 2620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "42 and 44 of the present Act to the effect (1) that a scheme can he framed by Sri Sadasib the Commissioner alone on a report of the Assistant Commissioner Prakash on such inquiry as he thinks fit and not by the Commissioner in Brahmachari association with one or more Government Officers to be appointed v. for the purpose by the Government (2) that there is no right of suit The State of Orissa for challenging the validity or the correctness of the scheme framed\n\nht the Commissioner but there is only an appeal to the High Court, still continue to be unreasonable restrictions on the right of Matbadipathi as in the case of Mahant Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das v.\n\nThe State of Orissa [(1954) S.C.R. 1046] is without substance.", "canonical_name": "Sadasib dity"}}, {"text": "Prakash", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2686, "end_char": 2693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "42 and 44 of the present Act to the effect (1) that a scheme can he framed by Sri Sadasib the Commissioner alone on a report of the Assistant Commissioner Prakash on such inquiry as he thinks fit and not by the Commissioner in Brahmachari association with one or more Government Officers to be appointed v. for the purpose by the Government (2) that there is no right of suit The State of Orissa for challenging the validity or the correctness of the scheme framed\n\nht the Commissioner but there is only an appeal to the High Court, still continue to be unreasonable restrictions on the right of Matbadipathi as in the case of Mahant Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das v.\n\nThe State of Orissa [(1954) S.C.R. 1046] is without substance."}}, {"text": "Brahmachari", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2758, "end_char": 2769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "42 and 44 of the present Act to the effect (1) that a scheme can he framed by Sri Sadasib the Commissioner alone on a report of the Assistant Commissioner Prakash on such inquiry as he thinks fit and not by the Commissioner in Brahmachari association with one or more Government Officers to be appointed v. for the purpose by the Government (2) that there is no right of suit The State of Orissa for challenging the validity or the correctness of the scheme framed\n\nht the Commissioner but there is only an appeal to the High Court, still continue to be unreasonable restrictions on the right of Matbadipathi as in the case of Mahant Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das v.\n\nThe State of Orissa [(1954) S.C.R. 1046] is without substance."}}, {"text": "State of Orissa", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2911, "end_char": 2926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "42 and 44 of the present Act to the effect (1) that a scheme can he framed by Sri Sadasib the Commissioner alone on a report of the Assistant Commissioner Prakash on such inquiry as he thinks fit and not by the Commissioner in Brahmachari association with one or more Government Officers to be appointed v. for the purpose by the Government (2) that there is no right of suit The State of Orissa for challenging the validity or the correctness of the scheme framed\n\nht the Commissioner but there is only an appeal to the High Court, still continue to be unreasonable restrictions on the right of Matbadipathi as in the case of Mahant Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das v.\n\nThe State of Orissa [(1954) S.C.R. 1046] is without substance."}}, {"text": "Matbadipathi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3127, "end_char": 3139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "42 and 44 of the present Act to the effect (1) that a scheme can he framed by Sri Sadasib the Commissioner alone on a report of the Assistant Commissioner Prakash on such inquiry as he thinks fit and not by the Commissioner in Brahmachari association with one or more Government Officers to be appointed v. for the purpose by the Government (2) that there is no right of suit The State of Orissa for challenging the validity or the correctness of the scheme framed\n\nht the Commissioner but there is only an appeal to the High Court, still continue to be unreasonable restrictions on the right of Matbadipathi as in the case of Mahant Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das v.\n\nThe State of Orissa [(1954) S.C.R. 1046] is without substance.", "canonical_name": "Matbadipathi"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3790, "end_char": 3817, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5473, "end_char": 5483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5491, "end_char": 5512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sadasib S. P. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5566, "end_char": 5585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Sadasib S. P. Sinha (S. D. Sekhari, with him), for the Prakash petitioner in Petition No."}}, {"text": "S. D. Sekhari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5587, "end_char": 5600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Sadasib S. P. Sinha (S. D. Sekhari, with him), for the Prakash petitioner in Petition No."}}, {"text": "M. M. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5715, "end_char": 5726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Brahmachari v.\n\nS. P. Sinha (B. K. Saran and M. M. Sinha, with The State of Orissa him), for the petitioner in Petition No."}}, {"text": "B. K. Saran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5807, "end_char": 5818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. K. Saran and M. M. Sinha, for the petitioner in Petition No."}}, {"text": "R. Patnaik", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5947, "end_char": 5957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Patnaik, for the petitioner in Petition No."}}, {"text": "M. C. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6008, "end_char": 6022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India (R. Gana- 1 pathy Iyer and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for respondents in all the Petitions."}}, {"text": "R. Gana- 1 pathy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6051, "end_char": 6072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India (R. Gana- 1 pathy Iyer and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for respondents in all the Petitions."}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6077, "end_char": 6090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India (R. Gana- 1 pathy Iyer and P. G. Gokhale, with him) for respondents in all the Petitions."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6250, "end_char": 6260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Orissa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6324, "end_char": 6330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JAGANNADHADAS J.-These are five petitions under article 32 of the Constitution by the heads of five Maths in the State of Orissa of which four known as Mahiparakash Math, Uttaraparswa Math, Dakshinaparswa Math and Radhakant Math are situated in Puri and the fifth known as Manapur Math is near Tirtol in Cuttack district."}}, {"text": "Puri", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6447, "end_char": 6451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JAGANNADHADAS J.-These are five petitions under article 32 of the Constitution by the heads of five Maths in the State of Orissa of which four known as Mahiparakash Math, Uttaraparswa Math, Dakshinaparswa Math and Radhakant Math are situated in Puri and the fifth known as Manapur Math is near Tirtol in Cuttack district."}}, {"text": "Cuttack district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6506, "end_char": 6522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JAGANNADHADAS J.-These are five petitions under article 32 of the Constitution by the heads of five Maths in the State of Orissa of which four known as Mahiparakash Math, Uttaraparswa Math, Dakshinaparswa Math and Radhakant Math are situated in Puri and the fifth known as Manapur Math is near Tirtol in Cuttack district."}}, {"text": "all these petitions certain provisions of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6527, "end_char": 6616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Orissa Act II of 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6618, "end_char": 6639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Orissa Act XVIII of 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6655, "end_char": 6679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Religious Endowments Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7171, "end_char": 7195, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Orissa Act IV of 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7204, "end_char": 7225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "31st August, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7266, "end_char": 7283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first statutory interference by the Provincial Legislature with the management of Hindu religious endowments in Orissa was by the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1939\n\n(Orissa Act IV of 1939) which came into operation\n\n1956 on the 31st August, 1939."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7362, "end_char": 7368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was modelled on a\n\nSri Sadasib similar Act operating in the Province of Madras at Prakash the time."}}, {"text": "Prakash", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7372, "end_char": 7379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was modelled on a\n\nSri Sadasib similar Act operating in the Province of Madras at Prakash the time."}}, {"text": "Jagannadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7676, "end_char": 7689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The - suit was on behalf of the individual Maths who Jagannadhadas J, fi d J f gure as p aintiffs (including three o the present petitioners, viz.", "canonical_name": "JagannadhadasJ."}}, {"text": "Dakshinaparswa Math", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7800, "end_char": 7819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahants of Mahiparakash Math, Dakshinaparswa Math and Radhakanta Math) and also in a representative capacity under Order I, rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code. (", "canonical_name": "Dakshinaparswa Math"}}, {"text": "Radhakanta Math", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7824, "end_char": 7839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahants of Mahiparakash Math, Dakshinaparswa Math and Radhakanta Math) and also in a representative capacity under Order I, rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code. (", "canonical_name": "Radhakanta Math"}}, {"text": "District Judge of Cuttack", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8020, "end_char": 8045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That suit was dismissed by the District Judge of Cuttack and came up in appeal to the High Court of Orissa."}}, {"text": "High Court of Orissa", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8075, "end_char": 8095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That suit was dismissed by the District Judge of Cuttack and came up in appeal to the High Court of Orissa."}}, {"text": "September, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8211, "end_char": 8226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and of the various sections thereof by its judgment dated the 13th September, 1949, which is reported in Mahant Sri Gadadhar Ramanuj Das v. The Province of Orissa(1)."}}, {"text": "During the period of pendency of the appeal the Orissa Legislature passed two further Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8522, "end_char": 8611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Orissa Act II of 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8676, "end_char": 8697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Orissa Act IV of 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8941, "end_char": 8962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "16th February, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8992, "end_char": 9011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Act became law on the 16th February, 1952, by the assent of the President."}}, {"text": "1st Janu-\n\n(1)", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9425, "end_char": 9439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Act was, in fact, brought into force much later, i.e., only as from the 1st Janu-\n\n(1) I.L.R. (19491 Cuttack 61i6."}}, {"text": "Orissa Act XVIII of 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10073, "end_char": 10097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "28th October, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10131, "end_char": 10149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was later superseded and substituted by Orissa Act XVIII of 1953 which came into operation on the 28th October, 1953."}}, {"text": "Mahiparakash", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10721, "end_char": 10733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some time in 1953, subsequent to the month of May, the Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, appears to have initiated proceedings for the framing of schemes in respect of a number of Maths, and schemes were actually framed during this period as regards the four Maths, Mahiparakash, Uttaraparswa, Dakshinaparswa and Radhakanta comprised in Petitions Nos.", "canonical_name": "Mahiparakash"}}, {"text": "Uttaraparswa", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10735, "end_char": 10747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some time in 1953, subsequent to the month of May, the Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, appears to have initiated proceedings for the framing of schemes in respect of a number of Maths, and schemes were actually framed during this period as regards the four Maths, Mahiparakash, Uttaraparswa, Dakshinaparswa and Radhakanta comprised in Petitions Nos.", "canonical_name": "Uttaraparswa"}}, {"text": "Dakshinaparswa", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10749, "end_char": 10763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some time in 1953, subsequent to the month of May, the Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, appears to have initiated proceedings for the framing of schemes in respect of a number of Maths, and schemes were actually framed during this period as regards the four Maths, Mahiparakash, Uttaraparswa, Dakshinaparswa and Radhakanta comprised in Petitions Nos.", "canonical_name": "Dakshinaparswa Math"}}, {"text": "Radhakanta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10768, "end_char": 10778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some time in 1953, subsequent to the month of May, the Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, appears to have initiated proceedings for the framing of schemes in respect of a number of Maths, and schemes were actually framed during this period as regards the four Maths, Mahiparakash, Uttaraparswa, Dakshinaparswa and Radhakanta comprised in Petitions Nos.", "canonical_name": "Radhakanta Math"}}, {"text": "Mahiparakash", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11043, "end_char": 11055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter Mahants of three of the affected Maths, Mahiparakash, Uttaraparswa and Radhakanta, who are also petitioners before us, filed applications under article 226 before the High Court of Orissa challenging the validity of the schemes.", "canonical_name": "Mahiparakash"}}, {"text": "Uttaraparswa", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11057, "end_char": 11069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter Mahants of three of the affected Maths, Mahiparakash, Uttaraparswa and Radhakanta, who are also petitioners before us, filed applications under article 226 before the High Court of Orissa challenging the validity of the schemes.", "canonical_name": "Uttaraparswa"}}, {"text": "Radhakanta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11074, "end_char": 11084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter Mahants of three of the affected Maths, Mahiparakash, Uttaraparswa and Radhakanta, who are also petitioners before us, filed applications under article 226 before the High Court of Orissa challenging the validity of the schemes.", "canonical_name": "Radhakanta Math"}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11147, "end_char": 11158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "17th February, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11291, "end_char": 11310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Those applications were dismissed by the High Court on the 17th February, 1954."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11466, "end_char": 11476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "23rd December, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11518, "end_char": 11537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meanwhile the Mahant of Dakshinaparswa Math who was a petitioner in the High Court and also before us, filed along with another Mahant, a petition under article 32 of the Constitution to this Court on the 23rd December, 1953, challenging the Act then in force as being in violation of their fundamental rights."}}, {"text": "9th, I 0th Prakash", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11796, "end_char": 11814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 of 1950, referred to above, came\n\nSri Sadasib up for hearing, together, in this Court on the 9th, I 0th Prakash and 11th February, 1954."}}, {"text": "Brahmachari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11863, "end_char": 11874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Judgment of this Court Brahmachari therein was delivered on the 16th March, 1954, and is v. reported in Mahant Sri J agannath Ramanuj Das v. The The State o/Orissa State of Orissa(')."}}, {"text": "16th March, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11904, "end_char": 11920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Judgment of this Court Brahmachari therein was delivered on the 16th March, 1954, and is v. reported in Mahant Sri J agannath Ramanuj Das v. The The State o/Orissa State of Orissa(')."}}, {"text": "sections 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12045, "end_char": 12056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Orissa Act IV of 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12069, "end_char": 12090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Court refers to Orissa Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12434, "end_char": 12460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Orissa Act XVIII of 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13228, "end_char": 13252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "2nd December, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13297, "end_char": 13315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Orissa Act XVIII of 1954 received the assent of the President on the 2nd December, 1954; and came into force at once and therefore Orissa Act II of 1952 became pro tanto amended and modified."}}, {"text": "Orissa Act II of 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13359, "end_char": 13380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 1(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13503, "end_char": 13515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Orissa Act II of 1952", "statute": "Orissa Act II of 1952"}}, {"text": "Orissa Act II of 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13651, "end_char": 13672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Orissa Act IV of 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13766, "end_char": 13787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mahant", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14347, "end_char": 14353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The challenge is entirely based upon the Tile State of Orissa principles laid down bv this Court in Mahant Sri J -;;;: a 1 Jagannath Rarnanuj Das;,.,", "canonical_name": "Mahant"}}, {"text": "Jagannath Rarnanuj Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14370, "end_char": 14392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The challenge is entirely based upon the Tile State of Orissa principles laid down bv this Court in Mahant Sri J -;;;: a 1 Jagannath Rarnanuj Das;,.,"}}, {"text": "State of Orissa(1", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14401, "end_char": 14418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Orissa(1)."}}, {"text": "sections 42 and 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14561, "end_char": 14579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Orissa Act IV of 1939", "statute": "Orissa Act IV of 1939"}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14827, "end_char": 14837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15339, "end_char": 15355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 38, 39 and 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15630, "end_char": 15652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16264, "end_char": 16266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Brailmacharl", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16337, "end_char": 16349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In making the S1i Sat!asib\n\nPrakash enquiry the Commissioner and the person or persons Brailmacharl associated with him therein are to consult the trustee v. and the persons having interest."}}, {"text": "Orissa Act XVIII of 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17159, "end_char": 17183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17247, "end_char": 17257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Orissa Act XVIII of 1953", "statute": "Orissa Act XVIII of 1953"}}, {"text": "section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17486, "end_char": 17496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Orissa Act XVIII of 1953", "statute": "Orissa Act XVIII of 1953"}}, {"text": "section 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17702, "end_char": 17712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Orissa Act XVIII of 1953", "statute": "Orissa Act XVIII of 1953"}}, {"text": "BrahmacliMi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18596, "end_char": 18607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court held that the legislation in so far as it authorised the\n>·\n\nframing of a scheme by the Commissioner along with 7956 his associates and declared such determination as Sri Sadasib final without any scope for correction thereof by Prakash judicial intervention, was an unreasonable restriction BrahmacliMi on the right of the head of the Math with reference v. to his interest in the Math."}}, {"text": "sections 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18704, "end_char": 18715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "JagannadhadasJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18815, "end_char": 18830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly sections 38 The State of Orissa and 39 of the Act then in force were struck down as - t \"t t\" l d • l\"d Th t • JagannadhadasJ. uncons i u 10na an mva i .", "canonical_name": "JagannadhadasJ."}}, {"text": "sections 42 and 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18937, "end_char": 18955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19903, "end_char": 19932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20389, "end_char": 20399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "Sadasib Commissioner", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20579, "end_char": 20599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "t9s6\n\n(2) Any party aggrieved by the order of the\n\nSri Sadasib Commissioner under sub-section (I) of section 42 may Prakash appeal to the High Court within thirty days from the Brahmachari date of the order or publication thereof as the case v. may be\"."}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20625, "end_char": 20635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "State ofOrissa", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20783, "end_char": 20797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State ofOrissa The effect of these provisions of the present Act is\n\nJagannadhadasJ. (I) that a scheme can be framed by the Commissiouer\n\nalone on a report of the Assistant Commissioner on such enquiry as he thinks fit and not by the Commissioner in association with one or more Government officers to be appointed for the purpose by the Government, (2) that there is no right of suit for challenging the validity or the correctness of the scheme framed by the Commissioner but there is only an appeal to the High Court direct."}}, {"text": "JagannadhadasJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20852, "end_char": 20867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State ofOrissa The effect of these provisions of the present Act is\n\nJagannadhadasJ. (I) that a scheme can be framed by the Commissiouer\n\nalone on a report of the Assistant Commissioner on such enquiry as he thinks fit and not by the Commissioner in association with one or more Government officers to be appointed for the purpose by the Government, (2) that there is no right of suit for challenging the validity or the correctness of the scheme framed by the Commissioner but there is only an appeal to the High Court direct.", "canonical_name": "JagannadhadasJ."}}, {"text": "Mathadipathi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21413, "end_char": 21425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is.urged that these provisions still continue to be unreasonable restrictions on the rights of the Mathadipathi and are accordingly ultra vires and unconstitutional.", "canonical_name": "Matbadipathi"}}, {"text": "article 19(I)(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21715, "end_char": 21731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Orissa Maths", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22531, "end_char": 22543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is this principle that was applied in the next decision of this Court relating to Orissa Maths in Mahant SriJagannath Ramanuj Das v. The State of Orissa(\")."}}, {"text": "sections 38 and 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22671, "end_char": 22689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Orissa Act IV of 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22751, "end_char": 22772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sadasib", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22840, "end_char": 22847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".\\. -\n\nOrissa Act IV of 1939 as amended in 1953 was ad- 1956 judged in the following terms: Sri Sadasib \"Sections 38 and 39 relate to the framing of a Prakash scheme.", "canonical_name": "Sadasib dity"}}, {"text": "Sections 38 and 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22849, "end_char": 22867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Orissa Act IV of 1939", "statute": "Orissa Act IV of 1939"}}, {"text": "Sections 38 and 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23633, "end_char": 23651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Orissa Act IV of 1939", "statute": "Orissa Act IV of 1939"}}, {"text": "Mahan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24395, "end_char": 24400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is further urged that the initial decision in a scheme-proceeding is still on the basis of an executive enquiry by an executive officer and that in any case a direct appeal to the High Court as against the Commissioner's order cannot be as adequate a safeguard regarding the rights of the Mahan ts, as a suit and a right of appeal therefrom in the ordinary course to the higher courts would be.", "canonical_name": "Mahant"}}, {"text": "Sadasib\n\nPrakash", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25129, "end_char": 25145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But in order to judge whether the provisions in the present Act operate by way of unreasonable restriction for constitutional purposes what is to be seen is whether the person affected gets a reasonable chance of presenting his entire case before the original tribunal which has to\n\ndetermine judicially the questions raised and whether he has a regular appeal to the ordinarily constituted Sri Sadasib\n\nPrakash court or courts to correct the errors, if any, of the\n\nBrahmachari tribunal of first instance.", "canonical_name": "Sadasib\n\nPrakash"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25383, "end_char": 25392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25544, "end_char": 25553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 38", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25868, "end_char": 25878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26115, "end_char": 26128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26282, "end_char": 26309, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26481, "end_char": 26493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27180, "end_char": 27207, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sri Sadasib Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27441, "end_char": 27456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mahant", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28024, "end_char": 28030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "might well have thought that, instead of mak'.ing\n\nthe enquiry before the Commissioner more or less in the nature of a preliminary executive enquiry to be followed up by the affected Mahant by way of a regular suit in the Civil Court, it is much more satisfactory and in the public interests, to impress the enquiry before the Commissioner himself with the stamp of greater seriousness and effectiveness and to assimilate the same to a regular enquiry by the judicial officer according to judicial procedure and then to provide a right of direct appeal to the High Court ..\n\nIt has been strongly urged that a mere right to appeal to the High Court would virtually be in the nature of a limited appeal confined to challenge only on certain basic matters and probably limited to questions of law.", "canonical_name": "Mahant"}}, {"text": "section 74(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29436, "end_char": 29449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sadasib\n\nPrakash", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29664, "end_char": 29680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It\n\n1956 has been urged that these provisions operate very harshly against the Mahant affected by a scheme Sri Sadasib\n\nPrakash when framed.", "canonical_name": "Sadasib\n\nPrakash"}}, {"text": "JagamiahadasJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29983, "end_char": 29997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is pointed out that as the result of Brahmachari a scheme being put into operation immediately, the v. l\\fahant may be deprived of the effective possession The State of Orissa of the Math and hence of the wherewithal to file an ·- appeal within the very short time that is allowed, as\n\nJagamiahadasJ. also of the resources to conduct the appeal in tbe High Court or to maintain himself during its pendency which may take years.", "canonical_name": "JagannadhadasJ."}}, {"text": "section 74(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30974, "end_char": 30987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dakshinaparswa", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31654, "end_char": 31668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The next point that has been urged, depends on the fact that in four of the petitions before us relating to the Maths of llfahiparakash, Uttaraparswa, Dakshinaparswa and Radhakanta, schemes were in fact framed in the year 1953 under the provisions of\n\n. ' --", "canonical_name": "Dakshinaparswa Math"}}, {"text": "Orissa Act IV of 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31763, "end_char": 31784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32188, "end_char": 32198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Orissa Act IV of 1939", "statute": "Orissa Act IV of 1939"}}, {"text": "sections 38 and 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32442, "end_char": 32460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Orissa Act IV of 1939", "statute": "Orissa Act IV of 1939"}}, {"text": "Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32468, "end_char": 32511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32979, "end_char": 32989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1939", "statute": "the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "16th May, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33534, "end_char": 33548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be noticed that the schemes so revived are only those which were settled after the commencement of Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments (Amendment) Ordinance, 1953, and before the commencement of the 1952 Act, i.e., between 16th May, 1953 to 31st December, 1954, (hereinafter referred to as the specified period)."}}, {"text": "31st December, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33552, "end_char": 33571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be noticed that the schemes so revived are only those which were settled after the commencement of Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments (Amendment) Ordinance, 1953, and before the commencement of the 1952 Act, i.e., between 16th May, 1953 to 31st December, 1954, (hereinafter referred to as the specified period)."}}, {"text": "Section 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33827, "end_char": 33837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35134, "end_char": 35144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35396, "end_char": 35406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35610, "end_char": 35620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35715, "end_char": 35725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35890, "end_char": 35900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36192, "end_char": 36202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37465, "end_char": 37475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Governmentof Brahmachari Orissa", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 38528, "end_char": 38559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This appears clearly from rules 51 Prakash to 109 of the Rules framed by the Governmentof Brahmachari Orissa, an official copy of which has been supplied to v. us in court by the learned Attorney-General on be- Th• State of Orissa half of the State."}}, {"text": "section 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38987, "end_char": 38997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39367, "end_char": 39377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39568, "end_char": 39578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 42(l)(b), 42(7) and 44(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39693, "end_char": 39727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39739, "end_char": 39749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40560, "end_char": 40570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sadasib dity", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 40661, "end_char": 40673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ">\n\nprovided in section 79-A has been filed to the High ma Court in respect of these cases challenging the vali- Sri Sadasib dity or the propriety of the various provisions in the Prakash scheme or correctness of the decision, express or Brahmachari implied, on the basic facts which are the foundation v. of the scheme proceedings.", "canonical_name": "Sadasib dity"}}, {"text": "Manapur Jagannad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40991, "end_char": 41007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "h da In the last of the petitions relating to Manapur Jagannad a sJ.\n\nMath, the facts appear to be slightly dissimilar but this makes no substantial or material difference."}}, {"text": "sections 38 and 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41172, "end_char": 41190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "22nd May, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41320, "end_char": 41334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The scheme itself was dated the 22nd May, 1948."}}, {"text": "12th May, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41952, "end_char": 41966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This compromise was recognised by the Commissioner by his order dated the 12th May, 1947, formally making the above declarations."}}, {"text": "22nd May,\n\n1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42082, "end_char": 42097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It waR 0):1: the basis of this that, later on, a scheme was framed on the 22nd May,\n\n1948."}}, {"text": "16th November,\n\n1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42390, "end_char": 42410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But it is stated to us by the learned Advocate appearing for tlie petitioner that an application was filed in the High Court for a writ to quash the scheme, and that it was dismissed by the High Court on the 16th November,\n\n1954."}}]} {"document_id": "1956_1_451_475_EN", "year": 1956, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nNAGUBAI AMMAL & OTHERS\n\nB. SHAMA RAO & OTHERS.\n\n[S. R. DAS, C.J., VENKATARAMA AYYAR\n\nand JAFER IMAM JJ.]\n\nLis pendens, Scope of-If prevents passing of title as between the transferor and the transferee-Nonjoinder of Receiver in insolvency in the execution proceeding-Effect-Transferee pendente lite, if entitled to attack execution sale on that gronnd-Limitation and adverse possession against a purchaser in execution of a decree on a prior mortga.ge-Oommencement-' Ool lusive' Mid 'Jra.1td11lent' - Distinction- Admission-Evid entiary valuc-TVhen can shift the burden of proof -Ma.xim that 'a person ca.nnot a.pprobate and reprobate'-Applicability-Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 52-Indian Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art. 142.\n\nThe appellants as defendants in a suit for declaration of title to certain building sites sought to resist the respondents' claim, arising by purchase from a purchaser in a sale in execution of a mortgage decree passed on a mortgage deed of 1918, by a counter-claim based on a purchase of the same lands made in 1920 by their predecessor-in-interest from one of the mortgagors against whom was then pending a suit for maintenance and for declaration of a charge on the land in s\"uit.\n\nThat suit was decreed in 1921 and the lands were purchased by the decreeholder in execution of her decree in 1928.\n\nThe mortgagor had been adjudged an insolvent in 1926 and the Official Receiver in whom his estrite vested was not made a party to the execution proceeding.\n\nSuit to enforce the mortgage deed of 1918 was brought in 1933 impleading the Official Receiver and the purchaser in execution of the maintenance and charge decree but not the appellants. In execution of the decree passed in this suit, the lands in suit were sold to a third party in 1936 and in 1938 the respondent's father purchased them.\n\nThe respondent did not specifically raise the question of lis pendens in his pleading nor was an issue framed on the point but he raised the question at the very commencement of the trial in his deposition, proved relevant documents which were admitted into evidence without any objection from the appellants who filed their own documents, cross-examined the respondent and invited thq, court to hold that the suit for maintenance and a charge and the connected proceedings evidenced by these documents were collusive in order to\n\naoid. the operation of s. 52 of the Tansfer of Property Act.\n\nThe District Judge held that the appellants title acquired by the purchase of 1920 was extinguished by the sale held in execution of the charge dec1ee by the operation of .s. 52 of the Transfer of Property\n\n1:;0\n\nApril 26\n\nN agubai Ammal\n\nand others v.\n\nB;· Shama Rao and others\n\nAct and decreed the suit and his decision was affirmed by the High Court in appeal.\n\nHeld, that the decisions of the courts below were correct and must be affirmed.\n\nThat in the facts and circnmstances of the case the omission of the respondent to specifically raise the question of !is pendens in his pleading did not take the appellants by surprise and was a mere irregularity which resulted in no prejudice to tliem. Rani Chandra Kunwar v. Chaudhri Narpat Singh ([1906] L.R. 34 I.A. 27), applied.\n\nSiddik Mad Shah v. Mt. Saran and Others (A.LR. 1930 P.d. 57), explained and held inapplicable.\n\nThat s. 52 of the Transfer .of Propety Act did not prevent the - vesting of title in a transferee in a sale pendente lite but only made it subject to the rights of other parties as decided in the suit and subsequent insolvency of the transferor could not, therefore, vest any title in the Official Receiver or make the title of the execution purchaser liable to attack on the ground that the Receiver was not made a party to the execution proceeding. That even assuming that title could not wholly pass by a transfer penden\"te lite and some interest would still subsist in the transferor to vest in the Receiver, the lands in suit having been sold in execution of a charge decree, the sale would at the most be not binding on him and he could, if he so chose, move to set it aside; but the transferee pendente lite or his representative could not be allowed to make his nonjoinder a ground for attacking the sale.\n\nWood v. Surr ([1854) 19 Beav. 551), applied.\n\nInamullah Khan v. Shambhu Dayal (A.LR. 1931 All. 159).\n\nSubbaiah v. Ramasami Goundan (I.L.R. [1954] Mad. 80) and Kala Chand Banerjee v. Jagannath Marwari ([1927] L.R. 54 I.A. 190), referred to.\n\nThat no question of limitation or adverse possession really arose in the case. It was well settled tht a claim of adverse possession could not affect the right of a prior mortgagee to bring the properties to sale and adverse possession against the purchaser under that sale could not commence prior to the date of sale.\n\nHeld further, that there was a fundamental distinction between a collusive and a fraudulent proceeding in that while the former was the result of an nnderstanding between the parties, both the claim and the contest being fictitious, and the purpose to confonnd third parties, in the latter the contest was real, though the claim was untme, and the purpose to injure the defendant by a verdict of the court obtained by practising fraud in it;\n\nthat an admission was a mere piece of evidence and could not be conclusive except by way of estoppal when it he.d been acted\n\nupon to his detriment by the person to whom it we.a made, the weight to be attached to it depending on the circumstances of each case, and the onus of proving that it was not true could not shift to the maker of it unless it was so clear and nnambi guous as to be conclusive in absence of any explanation from him.\n\nSlatterie v. Pooley, ([1840] 6 M. & W. 664) and Rani Chandra Kunwari v. Choudhri Narpat Singh ([1906) L.R. 34 I.A. 27), refer red to.\n\nThat the maxim that 'a person could not approbate and repro bate' had its origin in the doctrine of election and was confined to reliefs arising out of one and the same transaction and against the parties to it. Where, however, there was no question of election, as the relief claimed was one and the so.me, although based on diff erent and inconsistent grounds, the maxim had no application.\n\nVerschures Creameries Ltd. v. Hull and Netherlands Steamship Company Ltd. ([1921) 2 K.B. 608), considered and distinguished.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDIOTION: Civil Appeal No. 216 of 1953.\n\nOn appeal from the judgment and decree dated the 8th March, 1951 of the Mysore High Court in Regular Appeal No. 123 of 1947-48 arising out of the decree dated the 23rd June 1947 of the Court of District Judge, Bangalore in Original Suit No. 84 of 1945-46.\n\nK. S. Krishnaswami Iyengar and M. S. K. Sastri for the appellants.\n\nR. Ganapathy Iyer and K. R. Krishnaswamy for the respondent No. 1.\n\n1956. April 26.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-This appeal arises out of a suit instituted by one Krishna Rao, since deceased, and now represented by his son and heir, the respondent herein, for a declaration of his title to certain building sites situate in Bangalore in the State of Mysore, and for consequential reliefs. These properties belonged to one Munuswami, who died leaving him surviving his third wife Chellammal, three sons by his predeceased wives, Keshavananda,\n\n1951!\n\nNagubai Ammal\n\nand others v.\n\nB. ShamaRao\n\nand others\n\nN agubai Animal\n\nand others v.\n\nB. Sha1na Rao and others\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar j.\n\nMadhavananda and Brahmananda, and three minor daughters, Shankaramma, Srikantamma and Devamma. On 1-9-1918 the three brothers executed a usufructuary mortgage for Rs. 16,000 in favour of one Abdul Huq over a bungalow and vacant sites including the properties concerned in this litigation. A period of three years was fixed for redemption. There was a lease back of the properties by the mortgagee to the mortgagots on 3-9-1918, and it was also for a period of three years. On 6-9-1918 the three brothers effected a partition under a deed, Exhibit K, which provided inter alia that they were to pay each a sum of Rs. 8 per mensem to their step-mother, Chellammal, for her maintenance, and that their step-sisters should be under their protection.\n\nOn 6-6-1919 Chellammal presented a plaint in forma pauperis claiming maintenance and praying\n\nthat it might be charged on the properties specified in the plaint.\n\nThat was Miscellaneous Case No. 377 of 1918-19. At the same time, she also presented as the next friend of her minor daughters, Srikantamma and Devamma, two plaints in forma pauperis, Miscellaneous Cases Nos. 378 and 379 of 1918-19 claiming maintenance and marriage expenses for them, and praying that the amounts decreed might be charged on the schedule-mentioned properties. The properties which are involved in this suit are included in item 8 in schedule A annexed to all the three plaints.\n\nOn 17-6-1920 permission to sue in forma pauperis was granted in all the three cases, and they were registered as Suits Nos. 98 to 100 of 1919-20.\n\nWe are concerned in this appeal with only one of them, the suit of Devamma which was Miscellaneous Case No. 379 of 1918-19, subsequently registered as Suit No. 100 of 1919-20.\n\nThe suits were contested, 'and decreed after trial on 12-12-1921.\n\nThe decree in 0. S. No. 100 of 1919-20 directed the defendants each to pay to the plaintiff a sum of Rs. 6 per mensem for maintenance until her marriage and Rs. 1,500 for marriage expenses, and the payment of the amount was made a first charge on the properties.\n\nIn execution of this decree, the\n\nproperties with which we are now concerned, were sold on 2-8-1928 and purchased by Devamma, the decree-holder. A sale certificate was issued to her on 21-11-1930 (Exhibit J-5).\n\nProceedings were also taken in execution of the decrees obtained by Chellammal and Srikantamma and of one Appalaraju, and all the properties comprised in the mortgage were sold and purchased by third parties.\n\nIt must be mentioned that all the three brothers were adjudicated insolvents on their own application, Brahmananda by an order dated 23-3-1923 in Insolvency Case No. 7 of 1921-22 and Keshavananda and Madhavananda by an order dated 19-2-1926 in Insolvency Case No. 4 of 1925-26.\n\nIt also appears from the evidence of D.W. 5 that at about this time all of them left the place.\n\nWhile these proceedings were going on, Abdul Huq, the mortgagee, filed on 16-8-1921, O.S. No. 27 of 1921- 22 against Keshavananda and his two brothers for recovery of arrears of rent due by them under the lease deed, and obtained a decree on 21-10-1921 but was unable to realise anything in exec1,1tion thereof, and the execution petition was finally dismissed on 22-1-1926.\n\nHe then filed a second suit against the mortgagors, O.S. No. 86of1931-a2, for arrears of rent for a period subsequent to that covered by the decree in O.S. No. 27 of 1921-22 and for possession of the properties on the basis of the lease dated 3-9-1918, and obtained a decree on 22-3-1932 but was unable to get possession, as the properties were in the occupation of third parties under claims of right. Abdul Huq died on 20-3-1933, and thereafter, his legal representatives filed on 30-8-1933 O.S. No. 8 of 1933-34 to enforce their rights under the mortgage deed dated 1-9-1918. Among the defendants who were impleaded in this suit were the mortgagors Keshavananda and Madhavananda, Gururaja, son of Brabmananda who bad died, the Official Receiver and the purchasers of the mortgaged properties in execution of the maintenance decrees and the decree of Appalaraju.\n\nDevamma was the third defendant in this action.\n\nThe plaint alleged that the mortgagors had failed to\n\nNagubai Ammal and others v.\n\nB. ShamaRao\n\nand others\n\nVenkatarama AyyarJ.\n\nN agubai Ammal\n\nand others\n\nB. Shama Rao and others\n\nVenkatarama\n\nllyyar J.\n\npay rent as provided in the lease deed dated 3-9-1918, and had suffered collusive decrees to be passed against them in the maintenance suits and other actions, and that properties had been sold fraudulently in execution of those decrees. On the basis of these allegations, the plaintiffs prayed for a decree for possession as against the purchasers including Devamma, and for a sum of Rs. 5,000 as damages. In the alternative, they prayed for a decree for sale of the mortgaged properties for the amount due under the mortgage.\n\nThe suit was contested, and issues raised as to whether the sales were collusive, and whether the plaintiffs were entitled to possession and damages, and alternatively, as to what amounts were payable under the mortgage and to what reliefs the plaintiffs were entitled. At the trial, the plaintiffs abandoned the relief as to possession and damages, and it accordingly became unnecessary to go into the question as to the collusive character of the maintenance decrees and the execution sales. On 26-9-1935 a decree was passed determining the amount payable to the plaintiffs on redemption, providing for payment thereof on or before 26th January 1936, and in default, directing the sale of the properties. In execution of this decree, the properties were sold in court-auction sometime in 1936, and purchased by one Chapman, and possession was taken by him through court on 18-2-1937. On 25-1-1938, Saldhana, who was the agent of Chapman, and became his executor on his death, sold the building sites now in dispute and forming part of the properties purchased in court auction, to Krishna Rao, the plaintiff in the present action. When Krishna Rao attempted to take possession of the sites, he was obstructed by one Garudachar, claiming title under a sale deed dated 1-12-1932 executed by one Lokiah, the husband of Srikantamma, sister of Devamma, and he accordingly filed O.S. No. 92 of 1938-39 in the court of the Subordinate Judge, Bangalore for establishing his title to the suit properties, and for an injunction restraining . Garudachar from interfering with his possession. The\n\nsuit was decreed on 23-7-1940, and the matter having been taken in appeal to the High Court by Garudachar, the parties entered into a compromise, and a decree, Exhibit E-1, was passed in terms thereof on 18-9-1942. Under this decree, the title of the plaintiff to the suit properties was recognised. After obtaining this decree, Krishna Rao started building on the sites, when he met with fresh obstruction, this time from the appellants who set up that they were in possession under a claim of title.\n\nUnder the partition deed entered into by the mortgagors on 6-9-1918 (Exhibit K), Keshavananda was allotted two plots, Nos. 3 and 4 to the west of East Lal Bagh Road in the plan, Exhibit G.\n\nThese are the very plots, which form the subject-matter of the present suit. On 30-1-1920 Keshavananda conveyed these properties to Dr. Nanjunda Rao under a deed of sale, Exhibit VI. There was on the same date a sale by Brahmananda of plots Nos. 1 and 2 to Dr. Nanjunda Rao, but those properties are not involved in this litigation. On the death of Dr.\n\nNanjunda Rao, his sons partitioned the properties, and in the division the suit properties fell to the share of one Raghunatha Rao, and on his death in 1938, his estate devolved on his widow, Nagubai, who is the first appellant. On 28-5-1939 she executed a. trust deed settling a moiety of these properties on the Anjaneyaswami Temple at Karaikal, and the trustees of that institution are the other appellants in this appeal. In view of their obstruction, Krishna Rao instituted the suit out of which the present appeal arises, for a declaration of his title to the sites in question, and for an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession, or in the alternative, for a decree in ejectment if they were held to be in possession. The claim made in the plaint is a simple one. It is that the title of Chapman as purchaser in execution of the decree passed on the mortgage dated 1-9-1918 prevailed against all titles created subsequent to that date, and that accordingly Dr. Nanjunda Rao and his successors acquired under the sale deed dated 30-1-1920 no title which could be\n\nNagubai Ammal\n\nand others v.\n\nB.ShamaRao\n\nand others\n\nVril 26\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1956]\n\nKARTAR SINGH & OTHERS\n\nTHE STATE OF PUNJAB.\n\n[BHAOWATI and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR, JJ.]\n\nPunjab Security of the Stole Act, 1953 (Punjab Act XII of 1953), s. 9-Members of proce38ion shouting defamatory slogans against Ministers of State Government-Prosecution under •· 9-Whether j11stified.\n\nThe appellants were members of a. procession taken out to protest against the policy of the Punjab Government to nationalise motor transport and raised the slogans \"Jaggu mama hai hai (Jaggu, maternal uncle he dead)\" and \"Khachar Kbota hai hai (mulecum donkey be dead)\". The words were directed against the Transport Minister and the Chief Minister respe9tively and were defamatory.\n\nThe appellants were prosecuted and convicted under s. 9 of the Pun jab Security of the mate Act, 1953.\n\nHeld that the statements could not be said to undermine the security of the State or friendly relations with foreign States nor did they amount to contempt of Court or defamation prejudicial to the security of the State nor did they tend to overthrow the State and that the prosecution had failed to establish that the act of the ap pellants undermined public order, decency or mora.lity or was tantamount to an incitement to an offence prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and consequently the prosecution under s. 9 was not justified.\n\nPublic men may as well think it worth their while to ignore such vulgar criticisms and abuses hurled against them, rather than give importance to the same by prosecuting the person responsible for the same.\n\nSeymour v. Bullerworth ([1862] 3 F. & F. 372, 376, 377), R. v.\n\nSir R. Carden ((1879] 5 Q.B.D. 1), Kelly v. Sherlock ([1866] L.R. 1 Q.B. 686, 689; 35 L.J. Q.B. 209) referred to.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 49 of 1955.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the order dated the 9th July, 1954 of the Punjab High Court at Simla in Criminal Revision No. 778 of 1954 arising out of the judgment and order dated the 30th June 1954 of the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Amritsar in Criminal Appeal No. 409 of 1954.\n\n\nRam Das and Raghu Nath Pandit, for the appellants.\n\nJ indralal and P. G. Gokhale, for the respondent.\n\n1956. April 26.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI J.-This appeal with special leave involves the interpretation of section 9 of the Punjab Security of the State Act, 1953 (Punjab Act XII of 1953), hereinafter called \"the Act\".\n\nThe appellants were members of the Amritsar District Motor Union which took out a procession on 23rd March, 1954 to protest against the policy of the Punjab Government to nationalise motor transport.\n\nThe procession started from Gui Park and was taken on lorries and jeeps. It stopped near Chitra Talkies and then started on foot. When it reached near Prabha.t Studio, the appellants raised slogans \"Jaggu\n\nmama hai hai (Jaggu, maternal uncle be dead)\" and \"Khachar Khota hai hai (mule-cum-donkey be dead)\". The first slogan was alleged to have been directed against the Hon'ble Shri Jagat Narain, Transport Minister, Punjab State and the second slogan against the Hon'ble Shri Bhim Sen Sachar, Chief Minister, Punjab State. The uttering of these slogans was considered objectionable and the appellants were charged in the Court of the Magistra.te, First-Class, Amritsar:-\"that you, on or about the 23rd day of Ma.rch 1954 at Amritsar, while being members of a procession, raised slogans \"J aggu mama hai hai\" \"Khachar Khota hai hai\" which besides being indecent amounted to defamation and was prejudicial to the security of the State and the maintenance of public order and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 9 of the Security of the State .Act\".\n\nThe appellants pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. They also led evidence in defence. The learned Magistrate, however, disbelieved the defence\n\nn.nd, accepting the prosecution evidence, found that the appellants did raise these slogans. In the opinion\n\nKartar Singh\n\nand others\n\n•• The Stale of Punjab\n\nKarlar Singh\n\nand others v.\n\nThe State-of\n\nPunjab\n\nBhagwatlJ.\n\nof the learned Magistrate, the slogans were in fact abuses hurled at the Transport Minister and the Chief Minister of the Punjab Government which besides being indecent amounted to defamation and were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.\n\nThe appeal taken by the appellants before the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Amritsar, was unsuccessful.\n\nThe learned Additional Sessions Judge also found against the appellants and observed that the slogans were highly objectionable and they fell within the ambit of section 9 of the said Act, that by raising those slogans the appellants undermined the public order as well as decency and they also amounted to defamation. He, therefore, maintained the conviction of the appellants and the sentences of 3 months' rigorous imprisonment which had been imposed by the learned Magistrate upon them.\n\nThe appellants filed a Revision Application before the High Court of Judicature for the State of Punjab at Simla but the same was summarily dismissed by the learned Chief Justice. The appellants thereafter applied for and obtained from this Court Special Leave to appeal and the appeal has accordingly come on for hearing and final disposal before us.\n\nOn the evidence on record, there is no doubt that the appellants were members of the procession and did utter those slogans against the Transport Minister and the Chief Minister of the Punjab Government.\n\nThe question, however, remains whether, in uttering these slogans, they committed an offence under section 9 of the Act. Section 9 of the Act reads as follows:-\n\n\"9. Whoever- (a) makes any speech, or (b) by words, whether spoken or written, or by signs or by visible or audible representations or otherwise publishes any statement, rumour or report, shall, if such speech, statement, rumour or report undermines the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or amounts to contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to an offence prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order, or tends to overthrow the State, be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to three years or with fine or with both\".\n\nIt cannot be denied that the appellants by words spoken published statements in relation to the Transport Minister and the Chief Minister of the Punjab Government. A futile argument was advanced before us by the advocate of the appellants that this condition was not satisfied but we need not pause to consider the same. The sole question for our determination is whether such statements (1) undermined the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or (2) amounted to contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to an offence prejudicial to the security of the State or maintenance of public order, or (3) tended to overthrow the State.\n\nThe appellants were no doubt affected by the policy of the Punjab Government to nationalise motor transport and the Transport Minister and the Chief Minister were really responsible for sponsoring that policy. Their tirade, therefore, was against both these individuals and, in the demonstration which the appellants held against that policy, they gave vent to violent expressions of opinion against them and, in the slogans which they uttered, used expressions which were certainly objectionable. The slogan \"Jaggu mama hai hai\" could be translated as \"Jaggu, whose sister is my father's wife is dead, woe betide him\" and was in that sense a vulgar abuse hurled against the Transport Minister. The slogan \"Khachar khota hai hai\" could be translated as \"mulecum-donkey is dead, woe betide him\" and it was directed against the Hon'ble Shri Bhim Sen Sachar, Chief Minister, Punjab Government, whose name Sachar was caricatured into khachar being mule and was also combined with khota, a donkey. This was a.gain a vulgar abuse hurled against the Chief Minister, Punjab Government.\n\nThe appellants' conduct in this behalf could not at\n\nK artar Siflgh\n\nand others v.\n\nThe State of Punjab\n\nBhagu, ati J.\n\nKartar Singh\n\naud others v.\n\nTh..! State of Punjab\n\nBlurgwati J.\n\nall be justified. Whatever their grievances against the Transport Minister and the Chief Minister of the Punjab Government were, they were entitled to ventilate them in a decent and dignified manner and they were certainly not justified in hurling such vulgar abuses against these individuals howsoever prejudicial to the interest of the appellants the policy of nationalised motor transport sponsored by them might have been. No decent citizen should have uttered such slogans and the State authorities were well within their rights in proceeding against the appellants.\n\nThe difficulty, however, in the way of the State authorities is that they misconceived their remedy. Howsoever provocative and indecent or unbefitting a responsible citizen of the State the conduct of the appellants was, the charge which was levelled against the appellants was one under section 9 of the Act and before the prosecution could succeed they had not only to prove that what the appellants did was against decency and was defamatory of these individuals but also was such that it undermined public order, decency or morality or was tantamount to an incitement to an offence prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The learned counsel for the State very rightly conceded that the statements could not be said to undermine the security of the State or friendly relations with foreign States nor did they amount to contempt of Court or defamation prejudicial to the security of the State nor did they tend to overthrow the State. Howsoever reprehensible these slogans were, they certainly would not have that effect. The only way in which he sought to bring these slogans uttered by the appellants within the mischief of section 9 of the Act was by urging before us that the statements undermined public order, decency or morality and that they were tantamount to an incitement to an offence prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. In support of this contention he referred us to the evidence of Ram Rakha, P.W. 2, Sub-Inspector, C.I.D., who had accompanied the procession:-\n\n\"There was a sufficient num her of public men\n\nthere and they felt annoyed over these slogans. The police had sufficient arrangements and had there been no arrangement there might have been a dispute\".\n\nThere was also the evidence of Gurdit Singh, P. W. 3:-\n\n\"There were many other persons of the public with the procession. People took these slogans ill\" and SunQ.er Singh, P. W. 4:-\n\n\"There were many 9ther persons of the public.\n\nThe slogans had a bad effect on the public\".\n\nIt is significant to observe that, in the initial report made by the Sub-Inspector Ram Rakha as also the Diary Report prepared by him~ no mention had been made by him of the members of the public having felt annoyed over these slogans. The two other witnesses Gurdit Singh, P~W. 3 and Sunder Singh, P. W. 4, were shown in their cross-examination to have been the associates of the police in the in vestigations which they used to carry on and were not at all worthy of credence. These statements, therefore, in regard to the members of the public having felt annoyed over these slogans uttered by the appellants, were liable to be discredited. Even assuming that some members of the public who had congregated near the Prabhat Studio felt annoyed at these slogans and took them ill it is a far cry from that annoyance to undermining of the public order, decency or morality or incitement to an offence prejudicial to the maintenance o.f public order. The only offence prejudicial to the maintenance of public order which could be thought of in this context was that of rioting and there is not the slightest evidence on record to justify an inference that the effect of the utterance of these slogans by the appellants against the Transport Minister and the Chief Minister would, but for the police arrangements, have led to the undermining of the public order or would have led to rioting which would be certainly prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Indecent and vulgar though these slogans were as directed against the Transport Minister and the Chief Minister of the Punjab Government, the utterance thereof by the appellants who were the members of the procession protesting against\n\nK artar Si11gh\n\na11d others\n\n....\n\nThe State of\n\nPunjab\n\nBhagu:atiJ.\n\n. 1956\n\nl{artar Singh\n\nand others v.\n\nTlac State oj\n\nP1oijab\n\nBliagwati J,\n\nthe scheme of nationalised motor transport was hardly calculated to undermine decency or morality the strata of society from which the appellants came being habituated to indulge freely in such vulgar abuses without any the slightest effect on the persons hearing the same.\n\nThese slogans were certainly defamatory of the Transport Minister and the Chief Minister of the Punjab Government but the redress of that grievance was personal to these individuals and the State authorities could not take the cudgels on their behalf by having recourse to section 9 of the Act unless and until the defamation of these individuals was prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order. So far as these individuals were concerned, they did not take any notice of these vulgar abuses and appeared to have considered the whole thing as beneath their notice. Their conduct in this behalf was consistent with the best traditions of democracy. \"Those who fill a public position must not be too thin skinned in reference to comments made upon them. It would often happen that observations would be made upon public men which they know from the bottom of their hearts were undeserved and unjust; yet they must bear with them and submit to be misunderstood for a time\" (Per Cockburn, C.J. in Seyrnour v. Butterworth(') and see the dicta of the Judges in R. v. Sir R. Carden(')). \"Whoever fills a public position renders himself open thereto. He must accept an attack as a necessary, though unpleasant, appendage to his office\" (Per Bramwell, B., in Kelley v. Sherlock(')). Public men in such positions may as well think it worth their while to ignore such vulgar criticisms and abuses hurled against them rather than give importance to the same by prosecuting the persons responsible for the same.\n\nWhile commending thus the conduct of the Transport Minister and the Chief Minister of the Punjab Government, we cannot help observing that the step\n\n(11 [1862] 3 F. & F. 372, 376, 377; 176 KR. 166, 168, 169.\n\n(2) [1879] 5 Q.D.D. 1.\n\n(3) [186G] L.R. 1 '< Il. 686, 689.\n\n• l\n\nwhich the State authorities took against the appellants in prosecuting them under section 9 of the Act was unjustified as the slogans uttered by the appellants did not under the circumstances set out above fall within the mischief of that section.\n\nDeprecating as we do the conduct of the appellants in uttering these slogans, we cannot help feeling that the prosecution has failed to establish that the appellants were guilty of the offence with which they had been charged with the result that the appeal of the appellants will be allowed, their convictions and sentences passed upon them will be set aside and they will be set at liberty forthwith.\n\nWe only hope that the observations made by us here will be an eyeopener to the appellants and they will behave themselves better in the future.\n\nJASWANTRAI MANILAL AKHANEY v.\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY.\n\n[VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHADAS and B. P. SINHA JJ.]\n\nCriminal breach a/trust-Conviction of a banker, Validity a/- Government Promissory Notes pledged with a bank to cover overdraft -No overdraft by the pledgor-Managin(J Director actin(J on behalf of all the Directors pledging the Notes to borrow money for the use of the bank-Legality-Sale of the Notes by the creditors to realise their dues and conseqitent inability of the bank to return them-Mens rea -Sanction to prosecute by the Company Judge, if iequired-Framing of charge, if defective-Indian Penal Code (Act XL V of 1860 ), ss. 409, 79-Indian Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 179-Indian Companies Act (VII of 1913), s.179-Code of Criminal Proceduie (Act V of 1898), ss. 221, 222, 223.\n\nThe appellant 'Was the Managing Director of a bank and held a power of attorney to act on behalf of its Directors and authorising him to borrow money on behalf of the bank. Certain Government Promissory Notes were pledged with the bank by another bank to cover an overdraft account up to a specified amount. There was, however, no overdraft by the pledgor.\n\nThe pledgee bank was in a precarious financial condition. The appellant pledged the securities with a third party to get a loan for the bank's use and on its failure 63\n\nKartar Singh\n\nand others v.\n\nThe State of Punjab\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nMay4", "total_entities": 59, "entities": [{"text": "KARTAR SINGH & OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 47, "end_char": 68, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KARTAR SINGH & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF PUNJAB", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF PUNJAB", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 131, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. 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G. Gokhale, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2180, "end_char": 2193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J indralal and P. G. Gokhale, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2277, "end_char": 2285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI J.-This appeal with special leave involves the interpretation of section 9 of the Punjab Security of the State Act, 1953 (Punjab Act XII of 1953), hereinafter called \"the Act\".", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI"}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2351, "end_char": 2360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Security of the State Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2368, "end_char": 2406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab Act XII of 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2408, "end_char": 2430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Amritsar District Motor Union", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2499, "end_char": 2528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants were members of the Amritsar District Motor Union which took out a procession on 23rd March, 1954 to protest against the policy of the Punjab Government to nationalise motor transport."}}, {"text": "23rd March, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2560, "end_char": 2576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants were members of the Amritsar District Motor Union which took out a procession on 23rd March, 1954 to protest against the policy of the Punjab Government to nationalise motor transport."}}, {"text": "Punjab Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2614, "end_char": 2631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants were members of the Amritsar District Motor Union which took out a procession on 23rd March, 1954 to protest against the policy of the Punjab Government to nationalise motor transport."}}, {"text": "Khachar Khota hai hai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2922, "end_char": 2943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When it reached near Prabha.t Studio, the appellants raised slogans \"Jaggu\n\nmama hai hai (Jaggu, maternal uncle be dead)\" and \"Khachar Khota hai hai (mule-cum-donkey be dead)\"."}}, {"text": "Jagat Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3048, "end_char": 3060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first slogan was alleged to have been directed against the Hon'ble Shri Jagat Narain, Transport Minister, Punjab State and the second slogan against the Hon'ble Shri Bhim Sen Sachar, Chief Minister, Punjab State."}}, {"text": "Punjab State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3082, "end_char": 3094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first slogan was alleged to have been directed against the Hon'ble Shri Jagat Narain, Transport Minister, Punjab State and the second slogan against the Hon'ble Shri Bhim Sen Sachar, Chief Minister, Punjab State."}}, {"text": "Bhim Sen Sachar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3142, "end_char": 3157, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first slogan was alleged to have been directed against the Hon'ble Shri Jagat Narain, Transport Minister, Punjab State and the second slogan against the Hon'ble Shri Bhim Sen Sachar, Chief Minister, Punjab State."}}, {"text": "Court of the Magistra.te, First-Class, Amritsar:-\"that", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3287, "end_char": 3341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The uttering of these slogans was considered objectionable and the appellants were charged in the Court of the Magistra.te, First-Class, Amritsar:-\"that you, on or about the 23rd day of Ma.rch 1954 at Amritsar, while being members of a procession, raised slogans \"J aggu mama hai hai\" \"Khachar Khota hai hai\" which besides being indecent amounted to defamation and was prejudicial to the security of the State and the maintenance of public order and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 9 of the Security of the State .Act\"."}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3685, "end_char": 3694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kartar Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3993, "end_char": 4005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the opinion\n\nKartar Singh\n\nand others\n\n•• The Stale of Punjab\n\nKarlar Singh\n\nand others v.\n\nThe State-of\n\nPunjab\n\nBhagwatlJ.\n\nof the learned Magistrate, the slogans were in fact abuses hurled at the Transport Minister and the Chief Minister of the Punjab Government which besides being indecent amounted to defamation and were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.", "canonical_name": "KARTAR SINGH & OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Karlar Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4043, "end_char": 4055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the opinion\n\nKartar Singh\n\nand others\n\n•• The Stale of Punjab\n\nKarlar Singh\n\nand others v.\n\nThe State-of\n\nPunjab\n\nBhagwatlJ.\n\nof the learned Magistrate, the slogans were in fact abuses hurled at the Transport Minister and the Chief Minister of the Punjab Government which besides being indecent amounted to defamation and were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.", "canonical_name": "KARTAR SINGH & OTHERS"}}, {"text": "State-of\n\nPunjab\n\nBhagwatlJ.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4076, "end_char": 4104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the opinion\n\nKartar Singh\n\nand others\n\n•• The Stale of Punjab\n\nKarlar Singh\n\nand others v.\n\nThe State-of\n\nPunjab\n\nBhagwatlJ.\n\nof the learned Magistrate, the slogans were in fact abuses hurled at the Transport Minister and the Chief Minister of the Punjab Government which besides being indecent amounted to defamation and were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order."}}, {"text": "Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Amritsar", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4402, "end_char": 4446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal taken by the appellants before the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Amritsar, was unsuccessful."}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4629, "end_char": 4638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature for the State of Punjab at Simla", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5014, "end_char": 5071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants filed a Revision Application before the High Court of Judicature for the State of Punjab at Simla but the same was summarily dismissed by the learned Chief Justice."}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5616, "end_char": 5625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5638, "end_char": 5647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8233, "end_char": 8248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Punjab\n\nBlurgwati J.\n\nall be justified.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nPunjab"}}, {"text": "Blurgwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8250, "end_char": 8259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Punjab\n\nBlurgwati J.\n\nall be justified."}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9125, "end_char": 9134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9975, "end_char": 9984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ram Rakha", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10258, "end_char": 10267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of this contention he referred us to the evidence of Ram Rakha, P.W. 2, Sub-Inspector, C.I.D., who had accompanied the procession:-\n\n\"There was a sufficient num her of public men\n\nthere and they felt annoyed over these slogans."}}, {"text": "Gurdit Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10572, "end_char": 10584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was also the evidence of Gurdit Singh, P. W. 3:-\n\n\"There were many other persons of the public with the procession."}}, {"text": "SunQ.er Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10698, "end_char": 10711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "People took these slogans ill\" and SunQ.er Singh, P. W. 4:-\n\n\"There were many 9ther persons of the public."}}, {"text": "Ram Rakha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10900, "end_char": 10909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is significant to observe that, in the initial report made by the Sub-Inspector Ram Rakha as also the Diary Report prepared by him~ no mention had been made by him of the members of the public having felt annoyed over these slogans."}}, {"text": "Sunder Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11102, "end_char": 11114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The two other witnesses Gurdit Singh, P~W. 3 and Sunder Singh, P. W. 4, were shown in their cross-examination to have been the associates of the police in the in vestigations which they used to carry on and were not at all worthy of credence."}}, {"text": "K artar Si11gh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12517, "end_char": 12531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indecent and vulgar though these slogans were as directed against the Transport Minister and the Chief Minister of the Punjab Government, the utterance thereof by the appellants who were the members of the procession protesting against\n\nK artar Si11gh\n\na11d others\n\n....\n\nThe State of\n\nPunjab\n\nBhagu:atiJ.\n\n."}}, {"text": "State of\n\nPunjab", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12556, "end_char": 12572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indecent and vulgar though these slogans were as directed against the Transport Minister and the Chief Minister of the Punjab Government, the utterance thereof by the appellants who were the members of the procession protesting against\n\nK artar Si11gh\n\na11d others\n\n....\n\nThe State of\n\nPunjab\n\nBhagu:atiJ.\n\n.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nPunjab"}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13211, "end_char": 13220, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cockburn", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13945, "end_char": 13953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would often happen that observations would be made upon public men which they know from the bottom of their hearts were undeserved and unjust; yet they must bear with them and submit to be misunderstood for a time\" (Per Cockburn, C.J. in Seyrnour v. Butterworth(') and see the dicta of the Judges in R. v. Sir R. Carden(')). \""}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14826, "end_char": 14835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15596, "end_char": 15607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHADAS and B. P. SINHA JJ.]"}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15609, "end_char": 15622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHADAS and B. P. SINHA JJ.]"}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15627, "end_char": 15638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHADAS and B. P. SINHA JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16136, "end_char": 16153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 409, 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16175, "end_char": 16186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16187, "end_char": 16206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 179", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16221, "end_char": 16227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Contract Act", "statute": "Indian Contract Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16228, "end_char": 16248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s.179", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16264, "end_char": 16269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Companies Act", "statute": "Indian Companies Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 221, 222, 223", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16314, "end_char": 16331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Companies Act", "statute": "Indian Companies Act"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16912, "end_char": 16920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant pledged the securities with a third party to get a loan for the bank's use and on its failure 63\n\nKartar Singh\n\nand others v.\n\nThe State of Punjab\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nMay4", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI"}}]} {"document_id": "1956_1_483_505_EN", "year": 1956, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 483\n\nwhich the State authorities took against the appellants in prosecuting them under section 9 of the Act was unjustified as the slogans uttered by the appellants did not under the circumstances set out above fall within the mischief of that section.\n\nDeprecating as we do the conduct of the appellants in uttering these slogans, we cannot help feeling that the prosecution has failed to establish that the appellants were guilty of the offence with which they had been charged with the result that the appeal of the appellants will be allowed, their convictions and sentences passed upon them will be set aside and they will be set at liberty forthwith.\n\nWe only hope that the observations made by us here will be an eyeopener to the appellants and they will behave themselves better in the future.\n\nJASWANTRAI MANILAL AKHANEY v.\n\nTHE STATE OF BOMBAY.\n\n[VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHADAS and B. P. SINHA JJ.]\n\nCriminal breach a/trust-Conviction of a banker, Validity a/- Government Promissory Notes pledged with a bank to cover overdraft -No overdraft by the pledgor-Managin(J Director actin(J on behalf of all the Directors pledging the Notes to borrow money for the use of the bank-Legality-Sale of the Notes by the creditors to realise their dues and conseqitent inability of the bank to return them-Mens rea -Sanction to prosecute by the Company Judge, if iequired-Framing of charge, if defective-Indian Penal Code (Act XL V of 1860 ), ss. 409, 79-Indian Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 179-Indian Companies Act (VII of 1913), s.179-Code of Criminal Proceduie (Act V of 1898), ss. 221, 222, 223.\n\nThe appellant 'Was the Managing Director of a bank and held a power of attorney to act on behalf of its Directors and authorising him to borrow money on behalf of the bank. Certain Government Promissory Notes were pledged with the bank by another bank to cover an overdraft account up to a specified amount. There was, however, no overdraft by the pledgor.\n\nThe pledgee bank was in a precarious financial condition. The appellant pledged the securities with a third party to get a loan for the bank's use and on its failure 63\n\nKartar Singh\n\nand others v.\n\nThe State of Punjab\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nMay4\n\nJaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v.\n\nThe State of Bombay\n\nto repay the same on demand, the creditors sold the securities fo'r realising their dues.\n\nThe pJedgee bank was thus no longer in a position to return the securities on demand made by the pledger.\n\nInformation was lodged with the police at tha instance of the Official Liquidator, appointed to wind up the bank and the appellant was put up for trial under s. 409 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nHeld, that the appellant was guilty of the offence charged and the appeal must be dismissed.\n\nHeldf,.rther, that in the absence of any overdraft by the pledger, the pledgee bank acquired no interest in the securities which it could deal with and s. 179 of the Contract Act had no application.\n\nThat the delivery of the securities by the pledger :nade the pledgee a trustee for him and he remained the owner subject to any especial interest created in favour of the pledgee by the agreement e.nd in a case, such as the present, where there was no question of redeeming the securities by the pledger, there having been no over~ draft, or sale by the pledgee in enforcement of any especial interest, as none had accrued to it, the pledgee bank had no right to deal with the securities.\n\nThat the question whether the temedy of the pledger was by way of a suit for damages for breach of contract or by way of a criminal prosecution would depend on whether or not there was mens rea and other elements constituting the offence.\n\nThat although the offence of criminal breach of trust presupposes an entrustment, such entrustment need not conform to all the technicalities of the law of truat, and, consequently, in a case such as the. present, where the accused had the necessary power and exercised dominion over the securities and caused wrongful loss to the pledger and wrongful gain to the pledgee by dealing with the securities, he was guilty of the offence.\n\nThat the provisions of s. 79 of the Indian Penal Code were of no a.va.il to him as it was never pleaded in his written statement nor found by the eourts below that be was unaware of the fact that there had been no overdraft at all.\n\nThat no sanction under s. 179 of the Companies Act was required for the prosecution.\n\nThe provisions of that section were of a permissive character enabling the court Liquidator to do certain things with the permission of the court and did not in any way conttol the general law so as to iestrict the power of the court to take ecignisance of an offence or of the Police to initiate a prosecution or even of a private citizen to move the machinery of the criminal courts to bring an offender to justice.\n\nBasdeo Agarwalla v. King-Emperor, ([1945] F.C.R. 93), distinguished and held inapplicable.\n\nThat the charge framed against the accused fulfilled the requirements of ss. 221 and 222(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and\n\nas the particulars mentioned in the charge were sufficient to give him notice of the matter he was being charged with it was not necessary to set out also the manner of the commission of the offence as required by s. 223 of the Code.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 152 of 1954.\n\nAppeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 20th October 1953 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 652 of 1953 arising out of the Judgment a.nd Order dated the 9th April 1953 of the Court of Presidency Magistrate, 19th Court, Bombay in Criminal Ca.se No. 12164/P of 1949.\n\nH.J. Umrigar and R. A. Govind for the appellant.\n\nPorus A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar for P. G. Gokhale for the respondent.\n\n1956. May 4.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSINHA J.-This is an appeal by special leave directed against the concurrent orders and judgments of the courts below convicting the appellant under section 409, Indian Penal Code and sentencing him to rigorous imprisonment for three months and a fine of Rs. 201 or in default, further six weeks rigorous imprisonment. As the appellant had been convicted and sentenced for a similar offence in another. case tried by the same Presidency Magistrate, 19th Court, Esplanade, Bombay, he directed the sentence in this case to run concurrently with the sentence in the other case. The charge against the accused in the trial court is in these terms:-\n\n\"The Accused is charged under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code for committing criminal breach of trust in respect of property to wit3% Government Promissory Loan Notes 1966-68 of the face value of Rs. 50,000 and 2!% Government Promissory Notes 1961 of the faee value of Rs. 25,000 in or about February to .May 1949 entrusted to him in his capacity as Managing Director of the Exchange Bank of\n\nJaswantrai Manil•l Akhane y v.\n\nThe State of\n\n&mbay\n\nJaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v.\n\nThe State of Bombay\n\nSinha].\n\nIndia and Africa Ltd. and belonging to the Cambay Hindu Merchants Co-operative Bank. (Detailed charge is separately framed)\".\n\nThe appellant at all material times was the Mang ing Director of the Exchange Bank of India and Africa Ltd., with its head office at Bombay, which hereinafter will be referred to as the Exchange Bank.\n\nHe held a power of attorney to act as the Managing Director on behalf of the Directors of the Company.\n\nBy that power the accused was invested with the authority to borrow money on behalf of the Bank.\n\nIn 1944 the Cambay Hindu Merchants Co-operative Bank at Cambay, which hereinafter will be referred to as the Co-operative Bank, had opened a current account with the Exchange Bank. On instructions from the Co-operative Bank, the Exchange Bank purchased in August 1946 securities worth Rs. 25,000 in its own name with money belonging to the Co-operative Bank and the securities were kept with the Exchange Bank as a cover for overdraft. In March 1948 two further lots of Government security of Rs. 25,000 each of the value of Rs. 50,000 were purchased likewise and left with the Exchange Bank for the same purpose. On the 14th May 1948 the two banks entered into a contract evidenced by three documents to be noticed in detail hereinafter. Shortly stated, the Exchange Bank agreed to grant the Co-operative Bank credit for overdraft up to a limit of Rs. 66,150 and as a security for the overdraft the Government securities of the value of Rs. 75,000 already in the custody of the Exchange Bank was pledged to the latter. These securities of the face value of Rs. 75,000 will hereinafter be referred to as \"the securities\".\n\nBut it appears that the Cooperative Bank had no occasion to operate on the overdraft acconn t un ti! the 28th February 1949 when the crucial event happened, namely, the Exchange Bank finding itself in an embarrassed financial position took a loan from the Canara Bank of one lakh of rupees by pledging the securities as also other securities with which we are not concerned in this case.\n\nOn the 24th April 1949 the Exchange Bank paid off the dues of the\n\nCanara Bank by taking a fresh loan of the same amount of one lakh from Messrs Merwanji Dalal & Co. and pledging the same securities as had been pledged to the Canara Bank. On the 28th April 1949 Messrs Merwanji Dalal & Co. demanded back their money by the forenoon of the day following. As the Exchange Bank could not pay the amount as demanded, the pledgees aforesaid sold those securities including the securities belonging to the Co-operative Bank, for realising their dues, on the 3rd May 1949.\n\nIn the meantime, in answer to a letter from the Co-operative Bank to the Exchange Bank asking for a certificate for the securities held by the latter on behalf of the former in the overdraft account, the Exchange Bank issued the certificate dated the 1st April 1949 to the effect that at the close of business on the 31st March 1949 it held Government of India securities of the total value of Rs. 75,000 as security against the overdraft. facilities granted to the Co-operative Bank and that there was no overdraft against the said securities on that date. Subsequently, on the 29th April 1949 the Co-operative Bank wrote to the Exchange Bank asking the latter to hand over securities of the face value of Rs. 50,000 to the Central Bank. The Central Bank also on behalf of the Co-operative Bank made a similar demand and as the Exchange Bank did not comply with that requisition, the Central Bank informed the Co-operative Bank by a letter dated the 3rd May 1949 that the securities had not been handed over to the Central Bank as directed by the Co-operative Bank. The Co-operative Bank then wrote to the Reserve Bank for stoppage of the securities of the value of Rs. 25,000. It became clear by then that the Exchange Bank was not in a position to return the securities to the owners, that is to say, the Co-operative\n\nBank.\n\nIn spite of the best efforts of the appellant as the Managing Director of the Exchange Bank, to stave off the crisis by borrowing money from different sources, the run on the bank became so great that the directors applied for and obtained from the Com-\n\nJ asuantrai Mani/al Akhaney\n\nThe State of\n\nBorn bay\n\nSinha J.\n\nJaswantrai Manilal Akhaney\n\nThe State of Bombay\n\nSinha J,\n\npany Judge of the Bombay High Court a moratorium of 15 days. On the 18th May 1949 a provisional liquidator was appointed in respect of the Exchange Bank on a creditor's application and on the 24th June 1949 the Official Liquidator was appointed to wind up the bank. On the 25th June 1949 one M. N. Raijee as agent of the Official Liquidator lodged information with the police charging the appellant with breach of trust in respect of a number of securities including the securities belonging to the Co-operative Bank.\n\nOn the 31st October 1949 a charge-sheet was submitted by the police under section 409, Indian Penal Code against the appellant in respect of the securities of the face value of Rs. 75,000 belonging to the Cooperative Bank. On the 4th April 1952 the charge as quoted above was framed against the appellant.\n\nThe delay of about two and a half years in placing the appellant on trial is attributable to the fact that at the request of the accused the trial in respect of this charge was stayed pending the disposal of the other case against him.\n\nAt the trial the prosecution examined the Manager of the Co-operative Bank as P.W. I. He proved the transactions between that Bank and the Exchange Bank. The second witness for the prosecution was a partner in the firm of Messrs Merwanji Bomanji Dalal during the material time. He proved the transaction of the loan by his firm to the Exchange Bank of one lakh of rupees on the pledge of the securities belonging to the Co-operative Bank, as also other securities. He deposed to the fact that it was the appellant who finalised the transaction on behalf of the Exchange Bank. He also proved that in default of payment by the Exchange Bank on demand by his firm, it sold the securities including the securities in question and realised the dues from the Bank from the sale proceeds of securities of the value of one lakh of rupees. The third witness for the prosecution was the Chief Accountant of the Exchange Bank who functioned as such till the 2nd May 1949 when the Bank closed down.· He also had a power of attorney from the Bank to act jointly with another person\n\nwith a similar power of attorney. According to this witness, the appellant as the Managing Director exercised the powers of borrowing, raising money, purchasing, selling and pledging of bonds, scrips and other forms of securities on behalf of the Bank and its constituents during the relevant period and that no one else exercised those powers. He also testified\n\nto the fact that there was a crisis in the affairs of the Bank from about the middle of February 1949 and that there was a rush on the Bank which continued till it closed down. He also proved the fact that during the material time the Co-operative Bank had a credit balance in its favour and that there was no overdraft by that Bank from the Exchange Bank.\n\nHe proved Exhibits E, F and G which are the documents evidencing the contract between the two banks in respect of the pledge of the security. He corroborated the previous witness that it was the appellant who negotiated and finalised the loan of one lakh of rupees from the Canara Bank and that the securities in question along with others had been pledged to the\n\nCanara Bank. It was he who had endorsed the securities to the Canara Bank. He stated that the Exchange Bank had submitted to the Canara Bank a declaration to the effect that the said securities belonged absolutely to the Exchange Bank. As there was a heavy rush of depositors on the bank, the loan from the Canara Bank was taken to satisfy the demand of the depositors. The most important witness examined on behalf of the prosecution is P.W. 4, Ganpati Venkatrao Kini. He was an accountant in the Exchange Bank during the relevant period.\n\nHe was also working with the Official Liquidator of the Bank after its liquidation was ordered by court.\n\nLike the previous witness, he also had a power of attorney to act only in conjunction with another person holding a similar power. He supports the previous witness in saying that the power of borrowing money or of purchasing, selling or pledging or repledging securities was exercised by the appellant and by no other person on all material dates. He also corroborates the previous witness and states that\n\n.]asu'antrai Manila/ Akhaney v.\n\nThe State of Bombay\n\nSinha J.\n\nJaswantrai Jlanilal Akhqney\n\nTlic State of\n\nBo1nbay\n\nSinliaJ.\n\nthere was a crisis in the bank from about the middle of February 1949 and that there was a heavy rush on the bank from that time till it closed down. He also proves Exs. E, F and G and states that from the 14th May 1948 when these documents were executed between the two banks till the 2nd May 1949 when the Exchange Bank closed its doors there was no overdraft by the Co-operative Bank which always had a credit balance. He also gives the details of the transaction of tho loan of one lakh between the Exchange Bank and the Canara Bank and the details of the securities pledged by way of security for that loan. He makes the following very significant statement:-\n\n\"I had handed over the two securities belonging to the Cambay Co-operative Bank to the accused for being handed over to the Canara Bank against the loan.\n\nThe accused actually asked me for these securities and I handed them to the accused''.\n\nTo a court question as to why he did not bring it to the notice of the appellant that the securities in question belonged to the Co-operative Bank and not to the Exchange Bank, his answer is in these words:-\n\n\" In fact, the accused himself told me to bring securities pleged by the Cam bay Co-operative Bank with the Exchange Bank\".\n\nHe also proves Ex. L, which is a very importaut document in this case and proves that it was signed by the accused.\n\nHe further states that the declaration in that document that the securities represented the Exchange Bank's investments was not correct.\n\nHe also makes detailed statements as to the different kinds of interest which the appellant had in the Exchange Bank. He was drawing Rs. 2,500 as monthly salary as the Managing Director. He was also drawing a salary of Rs. 1,000 from the Union Life Assurance Co. Ltd., as its Managing Director. The Insurance Company and its branches had a current account with the Exchange Bank and hB.d advanced to the latter six to seven lakhs of rupees as \"call deposits\".\n\nThe appellant was also connected with Messrs L. A.\n\nStronach Ltd., Advertising Agents, which had been 1956 given overdraft facilities by the Exchange Bank. .\n\nThe appellant was also getting Rs. 2,000 per month M 1~1 sw 1 Aankh#ra• f h f \"d Ad . .\n\nA Th ant a aney as salary rom t ea oresa1 vertismg gents. e v. appellant and his wife were the principal sharehold- The state of ers in Akhaney & Sons Ltd., who were the Secretaries Bombay and Treasurers of the Indian Overseas Airlines. The Exchange Bank had advanced to the aforesaitl Indian Overseas Airlines a loan of one crore and ten lakhs of rupees and Messrs Akhaney & Sons Ltd. aforesaid were getting a remuneration of Rs. 2,500 per month from the Indian Overseas Airlines Ltd. It would thus appear that the appellant along with his wife in one way or another was getting about Rs. 8,000 per mensem as remuneration from the different companies referred to above which were closely associated with one another from the financial point of view and that the appellant was the chief person concerned with them and the connecting link between them. It was naturally his interest to see that the Exchange Bank continued its existence as long as could be arranged even by borrowing large sums of money when there was already a run on the bank.\n\nIt is in the background of all these facts and circumstances that the appellant's acts of commission and omission had to be judged.\n\nThe other four witnesses, P.Ws. 5 to 8 are more or less formal witnesses in the sense that they have proved certain documents and letters which need not be noticed. The evidence of P.W. 2 had to be set aside as he was not available for cross-examination after charge, being out of the country.\n\nThe appellant's .defence is disclosed in a long written statement running into twenty paragraphs and seven closely typed pages submitted on the 3rd October 1952. Shortly stated, it is to the effect that the charge framed against him is bad in law and extremely vague; that the vagueness of the charge had \"considerably handicapped\" hie defence, that the prosecution had not been fair in that it had not examined the first informant, M. N. Raiji, that if he had been examined by the prosecution, the appellant would have shown from the records in his possession\n\nSinha J.\n\nJ aswantrai Manilal Akhane; y\n\nThe State of Bombay\n\nSinha/.\n\nthat the Co-operative Bank had not suffered any loss and that the Bank in the hands of the Liquidator had more than sufficient funds to pay the dues of the former; that the prosecution had not been launched with the sanction of the Company Judge who was in seisin of the liquidation proceedings ih respect of the Exchange Bank and that.therefore the provisions of sections 179 and 237 of the Indian Companies Act had not been complied with; that the securities in question had not been entrusted to the appellant but to the Exchane Bank, if at all there was any entrustment, and that as a matter of fact and law, the Exchange Bank had not been entrusted with the securities, that the Exchange Bank \"could legally deal with the securities in any manner it liked\", as provided in the documents, Exs. E, F and G, between the two banks; that the sub-pledging of the securities with the Canara Bank or with Messrs Merwanji Bomanji Dalal was \"perfectly within the four corners of the law\", and that the essential ingredients of an offence under section 409, Indian Penal Code had not been made out. Grievance was also sought to be made of the fact that Inspector Milburn who had investigated the case had not been called as prosecution witness, with the result that the appellant had been deprived of the right of challenging the prosecution evidence with reference to the police diary.\n\nThe learned Magistrate aftr a very fair and full examination of the evidence in the case and the points raised by the appellant in his defence came to the conclusion that the appellant was guilty of the offence of criminal breach of trust under section 409, Indian Penal Code and passed a lenient sentence, as stated above, in view of the consideration that \"not a pie went to the pocket of the accused\", and that \"the accused had not taken up any dishonest defence\".\n\nThe learned Magistrate held that the charge as framed was not vague in view of the provisions of section 222, Criminal Procedure Code, with special reference to the terms of sub-section (2) of that sectiol'.. On the question of the non-examination of the first informant, M. N. Raiji, and of the investigating police officer,\n\nthe learned Magistrate observed that they were formal witnesses inasmuch as the facts of the case were not in dispute. Furthermore, the court .observed that if the accused or his lawyer who defended him at the later stage of the prosecution,• had applied to the court for their being examined, they could have been called as witnesses and subjected to cross-examina, tion by the accused. But no such application had been made. As regards want of sanction of the Company Judge, he held that section 179 of the Indian Companies Act had no application to the facts of the present case, as it was not a prosecution under the Companies Act and that therefore no such sanction as is contemplated by that section was necessary. Dealing with the appellant's contention that there was no entrustment within the meaning of section 405, Indian Penal Code the learned Magistrate observed that the accused held delegated powers from the Board .of Directors and he held the property in trust on behalf of the Directors of the Exchange Bank. He further held that the contract of pledge dated the 14th May 1948 between the two banks did not vest any right in the Exchange Bank absolutely to deal with the securities and that at any rate, the Exchange Bank could not de{l.l with the securities so long as the Cooperative Bank had not taken an overdraft from the former. In dealing with the question whether the appellant had dealt witl, l the securities dishonestly, he held that in all the circumstances of the case there was no doubt that wrongful loss was caused to the Co-operative Bank and wrongful gain not to the accused personally but to the Exchange Bank which he represented during the transactions in question.\n\nOn appeal to the Bombay High Court, a Division Bench of that court dismissed the appeal substantially agreeing with the findings of the trial court.\n\nDealing with a new point raised before the appeal court, namely, that the appellant was under a mistake of fact or law as to the indebtedness of the Cooperative Bank to the Exchange Bank or as to its powers to deal with the security, the High Court held\n\nJ aswantraf Manila/ Akha11e :1\n\nv, The Stale of\n\nBomba; y\n\nSinha].\n\nJaswantrai Mani/al Akllaney\n\nThe State oj\n\nBo111bay\n\nSinha J.\n\nthat there was no possibility of the appellant having made any mistake of fact in good faith. The court also pointed out that the appellant himself had not raised this plea of mistake either about the facts of the case or about arry doubtful question of Jaw. The court also pointed out the declaratfons made by the appellant on behalf of the Exchange Bank that the securities belonged absolutely to the bank and represented its investments-statements which he knew were false.\n\nWhile dealing with the appeal on the question of sentence, the High Court pointed out that there was good evidence to support the inference that the appellant had been actuated by motives of personal benefit also. In that view of the matter the High Court maintained the conviction and the sentence passed by the trial Magistrate. The appellant then moved the High Court for a certificate that the case was a fit one for appeal to this Court. The certificate was refused by that court. Thereafter the appellant moved this Court and obtained special leave to appeal.\n\nIn support of the appeal the learned counsel for the appellant has raised a number of questions of law and at the forefront of his argument contended that both in law and on a proper construction of the contract between the two banks the appellant was fully entitled to pledge the securities as long as the overdraft agreement subsisted, irrespective of whether or not there was an actual overdraft by the Co-operative Bank on the date of the pledge, that is to say, on the 28th February 1949.\n\nExamining the position with reference to the contract between the two banks, we find that Exhibits E, F and G, all dated the 14th l\\lay 1948, are parts of the same transaction and evidence the terms of the contract between them. Ex. Eis a promissory note executed by the Co-operative Bank in favour of the Exchange Bank for the sum of Rs. 66,150 with interest at three per cent. per annum with half yearly rests. Ex. F is a letter addressed by the Cooperative Bank to the Exchange Bank enclosing Ex.\n\nE, and Ex. G is the bond pledging all marketable\n\nsecurities and goods to the Exchange Bank in consideration of its promise to grant credit for overdraft limited to the amount aforesaid in favour of the Cooperative Bank from time to time with interest at three per cent. per annum as aforesaid. The significant portion of the bond is in these terms:-\n\n\" ............................ and we agree and undertake that in the event of our failure to maintain the marg, in on the said movable property marketable securities and goods in the manner hereinafter provided or failing repayment on demand to you by us of the amount of such advance or credit with interest cost charges and expenses_ as aforesaid you shall be entitled, but not bound, to sell or otherwise dispose of all or any of the said movable property marketable securities and goods by public auction or private contract in such manner and upon such terms and subject to such conditions as you may think fit without any reference to us or obtaining our consent, and the proceeds of such sale or disposal shall be applied first in payment of all costs charges and expenses of and incident to such sale or disposal and the enforcement of the pledge and charge in your favour hereby created, secondly in repaying the amount of such advance or credit with interest as aforesaid and all costs charges and expenses incurred by you in relation thereto not otherwise met including loss in exchange (if any) and all other debts and monies however due to you by us and lastly in payment to us of the surplus if any thereafter remaining, declaring as it is hereby expressly provided agreed and declared that this shall be continuing security to cover the amount of any advance or credit which you have allowed to us or may from time to time ailow us with interest costs, charges and expenses and all other debts and monies due as aforesaid ............... \".\n\nReading Exhibits E, F and G together, it is clear that the securities of the face value of Rs. 75,000 were pledged to the Exchange Bank as security for overdraft up to the limit of Rs. 66,150 for which the Cooperative Bank had given the promissory note to the Exchange Bank. It was further stipulated that in\n\n19.56\n\nJaswantrai Mani/al Akhaney v.\n\nThe State of\n\nBombay\n\nSinha J.\n\nJaswantrai ManUal Akhaney\n\nThe State of\n\n&mbay\n\nSinha}.\n\nthe event of the pledgor making a default in payment on demand of the amount advanced by way of overdraft with outstanding interest it may be realised by the Exchange Bank by sale of those securities and after satisfying the pledgee's dues against the pledgor, if there was any outstanding amount the surplus of the sale proceeds shall be paid back to the pledgor.\n\nThus it is clear that according to the terms of the contract the Exch'ange Bank was not entitled, as contended on behalf of the appellant, to sell the securities even though there may not have been any outstanding dues from the Co-operative Bank. The securities were to be kept by the Exchange Bank -charged with the payment of such amount as may from time to time have been advanced or be advanced under the overdraft arrangement. But that charge was not an absolute one without reference to the state of accounts between the two banks; in other words, there would be a charge only when there was an adverse balance against the Co-operative Bank. We know that at all material times the Co-operative Bank had not drawn any sum from the Exchange Bank in pursuance of the agreement referred to above.\n\nThe right of the Exchange Bank to deal with the securities under the agreement would arise only on the happening of certain events, namely, that the pledgor either had failed to maintain the proper margin or had made a default in repayment of the outstanding amount on demand by the Exchange Bank. So long as those contingencies did not arise,-and it is nobody's case that any of those contingencies had arisen,--the pledgee bank had no right to deal with the securities by way of pledge, sub-pledge or assignment. In this connection our attention was invited to the provisions of section 179 of the Indian Contract Act in support of the contention that as the securities had been agreed between the two banks to be a cover for overdraft not exceeding Rs. 66,150, up to that amount the pledgee bank had an interest in those securities which it could have dealt with. It was further argued that as there wasnothing to show that the appellant bad dealt with the securities for\n\na larger amount than that, 4e. could not be said to have contravened the terms of the contract.\n\nIn our opinion, there is no substance in this contention. Section 179 predicates that the pledgor has a limited interest which he can deal with and his transaction to that extent would be valid. If the Co-operative Bank had as a matter of fact operated upon the overdraft account and had drawn any sum within the limit aforesaid, the Exchange Bank would have an interest pro tanto in those securities and might then have been entitled to pledge or sub-pledge the securities with a third party. But so long as there was no overdraft by the pledgor, the pledgee had no such interest as it could in its turn pledge or sub-pledge to a third party. Furthermore, it is clear from the narrative of events given above that the appellant dealt with the securities with third parties on the footing, after an express declaration had been made by him, that those securities were the absolute property of the Exchange Bank. We are not here concerned with the question of the extent of interest acquired by such third party. We are only concerned with determining the legal position as between the two banks, the Bxchange Bank being represented by its Managing Director, the appellant. Hence there is no difficulty in holding that on the terms of the contract between the two banks the appellant was not entitled to transfer any interest in those securities and if he did so, he did it in contravention of the terms of the contract.\n\nWe will now deal with the legal position, apart from the terms of the contract. On the facts stated above the Exchange Bank had become the bailee in respect of the securities. The securities had been delivered by the Co-operative Bank to the Exchange Bank for the express purpose, as disclosed in the contract set out above, that they shall be disposed of in accordance with the terms contained in Exhibit G set out above. By the very fact of the delivery of the securities to the bailee the latter became a trustee in terms of the contract, not for all purposes, but only for the limited purpose indicated by the agreement\n\nJaswantrai Manila/ Akhat1ey\n\nTlte State of Bombay\n\nSinha J.\n\nJasu:antrai Manilal Akhancy\n\nThe State of\n\nHon1bay\n\nSinha J.\n\nbetween the parties. The pledgor has in the present case only transferred his possession of the property to the pledgee who has a specia, J interest in the property of enforcing his charge for payment of an overdraft, if any, whereas the property continues to be owned by the pledgor.\n\nThe special interest of the pledgee comes to an end as soon as the debt for which it was pledged is discharged. It is open to the pledgor to redeem the pledge by full payment of the amount for which the pledge had been made at any time if there is no fixed period for redemption, or at any time after the date fixed and such a right of redemption continues until the thing pledged is lawfully sold.\n\nHence the Co-operative Bank in this case could have asked for a return of the securities at any time, because there never was any overdraft. As the pledge had been terminated neither by redemption, nor by a lawful sale on the happening of such contingencies as the parties contemplated in their agreement or the law allowed, the securities continued to be the property of the Co-operative Bank and the Exchange Bank, or the appellant as its Managing Director, had no right to deal with them.\n\nIt was next contended, alternatively, that assuming that the Exchange Bank had dealt with the securities in contravention of the terms of the agreement, the appellant had, as representing the bank, only committed a breach of contract, the remedy for which was a suit for damages and not a criminal prosecution. This argument assumes that the same set of facts cannot give rise both to a civil liability and a criminal prosecution. It is manifest that such an argument in its bald form cannot be acceptable. If there is no mens rea, or if the other essential ingredients of an offence are lacking, the same facts may not sustain a criminal prosecution, though a civil action may lie.\n\nWe have therefore to examine whether or not there was mens rea in this case or whether the necessary element of a criminal offence have been made out.\n\nIt has been contended that no offence under section 409, Indian Penal Code has been brought home to the appellant for the reasons, (1) that there\n\nwas no entrustment, (2) that there was no mens rea, and (3) that there was no dishonesty on the part of the appellant. For an offence under section 409, Indian Penal Code, the first essential ingredient to be proved is that the property was entrusted. It has been argued that in this case there was no such entrustment as is contemplate'd by that section; and that the securities were pledged with the Exchange Bank by the Co-operative Bank which was in the position of a debtor to the former. The contention is that the parties never contemplated the creation of a trust in the strict sense of the term. But when section 405 which defines \"criminal breach of trust\" speaks of a person being in any manner entrusted with property, it does not contemplate the creation of a trust with all the technicalities of the law of trust.\n\nIt contemplates the creation of a relationship whereby the owner of property makes it over to another person to be retained by him until a certain contingency arises or to be disposed of by him on the happening of a certain event. The person who transfers possession of the property to the second party. still remains the legal owner of the property and the person in whose favour possession is so transferred has only the custody of the property to be kept or disposed of by him for the benefit of the other party, the person so put in possession only obtaining a special interest by way of a claim for money advanced or spent upon the safe keeping of the thing or such other incidental expenses as may have been incurred by him. In the present case the Co-operative Bank entrusted the Excqange Bank with the .securities for the purpose of keeping them as a security for the overdrafts if and when taken by the former. In law those securities continued to be the property of the Co-operative Bank and as it never borrowed any money from the Exchange Bank, the latter had no interest in those securities which it could transfer in any way to a third party so fai; as the two banks are concerned. The entrustment was to the Exchange Bank itself. But it being a non-natural person, its business had to be transacted by someone who was authorised\n\nJaswantrai Manila/ Akha11e~\n\nThe State of Bombay\n\nSinhaJ,\n\nJaswantrai Manilal Akhancy\n\nThe State of Bombay\n\nSinha}.\n\nto do so on its behalf. The appellant held the power of attorney on behalf of the directors of the bank to transact business on behalf of the bank. In that capacity the appellant had dominion over the securities.\n\nHence the appellant can be said either to have been entrusted with the property in a derivative sense or to have dominion over the securities as a banker; and thus in either case, the first essential condition for the application of section 409, Indian Penal Code is fulfilled.\n\nOn the question of mens rea, it has to be determined whether or not the appellant dishonestly disposed of those securities in violation of any of the terms of the agreement aforesaid. As alr.eady indicated, the appellant did dispose of these securities in violation of the terms of the contract between the two banks.\n\nBut still the question remains whether he did so dishonestly; in other words, whether when disposing of those securities the appellant had the intention of causing wrongful gain to the Exchange Bank or wrongful loss to the Co-operative Bank. In our opinion, he intended both and, as a matter of fact, he caused wrongful loss to the pledgor bank and wrongful gain to the pledgee bank. The Exchange Bankraised money on those securities which it was not entitled to do and the Co-opera.tive Bank was deprived of those securities, even though not for all times. It is settled law that a deprivation even for a short period is within the meaning of the expression.\n\nIf he disposed of those securities with the intention of causing wrongful loss to the one and wrongful gain to the other, there can be no question. but that the appellant had the necessary mens rea.\n\nIt was next argued that assuming that the essential ingredients of an offence under section 409, Indian Penal Code had been made out, the appellant may have made a mistake of fact in assuming that the Co-operative Bank was indebted to the Exchange Bank or may have made a mistake oflaw in mistakenly believing that the Exchange Bank had the right as the pledgee to sub-pledge those securities for raising money for its own purposes. We know as a fact tht\n\nthe Co-operative Bank had not taken any overdraft from the Exchange Bank. But it was argued that it had not been proved that the appellant had that knowledge. The appellant in his long written statement has not tried to take shelter behind any such mistake. He was in full control of the bank accounts and as pointed out by the courts below, it is impossible to believe that in the circumstances in which the bank had found itself and when the appellant was hard put to it to collect all the bank's resources to stave off the severe crisis through which it was passing, the appellant would not have known the fact that the Co-operative Bank did not owe his bank any money by way of overdraft. Hence, in our opinion, there is no room for the supposition that the appel-. lant was not aware of the true state of accounts between the two banks. But then it was argued that the appellant may have made a mistake of law in thinking that he was justified by law in dealing with those securities. The attempt is to bring the case withjn one of the general exceptions contained in Chapter IV of the Indian P6nal Code and set out in section 79 in these terms:-\n\n\"N othing is an offence which -is done by any person who is justified by law, or who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason of a mistake oflaw in good faith, believes himself to be justified by law, in doing it\".\n\nIn considering a matter or'this kind the attitude of the accused is an important consideration. We note that here the appellant made no attempt in the trial court to set up such a defence. If he had ever said that he made a mistake of fact after exercising due care and caution that there was an overdraft against the Co-operative Bank in favour of the Exchange Bank, he may have been able to take advantage of the exception. But as in this case there was no mistake of fact and as the court was in a position to find that the appellant must have known that there was no such overdraft, there is no room for the application of section 79 quoted above. The appellant cannot avail himself of the exception of section 79 simply by\n\nJasu1antrai Mani/al Akhaney v.\n\nThe State of\n\nBombay\n\nSinha J.\n\nJ asu•antrai Manilal Akhaney\n\nThe State of\n\nBot11bay\n\nSinha}.\n\nsaying that lie believed that in law he was entitled to deal with the securities as the property of the Exchange Bank, as he attempted to do in his written statement. If he had further proved that he believed in good faith that the Co-operative Bank was indebted to his bank, his belief that he was justified by law in dealing with the securities as the property of the bank may have lielped to bring him within the exception. But as there was no mistake about the basic fact, the provisions of section 79, Indian Penal Code are not attracted to this case.\n\nIt now remains to deal with certain objections relating to the illegality or irregularity in the procedure followed in the trial of this case. It was argued that this-prosecution was iv competent for the reason that no sanction of the Company Judge had been obtained under section 179 of the Indian Companies Act. The relevant portion of section 179 is as follows:-\n\n\"The official liquidator shall have power, with the sanction of the Court, to do the following things:- ( a) to institute or defend any suit or prosecution, or other legal proceeding, civil or criminal, in the name and on behalf of the company; ................... .\n\n\" In terms the section lays down the powers of the official liquidator. Such a liquidator has to function under the directions of the court which is in charge of the liquidation proceedings. One of his powers is to institute prosecutions in the name and on behalf of the company under liquidation with the sanction of the court.\n\nThis section does not purport to impose any limitations on the powers of a criminal court to entertain a criminal prosecution launched in the ordinary course under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Where a prosecution has to be launched in the name of, or on behalf of, the company, it naturally becomes the concern of the Judge to see whether or not it was worthwhile to incur expenses on behalf of the company and therefore, the section requires the sanction of the Judge before the liquidator can undertake the prosecution or defence in the name of and on behalf of the company.\n\nThe\n\npresent case is not a prosecution in the name or on 1956 behalf of the company; nor is the official liquidator J t . . . aswan rai interested in prosecutmg the case.\n\nThe prosecut10n Mani/al Akhaney was started on a charge-sheet submitted by the police, v. though the first information report had been lodged The State of by an official under the official liquidator. This was Bombay not a prosecution initiated or institut_ed by the official Sinha J. liquidator.\n\nThis is not a case which can come even by analogy within the rule laid down by the Federal Court in the case of Basdeo Agarwalla v. King-Emperor(1 ), that a prosecution launched without the previous sanction of the Government within the meaning of clause 16 of the Drugs Control Order, 1943, was completely null and void.\n\nIn that case their Lordships of the Federal Court had to consider the effect of the following words of clause 16 aforesaid:-\n\n\"No prosecution for any contravention of the provisions of this Order shall be instituted without the previous sanction of the Provincial Government ....... \".\n\nIt will be noticed that section 179 of the Companies Act does not contain any words similar in effect to those quoted above. Where the legislature intended to place a limitation on the powers of the court to take cognisance of an offence unless certain condi tions were fulfilled, like the provisions of sections 196 and 197, Criminal Procedure Code, it has used words s1:1ch as these: \"No court shall take cognisance\n\n\" There is nothing in section 179 of the Companies Act which can be construed as restricting the powers of the court to take cognisance of an offence or the powers of the police to initiate prosecution or even of a private citizen to move the machinery of the criminal courts to bring an offender like the appellant to justice. For a prosecution for breach of trust even by a director of a company no such condition precedent as the previous sanction of any authority is contemplated by law, unless it is a prosecution in the name and on behalf of the company by the official liquidator who has to incur expenses out of the funds of the company.\n\nSection 179 is an\n\n(1) [1945] F.C.R. 93.\n\n.Taswantrai Manilal Akhaney\n\nThe State of\n\nBonibay\n\nSinha}.\n\nenabling provision to enable the liquidator to do certain things with the sanction of the court.\n\nIt does not control the general Jaw of the land.\n\nIt was next contended that the charge as framed by the trial court was illegal and vagne and had caused material prejudice to the appellant. The charge as framed has already been set out. The learned trial magistrate had stated at the end that a detaioled charge was to be separately framed. But no such charge is before us and the appeal has proceeded on the assumption that no such detailed charge was as a matter of fact framed by the trial court. The question therefore is whether the charge, such as it is, complies with the requirements of the law. It has been argued on behalf of the appellant that the charge is materially defective in so far as the nature of the breach of trust, the facts constituting the breach, the exact date and manner of the breach have not been set out. The charge as framed fulfils the requirements of section 221, Criminal Procedure Code, because it has mentioned the name of the offence, namely, cr.iminal breach of trust and , specified section 409, Indian Penal Code, which impliedly gives notice to the accused of every legal condition required by law to be fulfilled in order to constitute the offence of criminal breach of trust. It has also fulfilled the reqnirements of section 222(1) of the Code in so far as it has specified the securities in respect of which and the Co-operative Bank against which a criminal breach of trust had been committed. Those particularB, in our opinion, were sufficient to give the accused notice of the matter with which he was charged. The trial court has made reference to the provisions of sub-section\n\n(2) of section 222. Bu:t it was in error in relying upon those provisions which relate to the offence of criminal breach of trust or dishonest misappropriation of money, which was not the present case. rt is true that the manner of the commission of the offence as required by section 223 of the Code has not been set out. But that has to be set out only when the nature of the case is such that the particulars required by sections 221 and 222 had not given the accused sufficient notice of the matter with which he is charged.\n\nIn our opinion, though the charge could have been more detailed as was intended by the learned Magistrate, as framed, it gives the accused sufficient notice of the nature of the offence alleged against him. Even assuming that there were certain omissions in the charge, they cannot be regarded as material unless in terms of section 225 of the Code it is shown by the accused that he had in fact been misled by such omission or that there had been a failure of justice as a result of such error or omission. The illustrations under that section show that each case has got to be judged on its own particular facts and there cannot b_e any general presumption that every error or omission in a charge has materially affected a trial or occasioned a failure of justice. In this case from the long written statement filed on behalf of the appel~ lant it is clear that he was aware of the gravamen of the charge against him and that he tried to meet it in all its bearings.\n\nWe are not therefore impressed by the argument advanced on his behalf that the omissions in the charge are material and that the case should be tried over again on a fresh charge. The learned Judges of the High Court constituting the Division Bench which heard the appeal have written separate but concurring judgments, but they did not notice any argument having been advanced before them on the question of the illegality or irregularity in the charge. That also would show that the appellant did not make it a grievance at the time of the argument of the appeal, though a ground had been taken in the memorandum of appeal that the charge as framed was vague and defective and as such bad\" in law. In our opinion, this is not a case in which it can be said that the omission in the charge has materially affected the trial of the case or prejudiced the appellant in his defence or has occasioned a failure of justice.\n\nAs all the grounds raised in support of the appeal fail, it is accordingly dismissed.\n\nJaswantrai Manila/ Akhaney v.\n\nThe State of Bombay\n\nSi11ha J.", "total_entities": 142, "entities": [{"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 117, "end_char": 126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "JASWANTRAI MANILAL AKHANEY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 833, "end_char": 859, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Jaswantrai Jlanilal Akhqney", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 864, "end_char": 883, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 887, "end_char": 898, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 900, "end_char": 913, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B. JAGANNADHADAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 918, "end_char": 933, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1427, "end_char": 1444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 409, 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1466, "end_char": 1477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1478, "end_char": 1497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 179", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1512, "end_char": 1518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Contract Act", "statute": "Indian Contract Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1519, "end_char": 1539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s.179", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1555, "end_char": 1560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Companies Act", "statute": "Indian Companies Act"}}, {"text": "ss. 221, 222, 223", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1605, "end_char": 1622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Companies Act", "statute": "Indian Companies Act"}}, {"text": "Kartar Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2153, "end_char": 2165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant pledged the securities with a third party to get a loan for the bank's use and on its failure 63\n\nKartar Singh\n\nand others v.\n\nThe State of Punjab\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nMay4\n\nJaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v.\n\nThe State of Bombay\n\nto repay the same on demand, the creditors sold the securities fo'r realising their dues."}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2186, "end_char": 2201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant pledged the securities with a third party to get a loan for the bank's use and on its failure 63\n\nKartar Singh\n\nand others v.\n\nThe State of Punjab\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nMay4\n\nJaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v.\n\nThe State of Bombay\n\nto repay the same on demand, the creditors sold the securities fo'r realising their dues."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2203, "end_char": 2211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant pledged the securities with a third party to get a loan for the bank's use and on its failure 63\n\nKartar Singh\n\nand others v.\n\nThe State of Punjab\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nMay4\n\nJaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v.\n\nThe State of Bombay\n\nto repay the same on demand, the creditors sold the securities fo'r realising their dues."}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2630, "end_char": 2636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2644, "end_char": 2661, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 179", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2910, "end_char": 2916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4146, "end_char": 4151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4159, "end_char": 4176, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 179", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4379, "end_char": 4385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4393, "end_char": 4406, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "[1945] F.C.R. 93", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4896, "end_char": 4912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 221 and 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5026, "end_char": 5044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5052, "end_char": 5078, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 223", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5298, "end_char": 5304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "H.J. Umrigar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5688, "end_char": 5700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H.J. Umrigar and R. A. Govind for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. A. Govind", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5705, "end_char": 5717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H.J. Umrigar and R. A. Govind for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Porus A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5738, "end_char": 5752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Porus A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar for P. G. Gokhale for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5757, "end_char": 5769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Porus A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar for P. G. Gokhale for the respondent."}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5774, "end_char": 5787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Porus A. Mehta and R. H. Dhebar for P. G. Gokhale for the respondent."}}, {"text": "SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5867, "end_char": 5872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSINHA J.-This is an appeal by special leave directed against the concurrent orders and judgments of the courts below convicting the appellant under section 409, Indian Penal Code and sentencing him to rigorous imprisonment for three months and a fine of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Sinha J"}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6015, "end_char": 6026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6028, "end_char": 6045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Presidency Magistrate, 19th Court, Esplanade, Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6292, "end_char": 6344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "case tried by the same Presidency Magistrate, 19th Court, Esplanade, Bombay, he directed the sentence in this case to run concurrently with the sentence in the other case."}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6542, "end_char": 6553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6561, "end_char": 6578, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "State of\n\n&mbay\n\nJaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v.\n\nThe State of Bombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6946, "end_char": 7013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "25,000 in or about February to .May 1949 entrusted to him in his capacity as Managing Director of the Exchange Bank of\n\nJaswantrai Manil•l Akhane y v.\n\nThe State of\n\n&mbay\n\nJaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v.\n\nThe State of Bombay\n\nSinha]."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7284, "end_char": 7290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant at all material times was the Mang ing Director of the Exchange Bank of India and Africa Ltd., with its head office at Bombay, which hereinafter will be referred to as the Exchange Bank."}}, {"text": "Cambay Hindu Merchants Co-operative Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7567, "end_char": 7607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1944 the Cambay Hindu Merchants Co-operative Bank at Cambay, which hereinafter will be referred to as the Co-operative Bank, had opened a current account with the Exchange Bank."}}, {"text": "14th May 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8176, "end_char": 8189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 14th May 1948 the two banks entered into a contract evidenced by three documents to be noticed in detail hereinafter."}}, {"text": "Canara Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8934, "end_char": 8945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the 28th February 1949 when the crucial event happened, namely, the Exchange Bank finding itself in an embarrassed financial position took a loan from the Canara Bank of one lakh of rupees by pledging the securities as also other securities with which we are not concerned in this case."}}, {"text": "24th April 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9074, "end_char": 9089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 24th April 1949 the Exchange Bank paid off the dues of the\n\nCanara Bank by taking a fresh loan of the same amount of one lakh from Messrs Merwanji Dalal & Co. and pledging the same securities as had been pledged to the Canara Bank."}}, {"text": "Merwanji Dalal & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9212, "end_char": 9232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 24th April 1949 the Exchange Bank paid off the dues of the\n\nCanara Bank by taking a fresh loan of the same amount of one lakh from Messrs Merwanji Dalal & Co. and pledging the same securities as had been pledged to the Canara Bank."}}, {"text": "28th April 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9313, "end_char": 9328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 28th April 1949 Messrs Merwanji Dalal & Co. demanded back their money by the forenoon of the day following."}}, {"text": "3rd May 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9619, "end_char": 9631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the Exchange Bank could not pay the amount as demanded, the pledgees aforesaid sold those securities including the securities belonging to the Co-operative Bank, for realising their dues, on the 3rd May 1949."}}, {"text": "1st April 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9885, "end_char": 9899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime, in answer to a letter from the Co-operative Bank to the Exchange Bank asking for a certificate for the securities held by the latter on behalf of the former in the overdraft account, the Exchange Bank issued the certificate dated the 1st April 1949 to the effect that at the close of business on the 31st March 1949 it held Government of India securities of the total value of Rs."}}, {"text": "31st March 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9951, "end_char": 9966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime, in answer to a letter from the Co-operative Bank to the Exchange Bank asking for a certificate for the securities held by the latter on behalf of the former in the overdraft account, the Exchange Bank issued the certificate dated the 1st April 1949 to the effect that at the close of business on the 31st March 1949 it held Government of India securities of the total value of Rs."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9975, "end_char": 9994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime, in answer to a letter from the Co-operative Bank to the Exchange Bank asking for a certificate for the securities held by the latter on behalf of the former in the overdraft account, the Exchange Bank issued the certificate dated the 1st April 1949 to the effect that at the close of business on the 31st March 1949 it held Government of India securities of the total value of Rs."}}, {"text": "29th April 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10213, "end_char": 10228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, on the 29th April 1949 the Co-operative Bank wrote to the Exchange Bank asking the latter to hand over securities of the face value of Rs."}}, {"text": "Central Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10359, "end_char": 10371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "50,000 to the Central Bank."}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10741, "end_char": 10753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Co-operative Bank then wrote to the Reserve Bank for stoppage of the securities of the value of Rs."}}, {"text": "State of\n\nBorn bay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11251, "end_char": 11269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In spite of the best efforts of the appellant as the Managing Director of the Exchange Bank, to stave off the crisis by borrowing money from different sources, the run on the bank became so great that the directors applied for and obtained from the Com-\n\nJ asuantrai Mani/al Akhaney\n\nThe State of\n\nBorn bay\n\nSinha J.\n\nJaswantrai Manilal Akhaney\n\nThe State of Bombay\n\nSinha J,\n\npany Judge of the Bombay High Court a moratorium of 15 days.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nHon1bay\n\nSinha J."}}, {"text": "Sinha J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11271, "end_char": 11278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In spite of the best efforts of the appellant as the Managing Director of the Exchange Bank, to stave off the crisis by borrowing money from different sources, the run on the bank became so great that the directors applied for and obtained from the Com-\n\nJ asuantrai Mani/al Akhaney\n\nThe State of\n\nBorn bay\n\nSinha J.\n\nJaswantrai Manilal Akhaney\n\nThe State of Bombay\n\nSinha J,\n\npany Judge of the Bombay High Court a moratorium of 15 days.", "canonical_name": "Sinha J"}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11313, "end_char": 11328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In spite of the best efforts of the appellant as the Managing Director of the Exchange Bank, to stave off the crisis by borrowing money from different sources, the run on the bank became so great that the directors applied for and obtained from the Com-\n\nJ asuantrai Mani/al Akhaney\n\nThe State of\n\nBorn bay\n\nSinha J.\n\nJaswantrai Manilal Akhaney\n\nThe State of Bombay\n\nSinha J,\n\npany Judge of the Bombay High Court a moratorium of 15 days."}}, {"text": "M. N. Raijee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11632, "end_char": 11644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 25th June 1949 one M. N. Raijee as agent of the Official Liquidator lodged information with the police charging the appellant with breach of trust in respect of a number of securities including the securities belonging to the Co-operative Bank.", "canonical_name": "M. N. Raijee"}}, {"text": "31st October 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11866, "end_char": 11883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 31st October 1949 a charge-sheet was submitted by the police under section 409, Indian Penal Code against the appellant in respect of the securities of the face value of Rs."}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11933, "end_char": 11944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11946, "end_char": 11963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "4th April 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12089, "end_char": 12103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 4th April 1952 the charge as quoted above was framed against the appellant."}}, {"text": "Merwanji Bomanji Dalal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12632, "end_char": 12654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second witness for the prosecution was a partner in the firm of Messrs Merwanji Bomanji Dalal during the material time."}}, {"text": "2nd May 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13350, "end_char": 13362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The third witness for the prosecution was the Chief Accountant of the Exchange Bank who functioned as such till the 2nd May 1949 when the Bank closed down.·"}}, {"text": "Ganpati Venkatrao Kini", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15006, "end_char": 15028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The most important witness examined on behalf of the prosecution is P.W. 4, Ganpati Venkatrao Kini."}}, {"text": "Jaswantrai Jlanilal Akhqney", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15678, "end_char": 15705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also corroborates the previous witness and states that\n\n.]asu'antrai Manila/ Akhaney v.\n\nThe State of Bombay\n\nSinha J.\n\nJaswantrai Jlanilal Akhqney\n\nTlic State of\n\nBo1nbay\n\nSinliaJ.\n\nthere was a crisis in the bank from about the middle of February 1949 and that there was a heavy rush on the bank from that time till it closed down.", "canonical_name": "Jaswantrai Jlanilal Akhqney"}}, {"text": "Cambay Co-operative Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16462, "end_char": 16486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He makes the following very significant statement:-\n\n\"I had handed over the two securities belonging to the Cambay Co-operative Bank to the accused for being handed over to the Canara Bank against the loan."}}, {"text": "Union Life Assurance Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17477, "end_char": 17506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,000 from the Union Life Assurance Co. Ltd., as its Managing Director."}}, {"text": "L. A.\n\nStronach Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17745, "end_char": 17765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was also connected with Messrs L. A.\n\nStronach Ltd., Advertising Agents, which had been 1956 given overdraft facilities by the Exchange Bank. ."}}, {"text": "Akhaney & Sons Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18084, "end_char": 18103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "e v. appellant and his wife were the principal sharehold- The state of ers in Akhaney & Sons Ltd., who were the Secretaries Bombay and Treasurers of the Indian Overseas Airlines."}}, {"text": "Indian Overseas Airlines", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18159, "end_char": 18183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "e v. appellant and his wife were the principal sharehold- The state of ers in Akhaney & Sons Ltd., who were the Secretaries Bombay and Treasurers of the Indian Overseas Airlines."}}, {"text": "Indian Overseas Airlines Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18404, "end_char": 18433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,500 per month from the Indian Overseas Airlines Ltd. It would thus appear that the appellant along with his wife in one way or another was getting about Rs."}}, {"text": "3rd October 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19566, "end_char": 19582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant's .defence is disclosed in a long written statement running into twenty paragraphs and seven closely typed pages submitted on the 3rd October 1952."}}, {"text": "M. N. Raiji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19855, "end_char": 19866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shortly stated, it is to the effect that the charge framed against him is bad in law and extremely vague; that the vagueness of the charge had \"considerably handicapped\" hie defence, that the prosecution had not been fair in that it had not examined the first informant, M. N. Raiji, that if he had been examined by the prosecution, the appellant would have shown from the records in his possession\n\nSinha J.\n\nJ aswantrai Manilal Akhane; y\n\nThe State of Bombay\n\nSinha/.\n\nthat the Co-operative Bank had not suffered any loss and that the Bank in the hands of the Liquidator had more than sufficient funds to pay the dues of the former; that the prosecution had not been launched with the sanction of the Company Judge who was in seisin of the liquidation proceedings ih respect of the Exchange Bank and that.therefore the provisions of sections 179 and 237 of the Indian Companies Act had not been complied with; that the securities in question had not been entrusted to the appellant but to the Exchane Bank, if at all there was any entrustment, and that as a matter of fact and law, the Exchange Bank had not been entrusted with the securities, that the Exchange Bank \"could legally deal with the securities in any manner it liked\", as provided in the documents, Exs.", "canonical_name": "M. N. Raijee"}}, {"text": "aswantrai Manilal Akhane", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19996, "end_char": 20020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shortly stated, it is to the effect that the charge framed against him is bad in law and extremely vague; that the vagueness of the charge had \"considerably handicapped\" hie defence, that the prosecution had not been fair in that it had not examined the first informant, M. N. Raiji, that if he had been examined by the prosecution, the appellant would have shown from the records in his possession\n\nSinha J.\n\nJ aswantrai Manilal Akhane; y\n\nThe State of Bombay\n\nSinha/.\n\nthat the Co-operative Bank had not suffered any loss and that the Bank in the hands of the Liquidator had more than sufficient funds to pay the dues of the former; that the prosecution had not been launched with the sanction of the Company Judge who was in seisin of the liquidation proceedings ih respect of the Exchange Bank and that.therefore the provisions of sections 179 and 237 of the Indian Companies Act had not been complied with; that the securities in question had not been entrusted to the appellant but to the Exchane Bank, if at all there was any entrustment, and that as a matter of fact and law, the Exchange Bank had not been entrusted with the securities, that the Exchange Bank \"could legally deal with the securities in any manner it liked\", as provided in the documents, Exs.", "canonical_name": "Jaswantrai Jlanilal Akhqney"}}, {"text": "sections 179 and 237", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20419, "end_char": 20439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20454, "end_char": 20467, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Exchane Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20579, "end_char": 20591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shortly stated, it is to the effect that the charge framed against him is bad in law and extremely vague; that the vagueness of the charge had \"considerably handicapped\" hie defence, that the prosecution had not been fair in that it had not examined the first informant, M. N. Raiji, that if he had been examined by the prosecution, the appellant would have shown from the records in his possession\n\nSinha J.\n\nJ aswantrai Manilal Akhane; y\n\nThe State of Bombay\n\nSinha/.\n\nthat the Co-operative Bank had not suffered any loss and that the Bank in the hands of the Liquidator had more than sufficient funds to pay the dues of the former; that the prosecution had not been launched with the sanction of the Company Judge who was in seisin of the liquidation proceedings ih respect of the Exchange Bank and that.therefore the provisions of sections 179 and 237 of the Indian Companies Act had not been complied with; that the securities in question had not been entrusted to the appellant but to the Exchane Bank, if at all there was any entrustment, and that as a matter of fact and law, the Exchange Bank had not been entrusted with the securities, that the Exchange Bank \"could legally deal with the securities in any manner it liked\", as provided in the documents, Exs."}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21094, "end_char": 21105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21107, "end_char": 21124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Milburn", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 21212, "end_char": 21219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Grievance was also sought to be made of the fact that Inspector Milburn who had investigated the case had not been called as prosecution witness, with the result that the appellant had been deprived of the right of challenging the prosecution evidence with reference to the police diary."}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21682, "end_char": 21693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21695, "end_char": 21712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22003, "end_char": 22014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22016, "end_char": 22039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 179", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22723, "end_char": 22734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22749, "end_char": 22762, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22854, "end_char": 22867, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 405", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23046, "end_char": 23057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23059, "end_char": 23076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23956, "end_char": 23973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal to the Bombay High Court, a Division Bench of that court dismissed the appeal substantially agreeing with the findings of the trial court."}}, {"text": "28th February 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25994, "end_char": 26012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of the appeal the learned counsel for the appellant has raised a number of questions of law and at the forefront of his argument contended that both in law and on a proper construction of the contract between the two banks the appellant was fully entitled to pledge the securities as long as the overdraft agreement subsisted, irrespective of whether or not there was an actual overdraft by the Co-operative Bank on the date of the pledge, that is to say, on the 28th February 1949."}}, {"text": "State of\n\n&mbay\n\nSinha}", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28837, "end_char": 28860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was further stipulated that in\n\n19.56\n\nJaswantrai Mani/al Akhaney v.\n\nThe State of\n\nBombay\n\nSinha J.\n\nJaswantrai ManUal Akhaney\n\nThe State of\n\n&mbay\n\nSinha}.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nHon1bay\n\nSinha J."}}, {"text": "section 179", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30610, "end_char": 30621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30629, "end_char": 30648, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 179", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31160, "end_char": 31171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of\n\nHon1bay\n\nSinha J.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33242, "end_char": 33269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By the very fact of the delivery of the securities to the bailee the latter became a trustee in terms of the contract, not for all purposes, but only for the limited purpose indicated by the agreement\n\nJaswantrai Manila/ Akhat1ey\n\nTlte State of Bombay\n\nSinha J.\n\nJasu:antrai Manilal Akhancy\n\nThe State of\n\nHon1bay\n\nSinha J.\n\nbetween the parties.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nHon1bay\n\nSinha J."}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35330, "end_char": 35341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35343, "end_char": 35360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35573, "end_char": 35584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35586, "end_char": 35603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 405", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36047, "end_char": 36058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38171, "end_char": 38182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38184, "end_char": 38201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39481, "end_char": 39492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39494, "end_char": 39511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40977, "end_char": 40987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41857, "end_char": 41867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41937, "end_char": 41947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of\n\nBombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 41995, "end_char": 42011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant cannot avail himself of the exception of section 79 simply by\n\nJasu1antrai Mani/al Akhaney v.\n\nThe State of\n\nBombay\n\nSinha J.\n\nJ asu•antrai Manilal Akhaney\n\nThe State of\n\nBot11bay\n\nSinha}.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nHon1bay\n\nSinha J."}}, {"text": "State of\n\nBot11bay\n\nSinha}", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 42057, "end_char": 42083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant cannot avail himself of the exception of section 79 simply by\n\nJasu1antrai Mani/al Akhaney v.\n\nThe State of\n\nBombay\n\nSinha J.\n\nJ asu•antrai Manilal Akhaney\n\nThe State of\n\nBot11bay\n\nSinha}.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nHon1bay\n\nSinha J."}}, {"text": "section 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42581, "end_char": 42591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42593, "end_char": 42610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 179", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42917, "end_char": 42928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42943, "end_char": 42956, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 179", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42982, "end_char": 42993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43795, "end_char": 43821, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "aswan rai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44334, "end_char": 44343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "aswan rai interested in prosecutmg the case."}}, {"text": "Mani/al Akhaney", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 44396, "end_char": 44411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecut10n Mani/al Akhaney was started on a charge-sheet submitted by the police, v. though the first information report had been lodged The State of by an official under the official liquidator."}}, {"text": "clause 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44926, "end_char": 44935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45104, "end_char": 45113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 179", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45312, "end_char": 45323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45331, "end_char": 45344, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sections 196 and 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45592, "end_char": 45612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45614, "end_char": 45637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45657, "end_char": 45659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 179", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45729, "end_char": 45740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45748, "end_char": 45761, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 179", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46354, "end_char": 46365, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "[1945] F.C.R. 93", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 46377, "end_char": 46393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": ".Taswantrai Manilal Akhaney", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 46396, "end_char": 46423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Taswantrai Manilal Akhaney\n\nThe State of\n\nBonibay\n\nSinha}.", "canonical_name": "Jaswantrai Jlanilal Akhqney"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nBonibay\n\nSinha", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 46429, "end_char": 46453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Taswantrai Manilal Akhaney\n\nThe State of\n\nBonibay\n\nSinha}.", "canonical_name": "State of\n\nHon1bay\n\nSinha J."}}, {"text": "section 221", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47441, "end_char": 47452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47454, "end_char": 47477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47579, "end_char": 47590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47592, "end_char": 47609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 222(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47818, "end_char": 47832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48192, "end_char": 48203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 223", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48462, "end_char": 48473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "sections 221 and 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48609, "end_char": 48629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 225", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49040, "end_char": 49051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50715, "end_char": 50717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jaswantrai Manila/ Akhaney v.\n\nThe State of Bombay\n\nSi11ha J."}}, {"text": "Si11", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50746, "end_char": 50750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jaswantrai Manila/ Akhaney v.\n\nThe State of Bombay\n\nSi11ha J."}}]} {"document_id": "1956_1_506_532_EN", "year": 1956, "text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nH4RI KHEMU GAWALI v.\n\n(1956]\n\nTHE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF POLICE,\n\nBOMBAY AND ANOTHER.\n\n[S. R. DAS C.J., JAGANNADHADAS, VENKATARAMA -~ AYYAR, B. P. SINHA and JAFER IMAM JJ.]\n\nBombay Police Act, 1961 (Bombay Act XXII of 1961), s. 67- Constitutional validity-Restrictions on individual right to reside in and move freely in any part of India-Reasonableness-Order of externment-Grounds of the order-Validity-Sufficiency of evi dence on which the order i• made-Whether can be examined by th• Court-Constitution of India, Art. 19(1)( d), (e) and ( 6).\n\nSection 57 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 provides that if a person has been convicted of certain offences detailed therein, \"the Commissioner, the District Magistrate or the SubPivisional Magistrate specially empowered by the State Government in this be half, if he has re.ason to believe that such person is likely again to engage himself in the commission of an offence similar to that for which he was convicted, may direct such person to remove himself outside the area within the local limits of his jurisdiction, by such route and within such time as the said officer may prescribe and not to enter or return to the area from which he was directed to remove himself\".\n\nUnder tb.e provis.ions of the said section an order. of externment was passed against the petitioner who challenged the order on the grounds thats. 57 contravened clauses (d) and (e) of Article 19(1) of the Constitution, that the provisions of the said section imposed un rea.sona.ble restrictions on the petitiOner's fundamental rights of free movement and residence and that the order pa88ed against him was illej; al inasmuch as it was based on vague allegations and inad mlssible material.\n\nHeld, per S. R. DAS C.J., VENKATABAMA AYYAR, B. P. SINHA .and JAFEB IMAM JJ. (JAGANNADHADAS J. dissenting)\n\n(1) Section 57 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 is not uncon stitutional, because, it is an instance of the State ta.king preventive measures in the interests of the public and for safeguarding individual rights, by preventing a person who has been proved to be a criminal from acting in a way which me.y be a repetition of his criminal propensities, and the restrictions that it imposes on the. individual's right to reside iil and move freely in any part of India are reasonable within the meaning of clause (5) of Art. 19 of the Constitution.\n\n(2) The restrictions cannot be said to be unreasonable on the ground that the person dealt with under s. 57 of the Act may be\n\n...\n\ndirected to remove himself altogether outside the limits of the State of Bombay as the Act extends to the whole of the State, because, unless the. person makes himself so obnoxious as to render his presence in every part of the State a menace to public peace and safety, every District authority would not think of acting in the same way in respect of the same person.\n\n(3) It cannot be laid down as a universal rule that unless there is a provision for an Advisory Board which could scnrtinise the material on which the officers or authority contemplated by s. 57 had taken action against a person, such a legislation would be unconstitutional.\n\n(4) The provisions in ss. 55, 56, 57 and 59 of the Act are not invalid on the ground that only the general nature of the material allegations against the person externed are required to be disclosed and that it would be difficult for him to get the mat ter judicially examined. The provisions are intended to be used in special cases requiring special treatment, that is, cases which cannot be dealt with under the preventive sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\n(5) The legality of the order of externment cannot be im pugned on the ground that there was not sufficient evidence to bring the charge home to the petitioner, because these are all matters which cannot be examined by this Court in an objective way, when the legislature ha.s provided for the subjective sa.tis faction of the authorities or officers who have been entrusted with the duty of enforcing the special provisions of the Act.\n\nuty Commissione,. .of\n\nPolice, Bombay\n\nand another\n\nSinha}.\n\nbond as directed above, I shall proceed with the inquiry in your absence. Take note: Allegations:- ,\n\n1. That you have been convicted of offences as per particulars mentioned below:~ -···--------·------------ Serial Court & Date of No, Dietriot Conviction\n\nSection of law Sentence\n\nPolice Station &\n\ncase No.\n\nH. C. 14-10-1938 304/109 6 yrs. Nagpada PS Bombay\n\nI. P. C. R.I.\n\nC.R. No. 324/109 2 yrs. 127 /38 I, P. C. R.I. (Concurrently).\n\n2. That you were arrested on 29-3-1948 in connection with Nagpada P.S.C.R. No. 273 of 1948 u/s 143, 147, 148, 149, 353, I.P.C. wherein you along with one Ramchandra lshwarbhai and others committed rioting and criminal assault on a public servant, viz. a police constable No. 4459/D to deter him from the execution of his lawful duties but you were discharged in the said case due to lack of sufficient evidence.\n\n3. That you were again arrested on 2-5-1948 in connection with Nagpada P.S.C.R. No. 353 u/s 143, 144, 146, 147, 148, 149, 324, I.P.C. wherein you along with one Rajaram Khemu Gawli and 7 others committed rioting armed with deadly weapons, viz., lathis, soda water bottles etc. and caused hurt to one Gopal Khemu Gaw Ii but you were discharged in the said case for want of sufficient evidence.\n\n4. That you were again arrested on 3-6-1949 in connection with Nagpada P.S.C.R. No. 336 of 1949 u/s 143, 147, 149, 225, 225-B, 332, I.P.O. wherein you along with one Shri Vithal Baloo and others committed rioting, assaulted a public servant, viz. a police officer .(Shri S. K. Kothare) to deter him from the lawful discharge of his duties and made 3 persons in the lawful custody of the police to escape, but were discharged in the said case for want of sufficient evidence.\n\n5. That now you have been arrested on 9-10-1954 at about 12-50 a.m. in the company of 7 others, viZ.\n\n(1) Amir Masud (2) Francis Sherao@ China (3) Antoo Narayan (4) Abdul Wahab Abdul Gafoor (5) Laxman Rama (6) Narayan Tukaramand (7) Rajaram Vishnoo out of whom persons mentioned at Nos. 1 and 6 are previous convicts and that at the time of arrest you and persons mentioned at Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 were armed with deadly weapons to wit, clasp knives, iron bar and a lathi, and thus you were reasonably suspected to be out to commit an offence either against property or person; And that you are likely again to engage yourself in the commission of a similar offence falling either under Chapter XVI or XVII of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nSd. N. P. Paranjapye Superintendent of Police, Crime Branch (1), C.I.D.\n\nL.T.I. of Hari@ Dada Khemu Gawli. \" The petitioner appeared before the Superintendent on the 8th November 1954 with his counsel and filed a long petition containing allegations running into 16 paragraphs showing cause against the order of externment proposed to be passed against him. That petition is Ex. B. The petitioner accepted the correctness of the allegation contained in the first paragraph of Ex. A set out above, but denied the truth of the other allegations made therein 1>gainst him which he characterised as based on \"old prejudice and suspicion\". As regards his conviction referred to in the first paragraph aforesaid, he stated:-\n\n\"! had unfortunately a conviction in 1938 when I was a mere youth. I have lived a clean and honourable life ever since.\" Then he goes on to make reference to the other cases charged against him and claimed that he had been \"discharged in those cases for want of sufficient evidence\"\n\nThe first respondent aforesaid ultimately passed the order of externment which is Exhibit C .to the petition, on the 8th November 1954. After reciting the previous conviction which was for offences under Chapter XVI, Indian Penal Code and that the petitioner was likely again to engage in the commission\n\nHart Khemt1\n\nGau•a/i\n\nTh~ Deputy Commissioner. of Police, Bombay and another\n\nSinha J.\n\nHari Khemu\n\nGawali\n\nThe Dtdy Commissioner of Police, Bombay\n\na\"d another\n\nfundamental right under the Constitution.\n\nJagannadhadasJ.\n\nNow there can be no doubt that the ordinary provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code enabling the executive to take preventive measures are often enough felt inadequate, particularly in large cities and towns wherein there are loose congregations of population. In a general way therefore it may be said that to arm the executive officers with powers for preventive action against commission of offences is not in itself unreasonable. Section 57 of the Act appears in Chapter V of the Act headed \"Special measures for maintenance of public order and safety of State\" and is under the sub-head II \"Dispersal of gangs and removal of persons convicted of certain offences\". The substantive provisions under head II are sections 55, 56 and 57.\n\nSection 55 relates to control and dispersal of gangs. Section 56 relates to removal of persons about to commit offences and section 57 relates to removal of persons previously convicted of certain offences. Sections 56 and 57 of the Act run as follows:\n\n\"56. Whenever it shall appear in Greater Bombay and other areas for which a Commissioner has been appointed under section 7 to the Commissioner and in other area or areas to which the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, extend the provisions of this section, to the District Magistrate, or the Sub-Divisional Magistrate specially empowered by the State Government in that behalf (a) that the movements of acts of any person are causing or calculated to cause alarm, danger or harm to person or property, or (b) that there are reasonable grounds for believing that such person is engaged or is about to be engaged in the commission of an offence involv-\n\n1956 ing force or violence or an offence punishable under\n\nHari Khemu Chapter XII, XVI or XVII of the Indian Penal Code, Gawali or in the abetment of any such offence, and when in v. the opinion of such officer witnesses are not willing The D•PutY to come forward to give evidence in public against Commission.- 01 such person by reason of apprehension on their part\n\nPoli;•• 8';,;'bay as regards the safety of their person or property, or\n\nan er\n\n(c) that an outbreak of epidemic disease is likely to JagannadhadasJ. result from the continued residence of an immigrant, the said officer may, by an order in writing duly served on him or by beat of drum or otherwise as he thinks t fit, direct such person or immigrant so to conduct himself as shall seem necessary in order to prevent violence and alarm or the outbreak or spread of such disease or to remove himself outside the area within the local limits of his jurisdiction by such route and within such time as the said officer may prescribe and not to enter or return to the said area from which he was directed to remove himself.\n\n57. If a person has been convicted-\n\n(a) of an offence under Chapter XII, XVI or XVII of the Indian Penal Code, or\n\n(b) twice of an offence under section 9 of the Bombay Beggars Act, 1945, or under the Bombay Prevention of Prostitution Act, 1923, or\n\n(c) thrice of an offence within a period of three years under section 4 or 12-A of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887, or under the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949, the Commissioner, the District Magistrate or the Sub-Divisional Magistrate specially empowered by the State Government in this behalf, if he has reason to believe that such person is likely again to engage himself in the commission of an offence similar to that for which he was convicted, may direct such person to remove himself outside the area within the local limits of his jurisdiction, by such route and within such time as the said officer may prescribe and not to enter or return to the area from which he was directed to remove himself.\n\nExplanation:-For the purpose of this section \"an\n\n1956 offence similar to that for which a person was convicted\" shall mean- Hari [{hernu\n\n(i) in the case of a person convicted of an Gawali offence mentioned in clause (a), an offence falling v. under any of the Chapters of the Indian Penal Code The Dc}uty mentioned in that clause, and Commi; sio1tc•\n\n(ii) in the case of a person convicted of an Police, 30111-'' ·- and another offence mentioned in clauses (b) and (c), an offence falling under the provisions of the Acts mentioned JagannadhadasJ. respectively in the said clauses\".\n\nSection 58 of the Act provides that a direction made under sections 56 and 57 not to enter a particular area shall be for such period as may be specified thereunder and shall in no case exceed a period of two years from the date on which it is made. This Court\n\nhas, in Gurbachan Singh v. The. State of Bombay(1) pronounced on the constitutional validity of section 27(1) of the City of Bombay Police Act of 1902\n\n(Bombay Act IV of 1902) which, word for word, is almost the same as section 56 of the Act above quoted omitting (c) thereof. As I understand that judgment, the view of the Court as to the reasonableness of that provision is based on the fact that under the said section it is essential for the exercise of the power, that in the opinion of the officer concerned, witnesses are not willing to come forward to give evidence in public against the person concerned by reason of apprehension on their part as regards the safety of their own person or property. This is clear from the following passage at page 743 of the report:\n\n\"The law is certainly an extraordinary one and has been made only to meet those exceptional cases where no witnesses for fear of violence to their person or property are willing to depose publicly against certain bad characters whose presence in certain areas constitutes a menace to the safety of the public residing therein\".\n\nThe provisions of section 57 of the Act are totally different. This section can be invoked without the requirement of non-availability of witnesses or of any opinion in that behalf being arrived at by the officer concerned. _\n\n(1) (195~] S.C.R. 737.\n\nHari Khem\"\n\nGawali v.\n\nThe Dej>\"ty Co111m.issionct' of Pol ici:, Boinbay\n\nanJ another\n\nJagannadhadas J,\n\nAll that is sufficient for the use of this section is that the person concerned should have been previously convicted of certain specified offences and that the officer concerned has reason to believe that such person is likely again to engage himself in the commission of a similar offence.\n\nThe powers under this section can, therefore, be invoked in every case where there is likelihood of repetition of offence by a person who has been previously convicted of a similar offence if the offence is of the specified categories,, even though witnesses may be willing to come forward.\n\nI am not prepared to accept the idea that in such a situation it would be right or reasonable to clothe executive officers with the power to take preventive action restraining the liberty of the citizen instead of taking the chance of the offence being committed and leaving the deprivation of his liberty to the ordinary channels of criminal prosecution and punishment. It is true that in some matters anticipatory prevention is better than ex post/ado punishment. ButinaState where personal liberty is a guaranteed fundamental right, the range of such preventive action must be limited to a narrow compass. What may be called the police power of the State in this behalf must be limited by the consideration that the offence likely to be committed is of a serious nature, that the likelihood of its commission is very probable, if not imminent, and that the perpetrator of the crime, if left to commit it, may go unpunished under the normal machinery on account of witnesses not being willing to eome forward. Section 151 of the Criminal Procedure Code authorises a police officer to arrest any person when he knows of his design to commit any cognizable offence and to send him to the nearest Magistrate for such action which he considers fit or as may be feasibh under sections 107 to IIO of the Criminal Procedure Code. Section 57 of the Act constitutes a very wide departure from such a provision and there must be clear justification for so serious an encroachment on personal liberty as is contemplated therein.\n\nA provision of the kind might not only be justified but may be called for, if confined to serious offencesserious either because of their nature or of the attend- 1956 ant circumstances-and if witnesses are likely to be Hari K he1nu terrorised. I am unable to see why a person who may Gawazi have previously committed any offence of a minor v. character and in ordinary circumstances, under The Deputy Chapters XII, XVI or XVII of the Indian Penal Code, Commissioner of should not be left alone to the ordinary channels of Police, Bombay and anoth,;1 prosecution. It appears to me that the proper balance between the fundamental right and social control is Jaga,., iadhadasJ. not achieved by vesting the power in executive officers in such wide terms as in section 57 of the Act. Such a provision would lead to serious encroachment on the personal liberty of a citizen.\n\nWhile, of course, abuse of power is not to be assumed to test its reasonableness, neither is a power given in wide terms and prima facie unreasonable, to be considered reasonable on an assumption of its proper use.\n\nI am also unable to see that the fact of previous commission of any such offence without any limhation as to the period of time that may have elapsed, ' or the circumstances with reference to which such an offence may have been committed, is any relevant consideration to justify restriction on personal liberty by way of preventive action. I am not aware that there is any accepted theory of criminology which justifies the view that a person who has committed an offence has any inherent tendency to repeat a similar offence-apart from environment, heredity or the like. In a trial for the commission of an offence prior conviction is ruled out as inadmissible. On an evaluation of the tendency to repeat a crime, I do not see how it is permissible material except in cases where repeated previous commission of offences indicates a habit. It has been said that the power under section 57 of the Act will be exercised only when the officer coqcerned has before him not merely the fact of previous conviction but other material on the basis of which he has reason to believe that the person concerned is likely to engage himself in the commission of the offence. But this ultimately is a question of subjective satisfaction. It is not open to review by a Court. It would be difficult to postulate how far\n\nHariKhemu\n\nGawali\n\nThe Deputy Cotnmissioncr of\n\nPolice, Bombay and anothel'\n\nJ agannadhadtts J.\n\nsuch a factor, as previous conviction, might have prejudiced a fair consideration of the other material before the officer.\n\nTo my mind the law which permits subjective satisfaction to prevail on such material must be considered unreasonable. In my view, therefore, though the procedural portion of the law as provided in sections 59 and 61 of the Act may not be open to serious criticism, the substantive portion of the law relating to content of the power as provided under section 57 of the Act cannot be held to be in the nature of reasonable restriction of the fundamental right, for three reasons.\n\nI. Clause (a) of section 57 of the Act not being confined to offences serious in their nature or with reference to the attendant circumstances within the Chapters specified therein, prevention of the repe-. tition thereof cannot be considered a reasonable restriction. It is in excess of what may be considered justifiable. 2.\n\nThe previous commission of an offence of the category specified, without any reference to the time, environment and other factors has no rational relation to the criterion of \"reasonableness in the interest of public\".\n\nThe exercise of the power not being limited by the consideration of non-availability of witnesses is also not rationally related to the criterion of \"reasonableness in the interest of the public\".\n\nFor all the above reasons I consider that section 57 of the Act is constitutionally invalid.\n\nORDER.\n\nBY THE CoURT.-In accordance with the Judgment of the majority this Petition is dismissed.\n\nPetition dismissed.", "total_entities": 226, "entities": [{"text": "H4RI KHEMU GAWALI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 40, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Hari l{hemu\n\nGawali", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF POLICE,\n\nBOMBAY AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 53, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, BOMBAY AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 125, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. R. DAS C.J.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 127, "end_char": 140, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JagannadhadasJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 164, "end_char": 175, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B. P. SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAFER IMAM JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 180, "end_char": 194, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JAFER IMAM JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 204, "end_char": 214, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 67", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 248, "end_char": 253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act XXII of 1961", "statute": "Bombay Act XXII of 1961"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 516, "end_char": 537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)( d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 539, "end_char": 553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 570, "end_char": 580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bombay Police Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 588, "end_char": 611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1432, "end_char": 1445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Police Act, 1951", "statute": "the Bombay Police Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "VENKATABAMA AYYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1767, "end_char": 1784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held, per S. R. DAS C.J., VENKATABAMA AYYAR, B. P. SINHA .and JAFEB IMAM JJ. (", "canonical_name": "VENKATABAMA AYYAR"}}, {"text": "JAFEB IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1803, "end_char": 1813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held, per S. R. DAS C.J., VENKATABAMA AYYAR, B. P. SINHA .and JAFEB IMAM JJ. (", "canonical_name": "JAFER IMAM JJ."}}, {"text": "Section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1853, "end_char": 1863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Police Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1871, "end_char": 1894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2307, "end_char": 2312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "individual's right to reside iil and move freely in any part of India are reasonable within the meaning of clause (5) of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2364, "end_char": 2371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Police Act, 1951", "statute": "the Bombay Police Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "s. 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2496, "end_char": 2501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Police Act, 1951", "statute": "the Bombay Police Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2599, "end_char": 2605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) The restrictions cannot be said to be unreasonable on the ground that the person dealt with under s. 57 of the Act may be\n\n...\n\ndirected to remove himself altogether outside the limits of the State of Bombay as the Act extends to the whole of the State, because, unless the."}}, {"text": "s. 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3085, "end_char": 3090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 55, 56, 57 and 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3195, "end_char": 3216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3615, "end_char": 3641, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4258, "end_char": 4263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Har'iKhemu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5125, "end_char": 5135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "66\n\nHar'iKhemu\n\nGawali\n\nThe Deputy Commissio11er of Police, Bombay and another\n\nHari Khemu\n\nGawali v.\n\nThe Deputy Commissicnur o/ Police, &mbay\n\nand another\n\nPetition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights."}}, {"text": "Deputy Commissio11er of Police, Bombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5149, "end_char": 5187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "66\n\nHar'iKhemu\n\nGawali\n\nThe Deputy Commissio11er of Police, Bombay and another\n\nHari Khemu\n\nGawali v.\n\nThe Deputy Commissicnur o/ Police, &mbay\n\nand another\n\nPetition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.", "canonical_name": "Deputy Commissio11er of Police, Bombay"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5294, "end_char": 5304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5312, "end_char": 5333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Purshottam Trikamdas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5378, "end_char": 5398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Trikamdas, V.R. Upadhya, J.IJ."}}, {"text": "V.R. Upadhya", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5400, "end_char": 5412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Trikamdas, V.R. Upadhya, J.IJ."}}, {"text": "N. Andley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5438, "end_char": 5447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. Andley, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5514, "end_char": 5520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, B. Sen andR. H. Dhebar, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "andR. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5521, "end_char": 5536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, B. Sen andR. H. Dhebar, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "S. R. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5590, "end_char": 5599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of S. R. Das C.J. and Venkatarama Ayyar, B. P. Sinha and Jafer ImamJJ.", "canonical_name": "S. R. DAS C.J."}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5609, "end_char": 5626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of S. R. Das C.J. and Venkatarama Ayyar, B. P. Sinha and Jafer ImamJJ.", "canonical_name": "VENKATABAMA AYYAR"}}, {"text": "B. P. Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5628, "end_char": 5639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of S. R. Das C.J. and Venkatarama Ayyar, B. P. Sinha and Jafer ImamJJ.", "canonical_name": "B. P. SINHA"}}, {"text": "Jafer ImamJJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5644, "end_char": 5656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of S. R. Das C.J. and Venkatarama Ayyar, B. P. Sinha and Jafer ImamJJ.", "canonical_name": "JAFER IMAM JJ."}}, {"text": "SinhaJ. JagannadhadasJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5675, "end_char": 5698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was delivered by SinhaJ. JagannadhadasJ. delivered a separate judgment."}}, {"text": "SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5731, "end_char": 5736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SINHA J.-This petition under article 32 of the Constitution challenges the vires of certain provisions of the Bombay Police Act, XXII of 1951, which hereinaner will be referred to as \"The Act\", with particular reference to section 57 under which the externment order dated the 8th November 1954 was passed against the petitioner by the first respondent, the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Crime Branch (1), C.I.D., Greater Bombay.", "canonical_name": "SINHA"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5760, "end_char": 5770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5848, "end_char": 5858, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5954, "end_char": 5964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "8th November 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6008, "end_char": 6025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SINHA J.-This petition under article 32 of the Constitution challenges the vires of certain provisions of the Bombay Police Act, XXII of 1951, which hereinaner will be referred to as \"The Act\", with particular reference to section 57 under which the externment order dated the 8th November 1954 was passed against the petitioner by the first respondent, the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Crime Branch (1), C.I.D., Greater Bombay."}}, {"text": "State of Bombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6192, "end_char": 6207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second respondent is the State of Bombay."}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6878, "end_char": 6908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Thana District prison", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6937, "end_char": 6958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In December 1953 an order of detention was passed against him under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, and he was detained in the Thana District prison."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6973, "end_char": 6993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He moved the High Court of Bombay under article 226 of the Constitution against the said order of detention."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7000, "end_char": 7011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "24th .\n\nFebruary 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7356, "end_char": 7377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TheJ]ase went\n\non for about two years when he was ultimately discharged by the Presidency Magistrate on the 24th ."}}, {"text": "9th October 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7487, "end_char": 7503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the night of the 9th October 1954 the petitioner was arrested along with his companions a little after midnight by members of the police force designated \"Ghost Squad\", which was a special wing of the\n\nCrime Branch of the C.I.D., on the allegation made by the police that they were seen running away on the sight of a police v&n and that they were chased and arrested and were found in possession of knives and other weapons."}}, {"text": "C.I.D.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7692, "end_char": 7698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the night of the 9th October 1954 the petitioner was arrested along with his companions a little after midnight by members of the police force designated \"Ghost Squad\", which was a special wing of the\n\nCrime Branch of the C.I.D., on the allegation made by the police that they were seen running away on the sight of a police v&n and that they were chased and arrested and were found in possession of knives and other weapons."}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7959, "end_char": 7969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7980, "end_char": 7990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8146, "end_char": 8156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8179, "end_char": 8188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8382, "end_char": 8392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Police\n\nAct, 1951", "statute": "the Bombay Police\n\nAct, 1951"}}, {"text": "Bombay Police Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8400, "end_char": 8423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bombay Act XXII of 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8425, "end_char": 8448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8562, "end_char": 8572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act XXII of 1951", "statute": "Bombay Act XXII of 1951"}}, {"text": "25-10-1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8714, "end_char": 8724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In order to give you opportunity of tendering your explanation regarding the said allegations, I have appointed 11 a.m. on 25-10-1954 to receive your explanation and to hear you and your witnesses, if any, in regard to the said allegations."}}, {"text": "s 143, 147, 148, 149, 353", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9925, "end_char": 9950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9952, "end_char": 9957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ramchandra lshwarbhai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9986, "end_char": 10007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "273 of 1948 u/s 143, 147, 148, 149, 353, I.P.C. wherein you along with one Ramchandra lshwarbhai and others committed rioting and criminal assault on a public servant, viz."}}, {"text": "2-5-1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10280, "end_char": 10288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That you were again arrested on 2-5-1948 in connection with Nagpada P.S.C.R. No."}}, {"text": "s 143, 144, 146, 147, 148, 149, 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10335, "end_char": 10370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10372, "end_char": 10377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Rajaram Khemu Gawli", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10406, "end_char": 10425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "353 u/s 143, 144, 146, 147, 148, 149, 324, I.P.C. wherein you along with one Rajaram Khemu Gawli and 7 others committed rioting armed with deadly weapons, viz.,"}}, {"text": "Gopal Khemu Gaw Ii", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10545, "end_char": 10563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and caused hurt to one Gopal Khemu Gaw Ii but you were discharged in the said case for want of sufficient evidence."}}, {"text": "3-6-1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10674, "end_char": 10682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That you were again arrested on 3-6-1949 in connection with Nagpada P.S.C.R. No."}}, {"text": "s 143, 147, 149, 225, 225", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10737, "end_char": 10762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Vithal Baloo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10810, "end_char": 10822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "336 of 1949 u/s 143, 147, 149, 225, 225-B, 332, I.P.O. wherein you along with one Shri Vithal Baloo and others committed rioting, assaulted a public servant, viz."}}, {"text": "S. K. Kothare", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10910, "end_char": 10923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a police officer .(Shri S. K. Kothare) to deter him from the lawful discharge of his duties and made 3 persons in the lawful custody of the police to escape, but were discharged in the said case for want of sufficient evidence."}}, {"text": "9-10-1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11153, "end_char": 11162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That now you have been arrested on 9-10-1954 at about 12-50 a.m. in the company of 7 others, viZ.\n\n(1) Amir Masud (2) Francis Sherao@ China (3) Antoo Narayan (4) Abdul Wahab Abdul Gafoor (5) Laxman Rama (6) Narayan Tukaramand (7) Rajaram Vishnoo out of whom persons mentioned at Nos."}}, {"text": "Amir Masud", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11221, "end_char": 11231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That now you have been arrested on 9-10-1954 at about 12-50 a.m. in the company of 7 others, viZ.\n\n(1) Amir Masud (2) Francis Sherao@ China (3) Antoo Narayan (4) Abdul Wahab Abdul Gafoor (5) Laxman Rama (6) Narayan Tukaramand (7) Rajaram Vishnoo out of whom persons mentioned at Nos."}}, {"text": "Francis Sherao@", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11236, "end_char": 11251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That now you have been arrested on 9-10-1954 at about 12-50 a.m. in the company of 7 others, viZ.\n\n(1) Amir Masud (2) Francis Sherao@ China (3) Antoo Narayan (4) Abdul Wahab Abdul Gafoor (5) Laxman Rama (6) Narayan Tukaramand (7) Rajaram Vishnoo out of whom persons mentioned at Nos."}}, {"text": "Antoo Narayan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11262, "end_char": 11275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That now you have been arrested on 9-10-1954 at about 12-50 a.m. in the company of 7 others, viZ.\n\n(1) Amir Masud (2) Francis Sherao@ China (3) Antoo Narayan (4) Abdul Wahab Abdul Gafoor (5) Laxman Rama (6) Narayan Tukaramand (7) Rajaram Vishnoo out of whom persons mentioned at Nos."}}, {"text": "Abdul Wahab Abdul Gafoor", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11280, "end_char": 11304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That now you have been arrested on 9-10-1954 at about 12-50 a.m. in the company of 7 others, viZ.\n\n(1) Amir Masud (2) Francis Sherao@ China (3) Antoo Narayan (4) Abdul Wahab Abdul Gafoor (5) Laxman Rama (6) Narayan Tukaramand (7) Rajaram Vishnoo out of whom persons mentioned at Nos."}}, {"text": "Laxman Rama", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11309, "end_char": 11320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That now you have been arrested on 9-10-1954 at about 12-50 a.m. in the company of 7 others, viZ.\n\n(1) Amir Masud (2) Francis Sherao@ China (3) Antoo Narayan (4) Abdul Wahab Abdul Gafoor (5) Laxman Rama (6) Narayan Tukaramand (7) Rajaram Vishnoo out of whom persons mentioned at Nos."}}, {"text": "Narayan Tukaramand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11325, "end_char": 11343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That now you have been arrested on 9-10-1954 at about 12-50 a.m. in the company of 7 others, viZ.\n\n(1) Amir Masud (2) Francis Sherao@ China (3) Antoo Narayan (4) Abdul Wahab Abdul Gafoor (5) Laxman Rama (6) Narayan Tukaramand (7) Rajaram Vishnoo out of whom persons mentioned at Nos."}}, {"text": "Rajaram Vishnoo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11348, "end_char": 11363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That now you have been arrested on 9-10-1954 at about 12-50 a.m. in the company of 7 others, viZ.\n\n(1) Amir Masud (2) Francis Sherao@ China (3) Antoo Narayan (4) Abdul Wahab Abdul Gafoor (5) Laxman Rama (6) Narayan Tukaramand (7) Rajaram Vishnoo out of whom persons mentioned at Nos."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11827, "end_char": 11844, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "N. P. Paranjapye", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11851, "end_char": 11867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. P. Paranjapye Superintendent of Police, Crime Branch (1), C.I.D.\n\nL.T.I. of Hari@ Dada Khemu Gawli. \""}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13068, "end_char": 13085, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sinha J.\n\nHari Khemu\n\nGawali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13234, "end_char": 13262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Police, Bombay and another\n\nSinha J.\n\nHari Khemu\n\nGawali\n\nThe Dtdy Commissioner of Police, Bombay", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 46843, "end_char": 46881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As repeatedly held by this Court, a proper balance must be struck between the fundamental right of the citizen and the social control by the State in order to evolve the permissible restriction of the\n\nHari Khemt4\n\nGawali\n\nThe Def>tdy Commissioner of Police, Bombay\n\na\"d another\n\nfundamental right under the Constitution.", "canonical_name": "Deputy Commissio11er of Police, Bombay"}}, {"text": "JagannadhadasJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 46939, "end_char": 46954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JagannadhadasJ.\n\nNow there can be no doubt that the ordinary provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code enabling the executive to take preventive measures are often enough felt inadequate, particularly in large cities and towns wherein there are loose congregations of population.", "canonical_name": "JagannadhadasJ."}}, {"text": "Now there can be no doubt that the ordinary provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 46956, "end_char": 47041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47392, "end_char": 47402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Now there can be no doubt that the ordinary provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Now there can be no doubt that the ordinary provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "sections 55, 56 and 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47673, "end_char": 47695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Now there can be no doubt that the ordinary provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Now there can be no doubt that the ordinary provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Section 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47698, "end_char": 47708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Now there can be no doubt that the ordinary provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Now there can be no doubt that the ordinary provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47752, "end_char": 47762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Now there can be no doubt that the ordinary provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Now there can be no doubt that the ordinary provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47822, "end_char": 47832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Now there can be no doubt that the ordinary provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Now there can be no doubt that the ordinary provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Sections 56 and 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47905, "end_char": 47923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Now there can be no doubt that the ordinary provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "Now there can be no doubt that the ordinary provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48066, "end_char": 48075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "XVI or XVII of the Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48716, "end_char": 48752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "XVI or XVII of the Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49795, "end_char": 49831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49867, "end_char": 49876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "XVI or XVII of the Indian Penal Code", "statute": "XVI or XVII of the Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Bombay Beggars Act, 1945", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49884, "end_char": 49908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Prevention of Prostitution Act, 1923", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49923, "end_char": 49966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50034, "end_char": 50043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Prevention of Prostitution Act, 1923", "statute": "the Bombay Prevention of Prostitution Act, 1923"}}, {"text": "Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50059, "end_char": 50098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50113, "end_char": 50141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50969, "end_char": 50986, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51277, "end_char": 51287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 56 and 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51336, "end_char": 51354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 27(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51635, "end_char": 51648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51671, "end_char": 51681, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bombay Act IV of 1902", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51692, "end_char": 51713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51759, "end_char": 51769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act IV of 1902", "statute": "Bombay Act IV of 1902"}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52663, "end_char": 52673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Act IV of 1902", "statute": "Bombay Act IV of 1902"}}, {"text": "Jagannadhadas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 52983, "end_char": 52996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hari Khem\"\n\nGawali v.\n\nThe Dej>\"ty Co111m.issionct' of Pol ici:, Boinbay\n\nanJ another\n\nJagannadhadas J,\n\nAll that is sufficient for the use of this section is that the person concerned should have been previously convicted of certain specified offences and that the officer concerned has reason to believe that such person is likely again to engage himself in the commission of a similar offence.", "canonical_name": "JagannadhadasJ."}}, {"text": "Section 151", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54598, "end_char": 54609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 107", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54859, "end_char": 54871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IIO of the Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 54875, "end_char": 54909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54911, "end_char": 54921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IIO of the Criminal Procedure Code", "statute": "IIO of the Criminal Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Hari K he1nu", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 55327, "end_char": 55339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A provision of the kind might not only be justified but may be called for, if confined to serious offencesserious either because of their nature or of the attend- 1956 ant circumstances-and if witnesses are likely to be Hari K he1nu terrorised."}}, {"text": "Gawazi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 55392, "end_char": 55398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I am unable to see why a person who may Gawazi have previously committed any offence of a minor v. character and in ordinary circumstances, under The Deputy Chapters XII, XVI or XVII of the Indian Penal Code, Commissioner of should not be left alone to the ordinary channels of Police, Bombay and anoth,;1 prosecution."}}, {"text": "XVI or XVII of the Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 55523, "end_char": 55559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55864, "end_char": 55874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "XVI or XVII of the Indian Penal Code", "statute": "XVI or XVII of the Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57074, "end_char": 57084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "HariKhemu\n\nGawali", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 57501, "end_char": 57518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would be difficult to postulate how far\n\nHariKhemu\n\nGawali\n\nThe Deputy Cotnmissioncr of\n\nPolice, Bombay and anothel'\n\nJ agannadhadtts J.\n\nsuch a factor, as previous conviction, might have prejudiced a fair consideration of the other material before the officer.", "canonical_name": "Hari l{hemu\n\nGawali"}}, {"text": "J agannadhadtts", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57578, "end_char": 57593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would be difficult to postulate how far\n\nHariKhemu\n\nGawali\n\nThe Deputy Cotnmissioncr of\n\nPolice, Bombay and anothel'\n\nJ agannadhadtts J.\n\nsuch a factor, as previous conviction, might have prejudiced a fair consideration of the other material before the officer.", "canonical_name": "JagannadhadasJ."}}, {"text": "sections 59 and 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57920, "end_char": 57938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58074, "end_char": 58084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58220, "end_char": 58230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58991, "end_char": 59001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1956_1_533_550_EN", "year": 1956, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 533\n\nBHAGUBHAI. DULLABHABHAI BHANDARI v.\n\nTHE DISTRlCT MAGISTRATE, TRANA\n\n& OTHERS (with connected petition)\n\n[S. R~ DAS c. J., JAGANNADHADAS, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, B. P. SINHA and JAFER IMAM JJ.]\n\nBombay Police Act, 1951 (Bombay Act XXII of 1951), s. 56- 0onstitutional validity-Order of externment-Restrictions- Reasonableness-\" Witness\", scope of the word in the section-Whether not applicable to members of the police force or customs department- Oonstitution of India, Art. 19.\n\nSection 56 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951, is not unconstitu tional and does not contravene the provisions of Art. 19 of the Constitution.\n\nGurbachan Singh v. State of Bombay ( [1952) S.C.R. 737), followed.\n\nIn order to attract the operation of the section the Officer con earned _should be satisfied that the witnesses are not willing to come forward to give evidence in public, but it is not necessary to show that all the witnesses a.re unwilling to give evidence. The terms of the section do not justify any restricted meaning being given to the word \"witnesses\" and it is applicable to memberf! of the police force and employees and officers of the Customs Department also.\n\nGurbachan Singh v. State of Bombay ( [1952] S.C.R. 737), explained.\n\nUnder the provisions of s. 56 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951, an order of externment was passed against the petitioner by whi'Ch he was directed to remove himself outside the limits of Greater Bombay and not to enter the said area for a. period of two yea.rs without the prescribed permission; and subsequently he entered Greater Bombay in order to\" attend Court in a case pending a.go.inst him in which a warrant of arrest ha.d been issued. He wa.s convicted for committing the breach of the externment order and he contended that his ccnviction wa.s in itself a.n indication of the unreasonable ness of the restriction.\n\nHeld, that the restrictions cannot be said to be unreasonable as the petitioner could have a.voided the prosecution a.nu the convic: ti on by obtaining the previous permission of the prescribed authority.\n\nPer JAGANNADHADAS J.-If the matter were res integra I should have felt difficulty in upholding the validity of s. 56(b) of\n\nMa; vB\n\nBhagrWhai Dullabhabhai\n\nBhandari\n\nThe District\n\nthe Bombay Police Act, 1951, in so far as it did not demarcate the application thereof ta the more serious classes of offences falling within. the specified Chapters. I should also have felt difficulty in holding a provision ta be reasonable which clothes the executive officers with an authority to extern a person for so long a. period as two years.\n\nMagistrate, Thana\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petitions Nos. 439 & and others 440 of 1955.\n\nPetitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.\n\nH.J. Umrigar and R. A. Govind, for the petitioner in. Petition No. 439 of 1955.\n\nJ. B. Dadachanji, for the petitioner in Petition No. 440 of 1955.\n\nM. G. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, B. Sen and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents.\n\n1956.\n\nMay 8.\n\nThe judgment of S. R. Das C. J. and Venkatarama Ayyar, B. P. Sinha and Jafer Imam JJ. was delivered by Sinha J. Jagannadhadas J. delivered a separate judgment.\n\nSINHA J.-These petitions under article 32 of the Constitution challenge the constitutionality of some of the provisions of the Bombay Police Act, XXII of 1951 (which hereinafter will be referred to as \"The Act\"), with special reference to section 56, as also of the orders passed against them externing them under that section of the Act. ·\n\nIn Petition No. 439 of 1955 Babubhai Dullabhbhai Bhandari is the petitioner and the District Magistrate of Thana, the Deputy Superintendent of Police and Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Bhivandi Division, Bhiwandi, District Thana, and the State of Bombay are respondents 1, 2 and 3.\n\nThe petitioner is a citizen of India and carries on trade in grass at Bhilad, a railway station on the Western Railway.\n\nOn 21st January 1955 the Deputy Superintendent of Police and Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Bhiwandi Division, served a notice under section 56 of the Act in the following terms:-\n\n\" No. Ext. 3/1 of 1955 Office of the S.D.P.O. Bhiwandi,\n\nBhagubhai Bhiwandi, dated 21-1-1955.\n\nDullabhabhai (I) I, Shri C. V. Bapat, Deputy Superintendent Bhanda.-i , of Police and Sub-Divisional Office Bhiwandi Di viv. sion, District Thana, do hereby issue a notice to you, The District Shri Bhagu Dubai Bhandari alias Bhagwanbhai Dulla Magtstrate, Thana Bhai Jadhav of Bhilad District Thana, that it is proaud others posed that you should be removed outside the Dis- Sinha J. trict of Thana and you should not enter or return to the said district for a period of two years from the date of the order to be made under section 56 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 for the following reasons:- . (II) Evidence is forthcoming that your following activities have caused and are calculated to cause alarm, danger and harm to person , and property in Bhilad and the surrounding areas:-\n\n(1) You have been dealing in smuggled foreign liquor and maintained a veil of secrecy by criminal intimidation and physical violence to the villagers and other right thinking persons.\n\n(2) Your activities have been in continuation of your similar activities for the last five years, given as under:- ( a) You criminally assaulted persons with the help of your associates and did violent acts in order to strike terror into the hearts of the villagers, so that they should not challenge you or your men.\n\n(b) You have been criminally assaulting and intimidating Central Excise and Custom officials with the help of your gang, so as to stop them from looking into your anti-national, anti-social and illegal activities. As a result of your unlawful and dangerous activities you are held in terrific awe by the Central Excise and Custom Officers and men and villagers in Bhilad area who are continuously labouring under grave apprehension of danger to their person and property.\n\n(c) You and your associates were and are making use of criminal intimidation against the villagers in order to prevent them from having recourse to legal means.\n\n1956 (~II) That you and your associates are also understood to be in possession of unlicensed firearms which Bhagubhal h n,, uabhabhai as been causing considerable ~!arm and spreading a Bhandari feeling of insecurity of life and property in the mind v. of villagers from Bhilad and neighbouring villages The District and Central Excise and Customs employees.\n\nMag,, trate, Thana (IV) The witnesses are not willing to come forand others ward and to give evidence against you by reason of SinhaJ. apprehension of danger and harm to their person and property.\n\n(V) Now, I Shri C. V. Bapat, Deputy Superintendent of Police and Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Bhiwandi Division, District Thana in exercise of the 1 authority conferred upon me under section 59 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 by the District Magistrate Thana under his number MAG. 2/ EX dated 17-1-1955 do hereby direct you to appear before me at 11 a.m. on 27-1-1955 at Dahanu in the office of the Sub-Divisional Police Office Dahanu for tendering your explanation regarding the said allegation.\n\nYou are also entitled to appear before me by advocate for the purpose of tendering your explanation and examining witnesses, produced by you.\n\nSigned and sealed this day of 21st Jan. 1955.\n\nSd ........................ .\n\nDeputy Superintendent of Police & Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Bhiwandi.\n\nShri Bhagu Dubai Bhandari @ Bhagwanbhai Dullabhai Jadhav of Bhilad, District Thana\".\n\nBy that notice the petitioner was called upon to appear before the said police officer on the 27th January 1955 in order to enable the former to offer such explanation and examine such witnesses as he may be advised. In pursuance of that notice the petitioner appeared before the police officer aforesaid and the hearing of his case took place on different dates.\n\nThe petitioner claims to have examined seven \"respectable persons\" to testify on his behalf. Ultimately on the 11th July 1955 an order was passed by the District Magistrate of Thana externing the petitioner outside the Thana District. The order of\n\nexternment is Ex. D to the petition and contains the 1956 recitals that after considering the evidence before Bhagubhai him and the explanation offered by the petitioner the Dullabhabhai District Magistrate of Thana (the 1st respondent), Bhandari was satisfied that the petitioner \"engages in giving v. threats and assaulting Central Excise and Customs T?e District Officials men and residents of Bhilad and surround- Magistrate, Thana .\n\n'II d . d I . 'JI' 't t ffi f r . and others mg v1 ages an m u ges m i ic1 ra c o 1ore1gn liquor from Daman\" and that in his opinion \"wit- SinhaJ. nessess are not willing to come forward to give evidence in public against the said Shri Bhagubhai Dullabhbhai Bhandari alias Bhagwanbhai Dullabhbhai Jadhav of Bhilad by reason of apprehension on their part as regards the safety of their person and property\". It is this order which is challenged as illegal and ultra vires and against which the petitioner has moved this Court for an appropriate writ, direction or order against the respondents, prohibiting them, their servants and agents from acting upon or taking any steps in enforcement, furtherance or pursuance of the said order and from interfering in any manner with the petitioner's right to reside in Bhilad and carry on his business. The petitioner had preferred an appeal to the Government against the said order of externment.\n\nBut the appeal was dismissed on the 9th September\n\n1955. Against the said order the petitioner moved the High Court of Judicature at Bombay under article 226 of the Constitution, but the said application was also dismissed in limine by the. High Court by its order dated the 7th November 1955.\n\nThe District Magistrate of Thana, the 1st respondent has sworn to the affidavit filed in this Court in answer to the petition. He swears that he had passed the externment order complained against after perusing the police reports and going through the explanation offered by the petitioner and the statements of the witnesses produced by him and on hearing his advocate. He further states in the affidavit that the general nature of the material allegations against the petitioner was given to him, that the material given to him was clear and by no means vague.\n\nOnly the names of the persons who had given the\n\n7956 information against the petitioner :were not disclosed to him inasmuch as those persons were not prepared\n\nd::!~~~~~; to come out in the open and depose against him in Bhandari public as witnesses. He was satisfied that witnesses v. were unwilling to come forward to give evidence in The DisMct public against the petitioner. He also iiffirms that Magistrate, Thana the petitioner's movements and acts were not only\n\nand others causing alarm, danger or harm to personal property SinhaJ. of the general public round about Bhilad, but also that his movements and acts were causing danger and alarm to public servants of the police force and the Central Excise who were doing very responsible work at Bhilad which is on the borderline of the Indian territory adjoining Daman area which is Portuguese territory. He admits that the petitioner was discharged by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Umberl; laon because the witnesses did not appear and depose against him for fear of the petitioner.\n\nIn Petition No. 440 of 1955, Kun war Rameshwar Singh is the petitioner and the respondents are- 1.\n\nShri W. K. Patil, Deputy Commissioner of Police, Crime Branch (I) C.l.D., Greater Bombay, 2.\n\nThe Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay, and 3.\n\nThe State of Bombay.\n\nThe petitioner is a citizen of India and claims to be ' a \"social worker\" connected with several social organisations. He alleges that his main social activity has been the improvement of the lot of prostitutes and singing girls in certain quarters of Bombay.\n\nOn the 2nd November, 1954 the petitioner was served with a notice under section 56 read with section 59 of the Act (Ex. A to the petition) setting out the allegations against him and calling upon him to explain those matters. In pursuance of the said notice the petitioner appeared before the Superintendent of Police to show cause against the proposed action against him. Ultimately on the 4th January, 1955 the Commissioner of Police, the second respondent, passed an order to the effect that the petitioner should remove himself from the limits of Greater Bombay\n\nwithin seven days. That order is marked Ex. H and is to the following effect:-\n\n\" Order of Externment\n\nBhagubha{ Didlabhabhai\n\nBhandari (Section 56 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951) v.\n\nPolice Station: Nagpada No. 7 /c/43/1955.\n\nThe District Magistrate, T/1ana Whereas the Commissioner of Police, Greater and ot1ters Bombay, has directed by his order, dated the 13th August, 1954 and 11th December 1954, made under Sinha]. sub-section (2) of section 10 of the Bombay Police\n\nAct, 1951 (Bombay Act XXII of 1951) that the powers, functions and duties under the said Act shall also be exercised by the Deputy Commissioners of Police, Greater Bombay.\n\nAnd whereas evidence has been placed before me, Deputy Commissioner of Police, Crime Branch (I), against the person known as Kunwar Rameshwar Singh, to the following effect:- I. That since October, 1953 in the locality known as Falkland Road, Foras Road, Sukhalaji Street, Bapty Road, Kamathipura and the areas adjoining thereto in Greater Bombay his movements and acts are causing alarm and harm to the persons residing in, carrying on business in, or visiting the said locality in that: '\n\n(i) He with assistance of his associates some of them being Sk. Makbool Sk. Hussain, Abdul Rahiman, Suleman alias Sapad, Ahmad Yusuf alias Ahmed Dalal, Shafi and others, extort money from women residing in and carrying on business either as prostitutes or singing girls in the said locality on threats of assault and of causing bodily injury to them;\n\n(ii) That he with the assistance of the said associates assault or threaten with assault the aforesaid women who do not comply with his demands for money;\n\n(iii) That in order to compel the aforesaid women to pay him the money demanded 'by him he also posts his associates at or near the places of business of the aforesaid women and prevent customers from entering the !ooms of such women;\n\n(iv) That he with the assistance of his associates extort money from shopkeepers, hotel-keepers, Bhagubhal h d k Dullal>habhai mere. ants an haw ers carrying on business in the Bhandari said locality and from rent collectors of buildings v. !lccupied by the aforesaid prostitutes and singing The District girls by assaulting them or thre.atening them with Mag•strate, Thana assault and dislocation of business\n\nandothers\n\n( ) T h. d ' h v hat e causes amage to t e property Sinha J. of the said hotelkeepers and hawkers of the said locality who do not pay him money demanded by him;\n\n(vi) That he accosts persons visiting the rooms of singing girls in the said locality for the purpose of entertainment and demand money from them under threats of assault and of preventing them from visiting the said locality;\n\n(vii) That he has committed several acts of the nature mentioned above; II. That witnesses to the above incidents are not willing to come forward to give evidence in public against him as they apprehend that they will be assaulted by him and/or by his associates if they do so.\n\nAnd whereas I have heard the said person and considered the explanation tendered by him and also the evidence given by the witnesses produced by him and have heard his counsel; And whereas afte~ considering all the evidence and explanation detailed above, I am satisfied that:- The movements and acts of Kun war Ramesh war Singh since October, 1953, are causing alarm and harm to the persons residing in carrying on business in or visiting the locality known as Falkland Road, Foras Road, Sukhalaji Street, Bapty Road, Kamathipura and the areas adjoining thereto in Greater Bombay and that he indulges in activities mentioned above.\n\nAnd whereas in my opinion witnesses are unwilling to come forward to give evidence in public against the said person by reason of apprehension on their part as regards the safety of their persons; Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers vested in me under section 56 of the said Act, I, Shri W. K.\n\nPatil, Deputy Commissioner of Police, Crime Branch\n\n7956 (I) C.l.D., Greater Bombay hereby direct that the said Kun war Rameshwar Singh sh. all remove himself R Bhagubhai outside the limits of Greater Bombay by Central ly.\n\nDullabhabhai\n\n(route) within seven days from the date of service of Bhandari this order and I further direct that he shall nbt enter v. the said area of Greater Bombay for a period of two Te District years from the date of this order without a permission Mlfgistrateh, Thana . •t• f h C • • f p l' G t and ot ers 1n wri mg rom t e omm1ss10ner o o 10e, rea er Bombay, or the Goyernment of Bombay.\n\nSd. W. K. Patil, Dy. Commissioner of Police, Crime Branch (I) C.l.D. Greater Bombay\".\n\nThe order quoted above is a self-contained one and discloses the nature of the allegations against him which he had been called upon to explain. The petitioner pr-eferred an appeal to the third respondent, the State of Bombay. But his appeal was dismissea on the 17th January 1955. The petitioner challenged the validity of the said order passed by the respondents by a petition under article 226 of the Constitution to the Bombay High Court, but it was dismissed on the 14th March 1955 after hearing. The judgment of the High Court is Exhibit D. The learned Judge of the Bombay High Court who dealt with the petition has set out briefly the main allegations of the petitioner and the affidavit in answer to the petition sworn to by the 1st respondent here. The learned Judge observed in the course of his judgment that in view of the averments in the petition and those in the affidavit in reply it was impossible for him to hold that the Deputy Commissioner of Police knew that witnesses were willing to give evidence against the petitioner. The petitioner went up on Letters Patent Appeal and a Division Bench consisting of the Chief Justice and another Judge of the Bombay High\n\nCourt dismissed the appeal holding that once the opinion has been formed by the authority that witnesses were unwilling to give evidence in public against the petitioner, the court could not go behind that opinion. They also negatived the plea of want of bona fides in the 1st respondent who had initiated the proceedings.\n\nSinha/.\n\n1956 The petitioner removed himself outside the limits of Greater Bombay. Having come to know that a Bhagubhai v,.uabllabhai warrant of arrest had been issued against him in Bhandari a certain pending case before the Presidency Magisv. trate, Fourth Court, at Girgaum, Bombay, on the The District 6th April 1955, the petitioner entered Greater Bom- Magistrate, Than• bay to attend court but he was arrested under the and others Act for committing a breach oftheexternment order.\n\nSinhaJ.\n\nHe was prosecuted before the Presidency Magistrate, Sixth Court at Mazgaon, Bombay, for an offence under section 142 of the Act. He was convicted by the Magistrate and sentenced to nine months' rigorous imprisonment by a judgment dated the 8th September 1955. The Magistrate's judgment is Exhibit F to the petition. The learned Magistrate overruled the petitioner's contention that the order of externment passed against him was illegal, relying chiefly upon the judgments of the High Court referred to above, upholding the constitutionality of that order. As regards his defence that he had entered Greater Bombay in obedience to the warrant issued against him, the learned Magistrate observed that as a matter of fact, according to the statement of the petitioner's counsel before him he had taken that step \"to test the validity of the order\". Secondly, the learned Magistrate has rightly pointed out that the petitioner should have obtained the previous permission of the Policp Commissioner before returning to Bombay, as otherwise the order of externment would be rendered nugatory.\n\nThe learned Magistrate also observed in the course of his judgment that no allegations of mala ft.des had been made against the police officers who had initiated the p'roceedings against the petitioner.\n\nThe petitioner went up in appeal to the High Court of Bombay which by its judgment dated the 5th October 1955 upheld the conviction and the sentence.\n\nThe judgment of the High Court is Exhibit G to the petition. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court repelled the contention on behalf of the appellant that the order of externment was invalid, relying chiefly upon the previous judgment of that very court upholding the constitutionality of the very order\n\nimpugned. Another matter referred to in the judgment 7956 of the High Court is rather significant. On behalf of Bhagubhai the appellant reliance had been placed upon a letter Dullabhabhai alleged to have been sent to the petitioner by the Bhandari Secretary to the Chief Minister granting permission v. to him to return to Bombay in order to see the Home Tl~• District Secretary. It was found on enquiry by the learned Mag:~~:!~.~:ana Government Pleader who intimated to the court that the alleged letter had not been signed by the Secretary Sinha J. to the Chief Minister and that no such letter had actually been sent to him. On that statement being made, the petitioner's counsel did not press his contention that his return was after permission. The petitioner moved this Court for special leave to appeal against the said judgment of the High Court in Petition No. 601of1955. One of the grounds in the petition was that the High Court should have held tha-t the externment order was illegal and that therefore the petitioner's entry was lawful.\n\nA Constitution Bench of this Court by its order dated the 21st November 1955 dismissed the petition for special leave to appeal. This completes the statement of the case made on behalf of the petitioner.\n\nIn answer to this petition the first respondent has sworn to the affidavit filed in this Court. It is necessary to state in some detail the facts stated in this affidavit which furnish the background to the whole case against the petitioner. The petitioner is said to be a native of Balrampur, District Gonda, Uttar Pradesh. After passing his school examination in 1940, he joined the then Royal Indian Navy in 1942.\n\nIn tlie year 1946 while he was attached to S.S. Talwar in Bombay, he was \"released from service\". In 1947 he joined the B. B. & C. I. Railway as a clerk and was removed from his post in July 1947 for having made baseless allegations against his superior officer.\n\nIn 1949 he made an attempt to enter the police force of Greater Bombay, but that failed as he was found to be unreliable. Subsequently, in August 1950 he joined the State Transport Department as a clerk but had again to be removed from that post in April 1951.\n\nLat.er on, the petitioner obtained accommodation in\n\n1956 Bombay on a false representation that he was a refugee from Pakistan. He was prosecuted and con Bhagubhai d d d fi f h Drillabhabhai victe an sentence to pay a ne o Rs. 30 or t ree Bhandari months' rigorous imprisonment in default. His appeal v. from that order of conviction and sentence to the The District High Court of Bombay was dismissed by a Division\n\nMag;:~·::;..~;•na Bench.in September 195~. On a similar false epre\n\nsentation he had bbtamed from the Custodian of Sinha}.\n\nEvacuee Property two shops in Bombay. Necessary proceedings bad to be taken against him for evicting him from those shops. After bis removal from Government jobs as aforesaid, the petitioner \"came forward\" as a social worker directing his activities mainly to \"the redlight district\" in certain quarters of Greater Bombay inhabited by over 10,000 public women. Along with his associates he started a norent campaign and resorted to violence with the help of so-called volunteers who were themselves bad characters, externees, drunkards and persons with previous convictions. With the help of associates like those he moved in the \"redlight district\" and realised money from his victims by threat and intimidation.\n\nThus by all questionable means the petitioner started extorting moneys by harassing the inmates of that district and those who frequented those quarters. The rest of the Jong affidavit running into 29 paragraphs is devoted to denying the allegations made by the petitioner that he had been a victim of police combination against him or that the procedure laid down by the law had not been followed or that the petitioner had not a fair and full opportunity of explaining his case to the authorities. The affidavit further asserts that witnesses who had given their statements to the police against the petitioner were not willing to come forward openly to depose against him and some of those witnesses who did turn up were prevailed upon by the petitioner to change their original statements made during the preliminary inquiries.\n\nOn those averments it was submitted by the lst respondent that the proceedings against him were regular and in accordance with the provisions of\n\nthe Act and that there was no merit in his cont956 tentions.\n\nBhagubhai These two petitions were heard along with Peti- Dullabhabhai tion No. 272 of 1955 which is being disposed of by a Bhandaro separate judgment. In that case the order impugned v. had been passed under section 57 of the Act. Sections The District 56 to 59 of the Act are closely connected. The com- Magistat;~ Thana mon arguments addressed to us by Shri Purshotham an _ 0_•rs challenging the validity of sections 56 to 59 have been Sinha}. dealt with in that judgmeQt and need not be repeated here. It is only necessary to deal with the provisions of the section impugned in these two cases, namely, section 56 of the Act, which is in these terms:-\n\n'1Whenever it shall appear in Greater Bombay and other areas for which a Commissioner has been appointed under section 7 to the Commissioner and in other area or areas to which the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, extend the provisions of this section to the District Magistrate, or the Sub-Divisional Magistrate specially empowered by the State Government in that behalf (a) that the movements or acts of any person are causing or calculated to cause alarm, danger or harm to person or property, or (b) that there are reasonable grounc; ls for believing that such person is engaged or is about to be engaged in the commission of an offence involving force or violence or an offence punishable under Chapter XII, XVI or XVII of the Indian Penal Code, or in the abetment of any such offence, and when in the opinion of such officer witnesses are not willing to come forward to give evidence in public against such person by reason of apprehension on their parts as regards the safety of their person or property, or (c) that an outbreak of epidemic disease is likely to result from the continued residence of an immigrant, the said officer may, by an order in writing duly served on him or by beat of drum or otherwise as he thinks fit, direct such person or immigrant so to conduct himself as shall seem necessary in order to prevent violence and alarm or the outbreak or spread of such disease or to remove himself outside the area within the local limits of his jurisdiction by\n\n1956 such route and within such time as the said officer may prescribe and not to enter or return to the said Bhagubhai Dullabhabhai area from which he was directed to remove himself\".\n\nBhandari In order to attract the operation of the section\n\nTh Dv: . quoted above with special reference to the portions\n\nMagira:tr:;:an relevant to these cases, it is necessary (1) that the\n\nand others a Commissioner, the District Magistrate or the Sub-\n\nDivisional Magistrate specially empowered by the SinhaJ.\n\nState Government in that behalf, as the case may be, should be satisfied that the movements or acts of any person are causing or calculated to cause alarm, danger or harm to person or property, or that there are reasona hie grounds for believing that such person is engaged or is about to be engaged in the commission of an offence involving force or violence or an offence punishable under Chapter XII, XVI or XVII, Indian Penal Code, or in the abetment of any such offence, and (2) that in the opinion of such officer witnesses are not willing to come forward to give evidence in public against such person by reason of apprehension on their parts as regards the safety of their person or property. When the officer concerned is satisfied about these two essential matters, he may direct such person to remove himself outside the local limits of his jurisdiction and not to return to the said area for a period not exceeding two years as laid down in section 58.\n\nBut before passing such orders the person proceeded against under section 56 has to be given an opportunity of exP.laining matters against him by adducing such evidence as he may tender after he has been informed in writing as to the \"general nature of the material allegations against .him\".\n\nSuch a person is entitled to appear before the officer by an advocate or attorney for the purpose of tendering his explanation and evidence.\n\nIt has not been contended on behalf of the petitioners that they had not been given the opportunity contemplated by section 59. But grievance was sought to be made of the fact that particulars of the evidence against the petitioners and of their alleged activities have not been given to them. That argument has\n\nbeen dealt with in the judgment in the other case. It 1956 is necessary therefore to deal only with the particular h .\n\nBhagubhai arguments advanced on behalf of eae petit10ner Dullabhabhai peculiar to his case.\n\nBhandari In Petition No. 439 of 1955, it was said that this v.\n\nCourt had laid down in the case of Gurbachan Singh The Dislrict\n\nv. State of Bombay(1) as follows:- Magistrate, Th11n11 Th l . . l d' d and others \" e aw is certam y an extraor mary one an has been made only to meet those exceptional cases Sinha J, where no witnesses for fear of violence to their person or property are willing to depose publicly against certain bad characters whose presence in certain areas constitutes a menace to the safety of the public residing therein\".\n\nThe words \"no witnesses\" have been emphasized as supporting the argument that unless all the witnesses before the police are unwilling to give evidence in open court the provisions of section 56 cannot be taken.recourse to.\n\nIn our opinion, it is reading too much into the observations of this Court quoted above, made by Mukherjea, J. (as he then was). The learned Judge did not mean to lay down, and we do not understand him as having laid down, that unless each and every witness is unwilling to give evidence in open court, the provisions of section 56 are Lot available to the police. The words of section 56 quoted above do not lend themselves to that extreme contention.\n\nIf such an extreme interpretation were to be put on that part of section 56, it is not difficult to imagine a situation where it will become almost impossible to apply that section to any case.\n\nIt was next contended on behalf of the petitioner in this case that the section contemplates witnesses other than members of the police force and employees and officers of the Customs Department.\n\nIt is said that it is the duty of the police force as of the employees of the Customs Department to brave all danger and to come out in the open even against desperate criminals to give evidence against them in court and to subject themselves to cross-examination.\n\nThat is a counsel of perfection which every member\n\n(1) [1952] S.C.R. 737. 71\n\n1956 of the police force or every employee of the Customs Department may not be able to act up to.\n\nFurther- Bhagubhai h f h f h . Dullabhabhai more, t e terms o t e section d9 not justi y any sue Bhandari restricted meaningbeing given to the word \"witness\". v.\n\nHence, in our opinion, there is no justification for the The District contention that members of the police force and.em- Magistratt, Thana ployees and officers of the Customs Department must\n\nandothers ) • th d \"d t\n\nSinha J. a ways come m e open an give ev1 ence agams criminals or potential criminals. If the officer concerned is satisfied that witnesses of whatever description they may be, are not willing to come out in the open, one of the essential conditions of the application of section 56 is fulfilled and it is no more necessary for them to stop to consider as to which class of persons those witnesses may come from.\n\nIn Petition No. 440 of 1955 the learned counsel for the petitioner had a more uphill task in view of the fact that this very order impugned had been examined in the criminal prosecution against the petitioner by the Presidency Magistrate and by the High Court on appeal and the petition for special leave to appeal to this Court had been refused.\n\nBut it was argued on behalf of the petitioner that section 56 itself was invalid as contravening the provisions of article 19 of the Constitution-an argument which has already been dealt with by this Court in Gurbachan Singh v. State of Bombay(') referred to above. In that case, Mukherjea, J. (as he then was) delivered the judgment of the court after examining the constitutionality of section 27(1) of the City of Bombay Police Act, (Bombay Act IV of 1902). The operative words of that section are almost exactly the same as those of section 56 of the Act.\n\nIt is not therefore necessary to re-examine the constitutionality of those very provisions in this case.\n\nIt is enough to point out that no attempt was made in this Court to shake the authority of that decision.\n\nShri Dadachanji, who appeared on behalf of the petitioner in this case faintly suggested that the petitioner bad been proceeded against under the penal sec-\n\n(1) [1952] S.C.R. 737.\n\n\"\"'\"\n\ntion of the Act notwithstanding the fact that he had 1956 entered Greater Bombay in order to look after the Bhagubhat case pending against him in which a warrant of arrest Dullabhablrai had been issued.\n\nBut that is a closed chapter so Bhandari far as the courts including this Court also are conv. cerned inasmuch as his conviction stands confirmed The District h f l f h• C t h' Magistrate Thana as a result of t e re usa o t is ?urt to gran Im and others special leave to appeal from the Judgment of the Bombay High Court. He further contended that Sinha}. his conviction for . his having entered Gre.ater Bombay itself is an indication of the unreasonableness of the restriction and of the law under which the order of externment had been passed against him. But if the petitioner had only taken the course indicated by the law, namely, of obtaining the previous permission of the prescribed authority, he could have avoided the prosecution and the conviction. It must therefore be held that there is no merit in this contention also.\n\nFor the reasons aforesaid it mu\"st be held that section 56 of the Act is not unconstitutional and that the orders passed against the petitioners are not invalid. These applications must stand dismissed.\n\nJAGANNADHADAS J.-ln view of the decision of this Court in Gurbal by persons carrying on business. It was stated t at Bagla this manner of securing loans on joint security was v. preferred by the Banks and it was also in the interest Tlie Commissioner of the traders as lower rate of interest was charged, of Incomc-ta_x, if the loan was on joint security. It was also stated West Bengal that the appellant used to borrow money on joint BliagwatiJ. security frequently and certain old pro-notes jointly executed were submitted before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. Reference was made to the case of Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. 8. A. 8.\n\nRamaswamy Ohettiar(1), where it was held that it was a custom amongst Nattukottai Chettiars to stand surety for one another for borrowing from Banks for the purpose of lending out at higher rates of interest and that the loss incurred under the agreement of guarantee by the Chettiar firm should be allowed as a ded11ction. The Appellate Assistant Commiesioner, however, distinguished the case on facts and held that even though the appellant stood surety for Mamraj Rambhagat in course of securing finance for his business of timber, it was the loss of a sum borrowed by another, the sum borrowed was capital in its nature and the loss suffered by the appellant on account of Mamraj Rambhagat's failure to pay was\n\na capital loss.\n\nOn appeal taken by the appellant before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, the Tribunal was of the opinion that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had not expressed any opinion in his order as\n\nto whether there was such custom or not nor had he asked the appellant to establish the custom. The Tribunal in these circumstances held that the custom was accepted by the Department. The Tribunal did not see any distinction between the money lending business and timber business which were both financed by this type of borrowing and differing from the Appellate Assistant Commissioner followed the decision in Commissioner of Income-tax, Madt'as v.\n\nS. A. 8. Ramaswamy Ghettiar (supra) and came to\n\n(1) [1946] 14 I.T.R. 236.\n\nMadanGojJal\n\nBagla\n\nThe Com1nissioner\n\nof Income-tar,\n\nWest Bengal\n\nBhagwati1 /,\n\nthe conclusion that the loss suffered by standing surety was an allowable loss and upheld the contention of the appellant. At the instance of the respondent the Tribunal stated a case to the High Court under section 66(1) of .the Act and referred the following question for its decision:-\n\n\" Whether on the facts found the sum of Rs. 55,030 is allowable as a bad debt under the provisions of section 10(2) (xi) of the Indian Income-tax Act\".\n\nThe said reference was heard by the High Court and in its judgment the High Court held that the. Tribunal had proceeded on an erI\"oneous assumption as to the facts of the case and the application of the money.\n\nSince no part of the loan, which had been taken from the Imperial Bank of India by Mamraj Rambhagat on the joint security of himself and the appellant, was applied to the appellant's .own business, there was no question of au allowable deduction in relation to the business of the appellant. The High Court held that the Tribunal was in error(lven in law inasmuch as under section 10(2) (xi) it is only a trading or business debt of the trade or business of the appellant, which could be claimed as a loss and as the debt claimed was not in respect of the business of the appellant, which was the business of trading in timber and not of a person carrying on the business of standing surety for other persons, the loss suffered by the appellant was a capital loss and not a business loss at all. Regarding the decision relied upon by the Tribunal, the High Court referred to a later decision in Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. S. R. Subramanya Pillai('), which held that the earlier decision must be read as confined to its peculiar facts and not applicable to business other than money lending business ofNattukottai Chettiars. The High Court, therefore, answered the referred question in the negative.\n\nHence this appeal.\n\nThe sole question for our determination in this appeal is whether the loss of Rs. 55,030 suffered by the appellant in this transaction was a capital loss or\n\n(1) [1050] 18 I.TR. 85.\n\nwas a trading loss or a bad debt incurred by the ap-\n\n- 1956 pellant in the course of carrying on his business of timber. It is clear that no part of the monies bor- Ma\"; a\"gopal rowed on the joint security of the appellant and Mamv. raj Rambhagat from the lmt>erial Bank of India, The Commissioner Bombay went to finance the timber business of the apof Income-tax, pellant, but they were all utilised by Mamraj Ram- West Bengal bhagat in his own business. These monies were not Bhagwati J. required to finance the timber business of the appellant, nor was the debt due by Mamraj Rambhagat and in respect of which the account was opened by the appellant in his ledger in the name of Mamraj Rambhagat a debt due by Mamraj Rambhagat to the timber business of the appellant. If any monies had been borrowed by the appellant in his timber business, they would certainly have been his capital and whatever loss he incurred therein would have been his capital loss. The manner in which these monies were sought to be connected with the timber business and treated as a trading loss or bad debt of the timBer\n\nbusiness was by showing that it was the custom amongst the persons carrying business in Bombay to borrow monies from Banks on joint security and if A wanted monies for financing his business, he could do so by asking B to join him as surety, but he could not ask B to join him as such unless he stood surety for B in the loans, which B borrowed in his turn from the Bank. A's joining B as surety was thus a consideration for B's joining A as surety in his transaction with the Bank and, therefore, although no part of the monies borrowed by B came into the business of A, A joined B as surety for the purpose of financing his own business, which he could not do without B joining him as surety in the loan which he himself obtained from the Bank for the purpose of financing his own business. The transaction of A's joining B as surety in the matter of B's procuring a loan for the financing of his business was thus an essential operation of the financing of A's business and was, therefore, an incident of A's business and any loss incurred by A in the transaction could thus be treated as a trading loss in the course of carrying on of A's\n\n1956 business. The loss incurred by the appellant in the\n\nMadan GoJ>al transaction. of his joining Mamraj Rambhagat as Bagla surety in the loan which Mamraj Rambhagat procured v. from the Imperial Bank of India could, it was urged, Th• Commi&Sioner thus be treated as a trading loss or bad debt of the of Incometax, appellant's timber business.\n\nWest Bengal It is necessary, therefore, to see what is the exact\n\nB/JagwatiJ. nature and scope of the custom said to have been accepted by tl•J Department. The custom stated before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was that persons carrying on business in Bombay used to borrow monies on joint security from the Banks in order to facilitate getting financial assistance from the'Banks and that too at lower rates of interest. A businessman could procure financial assistance from the Banks on his own, but he would in that case have to pay a higher rate of interest. He would have to pay a lower rate of interest if he could procure as surety another businessman, who would be approved by the Bank. This, however, did not mean that mutual accommodation by businessmen was necessarily an ingredient part of that custom. A could procure B, C or D to join him as surety in order to achieve this objective, but it did not necessarily follow that if A wanted to procure B, C or D to thus join him as surety, he could only do so if he in his own turn joined B, C or D as surety in the loans, which B, C or D procured in their turns from the Banks for financing their respective businesses. Unless that factor was established, the mere procurement by A of B, C or D as surety would not be sufficient to establish the custom sought to be relied upon by the appellant so as to make the transaction of his having joined Mam raj Rambhagat as surety in the loan procured by Mamraj Rambhagat from Imperial Bank of India, a transaction in the course of carrying on his own timber business and to make the loss in the transaction a trading loss or a bad debt of the timber business of the appellant. The old pronotes jointly executed by the appellant and others, which were submitted before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner did rrot carry the case of the appellant far enough and stopped\n\nshort of proving the custom alleged by the appellant in its entirety. The transaction in question could not, therefore, be deemed to be one entered into by the appellant in the course of or in car, rying on his timber business.\n\nProcuring finances for his timber business would no doubt be an essential operation in the course of his carrying on his business, but the same thing could not be predicated of this transaction of his joining Mamraj Rambhagat as surety for procuring Rs. l lakh from the Imperial Bank of India, which was wholly to finance Mamraj Rambhagat's business and not the timber business of the appellant.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellant laid particular emphasis on the finding by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that \"it was in the course of securing finance for the business of timber that he stood surety with Mamraj Rambhagat\". This finding merely records the statement of fact, but does not go so far as to establish the custom sought to be relied upon by the appellant. The old pronotes submitted by the appellant before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner merely related to his own transactions, where he had been joined by others as surety and did not establish that the others had been similarly accommodated by him in the matters of loans which they had in theit' turn procured from the Banks. The solitary instance of the appellant's having joined Mamraj Rambliagat in the transaction in question could not be sufficient to establish the custom sought to be relied upon by him and we do not see any reason to enlarge the scope of the so-called custom beyond what is warranted by the facts as set out in the order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.\n\nThe custom among the Nattukottai Chettiars held proved in Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. S.\n\nA. S. Ramaswamy Ohettiar (supra) was that they stood surety for one another, when they borrowed from Banks for the purpose of lending out at higher rates of interest. It was, moreover, an essential element in the carrying on of a money lender's business that\n\nMadanal Bag/a Rs. 5,049, which be had to pay the creditors on acv. count of L's share of the joint loan, in the computa- The Commissiatter tion of his business profits. It was held that the asof Income-tax, sessee was not entitled to deduct these sums in the West Bengal computation of his business profit either under sec- Bl!agwatiJ. tion 10(2) (xi) or section 10(2)(xv) or as business loss.\n\nThis case furnishes the proper analogy to the present case and points to the right conclusion in regard to the claim of the appellant.\n\nThe following passage from the judgment of the learned C. J. under appeal correctly sums up, in our opinion, the whole position:-\n\n\"The debt must therefore be one which can properly be called a trading debt and a debt of the trade, the profits of which are being computed. Judged by that test, it is difficult to see how the debt in the present case can be said to be a debt in respect of the business of the assessee. The assessee is not a person carrying on a business of standing surety for other persons. Nor is he a money-lender.\n\nHe is simply a timber-merchant.\n\nThere seems to have been some evidence before tpe Appellate Assistant Commissioner that he had from time to time obtained finances for his business by procuring loans on the joint security of himself and some other person.\n\nBut it is not established, nor does it seem to have been alleged, that he in his turn was in the habit of standing surety for other persons along with them for the purpose of securing loans for their use and benefit. Even if such had been the case, any loss suffered by reason of having to pay a debt borrowed for the benefit of another, would have been a capital loss to him and not a business loss at all.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that the appeal fails and must stand dismissed with costs.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 57, "entities": [{"text": "MADAN GOPAL BAGLA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 48, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MADAN GOPAL BAGLA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nWEST BENGAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 53, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, WEST BENGAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 115, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 117, "end_char": 125, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "come-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 275, "end_char": 293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 308, "end_char": 313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income-tax-Allowable deduction-Timber business-Surety to third party-Bacl debt-Capital loss or business loss-Indian In\n\ncome-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Income-tax-Allowable deduction-Timber business-Surety to third party-Bacl debt-Capital loss or business loss-Indian In\n\ncome-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Imperial Bank of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 502, "end_char": 524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant who was a.-timber merchant obtained a loan from the Bank of India on the ]oint security of himself and a third party, M. On the same day M obtained a loan from the Imperial Bank of India on the joint security of himself and the appellant."}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 857, "end_char": 862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income-tax-Allowable deduction-Timber business-Surety to third party-Bacl debt-Capital loss or business loss-Indian In\n\ncome-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Income-tax-Allowable deduction-Timber business-Surety to third party-Bacl debt-Capital loss or business loss-Indian In\n\ncome-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 870, "end_char": 897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1693, "end_char": 1701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1722, "end_char": 1736, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "R. J. Kolah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2129, "end_char": 2140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. J. Kolah and P. K. Ghosh, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. K. Ghosh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2145, "end_char": 2156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. J. Kolah and P. K. Ghosh, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Maya\n\nG. N.Joshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2178, "end_char": 2194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maya\n\nG. N.Joshi, Porus A. Mehta and R.H. Dhebar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Porus A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2196, "end_char": 2210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maya\n\nG. N.Joshi, Porus A. Mehta and R.H. Dhebar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R.H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2215, "end_char": 2226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maya\n\nG. N.Joshi, Porus A. Mehta and R.H. Dhebar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Madan Gopal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2323, "end_char": 2334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was Th• Commissiontr delivered by\n\nMadan Gopal\n\nBagla\n\n01 Income-tax, BHAGWATI J:-This is an appeal with certificate We!t Bengal under section 66-A(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 from the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta on a reference under section 66(1) of the Act, whereby the High Court answered the referred question in the negative.", "canonical_name": "MADAN GOPAL BAGLA"}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2423, "end_char": 2433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2446, "end_char": 2473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2516, "end_char": 2552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was Th• Commissiontr delivered by\n\nMadan Gopal\n\nBagla\n\n01 Income-tax, BHAGWATI J:-This is an appeal with certificate We!t Bengal under section 66-A(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 from the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta on a reference under section 66(1) of the Act, whereby the High Court answered the referred question in the negative."}}, {"text": "section 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2574, "end_char": 2587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "5th February 1930", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2711, "end_char": 2728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 5th February 1930 he obtained a loan of Rs."}}, {"text": "Bank of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2771, "end_char": 2784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l lakh from the Bank of India on the joint security of himself and one Mamraj Rambhagat."}}, {"text": "Mamraj Rambhagat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2826, "end_char": 2842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l lakh from the Bank of India on the joint security of himself and one Mamraj Rambhagat.", "canonical_name": "Mamv. raj Rambhagat"}}, {"text": "Imperial Bank of India, Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2917, "end_char": 2947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l lakh from the Imperial Bank of India, Bombay on the joint security of himself and the appellant."}}, {"text": "24th March 1930", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3291, "end_char": 3306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "626 on 24th March 1930."}}, {"text": "25th April 1930", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3404, "end_char": 3419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mamraj Rambhagat failed in his business and his estate went into the hands of the receivers on 25th April 1930."}}, {"text": "ofMamraj Rambhagat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3471, "end_char": 3489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant opened a ledger account in the name ofMamraj Rambhagat and the total amount of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Mamv. raj Rambhagat"}}, {"text": "30th October 1930", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3628, "end_char": 3645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "31,446 on 30th October 1930, Rs."}}, {"text": "25th April 1934", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3660, "end_char": 3675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9,434 on 25th April 1934 and Rs."}}, {"text": "17th May 1938", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3693, "end_char": 3706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4,716 on 17th May 1938, aggregating to Rs."}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3924, "end_char": 3934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bagla", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4329, "end_char": 4334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was stated t at Bagla this manner of securing loans on joint security was v. preferred by the Banks and it was also in the interest Tlie Commissioner of the traders as lower rate of interest was charged, of Incomc-ta_x, if the loan was on joint security."}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4587, "end_char": 4598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also stated West Bengal that the appellant used to borrow money on joint BliagwatiJ. security frequently and certain old pro-notes jointly executed were submitted before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner."}}, {"text": "Ramaswamy Ohettiar(1", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4865, "end_char": 4885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramaswamy Ohettiar(1), where it was held that it was a custom amongst Nattukottai Chettiars to stand surety for one another for borrowing from Banks for the purpose of lending out at higher rates of interest and that the loss incurred under the agreement of guarantee by the Chettiar firm should be allowed as a ded11ction."}}, {"text": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5642, "end_char": 5671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal taken by the appellant before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, the Tribunal was of the opinion that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had not expressed any opinion in his order as\n\nto whether there was such custom or not nor had he asked the appellant to establish the custom."}}, {"text": "section 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6613, "end_char": 6626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6797, "end_char": 6810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6830, "end_char": 6844, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 10(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7432, "end_char": 7445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ofNattukottai Chettiars", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8169, "end_char": 8192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Regarding the decision relied upon by the Tribunal, the High Court referred to a later decision in Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. S. R. Subramanya Pillai('), which held that the earlier decision must be read as confined to its peculiar facts and not applicable to business other than money lending business ofNattukottai Chettiars.", "canonical_name": "ofNattukottai Chettiars"}}, {"text": "Mamv. raj Rambhagat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8701, "end_char": 8720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is clear that no part of the monies bor- Ma\"; a\"gopal rowed on the joint security of the appellant and Mamv.", "canonical_name": "Mamv. raj Rambhagat"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8772, "end_char": 8778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "raj Rambhagat from the lmt>erial Bank of India, The Commissioner Bombay went to finance the timber business of the apof Income-tax, pellant, but they were all utilised by Mamraj Ram- West Bengal bhagat in his own business."}}, {"text": "Mamraj Ram- West Bengal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8878, "end_char": 8901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "raj Rambhagat from the lmt>erial Bank of India, The Commissioner Bombay went to finance the timber business of the apof Income-tax, pellant, but they were all utilised by Mamraj Ram- West Bengal bhagat in his own business."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8952, "end_char": 8960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These monies were not Bhagwati J. required to finance the timber business of the appellant, nor was the debt due by Mamraj Rambhagat and in respect of which the account was opened by the appellant in his ledger in the name of Mamraj Rambhagat a debt due by Mamraj Rambhagat to the timber business of the appellant.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI"}}, {"text": "s\n\n1956", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10717, "end_char": 10724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madan GoJ", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10778, "end_char": 10787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The loss incurred by the appellant in the\n\nMadan GoJ>al transaction.", "canonical_name": "MADAN GOPAL BAGLA"}}, {"text": "Imperial Bank of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10908, "end_char": 10930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of his joining Mamraj Rambhagat as Bagla surety in the loan which Mamraj Rambhagat procured v. from the Imperial Bank of India could, it was urged, Th• Commi&Sioner thus be treated as a trading loss or bad debt of the of Incometax, appellant's timber business."}}, {"text": "Mam raj Rambhagat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12479, "end_char": 12496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Unless that factor was established, the mere procurement by A of B, C or D as surety would not be sufficient to establish the custom sought to be relied upon by the appellant so as to make the transaction of his having joined Mam raj Rambhagat as surety in the loan procured by Mamraj Rambhagat from Imperial Bank of India, a transaction in the course of carrying on his own timber business and to make the loss in the transaction a trading loss or a bad debt of the timber business of the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Mamv. raj Rambhagat"}}, {"text": "Mamraj Rambliagat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14334, "end_char": 14351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The solitary instance of the appellant's having joined Mamraj Rambliagat in the transaction in question could not be sufficient to establish the custom sought to be relied upon by him and we do not see any reason to enlarge the scope of the so-called custom beyond what is warranted by the facts as set out in the order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.", "canonical_name": "Mamv. raj Rambhagat"}}, {"text": "Nattukottai Chettiars", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14669, "end_char": 14690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The custom among the Nattukottai Chettiars held proved in Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. S.\n\nA. S. Ramaswamy Ohettiar (supra) was that they stood surety for one another, when they borrowed from Banks for the purpose of lending out at higher rates of interest.", "canonical_name": "ofNattukottai Chettiars"}}, {"text": "Madan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15008, "end_char": 15013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was, moreover, an essential element in the carrying on of a money lender's business that\n\nMadan-\n\nthat they might be awarded by way of compensation 1956 full wages for the entire period of the lay off.\n\nThe M/s. Modi Food appellant contested the claim. It contended that the Products Co. non-availability of groundnut and neem seeds as Limited mentioned in the notice was true, and that the lay v. off was bona fide. It also claimed that section 22( a) Shri Faqir Chand'' of the Act had no application to the dispute, as the Sharma and others notice distinctly stated that the workmen would be Ven;;:;; rama paid compensation as provided in section 25-C of the AyyarJ.\n\nIndustrial Disputes Act as amended by Act XLIII of 1953. It also contended that under that section compensation was payable only for the first 45 days at the rate mentioned in the body of the section and not for any period subsequent thereto. The Tribunal held that the lay off was justified. It further held on a construction of section 25-C that the workmen were entitled to half the basic wages and dearness allowance not merely for the first 45 days but for the entire period, and that as the appellant did \"not\n\nobserve the provisions of that section\", there was an alteration of the conditions of service within section 22(a) of the Act. It accordingly awarded compensation for the whole of the period at 50 per cent. of the basic wages and darness allowance. Against this decision, the management has preferred this appeal by special leave.\n\nOn behalf of the appellant, Sri Veda Vyas contended firstly, that on its finding that the lay off was justified, the only order which the Tribunal could have passed was one of dismissal of the petition filed by the respondents, and that\"the award of compensation was, in consequence, without jurisdiction; and secondly, that on a true construction of section 25-C\n\nof the Industrial Disputes Act, the workmen were entitled to compensation only for a period of 45 days as provided in proviso (a) to section 25-C. We are of opinion that both these contentions axe well-founded.\n\nOn the first question, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to grant relief under sectin 23 of the Act arises only if it is made out that there was contravention of section 22 by the management. The respondents understood this position quite correctly, and with\n\n1956 a view to bring themselves within section 23, they -- alleged that the lay off was not bona fide, inasmuch as, Ml s. Modi Food\n\nProducts Co. in fact, groundnut and neem seeds were available. This Limited contention rests on the supposition that the condiv. tions under which wotkmen could be laid off are con- Shri Faqir Chand ditions as to their service, and• that when the em-\n\nSharma and others ployer lays off workmen without proper grounds\n\ny,,,;;;;;, mt> therefor, it is a violation of the conditions of service Ayy:r J. within section 22( a) of the Act.\n\nThere was some argument before us whether lay off, whether justifiable or otherwise, could be brought within section 22(a) of the Act as amounting to breach of the conditions of service. On the one hand, the argument was that the expression \"conditions of service\" would include only such conditions as would operate when the workmen were actually in service, such as the quantum of wages, hours of work, provision for leave and so forth, and that when there was a lay off, these conditions could by their very nature have no application, and that if the lay off was unjustified, that would give the workmen a right to take proceedings under the provisions. of the Industrial Disputes Act, but that they could make no claim under section 23 as for a breach of the provisions of section 22(a). The contention, on the other side, was that the workmen and the management should be deemed to have agreed that there would be lay off only for good and proper reasons and under .conditions permitted by law, and that if those conditions were not satisfied, the lay off would be an alteration of the conditions of service within section 22(a). The question is one of some importance, but it is unnecessary to express any opinion on it, as counsel for the appellant conceded after some argument that conditions under which the workmen could be laid off would be conditions of service. On this footing, he contended that as the lay off was, in fact, justified, there was no breach of those conditions, and that, in consequence, section 22(a) of the Act had no application. On behalf of the respondents, it is argued that the lay off must, by its very nature, be temporary and of short duration, and that if it is for\n\na long or indefinite period as in the present case, it could not be said to be a proper lay off such as could\n\nMfs. Modi Food be deemed to have been agreed to by the workmen, Products co. and that section 22(a) of the Act would, there.fore, be Limited applicable. v.\n\nIt is common ground that there are no statutory Shri Faqir Cliand rules prescribing the conditions under which tere Sharma and others could be a lay off. If there had been, they w.ould ope- Venkatarama rate as conditions of service between the parties, and Ayyar J. then the question would simply have been whether there had been a compliance with them. Under the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act XX of 1946, certain Standing Orders had been framed with reference to this matter. Counsel on both sides state that after the enactment of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act XLIIIofl953, they are no longer in force, and that there are no statutory provisions applicable to the present d.ispute. We must, therefore, decide the question on the footing that the only condition which the parties might be taken to have agreed to is that the lay off should be for adequate grounds and for a reasonable period. On this question, there is a clear finding in favour of the appellant. The Tribunal has found that groundnut and neem seeds were not available at parity prices,.and that for that reason, the work had to be stopped. It is not likely thap businessmen would cut their profits to spite the workmen. The period of the lay off was expressed to be until the next groundnut season, and we have been told that the season for groundnut begins sometime in November- December. In fact, all the respondents have been reemployed in relays from September onwards, and by the first week of December all of them had been absorbed. On the finding of the Tribunal that the. lay off was justified, it follows that the application of the respondents under section 23 of the Act was liable to be dismissed on the ground that there had been no contravention of section 22(a).\n\nBut, notwithstanding this finding, the Tribunal went on to hold that the application under section 23 of the Act was maintainable.\n\nTo appreciate the\n\n1956 reasoning behind this decision, it is necessary to refer to section 25-C of the Industrial Disputes Act, ~Ifs. Modi Food\n\nProducts co. which runs as follows: Limited \"Right of workmen laid-off for compensation: v.\n\nWhenever a workman (other than a badli workman Shri Faqir CJoand or a casual workman) whose name is borne on the Sliarmaandothers muster rolls of an industrial establishment and who\n\nVenkatarama has completed not less than one year of continuous A:; yar J. service under an employer is laid-off, he shall be paid by the employer for all days during which he is so laid off, except for such weekly holidays as may intervene, compensation which shall be equal to fifty per cent. of the total of the basic wages and dearness allowance that would have been payable to him had he not been so laid off: Provided that- ( a) the compensation payable to a workman during any period of twelve months shall not be for more than forty-five days except in the case specified in clause (b);\n\n(b) if during any period of twelve months, a workman has been paid compensation for forty-five days and during the same period of twelve months he is again laid off for further continuous periods of more than one week at a time, he shall, unless there is any agreement to the contrary between him and the employer, be paid for all the days during such subsequent periods of lay-off compensation at the rate specified in this section\".\n\nThe appellant does not dispute the right of the respondents to compensation, and, in fact, they were informed by the very notice dated 12-7-1954 under which they were laid off, that compensation would be paid to them in accordance with section 25-C. It is as regards the quantum of compensation payable nnder that section that the parties are disagreed. It will be remembered that the lay off commenced on 14-7-1954 and was to continue until the next groundnut season, and that the workers were actually absorbed in batches from September,.and that by the first week of December, they had all of them been employed. There was thus one continuous lay off\n\nfor periods varying from 57 to 121 days. The conteng_s tion of the appellant is that, on these facts, the work- M/s. Modi Food men were entitled to compensation only in accordance Products co. with proviso (a) to section 25-C, and that they would Limited therefore be entitled to 50 per cent. of the basic v. wages and dearness allowance for the first 45 days Shri Faqir Chand and for the rest of the period, no compensation was Sharma and_ others payable. The re&pondents agree that proviso (a) to .venk;;;;.ama section 25-C applies to the first period of 45 days; but Ayyar 1. they contend that for the remaining period of the lay off, the governing provision is proviso (b) to section 25-C, and that under that proviso, they would be entitled to compensation as provided in the body of the section, i.e. 50 per cent. of the basic wages and dearness allowance, for the remaining period also. This contention was accepted by the Tribunal, and holding that the compensation awarded by the appellant was not in accordance with section 25-C, it decided, as already mentioned, that there was an alteration of the conditions of service, and accordingly awarded compensation under section 23 of the Act.\n\nIt is contended for the appellant that the construction which the Tribunal has put on section 25-C is erroneous, and that the amount of compensation offered by the appellant was the correct amount payable under that section. As already stated, there is no dispute that the compensation payable for the first 45 days has to be determined in accordance with proviso (a) to section 25-C. The dispute is only as to whether for the rest of the period of lay off the workmen are entitled to compensationunder proviso (b) to section 25-C. That proviso would apply only if the workmen had been paid compensation for 45 days, and were again laid off for further periods of more than one week at a time. On the wording of the section, it is clear that the lay off whjch falls within proviso (b) to section 25-C must be distinct from that for which compensation had been paid in accordance with proviso (a) to section 25-C and subsequent thereto in point of time. And as, in the present case, there was one continuous lay off for the entire period, proviso (b) could have no application.\n\n1956 Counsel for the respondents contends that though\n\nM/s. Modi Food there was only one lay off, it should notionally be split Products co, up into two, the first period being the 45 days covered umited by proviso (a) to the section and the rest of the period, v. by proviso (_b). It is arguable that there could be a Shri Faqir Chand second and distinct lay off following the first with- Sharma and others out a break, as for example, when the management\n\nV.nkatar\"ma first notifies lay off for a period of 4;5 days and pays Ayyar J. compensation therefor, and again issues a fresh notification at the end of the period declaring a further lay off for a period exceeding 7 days in continuation of the notified.Jay off, and that that would fall within proviso (b). But, in the present case, there was only one notification, and the period specified therein was up to the next season. By no straining of the language of proviso (b) to section 25-C can such a lay off be brought within its purview. The respondents rely in support of their contention on the decision in Automobile Products of India Ltd. v. Their Workmen(').\n\nBut that decision gives no effect whatever to the words \"again laid off'', and moreover, if the construction adopted therein is correct, there would be no need for the provisos (a) and (b), as what would be payable under them, according to the respondents, would become payable under the body of the section itself. If, as observed in the above decision, this conclusion leads to an anomalous position, it is for the legislature, if it thinks fit, to amend the section and not for the Tribunal to construe it otherwise than what it plainly means. We are accordingly of opinion that the respondents are entitled to compensation only for the 45 days as provided in proviso (a), and that as the appellant had offered to pay the same by its notice dated 12-7-1954, there was ilo alteration of the conditions of service within section 22 of the Act, and that, in consequence, the petition of the respondents was liable to be rejected.\n\nWe accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order of the Tribunal, and dismiss the petition of the respondents. The parties will bear their own costs.\n\n{1) [1955} l Labour Law Journal 67.", "total_entities": 88, "entities": [{"text": "M/s. MODI FOOD PRODUCTS CO. LIMITED", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 36, "end_char": 71, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M/s. MODI FOOD PRODUCTS CO. LIMITED", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "FAQIR CHAND SHARMA & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 105, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "FAQIR CHAND SHARMA & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 109, "end_char": 122, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B. JAGANNADHADAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 147, "end_char": 162, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Ss. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 238, "end_char": 244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 315, "end_char": 320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 340, "end_char": 348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 471, "end_char": 476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 855, "end_char": 860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 864, "end_char": 887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s.23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 943, "end_char": 947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1396, "end_char": 1401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1551, "end_char": 1556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "22nd August 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1861, "end_char": 1877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 22nd August 1955 of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India at Lucknow in Misc."}}, {"text": "Labour Appellate Tribunal of India at Lucknow", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1885, "end_char": 1930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 22nd August 1955 of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India at Lucknow in Misc."}}, {"text": "Veda Vyas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1968, "end_char": 1977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Veda Vyas, (8."}}, {"text": "K. Kapur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1983, "end_char": 1991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Kapur and N. H. Hingorani, with him) for the appellant. -"}}, {"text": "N. H. Hingorani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1996, "end_char": 2011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Kapur and N. H. Hingorani, with him) for the appellant. -"}}, {"text": "J. N. Bannerji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2044, "end_char": 2058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. N. Bannerji, (P. C. Agarwalla, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "P. C. Agarwalla", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2061, "end_char": 2076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. N. Bannerji, (P. C. Agarwalla, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Modi Food VENKATARAMA AYYAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2186, "end_char": 2213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Modi Food VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-The appellant is a com- Products Co.\n\nA Limited pany registered under the Indian Companies ct, v. and owns a factory called Modi Oil Mills in the dis- Shri Faqir Chan, l trict of Meeru t. The responeen ts are workmen em- Sharma and others ployed in the Mills."}}, {"text": "12-7-1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2557, "end_char": 2566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 12-7-1954 the management put up the following notice:\n\n\"Notice is hereby given that due to non-availability of groundnut seed and neem seed at the parity with the ruling prices of the groundnut oil and neem oil, the Management is reluctantly compelled to close the Groundnut Crushing Section and Neem Section till the next groundnut season and thus the workers in the attached list are surplus and their services are laid off with effect from 14th July, 1954."}}, {"text": "14th July, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3000, "end_char": 3015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 12-7-1954 the management put up the following notice:\n\n\"Notice is hereby given that due to non-availability of groundnut seed and neem seed at the parity with the ruling prices of the groundnut oil and neem oil, the Management is reluctantly compelled to close the Groundnut Crushing Section and Neem Section till the next groundnut season and thus the workers in the attached list are surplus and their services are laid off with effect from 14th July, 1954."}}, {"text": "Section 25(D)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3231, "end_char": 3244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "14th July 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3419, "end_char": 3433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pursuant to this notice, 142 workmen mentioned therein, being the respondents in this appeal, were laid off from the 14th July 1954."}}, {"text": "26-7-1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3438, "end_char": 3447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 26-7-1954 the workmen acting through their Union sent a notice to the management demanding full wages for the period of lay off on the ground that it was unjustified and illegal."}}, {"text": "section 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3729, "end_char": 3741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3749, "end_char": 3772, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4040, "end_char": 4050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4058, "end_char": 4081, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Meerut", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4137, "end_char": 4143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That dispute had been referred under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act for adjudication to the Regional Conciliation Officer, Meerut."}}, {"text": "Modi Food bunal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4272, "end_char": 4287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He had pronounced his award, and against that, both the parties\n\n1955 had preferred appeals to the Labour Appellate Tri-\n\nM/s. Modi Food bunal, and they were pending at the date of the Products co. notice.", "canonical_name": "Modi Food bunal"}}, {"text": "Sliri Faqir Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4511, "end_char": 4528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Limited Act XL VIII of 1950, hereinafter referred to as the v.\n\nAct, contains special provisions with reference to Sliri Faqir Chand certain disputes which might arise between parties, Sharma and others when there is already pending adjudication between\n\nVenkataraina them another industrial dispute."}}, {"text": "Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4581, "end_char": 4587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Limited Act XL VIII of 1950, hereinafter referred to as the v.\n\nAct, contains special provisions with reference to Sliri Faqir Chand certain disputes which might arise between parties, Sharma and others when there is already pending adjudication between\n\nVenkataraina them another industrial dispute."}}, {"text": "Venkataraina", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4651, "end_char": 4663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Limited Act XL VIII of 1950, hereinafter referred to as the v.\n\nAct, contains special provisions with reference to Sliri Faqir Chand certain disputes which might arise between parties, Sharma and others when there is already pending adjudication between\n\nVenkataraina them another industrial dispute.", "canonical_name": "Venkataraina"}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4838, "end_char": 4848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5307, "end_char": 5317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "24-8-1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5790, "end_char": 5799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on 24-8-1954 the respondents filed an application before the Labour Appellate Tribunal under section 23 of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5880, "end_char": 5890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6247, "end_char": 6260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Modi Food", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6421, "end_char": 6430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The M/s. Modi Food appellant contested the claim.", "canonical_name": "Modi Food bunal"}}, {"text": "section 22( a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6647, "end_char": 6661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Faqir Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6667, "end_char": 6678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It also claimed that section 22( a) Shri Faqir Chand'' of the Act had no application to the dispute, as the Sharma and others notice distinctly stated that the workmen would be Ven;;:;; rama paid compensation as provided in section 25-C of the AyyarJ.\n\nIndustrial Disputes Act as amended by Act XLIII of 1953."}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6850, "end_char": 6860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act as amended by Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6879, "end_char": 6920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7209, "end_char": 7219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act as amended by Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act as amended by Act"}}, {"text": "section 22(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7497, "end_char": 7510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act as amended by Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act as amended by Act"}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8079, "end_char": 8089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8100, "end_char": 8123, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8226, "end_char": 8236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8466, "end_char": 8476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8603, "end_char": 8613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Modi Food\n\nProducts Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8686, "end_char": 8709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents understood this position quite correctly, and with\n\n1956 a view to bring themselves within section 23, they -- alleged that the lay off was not bona fide, inasmuch as, Ml s. Modi Food\n\nProducts Co. in fact, groundnut and neem seeds were available."}}, {"text": "Ayy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9087, "end_char": 9090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tions under which wotkmen could be laid off are con- Shri Faqir Chand ditions as to their service, and• that when the em-\n\nSharma and others ployer lays off workmen without proper grounds\n\ny,,,;;;;;, mt> therefor, it is a violation of the conditions of service Ayy:r J. within section 22( a) of the Act.", "canonical_name": "Ayyar"}}, {"text": "section 22( a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9103, "end_char": 9117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9240, "end_char": 9253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9796, "end_char": 9819, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9861, "end_char": 9871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9909, "end_char": 9922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10252, "end_char": 10265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10649, "end_char": 10662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11036, "end_char": 11049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11364, "end_char": 11369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If there had been, they w.ould ope- Venkatarama rate as conditions of service between the parties, and Ayyar J. then the question would simply have been whether there had been a compliance with them.", "canonical_name": "Ayyar"}}, {"text": "Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11489, "end_char": 11532, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12778, "end_char": 12788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12881, "end_char": 12894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12988, "end_char": 12998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13113, "end_char": 13123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13133, "end_char": 13156, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Modi Food\n\nProducts co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13164, "end_char": 13187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Modi Food\n\nProducts co. which runs as follows: Limited \"Right of workmen laid-off for compensation: v.\n\nWhenever a workman (other than a badli workman Shri Faqir CJoand or a casual workman) whose name is borne on the Sliarmaandothers muster rolls of an industrial establishment and who\n\nVenkatarama has completed not less than one year of continuous A:; yar J. service under an employer is laid-off, he shall be paid by the employer for all days during which he is so laid off, except for such weekly holidays as may intervene, compensation which shall be equal to fifty per cent."}}, {"text": "Faqir CJoand", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13320, "end_char": 13332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Modi Food\n\nProducts co. which runs as follows: Limited \"Right of workmen laid-off for compensation: v.\n\nWhenever a workman (other than a badli workman Shri Faqir CJoand or a casual workman) whose name is borne on the Sliarmaandothers muster rolls of an industrial establishment and who\n\nVenkatarama has completed not less than one year of continuous A:; yar J. service under an employer is laid-off, he shall be paid by the employer for all days during which he is so laid off, except for such weekly holidays as may intervene, compensation which shall be equal to fifty per cent."}}, {"text": "Venkatarama", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13451, "end_char": 13462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Modi Food\n\nProducts co. which runs as follows: Limited \"Right of workmen laid-off for compensation: v.\n\nWhenever a workman (other than a badli workman Shri Faqir CJoand or a casual workman) whose name is borne on the Sliarmaandothers muster rolls of an industrial establishment and who\n\nVenkatarama has completed not less than one year of continuous A:; yar J. service under an employer is laid-off, he shall be paid by the employer for all days during which he is so laid off, except for such weekly holidays as may intervene, compensation which shall be equal to fifty per cent.", "canonical_name": "Venkataraina"}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14718, "end_char": 14728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "14-7-1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14888, "end_char": 14897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It will be remembered that the lay off commenced on 14-7-1954 and was to continue until the next groundnut season, and that the workers were actually absorbed in batches from September,.and that by the first week of December, they had all of them been employed."}}, {"text": "Modi Food men", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15254, "end_char": 15267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contengs tion of the appellant is that, on these facts, the work- M/s. Modi Food men were entitled to compensation only in accordance Products co. with proviso (a) to section 25-C, and that they would Limited therefore be entitled to 50 per cent."}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15350, "end_char": 15360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15650, "end_char": 15660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15817, "end_char": 15827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16163, "end_char": 16173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16313, "end_char": 16323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16423, "end_char": 16433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16708, "end_char": 16718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16855, "end_char": 16865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17125, "end_char": 17135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17236, "end_char": 17246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Modi Food", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17475, "end_char": 17484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1956 Counsel for the respondents contends that though\n\nM/s. Modi Food there was only one lay off, it should notionally be split Products co, up into two, the first period being the 45 days covered umited by proviso (a) to the section and the rest of the period, v. by proviso (_b)."}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18350, "end_char": 18360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19362, "end_char": 19372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1956_1_569_576_EN", "year": 1956, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS_ 569\n\nTHE STATE OF PUNJAB v.\n\nKHARAITI LAL.\n\n[JAGANNADHADAS and B. P. SINHA JJ.]\n\nEast Punjab Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1947 (East Punjab AcO XIII of 1947 ), ss. 8, 5, 7-Complaint-Whether it\n\nshould be authorised by the State Government-Police Act, 1861 (V of 1861), ss. 22, 29-Absence from Police Lines-Neglect of duty- Whether amounts to abandonment of employment or absence from work.\n\nSection 7(3) of the Ea.st Punjab Essential Services (Mainten a.nee) Act, 194 7, provides that \"no court shall take cognisance of any offence under this Act except upon complaint in writing ma.de by a person authorised in this behalf by the State Government\".\n\nHeld, that the law does not require that the particular com plaint chould have been authorised by the State Government and it is sufficient if it has been filed by a person authorised by the State Government to do so.\n\nNeglect of duty as contemplated by s. 29 of the Police Act, 1861, is quite different from abandoning an employment or absent ing oneself from work without reasonable cause within the meaning of s. 5(b) of the East Punjab Essential Services (Maintenance) Act.\n\nThe respondent, a constable, on account of physical infirmity was not assigned any \"work\" in the Police Lines within the mean ing of cl. (b) of s. 5 of the Ea.st Punjab Essential Services (Ma.inten ance) Act. He absented himself from the Police Lines without per mission. Held, that his absence from Police Lines during the rele vant time may have a.mounted to neglect of duty but he could not be convicted under s. 5(b).\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Ap'peal No. 140 of 1954.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 23rd July 1953 of the Punjab High Court in Criminal Revision No. 487 of 1953 arising out of the judgment and order dated the 17th April 1953 of the Court of Sessions Judge at Hoshiarpur in Criminal Appeal No. D/1 of 1953.\n\nN. S. Bindra and P. G. Gokhale, for the appellant.\n\nA. N. Chona and K. L. Mehta for the respondent.\n\nMoy&\n\nThe State of Punjab v.\n\nKhaf'aiti Lal\n\n1956. May 8.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by SINHA J.-This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment of a single Judge of the High Court of Judicature of. Punjab at Simla in Criminal Revision No. 487 of 1953 dated the 23rd July 1953 acquitting the respondent, a constable in the police force of the State of an offence under section 7 of the East Punjab Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, XIII of 1947 (which hereinafter will be referred to as \"the Act\"), for which he had been convicted by a Magistrate of the First Class at Dharamsala by his judgment d'ated the 30th March 1953 and sentenced to 15 days' rigorous imprisonment, which orders of conviction and sentence had been affirmed by the Sessions Judge of Hoshiarpur, Camp Dharanisala, by his judgment and order dated the 17th April 1953.\n\nThe facts leading up to this appeal may shortly be stated.\n\nThe respondent was prosecuted on a complaint filed , l>y the Superintendent of Police, Kangra District, in the Court of the Ilaqa Magistrate, Dharamsala, District Kangra, for an offence under section 7 of the Act.\n\nThe allegations against the respondent were that he joined the Police Department as a constable in Jullundur District in 1947, that in December 1952 he was transferred from Jullundur District to Kangra District and posted to Police Lines, Kangra, as a constable on general duty at Seraj police station; that in January 1953 he came to Police Lines, Dharamsala for monthly training (refresher course), that on the 2nd February 1953 at the time of roll call at 7 p.m. the appellant was assigned the duty as sentry No. 1 without rifle behind the Police Lines Armoury, Dharamsala, from 9 p.m. to 11 p.m.\n\nThe respondent, though informed of the assignment of the aforesaid duty to him, refused to obey that order or to perform any other duty in the Lines.\n\nThere- . upon his name was struck off from the Duty Roster and another foot constable was duly placed in that post of duty. On the night between the 2nd and 3rd February 1953 at 11-30 p.m. a surprise roll call of the employees of the Police Lines was duly made by means\n\nof an alarm sounded with a bugle which was blown continuously for about 15 minutes. The respondent was found absent on such a roll call and another constable was deputed to search for the respondent but he could not be found.\n\nHe appeared the next morning at about 9-30 a.m. after remaining absent from the Police Lines without offering any explanation for his unauthorised absence. The gravamen of the charge as laid in the petition of complaint was that he refused to carry out the order of his superior officer who had assigned a duty to him and that he remained absent from his official duty in the Police\n\nLines without obtaining permission and without any cogent reasons, from 11-30 p.m. on the 2nd February 1953 till 9-30 a.m. on the day following.\n\nThus he was said to have committed an offence under section 7 of the Act.\n\nOn those allegations the respondent was placed on his trial before the Magistrate of the First Class at Dharamsala.\n\nAfter recording the prosecution evidence the learned Magistrate framed a charge under section 7 of the Act under two heads, firstly, that he had on the 2nd February 1953 at Dharamsala as a foot constable in the police force of the Kangra District had disobeyed the lawful orders given by a superior officer who had assigned to him a duty as such foot constable of a sentry without rifle in the rear of the armoury in the Police Lines from 9 p.m. to 11 p.m. and, secondly, that on the same date and at the same place he had absented himself from duty as a foot constable without reasonable excuse and had thus remained absent from 11-30 p.m. on the 2nd February 1953 to 9-30 a.m. of the following day.\n\nThe respondent's defence as disclosed in his answer to questions put by the court under section 342, Criminal Procedure Code was one of denial of the charge. His substantive defence may be stated in his own words:-\n\n\"On 2nd February, 1953 at 7 p.m. my duty was allotted to me and I signed at Ex. P. D./I.\n\nI then told Raghbir Singh P.W. that according to the Civil Surgeon, Jullundur I could only be given sitting or\n\nThe State of Punjab v.\n\nKharaiti Lal\n\nSinha}.\n\nTh• Slate of Punjab v.\n\nHharaiti Lal\n\nSinha J.\n\noffice duty. I showed him the copy Exhibit D. E. I also told him that the Civil Surgeon, Dharamsala, bad also examined that very day on 2nd February\n\n1953. 'Thereupon Ragbbir Singh P.W. cancelled my said duty. I was lying ill in the Police Lines Barracks and did not hear the bugle.\n\nIn the morning of 3rd February, 1953, I came to know that my absence had been noted. Thereupon I presented myself for duty to the Head Constable and signed at Exhibit P.E./I.\n\nMy leg was burnt in rescue work at Gujranwalla when I was in the special Police Lines\".\n\nHe also examined a number of defence witnesses including the Civil Surgeon of Jullundur who deposed to having examined the respondent on the 27th February 1953 \"and found that he had got extensive burn scars on the back of the right thigh and leg crossing the knee.\n\nHence he could not perform any strenuous duty like standing for long hours.\n\nIn my opinion he could be given some light duty in the office.\n\nEx. D. W. l/D is a true copy of my medico-legal report of this case\".\n\nThe learned Magistrate acquitted the accused in respect of the first part of the charge relating to his alleged disobedience of the lawful orders of his superior officer to perform sentry duty. But he convicted .him of the second part of the charge, namely, absence from duty and sentenced him to 15 days' rigorous imprisonment. On appeal by the accused, the learned Sessions Judge affirmed the_ findings of the trial Magistrate and held that the appellant before him was absent from duty without permission during the night between the 2nd and 3rd February 1953.\n\nHe accordingly dismissed the appeal.\n\nOn a revisional application made by the convicted person, the learned single Judge who heard the case, came to the conclusion that the accused had not offended against any provisions of the Act.\n\nAccordingly he acquitted him. The ratio of his decision may be given in his own words as follows:-\n\n\"This Act does not appear to me to apply to the kind of act which the constable is said to have done.\n\nHe had been called to Dharamsala on a refresher\n\ncourse and on the night in question and in the early morning he appears to have been not present at the time when be according to the prosecution should have been present. This, in my opinion, does not attract the attention of the Essential Services Maintenance Act. It is possible that if he is guilty he is liable to some disciplinary punishment, but his prosecution under the East Punjab Essential Services Maintenance Act is in my opinion not justified. I hold that he has not offended against the provisions of this Act and therefore he has not committed any offence under this Act\".\n\nAgainst this order of acquittal the State of Punjab obtained special leave to appeal to this Court, apparently because the judgment of the learned Judge of the High Court involved very important questions as to the scope and effect of the Act and the question of law decided by the High Court was of great public importance.\n\nThis case was first placed on the 11th April this year before another Bench of this Court and learned counsel for the respondent raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the prosecution on the ground, it was alleged, that there was no proper complaint under section 7(3) of the Act and as this question had not been raised in any of the courts below and as counsel for the appellant was taken by surprise, the Bench granted two weeks time to enable him to satisfy the court that there was a proper compliance with the provisions of section 7(3) of the Act. When the matter came up before us for hearing, the learned counsel for the appellant placed before us the following notification by the Punjab Government authorising all police officers above the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police and the Heads of the various Government Departments to make complaints in writing to a court in respect of alleged offences against the Act:-\n\n\" Dated Simla-2, the 20th January, 1948.\n\nNo. 1248-H Camp-48/2075.-ln exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (3) of section 7 of the East Punjab Essential Services (Maintenance) Act\n\n1956_\n\nTire State of\n\nP11njab\n\nK/imaiti I.al\n\nSinha J.\n\nThe State of Punjab v.\n\nKharaiti Lal\n\nSinhaJ.\n\n1947, the Governor of the East Punjab is pleased to authorise all police officers of and above the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police and the Heads of the various Government Departments to make complaints in writing to a court against persons of their respective Departments, who are alleged to have committed offences against the Act.\n\nSd. Nawab Singh Home Secretary to Govt. of East Punjab\".\n\nOn a reference to the notification quoted above, it is clear that the complaint filed by. the Superintendent of Police, Kangra District, in the court of the Ilaqa Magistrate, Dharamsala in the district of Kangra, was filed in compliance with the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 7 of the Act which is in these terms:-\n\n\"N o court shall take cognisance of any offence under this Act except upon complaint in writing made by a person authorised in this behalf by the State Government\".\n\nBut it was argued on behalf of the respondent that there was nothing to show that the complaint on the basis of which the prosecution had been initiated in this case had been authorised by the State Government. The law does not require that the particular complaint should have been authorised by the State Government. What is required is that the complaint should have been filed by a person authorised by the State Government to do so. The notification has authorised a Superintendent of Police to file a complaint in respect of a contravention of the provisions of the Act by a person in his department. It is not denied that the respondent was such a person. Hence the preliminary objection.must be overruled.\n\nComing to the merits of the decieion, it is a little surprising that the learned Judge below should have completely ignored the opening words of section 3 of the Act which completely answer the ratio of the decision under appeal.\n\n\"This Act shall apply to all employment under the State Government ........ \" (omitting words not material for the present case).\n\nThe learned Judge of the High Court has quotea the provisions of sections 5 and 6 of the Act in support of his conclusion that the Act is \"intended to be applied in special cases of dislocation of essential services because of extraordinary events such as strikes or because of political agitation or similar circumstances\". The relevant portion of section 5 is in these terms:-\n\n\" Any person engaged in any employment or class of employment to which this Act applies who- ( a) disobeys any lawful order given to him in the course of such employment, or . (b) without reasonable excuse abandons such employment or absents himself from work,\n\nis guilty of an offence under this Act\".\n\nThe opening words of section 5 have reference to the opening words of section 3 so far as an employee under the State Government is concerned. As the learned Judge missed these opening words as indicated above, he fell into the error of supposing that a)>erson in the position of the respondent was not intended to be governed by the Act. It is mainfest that the learned Judge has acquitted the appellant, not on a misreading of the provisions of the Act, but by ignoring the opening words of section 3. It must therefore be held that the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained. But it still remains to consider whether the orders passed by the High Court acquitting the respondent should be interfered with. The courts below have acquitted the respondent of the first part of the charge which could have come within clause (a) of section 5 which lays down offences under the Act. The respondent had been convicted by the first two courts of an offence referred to in the second part of the charge, namely, of his having absented himself from duty.\n\nUnder section 22 of the Police Act, V of 1861, every police officer is to be considered to be always on duty and may at any time be employed as a police officer, and on the findings of the courts of fact that the respondent had absented himself from the Police Lines\n\nThe State of\n\nPttnjab\n\nKharaiti Lal\n\nSi11ha J.\n\nThe State of\n\nPunjab\n\nKltaraiti Lal\n\nSinha}.\n\nduring the night between the 2nd and 3rd February 1953 he may have made himself liable to the penalty for neglect of duty under section 29 of the Police Act, or may have made himself liable to departmental punishment for absence from the police lines without permission. But we are not concerned here with these provisions. The respondent bad been found guilty under clause (b) of section 5, that is to say, for the offence of absenting himself from work. Neglect of duty as contemplated by section 29 of the Police Act is quite different from abandoning an employment or of absenting oneself from work without reasonable cause which is the particular offence contemplated by clause (b) of section 5.\n\nAs already indicated, on account of the respondent's physical infirmity or deficiency the work assigned to l:lim had been cancelled and he was expected to be in police lines during the material time without apparently doing any \"work\". It is clear from the record that he bad not been assigned any \"work\" within the meaning of clause (b) of section 5. Hence his absence from Police Lines during the relevant time may have amounted to neglect of duty; but, in our opinion, is not synonymous with absence from work or abandonment of employment which has been made penal under clause (b) of section 5.\n\nFor the reasons aforesaid it must be held that the respondent bad been rightly acquitted, though for wholly wrong reasons. The appeal must therefore stand dismissed.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 71, "entities": [{"text": "569\n\nTHE STATE OF PUNJAB", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 55, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF PUNJAB", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "KHARAITI LAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 72, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KHARAITI LAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 76, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B. JAGANNADHADAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 8, 5, 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 200, "end_char": 211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "should be authorised by the State Government-Police Act, 1861", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 234, "end_char": 295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 22, 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 309, "end_char": 319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Complaint-Whether it\n\nshould be authorised by the State Government-Police Act, 1861", "statute": "Complaint-Whether it\n\nshould be authorised by the State Government-Police Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "Section 7(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 431, "end_char": 443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Complaint-Whether it\n\nshould be authorised by the State Government-Police Act, 1861", "statute": "Complaint-Whether it\n\nshould be authorised by the State Government-Police Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "s. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 945, "end_char": 950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Complaint-Whether it\n\nshould be authorised by the State Government-Police Act, 1861", "statute": "Complaint-Whether it\n\nshould be authorised by the State Government-Police Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "Police Act, 1861", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 958, "end_char": 974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 5(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1104, "end_char": 1111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Police Act, 1861", "statute": "the Police Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1314, "end_char": 1318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Police Act, 1861", "statute": "the Police Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "s. 5(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1583, "end_char": 1590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Police Act, 1861", "statute": "the Police Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "N. S. Bindra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1946, "end_char": 1958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. S. Bindra and P. G. Gokhale, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokhale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1963, "end_char": 1976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. S. Bindra and P. G. Gokhale, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "A. N. Chona", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1998, "end_char": 2009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. N. Chona and K. L. Mehta for the respondent."}}, {"text": "K. L. Mehta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2014, "end_char": 2025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. N. Chona and K. L. Mehta for the respondent."}}, {"text": "SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2149, "end_char": 2154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SINHA J.-This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment of a single Judge of the High Court of Judicature of.", "canonical_name": "SINHA"}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature of. Punjab at Simla", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2236, "end_char": 2280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SINHA J.-This is an appeal by special leave from the judgment of a single Judge of the High Court of Judicature of."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2435, "end_char": 2444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dharamsala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2639, "end_char": 2649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "487 of 1953 dated the 23rd July 1953 acquitting the respondent, a constable in the police force of the State of an offence under section 7 of the East Punjab Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, XIII of 1947 (which hereinafter will be referred to as \"the Act\"), for which he had been convicted by a Magistrate of the First Class at Dharamsala by his judgment d'ated the 30th March 1953 and sentenced to 15 days' rigorous imprisonment, which orders of conviction and sentence had been affirmed by the Sessions Judge of Hoshiarpur, Camp Dharanisala, by his judgment and order dated the 17th April 1953."}}, {"text": "Sessions Judge of Hoshiarpur, Camp Dharanisala", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2807, "end_char": 2853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "487 of 1953 dated the 23rd July 1953 acquitting the respondent, a constable in the police force of the State of an offence under section 7 of the East Punjab Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, XIII of 1947 (which hereinafter will be referred to as \"the Act\"), for which he had been convicted by a Magistrate of the First Class at Dharamsala by his judgment d'ated the 30th March 1953 and sentenced to 15 days' rigorous imprisonment, which orders of conviction and sentence had been affirmed by the Sessions Judge of Hoshiarpur, Camp Dharanisala, by his judgment and order dated the 17th April 1953."}}, {"text": "Ilaqa Magistrate, Dharamsala, District Kangra", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3093, "end_char": 3138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent was prosecuted on a complaint filed , l>y the Superintendent of Police, Kangra District, in the Court of the Ilaqa Magistrate, Dharamsala, District Kangra, for an offence under section 7 of the Act."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3161, "end_char": 3170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jullundur District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3283, "end_char": 3301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The allegations against the respondent were that he joined the Police Department as a constable in Jullundur District in 1947, that in December 1952 he was transferred from Jullundur District to Kangra District and posted to Police Lines, Kangra, as a constable on general duty at Seraj police station; that in January 1953 he came to Police Lines, Dharamsala for monthly training (refresher course), that on the 2nd February 1953 at the time of roll call at 7 p.m. the appellant was assigned the duty as sentry No."}}, {"text": "Kangra District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3379, "end_char": 3394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The allegations against the respondent were that he joined the Police Department as a constable in Jullundur District in 1947, that in December 1952 he was transferred from Jullundur District to Kangra District and posted to Police Lines, Kangra, as a constable on general duty at Seraj police station; that in January 1953 he came to Police Lines, Dharamsala for monthly training (refresher course), that on the 2nd February 1953 at the time of roll call at 7 p.m. the appellant was assigned the duty as sentry No."}}, {"text": "Seraj police station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3465, "end_char": 3485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The allegations against the respondent were that he joined the Police Department as a constable in Jullundur District in 1947, that in December 1952 he was transferred from Jullundur District to Kangra District and posted to Police Lines, Kangra, as a constable on general duty at Seraj police station; that in January 1953 he came to Police Lines, Dharamsala for monthly training (refresher course), that on the 2nd February 1953 at the time of roll call at 7 p.m. the appellant was assigned the duty as sentry No."}}, {"text": "2nd February 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3597, "end_char": 3614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The allegations against the respondent were that he joined the Police Department as a constable in Jullundur District in 1947, that in December 1952 he was transferred from Jullundur District to Kangra District and posted to Police Lines, Kangra, as a constable on general duty at Seraj police station; that in January 1953 he came to Police Lines, Dharamsala for monthly training (refresher course), that on the 2nd February 1953 at the time of roll call at 7 p.m. the appellant was assigned the duty as sentry No."}}, {"text": "2nd and 3rd February 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4085, "end_char": 4110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the night between the 2nd and 3rd February 1953 at 11-30 p.m. a surprise roll call of the employees of the Police Lines was duly made by means\n\nof an alarm sounded with a bugle which was blown continuously for about 15 minutes."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5016, "end_char": 5025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5242, "end_char": 5251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5946, "end_char": 5957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5959, "end_char": 5982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "2nd February, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6078, "end_char": 6096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His substantive defence may be stated in his own words:-\n\n\"On 2nd February, 1953 at 7 p.m. my duty was allotted to me and I signed at Ex."}}, {"text": "Raghbir Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6176, "end_char": 6189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. D./I.\n\nI then told Raghbir Singh P.W. that according to the Civil Surgeon, Jullundur I could only be given sitting or\n\nThe State of Punjab v.\n\nKharaiti Lal\n\nSinha}."}}, {"text": "Jullundur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6232, "end_char": 6241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. D./I.\n\nI then told Raghbir Singh P.W. that according to the Civil Surgeon, Jullundur I could only be given sitting or\n\nThe State of Punjab v.\n\nKharaiti Lal\n\nSinha}."}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6361, "end_char": 6366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th• Slate of Punjab v.\n\nHharaiti Lal\n\nSinha J.\n\noffice duty.", "canonical_name": "SINHA"}}, {"text": "Ragbbir Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6538, "end_char": 6551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon Ragbbir Singh P.W. cancelled my said duty."}}, {"text": "Gujranwalla", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6866, "end_char": 6877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon I presented myself for duty to the Head Constable and signed at Exhibit P.E./I.\n\nMy leg was burnt in rescue work at Gujranwalla when I was in the special Police Lines\"."}}, {"text": "Dharamsala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8423, "end_char": 8433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He had been called to Dharamsala on a refresher\n\ncourse and on the night in question and in the early morning he appears to have been not present at the time when be according to the prosecution should have been present."}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9076, "end_char": 9091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against this order of acquittal the State of Punjab obtained special leave to appeal to this Court, apparently because the judgment of the learned Judge of the High Court involved very important questions as to the scope and effect of the Act and the question of law decided by the High Court was of great public importance."}}, {"text": "Judge of the High Court involved very important questions as to the scope and effect of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9187, "end_char": 9282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 7(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9640, "end_char": 9652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Judge of the High Court involved very important questions as to the scope and effect of the Act", "statute": "Judge of the High Court involved very important questions as to the scope and effect of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 7(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9914, "end_char": 9926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Judge of the High Court involved very important questions as to the scope and effect of the Act", "statute": "Judge of the High Court involved very important questions as to the scope and effect of the Act"}}, {"text": "Punjab Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10075, "end_char": 10092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the matter came up before us for hearing, the learned counsel for the appellant placed before us the following notification by the Punjab Government authorising all police officers above the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police and the Heads of the various Government Departments to make complaints in writing to a court in respect of alleged offences against the Act:-\n\n\" Dated Simla-2, the 20th January, 1948."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10443, "end_char": 10452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nawab Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10959, "end_char": 10970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nawab Singh Home Secretary to Govt."}}, {"text": "Kangra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11133, "end_char": 11139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Superintendent of Police, Kangra District, in the court of the Ilaqa Magistrate, Dharamsala in the district of Kangra, was filed in compliance with the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 7 of the Act which is in these terms:-\n\n\"N o court shall take cognisance of any offence under this Act except upon complaint in writing made by a person authorised in this behalf by the State Government\"."}}, {"text": "Ilaqa Magistrate, Dharamsala", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11170, "end_char": 11198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Superintendent of Police, Kangra District, in the court of the Ilaqa Magistrate, Dharamsala in the district of Kangra, was filed in compliance with the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 7 of the Act which is in these terms:-\n\n\"N o court shall take cognisance of any offence under this Act except upon complaint in writing made by a person authorised in this behalf by the State Government\"."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11292, "end_char": 11301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12366, "end_char": 12375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 5 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12648, "end_char": 12664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12932, "end_char": 12941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13288, "end_char": 13297, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13337, "end_char": 13346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13760, "end_char": 13769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14106, "end_char": 14115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14331, "end_char": 14341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14349, "end_char": 14359, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "State of\n\nPttnjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14597, "end_char": 14614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under section 22 of the Police Act, V of 1861, every police officer is to be considered to be always on duty and may at any time be employed as a police officer, and on the findings of the courts of fact that the respondent had absented himself from the Police Lines\n\nThe State of\n\nPttnjab\n\nKharaiti Lal\n\nSi11ha J.\n\nThe State of\n\nPunjab\n\nKltaraiti Lal\n\nSinha}."}}, {"text": "Kharaiti Lal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14616, "end_char": 14628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under section 22 of the Police Act, V of 1861, every police officer is to be considered to be always on duty and may at any time be employed as a police officer, and on the findings of the courts of fact that the respondent had absented himself from the Police Lines\n\nThe State of\n\nPttnjab\n\nKharaiti Lal\n\nSi11ha J.\n\nThe State of\n\nPunjab\n\nKltaraiti Lal\n\nSinha}.", "canonical_name": "KHARAITI LAL"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nPunjab", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14645, "end_char": 14661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under section 22 of the Police Act, V of 1861, every police officer is to be considered to be always on duty and may at any time be employed as a police officer, and on the findings of the courts of fact that the respondent had absented himself from the Police Lines\n\nThe State of\n\nPttnjab\n\nKharaiti Lal\n\nSi11ha J.\n\nThe State of\n\nPunjab\n\nKltaraiti Lal\n\nSinha}."}}, {"text": "Kltaraiti Lal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14663, "end_char": 14676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under section 22 of the Police Act, V of 1861, every police officer is to be considered to be always on duty and may at any time be employed as a police officer, and on the findings of the courts of fact that the respondent had absented himself from the Police Lines\n\nThe State of\n\nPttnjab\n\nKharaiti Lal\n\nSi11ha J.\n\nThe State of\n\nPunjab\n\nKltaraiti Lal\n\nSinha}."}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14815, "end_char": 14825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14833, "end_char": 14843, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15068, "end_char": 15077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15178, "end_char": 15188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15196, "end_char": 15206, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15377, "end_char": 15386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15730, "end_char": 15739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15977, "end_char": 15986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1956_1_577_591_EN", "year": 1956, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nRAVULA SUBBA RAO AND ANOTHER v.\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nMADRAS.\n\n[S. R. DAS C.J., BHAGWATI and VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR JJ.)\n\nIndian Income Tax Act, 1922 (Act XI of 1922), ss. 26-A; 69, Rules 2 and 6 framed under s. 69-Word 'personally' in theRules- Whether excludes a duly authorised agent from signing an application on behalf of the partner. under s. 26A-Rules 2 and 6-Whether ultra. vires the rule-making authority-Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 -Whether exhaustive of the matters dealt with therein.\n\nRules 2 a.nd 6 of the Rules fro.med under s. 59 of the Indian Income Ta.x Act provide tha.t a.n a.pplica.tion for registration of a. firm under s. 26-A of the Act a.nd for renewal of registration certifi ca.be \"shall be signed persona.Hy by a.ll the parties\".\n\nHeld that the word 'personally' in the Income Ta.x Rules, as framed under s. 59 of the Income Tax Act would exclude a duly authorised agent of a partner of a firm signing an application on behalf of the partner under s. 26-A of the Income Tax Act.\n\n(2) That Rules 2 and 6 a.re not ultra vires the rule-making authority.\n\nTo decide the question whether on its true interpretation the Indian Income Tax Act intended tha.t an application under s. 26-A should be signed by the partner personally, or whether it could be signed by his a.gent on his behalf t)le Court must have regard not - only to the language of s. 96 A but also to the character of the legislation, the scheme of the Act and the nature of j; he right con ferred by the section. The Indian Income Tax Act is a self-contained code exhaustive of the matters dealt with therein, and its provisions show an inten tion to depart from the common rule,' qui facit per alium facit per 88.\n\nIts intention again is that a firm should be given benefit of s. 23(5)(a), only if it is registered under s. 26-A in accordance with the conditions laid down in that section and the rules framed thereunder. And as those rules require the application to be signed by the partner in person, the signature by an agent on his behalf is in valid.\n\nCommissioner of Agricultural Income-tax v. Kesha-b Chandra Mandal, ([1950] S.C.R 435), relied upon.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax v. Subba Rao, ([1947) I.L.R.\n\nMad. 167) approved.\n\nOther case-law referred to.\n\nMay9\n\nRavula Subba Rao\n\nand another\n\nThe Comtnissiontf'\n\nof Income.tax,\n\n- Madras\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Nos. 56 & 57 of1954.\n\nCivil Appeals\n\nAppeal from tho judgment and order dated the 25th day of March 1951 of the Madras High Court in Case Referred Nos. 32 of 1948 and 31 of 1950.\n\nK. S. Krishnaswami Iyengar, (K. R. Ohoudhry, with him) for the appellants.\n\nG, N. Joshi and P. -G. Gokhale, for the respondent.\n\n1956. May 9.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-The appellant is a firm which was Qonstituted under a deed of partnership dated 10-2-1941, and consists of two partners, Subba Rao and Hariprasada Rao. On 21-3-1942 it was registered under section 26-A of the Indian Income- Tax Act No. XI of 1922, hereinafter referred to as the Act, for the assessment year 1942. Sometime thereafter, one of the partners, Subba Rao, is stated to have left on a long pilgrimage, and the affairs of the partnership were then managed by Hariprasada Rao as his agent under a general power-of-attorney dated 1-7-1940. Hariprasada Rao then applied under rules 2 and 6 of the rules framed under section 59 of the Act, for renewal of the registration certificate for the year 1942-43, and the application was signed by him for himself and again as the attorney of Subba Rao. Those rules provide that an application for registration of a firm under section 26-A and for renewal of registration certificate \"shall be signed personally by all the partners\". The Income-tax Officer rejected the application for renewal on the ground that it was not personally signed by one of the partners, Subba Rao, and that the signature of Hariprasada Rao as his agent was not valid.\n\nThe order was taken in appeal, and was ultimately the subject of a reference under section 66(1) of the Act to the High Court of Madras, which held that the word \"personally\" in rule 6 required that the partner\n\nshould himself sign the application, and that the 7956 principles of agency under the general law were Ra'Vula Subba Rao excluded. (Vide Commissioner of Income-tax v. Subba and another Rao(1)). v.\n\nWhile these proceedings were pending, Hariprasada The Commissioner Rao filed the two applications, out of which the 0/ Income-tax, 1 • l f th • t t' Madras present appea s arise, 1or renewa o e reg1s ra 10n certificate for the assessment years 1943-44 and Venkatarama 1944-45. Both of them were signed by him for him- AyyarJ. self and as attorney for Subba Rao. At the hearing of these petitions the appellant, apart from maintaining that rules 2 and 6 did not, on their true construction, exclude signature by an agent on behalf of a partner, raised a further contention that the rules themselves were ultra vires the powers of the rulemaking authority. The Income-tax Officer overruled both these contentions, and rejected the applications, and his order11 were confirmed on appeal by the Appellate Assistant 0ommissioner and then by the Appellate Tribunal. Thereafter, on the application of the appellant, the Tribunal referred the following questions for the decision of the High Court:\n\n\"(1) Whether the word 'personally' in the Income-tax Rules, as framed under section 59 of the Income-tax Act would exclude a duly authorised agent of a partner from signing an application on behalf of the partner under section 26-A of the Income-tax Act?\n\n(2) If the answer to the above question is in the affirmative, whether rules 2 and 6 a.re ultra vires the rule ma.king authority?\"\n\nThe reference was heard by Sa.tyana.ra.yana Rao and Viswanatha Sastry, JJ. Following the decision in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Subba. Rao(1), they answered the first question in the affirmative. On the second question, however, they differed. Satyanarayana Rao, J. held that the rules were ultra vires, and that the applications were in order, and ought to have been granted. Viswanatha Sastry, J. was of\n\nthe contrary opinion, and held that the rules were intra vires, and that the applications were properly\n\n(1) I.L R. [1947] Mad. 167: 1946 I.T.R. l!Sll.\n\n1P56\n\nRavula Subba Rao and another v.\n\nThe Commissioner\n\ncf lncometax,\n\nMadt'as\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nrejected as not being in accordance with them. The learned Judges, however, granted a certificate under section 66-A of the Act, and that is how the appeals come before us.\n\nThe first question whether the word \"personally\" would exclude signature by an authorised agent on behalf of the partner was answered in tlie affirmative by the Madras High Court in Commissioner of Incometax v. Subba Rao('). This was one of the decisions quoted with approval by this Court in Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax\n\nv. Keshab Chandra Mandril(\"), where the question was whether a rule framed under the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act that the declaration in the return should be signed by the individual himself required that he should sign it personally, and it was held that it did so require.\n\nSri K. S. Krishnaswami Ayyangar, learned counsel for the appellant, did not urge any grounds for differing from the above conclusion, and we must therefore hold, in agreement with the views expressed in the above decisions, that the signature which is prescribed by the rules is that of the partner himself, and that they are not complied with by the agent signing on his behalf.\n\nThen we come to the second 'qUestion-and that is the substantial question that arises for our determination in this appeal-whether rules 2 and 6 are ultra vires the rule-making authority. The argument of the appellant in support of its contention that the rules are ultra vires may thus be stated: Under the common law of England, a person has the right to do through an agent whatever he can do himself, and that right has also been conferred on him in this country by section 2 of the Powers-of-Attorney Act VII of 1882, which runs as follows:\n\n\"The donee of a power-of-attorney may, if he thinks fit, execute or do any assurance, instrument or thing in and with bis own name and signature, and his own seal, where sealing is required, by the authority of the donor of the power; and every assurance,\n\n(1) I.L.R. 19i7 'M•d. 167: 19i6 I.T.R. 282.\n\n(2) [19W] S.O.R. i85.\n\ninstrument and thing so executed and done, shall be 1956 as effectual in law as if it had been executed or done Ravida Subba Rao by the donee of the power in the name, and with the and at1other signature and seal, of the donor thereof. v. \"This section applies to powers-of-attorney The Commissiot1er created by instruments executed either before or after of Income-tax, this Act comes into force\".\n\nMadras Section 26-A of the Act confers on a partner the Venkatarama right to apply for registration of the firm, and that AyyarJ. right could be exercised both under the common law and under section 2 of the Powers-of-Attorney Act through an authorised agent. The sovereign legislature might, if it so chooses, abrogate the rule of common law, and repeal section 2 of the Powers-of- Attorney Act, and enact that the application to be presented under section 26-A should be signed by the partner himself and not by any other person; but it has not done so eithr expressly or by necessary implication, and, therefore, the application which was signed by Hariprasada Rao is as good as if it had beeq signed by Subba Rao. The Rules no doubt require that the signature should be that of the partner and not that of his agent. But in prohibiting what would be lawful under the section, the Rules go beyond the ambit of the authority conferred by section 26-A on the rule-making authority, which is limited to framing Rules for giving effect to the principles laid down in the statute. They are therefore ultr:a vires. In the alternative, assuming that the mandate given to the rule-making authority under section 26-A is of sufficient amplitude to authorise the making of the Rules in question, even then, they must be held to be ultra vires, as they have the effect of abrogating the common law and of repealing section 2 of the Powers-of-Attorney Act, which confer on a person the right to act through an agent, and that being a legislative function cannot be delegated to a rule-making authority, and section 26-A, if it is to be construed as conferl'.ing such power on an outside authority, must be struck down as constituting an unconstitutional delegation by the legislature of its legislative function.\n\nRattula Subba Rao\n\nIt is the correctness of these contentions, that now falls to be considered.\n\nand another According to the law of England-and that is also v. the law under the Indian Contract Act, 1872-\"every The Commissioner person who is aui juris bas a• right to appoint an\n\n01 Income-tax, agent for any purpose whatever, and that be can do Madras so when be is exercising a statutory right no lee~ Venkatarama than when be is exercising any other right\". Per Ayyar J.\n\nStirling, J. in Jackson and Oo. v. Napper: In re Bckmidts' TradeM12rk('). This rule is subject to certain well-known exceptions as when the act to be performed is personal in character, or is annexed to a public office, or to an office involving fiduciary obligations. But apart from such exceptions, the Jaw is well settled that whatever a person can do himself, he can do through an agent. It bas accordingly been held that \"at common law, when a person authorizes another to sign for him, the signature of the person so signing is the signature of the person authorizing it\". Per Blackburn, J. in The Queen v.Justices of\n\nKent('). The appellant is therefore right in bis •contention that unless the statute itself enacts otherwise, an application which a partner has to 1ign wouJd be in order and valid, if it is signed by his authorised agent. The question then is whether there .is any thing in the Act, which requires that an application under section 26-A should be signed by the party personally.\n\nSection 26-A is as follows:\n\n\"(I) Application may. be made to the Incometax Officer on behalf of any firm, constituted under an instrument of partnership specifying the individual shares of the partners, for registration for the purposes of this_ Act and of any other enactment for the time being in force relating to income-tax or super-tal):.\n\n(2) The application shall be made by such per.son or persons, and .at such times and shall contain Buch particulars and shall bein such form, and be verified in such manner, as may be prescribed;· and it shall\n\n(1) [1887] 85 Oh. D. 16!1, 172.\n\n(2) [1812-78] L.B. 8 Q.B. 805, 807.\n\nbe dealt with by the Income-tax Officer in such manner 1956 as may be prescribed\".\n\nRavula Subba Rao The section does not, it should be noted, provide that and another the application for registration should be signed by v. the partner personally, and it is this that forms the The Commissioner foundation of the contention of the appellant that 0/ Income-tax, the right which a person has under the general law Madras and under section 2 of the Powers-of-Attorney Act to Venkatarama act through an agent has not been taken away or Ayyar J. abridged by the section. He relies in support of his contention on the following rules of construction: (I) Statutes which encroach on the rights of a subject should be interpreted if possible so as to respect such rights. [Vide Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition, page 285; Craies on Statute Law, 5th Edition, pages Ill to ll4). The law is thus stated by Lord Justice Bowen in In re Ouno: Mans.field\n\nv. Mans.field(1):\n\n\"In the construction of statutes, you must not construe the words so as to take away rights which already existed before the statute was passed, unless you have plain words which indicate that such was the intention of the legislature\".\n\n(2) In the absence of clear and unambiguous language, an intention to alter the existing law should not be imputed to the legislature. (Vide Craies on Statute Law, 5th Edition, pages ll4 and ll5). ..\n\n(3) The law does not favour repeal of a statute by implication, and therefore a later statute should. not be construed as repealing an earlier one without express words or by necessary implication. (Vide Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition, page 170; Craies on Statute Law, 5th Edition, page 337).\n\n\"If it is possible\", observed Farwell, J., \"It is my duty so to read the section as not to effect an implied repeal of the earlier Act\": Re Okance(9).\n\n\"Unless two Acts are sp plainly repugnant to each other, that effect cannot be given to both at the same time, a repeal will.not be implied\". Per A. L. Smith, J. in Kutner v. Pkillipa(8).\n\n(1) [1890] 43 Oh. D. UI, 17. (!!)· [1986] 1 Oh. !166, 270. .\n\n(S) [1891] SI Q.B. 1167, .2711.\n\nRavula Subba Rao\n\nand another\n\nThe Commjssiomr\n\no/ Inconu-taz,\n\nMadras\n\nVenkatarama\n\nA:; yarJ.\n\nIn the light of these principles, it is contended that the true scope of section 26-A is that it confers a right on a partner to register the firm, and leaves the modus of the exercise thereof to be regulated by the existing law,.and that, therefore, far from showing an intention either to alter the general law as to the right of a person to act through his agent or to repeal section 2 of the Powers-of-Attorney Act, the section depends on their continued operation for its implementation.\n\nNow, the rules of construction on which the appellant relies are well-established.\n\nBut then, it should not be overlooked that they are only aids to ycertain the true intention of the legislature as expressed in the statute, and the question ultimately is, what in the context do .the words of the enactment mean?\n\nThe following passage from Crawford on \"The Construction of Statutes'', 1940 Edition, page 454 cited by the appellant may be usefully referred to in this connection:\n\n\"Why should a statute be subjected to a strict or a liberal construction, as the case may be? The only .answer that can possibly be correct is because the type of construction utilized gives effect to the legislative intent. Sometimes a liberal construction must be used in order to make the legislative intent effective, and sometimes. such a construction will defeat the intent of the legislature. If this is the proper conception concerning the rule of cdnstruction to be adhered to, then a strict or a liberal construction is simply a means by which the scope of a statute is extended or restricted in order to convey the legislative meaning. If this is the proper position to be accorded strict and liberal constructions, it would make no difference whether the statute involved was penal, criminal, remedial or in derogation of common right, as a distinction based upon this classification would then mean nothing\".\n\nThat being the correct position, the question is whether on its true interpretation, the statute intended that an application under section 26-A should be signed by the partnel' personally, or whether it could\n\nbe signed by bis agent on his behalf. To decide that, 1956 we must ha.ve regard not only to the language of sec- Ravula Subba Rao tion 26-A but also to the character of the legislation, and another the scheme of the Act and the nature of the right v. conferred by the section. The Act is, as stated in the The Commissioner preamble, one to consolidate and amend the law rea/Income-tax, - la ting to income-tax. The rule of construction to be Madras applied to such a statute is .thus stated by Lord Venkataran•a Herschell in Bank of England v. Vagliano(1): AyyarJ. \"I think the proper !JOUrse is in the first instance to examine the language of the statute, and to ask what is its natural meaning, uninfluenced by any - considerations derived from the previous.state of the law, and not to start with inquiring how the law previously stood, and then, assuming that it was probably \"intended to leave it unaltered ........................... .\n\n\" We must therefore construe the provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act as forming a code complete in itself and exhaustive of the matters dealt with therein, and ascertain what their true scope is.\n\nTurning then to the provisions of the Act, considerable light is thrown on their true import by the decision of this Court in Commissioner of Agricultural\n\nIncome-tax v. Keshab Chandra Mandal(9).\n\nThere, the question was as to th~ meaning of Rule 11 framed under the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1944 read with Form No. 5, which required that the declaration in the return should be signed \"in the case of an individual, by the individual himself\". It was held by this Court on a review of the provisions of the statute that the intention of the legislature as expressed therein was to exclude the common law rule, qui facit per alium facit per se, and the declaration to be valid must be signed by the assessee personally. It is argued for the app.ellant that Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax v. Keskab Chandra Mandal(9) was a decision only on the interpretation of Rule No. 11 and not on its validity, and that the question whether the rule was ultra virea or not was not in issue. That is so, but the materiality of the\n\n(1) [1891] A.O. 107, Hl.\n\n(9) (19llO] S.O.B. '86, 76\n\nRavula Subba Rao\n\nand another\n\nThe Ccnnmissioner\n\nof Income.tax,\n\nMadras\n\nVenkatarama AyyarJ.\n\ndecision to the present controversy lies in this that the interpretation which was put on Rule 11 as requiring personal signature was based on the conclusion which this Court reached on a consideration of the relevant provisions of the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act that the intention of the legislature was to exclude the rule of the common law on the subject. Now, the provisions of the Bengal Act which were construed in Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax v. Keshab Chandra Mandal(') as indicative of the above intention, are identical in terms with the corresponding provisions in the Indian Income-tax Act, and are, in fact, based on them, and it would therefore be logical to construe the latter as expressing an intention to discard the rule of common law on the subject.\n\nThe relevant provisions of the Bengal. Agricultural Income-tax Act may now be noticed. Section 25(1) of the Bengal Act provides that if the Income-tax Officer is not satisfied that the return made is correct and complete, he may require the assessee by notice eit.her to attend at the Income-tax office or to produce or cause to be produced any evidence on which he might rely. This corresponds to section 23(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act.\n\nThe point to be noted with reference to this section is that it contains an express provision for production of evidence by the assessee through his agent, a provision which would have been wholly unnecessary if the common law was intended to apply. Sections 35 and 36 of the Bengal Act contain provisions as to who can represent the assessee and in what proceedings, and they follow section 61 of the Indian Income-tax Act and form a code complete in themselves. Then again, both the Bengal f\\ct and the Indian Income-tax Act provide that certain provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are applicable to the proceedings under the Act. The provisions of Order 3 of the Civil Procedure Code enacting that parties may appear and act through recognised agents are not among them. To cut the discussion short, the effect of the provisions of the\n\n(1) [1900] S.C.B. ~35.\n\nBengal Act is thus summarised in Commissioner of 7956 Agricultural Income-tax v. Keshab Chandra Mandal(1): R ul subb Rao\n\n\"The omission of a definition of the word 'sign' \";,,; anoth:r as including a signature by an agent, the permission v. under section 25 for production of evidence by an The Commissioner agent and under sections 35 and 58 for attendance by 01 Income-tax, h Madras an agent 8, nd the omission Of any provision in t e Act applying the provisions of the Code of Civil Provenkatarama cedure relating to the signing and verification of AyyarJ. pleadings to the signing and verification of the return while expressly adopting the provisions of that Code relating to the attendance and examination of witnesses, production of documents and issuing of commission for examination and for service of notices und~ sections 41 and 60 respectively, cannot be regarded as wholly without significance\".\n\nThis reasoning applies with equal force to the provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act, and goes far to support the contention of the respondent that the common law is not intended to apply to proceedings under the Act.\n\nAnother factor material for the determination of this question is the nature of the right conferred by section 26-A. Under the common law of England, a firm is not a juristic person, the firm name being only\n\na compendious expression to designate the various partners constituting it. But, as pointed out by this Court in Dulichand Laxminarayan v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Nagpur(9), inroads have been made by statutes into this conception, and firms have been regarded as distinct entities for the purpose of those statutes. One of those statutes is the Indian Income- Tax Act, which treats the firm as a unit for purposes of taxation. Thus, under section 3 of the Act the charge is imposed on the total income of a firm, the partners as such being out of the picture, and accordingly under section 23 of the Act, the assessment will be on the firm on its total profits. Section 23(5) enacts an exception to this in the case of firms registered under the Act, and provides that,\n\n\"(a) ·····'the sum payable bythefirmitselfshall\n\n(1) [1950] S.C.R. 435.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 854.\n\n7956 not be determined but the total income of each part- - ner of the firm, including therein his share of its in-\n\nRa\"';,~ 8ne1:.~\"0 come, profits and gains of the previous year, shall be\n\n• \"v. assessed and the sum payable by him on the basis of The Commissioner such assessment shall be determined\".\n\n01 Incometax, Thus, if a firm is registered, it ceases to be a unit for Madras b purposes of taxation and the profits earned y it are venkatarama taken, in accordance with the general law of partner- Ayyar J. ship, to have been earned by the individual partners according to their shares, and they are taxed on their individual income including their share of profits.\n\nThe advantages of this provision are obvious. The rate of tax chargeable will not. be on the higher scale provided for incomes on the higher levels but on the lower one at which the income of the individuarpartner is chargeable. Thus, registration confers on the partners a benefit to which they would not have been entitled but for section 26-A, and such a right being a creature of the statute, can be claimed only in accordance with the .statute which confers it, and a person who seeks relief under section 26-A must bring himself strictly within its terms before he can claim the benefit of it. In other words, the right is regulated solely by the terms of the statute, and it would be repugnant to the character of such a right to add to those terms by reference to other laws. The statute must be construed as exhaustive in regard to the conditions under which it can be claimed.\n\nThus, considering the quiistion with reference to the character of the legislation, the scheme of the statute and the nature of the right conferred by section 26-A, the conclusion is irresistible that rules of common law were not intended to be saved, and that the right to apply for registration under that section is to be determined exclusively by reference to the prescriptions laid down therein. If that is the trWl construction, in authorising the rule-making authority to frame rules as to who can apply for registration under section 26-A, and when and how, the statute has merely directed that authority to fill in details in the field of legislation occupied by it, and it is not denied that Rules 2 and 6 are within the mandate conferred\n\n. .-\n\nby the section. In this view, section 59(5) of the_ Act which enacts that \"Rules made under this section shall be published in the official Gazette, and shall thereupon have effect as if enaced in this Act\" directly applies, and the vires of the Rules is beyond question. Vide the observations of Lord Herschell in Institute of Patent Agents v. Lockwood(1).\n\nThen, there is the contention of the appellant that the Rules in question are repugnant to section 2 of the Powers-of-Attorney Act VII of 1882, and are therefore ultra vires. In addition to the reasons given above in support of the conclusion that the rule of the common law was not intended to operate in the field occupied by section 26-A, there is a further and a more compelling reason why this contention should not be accepted. It is that there is, in fact, no conflict between the two statutory provisions. To understand the scope of section 2 of the Powers-of-\n\nAttorney Act, it is necessary to refer to the history of this legislation. Under the common law of England, an agent having authority to execute an instrument must sign in the name of the principal if he is to be bound. If the agent signs the deed in his name albeit\n\nas agent, he is the person who is regarded as party to the document and not the principal. It is the agent alone that can enforce the deed, and it is he that will be liable on it.\n\nVide In re International Contract Company(2); Schack v. Antony(3), Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Volume 1, page 217, and Bowstead on Agency, 10th Edition, page 93. To remove the hardships resulting from this state of the law, the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881 (44 and 45, Viet, Chapter 41) enacted section 46, which is as follows: \"(l) The donee of a power of attorney may, if be thinks fit, execute_ or do any assurance, instrument, or thing in and with his own name and signature and his own seal, where sealing is required, by the authority of the donor of the power; and every assurance, instrument, and thing so executed and done shall be\n\n(1) [1894) A.O. 847, 861.\n\n12) [1871] 6 Ch. App. 626.\n\n(8) 1 M. & 8. 673; 106 E. R. 214.\n\nRawla Subba Rao\n\nand another\n\nThe Commissioner\n\nof Income-tax, Madras\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAy:varJ,\n\n1~56 as effectual in law, to all intents, as if it had been R 1 --;-;; b R executed or done by the donee of the power in the •:;,; a;:,, t:er ao name and with the signature and seal of the donor v. thereof.\n\nThe Commissioner\n\n(2) This section applies to powers of attorney\n\n01 Income.tax, created by instruments executed either before or after Madras the commencement of this Act\".\n\nvenkatarama The Indian Legislature immediately followed suit, Ayyar J. and enacted the Powers-of-Attorney Act VII of 1882 incorporating in section 2 therein word for word, section 46 of the English Act. The object of this section is to effectuate instruments executed by an agent but not in accordance with the rule of the common law and the enactment is more procedural than substantive. It does not confer on a person a right to act through agents. It presupposes that the agent has the authority to act on behalf of the principal, and protects acts done by him in exercise of that authority but in his own name. But where the question is as to the existence or the validity of authority, the section has no operation. Thus, the fields occupied by the two enactments are wholly distinct. Section 26-A says that a partner cannot delegate the exercise of his rights under that section to an agent. Section 2 of the Powers-of-Attorney Act says that if there can be and, in fact there is, delegation, it can be exercised in the manner provided therein. There is accordingly no conflict between the two sections, and no question of repeal arises.\n\nTo sum up, the Indian Income-tax Act is a selfcontained code exhaustive of the matters dealt with th'erein, and its provisions show an intention t~ depart from the common rule, qui facit per alium facit per se. Its intention again is that a firm should be given benefit of section 23(5)(a), only if it is registered under section 26-A in accordance with the conditions laid down in that section and the rules framed thereunder. And as those rules require the application to be signed by the partner in person, the signature by an agent on his behalf is invalid.\n\nIn the view which we have taken, the further question raised by the appellant that the power to repeal\n\na law being a legislative function, can be exercised 7956 only by the legislature duly constituted and not by R u1 s bb R any outside authority, and that the delegation of a:n; a::Ot:er\n\nsuch a power to an outside authority is unconstituv. tional, does not arise for decision.\n\nThe Commissioner In the result, we agree with Viswanatha Sastry, J. of Income-tax, Madras that rules 2 and 6 are intra vires the powers of the rule-making authority, and dismiss the appeals with Venkatarama costs.\n\nAyyar J.\n\nMRS. SHIRINBAI MANECKSHA W & OTHERS\n\nNARGACEBAI J. MOTISHAW & OTHERS.\n\n[S. R. DAS C.J., BHAGWA'l'I and S. K. DAS JJ.]\n\nWill-Construction-Substitutional beq1Mst, Validity of- I ndian Succession Act (XXXIX of 1925), ss. 67, 129, 180. ·\n\nA Parsi testator by a holograph will provided, \"I hereby give, devise and bequeath to my so, ca.lied mother Mrs. Shirinbai, ............... her heirs, executors and administrators, for her and their own use and benefit, absolutely and for ever all my estate and effects, both real and personal, whatsoever and wheresoever' and of what nature and quality soever, and I hereby appoint her the said Mrs. Shirinbai Maneckshaw Bejonji Mistry, sole exe cutrix of this my Will ............... \" The will was attested by two witnesses one of whom was the husband of Mrs. Shirinbai. Mrs.\n\nShirinbai a.s the sole executrix obtained probate of the said will from the High Court and took possession of the estate. A suit was brought by the heirs of the testator in the Court of the Civil Judge for a decl&ration that the bequest in favour of Mrs.\n\nShirinba.i was void in law by operation of s. 67 of the Indian Succession Act and that. the estate of the testator had, therefore, become divisible amongst his heirs as on intestacy. The trial Judge held that the bequest in favour of Mrs. Shirinbai was void under s. 67 of the Indian Succession Act and there was no gift over but that the plaintiffs were not the heirs of the testator and, conse quently, they could not maintain the suit. On appeal by the plain tiffs, the High Court agreed with the first two findings of the trial Judge, but reversed his decision and decreed the suit holding that the plaintiffs were the heirs of the testator. It was contended on behalf of Mrs. Shirinbai and her two daughters in this appeal that on a. tma construction of the will there was a substitution'al bequest in favour of the heirs, executors and administrators of Mrs. Shiriu\n\nMay9", "total_entities": 146, "entities": [{"text": "RAVULA SUBBA RAO AND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 59, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAVULA SUBBA RAO AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nMADRAS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 103, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 107, "end_char": 121, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 123, "end_char": 131, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHAGWA'l'I", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 161, "end_char": 188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 207, "end_char": 213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 69", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 248, "end_char": 253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 26A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 386, "end_char": 392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 454, "end_char": 481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 580, "end_char": 585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 682, "end_char": 687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 873, "end_char": 878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1016, "end_char": 1021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "To decide the question whether on its true interpretation the Indian Income Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1120, "end_char": 1203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1240, "end_char": 1245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "To decide the question whether on its true interpretation the Indian Income Tax Act", "statute": "To decide the question whether on its true interpretation the Indian Income Tax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1408, "end_char": 1413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "To decide the question whether on its true interpretation the Indian Income Tax Act", "statute": "To decide the question whether on its true interpretation the Indian Income Tax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 23(5)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1806, "end_char": 1817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "To decide the question whether on its true interpretation the Indian Income Tax Act", "statute": "To decide the question whether on its true interpretation the Indian Income Tax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1850, "end_char": 1855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "To decide the question whether on its true interpretation the Indian Income Tax Act", "statute": "To decide the question whether on its true interpretation the Indian Income Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Ravula Subba Rao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2301, "end_char": 2317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "May9\n\nRavula Subba Rao\n\nand another\n\nThe Comtnissiontf'\n\nof Income.tax,\nMadras\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Nos.", "canonical_name": "RAVULA SUBBA RAO AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2520, "end_char": 2537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Civil Appeals\n\nAppeal from tho judgment and order dated the 25th day of March 1951 of the Madras High Court in Case Referred Nos."}}, {"text": "K. S. Krishnaswami Iyengar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2588, "end_char": 2614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Krishnaswami Iyengar, (K. R. Ohoudhry, with him) for the appellants.", "canonical_name": "K. S. Krishnaswami Ayyangar"}}, {"text": "K. R. Ohoudhry", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2617, "end_char": 2631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. S. Krishnaswami Iyengar, (K. R. Ohoudhry, with him) for the appellants."}}, {"text": "N. Joshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2667, "end_char": 2675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G, N. Joshi and P. -G. Gokhale, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "P. -G. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2680, "end_char": 2694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G, N. Joshi and P. -G. Gokhale, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMA AYYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2774, "end_char": 2791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-The appellant is a firm which was Qonstituted under a deed of partnership dated 10-2-1941, and consists of two partners, Subba Rao and Hariprasada Rao.", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama AyyarJ."}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2916, "end_char": 2925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-The appellant is a firm which was Qonstituted under a deed of partnership dated 10-2-1941, and consists of two partners, Subba Rao and Hariprasada Rao."}}, {"text": "Hariprasada Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2930, "end_char": 2945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-The appellant is a firm which was Qonstituted under a deed of partnership dated 10-2-1941, and consists of two partners, Subba Rao and Hariprasada Rao."}}, {"text": "21-3-1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2950, "end_char": 2959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 21-3-1942 it was registered under section 26-A of the Indian Income- Tax Act No."}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2984, "end_char": 2994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1-7-1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3332, "end_char": 3340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sometime thereafter, one of the partners, Subba Rao, is stated to have left on a long pilgrimage, and the affairs of the partnership were then managed by Hariprasada Rao as his agent under a general power-of-attorney dated 1-7-1940."}}, {"text": "section 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3417, "end_char": 3427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3669, "end_char": 3679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4073, "end_char": 4086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4105, "end_char": 4125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order was taken in appeal, and was ultimately the subject of a reference under section 66(1) of the Act to the High Court of Madras, which held that the word \"personally\" in rule 6 required that the partner\n\nshould himself sign the application, and that the 7956 principles of agency under the general law were Ra'Vula Subba Rao excluded. ("}}, {"text": "Ra'Vula Subba Rao", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4305, "end_char": 4322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order was taken in appeal, and was ultimately the subject of a reference under section 66(1) of the Act to the High Court of Madras, which held that the word \"personally\" in rule 6 required that the partner\n\nshould himself sign the application, and that the 7956 principles of agency under the general law were Ra'Vula Subba Rao excluded. (", "canonical_name": "RAVULA SUBBA RAO AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Hariprasada The Commissioner Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4438, "end_char": 4470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nWhile these proceedings were pending, Hariprasada The Commissioner Rao filed the two applications, out of which the 0/ Income-tax, 1 • l f th • t t' Madras present appea s arise, 1or renewa o e reg1s ra 10n certificate for the assessment years 1943-44 and Venkatarama 1944-45."}}, {"text": "section 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5468, "end_char": 5478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5486, "end_char": 5500, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5611, "end_char": 5621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5631, "end_char": 5645, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sa.tyana.ra.yana Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5807, "end_char": 5827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reference was heard by Sa.tyana.ra.yana Rao and Viswanatha Sastry, JJ.", "canonical_name": "Sa.tyana.ra.yana Rao"}}, {"text": "Viswanatha Sastry", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5832, "end_char": 5849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reference was heard by Sa.tyana.ra.yana Rao and Viswanatha Sastry, JJ."}}, {"text": "Satyanarayana Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6027, "end_char": 6044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Satyanarayana Rao, J. held that the rules were ultra vires, and that the applications were in order, and ought to have been granted.", "canonical_name": "Sa.tyana.ra.yana Rao"}}, {"text": "Ravula Subba Rao", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6349, "end_char": 6365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1P56\n\nRavula Subba Rao and another v.\n\nThe Commissioner\n\ncf lncometax,\n\nMadt'as\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nrejected as not being in accordance with them.", "canonical_name": "RAVULA SUBBA RAO AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Commissioner\n\ncf lncometax,\n\nMadt'as\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6386, "end_char": 6444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1P56\n\nRavula Subba Rao and another v.\n\nThe Commissioner\n\ncf lncometax,\n\nMadt'as\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nrejected as not being in accordance with them."}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6550, "end_char": 6560, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7059, "end_char": 7073, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "K. S. Krishnaswami Ayyangar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7241, "end_char": 7268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri K. S. Krishnaswami Ayyangar, learned counsel for the appellant, did not urge any grounds for differing from the above conclusion, and we must therefore hold, in agreement with the views expressed in the above decisions, that the signature which is prescribed by the rules is that of the partner himself, and that they are not complied with by the agent signing on his behalf.", "canonical_name": "K. S. Krishnaswami Ayyangar"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7940, "end_char": 7947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The argument of the appellant in support of its contention that the rules are ultra vires may thus be stated: Under the common law of England, a person has the right to do through an agent whatever he can do himself, and that right has also been conferred on him in this country by section 2 of the Powers-of-Attorney Act VII of 1882, which runs as follows:\n\n\"The donee of a power-of-attorney may, if he thinks fit, execute or do any assurance, instrument or thing in and with bis own name and signature, and his own seal, where sealing is required, by the authority of the donor of the power; and every assurance,\n\n(1) I.L.R. 19i7 'M•d."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8088, "end_char": 8097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Attorney Act VII of 1882", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8115, "end_char": 8139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ravida Subba Rao", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8602, "end_char": 8618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "instrument and thing so executed and done, shall be 1956 as effectual in law as if it had been executed or done Ravida Subba Rao by the donee of the power in the name, and with the and at1other signature and seal, of the donor thereof.", "canonical_name": "RAVULA SUBBA RAO AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8890, "end_char": 8896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madras Section 26-A of the Act confers on a partner the Venkatarama right to apply for registration of the firm, and that AyyarJ. right could be exercised both under the common law and under section 2 of the Powers-of-Attorney Act through an authorised agent."}}, {"text": "Section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8897, "end_char": 8907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Attorney Act VII of 1882", "statute": "Attorney Act VII of 1882"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9081, "end_char": 9090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Attorney Act VII of 1882", "statute": "Attorney Act VII of 1882"}}, {"text": "Powers-of-Attorney Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9098, "end_char": 9120, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9245, "end_char": 9254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9340, "end_char": 9350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9830, "end_char": 9840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10089, "end_char": 10099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10297, "end_char": 10306, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Powers-of-Attorney Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10314, "end_char": 10336, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10488, "end_char": 10498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rattula Subba Rao", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10695, "end_char": 10712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rattula Subba Rao\n\nIt is the correctness of these contentions, that now falls to be considered.", "canonical_name": "RAVULA SUBBA RAO AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act, 1872", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10874, "end_char": 10899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11161, "end_char": 11166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Ayyar J.\n\nStirling, J. in Jackson and Oo."}}, {"text": "Stirling", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11171, "end_char": 11179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Ayyar J.\n\nStirling, J. in Jackson and Oo."}}, {"text": "Blackburn", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11754, "end_char": 11763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Blackburn, J. in The Queen v.Justices of\n\nKent(')."}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12121, "end_char": 12131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12177, "end_char": 12187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ravula Subba Rao", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12888, "end_char": 12904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ravula Subba Rao The section does not, it should be noted, provide that and another the application for registration should be signed by v. the partner personally, and it is this that forms the The Commissioner foundation of the contention of the appellant that 0/ Income-tax, the right which a person has under the general law Madras and under section 2 of the Powers-of-Attorney Act to Venkatarama act through an agent has not been taken away or Ayyar J. abridged by the section.", "canonical_name": "RAVULA SUBBA RAO AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13233, "end_char": 13242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Powers-of-Attorney Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13250, "end_char": 13272, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Vide Maxwell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13569, "end_char": 13581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vide Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition, page 285; Craies on Statute Law, 5th Edition, pages Ill to ll4)."}}, {"text": "Bowen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13731, "end_char": 13736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The law is thus stated by Lord Justice Bowen in In re Ouno: Mans.field\n\nv. Mans.field(1):\n\n\"In the construction of statutes, you must not construe the words so as to take away rights which already existed before the statute was passed, unless you have plain words which indicate that such was the intention of the legislature\"."}}, {"text": "Farwell", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14567, "end_char": 14574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"If it is possible\", observed Farwell, J., \"It is my duty so to read the section as not to effect an implied repeal of the earlier Act\": Re Okance(9)."}}, {"text": "A. L. Smith", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14835, "end_char": 14846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per A. L. Smith, J. in Kutner v. Pkillipa(8)."}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15142, "end_char": 15152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15448, "end_char": 15457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Powers-of-Attorney Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15465, "end_char": 15487, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Crawford", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15905, "end_char": 15913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following passage from Crawford on \"The Construction of Statutes'', 1940 Edition, page 454 cited by the appellant may be usefully referred to in this connection:\n\n\"Why should a statute be subjected to a strict or a liberal construction, as the case may be?"}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17100, "end_char": 17110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Venkataran•a Herschell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17678, "end_char": 17700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rule of construction to be Madras applied to such a statute is .thus stated by Lord Venkataran•a Herschell in Bank of England v. Vagliano(1): AyyarJ. \"I think the proper !"}}, {"text": "must therefore construe the provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18128, "end_char": 18195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18591, "end_char": 18631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ccnnmissioner\n\nof Income.tax,\n\nMadras", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19451, "end_char": 19488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(9) (19llO] S.O.B. '86, 76\n\nRavula Subba Rao\n\nand another\n\nThe Ccnnmissioner\n\nof Income.tax,\n\nMadras\n\nVenkatarama AyyarJ.\n\ndecision to the present controversy lies in this that the interpretation which was put on Rule 11 as requiring personal signature was based on the conclusion which this Court reached on a consideration of the relevant provisions of the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act that the intention of the legislature was to exclude the rule of the common law on the subject."}}, {"text": "Venkatarama AyyarJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19490, "end_char": 19509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(9) (19llO] S.O.B. '86, 76\n\nRavula Subba Rao\n\nand another\n\nThe Ccnnmissioner\n\nof Income.tax,\n\nMadras\n\nVenkatarama AyyarJ.\n\ndecision to the present controversy lies in this that the interpretation which was put on Rule 11 as requiring personal signature was based on the conclusion which this Court reached on a consideration of the relevant provisions of the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act that the intention of the legislature was to exclude the rule of the common law on the subject.", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama AyyarJ."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19767, "end_char": 19781, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20117, "end_char": 20131, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Agricultural Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20340, "end_char": 20367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 25(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20388, "end_char": 20401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Agricultural Income-tax Act", "statute": "Agricultural Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "section 23(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20699, "end_char": 20712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Agricultural Income-tax Act", "statute": "Agricultural Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20727, "end_char": 20741, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sections 35 and 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20994, "end_char": 21012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Agricultural Income-tax Act", "statute": "Agricultural Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "section 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21128, "end_char": 21138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Agricultural Income-tax Act", "statute": "Agricultural Income-tax Act"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21153, "end_char": 21167, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21256, "end_char": 21270, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21858, "end_char": 21868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 35 and 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21935, "end_char": 21953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 41 and 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22435, "end_char": 22453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22593, "end_char": 22607, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22845, "end_char": 22855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "One of those statutes is the Indian Income- Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23271, "end_char": 23322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23394, "end_char": 23403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "One of those statutes is the Indian Income- Tax Act", "statute": "One of those statutes is the Indian Income- Tax Act"}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23537, "end_char": 23547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "One of those statutes is the Indian Income- Tax Act", "statute": "One of those statutes is the Indian Income- Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Section 23(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23617, "end_char": 23630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "One of those statutes is the Indian Income- Tax Act", "statute": "One of those statutes is the Indian Income- Tax Act"}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24834, "end_char": 24844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25004, "end_char": 25014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25540, "end_char": 25550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25923, "end_char": 25933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 59(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26175, "end_char": 26188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Herschell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26447, "end_char": 26456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vide the observations of Lord Herschell in Institute of Patent Agents v. Lockwood(1)."}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26595, "end_char": 26604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Attorney Act VII of 1882", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26622, "end_char": 26646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26832, "end_char": 26842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Attorney Act VII of 1882", "statute": "Attorney Act VII of 1882"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27045, "end_char": 27054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Attorney Act VII of 1882", "statute": "Attorney Act VII of 1882"}}, {"text": "Bowstead", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27655, "end_char": 27663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vide In re International Contract Company(2); Schack v. Antony(3), Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Volume 1, page 217, and Bowstead on Agency, 10th Edition, page 93."}}, {"text": "Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27764, "end_char": 27806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27845, "end_char": 27855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881", "statute": "the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881"}}, {"text": "Rawla Subba Rao", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28282, "end_char": 28297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rawla Subba Rao\n\nand another\n\nThe Commissioner\n\nof Income-tax, Madras\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAy:varJ,\n\n1~56 as effectual in law, to all intents, as if it had been R 1 --;-;; b R executed or done by the donee of the power in the •:;,; a;:,, t:er ao name and with the signature and seal of the donor v. thereof.", "canonical_name": "RAVULA SUBBA RAO AND ANOTHER"}}, {"text": "Commissioner\n\nof Income-tax, Madras\n\nVenkatarama", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28316, "end_char": 28364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rawla Subba Rao\n\nand another\n\nThe Commissioner\n\nof Income-tax, Madras\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAy:varJ,\n\n1~56 as effectual in law, to all intents, as if it had been R 1 --;-;; b R executed or done by the donee of the power in the •:;,; a;:,, t:er ao name and with the signature and seal of the donor v. thereof."}}, {"text": "venkatarama", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28759, "end_char": 28770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "venkatarama The Indian Legislature immediately followed suit, Ayyar J. and enacted the Powers-of-Attorney Act VII of 1882 incorporating in section 2 therein word for word, section 46 of the English Act.", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama AyyarJ."}}, {"text": "Attorney Act VII of 1882", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28856, "end_char": 28880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28898, "end_char": 28907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Attorney Act VII of 1882", "statute": "Attorney Act VII of 1882"}}, {"text": "section 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28931, "end_char": 28941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Attorney Act VII of 1882", "statute": "Attorney Act VII of 1882"}}, {"text": "Section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29549, "end_char": 29559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Attorney Act VII of 1882", "statute": "Attorney Act VII of 1882"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29657, "end_char": 29666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Attorney Act VII of 1882", "statute": "Attorney Act VII of 1882"}}, {"text": "Powers-of-Attorney Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29674, "end_char": 29696, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29926, "end_char": 29940, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 23(5)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30177, "end_char": 30193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30226, "end_char": 30236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SHIRINBAI MANECKSHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31079, "end_char": 31098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHIRINBAI MANECKSHA W & OTHERS\n\nNARGACEBAI J. MOTISHAW & OTHERS.", "canonical_name": "Shirinbai Maneckshaw Bejonji Mistry"}}, {"text": "NARGACEBAI J. MOTISHAW", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31111, "end_char": 31133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHIRINBAI MANECKSHA W & OTHERS\n\nNARGACEBAI J. MOTISHAW & OTHERS."}}, {"text": "BHAGWA'l'I", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31162, "end_char": 31172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. DAS C.J., BHAGWA'l'I and S. K. DAS JJ.]", "canonical_name": "BHAGWA'l'I"}}, {"text": "S. K. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31177, "end_char": 31186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[S. R. DAS C.J., BHAGWA'l'I and S. K. DAS JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Validity of- I ndian Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31235, "end_char": 31270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 67, 129, 180", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31288, "end_char": 31304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Validity of- I ndian Succession Act", "statute": "Validity of- I ndian Succession Act"}}, {"text": "Shirinbai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31422, "end_char": 31431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Parsi testator by a holograph will provided, \"I hereby give, devise and bequeath to my so, ca.lied mother Mrs. Shirinbai, ............... her heirs, executors and administrators, for her and their own use and benefit, absolutely and for ever all my estate and effects, both real and personal, whatsoever and wheresoever' and of what nature and quality soever, and I hereby appoint her the said Mrs. Shirinbai Maneckshaw Bejonji Mistry, sole exe cutrix of this my Will ............... \" The will was attested by two witnesses one of whom was the husband of Mrs. Shirinbai.", "canonical_name": "Shirinba.i"}}, {"text": "Shirinbai Maneckshaw Bejonji Mistry", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31710, "end_char": 31745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Parsi testator by a holograph will provided, \"I hereby give, devise and bequeath to my so, ca.lied mother Mrs. Shirinbai, ............... her heirs, executors and administrators, for her and their own use and benefit, absolutely and for ever all my estate and effects, both real and personal, whatsoever and wheresoever' and of what nature and quality soever, and I hereby appoint her the said Mrs. Shirinbai Maneckshaw Bejonji Mistry, sole exe cutrix of this my Will ............... \" The will was attested by two witnesses one of whom was the husband of Mrs. Shirinbai.", "canonical_name": "Shirinbai Maneckshaw Bejonji Mistry"}}, {"text": "Shirinbai", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 31889, "end_char": 31898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mrs.\n\nShirinbai a.s the sole executrix obtained probate of the said will from the High Court and took possession of the estate."}}, {"text": "Shirinba.i", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32145, "end_char": 32155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A suit was brought by the heirs of the testator in the Court of the Civil Judge for a decl&ration that the bequest in favour of Mrs.\n\nShirinba.i was void in law by operation of s. 67 of the Indian Succession Act and that.", "canonical_name": "Shirinba.i"}}, {"text": "s. 67", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32188, "end_char": 32193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Validity of- I ndian Succession Act", "statute": "Validity of- I ndian Succession Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32201, "end_char": 32222, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 67", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32409, "end_char": 32414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32422, "end_char": 32443, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Shiriu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33010, "end_char": 33016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended on behalf of Mrs. Shirinbai and her two daughters in this appeal that on a. tma construction of the will there was a substitution'al bequest in favour of the heirs, executors and administrators of Mrs. Shiriu\n\nMay9"}}]} {"document_id": "1956_1_591_602_EN", "year": 1956, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 591\n\na law being a legislative function, can be exercised 7956 only by the legislature duly constituted and not by R u1 s bb R any outside authority, and that the delegation of a:n; a::Ot:er\n\nsuch a power to an outside authority is unconstituv. tional, does not arise for decision.\n\nThe Commissioner In the result, we agree with Viswanatha Sastry, J. of Income-tax, Madras that rules 2 and 6 are intra vires the powers of the rule-making authority, and dismiss the appeals with Venkatarama costs.\n\nAyyar J.\n\nMRS. SHIRINBAI MANECKSHA W & OTHERS\n\nNARGACEBAI J. MOTISHAW & OTHERS.\n\n[S. R. DAS C.J., BHAGWA'l'I and S. K. DAS JJ.]\n\nWill-Construction-Substitutional beq1Mst, Validity of- I ndian Succession Act (XXXIX of 1925), ss. 67, 129, 180. ·\n\nA Parsi testator by a holograph will provided, \"I hereby give, devise and bequeath to my so, ca.lied mother Mrs. Shirinbai, ............... her heirs, executors and administrators, for her and their own use and benefit, absolutely and for ever all my estate and effects, both real and personal, whatsoever and wheresoever' and of what nature and quality soever, and I hereby appoint her the said Mrs. Shirinbai Maneckshaw Bejonji Mistry, sole exe cutrix of this my Will ............... \" The will was attested by two witnesses one of whom was the husband of Mrs. Shirinbai. Mrs.\n\nShirinbai a.s the sole executrix obtained probate of the said will from the High Court and took possession of the estate. A suit was brought by the heirs of the testator in the Court of the Civil Judge for a decl&ration that the bequest in favour of Mrs.\n\nShirinba.i was void in law by operation of s. 67 of the Indian Succession Act and that. the estate of the testator had, therefore, become divisible amongst his heirs as on intestacy. The trial Judge held that the bequest in favour of Mrs. Shirinbai was void under s. 67 of the Indian Succession Act and there was no gift over but that the plaintiffs were not the heirs of the testator and, conse quently, they could not maintain the suit. On appeal by the plain tiffs, the High Court agreed with the first two findings of the trial Judge, but reversed his decision and decreed the suit holding that the plaintiffs were the heirs of the testator. It was contended on behalf of Mrs. Shirinbai and her two daughters in this appeal that on a. tma construction of the will there was a substitution'al bequest in favour of the heirs, executors and administrators of Mrs. Shiriu\n\nMay9\n\nMt's, Shirinba$\n\nManeckshllW\n\nand others\n\ny, Nargacebai J, Moti1hau1\n\nanti others\n\nbai and tb&t even if the bequest to her failed by operation of s. 67 of the Act, the other bequest must take effect.\n\nHeld, that on a proper construction of the will as a whole and the words \"for her and their own use and benefit\" used by the testa tor and having regard to the facts and the circumstances in which be executed it, there could be no doubt that the intention of the testator was to create a substitutional bequest. Although bis primary inten tion was ta benefit Mrs. Shirinbai, the language be used unmistak ably showed that be intended to preyent his estate from passing on to his step relations as on intestacy, should the bequest in favour of Mre. Shirinbai fail by reason of .her predeceasing him.\n\nIn re Mcelligott. (L.B. (1944) Chancery 216), dissented from.\n\nThat as the will did not in terms state that the substitutional bequeet was to take effect only in the event of Mrs. Shirinbai pre deceasing the testator, and so did not come under the illustration to s. 130 of the Indian Succession Act, that section had no application and s. 129 of the Act would apply.\n\nThat the result was that the substitutional bsqnest in favour of the two daughters, who were presumive heirs of Mrs. Shirinbai when the testator died, would take effect although it must fail so far as herexecutors and administrators wwe concerned.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDIOTION: Civil Appeal No. 213 of 1953.\n\nOn appeal from the judgment and decree dated the 30th July 1951 of Allahabad High Court in First Appeal No. 258 of 1943 arising out of the judgment and the decree dated the 8th March 1943 of the Court of Additional Civil Judge at Allahabad in Original Suit No. 27 of 1940.\n\n8. K. Dar, B. 8. Shastri, R. 0. Ghatak and 0. P.\n\nLal for the appellants.\n\nS. P. Sinha and R. Patnaik for respondents Nos. 1, 9 to 13 and 15.\n\nI. N. Shroff for respondent No. 16.\n\n1956.\n\nMay 9.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAS C. J.-This is an appeal from the judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dated the 30th July 1951 reversing the judgment and decree of the Additional Civil Judge of\n\nAllahabad dated tl, ie 8th March 1943 passed in Suit No. 27 of 1940. The relevant facts are as follows:\n\nOne Cawashaw Dadabhoy Motishaw, a Parsi, (hereinafter referred to as the testato~) died at Allahabad on the 10th November 1937 leaving him surviving a step-brother (Plaintiff No. 1) now represented by his widow and children, being Respondents Nos. 1 to 8, a step-sister's son (originally Defendant No. 4, subsequently transposed as Plaintiff No. 2) now represented by Respondents Nos. 9 to 12, a stepbro.ther's son (Defendant No. 2) now represented by Respondents Nos. 13 and 14, a step-sister (Defendant No. 3) now Respondent No. 15 and a step-sister's daughter (Defendant No. 5) now Respondent No. 16.\n\nHe is said to have left considerable properties which he acquired in or near Allahabad. Prior to his death the testator had on the 11th March 1922 executed a holograph \"will in the following terms:--\n\n\"This is the last Will and testament of Mr.\n\nCawashaw Dadabhoy Motishaw, residing 20, Canning\n\nRoad, Allahabad.\n\nI hereby give, devise and bequeath to my so called mother named Mrs. Shirinbai Maneckshaw Bejonji Mistri, wife of Maneckshaw Bejonji Mistri alias Photographer residing 20 Canning Road, Allahabad, her heirs, executors and administrators, for her and their own use and benefit, absolutely and for ever all my estate and effects, both real and personal, whatsoever and wheresoever and of what nature and quality soever, and I hereby appoint her the said Mrs. Shirinbai Maneckshaw Bejonji Mistry, sole executrix of this my Will. Mrs. Shirinbai, the wife of Mr. Maneckshaw Bejonji Mistry, residing 20, Canning Road, Allahabad, is my adopted mother by my own willandaccord and for which no one in the worldhas the right to dispute about he, calling my own mother.\n\nThis will has been made and written by myself with all my full mind with good heart and disposition and in sound state of my body and mind. In witness thereof I have hereunto set my hand this 11th day of March one thousand nine hundred and twenty two (1922)\".\n\nMrs. Shirilibai\n\nManeckshaw\n\nand others v.\n\nNargacebai J. Motishaw and others\n\nDas C.J.\n\nMrs. Shirinbai\n\nManeckshaw\n\nana others\n\nNat'gacebai J. Motishaw\n\nand others\n\nDas C.J.\n\nThere were two attesting witnesses to the will, namely, B. Hirji and M. B. Mistry who was the husband of Mrs. Shirinbai (Defendant No. 1). Shirinbai applied for and on the 18th August 1939 obtained probate of the said will from the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and tookpossessionoftheestate.\n\nOn the 13th April 1940 the testator's step-brother (Plaintiff No. 1) filed a suit, being 0. S. No. 27 of 1940, in the Court of the Civil Judge of Allahabad against Shirinbai praying for a declaration that the bequest in favour of Shirinbai was void in law, and that tliere was an intestacy in respect of the whofo estate of the testator which became divisible amongst the heirs oJ the testator, for an enquiry as to who were the heirs of the testator aceording to the personal law applicable to Parsis, for administration of the estate by and under the direction of the Court and for necessary accounts and enquiries. The contention of the plaintiff was that the bequest to Shirinbai was void under section 67 of the Indian Succession Act. Certain other persons who also claimed to be the heirs of the testator were impleaded as pro forma defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 4.\n\nDefendant No. 4\n\nwa~ later on transposed to the category of plain tiffs as plaintiff No. 2.\n\nShirinbai, defendant No. 1, filed a written statement denying that the plaintiffs or the proforma defendants were the legal heirs of the testator and pleaded inter alia that the provisions of section 67 of the Indian Succession Act were not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case and that in any case her heirs were under the will made the direct objects of a distinct and independent bequest and that consequently there was no intestacy and the plaintiffs had no locus standi to maintain the suit. Subsequently the two daughters of Shirinbai were, on their own application, ordered on the 23rd September 1940 to be added as defendants Nos. 5and 6.\n\nA separate written statement was filed on behalf of those added defendants on the same lines as that of their mother. The proforma defendants naturally supported the plaintiffs and the suit was contested only by Shirinbai and her two daughters.\n\nThe following issues, amongst others, were raised and settled, namely,\n\n\"I) Is the bequest made in favour of Mrs. Mistry void in law?\n\nII) Is the defendant No. 1 the universal legatee under the will or are the other defendants, viz. Mrs.\n\nPatel and Mrs. Chinimini also legatees under the will?\n\nIII) Are the plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 or defendants L. J. D. l\\Iotishaw, Mrs. A. K. Capoor, and Mrs.\n\nH. S. N. Talati heirs of the deceased Mr. C. D. Motishaw and are they entitled to succeed to the property left by the deceased?\n\nIV) Is theclaim barred by section 27 of the Indian Succession Act?\" The Additional Civil Judge of Allahabad who tried the suit recorded the following findings:- . \"I) That the bequest in favour of defendant No. 1 was without any limitation and conferred an absolute estate on her and there was no gift over to her heirs.\n\nII) That the husband of defendant No. 1, namely Mr. M. B. Mistry having attested the will, the bequest made to her was void in view of the provisions of section 67 of the Indian Succession Act. III) That under the law of succession applicable to Parsis, namely section 56 of the Indian Succession Act read with Schedule II, Part 2, the plaintiffs were not the heirs of the deceased and were not entitled to maintain the suit\".\n\nAs upon the aforesaid findings the plaintiffs failed to establish their title as heirs of the testator the suit was held to be not maintainable at their instance and was accordingly dismissed with costs.\n\nThe plaintiffs appealed from the judgment and decree of the Additional Civil Judge to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. By its judgment and decree dated the 30th July 1951 the High Court agreed with findings 1 and 2 of the trial court but held that the plaintiffs and the proforma defendants were the heirs of the testator under the law of succession applicable to Parsis as laid down in section 56 of\n\nMrs. Shirinbai\n\nManeckshaw\n\nand others\n\nNargacebai J. Motisharv\n\nand others\n\nDas C.j.\n\nMrs. Shif'inbai\n\nManeckshaw\n\nand others v.\n\nNargacebai J. Motishaw\n\nand others\n\nDas C.J.\n\nthe Indian Succession Act read with Part 2 of Schedule II thereto. The result was that the High Court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit but directed the costs of the parties in both Courts to be paid out of the estate of the testator. On the 13th February 1953 on the application of Shirinbai and her two daughters (Defendants Nos. 1, 5 and 6) the High Court granted a certificate under section 110, C. P. C. and article 133 of the Constitution. Hence the present appeal which has come up before us for hearing.\n\nShri S. K. Dar appearing in support of the appeal has not questioned the propriety of the High Court's decision that the bequest in favour of Shirinbai is void in law or that the plaintiffs and the proforma defendants supporting them are the heirs of the testator under the law of intestate succession applicable to Parsis but he has rested his whole argument on one point, namely, that even if the bequest to Shirinbai is void under section 67 of the Indian Succession Act, the entire will does not fail and no intestacy intervenes because on a true construction of the will there is a substitutional bequest in favour of the heirs, executors and administrators of Shirinbai. He draws our attention to the terms on which the bequest is made. He frankly concedes that if the first sentence of the bequest stopped with the words \"her heirs, executors and administrators\" and those words had not been followed by the words \"for her and their own use and benefit, absolutely and forever\" then it might have been said that the words \"her heirs, executors and administrators\" were words of limitation conferring an absolute estate on her; but those words are followed immediately by the words \"for her and their own use and benefit, absolutely and forever\" which completely alter the position.\n\nSays learned counsel that the relevant words used in the will for making the bequest under consideration should be read distributively, viz. \"I hereby give, devise and bequeath to my so called mother named Mrs. Shirinbai Maneckshaw Bejonji Mistri .................. .. for her own use and benefit absolutely and forever and to her heirs, executors and administrators for\n\ntheir own use and benefit absolutely and forever\".\n\nSo read it becomes immediately apparent that the words \"her heirs, executors and administrators\" can have no reference to the estate given to Shirinbai and cannot be regarded as words of limitation of Shirinbai's estate but are clearly words of purchase indicating that they are the direct objects of the testator's bounty and that an estate is given to them for their own use and benefit, absolutely and forever.\n\nThe testator having given the estate to Shirinbai for her own use and benefit absolutely and forever, it was not necessary for him to use the words \"her heirs, executors and administrators\" as words of limitation in order to confer an absolute estate on her.\n\nThe testat.or, it is said, knew that there was a possibility of Shirinbai dying before his own death and the bequest in her favour lapsing and evidently did not intend that his estate should pass as on intestacy to his step-brothers and step-sisters.\n\nIndeed he made this will to prevent that possibility and to effectively secure that object he made a double bequest, one in favour of Shirinbai for her own use and benefit absolutely and forever and the other, to her heirs, fXecutors and administrators for their own use and benefit absolutely and forever.\n\nThe two bequests were evidently successive and the bequest to the heirs, executors and administrators was to take effect on the failure of the bequest to Shirinbai. The two bequests, it is said, were mutually exclusive and independent of each other and even if the bequest to Shirinbai failed under section 67 of the Indian Succession Act by reason of her husband M. B. Mistry having attested the will, the other bequest to 'her heirs, executors and administrators for their own use and benefit absolutely and forever' must take effect under section 129 of the Indian Succession Act.\n\nLearned counsel for the respondents strenuously oppose this construction of the bequest and maintain that there was only one bequest to Shirinbai of an absolute estate and there was no alternative or substitutional bequest to her heirs, executors and administrators as independent objects of the testator's bounty.\n\nIn any event\n\nMrs. Shirinbai\n\nManeckshaw and others v.\n\nNargacebai J. Motishaw\n\nand others\n\nDas C.J.\n\nMrs. Shirinbai\n\n!t-Ianeckshaw\n\nand others v.\n\nNargacebai J. Motishatv and others\n\nDas C.j.\n\nthey contend that the case should rath'er be governed by section 130 than by section 129 of the Indian Succession Act.\n\nThe applicability of either section 129 or section 130 of the Indian Succession Act will depend upon whether there is in the will a substitutional bequest which is to take effect on the failure of a prior bequest.\n\nIf there is no substitutional bequest then neither of the two sections can come into play. Our task is, therefore, to construe the will and ascertain whether there is a single bequest in favour of Shirinbai as contended by the respondents or there is also a substitutional bequest to take effect on the failure of the bequest to Shirinbai as contended by learned counsel for the appellants.\n\nIn construing the will we have to bear in mind the rules of construction embodied in the Indian Succession Act, namely that the will should be read as a whole and all its parts are to be construed with reference to each other (section 82), that if a clause is susceptible of two meanings according to one of which it has some effect and according to the other of which it can have none, the former is to be .preferred (section Sil) and finally that no part of the will is to be rejected as destitute of meaning if it is possible to put a reasonable construction upon it (section 85). In construing a will we are not fettered by the technical rules of English law founded on the difference between realty and personalty. Our duty is to ascertain the true intention of the testator from the language used y him, regard being had to all the surrounding circumstances.\n\nThe will is a holograph will written by the testator himself.\n\nHe was a person who had settled down in Allahabad where he was carrying on business and had acqnired his properties. There is no evidence that he maintained any connection with his step-brothers and step-sisters. As will appear from the will itself, the testator regarded Shirinbai as his mother. It also appears from the will that Shirinbai with her husband was residing at 20, Canning Road, Allahabad, where the testator himself was also residing. The bequest\n\nto her was immediately followed by the words \"her heirs, executors and administrators\". According to Jarman, 8th edition, volume 2page1304, an intention to create a substitutional gift can be inferred when the gift is to a person \"or\" his issue, children, etc. or sometimes to a person \"and\" his issue, children, etc.\n\nIn this case neither of the two conjunctions appears in the will before the words \"her heirs, executors and administrators\". But this does not conclude the matter, for the words following, viz. \"fo'r her and their own use and benefit\" are clearly indicative of an intention to create a substitutional bequest. The primary intention of the testator was evidently to benefit Shirinbai but it is quite likely, in view of the language used by him, that he had in view the possibility of her predeceasing him and the bequest to her lapsing and the estate passing to his step relations as on intestacy. The language used by the testator unmistakably evinces an intention on his part to prevent that contingency and he accordingly made a provision for her heirs, executors and administrators as independent objects of a substitutional bequest. If it is to be assumed that the testator was familiar with the niceties of English law that in a bequest to a person the addition of the words \"her heirs, executorsand administrators\" would only be regarded as words of limitation conferring an absolute estate on that person, then it is not intelligible why he should a.gain use the words \"absolutely and forever\".\n\nFurther, if the intention of the testator was to use the words \"her heirs, executors and administrators\" as words of limitation, then it is not understandable why he should have used the words \"for her and their own use and benefit\". The provision for the \"own use and benefit\" of \"her heirs, executors and administrators\" is only compatible with an intention of making a bequest in favour of her heirs, executors and administrators. If there was to be no dfrect gift to her heirs, executors and administrators, then the question of \"their own use and benefit\" was wholly out of place. If the intention of the testator was only to give an absolute estate to Shirinbai and that\n\nMrs. Shirinbai\n\nManeckshaw and others\n\nNargacibai J. Motishaw and others\n\nDas C.J.\n\nl'vlrs. Shirinbai\n\nManeckshaw and others v.\n\nNargacebai J. Motishaw and others\n\nDas C.J •.\n\nher heirs, executors and administrators were only to claim through her and not independently of her, then the death of Shirinbai during the life-time of the testator would have defeated his object, namely, to benefit Shirinbai absolutely. If, therefore, we are to give effect to the words \"for her and their own use and benefit\", as we must according to the rule of construction embodied in the Succession Act to which reference has been made, there can be no getting away from the fact, apparent on the language of the will, that the testator intended to provide for the contingency of the bequest to Shirinbai failing by reason of her death in the life-time of the testator by making a substitutional bequest in favour of her heirs, executors and administrators. In In re Mcelligott(') a testator, who died in 1941,, directed by his will that his residuary estate which consisted only of personal estate be given to his wife \"and her heirs for her and their use and benefit absolutely and forever\". It was held by a single Judge that neither the rule in Shelley's case nor section 131 of the Law of Property Act, 1925, which abolished that rule, had any application to the bequest and that the widow was entitled to an absolute interest in the residuary estate of the testator. We are, of course, not concerned either with the rule in Shelley's case or with the provisions of the English Law of Property Act, 1925, but the decision may be said to be against the contention of learned counsel for the appellant, for at the end of his judgment Vaisey, J. said that the super-added words \"for her and their use and .benefit absolutely and forever\" did not in his view make any difference or throw any light on the matter. There is no reason given why no effect should be given to those words and no reference is made to any decided case and the observation of the learned Judge is no more than a bald statement of his view unsupported by any reason or judicial decision. It runs counter to the rule of construction embodied in section 85 of the Indian Succession Act. In our view .these words, on the facts of this case, cannot be ignored and they\n\n(1) L.R. [1944] Chancery 216.\n\n' >\n\nclearly indicate the intention of the testator as mentioned above.\n\nIt is also argued that if the intention of the testator was to make a direct gift to the heirs, executors and administrators, then difficulties may arise. Supposti, it is said, that Shirinbai died leaving heirs and at the same time after having made a will of her own appointing somebody other than an heir as her executor. Who will be the recipient of the gift-the heirs or the executor? On the happening of the contingency thus contemplated, serious questions of construction may arise as to whether the heirs and the executor are to take successively or jointly. But that difficulty can have no bearing on the construction to be put upon the language used by the testator. On a fair and plain reading of the will as a whole and in view of the language used towards the end of the will about no one in the world having the right to dispute about his calling Shirinbai as his own mother, we are of opinion that the testator intended to make a bequest first to Shirinbai for her own use and benefit absolutely and forever and on failure of that bequest, to make a bequest to her heirs, executors and administrators for their own use and benefit absolutely and forever. ,\n\nThere being thus a substitutional bequestin favour of the heirs, executors and l!-dministrators the question arises whether section 129 or section 130 of the Indian Succession Act will apply. It may well be that the testator had in his contemplation the possibility of Shirinbai predeceasing him and he was, therefore, making a substitutional gift.\n\nNevertheless, the bequest ex facie and in terms does not show an intention that the second bequest was to take effect only in the event of the first bequest failing in a particular manner, namely, the ati J,\n\nDecember 1945, Rs. 15,000 in 1,000 rupees currency notes on 6th January 1946 and Rs. 8,500 in 1,000 rupees currency notes (making Rs. 8,000) on 8th January 1946, thus aggregating to Rs. 43,500 during the relevant period. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner did not accept the statements contained in the said affidavits and dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order of the Income-tax Officer.\n\nAn appeal was taken by the appellants before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal after taking into consideration all the materials which bad been placed before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, including the said affidavits, was of the opinion that if it was to accept the appellants' contention, it would mean that practically every payment above Rs. 1,000 was received by the appellants in high denomination notes, which was almost impossible. The Tribunal could not say that the appellants had no high denomination notes with them. It accepted the books of account of the appellants but thought that the cash balance on 18th January 1946 could not have sixtyone high denomination notes. It came to the conclusion that the appellants appeared to have put in high denomination notes in the cash balance and taken the other notes away. It accepted the appellants' explanation only in regard to 31 notes and directed that the appellants' assessment for the year under reference be reduced by that amount and dismissed the rest of the appeal.\n\nThe appellants applied to the Tribunal for stating a case and referring the first question of law to the High Court for its opinion under section 66(1) of the Act.\n\nThe Tribunal rejected the said application holding that no question of law arose from its order.\n\nThe appellants thereupon applied to the High Court under section 66(2) of the Act for an order directing the Tribunal to state a case and refer the questions set out in the application. The High Court directed the Tribunal to state a case and refer the two questions of law set out hereinabove to it for its decision under section 66(2) of the Act. In stating the case and referring the said questions of law to the High\n\nCourt, the Tribunal pointed out that the second quest9s6 tion was not urged' before the Tribunal at any stage Messrs Mehta and hence it was not dealt with by it in its original Parikh and co. m~. The reference was heard by the High Court and the The Commissioner High Court answered the first referred question in the of Income-tax, affirmative, but did not answer the second referred Bombay question, The High Court held that there were BhagwatiJ. materials before the Tribunal to hold that the sum of Rs. 30,000 represented the income of the appellants from undisclosed sources and that the finding of the Tribunal was a finding of fact based on materials before it and even if it was an inference drawn by the Tribunal, the inference was based on the facts and materials before the Tribunal. The Higl:i Court observed that it was impossible to say that the inference drawn by the Tribunal from the circumstances was an unreasonable inference or an arbitrary and capricious inference or an inference, which no judicial tribunal could ever draw. It, therefore, answered the first referred question in the affirmative.\n\nAs regards the second referred question, the High Court held that that question was not raised by the appellants in their application for reference under section 66(1) of the Act and, therefore, it had no jurisdiction to ask the Tribunal to state a case on a particular question of law; where the appellants themselves had never asked the Tribunal to refer such a question to the High Court and that even though it had directed the Tribunal under section 66(2) to refer the said question, as it had no jurisdiction to ask the Tribunal to refer the said question, it was not open to it to answer the second question which had been raised by the Tribunal at its instance and refused to answer it.\n\nOn a petition made by the appellants for leave to appeal to this court, the High Court granted a certificate that this was a fit case for appeal to this court and hence this appeal.\n\nIt may be mentioned at the outset that the assessment of the appellants by the Income-tax Officer was under section 23(3) and section 26-A of the Act. The\n\nMessrs Mehta Parikh and Co, v.\n\nThe Commissioner\n\no/ Inconietax,\n\nBonibay\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nbooks of account of the appellants were accepted by the Income-tax Officer and the only scrutiny made by the Income-tax Officer was whether at the relevant date, i.e. on 12th January 1946, the appellants had in their cash 61 notes of high denomination of Rs. 1,000 each.\n\nThe cash book entries from 20th December 1945 up to 18th January 1946 were put in before the Income-tax Officer and they showed that on 28th December 1945 Rs. 20,000 were received from the Anand Textiles, and there was an opening balance of Rs. 18,395 on 2nd January 1946. Rs. 15,000 were received by the appellants on 7th January 1946 from the Sushico Textiles and Rs. 8,500 were received by them on 8th January 1946 from Maniben, widow of Shah Maneklal Nihalchand. Various other sums were also received by the appellants from 2nd January 1946 up to and inclusive of 11th January 1946, which were either multiples of Rs. 1,000 or were over Rs. 1,000 and were thus capable of having been paid to the appellants in high denomination notes of Rs. 1,000. There was a cash balance of Rs. 69,891-2-6 with the appellants on 12th January 1946, when the High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetisa tiou) Ordinance 1946 was promulgated and it was the case of the appellants that they had then in their custody and possession 61 high denomination notes of Rs. 1,000, which they encashed through the Eastern Bank on 18th January 1946.\n\nThe appellants further sought to support their contention by procuring before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner the affidavits of Kuthpady Shyama Shetty, Geqeral Manager of Messrs Shree Anand Textiles, in regard to payment to the appellants of a sum of Rs. 20,000 in Rs. 1,000 currency notes on 28th December 1945, Govindprasad Ramjivan Nivetia, proprietor of Messrs Shusiko Textiles, in regard to payment to the appellants of a sum of Rs. 15,000 in Rs. 1,000 currency notes on 6th January 1946 and Bai Maniben, widow of Shah Maneklal Nihalchand, in r,; gard to payment to the appellants of a sum of Rs. 8,500 (Rs. 8,000 thereout being in Rs. 1,000 currency notes) on 8th January 1946.\n\nThe appellants were not in a position to give further\n\nparticulars of Rs. 1,000 currency notes received by them during the relevant period, as they were not in the habit of noting these particulars in their cash book and therefore relied upon the position as it could be spelt out of the entries in their cash book coupled with these affidavits in order to show that on 12th January 1946 they had in their cash balance of Rs. 69,891-2-6, the 61 high denomination currency notes of Rs. 1,000 each, which they en cashed on 18th January 1946 through the Eastern Bank.\n\nBoth the Inrome-tax Officer and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner discounted this suggestion of the appellants by holding that it was impossible that the appellants had on hand on 12th January 1946, the 61 high denomination currency notes of Rs. I ,000 each, included in their cash balance of Rs. 69,891-2-6.\n\nThe calculations, which they made involved taking into account all payments received by the appellants from and after 2nd January 1946, which were either multiples of Rs. 1,000 or were over Rs.1,000. There was a cash balance of Rs. 18,395-6-6 on hand on 2nd January 1946, which could have accounted for 18 such notes.\n\nThe appellants received thereafter as shown in their cash book several sums of monies aggregating to over Rs. 45,000 in multiples of Rs. 1,000 or sums over Rs. 1,000, which could account for 45 other notes of that high denomination, thus making up 63 currency notes of the high denomination of Rs. 1,000 and these 61 currency notes of Rs. 1,000 each, which the appellants encashed on 18th January 1946 could as well have been in their custody on 12th January\n\n1946. This was, however, considered impossible by both the Income-tax Officer and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner as they could not consider it within the bounds of possibility that each and every payment received by the appellants after 2nd January 1946 in multiples of Rs. 1,000 or over Rs. 1,000 was received by the appellants in high denomination notes of Rs. 1,000 each. It was by reason of their visualisation of such .an impossibility that they negatived the appellants' contention. ' It has to be noted, however, that beyond these\n\nMessrs Mehla Parikh and Co.\n\nTho Commissioner\n\nof Income.ta~-.\n\nBombay\n\nBhagu•atl J,\n\n1956 calculations of figures, no further scrutiny was made\n\nMessrs Mehta by the Income-tax Officer or the Appellate Assistant Parikh and co. Commissioner of the entries in the cash book of the v. appellants. The cash book of the appellants was The Commissioner accepted and the entries therein were not challenged. of Income.tax, No further documents or vouchers in relation to those Bombay entries were called for, nor was the presence of the\n\nBhagwatiJ. deponents of the three affidavits considered necessary by either party. The appellants took it that the affidavits of these parties were enough and neither the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, nor the Incometax Officer, who was present at the hearing of the appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, considered it necessary to call for them in order to cross-examine them with reference to the statements made by them in their affidavits. Under these circumstances it was not open to the Revenue to challenge the correctness of the cash book entries or the statements made by those deponents in their affidavits.\n\nThis being the position, the state of affairs, as it obtained on 12th January 1946, had got to be appreciated, having regard to those entries in the cash books and the affidavits filed before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, taking them at their face value. The entries in the cash books disclosed that, taking the number of high denomination notes at 18 on 2nd January 1946, there came in the custody or possession of the appellants after 2nd January 1946 and up to 12th January 1946, 49 further notes of that high denomination, making 67 such notes in the aggregate, out of which 61 such notes could be encashed by the appellants on 18th January 1946 through the Eastern Bank. A mere calculation of the nature indulged in by the Income tax Officer or the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was not enough, without any further scrutiny, to dislodge the position taken up by the appellants, supported as it was, by the entries in the cash book and the affidavits put ii1 by the appellants before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.' The Tribunal also fell into the same error. It could\n\nnot negative the possibility of the appellant being in possession of a substantial number of these high denomination currency notes. It, however, considered that it was impossible for the appellants to have bad 61 such notes in the cash balance in their bands on 12th January 1946 and then it applied a rule of the thumb treating 31 out of such 61 notes as within the bounds of possibility, excluding 30 such notes as not covered by the explanation of the appellants. This was pure surmise and had no basis in the evidence, which was on the record of the proceedings.\n\nThe High Court treated this finding of the Tribunal as a mere finding of fact.\n\nThe position in regard to all such findings of fact, as to whether they can be questioned in appeal, is thus laid down by the House of Lords in Cameron v. Prendergast (Inspector of Taxes)(1):\n\n\"Inferences from facts stated by the Commissioners are matters of law and can be questioned on appeal. The same remark is true as to the construction of documents. If the Commissioners state the evidence and hold upon that evidence that certain results follow, it is open to the Court to differ from such a. holding\".\n\nTo the same effect are the observations of the House of Lords in Bamford v. Osborne (H. M. Inspector of\n\nTaxes)(~):\n\n\"No doubt there are many cases in which Commissioners, having had proved or admitted before them a series of facts, may deduce therefrom further conclusions which are themselves conclusions of pure fact. But in such cases the determination in point of law is that the facts proved or admitted provide evidence to support the Commissioners' conclusions\".\n\nThe latest pronouncement of the House of Lords on this question is to be found in Edwards (Inspector of Taxes) v. Bairstow and Another(8). Viscount Simonds observed at page 586:-\n\n\"For it is universally conceded that, though it is\n\n(1) [1940) 8 I.T.R. (Suppl.) 75, 81.\n\n(2) (1942110 I.T.R. (Suppl.) 27, 84.\n\n(3) [1955] 28 I.T.R. 579.\n\nMe•srs Mehta Parikh and Co. v.\n\nThe Commissioner of Income-tax,\n\nBombay\n\nBhagwati J.\n\n19J6\n\nMessrs Mehta Par; kh and Co. v.\n\nThe Com1nissioner \"\\ o/ lnco111e .. tax,\n\nBomba1\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\na pure finding of fact, it may be set aside on grounds which have been stated in various ways but are, I think, fairly summarised by saying that the court should take that course if it appears that the Commissioners have acted without any evidence or upon a view of the facts which could not reasonably be entertained\". and Lord Radcliffe expressed himself as under at page592:-\n\n\"If the case contains anything ex facie which is bad law and which bears upon the determination, it is, obviously erroneous in point of law. But, without any such misconception appearing ex facie, it may be that the facts found are such that no person acting judicially and properly instructed as to the relevant law could have come to the determination under appeal. In those circumstances, too, the court must intervene\".\n\nIt follows, therefore, that facts proved or admitted may provide evidence to support further conclusions to be deduced from them, which conclusions may themselves be conclusions of fact and such inferences from facts proved or admitted could be matters of law. The court would be entitled to intervene if it appears that the fact finding authority has acted without any evidence or upon a view of the facts, which could not reasonably be entertained or the facts found are such that no person acting judicially and properly instructed as to the relevant law would have come to the determination in question.\n\nThe High Court recognised this position in effect but went wrong in applying the true principles of interference with such findings of fact to the present case.\n\nThe attempt which was made by the High Court to probe into the mind of the Tribunal hy trying to discard the affidavitofGovindprasad Ramjivan Nivetia in regard to the payment of Rs. 15,000 to the appellants in 15 currency notes of Rs. 1,000 each on 6th January 1946 and thus reducing the aggregate sum of Rs. 43,500 to Rs. 28,500 and justifying the figure of Rs. 31,000 arrived at by the Tribunal was really far-fetched and contrary to the terms of\n\nSJ'1.R..\n\nSUPR.EME COUR.'f REPOR.TS 637\n\nthe Tribunal's order itself, the Tribunal not having 7956 given any inkling, whatever, of what was at the back Messrs Mehta of its mind when it fixed upon the figure R.s. 31,000.\n\nParikh and co.\n\nReally speaking the Tribunal had not indicated upon v. what material it held that R.s. 30,000 should be Tiie Commissioner treated as secret profit or profits from undisclosed of Income-tax, sources and the order passed by it was bad.\n\nThe Bombay appellants had furnished a reasonable explanation BhagwatiJ. for the possession of the high denomination notes of the face value of Rs. 61,000 and there was no justification for having accepted it in part and discarded it in relation to a sum of Rs. 30,000.\n\nThe case was analogous to the one before the Patna High Court in Chunilal Ticamchand Coal Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar and Orissa(1) and should have been similarly decided in favour of the appellants.\n\nFor the reasons indicated above, we are of the opinion that the High Court was in error in answering the first referred question in the affirmative. It ought to have answered it in the negative and held that there were no materials to justify the assessment of Rs. 30,000 from out of the sum of Rs. 61,000, for Income-tax and Excess Profits Tax and Business Profit Tax purposes representing the value of the high denomination notes which were encashed on 18th , January 1946.\n\nIn view of the above it is not necessary for us to go into the question whether the High Court ought to have answered the second referred question also. The answer to the first referred question being in the negative, the very basis for Excess Profits Tax and Business Profits Tax disappears and the second referred question becomes purely academical.\n\nThe result, therefore, is that the appeal is allowed and the first referred question is answered in the negative. The appellants will have their costs here as well as in the High Court.\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-I agree to the order just proposed; but I prefer to rest my decision on the\n\n(1) [1966] 27 I.T.R. 602,\n\n7956 ground that the finding of the Tribunal that high\n\nMessrs Mehta denomination notes of the value of Rs. 30,000 repre- Parikh and co. sented the concealed profits of the appellant is not v. supported by any evidence, and is, in consequence, The commissioner erroneous in point of law and liable to be set aside. of Income-tax.\n\nThe evidence on record has been exhaustively re- Bombay viewed in the judgment just delivered, and there is no BhagwatiJ. need to traverse the same ground again. To put the matter in a nut-shell, the accounts of the appellant have been accepted by the Tribunal as genuine, and it is impossible to say, having regard to the cash balance as shown therein, that the notes in question could not have been included therein. The Tribunal observes that it is unlikely that so many high denomination notes would have been held as part of the cash on hand for such a large number of days.\n\nThat, no doubt, is highly suspicious; but the decision of the Tribunal must rest not on suspicion but on legal testimony. For the respondent, Mr. Joshi contended that the cash balance shown in the books could not be accepted as true, because the appellant had ample time to rewrite the accounts, as the Ordinance was issued on 12th January 1946 and the year of account of the assessee was the Calendar year.\n\nWhether the accounts are genuine or not is a pure question of fact, and a finding on a question of fact is as much binding on the Revenue as on the subject.", "total_entities": 75, "entities": [{"text": "MEHTA PARIKH & CO", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 45, "end_char": 62, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Mehla Parikh and Co.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nBOMBAY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BOMBAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 108, "end_char": 122, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 124, "end_char": 132, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BhagwatiJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 492, "end_char": 506, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 62(2), 23(3), 26A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 521, "end_char": 542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 23(3) and 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 595, "end_char": 611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "12th of January, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1006, "end_char": 1027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "23(3) and 26 A of the Incometax Act, were called upon by the Incometax Officer during the assessment year 1947-48 to explain how and when they came to possess 61 thousandrupee currency notes which they had encashed on the 18th January, 1946, after the promulgation of the High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetisation) Ordinance of 1946, under which such notes ceased to be legal tender on the expiry of the 12th of January, 1946."}}, {"text": "20th December, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1085, "end_char": 1104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessees produced their cash-book entries from the 20th December, 1945, to the 18th January, 1946, which were accepted as correct by the Income-tax Officer, who, however, made no further scrutiny of the accounts, and the entries showed that on the 12th of January, 1946, the cash balance in hand was Rs."}}, {"text": "18th January, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1113, "end_char": 1131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessees produced their cash-book entries from the 20th December, 1945, to the 18th January, 1946, which were accepted as correct by the Income-tax Officer, who, however, made no further scrutiny of the accounts, and the entries showed that on the 12th of January, 1946, the cash balance in hand was Rs."}}, {"text": "28th December, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1668, "end_char": 1687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "20,000 on the 28th December, 1945, Rs."}}, {"text": "6th of January, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1707, "end_char": 1727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "15,000 on the 6th of January, 1946, and Rs."}}, {"text": "8th of January, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1779, "end_char": 1799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8,500, on the 8th of January, 1946, were paid in thousand-rupee notes."}}, {"text": "s. 66(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2691, "end_char": 2699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3249, "end_char": 3257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per C.J. and BHAGWATI J.-Conclusions based on facts proved or admitted may be conclusions of fact but whether a particular inference can legitimately be drawn from such conclusions may be a question of law.", "canonical_name": "BhagwatiJ."}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMA AYYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5270, "end_char": 5287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per VENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-The finding of the Tribunal that high denomination notes of the value Rs."}}, {"text": "R.J. Kolah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6155, "end_char": 6165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.J. Kolah and/. N. Shroff for the appellant."}}, {"text": "N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6172, "end_char": 6181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.J. Kolah and/. N. Shroff for the appellant."}}, {"text": "G. N.Joshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6202, "end_char": 6212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. N.Joshi, Porus A. Mehta and R.H. Dhebar for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Porus A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6214, "end_char": 6228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. N.Joshi, Porus A. Mehta and R.H. Dhebar for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R.H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6233, "end_char": 6244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. N.Joshi, Porus A. Mehta and R.H. Dhebar for the respondent."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6405, "end_char": 6425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BHAGWATI J.-Two questions were referred by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to the High Court of Bombay under section 66(1) of the Indian Incometax Act."}}, {"text": "section 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6432, "end_char": 6445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7352, "end_char": 7362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ahmedabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7703, "end_char": 7712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants are a partnership firm doing business in Mill Stores at Ahmedabad."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7778, "end_char": 7784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Their head office is in Ahmedabad and their branch office is in Bombay."}}, {"text": "12th January 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7811, "end_char": 7828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Governor-General on 12th January 1946 promulgated the High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetisation) Ordinance, 1946 and High Denomination Bank Notes ceased to be legal tender on the expiry of 12th day of January 1946."}}, {"text": "clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8021, "end_char": 8029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "18th January 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8065, "end_char": 8082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pursuant to clause 6 of the Ordinance the appellants on 18th January 1946 encashed high denomination notes of Rs."}}, {"text": "20th December 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8675, "end_char": 8693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After examining the entries in the books of account of the appellants and the , position of the Cash Balances on various dates from 20th December 1945 to 18th January 1946 and the nature and extent of the receipts and payments during the relevant period, the Income-tax Officer came to the conclusion that in order to imstain the contention of the appellants he would have to presume that there were 18 high denomination notes of Rs."}}, {"text": "1st January 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9013, "end_char": 9029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,000 each in the Cash B11.lance on 1st January 1946 and that all cash receipts after l'st January 1946 and before 13th January 1946 were received in currency notes of Rs."}}, {"text": "13th January 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9092, "end_char": 9109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,000 each in the Cash B11.lance on 1st January 1946 and that all cash receipts after l'st January 1946 and before 13th January 1946 were received in currency notes of Rs."}}, {"text": "Commissioner\n\nof /11come-ta; r,\n\nBombay", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9593, "end_char": 9632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "20,000, in 1,000 rupees currency notes on 28th\n\nMessrs Mehta Parikh and Co.\n\nThe Commissioner\n\nof /11come-ta; r,\n\nBombay\n\nBhagu:ati J,\n\nMessis Mehta Parikh and Co. v.\n\nThe Co1ntn£sst'oncr\n\nof lnconie-tax,\n\nBo1nbay\n\nBhagu.>ati J,\n\nDecember 1945, Rs."}}, {"text": "8th January 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9886, "end_char": 9902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8,000) on 8th January 1946, thus aggregating to Rs."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10189, "end_char": 10218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An appeal was taken by the appellants before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal."}}, {"text": "section 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11336, "end_char": 11349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 66(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11518, "end_char": 11531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 66(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11784, "end_char": 11797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mehta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12000, "end_char": 12005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In stating the case and referring the said questions of law to the High\n\nCourt, the Tribunal pointed out that the second quest9s6 tion was not urged' before the Tribunal at any stage Messrs Mehta and hence it was not dealt with by it in its original Parikh and co. m~. The reference was heard by the High Court and the The Commissioner High Court answered the first referred question in the of Income-tax, affirmative, but did not answer the second referred Bombay question, The High Court held that there were BhagwatiJ. materials before the Tribunal to hold that the sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "section 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13157, "end_char": 13170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 66(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13450, "end_char": 13463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13990, "end_char": 14003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14008, "end_char": 14018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Messrs Mehta Parikh and Co", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14038, "end_char": 14064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\nMessrs Mehta Parikh and Co, v.\n\nThe Commissioner\n\no/ Inconietax,\n\nBonibay\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nbooks of account of the appellants were accepted by the Income-tax Officer and the only scrutiny made by the Income-tax Officer was whether at the relevant date, i.e. on 12th January 1946, the appellants had in their cash 61 notes of high denomination of Rs."}}, {"text": "Commissioner\n\no/ Inconietax,\n\nBonibay\n\nBhagwati J.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14074, "end_char": 14124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\nMessrs Mehta Parikh and Co, v.\n\nThe Commissioner\n\no/ Inconietax,\n\nBonibay\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nbooks of account of the appellants were accepted by the Income-tax Officer and the only scrutiny made by the Income-tax Officer was whether at the relevant date, i.e. on 12th January 1946, the appellants had in their cash 61 notes of high denomination of Rs."}}, {"text": "28th December 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14534, "end_char": 14552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The cash book entries from 20th December 1945 up to 18th January 1946 were put in before the Income-tax Officer and they showed that on 28th December 1945 Rs."}}, {"text": "Anand Textiles", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14587, "end_char": 14601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "20,000 were received from the Anand Textiles, and there was an opening balance of Rs."}}, {"text": "2nd January 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14653, "end_char": 14669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "18,395 on 2nd January 1946."}}, {"text": "7th January 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14717, "end_char": 14733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "15,000 were received by the appellants on 7th January 1946 from the Sushico Textiles and Rs."}}, {"text": "Sushico Textiles", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14743, "end_char": 14759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "15,000 were received by the appellants on 7th January 1946 from the Sushico Textiles and Rs."}}, {"text": "Maniben", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14821, "end_char": 14828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8,500 were received by them on 8th January 1946 from Maniben, widow of Shah Maneklal Nihalchand."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14839, "end_char": 14843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8,500 were received by them on 8th January 1946 from Maniben, widow of Shah Maneklal Nihalchand."}}, {"text": "Maneklal Nihalchand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14844, "end_char": 14863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8,500 were received by them on 8th January 1946 from Maniben, widow of Shah Maneklal Nihalchand."}}, {"text": "11th January 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14966, "end_char": 14983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Various other sums were also received by the appellants from 2nd January 1946 up to and inclusive of 11th January 1946, which were either multiples of Rs."}}, {"text": "Kuthpady Shyama Shetty", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15653, "end_char": 15675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants further sought to support their contention by procuring before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner the affidavits of Kuthpady Shyama Shetty, Geqeral Manager of Messrs Shree Anand Textiles, in regard to payment to the appellants of a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Govindprasad Ramjivan Nivetia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15838, "end_char": 15867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,000 currency notes on 28th December 1945, Govindprasad Ramjivan Nivetia, proprietor of Messrs Shusiko Textiles, in regard to payment to the appellants of a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Shusiko Textiles", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15890, "end_char": 15906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,000 currency notes on 28th December 1945, Govindprasad Ramjivan Nivetia, proprietor of Messrs Shusiko Textiles, in regard to payment to the appellants of a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Bai Maniben", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16022, "end_char": 16033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,000 currency notes on 6th January 1946 and Bai Maniben, widow of Shah Maneklal Nihalchand, in r,; gard to payment to the appellants of a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Shah Maneklal Nihalchand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16044, "end_char": 16068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,000 currency notes on 6th January 1946 and Bai Maniben, widow of Shah Maneklal Nihalchand, in r,; gard to payment to the appellants of a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "12th January\n\n1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17854, "end_char": 17872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1,000 each, which the appellants encashed on 18th January 1946 could as well have been in their custody on 12th January\n\n1946."}}, {"text": "Mehla Parikh and Co.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18420, "end_char": 18440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has to be noted, however, that beyond these\n\nMessrs Mehla Parikh and Co.\n\nTho Commissioner\n\nof Income.ta~-.", "canonical_name": "Mehla Parikh and Co."}}, {"text": "BhagwatiJ.", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 18944, "end_char": 18954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Income.tax, No further documents or vouchers in relation to those Bombay entries were called for, nor was the presence of the\n\nBhagwatiJ. deponents of the three affidavits considered necessary by either party."}}, {"text": "Viscount Simonds", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22444, "end_char": 22460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Viscount Simonds observed at page 586:-\n\n\"For it is universally conceded that, though it is\n\n(1) [1940) 8 I.T.R. (Suppl.)"}}, {"text": "Commissioner of Income-tax,\n\nBombay\n\nBhagwati J.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22676, "end_char": 22724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Me•srs Mehta Parikh and Co. v.\n\nThe Commissioner of Income-tax,\n\nBombay\n\nBhagwati J.\n\n19J6\n\nMessrs Mehta Par; kh and Co. v.\n\nThe Com1nissioner \"\\ o/ lnco111e .. tax,\n\nBomba1\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\na pure finding of fact, it may be set aside on grounds which have been stated in various ways but are, I think, fairly summarised by saying that the court should take that course if it appears that the Commissioners have acted without any evidence or upon a view of the facts which could not reasonably be entertained\"."}}, {"text": "Mehta Par; kh and Co.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22739, "end_char": 22760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Me•srs Mehta Parikh and Co. v.\n\nThe Commissioner of Income-tax,\n\nBombay\n\nBhagwati J.\n\n19J6\n\nMessrs Mehta Par; kh and Co. v.\n\nThe Com1nissioner \"\\ o/ lnco111e .. tax,\n\nBomba1\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\na pure finding of fact, it may be set aside on grounds which have been stated in various ways but are, I think, fairly summarised by saying that the court should take that course if it appears that the Commissioners have acted without any evidence or upon a view of the facts which could not reasonably be entertained\"."}}, {"text": "Com1nissioner", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22769, "end_char": 22782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Me•srs Mehta Parikh and Co. v.\n\nThe Commissioner of Income-tax,\n\nBombay\n\nBhagwati J.\n\n19J6\n\nMessrs Mehta Par; kh and Co. v.\n\nThe Com1nissioner \"\\ o/ lnco111e .. tax,\n\nBomba1\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\na pure finding of fact, it may be set aside on grounds which have been stated in various ways but are, I think, fairly summarised by saying that the court should take that course if it appears that the Commissioners have acted without any evidence or upon a view of the facts which could not reasonably be entertained\"."}}, {"text": "Radcliffe", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23156, "end_char": 23165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Lord Radcliffe expressed himself as under at page592:-\n\n\"If the case contains anything ex facie which is bad law and which bears upon the determination, it is, obviously erroneous in point of law."}}, {"text": "Ramjivan Nivetia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24536, "end_char": 24552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The attempt which was made by the High Court to probe into the mind of the Tribunal hy trying to discard the affidavitofGovindprasad Ramjivan Nivetia in regard to the payment of Rs."}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25062, "end_char": 25067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parikh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25074, "end_char": 25080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Parikh and co.\n\nReally speaking the Tribunal had not indicated upon v. what material it held that R.s."}}, {"text": "s. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25174, "end_char": 25179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "BhagwatiJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25386, "end_char": 25396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bombay appellants had furnished a reasonable explanation BhagwatiJ. for the possession of the high denomination notes of the face value of Rs.", "canonical_name": "BhagwatiJ."}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25640, "end_char": 25656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case was analogous to the one before the Patna High Court in Chunilal Ticamchand Coal Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar and Orissa(1) and should have been similarly decided in favour of the appellants."}}, {"text": "18th , January 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26269, "end_char": 26288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "61,000, for Income-tax and Excess Profits Tax and Business Profit Tax purposes representing the value of the high denomination notes which were encashed on 18th , January 1946."}}, {"text": "Joshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28014, "end_char": 28019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the respondent, Mr. Joshi contended that the cash balance shown in the books could not be accepted as true, because the appellant had ample time to rewrite the accounts, as the Ordinance was issued on 12th January 1946 and the year of account of the assessee was the Calendar year."}}]} {"document_id": "1956_1_62_71_EN", "year": 1956, "text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nJAI NARAIN RAM LUNDIA\n\n(1956)\n\nKEDAR NATH KHETAN AND OTHERS.\n\n[VIVIAN BosE, JAFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR JJ.)\n\nExeclttion-Power of transferee Court,-DeOTet for specific pSf'- formance-Reciprocal conditions indissolubly link.d together-AltSf'ation in a material particular, if permissible-Code of Civil Procedure (Act F of 1908), ss. 47, 42, 0. XXI, r. 82(1).\n\nAn executing court cannot go behind a decree so as to vary its terms and when the obligations it imposes on the paities are reciprocal and inseverable, rendering pa.rtie.l execution impossible, the decree must be executed wholly as it stands or not at all.\n\nThis is particularly true of a decree for specific performa.nce where the party who seeks execution must satisfy the executing court that he is in a position to perform the obligations which the decree imposes on him.\n\nThat in cases where the identity or substance of what the decree directs a party to give to the other is in dispute, the .executing court alone has the power to decide it under s. 4 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure and under s. 42 of the Code the powers of the court executing a decree on transfer are identical with those of the court which passed the decree.\n\nThat although the remedy provided by O. XXI, r. 32(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure is available in executioD. of a decree for specific performance, it can be used only by a person entitled to execute the decree and if, by reason of bis own incapacity to perform his part, he is precluded from seeking execution, O. XX!, r. 32(1), Can have no application.\n\nConsequently, in a. case where, as in the present, the defendant sought to execute a decree for specific performane of a contract but was himself unable to perfor1n one of the obligations the decree imposed on his party, namely, to transfer five a.nnas share in a \\ - partnership firm, for the res.son that the firm had ceased to exist by dissolution before the date of execution, he wn.s not entitled to execute the decree.\n\nHeldf7trther, that the defendant could not be allowed to substitute five a.nnas share in the assets of the dissolved firm instead, as that would amount to an alteration of the decree which the execution court was not competent to make.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 206 of 1955.\n\nOn appeal from the judgment and order dated 7956 the 5th May 1954 of the Patna High Court in Appeal Jai Narain Ram from the Original Order No. 284 of 1951 arising out Lundia of the order dated the 11th July 1951 of the Court of v.\n\nSubordinate Judge, Motihari in Misc. Case No. 30 of KedarNath 1951.\n\nKhetan at1d others\n\nVeda, Vyas, (S. K. Kapur and Ganpat Rai, with him) for the appellant.\n\n0. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India (K. B.\n\nAsthana and 0. P. Lal, with him) for respondent No. 1.\n\n1956. January 31. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BosE J.-This appeal arises out of certain execution proceedings. The decree which the appellant, J ainarain 'Ram Lundia, seeks to execute is one that directs specific performance of a contract to sell certain shares in a private limited company known as the Ganga I)evi Sugar Mills, together with a five annas share in a partnership firm called the Mai:wari Brothers, on payment of a sum of Rs. 2,45,000.\n\nThe facts are as follows.\n\nThe partnership firm, known as the Marwari Brothers, was formed on the 29th of February 1936. The partners consisted of two groups called the Bettia Group and the Padrauna Group. The Padrauna Group consisted of (1) Kedarnath Khetan and (2) a firm called Surajmal. Thef;!e two were the plaintiffs in the suit. Kedarnath was\n\non~ of the partners of the Surajmal firm. The Bettia Group consisted of (1) Gobardhan Das (2) Jainarain Ram Lundia (3) Badri Prasad and (4) Bisheshwar Nath. On Bisheshwar Nath's death his son Madan Lal Jhunjhunwalla stepped into his shoes. These persons were the defendants.\n\nThe Marwari Brothers :Firm was formed for the purpose of promoting a company for starting a sugar mill in Cbamparan and for securing the managing agency of the company for itself for a period of ninety years. This was done. The capital of the company consisted of Rs. 8,00,000 divided into 800 shares of\n\nJ ai Narain Ram Lundia v.\n\nKedarNath Khetan and others\n\nBose}.\n\nRs.1,000 each. The shares were distributed as follows.\n\nIn the Bettia Group Gobardhan Das and his brother Badri Prasad had 100 shares; Jainarain had 150 and Madan Lal had 100. The Bettia Group thus had 350 shares between them. The other group (Padrauna)\n\nheld the remaining 450 shares.\n\nAbout five years later the two sets of partners fell out and, as a result, the Bettia Group agreed, on 1-1-1941, to sell a certain number of their shares in the Ganga Devi Sugar Mills Limited to the Padrauna Group along with a certain share in the Marwari Brothers firm. The exact number of shares agreed to be sold and the extent of the share in the firm was a matter of dispute but that does not concern us at this stage because we are only concerned with the final result embodied in the decree now under execution.\n\nT}le Padrauna Group sued for specific performance and the dispute was carried as far-as the Federal Court. That Court affirmed the decree of the Calcutta High Court on 6-5-1949. The substance of the decree was this: I. \"It is declared that upon payment and or tender to the defendants-appellants Jainarain Ram Lundia and Madan Lal Jhunjhunwala of the sum of Rs. 2,45,000 ........ with interest thereon ........ by the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs are entitled to 250 shares belonging to the said defendants in the Ganga Devi Sugar Mills Limited and five aunasshare belonging to them in the Marwari Brothers ........ and to all dividends and profits in respect thereof with effect from 1-2-1941.. ...... \"\n\n2. \"And it is further ordered and decreed that against payment or tender by the plaintiffs to the said defendants ........ of the said sum of Rs. 2,45,000\n\nwith interest as aforesaid the said defendants-appellants and all proper parties do execute in favour of the plaintiffs proper deed or deeds of transfer or assignment of the said 250 shares in the Ganga Devi Sugar Mills Limited and the said five annas share in the Marwari Brothers ........ \"\n\nThis was in slight variation of the first Court's decree. The exact variation does not matter. All\n\n' -\n\n._,\n\nthat it is necessary to note is that the plaintiffs (that 1956 is, the Padrauna Group) tendered the money some time after the first Court's decree and before the Jai N;,:,7~7aRam Calcutta High Court's decree. The tender was not v. accepted as the defendants (the Bettia Group) had KedarNath appealed. It is admitted that there was no second Khetan and others tender after the High Court's decree. - After the Federal Court had settled the matter, Bose J. one of the defendants, J ainarain Ram Lundia, applied to the Calcutta High Court for execution.\n\nThe deotee was transferred to the Subordinate Judge, Motihari, and the execution proceedings started there on 25-1-1951. One of the plaintiffs, Kedarnath Khetan, filed an objection petition on 20-3-1951.\n\nThat is the objection we are concerned with. Among other things, one of the objections was that the defendants were not in a position to implement the conditions imposed on them by the decree because the Marwari Brothers firm was dissolved by agreement between the parties before the Federal Court's decree and was no longer in existence. The present appeal turns almost entirely on that fact and on the consequences that flow from it.\n\nThe first Court, that is, the Subordinate Judge's Court at Motihari to whom the decree had been transferred, declined to go into this holding that it had no jurisdiction as a transferee Court.\n\nThe plaintiff Kedarnath appealed to the High Court and succeeded. The High Court held that the transferee Court had jurisdiction, that the Marwari Brothers had been dissolved and that because of that the defendants could not execute the decree.\n\nThe defendants appealed here.\n\nWe will first consider the question of fact, namely, whether the Marwari Brothers was still in existence as a firm at the date of the execution application.\n\nOn this point we agree with the High Court that it was not, for the following reasons.\n\nThe plaintiff Kedarnath asserted in his objection petition that the firm had been dissolved by agreement between the parties \"including the plaintiffs and the defendants\". This fact was not denied by\n\nJ ai Narain Ram Lundi a v.\n\nKedarNath Khetan and others\n\nBose}.\n\nthe defendant Jainarain Ram Lundia in his rejoinder though the fact was specifically alleged to be within his personal knowledge. Even if he did not know whether the firm had been dissolved or not (a fact which cannot be the case for reasons that we shall give later) he was certainly in a position to admit or deny whether the fact was within his personal knowledge. His silence can therefore only have one meaning. The defendant's learned counsel contended before us that the fact had been denied by implication because Kedarnath stated that his side was, and had always been, ready to perform their part of the decree. Counsel argued that as the plaintiffs contended that performance was not possible after the dissolution of the M.arwari Brothers firm this meant that the firm was still in existence.\n\nWe reject this contention and remark in passing that this is inconsistent with another argument which was also urged in this Court, namely that the fact of dissolution was no bar to performance on the defendant's part.\n\nQuite apart from the language of the rejoinder, the defendant Jainarain said in paragraph 15 of his application dated 12-7-1954 made to the High Court for leave to appeal here that\n\n\"the said Marwari Brothers was in existence on the date of the said conveyance, namely 14th September 1950, and died a natural death on the conveyance of the Ganga Devi Sugar Mills. to North Bihar Sugar Mills\".\n\nThis is a clear admission that the firm was dissolved, at any rate, on 14-9-1950.\n\nThe plaintiff's contention is that it was dissolved much earlier but whether that was so or not will make no difference to this appeal because 14-9-1950 is also before the date of the application for execution.\n\nThe defendant's learned counsel tried to explain this away also.\n\nHe said that the defendant did not mean that the firm was dissolved on that date but that as the only purpose for which the firm existed, namely, the managing agency of the Ganga Devi Sugar Mills, had gone the firm could no longer function.\n\n' -\n\nIn .order to understand this, some further facts will 1956 be necessary. While the plaintiff's appeal was being Jai Narain Ram heard in the High Court, the defendants made an Lundia application to that Court on 14-4-1954 asking for v. permission to adduce further evidence in the shape of Kedar Nath a sale deed dated 14-9-1950.\n\nThe defendant con- Khetan and others tended that he had only \"recently\" come to know that the Ganga Devi Sugar Mills had sold all its land, machinery, etc. to the North Bihar Sugar Mills on 14-9-1950. This terminated the managing agency, and as the only business of the firm was this managing agency and as that was the only purpose for which the firm was formed, it was no longer able to function. But he said that this deed would show conclusively that the firm was in existence on that date.\n\nThe High Court refused to accept this document because it considered that the only ground on which additional evidence can be admitted in appeal is when the Court is unable to pronounce judgment on the material already before it; as that was not the case here it rejected the document.\n\nWe need not decide whether there is any conflict of view between the Privy Council decisions in Kessowji Issur v. G.I.P. Rly.(1) and Parsotim v. Lal Mohar(g) on the one hand and Indrajit Pratap Sahi v.\n\nAmar Singh(3) on the other because, even if this evidence were to be admitted and were to be accepted as true, there would still be the defendant's admission in the High Court that the firm stood dissolved at least on 14-9-1950. We are not able to construe the statement in any other way. The plaintiff says that the dissolution was much earlier and that the firm mentioned in the sale deed now sought to be filed was not the same firm but another firm of the same name, but even ifthe defendant's version be accepted the fact still remains that even according to his statement there was a dissolution before his application for execution and that therefore the defendants were not in a position to assign their five annas share\n\n(1) [1907] L.R. 84 I.A. 115, 122.\n\n(2) [1981] L.R. 58 I.A. 254.\n\n(3) [1928] L.R. 50 I.A. 183, 190, 191.\n\nBose].\n\n1956 in the Marwari Brothers firm.\n\nWe now have to consider the effect of that.\n\nJai Narain Ram\n\nLunaia Much of the argument about this revolved round v. the question whether the equitable rules that obtain Kedar Nath before decree in a suit for specific performance con- Kheta\" and others tinue at the stage of execution. It is not necessary\n\n- for us to go into that here because the position in the Bose]. present case is much simpler. When a decree imposes obligations on both sides which are so conditioned that performance by one is conditional on performance bv the other execution will not be ordered unless the party seeking execution not only offers to perform his side but, when objection is raised, satisfies the executing Court that he is in a position to do so. Any other rule would have the effect of varying the conditions of the decree: a thing that an executing Court cannot do. There may of course be decrees where the obligations imposed on each side are distinct and severable and in such a case each party might well be left to its own execution. But when the obligations are reciprocal and are interlinked so that they cannot be separated, any attempt to enforce performance unilaterally would be to defeat the directions in the decree and to go behind them which, of course, an executing Court cannot do.\n\nThe only question therefore is whether the decree in the present case is of this nature. We are clear that it is.\n\nThe relevant part of the decree has already been quoted. It directs that\n\n\"against payment or tender by the plaintiffs .... the said defendants ... do execute in favour of the plaintiffs proper deed or deeds of transfer of .... five annas share in the Marwari Brothers .... \" This is not a case of two independent and severable directions in the same decree but of one set of reciprocal conditions indissolubly linked together so that they cannot exist without each other. The fact that it is a decree for specific performance where the decree itself cannot be given unless the side seeking performance is ready and willing to perform his side of the bargain and is in a position to do Bo, only strengthens the conclusion that that was the meaning\n\nand intendment of the language used.\n\nBut the 1996\n\nPrinciple on which we are founding is not confined to J ai Narain Ram cases of specific performance. It will apply whenever Lundia a decree is so conditioned that the right of one party v. to seek performance from the other is conditional on Kedar Nath his readiness and ability to perform his own obliga- Khetan and others tions. The reason is, as we have explained, that to hold otherwise would be to permit an executing Court\n\nto go behind the decree and vary its terms by splitting up what was fashioned as an indivisible whole into distinct and divisible parts having separate and severable existence without any interrelation between them just as if they had been separate decrees in separate and distinct suits.\n\nFry on Specific Performance was quoted to us (6th edition, Chapter IV, pages 546 onwards) where the learned author states that relief can often be obtained after judgment along much the same lines as before: thus a party to a contract may, in a proper case, apply for rescission of the contract and so forth. It was urged by the other side that even if that can be done it can only be done by the Court which passed the decree and not in execution. We do not intend to examine this because even if these remedies also exist, provided application is made to the proper Court, it does not affect the basic principle in execution that the executing Court must take the decree as it stands and cannot go behind it. If the decree says that on payment being made some definite and specific thing is to be given to the other side, the executing Court cannot alter that and allow something else to be substituted for the thing ordered to be given.\n\nThe learned counsel for the defendant-appellant contended that even if the Marwari Brothers had ceased to exist as a firm the plaintiff was still entitled to a five annas share in its assets on dissolution. But a five annas share in the assets of a dissolved firm which has ceased to exist is a very different thing from a five annas share in a going partnership concern; and to permit this substitution in the decree would be to alter it in a very material particular. The defendant may or may not have the\n\nBose}.\n\nJ ai Narain Ram Lundia v.\n\nKedarNath /(hetan and others\n\nBose J.\n\nright to ask the Court which passed the decree to vary it in that way but he can certainly not ask the executing Court to do so.\n\nThe .decree must either be executed as it stands in one of the ways allowed by law or not at all.\n\nIn the High Court, and also before us, much was made of the fact that the plaintiff had not re-tendered the money after the decree was varied by the High 8ourt and it was argued that that preclnded him from contesting the defendant's right to attach his property under Order XXI, rule 32(1), of the Civil Procedure Code.\n\nThe remedy provided in Order XXI, rule 32(1), is, of course, one of the remedies available in execution of a decree for specific performance but it can only be used by a person who is entitled to execute the decree, and if, by reason of his own incapacity to perform his part, he is precluded from seeking execution, Order XXI, rule 32(1), cannot apply.\n\nThe only question that remains is whether the executing Court can consider whether the defendant is in a position to perform his part of the decree. But of course it can. If the executing Court cannot consider this question who can?\n\nThe executing Court has to see that the defendant gives the plaintiff the very thing that the decree directs and not something else, so if there is any dispute about its identity or substance nobody but the Court executing the decree can determine it.\n\nIt is a matter distinctly relating to the execution, discharge and satisfaction of the decree and so under section 4 7 of the Ci vii Procedure Code, it can only be determined by the Court executing the decree. And as for the first Court's conclusion that it could not decide these matters because it was not the Court that passed the decree, it is enough to say, as the High Court did, that section 42 of the Code expressly gives the Court executing a decree sent to it the same powers in executing such decree as if it had been passed by itself.\n\nThe next point urged by the appellant was that as the plaintiff did not raise the present objection before the Federal Court when it passed its decree he\n\n- ,\n\nis precluded from doing so now. It is true this would 1956 have been a good ground for resisting a decree for Jai Narain Ram specific performance but is no answer to the objection Lundia to execution. The defendant undertook to perform v. his part when the decree was passed and he must KedarNath make good that undertaking before he can seek execu- Khetan and others tion because the decree, in view of its language and intendment, must either be executed as a whole or not at all; it cannot be split up into different and uncorrelated parts and be executed unilaterally. It may be observed in passing that it was as much the duty of the defendant to seek modification of the contract by the Court which passed the decree, or modification of the terms of the decree later if he did not know these facts at the time, as he says, it was of the plaintiff. The fact remains that the decree was passed in these terms and it must either be executed as it stands or not at all unless the Court\n\nwhich passed it alters or modifies it.\n\nThen it was argued that this objection to execution should have been taken by the plaintiff in the Calcutta High Court when the defendant asked for transfer of the decree to Motihari and that as that was not done it is too late now. But here also the answer is the same. The only question before the Calcutta High Court on the application made to it was whether the decree should be transferred or not.\n\nWhether the plaintiff might or could have taken the objection in the High Court is beside the point because it is evident that he need not have done so on the only issue which the application for transfer raised, namely, whether the decree should be transferred or not; at best it could only be said that the plaintiff had a choice of two forums. If the appellant's contention is pushed to its logical conclusion it would mean that whenever a decree is transferred all objection to execution must cease unless the order of the Court directing the transfer expressly enumerates the issues that the transferring Court is at liberty to determine. In our opinion section 42 of the Civil Procedure Code is a complete answer to this contention.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.\n\nBoseJ.", "total_entities": 76, "entities": [{"text": "JAI NARAIN RAM LUNDIA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 44, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J ainarain 'Ram Lundia", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "KEDAR NATH KHETAN AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 82, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KEDAR NATH KHETAN AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 86, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAFER IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SYED JAFFER IMAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AIYAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 130, "end_char": 139, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 319, "end_char": 342, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 47, 42, 0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 360, "end_char": 373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1045, "end_char": 1049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1055, "end_char": 1082, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1093, "end_char": 1098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1287, "end_char": 1314, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Khetan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2613, "end_char": 2619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Khetan at1d others\n\nVeda, Vyas, (S. K. Kapur and Ganpat Rai, with him) for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Khetan"}}, {"text": "S. K. Kapur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2646, "end_char": 2657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Khetan at1d others\n\nVeda, Vyas, (S. K. Kapur and Ganpat Rai, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2662, "end_char": 2672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Khetan at1d others\n\nVeda, Vyas, (S. K. Kapur and Ganpat Rai, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2707, "end_char": 2718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India (K. B.\n\nAsthana and 0."}}, {"text": "K. B.\n\nAsthana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2748, "end_char": 2762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India (K. B.\n\nAsthana and 0."}}, {"text": ". P. Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2768, "end_char": 2776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India (K. B.\n\nAsthana and 0."}}, {"text": "J ainarain 'Ram Lundia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2969, "end_char": 2991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decree which the appellant, J ainarain 'Ram Lundia, seeks to execute is one that directs specific performance of a contract to sell certain shares in a private limited company known as the Ganga I)evi Sugar Mills, together with a five annas share in a partnership firm called the Mai:wari Brothers, on payment of a sum of Rs.", "canonical_name": "J ainarain 'Ram Lundia"}}, {"text": "Ganga I)evi Sugar Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3130, "end_char": 3153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decree which the appellant, J ainarain 'Ram Lundia, seeks to execute is one that directs specific performance of a contract to sell certain shares in a private limited company known as the Ganga I)evi Sugar Mills, together with a five annas share in a partnership firm called the Mai:wari Brothers, on payment of a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Mai:wari Brothers", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3221, "end_char": 3238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decree which the appellant, J ainarain 'Ram Lundia, seeks to execute is one that directs specific performance of a contract to sell certain shares in a private limited company known as the Ganga I)evi Sugar Mills, together with a five annas share in a partnership firm called the Mai:wari Brothers, on payment of a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Marwari Brothers", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3340, "end_char": 3356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The partnership firm, known as the Marwari Brothers, was formed on the 29th of February 1936."}}, {"text": "29th of February 1936", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3376, "end_char": 3397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The partnership firm, known as the Marwari Brothers, was formed on the 29th of February 1936."}}, {"text": "Bettia Group", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3447, "end_char": 3459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The partners consisted of two groups called the Bettia Group and the Padrauna Group."}}, {"text": "Padrauna Group", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3468, "end_char": 3482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The partners consisted of two groups called the Bettia Group and the Padrauna Group."}}, {"text": "Kedarnath Khetan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3520, "end_char": 3536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Padrauna Group consisted of (1) Kedarnath Khetan and (2) a firm called Surajmal.", "canonical_name": "KEDAR NATH KHETAN AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Surajmal.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3559, "end_char": 3568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Padrauna Group consisted of (1) Kedarnath Khetan and (2) a firm called Surajmal."}}, {"text": "Kedarnath", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3614, "end_char": 3623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kedarnath was\n\non~ of the partners of the Surajmal firm.", "canonical_name": "KEDAR NATH KHETAN AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Surajmal firm", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3656, "end_char": 3669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kedarnath was\n\non~ of the partners of the Surajmal firm."}}, {"text": "Gobardhan Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3705, "end_char": 3718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bettia Group consisted of (1) Gobardhan Das (2) Jainarain Ram Lundia (3) Badri Prasad and (4) Bisheshwar Nath."}}, {"text": "Jainarain Ram Lundia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3723, "end_char": 3743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bettia Group consisted of (1) Gobardhan Das (2) Jainarain Ram Lundia (3) Badri Prasad and (4) Bisheshwar Nath.", "canonical_name": "J ainarain 'Ram Lundia"}}, {"text": "Badri Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3748, "end_char": 3760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bettia Group consisted of (1) Gobardhan Das (2) Jainarain Ram Lundia (3) Badri Prasad and (4) Bisheshwar Nath."}}, {"text": "Bisheshwar Nath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3769, "end_char": 3784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bettia Group consisted of (1) Gobardhan Das (2) Jainarain Ram Lundia (3) Badri Prasad and (4) Bisheshwar Nath."}}, {"text": "Madan Lal Jhunjhunwalla", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3821, "end_char": 3844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On Bisheshwar Nath's death his son Madan Lal Jhunjhunwalla stepped into his shoes.", "canonical_name": "Madan Lal Jhunjhunwalla"}}, {"text": "Marwari Brothers :Firm", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3909, "end_char": 3931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Marwari Brothers :Firm was formed for the purpose of promoting a company for starting a sugar mill in Cbamparan and for securing the managing agency of the company for itself for a period of ninety years."}}, {"text": "Cbamparan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4011, "end_char": 4020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Marwari Brothers :Firm was formed for the purpose of promoting a company for starting a sugar mill in Cbamparan and for securing the managing agency of the company for itself for a period of ninety years."}}, {"text": "Bettia Group Gobardhan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4337, "end_char": 4359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Bettia Group Gobardhan Das and his brother Badri Prasad had 100 shares; Jainarain had 150 and Madan Lal had 100."}}, {"text": "Jainarain", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4409, "end_char": 4418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Bettia Group Gobardhan Das and his brother Badri Prasad had 100 shares; Jainarain had 150 and Madan Lal had 100.", "canonical_name": "J ainarain 'Ram Lundia"}}, {"text": "Madan Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4431, "end_char": 4440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Bettia Group Gobardhan Das and his brother Badri Prasad had 100 shares; Jainarain had 150 and Madan Lal had 100."}}, {"text": "Padrauna)", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4518, "end_char": 4527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other group (Padrauna)\n\nheld the remaining 450 shares."}}, {"text": "1-1-1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4664, "end_char": 4672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "About five years later the two sets of partners fell out and, as a result, the Bettia Group agreed, on 1-1-1941, to sell a certain number of their shares in the Ganga Devi Sugar Mills Limited to the Padrauna Group along with a certain share in the Marwari Brothers firm."}}, {"text": "Ganga Devi Sugar Mills Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4722, "end_char": 4752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "About five years later the two sets of partners fell out and, as a result, the Bettia Group agreed, on 1-1-1941, to sell a certain number of their shares in the Ganga Devi Sugar Mills Limited to the Padrauna Group along with a certain share in the Marwari Brothers firm."}}, {"text": "Marwari Brothers firm", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4809, "end_char": 4830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "About five years later the two sets of partners fell out and, as a result, the Bettia Group agreed, on 1-1-1941, to sell a certain number of their shares in the Ganga Devi Sugar Mills Limited to the Padrauna Group along with a certain share in the Marwari Brothers firm."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5226, "end_char": 5245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That Court affirmed the decree of the Calcutta High Court on 6-5-1949."}}, {"text": "6-5-1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5249, "end_char": 5257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That Court affirmed the decree of the Calcutta High Court on 6-5-1949."}}, {"text": "Jainarain Ram Lundia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5377, "end_char": 5397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The substance of the decree was this: I. \"It is declared that upon payment and or tender to the defendants-appellants Jainarain Ram Lundia and Madan Lal Jhunjhunwala of the sum of Rs.", "canonical_name": "J ainarain 'Ram Lundia"}}, {"text": "Madan Lal Jhunjhunwala", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5402, "end_char": 5424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The substance of the decree was this: I. \"It is declared that upon payment and or tender to the defendants-appellants Jainarain Ram Lundia and Madan Lal Jhunjhunwala of the sum of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Madan Lal Jhunjhunwalla"}}, {"text": "1-2-1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5764, "end_char": 5772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,45,000 ........ with interest thereon ........ by the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs are entitled to 250 shares belonging to the said defendants in the Ganga Devi Sugar Mills Limited and five aunasshare belonging to them in the Marwari Brothers ........ and to all dividends and profits in respect thereof with effect from 1-2-1941.. ...... \"\n\n2. \""}}, {"text": "KedarNath", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6626, "end_char": 6635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The tender was not v. accepted as the defendants (the Bettia Group) had KedarNath appealed.", "canonical_name": "KEDAR NATH KHETAN AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6792, "end_char": 6796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the Federal Court had settled the matter, Bose J. one of the defendants, J ainarain Ram Lundia, applied to the Calcutta High Court for execution."}}, {"text": "J ainarain Ram Lundia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6823, "end_char": 6844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the Federal Court had settled the matter, Bose J. one of the defendants, J ainarain Ram Lundia, applied to the Calcutta High Court for execution.", "canonical_name": "J ainarain 'Ram Lundia"}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge, Motihari", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6931, "end_char": 6958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The deotee was transferred to the Subordinate Judge, Motihari, and the execution proceedings started there on 25-1-1951."}}, {"text": "25-1-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7007, "end_char": 7016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The deotee was transferred to the Subordinate Judge, Motihari, and the execution proceedings started there on 25-1-1951."}}, {"text": "Kedarnath Khetan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7041, "end_char": 7057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the plaintiffs, Kedarnath Khetan, filed an objection petition on 20-3-1951.", "canonical_name": "KEDAR NATH KHETAN AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "20-3-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7090, "end_char": 7099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the plaintiffs, Kedarnath Khetan, filed an objection petition on 20-3-1951."}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge's Court at Motihari", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7569, "end_char": 7606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first Court, that is, the Subordinate Judge's Court at Motihari to whom the decree had been transferred, declined to go into this holding that it had no jurisdiction as a transferee Court."}}, {"text": "Kedarnath", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7747, "end_char": 7756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff Kedarnath appealed to the High Court and succeeded.", "canonical_name": "KEDAR NATH KHETAN AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "KedarNath Khetan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8485, "end_char": 8501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This fact was not denied by\n\nJ ai Narain Ram Lundi a v.\n\nKedarNath Khetan and others\n\nBose}.", "canonical_name": "KEDAR NATH KHETAN AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Jainarain Ram Lundia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8536, "end_char": 8556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the defendant Jainarain Ram Lundia in his rejoinder though the fact was specifically alleged to be within his personal knowledge.", "canonical_name": "J ainarain 'Ram Lundia"}}, {"text": "M.arwari Brothers firm", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9255, "end_char": 9277, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel argued that as the plaintiffs contended that performance was not possible after the dissolution of the M.arwari Brothers firm this meant that the firm was still in existence."}}, {"text": "12-7-1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9666, "end_char": 9675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Quite apart from the language of the rejoinder, the defendant Jainarain said in paragraph 15 of his application dated 12-7-1954 made to the High Court for leave to appeal here that\n\n\"the said Marwari Brothers was in existence on the date of the said conveyance, namely 14th September 1950, and died a natural death on the conveyance of the Ganga Devi Sugar Mills."}}, {"text": "Ganga Devi Sugar Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9888, "end_char": 9910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Quite apart from the language of the rejoinder, the defendant Jainarain said in paragraph 15 of his application dated 12-7-1954 made to the High Court for leave to appeal here that\n\n\"the said Marwari Brothers was in existence on the date of the said conveyance, namely 14th September 1950, and died a natural death on the conveyance of the Ganga Devi Sugar Mills."}}, {"text": "North Bihar Sugar Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9915, "end_char": 9938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to North Bihar Sugar Mills\"."}}, {"text": "14-9-1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10013, "end_char": 10022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is a clear admission that the firm was dissolved, at any rate, on 14-9-1950."}}, {"text": "Jai Narain Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10662, "end_char": 10676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While the plaintiff's appeal was being Jai Narain Ram heard in the High Court, the defendants made an Lundia application to that Court on 14-4-1954 asking for v. permission to adduce further evidence in the shape of Kedar Nath a sale deed dated 14-9-1950.", "canonical_name": "J ainarain 'Ram Lundia"}}, {"text": "14-4-1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10761, "end_char": 10770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While the plaintiff's appeal was being Jai Narain Ram heard in the High Court, the defendants made an Lundia application to that Court on 14-4-1954 asking for v. permission to adduce further evidence in the shape of Kedar Nath a sale deed dated 14-9-1950."}}, {"text": "Kedar Nath", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10839, "end_char": 10849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While the plaintiff's appeal was being Jai Narain Ram heard in the High Court, the defendants made an Lundia application to that Court on 14-4-1954 asking for v. permission to adduce further evidence in the shape of Kedar Nath a sale deed dated 14-9-1950.", "canonical_name": "KEDAR NATH KHETAN AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Khetan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10899, "end_char": 10905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendant con- Khetan and others tended that he had only \"recently\" come to know that the Ganga Devi Sugar Mills had sold all its land, machinery, etc.", "canonical_name": "Khetan"}}, {"text": "L.R. 84 I.A. 115", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 12607, "end_char": 12623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L.R. 58 I.A. 254", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 12642, "end_char": 12658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L.R. 50 I.A. 183", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 12672, "end_char": 12688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "J ai Narain Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15009, "end_char": 15024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the 1996\n\nPrinciple on which we are founding is not confined to J ai Narain Ram cases of specific performance."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18699, "end_char": 18708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18983, "end_char": 18993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lundia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19480, "end_char": 19486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true this would 1956 have been a good ground for resisting a decree for Jai Narain Ram specific performance but is no answer to the objection Lundia to execution."}}, {"text": "Motihari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20503, "end_char": 20511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then it was argued that this objection to execution should have been taken by the plaintiff in the Calcutta High Court when the defendant asked for transfer of the decree to Motihari and that as that was not done it is too late now."}}, {"text": "section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21392, "end_char": 21402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1956_1_639_643_EN", "year": 1956, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nHARIPADA DEY v.\n\nTHE STATE OF WEST BENGAL\n\nAND ANOTHER.\n\n[BHAGWATI, JAFER IMAM and Gov1NDA MENON JJ.]\n\nConstitution tJf India, Art. 184(1)(c)-Jurisdiction of High Court-Certificate on mere question of fact no certificate at all- Oonstitution of India, Art. 186(1)-Special Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to intervene on mere question of facts to be invoked -High Oourt not to arrogate that fimction to itself-Evidence- Prosecution not to be blamed for the lacuna to addiu:e evidence by defence.\n\nThe High Court has no jurisdiction to grant cettifica.te under Art. 134(l)(c) of the Constitution on mere question of fa.ct, e.nd is not justified in passing on such question to the Supreme Court for further consideration, thus converting the Supreme Court into .a.\n\nCourt of Appeal on facts.\n\nNo doubt the Supreme Court, in ce.se of gross misca.rrie.ge of justice or departure from legal procedure such e.s vitiates the whole trial, possesses the power a.nd ha.s special jurisdiction to intervene under Art. 136(1) of the Constitution e.nd e.lso if the findings of fa.ct were such e.'s were shocking to judicial conscience; but no High Court can arrogate that function to itself because it finds itself helpless to redress the grievance.\n\nCertificate granted on mere question of fa.ct would be no certificate e.t a.II; High Court should refuse sueh certificates under Art. 134(1)(c) e.nd should e.sk the parties to approach the Supreme Court to invoke its special jurisdiction under Art. ' 136(1) of the Constitution.\n\nThe accused e.nd not the prosecution is to be blamed for the lacuna. in the defence in not adducing evidence in support of his contentions, which if forthcoming would he.ve demolished the ce.se of the prosecution.\n\nNarsingh and another v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, ([1955) 1 S.C.R. 238), Baladirz cf Others v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, (A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 181) and Sunder Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, (A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 411), referred to.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 86 of 1954.\n\nAppeal under Article 134(l)(c) of the Constitution of India from the judgment and order dated the 27th May 1954 of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 158 of 1953.\n\nSeptember 5\n\nHaripada Dey\n\nThe State of\n\nH'e.st Btngal u nd anotll e-r'\n\nSukumar Ghose for the appellant.\n\nD. N. Mukeijee for P. K. Bose for respondent No. l.\n\nK. L. Arora for respondent No. 2.\n\n1956. September 5.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI J.-The Appellant was charged under Section 411, Indian Penal Code with dishonestly receiving or retaining in his possession one Hillman Car number WED 4514 bearing Engine and Chassis No. All 78482 WSO knowing or having reason to believe the same to be stolen property. The learned Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, convicted him of this offence and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for 2 years. The Appellant took an appeal to the High Court at .Calcutta and a Division Bench of the High Court constituted by Mr. Justice Jyoti Prakash Mitter and Mr. Justice Sisir Kumar Sen dismissed the appeal confirming the conviction and sentence passed upon him. The Appellant filed a petition for leave to appeal to this Court and that petition according to what we ara told is the practice obtaining in the Calcutta High Court came before a Division Bench differently constituted-a Bench constituted by the learned Chief Justice and Mr. Justice S. C. Lahiri.\n\nThis Bench allowed the petition and ordered that a certificate for leave to appeal under article 134(l)(c) of the Constitution may be drawn up. In an elaborate judgment the learned Chief Justice observed:\n\n\"In my view a certificate of fitness ought to issue in this case, although the question involved is one of fact\".\n\nAfter discussing in detail the various circumstances in the case which did not meet with his approval, he wound up by saying:\n\n\"In my view it is impossible not to feel in this case that there has not been as full and fair a trial as ought to have been held. In the circumstances, it appears to me that the petitioner is entitled to have\n\nhis case further considered and since such further consideration can only be given by the Supreme Court, I would grant the certificate prayed for\".\n\nContrary to what we had in the previous case before us, viz., Criminal Appeal No. 146 of 1956 (Orn\n\nPrakash v. The State of Uttar Pradesh), where no reasons were given as to why the Conrt exercised its discretion in granting the certifieate, in this judgment we have an elaborate discussion as to why such discretion was being exercised by the Court. The reasoning, however, does not. appeal to us.\n\nWhatever may have been the misgivings of the learned Chief Justice in the matter of a full and fair trial not having been held we are of the opinion that he had no jurisdiction to grant a certificate under article 134(1)(c) in a case where admittedly in his opinion the question involved was one of fact-where in spite of a full and fair trial not having been vouchsafed to the appellant, the question was merely one of a further consideration of the case of the Appellant on facts. The mere disability of the High Court to remedy this circumstance and vouchsafe a full and fair trial could not be any justification for granting a certificate under article 134( I) ( c) and converting this Court into a Court of Appeal on facts.\n\nNo High Court has the jurisdiction to pass on mere questions of fact for further consideration by this Court under the relevant articles of the Constitution. We no doubt possess that power and in proper cases have exercised it under article 136(1).\n\nIf there has been a gross miscarriage of justice or a departure from legal procedure such as vitiates the whole trial we would certainly intervene and we would also intervene if even the findings of fact were such as were shocking to our judicial conscienca and grnnt in such cases special leave to appeal under :trticle 136(1). That is, however, a special jurisdiction which we can exercise under article 136(1), but no High Court can arrogate that function to itself and pass on to us a matter which in its view is purely one involving questions of fact, because it finds itself helpless to redress the grievance. In surh a case, the High Court should\n\nHarij>ada Dey\n\nTl1c Stat: of lVest Bengal\n\na11d auofht'r\n\nHaripada Dey\n\nThe State of West Bengal and another\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nrefuse to give a certificate under article 134(1)(c) and ask the parties to approach us invoking our special jurisdiction under article 136(1) of the Constitution.\n\nWe are, therefore, of the opinion that the discretion that was so elaborately exercised by the Calcutta High Court in this case was wrongly exercised. The certificate purporting to have been granted under article 134(1)(c) was no certificate at all and it does not avail the appellant liefore us.\n\nFollowing our decisions in Narsingh and another v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh('), Baladin & Others v. The State of Uttar Pradesh(') and Sunder Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh('), Mr. Sukumar Ghose for the appellant urged that this was a fit case where we should exercise our discretion and grant the appellant Rpecial leave to appeal under article 136(1) of the Constitution. He pointed out that eviin though the appellant had led no evidence in defence there were on the record of the case certain documents which if taken as proved would have been sufficient to demolish the prosecution case. These were commented upon by the learned Chief Justice in the judgment which he delivered when certificate for leave to appeal under article 134(1)( c) was granted by him. These documents, it was urged, went to show that sometime before the car in question was stolen, an application had been made by the appellant to the police authorities in Chandarnagore for registration of Hillman Minx 1951 Model car which bore the same number on the engine, chassis and tin-plate as the car in question and on that application, investigation had been made by the A.S.I. police, who made his report, the contents of which would go to establish the case which was put forwaro by the appellant in his defence. It is no doubt true that the prosecution has got to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and the accused need not open his mouth nor lead any evidence. If the prosecution succeeds in establishing its case, the conviction would follow, but if the prosecution fails to discharge the burden which lies upon it to prove the charge which\n\n(1) [1955) 1 S.0.R. 238.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1956 S.0.181.\n\n(S) A.I.R. 1956 S.0. 411.\n\nhas been framed against the accused he is entitled to an acquittal. In this case both the Courts below held that the prosecution had proved its case by the evidence of the witnesses who were called including the motor expert, who on applying chemicals discovered on the engine the very number which was the number on the stolen car. On this state of the evidence, it was the bounden duty of the appellant if he wanted to prove his defence to adduce evidence in support of his contentions and if he did not do so, he had only to thank himself for it. The prosecution could not be blamed for that lacuna and if both the Courts below went on the record as it stood and came to the conclusion, finding it as a fact, that the prosecution had established its case, it could not be urged, as was sought to be done in the judgment delivered by the learned Chief Justice in the petition for leave to appeal to this Court, that that evidence, if forthcoming, would have demolished the case of the prosecution.\n\nIf those who represented the appellant did not take counsel within themselves and put forward the defence as they should have done, there was no blame on the prosecution nor on. the learned Presidency Magistrate who tried the case and came to the conclusion adverse to the appellant. Whatever sentiment appears to have been imported in the matter has been simply out of place and even if one may have a lurking suspicion at the back of his mind and might feel that there has not been a full and fair trial as ought to have been held, that is no justification for going behind the concurrent findings of fact reached by both the Courts below to the effect that the prosecution had succeeded in establishing the guilt of the appellant. We see nothing in this case to warrant an interference under article 136(1) of the Constitution. This application will, therefore, be rejected and the appeal will stand dismissed. Bail bond cancelled and the appellant to surrender his bail.\n\nHaripada Dey v.\n\nThe State of West Bengal\n\nand another\n\nBhagu•ati J.", "total_entities": 48, "entities": [{"text": "HARIPADA DEY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 43, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARIPADA DEY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL\n\nAND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 48, "end_char": 85, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 89, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BhagwatiJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAFER IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SYED JAFFER IMAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Gov1NDA MENON JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 114, "end_char": 131, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. GOVINDA MENON", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 184(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 158, "end_char": 172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 186(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 283, "end_char": 294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 323, "end_char": 336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "186(1)-Special Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to intervene on mere question of facts to be invoked -High Oourt not to arrogate that fimction to itself-Evidence- Prosecution not to be blamed for the lacuna to addiu:e evidence by defence."}}, {"text": "Art. 134(l)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 592, "end_char": 606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 136(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1033, "end_char": 1044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 134(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1398, "end_char": 1412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1955) 1 S.C.R. 238", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1817, "end_char": 1836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 134(l)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2077, "end_char": 2094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2102, "end_char": 2123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Haripada Dey", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2253, "end_char": 2265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "September 5\n\nHaripada Dey\n\nThe State of\n\nH'e.st Btngal u nd anotll e-r'\n\nSukumar Ghose for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "HARIPADA DEY"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nH'e.st Btngal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2271, "end_char": 2294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "September 5\n\nHaripada Dey\n\nThe State of\n\nH'e.st Btngal u nd anotll e-r'\n\nSukumar Ghose for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Sukumar Ghose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2313, "end_char": 2326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "September 5\n\nHaripada Dey\n\nThe State of\n\nH'e.st Btngal u nd anotll e-r'\n\nSukumar Ghose for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Sukumar Ghose"}}, {"text": "D. N. Mukeijee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2347, "end_char": 2361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. N. Mukeijee for P. K. Bose for respondent No."}}, {"text": "P. K. Bose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2366, "end_char": 2376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. N. Mukeijee for P. K. Bose for respondent No."}}, {"text": "K. L. Arora", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2400, "end_char": 2411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l.\n\nK. L. Arora for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Section 411", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2543, "end_char": 2554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2556, "end_char": 2573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2789, "end_char": 2820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, convicted him of this offence and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for 2 years."}}, {"text": "High Court at .Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2944, "end_char": 2967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appellant took an appeal to the High Court at .Calcutta and a Division Bench of the High Court constituted by Mr. Justice Jyoti Prakash Mitter and Mr. Justice Sisir Kumar Sen dismissed the appeal confirming the conviction and sentence passed upon him."}}, {"text": "Jyoti Prakash Mitter", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3034, "end_char": 3054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appellant took an appeal to the High Court at .Calcutta and a Division Bench of the High Court constituted by Mr. Justice Jyoti Prakash Mitter and Mr. Justice Sisir Kumar Sen dismissed the appeal confirming the conviction and sentence passed upon him."}}, {"text": "Sisir Kumar Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3071, "end_char": 3086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appellant took an appeal to the High Court at .Calcutta and a Division Bench of the High Court constituted by Mr. Justice Jyoti Prakash Mitter and Mr. Justice Sisir Kumar Sen dismissed the appeal confirming the conviction and sentence passed upon him."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3310, "end_char": 3329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appellant filed a petition for leave to appeal to this Court and that petition according to what we ara told is the practice obtaining in the Calcutta High Court came before a Division Bench differently constituted-a Bench constituted by the learned Chief Justice and Mr. Justice S. C. Lahiri."}}, {"text": "S. C. Lahiri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3448, "end_char": 3460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appellant filed a petition for leave to appeal to this Court and that petition according to what we ara told is the practice obtaining in the Calcutta High Court came before a Division Bench differently constituted-a Bench constituted by the learned Chief Justice and Mr. Justice S. C. Lahiri."}}, {"text": "article 134(l)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3552, "end_char": 3569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "article 134(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4877, "end_char": 4894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 134( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5320, "end_char": 5335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 136(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5634, "end_char": 5648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 136(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6049, "end_char": 6063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of West Bengal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6382, "end_char": 6402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In surh a case, the High Court should\n\nHarij>ada Dey\n\nTl1c Stat: of lVest Bengal\n\na11d auofht'r\n\nHaripada Dey\n\nThe State of West Bengal and another\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nrefuse to give a certificate under article 134(1)(c) and ask the parties to approach us invoking our special jurisdiction under article 136(1) of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "BhagwatiJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6416, "end_char": 6426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In surh a case, the High Court should\n\nHarij>ada Dey\n\nTl1c Stat: of lVest Bengal\n\na11d auofht'r\n\nHaripada Dey\n\nThe State of West Bengal and another\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nrefuse to give a certificate under article 134(1)(c) and ask the parties to approach us invoking our special jurisdiction under article 136(1) of the Constitution.", "canonical_name": "BhagwatiJ."}}, {"text": "article 134(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6463, "end_char": 6480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 136(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6556, "end_char": 6570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 134(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6798, "end_char": 6815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sukumar Ghose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7079, "end_char": 7092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Following our decisions in Narsingh and another v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh('), Baladin & Others v. The State of Uttar Pradesh(') and Sunder Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh('), Mr. Sukumar Ghose for the appellant urged that this was a fit case where we should exercise our discretion and grant the appellant Rpecial leave to appeal under article 136(1) of the Constitution.", "canonical_name": "Sukumar Ghose"}}, {"text": "article 136(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7236, "end_char": 7250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 134(1)( c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7624, "end_char": 7642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Chandarnagore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7835, "end_char": 7848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These documents, it was urged, went to show that sometime before the car in question was stolen, an application had been made by the appellant to the police authorities in Chandarnagore for registration of Hillman Minx 1951 Model car which bore the same number on the engine, chassis and tin-plate as the car in question and on that application, investigation had been made by the A.S.I. police, who made his report, the contents of which would go to establish the case which was put forwaro by the appellant in his defence."}}, {"text": "A.S.I. police", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8044, "end_char": 8057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These documents, it was urged, went to show that sometime before the car in question was stolen, an application had been made by the appellant to the police authorities in Chandarnagore for registration of Hillman Minx 1951 Model car which bore the same number on the engine, chassis and tin-plate as the car in question and on that application, investigation had been made by the A.S.I. police, who made his report, the contents of which would go to establish the case which was put forwaro by the appellant in his defence."}}, {"text": "S.0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8537, "end_char": 8540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8566, "end_char": 8569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8592, "end_char": 8595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 136(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10399, "end_char": 10413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bhagu•ati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10636, "end_char": 10645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Haripada Dey v.\n\nThe State of West Bengal\n\nand another\n\nBhagu•ati J.", "canonical_name": "BhagwatiJ."}}]} {"document_id": "1956_1_644_652_EN", "year": 1956, "text": "September 17\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1956]\n\nSHAMRAO VISHNU PARULEKAR\n\nTHE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, THANA (and connected petition)\n\n(S. R. DAS C. J., VENKATARAMA AYYAR, B. P. SINHA, S. K. DAS and GovINDA MENON JJ.)\n\nPreventive detention-Order of detention by the District Magistrate-Report sent to the State Government-Approval by the Statc- Gro1tndsfor the order sent later-Validity of detention-\" Grounds on which the order has been made\", Interpretation of-Preventive Deten tion Act, 1950 (IV of 19~0), ss. 8(2)(8), 7.\n\nSub-section (3) of s. 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, provides that when an order oJ detention is me.de under sub-Section\n\n(2) by an officer mentioned therein, he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government together with the grounds on which the order has been ma.de ... and no such order ... shall remain in force for more than twelve days alter the making thereof unless in the meantime it has been approved by the State Government.\n\nUnder s. 7(1) \"when a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority making the order shall ... communicate to him the grounds on which the order has been made, and shall\n\nafford him the earliest opportunity of makin~ a representation against the order to the appropriate Government' .\n\nThe petitioners were arrested on 27th January 1956 in pursuance of the orders of detention passed under s. 3(2) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, by the District Magistrate who sent his report the next day to the State Government which approved of the same on 3rd February 1956. Meantime, the grounds on which the orders of detention were made were formulated by the District Magistrate who furnished the same to the petitioners on 31st January 1956 under s. 7 of the Act. A copy of these grounds was sent to the State Government on 6th February 1956. The petitioners challenged the validity of the detention and contended, inter alia, that as the expression \"grounds on which the order bas been m&de\" occurring in s. 3(3) is word for word, the same as in s. 7 of the Act, it must have the same ineaning a.nd as the copy of the grounds referred to in s. 7 had not been sent along with the report under s. 3(3) to the State Government before it had approved of the orders of detention there was a violation of the procedure prescribed by the statute and consequently the detention became illegal. It was found that the report sent by the District Magistrate set out not merely the fact of the making of the order of detention but also the materials on which\n\nhe had made the order.\n\nHeld, that the failure on the part of the District Magistrate to\n\nsend a.long with his report under s. 3(3) the very grounds which he 1956 subsequently furnished the detenu under s. 7, is not e. brae.ch of the requirements of the.t sub-section and that it was sufficiently complied Shamrao Vis/111,. with when he reported the materials on which he made the order.\n\nParulekar\n\nfl v.\n\nThe scope and intendment of the expression the grounds on The Distrht which the order has been made\" in ss. 3(3) e.nd 7 of the Act a.re Magistrate Thana quite different and it is not essential that the grounds which are ' furnished to the detenu must have been before the State Government before it approves of the order.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petitions Nos. 100 and 101 of 1956.\n\nPetitions under Article 32 of the Constitution for writs in the nature of Habeas Corpus.\n\nN. 0. Chatterjee, Sadhan Chandra Gupta and Janardhan Sharma, for the petitioners.\n\n0. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India, Porus A. Mehta and R.H. Dhebar, for the respondents.\n\n1956.\n\nSeptember 17.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by v ENKATARAMA AYY AR J .-These are petitions under article 32 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus. On 26th January 1956 the District Magistrate, Thana, passed orders under section 3(2) of the Preventive Detention Act IV of 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for the detention of the petitioners~ and in execution of the orders, they were arrested on 27th January 1956. The next day, the District Magistrate sent his report to the State Government which on 3rd February 1956 approved of the samE'.\n\nMeantime, on 30th January 1956 the District Magistrate formulated the grounds on which the orders of detention were made, and the same were communicated to the petitioners on 31st , January 1956.\n\nA copy of these grounds was sent to the State Government on 6th February 1956.\n\nThe petitioners challenge the validity of the detention .on two grounds.\n\nThey contend firstly that the grounds for the order of detention which were furnished to them under section 7 of the Act are vague,\n\n1956 and secondly that the requirements of section 3(3) of\n\nShamrao v;,1,,,,. the Act had not been complied with, in that those\n\nPanitekar grounds had been sent to the State Government by\n\nv. the District Magistrate, not along with his report on The Distrid 28th January 1956, but on 6th February 1956, after Magist.-ate, Thana the State Government had approved of the order. - There is no substance whatsoever in the first con- Venkataran1a\n\nAyyarJ. tention. The communication sent to the petitioners runs as follows:\n\n\"During the monsoon season in the year 1955, you held secret meeting of Adivasis in Umbergaon, Dhanu, Palghar and Jawhar Talukas of Thana District at which you incited and instigated them to have recourse to intimidation, violence and arson in order to prevent the labourers from outside villages hired by landlords from working for landlords. As a direct result of your incitement and instigation, there were several cases of intimidation, violence and arson in which the Adivasis from these Talukas indulged.\n\nSome of these cases are described below ........ \".\n\nThen follows a detailed statement of the cases. It is argued for the petitioners that no particulars were given as to when and where the secret meetings were held in which they are alleged to liave participated, and •that the bald statement that they took place during the monsoon season was too wide and vague to be capable of being refuted.\n\nBut then, the particulars which follow give the dates on which the several incidents took place, and it is obvious that the meetings must have been held near about those dates.\n\nThe communication further states that it is not in the public interests to disclose further facts.\n\nReading the communication as a whole, we are of opinion that it is sufficiently definite to apprise the petitioners of what they were charged with and to enable them to give their explanation therefor.\n\nThat was the view taken by Chagla, d. J. in the applications for habea8 corpuB, which the petitioners moved in the High Court of Bombay under article 226 of the Constitution, and we are in agreement with it. Tl:e complaint that the grounds are vague must therefore fail.\n\nAs regards the second contention, it will be usefu\n\nto set out the relevant sections of the Act bearing on 1955 the question: Shamrao Vishnu Section 3(1) \"The Central Government or the Parulekar State Government may-- v.\n\n(a) if satisfied with respect to any person tat The District with a view to preventing him from acting in any Magistrate, Tha11a manner preJ\"udicial to- - Venkatarama\n\n(i) the defence of India, the relations of India Ayyar J. with foreign powers, or the security of India, or\n\n(ii) the security of the State or the maintenance of public order, or\n\n(iii) the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community; or\n\n(b) if satisfied with respect to any person who is a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners Act, 1946 (XXXI of 1946), that with a view to regulating his continued presence in India or with a view to making arrangements for his expulsion from India, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained.\n\n(2) Any of the following officers, -namely,-\n\n(a) District Magistrates,\n\n(b) Additional District Magistrates specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government, ( c) the Commissioner of Police for Born bay, Calcutta, Madras or Hyderabad,\n\n(d) Collector in the State of Hyderabad may if satisfied as provided in sub-clauses (ii) and\n\n(iii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) exercise powers conferred by the said sub-section.\n\n(3) When any order is made under this section by an officer mentioned in sub-section (2) be shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government to which he is subordinate together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in his opinion have a bearing on the matter, and no such order made after the commencement of the Preventive Detention (Second Amendment) Act, 1952, shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof unless in the meantime it has been approved by the State Gov ernment.\n\n(4) Where any order is made or approved by the State Government under this section, the State Shauirao Vishn11\n\nParulekar Government shall, as soon as may be, report the fact v. to the Central Government together with the grounds The District on. which the order has been made and such other Magistrate, T/la\"a particulars as in the opinion of the State Govern- - ment have bearing on the necessity for the order\". vnktrtara11ia\n\nAyyar J.\n\nSection 7(1) \"Where a person is detained in pursU ance of a detention order, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, but not later than five days from the date of detention, communicate to him the grounds on which the order has been made, and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the appropriate Government.\n\n(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall require the authority to disclose facts which it considers to be against the public interest to disclose''.\n\nOn these sections, the argument of Mr. Chatterjee for the petitioners is that section 3(3) requires that when an order of detention is made by one of the authorities mentioned in section 3(2)-in this case it was so madethat authority should forthwith report the fact to the State Government together with the grounds on which the order was made; that this provision is clearly intended to safeguard the rights of the detenu, as it is on a consideration of these grounds that the Government has to decide whether it will approve of the order or not; that when therefore the grounds had not been made available to the State Government before they had approved of the order, as happened in the present case, there was a clear violation of the proeedure prescribed by the statute, and that the detention became illegal.\n\nNow, it is clear from the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent that when the District Magistrate sent a report under section 3(3) on 28th January 1956, he did send a report not merely of the fact of the making of the order of detention, but also of the materials on which he had made the order. The contention of the petitioner is that the grounds which\n\nwere formulated on 30th January 1956 and communi- 1956 cated to them on 31st January 1956 should also have Shamrao Vishnu been sent along with the report. The question is whe- Parulekar ther what the District Magistrate did was sufficient v. compliance with the requirements of section 3(3), and The District that will depend upon the interpretation to be put Magistrate, Thana upon the words \"grounds on which the order has Venkatarama been made\" occurring in that section. Construing AyyarJ. these wotds in their naturi:tl and ordinary sense, they would include any informii tion or material on which the order was based. The Oxford Concise Dictionary gives the following meanings to the word \"ground\": 'Base, foundation, motive, valid reason'. On this definition, the materials on which the District Magistrate considered that an order of detention should be made could properly be described as grounds therefor. But it is contended by Mr. Chatterjee that the expression \"grounds on which the order has been made\" occurring in section 3(3) is, word for word, the same as in section 7, that the same expression occurring in the same statute must receive the same construction, that what section 3 requires is that on the making of an order for detention, the authority is to formulate the grounds for that order, and send the same to the State Government under section 3(3) and to the detenu under section 7, and that therefore it was not sufficient merely to send to the State Government a report of the materials on which the order was made.\n\nReliance was placed on the following passage in Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition, page 522:\n\n\"It is, at all events, reasonable to presume that the same meaning is implied by the use of the same expression in every part of an Act\".\n\nThe rule of construction contended for by the petitioners is well-settled, but that is only one element in deciding what the true import of the enactment is, to ascertain which it is necessary to have regard to the purpose behind the particular provision and its setting in the scheme of the statute. \"The presumption\", says Craies, \"that the same words are used in the same meaning is however very slight, and\n\n7956 it is proper 'if sufficient reason can be assigned, to construe a word in one part of an Act in a different Sha111rao Vi1hnu\n\nParrilekar sense from that which it bears in another part of v. an Act'\" (Statute Law, 5th Edition, page 159).\n\nThe District And Maxwell, on whose statement of the law the Magistrate. Thana petitioners rely, observes further on;\n\n\"But the presumption is not of much weight.\n\nVen-katara1na d d ff Ayyar J.\n\nThe same wor may be use in di erent senses in 1he same statute, and even in the same section\". (Interpretation of Statutes, page 322).\n\nExamining the two provisions in their context, it will be seen that section 3(1) confers on the Central - Government and the State Government the power to • pass an order of detention, when the grounds mentioned in that sub-clause exist.\n\nWhen an order is made under this provision, the right of the detenu nuder section 7 is to be informed of the grounds of detention, as soon as may be, and that is to enable him to make a representation against that order, which is a fundamental right guaranteed under article 22(5).\n\nComing next to section 3(2), it provides for the power which is conferred on the State Government under section 3(1) being exercised by certain authorities with reference to the matters specified therein. This being a delegation of the power conferred on the State Government under section 3(1), with a view to ensure that the delegate acts within his authority and fairly and properly and that the State exercises due and effective control and supervision over him, section 3(3) enacts a special procedure to be observed when action is taken under section 3(2).\n\nThe authority making the order under section 3(2) is accordingly required to report the fact of the order forthwith to the State along with the grounds therefor, and if the State does not approve of the order within twelve days, it is automatically to lapse. These provisions are intended to regulate the course of business between the State Government and the authorities subordinate to it exercising its power under statutory delegation; and their scope is altogether different from that of section 7 which deals with the right of the detenue as against the State\n\nGovernment and its subordinate authorities. Sec- 7956 tion 3(3) requires the authority to communicate the Shamrao Vis/mt< grounds of its order to the State Government, so that Parulekar the latter might satisfy itself whether detention v. should be approved. Section 7 requires the statement The District of grounds to be sent to the detenu, so that he might Magistrate, Tha\"a make a representation against the order. The pur- - • Venkataran1a pose of the two sections is so different that it cannot Ayyar J. be presumed that the expression \"the grounds on which the order has been made\" is used in section 3(3) in the same sense which it bears in section 7:\n\nThat the legislature could not have contemplated that the grounds mentioned in section 3(3) should be identical with those referred to in section 7 could also be seen from the fact that whereas under section 7(2) it is open to the authority not to disclose to the detenu facts if it considers that it would be against public interests so to do, it is these facts that will figure prominently in a report by the subordinate authority to the State Government under section 3(3), and form the basis for approval. If the grounds which are furnished under section 3(3) could contain matters which need not be communicated to the detenu under section 7, the expression \"grounds on which the order has been made\" cannot bear the same meaning in both the sections.\n\nThere is also another reason in support of this conclusion. When the authority mentioned in section 3(2) decides, on a consifi}eration of the materials placed before it, to act under that section and orders detention, it is required by section 3(3) to report that fact with the grounds therefor to the State Government forthwith.\n\nBut under section 7, the duty of the authority is to communicate the grounds to the detenu, as soon as may be. Now, it bas been held that as the object of this provision is to give the detenu an opportunity to make a representation against the order, the grounds must be sufficiently definite and detailed to enable him to do so.\n\nIt is obvious that the communication that has to be served on the detenu under section 7 of the Act is a formal document setting out the grounds for the order and the\n\n1956 particulars in support thereof, subject, of course, to section 7(2); whereas the report to the State under Slta1nrao Vishnu\n\nParulekar section 3(3) is a less formal document in the nature v. of a confidential inter-departmental communication, The District which is to contain the particulars on which the order Magistrate, Thana was made. It could not have been intended that the contents of the two communications which are so Vcnkatal'ama Ii AyyarJ. dissimilar in t eir scope and intendment should be identical.\n\nMr. N. C. Chatterjee also cited certain observations of Kania C.J. in State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya(') as supporting his contention that the grounds which are furnished to the detenu must have been before the State Government before it approves of the order. Said the learned Chief Justice:\n\n\"It is obviouR that the grounds for making the order as mentioned above, are the grounds on which the detaining authority was satisfied that it was necessary to make the order. These grounds therefore must be in existence when the order is made''.\n\nBut the grounds referred to in the above passages are the reasons for making the order, not the formal expressions in which they are embodied, and that will be clear from the following observation further on:\n\n\"By their very nature the grounds are conclusions of facts and not a complete detailed recital of all the facts\".\n\nOur conclusion is that th11 failure on the part of the District Magistrate of Thana to send along with his report under section 3(3), the very grounds which he subsequently communicated to the detenu under section 7 is not a breach of the requirements of that sub-section, and that it was sufficiently complied with when he reported the materials on which he made the order.\n\nThe second contention of the petitioners also fails, and these applications must therefore be dismissed.\n\n(l l [1951] s c It. lr.7, 178.", "total_entities": 105, "entities": [{"text": "SHAMRAO VISHNU PARULEKAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 44, "end_char": 68, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHAMRAO VISHNU PARULEKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, THANA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 100, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, THANA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 128, "end_char": 137, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 164, "end_char": 175, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GovINDA MENON JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 191, "end_char": 208, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. GOVINDA MENON", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Interpretation of-Preventive Deten tion Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 437, "end_char": 486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 8(2)(8), 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 501, "end_char": 515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Interpretation of-Preventive Deten tion Act, 1950", "statute": "Interpretation of-Preventive Deten tion Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 537, "end_char": 541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Interpretation of-Preventive Deten tion Act, 1950", "statute": "Interpretation of-Preventive Deten tion Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 549, "end_char": 579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 981, "end_char": 988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1387, "end_char": 1394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1402, "end_char": 1432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "3rd February 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1548, "end_char": 1565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners were arrested on 27th January 1956 in pursuance of the orders of detention passed under s. 3(2) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, by the District Magistrate who sent his report the next day to the State Government which approved of the same on 3rd February 1956."}}, {"text": "31st January 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1720, "end_char": 1737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meantime, the grounds on which the orders of detention were made were formulated by the District Magistrate who furnished the same to the petitioners on 31st January 1956 under s. 7 of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1744, "end_char": 1748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "6th February 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1821, "end_char": 1838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A copy of these grounds was sent to the State Government on 6th February 1956."}}, {"text": "s. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2003, "end_char": 2010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2044, "end_char": 2048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2139, "end_char": 2143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2190, "end_char": 2197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "statute": "the Preventive Detention Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "s. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2670, "end_char": 2677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2749, "end_char": 2753, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3057, "end_char": 3065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3352, "end_char": 3362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N. 0. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3426, "end_char": 3442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. 0.", "canonical_name": "N. 0. Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "Sadhan Chandra Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3444, "end_char": 3464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chatterjee, Sadhan Chandra Gupta and Janardhan Sharma, for the petitioners."}}, {"text": "Janardhan Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3469, "end_char": 3485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chatterjee, Sadhan Chandra Gupta and Janardhan Sharma, for the petitioners."}}, {"text": "K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3512, "end_char": 3523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India, Porus A. Mehta and R.H. Dhebar, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Porus A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3554, "end_char": 3568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India, Porus A. Mehta and R.H. Dhebar, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "R.H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3573, "end_char": 3584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India, Porus A. Mehta and R.H. Dhebar, for the respondents."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3723, "end_char": 3733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "District Magistrate, Thana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3835, "end_char": 3861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 26th January 1956 the District Magistrate, Thana, passed orders under section 3(2) of the Preventive Detention Act IV of 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for the detention of the petitioners~ and in execution of the orders, they were arrested on 27th January 1956."}}, {"text": "section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3883, "end_char": 3895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Detention Act IV of 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3914, "end_char": 3938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "30th January 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4229, "end_char": 4246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meantime, on 30th January 1956 the District Magistrate formulated the grounds on which the orders of detention were made, and the same were communicated to the petitioners on 31st , January 1956."}}, {"text": "31st , January 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4391, "end_char": 4410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meantime, on 30th January 1956 the District Magistrate formulated the grounds on which the orders of detention were made, and the same were communicated to the petitioners on 31st , January 1956."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4667, "end_char": 4676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Detention Act IV of 1950", "statute": "Detention Act IV of 1950"}}, {"text": "section 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4743, "end_char": 4755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Detention Act IV of 1950", "statute": "Detention Act IV of 1950"}}, {"text": "Distrid 28th January 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4950, "end_char": 4975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Act had not been complied with, in that those\n\nPanitekar grounds had been sent to the State Government by\n\nv. the District Magistrate, not along with his report on The Distrid 28th January 1956, but on 6th February 1956, after Magist.-ate, Thana the State Government had approved of the order. -"}}, {"text": "Umbergaon", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5304, "end_char": 5313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The communication sent to the petitioners runs as follows:\n\n\"During the monsoon season in the year 1955, you held secret meeting of Adivasis in Umbergaon, Dhanu, Palghar and Jawhar Talukas of Thana District at which you incited and instigated them to have recourse to intimidation, violence and arson in order to prevent the labourers from outside villages hired by landlords from working for landlords."}}, {"text": "Dhanu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5315, "end_char": 5320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The communication sent to the petitioners runs as follows:\n\n\"During the monsoon season in the year 1955, you held secret meeting of Adivasis in Umbergaon, Dhanu, Palghar and Jawhar Talukas of Thana District at which you incited and instigated them to have recourse to intimidation, violence and arson in order to prevent the labourers from outside villages hired by landlords from working for landlords."}}, {"text": "Palghar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5322, "end_char": 5329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The communication sent to the petitioners runs as follows:\n\n\"During the monsoon season in the year 1955, you held secret meeting of Adivasis in Umbergaon, Dhanu, Palghar and Jawhar Talukas of Thana District at which you incited and instigated them to have recourse to intimidation, violence and arson in order to prevent the labourers from outside villages hired by landlords from working for landlords."}}, {"text": "Thana District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5352, "end_char": 5366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The communication sent to the petitioners runs as follows:\n\n\"During the monsoon season in the year 1955, you held secret meeting of Adivasis in Umbergaon, Dhanu, Palghar and Jawhar Talukas of Thana District at which you incited and instigated them to have recourse to intimidation, violence and arson in order to prevent the labourers from outside villages hired by landlords from working for landlords."}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6637, "end_char": 6643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That was the view taken by Chagla, d. J. in the applications for habea8 corpuB, which the petitioners moved in the High Court of Bombay under article 226 of the Constitution, and we are in agreement with it."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6725, "end_char": 6745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That was the view taken by Chagla, d. J. in the applications for habea8 corpuB, which the petitioners moved in the High Court of Bombay under article 226 of the Constitution, and we are in agreement with it."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6752, "end_char": 6763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shamrao Vishnu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7008, "end_char": 7022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the second contention, it will be usefu\n\nto set out the relevant sections of the Act bearing on 1955 the question: Shamrao Vishnu Section 3(1) \"The Central Government or the Parulekar State Government may-- v.\n\n(a) if satisfied with respect to any person tat The District with a view to preventing him from acting in any Magistrate, Tha11a manner preJ\"udicial to- - Venkatarama\n\n(i) the defence of India, the relations of India Ayyar J. with foreign powers, or the security of India, or\n\n(ii) the security of the State or the maintenance of public order, or\n\n(iii) the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community; or\n\n(b) if satisfied with respect to any person who is a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners Act, 1946 (XXXI of 1946), that with a view to regulating his continued presence in India or with a view to making arrangements for his expulsion from India, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained.", "canonical_name": "SHAMRAO VISHNU PARULEKAR"}}, {"text": "Section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7023, "end_char": 7035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7041, "end_char": 7059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the second contention, it will be usefu\n\nto set out the relevant sections of the Act bearing on 1955 the question: Shamrao Vishnu Section 3(1) \"The Central Government or the Parulekar State Government may-- v.\n\n(a) if satisfied with respect to any person tat The District with a view to preventing him from acting in any Magistrate, Tha11a manner preJ\"udicial to- - Venkatarama\n\n(i) the defence of India, the relations of India Ayyar J. with foreign powers, or the security of India, or\n\n(ii) the security of the State or the maintenance of public order, or\n\n(iii) the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community; or\n\n(b) if satisfied with respect to any person who is a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners Act, 1946 (XXXI of 1946), that with a view to regulating his continued presence in India or with a view to making arrangements for his expulsion from India, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7291, "end_char": 7296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the second contention, it will be usefu\n\nto set out the relevant sections of the Act bearing on 1955 the question: Shamrao Vishnu Section 3(1) \"The Central Government or the Parulekar State Government may-- v.\n\n(a) if satisfied with respect to any person tat The District with a view to preventing him from acting in any Magistrate, Tha11a manner preJ\"udicial to- - Venkatarama\n\n(i) the defence of India, the relations of India Ayyar J. with foreign powers, or the security of India, or\n\n(ii) the security of the State or the maintenance of public order, or\n\n(iii) the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community; or\n\n(b) if satisfied with respect to any person who is a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners Act, 1946 (XXXI of 1946), that with a view to regulating his continued presence in India or with a view to making arrangements for his expulsion from India, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained."}}, {"text": "Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7321, "end_char": 7326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the second contention, it will be usefu\n\nto set out the relevant sections of the Act bearing on 1955 the question: Shamrao Vishnu Section 3(1) \"The Central Government or the Parulekar State Government may-- v.\n\n(a) if satisfied with respect to any person tat The District with a view to preventing him from acting in any Magistrate, Tha11a manner preJ\"udicial to- - Venkatarama\n\n(i) the defence of India, the relations of India Ayyar J. with foreign powers, or the security of India, or\n\n(ii) the security of the State or the maintenance of public order, or\n\n(iii) the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community; or\n\n(b) if satisfied with respect to any person who is a foreigner within the meaning of the Foreigners Act, 1946 (XXXI of 1946), that with a view to regulating his continued presence in India or with a view to making arrangements for his expulsion from India, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained."}}, {"text": "Foreigners Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7620, "end_char": 7640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8084, "end_char": 8092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Any of the following officers, -namely,-\n\n(a) District Magistrates,\n\n(b) Additional District Magistrates specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government, ( c) the Commissioner of Police for Born bay, Calcutta, Madras or Hyderabad,\n\n(d) Collector in the State of Hyderabad may if satisfied as provided in sub-clauses (ii) and\n\n(iii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) exercise powers conferred by the said sub-section."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8094, "end_char": 8100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Any of the following officers, -namely,-\n\n(a) District Magistrates,\n\n(b) Additional District Magistrates specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government, ( c) the Commissioner of Police for Born bay, Calcutta, Madras or Hyderabad,\n\n(d) Collector in the State of Hyderabad may if satisfied as provided in sub-clauses (ii) and\n\n(iii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) exercise powers conferred by the said sub-section."}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8104, "end_char": 8113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Any of the following officers, -namely,-\n\n(a) District Magistrates,\n\n(b) Additional District Magistrates specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government, ( c) the Commissioner of Police for Born bay, Calcutta, Madras or Hyderabad,\n\n(d) Collector in the State of Hyderabad may if satisfied as provided in sub-clauses (ii) and\n\n(iii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) exercise powers conferred by the said sub-section."}}, {"text": "Parulekar Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8970, "end_char": 8990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(4) Where any order is made or approved by the State Government under this section, the State Shauirao Vishn11\n\nParulekar Government shall, as soon as may be, report the fact v. to the Central Government together with the grounds The District on."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9043, "end_char": 9061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(4) Where any order is made or approved by the State Government under this section, the State Shauirao Vishn11\n\nParulekar Government shall, as soon as may be, report the fact v. to the Central Government together with the grounds The District on."}}, {"text": "Section 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9298, "end_char": 9310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9862, "end_char": 9872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On these sections, the argument of Mr. Chatterjee for the petitioners is that section 3(3) requires that when an order of detention is made by one of the authorities mentioned in section 3(2)-in this case it was so madethat authority should forthwith report the fact to the State Government together with the grounds on which the order was made; that this provision is clearly intended to safeguard the rights of the detenu, as it is on a consideration of these grounds that the Government has to decide whether it will approve of the order or not; that when therefore the grounds had not been made available to the State Government before they had approved of the order, as happened in the present case, there was a clear violation of the proeedure prescribed by the statute, and that the detention became illegal."}}, {"text": "section 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9901, "end_char": 9913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10002, "end_char": 10014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10764, "end_char": 10776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "28th January 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10780, "end_char": 10797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now, it is clear from the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent that when the District Magistrate sent a report under section 3(3) on 28th January 1956, he did send a report not merely of the fact of the making of the order of detention, but also of the materials on which he had made the order."}}, {"text": "section 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11280, "end_char": 11292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12032, "end_char": 12044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12079, "end_char": 12088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12191, "end_char": 12200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12365, "end_char": 12377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12402, "end_char": 12411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maxwell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12597, "end_char": 12604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance was placed on the following passage in Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition, page 522:\n\n\"It is, at all events, reasonable to presume that the same meaning is implied by the use of the same expression in every part of an Act\"."}}, {"text": "Craies", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13124, "end_char": 13130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The presumption\", says Craies, \"that the same words are used in the same meaning is however very slight, and\n\n7956 it is proper 'if sufficient reason can be assigned, to construe a word in one part of an Act in a different Sha111rao Vi1hnu\n\nParrilekar sense from that which it bears in another part of v. an Act'\" (Statute Law, 5th Edition, page 159)."}}, {"text": "District And Maxwell", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13458, "end_char": 13478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The District And Maxwell, on whose statement of the law the Magistrate."}}, {"text": "Ayyar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13638, "end_char": 13643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ven-katara1na d d ff Ayyar J.\n\nThe same wor may be use in di erent senses in 1he same statute, and even in the same section\". ("}}, {"text": "section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13852, "end_char": 13864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central - Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13880, "end_char": 13900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Examining the two provisions in their context, it will be seen that section 3(1) confers on the Central - Government and the State Government the power to • pass an order of detention, when the grounds mentioned in that sub-clause exist."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14097, "end_char": 14106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14290, "end_char": 14303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14321, "end_char": 14333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14410, "end_char": 14422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14588, "end_char": 14600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14773, "end_char": 14785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14855, "end_char": 14867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14907, "end_char": 14919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15363, "end_char": 15372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15696, "end_char": 15705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16036, "end_char": 16048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16085, "end_char": 16094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16176, "end_char": 16188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16235, "end_char": 16244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16297, "end_char": 16309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16560, "end_char": 16572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16648, "end_char": 16660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16734, "end_char": 16743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16947, "end_char": 16959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17091, "end_char": 17103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17196, "end_char": 17205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17596, "end_char": 17605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17745, "end_char": 17757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Slta1nrao Vishnu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17797, "end_char": 17813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is obvious that the communication that has to be served on the detenu under section 7 of the Act is a formal document setting out the grounds for the order and the\n\n1956 particulars in support thereof, subject, of course, to section 7(2); whereas the report to the State under Slta1nrao Vishnu\n\nParulekar section 3(3) is a less formal document in the nature v. of a confidential inter-departmental communication, The District which is to contain the particulars on which the order Magistrate, Thana was made."}}, {"text": "section 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17825, "end_char": 17837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18209, "end_char": 18225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. N. C. Chatterjee also cited certain observations of Kania C.J. in State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya(') as supporting his contention that the grounds which are furnished to the detenu must have been before the State Government before it approves of the order.", "canonical_name": "N. 0. Chatterjee"}}, {"text": "Kania", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18261, "end_char": 18266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. N. C. Chatterjee also cited certain observations of Kania C.J. in State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya(') as supporting his contention that the grounds which are furnished to the detenu must have been before the State Government before it approves of the order."}}, {"text": "District Magistrate of Thana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19139, "end_char": 19167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Our conclusion is that th11 failure on the part of the District Magistrate of Thana to send along with his report under section 3(3), the very grounds which he subsequently communicated to the detenu under section 7 is not a breach of the requirements of that sub-section, and that it was sufficiently complied with when he reported the materials on which he made the order."}}, {"text": "section 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19204, "end_char": 19216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19290, "end_char": 19299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1956_1_653_663_EN", "year": 1956, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nKESHA V NILKANTH JOGLEKAR v.\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, GREATER\n\nBOMBAY (and connected petitions)\n\n[S. R. DAS C.J., VENKATARAMA AYYAR, B. P. SINHA,\n\nS. K. DAs and GovINDA MENON JJ.]\n\nPreventive detention-Detention order by the Commissioner of Police-Duty to report forthwith to the State Government-\" Forthwith\", J1feaning of-Time tak-, n for sending report-Validity of detention-Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (IV of 1950), ss. 3(3), 7.\n\nSection 3(3) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, provides that when an order of detention is made by an officer mentioned in s. 3(2) he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made ..... . and no such order ...... shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof unless in the meantime it has been approved by the State Government.\n\nOn 13th January 1956 the Commissioner of Police, Bombay, passed orders under s. 3(2) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, directing the detention of the petitioners and in pursuance thereof they were arrested on 16th January 1956 The grounds on which the orders were made were furnished to the petitioners on 20th January 1956 and the next day the Commissioner reported the fa.ct of the order and the grounds therefor to the State Government, which approved of the same on 23rd January 1956. The pet.itioners contested the validity of the detention on the ground that when the Commissioner passed the orders for detention on 13th January 1956 it was his duty under s. 3(3) to report that fact forthwith to the State Government, and as he did not do so until 21st January 1956, he had acted in contravention of the statute and that the detention was therefore illegal. It was found that the delay in sending the report could not have been a.voided by the Commissioner and that it was due to causes to which the petitioners had very largely contributed.\n\nHeld, that the word \"forthwith\" in s. 3(3) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, has not a fixed and an absolute meaning and it must be construed with reference to the object of the section and the circumstances of the case. It cannot mean the same thing as \"as soon as may be\" in s. 7 of the Act and the former is more peremptory than the latter. The difference between the two expressions lies in this that while under s. 7 the time that is allowed to the authority to send the communication to the detenu is what is reasonably convenient, under s. 3(3) what is allowed is only the\n\nSeptember 17\n\n1956 period during which he could not, withoub any fault of his own, send the report. /(eshav Nilkanth . . , J gl k An act which is to be done forthwith must be held to have oear b d h\"\"d \"h een so one w en it is one wit all reasonable despatch and The Co;::,, is$iouer without avoidable delay. of Police, Greater The Queen v. The Justices of Beikshire ([1878-79] 4 Q.B.D. 469), Bombay Hudson and others v. Hill and others ([1874] 43 L. J. C.P. 273), and R•g. v. PriAlthough the term has received a strict construction, ordinarily it is not to be strictly construed, but should receive a liberal or reasonable construction. Some regard must be had to the nature of the act or thing to be performed and the circumstances of the case\".\n\nIn England, there is a long catena of decisions interpreting the word \"forthwith\" occurring in statutes, rules and contracts, and their trend has been to construe it liberally. As early as 1767, discussing the meaning of the word 'immediately'-and the word \"forthwith'.' has been held to have the same significance-Lord Hardwicke observed in Rex v. Francis(1):\n\n\"But then the word immediately, is strorrgly insisted on, as a word which excludes all mesne acts and time; and therefore, that this taking away the money must necessarily be in the presence of Cox.\n\n(1) Cuu. 165; 94 E.R. 1129, 1133.\n\nK eshav N ilka1t: h\n\nJoglekar v.\n\nThe Commissiomr of Police, Greater Bombay\n\nVmkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nBut all the nine Judges held this word immediately,\n\nKservations were made by West, J., and the Court came to the conch1sion that Deshmukhs and Deshpandes would be sufficiently within the meaning of the clause they being appointed to perform for the State a portion of its functions or to aid those who were its active representatives but not so an Izaphatdar or the lessee such as the accused.\n\nHe was not an officer but a mere contractor bound by his engagement but not by the terms of his office or employment to pay a certain proportion to the Government.\n\nThere was no delegation to him of any\n\nauthority for coercion or interference nor was he an 7956 assistant appointed to help any one who was vested\n\nG A M . with such authority. The duties which he performed · vnterio were contractual duties fraudulent deception in the The state of Afmer discharge of which might subject him to punishment for cheating but not duties attached to any office BhagwatiJ. conferred on him or his predecessor in title, failure to perform which with integrity could make him liable, as an officer, to the special penalties prescribed for delinquent public servants.\n\nThis decision in 12 Bombay High Court Reports 1, came to be considered by the Calcutta High Court in Nazamuddin v. Queen-Empress(1).\n\nThe petitioner in that case was a peon attached to the office of the Superintendent of the Salt Department in the district of Mozafferpur and he had been convicted under section 161, Indian Penal Code. The contention urged on behalf of the petitioner was that he did not fall within the terms of the last portion of clause (9) of section 21, Indian Penal Code which declared \"every\n\nofficer in the service or pay of Government\" was a public servant 'because he was not an officer. The case of Reg. v. Ramajirav Jivbajirav(2) was cited in support of that contention and the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court observed at page 346 as under:-\n\n\"The learned Judges in that case had to consider whether a lessee from Government was on the condi- - tions of his lease a public servant, and, in doing so, they considered generally the meaning of the term \"officer\". It was there held that an officer means\n\n\"some person employed to exercise, to some extent and in certain circumstances, a delegated function of Government. He is either armed with some authority or representative character, or his du ties are immediately auxiliary to thoRe of some person who is so\n\narmed\". The meaning which we are asked to put on these words seems to us to be too narrow as applied to the present case. The peon who has been convicted as a public servant is in service and pay of the Government, and he is attached to the office of the Superintendent of the Salt Department. The exact\n\n(1) I.L.R. 28 Cal. 344. l21 XII Bom. H.C.R. 1.\n\n7956 nature of his duties is not stated, because this objection was not taken at the trial, but we must take it G. A. Monterio v. that, from the nature of his appointmen~ it was his The State of Ajmer duty to carry out the orders of his official superior, - who undoubtedly is a public servant, and in that BhagwatiJ. capacity to assist the Superi.ntendent in the performance of the public duties of his office. In that sense he would be an officer of Government, although he might not possibly exercise \"any delegated function of the Government\". Still his duties would be \"immediately auxiliary to those of the Superintendent who is so armed\". We think that an \"officer in the service or pay of Government\" within the terms of s. 21 of the Penal Code is one who is appointed to some office for the performance of some public duty.\n\nIn this sense the peon would come within s. 21, cl. 9\".\n\nThe true test, therefore, in order to determine whether a person is an officer of the Government, is:-\n\n(1) whether he is in the service or pay of the Government, and\n\n(2) whether he is entrusted with t)le performance of any public duty.\n\nIf both these requirements are sa.tisfied it matters not the least what is the nature of his office, whether the duties he is performing are of an exalted character or very humble indeed. As has been stated in BaQon's Abridgment at Vol. 6, page 2, in the article headed \"Of the nature of an officer and the several kinds of officers\":-\"The word 'officium' principally implies a duty, and in the next place, the charge of such duty; and that it is a rule that where one man hath to do with another's affairs against his will, and without his leave, that this is an office, and he who is in it is an officer\". The next paragraph thereafter may also be referred to in this context:-\"There is a difference between an office and an employment, every office being an employment; but there are employments which do not come under the denomination of offices; such as an agreement to make hay, herd a flock, &c; which differ widely from that of steward of a manor\" &c. (Vide 12 Bombay High Court Reports 1 at page 5).\n\nThis wae the sense in which the decision in 12 1956 Bombay High Court Reports 1, was understood by G. A. Monterio the learned Judgs of the Lahore High Court in Ahad v.\n\nShah v. Emperor() when they observed at page ,157:- The State of Ajmer\n\n\"But it is not enough tha.t a person should be in the pay or service of Government to constitute him a BhagwatiJ. public eervant within the meaning of s. 21 (ninthly), I.P.C. He must also be an \"Officer\". That expression is not, of course, to be restricted to its colloquial meaning of a Commissioned or non-Commissioned Officer; it means a functionary or holder of some \"officium\" or office. The office may be one of dignity or importance; it may equally be humble. But whatever its nature, it is essential that the person holding the office, should have in some degree delegated to him certain functions of Government\".\n\nThe question for consideration before the learned Judges of the Labore High Court was whether a Quarter Master's clerk was a public servant within the meaning of that expression in section 21, Indian Penal Code. On the facts elicited before them the learned Judges came to the conclusion that the Quarter Master's clerk as such was just a Babu and no more 'an officer' than a labourer or menial employed and paid by Government to do public work (See Queen\n\nv. Nachimuttu(2)).\n\nIf therefore on the facts of a particular case the Court comes to the conclusion that a person is not only in the service or pay of the Government but is also performing a public duty, he has delegated to him the functions of the Government or is in any event performing duties immediately auxiliary to those of some one who is an officer of the Government and is therefore 'an officer' of the Government within the meaning of section 21(9), Indian Penal Code.\n\nApplying this test to the facts of the case before us, we find that the appellant was a Class III servant and was employed as a metal examiner known as Chaser in the Railway Carriage Workshop. He was working under the Works Manager who was certainly\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1918 Lah. 1G2.\n\n(2) I.L.R. 7 Madras 18.\n\n1956 an officer of the Government and the duties which he Performed were immediately auxiliary to those of the G. A. Monterio v.\n\nWorks Manager who, beside being an officer of the The state of ; ljmer Gover, nment was also armed with some authority or representative character qua the Government.\n\nThe Bhagwati J. appellant was thus, even on a narrow interpretation of the dicta of West, J. in 12 Bombay High Court Reports 1, an officer in the service or pay of the Government performing as such a public duty entrusted to him by the Government and was therefore, a public servant within the meaning of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nThis being the true legal position, this contention of the appellant also does not avail him and the first question must be answered against him.\n\nThe appellant was, therefore, an officer within the meaning of section 21 (9) and therefore a public servant within the meaning of section 21, Indian Penal Code and being such public servant he fell within the definition of a public servant contained in section 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act II of\n\n1947. He was, therefore, on the facts and circumstances of the case, rightly convicted under section 5(1) (d) of Act II of 1947.\n\nHis conviction and the sentence imposed upon him by the Courts below were therefore quite in order and this appeal must therefore stand dismissed.", "total_entities": 107, "entities": [{"text": "G. A. MONTERIO", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 45, "end_char": 59, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "G. A •. 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GOVINDA MENON", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Railway Carriage workshop-Whether officer- I ndian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 216, "end_char": 277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 21(9)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 297, "end_char": 305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Railway Carriage workshop-Whether officer- I ndian Penal Code", "statute": "Railway Carriage workshop-Whether officer- I ndian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Cor ruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 306, "end_char": 335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 350, "end_char": 354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Cor ruption Act", "statute": "Prevention of Cor ruption Act"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 624, "end_char": 652, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 21(9)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 772, "end_char": 780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Cor ruption Act", "statute": "Prevention of Cor ruption Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 788, "end_char": 805, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 21(9)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1233, "end_char": 1241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Cor ruption Act", "statute": "Prevention of Cor ruption Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1249, "end_char": 1266, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1322, "end_char": 1326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Cor ruption Act", "statute": "Prevention of Cor ruption Act"}}, {"text": "CRIMIN.AL APPELLATE JuRISDIOTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1938, "end_char": 1970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CRIMIN.AL APPELLATE JuRISDIOTION: Criminal AppealNo."}}, {"text": "B. P. Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2284, "end_char": 2300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. P. Maheshwari, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2325, "end_char": 2336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India, Porus A. Mehta, H. R. Khanna and IR."}}, {"text": "Porus A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2367, "end_char": 2381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India, Porus A. Mehta, H. R. Khanna and IR."}}, {"text": "R. Khanna", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2386, "end_char": 2395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India, Porus A. Mehta, H. R. Khanna and IR."}}, {"text": "H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2404, "end_char": 2413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. Dhebar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "article 134(l)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2560, "end_char": 2577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ajmer", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2651, "end_char": 2656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI J.-This Appeal with a certificate of fitness under article 134(l)(c) of the Constitution against the decision of the Judicial Commissioner at Ajmer raises an important question as to the connotation of the word \"officer\" contained in section 21(9), Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "section 21(9)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2743, "end_char": 2756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2758, "end_char": 2775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2931, "end_char": 2942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2944, "end_char": 2961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Nanak Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2992, "end_char": 3003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He was charged under section 161, Indian Penal Code with having accepted from one Nanak Singh currency notes of the value of Rs."}}, {"text": "Kallu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3108, "end_char": 3113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as illegal gratification as a motive for securing a job for one Kallu."}}, {"text": "section 5(1)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3141, "end_char": 3156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3408, "end_char": 3419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3421, "end_char": 3438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "State of Ajmer", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3638, "end_char": 3652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Special Judge, State of Ajmer, who tried him in the first instance for the said offences convicted him of the offence undersection 161, Indian Pena."}}, {"text": "section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3746, "end_char": 3757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 5(1)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3804, "end_char": 3819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "G. A •. Monterio", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4008, "end_char": 4024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In so far, 89\n\nG. A •. Monterio\n\nThe State of Ajmer\n\n1956 however, as it was not proved that the appellant did not believe when lie accepted the money that G. A. Monterio he could secure or would try to secure a job for Kallu, The stat;~!", "canonical_name": "G. A •. Monterio"}}, {"text": "State of Ajmer", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4030, "end_char": 4044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In so far, 89\n\nG. A •. Monterio\n\nThe State of Ajmer\n\n1956 however, as it was not proved that the appellant did not believe when lie accepted the money that G. A. Monterio he could secure or would try to secure a job for Kallu, The stat;~!"}}, {"text": "G. A. Monterio", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4149, "end_char": 4163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In so far, 89\n\nG. A •. Monterio\n\nThe State of Ajmer\n\n1956 however, as it was not proved that the appellant did not believe when lie accepted the money that G. A. Monterio he could secure or would try to secure a job for Kallu, The stat;~!", "canonical_name": "G. A •. Monterio"}}, {"text": "section 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4269, "end_char": 4280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4291, "end_char": 4301, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4339, "end_char": 4347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ajmor it was held that no case under section 420, Indian _ Penal Code was made out and he was acquitted of Bhagwati J. that charge.", "canonical_name": "BhagwatiJ."}}, {"text": "10th December, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4462, "end_char": 4481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal taken to the Judicial Commissioner, State of Ajmer, by he appellant failed and on the 10th December, 1954, the learned Judicial Commissioner granted to the appellant a certificate of fitness for appeal on two main grounds, viz., ("}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4684, "end_char": 4694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4696, "end_char": 4713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 137", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4750, "end_char": 4761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4769, "end_char": 4781, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4886, "end_char": 4903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 137", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5614, "end_char": 5625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Railways Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5633, "end_char": 5645, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5750, "end_char": 5767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 5(1 )( d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5961, "end_char": 5978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6128, "end_char": 6139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6168, "end_char": 6185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "state of Ajmer", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6400, "end_char": 6414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "has become merely academical and the only question · vn eno which remains to be considered by us here is whether The state of Ajmer he was an \"officer\" within the meaning of section 21 (9), In.dian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6457, "end_char": 6467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6481, "end_char": 6491, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "BhagwatiJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6494, "end_char": 6504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BhagwatiJ.\n\nThe provisions of law in regard to the first question may be conveniently set out at this stage:-\n\nSection 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act II of 1947 provides:-\n\n\"for the purposes of this Act \"public servant\" means a public servant as defined in section 21 of the Indian Penal Code\".", "canonical_name": "BhagwatiJ."}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6605, "end_char": 6614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Corruption Act II of 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6636, "end_char": 6661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6758, "end_char": 6768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Corruption Act II of 1947", "statute": "Corruption Act II of 1947"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6776, "end_char": 6793, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6797, "end_char": 6807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Corruption Act II of 1947", "statute": "Corruption Act II of 1947"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6809, "end_char": 6826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7522, "end_char": 7532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7538, "end_char": 7555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "West", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7872, "end_char": 7876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the dictum of West J., the word \"officer\" meant some person employed to exercise to some extent and in certain circumstances a delegated function of Government."}}, {"text": "State of Ajmer", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8260, "end_char": 8274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was, therefore, contended that the appellant being Th• State of Ajmer a metal examiner known as Chaser in the Railway\n\nG. A. Monterio\n\nBha gwati J, Carriage Workshops had .not delegated to him by the supreme authority some portion of its regulating ii, nd coercive powers nor was he appointed to represent the State in its relations to individual subjects."}}, {"text": "G. A. Monterio", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8324, "end_char": 8338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was, therefore, contended that the appellant being Th• State of Ajmer a metal examiner known as Chaser in the Railway\n\nG. A. Monterio\n\nBha gwati J, Carriage Workshops had .not delegated to him by the supreme authority some portion of its regulating ii, nd coercive powers nor was he appointed to represent the State in its relations to individual subjects.", "canonical_name": "G. A •. Monterio"}}, {"text": "Bha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8340, "end_char": 8343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was, therefore, contended that the appellant being Th• State of Ajmer a metal examiner known as Chaser in the Railway\n\nG. A. Monterio\n\nBha gwati J, Carriage Workshops had .not delegated to him by the supreme authority some portion of its regulating ii, nd coercive powers nor was he appointed to represent the State in its relations to individual subjects."}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8907, "end_char": 8917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8923, "end_char": 8940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9047, "end_char": 9057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code nor could he be a public servant for the purposes of Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9059, "end_char": 9133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 5(l)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9193, "end_char": 9208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code nor could he be a public servant for the purposes of Act", "statute": "Indian Penal Code nor could he be a public servant for the purposes of Act"}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9305, "end_char": 9325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has to be noted, however, that the case before the learned Judges of the High Court of Bombay in 12 Bombay High Court Reports 1, concerned an Izaphatdar, that is a lessee, of a village who had undertaken to keep an account of its fores~ revenue and pay a certain pro}Jortion to the Government, keeping the remainder for himself and the question that arose for the consideration of the Court was whether such a person was an officer within the meaning of section 21(9), Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9332, "end_char": 9349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has to be noted, however, that the case before the learned Judges of the High Court of Bombay in 12 Bombay High Court Reports 1, concerned an Izaphatdar, that is a lessee, of a village who had undertaken to keep an account of its fores~ revenue and pay a certain pro}Jortion to the Government, keeping the remainder for himself and the question that arose for the consideration of the Court was whether such a person was an officer within the meaning of section 21(9), Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "section 21(9)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9686, "end_char": 9699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code nor could he be a public servant for the purposes of Act", "statute": "Indian Penal Code nor could he be a public servant for the purposes of Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9701, "end_char": 9718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Deshmukhs", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9843, "end_char": 9852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was in this context that the aforesaid ol:;>servations were made by West, J., and the Court came to the conch1sion that Deshmukhs and Deshpandes would be sufficiently within the meaning of the clause they being appointed to perform for the State a portion of its functions or to aid those who were its active representatives but not so an Izaphatdar or the lessee such as the accused."}}, {"text": "Deshpandes", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9857, "end_char": 9867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was in this context that the aforesaid ol:;>servations were made by West, J., and the Court came to the conch1sion that Deshmukhs and Deshpandes would be sufficiently within the meaning of the clause they being appointed to perform for the State a portion of its functions or to aid those who were its active representatives but not so an Izaphatdar or the lessee such as the accused."}}, {"text": "BhagwatiJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10665, "end_char": 10675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The duties which he performed · vnterio were contractual duties fraudulent deception in the The state of Afmer discharge of which might subject him to punishment for cheating but not duties attached to any office BhagwatiJ. conferred on him or his predecessor in title, failure to perform which with integrity could make him liable, as an officer, to the special penalties prescribed for delinquent public servants.", "canonical_name": "BhagwatiJ."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10947, "end_char": 10966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This decision in 12 Bombay High Court Reports 1, came to be considered by the Calcutta High Court in Nazamuddin v. Queen-Empress(1)."}}, {"text": "Mozafferpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11129, "end_char": 11140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner in that case was a peon attached to the office of the Superintendent of the Salt Department in the district of Mozafferpur and he had been convicted under section 161, Indian Penal Code."}}, {"text": "section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11173, "end_char": 11184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11186, "end_char": 11203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11333, "end_char": 11343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11345, "end_char": 11362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13252, "end_char": 13257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13265, "end_char": 13275, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13398, "end_char": 13403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13405, "end_char": 13410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "BaQon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13863, "end_char": 13868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As has been stated in BaQon's Abridgment at Vol."}}, {"text": "Lahore High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14803, "end_char": 14820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This wae the sense in which the decision in 12 1956 Bombay High Court Reports 1, was understood by G. A. Monterio the learned Judgs of the Lahore High Court in Ahad v.\n\nShah v. Emperor() when they observed at page ,157:- The State of Ajmer\n\n\"But it is not enough tha.t a person should be in the pay or service of Government to constitute him a BhagwatiJ. public eervant within the meaning of s. 21 (ninthly), I.P.C. He must also be an \"Officer\"."}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15056, "end_char": 15061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15073, "end_char": 15078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15709, "end_char": 15719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15721, "end_char": 15738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 21(9)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16432, "end_char": 16445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16447, "end_char": 16464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17373, "end_char": 17383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17391, "end_char": 17408, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17621, "end_char": 17631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17689, "end_char": 17699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17701, "end_char": 17718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17812, "end_char": 17821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Corruption Act II of", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17843, "end_char": 17863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17958, "end_char": 17970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Corruption Act II of\n\n1947", "statute": "Corruption Act II of\n\n1947"}}]} {"document_id": "1956_1_691_734_EN", "year": 1956, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nMEEN AKSHI MILLS, MADURAI\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nMADRAS.\n\n[S. R. DAS C. J., VENKATARAMA AYYAR\n\nand JAFER IMAM JJ.]\n\nIncomettix-Referet1ce to High Court-Question of law-In ference from findinqs of fact, when a qitcstion of law-Test-Profits earned by the assessee Company by sale of aood s entered in the names of d1immy fi1ms aml Conipanies-Benami, Meaning of-Finding of the stcitm of wch firms and Companies, if and when material-Ac crnal of liability-Manner of dealing with the profits by a registered Company, if affects its liability--Apportionment of pmfits between place of mannjc:, ct1tre and pince of sale, if a question of law-Indian Incomg-tax Act, (XI of 1922), ss. 66(1). 42(1), 42(8).\n\nA finding of fa.ct, even when it is an inference from other facts found on evidence, is not a question of law within the meaning of s. 66(1) of the Indian Income Tax Act that can be refei;.red to the High Court for its deoision. Such an inference can be a question of law only when the point for determination is a mixed question of law and fact. On the principles established by authorities, only such questions as relate to one or other of the following matters can be questions of law under the section:-\n\n(1) the construction of o. statute or a document of title;\n\n(2) the legal effect of the facts found where the point for determinatioI? ie a mixed question of lr.w and fa.ct;\n\n(3) a finding of fact unsupporled by evidence or nnrea, ponable r.nd perveri!e in nature.\n\nAlthough a finding of fa.ct which is not supported by any evi dance or is unreasonable and perverse ma.y be challenged a.s an error of la.w, where there is evidence to consider the finding of the Tribn na.l does not cease to be final simply because the Court may be iI?clined to take a view different from tha.t of the Tribunal.\n\nGreat Western Railway Co. v. Bater, ((1922] 8 T. C. 231), followed.\n\nThe soundness of a. conclusion ba.sed on a number of facts found on evidence must be judged by the cumula.tive effect of a.11 the facts and it is altogether a wrong approach to consider them indivi dually in an isolated manner in order to explain them and show that inferences other than those drawn by the Tribunal could be drawn from them.\n\nSej>tember 26\n\nMeenakshi Mills,\n\nMadurai\n\nTlie Cointnissioner\n\nof Income-tax,\n\nMadras\n\nEdwards (Inspect-01' of Taxes) v. Bairstow, ([1955] 28 I.T.R. 579), referred to.\n\nMisa.pprecia.tion of evidence does not amount to want of evi .. dence a.nd unless the eviden'ce can be shown to be irrelevant or inadmissible, the conclusion of the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that it is based on no lega'l evidence.\n\nThe test as to whether a question is 'one of fact or one of mixed law and fact is this that while in determining II question of fact no application of any principle of law is required in finding either the ha.sic facts or arriving at the ultimate conclusion, in a mixed question of law and fact the ultimate conclusion has to be drawn by applying the relevant principles of law to the basic findings, Herbert v. Samuel Fox and Co. Ltd., ([1916] 1 A.O. 405) and The Queen v. Special Commissioners of Income-tax ((1894] 3 T. 0. 289), followed.\n\nThe view expressed in a number of English decisions that an inference from facts is a question of la.w has reference really to questions of mixed law and fact.\n\nEdwards(Inspect01 of Taxes) v. Bairstow, ([la55J 28 I.T.R. 579), Bamford v Osborne, ([1942] A.O. 14), Thomas Fattorini (Lancashire) Ltd. v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ([l!J42) A.O. 643), and Camererse possession in law. Is the user continuous or fugitive?\n\nIs it as of right or permissive in character? Thus, for deciding whether the defendant has acquired title by adverse possession, the court has firstly to find on an appreciation of the evidence what the facts are. So far, it is a question of fact. It has then to apply the principles of law regarding acquisition of title by ad verse possession, and decide whether on the facts\n\n.. -\n\nestablished by the evidence, the requirements of law are satisfied. That is a question of law.\n\nThe ultimate finding on the issue must, therefore, be an inference to be drawn from the facts found, on the application of the proper principles of law, and it will be correct tq_ say in such cases that an inference from facts is a question of law. In this respect, mixed questions of law and fact differ from pure questions of fact in which the final determination equally with the finding or ascertainment of basic facts does not involve the application of any principle of law. The proposition that an inference from facts is one of law will be correct in its application to mixed questions of law and fact but not to pure questions of fact.\n\nThe following observations of Lord Atkinson in Herbert v. Samuel Fox and Go., Ltd. (1) clearly bring out the principle above stated:\n\n\"' .... Your Lordships were pressed with the usual argument, that as the County Court judge though a judge of law and facts, is the sole judge of fact, his findings cannot be disturbed if there was any evidence before him upon which he, as a reasonable man, could find as he has found.\n\nThat argument is quite sound if it be applied to pure findings of fact.\n\nIt is utterly unsound if it be applied either to findings on pure questions of law or on mixed questions of law and fact .... It is wholly illegitimate, in my view, in cases such as the present, by finding in the words of the statute to endeavour to secure for a finding on a pure question of law, or on a mixed question of law and fact, that unassailability which properly belongs only to a finding on a question of pure fact\".\n\nThese observations were made in a case under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1904.\n\nBut the same principles have been applied to revenue cases, and it has consistently been held that inferences from facts may themselves be inferences of fact and not of kw, and that such inferences are not open to review by the court.\n\nIn The Queen v. Spscial Commissioners of Incometax(2) Esher M. R. observed:\n\n(1) [1916) 1 A.O. 405, 413.\n\n(2) [1894] 3 T.C, 289, 290·291.\n\nMeenakshi Mills,\n\nMadurai v.\n\nThe Commissi01111r\n\nof Incometax,\n\n/.fadras\n\nVenhatara111a\n\nAyyarJ.\n\n7956 \" ••. .it &eems to me that that is a question of fact.\n\nM -k h\" M. 11 It is a question of the true inference which they eena s • 1 s,. (C · ) h d d f 'd Madurai omm1ss10ners a to raw as a mattero ev1 ence. v. upon the facts which they had in evidence before Th• Commi .. 1onme-tax Act, 1918. The House of Lords agreed with this contention, and discharged the assessment. One of the points raised on behalf of the Crown was that the finding of the Commissioner was one of fact and was thecefore final. This contention was repelled on the ground that whether the lands were gardens within rule 8 was not a pure question of fact. The following observations in the speech of Lord Wright at page 38 may be quoted:\n\n\"It has been strenuously contended as a main argument on behalf of the Crown that the questions here to be discussed are questions of 'fact and degree'.\n\nBut, in my opinion, the true effect of the facts found cannot be ascertained until the true construction of r. 8 has been examined and its true application to\n\n(I) (19,2] A.O. 1': (19,2] I.T.R. Supplt. 27.\n\nthe facts ascertained. There are, in addition to inci- 1956 dental questions, two main questions of law, namely, Meenakshi Mills, what is the meaning of \"gardens for the sale of pro- Madurai duce\" and how is that meaning to be applied to v. acreage which is worked as e. single mixed farm in The Commissioner one unit\". of Income-tax, Thus, the basis of the judgment was that the ques- Madras tion decided by the Commissioners was one of mixed Vcnkatarama law and fact, and that their determination was open AyyarJ. to review by the courts. There is nothing in this decision again which supports the contention of the appellant that findings on questions of fact based on inference from other facts should be regarded as questions of law. On the other hand, the following observations of Viscount Simon at page 22 are really against this contention: \"No doubt, there are many cases in which Commissioners, having had proved or admitted before them a series of facts, may deduce therefrom further conclusions which are themselves conclusions of pure fact, but in such cases the determination in point of law is that the facts proved or admitted provide evidence to support the Commissioner's conclusions\".\n\nThese observations clearly establish that inferences fro!ll facts found need not necessarily be inferences of law but may be conclusions of fact, and such conclusions of fact could be attc'ked on grounds on which findings of fact could be attacked, namely, there is no evidence to support them as for example, if the conclusion does not follow even if all the.facts found are accepted. That does not certainly support the contention of the appellant.\n\nIn Thomas Fattorini (Lancashire), Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Oommissioners(1), the point for decision was whether the appellant company had failed to declare within a reasonable time dividend out of the profits earned by it, in which case under section 21 of the Finance Act, 1922 the income is deemed to be income of the members and chargeable to super-tax. The finding of the Bqard of Referees was that distribution of profits had not been made within a reasonable time,\n\n(1) [1942] A.O. 643; 24 T.C. 328.\n\nMeenakshi Mills,\n\nMadurai v.\n\nTlic Co1n1nissio11er\n\nof Income-tax,\n\nMadras\n\nVi•nkatarama\n\nAyyarJ,\n\nbut their decision was reversed by the House of Lords on the ground that there was no evidence in support of it. Thus, there is nothing in t.he decision itself which has any bearing on the present controversy.\n\nThe appellant, however, relies on the following observations in the speech of Lord Porter at page 667:\n\n\"!.. .. think that the final conclusion is not a fact but an inference from facts previously set out, and that, therefore, that conclusion is not binding upon the tribunal to which the case is referred unless it appears from the previous findings that there are facts which support it. In the present case I cannot find such support.\" In the context, what these remarks mean is that when the final conclusion is one of fact and is itself an inference from other facts, it is open to attack on the ground that the basic facts themselves do not constitute evidence in support of the final conclusion -a position which does not arise here.\n\nThen there is the observation of Lord Maugham in Cameron v. Prenderga8t(') that \"inferences from facts stated by the Commissioners are matters of law and can be questioned on appeal\".\n\nDoeg this remark mean that inferences from facts found are questions of law in all cases, whether these inferences areinferences of facts or of law? There being nothing in the observation to throw any light on this question, we must examine the facts of the case to ascertain its true import. There, the assessee who had been a Director in a building company for 44 years wanted to resign his office, but he was persuaded to continue as an advisory Director on a reduced remuneration and a payment of £45,000, and this arrangement was embodied in a deed. The question was whether these amounts were taxable as profits arising from an office.\n\nThe Commissioners had held that the consideration for the payments was the promise of the asessee not to resign his office, and that therefore they were not profits arising from any office.\n\nThe House of Lords held, affirming the judgment of the majority of the\n\nCourt of Appeal that the amounts were paid to\n\nI!\\ [1910) A.C. 549: 81.1'.R Supplt. 75, 81.\n\n-.\n\nthe assessee in consideration of his continuing ae a 7956 Director, and were therefore taxable. Thus, the only Point for determination in the case was as to the Meenakshi Mills, Madurai character of the payments made to the appellant, v. and that depended on the true interpretation to be The Commissioner put on the agreement, and that really was a question o/It1come.ta>:, - of law. There was no question of the Commissioners Madras recording findings on primary facts and then of draw- Venkatarama ing further inferences therefrom.\n\nThe dictum relied AyyarJ. on by the appellant therefore could have no reference to the question now under consideration.\n\nIt is possible that having regard to the observations following the one quoted above that \"the same remark is true as to the construction of documents\", what was meant to be conveyed was that the legal effect of facts stated in the deed of agreement was a question of law.\n\nIn the context, it is impossible to construe the observation as an authority in support of the present contention of the appellant, and it should be mentioned that there is nothing about this in the judgments of the other members of the court.\n\nOne other argument advanced on behalf of the appellant must now be considered.\n\nThis is based on the following observations of Cozens-Hardy M.R. in The Gramophone and Typewriter Ltd. v. Stanley(1):\n\n\"It is undoubtedly true that if the Commissioner~ find a fact, it is not open to this court to .question that finding unless there is no evidence to support it.\n\nIf, however, the Commissioners state the evidence which was before them, and add that upon such evidence they hold that t:ertain results follow, I think it is open, and was intended by the Commissioners that it should be open, to the court to say whether the evidence justified what the Commissioners held.\n\nI am satisfied that the case stated by the Commissioners falls under the latter head\".\n\nOn these observations, the argument of the appellant was that whenever the Tribunal found certain basic facts and stated its conclusions thereon, its determi:..\n\nnation was open to review by court, and that it was immaterial whether these conclusions were of fact or\n\n(1) (1908] 2 K.B. 89: 5 T.C. 858.\n\n1956 of law.\n\nThe answer to this contention is furnished\n\n-. M' by the decision in The American Thread Company v.\n\nA \"naksh• •lls J (1) h h f h b Madurai ' oyce , w ere1n t e true scope o t ese o servat1ons v. has been fully considered and authoritatively settled.\n\nThe Commissioner There, Hamilton J. pointed out that what the obsero/ Income-tax, vations meant was that if the Commissioners merely Madras stated certain findings of fact and while expressing what according to them was their effect, did not Vt.!nkatarama\n\nAyyarJ. intend that the expression should be taken as their finding thereon, then it must be taken that they had referred to the decision of the court the question as to what inference should be drawn from the basic findings, but that if they had not merely stated the basic findings but had also stated their conclusions thereon intending that they should be their determinations on the question, then those determinations, if conclusions of fact, would be binding on the court and that the assessee would then have been stated out of court. Dealing with the statement of the Commissioners which was under reference before him, the learned Judge observed at page 22:\n\n\"It appears to me, therefore, that it is quite clear that the Commissioners have done this: they .have stated their determination, with which the appellants are dissatisfied; they have stated the facts as found upon which they so determined. The facts as found they have stated in the first part of paragraph 17, and then they have stated in the previous paragraphs the materials on which they so found, and in so doing they have invited, and only invited, the determination in point of law of the question whether there was evidence upon which they could reasonably arrive at the conclusion at which they did arrive\".\n\nThe decision in The Gramophone and Typewriter Company Ltd. v. Stanley(\") is thus really not a pronouncement on what is a question of law but on what construction was to be put on the statement of the Commissioners which was before the court. It should be added that the situation envisaged by Cozens-Hardy M. R. in The Gramophone and Typewriter Company\n\n(1) [1911] 6 T.C. 1.\n\n(2) [1908] 2 K.B. 89; 5 T.C. 858.\n\nLta. v. Stanley(1) cannot arise under section 66 of the Act, as the Tribunal is itself charged with the duty to decide whether a. question of law arises out of its order, and it cannot therefore merely paH it on for the determination of the court.\n\nThe decision in The American Thread Company v.\n\nJoyce(9) was taken on appeal and confirmed by the\n\nCourt of 1Appeal, of which it may be noted two of the members, Fletcher Moulton L.J. and Buckley L.J. were parties to the decision in The Gramophone and Typewriter Company Ltd. v. Stanley(1), and they expressed themselves in agreement with the view taken by Hamilton J. There was a further appeal to the House of Lords, which in confirming the decision of the courts below expressly approved of the observations of Hamilton J. The Earl of Halsbury observed:\n\n\"It is enough to say that they (the Commissioners) have found it and that there was evidence upon which they might find it, and if they did find it and if there was evidence upon which they might find it, there is no question of appeal here at all .... I should have been contented absolutely to say that I entirely agree with every word of Mr. Justice Hamilton's judg!llent\". (The American Thread Company v.\n\nJoyce(s)).\n\nThis decision is particularly important as the finding in that case was itself, as appears from the judgment of Hamilton J., an inference from facts found and; nevertheless, it was decided that it was a question of fact on which the finding of the Commissioners was fin'al. I must now refer to another catena of cases relied on by the appellant in support of its contention that inferences from facts are questions of law. They are decisions of the Privy Council as to when a court of second appeal having authority to review decisions of the lower appellate court on a question oflaw could interfere with its findings of fact. In Ramgopal v.\n\nSham.skhaton('), one Daud Rao was sought to be made liable on a mortgage to which he was not a\n\n(1) [1908] 2 K. B. 89; 5 T. C. 368.\n\n(S) (1918] 6 T. C. 16S, 165.\n\n(2) [1911] 6 T. C. 1.\n\n(4) [1891-92] 19 I. A. 228,\n\nMeenallshi Mills,\n\nMad11rai\n\nThe Commissioner\n\nof Income-tax,\n\nMadras\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAnarJ.\n\n1956 party on the ground that he had knowledge of it and had accepted it. In holding that the acts found did Meenakshi Mills, bl• h d f J b S h Madurai not esta 1s any groun o ia ility, ir Ric ard v.\n\nCouch observed: The Commissioner \"A finding that the bond shewed that the morto/ Income-tax, gage deed was accepted by the defendant, as binding Madras obligation upon him, would be an inference of law, an\n\nVenkatarama inference which, in their Lordships' opinion, is not a AyyarJ. just one from the facts which the Commissioner held to be proved. The knowledge of the mortgage, and saying that the money due upon it was repayable, do not amount to an agreement by him to be bound by it. As the mortgage did not purport to be made in any way on behalf of Daud Rao it was not a case for ratification. A new agreement was necessary to bind\n\nhim\".\n\nThen, after referring to -the observations of Lord Watson in Ramratan Sukal v . .llfussumat Nandu(1) that \"it has now been conclusively settled that the third Court, which was in this case the court of the Judicial Commissioner, cannot entertain an appeal upon any question as to the soundness of findings of fact by the second court; if there is evidence to be considered, the decision of the second Court, however unsatisfactory it might be if examined, must stand final\", Sir Richard Couch continued:\n\n\" ........ the present case does not come within that rule. The facts found need not be questioned. It is the soundness of the conclusion from them that is in question, and this is a matter of Jaw\".\n\nIt is this last observation that is relied upon for the appellant. But when read along with the other passages quoted above, it clearly recognises the distinction between findings of pure questions of fact and of mixed question of Jaw and fact.\n\nIn Najar Ohandra Pal v. Shukur(•), Lord Buckmaster observed:\n\n\"Questions of Jaw and of fact are sometimes difficult to disentangle. The proper legal effect of a proved fact is essentially a question of Jaw, so also is the question of admissibility of evidence and the\n\n{l) [1891-921 19 I.A. 1.\n\n(2) [1917-18] 45 I.A. 183, 187.\n\n.....\n\nquestion of whether any evidence has been offered by one side or the other; but the question whether the\n\nMeenakshi Mills, fact has been proved, when evidence for and against Madurai has been properly admitted, is necessarily a pure v. question of fact\".\n\nThe Commlssicmer The expression \"the proper legal . effect of a proved 01 Income-tax, fact\" is itself Indicative that inferences from facts Madras are not all of them questions of law open to consideration in second appeal but only those which involve the application of some legal principle. The actual decision in that case was that the question as to the character of land was one of fact not open to consideration in second appeal.\n\nIn Dhanna Mal v. Motisagar(1), the point for determination was whether the facts proved were sufficient to establish a right of permanent occupancy. Discussing how far a finding on that question by the lower appellate court could be disturbed in second appeal, Lord Blanesburgh observed at page 185:\n\n\"It is clear, however, that the proper effect of a proved fact is a question of law, and the. question whether a tenancy is permanent or precarious seems to them, in a case like the present, to be a legal inference fr:om facts and not itself a question of fact.\n\nThe High Court has described the question here as a mixed question of law and fact-a phrase not unhappy if it carries with it the warning that, in so far as it depends upon fact, the finding of the court of first appeal must be accepted\".\n\nThese observations again emphasise the distinction between inferences which are themselves questions of fact and inferences on mixed questions of law and fact.\n\nThis question was the subject of further consideration by the Privy Council in Wali Mohammad v.\n\nMohammad Baksh(2), Secretary of State for India in Council v. Rameswaram Devasthanam(a) and Lakshmidhar Misra v. Rangalal(4). In Wali Mohammad v. Mohammad Baksh(9), Sir Benod Mitter\n\n(1) [1927] L.R. 54 I.A. 178.\n\n(2) [1929) L.R. 57 I.A 86: 59 M.L.J. 53.\n\n(3) [1934) L.R. 61 I.A. 163: 66 M.L.J. 595.\n\n(4) [1949j L.R. 76 I.A. 271: 1951 M.L.J. 100.\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nMeenakshi Mills,\n\nMad11rai\n\nThe Comminioner\n\nof Income-tax,\n\nMadras\n\nVenkataraa\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nexhaustively reviewed the authorities on the questions and stated the law in the following terms:\n\n\"No doubt questions of law and fact are often difficult to disentangle, but the following propositions are clearly established:\n\n(1) There is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of erroneous finding of facts, however gross the error may seem to be. (See Musumat Durga C1ioudrain v. Jawahir Singh Choudhri(1)).\n\n(2) The proper legal effect of a proved fact is essentially a question of law, but the question whether a fact has been proved when evidence for and against has been properly admitted is necessarily a pure question of fact. (Najar v. Shukur(\")).\n\n(3) Where the question to be decided is one of fact, it does not involve an issue of law merely because documents which were not instruments of title or otherwise the direct foundation of rights but were really historical matters, have to be construed for the purpose of deciding the question. (See Midnapur Zamindary Co. v. Uma Charan Mandal(')).\n\n(4) A seof'.\\nd appeal would not lie because some portion of the evidence might be contained in a document or documents and the first appellate court had made a mistake as to its meaning. (See Nowbutt Singh\n\nv. Chutter Dharee Singh(')).\n\nGreat reliance was placed by the appellants' counsel on Dhanna Mal v. Moti Sagar(') but there, the tenancy was admitted and the question was whether it was permanent or not, and the solution of it depended upon what was the legal inference to be drawn from proved facts, or in other words, the question was what was the legal effect of proved facts\".\n\nIn Secretary of State/or India in Council v. Rameswaram Devasthanam(') where a finding of fact reached by the lower appellate court on a consideration of the documentary evidence was reversed in second appeal, Sir John Wallis in holding that the High Court had, in interfering with the finding of\n\n{l) [1889·90) 17 I.A. 122.\n\n(2) [1917-18] 46 I.A. 183.\n\n(3) [1918) !5 M.L.J. 663 P.C.; 29 c.w.N. 131.\n\n(4) 19 W.R. 222.\n\n(5) [19~7] L.R. 51 I.A 178. (G) 11934] L.R ul I.A. 163.\n\nfact, acted in excess of its powers under section 100\n\nobserved:\n\nMeenakshi Mills, \"The question is mainly one of fact, and it is Madurai well settled that under section 100 of the Code of v.\n\nCivil Procedure the High Court'has no jurisdiction to The Commissioner reverse the findings of fact arrived at by the lower of Income-tax, appellate court however erroneous, unless they are Madras vitiated by some error of law.\n\nSubsequently to the Venkatarama date of the judgments under appeal the Board has Ayyar J. had occasion to emphasise the fact that this rule is equally applicable to cases such as this in which the findings of the lower appellate court are based on inferences drawn from the documents exhibited in\n\nevidence\".\n\nIf an inference from documents exhibited in evidence is a question of fact, an inference from facts found on the evidence must equally be so.\n\nThere is one more decision of the Privy Council bearing on this question. In Lakshmidhar Misra v.\n\nRangalal(1), the question was whether the finding of the Subordinate Judge in appeal that there had been a dedication of certain lands as cremation ground could be reversed in second appeal. In holding that the finding was open to review by the High Court, Lord Radcliffe observed: . \"Issue No. 5, (whether the land was a cremation ground) is essentially a mixed question of law and fact. There are findings of fact by the Subordinate Judge which must indeed be accepted as binding in any consideration of this matter on further appeal: but his actual conclusion that there had been a dedication or lost grant is more properly regarded as a proposition of law derived from those facts than as a finding of fact itself\".\n\nThese observations lend no support to the broad contention of the appellant that inferences from facts are of necessity and always questions of law.\n\nWe have discussed the authorities at great length, as some of the observations contained therein appear, at first sight, to render plausible the contention of the appellant, and it seems desirable that the true\n\n(I) (1949] L.R. 7G I.A. 271.\n\nMeenakshi Mills,\n\nMadurai v.\n\nThe Commissioner\n\nof lncomt•tax,\n\nMadras\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar ),\n\nmeaning of those observations shoukl be clarified, lest error and misconception should embarrass and fog the administration of law. The position that emerges on the authorities may thus be summed up: (I) When the point for determination is a pure question of law such as construction of a statute or document of title, the decision of the Tribunal is open to reference to the court under section 66(1).\n\n(2) When the point for determinationis a mixed question of law and fact, while the finding of the Tribunal on the facts found is final its decision as to the legal effect of those finding is a question of law which can be reviewed by the court.\n\n(3) A finding on a question of fact is open to attack under section 66(1) as erroneous in law when there is no evidence to support it or if it is perverse.\n\n(4) When the finding is one of fact, the fact that it is itself an inference from other basic facts will not alter its character as one of fact.\n\nApplying these principles, admittedly there is no question here of construction of any statutory provision or document of title. The issues which arise for determination whether the sales entered in the books of the appellant in the names of the intermediaries were genuine and if not, to whom the goods were sold and for what price are all questions of fact. Their determination does not involve the application of legal principles to facts established in the evidence.\n\nThe findings of the Tribunal are amply supported by evidence and are eminently reasonable. It should, therefore, follow that there is no question which could be referred to the court under section 66(1).\n\nIt was argued for the appellant that what the Tribunal had found was that the intermediaries, firms and companies were benamidars for the appellant, that a question of benami was one of mixed law and fact, and that accordingly a finding thereon was open to review under section 66(1). Whether that is a correct reading of what the Tribunal had found will presently be considered. Assuming that such is the finding, what is the ground for holding that a finding of benami is one of mixed law and fact?\n\nThe only basis\n\n• -\n\nfor such a contention is that the finding that a transaction is benami is a matter of inference from various\n\nMeenakshi Mills, primary basic facts such as who paid the considera- Madurai tion, who is in enjoyment of the properties and the v. like. But that is not sufficient to make the question Tlze Commissioner one of mixed law and fact unless, as already stated, 01 Income-tax, there are legal principles to be applied to the basic Madras findings before the ultimate conclusion is drawn. But Venkatarama no such principles arise for application to the deter- Ayyar J. mination of the question of benami, which is purely one of fact, and none has been suggested by the appellant.\n\nIn Gangadara Ayyar v. Subramania Sastrigal(1), the Federal Court had to consider whether concurrent findings of benami by the courts below could be reviewed by it, and it was held that it could not be done as the practice of the court was not to interj ere with concurrent findings of fact unless there were exceptional grounds therefor and that there were none such in that case. It should be noted that the finding of benami in that case was a matter of inference from primary facts found which are set out at page 573.\n\nBut it was nevertheless held to be a question of fact. In\n\nlliisrilal v. Surji(2), it was held by the Privy Council that a finding of beuami was one of fact not open to attack in second appeal. This contention of the appellant must accordingly be rejected.\n\nIt was next contended that the finding of the Tribunal that the intermediaries, firms and companies were benamidars for the appellant was bad for the following reasons:\n\n(1) It had been reached without due consideration of several matters relevant for such a determination.\n\n(2) The finding of benami in so far as it related to the companies was bad for not considering the tests laid down in Smith, Stone and Knight v. Binningham Gorporation(3) as material for a decision on the point.\n\n(1) [1949] 1 ~I.L.J. 568: A.I.R. 1949 F.C. 88.\n\n12) A.LR. 1950 P.C. 23: [1950) 11'LL.J. 294.\n\n(3) [~939] 4 .\\.KR. 116.\n\n.\\Icenakslii Mills,\n\nMadurai v.\n\n(3) On the facts found, the proper conclusion to come to was that the intermediaries were benamidars not for the appellant but for Mr. Thyagarajan Chettiar of the Managing Agents firm.\n\nThe Commissioner These contentions will now be considered. As re- 0/ blcomc tax, gards the first con ten ti on, the argument on behalf of\n\nMadfas the appellant was this:- An important teat for deter-\n\nVcn!atara111a\n\nAyyar }. mining whether a transaction is benami is to discover the source of consideration for the transfer. When the question is whether firms and companies are benamidars for another person, what has to be found is whether it was the latter who found the capital of those concerns. The firms and companies had according to their books their own capital, and there is no , finding that the appellant subscribed it. Another important test of benami is to find who has been in enjoyment of the benefits of the transaction. It has not been shown that the profits of the intermediaries had been utilised by the appellant. Therefore, the finding that the intermediaries were benamidars of the appellant could not stand.\n\nNow, the assumption underlying this argument is that the Tribunal had found in its order that the intermediaries were benamidars for the appellant, but there is no basis for this in the order. In this con~ nection, it is necessary to note that the word 'benami' is used to denote two classes of transactions which differ from each other in their legal character and incidents. In one sense, it signifies a transaction which is real, as for example when A sells properties to B but the sale deed mentions X as the purchaser. Here the sale itself is genuine, but the real purchaser is B, X being his benamidar. This is the class of transactions which is usually termed as benami. But the word 'benami' is also occasionally used, perhaps not quite accurately, to refer to a sham transaction, as for example, when A purports to sell his property to B without intending that his title should cease or pass to B. The fundamental difference between these two classes of transactions is that whereas in the former there is an operative transfer resulting in the vesting of title in the transferee, in the latter there is none\n\nsuch, the transferor continuing to retain the title notwithstanding the execution of the transfer deed.\n\nIt is only in the former class of cases that it would be necessary, when a dispute arises as to whether the person named in the deed is the real transferee or B, to enquire into the question as to who paid the consideration for the transfer, X or B. But in the latter class of cases, when the question is whether the transfer is genuine or sham, the point for decision would be, not who paid the consideration but whether any consideration was paid. Therefore, there will be force in the contention of the appellant that a finding as to who furnished the capital for the intermediaries was requisite before they could be hel superior officers da11 to da11-0ontra11ention of t/r.t rule-Whether it vitiates the trial-Utl<>r Pradeah Polict Regulation•, r. 109.\n\nRule 109 of the Uttar Pradesh Police Regulations dealing with the investigation of crimes enjoins upon the police officer when an investigation is closed for the dayto note the time and place at which it closed and also lays down that throughout the investi gation the diary must be sent daily to the Superintendent of Police on all days on which any proceedings are takep.\n\nThe question that bad to be decided by the court was as to whether the appellants took part in the dacoity and the case of the prosecution depended mainly on the identification of the appellants.\n\nIt was found that the investigating officer did not send the case diary daily to the Superintendent of Police but only all together at the end of the period of investigation. It was contended for the ap pellants that the case diary could not be relied upon ae it enabled the officer to make alteration• during the course of the period of investigation and that as there had been an infraction of r. 109 of\n\n(1) [1950) S.0 R. 886; [1950] I.T.R. 472.", "total_entities": 168, "entities": [{"text": "MEEN AKSHI MILLS, MADURAI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 56, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MEEN AKSHI MILLS, MADURAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nMADRAS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 58, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADRAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 110, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.\n\nR. Das", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAFER IMAM JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 141, "end_char": 155, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SYED JAFFER IMAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Incomg-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 677, "end_char": 698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 714, "end_char": 723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Incomg-tax Act", "statute": "Indian Incomg-tax Act"}}, {"text": "s. 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 872, "end_char": 880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Incomg-tax Act", "statute": "Indian Incomg-tax Act"}}, {"text": "Meenakshi Mills", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2272, "end_char": 2287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sej>tember 26\n\nMeenakshi Mills,\n\nMadurai\n\nTlie Cointnissioner\n\nof Income-tax,\n\nMadras\n\nEdwards (Inspect-01' of Taxes) v. Bairstow, ([1955] 28 I.T.R. 579), referred to.", "canonical_name": "MEEN AKSHI MILLS, MADURAI"}}, {"text": "L.R. 19 I.A. 228", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4099, "end_char": 4115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L.R. 54 I.A. 178", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4206, "end_char": 4222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L.R. 57 I.A. 86", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4266, "end_char": 4281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Secretary of State for India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4284, "end_char": 4312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Gopal v. Shamskhat:, - of law."}}, {"text": "AyyarJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50043, "end_char": 50050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The dictum relied AyyarJ. on by the appellant therefore could have no reference to the question now under consideration.", "canonical_name": "AyyarJ."}}, {"text": "Cozens-Hardy M.R.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 50793, "end_char": 50810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is based on the following observations of Cozens-Hardy M.R. in The Gramophone and Typewriter Ltd. v. Stanley(1):\n\n\"It is undoubtedly true that if the Commissioner~ find a fact, it is not open to this court to .question that finding unless there is no evidence to support it.", "canonical_name": "Cozens-Hardy M.R."}}, {"text": "Hamilton", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 52016, "end_char": 52024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commissioner There, Hamilton J. pointed out that what the obsero/ Income-tax, vations meant was that if the Commissioners merely Madras stated certain findings of fact and while expressing what according to them was their effect, did not Vt.!nkatarama\n\nAyyarJ. intend that the expression should be taken as their finding thereon, then it must be taken that they had referred to the decision of the court the question as to what inference should be drawn from the basic findings, but that if they had not merely stated the basic findings but had also stated their conclusions thereon intending that they should be their determinations on the question, then those determinations, if conclusions of fact, would be binding on the court and that the assessee would then have been stated out of court."}}, {"text": "Cozens-Hardy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 53831, "end_char": 53843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It should be added that the situation envisaged by Cozens-Hardy M. R. in The Gramophone and Typewriter Company\n\n(1) [1911] 6 T.C. 1.", "canonical_name": "Cozens-Hardy M.R."}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53987, "end_char": 53997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Fletcher Moulton", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 54360, "end_char": 54376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision in The American Thread Company v.\n\nJoyce(9) was taken on appeal and confirmed by the\n\nCourt of 1Appeal, of which it may be noted two of the members, Fletcher Moulton L.J. and Buckley L.J. were parties to the decision in The Gramophone and Typewriter Company Ltd. v. Stanley(1), and they expressed themselves in agreement with the view taken by Hamilton J. There was a further appeal to the House of Lords, which in confirming the decision of the courts below expressly approved of the observations of Hamilton J. The Earl of Halsbury observed:\n\n\"It is enough to say that they (the Commissioners) have found it and that there was evidence upon which they might find it, and if they did find it and if there was evidence upon which they might find it, there is no question of appeal here at all .... I should have been contented absolutely to say that I entirely agree with every word of Mr. Justice Hamilton's judg!llent\". ("}}, {"text": "Buckley", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 54386, "end_char": 54393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision in The American Thread Company v.\n\nJoyce(9) was taken on appeal and confirmed by the\n\nCourt of 1Appeal, of which it may be noted two of the members, Fletcher Moulton L.J. and Buckley L.J. were parties to the decision in The Gramophone and Typewriter Company Ltd. v. Stanley(1), and they expressed themselves in agreement with the view taken by Hamilton J. There was a further appeal to the House of Lords, which in confirming the decision of the courts below expressly approved of the observations of Hamilton J. The Earl of Halsbury observed:\n\n\"It is enough to say that they (the Commissioners) have found it and that there was evidence upon which they might find it, and if they did find it and if there was evidence upon which they might find it, there is no question of appeal here at all .... I should have been contented absolutely to say that I entirely agree with every word of Mr. Justice Hamilton's judg!llent\". ("}}, {"text": "Daud Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 55843, "end_char": 55851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Ramgopal v.\n\nSham.skhaton('), one Daud Rao was sought to be made liable on a mortgage to which he was not a\n\n(1) [1908] 2 K. B. 89; 5 T. C. 368."}}, {"text": "Commissioner\n\nof Income-tax,\n\nMadras", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 56070, "end_char": 56106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(4) [1891-92] 19 I. A. 228,\n\nMeenallshi Mills,\n\nMad11rai\n\nThe Commissioner\n\nof Income-tax,\n\nMadras\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAnarJ.\n\n1956 party on the ground that he had knowledge of it and had accepted it.", "canonical_name": "Commissioner\n\nof Income-tax,\n\nMadras\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyya•J."}}, {"text": "Watson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 57027, "end_char": 57033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then, after referring to -the observations of Lord Watson in Ramratan Sukal v ."}}, {"text": "Richard Couch", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 57455, "end_char": 57468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".llfussumat Nandu(1) that \"it has now been conclusively settled that the third Court, which was in this case the court of the Judicial Commissioner, cannot entertain an appeal upon any question as to the soundness of findings of fact by the second court; if there is evidence to be considered, the decision of the second Court, however unsatisfactory it might be if examined, must stand final\", Sir Richard Couch continued:\n\n\" ........ the present case does not come within that rule."}}, {"text": "Buckmaster", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 57967, "end_char": 57977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Najar Ohandra Pal v. Shukur(•), Lord Buckmaster observed:\n\n\"Questions of Jaw and of fact are sometimes difficult to disentangle."}}, {"text": "Blanesburgh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 59221, "end_char": 59232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Discussing how far a finding on that question by the lower appellate court could be disturbed in second appeal, Lord Blanesburgh observed at page 185:\n\n\"It is clear, however, that the proper effect of a proved fact is a question of law, and the."}}, {"text": "L.R. 54 I.A. 178", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 60211, "end_char": 60227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L.R. 57 I.A 86", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 60241, "end_char": 60255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L.R. 61 I.A. 163", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 60283, "end_char": 60299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L.R. 76 I.A. 271", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 60328, "end_char": 60344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Venkatarama", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 60364, "end_char": 60375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Venkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nMeenakshi Mills,\n\nMad11rai\n\nThe Comminioner\n\nof Income-tax,\n\nMadras\n\nVenkataraa\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nexhaustively reviewed the authorities on the questions and stated the law in the following terms:\n\n\"No doubt questions of law and fact are often difficult to disentangle, but the following propositions are clearly established:\n\n(1) There is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of erroneous finding of facts, however gross the error may seem to be. (", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama appellant"}}, {"text": "John Wallis", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 62310, "end_char": 62321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Secretary of State/or India in Council v. Rameswaram Devasthanam(') where a finding of fact reached by the lower appellate court on a consideration of the documentary evidence was reversed in second appeal, Sir John Wallis in holding that the High Court had, in interfering with the finding of\n\n{l) [1889·90) 17 I.A. 122."}}, {"text": "L.R. 51 I.A 178", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 62526, "end_char": 62541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62614, "end_char": 62625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62734, "end_char": 62745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Commissioner\n\nof lncomt•tax,\n\nMadras\n\nVenkatarama", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 64693, "end_char": 64742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meenakshi Mills,\n\nMadurai v.\n\nThe Commissioner\n\nof lncomt•tax,\n\nMadras\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar ),\n\nmeaning of those observations shoukl be clarified, lest error and misconception should embarrass and fog the administration of law.", "canonical_name": "Commissioner\n\nof Income-tax,\n\nMadras\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyya•J."}}, {"text": "section 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65142, "end_char": 65155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65464, "end_char": 65477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66368, "end_char": 66381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66654, "end_char": 66667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Venkatarama", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67404, "end_char": 67415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But Venkatarama no such principles arise for application to the deter- Ayyar J. mination of the question of benami, which is purely one of fact, and none has been suggested by the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama appellant"}}, {"text": "section 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 72470, "end_char": 72483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mce11aksh i Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 73485, "end_char": 73502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus, the point which was actually in issue in the proceedings was a question of benami in the second sense and not in the first, and to decide that, the Tribunal had only to\n\nMce11aksh i Mills,\n\nThe Conttnissioucr\n\noj lnco11ict,1x,\n\nMadras\n\nVt:nkatara11:a\n\nAyyarJ.\n\n1956 find whether any price was paid by the intermediaries for the sales and not who paid the price for them."}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 74919, "end_char": 74932, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sterndale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 77425, "end_char": 77434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In those cases, the question was whether the profits earned by a subsidiary company X could be held to be profits earned by the parent company A and taxed in the hands of company A. It was held that the fact that X was a legal entity did not stand in the way of its profits being treated as profits of A, if, as observed by Lord Sterndale in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Samson(3), X was doing the business of A and not its own, and various tests were laid down for ascertaining whether it was A who was running the business of X. But here, no such question arises."}}, {"text": "Comniissioner\n\nof Income-ta:r, Madras", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 77950, "end_char": 77987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meenakshi Mills, Madurai v.\n\nThe Comniissioner\n\nof Income-ta:r, Madras\n\nVi!nkataratna\n\nAyyar J,\n\nNiecnakslii ftfills,\n\n•lfadurai v.\n\nTltc Con11nissio1ter\n\nof /11co11:,, tax,\n\niUadras\n\nVcnkatarania\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nthe picture only as the persons in whose names the sales were made."}}, {"text": "Madurai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 80469, "end_char": 80476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And this finding clearly reveals how hollow 1\n\nMeenakshi Mills, and unsubstantia the contentions of the appellant Madurai are as to the sources of capital for the intermediaries v. and the application of the tests laid down in Smith, The Commissioner Stone and Knight v. Birmingham Corporation (1).", "canonical_name": "Madurai"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82032, "end_char": 82041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ltfeenakshl Mills, Madurai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 82518, "end_char": 82544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ltfeenakshl Mills, Madurai\n\nv, The Com1nissioner\n\nof Income.tax,\n\nMadras\n\nVenkatarama\n\nA; y; yar J.\n\nappellant, because, as pointed out in discussing the previous contention of the appellant of which the present is but a repetition in another form, the intermediaries did no other business than the sales concerned in this assessment, so that the profits of the business mean the same thing as profits made on the concerned sales."}}, {"text": "Ayya", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 87127, "end_char": 87131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Is it not more legitimate to presume that the Managing Agent wanted to benefit the shareholders by reducing the\n\nftl.:euakslii ff ills,\n\nltladurai'\n\nTit~ Co1111nissio1ur\n\nof l11co111e-lt1.1,\n\nJla1lrt1s\n\nV.-uk,1ti.1ra11iii\n\nAyya,."}}, {"text": "St. Lucia Usines and Estates Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 88070, "end_char": 88102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decisions in St. Lucia Usines and Estates Co. ,.,"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 89844, "end_char": 89858, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 90685, "end_char": 90698, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 91148, "end_char": 91162, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 91649, "end_char": 91662, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 92133, "end_char": 92138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It of Income-tax, should also be mentioned that though the decision Madras in Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. K. R. M.\n\nVenkatarama T. T. Thyagaraja Ohetty(') relates to a firm and not Ayyar J. a company, the c; iecisions in St. Lucia Usines and Estates Co. v. St. Lucia (Colonial Treasurer)(') and Commissioner of Taxes v. Melbourne Trust(') which were held to be inapplicable to the imposition of a charge under the Indian Income-tax Act related to comparries, and the argument and the decision proceeded on the footing that principles applicable were the same both to firms and companies.", "canonical_name": "AyyarJ."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 92373, "end_char": 92387, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92887, "end_char": 92900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92971, "end_char": 92984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93274, "end_char": 93285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93555, "end_char": 93568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Travancore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 93732, "end_char": 93742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts relating to this matter are that during the periods of assessment with which the appeals are concerned, the aP.pellant opened branches in the States of Travancore, Cochin, Pudukkottah and Mysore, and sold yarn to its consti-\n\n.ll) [195!)"}}, {"text": "Cochin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 93744, "end_char": 93750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts relating to this matter are that during the periods of assessment with which the appeals are concerned, the aP.pellant opened branches in the States of Travancore, Cochin, Pudukkottah and Mysore, and sold yarn to its consti-\n\n.ll) [195!)"}}, {"text": "Pudukkottah", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 93752, "end_char": 93763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts relating to this matter are that during the periods of assessment with which the appeals are concerned, the aP.pellant opened branches in the States of Travancore, Cochin, Pudukkottah and Mysore, and sold yarn to its consti-\n\n.ll) [195!)"}}, {"text": "Mysore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 93768, "end_char": 93774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts relating to this matter are that during the periods of assessment with which the appeals are concerned, the aP.pellant opened branches in the States of Travancore, Cochin, Pudukkottah and Mysore, and sold yarn to its consti-\n\n.ll) [195!)"}}, {"text": "S.0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93818, "end_char": 93821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14(2)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94184, "end_char": 94200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "British India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 94302, "end_char": 94315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "remitted to British India."}}, {"text": "Venkatarama appellant", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 94396, "end_char": 94417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That was not disputed by Madras the Department, but they contended that as the Venkatarama appellant sold in the States goods manufactured by it Ayyar J. in British India, the governing provisions were sections 42(1) and 42(3), and that under these provisions, the appellant was liable to be taxed on such portions of the profits as were apportionable to the manufacture of the goods in British India.", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama appellant"}}, {"text": "sections 42(1) and 42(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94519, "end_char": 94543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94835, "end_char": 94848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 42(1) and 42(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94891, "end_char": 94915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14(2)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94967, "end_char": 94983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 42(1) and 42(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95231, "end_char": 95255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95759, "end_char": 95769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 42(1) and 42(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95851, "end_char": 95875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPREME CQURT REPORTS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 96098, "end_char": 96119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) [1949) I.T.R. 355\n\nSUPREME CQURT REPORTS [1956]\n\n1956 course of the argument, and the appellant did not even ask for this question being referred."}}, {"text": "section 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96778, "end_char": 96791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "NIRANJAN SINGH", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 96871, "end_char": 96885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "October 3\n\nNIRANJAN SINGH\n\nTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH\n\n(and connected appeal)\n\n[BHAGWATI, JAFER IMAM, S. K. DAS and\n\nGOVINDA MENON JJ.)"}}, {"text": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 96891, "end_char": 96913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "October 3\n\nNIRANJAN SINGH\n\nTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH\n\n(and connected appeal)\n\n[BHAGWATI, JAFER IMAM, S. K. DAS and\n\nGOVINDA MENON JJ.)"}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96940, "end_char": 96948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "October 3\n\nNIRANJAN SINGH\n\nTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH\n\n(and connected appeal)\n\n[BHAGWATI, JAFER IMAM, S. K. DAS and\n\nGOVINDA MENON JJ.)"}}, {"text": "S. K. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96962, "end_char": 96971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "October 3\n\nNIRANJAN SINGH\n\nTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH\n\n(and connected appeal)\n\n[BHAGWATI, JAFER IMAM, S. K. DAS and\n\nGOVINDA MENON JJ.)", "canonical_name": "P.\n\nR. Das"}}, {"text": "GOVINDA MENON", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96977, "end_char": 96990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "October 3\n\nNIRANJAN SINGH\n\nTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH\n\n(and connected appeal)\n\n[BHAGWATI, JAFER IMAM, S. K. DAS and\n\nGOVINDA MENON JJ.)"}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 97068, "end_char": 97070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pradeah Polict Regulation", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 97202, "end_char": 97227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S.0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98229, "end_char": 98232, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1956_1_72_91_EN", "year": 1956, "text": "F_bmary 3\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nRAJA SRI SAILENDRA NARAYAN\n\nBHANJA DEO\n\nTHE STATE OF ORISSA.\n\n[1956]\n\n[S. R. DAS, C.J., BRAGWATI, JAGANNADHADAS,\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR and B. P. SINHA JJ.]\n\nEstates Abolition-'Estate', Meaning Qf-Estoppel by judgment -Test-Respondent, if can rely on grounds not specified in his State ment of Gase-Orissa Estates Abolition Act (Orissa Act I of 1962), ss. 2 (g), 8(1)-Supreme Court Rules, 0. XIX, r. 4.\n\nThe appellant sued the State of Orissa for a declaration that the Orissa Estates Abolition Act of 1951 was in its application to the Kanika. Ra.j, of which he wa.s the Raja. a.nd owner, invalid, un constitutional and ultra vires the State Legislature and for an in junction restraining the State of Orissa from taking any action under the Act. It was contended, inte>· alia, that no notification under s. 3(1) of the Act vesting the Kanika Raj in the State of Orissa could issue as the Raj was not an estate as defined by s. 2 (g) of the Act.\n\nThe contrary was asserted by the State of Orissa and its fur ther conten.tion was that the appellant was estopped by a compro mise decree between his predecessors-in-title on the one hand and the Secretary of State on the other from denying that the Raj was an estate as defined by the Act.\n\nHeld, that the Kanika Raj was an estate as defined by the Orissa Estates Abolition Act of 1951 and the appellant was estopped from denying it by the compromise decree.\n\nThat the real intention of the Act in defining 'estate' as it has done in s. 2(g) of the Act, was to include all lands, such as the ap pellant' s, which were e.s a. matter of fact included in the register prepared under the Bengal Land Registration Act of 1876, and in con struing the definition it is wholly unnecessary to consider whether such inclusion was valid or proper or in conformity with the mean~ ~- ing of an estate under that Act.\n\nThat a judgment by consent is as effective in creating an estop~ pol between the parties as a judgment on contest and the test is who .ther the judgment in the previous case could have been passed with\n\nout the determination of the question which is put in issue in the subsequent case where the plea of estoppal is raised.\n\nHeld further, that there is no role corresponding to Rule 4 of Order XIX of the Supreme Court Rules imposing a similar disability on the respondent, and even with regard to the appellant the court may in appropriate ca.sas, give him leave to raise a ground not specified in the Statement of the Case filed by him.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 122of1954.\n\nRaja Sri Sailendra Appeal under section 109(b) read with section Narayan Bhanja 110, C.P.C. from the judgment and order dated the Doo 28th September 1953 of the Orissa High Court in The stat;~! OriSSP O.S. No. 1 of 1953.\n\nP. R. Das and Bakshi Tek Chand, with M.\n\nMohanti and S. P. Varma, for the appellant.\n\nM. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India. B.\n\nMohapatra, Advocate-General of Orissa with S. Mohanti and P. G. Gokhale, for the respondent.\n\n1956. February 3. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAS C.J.-This is an appeal from the judgment and decree passed on the 28th September, 1953, by a Bench of the Orissa High Court in an Original Suit which was filed on the 24th November, 1952, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Cuttack and was on the 17th January, 1953, transferred to the High Court and marked as Original Suit No. 1 of 1953.\n\nThe suit was filed by the plaintiff-appellant claiming as the Raja and owner of the Rajgee, known as the Kanika Raj, against the State of Orissa, praying for a declaration that the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as \"the Abolition Act\") was, in its application to the Rajgee of Kanika, invalid, unconstitutional and ultra vires the State Legis- \"' lature and for an injunction restraining the State of Orissa from taking any action under the said Act.\n\nThe suit was instituted evidently under an apprehension that the State of Orissa might issue a notification under section 3(1) of the Abolition Act declaring that the Rajgee of Kanika had passed to and become vested in the State free from all encumbrances. The High Court dismissed the suit hut gave a certificate of fitness for appeal to this court. Hence the present appeal by the plaintiff.\n\nThe plaintiff's contention before us is that no notification under section 3(1) of the Abolition Act\n\n7956 .can issue because (1) his land is not an \"estate\" as . -. -. defined in section 2(g) of the Act, and (2) the plain- Ra1a Sri Sa1lendra t\"ff t w t d\" ' h h f Nara:; anBhanja I IS no an m erme 1ary wit m t e meanmg o Dco section 2(h) thereof. In answer to this, the Attorneyv.\n\nGeneral, appearing on behalf of the State, makes five The State of Orissa submissions, viz.,\n\nDas C.J.\n\n(a) that on the admitted facts the plaintiff's land is an \"estate\" within the meaning of the Abolition Act;\n\n(b) that the plaintiff is estopped by the compromise decree passed by the Patna High Court on 2nd May 1945 in F.A. No. 15 of 1941 from contending that his land is not an \"estate\" within the meaning of the Abolition Act;\n\n(c) that the plaintiff's land has been held as an \"estate\" ever since 1803;\n\n(d) that whatever may have been the position before 1805, the plaintiff's land became an \"estate\" by Regulation XII of 1805; and\n\n(e) that in any event, the plaintiff's land became an \"estate\" after 1805 by subsequent acts and conduct of the plaintiff and his predecessors in title.\n\nRe. (a):-Under section 3(1) of the Abolition Act, the State Government can declare that a specified \"estate\" has passed to and has become vested in the State. It is, therefore, clear that the State Government cannot make amy notification with respect to land which is not an \"estate\". \"Estate\" is defined in section 2(g) of the Abolition Act. The material portion of that definition, as it stood at the date of the institution of the suit, was as follows:-\n\n\" 'estate' means any land held by an intermediary and included under one entry in any of the general registers of revenue-paying lands and revenue, free lands, prepared and maintained under the law for the time being in force by the Collector of a district, ........................ \" In order to be an \"estate\", the land must be held by an \"intermediary\" and must be included under one en try in any of the general registers of revenue-paying lands and revenue-free lands and such general registers must be prepared and maintained under the\n\nI \\\n\nlaw for the time being in force.\n\nSection 2(h), as it 1956. stood then, by its earlier part, defined an \"interme- R . s;.--s zendra d• \" • h \" t t \" t a1a ' a• iary , wit re1erence to any es a e , o mean, Narayan Bhanja amongst other things, a proprietor. The plaintiff Deo certainly claims to be the proprietor of his land. v. .\n\nTherefore if his land is an \"estate\" he is clearly an The State ofOrissa ' ' \"intermediary\". The case of Biswambhar Singh v. - The State of Orissa and Others(1), which has been relied Das C.J. on by learned counsel for the plaintiff has no application to the present case, for that case was concerned not with the earlier but with the latter part of the definition of \"intermediary\". That the plaintiff's land is included under one entry in the general register of revenue paying lands is not disputed. What is contended for is that in order to make such land an \"estate\" the register must be prepared and maintained under the law for the time being in force.\n\nThere is no dispute that \"the law for the time being, in force\" means the Bengal Land Registration Act (Bengal Act VII of 1876). The plaintiff contends that the register in which his land is included under one entry was not prepared or maintained under the Bengal Land Registration Act. The argument is that it is not only necessary to show that the land is included under one entry in a register but that it is also necessary to show that the register where the entry appears was prepared and maintained under the law. Under the Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876, land can be included in the register prepared and maintained under that Act only if such land is an \"estate\" as defined in that Act. The relevant part of that definition i.s:-\n\n\"3(2) 'estate' includes:- ( a) any land subject to the payment of landrevenue, either immediately or prospectively, for the discharge of which a separate engagement has been entered into with Government;\n\n(b) ....................................................... .\n\n(c) ............................................................ \" It is urged, therefore, that the preparation of a register unrler that Act means the making of entries in that\n\n(1) [1954J s.c.R. s42,\n\n1956 register of lands which are subject to the payment of - land revenue for the discharge of which a separate Raja Sri Sailcndra h b d .\n\nL . .\n\nNarayan Bhanja enggement as een entere mto. and which is not Deo subject to payment of land revenue and for the disv. charge of which a separate engagement has not been The State o/Orissa entered into is not an \"estate\" and cannot be entered\n\nDas C.J. in the register prepared and maintained under the Bengal Land Registration Act. That Act confers powers on the Collector to prepare the register in the manner specified therein and such statutory power; in order to have effect, must be exercised in strict compliance with the provisions of that Act.\n\nThe plaintiff maintains that the Rajgee of Kanika was never subject to payment of land revenue for the discharge of which a separate engagement had been entered into by him or his predecessors-intitle.\n\nThat the ancestors of the plaintiff were at one time independent chiefs and that the Rajgee or Killa of Kanika was in ancient time an independent State are conceded.\n\nLater on, the Rajas of Kanika owed nominal allegiance to the Mahrattas. Then came the last Mahratta War and the plains of Orissa were conquered by the East India Company.\n\nOn 22nd November, 1803, there was an \"Engagement\" between the East India Company and Raja Balabhadra Bhanja Deo, the then Raja of Killa Kanika.\n\nThe East India Company on the same day granted a Kaool-Namah to the Raja. Under the Engagement the Raja agreed, amongst other things, to pay, as annual Peshkush or tribute, 84,840 Kahuns ofCowrees, amounting to Rs. 20,407-12-11. This Engagement was confirmed by clause 10 of the Treaty of Peace concluded on the 17th December, 1803, at Deogan between the East India Company and the Mahrat.tas which treaty was later on ratified by the Governor- General in 1804. On the 5th September, 1805, was passed the Bengal Regulation XII of 1805. Sections 33 to 37 which are material for our present purpose were as follows:-\n\n\"XXXIII.-The Commissioners having granted sanads to certain zamindars, entitling them to hold\n\ntheir estates at a fixed jama in perpetuity, those 1956. sanads are hereby confirmed. The following is the R . -. - . . f h . d h h\" aJa Sri.Sailen .. ra hat of the names o t e zamm ars to w om t is pro- Nara:1\"n Bhanja vision is to be considered applicable: Deo Zamindar of Killah Darpan, v.\n\nZamindar of Killah Sookindah, The State of Orissa Zamindar of Killah Muddoopore.\n\nXXXIV.-The Commissioners having likewise granted a sanad to Futtah Mohmed, jaghirdar of Malood, entitling him and his heirs for ever, in consideration of certain services performed towards the British Government, to hold his lands exempt from assessment, such sanad is hereby confirmed.\n\nXXXV. First.-The late Board of Commissioners having concluded a settlement of the land revenue with certain zamindars, whose estates are situated chiefly in the hills and jungles, for the payment of a fixed annual quit-rent in perpetuity, those engagements are hereby confirmed; and no alteration shall, at any time, be made in the amount of the revenue payable under the engagements in question to Government.\n\nSecond.-The following is a list of the mehals to which the provision in the preceding Clause is applicable: Killah Aull, : Killah Humishpore, Killah Cojang, : Killah Miritchpore, Killah Puttra, : Killah Bishenpore.\n\nThird.-The zamindaries of Cordah and Cunka being mehals of the description of those specified in the preceding Clause, a settlement shall be concluded, as soon as circumstances may admit, for the revenue of those mehals on the principle on which a settlement has been concluded with the zamindars of the mehals specified in the preceding Clause.\n\nXXXVL-All Regulations relating directly or indirectly to the settlement and collection of the public revenue, or to the conduct of the officers employed in the performance of that duty, whether European or native, in the province of Bengal, which are not superseded by the foregoing rules, are hereby extended to, and declared to be in force in the zillah\n\n])as c.J.\n\n1956 of Cuttack. Provided, however, that nothing herein\n\nR . 5 contained shall be construedto authorize the division a7a rl Sailedra f th 1 d d t t th \"JI h f Nara an Bhan a o e an s comprise m any es a es in e z1 a o Y Deo 1 Cuttack, in which the succession to the entire estate v. devolves according to established usage to a single TheStateofOrissa heir: in cases of this nature, the Courts of Justice\n\nDas C.J. are to be guided by the provisions contained in Regulation X, 1800. Provided, also, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to imply, that any part of the said Regulations are for the present to be considered to be in force in certain jungle or hill zamindarries occupied by a rude and uncivilized race of people with the proprietors of which estates engagements were formed by the late Board of Commissioners for the payment of a certain fixed quit rent or tribute to Government.\n\nThe following is the list of the names of the mehals to which this exemption from the operation of the general Regulations is to be considered applicable.\n\nKill ah N eelgerry, : Kill ah Toalcherry,\n\nKillah Bankey, : Killah Attgurh,\n\nKillah J oormoo, : Killah Kunjur,\n\n: Killah Ram pore, : Killah Hin dole, : Killah\n\nKillah Nirsing- Teegereah, : Killah Kindeapara,: Killah pore, Killah Augole, : Killah N eahgurh, Burrumboh, : Killah Deckenaul.\n\nXXXVII. The foregoing exemption from the operation of the general Regulations shall likewise, for the present, be considered to be applicable to the lands known by the appellation of the territory of Mohurbunge; but it shall be the duty of the Collector of the zillah to conclude a settlement with the proprietor of the estate for the payment of a fixed annual quit-rent, on the principles on which a settlement has been concluded with the other hill or jungle zamindars specified in the preceding section\".\n\nIt is claimed that there was at no subsequent time any such revenue settlement as was contemplated by\n\nsection XXXV(3) and that there was no separate 1956 engagement for payment of any land revenue at any . -. - . time thereafter. The conclusion sought to be drawn ~Ja ~~:';;!\"::;: in the circumstances is that as Killa Kanika was not ara Deo subject to payment of land revenue, for the discharge v. of which a separate engagement had been entered The State of Orissa into, it was not an \"estate\" as defined in Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876, and that that being the position, it could not have been validly entered in the register prepared and maintained under the Bengal Land . Registration Act. The action of the Collector in entering Killa Kanika as a revenue-paying estate was wholly ultra vires and in the eye of the law such an entry is a nullity and does not exist. It follows, therefore, that Killa Kanika cannot be regarded as an \"estate\" within the meaning of the Abolition Act because the general register in which it is included cannot be said to have been validly prepared and maintained under the law for the time being in force.\n\nSection 4 of the Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876, directs the Collector of every district to prepare and keep up the four kinds of registers therein mentioned. Section 7 lays down that in Part I of the general register of revenue-paying lands should be entered the name of every estate which is borne on the revenue-roll of the district and certain other particulars relating to every such estate as therein specified. Therefore, if the name of Killa Kanika was borne on the revenue-roll of the district, the Collector would be bound to enter the same in Part I of the general register prepared and kept up by him under section 4.\n\nSection 20 of the Act provides that until the registers by that Act directed to be prepared were so prepared the existing registers then kept up in the office of every Collector should be deemed to be the registers kept up under the Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876. Prior to 1876, land registers used to be maintained under the Bengal Regulation XLVIII of 1793 as amended by Bengal Regulation VII of 1800.\n\nExisting registers mentioned in section 20 of the Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876, clearly refer to registers kept under those Regulations and the learned\n\nDas C.J.\n\n1956 Attorney-General contends that section 20 gives a\n\nR . 8 -. -. statutory validity to the registers kept under those a1a \"SatlendraR\n\nI M p RD f h J Narayan Bhanja egu atlons. r. . . as appearmg or t e appe - Deo !ant submits that his arguments apply with equal v. force to the registers kept under the old Regulations The State of Orissa referred to above. According to him, if the Collector\n\nDas C.J. entered lands which were not \"estate\" as defined in the old Regulations, he did not exercise his statutory powers and the entry made by him was a nullity and if any of the existing registers was void as regards a particular entry, then that entry did not exist and could not be transferred to the new register and if it was transferred, such transfer was a nullity and the new register, qua that entry, was void and could not be said to have been prepared and maintained under law.\n\nWe are unable to accept the line of reasoning developed by Mr. P. R. Das.\n\nTo accede to his contention would be to add words to section 2(g) of the Abolition Act so as to make it applicable to lands which were \"validly\" included under one entry in any of the general registers \"properly\" prepared and maintained under the law for the time being in force, that is to say, the Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876.\n\nThis the court has no power to do. If section 2(g) defined \"estate\" as including lands mentioned in the schedule to the Act, then whatever was included in the 3chedule would be an \"estate\" within the meaning of the Abolition Act, irrespective of whether such land was or was not an \"estate\" within the meaning of any other Act.\n\nThe same reasoning applies when the definition includes lands entered in -the general registers prepared and maintained under the Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876. Here the reference to the register prepared or kept under the law for the time being in force was meant only to identify the particular register in which the particular land was included under one entry. Suppose that a register prepared and maintained under the Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876, included lands which were \"estates\" within the meaning of the Land Registration Act and also lands which were not\n\n\"estates\" within the meaning of that Act. Suppose 1956 further that the Orissa Legislature by the Abolition . -. - . 4 A . d d • l' d 11 h l d l .\n\nRaia Sn SadeH ,. •. . ct mten e. to me u. e a t se an s, proper Y or Nara; yan Bhan/a improperly included m the register, what language Deo would they then have used? Precisely the language v. they have used in section 2(g) of the Abolition Act, The State ofOritis• namely, that an \"estate\" means any land included in\n\nD-~J the general registers prepared and maintained under as • the law for the time being in, force. In other words, the definition covers lands which are factually included in the particular register referred to. Whether they are \"estates\" within the meaning of the Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876, and whether they were validly or properly entered according to the provisions of that Act, appears to us to be wholly irrelevant for the purpose of construing section 3(g) of the Abolition Act. In our opinion, the contention of the State of Orissa on this point must be accepted.\n\nRe. (b):-Mr. P.R. Das appearing for the appellant objects to the plea of estoppel being raised, because it has not been included in the Statement of Case filed in the present appeal by the respondent. Order XVIII of the Rules of this Court deals with the lodging of cases. Under Rule 1 no party to an appeal is entitled to be heard by the court unless he has previously lodged his case in the appeal. Rule 3 lays down how the case is to be vrepared and what its contents should be. Order XIX, Rule 4 provides that the appellant shall not, without the leave of the Court, rely at the hearing on any grounds not speci fied in the Statement of-Case filed by him. The Privy\n\nCouncil Practice founded on Shea Singh Rai v. Mu88U mut Dakho and Moorari Lall(1) and set forth in Bentwich 3rd edition Ruling 63 at page 181 is to the same effect. There is no rule imposing corresponding disability on the respondent. Further even with regard to the appellant the Court may, in appropriate cases, give him leave to raise a ground not specified in the Statement of Case. In tlie present case there is no question of surprise, for the plea of estoppal was pointedly raised and made the subject matter of an\n\n(1) [1878] L.R. 5 I.A. 87. 11\n\n1956 issue before the High Court and was elaborately dealt\n\nR . 5 -:-- 5 . d with bv the High Court in its Judgment under ap- , a1a ri atlen ra l •I h . d . .\n\nNar\"\"\"\" Bl Judge stated as . fe!lows:-\n\n\"Now taking these two documents together, it is difficult to read in them that any grant was made either expressly ormpliedly by the.sovereign authority in favour of the holder of the Killa.\n\nThe main provisions are that the revenue was fixed for ever, and that the holder was asked to be loyal to the Company's Government. Thus initially, I have been unable to associate any idea of grant as to be flowing from these engagements. All that can be sairl, and perhaps the learned counsel for the plaintiff maintains to that effect, is that what rights the holder of the Killa had, in reference to the Killa, were fully and without any limitation or restrictioQ, recognised.\n\nIt is, therefore, that the question will now be set at large for a discussion as to what rights the proprietor of the Killa had at the time when these engagements were made,,. • It is needless to extract further passages from the judgment.\n\nIn the result the learned Subordinate Judge answered the issues against the plaintiff and dismissed the suit.\n\nThe plaintiff appealed to the Patna High Court.\n\nA compromise was arrived at between the parties, which was filed in court and the appeal was disposed of in accordance with the terms of the compromise petition'.\n\nThe principal terms of the compromise petition were as follows:-\n\n\"l. That it shall be declared that the Crown 1956 and for the matter of that, the Province of Orissa, R . 5 -:--- 5 .1 a h .. 1 h d\" d . b d a1a ri at en ra the defendant hast e tit e tot e ispute river e s, Narayn Bhanja as described in the schedule of the plaint, and the Deo plaintiff-appellant acknowledges the same. v. .\n\n2. That the plaintiff-appellant, that is the Pro- The State o/Orissa Prietor of the Kanika Estate is the ri.ghtful owner of -. d h\n\n~ d h Das C.J. the fisheries of the sai rivers and t e deJ.en ant as not nor will have any objection to his unobstructed exclusive permanent enjoyment of the fishery rights in th¢ said rivers at any time whatsoever.\n\nThe respondents shall not claim nor the appellant shall be liable to any assessment on that ground, other than what is payable in respect of the permanently settled estate of Killa.\n\n3. That subject to such rights as the Crown or in other words, the Province of Orissa has in the beds of the rivers aforesaid and in the channel of waters flowing thereon, the Proprietor of Kanika Estate that is the plaintiff-appellant will have his rights to the ferries over the said rivers which he has been so far enjoying and except when such ferry rights interfere with the Crown's right in the bed of the rivers and similar rights in the waters on the channel of the rivers for the purpose of navigation and things of the kind, the Province of Orissa will not interfere with nor raise any objection to the plaintiff's enjoyment of such rights or ferry through the length and breadth of the aforesaid rivers.\n\n4. That such Chars, islands or other accretions formed in the said rivers as have been shown in the Civil Court Commissioner's map prepared in this suit and now forming a part of the court's record shall be deemed as part and parcel of the permanently settled estate of Kanika and the defendant will not be entitled to any further assessment in respect thereof.\n\n5. 'That all future riparian accretions or Chars formed adjoining the banks of the rivers in dispute shall also be always deemed to be part and parcel of the said permanently settled Zamindary of Kanika and shall be so possessed by him without any further payment on assessment of land revenue over and\n\nl9S6 above the land revenue that h~~ been permanently.\n\nRaja Sri Sailendra fixed. .\n\nNarayan Bhanja\n\n6. That all other islands or Chars that may be Deo formed subsequent hereto in the midst of the rier\n\nT. • being cut off from the banks thereof by waters that The Stak 01 Omsa are tidal, unfordable and navigable in all seasons of the year shall belong to the defendant and the plain- Das c.J. tiff or his successor-in-interest will have a right to possess and take settlement of the same from the defendant and the latter will have the right to levy assessment of land revenue thereon according to the principles and provisions of law as laid down in Regulation II of 1819 and this assessment will be of force from the time when the islands or Chars will appear and be capable of enjoyment irrespective of the fact whether estate holder does really enjoy it or not\". The declaration of the title of the State to the disputed river beds was a clear acknowledgment by the plaintiff of the State's sovereign rights, which necessarily negatived the sovereign rights which he asserted and claimed for himself. The declaration that the plaintiff, as the proprietor of the Kanika estate, was. the rightful owner of fisheries in the said rivers and that the defendant would not claim any assessment on that ground was nothing hut a recognition of he plaintiff's title a:s the holder of a permanently settled estate.\n\nThe same observations apply to clause (3) whereby the plaintiff was declared to have the ferry rights over the said rivers,. which were expressly made subject to the rights of the State in the beds of the rivers. The provision that all future riparian accretions or Chars formed adjoining the banks of the rivers would always be deemed part of the permanently settled Zemindari of Kanika and should be possessed by him without further payment of assessment of land revenue over and above the land revenue that had been permanently fixed clearly acknowledges that the plaintiff accepted the position that he had no rights other than what he had as the holder of a permanently settled estate liable to the payment of land revenue, in contradistinction to\n\ntribute fixed in perpetuity. The provisions of clause 1956\n\n(6) of the terms of settlement also point to the same R . 8 . 8 .1 4 • aJa n ai en ra conclus10n.\n\nNarayan Bhanja .Mr. P. R. Das contends that the issue in the pre- Deo sent case is whether the land held by the plaintiff is v. an \"estate\" within the meaning of the Bengal Land The State of Orissa Registration Act, 1876, whereas the issue in the earlier case was whether the plaintiff's predecessors had title to the river beds by express or implied grant from the Crown. This does not appear to us to be a fair reading of the pleadings as a whole. The plaint in the earlier suit summarised above and the passages culled from the judgment of the trial court clearly indicate that the parties went to trial on the definite and well understood issue that the plaintiff's claim to the river beds was founded on his anterior title as an independent Ruling Chief of Killa Kanika and that that title had been confirmed by the Engagement and Kaoolnama of 1803, which were, in a loose way, construed as a grant of the river beds, express or implied, by the East India Company. What the parties understood by the issues on which they went to trial is clearly illustrated by the passages quoted from the judgment. The fact that the claim in the earlier suit related only to a part of the land, namely the river beds, whereas the present case is that the entire land held by the plaintiff is not an \"estate\" makes no difference, for the real issue between the parties in the earlier suit was, as it is in the present suit, only concerning his status and the rights fl.owing therefrom.\n\nTo hold in this suit that the plaintiff is not the holder of an estate subject to payment of land revenue for the discharge of which a separate engage~ ment has been entered into, will be to permit the plaintiff to set up a sovereign status for himself, which he actually did in the earlier case but failed to establish in the trial court and which he, by the\n\ncompromise~ exptessly abandoned in the appeal court.\n\nIn our judgment the compromise decree precludes the plaintiff from re-asserting the title, which had been negatived by the compromise decree although it related only to his claim to a part of the lands, namely\n\nDas C.J.\n\n1956 the beds of the rivers therein mentioned.\n\nR • ss .1 d The compromise decree is also sought to be pleaded a1a \" ai en ra b th St t h 1 ' 'ff 1 b Narayan Bhanfa Y e a e agamst t e p amt! as estoppe y Deo representation. It is said, that even if the comprov. mise had not the imprimatur of the court, it would, The State o/Orissa nevertheless, be representation that the plaintiff's\n\n- 1 predecessor was the Zeminda'r of a permanently Das c. settled estate. The compromise consisted of reciprocal concessions, those made by one party being the consideration for those made by the other. It was on the basis of the concelilsion made by the plaintiff's predecessor, namely, that he was a Zemindar of a permanently settled estate, that the State gave up the benefit of the decree which had been passed in its favour by the trial court and also the right to levy assessment on the accretions of future Chars.\n\nOne of the main considerations for the compromise was the clear admission on the part of the plaintiff in that case that his status in respect of Killa Kanika was nothing more than that of a proprietor of a permanently settled estate liable to pay land revenue. The High Court decided the issue of estoppel against the State on two considerations, namely, (I) that the status of the owner of Killa Kanika was not directly and substantially in issuein the earlier litigation and\n\n(2) that there was no clear evidence led on the side of the State to establish that the admission by the plaintiff in that case of his status was the main consideration for the compromise. We are satisfied that the High Court was in err():r on both these points. As already pointed out, the pleadings summarised above and the passages in the judgments quoted above clearly indicate that the status of the plaintiff was the foundation of his claim to the river beds and was consequently directly and substantially in issue in that litigation and was understood to be so by the\n\nprties themselves. On the second ground the terms of the compromise speak for themselves. It is quite clear that the concessions made by one party were the consideration for those made by the other party and, therefore, it was not necessary to adduce any further evidence, assuming that any evidence was\n\nadmissible for the purpose.\n\nIn our judgment, the 1956 finding of the High Court on this issue was clearly Rafa Sri Silendra erroneous.\n\nNarayan Bhanja Each of the conclusions we have arrived at on the D•o first two points is quite sufficient, by itself, to enable v. . us to dispose of this appeal and it is not necessary for Th• Slate 01 Oms\"\n\nus to deal with or express any opinion on the other - Th 1 h Das C.J. three points canvassed before us. e resu t, t erefore, is that this appeal should be dismissed with costs and we order accordingly.\n\nMESSRS PRATAP~AL LUXMICHAND v.\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADHYA\n\nPRADESH. [S. R. DAs, C. J., BHAGWATI and VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR JJ.]\n\nRegistration of firm-Deed of partnership and application for registration not signed bu all partners-Refusal to register by the In come-tax Officer-Powers of the Appellate Assistant Oommissione1- I ndian Income-tax Act (XI of 1922), 1. 26-A-Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922, rule 2.\n\nThe appellant (a firm) consisted of seven partners and a deed of partnership was executed by all the partners except one who happened to be in Jail being a security prisoner under the Defence of India Rules.\n\nAn application for registration of the firm under s. 26-A of the India.n Income-tax Act was made before the Incometa.x Officer, who, however, rejected it on the ground that the deed of partnership and the application for registration were not signed by all the partners. On appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner cancelled the order of the Income-tax Officer and directed him to register the firm after obtaining the signature of the partner who had not signed before, both on the application for registration and the deed of partnership.\n\nHeld, that under Rule 2(c) of the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922, £re.med under s. 26 A(2) of the Indian Incometax Act, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had only the power to direct registration of the firm if an application duly signed by all the partners had been presented to him before the assessment was confirmed, reduced, enhanced or a.nnulled and tha.t he wa.s not legally\n\nFebruary 8", "total_entities": 120, "entities": [{"text": "RAJA SRI SAILENDRA NARAYAN\n\nBHANJA DEO", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 72, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAJA SRI SAILENDRA NARAYAN BHANJA DEO", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 105, "end_char": 120, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. R. DAS, C.J.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 132, "end_char": 145, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B. JAGANNADHADAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 170, "end_char": 185, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "State ment of Gase-Orissa Estates Abolition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 310, "end_char": 357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 382, "end_char": 387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Orissa Act I of 1962", "statute": "Orissa Act I of 1962"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 398, "end_char": 417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Orissa", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 457, "end_char": 472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant sued the State of Orissa for a declaration that the Orissa Estates Abolition Act of 1951 was in its application to the Kanika."}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 836, "end_char": 843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Supreme Court Rules", "statute": "Supreme Court Rules"}}, {"text": "Orissa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 894, "end_char": 900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended, inte>· alia, that no notification under s. 3(1) of the Act vesting the Kanika Raj in the State of Orissa could issue as the Raj was not an estate as defined by s. 2 (g) of the Act."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 956, "end_char": 960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Supreme Court Rules", "statute": "Supreme Court Rules"}}, {"text": "by the State of Orissa", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1004, "end_char": 1026, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF ORISSA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1513, "end_char": 1520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1675, "end_char": 1691, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Order XIX of the Supreme Court Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2272, "end_char": 2308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Raja Sri Sailendra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2583, "end_char": 2601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Sri Sailendra Appeal under section 109(b) read with section Narayan Bhanja 110, C.P.C. from the judgment and order dated the Doo 28th September 1953 of the Orissa High Court in The stat;~!", "canonical_name": "Raja Sri Sailendra"}}, {"text": "section 109(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2615, "end_char": 2629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Order XIX of the Supreme Court Rules", "statute": "Order XIX of the Supreme Court Rules"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2668, "end_char": 2673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Orissa High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2744, "end_char": 2761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Sri Sailendra Appeal under section 109(b) read with section Narayan Bhanja 110, C.P.C. from the judgment and order dated the Doo 28th September 1953 of the Orissa High Court in The stat;~!"}}, {"text": "P. R. Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2805, "end_char": 2814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Das and Bakshi Tek Chand, with M.\n\nMohanti and S. P. Varma, for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "S. R. DAS, C.J."}}, {"text": "Bakshi Tek Chand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2819, "end_char": 2835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Das and Bakshi Tek Chand, with M.\n\nMohanti and S. P. Varma, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "M.\n\nMohanti", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2842, "end_char": 2853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Das and Bakshi Tek Chand, with M.\n\nMohanti and S. P. Varma, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. P. Varma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2858, "end_char": 2869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. R. Das and Bakshi Tek Chand, with M.\n\nMohanti and S. P. Varma, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "0. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2894, "end_char": 2905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. 0."}}, {"text": "B.\n\nMohapatra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2934, "end_char": 2947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B.\n\nMohapatra, Advocate-General of Orissa with S. Mohanti and P. G. Gokhale, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. Mohanti", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2981, "end_char": 2991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B.\n\nMohapatra, Advocate-General of Orissa with S. Mohanti and P. G. Gokhale, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2996, "end_char": 3009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B.\n\nMohapatra, Advocate-General of Orissa with S. Mohanti and P. G. Gokhale, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "DAS C.J.-This", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3094, "end_char": 3107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAS C.J.-This is an appeal from the judgment and decree passed on the 28th September, 1953, by a Bench of the Orissa High Court in an Original Suit which was filed on the 24th November, 1952, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Cuttack and was on the 17th January, 1953, transferred to the High Court and marked as Original Suit No.", "canonical_name": "DAS C.J.-This"}}, {"text": "Subordinate Judge of Cuttack", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3306, "end_char": 3334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAS C.J.-This is an appeal from the judgment and decree passed on the 28th September, 1953, by a Bench of the Orissa High Court in an Original Suit which was filed on the 24th November, 1952, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Cuttack and was on the 17th January, 1953, transferred to the High Court and marked as Original Suit No."}}, {"text": "17th January, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3350, "end_char": 3368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAS C.J.-This is an appeal from the judgment and decree passed on the 28th September, 1953, by a Bench of the Orissa High Court in an Original Suit which was filed on the 24th November, 1952, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Cuttack and was on the 17th January, 1953, transferred to the High Court and marked as Original Suit No."}}, {"text": "State of Orissa", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3573, "end_char": 3588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was filed by the plaintiff-appellant claiming as the Raja and owner of the Rajgee, known as the Kanika Raj, against the State of Orissa, praying for a declaration that the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as \"the Abolition Act\") was, in its application to the Rajgee of Kanika, invalid, unconstitutional and ultra vires the State Legis- \"' lature and for an injunction restraining the State of Orissa from taking any action under the said Act."}}, {"text": "Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3625, "end_char": 3659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4039, "end_char": 4051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951", "statute": "the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4387, "end_char": 4399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951", "statute": "the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Abolition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4407, "end_char": 4420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4500, "end_char": 4512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Abolition Act\n\n7956", "statute": "the Abolition Act\n\n7956"}}, {"text": "section 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4647, "end_char": 4659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Abolition Act\n\n7956", "statute": "the Abolition Act\n\n7956"}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4991, "end_char": 5007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das C.J.\n\n(a) that on the admitted facts the plaintiff's land is an \"estate\" within the meaning of the Abolition Act;\n\n(b) that the plaintiff is estopped by the compromise decree passed by the Patna High Court on 2nd May 1945 in F.A. No."}}, {"text": "2nd May 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5011, "end_char": 5023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das C.J.\n\n(a) that on the admitted facts the plaintiff's land is an \"estate\" within the meaning of the Abolition Act;\n\n(b) that the plaintiff is estopped by the compromise decree passed by the Patna High Court on 2nd May 1945 in F.A. No."}}, {"text": "section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5514, "end_char": 5526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5807, "end_char": 5819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(h)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6539, "end_char": 6551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Narayan Bhanja", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6710, "end_char": 6724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s;.--s zendra d• \" • h \" t t \" t a1a ' a• iary , wit re1erence to any es a e , o mean, Narayan Bhanja amongst other things, a proprietor.", "canonical_name": "Narayan Bhanja"}}, {"text": "Deo", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6775, "end_char": 6778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff Deo certainly claims to be the proprietor of his land."}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7583, "end_char": 7599, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bengal Act VII of 1876", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7601, "end_char": 7623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7766, "end_char": 7782, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8027, "end_char": 8061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s42,\n\n1956", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8705, "end_char": 8715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Under the Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876", "statute": "Under the Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876"}}, {"text": "Sailcndra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8832, "end_char": 8841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. s42,\n\n1956 register of lands which are subject to the payment of - land revenue for the discharge of which a separate Raja Sri Sailcndra h b d ."}}, {"text": "Narayan Bhanja", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8858, "end_char": 8872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Narayan Bhanja enggement as een entere mto.", "canonical_name": "Narayan Bhanja"}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9172, "end_char": 9188, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Kanika", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9718, "end_char": 9724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That the ancestors of the plaintiff were at one time independent chiefs and that the Rajgee or Killa of Kanika was in ancient time an independent State are conceded."}}, {"text": "Mahrattas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9842, "end_char": 9851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Later on, the Rajas of Kanika owed nominal allegiance to the Mahrattas."}}, {"text": "East India Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9932, "end_char": 9950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Then came the last Mahratta War and the plains of Orissa were conquered by the East India Company."}}, {"text": "22nd November, 1803", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9956, "end_char": 9975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 22nd November, 1803, there was an \"Engagement\" between the East India Company and Raja Balabhadra Bhanja Deo, the then Raja of Killa Kanika."}}, {"text": "Raja Balabhadra Bhanja Deo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10038, "end_char": 10064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 22nd November, 1803, there was an \"Engagement\" between the East India Company and Raja Balabhadra Bhanja Deo, the then Raja of Killa Kanika."}}, {"text": "clause 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10360, "end_char": 10369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "17th December, 1803", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10410, "end_char": 10429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Engagement was confirmed by clause 10 of the Treaty of Peace concluded on the 17th December, 1803, at Deogan between the East India Company and the Mahrat.tas which treaty was later on ratified by the Governor- General in 1804."}}, {"text": "Deogan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10434, "end_char": 10440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Engagement was confirmed by clause 10 of the Treaty of Peace concluded on the 17th December, 1803, at Deogan between the East India Company and the Mahrat.tas which treaty was later on ratified by the Governor- General in 1804."}}, {"text": "5th September, 1805", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10567, "end_char": 10586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 5th September, 1805, was passed the Bengal Regulation XII of 1805."}}, {"text": "Sections 33 to 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10634, "end_char": 10651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sailen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10950, "end_char": 10956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sailen .. ra hat of the names o t e zamm ars to w om t is pro- Nara:1\"n Bhanja vision is to be considered applicable: Deo Zamindar of Killah Darpan, v.\n\nZamindar of Killah Sookindah, The State of Orissa Zamindar of Killah Muddoopore."}}, {"text": "Futtah Mohmed", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11245, "end_char": 11258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XXXIV.-The Commissioners having likewise granted a sanad to Futtah Mohmed, jaghirdar of Malood, entitling him and his heirs for ever, in consideration of certain services performed towards the British Government, to hold his lands exempt from assessment, such sanad is hereby confirmed."}}, {"text": "Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12681, "end_char": 12687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "XXXVL-All Regulations relating directly or indirectly to the settlement and collection of the public revenue, or to the conduct of the officers employed in the performance of that duty, whether European or native, in the province of Bengal, which are not superseded by the foregoing rules, are hereby extended to, and declared to be in force in the zillah\n\n])as c.J.\n\n1956 of Cuttack."}}, {"text": "Das C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13222, "end_char": 13230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 contained shall be construedto authorize the division a7a rl Sailedra f th 1 d d t t th \"JI h f Nara an Bhan a o e an s comprise m any es a es in e z1 a o Y Deo 1 Cuttack, in which the succession to the entire estate v. devolves according to established usage to a single TheStateofOrissa heir: in cases of this nature, the Courts of Justice\n\nDas C.J. are to be guided by the provisions contained in Regulation X, 1800.", "canonical_name": "DAS C.J.-This"}}, {"text": "Kill ah N eelgerry", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13878, "end_char": 13896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kill ah N eelgerry, : Kill ah Toalcherry,\n\nKillah Bankey, : Killah Attgurh,\n\nKillah J oormoo, : Killah Kunjur,\n\n: Killah Ram pore, : Killah Hin dole, : Killah\n\nKillah Nirsing- Teegereah, : Killah Kindeapara,: Killah pore, Killah Augole, : Killah N eahgurh, Burrumboh, : Killah Deckenaul."}}, {"text": "Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15187, "end_char": 15221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15360, "end_char": 15376, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Killa Kanika", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15418, "end_char": 15430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The action of the Collector in entering Killa Kanika as a revenue-paying estate was wholly ultra vires and in the eye of the law such an entry is a nullity and does not exist."}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15826, "end_char": 15835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876", "statute": "Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876"}}, {"text": "Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15843, "end_char": 15877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15989, "end_char": 15998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876", "statute": "the Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876"}}, {"text": "Killa Kanika", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16274, "end_char": 16286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, if the name of Killa Kanika was borne on the revenue-roll of the district, the Collector would be bound to enter the same in Part I of the general register prepared and kept up by him under section 4."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16449, "end_char": 16458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876", "statute": "the Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876"}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16461, "end_char": 16471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876", "statute": "the Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876"}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16706, "end_char": 16722, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16903, "end_char": 16913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16921, "end_char": 16955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17076, "end_char": 17086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876", "statute": "the Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876"}}, {"text": "P. R. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17993, "end_char": 18002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are unable to accept the line of reasoning developed by Mr. P. R. Das.", "canonical_name": "S. R. DAS, C.J."}}, {"text": "section 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18058, "end_char": 18070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18305, "end_char": 18339, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18380, "end_char": 18392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876", "statute": "the Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876"}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18813, "end_char": 18829, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Suppose that a register prepared and maintained under the Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19041, "end_char": 19133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19202, "end_char": 19218, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 2(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19609, "end_char": 19621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Suppose that a register prepared and maintained under the Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876", "statute": "Suppose that a register prepared and maintained under the Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876"}}, {"text": "Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19983, "end_char": 20017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 3(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20178, "end_char": 20190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876", "statute": "the Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876"}}, {"text": "P.R. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20313, "end_char": 20321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.R. Das appearing for the appellant objects to the plea of estoppel being raised, because it has not been included in the Statement of Case filed in the present appeal by the respondent.", "canonical_name": "S. R. DAS, C.J."}}, {"text": "Order XVIII of the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20501, "end_char": 20525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L.R. 5 I.A. 87", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 21505, "end_char": 21519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "2nd1May, 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21931, "end_char": 21944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "0' passed by the Patna High\nCourt on 2nd1May, 1945, in F. A. No."}}, {"text": "Vaughan Williams", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22349, "end_char": 22365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Upholding the judgment of Vaughan Williams, J., Lord Herschell said at page 50:- . ' \""}}, {"text": "Herschell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22376, "end_char": 22385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Upholding the judgment of Vaughan Williams, J., Lord Herschell said at page 50:- . ' \""}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23448, "end_char": 23453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same principle has been followed by the High Courts in India in a number of reported decisions."}}, {"text": "4th February, 1936", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25292, "end_char": 25310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the 4th February, 1936, the predecessor-in-title of the plaintiff brought 'a suit (O.S. No."}}, {"text": "Court of the Subo.rdinate Judge of Cut", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25398, "end_char": 25436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7 of l936) in the Court of the Subo.rdinate Judge of Cut tack against the Secretary of State for India in Council, praying for a declaration that the plaintiff had a good and indefeasible tit1e to the beds of certain rivers, by expressed or implied grant from the East India Comp, any, alternatively for a declaration that the plaintiff had acquired an indefeasible right and title to the beds of the said rivers by presciption or adverse possession and for permanent injunction against the defendant restraining him from interfering with the\n\n(1) [1911] I.L.R. 86 Bom."}}, {"text": "Narayan Bhan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26119, "end_char": 26131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suft was founded\n\nNarayan Bhan/a on, amongst others, the following allegations.", "canonical_name": "Narayan Bhanja"}}, {"text": "Kille. Kanika", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26653, "end_char": 26666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In para- Deo graphs 3 to 6 of the plaint were pleaded that the v. plaintiff's ancestors were the rulers of Killa Kanika The State 01 Orissa owing allegiance to the Hindu Gajapati Kings of\nOrissa and were absolute owners of all lands and Das C.J. waters within the ambit of their territories including the two rivers therein mentioned and that after the fall of the Hindu kingdom in Orissa, and during the Afghan, Moghal and Mahratha occupation of Orissa, the Rulers of Kille."}}, {"text": "Narayan B,,,", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30665, "end_char": 30677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "h h d f h Narayan B,,,.", "canonical_name": "Narayan Bhanja"}}, {"text": "Killa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33549, "end_char": 33554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents shall not claim nor the appellant shall be liable to any assessment on that ground, other than what is payable in respect of the permanently settled estate of Killa."}}, {"text": "Province of Orissa", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 33624, "end_char": 33642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That subject to such rights as the Crown or in other words, the Province of Orissa has in the beds of the rivers aforesaid and in the channel of waters flowing thereon, the Proprietor of Kanika Estate that is the plaintiff-appellant will have his rights to the ferries over the said rivers which he has been so far enjoying and except when such ferry rights interfere with the Crown's right in the bed of the rivers and similar rights in the waters on the channel of the rivers for the purpose of navigation and things of the kind, the Province of Orissa will not interfere with nor raise any objection to the plaintiff's enjoyment of such rights or ferry through the length and breadth of the aforesaid rivers."}}, {"text": "Kanika", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34543, "end_char": 34549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That such Chars, islands or other accretions formed in the said rivers as have been shown in the Civil Court Commissioner's map prepared in this suit and now forming a part of the court's record shall be deemed as part and parcel of the permanently settled estate of Kanika and the defendant will not be entitled to any further assessment in respect thereof."}}, {"text": "Raja Sri Sailendra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 34996, "end_char": 35014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Sri Sailendra fixed. .", "canonical_name": "Raja Sri Sailendra"}}, {"text": "clause 1956", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37151, "end_char": 37162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bengal Land The State of Orissa Registration Act, 1876", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37429, "end_char": 37483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Narayan Bhanfa", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 39525, "end_char": 39539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R • ss .1 d The compromise decree is also sought to be pleaded a1a \" ai en ra b th St t h 1 ' 'ff 1 b Narayan Bhanfa Y e a e agamst t e p amt!", "canonical_name": "Narayan Bhanja"}}, {"text": "Rafa Sri Silendra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41752, "end_char": 41769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In our judgment, the 1956 finding of the High Court on this issue was clearly Rafa Sri Silendra erroneous."}}, {"text": "S. R. DAs", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42272, "end_char": 42281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. R. DAs, C. J., BHAGWATI and VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR JJ.]", "canonical_name": "S. R. DAS, C.J."}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42290, "end_char": 42298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. R. DAs, C. J., BHAGWATI and VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR JJ.]"}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42303, "end_char": 42321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. R. DAs, C. J., BHAGWATI and VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42532, "end_char": 42546, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42569, "end_char": 42598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Jail being a security prisoner under the Defence of India Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42752, "end_char": 42815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42868, "end_char": 42873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jail being a security prisoner under the Defence of India Rules", "statute": "Jail being a security prisoner under the Defence of India Rules"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 42891, "end_char": 42905, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43398, "end_char": 43427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43443, "end_char": 43448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922"}}]} {"document_id": "1956_1_734_745_EN", "year": 1956, "text": "SUPREME CQURT REPORTS [1956]\n\n1956 course of the argument, and the appellant did not even ask for this question being referred. That apart, Meenokshi Mills, , . f h d C\n\n,/ J Madurai m view o t e ecision in ommisBioner oJ ncome-tax v.\n\nv. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai and Co.('), no purpose would Th• Commissioner be served by directing a reference of this question, o/ lncometa:r, and the Tribunal was right in observing that \"it is Madra• not even of academic interest to refer the said quesv ... katarama tion to the High Court\". On the question whether Ayyar J. the fixation of ratio was correct, we are of opinion that it is a pure question of fact, and is not open to reference under section 66(1).\n\nIn the result, the appeals fail, and are dismissed with costs. -\n\nOctober 3\n\nNIRANJAN SINGH\n\nTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH\n\n(and connected appeal)\n\n[BHAGWATI, JAFER IMAM, S. K. DAS and\n\nGOVINDA MENON JJ.)\n\nCriminal lrial-In,,.sligation of crime-Police Reg1tlations- Oase diaty-S1tbminion of t/r.t -case diar11 I<> superior officers da11 to da11-0ontra11ention of t/r.t rule-Whether it vitiates the trial-Utl<>r Pradeah Polict Regulation•, r. 109.\n\nRule 109 of the Uttar Pradesh Police Regulations dealing with the investigation of crimes enjoins upon the police officer when an investigation is closed for the dayto note the time and place at which it closed and also lays down that throughout the investi gation the diary must be sent daily to the Superintendent of Police on all days on which any proceedings are takep.\n\nThe question that bad to be decided by the court was as to whether the appellants took part in the dacoity and the case of the prosecution depended mainly on the identification of the appellants.\n\nIt was found that the investigating officer did not send the case diary daily to the Superintendent of Police but only all together at the end of the period of investigation. It was contended for the ap pellants that the case diary could not be relied upon ae it enabled the officer to make alteration• during the course of the period of investigation and that as there had been an infraction of r. 109 of\n\n(1) [1950) S.0 R. 886; [1950] I.T.R. 472.\n\nthe UUar Pradesh Police Regulations which had resulted in prejudice, the whole trial was vitiated thereby.\n\nHeld: (1) Rule 109 of the mtar Pradesh Police Regulations has no statutory foundation but is only an injunction by the executive Government to the police officers as to how they must regulate their work and conduct themselves during the course of investigation and\n\na failure to comply with the rule relating to the submision of the police diary cannot vitiate the trial.\n\nHafiz Mohammad Sani and others v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1931 Patna 150), approved.\n\nObservations in Tilkeshwar Singh and others v. Tht State of Bihar ([1955) 2 S.C.R. 1043), followed.\n\n(2) It could not be said in the absence of compelling reasons that because the investigating officer did not send the case diary to the superior officers every day the same is unworthy of credit particularly in view of the fact that the courts below have cast no doubt upon its genuinness.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeals Nos. 60 and 61 of 1956.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 4, 1955, of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 298 of 1955 and Referred No. 31 of 1955 with connected Criminal Appeals Nos. 299 and 307 of 1955 arising out of the judgment and order dated February 28, 1955, of the Court of Sessions Judge, Meerut in Criminal Sessions Trial No. 142of1954.\n\nJai Gopal Sethi, S. 0. Saran and G. 0. Mathur, for appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 60 of 1956.\n\nJ. N. Bannerji and P. 0. Agarwala, for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 61 of 1956.\n\nH.J. Umrigar and 0. P. Lal, for the respondents in both Appeals.\n\n1956. October 3. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGovINDA MENON J.-On September 6, 1955, this court granted the appellants herein, special leave to appeal under art. 136( I) of the Constitution from the judgment and order dated August 4, 1955, of the\n\nN ira11jan Sit1gh\n\nTiie State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nNiranjan SittgTi\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nGovinda Menon J.\n\nAllahabad High Court, in Criminal Appeal No. 298 of 1955 (Reference No. 31 of 1955) connected with Criminal Appeals Nos. 299 and 307of1955, limited tci the question whether the failure to comply with the rules relating to the submission of the police case diary, vitiates the entire trial and what the consequences of such failure are. It is in pursuance to the leave so granted, that Criminal Appeal No. 60 ofl956, has been preferred by accused Nos. 4, 7, 1, :t, 5& 2 (Niranjan Singh, Tikam Singh, Kharak Singh, Harpal Singh, Sardar Singh and Satpal Singh) respectively in Sessions Trial No. 142of1954, in the court of Session\n\nat Meerut and Criminal Appeal No. 61 of 1956, is preferred by accused No. 6 (Udaibir Singh) in the same Sessipns trial. Appellants 1 to 3 in Criminal Appeal No. 60 ofl956 (accused Nos. 4, 7 & I, Niranjan Singh, Tikam Singh and Kharak Singh) have been sentenced to the extreme penalty of the law and the remaining appellants in that appeal sentenced to imprisonment for life.\n\nThe appellant (accused No. 6) in Appeal No. 61 of 1956, has also been sentenced to death.\n\nOn the night between February 28, and March 1, 1954, a dacoity took place in the house of Atal Singh in the village of Akheypur in which about twenty dacoits took part and considerable property was looted and taken away by the dacoit.s. During the course of this incident four ruem be rs of the family of Atal Singh, including himself, were shot dead and another received gun-shot wounds as a result of which he died subsequently in the hospital. Four other members of the family received gun-shot wounds and incised wounds at the hands of the dacoits but they survived as a result of treatment. in the hospital.\n\nThe prosecution case was that among the dacoits who took part were the seven appellants in these two appeals, as well as two others; and of them accused No. I (Kharak Singh), accused No. 4 (NiranjanSingh), accused No. 6 (Udaibir Singh) and accused No. 7 (Tikam Singh) were armed with guns and as such were responsible for the shooting and murders. The two others, namely, Achhpal Singh and Deoki Saran alias\n\n1956 Beg Saran, who figured as accused Nos. 8 & 9 respectively in the court of Sessions, were acquitted by the h N iranjan Singh learned Sessions Judge, who, after an analysis of t e v. large volume of evidence, found that all the appellants The state of herein were guilty of an offence under s. 396 of the Uttar Pradesh Indian Penal Code and sentenced accused Nos. l,4,6 - and 7 (Kharak Singh, Niranjan Singh, Udaibir Singh Govinda Meno,.J. and Tikam Singh) to death and accused Nos. 2, 3 & 5\n\n(Satpal Singh, Harpal Singh and Sardar Singh) to imprisonment for life as herein before mentioned. On\n\nappeal to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, the learned Judges (Asthana and Roy JJ.) confirmed the convictions and sentences and diSmissed the appeals. As stated already, leave to appeal to this court under art. 136 was granted restricted to the question outlined by us at the beginning.\n\nThe prosecution case is that the village of Akheypur is a factious one in which one Narain Singh, the brother of the 4th accused, was the leader of one party and Atal Singh, one of the deceased, was the leader of the other. Consequently the dacoity and murders in the house of Atal Singh took place as a matter of revenge. Shortly stated, the case put forward on behalf of the prosecution is that the appellants and others, some of whom were armed with guns, raided the house of Atal Singh on the night in question. The inmates of the house and others were inflicted injuries and the dacoits after looting the house carried away valuable property. It is not suggested that if the facts spoken to by the prosecution witnesses, who are eye-witnesses, are true, then an offence under s. 396 of the Indian Penal Code has not been amply proved; but the only question is whether the appellants took part in the crime.\n\nThat a dacoity took place in the house of Atal Singh admits of no doubt and the appellants do not deny the occurrence, but it is the case of accused Nos. 4 and 7 (Niranjan Singh and Tikam Singh) that while the dacoity was in progress, they, along with the other residents of the village, had gone to the enclosure of Sardara Singh and Daryao Singh, close to the house of Atal Singh, armed with guns with the object\n\nNiranjan Singh\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nGovinda Jllenon J.\n\nof giving assistance and succour to the inmates of the house and it was they who opened fire from that place on the dacoits, compelling them to take to their heels as a result of the firing, and that after the dacoits had left the scene of occurrence, they, as well as others, proceeded to Atal Singh's house where Dharam Singh and other persons requested them to go to the Police Station at Kithore on their motorcycle in order to make a report to the police.\n\nIt is further alleged that both of them went to Kithore police station and reported the occurrence to the Sub- Inspector Dalbir Singh (P. W. 28) who was in charge of the police station and on the direction given by him, they went to the police station Garhmukteshwar to give information. In short, the defence is that these two accused were good Samaritans who tried to help the family of Atal Singh in their hour of dire need and not the assailants.\n\nThe other appellants denied the charge.\n\nIt is not necessary, in view of the concurrent eonclusions arrived at by the trial court and by the learned Judges of the High Court, to restate with any elaboration the details of the incident which culminated in the dacoity and murders. In addition to the corroborating pieces of evidence, there are eye-witnesses who have identified some or all the accused at the scene of crime, and it may also be stated that some of them had received injuries at the hands of the miscreants.\n\nWe have also a dying declaration, Exhibit P50, recorded by P.W. 20, a Magistrate, who also had recorded the statements of Ganga Saran (P. W. 2) and Ranbir (P.W. 18) when they were in a serious condition, anticipating that they might not survive the injuries but which t.hey fortunately did.\n\nThe earliest information of the crime (Ex. P. I) was given by Samey Singh (P.W. I) at the Police Station Kithore at about 2 a.m. on March I, 1954. It does not contain any details of the incident and is confined to the statement that a dacoity was being\n\ncommitted. at the house of Atal Singh in the village and that the informant had rushed from the village\n\nfor making a report. That guns were being fired has also been recorded in it. P.W. 28 Dalbir Singh, who was Sub-Inspector of Police and the Station House Officer of Police Station Kithore at that time, received the information and reached the scene of dacoity at about 2-30 a.m., whereupon Jhamel Kaur (P.W. 4) handed over to him the list of the looted property (Ex. P. 2). According to this witness, he immediately examined P. W. 2 and other witnesses on the spot and recorded their statements. The injured persons were sent to the hospital and inquests were held over the dead bodies of Rohtas Singh, Tejpal Singh, Atal Singh and Charan Singh in the presence of witnesses. Between 2-30 a.m. and 7 or 7-30 a.m., P.W. 28, according to him, did a considerable amount of work, such as recording the statements of all the available witnesses, sending the injured persons to the hospital after taking their statements, holding inquests over the dead bodies, inspecting the scene of dacoity, finding lead shots and wads there, and taking such things into custody, etc. By about 7 or 7-30 a.m. the Senior Superintendent of Police, the Deputy Superintendent of Police and other police officials reached the place of incident on hearing of the dacoity and by the time of their arrival, according to P. W. 28, he had finished the preliminary work. He also deposes that the parchas of the case diary for the period between March 1 and March 7, 1954, were sent all together to the Superintendent of Police only on March 7, and not as is enjoined by the rules every day as and when the day's recording is complete. We shall advert to the arguments of the learned counsel about this circumstance at a later stage .\n\nThe prosecution case depends, mainly if not solely, on the identification of the various accused persons by some or all of the prosecution witnesses, in addition to the dying declaration Exhibit P. 50 and the corroborating statements of P.W. 2, (vide Exhibit P. 49) and P.W. 18 (vide Exhibit P. 48).\n\nWe may here summarise in very short-outline the details of identification by the witnesses. P. W. 2 Ganga Saran identified accused Nos. I, 3, 4, 5 and 7\n\nNiranjau Singh\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nGrwind a Men on /.\n\nNiranjan Singh\n\nThe State of UUar Pradesh\n\nGovinda Menon J.\n\n(Kharak Singh, Harpal Singh, Niranjan Singh, Sardar Singh and Tikam Singh). Dharam Singh P. W. 3 identified accused No. 6 (Udaibir Singh) among the dacoits and also deposes that Atal Singh told him that accused No. 7 (Tikam Singh) had shot him with a gun. P. W. 4 Mst. Jhamel Kaur, in addition to giving a list of the looted property (Exhibit P. 2), identified accused Nos. 2 & 6 (Satpal Singh and Udaibir Singh). P. W. 5 (Richpal Singh) states that, among the dacoits, there were accused Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 (Satpal Singh, Niranjan Singh, Sardar Singh, Udaibir Singh and Tikam Singh). P. W. 7 (Om Pal) found among the dacoits accused Nos. 2, 6 and 7. The deposition of P:W. 9 is to the effect that he identified accused No. 6 (UdaibiI Singh) and also that Atal Singh told him that accused No. 7 (Tikam Singh) had shot him. P. 'vV. 10 Jagbir Singh identified accused No. I (Kharak Singh). All the appellants before us were identified by P. W. II (Ganga Bal), and P. W. 18 (Ranbir) was able to identify accused No. 6 Udaibir Singh. The result of the above analysis is that each one of the accused bas been identified by one or more of the prosecution witnesses. Accused No. I (Kharak Singh) is identified by P.W. 2, P.W. 10 and P. W. 11; accused No. 2 (Sat pal Singh) is identified by P.W. 4, P.W. 5, P.W. 7 and P.W. II; accused No. 3 (Harpal Singh) is identified by P.W. 2 and P.W. II; accused No. 4 (Niranjan Singh) is identified by P.W. 2, P.W. 5and P.W. ll; accused No. 5 (Sardar Singh) by P.W. 2, P.W. 5 and P.W. ll; accused No. 6 (Udaibir Singh) by P.W. 4, P.W. 5, P.W. 7, P.W. 9, P.W. ll and P.W. 18; and accused No. 7 (Tikam Singh) is identified by P.W. 2, P.W. 5, P.W. 7, P.W. 9 and P.W. 11.\n\nThe learned Sessions Judge accepted the testimony of these witnesses and disbelieved the story put forward by the accused and in this he had the concurrence of the High Court. Such being the case, this court would not be justified in re-opening the finding' about the guilt of the appellants if no question of law is involved, or if the conclusion is not preverse or opposed to principles of natural justice or revolt . .\n\ning to judicial conscience. But Mr. Jai Gopal Sethi, counsel for the appellants, strenuously contended that in view of the failure of the Sub-Inspector P. W. 28 to comply with para. 109 of Ch. XI of the Uttar Pradesh Police Regulations, which lays down that when the investigation is closed for the day, a copy of the case diary for the day should be sent to the superior police officers, there has been an infraction of a mandatory rule of law which has resulted in prejudice and if that is so, the findings regarding the guilt of the accused should be re-opened and this court should reassess and assay the evidence to find out how far the guilt of the appellants has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.\n\nThe question, therefore, is whether the action of the Sub-Inspector amoun~ to a violation of a statutory duty enjoined on him. If the Uttar Pradesh Police Regulations were a set of rules framed under any statute, and as such have the force of law, then a violation of any rule thereunder, may either amount to an illegality or an irregularity which may or may not vitiate the proceedings. The Police Act, 1861 was enacted to reorganize the police and to make it a more efficient instrument for the prevention and detection of crimes, whereby the State Government is given authority to appoint police officers, such as the Inspector-General, ete. Under s. 12 of that Act, the Inspector-General of Police may, from time to time, subject to the approval of the State Government, frame such rules and orders as he shall deem expedient relative to the organization, classification and distribution of the police force, the places at which the members of the force shall reside, and the particular services to be performed by them; their inspection, the description of arms, accoutrements and other necessaries to be furnished to them; the collecting and communicating by them of intelligence and information, and all such other orders and rules relative to the police force as the Inspector-General shall, from time to time, deem expedient for preventing abuse or neglect of duty, and for rendering such force efficient in the discharge of its duties. It is not s if\n\nN iranjan Singh v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Prade sll\n\nGovind; Menon J.\n\nv iranjan Si-ngh\n\nThe State of lTttar Pratle sh\n\nGovinda Meno'i J,\n\nthese police regulations are rules framed by the Inspector-General in accordance with section 12; but they are the result of the State Government laying down the mode of conduct and how the officers have to perform their duties. Rule 109 in Chapter XI dealing with the inveRtigation of crimes enjoins upon the police officers when an investigation is closed for the day to note the time and place at which it closed and also lays down that throughout the investigation the diary must be sent daily to the Police Superintendent on all days on which any proceedings are taken. If the investigating officer is not himself in-charge of the station, the diary must be sent through the officer in-charge except when this will cause delay. It also directs the police officer to study carefully sections 162 and 173 of the Code of Cri, minal Procedure. Nowhere in the rules is it stated that there is any statutory authority for the framing of rule 109, nor is it said to form any addition to a statute, even though some other rules are expressly stated to be statutory ones.\n\nSuch being the case, it is clear that rule 109 has no statutory foundation but is only an injunction by the executive Government to the police officers as to how they must regulate their work and conduct themselves during the course of investigation.\n\nMr. Jai Gopal Sethi, who appeared for the appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 60 of 1956, and Dr.\n\nBanerjee, who appeared for the appellant-accused No. 6, in Appeal No. 61 of 1956, put their case in this way: According to the police officer P. W. 28, he re- . corded t.he statements of all the eye-witnesses before day-break, and in case the diary under s. 172 containing the statements recorded under s. 162 had been sent to the superior police officers every day, then that fact would vouchsafe for the correctness of that document and it would not be possible for the officer\n\nt, o change or alter the statements of witnesses as it suited his desire if he wanted to do so at a later stage. In the present case since admittedly the case diary and the details of work during the course of seven cln.ys had not been sent to the superior police officers for a period of one week, it is suggested that\n\nit is possible that it might be considered a false docu-- ment because it was not prepared then and there containing statements recorded as and when they were made. In that case, both the learned counsel contend that the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses and finding out whether the names of the accused were given at the earliest point of time has been lost to the defence.\n\nThe result of this, according to the learned counsel, has caused irreparable prejudice which cannot be condoned or regularised.\n\nBut the learned counsel have not been able to show to us that para. 109 of Ch. XI of the Police Regulations has the force of law. In this connection reference may be made to Ch. XLV of the Code of Criminal Procedure dealing with illegal and irregular proceedings and to s. 529 laying down irregularities which do not vitiate proceedings, while s. 530 concerns irregularities which vitiate proceedings. Section 537 is to .the effect that subject to the provisions contained in the previous sections of that Chapter no finding, sentence or order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered under Ch.\n\nXXVII or on appeal or revision on account of among other things any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, proclamation, order, judgment or other proceedings before or during trial or in any inquiry or other proceedings under the Code.\n\nThere is an Explanation added that \"in determining whether any error, omission or irregularity in any proceeding under this Code has occasioned a failure of justice, the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings\". It is true that the objection was taken before the learned Sessions Judge and, therefore, the Explanation cannot be applied. In these circumstances and on the footing that the Uttar Pradesh Police Regulations, are merely directions regarding the course of conduct, can it be stated that a breach of it would vitiate the trial? The Code of Criminal Procedure in laying down the omissions or irregularities which either vitiate the proceedings or not does not anywhere\n\nN iranjan Singh\n\nThe State of Vttar Pradesh\n\nGor; inda Menon J,\n\nN iranjan Singh\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nGovinda Menon J.\n\nspecifically say that a mistake committed by a police officer during the course of the investigation can be said to be an illegality or irregularity. Investigation is certainly not an inquiry or trial before the court and the fact that there is no specific provision either way in Ch. XLV with respect to omissions or mistakes committed during the course of investigation except with regard to the holding of an inquest is, in our opinion, a sufficient indication that the legislature did not contemplate any irregularity in investigation as of sufficient importance to vitiate or otherwise form any infirmity in the inquiry or trial.\n\nThe learned counsel for the State ofUttar Pradesh invited our attention to a few cases which show that even violation of the provisions of the Code would not amount to an illegality.\n\nThe decisions of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee reported in Pulukuri Kotayya and Others\n\nv. King-Emperor(') and Zahiruddinv. King-Emperor(\") lay down that a breach of sections 162 and 172 of the Code does not amount to an illegality.\n\nIf therefore such an omission could not vitiate a trial, it is all the more reasonable that a failure to conform to a rule of conduct prescribed by the State Government on police officers cannot in any way interfere with the legality of a trial. That failure to investigate an offence does not necessarily prejudice an accused and therefore any mistake or omission in conducting investigatfon cannot vitiate a trial has been laid down in Hafiz Mohammad Sani and Others v. Emperor('). At p. 152, Adami J. observes as follows:-\n\n\"There can be no doubt that the Sub-Inspector in bis procedure disobeyed certain provisions of the law, and for that he could be punished, if the authorities deemed it fit, but I cannot find that his failure was to the prejudice of the petitioners.\n\nNor can I see how failure properly to conduct an investigation into an offence can vitiate a trial which was started on the final report after the investigation\".\n\n\\1) [1946] L.R. 74 I.A. 65.\n\n12) [19'7] L.R. HI.A. 80. '8) A.LR. 1931 Pat. 150,\n\nWe are in agreement with these observations. t956 In a recent case reported in Tilkeshwar Singh and Niranjan Singh Others v. The State of Bihar(1), Venkatarama !\\yyar ....\n\nJ. expressed the opinion that \"while the failure to The state of comply with the requirements of section 161 (3) might Uttar Pradesl• affect the weight to be attached to the evidence of Govinda Menon 1. the witnesses, it does not render it inadmissible\". He referred to the case of Bejoy Chand v. The State(2) and agreed with the observations of the Calcutta High Court therein.\n\nWe have no hesitation in following those observations. Our attention was also drawn to the case of Gajanand and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh(a), which contains statements of law helpful for the decision of this case.\n\nWe are not prepared to say that because P.W. 28 did not send copies of his diary to the superior officers every day, the same should be considered as a suspicious document unworthy of credit.\n\nThe learned Judges of the High Court and the court of first instance have ca.st no doubt upon the genuineness of the case diary and that being the case, it is not open to us without any compelling reasons to say that it is spurious or suspicious.\n\nIn the \"circumstances, we do not feel justified in holding that the omission of P. W. 28 is a violation of the provisions of a statute or a rule having the force of law which renders the trial invalid.\n\nHolding therefore the point on which the special leave had been granted, against the appellants, we order that the appeals be dismissed.\n\n(1) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1043, 1047, 1048.\n\n(2) A.LR. 1950 Cal. SSS.\n\n(S) A.I R. 19M S.C. 695, 699.\n\nAppeals dismissed.", "total_entities": 115, "entities": [{"text": "Meenokshi Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 140, "end_char": 155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That apart, Meenokshi Mills, , ."}}, {"text": "section 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 680, "end_char": 693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "3\n\nNIRANJAN SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 770, "end_char": 787, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "3\n\nNIRANJAN SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 789, "end_char": 815, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 842, "end_char": 850, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAFER IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 852, "end_char": 862, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SYED JAFFER IMAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. 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{"in_sentence": "136( I) of the Constitution from the judgment and order dated August 4, 1955, of the\n\nN ira11jan Sit1gh\n\nTiie State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nNiranjan SittgTi\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nGovinda Menon J.\n\nAllahabad High Court, in Criminal Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "GOVINDA MENON JJ."}}, {"text": "Niranjan Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4654, "end_char": 4668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4, 7, 1, :t, 5& 2 (Niranjan Singh, Tikam Singh, Kharak Singh, Harpal Singh, Sardar Singh and Satpal Singh) respectively in Sessions Trial No.", "canonical_name": "3\n\nNIRANJAN SINGH"}}, {"text": "Tikam Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4670, "end_char": 4681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4, 7, 1, :t, 5& 2 (Niranjan Singh, Tikam Singh, Kharak Singh, Harpal Singh, Sardar Singh and Satpal Singh) respectively in Sessions Trial No."}}, {"text": "Kharak Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4683, "end_char": 4695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4, 7, 1, :t, 5& 2 (Niranjan Singh, Tikam Singh, Kharak Singh, Harpal Singh, Sardar Singh and Satpal Singh) respectively in Sessions Trial No."}}, {"text": "Harpal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4697, "end_char": 4709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4, 7, 1, :t, 5& 2 (Niranjan Singh, Tikam Singh, Kharak Singh, Harpal Singh, Sardar Singh and Satpal Singh) respectively in Sessions Trial No."}}, {"text": "Sardar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4711, "end_char": 4723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4, 7, 1, :t, 5& 2 (Niranjan Singh, Tikam Singh, Kharak Singh, Harpal Singh, Sardar Singh and Satpal Singh) respectively in Sessions Trial No.", "canonical_name": "Sardara Singh"}}, {"text": "Satpal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4728, "end_char": 4740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4, 7, 1, :t, 5& 2 (Niranjan Singh, Tikam Singh, Kharak Singh, Harpal Singh, Sardar Singh and Satpal Singh) respectively in Sessions Trial No.", "canonical_name": "Sat pal Singh"}}, {"text": "at Meerut", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4813, "end_char": 4822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "142of1954, in the court of Session\n\nat Meerut and Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Udaibir Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4890, "end_char": 4903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 (Udaibir Singh) in the same Sessipns trial.", "canonical_name": "Udaibir Singh"}}, {"text": "February 28, and March 1, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5301, "end_char": 5331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the night between February 28, and March 1, 1954, a dacoity took place in the house of Atal Singh in the village of Akheypur in which about twenty dacoits took part and considerable property was looted and taken away by the dacoit.s."}}, {"text": "Atal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5370, "end_char": 5380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the night between February 28, and March 1, 1954, a dacoity took place in the house of Atal Singh in the village of Akheypur in which about twenty dacoits took part and considerable property was looted and taken away by the dacoit.s."}}, {"text": "Akheypur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5399, "end_char": 5407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the night between February 28, and March 1, 1954, a dacoity took place in the house of Atal Singh in the village of Akheypur in which about twenty dacoits took part and considerable property was looted and taken away by the dacoit.s."}}, {"text": "NiranjanSingh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6084, "end_char": 6097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 (NiranjanSingh), accused No.", "canonical_name": "3\n\nNIRANJAN SINGH"}}, {"text": "Achhpal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6266, "end_char": 6279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The two others, namely, Achhpal Singh and Deoki Saran alias\n\n1956 Beg Saran, who figured as accused Nos."}}, {"text": "Deoki Saran alias", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6284, "end_char": 6301, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The two others, namely, Achhpal Singh and Deoki Saran alias\n\n1956 Beg Saran, who figured as accused Nos."}}, {"text": "Beg Saran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6308, "end_char": 6317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The two others, namely, Achhpal Singh and Deoki Saran alias\n\n1956 Beg Saran, who figured as accused Nos."}}, {"text": "h N iranjan Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6414, "end_char": 6431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8 & 9 respectively in the court of Sessions, were acquitted by the h N iranjan Singh learned Sessions Judge, who, after an analysis of t e v. large volume of evidence, found that all the appellants The state of herein were guilty of an offence under s. 396 of the Uttar Pradesh Indian Penal Code and sentenced accused Nos.", "canonical_name": "3\n\nNIRANJAN SINGH"}}, {"text": "s. 396", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6597, "end_char": 6603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6625, "end_char": 6642, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Udaibir Singh Govinda Meno,", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6715, "end_char": 6742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l,4,6 - and 7 (Kharak Singh, Niranjan Singh, Udaibir Singh Govinda Meno,."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6916, "end_char": 6953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On\n\nappeal to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, the learned Judges (Asthana and Roy JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Asthana", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6975, "end_char": 6982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On\n\nappeal to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, the learned Judges (Asthana and Roy JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Roy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6987, "end_char": 6990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On\n\nappeal to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, the learned Judges (Asthana and Roy JJ.)"}}, {"text": "art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7118, "end_char": 7126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Narain Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7284, "end_char": 7296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case is that the village of Akheypur is a factious one in which one Narain Singh, the brother of the 4th accused, was the leader of one party and Atal Singh, one of the deceased, was the leader of the other."}}, {"text": "s. 396", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7981, "end_char": 7987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7995, "end_char": 8012, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sardara Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8430, "end_char": 8443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 and 7 (Niranjan Singh and Tikam Singh) that while the dacoity was in progress, they, along with the other residents of the village, had gone to the enclosure of Sardara Singh and Daryao Singh, close to the house of Atal Singh, armed with guns with the object\n\nNiranjan Singh\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nGovinda Jllenon J.\n\nof giving assistance and succour to the inmates of the house and it was they who opened fire from that place on the dacoits, compelling them to take to their heels as a result of the firing, and that after the dacoits had left the scene of occurrence, they, as well as others, proceeded to Atal Singh's house where Dharam Singh and other persons requested them to go to the Police Station at Kithore on their motorcycle in order to make a report to the police.", "canonical_name": "Sardara Singh"}}, {"text": "Daryao Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8448, "end_char": 8460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 and 7 (Niranjan Singh and Tikam Singh) that while the dacoity was in progress, they, along with the other residents of the village, had gone to the enclosure of Sardara Singh and Daryao Singh, close to the house of Atal Singh, armed with guns with the object\n\nNiranjan Singh\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nGovinda Jllenon J.\n\nof giving assistance and succour to the inmates of the house and it was they who opened fire from that place on the dacoits, compelling them to take to their heels as a result of the firing, and that after the dacoits had left the scene of occurrence, they, as well as others, proceeded to Atal Singh's house where Dharam Singh and other persons requested them to go to the Police Station at Kithore on their motorcycle in order to make a report to the police.", "canonical_name": "Daryao Singh"}}, {"text": "Govinda Jllenon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8573, "end_char": 8588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 and 7 (Niranjan Singh and Tikam Singh) that while the dacoity was in progress, they, along with the other residents of the village, had gone to the enclosure of Sardara Singh and Daryao Singh, close to the house of Atal Singh, armed with guns with the object\n\nNiranjan Singh\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nGovinda Jllenon J.\n\nof giving assistance and succour to the inmates of the house and it was they who opened fire from that place on the dacoits, compelling them to take to their heels as a result of the firing, and that after the dacoits had left the scene of occurrence, they, as well as others, proceeded to Atal Singh's house where Dharam Singh and other persons requested them to go to the Police Station at Kithore on their motorcycle in order to make a report to the police.", "canonical_name": "GOVINDA MENON JJ."}}, {"text": "Dharam Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8908, "end_char": 8920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 and 7 (Niranjan Singh and Tikam Singh) that while the dacoity was in progress, they, along with the other residents of the village, had gone to the enclosure of Sardara Singh and Daryao Singh, close to the house of Atal Singh, armed with guns with the object\n\nNiranjan Singh\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nGovinda Jllenon J.\n\nof giving assistance and succour to the inmates of the house and it was they who opened fire from that place on the dacoits, compelling them to take to their heels as a result of the firing, and that after the dacoits had left the scene of occurrence, they, as well as others, proceeded to Atal Singh's house where Dharam Singh and other persons requested them to go to the Police Station at Kithore on their motorcycle in order to make a report to the police.", "canonical_name": "Daryao Singh"}}, {"text": "Kithore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8985, "end_char": 8992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 and 7 (Niranjan Singh and Tikam Singh) that while the dacoity was in progress, they, along with the other residents of the village, had gone to the enclosure of Sardara Singh and Daryao Singh, close to the house of Atal Singh, armed with guns with the object\n\nNiranjan Singh\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nGovinda Jllenon J.\n\nof giving assistance and succour to the inmates of the house and it was they who opened fire from that place on the dacoits, compelling them to take to their heels as a result of the firing, and that after the dacoits had left the scene of occurrence, they, as well as others, proceeded to Atal Singh's house where Dharam Singh and other persons requested them to go to the Police Station at Kithore on their motorcycle in order to make a report to the police."}}, {"text": "Kithore police station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9103, "end_char": 9125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is further alleged that both of them went to Kithore police station and reported the occurrence to the Sub- Inspector Dalbir Singh (P. W. 28) who was in charge of the police station and on the direction given by him, they went to the police station Garhmukteshwar to give information."}}, {"text": "Dalbir Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9176, "end_char": 9188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is further alleged that both of them went to Kithore police station and reported the occurrence to the Sub- Inspector Dalbir Singh (P. W. 28) who was in charge of the police station and on the direction given by him, they went to the police station Garhmukteshwar to give information."}}, {"text": "Garhmukteshwar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9307, "end_char": 9321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is further alleged that both of them went to Kithore police station and reported the occurrence to the Sub- Inspector Dalbir Singh (P. W. 28) who was in charge of the police station and on the direction given by him, they went to the police station Garhmukteshwar to give information."}}, {"text": "Ganga Saran", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10152, "end_char": 10163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have also a dying declaration, Exhibit P50, recorded by P.W. 20, a Magistrate, who also had recorded the statements of Ganga Saran (P. W. 2) and Ranbir (P.W. 18) when they were in a serious condition, anticipating that they might not survive the injuries but which t.hey fortunately did."}}, {"text": "Ranbir", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10178, "end_char": 10184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have also a dying declaration, Exhibit P50, recorded by P.W. 20, a Magistrate, who also had recorded the statements of Ganga Saran (P. W. 2) and Ranbir (P.W. 18) when they were in a serious condition, anticipating that they might not survive the injuries but which t.hey fortunately did."}}, {"text": "Samey Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10384, "end_char": 10395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. I) was given by Samey Singh (P.W. I) at the Police Station Kithore at about 2 a.m. on March I, 1954."}}, {"text": "March I, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10454, "end_char": 10467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. I) was given by Samey Singh (P.W. I) at the Police Station Kithore at about 2 a.m. on March I, 1954."}}, {"text": "Police Station Kithore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10846, "end_char": 10868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 28 Dalbir Singh, who was Sub-Inspector of Police and the Station House Officer of Police Station Kithore at that time, received the information and reached the scene of dacoity at about 2-30 a.m., whereupon Jhamel Kaur (P.W. 4) handed over to him the list of the looted property (Ex."}}, {"text": "Jhamel Kaur", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10971, "end_char": 10982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.W. 28 Dalbir Singh, who was Sub-Inspector of Police and the Station House Officer of Police Station Kithore at that time, received the information and reached the scene of dacoity at about 2-30 a.m., whereupon Jhamel Kaur (P.W. 4) handed over to him the list of the looted property (Ex."}}, {"text": "Rohtas Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11270, "end_char": 11282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The injured persons were sent to the hospital and inquests were held over the dead bodies of Rohtas Singh, Tejpal Singh, Atal Singh and Charan Singh in the presence of witnesses."}}, {"text": "Tejpal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11284, "end_char": 11296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The injured persons were sent to the hospital and inquests were held over the dead bodies of Rohtas Singh, Tejpal Singh, Atal Singh and Charan Singh in the presence of witnesses."}}, {"text": "Charan Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11313, "end_char": 11325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The injured persons were sent to the hospital and inquests were held over the dead bodies of Rohtas Singh, Tejpal Singh, Atal Singh and Charan Singh in the presence of witnesses."}}, {"text": "March 1 and March 7, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12094, "end_char": 12119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also deposes that the parchas of the case diary for the period between March 1 and March 7, 1954, were sent all together to the Superintendent of Police only on March 7, and not as is enjoined by the rules every day as and when the day's recording is complete."}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12859, "end_char": 12881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I, 3, 4, 5 and 7\n\nNiranjau Singh\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nGrwind a Men on /.\n\nNiranjan Singh\n\nThe State of UUar Pradesh\n\nGovinda Menon J.\n\n(Kharak Singh, Harpal Singh, Niranjan Singh, Sardar Singh and Tikam Singh).", "canonical_name": "State of Uttar Pradesh"}}, {"text": "State of UUar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12923, "end_char": 12944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I, 3, 4, 5 and 7\n\nNiranjau Singh\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nGrwind a Men on /.\n\nNiranjan Singh\n\nThe State of UUar Pradesh\n\nGovinda Menon J.\n\n(Kharak Singh, Harpal Singh, Niranjan Singh, Sardar Singh and Tikam Singh)."}}, {"text": "Dharam Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13040, "end_char": 13052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dharam Singh P. W. 3 identified accused No."}}, {"text": "Richpal Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13387, "end_char": 13400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. W. 5 (Richpal Singh) states that, among the dacoits, there were accused Nos."}}, {"text": "Tikam Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13538, "end_char": 13549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 (Satpal Singh, Niranjan Singh, Sardar Singh, Udaibir Singh and Tikam Singh)."}}, {"text": "Om Pal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13561, "end_char": 13567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. W. 7 (Om Pal) found among the dacoits accused Nos."}}, {"text": "UdaibiI Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13694, "end_char": 13707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 (UdaibiI Singh) and also that Atal Singh told him that accused No.", "canonical_name": "Udaibir Singh"}}, {"text": "Jagbir Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13801, "end_char": 13813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. 'vV. 10 Jagbir Singh identified accused No."}}, {"text": "Ganga Bal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13913, "end_char": 13922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All the appellants before us were identified by P. W. II (Ganga Bal), and P. W. 18 (Ranbir) was able to identify accused No."}}, {"text": "Udaibir Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13982, "end_char": 13995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 Udaibir Singh."}}, {"text": "Kharak Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14142, "end_char": 14154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I (Kharak Singh) is identified by P.W. 2, P.W. 10 and P. W. 11; accused No."}}, {"text": "Sat pal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14218, "end_char": 14231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 (Sat pal Singh) is identified by P.W. 4, P.W. 5, P.W. 7 and P.W. II; accused No.", "canonical_name": "Sat pal Singh"}}, {"text": "Harpal Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14301, "end_char": 14313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 (Harpal Singh) is identified by P.W. 2 and P.W. II; accused No."}}, {"text": "Niranjan Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14367, "end_char": 14381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 (Niranjan Singh) is identified by P.W. 2, P.W. 5and P.W. ll; accused No."}}, {"text": "Sardar Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14442, "end_char": 14454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 (Sardar Singh) by P.W. 2, P.W. 5 and P.W. ll; accused No."}}, {"text": "Jai Gopal Sethi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15126, "end_char": 15141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But Mr. Jai Gopal Sethi, counsel for the appellants, strenuously contended that in view of the failure of the Sub-Inspector P. W. 28 to comply with para.", "canonical_name": "Jai Gopal Sethi"}}, {"text": "XI of the Uttar Pradesh Police Regulations", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15283, "end_char": 15325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Police Act, 1861", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16191, "end_char": 16207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16450, "end_char": 16455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Police Act, 1861", "statute": "The Police Act, 1861"}}, {"text": "Menon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17319, "end_char": 17324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not s if\n\nN iranjan Singh v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Prade sll\n\nGovind; Menon J.\n\nv iranjan Si-ngh\n\nThe State of lTttar Pratle sh\n\nGovinda Meno'i J,\n\nthese police regulations are rules framed by the Inspector-General in accordance with section 12; but they are the result of the State Government laying down the mode of conduct and how the officers have to perform their duties."}}, {"text": "State of lTttar Pratle", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17351, "end_char": 17373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not s if\n\nN iranjan Singh v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Prade sll\n\nGovind; Menon J.\n\nv iranjan Si-ngh\n\nThe State of lTttar Pratle sh\n\nGovinda Meno'i J,\n\nthese police regulations are rules framed by the Inspector-General in accordance with section 12; but they are the result of the State Government laying down the mode of conduct and how the officers have to perform their duties.", "canonical_name": "State of Uttar Pradesh"}}, {"text": "Govinda Meno'i", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17378, "end_char": 17392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not s if\n\nN iranjan Singh v.\n\nThe State of Uttar Prade sll\n\nGovind; Menon J.\n\nv iranjan Si-ngh\n\nThe State of lTttar Pratle sh\n\nGovinda Meno'i J,\n\nthese police regulations are rules framed by the Inspector-General in accordance with section 12; but they are the result of the State Government laying down the mode of conduct and how the officers have to perform their duties.", "canonical_name": "GOVINDA MENON JJ."}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17483, "end_char": 17493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 162 and 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18184, "end_char": 18204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Banerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18815, "end_char": 18823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "60 of 1956, and Dr.\n\nBanerjee, who appeared for the appellant-accused No."}}, {"text": "s. 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19070, "end_char": 19076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19118, "end_char": 19124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "XI of the Police Regulations", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20212, "end_char": 20240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20322, "end_char": 20348, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 529", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20403, "end_char": 20409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "XI of the Police Regulations", "statute": "XI of the Police Regulations"}}, {"text": "s. 530", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20477, "end_char": 20483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "XI of the Police Regulations", "statute": "XI of the Police Regulations"}}, {"text": "Section 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20535, "end_char": 20546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "XI of the Police Regulations", "statute": "XI of the Police Regulations"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21661, "end_char": 21687, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "N iranjan Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21798, "end_char": 21813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Code of Criminal Procedure in laying down the omissions or irregularities which either vitiate the proceedings or not does not anywhere\n\nN iranjan Singh\n\nThe State of Vttar Pradesh\n\nGor; inda Menon J,\n\nN iranjan Singh\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nGovinda Menon J.\n\nspecifically say that a mistake committed by a police officer during the course of the investigation can be said to be an illegality or irregularity.", "canonical_name": "3\n\nNIRANJAN SINGH"}}, {"text": "State of Vttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21819, "end_char": 21841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Code of Criminal Procedure in laying down the omissions or irregularities which either vitiate the proceedings or not does not anywhere\n\nN iranjan Singh\n\nThe State of Vttar Pradesh\n\nGor; inda Menon J,\n\nN iranjan Singh\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nGovinda Menon J.\n\nspecifically say that a mistake committed by a police officer during the course of the investigation can be said to be an illegality or irregularity."}}, {"text": "inda Menon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21848, "end_char": 21858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Code of Criminal Procedure in laying down the omissions or irregularities which either vitiate the proceedings or not does not anywhere\n\nN iranjan Singh\n\nThe State of Vttar Pradesh\n\nGor; inda Menon J,\n\nN iranjan Singh\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nGovinda Menon J.\n\nspecifically say that a mistake committed by a police officer during the course of the investigation can be said to be an illegality or irregularity.", "canonical_name": "GOVINDA MENON JJ."}}, {"text": "N iranjan Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21863, "end_char": 21878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Code of Criminal Procedure in laying down the omissions or irregularities which either vitiate the proceedings or not does not anywhere\n\nN iranjan Singh\n\nThe State of Vttar Pradesh\n\nGor; inda Menon J,\n\nN iranjan Singh\n\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh\n\nGovinda Menon J.\n\nspecifically say that a mistake committed by a police officer during the course of the investigation can be said to be an illegality or irregularity.", "canonical_name": "3\n\nNIRANJAN SINGH"}}, {"text": "State ofUttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22590, "end_char": 22611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned counsel for the State ofUttar Pradesh invited our attention to a few cases which show that even violation of the provisions of the Code would not amount to an illegality."}}, {"text": "Zahiruddinv", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22869, "end_char": 22880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decisions of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee reported in Pulukuri Kotayya and Others\n\nv. King-Emperor(') and Zahiruddinv."}}, {"text": "sections 162 and 172", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22924, "end_char": 22944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Adami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23487, "end_char": 23492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At p. 152, Adami J. observes as follows:-\n\n\"There can be no doubt that the Sub-Inspector in bis procedure disobeyed certain provisions of the law, and for that he could be punished, if the authorities deemed it fit, but I cannot find that his failure was to the prejudice of the petitioners."}}, {"text": "L.R. 74 I.A. 65", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 23944, "end_char": 23959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24284, "end_char": 24295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Govinda Menon", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 24373, "end_char": 24386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\yyar ....\n\nJ. expressed the opinion that \"while the failure to The state of comply with the requirements of section 161 (3) might Uttar Pradesl• affect the weight to be attached to the evidence of Govinda Menon 1."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 24537, "end_char": 24556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He referred to the case of Bejoy Chand v. The State(2) and agreed with the observations of the Calcutta High Court therein."}}, {"text": "[1955] 2 S.C.R. 1043", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 25575, "end_char": 25595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]} {"document_id": "1956_1_746_756_EN", "year": 1956, "text": "October 4\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nLAXMI DEVI SUGAR MILLS\n\nNAND KISHORE SINGH.\n\n[1956]\n\n[BHAOWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, s. K. DAS and\n\nGOVINDA MENON JJ.)\n\nIndustrial Dispu!e-Application fm permission to dismiss a workman-Resolution passed at a meetina of the Labour Union for removal of the General Manager-Vice-President of the Union addre'5ing the meeting to instigate the workers, if guilty of misconduct and indiscipline-Refusal to answer queries bv the General Manager, if an act of insubordination-Theory of dual capacity, if tenablc- Dismissal, if can be permitted on a ground not included in the charge -Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act (XLVIII of 1950) -U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 19<1,7 (U. P. Act XXVIIl of 1947), •· a, Standing Orders, cl. L(l)(j).\n\nThe respondent,• steno-typist and the Vice-President of the Labour Union, was charged by the appellant with misconduct and indiscipline under clause L(l)(j) of the Standing Orders of the Gov emment of Uttar Pradesh for instigating the workmen to pas• a resolution for the removal of the General Manager by a defamatory speech delivered at a meeting of the Union. The question in issue was whether_ the respondent by doing so had committed \"any act subversive of discipline\" within the meaning of that clause. In course of the correspondence with the General Manager over the matter, as also during the enquiry made by him, the respondent took up the attitude that be, as a stenotypist, was not answerable to his employers for his activities as Vice-President of the Union outside the factory area and persistently refused to answer questions categorically put to him by the General Manager. The appellant applied to the Labour Appellate Tribunal under s. 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act of 1950 for permission to dismiss the respondent. That application having been refused the appellant obtained Special Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court and it was contended that the passing of the resolution and the refusal to answer questions in course of the correspondence and the enquiry amounted to acts subversive of discipline and the respon dent was liable to be dismissed.\n\nHeld, that it was perfectly legitimate for the Union to pass the re•olution they did and no guilt either of a breach of the Standing Orders or of committing a.n act subversive of discipline could attach to the respondent for what part he took in the meeting as Vice- President of the Union and the order of dismissal passed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal must be affirmed.\n\nThat where, as in the present case, the members of the Union were of opinion that the circumstances warranted the resolution 1 it\n\nwas not for the court to scrutinise the correctness or otherwise of the reasons for it.\n\nHeld further that the respondent was primarily an employee of the appellant before he could be anything else and was in duty bound to answer such queries as were put to him by the General Manager and his persistent refusal to do so, on the pretext of a dual capacity, amounted to insubordination which would have justified his dismissal but the appellant having omitted to include this as a ground in the charge-sheet, which was served on the respondent and formed the basis of the enquiry, could not be allowed to rely\n\non it.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 162 of 1954.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 21st day of July 1953 of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Lucknow in Miscellaneous Case No. C-III-33 of 1952.\n\nH.J. Umrigar and R. A. Govind for the appellant.\n\nB. P. Maheshwari for the respondent.\n\n1956. October 4.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by-\n\nBHAGWATI J.-The Labour Appellate Tribunal of India at Lucknow dismissed the application of the appellant made under section 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, for permission to dismiss the respondent, its workman, and the appellant obtained from this Court Special Leave to Appeal against that order.\n\nThe respondent has been working as a Steno-typist with the appellant since 3rd December, 1946, and is also the Vice-President of the Union of workers which is affiliated to the Indian National Trade Union Congres!l and is known as Chini Mills Mazdoor Sangh.\n\nOne M. P. Singh has at all relevant times been and is still the General Manager of the appellant.\n\nThe relations between the appellant and its workmen are governed by the Standing Orders framed by mutual agreement between the Labour and the Sugar Mills in Uttar Pradesh which have been approved by\n\nU.xm; Devi Sugar Mills v.\n\nN a11d Kish ore\n\nSi11gh\n\nBhagtrat1 J.\n\nLax11ii Devi\n\nSugar Mills v.\n\nNaud Kishore\n\nSingh\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nthe Government of Uttar Pradesh. Clause L(l)(j) of the said Standing Orders runs as under:-\n\n\"Drunkenness or gambling or riotous or disorderly behaviour while on duty in factory premises, or in quarters provided by the mills or elsewhere or any act subversive of discipline\".\n\nThese are among the items of misconduct which would entitle the appellant, after due enquiry, to dismiss a workman from its employ.\n\nThere were longstanding disputes between the appellant and its workmen since October, 1946, and on the 23rd February, 1949, Kedar Nath Khetan, one of the partners of the appellant, wrote to Shri Kashi Nath Pandey, General Secretary, Indian National Sugar Workers Federation, promising to remove the General Manager as soon as the season of the Chhitauni factory was over. There was, however, an agreement arrived at between the partners of the factory and the Ohini Mills Mazdoor Sangh on the 13th September, 1949, under which the demand for the removal of the General Manager was withdrawn by the workers.\n\nThe disputes, however, continued and matters came to a head in 1952. In May, 1952, the management charged 76 members of the Union for participation in a 'Tools-down' strike. The matter went up to the Labour Appellate Tribunal which, by its award, reinstated all the 76 workmen. The management preferred writ petitions Nos. 402 and 409 in the Allahabad High Court but the same also were dismissed. Special Leave was obtained from this Court against those decisions of the Allahabad High Court and the same are pending.\n\nDuring the pendency of the application of the management for the discharge of the said 76 workmen before the Labour Appellate Tribunal, the workers held a meeting on the 10th June, 1952, near an old mosque outside the factory area to consider the situation arising out of the suspension of the 76 workmen and the ways and means of meeting the same.\n\nThe respondent participated in the said meeting as the Vice-President of the Union and made a speech criticising the attitude of the General Manager in terms\n\nwhich were set out in the report dated the 10th June, 1952, submitted by two workers by name Ganga Dhar Tewari and Jamuna Prasad to the General Manager.\n\nThe speech of the respondent as reported therew as to the following effect:-\n\n\"The General Manager of this factory wants to crush the Labour movement from the very beginning.\n\nHe allowed some of his intermediaries to join strike when Shri Shibban Lal Saxena had served a strike notice. His men had also persuaded some of our members to join the strike. As a result of this we had decided to launch a strike. On the other hand, the Manager Sahib was sitting on the phone for the permission of the Collector to dismiss all our fellow workers. Shri Moti Lal Singh was able to discover this conspiracy and he at once prevented us from going on strike. Then Manager Sahib could not succeed in his plan.\n\nThis time he has falsely accused 76 of our workers of resorting to Tools-down strike. These workers will surely be reinstated. But our efforts are rendered useless due to the acts of the Government Officers; the Collector of this District is getting some thing secretly from the Manager Sahib.\n\nWe have only one alternative open to us, let us again agitate for his dismissal. Many of the proprietors have written to me against him\".\n\nA resolution was moved at that meeting for the reinstatement of the 76 workers and dismissal of Shri Madan Pal Singh, the General Manager and the same was passed.\n\nAs stated above, the two workers Ganga Dhar Tewari and Jamuna Prasad reported the proceedjngs of the said meeting to the General Manager on the very same day.\n\nThe General Manager thereafter addressed a letter to the respondent on the 16th July, 1952, stating that he, the respondent, was present in and addressed a meeting held on the 10th June, 1952, wherein, among other matters, a resolution for the reinstatement of the 76 suspended workers and the removal of the General Manager was passed.\n\nHe asked the respondent to give him information regard-\n\nLaxmi Devi Sugar Mills\n\nNand Kishore\n\nSingh\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nLaxmi Devi Sugar Mills v.\n\nNandKisho~\n\nSingh\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\ning the above-mentioned facts within 24 hours of the receipt of the letter. The responaent replied on the 17th July, 1952, stating that be never attended any meeting whatever in bis capacity as the Steno-typist of the factory and expressed his inability, therefore, to say anything in the capacity in which the letter dated the 16th July, 1952, had been addressed by the General Manager to him. Not being content with bypassing the whole issue in this manner, he proceeded to observe that it was none of the factory's business to seek information from him for his personal, social or political activities outside the factory area. He stated that as a matter of courtesy any information asked for would have been supplied by him, but, as the things stood, he very much regretted his inability to comply with the wishes of the General Manager. The General Manager again addressed a letter to the respondent on the 17th July, 1952, stating that he was entitled to seek the information from him even in his personal capacity and asked him to let him have the reply to the queries contained in the letter dated the 16th July, 1952. The respondent, in his letter dated the 17th July, 1952 in reply, observed that some of the conclusions drawn by the General Manager were \"simply out of self-complacency\" and he respectfully begged to differ from the General ManJtger. He stated that he had nothing further to add to his earlier reply dated the 17th July, 1952.\n\nThe General Map.ager waited for a while and on the lat August, 1952, served upon the respondent a chargesheet calling upon the respondent to show cause why action should not be taken against him under clause L(1) (i) of the Standing Orders for making a speech in a meeting held near the local mosque on the 10th June, 1952, wherein, among other defamatory remarks, he, the respondent, instigated the workers to take steps for the removal of the General Manager.\n\nThe respondent was asked to submit his explanation latest by 10 a.m. on the 2nd Augl1!lt, 1952. The respondent submitted his written statement accordingly wherein he stated that there was absolutely no justification whatsoever for charging him with breach of\n\nthe Standing Orders under clause L(l) (j). He denied the allegations contained in the charge-sheet and wound up by asking the General Manager to enlighten him as to under what rules of the Factories Act, Commercial Establishments Act or the Standing Orders, written replies in the matters other than one's daily routine work of the factory were demanded at such short notice.\n\nThe General Manager fixed 10 a.m. on Monday the 4th August, 1952, for the holding of the enquiry and the respondent was called upon to present himself in time and he was also intimated that he would be at liberty to produce oral or documentary evidence in defence against the charges framed against him.\n\nAn enquiry was accordingly held by the General Manager on the 4th August, 1952.\n\nThe proceedings thereat were recorded in the form of questions and answers. The respondent adopted an attitude which was consistent with the one which he had adopted in the course of the correspondence above referred to.\n\nHe refused to answer the questions which were categorically put by the General Manager to him and stated that he had nothing to add to his written statement. He also took up the attitude that if he had taken part in any meeting held under the auspices of the Chini Mills Mazdoor Sangh outside the factory, the General Manager should write to the officials of the Sangh for necessary information. When it was specifically put to him that no confidential work was taken from him as he had been taking active interest in the anti-management activities maliciously and had been exploiting the poor labour to force himself being confirmed by the management, he said that he did not agree with it and it was not a question which needed any reply.\n\nAs a result of the enquiry, the General Manager made his report on the 24th October, 1952, wherein he found that the respondent had made a speech exhorting the workmen of the factory to pass a resolution for the removal of the General Manager, that the management was bound to lose confidence if a worker who had excited other workers against the General\n\nLaxmi De'IJi\n\nSugar Mills v.\n\nN and K ishore\n\nSingh\n\nBhagwatf l\n\nLarml Devi\n\nS\"gar Mills\n\nN and K i6hore\n\nSingh\n\nBliagwati J.\n\nManager of the concern , refused to give a direct reply to direct questions, that, in the absence of a Stenotypist who could enjoy the confidence of the management, it was impossible to run the factory without the risk of any trouble and that the respondent was thus guilty of misconduct and acts subversive of discipline.\n\nAs, however, there was a pendency of a proceeding before the Labour Appellate Tribunal, an application should be made to that authority for permitting his dismissal.\n\nThis report was accepted by the management and the appellant made the application under section 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, for permission to dismiss the respondent from its employ.\n\nThe Labour Appellate Tribunal embarked on the freedom of speech vouchsafed to the citizens of India under article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution, observed that the making of the speech in question at the meeting held by the respondent as the Vice-President of the Union was within the scope of the legitimate activities of the Union and held that the speech said to have been made by the respondent at the meeting could not be said to be an act subversive of discipline.\n\nThe application of the appellant was accordingly dismissed. Hence this appeal before us.\n\nThe only question for determination before us is whether the speech made by the respondent at the meeting held on the 10th June, 1952, was an act subversive of discipline.\n\nThe respondent was the Vice- President of the Union and, prima facie, any resolution passed by the Union asking for the remova 1 of the General Manager would bo perfectly legitimate if the members of the Union thought that there were circumstances warranting the same.\n\nThe correctness or otherwise of the reasons given for such removal would not be liable to scrutiny by the Court, the only thing requisite being that the Union was not acting mala fide or was not actuated by any malice or illwill against the General Manager in passing such resolution.\n\nThe resolution by itself would not have the effect of harming the General Manager at all.\n\n,. '\n\nIt would have to be forwarded to themanagement and the management would take such steps as it may be advised on receipt of the resolution. It would then be for the management to find for itself whether the reasons given for the removal of the General Manager were such as to warrant his removal.\n\nThe management would then, if it thought necessary, institute proper enquiries and come to his own conclusion as to the desirability or otherwise of the removal of the General Manager. So far as the Union is concerned, apart from mala fides or malice or ill will, the act of its passing the resolution would be innocuous and would not be liable to be visited with any punishment and the members of the Union would not be committing any breach of the Standing Orders nor would they be guilty of any act subversive of discipline. The gravamen of the charge I\\'.)ade by the management against the respondent, however, was that the latter was not merely responsible for the passing of such resolution, but, in the speech which he made in support, he gave vent to such expressions as were quite false and defamatory and was actuated by malice against the General Manager. He incited the members of the Union who were there assembled against the General Manager with the result that his act was thus subversiv.e of discipline. The speech had the effect of lowering the General Manager in the esteem of the workmen and subjecting him to hatred or ridicule and the necessary effect of making such speech before the workmen would be that they would look down upon the General Manager and would not be amenable to discipline and it would be impossible to conduct the management with efficiency with such disgruntled workmen in the factory. The words used by the respondent were, therefore, it was urged, calculated to undermine the discipline in the factory and his act was, therefore, subversive of discipline bringing him well within the mischief of clause L(I)(j) of the Standing Orders.\n\nIt was further urged that the ctmduct of the respondent in the course of the correspondence which took pl11.ce between the General Manager and himself\n\nLaxmi De'f)i\n\nSugar Mills v.\n\nN and K ishore\n\nSingh\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nI...axmi Devi Sugar Mills\n\nN and K ishore\n\nSingh\n\nBhagwati j.\n\nwas, to say the least, impudent. He relied upon his dual personality distinguishing between his capacity as the Steno-typist and his capacity as the Vice-President of the Union. The act complained of was attributed to his capacity as the Vice-President of the Union and he refused to give any reply to the queries addressed to him because in the letters addressed bv the General Manager to him he was described as the Steno-typist. He refused to give any information to the General Manager and asked him to communicate with the Sangh or the Union if any information was required by the General Manager in the matter of what took place at the meeting of the Union on the\n\n10th June, 1952. In the enquiry also, he adopted a similar attitude and refused to answer the direct questions addressed to him by the General Manager in regard to the proceedings of that meeting.\n\nIt was strenuously urged before us by the learned counsel for the appellant that this conduct of the respondent was subversive of discipline and amounted to such misconduct as would entitle the appellant to dismiss him from its employ.\n\nThere is considerable force in this argument and we are of the opinion that the respondent adopted an attitude unbecoming an employee of the appellant.\n\nHe adopted a truculent attitude in the course of the correspondence and resorted to the theory of his dual personality refusing to answer the queries addressed to him by the General Manager.\n\nThis attitude was, to say the least, reprehensible.\n\nEven though he happened to occupy what he considered to be the august position of the Vice- President of the Union he did not cease to be an employee of the appellant and the attempt to distinguish between his capacity as the Steno-typist and his capacity as the Vice-President of the Union was absolutely puerile.\n\nHe ought to have realised that he was first and foremost an employee of the a ppellant and owed a duty to the appellant to answer all the queries which had been addressed to him by the General l\\fanaget. His evasion to give such replies on the pretext of shielding himself under his capacity as the Vice-President of the Union was absolutely\n\nunjustifiable and if such insubordination and breach of discipline had been the subject-matter of the charges made against him, we do not see -how the respondent could have escaped the punishment of dismissal.\n\nSimilar is the position in regard to the attitude which the respondent adopted at the enquiry.\n\nHe refused to answer the direct questions which were addresse.d to him and had the temerity to ask the General Manager to see his written statement and find.out for himself the answers to the same. To say the least, the respondent was guilty of insubordination and if his attitude was such as would not conduce to the maintenance of discipline in the factory, here also we would have found it difficult to resist the appellant's claim for his dismissal if be had been charged with having been guilty of such misconduct.\n\nThe charge-sheet, however, only complained about the speech which he had made on the 10th June, 1952, wherein, among other defamatory remarks, he, the respondent, had instigated the workers to take steps for the removal of the General Manager.\n\nThe enquiry which was held on the 4th August, 1952, also concentrated on this particular charge and the report which was made by the General Manager on the 24th October, 1952, also found that the respondent had made a speech exhorting the workers to pass the resolution for the removal of the General Manager.\n\nThe acts of insubordination calculated to undermine the discipline in the factory which we have adverted to above were neither the subject-matters of the charge nor were they relied upon by the General Manager in his report as the grounds of misconduct entitling the management to dismiss the respondent from its employ.\n\nThe passing of the resolution for the removal of the General Manager by itself was not, as already stated, an act subversive of discipline and would not entitle the management to dismiss him and we are of the opinion that, on the record as it stood, the Labour Appellate Tribunal was justified in refusing to the appellant the permission to dismiss the respondent from its employ.\n\nThe charge-sheet which was furnished by the appelos\n\nLaxmi Devi\n\nSugar Mills v.\n\nN and IWment-Temple-Public or private -Question of mixed fact and law-Gift to idol-Whether worshippers are the beneficiaries-: Dedication to public-Construction of will -Ceremonies relating to installation of idol-fher of temple.\n\nThe issue whether a. religious endowment is a. public or e. pri va.te one is a. mixed question of law and fact the decision of whi°6b must depend on the application of legal concepts of • public and • private endowment to the facts found and is open to consideration by the Supreme Court.\n\nLakshmidhar Misra v. Rangalal ([1949] L.R. 76 I.A. 271), referred to.\n\nThe di•tinction between a private and a public endowment is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries a.re specific individua.ls, in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof,", "total_entities": 55, "entities": [{"text": "October 4", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 9, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "October 4\n\nLAXMI DEVI SUGAR MILLS\n\nNAND KISHORE SINGH."}}, {"text": "LAXMI DEVI SUGAR MILLS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 56, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LAXMI DEVI SUGAR MILLS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "NAND KISHORE SINGH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 58, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NAND KISHORE SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. K. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 117, "end_char": 126, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "s. K. DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GOVINDA MENON JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 132, "end_char": 149, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. GOVINDA MENON", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 678, "end_char": 701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1727, "end_char": 1732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1926, "end_char": 1939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That application having been refused the appellant obtained Special Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court and it was contended that the passing of the resolution and the refusal to answer questions in course of the correspondence and the enquiry amounted to acts subversive of discipline and the respon dent was liable to be dismissed."}}, {"text": "Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Lucknow", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3448, "end_char": 3491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 21st day of July 1953 of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Lucknow in Miscellaneous Case No."}}, {"text": "H.J. Umrigar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3537, "end_char": 3549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H.J. Umrigar and R. A. Govind for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. A. Govind", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3554, "end_char": 3566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H.J. Umrigar and R. A. Govind for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B. P. Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3587, "end_char": 3603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. P. Maheshwari for the respondent."}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3688, "end_char": 3696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by-\n\nBHAGWATI J.-The Labour Appellate Tribunal of India at Lucknow dismissed the application of the appellant made under section 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, for permission to dismiss the respondent, its workman, and the appellant obtained from this Court Special Leave to Appeal against that order.", "canonical_name": "BhagwatiJ."}}, {"text": "Labour Appellate Tribunal of India at Lucknow", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3704, "end_char": 3749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by-\n\nBHAGWATI J.-The Labour Appellate Tribunal of India at Lucknow dismissed the application of the appellant made under section 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, for permission to dismiss the respondent, its workman, and the appellant obtained from this Court Special Leave to Appeal against that order."}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3804, "end_char": 3814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "3rd December, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4092, "end_char": 4110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent has been working as a Steno-typist with the appellant since 3rd December, 1946, and is also the Vice-President of the Union of workers which is affiliated to the Indian National Trade Union Congres!l and is known as Chini Mills Mazdoor Sangh."}}, {"text": "Indian National Trade Union Congres!l and", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4194, "end_char": 4235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent has been working as a Steno-typist with the appellant since 3rd December, 1946, and is also the Vice-President of the Union of workers which is affiliated to the Indian National Trade Union Congres!l and is known as Chini Mills Mazdoor Sangh."}}, {"text": "Chini Mills Mazdoor Sangh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4248, "end_char": 4273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent has been working as a Steno-typist with the appellant since 3rd December, 1946, and is also the Vice-President of the Union of workers which is affiliated to the Indian National Trade Union Congres!l and is known as Chini Mills Mazdoor Sangh."}}, {"text": "M. P. Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4280, "end_char": 4291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One M. P. Singh has at all relevant times been and is still the General Manager of the appellant."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4532, "end_char": 4545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relations between the appellant and its workmen are governed by the Standing Orders framed by mutual agreement between the Labour and the Sugar Mills in Uttar Pradesh which have been approved by\n\nU.xm; Devi Sugar Mills v.\n\nN a11d Kish ore\n\nSi11gh\n\nBhagtrat1 J.\n\nLax11ii Devi\n\nSugar Mills v.\n\nNaud Kishore\n\nSingh\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nthe Government of Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Government of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4708, "end_char": 4735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relations between the appellant and its workmen are governed by the Standing Orders framed by mutual agreement between the Labour and the Sugar Mills in Uttar Pradesh which have been approved by\n\nU.xm; Devi Sugar Mills v.\n\nN a11d Kish ore\n\nSi11gh\n\nBhagtrat1 J.\n\nLax11ii Devi\n\nSugar Mills v.\n\nNaud Kishore\n\nSingh\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nthe Government of Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "23rd February, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5217, "end_char": 5236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were longstanding disputes between the appellant and its workmen since October, 1946, and on the 23rd February, 1949, Kedar Nath Khetan, one of the partners of the appellant, wrote to Shri Kashi Nath Pandey, General Secretary, Indian National Sugar Workers Federation, promising to remove the General Manager as soon as the season of the Chhitauni factory was over."}}, {"text": "Kedar Nath Khetan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5238, "end_char": 5255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were longstanding disputes between the appellant and its workmen since October, 1946, and on the 23rd February, 1949, Kedar Nath Khetan, one of the partners of the appellant, wrote to Shri Kashi Nath Pandey, General Secretary, Indian National Sugar Workers Federation, promising to remove the General Manager as soon as the season of the Chhitauni factory was over."}}, {"text": "Kashi Nath Pandey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5309, "end_char": 5326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were longstanding disputes between the appellant and its workmen since October, 1946, and on the 23rd February, 1949, Kedar Nath Khetan, one of the partners of the appellant, wrote to Shri Kashi Nath Pandey, General Secretary, Indian National Sugar Workers Federation, promising to remove the General Manager as soon as the season of the Chhitauni factory was over."}}, {"text": "Indian National Sugar Workers Federation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5347, "end_char": 5387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were longstanding disputes between the appellant and its workmen since October, 1946, and on the 23rd February, 1949, Kedar Nath Khetan, one of the partners of the appellant, wrote to Shri Kashi Nath Pandey, General Secretary, Indian National Sugar Workers Federation, promising to remove the General Manager as soon as the season of the Chhitauni factory was over."}}, {"text": "Chhitauni factory", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5458, "end_char": 5475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There were longstanding disputes between the appellant and its workmen since October, 1946, and on the 23rd February, 1949, Kedar Nath Khetan, one of the partners of the appellant, wrote to Shri Kashi Nath Pandey, General Secretary, Indian National Sugar Workers Federation, promising to remove the General Manager as soon as the season of the Chhitauni factory was over."}}, {"text": "Ohini Mills Mazdoor Sangh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5574, "end_char": 5599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was, however, an agreement arrived at between the partners of the factory and the Ohini Mills Mazdoor Sangh on the 13th September, 1949, under which the demand for the removal of the General Manager was withdrawn by the workers."}}, {"text": "13th September, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5607, "end_char": 5627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was, however, an agreement arrived at between the partners of the factory and the Ohini Mills Mazdoor Sangh on the 13th September, 1949, under which the demand for the removal of the General Manager was withdrawn by the workers."}}, {"text": "Labour Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5922, "end_char": 5947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The matter went up to the Labour Appellate Tribunal which, by its award, reinstated all the 76 workmen."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6064, "end_char": 6084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "402 and 409 in the Allahabad High Court but the same also were dismissed."}}, {"text": "10th June, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6411, "end_char": 6426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the pendency of the application of the management for the discharge of the said 76 workmen before the Labour Appellate Tribunal, the workers held a meeting on the 10th June, 1952, near an old mosque outside the factory area to consider the situation arising out of the suspension of the 76 workmen and the ways and means of meeting the same."}}, {"text": "Ganga Dhar Tewari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6843, "end_char": 6860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent participated in the said meeting as the Vice-President of the Union and made a speech criticising the attitude of the General Manager in terms\n\nwhich were set out in the report dated the 10th June, 1952, submitted by two workers by name Ganga Dhar Tewari and Jamuna Prasad to the General Manager."}}, {"text": "Jamuna Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6865, "end_char": 6878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent participated in the said meeting as the Vice-President of the Union and made a speech criticising the attitude of the General Manager in terms\n\nwhich were set out in the report dated the 10th June, 1952, submitted by two workers by name Ganga Dhar Tewari and Jamuna Prasad to the General Manager."}}, {"text": "Shibban Lal Saxena", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7143, "end_char": 7161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He allowed some of his intermediaries to join strike when Shri Shibban Lal Saxena had served a strike notice."}}, {"text": "Sahib", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7343, "end_char": 7348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, the Manager Sahib was sitting on the phone for the permission of the Collector to dismiss all our fellow workers."}}, {"text": "Moti Lal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7450, "end_char": 7464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Moti Lal Singh was able to discover this conspiracy and he at once prevented us from going on strike."}}, {"text": "Madan Pal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8138, "end_char": 8153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A resolution was moved at that meeting for the reinstatement of the 76 workers and dismissal of Shri Madan Pal Singh, the General Manager and the same was passed."}}, {"text": "Ganga Dhar Tewari", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8234, "end_char": 8251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As stated above, the two workers Ganga Dhar Tewari and Jamuna Prasad reported the proceedjngs of the said meeting to the General Manager on the very same day."}}, {"text": "16th July, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8436, "end_char": 8451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The General Manager thereafter addressed a letter to the respondent on the 16th July, 1952, stating that he, the respondent, was present in and addressed a meeting held on the 10th June, 1952, wherein, among other matters, a resolution for the reinstatement of the 76 suspended workers and the removal of the General Manager was passed."}}, {"text": "BhagwatiJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8860, "end_char": 8870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He asked the respondent to give him information regard-\n\nLaxmi Devi Sugar Mills\n\nNand Kishore\n\nSingh\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nLaxmi Devi Sugar Mills v.\n\nNandKisho~\n\nSingh\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\ning the above-mentioned facts within 24 hours of the receipt of the letter.", "canonical_name": "BhagwatiJ."}}, {"text": "17th July, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8978, "end_char": 8993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The responaent replied on the 17th July, 1952, stating that be never attended any meeting whatever in bis capacity as the Steno-typist of the factory and expressed his inability, therefore, to say anything in the capacity in which the letter dated the 16th July, 1952, had been addressed by the General Manager to him."}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11240, "end_char": 11253, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Commercial Establishments Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11255, "end_char": 11284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "4th August, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11476, "end_char": 11492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The General Manager fixed 10 a.m. on Monday the 4th August, 1952, for the holding of the enquiry and the respondent was called upon to present himself in time and he was also intimated that he would be at liberty to produce oral or documentary evidence in defence against the charges framed against him."}}, {"text": "24th October, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12849, "end_char": 12867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result of the enquiry, the General Manager made his report on the 24th October, 1952, wherein he found that the respondent had made a speech exhorting the workmen of the factory to pass a resolution for the removal of the General Manager, that the management was bound to lose confidence if a worker who had excited other workers against the General\n\nLaxmi De'IJi\n\nSugar Mills v.\n\nN and K ishore\n\nSingh\n\nBhagwatf l\n\nLarml Devi\n\nS\"gar Mills\n\nN and K i6hore\n\nSingh\n\nBliagwati J.\n\nManager of the concern , refused to give a direct reply to direct questions, that, in the absence of a Stenotypist who could enjoy the confidence of the management, it was impossible to run the factory without the risk of any trouble and that the respondent was thus guilty of misconduct and acts subversive of discipline."}}, {"text": "Singh\n\nBliagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13240, "end_char": 13256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result of the enquiry, the General Manager made his report on the 24th October, 1952, wherein he found that the respondent had made a speech exhorting the workmen of the factory to pass a resolution for the removal of the General Manager, that the management was bound to lose confidence if a worker who had excited other workers against the General\n\nLaxmi De'IJi\n\nSugar Mills v.\n\nN and K ishore\n\nSingh\n\nBhagwatf l\n\nLarml Devi\n\nS\"gar Mills\n\nN and K i6hore\n\nSingh\n\nBliagwati J.\n\nManager of the concern , refused to give a direct reply to direct questions, that, in the absence of a Stenotypist who could enjoy the confidence of the management, it was impossible to run the factory without the risk of any trouble and that the respondent was thus guilty of misconduct and acts subversive of discipline."}}, {"text": "section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13840, "end_char": 13850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14063, "end_char": 14068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Labour Appellate Tribunal embarked on the freedom of speech vouchsafed to the citizens of India under article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution, observed that the making of the speech in question at the meeting held by the respondent as the Vice-President of the Union was within the scope of the legitimate activities of the Union and held that the speech said to have been made by the respondent at the meeting could not be said to be an act subversive of discipline."}}, {"text": "article 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14075, "end_char": 14088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Laxmi De'f)i\n\nSugar Mills v.\n\nN and K ishore\n\nSingh\n\nBhagwatiJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17487, "end_char": 17550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was further urged that the ctmduct of the respondent in the course of the correspondence which took pl11.ce between the General Manager and himself\n\nLaxmi De'f)i\n\nSugar Mills v.\n\nN and K ishore\n\nSingh\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nI...axmi Devi Sugar Mills\n\nN and K ishore\n\nSingh\n\nBhagwati j.\n\nwas, to say the least, impudent."}}, {"text": "I...axmi Devi Sugar Mills", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17552, "end_char": 17577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was further urged that the ctmduct of the respondent in the course of the correspondence which took pl11.ce between the General Manager and himself\n\nLaxmi De'f)i\n\nSugar Mills v.\n\nN and K ishore\n\nSingh\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nI...axmi Devi Sugar Mills\n\nN and K ishore\n\nSingh\n\nBhagwati j.\n\nwas, to say the least, impudent."}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23048, "end_char": 23061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[JAGANNADHADAS, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, B. P. SINHA and S. K. DAS JJ.]"}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23082, "end_char": 23093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[JAGANNADHADAS, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, B. P. SINHA and S. K. DAS JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. K. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23098, "end_char": 23107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[JAGANNADHADAS, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, B. P. SINHA and S. K. DAS JJ.]", "canonical_name": "s. K. DAS"}}, {"text": "L.R. 76 I.A. 271", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 23691, "end_char": 23707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]} {"document_id": "1956_1_756_771_EN", "year": 1956, "text": "Laxnii Devi\n\nSugar Mills v.\n\nN and K ishore\n\nSingh\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nOctober 4 •\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1956]\n\nlant to the respondent formed the basis of the enquiry which was held by the General Manager and the appellant could not be allowed to justify its action on any other grounds than those contained in the chargesheet. The respondent not having been charged with the acts of insubordination which would have really justified the appellant in dismissing him from its employ, the appellant could not take advantage of the same even though these acts could be brought home to him.\n\nWe have, therefore, com!'l to the conclusion that the order made by the Labour Appellate Tribunal was correct even though we have done so on grounds other than those whi.ih commended themselves to it.\n\nWe accordingly dismiss this appeal but having regard to the conduct of the respondent which we have characterised above as reprehensible we feel that the ends of justice will be met if we ordered that each party do bear and pay its own costs of this appeal.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nDEOKI NANDAN v.\n\nMURLIDHAR .\n\n[JAGANNADHADAS, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, B. P. SINHA and S. K. DAS JJ.]\n\nHindu Law-Religious end<>Wment-Temple-Public or private -Question of mixed fact and law-Gift to idol-Whether worshippers are the beneficiaries-: Dedication to public-Construction of will -Ceremonies relating to installation of idol-fher of temple.\n\nThe issue whether a. religious endowment is a. public or e. pri va.te one is a. mixed question of law and fact the decision of whi°6b must depend on the application of legal concepts of • public and • private endowment to the facts found and is open to consideration by the Supreme Court.\n\nLakshmidhar Misra v. Rangalal ([1949] L.R. 76 I.A. 271), referred to.\n\nThe di•tinction between a private and a public endowment is that whereas in the former the beneficiaries a.re specific individua.ls, in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof,\n\nThough under Hindu law an idol is a juristic person capable of holding property and the properties endowed for the temple vest in it, it can have no beneficial interest in the endowment, and the true beneficiaries are the worshippers, as the real purpose of a gift of properties to an idol is not to confer a.ny benefit on God, but the acquisition of spiritual benefit by providing opportunities and facilities for those who desire to worship.\n\nProsunno Kitmari Debya v. Golab Ohand Baboo ([1875] L.R. 2 I.A. 145), Maharaja J agadindra Nath Roy Btthadur v. Rani Hemanta Kumari Debi ([1904] L.R. 31 I.A. 203), Pramatha Nath Mullik v.\n\nPradhyumna Kumar Mitllik ([1924] L.R. 52 I.A. 245) and Bhupati\n\nNath Smrititirtha v. Ram Lal Maitra ([1910] I.L.R. 37 Cal. 128), referred to.\n\nA pious Hindu who was childless constructed a temple and was in management of it till his death. He executed a will whereby he bequeathed all his lands to the temple and made provision for its proper management. The question was whether the provisions of the will disclosed an intention on the part of the testator to dedicate the temple to the public or merely to the members of the family.\n\nHeld, that the recital in the will that the testator had no sons coupled with provisions for the management of the trust by strangers was an indication that the dedication was to the public.\n\nNabi Shirazi v. Province of Bengal (I.L.R. [1942] 1 Cal. 211), referred to.\n\nHeldfitrther, that the performance of ceremonies at the con secration of the temple (Prathista), the user of the temple and other evidence in the case showed that the dedication was for worship by the general public.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil AppealNo. 250ofl953.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated July 14, 1948 of the Obief Court of Audh, Lucknow in Second Appeal No. 365 of 1945 arising out of the de- ..,_ cree dated May 30, 1945 of the Court of District Judge, Sitapur in Appeal No. 4 of 1945 against the decree dated November 25, 1944 of the Court of Additional Civil Judge, Sitapur in Regular Civil Suit No. 14\n\nof 1944.\n\nA. D. Mathur, for the appellant.\n\nJagdisk Okandra, for respondent No. 1.\n\nDeoki N and an\n\nMurlidhar\n\nDeokl N andan\n\nMurlidhar\n\n1956. October 4.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-The point for decision in this appeal is whether a Thakurdwara of Sri Radhakrishnaji in the village of Bhadesia in the District of Sitapur is a private temple or a public one in which all the Hindus are entitled to worship.\n\nOne Sheo Ghulam, a pious Hindu and a resident of the said village, had the Thakurdwara constructed d1,1ring the years 1914-1916, .and the idol of Shri Radhakrishnaji ceremoniously installed therein. He was himself in management of the temple and its affairs till 1928 when he died without any issue. On March 6, 1919, he had executed a will whereby he bequeathed all his lands to the Thakur.\n\nThe provisions of the will, in so far as they are material, will presently be referred to. The testator had two wives one of whom Ram Kuar, had predeceased him and the surviving widow, Raj Kuar, succeeded him as Mutawalli in terms of the will and was in management till her death in 1933. Then the first defendant, who is the nephew of Sheo Ghulam, got into possession of the properties as manager of the endowment in accordance with the provisions of the will. The appellant is a distant agnate of Sheo Ghulam, and on the allegation that the first defendant had been mismanaging the temple and denying the rights of the public therein, he moved the District Court of Sitapur for relief under the Religious and Charitable Endowments Act XIV of 1920, but the court declined to interfere on the ground that the endowment was private. An application to the Advocate-General for sanction to institute a suit under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure was also refused for the same reason.\n\nThe appellant then filed the suit, out of which the present appeal arises, for a declaration that the Thakurdwara is a public temple in which all the Hindus have a right to worship. The first defendant contested the suit, and claimed that \"the Thakurdwara and the idols were private'', and that \"the general public had no right to make any interference\".\n\nThe Additional Civil Judge, Sitapur, who tried the suit was of the opinion that the Thakurdwara had been built by Sheo Ghulam \"for worship by his family\",\n\nand that it was a private temple.\n\nHe accordingly dismissed the suit.\n\nThis judgment was affirmed on appeal by the District Judge, Sitapur, whose decision again was affirmed by the Chief Court of Oudh in second appeal. The learned Judges, however, granted a certificate under s. 109(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure that the question involved was one of great importance, and that is how the appeal comes before us.\n\nThe question that arises for decision in this appeal whether the Thakurdwara of Sri Radhakrishnaji at Bhadesia is a public endowment or a private one is one of mixed law and fact. In Lakshmidhar Misra v.\n\nRangalal(1), in which the question was whether certain lands had been dedicated as cremation ground, it was observed by the Privy Council that it was \"essentially a mixed question of law and fact\", and that while the findings of fact of the lower appellate court must he accepted as binding, its \"actual conclusion that there has been a dedication or lost grant is more properly regarded as a proposition of law derived from those facts than as a finding of fact itself\". In the present case, it was admitted that there was a formal dedication; and the controversy is only as to the scope of the dedication, and that is also a mixed question of law and fact, the decision of which must depend on the application of legal concepts of a public and a private endowment to the faqts found, and that is open to consideration in this appeal.\n\nIt will be oonvenient first to consider the principles of law applicable to a determination of the question whether an endowment is public or privatP, anC then to examine, in the light of those principles, the facts found or established. The distinction between a private and a public trust is that.whereas in the former the beneficiaries are specific individuals, in the latter they are the general public or a class thereof, While in the former the beneficiaries are persons who are\n\n(1) [1949] L.R. 76 I.A. 271.\n\nDcoki N and an\n\nMurlidhar\n\nVenkatarama AyyarJ\n\nDeoki N andan v.\n\nMurlidliar\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nascertained or capable of being ascertained, in the latter they constitute a body which is incapable of ascertainment. The position is thus stated in Lewin on Trusts, Fifteenth Edition, pp. 15-16:\n\n\"By public must be understood such as are constituted for the benefit either of the public at large or of some considerable portion of it answering a particular description. To this class belong all trusts for charitable purposes, and indeed public trusts and charitable trusts may be considllred in general as synonymous expressions. In private trusts the beneficial interest is vested absolutely in one or more individuals who are, or within a certain time may be, definitely ascertained .... \".\n\nVide also the observations of Mitter J. in Nabi Shirazi\n\nv. Province of Bengal('). Applying this principle, a religious endowme.nt must be. held to be private or public, according as the beneficiaries thereunder are specific persons or the general public or sections thereof.\n\nThen the question is, who are the beneficiaries when a temple is built, idol installed thereip and properties endowed therefor? Under the Hindu law, an idol is a juristic person capable of holding property and . the properties endowed for the institution vest in it. But does it follow from this that it is to be regarded as the beneficial owner of the endowment?\n\nThough. such a notion had a vogue at one time, and there is an echo of it in these proceedings (vide para 15 of the. plaint), it is now established beyond all controversy that this isnot the true position. It has been repeatedly held that it is only in an ideal sense that the idol is the owner of the endowed properties.\n\nVide Prosunno Kumari Debya v. Golab Chand Baboo(\"); Maharaja Jagadindra Nath Roy Bahadur v. Rani Hemanta Kumari Debi(') and Pramatha Nath Mullik\n\nv. Pradhyumna Kumar Mullik('). It cannot itself make use of them; it cannot enjoy them or dispose of them, or even protect them. In short, the idol can have no beneficial interest in the endowment. This was clearly\n\n(1) T.L.R. (1942) l Cal. 211, 227, 228.\n\n(2) (1876) L.R. 2 I.A. U5, 162.\n\n(31 [1904) L.R. 31 I.A, 203.\n\n(4) (1924) L.R. 52 I.A. ~46.\n\nlaid down in the Sanskrit Texts. Thus, in his Bhashya on the Purva Mimamsa, Adhyaya 9, Pada 1, Sahara Swami has the following:\n\ne:\"l'!frir\\ ~irra, q:q1\"11'44:_t m1ra f.ffirfi- ....\n\nJlira, a~~ ~I ; r 'q' mil ~~ Cl'T mfllSlrir ~~~ ~q~R=lf q~ I\n\n\"Property of the Gods, Devaswam, means whatever is abandoned for Gods, for purposes of sacrifice and the like, because ownership in the primary sense, as showing the relationship between the owner and the property owned, is impossible of application to Gods.\n\nFor the Gods do not make use of the property according to their desire nor are they seen to act for protecting the same\".\n\nThus, according to the texts, the Gods have no beneficial enjoyment of the properties, and they can be described as their owners only in a figurative sense (Gaunartha), and the true purpose of a gift of properties to the idol is not to confer any benefit on God, but to acquire spiritual benefit by providing oppor tunities and facilities for those who desire to worship.\n\nDeoki N andan\n\nMurlidhar\n\nVenkatarama AyyarJ.\n\nDeoki N andan v. 1rlurlidhar\n\nV.:ullatara11ta\n\nAyyar J.\n\nIn Bhupati Nath Smrititirtha v. Ram Lal Maitra(1), it was held on a consideration of these and other texts that a gift to an idol was not to be judged by the rules. applicable to a transfer to a 'sentient being', and that dedication of properties to an idol consisted in the abandonment by the owner of his dominion over them for the pnrpose of their being appropriated for the purposes which he intends. Thus, it was observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins 0. J. at p. 138 that \"the pious purpose is still the legatee, the establishment of the image is merely the mode in which the pious purpose is to be effected\" and that \"the dedication to a deity\" may be \"a compendious expression of the pious purposes for which the dedication is designed\". Vide also the observations of Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee at p. 155.\n\nIn Hindu Religious Endownlents Board v. Veeraraghavachariar('), Varadachariar J. dealing with this question, referred to the decision in Bhupati Nath Smrititirtha v. Ram Lal Maitra (supra)· and observed:\n\n\"As explained in that case, the purpose of making a gift to a temple is not to confer a benefit on God but to confer a benefit on those who worship in that temple, by making it possible for them to have the worship conducted in a proper and impressive manner.\n\nThis is the sense in which a temple and its endowments are regarded as a public trust\".\n\nWhen once it is understood that the true beneficiaries of religious endowments are not the idols but the worshippers, and that the purpose 'of the endowment is the maintenance of that worship for the benefit of the worshippers, the question whether an endowment is private or public presents no difficulty.\n\nThe cardinal point to be decided is whether it was the intention of the founder that specified individuals are to have the right of worship at the shrine, or the general public or any specified portion thereof.\n\nIn accordance with this theory, it has been held that when property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the persons who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be the members of the family,\n\n(!) [1910) I.L.R. 37 C•l. 128.\n\n(2) A.LR. 1037 :\\fad. 750.\n\n...\n\nand that is an ascertained group of individuals. But where the beneficiaries are not members of a family or a specified individual, then the endowment can only be regarded as public, intended to benefit the general body of worshippers.\n\nIn the light of these principles, we must examine the facts of this case. The materials bearing on the question whether the Thakurdwara is a public temple or a private one may be considered under four heads:\n\n(1) the will of Sheo Ghulam, Exhibit A-1, (2) user of the temple by the public, (3) ceremonies relating to the dedication of the Thakurdwara and the installation of the idol with special reference to Sankalpa and\n\nUthsarga, and (4) other facts relating to the character of the temple.\n\n(1) The will, Exhibit A-1, is the most important evidence on record as to the intention of the testator and the scope of the dedication. Its pro, visions, so far as they are material, may now be noticed.\n\nThe will begins with the recital that the testator has two wives and no male issue, that he has constructed a Thakurdwara and installed th~ idol of Sri Radhakrishnaji therein, and that he is making a disposition of the properties with a view to avoid disputes. Clause 1 of Exhibit A-1 provides that after the death of the testa- tor \"in the absence of male issue, the entire immovable property given below existing at present or which may come into being hereafter shall stand endowed in the name of Sri Radhakrishnaji, and mutation of names shall be effected in favour of Sri Radhakrishnaji in the Government papers and my wives l\\Ist. Raj Kuer and Mst. Ram Kuer shall be the Mutawallis of the waqf\".\n\nHalf the income from the properties is to be taken by the two wives for their maintenance during their lifetime, and the remaining half was to \"continue to be spent for the expenses of the Thakurdwara\". It is implicit in this provision that after the lifetime of the wives, the whole of the income is to be utilised for the purpose of the Thakurdwara. Clause 4 provides that if a son is born to the testator, then the properties are to be divided between the son and the Thakurdwara in a specified\n\nDeoki N andan\n\nMurlidltar\n\nVenkataranra\n\nAyyar j.\n\nDcoki N andan v.\n\nMurlidhar\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J,\n\nproportion; but as no son was born, this clause never came into operation. Clause 5 provides that the Mutawallis are to have no power to sell or mortgage the property, that they are to maintain accounts, that the surplus money after meeting the expenses should be deposited in a safe bank and when funds permit, property should be purchased in the name of Sri Radhakrishnaji. Clause 2 appoints a committee 0f four persons to look after the management of the temple and its properties, and of these, two are not relations of the testator and belong to a different caste. It is further.provided in that clause that after the death of the two wives the committee \"may appoint my nephew Murlidhar as Mutawalli by their unanimous opinion\". This Murlidhar is a. divided nephew of the testator and he is the first defendant in this action. Clause 3 provides for filling up of vacancies in the committe!l. Then finally there is\n\ncl. 6, which r'uns as follows:\n\n\"If any person alleging himself to be my near or remote h!lir files a claim in respect of whole or part of the waqf property his suit shall be improper on the face of this deed\".\n\nThe question is whether the provisions of the will disclose an intention on the part of the testator that the Thakurdwara should be a private endowment, or that it should be pub\\ic. The learned Judges of the Chief Court in affirming the decisions of the courts below that the temple was built for the benefit of the members of the family, observed that there was nothing in the will pointing \"to a conclusion that the trust was a public one\", and that its provisions were not \"inconsistent with the property being a private endowment\". We are unable to endorse this.opinion.\n\nWe think that the will read as a whole indubitably reveals an intention on the part of the testator to dedicate the Thakurdwara to the public and not merely to the members of hi~ family.\n\nThe testator begins by stating that he had no male issue. In Nabi Shirazi v. Province of Bengal (supra), the question was whether a wakf created by a deed of the year 1806 was a public or a private\n\n• I\n\nendowment. Referring to a recital in the deed that the settlor had no children, Khundkar J. observed at p. 217:\n\n\"The deed recites that the founder has neither children nor grandchildren, a circumstance which in itself suggests that the imambara was not to remain a private or family institution\".\n\nVide also the observations of Mitter J. at p. 228. The reasoning on which the above view is based is, obviously, that the word 'family' in its popular sense means children, and when the settlor recites that he has no children, that is an indication that the dedication is not for the benefit of the family but for the public.\n\nThen we have clause 2, under which the testator constitutes a committee of management consisting of four persons, two of whom were wholly unrelated to him. Clause 3 confers on the committee power to fill up vacancies; but there is no restriction there.in on the persons who could be appointed under that clause, and conceivably, even all the four member~ might be strangers to the family. It is difficult to believe that if Sheo Ghulam intended to restrict the right of worship in the temple to his relations, he would have entrusted the management thereof to a body consisting of strangers. Lastly, there is clause 6, which shows that the relationship between Sheo Ghulam and his kinsmen was not particularly cordial, and it is noteworthy that under clause 2, even the appointment of the first defendant as manager of the epdowment is left to the option of the committee. It is inconceivable that with such scant solicitude for his relations, Sheo Ghulam would have endowed a temple for their benefit. And if he did not intend them to be beneficiaries under the endowment, who are the members of the family who could take the benefit thereunder after the lifetime of his two wives? If we are to hold that the endowment was in favour of the members of the family, then the result will be that on the death of the two wives, it must fail for want of objects. But it is clear from the p.rovisions of the wiU that the testator contemplated the continuance\n\nDeoki N andau\n\nMurli4haf\"\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar).\n\nDeoki l'>[ and an\n\nMurlidhar\n\nVi:nkatarafna\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nof the endowment beyond the lifetime of his wives.\n\nHe directed that the properties should be endowed in the name of the deity, and that lands are to be purchased in future in the name of the deity. He also provides for the management of the trust after the lifetime of his wives.\n\nAnd to effectuate this intention, it is necessary to hold that the Thakurdwara was dedicated for worship by members of the public, and not merely of his family. In deciding that the endowment was a private one, the learned Judges of the Chief Court failed to advert to these aspects, and we are unable to accept their decision as correct. 2.\n\nIn the absence of a deed of endowment constituting the Thakurdwara, the plaintiff sought to establish the true scope of the dedication from the user of the temple by the public. The witnesses examined on his behalf deposed t.hat the villagers were worshipping in the temple freely and without any interference, and indeed, it was even stated that the Thakurdwara was built by Slieo Ghulam at the instance of the villagers, as there was no tern pie in the village.\n\nThe trial Judge did not discard this evidence as unworthy of credence, but he held that the proper inference to be drawn from the evidence of P. W. 2 was that the public were admitted into the temple not as a matter of right but as a matter of grace.\n\nP; W. 2 was a pujari in the temple, and he deposed that while Sheo Ghulam's wife was doing puja within the temple, he stopped outsiders in whose presence she used to observe purdah, from going inside. We are of opinion that this fact does not afford sufficient ground for the conclusion that the villagers did not worship at the temple as a matter of right.\n\nIt is nothing unusual even in well-known pblic temples for the puja hall being cleared of the public when a high dignitary comes for worship, and the act of the pujari in stopping the public is expression of the regard which.the entire villagers must have had for the wife of the founder, who was a pardanashin lady, when she came in for worship, and cannot be construed as a denial of their rights. The learned Judges of the Chief Court also relied on the decision\n\nof the Privy Council in Babu Bhagwan Din v. Gir Har\n\nSaroon(1) as an authority for the position that \"the mere fact that the public is allowed to visit a temple or thakurdwara cannot necessarily indicate that the trust is public as opposed to private\". In that case, certain properties were granted not in favour of an idol or temple but in favour of one Daryao Gir, who was maintaining a temple and to his heirs in perpetuity. The contention of the public was that subsequent to the grant, the family of Daryao Gir must be held to have dedicated the temple to the public for purpose of worship, and the circumstance that members of the public were allowed to worship at the temple and make offerings was relied on in proof of such dedication.\n\nIn repelling this contention, the Privy Council observed that as the grant was initially to an individual, a plea that it was subsequently dedicated by the family to the public required to be clearly made out, and it was not made out merely by showing that the public was allowed to worship at the temple \"since it would not in general be consonant with Hindu sentiments or practice that worshippers should be turned away\".\n\nBut, in the present ca.se, the endowment was in favour of the idol itself, and the point for decision is whether it was a private or public endowment.\n\nAnd in such circumstances, proof of user by the public without interference would be cogent evidence that the dedication was in favour of the public. In Mundancheri Koman v. Achuthan(2), which was referred to and followed in Babu Bhagwan Din v Gir Har Saroon(1), the distinction between user in respect of an institution which is initially proved to have been private and one which is not, is thus expressed:\n\n\"Had thne been any sufficient reason for holding that these temples and their endowment were originally dedicated for the tarwad, and so \\Vere privat_e trusts, their Lordships would have been slow to hold that the admission of the public in later times possibly owing to altered conditions, would affect the private character of the trusts.\n\nAs it is, they are of\n\n(1) (1939] L.R. 67 I.A. 1.\n\n(2J [1934] L.R. 61 I.A. 405.\n\nDeoki N andati\n\nMrq~R=lf q~ I\n\n\"Property of the Gods, Devaswam, means whatever is abandoned for Gods, for purposes of sacrifice and the like, because ownership in the primary sense, as showing the relationship between the owner and the property owned, is impossible of application to Gods."}}, {"text": "Deoki N andan\n\nMurlidhar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12286, "end_char": 12310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Deoki N andan\n\nMurlidhar\n\nVenkatarama AyyarJ.\n\nDeoki N andan v. 1rlurlidhar\n\nV.:ullatara11ta\n\nAyyar J.\n\nIn Bhupati Nath Smrititirtha v. Ram Lal Maitra(1), it was held on a consideration of these and other texts that a gift to an idol was not to be judged by the rules.", "canonical_name": "Deoki N andan\n\nMurlidhar"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama AyyarJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12312, "end_char": 12331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Deoki N andan\n\nMurlidhar\n\nVenkatarama AyyarJ.\n\nDeoki N andan v. 1rlurlidhar\n\nV.:ullatara11ta\n\nAyyar J.\n\nIn Bhupati Nath Smrititirtha v. Ram Lal Maitra(1), it was held on a consideration of these and other texts that a gift to an idol was not to be judged by the rules.", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama AyyarJ."}}, {"text": "Lawrence Jenkins", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12824, "end_char": 12840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus, it was observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins 0."}}, {"text": "Ashutosh Mookerjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13164, "end_char": 13182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vide also the observations of Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee at p. 155."}}, {"text": "Varadachariar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13259, "end_char": 13272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Hindu Religious Endownlents Board v. Veeraraghavachariar('), Varadachariar J. dealing with this question, referred to the decision in Bhupati Nath Smrititirtha v. Ram Lal Maitra (supra)· and observed:\n\n\"As explained in that case, the purpose of making a gift to a temple is not to confer a benefit on God but to confer a benefit on those who worship in that temple, by making it possible for them to have the worship conducted in a proper and impressive manner."}}, {"text": "Sankalpa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15250, "end_char": 15258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The materials bearing on the question whether the Thakurdwara is a public temple or a private one may be considered under four heads:\n\n(1) the will of Sheo Ghulam, Exhibit A-1, (2) user of the temple by the public, (3) ceremonies relating to the dedication of the Thakurdwara and the installation of the idol with special reference to Sankalpa and\n\nUthsarga, and (4) other facts relating to the character of the temple."}}, {"text": "Uthsarga", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15264, "end_char": 15272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The materials bearing on the question whether the Thakurdwara is a public temple or a private one may be considered under four heads:\n\n(1) the will of Sheo Ghulam, Exhibit A-1, (2) user of the temple by the public, (3) ceremonies relating to the dedication of the Thakurdwara and the installation of the idol with special reference to Sankalpa and\n\nUthsarga, and (4) other facts relating to the character of the temple."}}, {"text": "Clause 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15802, "end_char": 15810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Raj Kuer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16178, "end_char": 16186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raj Kuer and Mst.", "canonical_name": "Ram Kuar"}}, {"text": "Ram Kuer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16196, "end_char": 16204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Kuer shall be the Mutawallis of the waqf\".", "canonical_name": "Ram Kuar"}}, {"text": "Clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16596, "end_char": 16604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16823, "end_char": 16840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clause 4 provides that if a son is born to the testator, then the properties are to be divided between the son and the Thakurdwara in a specified\n\nDeoki N andan\n\nMurlidltar\n\nVenkataranra\n\nAyyar j.\n\nDcoki N andan v.\n\nMurlidhar\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J,\n\nproportion; but as no son was born, this clause never came into operation.", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama AyyarJ."}}, {"text": "Clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16920, "end_char": 16928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17221, "end_char": 17229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Murlidhar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17528, "end_char": 17537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is further.provided in that clause that after the death of the two wives the committee \"may appoint my nephew Murlidhar as Mutawalli by their unanimous opinion\".", "canonical_name": "MURLIDHAR"}}, {"text": "Clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17678, "end_char": 17686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17766, "end_char": 17771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Khundkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19026, "end_char": 19034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Referring to a recital in the deed that the settlor had no children, Khundkar J. observed at p. 217:\n\n\"The deed recites that the founder has neither children nor grandchildren, a circumstance which in itself suggests that the imambara was not to remain a private or family institution\"."}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19585, "end_char": 19593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19728, "end_char": 19736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20181, "end_char": 20189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20323, "end_char": 20331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Slieo Ghulam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22130, "end_char": 22142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witnesses examined on his behalf deposed t.hat the villagers were worshipping in the temple freely and without any interference, and indeed, it was even stated that the Thakurdwara was built by Slieo Ghulam at the instance of the villagers, as there was no tern pie in the village.", "canonical_name": "Slieo Ghulam"}}, {"text": "Daryao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23652, "end_char": 23658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case, certain properties were granted not in favour of an idol or temple but in favour of one Daryao Gir, who was maintaining a temple and to his heirs in perpetuity.", "canonical_name": "Daryao Gir"}}, {"text": "Daryao Gir", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23802, "end_char": 23812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contention of the public was that subsequent to the grant, the family of Daryao Gir must be held to have dedicated the temple to the public for purpose of worship, and the circumstance that members of the public were allowed to worship at the temple and make offerings was relied on in proof of such dedication.", "canonical_name": "Daryao Gir"}}, {"text": "L.R. 67 I.A. 1", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 25405, "end_char": 25419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L.R. 61 I.A. 405", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 25433, "end_char": 25449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Deoki N andati", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25452, "end_char": 25466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Deoki N andati\n\nMr hold that the middle classes in this country can be said to form a separate stratum of society even in a city like Calcutta having the same mode of life, the same necessities, uniform requirements and comforts.\n\nThere are different grades even among the middle classes and it is unwise to predicate the same degrees of comforts and necessities for everyone who is said to belong to the middle classes. Such being the case, to say that the clerks in the mercantile firms can be considered equal in all respects to the 600 clerks and Depot ca.shiers of the Company, is an argument which cannot be accepted as sound. The Labour Appellate Tribunal has not completely ignored the recommendations of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, for it is seen that in raising the amount awarded by the Industria.l\n\nTribunal the Appellate Tribunal has based its conclusion on the higher cost of living index in the case of\n\nClerks of Calcutta middle class employees.\n\nTramways Such being the case, the point for consideration is v. whether any quest.ion of principle is involved, so that Calcutta this court might interfere with the conclusions arrived Tt'amways at by the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Wide and unco. Ud. definable with exactitude as the powers of the Court are (see Dhakeswari Cotton Mills L.td. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal(1)), it is now well settled that generally the necessary pre-requisites for this court's interference to set right decisions arrived at by Tribunals whose conclusions on questions of fact are final can be classified under the following categories, namely, (i) where the Tribunal acts in excess of the jurisdiction conferred upon it under the statute or regulation creating it or where it ostensibly fails to exercise a patent jurisdiction; (ii) where there is an apparent error on the face of the decision and\n\n(iii) where the Tribunal has erroneously applied wellaccepted principles of jurisprudence. It is only when errors of this nature exist, that interference is called for. In the present case the appellants have not been able to show that there is any deviation from those principles. If the Tribunal below had failed to resort to a basic principle, then something might have been said but what has been done is, that in computing the dearness allowance it has considered various methods and adopted one of them. That being the case, it is difficult to say that there is any question of principle at all.\n\nThe report of the Central Pay Commission at page 46, in Paragraph 71, made the following recommendation:\n\n\"Without adopting such a complicated procedure, we think it sufficient to provide by slabs for persons on different levels of pay, as shown in the accompanying table which also provides for diminishing rates of dearness allowance as the cost of living index falls, taking the stages by 20 points at a time\".\n\n(1) [1965] 1 S.O.R. 9!ll, 9:19.\n\nGooinda Menon}.\n\nClef'ks of Calcutta Tramways v.\n\nCalcutta Tra, nways\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nGovinda Menon J.\n\nIt refrained from recommending the neutralisation of the entire higher coat of living by means of dearness allowance.\n\nThe report of the Committee on Fair Wages appointed by the Government of India in .Chapter IV, dealing with Wage Adjustments considered in paragraph 43 the various modes and methods of granting relief to meet the burden of increased cost of living and came to the conclusion that there is no practice of uniformity in the extent of compensation given to employees to meet the increased cost of living. It observed as follows:-\n\n\"Tbe Pay Commission bas accepted the principle that the lowest paid employee should be re-imbursed to the full extent of the rise in the cost of living and that higher categories of employees should receive a diminishing but graduated scale of dearness allowance. The Pay Commission bas rejected the principle of a flat rate for all categories of employees, irrespective of their basic salaries\".\n\nFinally it came to the conclusion \"that for the lowest categories of employees the target should obviously be compensation to the extent of 100 per cent. of the increase in the cost of living. For categories above the lowest we agree that the same consideration will not apply. A flat rate equal to the rate allowed to the least skilled worker is not likely to satisfy higher categories\":\n\nIn the analysis regarding the Industrial Awards, issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Labour, the question of dearness allowance is considered somewhat elaborately. At page 33 there is a discussion regarding the linking of dearness allowance to the cost of index numbers and as to whether a flat rate of dearness allowance irrespective of the income group should be allowed or not.\n\nThey further considered the linking of dearness allowance to the cost of living index numbers on the scale of income groups, but at rates diminishing with the income received. A perusal of the fairly elaborate discussion in Chapter\n\n.... ---\n\n1956 III shows that there cannot be a hard and fast rule applicable to all kinds of employees. Very much will d h d f 1 b h f Clerks of Calcutta depen upon t e con itions o p. our, t e nature o Tramways the locality and the mode of living. v.\n\nCalcutta In Buckingham and Carnatic Company Ltd., Madras\n\nv. Workers of the Company(1) the Tribunal considered Tramways the question of neutralisatiOn of the rise of the cost co. Ltd. of living by the grant of dearness allowance and was Govinda Meno11J. of the opinion that cent per cent neutralisation cannot be allowed, as it would lead to a vicious circle and add fillip to the infiatory spiral. It further held that there was no reason why the Industrial worker should not make sacrifices like all other citizens. We can now take it as settled that in matters of the grant of dearness allowance except to the very lowest class of manual labourers whose income is just sufficient to keep body and soul together, it is impolitic and unwise to neutralise the entire rise in the cost of living by dearness allowance. More so in the case of the middle classes.\n\nThe criterion to be adopted in the fixation of dearness allowance is also considered in Mahomad Rai Akbarali Khan v. The Associated Cement Companies Limited(9) where similar principles are discussed.\n\nOn behalf of the appellants our attention was invited to certain observations contained in The Millowners' Association, Bombay v. The Rashtriya Mill Mazd, oor Sangh(3), but we do not think that any different principle is enunciated there at all. Mr. Isaacs, the learned counsel for the appellants, laid great stres1;1 on the decision in Workmen of the Firestone Tyre and Rubber Company of India Ltd., Bombay v.\n\nFirestone Tyre and Rubber Oompam, y of India Ltd., Bombay(4) where the Tribunal expressed the opinion that dearness allowance is intended to neutralise rise in the cost of living and as there is a well recognised difference between the clerical staff and other workmen in their cost of living, the latter are not entitleµ\n\n(1) [1952] L.A.O. 490, 519, 520.\n\n(2) [1953) Ii A.O. 677.\n\n(S) {1955] L.A.C. 371.\n\n(4) (1953] L.A.O. 509.\n\n19>6\n\nClerks of Calcutta Tramways v.\n\nCalcutta Tramways\n\nCo. Lt4.\n\nGovi\"nda Menon J.\n\nto claim the allowance on the same basis. From this the learned counsel contends that the recommendations of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce should be accepted iµ toto. In our opinion, the decision does not help the point of view put forward on behalf of the appellants. In fact, the Labour Appellate Tribunal has made a distinction between the physical labourers and the clerks and Depot cashiers.in whose work it is not alone the physical exertion that is essential but some kind of mental and brain work as well and accordingly the higher cost of living index taken into account.\n\nIn such circumstances, it seems to us that the Labour Appellate Tribunal has, after conside.ring the various points of view, come to the correct conclusion in awarding the dearness allowance it did. There is no question of law or principle invo)ved and the appeal has to be dismissed with costs of the Calcutta Tramways Coy. Ltd.\n\nThe State of West Bengal, which has intervened during the appeal, will bear its own costs.", "total_entities": 40, "entities": [{"text": "CLERKS OF CALCUTTA TRAMWAYS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 42, "end_char": 69, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CLERKS OF CALCUTTA TRAMWAYS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CALCUTTA TRAMWAYS CO. LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CALCUTTA TRAMWAYS CO. LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 111, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. K. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 132, "end_char": 141, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.K. DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GovINDA MENON JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 146, "end_char": 163, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GovINDA MENON JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 306, "end_char": 319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Industrial dispute-Dearness allowance-Clerks-Middle class employees-Whether uniform rates to be adopted-Decisions of Trilmnals-Power of the Supreme Court to interfere."}}, {"text": "Bengal Chamber of Commerce", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 808, "end_char": 834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bengal Chamber of Commerce of which the respondent Company was a member, had made an investigation into the cost of living index for the middle class families and fixed the dearness allowance payable to the employees of the mercantile firms in Calcutta."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1052, "end_char": 1060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Bengal Chamber of Commerce of which the respondent Company was a member, had made an investigation into the cost of living index for the middle class families and fixed the dearness allowance payable to the employees of the mercantile firms in Calcutta."}}, {"text": "S. 0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2463, "end_char": 2467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A. K. Datt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2477, "end_char": 2487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Isaacs, A. K. Datt and Sukumar Ghose, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Sukumar Ghose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2492, "end_char": 2505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Isaacs, A. K. Datt and Sukumar Ghose, for the appellants."}}, {"text": "M. 0. Setalvad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2528, "end_char": 2542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. 0."}}, {"text": "D. R.\n\nDas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2572, "end_char": 2582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, D. R.\n\nDas and S. N. Mukherji, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. N. Mukherji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2587, "end_char": 2601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, D. R.\n\nDas and S. N. Mukherji, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2624, "end_char": 2630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen and P. K. Bose, for Intervener (State of West Bengal)."}}, {"text": "P. K. Bose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2635, "end_char": 2645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Sen and P. K. Bose, for Intervener (State of West Bengal)."}}, {"text": "GOVINDA MENON", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2749, "end_char": 2762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGOVINDA MENON J.-This appeal is by special leave against the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Calcutta, which modified the award, passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Calcutta, in the matter of a dispute referred to it by the Government of West Bengal, for adjudication with regard to the rates of dearness allowance for clerks and Depot cashiers, employed by the Calcutta Tramways Coy.", "canonical_name": "GovINDA MENON JJ."}}, {"text": "Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2826, "end_char": 2870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGOVINDA MENON J.-This appeal is by special leave against the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Calcutta, which modified the award, passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Calcutta, in the matter of a dispute referred to it by the Government of West Bengal, for adjudication with regard to the rates of dearness allowance for clerks and Depot cashiers, employed by the Calcutta Tramways Coy."}}, {"text": "Government of West Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2992, "end_char": 3017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGOVINDA MENON J.-This appeal is by special leave against the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Calcutta, which modified the award, passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Calcutta, in the matter of a dispute referred to it by the Government of West Bengal, for adjudication with regard to the rates of dearness allowance for clerks and Depot cashiers, employed by the Calcutta Tramways Coy."}}, {"text": "Calcutta Tramways Coy.\n\nLtd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3130, "end_char": 3158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGOVINDA MENON J.-This appeal is by special leave against the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Calcutta, which modified the award, passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Calcutta, in the matter of a dispute referred to it by the Government of West Bengal, for adjudication with regard to the rates of dearness allowance for clerks and Depot cashiers, employed by the Calcutta Tramways Coy."}}, {"text": "Calcutta Tramways Coy. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3265, "end_char": 3292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Disputes having arisen between the workmen of the Calcutta Tramways Coy."}}, {"text": "May 16, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3489, "end_char": 3501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd. (which may hereafter be called 'The Company') on the one hand, and the employers on the other, relating to the dearness allowance payable to the workmen, there were two previous awards, one dated May 16, 1947, by Sri S. N. Guba Roy, and the other dated October 27, 1948, by Sri P. K. Sircar."}}, {"text": "S. N. Guba Roy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3510, "end_char": 3524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd. (which may hereafter be called 'The Company') on the one hand, and the employers on the other, relating to the dearness allowance payable to the workmen, there were two previous awards, one dated May 16, 1947, by Sri S. N. Guba Roy, and the other dated October 27, 1948, by Sri P. K. Sircar."}}, {"text": "October 27, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3546, "end_char": 3562, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd. (which may hereafter be called 'The Company') on the one hand, and the employers on the other, relating to the dearness allowance payable to the workmen, there were two previous awards, one dated May 16, 1947, by Sri S. N. Guba Roy, and the other dated October 27, 1948, by Sri P. K. Sircar."}}, {"text": "P. K. Sircar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3571, "end_char": 3583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd. (which may hereafter be called 'The Company') on the one hand, and the employers on the other, relating to the dearness allowance payable to the workmen, there were two previous awards, one dated May 16, 1947, by Sri S. N. Guba Roy, and the other dated October 27, 1948, by Sri P. K. Sircar."}}, {"text": "West Bengal Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3740, "end_char": 3762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently a reference was made by the West Bengal Government on June 13, 1951, concerning a dispute relating to the dearness allowance of the workmen of the Company, excluding clerks and Depot cashiers."}}, {"text": "June 13, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3766, "end_char": 3779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently a reference was made by the West Bengal Government on June 13, 1951, concerning a dispute relating to the dearness allowance of the workmen of the Company, excluding clerks and Depot cashiers."}}, {"text": "Tramways Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6614, "end_char": 6630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judges of the Appellate Tribunal held that those recommendations were made to the mercantile firms where the workmen consist practically of the clerical and subordinate staff as opposed to Tramways Company where the large percentage of workmen belong to other categories, the clerks and Depot cashiers being only a small minority, though they found that the cost of Go\"i\"da Me11o11 J. living index found by the Bengal 8hamber of Commerce should be accepted as the criterion for awarding the increased dearness allowance in the case of the employees of the Company as well."}}, {"text": "Bengal Cham her of Commerce", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7116, "end_char": 7143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the appellants it is urged before us that a different mode of treatment than the one recommended by the Bengal Cham her of Commerce should not have been resorted to in the case of the appellants, for the reaso~ that those recommendations are intrinsically reasonable, considering the uniformity of life and modes of habit of the middle classes to which the clerks and Depot cashiers belong."}}, {"text": "Gotiuda Menon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8556, "end_char": 8569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gotiuda Menon J.\n\nWe have, therefore, to see whether in following the course now adopted by the Tribunals below they have ignored any legal principle or acted in violation of any statute.", "canonical_name": "GovINDA MENON JJ."}}, {"text": "Labour Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10976, "end_char": 11001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tramways Such being the case, the point for consideration is v. whether any quest.ion of principle is involved, so that Calcutta this court might interfere with the conclusions arrived Tt'amways at by the Labour Appellate Tribunal."}}, {"text": "Central Pay Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12289, "end_char": 12311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The report of the Central Pay Commission at page 46, in Paragraph 71, made the following recommendation:\n\n\"Without adopting such a complicated procedure, we think it sufficient to provide by slabs for persons on different levels of pay, as shown in the accompanying table which also provides for diminishing rates of dearness allowance as the cost of living index falls, taking the stages by 20 points at a time\"."}}, {"text": "Gooinda Menon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12719, "end_char": 12732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gooinda Menon}.", "canonical_name": "GovINDA MENON JJ."}}, {"text": "Govinda Menon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12800, "end_char": 12813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clef'ks of Calcutta Tramways v.\n\nCalcutta Tra, nways\n\nCo. Ltd.\n\nGovinda Menon J.\n\nIt refrained from recommending the neutralisation of the entire higher coat of living by means of dearness allowance.", "canonical_name": "GovINDA MENON JJ."}}, {"text": "Tbe Pay Commission", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13366, "end_char": 13384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It observed as follows:-\n\n\"Tbe Pay Commission bas accepted the principle that the lowest paid employee should be re-imbursed to the full extent of the rise in the cost of living and that higher categories of employees should receive a diminishing but graduated scale of dearness allowance."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14216, "end_char": 14235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A flat rate equal to the rate allowed to the least skilled worker is not likely to satisfy higher categories\":\n\nIn the analysis regarding the Industrial Awards, issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Labour, the question of dearness allowance is considered somewhat elaborately."}}, {"text": "Govinda Meno11J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15270, "end_char": 15286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nCalcutta In Buckingham and Carnatic Company Ltd., Madras\n\nv. Workers of the Company(1) the Tribunal considered Tramways the question of neutralisatiOn of the rise of the cost co. Ltd. of living by the grant of dearness allowance and was Govinda Meno11J. of the opinion that cent per cent neutralisation cannot be allowed, as it would lead to a vicious circle and add fillip to the infiatory spiral.", "canonical_name": "GovINDA MENON JJ."}}, {"text": "Isaacs", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16345, "end_char": 16351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Isaacs, the learned counsel for the appellants, laid great stres1;1 on the decision in Workmen of the Firestone Tyre and Rubber Company of India Ltd., Bombay v.\n\nFirestone Tyre and Rubber Oompam, y of India Ltd., Bombay(4) where the Tribunal expressed the opinion that dearness allowance is intended to neutralise rise in the cost of living and as there is a well recognised difference between the clerical staff and other workmen in their cost of living, the latter are not entitleµ\n\n(1) [1952] L.A.O. 490, 519, 520."}}, {"text": "Govi\"nda Menon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17004, "end_char": 17018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Govi\"nda Menon J.\n\nto claim the allowance on the same basis.", "canonical_name": "GovINDA MENON JJ."}}, {"text": "State of West Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17941, "end_char": 17961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd.\n\nThe State of West Bengal, which has intervened during the appeal, will bear its own costs."}}]} {"document_id": "1956_1_781_799_EN", "year": 1956, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nBURN & CO., CALCUTTA\n\nTHEIR EMPLOYEES\n\n(and connected appeal)\n\n[BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, s. K. DAS\n\nand GovINDA MENON JJ.]\n\nIndustrial Dispute-Tribunal's award-Term of operation-If and 'lihen can be reopened in a subsequent dispute-Principle of res judioata, if applicable-Boniloyees\n\nVenkatarama AyyarJ.\n\nments given as laid down in the award; (3) that the employees should be paid a month's bonus in addition to what had been given to them; and (4) that of the employees, Shambunath Chatterjee, Ashimananda Banerjee and Panchanan Rana should not merely be re-employed but reinsta.ted with continuity of service, and that further Shambunath Chatterjee was entitled to compensation at the rate of six months' basic wages with dearness allowance, As for Joydeb Banerjee, the Appellate Tribunal held that though his reinstatement was not desirable, he was entitled to one year's basic wages with dearness allowance as compensation.\n\nAgainst this decision, the Company has preferred Civil Appeal No. 1125 of 1955 by special leave, and the Union has likewise preferred Civil Appeal No. 174 of 1956, the leave being limited in the latter to the four points raised by the Company in its appeal. (I) The first question relates to the increase in the minimum wages of the clerical and sub-staff. For a correct understanding of the true position, it is necessary to refer to the facts which form the background of the present dispute. In 1946, the Bengal Chamber of Commerce took up the question of fixing, suitably to the changed conditions brought about by World War II, wages and other terms of service of the employees in industrial concerns, and framed a scheme classifying them under different categories, and fixing scales of pay and dearness allowance for the several categories, and that was brought into force in the Company on 1-10-1946. Under this scheme, the scale of pay for the lower categories of employees, with whom we are concerned in these appeals, was as follows:\n\nGlass of employees\n\nJunior clerks Tracers Clerks Typists Steno-typists I\n\nComptometer}\n\nOperators\n\nBasic monthly pay range Rs. 60-2-90\n\n60-2-80 60-4-124 (E. B. at 105) 60-4-90\n\n80-4-124 (E. B. at 105)\n\nJuniors (Drg. and Estg.) 60-4-88-2-100 Junior Draftsmen} 92-4-124-2-134 Junior Estimators_\n\nDisputes then arose between Engineering Firms in the State of West Bengal and their employees as regards :fixation of grades, wages and dearness allowance, and by a notification dated 31-10-1947 the Gov.:- ernment referred them to the adjudication of the First Engineering Tribunal. The appellant Company and its workmen were parties to the proceedings but not the present Union, which was composed of the clerical and sub-staff.\n\nOn 30\"6-1948 the Tribunal passed an award, the terms whereof were, in general, less favourable to the employees than those fixed by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and adopted by the Company on 1\"10-1946.\n\nWhile the proceedings were pending before the Engineering Tribunal, disputes arose between various Mercantile Firms in Calcutta and their employees as regards wages, dearness allowance and other terms of service, and by notification dated 17-1-1948 the Government of West Bengal referred them to the adjudication of another Tribunal, called the Mercantile Tribunal. This Tribunal pronounced its award on 26-8-1949, and the scale of pay provided therein for - the lower categories of employees was as follows:\n\nGrade D .... Rs. 70-3-130 Grade C . ...\n\nRs. 70-4-134 The Union was party No. 192 in those proceedings, but for technical reasons, the Tribunal declined to adjudicate on their disputes. The result was that this a ward was no more binding on the parties than the one passed by the Engineering Tribunal. But the scale fixed in the award of the Mercantile Tribunal was decidedly more favourable to the employees than either the scale recommended by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and adopted by the Company on 1-10-1946 or that fixed in the award of the Engineering Tribunal, and it is therefore not surprising that it should have inspired the Union to present a demand\n\nBurn and Co., Calcutta v.\n\nTheir.Employes\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nBurn and Co.,\n\nCalcutta\n\nTheir Emj>loyees\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nfor wages and dearness allowance on the scales provided therein. The Company having declined to accept it, there arose an industrial dispute, and by a notification dated 18-1-1950, the Governmt>nt of West Bengal referred the same for adjudication to one Shri Palit, District Judge. Before him, the Company contended that as the members of the Union were employees in an Engineering concern, the scale of pay applicable to the!Ilwas that laid down in the award of the Engineering Tribunal, and that as the scale actuallv in force was more favourable to them than that scale, there was no ground for revision. The Union, on the other hand, contended that not having been a party to the proceedings before the Engineering Tribunal, it was not bound by the award therein, and that as its members were clerical staff and not workers, the scales fixed in the award of the Mercantile Tribunal were more appropriate to them. By his award dated 12-6-1950 Shri Palit held that the nature of the work and the qualifications of the clerical staff were not the same in all business establishments, that the clerks in mercantile concerns were better qualified and had to do more onerous work than the members of the Union, that the latter could not be put in the same position as the former, and that the scale of pay fixed in the scheme of the Bengal Chamber of Com- . merce which was adopted by the Company was fair and required no revision. He, however, made some slight changes in the incremental scales and the maximum limits of the grades.\n\nThe scheme as settled in his award with. reference to the categories involved in this appeal was as follows: Grade Class of employees\n\n\"D\" Junior Clerks Tracers Clerks Typists Stenotypists and Comptometer Operators\n\nPc.y according to the award of Shri Palit 60-3-96\n\n60-3-90 60-4-140 (E.B. at 100) 60-4-100\n\n80-4-124 (E.B. at 120)\n\n\"C\" Junior (Drawing and Estimating) 60-4-120\n\nJunor Dratsmen } 92_4_140.\n\nJ um or Estimators\n\nThe Union preferred an appeal against this award, but that was dismissed as barred by limitation.\n\nUnder section 19(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act XIV of 1947, an award is to be in operation for a period of one year, and under section 19(6), it is to continue to be binding on the parties even thereafter, until terminated by either party by giving two months' notice. Acting on this provision, the Union issued a notice to the Company on 12-7-1951 being exactly one year from the date of publication of Shri Palit's award dated 12-6-1950, declaring its intention not to be bound by it. This was followed in November by presentation of demands including one for raising the scale of pay to the level adopted in the award of the Mercantile Tribunal, and the result was an industrial dispute, which is the subject-matter of the present reference.\n\nShri Banerji, who heard the reference, held that the question as to the scale of pay had been directly adjudicated upon by Shri Palit, that, on principle, the decision of a Tribunal on a matter referred to it should not be disturbed, unless there had been a change of circumstances since the date of the award, and as none such existed, the wage structure as fixed by him should stand.\n\nThe Appellate Tribunal disagreed with this conclusion. lt held that the award of Shri Palit, which Shri Banerji accepted, was bad for the reason that it had failed to examine \"the question as to whether the minimum salary fixed by the Managing Agents was adequate to cover the cost of a balanced diet and provide frugal comforts which a workman of the clerical staff must have to maintain the efficiency of his work\". It then referred to the opinion of Dr. Akroyd that an intake of 2,600 calories of food was necessary for efficiency of work, quoted some decisions of the Labour Tribunal in which the minimum pay of the clerical staff had been fixed at Rs. 70 and even more, and decided that the minimum pay should be fixed at Rs. 65 per\n\nBurn and Co.,\n\nCalcUtta\n\nTheir Emj>/oyee.s\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J,\n\nBum and Co., Calcutta v.\n\nTheir Employees\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nmensem for the clerical and sub-staff of the Company.\n\nHaving raised the floor level of the wage structure as aforesaid, it correspondingly raised the ceiling level and the scales of increment, and further with a view to maintain the differential scales as between the different-categories, it raised the minimum pay in scales where it stood at Rs. 65 and more, with \"consequential change in their incremental scales and the maximum grades\".\n\nIt is argued for the appellant Company that the Appellate Tribunal was in error in brushing aside the award of Shri Palit and in deciding the matter afresh, as if it arose for the first time for determination, that when once a dispute is referred to a Tribunal and that results in an adjudication, that must be taken as binding on the parties thereto, unless there was a change of circumstances, and as none such had been alleged or proved, the award of Shri Palit should have been accepted, as indeed it was by Shri Banerji, and the decisions in The Army & Navy Stores Ltd., Bombay v. Thei1 Workmen(') and Ford Motor Go. of India Ltd. v. Their Workmen(') were cited in support of this contention. In the instant case, the Labour Appellate Tribunal dismissed this argument with the observation that that was \"a rule of prudence and not of law\". If the Tribunal meant by this observation that the statute does not enact that an award should not be re-opened except on the ground of change of circumstances, that would be quite correct. But that is not decisive of the question, because there is no provision in the statute prescribing when and under what circumstances an award could be re-opened.\n\nSection 19(4) authorises the Government to move the Tribunal for shortening the period .during which the award would operate, if \"there has been a material change in the circumstances on which it was based\". But this has reference to the period of one year fixed under section 19(3) and if that indicates anything, it is that that would be the proper ground on which the award could be reopened under section 19(6), and thafis what the learned Attorney-General\n\n(1) [1951] 2 L.L J. 31.\n\n(2) [1951) 2 L.L.J. 231,\n\ncontends. But we propose to consider the question 1956 on the footing that there is nothing in the statute to , Burn and Co., indicate the grounds on which an award could be re- Calcutta opened. What then is the position? Are we to hold v. that an award given on a matter in controversy bet- Their Employees ween the parties after full hearing ceases to have any force if either of them repudiates it under section Venkatarama h h AyyarJ, 19(6), and that the Tribunal has no option, w en t e matter is again referred to it for adjudication, but to proceed to try it de novo, traverse the entire ground once again, and come to a fresh decision. That would be contrary to the well recognised principle that a decision once rendered by a competent authority on a matter in issue between the parties after a full enquiry should not be permitted. to be re-agitated. It is on this principle that the rule of res judicata enacted in section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code is based.\n\nThat section is, no doubt, in terms inapplicable to the present mp.tter, but the principle underlying it, expressed in the maxim \"interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium'', is founded on sound public policy and is of universal application. (Vide Broom's Legal Maxims, Tenth Edition, page 218). \"The rule of res judicata is dictated\" observed Sir Lawrence Jenkins, C.J. in Sheoparsan Singh v. Ramnandan Prasad Singh(1) \"by a wisdom which is for all time\". And there are good reasons why this principle should be applicable to decisions of Industrial Tribunals also.\n\nLegislation regulating the relation between Capital and Labour has two objects in view. It seeks to ensure to the workmen who have not the capacity to treat with capital on equal terms, fair returns for their labour. It also seeks to prevent disputes between employer and employees, so that production might not be adversely affected and the larger interests of the society might not suffer.\n\nNow, if we are to hold that an adjudication loses its force when it is repudiated under section 19(6) and that the whole controversy is at large, then the result would be that far from reconciling themselves to the award and settling down to work it, either party will treat it as a\n\n(1) (1916] L.R. 43 I.A. 91; [1916] I.L.R. 43 Cal, 694.\n\nBurn and Co., Calcutta v.\n\nTheir Employees\n\nVenkatara, na Ayyar J,\n\nmere stage in the prosecution of a prolonged struggle, and far from bringing industrial peace, the awards would turn out to bt; i but truces giving the parties breathing time before resuming hostile action with renewed vigour. On the other hand, if we are to regard them as intended to have long term operation and at the same time hold that they are liable to be modified by change in the circumstances on which they were based, both the purposes of the legislature would be served. That is the view taken by the Tribunals themselves in The Army & Navy Stores Ltd., Bombay v. Their Workmen(1) and Ford Motor Go. of India Ltd. v. Their Workmen('), and we are of opinion that they lay down the correct principle, and that there were no grounds for the Appellate Tribunal for not following them.\n\nWe should add that the Appellate 'J.'ribunal was also in error in thinking that Shri Palit had failed to advert to the principle on which basic wages should be fixed, and that he had not referred to the doctrine of Dr. Akroyd about the need for a balanced diet of 2,600 calories. It is true that Shri Palit does not in terms refer to these matters in his award.\n\nBut they were all discussed in the awards of both the Engineering Tribunal and the Mercantile Tribunal.\n\nThe dispute between the parties was whether the one award or the other should be taken as the basis for fixation of the scale of pay, and Shri Palit decided that it was the Engineering Tribunal's award and not the other that was more appropriate to the class of employees, of which the Union was composed.\n\nIn basing his award on the award of the Engineering Tribunal, Shri Palit must be taken to have considered all the factors relied on by the Tribunal for fixing the scales and the criticism that the award does not refer to them once again is one of form rather than of substance. We must, therefore, hold that the decision of the Appellate Tribunal cannot be maintained even on its own ground.\n\nThe position then is this: The question of scales of pay was decided by Shri Palit in his award dated\n\n(1) [1951] 2 L.L.J. 31.\n\n(2) [1951] 2 L.L.J. 231.\n\n12-6-1950, and the Union was a party to it. It is not alleged that there has been any change in circumstances between that date and 16-12-1952 when the present reference was made to Shri Banerji. On the principles stated above, therefore, the award of Sbri Palit should not be disturbed.\n\nThis conclusion would have entailed the reversal of the order of the Appellate Tribunal and the restoration of the award ofShri Banerji. We are of opinion, however, that the scale fixed by the Appellate Tribunal in its order dated 29-4-1955 should not be interfered with, in so far as it fies the minimum pay of the clerical and sub-staff at Rs. 65 per mensem. It is common ground that dearness allowance is payable under the rules of the Company, only when the cost of living index exceeds point 180.\n\nThe basic wages should therefore be fixed with 180 point as cost of living index. When we turn to the award of the Engineering Tribunal, we find that it fixed the basic wages after taking the cost of living index as 160 points. Before Shri Palit, the Company contended that the scale fixed in the award of the Engineering Tribunal should form the basis of fixation of the pay scale of the Union, and though the Tribunal held that the award was not as such binding on the Union, it agreed with the Company that it was the scale fixed therein and not that fixed in the award of the Mercantile Tribunal that was more appropriate to the clerical staff of an Engineering concern, and adopted the scale fixed by the Company on 31-10-1946 as being \"slightly in advance of the terms contained in the Engineering Tribunal's award\". It is clear from a reading of the award of Shri Palit that he was not conscious that the basic wages had been fixed by the Engineering Tribunal with point 160 as the cost of living index, and his observation that the scale adopted by the Company was an advance on that fixed by the Engineering Tribunal is consistent only with an assumption by him that the basic wages had been fixed both by the Company and the Engineering Tribunal with point 180 as the cost of living index.\n\nNow, if we are to accept the scale fixed in the a ward\n\nBurn and Co.,\n\nCalcutta\n\nv. .Their Employees\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nBurn and Co.,\n\nCalcutta ...\n\nTheir Employees I - Venkatarama\n\nA, yat' J. ~\n\nof Shri Palit as did Shri Banerji, the position would be that while for purposes of basic wages the cost of living index point would be 160, for purposes of dearness allowance it would be 180, and that would work great injustice on the workers. It is the realisation of this fact that must have led Mr. Bose, counsel for the Company, to raise at a late stage of the hearing of the appeal the contention that the cost of living index ofthe Bengal ChamberofCommerce which was adopted by the Company was different from that of the Government. But this contention went against the admission made by Mr. Sen on behalf of the Company at an earlier stage, and was rightly rejected by the Appellate Tribunal, and that was abandoned before us.\n\nThere is thus, on the face of the record, an error of a fundamental character.\n\nIt is argued for the appellant that this point is not open to consideration at this stage, as it had not been raised by the Union at any time before, and that, in any event, the matter should be remanded for further enquiry. But the question is whether in view of what appears on the face of the record this is a fit case for our interference in special appeal. The minimum pay fixed by the Appellate Tribunal would be quite proper if the cost of Ii ving index is taken, for the purpose of fixing the basic wages, at point 180 instead of 160, and there is no reason why we should not accept it.\n\nNor do we think that a remand is called.for in the interests of justice, as, in the face of the undisputed facts, it can only result in the proceedings dragging on and the relationship between the parties deteriorating. Under the circumstances, we do not propose to disturb the minimum pay of Rs. 65 per mensem fixed by the Appellate Tribunal. But we see no justification for raising either the ceiling levels or the starting pay of other categories of employees whose initial pay was Rs. 65 per mensem or more. We accordingly set aside the scale of pay as fixed by the Appellate Tribunal and restore that of Shri. Banerji subject to the following modifications: Grade D Junior clerks Rs. 65-3-98 Tracers 65-3-92 •\n\n...\n\nGrade C Clerks\n\nTypists Junior (Drawing\n\n65-4-141 (E.B. at 105)\n\n65-4-101\n\nand Estimating) 65-4-121\n\n(2) The second question relates to the grading of sarkars and checkers. The claim put forward on their behalf is that they should be raised to the category of clerks. This was rejected by Shri Palit in his award dated 12-6-1950 and again by Shri Banerji in those proceedings.\n\nThe Appellate Tribunal before whom this claim was repeated, while observing that the work of sarkars and checkers was \"not of the same nature as that of the members of the clerical staff\", held, nevertheless, that the scales of pay fixed in the award of the Engineering Tribunal for clerks should be applied to them, and that therefore nonmatriculate sarkars and checkers should be put on Rs. 55-2t-80 scale and matriculate sarkars and checkers on Rs. 60-2~-90 scale. We are unable to uphold this order.\n\nWhen once the Appellate Tribunal reached the conclusion that the sarkars and checkers could not be put in the same category as clerks, the question then. is simply whether any grounds had been made out for interfering with the fixation of pay scales by Shri Banerji. So far as the sarkars are concerned, the scale had been fixed by Shri Palit, and Shri Banerji adopted it.\n\nAs no change in the circumstances was alleged in support of a revision thereof, there was no ground for interfering with it. As for checkers, they are hourly-rated workers, and Shri Banerji had revised their pay scale. Apart from stating that \"the ends of justice\" required it, the Appellate Tribunal gave no reason for modifying his award. We are of opinion that the order of the Appellate Tribunal should be set aside both in respect of sarkars and checkers arid the award of Shri Banerji restored.\n\n(3) On the question of bonus, the facts are that the Company had an elaborate scheme for granting bonus and the employees had been paid in accordance therewith. But the Union claimed that having regard to the profits made by the Company, the employees\n\nBtlrn and Co.,\n\nCalcutta v.\n\nTheir Employees\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nBurn and Co., Calcutta v.\n\nTheir Employees\n\nVenkatarama:\n\nAyyar J,\n\nshould be paid three months' basic wages as bonus for the years 1950 and 1951. It is not in dispute that the profits of the Company available for distribution for the year 1950 were Rs. 3.81 lakhs and for the year 1951, even less.\n\nThe monthly salary of the clerks, sub-staff, sarkars and checkers was Rs. 89,500 and the monthly wages of the workers were Rs. 1,75,000, making a total of Rs. 2,64,500. This is only for one factory, the Howrah Iron Works.\n\nThe Company owns nine other units at different places, and there is no evidence as to the monthly salary payable to the employees and workmen in those units.\n\nNow, the surplus of Rs. 3.81 lakhs in the hands of the Company represents the total profits made by it in all its units, and there cannot be much of a doubt that this amount would be wholly insufficient to pay one month's basic wages as bonus to the employees of the Company in all its ten units. Shri Banerji accordingly held that the profits of the Company did not justify the grant of any bonus beyond what the Company had granted, and simplifying the complicated scheme of bonus which the Company had evolved, he directed that bonus should be paid, including what had been paid by it, at one month's basic pay. The Appellate Tribunal when dealing with this question agreed that \"if all categories of workmen be paid bonus, there is no scope for the payment of any additional bonus\".\n\nBut it held that as the other categories of workmen had not made any claim for bonus and as the amount payable to the members of the Union was only Rs. 89,000, the surplus was sufficient to justify the award to them only of another month's basic wages as bonus.\n\nWhether we consider the question on principles of law or of equity, this conclusion is clearly unsound.\n\nIn law, a claim for bonus will be admissible only if the business had resulted during the year in sufficient profits. And as the reasons for the grant of bonus is that workers should share in the prosperity to which they have contributed, all of them would have the right to participate in it. Therefore, profits can be said to be sufficient to declare a bonus only if they\n\nare sufficient to make a payment to all of them. If the profits are not sufficient for that purpose, then the very condition on which bonus could be declared would be absent, and no question of granting any bonus could arise.\n\nAs it is common ground that the profits of the Company are not sufficiel'lt to justify the award of bonus if it is to be paid to all the workers of the Company in all its units, it follows that there is in law no ground for the grant of bonus. Nor can such a claim be sustained in equity. The entire profits of the Company are the result of the labour of all the workmen and employees in all its units. To grant a bonus to a section of them on the basis of the total profits of the Company will be to give them a share in profits to which they have not contributed. We are wholly unable to appreciate the observation of the Appellate Tribunal that to refuse additional bonus to the Union employees would be to penalise them \"not for their own fault but for the !aches of the coworkers, who abandoned their claim\". The Tribunal forgets that, on its own finding, if all the workmen made a claim, no bonus could have been declared. It is not a question of their abandoning their claim but of their realising that they have none. If the order of the Appellate Tribunal is to be given effect to, some of the employees of the Company would get a bonus, while others not, and as observed in Karam Chand Thappar & Bros.' Workmen v. The Gompany(1), that must lead to disaffection among the workers and to further industrial disputes. The order of the Appellate Tribunal awarding an additional one month's basic wages as bonus is neither legal nor just and must be set aside and the award of Shri Banerii as regards bonus restored.\n\n(4) It remains to deal with the question of the reinstatement and/or compensation of four employees, S. N. Chatterjee, Ashimananda Banerjee, Panchanan Rana and J oydeb Banerjee. It has been already stated that the order of Shri Banerji with reference to them was modified by the Appellate Tribunal by awarding compensation at the rate of six months' basic wages\n\n(1) [1953] L.A.C. 1521 160.\n\nBurn and Co.,\n\nCalcutta v.\n\nTheir Employees\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nBurn and Co.,\n\nCalcutta v.\n\nTheir Employees\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J,\n\nto S. N. Chatterjee and one year's basic wages with dearness allowance to Joydeb Banerjee and by providing that S. N. Chatterjee, Ashimananda Banerjee and Panchanan Rana should not merely be re-employed but reinstated with continuity of service.\n\nIt is argued for the appellant that under section 7 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act XL VIII of 1950, the order of the Tribunal refusing reinstatement was not open to appeal, as it is not one of the matters set out in section 7(l)(b), and that, in consequence, the order of the Appellate Tribunal in so far as it modified the order of the Tribunal as regards the four employees aforesaid, was without jurisdiction, and the decision in Ranganathan v. Madras Electric Tramways\\) and Sudershan Steel Rolling Mills\n\nv. Their Workmen( ) were relied on in support of this contention. It must be mentioned that retrenchment is one of the matters enumerated in section 7(l)(b), in respect of which an appeal would lie. But if the order is one of dismissal, it cannot be said to be one of retrenchment as that word is ordinarily understood, and will not be appealable under section 7(i)(b). In 1953 the legislature enacted the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act XLIII of 1953 wherein \"retrenchment\" was for the first time defined so as to include, subject to certain exceptions, the termination by the employer of the service of workmen for any reason whatsoever. (Vide section 2(oo) ). Under this definition, an appeal would be competent under section 7(1)(b)(vii) in the case of termination of service, subject to the exceptions specified therein. But this Act came into force on the 24th December 1953, and as there is nothing in it giving retrospective operation to this definition, the rights of the parties to the present appeal would remain unaffected by it. Act XLIII of 1953 replaced Ordinance No. V of 1953, wherein also retrenchment was defined as induding, subject to exceptions all termination of service; but that also came into force only on the 24th October 1953, whereas the present appeal was filed on 19-8-1953.\n\nOn that date, the order of the Tribunal refusing\n\n(1) A.LR. 1952 Mad. 6~9.\n\n(2) [1956] 2 L.L.J. 64.\n\nreinstatement was not open to appeal, and the order of the Appellate Tribunal modifying it would therefore be without jurisdiction and void.\n\nBut it is argued for the respondent that an award of the Tribunal refusing reinstatement would be appealable under sect.ion 7(I)(a) if it involved a substantial question of law, and that as the contention of the employees was that the orders dismissing them were bad as having been passed in contravention of the rules of natural justice, that was a question of law on which an appeal was competent. It was further contended that when a question arises whether a Tribunal has jurisdiction over the subject-matter, it must be competent to decide whether the preliminary conditions exist, on which its jurisdiction depends, and its decision on that question is not liable to be attacked in civil courts, and that accordingly the assumption of jurisdiction by the Appellate Tribunalon the footing that there was a substantial question of law was not liable to be questioned by the civil court, and the decisions in Pankaj Kumar Ganguli v.\n\nBank of lndia(3) and Upper Ganges Electric Employees Union v. Upper Ganges Valley Electricity Supply Go.\n\nLtd. and another(4) were relied on in support of this contention.\n\nWe agree that an order 11efusing reinstatement WO\"\\lld be open to appeal under section 7(l)(a) if it involved a substantial question of law.\n\nWhether a decision of the Appellate Tribunal that an appeal to it from an award was competent under section 7(1)(a) on the ground that it involved a substantial question of law is final and not open to question in a civil court is a point on which we do not desire to express an opinion, as in the present case, the correctness of that decision is challenged not collaterally or in independent proceedings, such as an application under article 226 of the Constitution 'ts in the two cases relied on for the respondent, but by way of appeal under article 136, and it is open to us to consider as a Court of Appeal whether, in fact, the order of the Tribunal was vitiated by an error of law, and whether the\n\n(1) [1956] 60 O.W.N. G02.\n\n(2) A.I.R. 1956 All. 491. 104\n\nBurn and Co., Calcutta v.\n\nTheir Emf!loyees\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyarj.\n\nBum and Co., Calcutta v.\n\nTheir Enifaloyees\n\nVenkatara1na Ayyar J.\n\norder of the Appellate Tribunal modifying it is sound.\n\nWe must now consider the case of the four employees from this standpoint:\n\n(1) S. N. Chatterjee had an eye defect, and acting on the advice of its medical officer, the Company discharged him on that ground. The Tribunal has found him to be fit, and directed bis re-employment. He now claims compensation on the ground that be bad produced a certificate of fitness from a competent medical officer but that the Company discharged him without making any enquiry thereon. The Appellate Tribunal found that the Company bad acted bona fide, but that as the order of dismissal was made without due enquiry it was bad, and accordingly awarded compensation at the rate of six months' basic wages.\n\nWe are unable to hold that on the facts found the Appellate Tribunal had acted without jurisdiction in jnterfering with the award or that its order is unjust.\n\nNo case has been made out for our interference with it under. article 136.\n\n(2) Asbimananda Banerjee was arrested by the Government under the West Bengal Security Act and detained in jail from 25-1-1949 to 5-4-1951. The Company terminated his services on 22-4-1949.\n\nThe Tribunal made an order that be should be re-employed, and tba t is not now in question. But he further claims that be is imtitled to be reinstated. The Appellate Tribunal has accepted that claim on the ground that be bad been discharged without the Company framing a charge or holding an enquiry, and that the rules of natural justice had been violated.\n\nWe are unable to agree with this decisian.\n\nThe ground of discharge is the continued absence of the employee, and his inability to do work, and it is difficult to see what purpose would be served by a formal charge being delivered to him and what conceivable answer he could give thereto.\n\nThe order of the Appellate Tribunal is manifestly erroneous and must be set aside.\n\n(3) The facts relating to Panchanan Rana are similar to those of Ashimananda Banerjee, and for the reasons already given, the order of the Appellate\n\n...\n\nTribunal in his favour should be set aside.\n\n(4) The question as regards Joydeb Banerjee is whether he is entitled to compensation on the grol}nd that he had been wrongly discharged. The facts are that on 16-11-1950 a number of employees participated in an assault on the Works Manager, Mr. Davison, and the Company dismissed fourteen of them on that ground, and Joydeb .Banerjee was one of them. The Appellate Tribunal has held that as no charge was framed against him or an enquiry held, his dismissal wa!l in contravention of the rules of natural justice.\n\nIt has accordingly ordered that he should be given one year's basic wages with dearness allowance as compensation.\n\nIt is true that no charge-sheet was formally drawn up against him, but that would not vitiate the order of dismissal if he knew what the charge against him was and had an opportunity of giving his explanation. It appears from t>l.ie order of the Tribunal that subsequent to the order of dismissal by the Company, there were conciliation proceedings and an enquiry by the Labour Minister, as a result of which he recommended the reinstatement of seven out of the fourteen who had been dismissed, leaving the order in operation as regards the other seven, of whom Joydeb Banerjee was one.\n\nIn the face of these facts, it is idle for him to contend that he had been dismissed without hearing or enquiry.\n\nThe order of the Appellate Tribunal awarding compensation to him should be set aside.\n\nIn the result, Civil Appeal No. 325 of 1955 is allowed, the order of the Appellate Tribunal set aside and that of Shri Banerji restored, except that (1) the minimum pay of the clerical staff will be Rs. 65 per mensem with modifications as to the ceiling level and increments as set out supra and (2) that S. N.\n\nChatterjee will be reinstated with compensation as provided in the order of the Appellate Tribunal. The\n\nUnion will pay half the costs of the appellant throughout.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 174 of 1956 is dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs.\n\nB11r11 and Co.,\n\nCalcutta v.\n\nTheir Employees\n\nVe11katarama\n\nAyyarJ.", "total_entities": 98, "entities": [{"text": "BURN & CO., CALCUTTA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 51, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BURN & CO., CALCUTTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THEIR EMPLOYEES", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 53, "end_char": 68, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THEIR EMPLOYEES", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 103, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. K. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 124, "end_char": 133, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.K. DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GovINDA MENON JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 139, "end_char": 156, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. GOVINDA MENON", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 467, "end_char": 475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Olaim when maintainable-Order passed by the Appellate Tribunal-Appealability-Power of Supreme - Court in appeal-Inditstrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Olaim when maintainable-Order passed by the Appellate Tribunal-Appealability-Power of Supreme - Court in appeal-Inditstrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "s. 7( 1)( a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 541, "end_char": 553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Olaim when maintainable-Order passed by the Appellate Tribunal-Appealability-Power of Supreme - Court in appeal-Inditstrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Olaim when maintainable-Order passed by the Appellate Tribunal-Appealability-Power of Supreme - Court in appeal-Inditstrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 186", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 577, "end_char": 585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Olaim when maintainable-Order passed by the Appellate Tribunal-Appealability-Power of Supreme - Court in appeal-Inditstrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Olaim when maintainable-Order passed by the Appellate Tribunal-Appealability-Power of Supreme - Court in appeal-Inditstrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "s. 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 695, "end_char": 703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Olaim when maintainable-Order passed by the Appellate Tribunal-Appealability-Power of Supreme - Court in appeal-Inditstrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Olaim when maintainable-Order passed by the Appellate Tribunal-Appealability-Power of Supreme - Court in appeal-Inditstrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 711, "end_char": 734, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1219, "end_char": 1224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Olaim when maintainable-Order passed by the Appellate Tribunal-Appealability-Power of Supreme - Court in appeal-Inditstrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Olaim when maintainable-Order passed by the Appellate Tribunal-Appealability-Power of Supreme - Court in appeal-Inditstrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1228, "end_char": 1255, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "L.R. 43 I.A. 91", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1636, "end_char": 1651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1825, "end_char": 1833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2420, "end_char": 2428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Consequently, where, as in the instant case, the Union of the employees of a. certain section of the appellant Company served a. notice on the Company under s. 19(6) of the Act terminating a previous a.ward which had applied to its members the scales of pay and dearness allowance fixed by the Bengii.l Chamber of Commerce with slight modifications, and demanded that the more favourable scale of pay adopted by the Mercantile Tribunal in its a.ward might be applied to them, and the Tribunal appointed to adjudicate the dispute, held that, there having been no change in the circumstances in which the previous a.ward had been ma.de, the same was binding between the parties and could not be modified, but the Appel\n\n10~\n\nOctober I I.\n\nBurn and Co.,\n\nCalcutta\n\nlate Tribunal in appeal held otherwise and brushed aside the previous award, held that the order of the Appellate Tribunal was erroneous in law and as such liable to be set aside."}}, {"text": "sections 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2906, "end_char": 2916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3151, "end_char": 3161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3590, "end_char": 3598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3642, "end_char": 3655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "136 of the Constitution and it was open to the Supreme Court in such an appeal to consider the legality or otherwise of the orders passed either by the Tribunal or by the Appellate Tribunal in appeal."}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4229, "end_char": 4257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "M. G. Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4562, "end_char": 4576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. G. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, B.\n\nSen, S. N. Mukherji and B. N. Ghosh for M/s. Burn & Co.\n\nN. G. Ghatterji, A. K. Dutt and B. P. Maheshwari for the workmen."}}, {"text": "B.\n\nSen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4606, "end_char": 4613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. G. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, B.\n\nSen, S. N. Mukherji and B. N. Ghosh for M/s. Burn & Co.\n\nN. G. Ghatterji, A. K. Dutt and B. P. Maheshwari for the workmen."}}, {"text": "S. N. Mukherji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4615, "end_char": 4629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. G. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, B.\n\nSen, S. N. Mukherji and B. N. Ghosh for M/s. Burn & Co.\n\nN. G. Ghatterji, A. K. Dutt and B. P. Maheshwari for the workmen."}}, {"text": "B. N. Ghosh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4634, "end_char": 4645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. G. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, B.\n\nSen, S. N. Mukherji and B. N. Ghosh for M/s. Burn & Co.\n\nN. G. Ghatterji, A. K. Dutt and B. P. Maheshwari for the workmen."}}, {"text": "N. G. Ghatterji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4667, "end_char": 4682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. G. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, B.\n\nSen, S. N. Mukherji and B. N. Ghosh for M/s. Burn & Co.\n\nN. G. Ghatterji, A. K. Dutt and B. P. Maheshwari for the workmen."}}, {"text": "A. K. Dutt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4684, "end_char": 4694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. G. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, B.\n\nSen, S. N. Mukherji and B. N. Ghosh for M/s. Burn & Co.\n\nN. G. Ghatterji, A. K. Dutt and B. P. Maheshwari for the workmen."}}, {"text": "B. P. Maheshwari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4699, "end_char": 4715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. G. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, B.\n\nSen, S. N. Mukherji and B. N. Ghosh for M/s. Burn & Co.\n\nN. G. Ghatterji, A. K. Dutt and B. P. Maheshwari for the workmen."}}, {"text": "Howrah Iron Works", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4952, "end_char": 4969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR J.--Disputes having arisen between Messrs Burn and Company, Calcutta, hereinafter called the Company, and a section of their employees in Howrah Iron Works, hereinafter referred to as the Union, the Government of West Bengal issued a notification on 16-12-1952 referring the same to the First Industrial Tribunal for adjudication."}}, {"text": "Government of West Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5013, "end_char": 5038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR J.--Disputes having arisen between Messrs Burn and Company, Calcutta, hereinafter called the Company, and a section of their employees in Howrah Iron Works, hereinafter referred to as the Union, the Government of West Bengal issued a notification on 16-12-1952 referring the same to the First Industrial Tribunal for adjudication."}}, {"text": "16-12-1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5064, "end_char": 5074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR J.--Disputes having arisen between Messrs Burn and Company, Calcutta, hereinafter called the Company, and a section of their employees in Howrah Iron Works, hereinafter referred to as the Union, the Government of West Bengal issued a notification on 16-12-1952 referring the same to the First Industrial Tribunal for adjudication."}}, {"text": "First Industrial Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5101, "end_char": 5126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR J.--Disputes having arisen between Messrs Burn and Company, Calcutta, hereinafter called the Company, and a section of their employees in Howrah Iron Works, hereinafter referred to as the Union, the Government of West Bengal issued a notification on 16-12-1952 referring the same to the First Industrial Tribunal for adjudication."}}, {"text": "S. N.\n\nChatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5411, "end_char": 5428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) revision of pay of clerical and sub-staff, (2) grades of sarkars and checkers, (3) bonus and ( 4) reinstatement of four employees, S. N.\n\nChatterjee, Ashimananda Banerjee, Panchanan Rana and Joydeb Banerjee and/or payment of compensation to them.", "canonical_name": "S. N.\n\nChatterjee"}}, {"text": "Ashimananda Banerjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5430, "end_char": 5450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) revision of pay of clerical and sub-staff, (2) grades of sarkars and checkers, (3) bonus and ( 4) reinstatement of four employees, S. N.\n\nChatterjee, Ashimananda Banerjee, Panchanan Rana and Joydeb Banerjee and/or payment of compensation to them."}}, {"text": "Panchanan Rana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5452, "end_char": 5466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) revision of pay of clerical and sub-staff, (2) grades of sarkars and checkers, (3) bonus and ( 4) reinstatement of four employees, S. N.\n\nChatterjee, Ashimananda Banerjee, Panchanan Rana and Joydeb Banerjee and/or payment of compensation to them."}}, {"text": "Joydeb Banerjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5471, "end_char": 5486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) revision of pay of clerical and sub-staff, (2) grades of sarkars and checkers, (3) bonus and ( 4) reinstatement of four employees, S. N.\n\nChatterjee, Ashimananda Banerjee, Panchanan Rana and Joydeb Banerjee and/or payment of compensation to them.", "canonical_name": "J oydeb Banerjee"}}, {"text": "24-6-1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5547, "end_char": 5556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By his award dated 24-6-1953, Shri Banerji, the Industrial Tribunal, held (1) that there were no grounds for revising the scale of pay of the clerical and sub-staff; (2) that the pay of checkers should be increased and that they should be paid ac- _ cording to the scale as set out in his award; (3) that the profits of the Company did not warrant the grant of any bonus in addition to what had been paid by the Company; and (4) that of the four employees, Shambunath Chatterjee should be re-employed as a\n\n:ihecker on his old pay, that Ashimananda Banerjee a.nd Panchanan Rana should be \"re-employed in posts equivalent to their own posts as new incumbents\" and that Joydeb Banerjee was not entitled either to reinstatement or compensation."}}, {"text": "Banerji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5563, "end_char": 5570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By his award dated 24-6-1953, Shri Banerji, the Industrial Tribunal, held (1) that there were no grounds for revising the scale of pay of the clerical and sub-staff; (2) that the pay of checkers should be increased and that they should be paid ac- _ cording to the scale as set out in his award; (3) that the profits of the Company did not warrant the grant of any bonus in addition to what had been paid by the Company; and (4) that of the four employees, Shambunath Chatterjee should be re-employed as a\n\n:ihecker on his old pay, that Ashimananda Banerjee a.nd Panchanan Rana should be \"re-employed in posts equivalent to their own posts as new incumbents\" and that Joydeb Banerjee was not entitled either to reinstatement or compensation.", "canonical_name": "Banerji"}}, {"text": "Shambunath Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5985, "end_char": 6006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By his award dated 24-6-1953, Shri Banerji, the Industrial Tribunal, held (1) that there were no grounds for revising the scale of pay of the clerical and sub-staff; (2) that the pay of checkers should be increased and that they should be paid ac- _ cording to the scale as set out in his award; (3) that the profits of the Company did not warrant the grant of any bonus in addition to what had been paid by the Company; and (4) that of the four employees, Shambunath Chatterjee should be re-employed as a\n\n:ihecker on his old pay, that Ashimananda Banerjee a.nd Panchanan Rana should be \"re-employed in posts equivalent to their own posts as new incumbents\" and that Joydeb Banerjee was not entitled either to reinstatement or compensation."}}, {"text": "29-4-1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6378, "end_char": 6387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its decision dated 29-4-1955 the Appellate Tribunal substantially modified the award of Shri Banerji in favour of the Union."}}, {"text": "Venkatarama AyyarJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6882, "end_char": 6901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It held (1) that the minimum pay of the clerical and sub-staff should be raised, and that corresponding changes should be made in the ceiling level, in the increments and in the scales of pay of other grades of the staff; (2) that the scale of pay of the sarkars and checkers should be increased and incre-\n\nB11rn and Co., Calcutta v.\n\nTheir Employees\n\nBt1rn and Co.,\n\nCalcutta\n\nTheir BmJ>loyees\n\nVenkatarama AyyarJ.\n\nments given as laid down in the award; (3) that the employees should be paid a month's bonus in addition to what had been given to them; and (4) that of the employees, Shambunath Chatterjee, Ashimananda Banerjee and Panchanan Rana should not merely be re-employed but reinsta.ted with continuity of service, and that further Shambunath Chatterjee was entitled to compensation at the rate of six months' basic wages with dearness allowance, As for Joydeb Banerjee, the Appellate Tribunal held that though his reinstatement was not desirable, he was entitled to one year's basic wages with dearness allowance as compensation.", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama AyyarJ."}}, {"text": "Bengal Chamber of Commerce", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8036, "end_char": 8062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1946, the Bengal Chamber of Commerce took up the question of fixing, suitably to the changed conditions brought about by World War II, wages and other terms of service of the employees in industrial concerns, and framed a scheme classifying them under different categories, and fixing scales of pay and dearness allowance for the several categories, and that was brought into force in the Company on 1-10-1946."}}, {"text": "1-10-1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8426, "end_char": 8435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1946, the Bengal Chamber of Commerce took up the question of fixing, suitably to the changed conditions brought about by World War II, wages and other terms of service of the employees in industrial concerns, and framed a scheme classifying them under different categories, and fixing scales of pay and dearness allowance for the several categories, and that was brought into force in the Company on 1-10-1946."}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8930, "end_char": 8941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "60-4-88-2-100 Junior Draftsmen} 92-4-124-2-134 Junior Estimators_\n\nDisputes then arose between Engineering Firms in the State of West Bengal and their employees as regards :fixation of grades, wages and dearness allowance, and by a notification dated 31-10-1947 the Gov.:- ernment referred them to the adjudication of the First Engineering Tribunal."}}, {"text": "31-10-1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9052, "end_char": 9062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "60-4-88-2-100 Junior Draftsmen} 92-4-124-2-134 Junior Estimators_\n\nDisputes then arose between Engineering Firms in the State of West Bengal and their employees as regards :fixation of grades, wages and dearness allowance, and by a notification dated 31-10-1947 the Gov.:- ernment referred them to the adjudication of the First Engineering Tribunal."}}, {"text": "30\"6-1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9302, "end_char": 9311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 30\"6-1948 the Tribunal passed an award, the terms whereof were, in general, less favourable to the employees than those fixed by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and adopted by the Company on 1\"10-1946."}}, {"text": "1\"10-1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9492, "end_char": 9501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 30\"6-1948 the Tribunal passed an award, the terms whereof were, in general, less favourable to the employees than those fixed by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and adopted by the Company on 1\"10-1946."}}, {"text": "17-1-1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9743, "end_char": 9752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While the proceedings were pending before the Engineering Tribunal, disputes arose between various Mercantile Firms in Calcutta and their employees as regards wages, dearness allowance and other terms of service, and by notification dated 17-1-1948 the Government of West Bengal referred them to the adjudication of another Tribunal, called the Mercantile Tribunal."}}, {"text": "26-8-1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9908, "end_char": 9917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Tribunal pronounced its award on 26-8-1949, and the scale of pay provided therein for - the lower categories of employees was as follows:\n\nGrade D .... Rs."}}, {"text": "18-1-1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10983, "end_char": 10992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Company having declined to accept it, there arose an industrial dispute, and by a notification dated 18-1-1950, the Governmt>nt of West Bengal referred the same for adjudication to one Shri Palit, District Judge."}}, {"text": "Palit", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11072, "end_char": 11077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Company having declined to accept it, there arose an industrial dispute, and by a notification dated 18-1-1950, the Governmt>nt of West Bengal referred the same for adjudication to one Shri Palit, District Judge.", "canonical_name": "Palit"}}, {"text": "12-6-1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11749, "end_char": 11758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By his award dated 12-6-1950 Shri Palit held that the nature of the work and the qualifications of the clerical staff were not the same in all business establishments, that the clerks in mercantile concerns were better qualified and had to do more onerous work than the members of the Union, that the latter could not be put in the same position as the former, and that the scale of pay fixed in the scheme of the Bengal Chamber of Com- ."}}, {"text": "Palit", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11764, "end_char": 11769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By his award dated 12-6-1950 Shri Palit held that the nature of the work and the qualifications of the clerical staff were not the same in all business establishments, that the clerks in mercantile concerns were better qualified and had to do more onerous work than the members of the Union, that the latter could not be put in the same position as the former, and that the scale of pay fixed in the scheme of the Bengal Chamber of Com- .", "canonical_name": "Palit"}}, {"text": "Bengal Chamber of Com- . merce", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12144, "end_char": 12174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By his award dated 12-6-1950 Shri Palit held that the nature of the work and the qualifications of the clerical staff were not the same in all business establishments, that the clerks in mercantile concerns were better qualified and had to do more onerous work than the members of the Union, that the latter could not be put in the same position as the former, and that the scale of pay fixed in the scheme of the Bengal Chamber of Com- ."}}, {"text": "section 19(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12877, "end_char": 12890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Disputes Act XIV of 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12909, "end_char": 12933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13002, "end_char": 13015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Disputes Act XIV of 1947", "statute": "Disputes Act XIV of 1947"}}, {"text": "12-7-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13214, "end_char": 13223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Acting on this provision, the Union issued a notice to the Company on 12-7-1951 being exactly one year from the date of publication of Shri Palit's award dated 12-6-1950, declaring its intention not to be bound by it."}}, {"text": "Akroyd", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14465, "end_char": 14471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It then referred to the opinion of Dr. Akroyd that an intake of 2,600 calories of food was necessary for efficiency of work, quoted some decisions of the Labour Tribunal in which the minimum pay of the clerical staff had been fixed at Rs."}}, {"text": "Section 19(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16520, "end_char": 16533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 19(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16789, "end_char": 16802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16921, "end_char": 16934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17959, "end_char": 17969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Vide Broom", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18252, "end_char": 18262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vide Broom's Legal Maxims, Tenth Edition, page 218). \""}}, {"text": "Lawrence Jenkins", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18357, "end_char": 18373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rule of res judicata is dictated\" observed Sir Lawrence Jenkins, C.J. in Sheoparsan Singh v. Ramnandan Prasad Singh(1) \"by a wisdom which is for all time\"."}}, {"text": "section 19(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19058, "end_char": 19071, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "L.R. 43 I.A. 91", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 19265, "end_char": 19280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Burn and Co., Calcutta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19310, "end_char": 19332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Burn and Co., Calcutta v.\n\nTheir Employees\n\nVenkatara, na Ayyar J,\n\nmere stage in the prosecution of a prolonged struggle, and far from bringing industrial peace, the awards would turn out to bt; i but truces giving the parties breathing time before resuming hostile action with renewed vigour.", "canonical_name": "Burn and Co.,\n\nCalcutta"}}, {"text": "Sbri Palit", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21747, "end_char": 21757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the principles stated above, therefore, the award of Sbri Palit should not be disturbed."}}, {"text": "Mercantile Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22867, "end_char": 22886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before Shri Palit, the Company contended that the scale fixed in the award of the Engineering Tribunal should form the basis of fixation of the pay scale of the Union, and though the Tribunal held that the award was not as such binding on the Union, it agreed with the Company that it was the scale fixed therein and not that fixed in the award of the Mercantile Tribunal that was more appropriate to the clerical staff of an Engineering concern, and adopted the scale fixed by the Company on 31-10-1946 as being \"slightly in advance of the terms contained in the Engineering Tribunal's award\"."}}, {"text": "31-10-1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23008, "end_char": 23018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before Shri Palit, the Company contended that the scale fixed in the award of the Engineering Tribunal should form the basis of fixation of the pay scale of the Union, and though the Tribunal held that the award was not as such binding on the Union, it agreed with the Company that it was the scale fixed therein and not that fixed in the award of the Mercantile Tribunal that was more appropriate to the clerical staff of an Engineering concern, and adopted the scale fixed by the Company on 31-10-1946 as being \"slightly in advance of the terms contained in the Engineering Tribunal's award\"."}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24091, "end_char": 24095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is the realisation of this fact that must have led Mr. Bose, counsel for the Company, to raise at a late stage of the hearing of the appeal the contention that the cost of living index ofthe Bengal ChamberofCommerce which was adopted by the Company was different from that of the Government."}}, {"text": "Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24387, "end_char": 24390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But this contention went against the admission made by Mr. Sen on behalf of the Company at an earlier stage, and was rightly rejected by the Appellate Tribunal, and that was abandoned before us."}}, {"text": "Banerii", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31928, "end_char": 31935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of the Appellate Tribunal awarding an additional one month's basic wages as bonus is neither legal nor just and must be set aside and the award of Shri Banerii as regards bonus restored.", "canonical_name": "Banerji"}}, {"text": "S. N. Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32065, "end_char": 32081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(4) It remains to deal with the question of the reinstatement and/or compensation of four employees, S. N. Chatterjee, Ashimananda Banerjee, Panchanan Rana and J oydeb Banerjee.", "canonical_name": "S. N.\n\nChatterjee"}}, {"text": "J oydeb Banerjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32124, "end_char": 32140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(4) It remains to deal with the question of the reinstatement and/or compensation of four employees, S. N. Chatterjee, Ashimananda Banerjee, Panchanan Rana and J oydeb Banerjee.", "canonical_name": "J oydeb Banerjee"}}, {"text": "Burn and Co.,\n\nCalcutta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32356, "end_char": 32379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Burn and Co.,\n\nCalcutta v.\n\nTheir Employees\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nBurn and Co.,\n\nCalcutta v.\n\nTheir Employees\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J,\n\nto S. N. Chatterjee and one year's basic wages with dearness allowance to Joydeb Banerjee and by providing that S. N. Chatterjee, Ashimananda Banerjee and Panchanan Rana should not merely be re-employed but reinstated with continuity of service.", "canonical_name": "Burn and Co.,\n\nCalcutta"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32780, "end_char": 32789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32975, "end_char": 32990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33410, "end_char": 33425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7(i)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33622, "end_char": 33637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(oo)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33919, "end_char": 33932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7(1)(b)(vii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33994, "end_char": 34014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "24th December 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34135, "end_char": 34153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But this Act came into force on the 24th December 1953, and as there is nothing in it giving retrospective operation to this definition, the rights of the parties to the present appeal would remain unaffected by it."}}, {"text": "24th October 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34510, "end_char": 34527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V of 1953, wherein also retrenchment was defined as induding, subject to exceptions all termination of service; but that also came into force only on the 24th October 1953, whereas the present appeal was filed on 19-8-1953."}}, {"text": "19-8-1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34569, "end_char": 34578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V of 1953, wherein also retrenchment was defined as induding, subject to exceptions all termination of service; but that also came into force only on the 24th October 1953, whereas the present appeal was filed on 19-8-1953."}}, {"text": "section 7(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36013, "end_char": 36028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36176, "end_char": 36191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36512, "end_char": 36523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36622, "end_char": 36633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Venkatara1na Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36953, "end_char": 36971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bum and Co., Calcutta v.\n\nTheir Enifaloyees\n\nVenkatara1na Ayyar J.\n\norder of the Appellate Tribunal modifying it is sound.", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama AyyarJ."}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37944, "end_char": 37955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Asbimananda Banerjee was arrested by the Government under the West Bengal Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37962, "end_char": 38048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "25-1-1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38075, "end_char": 38084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Asbimananda Banerjee was arrested by the Government under the West Bengal Security Act and detained in jail from 25-1-1949 to 5-4-1951."}}, {"text": "5-4-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38088, "end_char": 38096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) Asbimananda Banerjee was arrested by the Government under the West Bengal Security Act and detained in jail from 25-1-1949 to 5-4-1951."}}, {"text": "22-4-1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38137, "end_char": 38146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Company terminated his services on 22-4-1949."}}, {"text": "16-11-1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39242, "end_char": 39252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts are that on 16-11-1950 a number of employees participated in an assault on the Works Manager, Mr. Davison, and the Company dismissed fourteen of them on that ground, and Joydeb .Banerjee was one of them."}}, {"text": "Davison", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39328, "end_char": 39335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts are that on 16-11-1950 a number of employees participated in an assault on the Works Manager, Mr. Davison, and the Company dismissed fourteen of them on that ground, and Joydeb .Banerjee was one of them."}}, {"text": "Joydeb .Banerjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39400, "end_char": 39416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts are that on 16-11-1950 a number of employees participated in an assault on the Works Manager, Mr. Davison, and the Company dismissed fourteen of them on that ground, and Joydeb .Banerjee was one of them.", "canonical_name": "J oydeb Banerjee"}}]} {"document_id": "1956_1_800_811_EN", "year": 1956, "text": "Octobe1' 11.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nROHTAS INDUSTRIES LTD. v.\n\nBRIJNANDAN PANDEY.\n\n[1956]\n\n[BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, s. K. DAS and\n\nGOYINDA MENON JJ.]\n\nIndustrial Disp,, te-Temporary employees-Discharge of work men-Application before the Labour Appellate Tribunal-Scope of enquiry-Discretion of the Tribunal-Ind•reme Court of in support of the specific oral authority is his . sole 111dia\n\nsta.tepiet before us on oath. He deposes that he was - authorised by the relation (or pairokar) of the com- Jaganr1adhadasJ. plainant, Attar Singh, (who used to go to him in connection with the appeal) to withdraw the unspent balance from the High Court. He stated that he was unable to give the name of the pairokar but that he was sitting in Court while he was giving evidence before us. The alleged relation or pairokar has not been . examined. as a defence witness. In the proceedings before our learned brother, Bhagwati J., his version on this part of the case is contained in paragraph 8 of his affidavit dated the 5th March, 1956, which is as follows: \"I requested Attar Singh to remit funds for prosecuting appeal on 21-12-51 and with his permililsion wrote to the High Court on 17-1-52 for refund of the balance out of Rs. 750.\n\nThus I received Rs: 242-1-9 from High Court in March, 1952\".\n\nThis clearly indicates that h-is case then was that he had the permission of Attar Singh himself for withdrawal of the balance. But when examined before our learned brother, Bhagwati J., he said as follows:\n\n\"Somebody asked me to get the money from the High Court to meet the expenses. Subsequently I wrote to the High Court\". . In answer to the specific question who that somebody was he said \"I do not remember exactly who it was\".\n\nHe did not then say that he was the complainant's :relation or pairoka.r. In his cross-examination before us he says \"His ·(Attar Singh'a) relation came to me and told me that I should get the money from the High Court\". When further cross-examined with reference to his previous statements he said that when he used the phrase \"with hie permission\" in bis affidavit. he meant to indicate the agent or pair()kar of Attar Singh and when further pressed as to who that relation was and whether he knows his name he was unable\n\n822 StJPREME COURT REPORTS [1!156)\n\n7956 to give any satisfactory answers. His evidence on\n\n1 . Sh . 'M' this part of the case is highly unsatisfactory and can-\n\n\".t; oc.: ofth:n not be accepted. We have no hesitation in coming Supreme court of to the conclusion that he has not proved the specific\n\nIndia oral authority, which he has pleaded, for the withdrawal of the balance amount.\n\nJagannadhadasJ.\n\nWh t • t l' d t f h h a is nex re ie upon. m suppor o t e aut ority is the Vakalatnama exeeuted by Attar Singh in his favour. The vakalatnama is in form No. 3 of the Fifth Schedule of the Supreme \"ourt Rules, 1950,'before their amendment in 1954.\n\nWhat is relied upon is that this form authorises the Agent not only to deposit moneys but also to draw moneys. It isalso urged that an Agent has the power by virtue of the specific wording of the vakalatnama \"to do all things incidental to his acting\" for his client in connection with the appeal. It is urged that the deposit of printing charges and the withdrawal of the unspent ha.lance of the printing charges are all acts incidental to acting for a client in connection with his appeal. On the other side it is pointed out that the form itself indicates that the acting is to be in connection with the work in the Supreme Court since it is headed \"in the Supreme Court of India\" and that the authority arising under this vakala.tnama cannot extend to acts to be da, ne in the Punjab High Court. We do not consider it necessary to decide about the exact scope of the power exercisable under the vakalatnama. with reference to the form that has been employed. There is the outstanding fact in this case that the amount has been in fact paid by Shri 'M' direct into the Punjab High Court on a letter issued by the High Court to him. There is also the fact that the receipt for the said a.mount has been issued by the High Court to him and in his name. There is the further fact that the unspent balance has been paid by the High Court directly to him without requiring any further written power or authority, apparently because he was the depositor and was therefore presumably entitled to withdraw the unspent balance. In view of these facts it would appear that the High Court itself was under the impression that the withdrawal was within the\n\nscope of Shri 'M's authority as an Agent for the ap- 1'56 P. eal in the Supreme Court. This impression, if wrong, 1 . Sh . 'M' - b h d b Sb 'M' n re. rt ' an was one that may well have een s are y n Adoeateofthe equally with the High Court. In these circumstances, supreme Court of while we definitely hold that the specific oral autho- India rity set up has not been proved, it appears to us that - t\" db t k f th\" h JagannadhadaaJ, no serious no ice nee e a en o is c arge.\n\nWhat remains is charge No. 3 which is as follows:\n\n\"That you after receiving tlhe sum of Rs. 242-1-9 in March 1952, retained the said sum, without any intimation to your client Attar Singh and without claiming any amount as due from him by way of fees to you and without lodging a bill for taxation against him for a period of over three years\".\n\nThe questions which require consideration under this charge are (1) whether Shri 'M' intimated Attar Singh about the withdrawal of the unspent balance of printing charges, (2) whether Shri 'M' intimated Attar Singh that any fee remained due and made any demand in that behalf, and (3) whether Shri 'M' was justified in retaining the amount towards fees without lodging a bill for taxation aginst his client.\n\nIt is now necessary to recall the relevant facts and enumer:ate some further facts. Criminal Appeal No. 12 of 1950 was filed into this Court on My 11, 1950, by the Agent, Shri 'M', on the basis of a vakalatnama signed by Attar Singh without date and accepted by Shri 'M' on May 11, 1950. Attar Singh says that when he signed the vaka]atnama there were blanks therein and that after signing, he gave the vakalatnama with the blanks to Sardar Ra.ghbir Singh. It is his evidence that having fixed the engagement with Sardar Raghbit Singh and paid the money into his hands, he went away leaving the actual filing of the appeal, on a later date, to Sardar\n\nRaghbir Singh. Shii 'M' who accepted the vakalatnama on May 11, 1950, and who filed the appeal memorandum into Court on the same date with the signatures thereon, also of Sardar Raghbir Singh and Shri Madan, admits that the blanks in the vakalatnama were filled in by him in his own handwriting. But he says that Attar Singh was also present at the time of\n\n1956 his acceptance of vakalatnama and the filing of the appeal and that Attar Singh then paid him a sum of Jn re: Shri 'M', an • h 1 f \" H Advocate of the Rs. 50 wit out any sett ement o .ees. e says s..preme c0,.rt of further that when he accepted the engagement he was India given to .understand by Sardar Raghbir Singh that - he would be paid reasonable fee. This was at the time JagannadhadasJ. when the appeal was filed in Court and presumably\n\nin the presence of Attar Singh according to him.\n\nAttar Singh denies that he was present or paid Rs. 50 to Shri 'M' at the time of filing the appeal or that he met Shri 'M' at all at the time.\n\nOn his evidence, if accepted, Shri 'M' could have no .expectation of any further payment of fe(ls.\n\nAbout an year later there was the payment of Rs. 750, towards the printing charges.\n\nIt is admitted that the amount was supplied by means of a draft in favour of the Deputy Registrar of the High Court given to Sardar Raghbir Singh, by the brother-in-law of Attar Singh. This wa11 passed on to Shri 'M' who sent it onto the High Court.\n\nA receipt dated July 19, 1951, was issued therefor by the High Court in Shri 'M's name. It is in evidence that the printed record was received in the Supreme Court in December, 1951. Intimation of the same was presumably given to the Agents concerned in due course. Shri 'M' applied to the High Court in Janu, ary, 1952, for refund of the unspent balance of the printing charges and re9eived an amount of Rs. 242-1-9 in March, 1952. The appeal was set down for he:i.ring m May, 1952. It is the evidence of Attar Singh that on receiving intimation that the appeal was coming up for hearing he came down to Delhi from Bombay, where he was employed at the time, and found that Sardar Raghbir Singh had left for China and was not available for arguing the appeal.\n\nHis evidence is that he enquired from the wife of Sardar Raghbir Singh who told him to meet Shri 'M' which he did.\n\nHe says that they came to the conclusion that Shri Umrigar, an Advocate of this Court, was to be engaged to argue the appeal. Thereupon Shri Umrigar was fixed up.\n\nThe appeal was not actually taken up in May, 1952, as expected. The engagements of both Sardar Raghbir Singh and Shri Madan were terminated sometime in August, 1952, by Shri 'M' under 1956 instructions of Attar Singh. The appeal came up for 1: . • Sh . 'M' h ' l\n\n N b 195\" I Sh ' n re. r• ' an earing, a ter on, m ovem er, ::.. t was r1 Adwcate of the Umrigar who argued the appeal.\n\nAdmittedly Shri supreme Court of 'M' was also present at the hearing and instructed India Shri Umrigar. The judgment in the appeal wa-s deli- -. vered on the 5th December, 1952, allowing the appeal JagannadhadasJ. and remanding it for further hearing by the Sessions Court, as an appellate court, on the evidence on record. It would appear that nearly two years later, i.e., on November 24, 1954, Attar Singh applied to the Punjab High Court stating that he had paid Rs. 750 for the printing charges of the record in his appeal and that some balance was lying to his credit out of the said amount and requesting that the same may be remitted to him. He received a reply thereto from the Deputy Registrar of the Punjab High Court dated October 17, 1955, intimatingthat theunspentbalanee of Rs. 242-1-9 was refunded to his counsel, Shri 'M' of the Supreme Court, and advising him to contact him in this behalf. It is in view of this information that Attar Singh ultimately filed on December 5, 1955, a complaint on which the present proceedings were initiated.\n\nThe evidence of Attar Singh on this part of the case is quite simple. He says that some time after the appeal was filed, i.e., in or about January 1951, he went away to Bombay in connection withprivateemployment which he had obtained there and that he came to Delhi again only in May, 1952, on receiving intimation that his appeal was expected to be taken up. He says further that since the appeal was not taken np in May and went beyond the long vacation he got himself transferred to, and remained in, Delhi since about May, 1952.\n\nHe says that he came into direct contact with Shri 'M' only from May, 1952, and that he had not met him till then. It is also his evidence that he was never told by Shri 'M' about the unspent balance being available or of his having withdraiWn the same. He was also not told that any fees had yet to be paid. He was under the impression that no further fee was due to Shri 'M' and that his\n\nIn t'e: Shri 'M', an\n\nAdvoc4te of the Supreme COt, rl of\n\nIndia\n\nJagannadhadas}.\n\nfees must have been paid up at the outset by Sardar Raghbir Singh. There wa~. no demand by Shri 'M' from him at any time for balanceof fees, not even at the time when his appeal was heard by this Court for two or three days. Towards the end of 1954, he was greatly in need of money on account of the further proceedings in his appeal consequent on the remand.\n\nHe then felt that he might enquire from the High Court about the availability of anY. unspent balance out of the printing charges deposited and get back the same and meet his needs. He accordingly wrote a letter to the High Court in November, 1954. He had to send a number' of reminders. He ultimately received the reply dated October 17, 1955, from the High Court nearly an year after his first enquiry.\n\nAccording to Attar Singh, before he wrote to the High Court enquiring about the unspent balance, he approached Shri 'M' and enquired from him. It was on his advice that he wrote to the High Court. His evidence further is that .when he actually received the letter from the Deputy Registrar of the High Court dated October 17, 1955, he again met Shri 'M' about the unspent balance and enquired of him whether he had received the amount, but that Shri 'M' denied having received any money. He says that thereafter he confronted him with the reply he had received from the High Court and that on seeing it Shri 'M' was astonished and told him to come later on. He states. that when he went to him again, Shri 'M' told him that he will return the money after two days, but that ultimately he evaded him. It was after this that at the suggestion of some friends, he lodged the complaint with the Registrar of this Court.\n\nAs against this, Shri 'M's evidence is as follows.\n\nWhen the pri.nted record was received from the High Court, and he got intimation of the same, he wrote a letter dated December 21, 1951, to Attar Singh intimating that the printed record had been received in the Supreme Court, that further steps have to be taken and that he is to supply him with fund!! therefor. He says that thereafter Attar Singh's relation came to him in January, 1952, and told him to write\n\n- '\n\nto the High Court to get a refund of the unspent 7956 balance of the printing charges. He admits that he d h In re: Shri 'M', an received the refund in March, 1952, an says that e Advocate of the appropriated the same towards his fee. He also says s .. preme comt of that when in May, 1952, Attar Singh came in connec- India tion with the expected hearing of the appeal, he told - him about the unspent balance having been received JaeannadhadasJ. by him and that later on, i.e.; after the hearing of the appeal was over, he told him that the bill for the work done by him in connection with the appeal would be about Rs. 500. He denies the versio11 of Attar Singh\n\nthat he was not aware of the unspent balance having been drawn and that for the first time he contacted Shri 'M' in 1954 for the unspent balance and wrote to the High Court on his advice for refund of the balance, if any. He denies specifically that Attar Singh met him in this connection a number of times and wrote reminders to the High Court at his instance.\n\nHe also denies categorically that he was confronted by Attar Singh with the letter received by him from the High Court and that he then told him all that had happened.\n\nThe question before us is which of these versions is to be accepted. Was there any intimation by Shri 'M' to Attar Singh that he withdrew the unspent balance and did he demand from him the alleged balance of fees?\n\nAdmittedly, there was no written intimation and no specific written demand. The orily writing from himself to his client that Shri 'M' relies on, is a letter dated December 21, 1951. He produces an alleged copy thereof which is as follows:\n\n\"S. Attar Singh\n\nC/o Gurdwara Sisganj, Delhi.\n\nDear Sir,\n\nYour appeal pending in the Supreme Court No. 12 of 1950 is ripe for further step.s as the record has been printed and despatched by the High Court, Simla.\n\nNow you haveto supply me withfundsfordrafting petition of appeal, statement of case, affidavits of service of notices and typing charges.\n\nIn re: Shri 'M', an\n\nAdvocate of the\n\nSuprme Court of\n\nIndia\n\nJagannadliadasJ,\n\nSince the record has reached the Supreme Court on 12th December 1951, you are to file petition within 30 days of receipt of this date.\n\nPlease treat this as very urgent, otherwise the appeal shall be dismissed for non-prosecution\".\n\nIt may be notiCed that the wordng of this letter does not in terms state that what is \"being demanded is his own fees, Paragraph2 of the letter may well be understood by a lay-man, as asking for nothing more than expenses to be incul'red. Attar Singh deposes that he never received the letter. It is clear from the evidence that Attar Singh was not in Delhi at the time and it is cur.ions that the letter is addressed to him at Sisganj Gurdwara, Delhi. Shri 'M' has been cross-examined on this and in our opinion, he has not been able to give any satisfactory explanation. He says that the address was furnished by SardBr Raghbir Singh. E.ut Sardar Raghbir Singh was not asked about it.\n\nAssuming the letter to be true, it is obvious that.it would not have been received by Attar Singh. Clearly no money has been remitted, nor any written communication received, in response to this letter.. If the letter is true, one would have\" expected some further letter to have been written to him with the correct address on proper enquiry.\n\nIt is to get over this difficulty that the story has been put forward by Sbri 'M' of a relation of Attar Singh having contacted him in January, 1952, and instructing him to withdraw the unspent balance, if any, of the printing charges.\n\nThere is nothing to show that these alleged instructions were by way of response to the above letter. It is not a little surprising that the said relation does not appear to have cared to ascertain whether any money was in fact available or was received . . But it is unnecessary to dwell on this any further because we have already noticed the entire evidence relating to these alleged instructions of the relation and seen bow unsatisfactory it is. We are clearly of the opinion that the story of instructions by the relation is wholly unreliable.\n\nIn that view, assuming, without deciding that the letter of December 21, 19.51, is true, it is all the more significant that there are no\n\nfurther reminders to Attar Singh to his correct 7956 address right up to May, 1952, i.e., when the appeal 1 . Sh . 'M' b d h • h h . th . 1 n re. r• ' an ecame rea y 1.or earing, t oug m e m terva Ad'1ocat• of tile Attar Singh was not in Delhi.\n\nIt is also surprising supreme Court of that even after the disposal of the appeal and up to India the stage of the complaint, Shri 'M' did not make any - written demand or send any bill for the fees to Attar JagannadhadasJ, Singh.\n\nIt is only in the reply dated December 16, 1955 to the complaint, filed before our learned brother, Bbagwati, J., by Attar Singh that a referece is made to his bill of about Rs. 550 against Attar Singh for the work done by him on his behalf.\n\nThe bill was in fact produced at a later date on March 5, 1956, along with his affidavit filed before Bhagwati, J. In paragraph 9 of that affidavit he says \"I1 as agent, had lien over the sum of Rs. 242-1-9 which was appropriated towards my bill for Rs. 542-15-9 (herewith attached). Rs. 250 is still due to me from Attar Singh\". That bill has also been marked before us as an exhibit on behalf of Shri 'M'.\n\nIt is the evidence of Shri 'M', as already stated, that when he accepted the engagement he was given to understand that be would be paid a reasonable fee but that there was no settlement at the time.\n\nHe is not very clear in his evidence what was the aggregate reasonable fee which he was entitled to. But from the statement in his evidence that he informed his client after the appeal was finished, that his bill would be Rs. 500 it may be presumed that his case is that he was entitled to the amount of his bill as exhibited.\n\nIf so, there should have been no difficulty in his applying to the Court for taxation against his client.\n\nWe have been informed that such a course is permissible under orders of the Court, even in a criminal matter. But Shri 'M' admits that he took no such step in spite of the fact that a large and substantial balance should have been due to him according to his case.\n\nWhen asked to explain why he did not do so, his answer is as follows:\n\n\"Because the appeal was remanded and it is a general practice here that when the case is finished the clients do pay the balance.\n\nSo we do not'insist 10$\n\n- 1956\n\nfurther.\n\nGenerally when the appeal or a matter is finished I do not make complaints or file suits or do Iii re: Shri 'M', an Advocate of the anything for the balance of fees because mostly these supreme court of matters create fuss.\n\nI did not, in this matter, press India for the balance\". - It may be noticed that in the bill the total of the JagannadhadasJ. items of out-of-pocket expenses is Rs. 22-15-6, leaving a balance of Rs. 27-0-6 out of the amount of Rs. 50, which on his own showing, he' had received from his client.\n\nAll the rest of the bill submitted by him is a claim for fees for various items of work said to have been done. If it be true, as he says, that he sent in December, 1951, a letter to Attar Singh demanding fees, it is all the more surprising that he never made any further written demand either during the pendency of the appeal or at least sent a bill after the disposal thereof, for the balance of the fees, whether or not he would have felt it advisable later on to take the matter to court for taxation. This admitted inaction renders it probable that, having obtained the refund of a substantial amount of over Rs. 200 after December, 1951, without the specific oral instructions or the knowledge of his client or his agent-as we have already found-he has kept discreetly silent, without intimating to the client the fact of his having received the balance and without making a demand against him for the fees. It is only now that he claims a lien on the said amount for a bill which he puts forward, and pleads justification for the retention and appropriation of the amount on the basis of that bill. Learned counsel for Shri 'M' very strongly urges that the evidence of Attar Singh that he was not informed by Sbri 'M' about having obtained refund of the unspent balance and that at no time was any demand made to his knowledge for the balance of fees should be rejected as being utterly improbable.\n\nHe urges that the evidence of Shri 'M' that he orally intimated to him the fact of his having obtained refund of the unspent balance, and of his making constant oral demands for the balance of fees should be accepted. He suggests that it is Attar Singh who discreetly evaded raising the question abou.t the balance\n\nof fees due, with full knowledge that some amount 7956 had already been received by Shri 'M' and that a 1 S-h\n\n. 'M' d l n re: ri , au much larger amount wo1Jld be found ue on a regu ar Advocate of the bill. He urges that ifthere is no reasonable proof of supreme Court of the arrangement that Shri 'M' was to receive only India Rs. 100 and of the fact of payment thereof, it is very -. - unlikely that a professional gentleman like Shri 'M' JagannadhadasJ, would go on working in the appeal without making even an oral demand for fees unless he was permitted by the client to withdraw and appropriate the amount.\n\nHe strongly urges that the conduct of Attar Singh himself on this part of the case gives room for considerable suspicion. It is pointed out that though the appeal was disposed of in December, 1952, he makes no enquiry for the unspent balance until after nearly two years. It is urged that he has no satisfactory account how he then came to know that there was a balance at all, the payment of which he might obtain from the High Court. It is submitted tliat his story that it was at the instance of Shri 'M' himself that he wrote to the Punjab High Court making enquiries about the balance is utterly improbable. We are not, however, impressed with the soundness of these comments.\n\nWe see no difficulty in accepting the explanation of Attar Singh that he came to think of the possibility of obtaining the unspent balance, if any, which may be available to him, only when he was hard-pressed for money for 1; he further conduct of his criminal appeal as a resuilt of the remand.\n\nIt may or may not be that the letters of Attar Singh to the Punjab High Court enquiring about the unspent balance were written on the advice of Shri 'M', but the fact remains that for an adequate reason as given by him he did start enquiries in this behalf so late as two years after the disposal of the appeal.\n\nOn this part of the case what is really significant is that at the earliest opportunity which Shri 'M' had, he did not put forward his present specific case, of intimation of the refund and of demand of the fees.\n\nPara 5 of the complaint of Attar Singh dated December 5, 1955, states as follows:\n\n\"I had throughout been making enquiries from\n\nIn re: Shri •M•, an\n\ndvocate of the Supreme Court of India\n\nJagannadhadas/,\n\nShri 'M' and he has consistently denied having received any money from the High Court\".\n\nIn his reply dated December 16, 1955, Shri 'M' has contented himself with a bare denial as follows:\n\n\"Para 5 of the application is emphatically denied and not admitted\".\n\nEven in his later statement, in the form of an affidavit dated March 5, 1956, filed before Bhagwati, J. all that he says is that \"on December 21, 1951, he requested Attar Singh to remit funds for prosecuting the appeal and that with his permission wrote to the High Court on January 17, 1952, for the refund of the balance. He has attempted to explain that by \"his permission\" he meant \"his pairokar's permission\". We have found that, on the evidence and probabilities, the story of pairokar's permission cannot be accepted as reliable. The story of his having directly informed Attar Singh about his having got the balance occurs for the first time in the crossexamination before Bhagwati, J., wherein he says that he told him about it at the time of the hearing of the appeal. But even there he says that he did not at that time ask for anything further. There he admits that it is only when Attar Singh asked him to refund the money that he told him that he should pay him the balance due. Now, it is in this Court in the cross-examination of Attar Singh that the story of his having informed Attar Singh about his obtain .. ing from the High Court refund of the unspent balance and of his having dema:nded the fees due to him, all at the time of hearing of the appeal,-has been put forward in the following questions and answers.\n\n\"Q. In fact, at the time when your appeal was heard Mr. 'M' had told you that Rs. 242, had been recovered from the High Court?\n\nA. It is far from true.\n\nHe also told you that his fees has got to be paid?\n\nNo.\n\nYou said nothing about it because you knew that more fees than Rs. 242 would be due to Mr. 'M'!\n\nThe question does not arise\".\n\nThe further cross-examination of Attar Singh is as 1956 follows.\n\nIn re: Sliri 'M•, an \"Q. I am putting it to you that your talk that Advocate of the you showed the letter of the !\"7th October, 1955 to s .. preme co,, rt of Mr. 'M' is a pure fabrication?\n\nIndia A.\n\nNo, it is correct. - Q. I will tell you what. had happened. You had JagannadhadasJ. asked 'M', 'M' had told you (this is my case) that he had recovered Rs. 242 and when you said 'what about Rs. 242' he said 'you have got to pay my fees', which would come to much more, and therefore thereafter there was no further talk between you both?\n\nNothing was talked by Mr. 'M' to me then, nor up till now\".\n\nThis belated case about intimation of withdrawal of unspent balance and about demand for fees having been made at the time of the hearing of the appeal, cannot be accepted as true.. His admission before Bhagwati, J. that even at the time of the hearing of the appeal (which admittedly took two or three days) he did not ask for anything further must be accepted as correct. If so that would make it very probable that the first information to Attar Singh about the fact of Shri 'M' having obtained refund of the unspent balance of the printing charges was only when the High Court intimated the same to him. It follows that the first oral demand for the fees by Shri\n\n'M' to Attar Singh, may have been when he was confronted with the letter of the High Court. This is what he admitted in the enquiry before Bhagwa.ti, J.\n\nIt may further be noticed that Shri 'M' states in his evidence as follows:\n\n\"After I received this money (unspent balance) I appropriated it towards my fee. There was no settlement of fees between me and my client. Raghbir Singh never told me that I should get only Rs. 50 or Rs. 100\".\n\nHe was cross-examined whether the appropriation was with the consent of the client, as appears from the following.\n\n\"Q. Coming to May, 1952, when you said you told the client that you had received money did you\n\n7956 tell him that you appropriated the money.\n\n1 , , A.\n\nYes. n re: Shri M, an Adre\"'e Court_pJ_ of the client on the termination of the case. It is India urged that on this view his action is bona fide. It is - pointed out that while, it may be, that such conduct JagannadhadasJ. is not consistent with the highest professional standards, it cannot be treated as amounting to professional misconduct. It is urged the.tit is not every conduct which may be considered unjustifiable or improper that amounts to professional! misconduct if in fact the agent or advocate honestly believed that he was justified in adopting the course he did so long as such a course is not, in terms, prohibited by any positive rules framed by competent authority to regulate the conduct of agents and advocates in such matters. We are unable to accept this contention. As has been laid down by this Court In the matter of Mr. 'G', a Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court (supra) \"the Court, in dealing with cases of profesisional misconduct is not concerned with ordinary legal rights, but with the special and rigid rules of professional conduct expected of and applied to a specially privileged class of persons who, because of their privileged status, are subject to curtain disabilities which do not attach to other men and which do not attach even to them in a non-professional character\" ................. \"He (a legal practitioner) is bound to conduct himself in a manner befitting the high and honourable profession to whose privileges he has so long been admitted; and if he departs from the high standards which that profession has set for itself and demands of him in professional matters, he is liable to disciplinary action\".\n\nIt appears to us that the fact of there being no specific rules governing the particufar situation, which we are dealing with, on the facts found by us, is not any reason for accepting a less rigid standard. If any, the absence of rules increases the responsibility of the mem hers of the profession attached to this Court as to how they should conduct themselves in such situations, having regard to the very high privilege that\n\n1956 an Advocate of this Court now enjoys as one entitled,\n\n1 Sh . 'M under the law, to practice in all the courts in India.\n\nnA; oca;; 01 ;;.:n We are conscious that at the time when the relevant Sufe'cme Court of facts happened in this case Shri 'M' was only an Agent.\n\nIndia But at the time when he was confronted with the Jetter . - of the Punjab High Court intimating receipt of the JagannadhadasJ. unspent balance, he had already become an Advocate on record and we haye to deal with this case with reference to rule 30 of Order IV of the amended Supreme Court Rules. That rule says \"Where .... the Court is of opinion that an Advocate has been guilty of misconduct or of conduct unbecoming of an Advocate, the Court may take disciplinary ?-Ction as provided therein\". Even under rules 31and32 of Order IV of the Supreme Court Rules prior to the amendment, the position would be the same in so far as a matter of the kind with which we are dealing is concerned. It is true that under rule 32 of the old rules which refers to drsciplinary action against agents, the phrase \"conduct unbecoming of an Advocate\" is not to be found. But that is probably only because in certain matters the Agent's position in relation to his client may differ from that of an Advocate. But we have no reason to think that in respect of a matter such as the one we are concerned with, the standard applicable to an Agent or to a present \"Advocate on record\" is anything different.\n\nWe have no doubt in our mind that the high standards of the profession demand that when the moneys of the client come into the possession of an Agent or an Advocate, otherwise than as earmarked fees, he has to treat himself as in the position of a trustee for the client in respect of the said moneys. Even if he has a lien on such moneys, jt would be improper for him to retain, i.e., to appropriate the same towards his fees without the consent, express or implied, of his client or without an order of the Court. It may be that in certain circumstancs he is entitled to exercise a lien, but he has to give reasonable intimation both of the fact of moneys having come. into his hands and of the exercise of his lien over them until his account is settled. If there has been no prior settlement of fees he ca.nnot constitute\n\n- -\n\nhimself a judge in his own cause as to what would be 1956 the reasonable fee payable to him. This position of r,\n\n. ;;;;-:.M, trusteeship in respect of moneys of the client in his ::i:aca:O' 01 th:n\n\nhands is all the greater where the moneys represent supreme Courlol the unspent balance of what was given for a specific India purpose, such as for payment of printing ch&rges, as - . in this case. On any such unspent balance, it is well JagannadhadasJ. settled, that he has no lien either under the common law or by the statute. (See Cordery's Law relating to Solicitors, 4th Edition, page 456 and Halsbury's Laws of England, 2nd E:dition, Vol. 31, page 239, para 265). In this case it appears to us that the retention and appropriation of the money by Shri 'M' without intimation to the elient and without sending a bill to him for his fees or applying for taxation even after disposal of the appeal constitutes professional misconduct. This is aggravated by the facts emerging from the evidence of Attar Singh who, Shri\n\n'M' admits, has no animus against him, and whose evidence on this part of the cas.e we see no reason not to accept. That evidence show13 that when in 1954 Attar Singh enquired of Shri 'M' he denied knowledge of the unspent balance and that when confronted with the letter received from the Punjab High Court be admitted receipt and demanded fees but evaded the situation without fairly and frankly facing it.\n\nShri 'M' appears to have been enrolled as an Agent in 1949 and he says that when, at the instance of Shri Madan and Sardar Raghhir Singh he accepted the engagement in May, 1950, it was his third or fourth engagement as Agent. There may, no doubt, be cases where an unscrupulous client may take advantage of and exploit a. beginner in the llegal profession. But we are satisfied that this is not such a case.\n\nWe are clearly of the opinion that Shri 'M' is guilty of professional misconduct. We direct that he should be suspended from practice foir a period of two years.\n\nOrder accordingly.\n\n101)", "total_entities": 92, "entities": [{"text": "IN RE: SHRI 'M', AN ADVOCATE OF\n\nTHE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 300, "end_char": 359, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "IN RE: SHRI 'M', AN ADVOCATE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 363, "end_char": 376, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M' JagannadhadasJ", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. 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K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2341, "end_char": 2350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Brijnat1dan\n\nPandey\n\nS. K. Das}."}}, {"text": "[1955) 1 S.C.R. 490", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3180, "end_char": 3199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 251", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3430, "end_char": 3436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3459, "end_char": 3485, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Order 4, Rule 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3680, "end_char": 3696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court Rules, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3704, "end_char": 3729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Purshottam Tricumdas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3745, "end_char": 3765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Tricumdas, B. B. Tawakley, G. G.\n\nMathur and K. P. Gupta, for the Advocate."}}, {"text": "B. B. Tawakley", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3767, "end_char": 3781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Tricumdas, B. B. Tawakley, G. G.\n\nMathur and K. P. Gupta, for the Advocate."}}, {"text": "G. G.\n\nMathur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3783, "end_char": 3796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Tricumdas, B. B. Tawakley, G. G.\n\nMathur and K. P. Gupta, for the Advocate."}}, {"text": "K. P. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3801, "end_char": 3812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purshottam Tricumdas, B. B. Tawakley, G. G.\n\nMathur and K. P. Gupta, for the Advocate."}}, {"text": "M. G. Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3833, "end_char": 3847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. G. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, and B. Sen Assisting the Court."}}, {"text": "B. Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3881, "end_char": 3887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. G. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, and B. Sen Assisting the Court."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court Rules, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4072, "end_char": 4097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "January 26, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4268, "end_char": 4284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJAGANNADHADAS J.-These proceedings before us arise out of a summons under Order IV, rule 30 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1950, (as amended) issued to Shri 'M', who was originally an Agent of this Court and became an \"Advocate on recQrd\" under the new rules of this Court which came into force on January 26, 1954."}}, {"text": "Attar Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4471, "end_char": 4482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It arises on a complaint against him made to the Registrar of this Court by one Attar Singh on December 5, 1955.", "canonical_name": "Attar - Singh"}}, {"text": "December 5, 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4486, "end_char": 4502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It arises on a complaint against him made to the Registrar of this Court by one Attar Singh on December 5, 1955."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5544, "end_char": 5552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This complaint was in the usual course put up before his Lordship the Chief Justice who directed the Chamber-Judge, our learned brother, Bhagwati, J., to enquire into it.", "canonical_name": "Bhagwa.ti,"}}, {"text": "supreme Court of Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6949, "end_char": 6983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "oc;;, of ; h:\" tion had been duly taken against the Advocate by the\n\nsupreme Court of Bombay High Court in connection with alleged mis- ."}}, {"text": "JagannadhadasJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7130, "end_char": 7145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The summons issued to the Advocate by this Court was with refer- JagannadhadasJ. ence to the same matter but as regards his position\n\nas a Supreme Court Advocate. (", "canonical_name": "M' JagannadhadasJ"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court Rules", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7791, "end_char": 7810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was said that under Order IV, rule 30 of the Supreme Court Rules, the enquiry was to follow a summons which is contemplated as the first step therein."}}, {"text": "May 9, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8402, "end_char": 8413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We accordingly directed by our orders dated May 9, 1956, and September 13, 1956, that evidence should be taken afresh before us and that procedure, substantially as in .a warrant case, should be adopted as far as possible under the amended section 251-A of the Criminal Procedure Code, subject to such modifications therein as may appear to be just and expedient in the circumstances of this case and without affecting the rules of natural justice."}}, {"text": "September 13, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8419, "end_char": 8437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We accordingly directed by our orders dated May 9, 1956, and September 13, 1956, that evidence should be taken afresh before us and that procedure, substantially as in .a warrant case, should be adopted as far as possible under the amended section 251-A of the Criminal Procedure Code, subject to such modifications therein as may appear to be just and expedient in the circumstances of this case and without affecting the rules of natural justice."}}, {"text": "section 251", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8598, "end_char": 8609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9299, "end_char": 9304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But it is as well to mention that, India in our opinion, the terms of Order IV, rule 30 of the - Supreme Court Rules do not preclude us from adopt- JagannadhadasJ. ing this course, including the reframing of, or adding to, the charges specified in the original summons, where the material at the preliminary enquiry justifies the same."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9361, "end_char": 9380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of India", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11129, "end_char": 11151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In re: Shri 'M', an\n\nAdvocate of the Supreme Court of India\n\nJ a gannatlhahs J.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS rrn56J\n\nThe undisputed facts are as follows."}}, {"text": "Attar Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11258, "end_char": 11269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The complainant, Attar Singh, engaged a Senior Advocate of this Court, Sardar RaghbirSingh, who associated with himself Shri M. K. Madan as the Junior Advocate and Shri 'M' as the Agent in the case.", "canonical_name": "Attar - Singh"}}, {"text": "Sardar RaghbirSingh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11312, "end_char": 11331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The complainant, Attar Singh, engaged a Senior Advocate of this Court, Sardar RaghbirSingh, who associated with himself Shri M. K. Madan as the Junior Advocate and Shri 'M' as the Agent in the case.", "canonical_name": "Sardar Ra.ghbir Singh"}}, {"text": "M. K. Madan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11366, "end_char": 11377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The complainant, Attar Singh, engaged a Senior Advocate of this Court, Sardar RaghbirSingh, who associated with himself Shri M. K. Madan as the Junior Advocate and Shri 'M' as the Agent in the case."}}, {"text": "M' as the Agent in the case.", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11411, "end_char": 11439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The complainant, Attar Singh, engaged a Senior Advocate of this Court, Sardar RaghbirSingh, who associated with himself Shri M. K. Madan as the Junior Advocate and Shri 'M' as the Agent in the case."}}, {"text": "Sardar Raghbir Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12489, "end_char": 12509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He approached Sardar Raghbir Singh, Senior Advocate, through a relation of his and requested him to arrange for the conduct of the appeal on his behalf and to accllpt therefor a fee of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Sardar Ra.ghbir Singh"}}, {"text": "Raghbir Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13521, "end_char": 13534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ar ar Advocate of the Raghbir Singh and Shri Madan have also been exasupreme Courl of mined to substantiate it: The evidence of Sardar India Raghbir Singh is that he was approached by Attar - Singh through a common friend, that he was asked to JagannadhadasJ. accept a consolidated fee of Rs."}}, {"text": "Madan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13544, "end_char": 13549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ar ar Advocate of the Raghbir Singh and Shri Madan have also been exasupreme Courl of mined to substantiate it: The evidence of Sardar India Raghbir Singh is that he was approached by Attar - Singh through a common friend, that he was asked to JagannadhadasJ. accept a consolidated fee of Rs."}}, {"text": "Sardar India Raghbir Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13627, "end_char": 13653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ar ar Advocate of the Raghbir Singh and Shri Madan have also been exasupreme Courl of mined to substantiate it: The evidence of Sardar India Raghbir Singh is that he was approached by Attar - Singh through a common friend, that he was asked to JagannadhadasJ. accept a consolidated fee of Rs."}}, {"text": "Attar - Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13683, "end_char": 13696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ar ar Advocate of the Raghbir Singh and Shri Madan have also been exasupreme Courl of mined to substantiate it: The evidence of Sardar India Raghbir Singh is that he was approached by Attar - Singh through a common friend, that he was asked to JagannadhadasJ. accept a consolidated fee of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Attar - Singh"}}, {"text": "Attar Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14691, "end_char": 14702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence of these three persons, Attar Singh, Sarin Chander form the necessary intention aforesaid.\n\nJaisinghbhai Shah\n\nDesertion is a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of each case a.nd those facts have to be viewed as to the purpose which is revealed by those facts or by conduct and expression of intention, both anterior and subsequent to the actual act of separation.\n\nIn a suit for divorce on the ground of desertion the burden is on the plaintiff to prove that the deserting spouse has been in desertion throughout the statutory period of four yea.rs.\n\nThomas v. Thomas ([1924] l'. 194), Bowron v. Bowron ([19115] P. 187), Pratt v. Pratt ([1939] A.O. 417) and Lang v. Lang ([1955]\n\nA.O. 402), referred to.\n\nQuaere, whether the statutory period of four years specified in s. 3(1)(d) should immediately precede the institution of the suit for\n\ndivorce.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 247 of 1953.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated August 22, 1952 of the Bombay High Court in Appeal No. 66 of 1952 arising out of the decree dated March 7, 19t>2 of Bombay High Court in its Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction in Suit\n\nNo. 1177 of 1951.\n\nM. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, Purshottam Tricumdas, T. God, iwala, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and S. N. Andley, for the appellant.\n\n0. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India and Sardar Bahadur, for the reE1pondent.\n\n1956. October 19. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSINHA J.-This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay dated August 22, 1952, reversing those of a single Judge of that Court on the Original Side, dated March 7-, 1952, by which he had granted a decree for dissolution of marriage between the appellant and the respondent.\n\nP.-abhawati\n\n1956 The facts and circumstances of this case may be Bp Ch d .stated as follows: The appellant, who was the plain-\n\nJai:i~; hbh:;• s:ah tiff, and the respondent were married at Pa tan on v.\n\nApril 20, 1942, according to Hindu rites of the Jain Prabhawati Community. The families of both the parties belong to Pa tan, which is a town in Gujarat, about a night's rail journey from Bombay. They lived in Bombay Sinha}.\n\nin a two-room flat which was in occupation of the >\"\n\nappellant's family consisting of his parents and, his two sisters, who occupied the larger room called the hall, and the plaintiff and the defendant who occupied the smaller room called the kitchen. The appellant's mother who is a patient of asthma lived mostly at Pa tan. There fa an issue of the marriage, a son named Kirit, born on September 10, 1945. The defendant's parents lived mostly at J algaon in the East Khandesh district in Bombay. The parties appear to have lived happily in Bombay until a third party named Mahendra, a friend of the family came upon the scene and began to live with the family in their Bombay flat some time in 1946, after his discharge from the army. On January 8, 1947, the appellant left for England on business. It was the plaintiff's case that during his absence from Bombay the defendant. became intimate with the said Mahendra and when she went to Patan after the plaintiff's departure for England she carried on \"amorous correspondence\" with Mahendra who continued to stay with the plaintiff's family in Bombay. One of the letters written by the defendant to Mahendra while staying at the plaintiff's flat in Bombay, is Ex. E as officially translated in English, the original being in Gujera ti except a few words written in fatilty English.\n\nThis letter is dated April 1, 1947, written from the plaintiff's house at Patan, where the defendant had been staying with her mother-in-law.\n\nThis letter had been annexed to the plaint with the official translation. It was denied by the defendant in her written statement.\n\nBut at the trial her counsel admitted it to have been written by her to Mahendra.\n\nAs this letter started all the trouble between the parties to this litigation, it will have to be set out in extenso hereinafter. Continuing\n\nthe plaintiff's narrative of the events as alleged in 1956 the plaint and in his evidence, the plaintiff returned Bp Ch d • t ui an er to Bombay from abroad on May 20, 1947. To receive Jaisinghbhai Shah him back from his foreign journey the whole family y. including the defendant was there in Bombay.\n\nAc- Prablrawati cording to the plaintiff, he found that on the fir, st night after his return his bed had been .made in the hall occupied by his father and that night he slept away from his wife.\n\nAs this incid1lnt is said to have some significance in the narrative of events leading up to the separation between the husband and the wife and about the reason for which the parties differ, it will have to be examined in detail later.\n\nNext morning, that is to say, on May 21, 1947, the plaintiff's father handed over the letter aforesaid to the plaintiff, who recognised it as being in the familia1 handwriting of bis wife. He decided to tackle his wife with reference to the letter. He handed it to a photographer to have photo copies made of the same. That very day in the evening he asked his wife as to why she had addressed the letter to Mahendra. She at first denied having written any letter and asked to see the letter upon which the plaintiff informed her that it was with the photographer with a view to photo copies being made. After receiving the letter and the photo copies from the photographer on May 23, the plaintiff showed the defendant the photo copy of the letter in controversy between them at that stage and then the defendant is alleged to have admitted having written the letter to Mahendra and to have further told the plaintiff that Mahendra was a better man than him and that Mahendra loved her and she loved him.\n\nThe next important event in the narrative is what happened on May 24, 1947. On the morning of that day, while the plaintiff was getting ready to go to his business office his wife is alleged to have told him that she had packed her luggage and was ready to go to Jalgaon on the ostensible ground that there was a marriage in her father's family.\n\nThe plaintiff told her that if she had made up her mind to go, he would send the car to take her to the station and offered to pay her Rs. 100 for her expenses. But she\n\nSinha J.\n\n1956 ref1;1se~ he offer. She left Bombay apparently in the a; p; n c1ia .. der plamtiff s absence for J algaon by the afternoon train.\n\nJaisinghbhai Shah When the plaintiff came back home from his office he v. \"discovered that she had taken away everything ith Prabhawati her and had left nothing behind\". It may be added here that the plaintiff's mother had left for Patan with his son some days previously.\n\nPlaintiff's case further is that the .defendant never came back to Bombay to live with l; lim, nor did sbe write any letters from Jalgaon, where she stayed most of the time. It appears further that the plaintiff took a very hasty, if not also a foolish, step of having a letter addressed to the defendant by his solicitor on July 15, 1947, charging her with intimacy .between herself o.nd Mahendra and asking her to send back the little boy.\n\nThe parties violently differ on the intent and effect of this letter which will have to be set out in extenso at the appropriate place.\n\nNo answer to this letter was received by the plaintiff.\n\nIn November, 1947, the plaintiff's mother came from Patan to Bombay and informed the plaintiff that the defendant might be expected in Bombay a few days later. Thereupon the plaintiff sent a telegram to his father-in-law at Pa tan.\n\nThe telegram is worded as follows:-\n\nSinha}.\n\n\"Must not send Prabha. Letter posted.\n\nWishing happy new year\".\n\nThe telegram stated that a letter had been posted.\n\nThe defendant denied that any such letter had been received by her or by her father. Hence the original, if any, is not on the record.\n\nBut the plaintiff produced what he alleged to be a carbon copy of that letter which purports to have been written on November 13, 1947, the date on which the telegram was despatched. An English translation of that letter is Ex. C and is to the following effect:-\n\n\" Bombay, 13-11-47 To Rajmanya Rajeshri Seth Popatlal & others.\n\nThere is no letter from you recently. You must have received the telegram sent by me today.\n\nFurther, this is to inform you that I have received information from my Marni (mother) that\n\nPrabha is going to come to Bombay in 3 or 4 days. I 1956 am surprised to hear this news.\n\nEver since she has\n\nJ 1 th h b . l l Bipin Chand•r gone to a gan, ere as een not a smg e etter Jaisinghbhai Shah from her to this day.\n\nNot only that, but, although v. you know everything, neither you nor any onf') on Prabhawati your behalf has come to see me in this connection.\n\nWhat has made Prabha thus inclined to come all of Sinha J. a sudden!\n\nAfter her behaviour while going to Jalgaon for the marriage, (and after), berletter to Mahendra and her words-'He is better than you-Has feeling for me and I love him' and all this, I was afraid that she would not set up a house with me.\n\nHence when my mother gave me the news of lier return, I was surprised .\n\n. I have not the slightest objection to the return of Prabha, but if she gives a.uch shameless replies to me and shows such improper behaviour, I shall not be able to tolerate the same. If she now really realises her mistake and if she is really repenti.og and wants sincerely to come, please make her write. a reply to this letter. On getting a letter from her, I shall personally come to Patan to fetch her. Kirit is young, For his sake also, it is necessary to persuade Prabha.\n\nFurther, I have to state that I have so far kept peace. I have made efforts to call back Prabha.\n\nPlease understand this to her my final effort. If even now Prabha does not give up her obstinacy, I am not responsible and (then) do not blame me.\n\nWell, that is all for the present. Kirit must be hale and hearty. My new year's greetings to you all: Please do assign to me such work as I can manage.\n\nWritten by Bipinchandra\".\n\nThe plaintiff stated that he received no answer either to the telegram or to the letter. Two days later, on November 15, the plaintiff's father addressed a letter to the defendant's father, which is Ex. D. This letter makes reference to the defendant's mother having talked to the plaintiff's mother about sending the defendant to Bombay and to the fact that the plaintiff had sent a telegram on November 13, and ends with the expression of opinion by the plaintiff's father\n\nBipin, Chander J aisinghbhai Shala\n\nPrabhawati\n\nSinha J.\n\nthat it was \"absolutely necessary\" that the plaintiff's consent should be obtained before sending the defendant to Bombay. This letter also remained unanswered. According to the plaintiff, nothing happened until May, 1948, when he went to Pa tan and there met the defendant and told her \"that if she repented for her relations with Mahendra in the interests of the child as well as our own interests she could come back and live with me\". To that the defendant is said to have replied that in November, 1947, as a result of pressure from her father and the community, she had been thinking of coming to livewith the plaintiff, but that she had then decided not to do so. The defendant has given quite a different version of this interview. The second interview between the plaintiff and the defendant again took place at Pa tan some time later in 1948 when the plaintiff went there to see her on comingto know that she had been suffering from typhoid. At that time also she evinced no desire to come back to the plaintiff.\n\nThe third and the last interview between the plaintiff and the defendant took place at Jalgaon in April-1\\iay, 1949.\n\nAt that interview also the defendant turned down the plaintiff's request that at least in the interests of the child she should come back to him. According to the plaintiff, since May 24, 1947, when the defendant left his home in Bombay of her own accord, she had not come back to her marital home.\n\nThe suit was commenced by the plaintiff by filing the plaint dated July 4, 1951, substantially on the ground that the defendant had been in desertion ever since May 24, 1947, without reasonable cause and without his consent and against his will for a period of over four years. He therefore prayed for a decree for a dissolution of bis marriage with the defendant and for the custody of the minor child.\n\nThe suit was contested by the defendant by a written statement filed on February 4, 1952, substantially on the ground that it was the plaintiff who by his treatment of her _after his return from England had made her life unbearable and compelled her to leave her marital home against her wishes on or about May\n\n24,, 1947. She denied any intimacy between herself 1956 and Mahendra or that she was confronted by the 8 ,,,. Ch J .\n\nE E tyin an er plaintiff with a photos tat copy of the letter, x. , Jais,.ghbhai Shah or that she had confessed any such intimacy to v. the plaintiff.\n\nShe admitted having received the Prabltawati Attorney's letter, Ex. A, and also that she did not reply to that letter. She adduced her father's advice\n\nae1 the reason for not sending any answer to that letter.\n\nShe added that her paternal uncle Bhogilal (since deceased) and his son Babubhai saw the plaintiff in Bombay at the instance of the defendant and her father and that the plaintiff turned down their request for taking her back. She also made reference to the negotiations between the defendant's mother and the plaintiff's mother to take the defendant back to Bombay and that the defendant could not go to Bombay as a result of the telegram of November 13, 1947, and the plaintiff's father's letter of November 15, 1947, aforesaid. She also stated that the defendant and her son, Kfrit, both lived with the plaintiff's family at Patan for over four months and off and on on several occasions. The defendant's definite case fa that she had always been ready and willing to go back to the plaintiff and that it was the plaintiff who all along had been wilfully refusing to keep her and to cohabit with her. On those allegations she resisted the plaintiff's claim for a decree for a dissolution of the marriage.\n\nOn those pleadings a single issue was joined between the parties, namely,-\n\n\"Whether the defndant deserted the plaintiff for a continuous period of over four years prior to\n\nt.he filing of the suit\".\n\nAt the trial held by Tendolkar, J. of the Bombay High Court on the Original Side, the plaintiff examined only himself in support of his case.\n\nThe defendant examined herself, her father, Popatlal, and her cousin, Bhogilal, in support of her case that she had been all i:tlong ready and willing to go back to her marital home and that in spite of repeated efforts on her part t.hroµgh her relations the plaintiff had been persistently refusing to take her back.\n\nSin/la J.\n\n1956 The learned trial Judge answered the only issue in\n\nB , A. Ch. 4 the case in the affirmative and granted a decree for ,,,,,. an er d' ' ,. f th 1 ' 'ff b d d Jaisinghbhai Shah ivorce m 1avour o e p amt1 , ut ma e no or er v. as to the costs of the suit.\n\nHe held that the letter,\n\nPrabhawali Ex, E \"reads like a love letter written by a girl to her paramour.\n\nThe reference to both of them having been anxious about something and there being now no need to be anxious any more can only be to a\n\nSinha}.\n\npossible fear that she might miss her monthly periods and her having got her monthly period thereafter, because, if it were not so and the reference was to anything innocent, there was nothing that she should have repented later on in her mind as she says she did, nor should there have been occasion for saying 'after all love is such an affair'.\" With reference to that letter he further held that it was capable of the interpretation that she had misbehaved with Mahendra and that she was conscious of. her guilt.\n\nWith reference to the incident of May 24, the learned Judge observed that having regard to the demeanour of the plaintiff and of the defendant in the witness box, he was inclined to prefer the husband's testimony to that of the wife in all matters in which there was a conflict.\n\nHe held therefore that there was desertion with the necessary animus deserendi and that the defendant had failed to prove that she entertained a bona fide intention to come back to the marital home, that is to say, there was no animus revertendi.\n\nWith reference to the contention that the solicitor's letter of July 15, 1947, had terminated the desertion, if any, he held that it was not well founded inasmuch as the defendant had at no time a genuine desire to return to her husband.\n\nHe made no reference to the prayer in the plaint that the custody of the child should be given to the father, perhaps because that prayer was not pressed.\n\nThe defendant preferred an appeal under the Letters Patent which was heard by a Division Bench consisting of Chagla C.J. and Bhagwati J. The Appellate Bench allowed the appeal, set aside the decision of the trial Judge and dismissed the suit with oosts. It held that the defendant was not guilty of\n\ndesertion, that the letter of July 15, 1947, clearly 1956 established that it was the plaintiff who had deserted 8 .,,. Ch a r d Al • } h A }) C r,.rn an et• the de1en ant. ternahve y, t e ppe ate ourt Jaisinghbhai Shah held that even assuming that the defendant was in v. desertion as a result of what had happened on May Prabhawati 24, and subsequently, the letter aforesaid had the effect of putting an end to that desertion. In its SinhaJ. judgment the letter, Ex. E, did not justify the plaintiff having any reasonable suspicions about his wife's guilt sind that the oral evidence of the defendant and her relations proved the wife's anxiety to return back to her husband and of the obduracy of the husband in refusing to take the wife back. The plaintiff made an application to the High Court for leave to appeal to this Court. The leave asked for was refused by another Division Bench consisting of the Chief Just.ice and Dixit J. Thereafter the plaintiff moved this Court and obtained special leave to appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Bench of the High Court ..\n\nIn this appeal the learned Attorney-General ap pearing on behalf of the appellant and the learned Solicitor-General appearing on behalf of the respondent have placed all relevant considerations of fact and law before us, and we are beholden to them for the great assistanqe they rendered to us in deciding this difficlt case. The difficulty is enhanced by the fact that the two courts below have taken diametrically opposite views of the facts of the case which depend mostly upon oral testimony of the plaintiff-husband and the defendant-wife and not corroborated in many respects on either side. It is a. case of the husband's testimony alone on his side and the wife's testimony aided by that of her father and her cousin. As already indicated, the learned trial Judge was strongly in favour of preferring the husband's testimony to that of the wife whenever there was any conflict. But he made no reference to the testimony of the defendant's father and cousin which, if believed, would give an entirely different colour to the case.\n\nBefore we deal with the points in controversy, it is convenient here to make certain general observations\n\n1956 on the history of the law on the subject and the well ap- Ch 1 established general prinniples on which such cases\n\nJa;:;:; hbh;;\"s~; ah are determined. The suit giving rise to this appeal v. is based on section 3(l)(d) of the Bombay Hindu Prabhawati Divorce Act, XXII of 1947, (which hereinafter will\n\nSinha J. be referred to as \"The Act\") which came into force on May 12, 1947, the date the Governor's assent was published in the Bombay Government Gazette. This Act, so far as the Bombay Province, as it then was, was concerned, was the first step in revolutionizing the law of matrimonial relationship, and, as the Preamble shows, was meant \"to provide for a right of divorce among all communities of Hindus in certain circumstances\". Before the enactment, dissolution of a Hindu marriage particularly amongst what were called the regenerate classes was unknown to general Hindu law and was wholly inconsistent with the basic conception of a Hindu marriage as a sacrament, that is to say, a holy alliance for the perform ance of religious duties. According to the Shastras, marriage amongst the Hindus was the last of the ten sacraments enjoined by the Hindu religion for purifica cation. Hence according to strict Hindu law as given by the Samhitas and as developed by the cornmenta tors, a Hindu marriage could not be dissolved on any ground whatsoever, even on account of degradation in the hierarchy of castes or apostacy. But custom, particularly amongst the tribal and what used to be called the lower castes recognised divorce on rather easy terms. Such customs of divorce on easy terms have been in some instances held by the courts to be against public policy. The Act in section 3 sets out the grounds of divorce. It is noticeable that the Act does not recognise adultery simpliciter as one of the grounds of divorce, though cl. (f) renders the fact that a husband \"has any other woman as a concubine\" and that a wife \"is a concubine of any other man or leads the life of a prostitute\" a. ground of divorce. In the present case we are immediately concerned with the provisions of s. 3(l)(d), which are in these terms:-\n\n\"3. (1) A husband or wife may sue for divorce on\n\nany of the following grounds, namely:- 1956\n\n....................................................\n\nBp' C ( d) that the defendant has deserted the plaintiff Ja;;,:; hb~·;;·~~; h for a continuous period of four years\". v. \"Desertion\" has been defined in section 2(b) in these Prabhtm>ati terms:-\n\n\" 'Desert' means to desert without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the will of the spouse\".\n\nIt will be seen that the definition is tautological 11, nd not very helpful and leads us to the Common Law of England where in spite of repeated legislation on the subject of matrimonial law, no attempt has been made to define \"desertion\". Hence a large body of caselaw has developed round the legal significance of\n\n\"desertion\". \"Marriage\" under the Act means \"a marriage between Hindus whether contracted before or after the coming into operation of this Act\". \"Husband\" means a Hindu husband and \"wife\" means a Hindu wife.\n\nIn England until 1858 the only remedy for desertion was a suit for restitution of conjugal rights.\n\nBut by the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857, desertion without cause for two years and upw1trds was made a ground for a suit for judicial separation. It was not till 1937 that by the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937, desertion without cause for a period of three years immediately preceding the institution of proceedings was made a ground for divorce.\n\nThe law has now been consolidated in the Matrimonial Causes Act,\n\n1950 (14 Geo. VI, c. 25). It would thus appear that desertion as affording a cause of action for a suit for dissolution of marriage is a recent growth even in England.\n\nWhat is desertion? \"Rayden on Divorce\" which is a standard work on the subject at p. 128 (6th Edn.) has summarised the case-law on the subject in these terms:-\n\n\"Desertion is the separation of one spouse from the other, with an intention on the part of the deserting spouse of bringing cohabitation permanently to an end without. reasonable cause and without the\n\nSinha J.\n\n1956 consent of the other spouse; but the physical act of departure by one spouse does not necessarily make BiPin Chander th t th d t t ,, Jaising11bhai Shah a . spouse . eser mg par y. . . v.\n\nThe legal pos1t10n has been admirably summarised in\n\nPrabhau•aU paras. 453 and 454 at pp. 241 to 243 of Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn.) Vol. 12, in the following Sinha]. words:-\n\n\"ln its essence desertion means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other's consent, and without reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. In view of the large variety of circumstances and of modes of life involved, the Court has discouraged attempts at defining desertion, there being no general principle applicable to all cases.\n\nDesertion is not the withdrawal from a place but from a state of things, for what the law seeks to enforce is the recognition and discharge of the common obligations of the married state; the state of things may usually be termed, for short, 'the home'. There can be desertion without previous cohabitation by the parties, or without the marriage having been consummated.\n\nThe person who actually withdraws from cohabital; ion is not necessarily tho deserting party. The fact that a husband makes an allowance to a wife whom.he has abandoned is no answer to a charge of desertion.\n\nThe offence of desertion is a course of conduct which exists independently of its duration, but as a ground for divorce it must exist for a period of at least three years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition or, where the offence appears as a cross-charge, of the answer. Desertion as a ground of divorce differs from the statutory grounds of adultery and. cruelty in that the offence founding the cause of action of desertion is not complete, but is inchoate, until the suit is constituted. Desertion is a continuing offence\".\n\nThus the quality of permanence is one of the essential elements which differentiates desertion from\n\nwilful separation. If a spouse abandon the other 1956 spouse in a state of temporary passion, for example, 8 .,,. Ch d . l• • l • d' tl t i,-tt! a1t Cl anger or c isgust, wit 10u t in ten mg perm an en y o Jaisinghbhai Shah cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion. , ..\n\nFor the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting Prabliawati spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there, namely, (I) the factum of separation, and (2) SillhaJ. the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi).\n\nSimilarly two elements are essential so far as the deserted ispouse is concerned: (I) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid. The petitioner for divorce bears the burde1i of proving those elements in the two spouses respectively. Here a difference between the English law and the law as enacted by the Bombay Legislature may be pointed out. Whereas under the English law those essential conditions must continue throughout the course of the three years immediately preceding the institution of the suit for divorce; under the Act, the period is four years without specifying that it should immediately precede the commencement of proceedings for divorce.\n\nWhether the omission of the last clause has any practical result need not detain us, as it does not call for decision in the present case.\n\nDesertion is a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of each case.\n\nThe inference may be drawn from certain facts which may not in another case be capable of leading to the same inference; that is to say, the facts have to be viewed as to the purpose which is revealed by those acts or by conduct and expression of intention, both anterior and subsequent to the actual acts of separation. If, in fact, there has been a separation, the essential question always is whether that act could be attributable to an animus deserendi.\n\nThe offence of desertion commences when the fact of separation and the animus deserendi co-exist. But it is not necessary that they should commence at the same time The de facto separation may have commenced without the necessary animus or it may be that the separation\n\n1956 and the animus deserendi coincide in point of time; for\n\nBiJ>i>• Chana-. exaple, when he sepratin~ spouse abandons the Jaisinghbhai Shah manta! home with the mtent1on, express or implied, v. of bringing cohabitation permanently to a close. The Prabhawati law in England has prescribed a three year period and the Bombay Act prescribes a period of four years as a SinhaJ. continuous period during which the two elements must subsist. Hence, if a deserting spouse takes advantage of the locus poenitentiae thus provided by law and decides to come back to the deserted spouse by a bona fide offer of resuming the matrimonial home with all the implications of marital life, before the statutory period is out or even after the lapse of that period, unless proceedings for dinirce have been commenced, desertion comes to an end and if the desert'ed spouse unreasonably refuses the offer, the latter may be in desertion and not the former. Hence it is necessary that during all the period that there has been a desertion the deserted spouse must affirm the marriage and be ready and willing to resume married life on such conditions as may be reasonable.\n\nIt is also well settled that in proceedings for divorce the plaintiff must prove the offence of desertion, like any other matrimonial offence, beyond all reasonable doubt.\n\nHence, though corroboration is not required as an absolute rule of law, the courts insist upon corroborative evidence, unless its absence is accounted for to the satisfaction of the court. In this connection the following observations of Lord Goddard, C.J. in the case of Lawson v. Lawson(') may be referred to:-\n\n\"These cases are not cases in which corroboration is required as a matter of law. It is required as a tt f t . \" ma er o precau 10n... ......... .\n\nWith these preliminary observations we now proceed to examine the evidence led on behalf of the parties to find out whether desertion has been proved in this case and, if so, whether there was a bona fide offer by the wife to return to her matrimonial home with a view to discharging marital duties and, if so, whether\n\n(1) [1955] 1 All 1'.R. 841, 342.\n\nthere was an unreasonable refusal on the part of the 1956 husband to take er back. . . . .\n\nBipin Chandet' In this connect10n the plamtiff m the witness box Jaisinghbhai Shah deposed to the incident of the night of May 20, 1947. v.\n\nHe stated that at night he found that his bed had Prabhawati been made in the hall in whieh his father used to sleep, and on being questioned by him, the defendant told him that it was so done , with a view to giving him the opportunity after a lbng absence in England to talk to his father. The plaintiff expressed his wish to the defendant that they should sleep in the same room as they used to before his departure for England, to which the wife replied that as the bed had already been made, \"it would look indecent if they were removed\". The plain tiff therefore slept in the hall that night.\n\nThis incident was relied upon by the plaintiff with a view to showing that the wife had already made up her mind to stop cohabitation.\n\nThis incident has not been admitted by the defendant in her cross-examination.\n\nOn the other hand, she would make it out that it was at the instance of the plaintiff that the bed had been madein the hall occupied by his father and that it was the plaintiff and not she who was responsible for their sleeping apart that night. As the learned trial Judge has preferred the plaintiff's testimony to that of the defendant on all matters on which there was simply oath against oat.h, we would not go behind that finding.\n\nThis incident by itself is capable of an innocent explanation and therefore has to be viewed along with the other incidents deposed to by the plaintiff in order to prove his case of desertion by the defendant.\n\nThere was no reason why the husband should have thought of sleeping apart from the wife because there was no suggestion in the record that the husband was aware till then of the alleged relationship between the defendant and Mahendra.\n\nBut the wife may have been apprehensive that the plaintiff had known of her relations with Mahendra. That apprehension may have induced her to keep out of the plaintiff's way.\n\nThe most important event which led to the ulti-\n\nSinha J.\n\n1956 mate rupture between the parties took place on May 21, 1947, when in the morning the plaintiff's father mpin Chander 1 d M h d , I tt f \"d . h I . \"ff' J .. gl bh . Sh h p ace a en ra s e er a oresa1 m t e p am tJ s amn 'v. •• a hands. The letter which has rightly been pointed out Pmbhawati in the courts below as the root cause of the trouble is in its relevant parts in these terms:- Sinha J. \"Mahendrababu,\n\nYour letter has been received.\n\nI have read the same and have noted the contents. In the same way, I hope, you will take the trouble of writing me a letter now and then. I am writing this letter with fear in my mind, because if this reaches anybody's hands, that cannot be said to be decent.\n\nWhat the mind feels has got to be constrained in the mind only.\n\nOn the pretext of lulling (my) son to sleep, I have been sitting here in this attic, writing this letter to you. All others are chitchatting below. I am thinking now and then that I shall write this and shall write that.\n\nJust now my brain cannot go in any way.\n\nI do not feel like writing on the main point.\n\nThe matters on which we were to remain anxious and you particularly were anxious, well we need not now ha. I very much repented later on in my mind. But after all love is such an affair. (Love begets love).\n\n\"While yet busy doing services to my motherin-law, the clock strikes twelve. At this time, I think of you and you only, and your portr.ait shoots up before my eyes.\n\nI am reminded of you every time.\n\nYou write of coming, but just now there is nothing like a necessity, why unnecessarily waste money?\n\nAnd again nobody gets salvation at my hands and really nobody will.\n\nYou know the natures of all.\n\nMany a time I get tired and keep on being uneasy in my mind, and in the end I weep and pray God and say, 0 Lord, kindly take me away soon: I am not obsessed by any kind of anxiety and so relieve me from this mundane existence. I do not know how many times I must be thinking of you every day ....\n\n\" This Jetter is not signed by the defendant .and in place of the signature the word \"namaste\" finds\n\nplace.\n\nThe contents of the letter were put to the 1956 defendant in cross-examination. At thattime it was Bp Ch d d d h d fi d , i in an er no more a conteste ocliment, t e e en ants coun- Jaisinghbhai Shalt sel having admitted it during the cross-examination v. of the plaintiff. She stated that she had feelings for Prabhawati Mahendra as a brother and not as a lover.\n\nWhen the mysterious parts of the letter beginning with the words \"The matters on which\" and ending with the words ''such an affair\" were put to her, she could not give any explanation as to what she meant. She denied the suggestion made on behalf of the plaintiff in these words:-\n\n\"lt is not true that the reference here is to our having had sexual intercourse and being afraid that I might remain pregnant\".\n\nThe sentence \"l very much repented later on in my mind\" was also put to her specifically and her answer was \"I do not know what I repented for.\n\nI wrote something foolishly\". Pressed further about the meaning of the next sentence after that, her answer was \"l cannot now understand how I came to write such a letter. I admit that this reads like a letter written by a girl to her lover. Besides the fact that my brain was not working properly I had no explanation to give as to how I wrote such a letter\".\n\nShe also admitted that she took good care to see that the other members of the family, meaning tlae mother-in-law and the sisters-in-law, did not see her writing that letter and that she wanted that the letter should remain a secret to them. Being further pressed to explain the sentence \"We need not be anxious now\", her answer was\" I did not intend to convey that I had got my monthly period about which we were anxious. I cannot say what the normal natural meaning of this letter would be\". She had admitted having received at least one letter from Mahendra.\n\nThough it would appear from the trend of her crossexamination that she received more letters than one, she stated that she did not preserve any of his letters.\n\nShe has further admitted in cross-examination \"I have not signed this letter. It must have remained to be signed by mistake.\n\nI admit that under the\n\nSinha].\n\nBi'Pi\"n Chander Jaisinghbhtli Shala\n\nPrabhau'Dti\n\nSinha J,\n\nletter where the signature should be I have put the word 'Namaste' only. It is not true that I did not sign this letter because I was afraid, that if it got into the bands of any one, it might compromise me and Mabendra.\n\nMahendra would have known from my handwriting that this was my letter. I had previously written one Jetter to him. That letter also I had not signed. I had only said 'Namaste' \".\n\nThe tenor of the letter and the defendant's explanation or want of explanation in the witness box of those portions of the Jetter which very much need explanation would leave no manner of doubt in any person who read that letter that there was something between her and Mabendra which she was interested to keep a secret from everybody. Even when given the opportunity to explain, if she could, those portions of the letter, she was not able to put any innocent meaning to her words except saying in a bland way that it was a letter from a sister to a brother.\n\nThe trial court rightly discredited her testimony relating to her answers with respect to the contents of the letter. The letter shows a correspondence between her and lVlahendra which was clearly unworthy of a faithful wife and her pose of innocence by cha: racterising it as between a sister and a brother is manifestly disingenuous. Her explanation, if any, is wholly unacceptable. The plaintiff naturally got suspicious of h\\s wife and naturally taxed her with reference to the contents of the letter. That she had a guilty mind in respect of the Jetter is shown by the fact that she at first denied having written any such letter to Mahendra, a denial in which she persisted even in her answer to the plaint. The plaintiff's evidence that he showed her a photostatic copy of that Jetter on May 23, 1947, and that she then admitted having written that letter and that she had tender feelings for Mahendra can easily be believed.\n\nThe learned trial Judge was therefore justified in coming to the conclusion that the letter betrayed on . the part of the writer \"a consciousness of guilt\". But it is questionable how far the learned Judge was justified in observing further that the contents of the\n\nletter \"are only capable of the interpretation that she 1956 had misbehaved with l\\fahendra during the absence 8 ,,,. Ch d f h l ff\" If h b h d \" b t,-tn an er o t e p amt1 . {l meant y t e wor mis e- Jaisinglrhhai s1ra11 haved\" that the defendant had sexual intercourse v. with Mahendra, he may be said to have jumped to the Prabhat<'ati conclusion which did not necessarily follow as the only conclusion from them. The very fact that a married girl was writing amorous letters to a man other than her husband was reprehensible and easily capable of furnishing good grounds to the husband for suspecting the wife's fidelity. So far there can be no difficulty in assuming that the husband was fully justified in losing temper with his wife and in insisting upon her repentance and assurance of good conduct in future. But we are not prepared to say that the contents of the letter are capable of only that interpretation and no other. O'n the other hand, the learned Judges of the Appeal Court were inclined to view this letter as an evidence merely of what is sometimes characterised as \"platonic love\" between two persons who by reasons of bond of matrimony are compelled to restrain themselves and not to go further than merely showing love and devotion for each other. We are not prepared to take such a lenient, almost indulgent, view of the wife's conduct as betrayed in the letter in question. We cannot but sympathise with the husband in taking a very serious view of the lapse on the wife's part. The learned Judges of the Appeal Court have castigated the counsel for the plain tiff for putting those questions to the defendant in cross-examination. They observe in their judgment (speaking through the Chief Jutice)\n\nthat there was no justification for the counsel for the plaintiff to put to the defendant those questions in cross-examination suggesting that she had intercourse with Mahendra as a result of which they were apprehending future trouble in the shape of pregnancy and illegitimate child birth. It is true that it was not in terms the plaintiff's case that there had beeu an adulterous intercourse between the defendant and Mahendra. That need not have been so, because the Act does not recognise adultery as one of the grounds\n\nSinha J.\n\n1956 for divorce. But we do not agree with the appellate Bp Ch a Court that those questions to the defendant in cross-\n\nJai.:i~; hbh:~ 8';;0 ,. examination were not justified. The plain tiff proposed v. to prove that the discovery of the incriminating Pmbhauati letter containing those mysterious sentences was the\n\nSinha J. occasion for the defendant to n'lake up her mind to desert the plaintiff.\n\nWe do not therefore agree with the observations of the appellate Court in all that they have said in respect of the letter in question.\n\nThere can be no doubt that the letter in question made the plaintiff strongly suspicious of his wife's conduct (to put it rather mildly), and naturally he taxed his wife to know from her as to what she had to say about her relations with Mahendra. She is said to have confessed to him that Mahendra was a better man than the plaintiff and that he loved her and she loved him.\n\nWhen matters had come to such a head, the natural reaction of the parties would be that the husband would get not only depressed, as the plaintiff admitted in the witness box, but would in the first blush think of getting rid of such an unloving, if not a faithless, wife.\n\nThe natural reaction of the defendant would be not to face the husband in that frame of mind. She would naturally wish to be out of the sight of her husband at least for some time, to gain time for trying, if she was so minded, to reestablish herself in her husband's estimation and affection, if not love. The event of the afternoon of May 24, 1947, must therefore be viewed in that light.\n\nThere was going to be performed the marriage of the defendant's cousin at her father's place of business in Jalgaon, though it was about five to six weeks from then. The plaintiff would make it out in his evidence that she left rather in a recalcitrant mood in the afternoon during his absence in office with all her belongings and that she had refused his offer of being sent in his car to station and Rs. 100 for expenses.\n\nThis conduct on the part of the wife can easily be explained as that of a person who had found that her love letter had been discovered by the husband. She\n\nwould naturally try to flee away from the husband for the time being at least because she had not the\n\n...\n\nmoral courage to face him. The question is whether 1956 her leaving her marital home on the afternoon of May 8 .,,. Ch d . l h h . d t d •yin an er 24, 1947, is only consistent wit l er avmg eser e Jaisinghbhai Shah her husband, in the sense that she had deliberately v. decided permanently to forsake aH relationship with Prabhawati her husband with the intention of not returning to consortium, without the consent of the husband and against his wishes. That is the plaintiff's case. May that conduct be not consistent with the defendant's case that she had not any such intention, i.e., being in desertion? The following observations of Pollock, M. R. in Thomas v. Thomas(1) may usefully be quoted in this connection:-\n\n\"Desertion is not a single act complete in itself and revocable by a single act of repentance.\n\nThe act of departure from the other spouse draws its significance from the purpose with which it is done, as revealed by conduct or other expressions of intention: see Charter v. Charter(9). A mere temporary parting is equivocal, unless and until its purpose and object is made plain.\n\nI agree .with the observations of Day J. in Wilkinson v. Wilkinson(3) that desertion is not a specific act, but a course of conduct. As Corell Barnes J. said in Sickert v. Sickert(1): 'The party who intends bringing the cohabitation to an end, and whose conduct in reality causes its termination, commits the act of desertion'. That conduct is not necessarily wiped out by a letter of invitation to the wife to return\".\n\nThe defendant's further case that she had been turned out of the house by the husband under duress cannot be accepted because it is not corroborated either by circumstances or by direct testimony.\n\nNeither her father nor her cousin say a word about her speaking to them on her arrival at Jalgaon that she had been turned out of her husband's home. If her case that she had been forcibly turned out of her marital home by the husband had been made out, certainly the husband would have been guilty of \"constructive desertion\", because the test is not who\n\n(11 (1924) P. 194.\n\n(3) 58 J.P. 415.\n\n(2) 84 LT. 272\n\n(41 (1899) P. 278, 28~.\n\nSinha J.\n\n1956 left the matrimonial home first. (See Lang v. Lang(1)).\n\nB ·~· Ch d If one spouse by his words and conduct compel the •.r•n an et' h .\n\nJaisinghbhai Shah ot er spouse to leave the manta! home, the former v. would be guilty of desertion, though it is the latter Prabhawali who has physically separated from the other and has been made to leave the marital home.\n\nIt should be SinlurJ. noted that the wife did not cross-petition for divorce or for any other relief.\n\nHence it is no more necessary for us to go into that question. It is enough to point out that we are not prepared to rely upon the uncorroborated testimony of the defendant that she had been compelled to leave her marital home by the threats of the plaintiff.\n\nThe happenings of May 24, 1947, as pointed out above, are consistent with the plaintiff's case of desertion by the wife.\n\nBut they are also consistent not with the defendant's case as actually pleaded in her written statement, but with the facts and circumstances disclosed in the evidence, namely, that the defendant having been discovered in her clandestine amorous correspondence with her supposed paramour Mahendra, she could not face her husband or her husband's people living in the same flat in Bombay and therefore shamefacedly withdrew herself and went to her parent's place of business in Jalgaon on the pretext of the marriage of her cousin which was yet far off.\n\nThat she was not expected at Jalgaon on that day in connection with the marriage is proved by her own admission in the witness box that \"when I went to J algaon everyone was surprised\". As pointed out above, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove desertion without cause for the statutory period of four years, that is to say, that the deserting spouse must be in desertion throughout the whole period. In this connection the following observations of Lord :Macmillan in his speech in the House of Lords in the case of Pratt v. Pratt(') are apposite:-·\n\n\"In my opinion what is required of a petitioner for divorce on the ground of desertion is proof that \"throughout the whole course of the three years the respondent has without cause been in desertion. The\n\n(1) [1955) A.O. 402. 417.\n\n(2) [1939] AC. 417, 420.\n\ndeserting spouse must be shown to have persisted in 1956 the intention to desert throughout the whole period. 8 .,,.\n\nCh d . . d f d . . h h th tylff att er In fulfillmg its uty o etermmmg w et er on e Jaisinghbhai Shah evidence a case of desertion without cause has been v. proved the court ought not, in my opinion, to leave Prabhawati out of account the attitude of mind of the petitioner.\n\nIf on the facts it appears that a petitioning husband has made it plain to his deserting wife that he will not receive her back, or if he has repelled all the advances which she may have made towards a resumption of married life, he cannot complain that she has persisted without cause in her desertion\".\n\nIt is true that the defendant did not plead that she had left her husband's home in Bombay in the circumstances indicated above. She, on the other hand, pleaded constructive desertion by the husband. That case, as already observed, she has failed to substantiate by reliable evidence. But the fact that the defendant has so failed does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the plaintiff has succeeded in proving his case. The plaintiff must satisfy the court that the defendant had been in desertion for the continuous period of four years as required by the Act. If we come to the conclusion that the happenings of May 24, 1947, are consistent with both the conflicting theories, it is plain that the plaintiff has not succeeded in bringing the offence of desertion home to the defendant beyond all reasonable doubt.\n\nWe must therefore examine what other evidence there is in support of the plaintiff's case and in corroboration of his evidence in court.\n\nThe next event of importance in this narrative is the plaintiff's solicitor's letter of July 15, 1947, addressed to the defendant, care of her father at Jalgaon.\n\nThe defendant's cousin's marriage was performed towards the end of June and she could have come back to her husband's place soon thereafter. Her evidence is that after the marriage had been performed she was making preparations to go back to Bombay but her father detained her and asked her to await a letter from the plaintiff. The defendant instead of getting an invitation from the plaintiff to 112\n\nSinha),\n\n1956 come back to the marital home received the solicitor's letter aforesaid, which, to say the least, was not Biftin Chander l 1 d b • h Th 1 Jaisinghbhai Shah ?a .cu ate to rmg t e parties nearer. e etter v. is m these terms:- Prabhawat; ''Madam,\n\nUnder instructions from our client Bi pin Chandra SinhaJ.\n\nJ. Shah we have to address you as under:- That you were married to our client in or about April 1942 at Patan. Since the marriage you and our client lived together mostly in Bombay and son by name Kirit was born on or about the 10th day of September 1944.\n\nOur client states that he left for Europe in January last and returned by the end of l\\Iay last. After our client's return, our client learnt that during our client's absence from India you developed intimacy with one Mahendra and you failed to give any satisfactory reply when questioned about the same and left for your parents under the pretext of attending to the marriage ceremony of your cousin. You have also taken the minor with you and since then you are residing with your father to evade any satisfactory explanation.\n\nOur client states that under the events that have happened, our client has become entitled to obtain a divorce and our client does not desire to keep you any longer under his care and protection. Our client desires the minor to be kept by him and we are instructed to request you to send back the minor to our client or if necessary our client will send his agent to bring the minor to him. Our client further states that in any event it will be in the interest of the minor that he should stay with our client. Our client has made this inquiry about the minor to avoid any unpleasan-tness when our client's agent comes to receive the minor''.\n\nThe letter is remarkable in some respects, apart from antedating the birth of the son Kirit by a year. The letter does not in terms allege that the defendant was in desertion, apart from mentioning the fact that she had left against the plaintiff's wishes or that she had done so with the intention of permanently abandoning her marital duties. On the other hand, it alleges 1956 that \"You are residing with your father to avoid any 8 ,,,. Ch d . f 1 . \" Th t . t t t '\"'\" an er sat1s actory exp anat10n . e mos impor an par Jaisinghbhai Shah of the letter is to the effect that the plaintiff had v. \"become entitled to obtain a divorce\" and that he Prabhawati \"does not desire to keep you any longer under his care and protection\". Thus if the solicitor's letter is any indication of the working of the mind of the plaintiff, it makes it clear that at that time the plaintiff did not believe that the defendant had been in desertion and that the plaintiff bad positively come to the determination that he was no longer prepared to affirm the marriage relationship. As already indicated, one of the essential conditions for success in a suit for divorce grounded upon desertion is that the deserted spouse should have been willing to fulfil his or her part of the marital duties. The statement of the law in para 457 at p. 244 of Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn. Vol. 12) may be usefully quoted:\n\n\"The burden is on the petitioner to show that desertion without cause subsisted throughout the statutOl'y period. The deserting spouse must be shown to have persisted in the intention to desert throughout the whole of the three year period. It has been said that a petitioner should be able honestly to say that be or she was all along willing to fulfil the duties of the marriage, and that the desertio~ was against his or her will, and continued throughout the statutory period without his or her consent; but in practice it is accepted that once desertion has been started by the fault of the deserting spouse, it is no longer necessary for the deserted spouse to show that during the three years preceding the petition he or she actually wanted the other spouse to come back, for the intention to desert is presumed to continue. That presumption may, however, be rebutted\".\n\nApplying those observations to the facts of the present case, can the plaintiff honestly say that he was all along willing to fulfil the duties of the marriage and that the defendant's desertion, if any, continued throughout the statutory period without his consent.\n\nThe letter, Ex. A, is an emphatic no. In the first\n\nSinhaJ\n\n1956 place, even the plaintiff in that letter did not allege BF Ch any desertion and, secondly, he was not prepared to\n\nJai; i~; hbh:7~'; ah receive her back to the matrimonial home. Realising v. his difficulty when cross-examined as to the contents Prabhawati of that letter, he wished the court to believe that at the time the letter was written in his presence he was SinhaJ. \"in a confused state of mind\" and did not remember - exactly whether he noticed the sentence that he did not desire to keep his wife any longer. Pressed further in cross-examination, he was very emphatic in his answer and stated:-\n\n\"lt is not true that by the date of this letter I had made up my mind not to take her back. It was my hope that the letter might induce her parents to find out what had happened, and they would persuade her to come back. I am still in the confused state of mind that despite my repeated attempts my wife puts me off\".\n\nIn our opinion, the contents of the letter could not thus be explained away by the plaintiff in the witness box.\n\nOn the other hand, it sh_ows that about seven weeks after the wife's departure for her father's place the plaintiff had at least for the time being convinced himself that the defendant was no more a suitable person to live with.\n\nThat, as found by us, he was justified in this attitude by the reprehensible conduct of his wife during his absence is beside the point.\n\nThis letter has an importance of its own only in so far as it does not corroborate the plaintiff's version that the defendant was in desertion and that the plaintiff was all along anxious to induce her to come back to him. This letter is more consistent with the supposition that the husband was very angry with her on account of her conduct as betrayed by the letter, Ex. E and that the wife left her husband's place in shame not having the courage to face him after that discovery. But that will not render her in the eye of the law a deserter, as observed by Pollock, M. R. in Bowron v. Bowron(1) partly quoting from Lord Gorell as follows:-\n\n\"In most cases of desertion the guilty party\n\n(1) [ 1925] P. 187, 192.\n\nactually leaves the other, but it is not always or 1956 necessarily the guilty party who leayes the matrimo- 8 ,,,. Ch d . 1 h I . . th t h . t d i,, in an er ma ome. n my opm10n, e par y w o m en s Jaisinghbhai s11ah bringing the cohabitation to an end, and whose conv. duct in reality causes its termination, commits the Prabhawati act of desertion: See also Graves v. Graves(1); Pulford\n\nv. Pulford(2); Jackson v. Jackson( 5); where Sir Henry Duke P. explains the same doctrine. You must look at the conduct of the spouses and ascertain their real intention\".\n\nIt is true that once it is found that one of the spouses has been in desertion, the presumption is that the desertion has continued and that it is not necessary for the deserted spouse actually to take steps to bring the deserting spouse back to the matrimonial home. So far we do not find any convincing evidence in proof of the alleged desertion by the wife and naturally therefore the presumption of continued desertion cannot arise.\n\nBut it is not necessary that at the time the wife left her husband's home she should have at the same time the animus desere, ndi.\n\nLet us therefore examine the question whether the defendant in this case, even if she had no such intention at the time she left Bombay, subsequently decided to put an end to the matrimonial tie. This is in consonance with the latest pronouncement of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Lang v. Lang(4) in an appeal from the decision of the High Court of Australia, to the following effect:-\n\n\"Both in England and in Australia, to establish desertion two things must be proved: first, certain outward and visible conduct-the 'factum' of desertion; secondly, the 'animus dserendi'-the intention underlying this conduct to bring the matrimonial union to an end.\n\nIn ordinary desertion the factum is simple: it is the act of the absconding party in leaving the matrimonial home.\n\nThe contest in such a case will be almost entirely as to the 'animus'. Was the intention\n\n(1) 8 Sw. & Tr. 350.\n\n(3) [1924) P. 19.\n\n(2) [1928] P. 18.\n\n(4) (1955) A.O. 402, 417.\n\nSinha J.\n\n7956 of the party leaving the home to break it up for good,\n\nB .•. Ch d or something short of, or different from that?\" i\"'in an er Jaisingl1bhaiShah In this connection the episode of November, 1947, v. when the plaintiff's mother came from Pa tan to Bom- Prabhaw•ti bay is relevant. It appears to be common ground now that the defendant had agreed to come back to Bombay along with the plaintiff's mother or after a few days. But on this information being given to the\n\nS.inha J,\n\nplaintiff he countermanded any such steps on the wife's part by sending the telegram, Ex. B, aforesaid and the plaintiff's father's letter dated November 15, 1947.\n\nWe are keeping out of consideration for the present the letter, Ex. C, dated November 13, 1947, which is not admitted to have been received either by the defendant or her father.\n\nThe telegram is in peremptory terms: \"Must not send Prabha''. The letter of November 15, 1947, by the plaintiff's father to the defendant's father is equally peremptory. It says \"It is absolutely necessary that you should obtain the consent of Chi. Bipinchandra before sending Chi.\n\nPrabhavati\". The telegram and the letter which is a supplement to the telegram, as found by the courts below, completely negative the plaintiff's statement in court that he was all along ready and willing to receive the defendant back to his home. The letter of November 13, 1947, Ex. C, which the plaintiff claims to have written to his father-in-law in explanation of the telegram and is a prelude to it is altogether out of tune with the tenor of the letter and the telegram referred to above. The receipt of this letter has been denied by the defendant and her father. In court this letter has been described as a fake in the sense that it was an afterthought and was written with a view to the legal position and particularly with a view to getting rid of the effect of the solicitor's letter of July 15, which the plaintiff found it hard to explain .away in the witness box.\n\nNeither the trial court, which was entirely in favour of the plaintiff and which had accepted the letter as genuine, nor the appellate Court, which was entirely in favour of the defendant has placed implicit faith in the bona fides of this lEftter. The lower appellate Court\n\n,· -\n\nis rather ironical about it, observing \"This letter as 1956 it were stands in isolated glory. There is no other 8 .,,. ..\n\nCh d h d f h 1 t\"ff h\" h i,, in an er letter. There IS no ot er con uct o t e p am I w IC Jaisinghbhai Shah is consistent with this letter\". Without going into the v. controversy as to the genuineness or bona fides of Prabhawati this letter, it can be said that the plaintiff's attitude, as disclosed therein, was that he was prepared to take her back into the matrimonial home provided she wrote a letter to him expressing real repentance and confession of mistake. This attitude of the plaintiff cannot be said to be unreasonable in the circumstances of the 0ase. He was more sinned against than sinning at the beginning of the controversy between the husband and the wife.\n\nThis brings us to a consideration of the three attempts alleged by the plaintiff to have been made b.y him to induce his wife to return to the matrimonial home when he made two journeys to Patan in 1948 and the third journey in April-May, 1949, to Jalgaon.\n\nThese three visits are not denied by the defendant.\n\nThe only difference betwen the parties is as to the purpose of the visit and the substance of the talk between them. That the plaintiff's attachment for the defendant had not completely dried up is proved by the fact that when he came to know that she had been suffering from typhoid he went to Patan to see her. On this occasion which was the second visit the plain tiff does not say that .he proposed to her to come back and that she refused to do so.\n\nHe only says that she did not express any desire to come back.\n\nThat may be explained as being due to diffidence on her part. But in respect of the first and the third visits the plaintiff states that on both those occasions he wanted her to come back but she refused. On the other hand, the defendant's version is that the purpose of his visit was only to take away the child and not to take her back to his home. It is also the plaintiff's complaint that the defendant never wrote any letter to him offering to come back. The wife's answer is that she did write a few letters before the solicitor's letter was received by the father and that thereafter under her father's advice she did not write\n\nSinha J.\n\n1956 any more to the_ plaintiff. In this connection it be-\n\nB ·•. Ch d comes necessary to examine the evidence of her cousin i.l'1n an er B b I d h f h .\n\nJaisinghbhai Shah a ula an er at er Popatlal. Her cousm, Babula!, v. who was a member of her father's joint family, deposes Prabhawati that on receipt of the letter, Ex. A, a fortnight later\n\nSinha J. he and his father, since deceased, came to Bombay and saw the plaintiff. They expostulated with him and pleaded the defendant's cause and asked the plaintiff to forgive and forget and to take her back.\n\nThe plaintiff's answer was that he did not wish to keep his wife.\n\nThe defendant's father's evidence is to the effect that after receipt of the letter, Ex. A, he came to Bombay and saw the plaintiff's father at his residence and protested to him that \"a false notice had been given to us\". The plaintiff's father is said to have replied that they \"would settle the matters amicably\". He also deposes as to his brother and h!s brother's son having gone to the plaintiff. He further states that he with his wife and the defendant wen} to Patan and saw the plaintiff's mother and in consultation with her made arrangements to send her back to Bombay. But before that could be done, the telegram, Ex. B, and the letter, Ex. D, were received and consequently he gave up the idea of sending the defendant to Bombay without straightening matters.\n\nBoth these witnesses on behalf of the defendant further deposed to the defendant having gone several times and stayed with the plaintiff's family, particularly his mother at Patan along with the boy.\n\nThe evidence of these two witnesses on behalf of the defendant is ample corroboration of the defendant's case and the evidenee in court that she has all along been ready and willing to go back to the matrimonial home.\n\nThe learned trial Judge has not noticed this evidence and we have not the advantage of his comment o!l this corroborative evidence. This body of evidence is in consonance with the natural course of events. The plaintiff himself stated in the witness box that he had sent the solicitor's letter by way of a shock treatment to the defendant's family so that they might persuade his wife to come back to his matrimonial home. The subsequent\n\ntelegram and letters (assuming that both the letters 7956 of the 13th and 15th Noveber had been posted in Bipin Chander the usual course and received by the addressees) Jaisittghbhai Shah would give a shock to the family. Naturally therev. after the members of the family would be up and Prabhawati doing to see that a reconciliation is brought about between the husband and the wife.\n\nHence the visits SinliaJ. of the defendant's uncle and the father would be a natural conduct after they had been apprised of the rupture between them.\n\nWe therefore do not see any sufficient reasons for brushing aside all that oral evidence which has been believed by the Lower Appellate\n\nCourt and had not in terms been disbelieved by the trial court. This part of the case on behalf of the defendant and her evidence is corroborated by the evidence of the defendant's relatives aforesaid. It cannot be seriously argued that that evidence should be disbelieved, because the witnesses happened to be the defendant's relatives. They were naturally the parties most interested in bringing about a reconciliation.\n\nThey were anxious not only for the welfare of the defendant but were also interested in the good name of the family and the community as is only natural in families like these which have not been so urbanised as to completely ignore the feelings of the community.\n\nThey would therefore be the persons most anxious in the interests of all the parties concerned to make efforts to bring the husband and the wife together and to put an end to a controversy which they considered to be derogatory to the good name and prestige of the families concerned. The plaintiff's evidence, on the other hand, on this part of the case is uncorroborated. Indeed his evidence stands uncorroborated in many parts of his case and the letters already discussed run counter to the tenor of his evidence in court.\n\nWe therefore feel inclined to accept the defendant's case that after her leaving her husband's home and after the perfo:mance of her cousin's marriage she was ready and willing to go back to her husband. It. follows from what we have said so far that the wife was not in desertion though she left her husband's home without any fault on the part of the ll3\n\n1956 plaintiff which could justify her action in leaving him, BF c d and that after the lapse of a few months' stay at her\n\n10,;,~; hb~=~ ;:ah father's place she was willing to go back to her v. matrimonial home.\n\nPrabllawati This conclusion is further supported by the fact that between 1948 and 1951 the defendant stayed SinhaJ. with her mother-in-law at Patao whenever she was there, sometimes for months, at other times for weeks. This conduct is wholly inconsistent with the plaintiff's case that the defendant was in desertion during the four years that she was out of her matrimonial home. It is more consistent with the defendant's attempts to get herself re-established in her husband's home after the rupture in May 1947 as aforesaid. It is also in evidence that at the suggestion of her mother-in-law the defendant sent her three year old son to Bombay so that he might induce his father to send for the mother. The boy stayed in Bombay for 11bout twenty days and then was brought back to Patao by his father as he (the boy) was unwilling to stay there without the mother. This was in August-September 1948 when the defendant deposes to having questioned her husband why she had not been called back and the husband's answer was evasive. Whether or not this statement of the defendant is true, there can be no doubt that the defendant would not have allowed her little boy of about three years of age to be sent alone to Bombay except in the hope that he might be instrumental in bringing about a reconciliation between the father and the mother.\n\nThe defendant has deposed to the several efforts made by her mother-in-law and her father-in-law to intercede on her behalf with the plaintiff but without any result. There is no explanation why the plaintiff could not examine his father and mother in corroboration of his case of continuouii desertion for the statutory period by the defendant. Their evidence would have been as valuable, if not more, as that of the defenda.nes father and cousin as discussed above.\n\nThus it is not I\\ case where evidence was not available in corroboration of the plaintiff's case. As the plaintiff's evidence on many important aspects of the case\n\nhas remained uncorroborated by evidence which could 1956 be available to him, we must hold that the evidence Bp Ch d given by the plaintiff falls short of proving bis case Jai;,~; hbh;; s~; ah\n\nof desertion by his wife. Though we do not find that v. the essential ingredients of desertion have been Prabhawati proved by the plaintiff, there cannot be the least doubt that it was the defendant who had by her objectionable conduct brought about a rupture in the matrimonial home and caused the plaintiff to become so cold to her after she left him.\n\nIn view of our finding that the plaintiff has failed to prove his case of desertion by the defendant, it is not necessary to go into the question of animus revertendi on which considerable argument with reference to case-law was addressed to us on both sides.\n\nFor the aforesaid reasens we agree with the Appellate Bench of the High Court in the conclusion at which they had arrived, though not exactly for the same reasons. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. But as the trouble started on account of the defendant's conduct, though she is successful in this Court, we direct that each party must bear its own costs throughout.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\nSinha J.", "total_entities": 98, "entities": [{"text": "BIPIN CHANDER JAISINGHBHAI SHAH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 43, "end_char": 74, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIPIN CHANDER JAISINGHBHAI SHAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PRABHAWATI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 76, "end_char": 86, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Prabhawati Mahendra", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90, "end_char": 103, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B. JAGANNADHADAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 128, "end_char": 144, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Divorce Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 295, "end_char": 312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)( d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 335, "end_char": 346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Divorce Act, 1947", "statute": "Divorce Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 452, "end_char": 459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1947 the appellant left for England on business and on his return to India discovered that this wife (respondent) had been having amorous correspondence with one M, and taxed her with having developed intimacy with him."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 493, "end_char": 498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1947 the appellant left for England on business and on his return to India discovered that this wife (respondent) had been having amorous correspondence with one M, and taxed her with having developed intimacy with him."}}, {"text": "May 24, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 712, "end_char": 724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She was unable to give any answer and went to her father's place on May 24, 1947, on the pre text of the marriage of her cousin which was to te.ke place in Jnne."}}, {"text": "Jnne", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 800, "end_char": 804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She was unable to give any answer and went to her father's place on May 24, 1947, on the pre text of the marriage of her cousin which was to te.ke place in Jnne."}}, {"text": "July 15, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 810, "end_char": 823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 15, 1947, the appellant sent a notice to the respondent through bis solicitor in which after mentioning the fact that she had left against his wishes stated that he did not desire to keep her any longer under his care and protection, and desired her to send the minor son to him."}}, {"text": "July 4, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1098, "end_char": 1110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 4, 1951, the appellant instituted the suit for divorce under s. 3(1)(d) of the Bombay Hindu Divorce Act, 1947, on the ground that the respondent had been in desertion ever since Ma.y 24, 1947, without reasonable ca.use and without his consent and against his will for a period of over four years."}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1164, "end_char": 1174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Divorce Act, 1947", "statute": "Divorce Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Bombay Hindu Divorce Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1182, "end_char": 1212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Jaisinghbhai Shah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2923, "end_char": 2940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jaisinghbhai Shah\n\nDesertion is a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of each case a.nd those facts have to be viewed as to the purpose which is revealed by those facts or by conduct and expression of intention, both anterior and subsequent to the actual act of separation.", "canonical_name": "Jaisinghbhai Shalt"}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3631, "end_char": 3641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. 0. Setalvad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4038, "end_char": 4052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. 0."}}, {"text": "Purshottam Tricumdas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4082, "end_char": 4102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, Purshottam Tricumdas, T. God, iwala, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and S. N. Andley, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "T. God", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4104, "end_char": 4110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, Purshottam Tricumdas, T. God, iwala, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and S. N. Andley, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "iwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4112, "end_char": 4117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, Purshottam Tricumdas, T. God, iwala, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and S. N. Andley, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "J. B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4119, "end_char": 4135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, Purshottam Tricumdas, T. God, iwala, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and S. N. Andley, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4137, "end_char": 4151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, Purshottam Tricumdas, T. God, iwala, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and S. N. Andley, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "S. N. Andley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4156, "end_char": 4168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, Purshottam Tricumdas, T. God, iwala, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and S. N. Andley, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4193, "end_char": 4204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India and Sardar Bahadur, for the reE1pondent."}}, {"text": "Sardar Bahadur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4237, "end_char": 4251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India and Sardar Bahadur, for the reE1pondent."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4420, "end_char": 4454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSINHA J.-This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay dated August 22, 1952, reversing those of a single Judge of that Court on the Original Side, dated March 7-, 1952, by which he had granted a decree for dissolution of marriage between the appellant and the respondent."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5066, "end_char": 5072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The families of both the parties belong to Pa tan, which is a town in Gujarat, about a night's rail journey from Bombay."}}, {"text": "Bombay Sinha", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5088, "end_char": 5100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They lived in Bombay Sinha}."}}, {"text": "Kirit", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5478, "end_char": 5483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There fa an issue of the marriage, a son named Kirit, born on September 10, 1945."}}, {"text": "Mahendra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5680, "end_char": 5688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The parties appear to have lived happily in Bombay until a third party named Mahendra, a friend of the family came upon the scene and began to live with the family in their Bombay flat some time in 1946, after his discharge from the army.", "canonical_name": "Mahendrababu"}}, {"text": "January 8, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5845, "end_char": 5860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 8, 1947, the appellant left for England on business."}}, {"text": "Patan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6045, "end_char": 6050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "became intimate with the said Mahendra and when she went to Patan after the plaintiff's departure for England she carried on \"amorous correspondence\" with Mahendra who continued to stay with the plaintiff's family in Bombay."}}, {"text": "Gujera", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6383, "end_char": 6389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E as officially translated in English, the original being in Gujera ti except a few words written in fatilty English."}}, {"text": "April 1, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6462, "end_char": 6475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This letter is dated April 1, 1947, written from the plaintiff's house at Patan, where the defendant had been staying with her mother-in-law."}}, {"text": "May 20, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7101, "end_char": 7113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Continuing\n\nthe plaintiff's narrative of the events as alleged in 1956 the plaint and in his evidence, the plaintiff returned Bp Ch d • t ui an er to Bombay from abroad on May 20, 1947."}}, {"text": "May 21, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7712, "end_char": 7724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Next morning, that is to say, on May 21, 1947, the plaintiff's father handed over the letter aforesaid to the plaintiff, who recognised it as being in the familia1 handwriting of bis wife."}}, {"text": "Jalgaon", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8949, "end_char": 8956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the morning of that day, while the plaintiff was getting ready to go to his business office his wife is alleged to have told him that she had packed her luggage and was ready to go to Jalgaon on the ostensible ground that there was a marriage in her father's family."}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9203, "end_char": 9208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But she\n\nSinha J.\n\n1956 ref1;1se~ he offer.", "canonical_name": "S.inha"}}, {"text": "15, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9953, "end_char": 9961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears further that the plaintiff took a very hasty, if not also a foolish, step of having a letter addressed to the defendant by his solicitor on July 15, 1947, charging her with intimacy .between herself o.nd Mahendra and asking her to send back the little boy."}}, {"text": "November 13, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10909, "end_char": 10926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the plaintiff produced what he alleged to be a carbon copy of that letter which purports to have been written on November 13, 1947, the date on which the telegram was despatched."}}, {"text": "13-11-47", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11066, "end_char": 11074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C and is to the following effect:-\n\n\" Bombay, 13-11-47 To Rajmanya Rajeshri Seth Popatlal & others."}}, {"text": "Rajmanya Rajeshri Seth Popatlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11078, "end_char": 11109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C and is to the following effect:-\n\n\" Bombay, 13-11-47 To Rajmanya Rajeshri Seth Popatlal & others."}}, {"text": "Marni", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11286, "end_char": 11291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further, this is to inform you that I have received information from my Marni (mother) that\n\nPrabha is going to come to Bombay in 3 or 4 days."}}, {"text": "Prabha", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11307, "end_char": 11313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further, this is to inform you that I have received information from my Marni (mother) that\n\nPrabha is going to come to Bombay in 3 or 4 days.", "canonical_name": "Prabhawati Mahendra"}}, {"text": "Prabhawati", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11615, "end_char": 11625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Not only that, but, although v. you know everything, neither you nor any onf') on Prabhawati your behalf has come to see me in this connection.", "canonical_name": "Prabhawati Mahendra"}}, {"text": "Bipinchandra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12952, "end_char": 12964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Written by Bipinchandra\".", "canonical_name": "Biftin Chander"}}, {"text": "Bipin", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13444, "end_char": 13449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. This letter makes reference to the defendant's mother having talked to the plaintiff's mother about sending the defendant to Bombay and to the fact that the plaintiff had sent a telegram on November 13, and ends with the expression of opinion by the plaintiff's father\n\nBipin, Chander J aisinghbhai Shala\n\nPrabhawati\n\nSinha J.\n\nthat it was \"absolutely necessary\" that the plaintiff's consent should be obtained before sending the defendant to Bombay."}}, {"text": "Chander J aisinghbhai Shala\n\nPrabhawati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13451, "end_char": 13490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. This letter makes reference to the defendant's mother having talked to the plaintiff's mother about sending the defendant to Bombay and to the fact that the plaintiff had sent a telegram on November 13, and ends with the expression of opinion by the plaintiff's father\n\nBipin, Chander J aisinghbhai Shala\n\nPrabhawati\n\nSinha J.\n\nthat it was \"absolutely necessary\" that the plaintiff's consent should be obtained before sending the defendant to Bombay."}}, {"text": "February 4, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15421, "end_char": 15437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was contested by the defendant by a written statement filed on February 4, 1952, substantially on the ground that it was the plaintiff who by his treatment of her _after his return from England had made her life unbearable and compelled her to leave her marital home against her wishes on or about May\n\n24,, 1947."}}, {"text": "May\n\n24,, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15656, "end_char": 15670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit was contested by the defendant by a written statement filed on February 4, 1952, substantially on the ground that it was the plaintiff who by his treatment of her _after his return from England had made her life unbearable and compelled her to leave her marital home against her wishes on or about May\n\n24,, 1947."}}, {"text": "Bhogilal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16176, "end_char": 16184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She added that her paternal uncle Bhogilal (since deceased) and his son Babubhai saw the plaintiff in Bombay at the instance of the defendant and her father and that the plaintiff turned down their request for taking her back."}}, {"text": "Babubhai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16214, "end_char": 16222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She added that her paternal uncle Bhogilal (since deceased) and his son Babubhai saw the plaintiff in Bombay at the instance of the defendant and her father and that the plaintiff turned down their request for taking her back."}}, {"text": "November 15, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16643, "end_char": 16660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She also made reference to the negotiations between the defendant's mother and the plaintiff's mother to take the defendant back to Bombay and that the defendant could not go to Bombay as a result of the telegram of November 13, 1947, and the plaintiff's father's letter of November 15, 1947, aforesaid."}}, {"text": "Kfrit", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16721, "end_char": 16726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She also stated that the defendant and her son, Kfrit, both lived with the plaintiff's family at Patan for over four months and off and on on several occasions."}}, {"text": "Tendolkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17373, "end_char": 17382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the trial held by Tendolkar, J. of the Bombay High Court on the Original Side, the plaintiff examined only himself in support of his case."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17394, "end_char": 17411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the trial held by Tendolkar, J. of the Bombay High Court on the Original Side, the plaintiff examined only himself in support of his case."}}, {"text": "Popatlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17539, "end_char": 17547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendant examined herself, her father, Popatlal, and her cousin, Bhogilal, in support of her case that she had been all i:tlong ready and willing to go back to her marital home and that in spite of repeated efforts on her part t.hroµgh her relations the plaintiff had been persistently refusing to take her back."}}, {"text": "Chagla C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19884, "end_char": 19895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendant preferred an appeal under the Letters Patent which was heard by a Division Bench consisting of Chagla C.J. and Bhagwati J. The Appellate Bench allowed the appeal, set aside the decision of the trial Judge and dismissed the suit with oosts."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19900, "end_char": 19908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendant preferred an appeal under the Letters Patent which was heard by a Division Bench consisting of Chagla C.J. and Bhagwati J. The Appellate Bench allowed the appeal, set aside the decision of the trial Judge and dismissed the suit with oosts."}}, {"text": "Dixit", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21004, "end_char": 21009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The leave asked for was refused by another Division Bench consisting of the Chief Just.ice and Dixit J. Thereafter the plaintiff moved this Court and obtained special leave to appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Bench of the High Court ..\n\nIn this appeal the learned Attorney-General ap pearing on behalf of the appellant and the learned Solicitor-General appearing on behalf of the respondent have placed all relevant considerations of fact and law before us, and we are beholden to them for the great assistanqe they rendered to us in deciding this difficlt case."}}, {"text": "section 3(l)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22509, "end_char": 22524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Divorce Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22556, "end_char": 22567, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "May 12, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22671, "end_char": 22683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The suit giving rise to this appeal v. is based on section 3(l)(d) of the Bombay Hindu Prabhawati Divorce Act, XXII of 1947, (which hereinafter will\n\nSinha J. be referred to as \"The Act\") which came into force on May 12, 1947, the date the Governor's assent was published in the Bombay Government Gazette."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23989, "end_char": 23998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(l)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24398, "end_char": 24408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24740, "end_char": 24752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "by the Matrimonial Causes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25527, "end_char": 25556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25704, "end_char": 25732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "law has now been consolidated in the Matrimonial Causes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25875, "end_char": 25934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "BiPin Chander", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26588, "end_char": 26601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "reasonable cause and without the\n\nSinha J.\n\n1956 consent of the other spouse; but the physical act of departure by one spouse does not necessarily make BiPin Chander th t th d t t ,, Jaising11bhai Shah a .", "canonical_name": "Biftin Chander"}}, {"text": "Goddard", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32370, "end_char": 32377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection the following observations of Lord Goddard, C.J. in the case of Lawson v. Lawson(') may be referred to:-\n\n\"These cases are not cases in which corroboration is required as a matter of law."}}, {"text": "Bipin Chandet", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33035, "end_char": 33048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bipin Chandet' In this connect10n the plamtiff m the witness box Jaisinghbhai Shah deposed to the incident of the night of May 20, 1947.", "canonical_name": "Biftin Chander"}}, {"text": "Jaisinghbhai Shah", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 33100, "end_char": 33117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bipin Chandet' In this connect10n the plamtiff m the witness box Jaisinghbhai Shah deposed to the incident of the night of May 20, 1947."}}, {"text": "Pmbhawati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35399, "end_char": 35408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The letter which has rightly been pointed out Pmbhawati in the courts below as the root cause of the trouble is in its relevant parts in these terms:- Sinha J. \"Mahendrababu,\n\nYour letter has been received."}}, {"text": "Mahendrababu", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35514, "end_char": 35526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The letter which has rightly been pointed out Pmbhawati in the courts below as the root cause of the trouble is in its relevant parts in these terms:- Sinha J. \"Mahendrababu,\n\nYour letter has been received.", "canonical_name": "Mahendrababu"}}, {"text": "Jaisinghbhai Shalt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37395, "end_char": 37413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At thattime it was Bp Ch d d d h d fi d , i in an er no more a conteste ocliment, t e e en ants coun- Jaisinghbhai Shalt sel having admitted it during the cross-examination v. of the plaintiff.", "canonical_name": "Jaisinghbhai Shalt"}}, {"text": "Prabhawati Mahendra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37524, "end_char": 37543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "She stated that she had feelings for Prabhawati Mahendra as a brother and not as a lover.", "canonical_name": "Prabhawati Mahendra"}}, {"text": "Mabendra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 39650, "end_char": 39658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not true that I did not sign this letter because I was afraid, that if it got into the bands of any one, it might compromise me and Mabendra.", "canonical_name": "Mahendrababu"}}, {"text": "Jetter", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39761, "end_char": 39767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I had previously written one Jetter to him."}}, {"text": "lVlahendra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40571, "end_char": 40581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The letter shows a correspondence between her and lVlahendra which was clearly unworthy of a faithful wife and her pose of innocence by cha: racterising it as between a sister and a brother is manifestly disingenuous."}}, {"text": "May 23, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41198, "end_char": 41210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiff's evidence that he showed her a photostatic copy of that Jetter on May 23, 1947, and that she then admitted having written that letter and that she had tender feelings for Mahendra can easily be believed."}}, {"text": "l\\fahendra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41685, "end_char": 41695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But it is questionable how far the learned Judge was justified in observing further that the contents of the\n\nletter \"are only capable of the interpretation that she 1956 had misbehaved with l\\fahendra during the absence 8 ,,,."}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41819, "end_char": 41821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pollock", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 46778, "end_char": 46785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following observations of Pollock, M. R. in Thomas v. Thomas(1) may usefully be quoted in this connection:-\n\n\"Desertion is not a single act complete in itself and revocable by a single act of repentance."}}, {"text": "Corell Barnes", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 47379, "end_char": 47392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Corell Barnes J. said in Sickert v. Sickert(1): 'The party who intends bringing the cohabitation to an end, and whose conduct in reality causes its termination, commits the act of desertion'."}}, {"text": "Macmillan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 50174, "end_char": 50183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this connection the following observations of Lord :Macmillan in his speech in the House of Lords in the case of Pratt v. Pratt(') are apposite:-·\n\n\"In my opinion what is required of a petitioner for divorce on the ground of desertion is proof that \"throughout the whole course of the three years the respondent has without cause been in desertion."}}, {"text": "Biftin Chander", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 52879, "end_char": 52893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendant instead of getting an invitation from the plaintiff to 112\n\nSinha),\n\n1956 come back to the marital home received the solicitor's letter aforesaid, which, to say the least, was not Biftin Chander l 1 d b • h Th 1 Jaisinghbhai Shah ?", "canonical_name": "Biftin Chander"}}, {"text": "Bi pin Chandra SinhaJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 53053, "end_char": 53075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "e etter v. is m these terms:- Prabhawat; ''Madam,\n\nUnder instructions from our client Bi pin Chandra SinhaJ.\n\nJ. Shah we have to address you as under:- That you were married to our client in or about April 1942 at Patan."}}, {"text": "Europe", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 53369, "end_char": 53375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Our client states that he left for Europe in January last and returned by the end of l\\Iay last."}}, {"text": "Gorell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 59154, "end_char": 59160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But that will not render her in the eye of the law a deserter, as observed by Pollock, M. R. in Bowron v. Bowron(1) partly quoting from Lord Gorell as follows:-\n\n\"In most cases of desertion the guilty party\n\n(1) [ 1925] P. 187, 192."}}, {"text": "s11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59459, "end_char": 59462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Henry Duke P.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 59687, "end_char": 59700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "duct in reality causes its termination, commits the Prabhawati act of desertion: See also Graves v. Graves(1); Pulford\n\nv. Pulford(2); Jackson v. Jackson( 5); where Sir Henry Duke P. explains the same doctrine."}}, {"text": "High Court of Australia", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 60745, "end_char": 60768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is in consonance with the latest pronouncement of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Lang v. Lang(4) in an appeal from the decision of the High Court of Australia, to the following effect:-\n\n\"Both in England and in Australia, to establish desertion two things must be proved: first, certain outward and visible conduct-the 'factum' of desertion; secondly, the 'animus dserendi'-the intention underlying this conduct to bring the matrimonial union to an end."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 61733, "end_char": 61739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears to be common ground now that the defendant had agreed to come back to Bombay along with the plaintiff's mother or after a few days."}}, {"text": "S.inha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61839, "end_char": 61845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But on this information being given to the\n\nS.inha J,\n\nplaintiff he countermanded any such steps on the wife's part by sending the telegram, Ex.", "canonical_name": "S.inha"}}, {"text": "Chi. Bipinchandra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 62439, "end_char": 62456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It says \"It is absolutely necessary that you should obtain the consent of Chi."}}, {"text": "Jaisittghbhai Shah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 68346, "end_char": 68364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The subsequent\n\ntelegram and letters (assuming that both the letters 7956 of the 13th and 15th Noveber had been posted in Bipin Chander the usual course and received by the addressees) Jaisittghbhai Shah would give a shock to the family.", "canonical_name": "Jaisinghbhai Shalt"}}, {"text": "Patao", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 70783, "end_char": 70788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prabllawati This conclusion is further supported by the fact that between 1948 and 1951 the defendant stayed SinhaJ. with her mother-in-law at Patao whenever she was there, sometimes for months, at other times for weeks."}}]} {"document_id": "1956_1_872_888_EN", "year": 1956, "text": "October 23.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nPIPRAICH SUGAR MILLS LTD. v.\n\n[1956]\n\nPIPRAICH SUGAR MILLS MAZDOOR UNION.\n\n[BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, S. K. DAS and GovINDA MENON JJ.]\n\nIndustrial Dispute-Definition-Claim in dispute arising prior to closure of indi1, stry-Government, if competent to issue notification for adjudication subsequent to such closure-Discharge of workmen on closure of industry and discharge on retrencliment-Distinction-\n\nAiorird of compensation for termination of service on cfo.urc, if permissible-U.P. Industrial Disputes Act (U.P. XXVIII of 1947),\n\nSS. !J, a-Industrial Disputes Act (XIV of 1947), •. !J(k).\n\nThe appellant company could ncit. work its Mills to full capacity owing to short supply of sugar-cane and got the permission of the Government to sell its machinery but continued crushing cane under a lease from the purchaser.\n\nThe workmen's Union in order to frustrate the tran.Saction resolved to go on strike and communi.\" ca.ted its resolution to the company. There wa~ correspondence bet ween the partie!i in course of which the company offered to pay to the workmen 25 per cent. of the profits of the sale on condition that the strike notice muc; t immediately be withdrawn.\n\nThe workmen did not fulfil the condition and made certain counterproposals. The company insisted that the condition must first be fulfilled before the counterproposals could be considered and renewed its offer.\n\nAlthougi1 the workmen did not actually go on strike, they did not Withdraw the strike notice, and did not co-operate with the manage ment in the dismantling and delivery of the machinery to the pur chaser, with tbe result that the company lost heavily. On the expiry of the lease and closure of the industry, the services of the workmen were duly terminated by the company on March 21, 1951. The workmen thereafter, claimed the share of profits on the basis of the offer made by the company in the correspondence and the dispute was referred to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudic•tion by the U.P.\n\nGovernment by a notification under s. 3 of the U.P. Industrial Dis putes Act of 19t7. The Tribunal held that the company was bound by the offer it had made and awarded a sum of Rs. 45.000 to the workmen as representing their share of the profits. On appeal the award of the Indu•trial Tribunal was affirmed by the Labour Appel late Tribunal. It was contended on behalf of the appellant company that the notification was ultra vires, and the reference and the e.wafd void in conseqtl'ence and that there having been no concluded agreen1ent between the parties, it was not bound to pay.\n\nHeld, that the definition of an industrial dispute contained iu s. 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act XIV of 1947 and adopted by the U.P. Inraich Sugar\n\nMills Mal&door\n\nUnioti\n\n1956. October 23.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-The appellant is a limited Company, which had been carrying on business in crushing sugarcane at a place called Pipraich in Gorakhpur District from the year 1932.\n\nIn 1946 it decided to expand its business, and with that object, sold its old machinery which had a crushing capacity of 160 tons per day, and purchased a new one with 650 tons capacity. The new plant was installed in 1947, and it actually started working in 1948-49. During this period, the sugar industry was passing through a crisis owing to shortage of sugarcane, and in consequence, the Government assumed control of its production and supply. The quota which was allotted to the appellant's Mill proved too small to its being worked profitably, with the result that in 1948-49 and 1949-50 the Company sustained losses which according to the appellant came to Rs. 2,67,042-7-4. After several unsuccessful attempts at getting a larger supply, the management wrote to the Government on May 11, 1950, either to increase their quota or to permit them to sell the Mills. In October, 1950, the Government granted permission for the sale of the plant and machinery, and pursuant thereto, the management sold them to a Madras party.\n\nAs the crushing season was then on, the appellant obtained from the purchaser a lease of the Milla for the current season agreeing to deliver possession thereof on the termination of the lease.\n\nIt should be mentioned that the appellant was also carrying on negotiations with the purchaser, for itself dismantling the machinery and erecting it at Madras for a lump consideration, expecting to perform the contract through its own workmen.\n\nWhen the workmen became aware of the agreement of sale, their reaction to it was thoroughly hostile, and acting through their Union, the respondent herein, they decided to prevent the transaction going through, as otherwise they would be thrown out of employment.\n\nWith that object, they moved the\n\nGovernment to cancel the permission granted to the appellant for the sale of the Mills, and they also passed a resolution on December 26, 1950, to go on strike from January 12, 1951, and communicated the same to the appellant. This led to correspondence between the parties, and as that is the foundation of the claim for compensation put forward by the respondent and awarded by the Tribunal, it becomes necessary to set it out with sufficient fulness. On January 3, 1951, the Managing Director offered through the Manager of the Mills, to allot 25 per cent. of the profit on the sale transaction with the Madras party on certain terms and subject to the condition \"that the notice of strike should be withdrawn at once and today, so that arrangement of work could be made\".\n\nTo this, the reply of the Union on January 5, 1951, was as follows:\n\n\"With reference to the assurance given by the Managing Director, communicated by your goodself to us under your No. 975 dated 4th January 1951, asking us to withdraw the notice of strike, we regret to inform you that our fight is with the Government, which is not solved with this only. Our members a.re bent upon keeping the sugar mills here at any cost, either by strike, satyagrah, etc., or through any other means guided by our federation, otherwise there is no assurance of employment of thousands of creatures\".\n\nThen the letter proceeded to take exception to some of the terms, and finally wound up by stating that the workmen were waiting for their President Kashi- 'nath Pandey to advise them in the matter. Replying to the objections raised by the respondent to some of the terms, the management wrote on January 8, 1951, that they were ready to reconsider them, but insisted on the withdrawal of notice of strike as \"the chief point\". On January 9, 1951, Kashinath Pandey came to Pipraich, and discussed the matter with the management, and following upon it, the General Manager wrote to the respondent on January IO, 1951, that \"in case the strike notice was withdrawn at once, he would accede to the following points raised by the Union\", and then the po in ts were set down.\n\nThe\n\nPipraich Sugar\n\nMills Ua.\n\nPipraich Sugar\n\nMills Mazdoor\n\nUnion\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\np; praich Sugar\n\nMillsUd.\n\nPlpraich Sugar\n\ni'11 ills M azdoor\n\nUnion\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J,\n\nletter concluded by stating that the amount of compensation \"will not be less than a lac\". The respondent replied to this on the same day that the workers were waiting for the \"final order\" of Kashinath Pandey in the matter, and assured the management that \"in the meantime the strike was not coming off from the 12th\". After this, the appellant did not hear from the respondent, the strike also did not take place, and the crushing went on till the end of January, 1951, when the season came to an end. One of the points that arises for our determination in this appeal is whether on this corresf>ondence there was a concluded and binding agreement that the appellant should pay 25 per cent. of the profits on the sale transaction to the workmen.\n\nTo continue the narration, the lease having expired with the crushing season, the purchaser came over to Pipraich to take delivery of the Mills and to arrange for the machinery being dismantled and removed to Madras for being erected there. The appellant who, as already stated, was negotiating to get the dismantling done for a lump consideration fonnd that its workmen were as hostile to it as ever, a.nd refused to help in the work. To adopt the language of the respondent in its written statement, \"they declined out of sentiment to dig their own graves\". After fruitless attempts at getting them to co-operate in dismantling the machinery, the management put up the following notice on February 28, 1951:\n\n\"The workers of Pipraich Sugar Mills Ltd. should know that we have sold our Mill to Madras party under the permission of the Government. The party has arrived for dismantling. Under the terms of agreement, we are bound to help them in this work.\n\nSo the workers should know that we can do this favour that we can take contract of dismantling here and erection in Madras and keep the workers engaged and request the purchasera for providing them in their concern. Hence it is notified that workers who are not ready to co-operate they should consider themselves to be discharged from 1st March 1951. Fifteen days' notice is served on the workers. Those who\n\ncreate obstructions will be deprived of benefits promised to them\".\n\nBut the Union could not reconcile itself to the prospect of the Mills being shifted, and on March 4, 1951, Kashinath Pandey wrote a letter to the Government threatening to go on hunger strike, if the Mills were to be shifted from Pipraich. The workmen were thus in no mood to accept the terms contained in the notice dated February 28, 1951, and so, the management had to issue further notice on March 14, 1951, in the following terms:\n\n\"Whereas the workers have already been notified that we have sold our entire plant to a Madras party who have arrived to take charge of the Machines and whereas we have to hand over the plant from 15-3-1951 to the purchasers and thus there will be no work for our workers and whereas the M azdoor Union has already refused our suggestion to engage the workers in the work of dismantling and erection at Madras. Now in pursuance of our notice dated 28-2-1951, it is notified that the following workers have been discharged from the services since 1-3-1951 subject of course to the payment of 15 days wages.\n\nThe workers are hereby asked to take their wages of 15 days on the 15th and 16th instant\".\n\nIt appears from a notice dated March 16, 195li sent by the appellant to the respondent, that after the notice dated March 14, 1951, was issued, Kashinath Pandey had a discussion with the management, as a result of which the date of termination of service of the workers was extended from the 15th to 21st March pending the decision of the Government on the \"future programme of the Pipraich factory\", the workmen agreeing on their part to \"take up the dismantling of the Mill after the said date\". But the Government declined by its letter dated March 21, 1951, to interfere with the sale of the machinery, and in accordance with the understanding reached above, the workers should have co-operated with the appellant in dismantling the macl: 'nery from March 21.\n\nBut they declined to do so, and thereupon, acting in accordance with its notices dated February 28, 1951,\n\nPij>raich Sugar\n\nMills Ltd. v.\n\nPipraich Sugar\n\nlv1 ills fv1 azdoor\n\nUnion\n\nVcnkatara1na\n\nAyyar J.\n\nPipraich Sugat'\n\nMills Ud,\n\nPipraich Sugai'\n\nMs'lls Mazdoor\n\nUnion\n\nvtzkatara1na\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nand March 14, 1951, the management duly discharged them. In view of the inability of the appellant to take up the contract, the purchaser entered into direct negotiations with the workmen, and on 1-4-1951 concluded an agreement with them for dismantling the machinery. The net result was that the appellant lost a contract on which, as admitted by the respondent, it would have earned a profit of at least Rs. 2 lakhs. The workers, having taken the benefit of a direct contract with the purchaser for dismantling the machinery, next turned their attention to the appellant, and on the basis of the letters dated January 3, 1951, and January 10, 1951, sent a notice to it on April 19, 1951, asking for distribution among the workers of the \"25 per cent labour-share of the profits on sale of machinery\". By its letter dated June 19, 1951, the appellant repudiated the claim, and stated:\n\n\"Then we also refer you to our notice dated 27-2-1951 in which we appealed to the labour to cooperate with us so that we might take the contract of dismantling here at Pipraich a.nd erection at Etikoppaka and said definitely that those who do not co-operate should consider themselves discharged. 'l'his would have given us a good saving to meet the demand of the labour, but as you in spite of our appeal and notice refused to co-operate, we had to suffer a heavy loss, for which you are directly responsible\".\n\nThereafter, the respondent moved the Government to take action in the matter, and the result was that on November 16, 1951, the U. P. Government issued a notification under section 3 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act XXVIII of 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act, referring the following dispute to the adjudication of the Industrial Tribunal:\n\n\"Whether the services of workmen, if so how many, were terminated by the concern known as Pipraic.h Sugar Mills Ltd., Pipraich, District Gorakhpur, without settlement of their due claims and improperly; and if so, to what relief are the workmen concerned entitled?\"\n\nBy its award dated February 28, 1952, the Indus-\n\n' '\n\ntrial Tribunal held firstly that the closure of the business and the sale of the machinery by the appellant was bona fide, as it had been continuously incurring losses and the supply position of sugarcane held out no immediate prospects of improvement, that the conduct of the workmen had been throughout unfair and such as to disentitle them to compensation but that the promise contained in the letters dated January 3 and 10, 1951, to pay 25 per cent. of the profits realised by the sale of the Mills, was binding on the management.\n\nIt further held, repelling the contention of the appellant, that the notification dated November 16, 1951, was competent, notwithstanding that at that date the business had been closed.\n\nThe Tribunal then proceeded to ascertain the profits made by the appellant on its sale of the Mills, and held that a sum of Rs. 45,000 representing the 25 per cent. of the net profits was payable to the workmen.\n\nThe management appealed against this decision; but the same was confirmed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal by its order dated July 21, 1953.\n\nThe matter now comes before us in appeal under art. 136. As the appeal raised questions of importance, and as the respondent was unrepresented we requested Mr. Umrigar to assist us, and we are indebted to him for his learned and com.prehensive argument.\n\nTwo contentions have been urged in support of the appeal:\n\n(1) The notification dated November 16, 1951, referring the dispute to the adjudication of the Industrial Tribunal is ultra vires, and the reference and the award therein are in consequence void; and\n\n(2) there was no concluded or binding agreement by the appellant to pay the workmen any share of profits in the sale transaction and the award is therefore bad on the merits.\n\nTaking the first contention, the provision of law under which the impugned notification dated November 16, 1951, was issued by the State is section 3 of the Act, which runs as follows:\n\n\"If in the opinion of the State Government, it is necessary or expedient so to do for securing the public safety or convenience, or the maintenance of\n\nPij>raich Sugar\n\nMills Ltd. v.\n\nPij>ralcll Sugm\n\nMills Masedoor\n\nUnion\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nPipraich Sugar\n\nMills Ud.\n\nv. p; praich Sugar\n\nMills Masdoor\n\nUnion\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J.\n\npublic order or supplies and services esRential to the life of the community, or for maintaining employment, it may, by general or special order, make provision-\n\n( d) for referring any industrial disputes for conciliation or adjudication in the manner provided in the order\".\n\nAn \"industrial dispute\", as defined in s. 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act XIV of 1947-and by force of section 2, that definition applies to the Act- \" means any dispute or difference between employers and employees, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person\". Now, the contention of the appellant is that it is a condition precedent to the exercise by the State of its power under s. 3 of the Act that there should be an industrial dispute, that there could be no industrial dispute according to this definition, unless there is a relationship of employer and employee; that in the present case, as the appellant sold its Mills, closed its business and discharged the wcrkmen on March 21, 1951, paying to them in full whatever was due in accordance with the standing orders, there was thereafter no question of any relationship of employer and employees between them, that accordingly there was no industrial dispute at the date of the notification on November 16, 1951, and that it was therefore incompetent. Reliance was placed in support of this position on the o bservation in Indian Metal and Metallurgical Corporation v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras(') that the definition of an \"industrial dispute\" presupposes the continued existence of the industry, and on the decision in K . . N. Padmanabha Ayyar v. The State of Madras(') that there could be no industrial dispute with regard to a business, which was not in existence.\n\nIt cannot be doubted that the entire scheme of the Act assumes that there is in existence an industry,\n\n(I) A IR. 1953 l>fad. 98, 102.\n\n(2) (1054] I L.L.J. 4G9.\n\nand then proceeds on to provide for various steps being taken, when a dispute arises in that industry.\n\nThus, the provisions of the Act relating to lock-out, strike, lay off, retrenchment, conciliation and adjudication proceedings, the period during which the awards are to be in force have meaning only if they refer to an industry which is running and not one which is 1closed.\n\nIn Messrs Burn and Go., Ltd., Calcutta v. Their Workmen(1), this Court observed that the object of all labour legislation was firstly to ensure fair terms to the workmen, and secondly to prevent disputes between employers and employees, so that production might not be adversely affected and the larger interests of the public might not suffer. Both these objects again can have their fulfilment only in an existing and not a dead industry. The view therefore expressed in Indian Metal and Metallurgical Corporation v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras (supra) and K. N. Padmanabha Ayyar v. The State of Madras (supra) that the industi:ial dispute to which the provisions of the Act apply is only one which arises out of an existing industry is clearly correct. Therefore, where the business has been closed and it is either admitted or found that th~ closure is real and bona fide, any dispute arising with reference thereto would, as held in K. N.\n\nPadmanabha Ayyar v. The State of Madras (supra), fall outside the purview of the Industrial Disputes Act. And that will a fortiori be so, if a dispute arises -if one such can be conceived-after the closure of the business between the qtondam employer and employees. .\n\nIn the light of the principles stated above, we must examine the nature of the dispute which is the subject-matter of the reference under the impugned notification. The claim of the workmen is that the promise made by the management in its letters dated January 3, 1951, and January 10, 1951, is a binding agreement and that they are entitled to be paid in accordance therewith. Now, if this contention is wellfounded, the dispute relates to a claim which arose\n\n(1) Civil Appeal No. 325 of 1055, clecicled on October J 1, 195G.\n\nPij>raich Sugar\n\nMills Ud.\n\nPij>ra ich Sugar\n\nMills Mazdoor\n\nUnion\n\nVenkatal'Oma\n\nAyyar J, -\n\nPifaraich Sugar\n\nMills Ud.\n\nPip1'aich Sugai\n\nMills Mazdoo1'\n\nUnion\n\nVenhatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nwhile the industry was in existence and between persons who stood in the relationship of employer and employees, and that would clearly be an industrial dispute as defined in the Act. But it is argued for the appellant that even so, the notification dated November 16, 1951, would be incompetent as the industry had been closed before that date, and there was therefore no relationship of employer and employee at that point of time.\n\nIn other words, the power of the State to make a reference under section 3 will depend, according to the appellant, not only on the dispnte having arisen in an existing indnstry but further, on the continued existence of that industry on the date of the notification. We do not find anything in the language of section 3 of the Act to warrant the imposition of this additional limitation on the power of the State to make a reference. That section only requires, apart from other conditions, with which we are not concerned, that there should be an industrial dispute before there can be a reference, and we have held that it would be an industrial dispute if it arises out of an existing industry. If that condition is satisfied, the competence of the State for taking action under that section is complete, and the fact that the industry has since been closed can have no effect on it.\n\nAny other construction would, in our opinion, result in serious anomalies and grave injustice. If a workman improperly dismissed raises an industrial dispute, and before action is taken by the Government the industry is closed, what happens to the right which the Act gives him for appropriate relief, if the Act vanishes into thin air as soon as the industry is closed? If the contention of the appellant is correct, what is there to prevent an employer who intends, for good and commercial reason, to close his business from indulging on a large scale in unfair labour practices, in victimisation and in wrongful dismissals, and escaping the consequences thereof by closing down the industry? We think that on a true construction of s. 3, the power of the State to make a reference under that section mnst be determined with reference not to the date on which\n\nit is made but to the date on which the right which is the subject-matter of the dispute arises, and that the machinery provided under the Act would be available for working out the rights which bad accrued prior to the dissolution of the business.\n\nIt was next argued that even on this view, the notification dated November 16, 1951, was incompetent inasmuch as the management had offered by its letter dated January 3, 1951, to pay the workmen 25 per cent. of the profits on the sale transaction only on April 30, 1951, and the right to the amount thus accrued to the workmen only after the closure of the business on March 21, 1951. But this argument proceeds on a misapprehension of the correct position on the facts. The true scope of the promise contained in the letter dated January 3, 1951, is that the workmen acquired thereunder a right in praesenti to 25 per cent. of the profits, but that the amount became payable only on April 30, 1951, the reason obvibusly being that it could be precisely determined only after the transaction was completed. In this view, as the claim for share of profits arose on January 3, 1951, and January 10, 1951, when the industry was working, the reference dated November 16, 1951, would be valid, notwithstanding that the business was closed on March 21, 1951.\n\nThat brings us on to a consideration of the second question, as to whether there was a concluded agre~ ment binding the appellant to pay 25 per cent. of the profits in the sale transaction to the workmen. The Tribunal has answered it in the affirmative, and its finding was accepted by the Appellate Tribunal as, being one of fact, it had to be, under section 7 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act No.\n\nXLVIII of 1950. It is argued by Mr. Umrigar that following the usual practice of this Court in special appeals not to disturb findings of fact by Tribunals unless there were e:xceptional grounds therefor, we should not interfere with the finding of the Industrial Tribunal that, there was a concluded and enforceable agreement. But our difficulty is that the Tribunal has spoken in two voices, and has given inconsistent\n\n'1955\n\nPipraich Sugar Mills Ltd. ...\n\nPipraich S11gar\n\nMills Mazdoor\n\nUnion\n\nVcnkatal'ama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nPipraich Sugar\n\nMills Ud.\n\nPjprai'ch Sugar\n\n!if ills ltfazdoor\n\nUnion\n\nVenkatara11ia\n\nAyyar J.\n\nand conflicting findings, and it has consequently become necessary for us to determine which of its findings should be accepted as supported by materials.\n\nWe start with the letter dated January 3, 1951, wherein the management made an offer to pay 25 per cent. of the profits of the sale transaction to the workmen. It. was expressly subject to the condition that the strike should be called off \"at once and today\". That was not done. On the other hand, the respondent made certain counter-proposals in its letter dated January 5, 1951, and the management replied on January 8, 1951, that it would reconsider its terms provided the strike notice was withdrawn,·\n\nThus, the offer contained in the letter dated January 3, 1951, was not accepted and lapsed. Then on January 10, 1951, the management renewed its offer subject again to the condition that the strike notice was withdrawn at once. The respondent passed no resolution withdrawing the notice, and in its reply dated January 10, 1951, it made it clear that it was waiting for Kashinath Pandey for it to come to a final decision. There was no forther communication from the Union. We do 'not see how on this correspondence it could be held that there was a concluded agreement between the parties, and that is the view which the Tribunal itself took of it when it ooserved that \"no final agreement could be arrived at ........ and consequently the management served a notice on 28th February 1951\". But then, it went on to observe that, in fact, the workmen did not go on strike on January 12, 1951, and continued in service till they were served with notice of discharge on February 28, 1951, that that was consideration for the promise made by the agreement, which must therefore be taken to have become a term of service, and that in consequence \"the promise of the management as contained in the letters of 3rd and 10th January 1951, is a binding agreement under which the workmen are entitled to compensation for termination of their services on the closure of the Mills\". This argument rests on a confusion of thought. The question whether there was consideration for the promise made by the\n\nmanagement in its letters dated January 3, and January 10, 1951 arises only if the offer contained in the letters had been accepted by the respondent, so as to ripen into an agreement. And if there was no concluded agreement between the parties, as the Tribunal itself had held, then the further question as to whether it was supported by consideration. would not arise, nor would there be any question of its becoming one of the terms of the service.\n\nIt was argued that though a formal resolution withdrawing the strike was not passed, in fact there was no strike, and that must be taken to be acceptance of the offer by conduct.\n\nThat would not be acceptance as required by the appellant, and that alone would be sufficient to reject the contention of the respondent.\n\nBut this contention must fail even on the merits. In its letter dated January 10, 1951, the respondent, while stating that the strike was not taking place on the 12th, made it clear that this was pending the final decision of the Union. That clearly is not an acceptance of the offer.\n\nThe matter does not rest there. The object of the strike was, it should -be remembered, not anything directly connected with the terms of employment but something collateral to it. It was to prevent the Mills from being removed from Pipraich to Madras.\n\nWhen the management offered to part with 25 per cent. of the profits of the sale transaction, its object was clearly to disarm the opposition of the workmen and to get the machinery dismantled and delivered to the purchaser peacefully.\n\nDid the workmen ever agree to it? As late as March 5, 1951, Kashinath Pandey wrote to the Government that if the Mills were to be shifted from Pipraich, he would go on hunger strike.\n\nEven after the Government had informed him that the sale could not be interfered with, the workmen did not co-operate with the management in the dismantling of the machinery with the result that the appellant had to give up the contract with reference thereto and to lose Rs. 2 lakhs profits.\n\nTo crown all, the workmen having successfully prevented the appellant from getting the contract for dismantling, themselves\n\nPiJ>raich Sugar\n\nMills Ltd. v.\n\nPipraich Sugar\n\nMills Mazdoor\n\nUnion\n\nVenkatarama\n\nA.yyarJ.\n\nPipraich Sugar\n\nMills lid. v.\n\nPipraich Sugar\n\nMills M azdoor\n\nUnion\n\nVenkatarania\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nentered into it directly with the purchaser and undoubtedly intercepted a part, if not the whole, of the profits which the appellant would have earned. Itis impossible to hold on these facts that there was a concluded agreement between the parties binding the appellant to give the workmen a share of the profits of the sale transaction.\n\nIt was next contended by Mr. Umrigar that even if there was no concluded agreement by the management to pay the workmen a share of profits on the sale transaction, it would have been open to the Tribunal to have awarded compensation for the termination of their services, treating it as retrenchment, and that the award of compensation of Rs. 45,000 which was what the management itself had suggested, might be sustained on that footing.\n\nThis contention assumes that the termination of the services of workmen, on the closure of a business, is retrenchment. But retrenchment connotes in its ordinary acceptation that the business itself is being continued but that a portion of the staff or the fabour force is discharged as surplusage and the termination of services of all the workmen as a result of the closure of the business cannot therefore be properly described as retrenchment.\n\nIt is however contended by Mr.\n\nUmrigar that the definition of retrenchmel)t in section 2( oo) of the InduAtrial Disputes Act XIV of 194 7 is wide enough to include discharge consequent on the closure of business, and that under section 25-F, compensation could be awarded therefor. Our attention has been invited on behalf of the appellant to the decision in J. K. Hosiery Factory v. Labour Appellate Tribunal('), where it was held that retrenchment as defined in section 2( oo) does not comprehend discharge on the closure of business, but Mr. Umrigar contends that it is erroneous.\n\nWe do not consider it necessary to decide this question, as the definition of \"retrenchment\" in section 2(oo) of Act XIV 1947 and sect.ion 25-F therein were inserted by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act No. XLIII of 1953, and we have held in Messrs Burn and Co., Ltd., Calcutta v.\n\n(1) A IR. 1956 All. 498.\n\nTheir Workmen (supra) that this Act has no retrospective operation. The rights of the parties to the present appeal must therefore be decided in accordance with the law as it stood on March 21, 1951, when the workmen were diScharged.\n\nIt was next contended, on the strength of the decisions in Employees of Messrs India Reconstruction Corporation Limited, Calcutta v. Messrs India Reconstruction Corporation Limited, Calcutta( 1) and Messrs Benett Goleman & Company Ltd v. Their Employees( 2 ) that even prior to the enactment of Act XLIII of 1953, the Tribunals had acted on the view that retrenchment included discharge on closure of business, and had awarded compensation on that footing and that the award of the Tribunal in the present case could be supported in that view and should not be disturbed. In Employees of Messrs India Reconstruction Corporation Limited, Calcutta v. Messrs India Reconstruction Corporation Limited, Calcutta (supra), the Tribunal observed at p. 576 as follows:\n\n\"Ordinarily retrenchment means discharge from service of only the surplus part of the labour force but in the case of closure the whole labour force is dispensed with. In substance the difference between closure and normal retrenchment is one of degree only. As in the case of retrenchment so in the case of closure the workmen are not responsible for closing their jobs. In both the cases, what is called compensation by way of retrenchment relief should be admissible\".\n\nWe are unable to agree with these observations.\n\nThough there is discharge of workmen both when there is retrenchment and closure of business, the compensation is to be awarded under the law, not for discharge as such but for discharge on retrenchment, and if, as is conceded, retrenchment means in ordinary parlance, discharge of the surplus, it cannot include discharge on closure of business. Moreover, there was no question of closing of business in Employees of Messrs India Reconstruction Corporation Limited,\n\nCalcutta v. Messrs India Reconstruction Corporation\n\n(1) [1953] L.A.C. 563.\n\n(2) (1954) L.A, C. 24.\n\nPij; raich Sugar\n\nMills Ltd. v.\n\nPij; raich Sugar\n\nMills Mazdoor\n\nUnion\n\nVenkat\"ara111a\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nPipraich Sugar\n\nJU ills Ud.\n\nPipraich S1, gar\n\nMills .Uazdoor\n\nUnion\n\nVe1tkatarama\n\nAyyar ].\n\nLimited, Calcutta (supra), as what happened there was that one of the units of the company, that at Calcutta, was closed and that would be a case of retrenchment, and the observations quoted above were purely obiter.\n\nThey were, however, quoted and followed without discussion by the Appellate Tribunal in Messrs Benett Coleman & Company Ltd. v.\n\nTheir Employees (supra), which forther remarked at p. 27:\n\n\"Thus whether the closure was justified or not, the workmen who have lost their jobs would in any event get compensation. If it was not bona fide or not justified, it may be that the measure of compensation would be larger than if it was otherwise\".\n\nFor the reasons given above, we cannot assent to these observations. It should be mentioned that in Messrs Benett Coleman and Company Ltd. v. Their Employees (supra), there was no closure of busi{less, but winding up of the Calcutta unit by a newspaper publishing company which bad its headquarters at Bombay. We must accordingly overrule this contention also.\n\nWe should add that the Tribunal was of the opinion that., apart from agreement, the workmen should not, in view of their conduct, be awarded compensation, and we entirely agree with it. And as we have found against the agreement, we must allow this appeal, and set aside the award of compensation to the workmen made by the Tribunal. In the cir. cumstances, the parties will bear their own costs throughout.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 91, "entities": [{"text": "PIPRAICH SUGAR MILLS LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 36, "end_char": 60, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PIPRAICH SUGAR MILLS MAZDOOR UNION", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PIPRAICH SUGAR MILLS MAZDOOR UNION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 108, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PIPRAICH SUGAR MILLS MAZDOOR UNION", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112, "end_char": 120, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. K. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 141, "end_char": 150, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.K. DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GovINDA MENON JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 155, "end_char": 172, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. GOVINDA MENON", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 525, "end_char": 548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 583, "end_char": 606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "March 21, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1803, "end_char": 1817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the expiry of the lease and closure of the industry, the services of the workmen were duly terminated by the company on March 21, 1951."}}, {"text": "U.P.\n\nGovernment", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2020, "end_char": 2036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The workmen thereafter, claimed the share of profits on the basis of the offer made by the company in the correspondence and the dispute was referred to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudic•tion by the U.P.\n\nGovernment by a notification under s. 3 of the U.P. Industrial Dis putes Act of 19t7."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2061, "end_char": 2065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Dis putes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2078, "end_char": 2102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2676, "end_char": 2683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Dis putes Act", "statute": "Industrial Dis putes Act"}}, {"text": "Disputes Act XIV of 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2702, "end_char": 2726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "U.P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2746, "end_char": 2750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Held, that the definition of an industrial dispute contained iu s. 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act XIV of 1947 and adopted by the U.P. Inraich Sugar\n\nMills Ltd. v.\n\nPipraich Sugar\n\nlv1 ills fv1 azdoor\n\nUnion\n\nVcnkatara1na\n\nAyyar J.\n\nPipraich Sugat'\n\nMills Ud,\n\nPipraich Sugai'\n\nMs'lls Mazdoor\n\nUnion\n\nvtzkatara1na\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nand March 14, 1951, the management duly discharged them.", "canonical_name": "PIPRAICH SUGAR MILLS MAZDOOR UNION"}}, {"text": "January 10, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14707, "end_char": 14723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The workers, having taken the benefit of a direct contract with the purchaser for dismantling the machinery, next turned their attention to the appellant, and on the basis of the letters dated January 3, 1951, and January 10, 1951, sent a notice to it on April 19, 1951, asking for distribution among the workers of the \"25 per cent labour-share of the profits on sale of machinery\"."}}, {"text": "April 19, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14748, "end_char": 14762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The workers, having taken the benefit of a direct contract with the purchaser for dismantling the machinery, next turned their attention to the appellant, and on the basis of the letters dated January 3, 1951, and January 10, 1951, sent a notice to it on April 19, 1951, asking for distribution among the workers of the \"25 per cent labour-share of the profits on sale of machinery\"."}}, {"text": "June 19, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14897, "end_char": 14910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its letter dated June 19, 1951, the appellant repudiated the claim, and stated:\n\n\"Then we also refer you to our notice dated 27-2-1951 in which we appealed to the labour to cooperate with us so that we might take the contract of dismantling here at Pipraich a.nd erection at Etikoppaka and said definitely that those who do not co-operate should consider themselves discharged. '"}}, {"text": "27-2-1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15005, "end_char": 15014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its letter dated June 19, 1951, the appellant repudiated the claim, and stated:\n\n\"Then we also refer you to our notice dated 27-2-1951 in which we appealed to the labour to cooperate with us so that we might take the contract of dismantling here at Pipraich a.nd erection at Etikoppaka and said definitely that those who do not co-operate should consider themselves discharged. '"}}, {"text": "Etikoppaka", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15155, "end_char": 15165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its letter dated June 19, 1951, the appellant repudiated the claim, and stated:\n\n\"Then we also refer you to our notice dated 27-2-1951 in which we appealed to the labour to cooperate with us so that we might take the contract of dismantling here at Pipraich a.nd erection at Etikoppaka and said definitely that those who do not co-operate should consider themselves discharged. '"}}, {"text": "November 16, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15579, "end_char": 15596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, the respondent moved the Government to take action in the matter, and the result was that on November 16, 1951, the U. P. Government issued a notification under section 3 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act XXVIII of 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act, referring the following dispute to the adjudication of the Industrial Tribunal:\n\n\"Whether the services of workmen, if so how many, were terminated by the concern known as Pipraic.h Sugar Mills Ltd., Pipraich, District Gorakhpur, without settlement of their due claims and improperly; and if so, to what relief are the workmen concerned entitled?\""}}, {"text": "U. P. Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15602, "end_char": 15618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, the respondent moved the Government to take action in the matter, and the result was that on November 16, 1951, the U. P. Government issued a notification under section 3 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act XXVIII of 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act, referring the following dispute to the adjudication of the Industrial Tribunal:\n\n\"Whether the services of workmen, if so how many, were terminated by the concern known as Pipraic.h Sugar Mills Ltd., Pipraich, District Gorakhpur, without settlement of their due claims and improperly; and if so, to what relief are the workmen concerned entitled?\""}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15647, "end_char": 15656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15670, "end_char": 15693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Pipraic.h Sugar Mills Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15917, "end_char": 15943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, the respondent moved the Government to take action in the matter, and the result was that on November 16, 1951, the U. P. Government issued a notification under section 3 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act XXVIII of 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act, referring the following dispute to the adjudication of the Industrial Tribunal:\n\n\"Whether the services of workmen, if so how many, were terminated by the concern known as Pipraic.h Sugar Mills Ltd., Pipraich, District Gorakhpur, without settlement of their due claims and improperly; and if so, to what relief are the workmen concerned entitled?\""}}, {"text": "Gorakhpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15964, "end_char": 15973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, the respondent moved the Government to take action in the matter, and the result was that on November 16, 1951, the U. P. Government issued a notification under section 3 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act XXVIII of 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act, referring the following dispute to the adjudication of the Industrial Tribunal:\n\n\"Whether the services of workmen, if so how many, were terminated by the concern known as Pipraic.h Sugar Mills Ltd., Pipraich, District Gorakhpur, without settlement of their due claims and improperly; and if so, to what relief are the workmen concerned entitled?\""}}, {"text": "February 28, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16113, "end_char": 16130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its award dated February 28, 1952, the Indus-\n\n' '\n\ntrial Tribunal held firstly that the closure of the business and the sale of the machinery by the appellant was bona fide, as it had been continuously incurring losses and the supply position of sugarcane held out no immediate prospects of improvement, that the conduct of the workmen had been throughout unfair and such as to disentitle them to compensation but that the promise contained in the letters dated January 3 and 10, 1951, to pay 25 per cent."}}, {"text": "January 3 and 10, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16560, "end_char": 16582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its award dated February 28, 1952, the Indus-\n\n' '\n\ntrial Tribunal held firstly that the closure of the business and the sale of the machinery by the appellant was bona fide, as it had been continuously incurring losses and the supply position of sugarcane held out no immediate prospects of improvement, that the conduct of the workmen had been throughout unfair and such as to disentitle them to compensation but that the promise contained in the letters dated January 3 and 10, 1951, to pay 25 per cent."}}, {"text": "July 21, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17212, "end_char": 17225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The management appealed against this decision; but the same was confirmed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal by its order dated July 21, 1953."}}, {"text": "art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17275, "end_char": 17283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Umrigar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17388, "end_char": 17395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the appeal raised questions of importance, and as the respondent was unrepresented we requested Mr. Umrigar to assist us, and we are indebted to him for his learned and com.prehensive argument."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18059, "end_char": 18068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pipraich Sugar\n\nMills Ud.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18352, "end_char": 18377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Taking the first contention, the provision of law under which the impugned notification dated November 16, 1951, was issued by the State is section 3 of the Act, which runs as follows:\n\n\"If in the opinion of the State Government, it is necessary or expedient so to do for securing the public safety or convenience, or the maintenance of\n\nPij>raich Sugar\n\nMills Ltd. v.\n\nPij>ralcll Sugm\n\nMills Masedoor\n\nUnion\n\nVenkatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nPipraich Sugar\n\nMills Ud.", "canonical_name": "PIPRAICH SUGAR MILLS MAZDOOR UNION"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18421, "end_char": 18438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. p; praich Sugar\n\nMills Masdoor\n\nUnion\n\nVenkatarama Ayyar J.\n\npublic order or supplies and services esRential to the life of the community, or for maintaining employment, it may, by general or special order, make provision-\n\n( d) for referring any industrial disputes for conciliation or adjudication in the manner provided in the order\".", "canonical_name": "Venhatarama\n\nAyyar"}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18760, "end_char": 18767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Disputes Act XIV of 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18786, "end_char": 18810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18827, "end_char": 18836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Disputes Act XIV of 1947", "statute": "Disputes Act XIV of 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19262, "end_char": 19266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Disputes Act XIV of 1947", "statute": "Disputes Act XIV of 1947"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21881, "end_char": 21904, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Pij>raich Sugar\n\nMills Ud.\n\nPij>ra ich Sugar\n\nMills Mazdoor", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22599, "end_char": 22658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "325 of 1055, clecicled on October J 1, 195G.\n\nPij>raich Sugar\n\nMills Ud."}}, {"text": "Venhatarama\n\nAyyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22761, "end_char": 22779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pip1'aich Sugai\n\nMills Mazdoo1'\n\nUnion\n\nVenhatarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nwhile the industry was in existence and between persons who stood in the relationship of employer and employees, and that would clearly be an industrial dispute as defined in the Act.", "canonical_name": "Venhatarama\n\nAyyar"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23284, "end_char": 23293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23530, "end_char": 23539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24843, "end_char": 24847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 30, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25477, "end_char": 25491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the profits on the sale transaction only on April 30, 1951, and the right to the amount thus accrued to the workmen only after the closure of the business on March 21, 1951."}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26628, "end_char": 26637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pipraich Sugar Mills Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27124, "end_char": 27149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But our difficulty is that the Tribunal has spoken in two voices, and has given inconsistent\n\n'1955\n\nPipraich Sugar Mills Ltd. ...\n\nPipraich S11gar\n\nMills Mazdoor\n\nUnion\n\nVcnkatal'ama\n\nAyyarJ.\n\nPipraich Sugar\n\nMills Ud.", "canonical_name": "PIPRAICH SUGAR MILLS MAZDOOR UNION"}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27164, "end_char": 27167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27303, "end_char": 27308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "if ills ltfazdoor\n\nUnion\n\nVenkatara11ia\n\nAyyar J.\n\nand conflicting findings, and it has consequently become necessary for us to determine which of its findings should be accepted as supported by materials."}}, {"text": "28th February 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28748, "end_char": 28766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do 'not see how on this correspondence it could be held that there was a concluded agreement between the parties, and that is the view which the Tribunal itself took of it when it ooserved that \"no final agreement could be arrived at ........ and consequently the management served a notice on 28th February 1951\"."}}, {"text": "3rd and 10th January 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29181, "end_char": 29206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But then, it went on to observe that, in fact, the workmen did not go on strike on January 12, 1951, and continued in service till they were served with notice of discharge on February 28, 1951, that that was consideration for the promise made by the agreement, which must therefore be taken to have become a term of service, and that in consequence \"the promise of the management as contained in the letters of 3rd and 10th January 1951, is a binding agreement under which the workmen are entitled to compensation for termination of their services on the closure of the Mills\"."}}, {"text": "January 3, and", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 29501, "end_char": 29515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question whether there was consideration for the promise made by the\n\nmanagement in its letters dated January 3, and January 10, 1951 arises only if the offer contained in the letters had been accepted by the respondent, so as to ripen into an agreement."}}, {"text": "March 5, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31063, "end_char": 31076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As late as March 5, 1951, Kashinath Pandey wrote to the Government that if the Mills were to be shifted from Pipraich, he would go on hunger strike."}}, {"text": "section 2( oo)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33114, "end_char": 33128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33263, "end_char": 33273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2( oo)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33499, "end_char": 33513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(oo)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33716, "end_char": 33729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36157, "end_char": 36159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 36222, "end_char": 36230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Limited, Calcutta (supra), as what happened there was that one of the units of the company, that at Calcutta, was closed and that would be a case of retrenchment, and the observations quoted above were purely obiter."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 37172, "end_char": 37178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It should be mentioned that in Messrs Benett Coleman and Company Ltd. v. Their Employees (supra), there was no closure of busi{less, but winding up of the Calcutta unit by a newspaper publishing company which bad its headquarters at Bombay."}}]} {"document_id": "1956_1_889_915_EN", "year": 1956, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nRAJA RAJINDER CHAND\n\nSUKHI (and connected appeals)\n\n{JAGANNADHADAS, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, B. P. SINHA and S. K.1DAs JJ.]\n\nRight to Royal trees-Conquest of territory-Grant of Jagir by conqueror-Title to trees within Jagir-Rights of the Jagirdar- Grant-Oonstruction-Entries in Wajibul-arz-Scope and legal effect-Ala malik and Adna malik, Meaning of-Punjab Land-Revenue Act, 188'1 (Piinjab XVII of 188'1 ), ss. 31, 1'4.\n\nThe appellant as the proprietor of N ada.un Jagir sued to establish his title to chil (pine) trees standing on lands within the J agir but belonging to the respondents, on the ground that the trees belonged to him as ala malik (superior landlord) and not to the respondents who were only adna maliks (inferior landlords).\n\nThe J agir originally formed part of the territory belonging to the rulers of Ke.ngra who were Sovereigns entitled toir Chand e>r any of his successors-in-interest is a different question which will depend on the terms of the grant or on other evidence showing that the right had been surrendered in favour of the appellant or his predecessors-in-interest. That is a question which we shall presently discuss'.\n\nThe learned District Judge was however wrong in thinking that, according to the system of land tenure which prevailed under the old Rajas or under the Sikhs, Raja J odh bir Chand got any right to all pine trees within Nadaun Jagir.\n\n(1) [1924J L.R. 51 I.A. 357, 360.\n\nRaja Rajinder Chand . v.\n\nSuk/ti\n\nS. K. DasJ.\n\nRaja Rajinder Chand v.\n\nSukhi\n\nS. K. DasJ,\n\nThat brings us to the second ground and to a consideration of the terms of the Sanad dated October 11, 1848, on which also the appellant based his claim.\n\nThe Sanad was in these terms:\n\n\"Fresh Sanad re: Settlement upon Raja Jodhbir Chand Katoch of the villages named hereinafter, situate in Taalluqa Nadaun, possessed by him.\n\nWhereas the mountainous country together with the Doaba tract had come under the occupation of the British Company in pursuance of the treaty which took place between the British Government and the Sirkar of Lahore on March 9, 1846: The Jagir of Choru, Bara, etc., situate in the Ilaqa of Nadaun the name of each Tappa whereof together with the number of its villages and its Jama is given herein below and the total Jama whereof was Rs. 26,270/10/3 per annum approximately, i.e., as much of the Ilaqa of Nadaun as was in the possession of the said Raja at the time of the commencement of tumult of battle whether less or more than the present one, has been granted in perpetuity, generation after generation, to Raja Jodhbir Chad and his male legitimate descendants who are not from the womb of a slave girl under the orders of the Most Generous Gracious, Exalted and Excellent Nawab Sir Henry Hardinge G.C.B.\n\nGovernor-General, ruler of the territory of India, communicated in writing in English bearing the signature of Mr. Edward, Deputy Chief Secretary to His Excellency, in reply to the Commissioner's report No. 147, dated July 24, 1847, and also as contemplated in the previous order of the Niiwab Governor-General, dated August 7, 1846, subject to the following conditions:-\n\n1. In no way shall criminal jurisdiction in respect of the said Ilaqa vest in the Raja Sahib. The entire administration and power of hearing every sort of complaint between the Riaya (subjects) and the said Raja shall remain in the hands of the British Government's officers.\n\n2. The Raja Sahib shall not be at liberty to receive on any pretext Mahsul for any commodity from any Mahajan and trader or from the Riaya\n\n(subjects) by way of Zakat (octroi), or anything on account of excise and intoxicants. He shall receive only revenue from the Riaya living in the villages of his Jagir according to the British Government's rules of practice. In case of contravention of the said rules of practice cash shall be fixed by the Government for the said Raja Sahib or his descendants. 3.\n\nAfter the death of the said Raja Sahib this Jagir shall be divided among his real sons according to the practice followed by Hindus. It shall not devolve on his descendants from a slave girl.\n\n4. It shall be essential for the Raja Sahib to construct at his own expense public roads, eleven cubits in width, in his Ilaqa.\n\n5. It is proper for the Raja Sahib to be always ready to serve the Government wholeheartedly and to bear good moral character.\n\nHence it is obligatory on the said Raja Sahib not to set his foot on the borders of others beyond his own. He should treat this Sanad as a Sanad absolute.\n\nPreviously on, September 22, 1846, a Sanad was issued by the Exalted Henry Montgomery Colonel Lawrence from Simla without thorough enquiry and without the name of each village being entered therein. In that Sanad the entire Jama is shown to be Rs. 32,000 approximately. According to the statements of officials of the Raja Sahib the said Jama includes amounts on account of excise, Bhum Chari (cattle grazing) etc. That was found to be wrong. Now the present Sanad with the name of each Tappa and the number of villages and Jama thereof being entered in it is issued by this Court subject to the abovementioned conditions after an enquiry having been made and a report having been submitted to the Nawab Governor-General\".\n\nAppended to the Sanad was a list of tappas and villages comprised within the Jagir of Nadaun. The list also mentioned in the third column the amount of Jama for each tappa.\n\nThe question now is whether the aforesaid Sanad was a grant primarily of land revenue; or it made a grant of other royal rights including the right to all\n\nRoja Rojinder Chand v.\n\nS11khi\n\nS. K. DasJ,\n\nRaja Rajinder\n\nChand\n\nSiikhi\n\nS. K. DasJ.\n\npine trees which is the particular right under consideration in the six suits brought by the appellant.\n\nIt is, we think, well settled that the ordinary rule applicable to grants made by a subject does not apply to grants made by the sovereign authority; and grants made by the Sovereign are to be construed most favourably for the Sovereign. This general rule, however, is capable of important relaxations in favour of the subject. It is necessary to refer here to such only of those relaxations as have a bearing on the construction of the document before us; thus, if the intention is obvious, a fair and liberal interpretation must be given to the grant to enable it to take effect; and the operative part, if plainly expressed, may take effect notwithstanding qualifications in the recitals.\n\nIn cases where the grant is for valuable consideration, it is construed in favour of the grantee, for the honour of the Sovereign; and where two constructions are possible, one valid and the other void, that which is valid ought to be preferred, for the honour of the Sovereign ought to be more regarded than the Sovereign's profit (see para 670 at p. 315 of Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. VII, s. 12, Simonds Ed.).\n\nIt is worthy of note that so far as the lands in possession of tenants or subjects were concerned, the Sanad did not grant any right other than the right to receive revenue; condition No. 2 of the Sanad made it quite clear that the grantee would receive only revenue from the subjects living in the villages of his Jagir according to the British Government's rules of practice, and that the grantee -was not at liberty to receive on any prete,; ict \"mahsul\" for any commodity from any Mahajan or trader or any octroi, etc. from any of the subjects. If the intention was to grant the right to pine tree standing on the lands of the subjects, one would expect. it to be mentioned in condition No. 2. The mention of the Jama in the Sanad is also significant. In the earlier Sanad the entire Jama was shown to be Rs. 32,000, because according to the statements of the officials of the Raja Sahib, the said Jama included amounts received on account of cattle grazing, etc.; that was found to be wrong, and\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOR1'S 903\n\nthe correct Jama was found to be Rs. 26,270-10-3.\n\nThe Sanad concluded with these words:\n\n\"Now the present. Sanad with the name of each tappa and the number of villages and Jama thereof being entered in it is issued subject to the abovementioned conditions, etc.\" In the recital portion of the Sanad a.lso it was stated that the J agir of certain tappas, together with the number of villages comprised within the tappas and the Jama mentioned in the list, the total Jama being Rs. 26,270-10-3, was granted to Raja Jodhbir Chand.\n\nThe other conditions subject to which the grant was made showed that no sovereign rights were granted to the Jagirdar. In para 69 at p. 96 of his report Mr.\n\nLyall gave a list of the principal J\"agirs of Kangra and stated that Raja Jodhbir Chand had a Jama or revenue demand of Rs. 36,079 in perpetuity; he said- \"Out of the total jama, Rs. 6,079 are the assessment of assigned Khalsa lands which the Raja pays to Government as nazarana; Rs. 33,000 is the value of the grant, but the Raja puts his collection at Rs. 30,000 only, exclusive of Khalsa tikas\". The aforesaid remarks, made not very long after the grant, also support the view that the grant was primarily an assignment of land revenue and whatever other rights might have been included, the right to all pine trees on cultivated lands of the subjects was not within the grant.\n\nWe agree therefore with the High Court that on a true and proper construction of the Sanad, it is impossible to spell out of its terms a grant in favour of Raja Jodhbir Chand of the right to all pine trees on cultivated and proprietary lands.\n\nWe proceed now to examine the third ground of the claim of the appellant, viz., that part of his claim which is based on the entries in the Wajib-ularz of 1892-93 (Ex. P-5), 1899-1900 (Ex. P-6) and 1910-1915 (Ex. P-4) and other connected documents.\n\nThis part of the claim of the appellant has been the most controversial and difficult to determine. The learned Subordinate Judge expressed the view that the aforesaid entries did not help the appellant, because they related to pine trees standing either on\n\nRaja Rajindcr Chand v.\n\nSukhi\n\nS. K. Das].\n\nRaja Rajinder\n\nChand ...\n\nSukhl\n\nS. K. Das].\n\nuncultivated waste lands or nautor (recently reclaimed) lands and not to such trees on proprietary and cultivated lands. The learned District Judge held on appeal that in the Wajib-ul•arz of 1892-93 (Ex. P-5) all pine (chil) trees were held to be the property of Government; this led to a dispute between the Raja and Government, and in the Wajib-ul-arz of 1899-1900 (Ex. P-6) and subsequent documents, an entry was made in favour of the Raja showing that Government had relinquished or surrendered their right to the Raja. He did not agree with the learned Subordinate Judge that the entries related to pine trees standing on waste or reclaimed lands only. The learned Judge who delivered the leading judgment of the High Court gave and considered a long string of quotations from many documents and then came to the conclusion that the authority of the Wajib-ul-arz entries was open to doubt and the Raja had failed to make out his claim; the learned Judge did not clearly find however if the entries related to waste and reclaimed lands only.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellant has very strongly submitted b1Jfore us that the view of the learned District J iidge was correct and should have been accepted by the High Court; learned counsel for the respondents has argued, on the contrary, that the trial Judge and the learned Judges of the High Court came to a definite finding, which he has characterised as a finding of fact, with regard to the Wajih-ul-arz entries and this Court should not go behind that finding. We do not think that these appeals can be disposed of on the short ground that this Court does not normally go behind a concurrent finding of fact.\n\nIndeed, in respect of the Wajib-ul-arz entries, there is no concurrent finding in these cases; the trial Judge thought that the entries related to waste and recently reclaimed lands, whereas the High Court doubted the very authority of the entries. Moreover, the question whether from the Wajib-ul-arz entries an inference of surrender or relinquishment of a sovereign right by Government can be properly dtawn is not a pure question of fact, depending as it does on the\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREM~ COURT R~PORTS 905\n\ntrue scope and legal effect of those entries. We cannot, by resorting to a short cut as it were, relieve ourselves of the task of examining the Wajib-ul-arz entries and considerding their true scope and legal effect.\n\nWe have already referred to Mr. Barnes' Settlement (1850-52) and pointed out that he did not undertake any actual settlement operations in Nadaun. The next person who dealt wi-th the settlement of Kangra was Mr. Lyall, afterwards Sir James Lyall, Lt. Governor of the Punjab. He began his work in 1865 and wrote his report in 1872.\n\nHe also did not undertake any settlement of Nadaun. Alex. Anderson was the next person who dealt with the settlement of Kangra. By Notification No. 25 dated January 26, 1888 a general re-assessment of the land revenue of Kangra district was ordered and by Notification No. 26 of the same date a preparation of the record-of-rights in the Jagirs of Guler, Siba and Nadaun was undertaken.\n\nMr. O'Brien undertook the settlement, but died on November 28, 1893 and it was left to Mr. Anderson to write the report. It may be stated here that Mr.\n\nAnderson wrote two reports: one was the Forest Settlement Report of 1887 and the other was the Revised Settlement Report of Kangra of 1897. On April 27,\n\n1910 two other notifications were published, directing a revision of the existing record-of-rights in Dera and Hamirpur Tehsils (Nadaun being within Hamirpur Tehsil).\n\nAs a result, Messrs Middleton and Shuttleworth undertook a revisional settlement, which was the Settlement of 1910-15.\n\nWe have in these cases to deal with the entries made in O'Brien's Settlement (1892-93), Anderson's Settlement (1899-\n\n1900), and the Settlement of Messrs Middleton and Shuttleworth (1910-15).\n\nBefore dealing with the actual entries made, it is necessary to refer to a few more matters arising out of the settlement operations of l\\fossrs Barnes and Lyall. The expressions 'ala-malik' and 'adna-malik' have been used often in the course of this litigation.\n\nWhat do those expressions mean? In Mr. Douie's Punjab Settlement Manual (1930 edition) it is stated\n\nRaja Raji11der\n\nChand v.\n\nSuk hi\n\nS. /{, DasJ,\n\nRaja Rajinder\n\nChand\n\nSukhl\n\ns. K. Das/.\n\nin para 143: \"Where the proprietary right is divided the superior owner is known in settlement literature as ala malik or talukdar, and the inferior owner as adna-malik. . ..................................................................... .. .................... In cases of divided ownership the proprietary profits are shared between the two classes who have an interest in the soil\". How this distinction arose, so far as the record-of-rights in the Jagirs are concerned, appears from para 105 at p. 60 of Mr. Anderson's report. Mr. Anderson said:\n\n\"The first great question for decision was the status of the Raja and of the people with respect to the land, which was actually in the occupancy of the people, and next with respect to the land not in their actual occupancy, but over which they were accustomed to graze and to do certain other acts. Mr.\n\nO'Brien decided that the Raja was superior proprietor or Talukdar of all lands in his J agir, and the occupants were constituted inferior proprietors of their own holdings and of the waste land comprised within their holdings as will be shown hereafter; he never fully considered the rights in waste outside holdings.\n\nThe general grounds for the decision may be gathered from Mr. Lyall's Settlement Report and from the orders on the Siba Summary Settlement Report, but I quote at length the principles on which Mr. O'Brien determined the status of occupants of land, not merely because it is necessary to explain here the action that he took, but also in order that the Civil Courts which have to decide questions as to proprietary rights may know on what grounds the present record was based\".\n\nMr. Anderson then quoted the following extract from Mr. O'Brien's assessment report to explain the position:\n\n\"In places where the possession of the original occupants of land was undisturbed, they were classed as inferior proprietors; but where they had acquired their first possession on land already cultivated at a recent date, or where the cultivators had admitted the Raja's title to proprietorship during the preparation and attestation of the Jamabandis, they were\n\nrecorded as tenants with or without right of occupancy as the circumstances of the case suggested. . .......... . ............... .' ................................. :.......................... In deciding the question old possession was respected. Where the ryots had been proved to be in undisturbed possession of the soil they have been recorded as 'inferior\n\nproprietors\". The same principles were followed in Nadaun: long possession with or without a patta or lease from the Raja was the test for recording the ryot as an inferior proprietor ( adna-malik).\n\nBearing in mind the aforesaid distinction between ala-malik and adna-malik, we proceed now to ex~ amine the actual entries made in the Wajib-ul-arz of I892-93 (Ex. P-5), of I899-1900 (Ex. P.-6) and of I9IO-I5 (Ex. P-4). In Ex. P-5 the relevant entry in para II was: ''The owners shall, however, have no right to pine trees. They can neither cut them nor get the same without permission, for it has been laid down in the Forest Settlement Reports that the:, Raja Sahib gave leases to reclaim such lands whereon the Government jungles, i.e., the Government pine trees exist. For this reason, the Government maintained their right to the pine trees. (see para. 78 of the English report regarding jungles.)\".\n\nIn Ex. P-6 the relevant entry was-\n\n\"Except the chil (pine) trees all the trees situated in the Khata of any person in the Tikas of the Jagir are the property of the owner of the Khata. The chil trees growing in such Khatas in the Tikas of the Jagir are the property of Raja; Sahib~'.\n\nIn Ex. P-4 the entry was-\n\n\"Excepting the pine trees all the trees standing in the Khata of any person in the Tikas of the Jagir save those proprietary lands the trees whereof have been held belonging to the Government during the recent Settlement and which have been mentioned above are the property of the owner of the Kha ta.\n\nIn the Tikas of Jagir, all the pine trees of such Khatas excepting those standing on such proprietary lands, and which have been held to be the property\n\nRaja Rajinder\n\nChand\n\nv, Suk hi\n\nS. K. Das].\n\nRaja Rafinder\n\nChand\n\nSttkhi\n\nS. K. DasJ.\n\nof the Government during the recent settlement and mention whereof has been made above are the property of Raja Sahib.\"\n\nThe question before us is as to the true scope and legal effect of these entries. Do they establish a grant of the right to chil trees or, what is the same thing, a surrender of that right, in favour of the Raja by Government? In these cases we are not concerned with trees on public waste lands, nor with forest trees; and as the High Court has'Pointed out, we do not know if the lands in suit were initially private waste or recently reclaimed lands. The Jamabandis show that they are proprietary and cultivated lands of adna rnaliks. Therefore, the question before us is the right to chil trees on proprietary and cultivated lands in possession of adna maliks.\n\nIt is not disputed that under s. 31 of the Punjab Land-Revenue Act, I 887, Wajib-ul-arz is a part of the record-of-rights, and entries made therein in accordance with Jaw and the provisions of Ch. IV of the Act and the rules thereunder, shall be presumed to be true (vide s. 44).\n\nThe Wajib-ul-arz or village administration paper is a record of existing customs regarding rights and liabilities in the estate; it is not to be used for the creation of new rights or liabilities. (see para 295 of the Punjab Settlement Manual, pp. 146-147, 1930 ed.). In appendix VIII of the Settlement Manual, Section E, are contained instructions with regard to the Wajib-ul-arz and instruction No. 2 states:\n\n\"The statement shall not contain entries relating to matters regulated by law, nor shall customs contrary to justice, equity or good conscience, or which have been declared to be void by any competent authority, be entered in it. Subject to these restrictions, the statement should contain information on so many of the following matters as are pertinent to the estate:\n\n(h) The rights of cultivators of all classes not expressly provided fqr by law (for instance, rights to\n\ntrees or manure, and the right to plant trees) and their customary liabilities other than rent.\n\n(j) The rights of Government to any nazul property, forests, unclaimed, unoccupied, deserted, or waste lands, quarries, ruins or objects of antiquarian interest, spontaneous products, and other accessory interest in land included within the boundaries of the estate.\n\n(1) Any other important usage affecting the rights of landowners, cultivators or other persons interested in the estate, not being a usage relating to succession and transfer of landed property\".\n\nIn the cases before us, the appellant did not base his claim on custom, though referring to his right he said in his plaint-\"this has been the practice throughout\". What he really meant by \"practice\" was the land system prevailing under the old independent Katoch rulers. We have already held that the appellant did not get the sovereign right of the independent Katoch rulers; nor did the grant made in 1848 give him any right to the royal trees. The entry in the Wajib-ul-arz of 1892-93 (Ex. P-5) is not really in his favour; it states that trees of every kind shall be considered to be the property of the owners (adnamaliks), but the owners shall have no right to pine trees; for this last part of the entry which is somewhat contradictory of the earlier part, a reference is made to para 78 of Anderson's Forest Settlement Report as authority for it. That paragraph, however, stated in clear terms-\"No orders have been passed by me in regard to trees on fields, as the present enquiry extended only to the waste land\". It is obvious that the entry in the Wajib-ul-arz of 1892-1)3 went much beyond what was stated in para 78 of Mr. Anderson's report, and so far as the right to pine trees on proprietary and cultivated lands was concerned, the statement made a confusion between Government jungles, recently reclaimed land and proprietary land. On its own showing, the entry. was\n\nRaja Rajit1der Chat1d v.\n\nSukhi\n\nS. K. Das],\n\nRaja Rajinder Chand v.\n\nSukhi\n\nS. K. Das].\n\nnot the statement of an existing custom, because it referred to para 78 of the Forest Settlement Report; far less did it show any surrender or relinquishment of a sovereign right by Government in favour of the Raja. Indeed, it is difficult to understand how the surrender or relinquishment of such a right can be the subject of a village custom or can be within the scope of an entry in the Wajib-ul-arz. The original grant in favour of Raja Jodhbir Chand was by means of a Sanad, and one would expect any additional grant or surrender to be embodied in a similar document. At any rate, if the intention of Government was to surrender a sovereign right in favour of the Raja, one would expect such intention to be expressed in unambiguous language. In Khalsa villages, Government did surrender their right to trees on Shamilat lands of adna-maliks on the authority of letter No. 347 of January 6, 1867. Taking the most favourable view for the appellant, the entries in the Wajib-ul-arz in these cases can be said to express the views of certain revenue authorities as to the rights of the Raja or the intention of Government; but the views of the revenue authorities as to the effect or construction of a grant or the intention of Government in respect of a grant, do not conclude the matter or bind the civil Courts. (See Rajah Venkata Narasimha Appa Row Bahadur v. Rajah Narayya Appa Row Bahadur(')).\n\nThe same comments apply to the Wajib-ul-arz of 1899-1900 (Ex. P-6) and of 1910-15 (Ex. P-4). They no doubt say that the pine trees on the lands comprised within the Khatas of adna-maliks are the property of the Raja Sahib. None of them indicate, however, on what basis the right to chil trees on proprietary and cultivated lands of the adna-m.aliks is to be held the property of the Raja Sahib. If the revenue authorities made the entries on the basis of the land system of the old Katoch rulers or on the basis of the Sanad of 1848, they were clearly wrong.\n\nIf, however, there was a surrender by Government of the right in favour of the Raja, one would expect it to be mentioned unambiguously in the entries; one\n\n(1) [1879] L.B. 7 I.A. 88, '8.\n\nt ...\n\nwould further expect the same to be mentioned in the Jamabandis (Exs. D-7 and D-8) of the adna-maliks.\n\nThe Jamabandis do not, however, show any restriction on the rights of adna-maliks with regard to the trees on their lands. A reference may be made here to another document (Ex. D-2) which is an extract of the Wajib-ul-arz (para 12) of 1892-93, dealing with the rights of ala-maliks and adna-maliks. The entry shows that the Raja Sahib was to get 15 per cent. on the net revenue in respect of the entire land owned by the adna-maliks as talukdari dues which had been fixed: the talukdari dues were fixed to compensate the Raja Sahib for all sorts of dues, such as banwaziri, domiana, etc. It is improbable that after the fixati.on of such talukdari dues, a grant of a further right in respect of chil trees on the la, nds of adna-maliks will be made but will not be specifically mentioned in para 12 of the Wajib-ul-arz, which dealt particularly wi\"th the rights of ala and adna maliks. Learned counsel for the appellant drew our attention to Ex. D-6, an extract of para 11 of the Wajib-ul-arz, of 1914-15, at the bottom of which there is a note that the Zamindars (adna-maliks) were present and every paragraph had been read out to them and the same were correct.\n\nThe argument before us is that the adna-maliks admitted the Wajib-ul-arz of 1914-15 to be correct. We cannot accept that argument; firstly, we do not think that the endorsement at the bottom of Ex. D-6 is an admission by adna-maliks of the correctness of the entries made in other paragraphs of the Wajib-ul-arz, as for example, para 10 (Ex. P-4) which related to the rights of Government in respect of the nazul lands, etc. Secondly, even ifthe endorsement amounts to such an admission as is contended for by learned counsel for the appellant, we do not think that it is conclusive or decisive of the right which the appellant is claiming. Ex. P-2 dated May 27, 1886, showed that even so far back as at that date, some of the adnamaliks had complained that the Raja's men had cut and taken away some chil trees on their.lands. It is quite improbable that after such a complaint the adna-maliks would admit the right of the ala-malik\n\nRaja Rajinder\n\nChand v.\n\nSukhi\n\nS. K. DasJ.\n\nRaja Rajinder Chand v.\n\nSukhi\n\nS. K. DasJ,\n\nto chil trees on their lands. In para 296 of the Punjab Settlement Manual, Mr. Douie observed that the Wajib-ul-arz in the first regular settlements was sometimes a formidable document, but its real value as evidence of village custom was not always proportionate to its length. Me quoted with approval the observations of Sir Arthur Brandreth to the following effect: \"Some few points have been ascertained in each case, but in general the villagers did not know their customs very well, and when they put their seals to the paper, no doubt they thought it very grand, though they did not know what it was about, as they could little understand the language.\n\nThe rules are of two sorts; one, the rules laid down by Government, or points on which the whole pargana have the same custom, and, secondly, the special customs of the particular manor; these together take up a great number of pages, and the villagers are confused by the long code of rules, and merely say 'yes, yes' and put their seals to the paper, hoping it is nothing very dreadful.\"\n\nA large number of decisions in which entries of the Wajib-ul-arz or the Riwaji-i-am and the value to be given to them were considered, have been cited before us. In some of them, entries in the Wajib-ul-arz were aC'Cepted as correct and in others they were not so accepted, notwithstanding the statutory presumption attaching to the entries under s. 44 of the Punjab Land-Revenue Act, 1887.\n\nWe do not think that any u§eful purpose will be served by examining those decisions in detail. The legal position is clear enough.\n\nAs was observed by the Privy Council in Dakas Khan\n\nv. Ghulam KasimKhan('), the Wajib-ul-arz, though it does not create a title, gives rise to a presumption in its support which prevails unless the presumption is properly displaced.\n\nIt is also true that the Wajibul-arz being part of a revenue record is of greater authority than a Riwaji-i-am which is of general application and which is not drawn up in respect of individual villages (Gurbakhsh Singh v.\n\nMst.\n\nPartapo(9)).\n\nWhether the statutory presumption\n\n(1) A.I.II. 1918 P.O. 4.\n\n(2) [1921) I L.11. 2 Lah. 846.\n\nattaching to an entry in the Wajib-ul-arz has been properly displaced or not must depend on the facts of each case.\n\nIn the cases under our consideration, we hold, for the reasons already given by us, that the entries in the Wajib-ul-arz with regard to the right of the Raja in respect of chil trees standing on cultivated and proprietary lands of the adna-maliks, do not and cannot show any existing custom of the village, the right being a sovereign right; nor do they show in unambiguous terms that the sovereign right was surrendered or relinquished in favour of the Raja.\n\nIn our view, it would be an unwarranted stre_tching of the presumption to hold that the entries in the Wajib-ul-arz make out a grant of a sovereign right in favour of the Raja; to do so would be to hold that the Wajib-ul-arz creates a title in favour of the Raja which it obviously cannot.\n\nIt is necessary to state here that in the Wajib-ularz of 1899-1900 (Ex. P-6) there was a reference to certain orders contained in letter No. 1353 dated March 11, 1897; from the Senior Secretary of the Financial Commissioner.\n\nThis Wajib-ul-arz also showed that certain amendments were made on May 26, 1914, by an order of Mr. Shuttleworth, the then Settlement Officer.\n\nThere is a further note that the amendment was cancelled on January 23, 1917.\n\nIn tlie High Court judgment there is a reference to the notes mentioned above and the learned Judge who gave the leading judgment observed that the aforesaid notes showed that the state of affairs prevailing at that time was somewhat confused and fluid. It is probable that each revenue officer was expressing his own opinion about the matter.\n\nAn attempt was made in the High Court to get some of the unpublished original documents of Government to clarify the entries in the Wajib-ul-arz.\n\nThe Government of the Punjab, however, claimed privilege in respect of those documents, which claim was upheld in_ the High Court..\n\nWe have re-examined that claim, and though the State was not a party to this litigation, we heard the learned Advocate-General for the State.\n\nRaja Rajinder Chand v.\n\n- Suk/ii\n\nS. K. Das}.\n\nRaja Rajinder Chand v.\n\nSukhi\n\nS. K. Das J.\n\n914 SUPREME COURT R:IJ:POR'tS [1956]\n\nWe found the claim to be valid under the law as it stands\" at present.\n\nWe have assumed that the entries in the Wajibul-arz of 1899-1900 and of 1910-15 related to cultivated and proprietary lands of adna-maliks, though they were entered in a paragraph which dealt with the rights of Government in respect of ownership of the nazul lands, jungles, unclaimed property, etc. Even on that assumption, we have come to the conclusion that the entries in the Wajib-ul-arz do not establish the claim of t!\\e appellant that there was a surrenper or relinquishment of a sovereign right in favour of his predecessor; It remains now to notice some other evidence on the record. Learned counsel for the appellant bas referred us o several judgments, Exs. P-9, P-7, P-8 and.P-4 (wrongly marked as Ex. P-6).\n\nReferring to these judgments, the learned trial Judge said that it was not clear whether those judgments related to lands which were private waste or nautor (reclaimed) lands. Apart, however, from that difficulty, we are of the view' that the judgments do not advance the case of the appellant any further. They proceeded primarily on the entries in the Wajib-ul-arz, the effect of which entries we have already considered at great length. Admittedly, no plea of res judicata arose on these. judgments, and they were merely evidence of an assertion and determination of a similar claim made by the Raja in respect of other lands within the Jagir.\n\nAs to the oral evidence in the case, none of the Courts below placed any great reliance on it. The learned Subordinate Judge did not accept the oral evidence given on behalf of the appellant; the learned District Judge, referring to the oral evidence of the respondents, said that he could not accept that evidence in preference to the overwhelming historical and documentary evidence led by the appellant. With regard to the appellant's witnesses he seemed to think that some of them at least were reliable. The learned Judges of the High Court did not refer to the oral evidence except for a slight reference to the statement of Salig Ram, the Raja's attorney, who appears to have stated that the Raja got his rights in 1893-94; how the Raja got his rights then was not explained.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellant has referred us to the evidence of one Babu Kailash Chander (witness No. 2 for the appellant), who was a Forest Range Officer.\n\nThis gentleman said that the trees standing on the land belonging to the landlords were exclusively owned by the Raja Sahib. In cross-examination he admitted that he had no knowledge of the trees in suit nor did he know on which lands the trees were standing. He admitted that he knew nothing about the rights of the Jagirdar and the landlords inter se with regard to the lands in dispute. It is obvious that such evidence does not prove the case of the appellnt. Had the Raja been in possession of the pine trees for such a long time as he now claims, one would expect him to produce some documents showing his income, etc. from the trees. No such documents were produced.\n\nFor these reasons, we hold that the appellant has failed to establish his claim to the pine trees, and the decision of the High Court is correct. The appeals fail and are dismissed. In the circumstances of these cases, where much of the doubt as respects the right claimed arose out of the entries made in the Wajibul-arz, the High Court properly directed that there would be no order for costs either in the High Court or in the Courts below. We think that that order was correct, and we also pass no order as to costs of the he!J.ring in this Court.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\nRaja Rajinder\n\nChand v.\n\nSuk hi\n\nS. /{, Das].", "total_entities": 131, "entities": [{"text": "RAJA RAJINDER CHAND", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 50, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Raja. J odhbir Chand", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SUKHI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 52, "end_char": 57, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUKHI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B. JAGANNADHADAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 129, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Meaning of-Punjab Land-Revenue Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 364, "end_char": 398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 31, 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 432, "end_char": 441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Meaning of-Punjab Land-Revenue Act", "statute": "Meaning of-Punjab Land-Revenue Act"}}, {"text": "Maharaja Ranjit Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 915, "end_char": 936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1827- 28 Maharaja Ranjit Singh conquered the territory and gramed N adaun as J agir to Raja.", "canonical_name": "Maharaja R<.tnjit Singh"}}, {"text": "Raja. J odhbir Chand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 993, "end_char": 1013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1827- 28 Maharaja Ranjit Singh conquered the territory and gramed N adaun as J agir to Raja.", "canonical_name": "Raja. J odhbir Chand"}}, {"text": "Raja Sansar Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1046, "end_char": 1063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J odhbir Chand who was the illegitimate son of Raja Sansar Chand, the last independent ruler of Kangra."}}, {"text": "Kangra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1095, "end_char": 1101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J odhbir Chand who was the illegitimate son of Raja Sansar Chand, the last independent ruler of Kangra."}}, {"text": "Raja", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1235, "end_char": 1239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1846 as a result of 'the first Sikh War the terrHory ca.me under the dominion of the British, who granted a Se.nad in favour of Raja."}}, {"text": "J odhbir Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1242, "end_char": 1256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J odhbir Chand in recognition of his services."}}, {"text": "Raja. Jodbbir Chand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2134, "end_char": 2153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rulers to chil trees passed by conquest to the Sikh rulers and subsequently to the British; Raja.", "canonical_name": "Raja. J odhbir Chand"}}, {"text": "Raja Raji.nder", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2616, "end_char": 2630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Raji.nder\n\nChand\n\n•• Sukhi\n\nIt is well settled that the general rule is that grants m•de by the.", "canonical_name": "Raja. J odhbir Chand"}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3562, "end_char": 3567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3575, "end_char": 3604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L.R. 7 I.A. 38", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4315, "end_char": 4329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CIVIL .APPELLATE JuRIBDIOTION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4464, "end_char": 4493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL .APPELLATE JuRIBDIOTION: Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "Court of Subordinate Judge, th Class, Kangra", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4968, "end_char": 5012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "104/35 of 1941-42, 101/32 of 1941, 103/34 of 1941/42, 15/73 of 1941, 102/33 of 1941/42 and 120 of 1941 arising out of the decrees dated July 24, 1941, of the Court of Subordinate Judge, th Class, Kangra in Suits Nos."}}, {"text": "Rang Beharilal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5069, "end_char": 5083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rang Beharilal and K. R. Ohaudhury, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. R. Ohaudhury", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5088, "end_char": 5103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rang Beharilal and K. R. Ohaudhury, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Ganpat Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5125, "end_char": 5135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ganpat Rai, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "S. M. Sikri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5158, "end_char": 5169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General for Punjab, Jindra Lal and R.H. Dhebar, for the Intervener (State of Punjab)."}}, {"text": "Jindra Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5200, "end_char": 5210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General for Punjab, Jindra Lal and R.H. Dhebar, for the Intervener (State of Punjab)."}}, {"text": "R.H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5215, "end_char": 5226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. M. Sikri, Advocate-General for Punjab, Jindra Lal and R.H. Dhebar, for the Intervener (State of Punjab)."}}, {"text": "S. K. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5332, "end_char": 5341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".l'he Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nS. K. DAS J.-These are six appeals by the plaintiff Raja Rajinder Chand, the superior landlord (alamalik) of Nadaun Jagir in the district of Kangra.", "canonical_name": "S. K. DasJ."}}, {"text": "Raja Rajinder Chand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5384, "end_char": 5403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".l'he Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nS. K. DAS J.-These are six appeals by the plaintiff Raja Rajinder Chand, the superior landlord (alamalik) of Nadaun Jagir in the district of Kangra.", "canonical_name": "Raja. J odhbir Chand"}}, {"text": "March 24, 1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5971, "end_char": 5985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also claime.d specified sums as damages for the loss caused to him from the tapping of pine trees by different defendants\n\nfrom March 24, 1940, up to the date when the suits were brought."}}, {"text": "Raja Rajinder Chand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7261, "end_char": 7280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Rajinder Chand then preferred appeals from the judgment and decrees of the learned Subordinate Judge, and the appeals were heard by the learned District Judge of Hoshiarpur.", "canonical_name": "Raja. J odhbir Chand"}}, {"text": "Hoshiarpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7428, "end_char": 7438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Rajinder Chand then preferred appeals from the judgment and decrees of the learned Subordinate Judge, and the appeals were heard by the learned District Judge of Hoshiarpur."}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8077, "end_char": 8094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The defendants then preferred second appeals to the Punjab High Court."}}, {"text": "sections 109(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8757, "end_char": 8772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8784, "end_char": 8811, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Nadaun Jagir", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9304, "end_char": 9316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question is of some importance, as it affects the rights of ala and adna maliks in Nadaun Jagir.", "canonical_name": "Nadaun J-agir"}}, {"text": "October 26, 1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10674, "end_char": 10690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In a later statement of replication dated October 26, 1940, the plaintiff-appellant gave some more particulars of his claim."}}, {"text": "Britieh Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11331, "end_char": 11349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Subordinate Judge, who tried the suits in the first instance, observed that the present appellant based his claim to ownership of the trees on three main grounds: first, on the ground that the land itself on which the trees stood belonged formerly to the ancestors of the present appellant (namely, the independent rulers of Kangra) and they gave the land to the ancestors of the adna maliks but retained their right of ownership in all pine trees; secondly, after the conquest of Kangra by the British, the rights of ownership in the pine trees belonged to the Britieh Government and the rights were assigned to Raja Jodhbir Chand, the first grantee of Nadaun Jagir; and thirdly, the right of the appellant in the\n\nRaja Rajinder\n\nChand\n\nSuk hi\n\nS. K. Das]."}}, {"text": "Raja Jodhbir Chand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11382, "end_char": 11400, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Subordinate Judge, who tried the suits in the first instance, observed that the present appellant based his claim to ownership of the trees on three main grounds: first, on the ground that the land itself on which the trees stood belonged formerly to the ancestors of the present appellant (namely, the independent rulers of Kangra) and they gave the land to the ancestors of the adna maliks but retained their right of ownership in all pine trees; secondly, after the conquest of Kangra by the British, the rights of ownership in the pine trees belonged to the Britieh Government and the rights were assigned to Raja Jodhbir Chand, the first grantee of Nadaun Jagir; and thirdly, the right of the appellant in the\n\nRaja Rajinder\n\nChand\n\nSuk hi\n\nS. K. Das].", "canonical_name": "Raja. J odhbir Chand"}}, {"text": "S. K, DasJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11560, "end_char": 11570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Rajinder Chand v.\n\nSuk hi\n\nS. K, DasJ,\n\ntrees had been \"vouchsafed\" by the entries made in the Wajib-ul-arz and recognised in several judicial decisions.", "canonical_name": "S. K. DasJ."}}, {"text": "Badhog", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12064, "end_char": 12070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Admittedly, the suit lands lie in Badhog and Jasai tappas comprised within the Jagir of Nadaun in the district of Kangra."}}, {"text": "Nadaun", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12118, "end_char": 12124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Admittedly, the suit lands lie in Badhog and Jasai tappas comprised within the Jagir of Nadaun in the district of Kangra."}}, {"text": "Raja Anirudh Chand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12421, "end_char": 12439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Sansar Chand was a Katoch Rajput and had children from two women; one of them, who was a Katoch lady, was his properly married wife and Raja Sansar Chand had a son by her, named Raja Anirudh Chand.", "canonical_name": "Raja. J odhbir Chand"}}, {"text": "Kangra State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12628, "end_char": 12640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The great antiquity of the Katoch royal line is undoubted, and the history of the Kangra State from the earliest times right up to its conquest by the Sikhs under Maharaja Ranjit Singh has been traced in the Kangra District Gazetteer (1924-25) at pp."}}, {"text": "Ranjit Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13020, "end_char": 13032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Gazetteer states (p. 75) that Raja Sansar Chand was for 20 years the \"lord paramount of the hills and even a formidable rival to Ranjit Singh himself; but his aggressive nature led him on in his bold designs and he fell at last a victim to his own violence\"."}}, {"text": "Anirudh Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13229, "end_char": 13242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With him the glory of the Katocb line passed away and what remained to bis son Anirudh Chand was little more than a name."}}, {"text": "Raja Dhian Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13472, "end_char": 13488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Sansar Chand had left two daughters, and Raja Dhian Singh of Jamun, one of the principal officers of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, asked one of the daughters to be given in marriage to his son.", "canonical_name": "Raja Dhian Singh"}}, {"text": "Jamun", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13492, "end_char": 13497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Sansar Chand had left two daughters, and Raja Dhian Singh of Jamun, one of the principal officers of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, asked one of the daughters to be given in marriage to his son."}}, {"text": "Hira Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13618, "end_char": 13628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hira Singh."}}, {"text": "Katoch Raja", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13777, "end_char": 13788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anirudh Chand was a.fraid to refuse, though\n\nin reality he regarded the alliance as an insult to his family honour; because by immemorial custom a Katoch Raja's daughter may not marry any one of lower rank than her father, i.e., a Raja or an heirapparent."}}, {"text": "Dhian Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13979, "end_char": 13990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anirudh Chand was a. Raja in his own right and the descendant of a long line of kings, while Dhian Singh was a Raja only by favour of his master."}}, {"text": "Sutlej", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14232, "end_char": 14238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He secretly sent away his family and property across the Sutlej and on hearing that Maharaja R<.tnjit Singh had started from Lahore for Nadaun, he fled into British territory."}}, {"text": "Maharaja R<.tnjit Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14259, "end_char": 14282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He secretly sent away his family and property across the Sutlej and on hearing that Maharaja R<.tnjit Singh had started from Lahore for Nadaun, he fled into British territory.", "canonical_name": "Maharaja R<.tnjit Singh"}}, {"text": "Lahore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14300, "end_char": 14306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He secretly sent away his family and property across the Sutlej and on hearing that Maharaja R<.tnjit Singh had started from Lahore for Nadaun, he fled into British territory."}}, {"text": "British", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14332, "end_char": 14339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He secretly sent away his family and property across the Sutlej and on hearing that Maharaja R<.tnjit Singh had started from Lahore for Nadaun, he fled into British territory."}}, {"text": "Jodhbir Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14393, "end_char": 14406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maharaja Ranjit Singh came to Nadaun, and Jodhbir Chand gave his two sisters to the Maharaja."}}, {"text": "Nadaun", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14489, "end_char": 14495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jodhbir Chand was then created a Raja, with Nadaun and the surrounding country as his Jagir.", "canonical_name": "Nadaun J-agir"}}, {"text": "Mian Fateh Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14538, "end_char": 14554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mian Fateh Chand, younger brother of Raja Sansar Chand, offered his grand-daughter to Raja Hira Singh."}}, {"text": "Raja Hira Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14624, "end_char": 14639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mian Fateh Chand, younger brother of Raja Sansar Chand, offered his grand-daughter to Raja Hira Singh.", "canonical_name": "Raja Dhian Singh"}}, {"text": "Jagirdars", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15164, "end_char": 15173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus by 1827-28 Kangra had ceased to be an independent principality and was to all intents and purposes annexed to the Sikh kingdom, the \"son of Mian Fateh Chand and Raja Jodhbir Chand occupying merely the positfon of Jagirdars under the Sikhs.", "canonical_name": "Jagirdars"}}, {"text": "Raja Parmudh Chand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15625, "end_char": 15643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In 1848, the second Sikh war began and Raja Parmudh Chand, one of the sons of Raja Anirudh Chand, raised the standard of rebellion in Kangra.", "canonical_name": "Raja. J odhbir Chand"}}, {"text": "S. K. DasJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15860, "end_char": 15871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Meanwhile, Jodhbir Chand\n\nRaja Rajinder Chand v.\n\nSulzhi\n\nS. [{, Das],\n\nRafa Rajtndt.r\n\nChand\n\nSukhi\n\nS. K. DasJ.\n\nremained conspicuous for his fidelity to the British Government; both in the Sikh war and in the Katoch insurrection he did good service to the British.", "canonical_name": "S. K. DasJ."}}, {"text": "October 11, 1848", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16157, "end_char": 16173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A copy of that Sanad was not available, but a copy of a Sanad granted on October 11, 1848, which renewed and clarified the earlier Sanad, was produced and exhibited on behalf of the present appellant."}}, {"text": "Nadaun J-agir", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17507, "end_char": 17520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We accept these as good and convincing reasons for discountenancing the claim of the appellant that the sovereign rights of the independent rulers of Kangra in respect of all royal trees (including pine trees) within Nadaun J-agir had come down to him.", "canonical_name": "Nadaun J-agir"}}, {"text": "Lyall", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18780, "end_char": 18785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The observations are taken from Mr.\n\nLyall's Settlement Report."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19029, "end_char": 19034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Lyall said:\n\n\"Under the Rajas (meaning the old Katoch rulers) the theory of property in land was that each Raja was the landlord of the whole of his raj or principality, not merely in the degree in which everywhere in India the State is, in one sense, the landlord, but in a clearer and stronger degree .................... ."}}, {"text": "Jagir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19520, "end_char": 19525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he remitted it as an act of favour to the holder, or assigned it in Jagir to a third party in lieu of pay, or as a subsistence allowance ................................................ ."}}, {"text": "July 30, 1872", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21536, "end_char": 21549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Lyall began his settlement work in 1865 and his report was dated July 30, 1872."}}, {"text": "Barnes", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21611, "end_char": 21617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He continued and revised the earlier settlement work of Mr. Barnes."}}, {"text": "Dunedin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22661, "end_char": 22668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is pertinent to quote here the following observations of Lord Dunedin in Vajesingji Joravarsingji v. Secretary of State for India(1):\n\n\"When a territory is acquired by a sovereign State for the first time that is an act of State."}}, {"text": "Douie", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23330, "end_char": 23335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Douie in his Punjab Settlement Manual (1899) said (p. 69):\n\n\"The Sikhs drove the hill Rajas of Kangra into exile or degraded them into mere Jagirdars, and the British Government when it took over the country did not restore them to their old position\"."}}, {"text": "British Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23489, "end_char": 23507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Douie in his Punjab Settlement Manual (1899) said (p. 69):\n\n\"The Sikhs drove the hill Rajas of Kangra into exile or degraded them into mere Jagirdars, and the British Government when it took over the country did not restore them to their old position\"."}}, {"text": "Raja Jodhl;>ir", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23753, "end_char": 23767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question as to whether the sovereign ruler having a right in all royal trees made a grant of that right to Raja Jodhbir Chand or surrendered that right in favour of Raja Jodhl;>ir Chand e>r any of his successors-in-interest is a different question which will depend on the terms of the grant or on other evidence showing that the right had been surrendered in favour of the appellant or his predecessors-in-interest."}}, {"text": "Raja J odh bir Chand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24218, "end_char": 24238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned District Judge was however wrong in thinking that, according to the system of land tenure which prevailed under the old Rajas or under the Sikhs, Raja J odh bir Chand got any right to all pine trees within Nadaun Jagir.", "canonical_name": "Raja. J odhbir Chand"}}, {"text": "L.R. 51 I.A. 357", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 24304, "end_char": 24320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. K. DasJ.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24362, "end_char": 24373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nSuk/ti\n\nS. K. DasJ.\n\nRaja Rajinder Chand v.\n\nSukhi\n\nS. K. DasJ,\n\nThat brings us to the second ground and to a consideration of the terms of the Sanad dated October 11, 1848, on which also the appellant based his claim.", "canonical_name": "S. K. DasJ."}}, {"text": "Sirkar of Lahore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24944, "end_char": 24960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whereas the mountainous country together with the Doaba tract had come under the occupation of the British Company in pursuance of the treaty which took place between the British Government and the Sirkar of Lahore on March 9, 1846: The Jagir of Choru, Bara, etc.,"}}, {"text": "March 9, 1846", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24964, "end_char": 24977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whereas the mountainous country together with the Doaba tract had come under the occupation of the British Company in pursuance of the treaty which took place between the British Government and the Sirkar of Lahore on March 9, 1846: The Jagir of Choru, Bara, etc.,"}}, {"text": "Jagir of Choru, Bara", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24983, "end_char": 25003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whereas the mountainous country together with the Doaba tract had come under the occupation of the British Company in pursuance of the treaty which took place between the British Government and the Sirkar of Lahore on March 9, 1846: The Jagir of Choru, Bara, etc.,"}}, {"text": "Raja Jodhbir Chad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25459, "end_char": 25476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "26,270/10/3 per annum approximately, i.e., as much of the Ilaqa of Nadaun as was in the possession of the said Raja at the time of the commencement of tumult of battle whether less or more than the present one, has been granted in perpetuity, generation after generation, to Raja Jodhbir Chad and his male legitimate descendants who are not from the womb of a slave girl under the orders of the Most Generous Gracious, Exalted and Excellent Nawab Sir Henry Hardinge G.C.B.\n\nGovernor-General, ruler of the territory of India, communicated in writing in English bearing the signature of Mr. Edward, Deputy Chief Secretary to His Excellency, in reply to the Commissioner's report No.", "canonical_name": "Raja. J odhbir Chand"}}, {"text": "Henry Hardinge", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25635, "end_char": 25649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "26,270/10/3 per annum approximately, i.e., as much of the Ilaqa of Nadaun as was in the possession of the said Raja at the time of the commencement of tumult of battle whether less or more than the present one, has been granted in perpetuity, generation after generation, to Raja Jodhbir Chad and his male legitimate descendants who are not from the womb of a slave girl under the orders of the Most Generous Gracious, Exalted and Excellent Nawab Sir Henry Hardinge G.C.B.\n\nGovernor-General, ruler of the territory of India, communicated in writing in English bearing the signature of Mr. Edward, Deputy Chief Secretary to His Excellency, in reply to the Commissioner's report No."}}, {"text": "Edward", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25773, "end_char": 25779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "26,270/10/3 per annum approximately, i.e., as much of the Ilaqa of Nadaun as was in the possession of the said Raja at the time of the commencement of tumult of battle whether less or more than the present one, has been granted in perpetuity, generation after generation, to Raja Jodhbir Chad and his male legitimate descendants who are not from the womb of a slave girl under the orders of the Most Generous Gracious, Exalted and Excellent Nawab Sir Henry Hardinge G.C.B.\n\nGovernor-General, ruler of the territory of India, communicated in writing in English bearing the signature of Mr. Edward, Deputy Chief Secretary to His Excellency, in reply to the Commissioner's report No."}}, {"text": "July 24, 1847", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25876, "end_char": 25889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "147, dated July 24, 1847, and also as contemplated in the previous order of the Niiwab Governor-General, dated August 7, 1846, subject to the following conditions:-\n\n1."}}, {"text": "Niiwab", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25945, "end_char": 25951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "147, dated July 24, 1847, and also as contemplated in the previous order of the Niiwab Governor-General, dated August 7, 1846, subject to the following conditions:-\n\n1."}}, {"text": "August 7, 1846", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25976, "end_char": 25990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "147, dated July 24, 1847, and also as contemplated in the previous order of the Niiwab Governor-General, dated August 7, 1846, subject to the following conditions:-\n\n1."}}, {"text": "Riaya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26208, "end_char": 26213, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The entire administration and power of hearing every sort of complaint between the Riaya (subjects) and the said Raja shall remain in the hands of the British Government's officers."}}, {"text": "Raja Sahib", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26315, "end_char": 26325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Raja Sahib shall not be at liberty to receive on any pretext Mahsul for any commodity from any Mahajan and trader or from the Riaya\n\n(subjects) by way of Zakat (octroi), or anything on account of excise and intoxicants."}}, {"text": "September 22, 1846", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27435, "end_char": 27453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Previously on, September 22, 1846, a Sanad was issued by the Exalted Henry Montgomery Colonel Lawrence from Simla without thorough enquiry and without the name of each village being entered therein."}}, {"text": "Simla", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27528, "end_char": 27533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Previously on, September 22, 1846, a Sanad was issued by the Exalted Henry Montgomery Colonel Lawrence from Simla without thorough enquiry and without the name of each village being entered therein."}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28498, "end_char": 28501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Raja Rajinder", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28519, "end_char": 28532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question now is whether the aforesaid Sanad was a grant primarily of land revenue; or it made a grant of other royal rights including the right to all\n\nRoja Rojinder Chand v.\n\nS11khi\n\nS. K. DasJ,\n\nRaja Rajinder\n\nChand\n\nSiikhi\n\nS. K. DasJ.\n\npine trees which is the particular right under consideration in the six suits brought by the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Raja. J odhbir Chand"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29738, "end_char": 29745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In cases where the grant is for valuable consideration, it is construed in favour of the grantee, for the honour of the Sovereign; and where two constructions are possible, one valid and the other void, that which is valid ought to be preferred, for the honour of the Sovereign ought to be more regarded than the Sovereign's profit (see para 670 at p. 315 of Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol."}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29757, "end_char": 29762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S 903", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30810, "end_char": 30815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jagirdar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31456, "end_char": 31464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The other conditions subject to which the grant was made showed that no sovereign rights were granted to the Jagirdar.", "canonical_name": "Jagirdars"}}, {"text": "Wajib-ul-arz of 1899-1900", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33371, "end_char": 33396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-5) all pine (chil) trees were held to be the property of Government; this led to a dispute between the Raja and Government, and in the Wajib-ul-arz of 1899-1900 (Ex.", "canonical_name": "Wajib-ul-arz of 1899-1900"}}, {"text": "James Lyall", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35659, "end_char": 35670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The next person who dealt wi-th the settlement of Kangra was Mr. Lyall, afterwards Sir James Lyall, Lt."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35692, "end_char": 35698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Governor of the Punjab."}}, {"text": "Alex. Anderson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35809, "end_char": 35823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Alex."}}, {"text": "January 26, 1888", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35914, "end_char": 35930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "25 dated January 26, 1888 a general re-assessment of the land revenue of Kangra district was ordered and by Notification No."}}, {"text": "Kangra district", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 35978, "end_char": 35993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "25 dated January 26, 1888 a general re-assessment of the land revenue of Kangra district was ordered and by Notification No."}}, {"text": "Guler", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36105, "end_char": 36110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "26 of the same date a preparation of the record-of-rights in the Jagirs of Guler, Siba and Nadaun was undertaken."}}, {"text": "Siba", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36112, "end_char": 36116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "26 of the same date a preparation of the record-of-rights in the Jagirs of Guler, Siba and Nadaun was undertaken."}}, {"text": "O'Brien", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 36149, "end_char": 36156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. O'Brien undertook the settlement, but died on November 28, 1893 and it was left to Mr. Anderson to write the report.", "canonical_name": "O'Brien"}}, {"text": "November 28, 1893", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36195, "end_char": 36212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. O'Brien undertook the settlement, but died on November 28, 1893 and it was left to Mr. Anderson to write the report."}}, {"text": "Anderson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36236, "end_char": 36244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. O'Brien undertook the settlement, but died on November 28, 1893 and it was left to Mr. Anderson to write the report."}}, {"text": "April 27,\n\n1910", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36441, "end_char": 36456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 27,\n\n1910 two other notifications were published, directing a revision of the existing record-of-rights in Dera and Hamirpur Tehsils (Nadaun being within Hamirpur Tehsil)."}}, {"text": "Dera", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 36554, "end_char": 36558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 27,\n\n1910 two other notifications were published, directing a revision of the existing record-of-rights in Dera and Hamirpur Tehsils (Nadaun being within Hamirpur Tehsil)."}}, {"text": "Shuttleworth", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36654, "end_char": 36666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result, Messrs Middleton and Shuttleworth undertook a revisional settlement, which was the Settlement of 1910-15.", "canonical_name": "Shuttleworth"}}, {"text": "Raja Raji11der", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 37298, "end_char": 37312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Mr. Douie's Punjab Settlement Manual (1930 edition) it is stated\n\nRaja Raji11der\n\nChand v.\n\nSuk hi\n\nS. /{, DasJ,\n\nRaja Rajinder\n\nChand\n\nSukhl\n\ns. K. Das/.\n\nin para 143: \"Where the proprietary right is divided the superior owner is known in settlement literature as ala malik or talukdar, and the inferior owner as adna-malik. . ..................................................................... .. ....................", "canonical_name": "Raja. J odhbir Chand"}}, {"text": "Suk", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37324, "end_char": 37327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Mr. Douie's Punjab Settlement Manual (1930 edition) it is stated\n\nRaja Raji11der\n\nChand v.\n\nSuk hi\n\nS. /{, DasJ,\n\nRaja Rajinder\n\nChand\n\nSukhl\n\ns. K. Das/.\n\nin para 143: \"Where the proprietary right is divided the superior owner is known in settlement literature as ala malik or talukdar, and the inferior owner as adna-malik. . ..................................................................... .. ....................", "canonical_name": "SUKHI"}}, {"text": "O'Brien", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 38249, "end_char": 38256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr.\n\nO'Brien decided that the Raja was superior proprietor or Talukdar of all lands in his J agir, and the occupants were constituted inferior proprietors of their own holdings and of the waste land comprised within their holdings as will be shown hereafter; he never fully considered the rights in waste outside holdings.", "canonical_name": "O'Brien"}}, {"text": "Raja Rajinder", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 41560, "end_char": 41573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Tikas of Jagir, all the pine trees of such Khatas excepting those standing on such proprietary lands, and which have been held to be the property\n\nRaja Rajinder\n\nChand\n\nv, Suk hi\n\nS. K. Das].", "canonical_name": "Raja. J odhbir Chand"}}, {"text": "S. K. Das", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 41593, "end_char": 41602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Tikas of Jagir, all the pine trees of such Khatas excepting those standing on such proprietary lands, and which have been held to be the property\n\nRaja Rajinder\n\nChand\n\nv, Suk hi\n\nS. K. Das].", "canonical_name": "S. K. DasJ."}}, {"text": "Raja Rafinder", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 41606, "end_char": 41619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Rafinder\n\nChand\n\nSttkhi\n\nS. K. DasJ.\n\nof the Government during the recent settlement and mention whereof has been made above are the property of Raja Sahib.\"", "canonical_name": "Raja. J odhbir Chand"}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42465, "end_char": 42470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42707, "end_char": 42712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45584, "end_char": 45593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was\n\nRaja Rajit1der Chat1d v.\n\nSukhi\n\nS. K. Das],\n\nRaja Rajinder Chand v.\n\nSukhi\n\nS. K. Das].", "canonical_name": "S. K. DasJ."}}, {"text": "Khalsa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 46393, "end_char": 46399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Khalsa villages, Government did surrender their right to trees on Shamilat lands of adna-maliks on the authority of letter No."}}, {"text": "January 6, 1867", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46527, "end_char": 46542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "347 of January 6, 1867."}}, {"text": "Wajib-ul-arz of 1899-1900", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 47076, "end_char": 47101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same comments apply to the Wajib-ul-arz of 1899-1900 (Ex.", "canonical_name": "Wajib-ul-arz of 1899-1900"}}, {"text": "May 27, 1886", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49724, "end_char": 49736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-2 dated May 27, 1886, showed that even so far back as at that date, some of the adnamaliks had complained that the Raja's men had cut and taken away some chil trees on their.lands."}}, {"text": "Arthur Brandreth", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 50420, "end_char": 50436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Me quoted with approval the observations of Sir Arthur Brandreth to the following effect: \"Some few points have been ascertained in each case, but in general the villagers did not know their customs very well, and when they put their seals to the paper, no doubt they thought it very grand, though they did not know what it was about, as they could little understand the language."}}, {"text": "s. 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51492, "end_char": 51497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Land-Revenue Act, 1887", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51505, "end_char": 51534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "March 11, 1897", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53261, "end_char": 53275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1353 dated March 11, 1897; from the Senior Secretary of the Financial Commissioner."}}, {"text": "May 26, 1914", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53402, "end_char": 53414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Wajib-ul-arz also showed that certain amendments were made on May 26, 1914, by an order of Mr. Shuttleworth, the then Settlement Officer."}}, {"text": "Shuttleworth", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 53435, "end_char": 53447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Wajib-ul-arz also showed that certain amendments were made on May 26, 1914, by an order of Mr. Shuttleworth, the then Settlement Officer.", "canonical_name": "Shuttleworth"}}, {"text": "January 23, 1917", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53539, "end_char": 53555, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is a further note that the amendment was cancelled on January 23, 1917."}}, {"text": "Government of the Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 54054, "end_char": 54078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of the Punjab, however, claimed privilege in respect of those documents, which claim was upheld in_ the High Court..\n\nWe have re-examined that claim, and though the State was not a party to this litigation, we heard the learned Advocate-General for the State."}}, {"text": "S. K. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 54404, "end_char": 54413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Rajinder Chand v.\n\nSukhi\n\nS. K. Das J.\n\n914 SUPREME COURT R:IJ:POR'tS [1956]\n\nWe found the claim to be valid under the law as it stands\" at present.", "canonical_name": "S. K. DasJ."}}, {"text": "Salig Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 56529, "end_char": 56538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judges of the High Court did not refer to the oral evidence except for a slight reference to the statement of Salig Ram, the Raja's attorney, who appears to have stated that the Raja got his rights in 1893-94; how the Raja got his rights then was not explained."}}, {"text": "Babu Kailash Chander", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 56755, "end_char": 56775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned counsel for the appellant has referred us to the evidence of one Babu Kailash Chander (witness No."}}]} {"document_id": "1956_1_916_938_EN", "year": 1956, "text": "October 24.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1956]\n\nLAKSHMI DEVI SUGAR MILLS LTD. v.\n\nPT. R.AM SARUP. (and connected appeal)\n\n[BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, s. K. DAS and ti GovINDA MENON JJ.] \"\n\nIndustrial Dispute-Application for permission to dismiss workmen-Jurisdiction of Appellate Tribunal-Scope of enquiry- ! nterim order of suspension by employer pending enquiry and receipt of permission-If amounts to a lock-out-If amounts to punishment -Prior permission of the Appellate Tribunal, if required-Enquiry by General Manager-Non-co-operation by Workmen-Enquiry not held within the prescribed time-If a breach of Standing Orders- Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act (XL VIII of 1950), .,. 22, 28-Indiistrial Disputes Act (XIV of 1947J, s. 83( a)(b)-\n\nStanding Orders, cl. L 12.\n\nSeventy-six workers of the appellant company resorted to a tools-down strike in sympathy with a dismissed co-worker.\n\nRe peated attempts to persuade them to resume work having failed the General Manager suspended them until further orders.\n\nAfter mid day recess the Management sought to prevent the workers from entering the mills but they violently entered the mills and the Police bad to be called in by the company to keep the peace.\n\nCharges of misconduct, a.nd insubordination were thereafter frame~ against the workers and they were called upon to show cause in an open enquiry to be held by the General Manager why disciplinary action should not be taken against them and the order of suspension was extended pending the enquiry.\n\nThe workers took up an attitude of total non-eel-operation and the atmosphere was tense with the result that the enquiry could not be held within 4 days.\n\nThe Management decided to dismiss the workers as a result of the en ... quiry but as an appeal was then pending before the Labour A11pel late Tribunal, the company applied to it under s. 22 of the Indus trial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Acit of 1950 for permission to do so and extended the period of suspension pending receipt of such permission.\n\nThe workmen in their turn filed an application under s. !13 of the Act to the Appellate Tribunal for requisite action to be taken against the company for having contravened s. 22(b) of the Act by resorting to an illegal lockout and thereby punishing them without its prior permission.\n\nThe Appellate Tribunal held that the company bad not held the enquiry within the time specified by cl. L 12 of the Standing Orders and on that ground dismissed its application. It allowed the application of the workers holding that the wholesale suspension of the workers and preventing them from continuing work after the mid-day recess amounted to a lock-out\n\nand punishment by the company and contravened ~· 22(b) of the Act and directed their reinstatement.\n\nThe company appealed. It was contended on behalf of the company that there had been neither a breach of cl. L 12 of the Standing Orders nor a contravention of s. 22(b) of the Act.\n\nHeld, that the contentions were correct and the appeals must succeed.\n\nThe conduct of the company did not come within the definition of a lockout and even if there was any lock-out it was in con sequence of the illegal strike resorted to by the workmen and as such could not be deemed to be illegal by virtue of s. 24(3) of the Indus trial Disputes Act, 194 7.\n\nMoreover, even assuming that the company declared an illegal lock-out it was not necessary for it to obtain the permission of the Appellate Tribunal under s. 22 of the Act before it could do so.\n\nA lock-out was neither an alteration of tb e conditions of service within the meaning of cl. (a) nor a discharge or punishment by dismissal or otherwise within the meaning of cl. ,(b) of s. 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or under s. 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 and no permission was, therefore, required for its declaration. If the lockout was illegal the workmen had their remedy under s. 26 of the Industrial Disputes Act.and in any event they had the right to have the dispute referred for adjudication.\n\nJute Workers Federation, Calcutta v. Clive Jute Mills ([1951] II L.L.J. 344) and Colliery Mazdoor Congress, Asansol v. New Beerbhoom Coal Co. Ltd. ([1952] L.A.C. 219), approved.\n\nThe Company having been declared a public utility concern, the workets had no right to go on strike without giving a notice in terms of s. 22(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7 and the tools down strike resorted to by them was illegal and the company was within its rights in suspending them.\n\nBuckingham and Carnatic Co. Ltd. v. Workers of the Buckingham and Carnatic Co. Ltd., ([1953] S.C.R. 219), referred to.\n\nMere failure to hold an enquiry within the period of four days prescribed by cl. L 12 of the Standing Orders could not determine -' he matter before the Appellate Tribunal and where, as in the mstant case, the delay was due to the conduct of the workers it was sufficiently explained.\n\nWhere full and free opportunity was given to the workers to be present and defend themselves in a duly notified enquiry and they failed to do so, the Management was quite within its right to come to its own conclusiQn as to their guilt and the punishment to be meted out to them and it was not open to the workmen thereafter to urge that such enquiry was not fair or impartia.l or violated the principles of natural justice.\n\nLakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd. v.\n\nPt, Ram Saruj>\n\nLakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ud.\n\nPt. Ram Sarup\n\nThere could be no punishment so long as there was no offence and any action of the employer to the deteriment of the workers' interest would not amount to punishment. The law did not contemplate anything like a contingent punishment of a worker and, consequently, where there was an interim order of suspension pend ing an enquiry or the grant of permission by the Appellate Tribunal, the question of pay for the period ol such suspension depending on whether or not tbe permission would be granted, such sus pension would not amount to punishment even where it was of an indefinite duration so as to attract the operation of s. 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950.\n\nChampdany J11te Mifls and Certain Workmen, ([1952) 1 L.L.J. 554), Joint Steamer Companies and Their Workmen, ([1954] II L.L.J. 221), Assam Oil Co. Ltd. v. Appalswami, ([1954] II L.L.J. 328), Standard Vac11um Oil Co. v. Gunaseelan, M. G. ([1954] II L.L.J. 656), relied on.\n\nUnder that section the only thing that the Appellate Tribunal he.d to consider was whether a prima facie case had been made out by the employer for lifting the ban imposed by the section and if, on thG materials before it, it was satisfied that there had been a fair enquiry in the circumstances of the case and the Management bad bona fide come to the conclusion that the worker was guilty of misconduct with which be had been charged and it would be detrimental to discipline and dangerous in the interests of the company ta continue him in its employ, a. prima jacie case was made out and the Tribunal would be bound to permit the employer to punish the workman. It would be no part of its duty to judge whether the punishment was harsh or excessive, except so far it might bear on the bona fides of the Management, and could only grant the permission as sought for or refuse it and the question of the propriety of the punishment could be decided only by the appropriate Tribunal appointed by the Government for adjudicating the industrial dis pute which would ensue upon the action of the management.\n\nAtherton West cf) Co. Ltd. v. Suti Mills Mazdoor Union and Otlwrs, ([1953] S.C.R. 780), The Automobile Products of India Ltd.\n\nv. R11kmaji Bala it Others, ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 1241) Champdany Jute Mills and Shri Alijan, ([1952] II L.L.J. 629), R.B.S. Lachmandas Mohan Lal if; Sons Ltd. and Chini Mill Karmachari Union, ((1952] II L.L.J. 787) and Assam Oil Companies' Case, ([1954] L:A.C. 78), referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 244 and 245 of 1954.\n\nAppeals from the judgment and order dated August 19, 1952, of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India (Calcutta) at Allahabad in Miscellaneous Cases\n\nNos. C-91 and 93 of 1952.\n\n... l\n\nN. 0. Ohatterji, H.J. Umrigar, J. B. Dadachanji, 1956 S. N. Andley and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant in both appeals.\n\nLakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ud,\n\nPurshottam Tricumdas, R. Ganapathy Iyer and B. P. Maheshwari, for respondents in both appeals.\n\nPt. Ram Sarup\n\nM. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, Porus A. Mehta and R.H. Dhebar, fo.r the Intervener.\n\n1956. October 24.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI J.-These two appeals by special leave arise out of an order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Lucknow Bench, by which it dismissed the application of the appellant under s. 22 of the • Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, hereinafter referred to as the Act for permission to dismiss the respondents from is employ and allowed \" the application of the respondents under s. 23 of the Act for reinstatement.\n\nThe respondents are 76 employees of the appellant, a limited company of Sugar Mills, situated in village Chitauni in the district of Deoria and were working in the engineering department of the.mills in the mill house, boiling house and the workshop sections. There were disputes between the appellant and its workmen and, on the date in question, i.e., Ma, y 27, 1952, there was pending before the Labour Appellate Tribunal an appeal which was registered as Cal-101/51. It appears that one Motilal Singh, an employee of the appellant, had been dismissed by it sometime prior thereto and he had been inciting the workmen to make common cause with him, and, at a meeting held th& previous night, some sort of action had been decided upon.\n\nWhen the workmen of the appellant entered the mills on the morning of May 27, 1952, these 76 workmen, though they entered their respective sections of the engineering department, did not commence any work from 7 a.m. as they should have done. The sectional engineers in-charge asked these workmen as to why they did not commence their work and became aware of their intention to resort\n\nLaksh1ni Devi Sugar Mills Ud.\n\nPt. Ram Sarup\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nto a tools-down strike. They reported the fact to the Chief Engineer who sent a slip to the General Manager informing him that the workers had gone on a toolsdown strike. The General Manager thereupon personally went to the workshop, mill house and the boiling house and asked these workmen not to resort to such strike but the latter did not pay any heed to his ad vice. The General Manager then asked the Chief Engineer to persuade these workmen to commence the work, give them time for about 2 hours till 10-30 a.m. and report to him if, in spite of his -persuasions, they did not commence work. The persuasions of the Chief Engineer and also of the section engineers proved of no avail and the 76 workmen persisted in their attitude with the result that the section engineers made their reports to the General Manager through the Chief Engineer giving the names of the workmen belonging to their respective sections who had resorted to the tools-down strike with effect from 7 a.m. that day. These reports were endorsed by the Chief Engineer and passed on to the General Manager who, in his turn, passed an order at about 10-30 a.m. suspending these 76 workmen till further orders. The order for suspen.sion was communicated to these workmen through their sectional heads and was also pasted on the notice board of the mills.\n\nThere was a recess between 11 a.m. and l p.m. and when the gates were opened at I p.m. these 76 workmen, in spite of the warnings of the gatekeepers and Jemadar to the contrary, rushed into the mills, entered their respective sections and adopted a threatening attitude. The sectional engineers made reports to the General Manager in regard to this occurrence and these reports also were endorsed by the Chief Engineer and passed on by him to the General Manager. The situation which was created by these workmen by forcibly entering their respective sections and continuing there threatening violence was explosive and the management had to call in the police in order to avert violence and damage to the property. The police came in at 5 p.m. and order appears to have been restored.\n\nThere was no untoward incident that day\n\n-~-\n\nI '\n\nbut the management appears to have viewed the situation with seriousness and approached the Regional Conciliation Officer the next day in order to ask for advice in regard to the dismissal of these workmen. The Regional Conciliation Officer, however, pointed out to the General Manager that, in, view of the pendency of the appeal before the Labour Appellate Tribunal, he had no jurisdiction to entertain any application fol\" such permission and referred the General Manager to the Labour Appellate Tribunal.\n\nThe workmen, on the other hand, got a letter dated May 28, 1952, addressed to the General Manager by the General Secretary of the Chini Mill Mazdoor Sangh to the effect that they had gone to the gates of the mills as usual at 7 a.m. that day to attend to their work but they were not allowed to enter the mill premises. They charged the management with the intention to victimise them on the charge of a toolsdown strike and stated that they had neither struck nor intended to strike but had been prevented froJ,11 attending to their work and had therefore been advised to go back to their quarters with a view to maintain peace. The last paragraph of that letter was very significant. The General Manager was told that if he did not mend his illegal mistakes and did not take the w.orkmen back on duty he would be responsible for any breach of peace.\n\nAfter receipt of that letter it was evident that the workmen would resort to violent measures in order to attend to their work and a breach of peace was apprehended. The management evidently continued the police precautions and, after having waited for some time, the General Manager furnished to these 76 workmen on June 2, 1952, a charge-sheet wherein he charged them with having committed misconduct within the meaning of cl. L. 1 (a) and (b) and wilful insubordination within the meaning of cl. L. l(a), (b} and (w) of the Standing Orders. He called upon them to show cause within 24 hours of the receipt of the charge-sheef why disciplinary action should not be taken against them and gave them intimation that an open enquiry in connection with the said charges\n\nLakshmi Devi Sugar Mills l.Jd.\n\nPt. Ram Sarup\n\nBhagwati J.\n\n195~\n\nLakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd. v.\n\nPt. Ram Sarup\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nwould be held by him at 8 a.m. on June 6, 1952. He also intimated that if all the workmen arranged to present themselves earlier than June 6, 1952, he would take up the said enquiry earlier provided, however, an intimation was received to that effect from them or from their Union. The workmen were to remain suspended till the enquiry was finished.\n\nThe workmen addressed uniform letters to the General Manager denying that there was any toolsdown strike on May 27, 1952, and alleging that the sectional heads and the Chief Engineer had conspired together \"under some mysterious preconceived plans\" and stated that no useful purpose would be served by holding an enquiry on the 11th day of their suspension.\n\nThey pointed out that such indefinite period of suspension during the pendency of the appeal before the Labour Appellate Tribunal and Reconciliation Board was illegal and unjustified and was in utter disregard of the Standing Orders. By their further letter dated June 5, 1952, similarly addressed to the General Manager, they voiced their apprehension that they would not get any justice from an enquiry held by the management itself and asked for investigation by an impartial tribunal. The management, however, held the enquiry as intimated at 8 a.m. on June 6, 1952. The workmen non-co-operated and did not present themselves at the enquiry.\n\nThe General Manager immediately addressed a letter to these workmen putting on record that in spite of the orders conveyed by him earlier the workmen had disobeyed the same and had not appeared at the appointed time and place for the enquiry into the tools-down strike. He pointed out that by not appearing in this manner they had made themselves liable to dismissal for insubordination, and intimated that the management was applying to the proper authorities for permission to dismiss them pending receipt of which the workmen would remain under suspension. This letter was received by the workmen at 9 a.m. that day and they replied through the General Secretary of the Chini Mill Mazdoor Sangh repeating that a demand had been made for an\n\n-·-\n\n...\n\n... .,..\n\ninvestigation by an impartial tribunal and in so far as no impartial tribunal had been appointed they were not agreeable to .present themselves and submit their defence at the enquiry which was conducted by the management itself.\n\nThe appellant thereafter made the necessary application under s. 22 of the Act before the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Lucknow Bench, for permission to dismiss these 76 workmen. In the affidavit which was filed in support. of that application, all the facts hereinbefore mentioned were set out in extenso and it was pointed out that the management, after giving full consideration to the explanations and offering every possible opportunity to these workmen to explain their conduct coupled with the unreasonable attitude adopted by them, had adjudged them guilty of misconduct under cl. L. l(a), (b) and (w) of the Standing Orders and considered that any further employment of these workmen would be extremely detrimental to discipline and dangerous in the interests of the industry.\n\nThe workmen, in their turn, filed on June 9, 1952, an application under s. 23 of the Act for requisite action to be taken against the appellant for having contravened s. 22(b) of the Act by inflicting on them the punishment in the shape of harassment by resorting to an illegal lockout for an indefinite period with effect from May 27, 1952, without obtaining the prior permission of the Labour Appellate Tribunal .and \"thereby acting contrary to law and resorting to mala fide actions in direct violation of the provisions of the Standing Orders in continuation of the management's anti-trade (Union) activities\".\n\nCounter-affidavits were made by the workmen as also the management in reply to both the above applications. The Labour Appellate Tribunal held that the appellant did not act in strict compliance with cl.\n\nL. 12 of the Standing Orders and was, therefore, not entitled to ask for permission to dismiss the 76 worktnen. It accordingly dismissed the appellant's application under s. 22 of the Act. In regard to the application of the workmen under s. 23 of the Act, it held\n\nLakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd. v.\n\nPt. Ram Sarup\n\nBhagwati).\n\nLakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ud;\n\nPt. Ram Sarup\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nthat the wholesale suspension of the 76 workmen and their prevention from resuming work at 1 p.m. after the lunch hour amounted to a lockout and that this conduct of the appellant amounted to punishment of the workers whether by dismissal or otherwise and was, therefore, in contravention of s. 22(b) of the Act. It accordingly ordered the reinstatement of the workmen if they presented themselves at the office of the General Manager during office hours o.n any day within 15 days of the order. and also ordered payment of half the salary and allowances for the period of non-payment, viz., from the date of their suspension up to the date on which they were taken back in service.\n\nShri N. C. Chatterjee for the appellant before us has strenuously urged that the workmen had resorted to the tools-down strike which was an illegal strike and that the appellant was well within its rights in suspending them pending enquiry and also pending the application for permission to dismiss them made before the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Even if it be held that the appellant had declared a lockout, such a lockout was in consequence of the illegal strike resorted to by the workmen and could not be deemed to be illegal. He further urged that the management\n\nhd held an enquiry into the illegal strike which had been resorted to by the workmen and found that the workmen were guilty of misconduct and insubordination within the meaning of cl. L. l(a), (b) and (w) of the Standing.Orders and the appellant rightly came to the conclusion that any further employment of these workmen would be extremely detrimental to discipline and dangerous in the interests of the industry. He also contended that the delay_in holding the enquiry was not un.reasonable and the suspension of the workmen pending enquiry for more than four days was due to sufficient reason, the atmosphere created by the non-co-operation of the workers being so tense as not being appropriate for the holding of an enquiry within those four days, that there was no breach of cl. L. 12 of the Standing Orders and that the Labour Appellate Tribunal was in error when it\n\nrefused to grant the application under s. 22 of the Act.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 245 of 1954 which is directed against the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal under s. 23 of the Act may be disposed of at once. The Labour Appellate Tribunal was of opinion that the conduct of the appellant in preventing the workmen from continuing work after 1 p.m. on May 27, 1952, came within the definition of a lockout and the workmen being employed in a public utility concern such lockout would be illegal without a proper notice. It was further of opinion that this conduct amounted to punishment of a worker whether by dismissal or otherwise and was, therefore, in contravention of s. 22(b) of the Act. This conclusion of the Labour Appellate Tribunal was, in our opinion, based on a misapprehension of the whole position. The position had been summed up by the Labour Appellate Tribunal in the following words:-\n\n\" As a matter of fact, the management never thought of a lockout. Their idea was to suspend the suspected persons pending enquiry for which they gave a notice\".\n\nIf this was the correct position, the conclusion reached by the Labour Appellate Tribunal that the conduct of the management came within the definition of a. lockout was absolutely unjustifiable. The Labour Appellate Tribunal recorded its inability to come to a definite finding as to what was the position which obtained on May 27, 1952. h observed:-\n\n\"W e have got a number of affidavits in support of the parties' case and there is oath against oath.\n\nWe do not find ourselves in a position to hold definitely as to what was the exact situation. But it does appear to us that a mountain has been made of a mole hill and conclusions have been arrived at without going deep into the matter\".\n\nEven if the parties had made a mountain of a mole hill and had reached conclusions without going deep into the matter, it was certainly the business of the Labour Appellate Tribunal itself to record a finding of fact in regard to the situation as it obtained on\n\nLakshmi Devi S11gar Mills Ltd. v.\n\nPt. Ram Satup\n\nLakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ud.\n\nPt. Ram Sarup\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nthat day. This unfortunately the Labour Appellate Tribunal did not do and it came to record its conclusion that the conduct of the management came within the definition of a lookout without realizing that such conclusion was inconsistent with what it had stated a li.ttle earlier thatthemanagement as a matter of fact never thought of a lookout.\n\nWe have been taken through the whole evidence by the learned counsel for the appellant and there is clear documentary evidence to show that the 76 workmen resorted to a tools-down strike from 7 a.m. on May 27,\n\n1952. The reports which were made by the section engineers and sent to the General Manager through the Chief Engineer were clear and categoric in regard to such tools-down strike having been resorted to by the workmen in question and the list of the 76 workmen which was prepared by the General Manager ordering their suspension was based on those reports. 'l'he further reports which were made by the section engineers again sent by them to the General Manager through the Chief Engineer in the afternoon of May 27, 1952, also were clear and categoric in regard to the said workmen having been asked not to enter the workshop, the boiling house and the mill house at 1 p.m. but their having entered the same threatening violence. A faint attempt was made to charge the section engineers and the Chief Engineer with having conspired \"under some mysterious preconceived plans\" b, ut the same rested merely on a bare allegation and was•not substantiated by any tangible evidence.\n\nEven though there was some conflict of evidence in regard to the time when the notice of suspension was given by the General Manager to these workmen and when the notice in that behalf was pasted on the notice-board of the appellant, it is abundantly clear on the documentary evidence above referred to that the 76 workmen resorted to a toolsdown strike from 7 a.m. on the morning of May 27, 1952, that they were suspended till further orders immediately after the receipt by the General Manager of the first series of reports from the section engineers, that they were prevented from entering the premises\n\n..,\n\n,_.\n\n• -\n\nat I p.m. but entered the same threatening violence.\n\nIf this is the true position it follows that there was no lockout declared by the appellant, much less an illegal lockout. The workmen had resorted to an illegal strike and the General Manager rightly ordered that the workmen indulging in such strike should be suspended pending further orders which obviously meant pending enquiry into their conduct and the obtaining of the permission to dismiss them as a result of such enquiry if the management thought fit.\n\nIf there was thus no illegal lockout at all, the conclusion reached by the Labour Appellate Tribunal in , that behalf was absolutely unjustified. Even if there had been a lockout as concluded by the Labour Appellate Tribunal the same was in consequence of the illegal strike which had been resorted to by these workmen and could not by virtue of s. 24(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, be deemed to be illegal.\n\nThere is, however, a more fundamental objection that, even if the appellant be held responsible for having declared an illegal lockout, the lockout would not come within the ban of s. 22 of the Act. The Labour Appellate Tribunal had before it an earlier decision of its own in Jute Workers Federation, Calcutta v. Clive Jute Mills(1), in which the same question had heed considered with reference to s. 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In that case, a lockout had been declared which involved 4,000 workers of the company and a preliminary contention was urged that there was no contravention of the provisions of s. 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.\n\nThe Labour Appellate Tribunal considered the question whether the lockout had (I) in fact altered the conditions of service of the workmen to their prejudice, or (2) had the effect of discharge, or (3) amounted to punishment of the workmen.\n\nIt came to the conclusion that a lockout had not the effect of a discharge, for a lockout does not automatically terminate the services of the workmen.\n\nIt did not also amount to punishment, for punishment presup-\n\n(1) [1951] II L.L.J. 344.\n\nLakshmi Dei Sttgar Mills Ltd. v.\n\nPt. Ram SarttP\n\nBhagwatiJ,\n\nLaksh1ni Devi Sugar Mills Ud.\n\nPt. Ram Sarup\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nposes an offence or misconduct.\n\nA lockout is generaly adopted as a security measure and may in certam cases be used as a weapon corresponding to what the employees have in the shape of a strike and that, therefore, s. 33(b) would not be contravened by the company by declaring a lockout.\n\nThe Labour Appellate Tribunal then considered whether a lockout would attract the operation of s. 33(a).\n\nIt was of opinion that no automatic termination of the services of the employees was brought about by a lockout and the question was whether any of the conditions of service was altered thereby to their prejudice.\n\nThe contention of the Union was that the conditions of service were altered to the prejudice of the workmen because those employees did not in fact get their pay during the period of the lockout with the possibility of losing it.\n\nThis contention was negatived and the Labour Appellate Tribunal was of opinion that the conditions of their service would be altered by the lockout if the employees lost their right to receive their pay during the period of lockout in all circum- stances but the question whether they would be entitled to get their pay during that period could not be postulated with certainty for that would depend on a variety of considerations.\n\nIn the opinion of the Labour Appellate Tribunal to bring a case within s. 33(a), the questioned act of the employer must directly and in fact alter the conditions of service to the prejudice of the workmen concerned, that is to say, the moment the lockout was declared.\n\nThe possibility that they may or may not get their pay meant that the lockout may or may not alter the conditions of their service to their prejudice.\n\nSection 33(a) would not, therefore, be attracted by the mere fact of a lockout.\n\nThe Labour Appellate Tribunal thus came to the conclusion that neither s. 33(a) nor s. 33(b) would be contravened by the company in declaring the lockout.\n\nThis decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal was followed in Colliery Mazrloor Congress, Asansol,\n\nv. New Beerbhoom. Coal Co .. Ltd.(') and t.he Labour\n\n(1) [1952] L A.O. 219.\n\n....\n\nAppellate Tribunal there held that a lockout did not come within the ambit of s. 33 and, therefore, no permission under that section was required for declaring a lockout.\n\nWe agree with the reasoning adopted in the above cases and are of opinion that a lockout is neither an alteration to the prejudice of the workmen of the conditions of service applicable to them within the meaning of cl. (a) nor a discharge or punishment whether by dismissal or otherwise of the workmen within the meaning of cl. (b) of s. 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, ors. 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, and that, therefore, no permission of the Conciliation Officer, Board or Tribunal as the case may be is necessary to be obtained before a lockout can be declared. If the lockout is legal, no question can at all arise. If, on the other hand, the lockout is illegal, a remedy is provided in s. 26 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.\n\nThe employees affected by a lock-out would in any event be entitled to refer the industrial dispute arising between themselves and the employer for adjudication by adopting the proper procedure in regard thereto.\n\nThe Labour Appellate Tribunal was, therefore, clearly in error when it came to the conclusion that the conduct of the appellant came within the definition of a lockout and that it amounted to punishment of the workmen whether by dismissal or otherwise and was, therefore, in contravention of s. 22(b) of the Act.\n\nThe application of the respondents under s. 23 of the Act was accordingly liable to be dismissed and should have been dismissed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Civil Appeal No. 245 of 1954 will,\n\ntherefore, be allowed and the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal reinstating the respondents in the service of the appellant will be set aside.\n\nComing now to Civil Appeal No. 244 of 1954, the first question to determine is whether the respondents had resorted to an illegal strike. We have already pointed out the circumstances under which the 76 workmen resorted to the tools-down strike from 7 a.m. on May 27, 1952, and recorded the finding\n\n121.\n\nLakshmi De'Oi Sugar Mills Ud.\n\nPt, Ram Sarup\n\nBha guati J.\n\nLakshmi Devi\n\n~:•igar Mills Ud.\n\nPt. Ram Sarup\n\nBhagwati J,\n\nthat they not. only resorted to such strike but persisted in their attitude in spite of the persuasions of the Chief Engineer and the General Manager of the appellant. The appellant having been declared a public utility concern, the workmen were not entitled to resort to such strike without giving to the appellant notice of the strike in terms of s. 22(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7, and the tools-down strike which was resorted to by them was, therefore, an illegal strike. The fact that the strike was of a short duration viz., from 7 a.rn. till 10-30 a.rn. would not exculpate the respondents from the consequences of having resorted to such illegal strike, the avowed intention of the strikers being not to resume work until their pre-concerted plan conceived at the meeting held on the previous night was carried out. The strike resorted to by the workmen was of an indefinite duration and the management, having foiled in its attempts to persuade the workmen to resume their work, was well within its rights to suspend these workmen pending further orders. (Vide Buckingham and Garnatic Go. Ltd. v. Workers of the Buckingham and Garnatic Go. Ltd.(')) . .\n\nThe Labour Appellate Tribunal did not decide this issue at all but only considered the alleged non-compliance by the appellant of cl. L. 12 of the Standing Orders as determinative of the whole enquiry before it observing that \"although the delay (in holding the enquiry) was not unreasonable, there was no doubt that the management did violate the letter of the rule\". It further observed that there was no sufficient reason indicated for extending the period of suspension beyond the period of four days provided in\n\ncl. L. 12 of the Standing Orders, the tension created by the non-co-operation of the workers not having been considered sufficient to preclude the management from collecting materials for conducting the enquiry within the said period of 4 days.\n\nThis reasoning of the Labour Appellate Tribunal was unsound. Having once come to the conclusion that the delay was not unreasonable, there was no justification for the further\n\n\\1) [1953] S.C.R. 219.\n\n.... _\n\n- •\n\nconclusion reached by the Labour Appellate Tribunal that the tension created by the non-co-operation of the workers was not a sufficient reason for extending the period of such suspension. The workmen had forcibly entered the premises of the mills in spite of the warnings of the watchmen and the Jemadar and had also entered the workshop, the boiling house and the mill house and continued to stay there threatening violence. In their letter dated June 3, 1952, theyhad also threatened the General Manager that if he did not mend his illegal mistakes and did not take the workmen back on duty he would be responsible for any breach of peace. This was enough evidence of their mentality and the management naturally enough apprehended breach of peace at the hands of these workmen. If this was the tense atmosphere created by the non-co-operation of the workmen, the management was perfectly justified in postponing the enquiry by a few days and continuing the workmen under suspension. The delay which was thus caused in furnishing the charge-sheets and giving notice of the enquiry to these workmen on June 2, 1952, was, therefore, sufficiently explained and if there was any one responsible for this delay it was the workmen and not the management. It did not then lie in the mouth of the workmen to protest against thi~ delay in the enquiry and trot out their suspension for a period exceeding four days as an excuse for abstaining from the enquiry.\n\nAs a matter of fact, the management intimated to the workmen that in spite of June 6, 1952, having been fixed as the date for the open enquiry, the management would be prepared to take up the enquiry earlier provided an intimation was received either from the workmen or from their Union to that effect. Instead of responding to this gesture of the appellant the workmen persisted in asking for an independent enquiry and non-co-operated with the management in the enquiry which was ultimately held by it as notified at 8 a.m. on June 6, 1952.\n\nWe are of opinion that under the circumstances the appellant was not guilty of having contravened cl. L. 12 of the Standing Orders and the Labour Appellate\n\nLakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd. v •• Pt. Ram Samfr-\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nLakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd, v.\n\nPt, Ram SaruP\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nTribunal was in error when it came to the contrary conclusion and dismissed the application of the appellant under s. 22 merely on that ground without making any further enquiry in to the circumstances of the case. It appears that the Labour Appellate Tribunal was driven to take this step because it found itself unable to hold definitely as to what was the exact situation on May 27, 1952.\n\nWe shall only observe that if the Labour Appellate Tribunal had really applied its mind ts> the question it would have come to the conclusion that the respondents in fact did resort to the illegal strike from 7 a.m. on May 27, 1952, and that there was no contravention of cl. L. 12 of the Standing Orders by the appellant.\n\nThe next question that falls to be determined is whether the enquiry which was held by the management on June 6, 1952, was a fair enquiry and whether the General Manager observed the principles of natural justice in the conduct of that enquiry. Due notice of the enquiry was given to the respondents by the letter of the management addressed to them on June 2, 1952, and if the respondents did not avail themselves of the opportunity of presenting themselves and defending their action at the enquiry they had only themselves to blame for it. It was within the province of the management to hold such an enquiry after giving aue notice thereof to the respondents and to come to its own conclusion as a result of such enquiry whether the respondents were guilty of the charges which had been levelled against them.\n\nIf full and free opportunity was given to the respondents to present themselves at the enquiry and defend themselves it could not be said that the enquiry was anything but fair.\n\nNo principles of natural justice were violated and the management was at liberty to come to its own conclusions in regard to the culpability of the respondents and also to determine what punishment should be meted out to the respondents for the misconduct and insubordination proved against them. If the ban which is imposed by s. 22 of the Act had not been in existence, the management would have been entitled to impose the punishment on the\n\n...\n\n...\n\nrespondents and dismiss them without anything more, if it honestly came to the conclusion that dismissal of these workmen was the only punishment which should be meted out to them in all the circumstances of the case. The respondents would no doubt then have been entitled to refer the industrial dispute which arose out of their dismissal for adjudication by adopting the proper procedure set out in the Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7, and the Industrial Tribunal appointed by the Government for the adjudication of such dispute would have been in a position to thrash out all the circumstances and award to them the appropriate relief. This course was, however, not open to the appellant by reason of the pendency of the appeal before the Labour Appellate Tribunal and the only thing which the appellant could do, therefore, was, after coming to its own conclusion as a result of such enquiry, to apply to the Labour Appellate Tribunal under s. 22 of the Act for permission to dismiss the respondents and this the appellant did on June 8, 1952. It was not open to the respondents then, having regard to the attitude which they had adopted throughout in relation to the said enquiry, to urge that the enquixy was not fair or impartial or that the principles of natural justice had been violated by the General Manager of the appellant in the conduct of the enquiry.\n\nIt was, however, urged on behalf of the respondents that the suspension for an indefinite period beyond the period of four days provided in cl. L. 12 of the Standing Orders was a punitive measure and the appellant was not justified in imposing that punishment on them without the permission of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. It was contended +rat such suspension involved loss of pay by the rcoipondents and being of an indefinite duration inflicted such harassment on them that it could not be deemed to be anything except a punishment. We do not accept this contention. It has been rightly held by the Labour Appellate Tribunal that suspension without pay pending enquiry as also pending permission of the Tribunal under the relevant section could not\n\nLakshmi Devi S11ga1 Mills Ltd. v.\n\nPt. Ram SaruP\n\nBhagwati J,\n\nIaksh1ni Devi Sugar Mills Ltd, v.\n\nPt. Ra1n Sf!r11p\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nbe considered a punishment as such suspension without payment would only be an interim measure and would last till the application for permission to punish the workman was made and the Tribunal had passed orders thereupon. If the permission was accorded the workman would not be paid during the period of suspension but if the permission was refused he would have to be paid for the whole period of suspension.\n\nThere is nothing like a contingent punishment of a workman and therefore such suspension could not be deemed to be a punishment of the workman at all.\n\nSuch suspension would of necessity be of an indefinite duration because to get a written permission of the Tribunal would mean delay and no Tribunal would likely issue any order without notice and without hearing all the parties concerned. Orders for suspension were meant only as security measures or precautionary ones taken in the interest of the industry itself or its employees in general. These measures were sometimes called for immediately after an incident and any delay, however small, might defeat the purpose for which such measures were intended. It would therefore be necessary to adopt these measures immediately and to suspend the workman pending the enquiry as also the permission to be o btaincd from the appropriate Tribunal for dismissing him if as a result of the enquiry the management thought fit to inflict such punishment upon him. The suspension, however, would not be a punishment by itself.\n\nThe ordinary dictionary meaning of the word \"punish\" is \"to cause the offender to suffer for the offence\" or \"to inflict penalty on the offender\" or \"to inflict penalty for the offence\" (Concise Oxford Dictionary, 4th Ed.). Punishment can be otherwise defined (Vide Law Lexicon by P.R. Aiyar, 1943 Ed.) as penalty for the transgression of law, and the word \"punish\" denotes or signifies some offence committed by the person who is punished.\n\nAny action of the employer to the detriment of the workman's interest would not be punishment so long as no offence was found to have been committed by the workman. The suspension under such circumstances, therefore, could\n\n- ...\n\nnot be a punishment even though it may be of an indefinite duration and would not attract the operation of s. 22 of the Act. It could not be contended, therefore, that suspension without pay even for an indefinite period pending enquiry or pending the permission of the appropriate Tribunal to dismiss the workman would be a punishment which would require permission under s. 22 of the Act before the same could be meted out to the workman. (Vide Champdany Jute Mills And Certain Workmen( 1); Joint Steamer Companies And Their Workmen( 2); Assam Oil Co. Ltd. v.\n\nAppalswami(3); Standard Vacuum Oil Co. v. Guna- seelan, M. G.(4)).\n\nThe scope of the enquiry before the Labour Appellate Tribunal under s. 22 of the Act has been the subject-matter of decisions by this Court in Atherton West & Co. Ltd. v. Suti Mill Mazdoor Union and Others( 5) and The Automobile Products of India Ltd. v. Rukmaji Bala & Others(6).\n\nThe Tribunal before whom an application is made under that section has not to adjudicate upon any industrial dispute arising between the employer and the workman but has only got, to consider whether the ban which is imposed on the employer in the matter of altering the conditions of employment to \\he prejudice of the workman or his disuharge or punishment whether by dismissal or otherwise during the pendency of the proceedings therein referred to should be lifted.\n\nA prima facie case has to be made out by the employer for the lifting of such ban and the only jurisdiction which the Tribunal has is either to give such permission or to refuse it provided the employer is not acting mala fide or is not resorting to any unfair practice or victimization.\n\nIt cannot impose any conditions on the employer before such permission is granted nor can it substitute another prayer for the one which the employer has set out in his application. If the permission is granted, the ban would be lifted and the employer would be at liberty, if he so chooses thereafter, to deal out the\n\n(1) [1952) I L.L.J. 554.\n\n(2) (1954] II L.L.J. 828.\n\n(3) [1953] S.C.R. 780.\n\n(4) [1954] II L.L J. 221.\n\n(5) [1954] II L.L.J. 656.\n\n(6) [1955) 1 S.C.R. 1241,\n\nLakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ud.\n\nPt. Ram Sarup\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nLakshmi Devi Sugar Mi.Us Ltd. v.\n\nPt. Ram Sarup\n\nBhagwati}.\n\npunishment to the workman. On such action being taken by the employer the workman would be entitled to raise an industrial dispute which would have to be referred to the appropriate Tribunal for adjudication 'by the Government on proper steps being taken in that behalf.\n\nWhen such industrial dispute comes to be adjudicated upon by the appropriate Tribunal, the workman would be entitled to have all the circumstances of the case scrutinized by the Tribunal and would be entitled to get the appropriate relief at the hands of the Tribunal. If, on the other hand, such permission is refused, the parties would be relegated to the status quo and the employer would not be able to deal out the puntshment which he intends to do to the workman.\n\nEven then an industrial dispute might arise between the employer and the workman if the workman was not paid his due wages and other benefits. Such industrial dispute also would have to be referred to the appropriate Tribunal by the Government and the Tribunal would award to the workman the appropriate relief having regard to all the circumstances of the case.\n\nThe Tribunal before whom such an• application for permission is made under s. 22 of the Act would not be entitled to sit in judgment on the action of the employer if once it came to the conclusion that a prima facie case had been made out for dealing out the punishment to the workman. It would not be concerned with the measure of the punishment nor with the harshness or otherwise of the action proposed to be taken by the employer except perhaps to the extent that it might bear on the question whether the action of the management was bona fide or was actuated by the motive of victimization. If on the materials before it the Tribunal came to the conclusion that a fair enquiry was held by the management in the circumstances of the case and it had bona fide come to the conclusion that the workman was guilty of misconduct with which he had been charged a prima facie case would be made out by the employer and the Tribunal would under these circumstances be bound to give the requisite permission to the employer to deal\n\nout the punishment to the workman. If the punishment was harsh or excessive or was not such as should be dealt out by the employer having regard to all the circumstances of the case the dealing out of such punishment by the employer to the workman after such permission was granted would be the subjectmatter of an industrial dispute to be raised by the workman and to be dealt with as aforesaid. The Tribunal, however, would have no jurisdiction to go into that question and the only function of the Tribunal under s. 22 of the Act would be to either grant the permission or to refuse it. (Vide Champdani Jute Mills And Shri Alijari(1); R.B.S. Lachmandas Mohan Lal & Sons Ltd. And Chini Mill Karma.chari Union(9); Assam Oil Companies' case(3)).\n\nIn the circumstances of the present case, once the appellant succeeded in establishing that the workmen had resorted to an illegal strike from 7 a.m. on May 27, 1952, that a fair enquiry into the alleged misconduct and insubordination of the workmen had been held by the management without violating any principles of natural justice, that the management had as a result of such enquiry found that the workmen had been guilty of misconduct and insubordination with which they had been charged and that the management had come to the bona fide conclusion that continuing the workmen in its employ was detrimental to discipline and dangerous in the interests of the appellant, the Labour Appellate Tribunal ought to have held that a prima facie case for the dismissal of the workmen had been made out by the appellant and ought to have granted the appellant the permission to dismiss the workmen.\n\nWe are, therefore, of opinion that the Labour Appellate Tribunal was clearly in error in rejecting the application of the appellant under s. 22 of the Act and refusing it the permission to discharge the respondents from its employ. Civil Appeal No. 244 of 1954 will, therefore, be allowed and the order of\n\n(1) [1952] II L.L.J. 629.\n\n(2) [1952) II L.L.J, 787.\n\n(S) [1954] L.A.C. 78. 122\n\nLakshmi Det'i Sugar Mills Ltd, v.\n\nPt, Ram Sarup\n\nBhagu:ati J.\n\nLakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ud.\n\nPt. Ram Sarup\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nthe Labour Appellate Tribunal dismissing the application under A. 22 of the Act will be set aside.\n\nThe appellant will be granted permission under s. 22 of the Act to discharge the respondents from its employ.\n\nUnder the orders of the Court, one-half of their salary has been already paid by the appellant to the\n\nresiondents from 1\\11!-y 27, 1952, onwards. As a result of this decision, the appellant would be entitled to recover the same back from them. Shri N. C. Chatterjee appearing on behalf of the appellant has, however, stated that the appellant would forego the recovery of that amount and would also keep the respondents on the reserve list to be employed in the mills as and when there were vacancies in their permanent cadre. We hope that the respondents will take this offer in the true spirit with which it has been made on behalf of the appellant and behave better in the furture. Shri N. C. Chatterjee has also left the question of costs of both these appeals to us and we do order that, in all the circumstances of the case, it would be proper that each party do bear and pay its own costs of both these appeals.\n\nAppeals allowed.\n\n. -", "total_entities": 120, "entities": [{"text": "LAKSHMI DEVI SUGAR MILLS LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 43, "end_char": 71, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mi.Us Ltd.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PT. R.AM SARUP", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 77, "end_char": 91, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PT. RAM SARUP", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 126, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. K. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 147, "end_char": 156, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ti GovINDA MENON JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 161, "end_char": 181, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P. GOVINDA MENON", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indiistrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 700, "end_char": 724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 83( a)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 740, "end_char": 752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indiistrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Indiistrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1860, "end_char": 1865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2200, "end_char": 2208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2935, "end_char": 2943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 24(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3269, "end_char": 3277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3474, "end_char": 3479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3702, "end_char": 3707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3715, "end_char": 3744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3754, "end_char": 3759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3944, "end_char": 3949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3957, "end_char": 3980, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4380, "end_char": 4388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4396, "end_char": 4419, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ram Sarup", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5460, "end_char": 5469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Sarup\n\nThere could be no punishment so long as there was no offence and any action of the employer to the deteriment of the workers' interest would not amount to punishment.", "canonical_name": "Ram Sarup"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6097, "end_char": 6102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1955] 1 S.C.R. 1241", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7699, "end_char": 7719, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Champdany Jute Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7721, "end_char": 7741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Atherton West cf) Co. Ltd. v. Suti Mills Mazdoor Union and Otlwrs, ([1953] S.C.R. 780), The Automobile Products of India Ltd.\n\nv. R11kmaji Bala it Others, ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 1241) Champdany Jute Mills and Shri Alijan, ([1952] II L.L.J. 629), R.B.S. Lachmandas Mohan Lal if; Sons Ltd. and Chini Mill Karmachari Union, ((1952] II L.L.J. 787) and Assam Oil Companies' Case, ([1954] L:A.C. 78), referred to."}}, {"text": "Alijan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7751, "end_char": 7757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Atherton West cf) Co. Ltd. v. Suti Mills Mazdoor Union and Otlwrs, ([1953] S.C.R. 780), The Automobile Products of India Ltd.\n\nv. R11kmaji Bala it Others, ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 1241) Champdany Jute Mills and Shri Alijan, ([1952] II L.L.J. 629), R.B.S. Lachmandas Mohan Lal if; Sons Ltd. and Chini Mill Karmachari Union, ((1952] II L.L.J. 787) and Assam Oil Companies' Case, ([1954] L:A.C. 78), referred to."}}, {"text": "R.B.S. Lachmandas Mohan Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7783, "end_char": 7810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Atherton West cf) Co. Ltd. v. Suti Mills Mazdoor Union and Otlwrs, ([1953] S.C.R. 780), The Automobile Products of India Ltd.\n\nv. R11kmaji Bala it Others, ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 1241) Champdany Jute Mills and Shri Alijan, ([1952] II L.L.J. 629), R.B.S. Lachmandas Mohan Lal if; Sons Ltd. and Chini Mill Karmachari Union, ((1952] II L.L.J. 787) and Assam Oil Companies' Case, ([1954] L:A.C. 78), referred to."}}, {"text": "Chini Mill Karmachari Union", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7829, "end_char": 7856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Atherton West cf) Co. Ltd. v. Suti Mills Mazdoor Union and Otlwrs, ([1953] S.C.R. 780), The Automobile Products of India Ltd.\n\nv. R11kmaji Bala it Others, ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 1241) Champdany Jute Mills and Shri Alijan, ([1952] II L.L.J. 629), R.B.S. Lachmandas Mohan Lal if; Sons Ltd. and Chini Mill Karmachari Union, ((1952] II L.L.J. 787) and Assam Oil Companies' Case, ([1954] L:A.C. 78), referred to."}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7946, "end_char": 7974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "H.J. Umrigar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8217, "end_char": 8229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ohatterji, H.J. Umrigar, J. B. Dadachanji, 1956 S. N. Andley and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant in both appeals."}}, {"text": "S. N. Andley", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8254, "end_char": 8266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ohatterji, H.J. Umrigar, J. B. Dadachanji, 1956 S. N. Andley and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant in both appeals."}}, {"text": "Rameshwar Nath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8271, "end_char": 8285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ohatterji, H.J. Umrigar, J. B. Dadachanji, 1956 S. N. Andley and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant in both appeals."}}, {"text": "Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ud", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8323, "end_char": 8350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ud,\n\nPurshottam Tricumdas, R. Ganapathy Iyer and B. P. Maheshwari, for respondents in both appeals.", "canonical_name": "Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mi.Us Ltd."}}, {"text": "Purshottam Tricumdas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8353, "end_char": 8373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ud,\n\nPurshottam Tricumdas, R. Ganapathy Iyer and B. P. Maheshwari, for respondents in both appeals."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8375, "end_char": 8392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ud,\n\nPurshottam Tricumdas, R. Ganapathy Iyer and B. P. Maheshwari, for respondents in both appeals."}}, {"text": "B. P. Maheshwari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8397, "end_char": 8413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ud,\n\nPurshottam Tricumdas, R. Ganapathy Iyer and B. P. Maheshwari, for respondents in both appeals."}}, {"text": "Ram Sarup", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8453, "end_char": 8462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Sarup\n\nM. 0.", "canonical_name": "Ram Sarup"}}, {"text": "Setalvad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8470, "end_char": 8478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, Porus A. Mehta and R.H. Dhebar, fo.r the Intervener."}}, {"text": "Porus A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8508, "end_char": 8522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, Porus A. Mehta and R.H. Dhebar, fo.r the Intervener."}}, {"text": "R.H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8527, "end_char": 8538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, Porus A. Mehta and R.H. Dhebar, fo.r the Intervener."}}, {"text": "Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Lucknow Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8701, "end_char": 8750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI J.-These two appeals by special leave arise out of an order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Lucknow Bench, by which it dismissed the application of the appellant under s. 22 of the • Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, hereinafter referred to as the Act for permission to dismiss the respondents from is employ and allowed \" the application of the respondents under s. 23 of the Act for reinstatement."}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8813, "end_char": 8818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9027, "end_char": 9032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chitauni", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9169, "end_char": 9177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents are 76 employees of the appellant, a limited company of Sugar Mills, situated in village Chitauni in the district of Deoria and were working in the engineering department of the.mills in the mill house, boiling house and the workshop sections."}}, {"text": "Deoria", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9197, "end_char": 9203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents are 76 employees of the appellant, a limited company of Sugar Mills, situated in village Chitauni in the district of Deoria and were working in the engineering department of the.mills in the mill house, boiling house and the workshop sections."}}, {"text": "Motilal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9555, "end_char": 9568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that one Motilal Singh, an employee of the appellant, had been dismissed by it sometime prior thereto and he had been inciting the workmen to make common cause with him, and, at a meeting held th& previous night, some sort of action had been decided upon."}}, {"text": "May 27, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9873, "end_char": 9885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the workmen of the appellant entered the mills on the morning of May 27, 1952, these 76 workmen, though they entered their respective sections of the engineering department, did not commence any work from 7 a.m. as they should have done."}}, {"text": "Ram Sarup", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10225, "end_char": 10234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Sarup\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nto a tools-down strike.", "canonical_name": "Ram Sarup"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10236, "end_char": 10244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Sarup\n\nBhagwati J.\n\nto a tools-down strike.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI"}}, {"text": "Jemadar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11733, "end_char": 11740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was a recess between 11 a.m. and l p.m. and when the gates were opened at I p.m. these 76 workmen, in spite of the warnings of the gatekeepers and Jemadar to the contrary, rushed into the mills, entered their respective sections and adopted a threatening attitude."}}, {"text": "May 28, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12979, "end_char": 12991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The workmen, on the other hand, got a letter dated May 28, 1952, addressed to the General Manager by the General Secretary of the Chini Mill Mazdoor Sangh to the effect that they had gone to the gates of the mills as usual at 7 a.m. that day to attend to their work but they were not allowed to enter the mill premises."}}, {"text": "Chini Mill Mazdoor Sangh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13058, "end_char": 13082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The workmen, on the other hand, got a letter dated May 28, 1952, addressed to the General Manager by the General Secretary of the Chini Mill Mazdoor Sangh to the effect that they had gone to the gates of the mills as usual at 7 a.m. that day to attend to their work but they were not allowed to enter the mill premises."}}, {"text": "June 2, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14098, "end_char": 14110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The management evidently continued the police precautions and, after having waited for some time, the General Manager furnished to these 76 workmen on June 2, 1952, a charge-sheet wherein he charged them with having committed misconduct within the meaning of cl."}}, {"text": "Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14550, "end_char": 14574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He called upon them to show cause within 24 hours of the receipt of the charge-sheef why disciplinary action should not be taken against them and gave them intimation that an open enquiry in connection with the said charges\n\nLakshmi Devi Sugar Mills l.Jd.", "canonical_name": "Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mi.Us Ltd."}}, {"text": "Labour Appellate Tribunal and Reconciliation Board", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15491, "end_char": 15541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They pointed out that such indefinite period of suspension during the pendency of the appeal before the Labour Appellate Tribunal and Reconciliation Board was illegal and unjustified and was in utter disregard of the Standing Orders."}}, {"text": "June 5, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15651, "end_char": 15663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By their further letter dated June 5, 1952, similarly addressed to the General Manager, they voiced their apprehension that they would not get any justice from an enquiry held by the management itself and asked for investigation by an impartial tribunal."}}, {"text": "June 6, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15944, "end_char": 15956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The management, however, held the enquiry as intimated at 8 a.m. on June 6, 1952."}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17091, "end_char": 17096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "June 9, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17859, "end_char": 17871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The workmen, in their turn, filed on June 9, 1952, an application under s. 23 of the Act for requisite action to be taken against the appellant for having contravened s. 22(b) of the Act by inflicting on them the punishment in the shape of harassment by resorting to an illegal lockout for an indefinite period with effect from May 27, 1952, without obtaining the prior permission of the Labour Appellate Tribunal .and \"thereby acting contrary to law and resorting to mala fide actions in direct violation of the provisions of the Standing Orders in continuation of the management's anti-trade (Union) activities\"."}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17894, "end_char": 17899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17989, "end_char": 17997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18814, "end_char": 18819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18882, "end_char": 18887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ud", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18970, "end_char": 18997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ud;\n\nPt.", "canonical_name": "Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mi.Us Ltd."}}, {"text": "s. 22(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19319, "end_char": 19327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N. C. Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19716, "end_char": 19732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri N. C. Chatterjee for the appellant before us has strenuously urged that the workmen had resorted to the tools-down strike which was an illegal strike and that the appellant was well within its rights in suspending them pending enquiry and also pending the application for permission to dismiss them made before the Labour Appellate Tribunal."}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21194, "end_char": 21199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21317, "end_char": 21322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21825, "end_char": 21833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lakshmi Devi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23176, "end_char": 23188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even if the parties had made a mountain of a mole hill and had reached conclusions without going deep into the matter, it was certainly the business of the Labour Appellate Tribunal itself to record a finding of fact in regard to the situation as it obtained on\n\nLakshmi Devi S11gar Mills Ltd. v.\n\nPt.", "canonical_name": "Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mi.Us Ltd."}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23189, "end_char": 23192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 27,\n\n1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23832, "end_char": 23845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have been taken through the whole evidence by the learned counsel for the appellant and there is clear documentary evidence to show that the 76 workmen resorted to a tools-down strike from 7 a.m. on May 27,\n\n1952."}}, {"text": "s. 24(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26306, "end_char": 26314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26322, "end_char": 26351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26560, "end_char": 26565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26779, "end_char": 26784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26792, "end_char": 26821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27001, "end_char": 27006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27014, "end_char": 27043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Laksh1ni Devi Sugar Mills Ud", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27592, "end_char": 27620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram SarttP\n\nBhagwatiJ,\n\nLaksh1ni Devi Sugar Mills Ud.", "canonical_name": "Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mi.Us Ltd."}}, {"text": "s. 33(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27867, "end_char": 27875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 33(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28036, "end_char": 28044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 33(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28997, "end_char": 29005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29349, "end_char": 29362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29501, "end_char": 29509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29514, "end_char": 29522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29849, "end_char": 29854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30279, "end_char": 30284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30292, "end_char": 30321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30679, "end_char": 30684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30692, "end_char": 30721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 22(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31230, "end_char": 31238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31293, "end_char": 31298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Lakshmi De'Oi Sugar Mills Ud", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31905, "end_char": 31933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lakshmi De'Oi Sugar Mills Ud.", "canonical_name": "Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mi.Us Ltd."}}, {"text": "Ram Sarup\n\nBha guati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31940, "end_char": 31960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pt, Ram Sarup\n\nBha guati J.\n\nLakshmi Devi\n\n~:•igar Mills Ud.", "canonical_name": "Ram SaruP\n\nBhagwatiJ."}}, {"text": "Lakshmi Devi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31965, "end_char": 31977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pt, Ram Sarup\n\nBha guati J.\n\nLakshmi Devi\n\n~:•igar Mills Ud.", "canonical_name": "Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mi.Us Ltd."}}, {"text": "s. 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32375, "end_char": 32383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32391, "end_char": 32414, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "June 3, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34628, "end_char": 34640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In their letter dated June 3, 1952, theyhad also threatened the General Manager that if he did not mend his illegal mistakes and did not take the workmen back on duty he would be responsible for any breach of peace."}}, {"text": "Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 36399, "end_char": 36427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Samfr-\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nLakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd, v.\n\nPt, Ram SaruP\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nTribunal was in error when it came to the contrary conclusion and dismissed the application of the appellant under s. 22 merely on that ground without making any further enquiry in to the circumstances of the case.", "canonical_name": "Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mi.Us Ltd."}}, {"text": "Ram SaruP\n\nBhagwatiJ.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36437, "end_char": 36458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Samfr-\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nLakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd, v.\n\nPt, Ram SaruP\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nTribunal was in error when it came to the contrary conclusion and dismissed the application of the appellant under s. 22 merely on that ground without making any further enquiry in to the circumstances of the case.", "canonical_name": "Ram SaruP\n\nBhagwatiJ."}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36575, "end_char": 36580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38499, "end_char": 38504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39031, "end_char": 39054, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39570, "end_char": 39575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "June 8, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39659, "end_char": 39671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This course was, however, not open to the appellant by reason of the pendency of the appeal before the Labour Appellate Tribunal and the only thing which the appellant could do, therefore, was, after coming to its own conclusion as a result of such enquiry, to apply to the Labour Appellate Tribunal under s. 22 of the Act for permission to dismiss the respondents and this the appellant did on June 8, 1952."}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40762, "end_char": 40765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P.R. Aiyar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 42642, "end_char": 42652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Punishment can be otherwise defined (Vide Law Lexicon by P.R. Aiyar, 1943 Ed.)"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43141, "end_char": 43146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43407, "end_char": 43412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43733, "end_char": 43738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1955) 1 S.C.R. 1241", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 45162, "end_char": 45182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 45185, "end_char": 45209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(6) [1955) 1 S.C.R. 1241,\n\nLakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ud.", "canonical_name": "Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mi.Us Ltd."}}, {"text": "Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mi.Us Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 45242, "end_char": 45271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Sarup\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nLakshmi Devi Sugar Mi.", "canonical_name": "Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mi.Us Ltd."}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46485, "end_char": 46490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47955, "end_char": 47960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R.B.S. Lachmandas Mohan Lal & Sons Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 48077, "end_char": 48116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vide Champdani Jute Mills And Shri Alijari(1); R.B.S. Lachmandas Mohan Lal & Sons Ltd. And Chini Mill Karma.chari Union(9); Assam Oil Companies' case(3))."}}, {"text": "Chini Mill Karma.chari Union(9)", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 48121, "end_char": 48152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vide Champdani Jute Mills And Shri Alijari(1); R.B.S. Lachmandas Mohan Lal & Sons Ltd. And Chini Mill Karma.chari Union(9); Assam Oil Companies' case(3))."}}, {"text": "Assam Oil Companies", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 48154, "end_char": 48173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vide Champdani Jute Mills And Shri Alijari(1); R.B.S. Lachmandas Mohan Lal & Sons Ltd. And Chini Mill Karma.chari Union(9); Assam Oil Companies' case(3))."}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49220, "end_char": 49225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lakshmi Det'i Sugar Mills Ltd", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 49470, "end_char": 49499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "122\n\nLakshmi Det'i Sugar Mills Ltd, v.\n\nPt, Ram Sarup\n\nBhagu:ati J.\n\nLakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ud.", "canonical_name": "Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mi.Us Ltd."}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49738, "end_char": 49743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1956_1_91_99_EN", "year": 1956, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 91\n\nadmissible for the purpose.\n\nIn our judgment, the 1956 finding of the High Court on this issue was clearly Rafa Sri Silendra erroneous.\n\nNarayan Bhanja Each of the conclusions we have arrived at on the D•o first two points is quite sufficient, by itself, to enable v. . us to dispose of this appeal and it is not necessary for Th• Slate 01 Oms\"\n\nus to deal with or express any opinion on the other - Th 1 h Das C.J. three points canvassed before us. e resu t, t erefore, is that this appeal should be dismissed with costs and we order accordingly.\n\nMESSRS PRATAP~AL LUXMICHAND v.\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADHYA\n\nPRADESH. [S. R. DAs, C. J., BHAGWATI and VENKATARAMA\n\nAYYAR JJ.]\n\nRegistration of firm-Deed of partnership and application for registration not signed bu all partners-Refusal to register by the In come-tax Officer-Powers of the Appellate Assistant Oommissione1- I ndian Income-tax Act (XI of 1922), 1. 26-A-Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922, rule 2.\n\nThe appellant (a firm) consisted of seven partners and a deed of partnership was executed by all the partners except one who happened to be in Jail being a security prisoner under the Defence of India Rules.\n\nAn application for registration of the firm under s. 26-A of the India.n Income-tax Act was made before the Incometa.x Officer, who, however, rejected it on the ground that the deed of partnership and the application for registration were not signed by all the partners. On appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner cancelled the order of the Income-tax Officer and directed him to register the firm after obtaining the signature of the partner who had not signed before, both on the application for registration and the deed of partnership.\n\nHeld, that under Rule 2(c) of the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922, £re.med under s. 26 A(2) of the Indian Incometax Act, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had only the power to direct registration of the firm if an application duly signed by all the partners had been presented to him before the assessment was confirmed, reduced, enhanced or a.nnulled and tha.t he wa.s not legally\n\nFebruary 8\n\n1956 competent to direct the Incometax Officer to register the firm after . obtaining the signature of the partner who had not signed before.\n\nMessrs Pratapmal\n\nLuxmicliand\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncome-tax, Madhya Pradesh\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: No. 199 ofl955.\n\nCivil Appeal\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 17th day of April 1953 of the Nagpur High Court in Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 53 of 1950.\n\nNur-ud-din Ahmad and Naunit Lal, for the appellant.\n\n0. K. Daphtary, Solicitoi-General of India, G. N.\n\nJoshi and R.H. Dhebar, for the respondent.\n\n1956. February 8.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI J.-This is an appeal with special leave from the Judgment and Order of the High Court of Judicature at Nagpur on a reference made by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Bombay Branch 'A' under section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act XI of 1922 whereby the High Court answered the referred question against the appellant . . The appellant, a firm of Messrs Pratapmal Laxmichand of Betul consisted of 7 partners, viz., Misrilal Goti, Meghraj Goti, Panraj Goti, Phulchand, Basanti\" bai, Ratanbai and Gokulchand Goti. A deed of partnership was executed on the 12th February 1944 by all the partners except Gokulchand Goti who happened to be in the Seoni Jail being a security prisoner under the Defence of India Rules. He was unable to sign the same in spite of all efforts to obtain his signature in prison. An application for registration of the firm under section 26-A of the Act for the assessment year 1943-44 was made on the 24th March 1944 personally signed by the other 6 partners of the firm and was accompanied by the deed of partnership which also had been signed by those 6 partners. The Special Income-tax Officer, Nagpur, rejected the application on the ground that the deed itself was not valid inasmuch as it had not been signed\n\nby all the partners mentioned in the body and there .195/i was no signature of Gokulchand on the deed and the Messrs Pratajmlal application. An appeal was taken to the Appellate Lu.miichand Assistant Commissioner against this decision of the v.\n\nSpecial Income-tax Officer on the 24th April 1944.\n\nCommissionerof Gokulchand appended his signature to the deed of Income-tax, partnership in Seoni Jail on the 9th January 1945. Madhya Pradesh The appeal was heard before the Appellate Assistant BhagwatiJ.\n\nCommissioner on the 20th March 1947 and he passed an order on the 17th February 1948 cancelling the order of the Special Income-tax Officer and directing him to register the firm after obtaining the signature of Gokulchand both on the application for registration and the deed of partnership. At the instance of the Commissioner of Income-tax, C. P. and Berar, an appeal was filed against this order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner by the Income-tax Officer, Spl. I.T. cum E.P.T. Circle, Nagpur, before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the appeal by its order dated 11/16 October 1948 observing that the Special Income-tax Officer was justified in refusing to register the firm as the application for registration was not signed by Gokulchand, that Rule 2( c) of the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922, on which the Appellate Assistant Commissioner seems to have relied did not apply and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was not justified in directing the Income-tax Officer \"to, register the firm after obtaining the signature of Seth Gokulchand both in the application for registration and the deed of partnership\". The appellant applied for a reference to the High Court under section 66(1) of the Act and the Tribunal referred the following question arising out of its order for the opinion of the High Court: \"Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was legally competent to direct the Income-tax Officer to register the firm after obtaining the signature of Seth Gokulchand both in the application for registration and in the deed of partnership\". When the statement of the case was being drawn up by the Tribunal, counsel for the appellant suggested that the words\n\nMeara Prata/lfnal\n\nLlumlchrm4\n\nCommlaslonerof\n\nlncottM-lax, Madhya Pradesh\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nappearing in para 6 of the statement, viz., \"No application was submitted to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner seeking his permission under Rule 2(c) of the Indian Income-tax Rules\" be deleted. He also suggested that the concluding words in the question referred to the High Court, viz., \"after obtaining the signature of Seth Gokulchand both in the application for registration and in the deed of partnership\" be deleted. With regard to the latter suggestion the Tribunal observed that they were unable to delete the same inasmuch as the words sought to be deleted were the concluding words appearing in the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order dated the 17th February, 1948 giving directions to the Income-tax Officer and were words which were material to the question before the High Court. With regard to the first suggestion counsel for the appellant had stated that the appellant had submitted three applications to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner all dated 20th March, 1947 and that it would be wrong to state that no application was submitted to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The allegation made by the appellant was properly investigated subsequently and the Tribunal was satisfied that the appellant did not appear to have put in the application dated 20th March, 1947 as alleged. This .being the position the Tribunal stated that no change in the statement of case was called for as suggested by the appellant.\n\nIt was on this statement of case by the Tribunal that the referred question ca.me to be determined by the High Court. Before the High Court the appellant had applied on the 27th November, 1950 that the three certified copies of the three applications dated 20th March, 1947 made by the appellant to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner with their originals should be sent for by the High Court from the Income- . tax Tribunal and an order had been made accordingly.\n\nThe High Court was of the opinion that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner should have ordered registration of the firm provided there was an application before him duly signed by all the partners. As,\n\nhowever, there was no such application, he could not 1956 have directed the Income-tax Officer to register the M P t ,_ , fi f b . . h . f G k l h d essrs ra a,, ... a. rm a ter o tammg t e signature o o u c, an on IMxmichana the application and also in the partnership deed. The v.\n\nHigh Court accordingly answered the referred ques- Commiuioner of tion in the negative.\n\nIncome-tax, An application under section 66-A(2) of the Act for Madhya Pradesh a certificate for leave to appeal to this Court against BhagwatiJ. that order was dismissed by the High Court but the appellant obtained special leave to appeal against the same from this Court on the 6th December, 1954.\n\nThe main question that arises for our determination in this appeal is:-What are the powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on the hearing of an appeal against the refusal by the Income-tax Officer to register a firm under section 26-A of the Act and Rule 2 of the, Indian Incometax Rules, 1922?\n\nSection 26-A of the Act provides:-·\n\n\"(l) Application may be made to the Income-tax Officer on behalf of any firm, constituted under an instrument of partnership specifying the individual shares of the partners, for registration for the purposes of this Act and of any other enactment for the time being in force relating to income-tax or supertax.\n\n(2) The application shall be made by such person or persons, and at such times and shall contain such particulars and shall be in such form, and be verified in such manner, as may be prescribed; and it shall be dealt with by the Income-tax Officer in such manner as may be prescribed\".\n\nRule 2 of the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922, which was in force at the relevant period, in so far as is material for the purpose of this appeal, provided:-\n\n\" Any firm constituted under an Instrument of . Partnership specifying the individual shares of the partners may, under the provisions of section 26-A of the Indian Income-tax Act,. 1922 register with the Income-tax Officer the particulars contained in the said Instrument on application made in this behalf.\n\nSuch a pp Ii cation shall be signed by all the partners\n\n1956 (not being minors) personally and shall be made-.\n\nr .. Sf's PrataPmal\n\n(a) before the income of the firm is assessed for Luxmichand any year under section 23 of the Act, or v. eo, nmlssloner of\n\nIncome-tax, JJfadhya Pradesh\n\nBhagwatij.\n\n(b) ........................ or\n\n(c) with the permissii>n of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner hearing an appeal under section 30 of the Act, before the assessment is confirmed, reduced, enhanced or annulled, or\n\n(d) ....................... .\n\n(e) ........................ \".\n\nThe decision of the Income-tax Officer in regard to the invalidity of the deed of partnership inasmuch as it did not bear the signature of Gokulchand was not challenged by the appellant at any stage. of the proceedings nor in the statement of case before us.\n\nCounsel for the1appellant, however, relying on a passage in the \"Lw and Practice of Income-tax by Kanga and Palkhivala'', 3rd Ed., at page 754, urged that it was not necessary that the partnership agreement should be signed by all the partners and if the agreement had not been signed by one of the partners but that partner had assented to the agreement and put it forward along with the other partners for registration, the agreement would be admissible for registration. In the first instance, it was not open to the appellant to urge any point which was not taken in the statement of case and even if it was open to him to urge that contention we do not think it necessary to express any opiqion on the correctness or otherwise of the statement above referred to in view of the construction which we put on Rule 2 of the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922.\n\nThe Rules were framed under .section 26-A(2) of the Act and had statutory force.\n\nUnder Rule 2, the a, pplication for registration of the firm was to be made to the Income-tax Officer and the particulars contained in the Instrument of Partnership specifying the individual shares of the partners w.ere to be registered with him on an application made in that behalf signed by all the partners (not being minors) personally.\n\nNo such application was submitted to the Special Income-tax Officer in this case before he\n\nmade his order on the 18th March 1944, and, on the 1956 materials as they stood on record then, the order of M\n\n-P ,, .\n\nOffi c l . 'fi d essrs rataJ!mal the Special Income-tax cer was periect y JUStl e .\n\nLuxmichana No such application signed by all the partners of the v. firm including Gokulchand was also available before Commissioner of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner when he heard Income-tax, the appeal on the 20th March 194 7.\n\nThe appellant Madhya Pradesh contended that he had in fact filed in the office of the Bhaguati J.\n\nAppellate Assistant Commissioner on the said 20th March 1947 three applications one of which was such an application signed by all the partners personally including Gokulchand and it was strenuously urged on his behalf that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner passed his order dated the 17th February 1948 ignoring the said application which had been filed in his office. It was urged that, if the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had before him the said application dated the 20th March 1947 signed by all the partners personally including Gokulchand, it was his duty to direct a registration of the firm himself without anything more inasmuch as the deed of partnership had been signed by Gokulchand on the 9th January 1945 and the application for registration of the firm dated the 20th March 1947 bore his signature.\n\nThe direction given by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to the Income-tax Officer to register the firm was, it was contended, therefore proper and we were asked to treat the words \"after obtaining the signature of Seth Gokulchand in the application for registration and in the deed of partnership\" as superfluous. .\n\nWe are not impressed .with this argument. Asappears abundantly clear from the terms of the order made by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner himself and also from the statement of case prepared by the Tribunal, the application signed by all the partners personally including Gokulchand was not before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.\n\nAn application had been made by the appellant before the Tribunal to amend the statement of case by deleting from para 6 thereof the words ''no application was submitted to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner\n\n'lrlessrs Pratap,,.,, z\n\nLuxtnial1and\n\nCo11•1t1issionet' o/\n\nlncoine-tax, lvladl1ya Pradesh\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nseeking his permission under Rule 2(c) of the Indian Income-tax Rules\" but the same had been rejected by the Tribunal as a result of proper investigation conducted by it subsequently, the Tribunal stating that they were satisfied that the assessee did not appear to have put in an application dated the 20th March 1947 as alleged.\n\nThe reference was heard by the High Court on this statement of case prepared by the Tribunal and no steps were taken by the appellant before the High Court for having the statement of case amended by the Tribunal or for having a further statement of case submitted by the Tribunal recording therein the facts alleged by the appellant.\n\nWe must, therefore, decide this appeal on the facts stated in the statement of case by the Tribunal and on the basis that the application for registration dated the 20th March 1947 signed by all the partners personally including Gokulchand was not before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.\n\nIf that was the position, the only power which the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had under Rule 2(c) was to accord permission to the appellant to make the application in proper form to the Incometax Officer signed by all the partners personally including Gokulchand before the assessment was confirmed, reduced, enhanced or annulled.\n\nThe Appellate Assistant Commissioner had, under the Rule, no power to direct the Income-tax Officer to register the firm after obtaining the signature of Gokulchand both in the application for registration and in the deed of partnership as he did. As a matter of fact the appellant did not ask for such permission from the Appellate Assistant Commissioner nor was any revision taken by the appellant before the Commissioner under section 33-A of the Act against the said order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The appellant contented himself with arguing that the order made by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was justified and the sole controversy which arose between the parties and was the subject matter of he referred question was whether the Appellate. Assistant Commissioner was legally competent to direct the Incometax Officer to register the firm after obtaining the 1956\n\nsigi; iatur~ of Gokduchahnd dbotdh inf the atpplichtionTfhor Muwa Pratapmal reg1strat10n an m t e ee o par ners i.p. e !.u%michantl appellant attempted no doubt to have the words v. \"after obtaining the signature of Seth Gokulchand Commisaionerof both in the application for registration and in the Income-tax, deed of partnership\" deleted from the referred ques- Madhya Pradesh tion. '!'hat attempt, however, failed and no steps BhagwatiJ. were tsken by the appellant before the High Court at the hearing of the reference to either have the referred question amended or reframed in order to bring into prominence his contention in regard to the powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.\n\nOn the question as framed, the only answer which the High Court could give was that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was not legally competent to direct the Income-tax Officer to register the firm after obtaining the signature of Gokulchand both in the application for registration and in the deed of partnership. Rule 2(c) above-quoted did not empower the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to do anything of the sort and we are of the opinion that the answer given by the High Court in the negative was, therefore, correct.\n\nCounsel for the appellant tried to support his argument by referring to the provisions of the earlier partnership deeds between the several partners of this firm in the years 1929and1941 which specifically provided that in the event of retirement, or death of, or relinquishment, of his share by a partner; the partnership will not be dissolved but will be continued, in case of death of any of the partn.ers, by such of the partners as remained and the legal representatives or nominees of the deceased partner and in the case of retirement of any of the partners by such of the partners as remained. We fail to understand what bearing these clauses have on the determination of the referred question. In the result, the appeal of the appellant fails and must stand dismissed with costs.", "total_entities": 66, "entities": [{"text": "Rafa Sri Silendra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 141, "end_char": 158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In our judgment, the 1956 finding of the High Court on this issue was clearly Rafa Sri Silendra erroneous."}}, {"text": "Narayan Bhanja", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 171, "end_char": 185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Narayan Bhanja Each of the conclusions we have arrived at on the D•o first two points is quite sufficient, by itself, to enable v. ."}}, {"text": "us to deal with or express any opinion on the other - Th 1 h Das C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 380, "end_char": 449, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PRATAP~AL LUXMICHAND", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 590, "end_char": 610, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PRATAPMAL LUXMICHAND", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADHYA\n\nPRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 615, "end_char": 658, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, MADHYA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 679, "end_char": 687, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BhagwatiJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 921, "end_char": 935, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 958, "end_char": 987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Jail being a security prisoner under the Defence of India Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1141, "end_char": 1204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1257, "end_char": 1262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jail being a security prisoner under the Defence of India Rules", "statute": "Jail being a security prisoner under the Defence of India Rules"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1280, "end_char": 1294, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1787, "end_char": 1816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1832, "end_char": 1837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922"}}, {"text": "Pratapmal\n\nLuxmicliand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2300, "end_char": 2322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Messrs Pratapmal\n\nLuxmicliand\n\nCommissioner of\n\nIncome-tax, Madhya Pradesh\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: No."}}, {"text": "Nur-ud-din Ahmad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2585, "end_char": 2601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nur-ud-din Ahmad and Naunit Lal, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2606, "end_char": 2616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nur-ud-din Ahmad and Naunit Lal, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2641, "end_char": 2652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitoi-General of India, G. N.\n\nJoshi and R.H. Dhebar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "G. N.\n\nJoshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2682, "end_char": 2694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitoi-General of India, G. N.\n\nJoshi and R.H. Dhebar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R.H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2699, "end_char": 2710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitoi-General of India, G. N.\n\nJoshi and R.H. Dhebar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Appellate Tribunal, Bombay Branch", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2953, "end_char": 2986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI J.-This is an appeal with special leave from the Judgment and Order of the High Court of Judicature at Nagpur on a reference made by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Bombay Branch 'A' under section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act XI of 1922 whereby the High Court answered the referred question against the appellant . ."}}, {"text": "section 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2997, "end_char": 3010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3025, "end_char": 3039, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Misrilal Goti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3224, "end_char": 3237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Misrilal Goti, Meghraj Goti, Panraj Goti, Phulchand, Basanti\" bai, Ratanbai and Gokulchand Goti."}}, {"text": "Meghraj Goti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3239, "end_char": 3251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Misrilal Goti, Meghraj Goti, Panraj Goti, Phulchand, Basanti\" bai, Ratanbai and Gokulchand Goti."}}, {"text": "Panraj Goti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3253, "end_char": 3264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Misrilal Goti, Meghraj Goti, Panraj Goti, Phulchand, Basanti\" bai, Ratanbai and Gokulchand Goti."}}, {"text": "Phulchand", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3266, "end_char": 3275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Misrilal Goti, Meghraj Goti, Panraj Goti, Phulchand, Basanti\" bai, Ratanbai and Gokulchand Goti."}}, {"text": "Basanti\" bai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3277, "end_char": 3289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Misrilal Goti, Meghraj Goti, Panraj Goti, Phulchand, Basanti\" bai, Ratanbai and Gokulchand Goti."}}, {"text": "Ratanbai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3291, "end_char": 3299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Misrilal Goti, Meghraj Goti, Panraj Goti, Phulchand, Basanti\" bai, Ratanbai and Gokulchand Goti."}}, {"text": "Gokulchand Goti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3304, "end_char": 3319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Misrilal Goti, Meghraj Goti, Panraj Goti, Phulchand, Basanti\" bai, Ratanbai and Gokulchand Goti.", "canonical_name": "Gokulchand Goti"}}, {"text": "12th February 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3363, "end_char": 3381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A deed of partnership was executed on the 12th February 1944 by all the partners except Gokulchand Goti who happened to be in the Seoni Jail being a security prisoner under the Defence of India Rules."}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3662, "end_char": 3672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Gokulchand Goti who happened to be in the Seoni Jail being a security prisoner under the Defence of India Rules", "statute": "Gokulchand Goti who happened to be in the Seoni Jail being a security prisoner under the Defence of India Rules"}}, {"text": "24th March 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3734, "end_char": 3749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An application for registration of the firm under section 26-A of the Act for the assessment year 1943-44 was made on the 24th March 1944 personally signed by the other 6 partners of the firm and was accompanied by the deed of partnership which also had been signed by those 6 partners."}}, {"text": "Nagpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3931, "end_char": 3937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Special Income-tax Officer, Nagpur, rejected the application on the ground that the deed itself was not valid inasmuch as it had not been signed\n\nby all the partners mentioned in the body and there .195/i was no signature of Gokulchand on the deed and the Messrs Pratajmlal application."}}, {"text": "Gokulchand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4128, "end_char": 4138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Special Income-tax Officer, Nagpur, rejected the application on the ground that the deed itself was not valid inasmuch as it had not been signed\n\nby all the partners mentioned in the body and there .195/i was no signature of Gokulchand on the deed and the Messrs Pratajmlal application.", "canonical_name": "Gokulchand Goti"}}, {"text": "Lu.miichand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4227, "end_char": 4238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An appeal was taken to the Appellate Lu.miichand Assistant Commissioner against this decision of the v.\n\nSpecial Income-tax Officer on the 24th April 1944."}}, {"text": "Commissionerof Gokulchand", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4347, "end_char": 4372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Commissionerof Gokulchand appended his signature to the deed of Income-tax, partnership in Seoni Jail on the 9th January 1945."}}, {"text": "BhagwatiJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4541, "end_char": 4551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madhya Pradesh The appeal was heard before the Appellate Assistant BhagwatiJ.\n\nCommissioner on the 20th March 1947 and he passed an order on the 17th February 1948 cancelling the order of the Special Income-tax Officer and directing him to register the firm after obtaining the signature of Gokulchand both on the application for registration and the deed of partnership.", "canonical_name": "BhagwatiJ."}}, {"text": "Assistant Commissioner", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4970, "end_char": 4992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the instance of the Commissioner of Income-tax, C. P. and Berar, an appeal was filed against this order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner by the Income-tax Officer, Spl."}}, {"text": "11/16 October 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5150, "end_char": 5168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal allowed the appeal by its order dated 11/16 October 1948 observing that the Special Income-tax Officer was justified in refusing to register the firm as the application for registration was not signed by Gokulchand, that Rule 2( c) of the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922, on which the Appellate Assistant Commissioner seems to have relied did not apply and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was not justified in directing the Income-tax Officer \"to, register the firm after obtaining the signature of Seth Gokulchand both in the application for registration and the deed of partnership\"."}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5351, "end_char": 5380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seth Gokulchand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5614, "end_char": 5629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal allowed the appeal by its order dated 11/16 October 1948 observing that the Special Income-tax Officer was justified in refusing to register the firm as the application for registration was not signed by Gokulchand, that Rule 2( c) of the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922, on which the Appellate Assistant Commissioner seems to have relied did not apply and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was not justified in directing the Income-tax Officer \"to, register the firm after obtaining the signature of Seth Gokulchand both in the application for registration and the deed of partnership\".", "canonical_name": "Seth Gokulchand Commisaionerof"}}, {"text": "section 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5763, "end_char": 5776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922"}}, {"text": "Meara Prata", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6311, "end_char": 6322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the statement of the case was being drawn up by the Tribunal, counsel for the appellant suggested that the words\n\nMeara Prata/lfnal\n\nLlumlchrm4\n\nCommlaslonerof\n\nlncottM-lax, Madhya Pradesh\n\nBhagwatiJ.\n\nappearing in para 6 of the statement, viz., \""}}, {"text": "17th February, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7062, "end_char": 7081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With regard to the latter suggestion the Tribunal observed that they were unable to delete the same inasmuch as the words sought to be deleted were the concluding words appearing in the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order dated the 17th February, 1948 giving directions to the Income-tax Officer and were words which were material to the question before the High Court."}}, {"text": "27th November, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8015, "end_char": 8034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the High Court the appellant had applied on the 27th November, 1950 that the three certified copies of the three applications dated 20th March, 1947 made by the appellant to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner with their originals should be sent for by the High Court from the Income- ."}}, {"text": "20th March, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8099, "end_char": 8115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the High Court the appellant had applied on the 27th November, 1950 that the three certified copies of the three applications dated 20th March, 1947 made by the appellant to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner with their originals should be sent for by the High Court from the Income- ."}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8919, "end_char": 8929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "6th December, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9166, "end_char": 9184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Income-tax, An application under section 66-A(2) of the Act for Madhya Pradesh a certificate for leave to appeal to this Court against BhagwatiJ. that order was dismissed by the High Court but the appellant obtained special leave to appeal against the same from this Court on the 6th December, 1954."}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9417, "end_char": 9427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Incometax Rules, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9460, "end_char": 9488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9491, "end_char": 9501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Incometax Rules, 1922", "statute": "Indian Incometax Rules, 1922"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10142, "end_char": 10171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10423, "end_char": 10433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10450, "end_char": 10464, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10805, "end_char": 10815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922"}}, {"text": "section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11017, "end_char": 11027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922"}}, {"text": "Kanga", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11533, "end_char": 11538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel for the1appellant, however, relying on a passage in the \"Lw and Practice of Income-tax by Kanga and Palkhivala'', 3rd Ed.,"}}, {"text": "Palkhivala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11543, "end_char": 11553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Counsel for the1appellant, however, relying on a passage in the \"Lw and Practice of Income-tax by Kanga and Palkhivala'', 3rd Ed.,"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12260, "end_char": 12289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12321, "end_char": 12331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Rules, 1922"}}, {"text": "20th March 194 7", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13232, "end_char": 13248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Luxmichana No such application signed by all the partners of the v. firm including Gokulchand was also available before Commissioner of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner when he heard Income-tax, the appeal on the 20th March 194 7."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13265, "end_char": 13279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant Madhya Pradesh contended that he had in fact filed in the office of the Bhaguati J.\n\nAppellate Assistant Commissioner on the said 20th March 1947 three applications one of which was such an application signed by all the partners personally including Gokulchand and it was strenuously urged on his behalf that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner passed his order dated the 17th February 1948 ignoring the said application which had been filed in his office."}}, {"text": "20th March 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13828, "end_char": 13843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was urged that, if the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had before him the said application dated the 20th March 1947 signed by all the partners personally including Gokulchand, it was his duty to direct a registration of the firm himself without anything more inasmuch as the deed of partnership had been signed by Gokulchand on the 9th January 1945 and the application for registration of the firm dated the 20th March 1947 bore his signature."}}, {"text": "9th January 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14060, "end_char": 14076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was urged that, if the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had before him the said application dated the 20th March 1947 signed by all the partners personally including Gokulchand, it was his duty to direct a registration of the firm himself without anything more inasmuch as the deed of partnership had been signed by Gokulchand on the 9th January 1945 and the application for registration of the firm dated the 20th March 1947 bore his signature."}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16881, "end_char": 16891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seth Gokulchand Commisaionerof", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17563, "end_char": 17593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".u%michantl appellant attempted no doubt to have the words v. \"after obtaining the signature of Seth Gokulchand Commisaionerof both in the application for registration and in the Income-tax, deed of partnership\" deleted from the referred ques- Madhya Pradesh tion. '!'", "canonical_name": "Seth Gokulchand Commisaionerof"}}]} {"document_id": "1956_1_939_948_EN", "year": 1956, "text": ".....\n\nS.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 939\n\nRAJ A BAHADUR MOTILAL POON A MILLS\n\nTUKARAM PIRAJI MASALE.\n\n[BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, S. K. DAS and GovINDA MENON JJ.]\n\nIndustrial Dispute-Strike-Change in the existing system of working-Workers obiecting as illegal change and going on strike-\n\nStrike, whether illegal-Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 ( Bom. XI of 1947 ), s. 97(1)( c).\n\nBy s. 97(1)(c) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946: \"A strike shall be illegal if it is commenced or continued only for the reason that the employer has not carried out the provisions of any standing order or has made an illegal change\".\n\nThe management of the appellant Mill desiring to make a change in the existing system of working started making an exper~ ment by asking a few workmen who had volunteered to work at the rate of four looms to a weaver for a period of two months. The other workers objected that this was an illegal change on the ground that the management could not legally introduce any change with\n\nout first going through the procedure prescribed by the Act, and went on strike. The question was whether the strike was illegal.\n\nHeld, that as the workmen had gone on strike only for the reason that the change or experiment made by the appellant was an illegal change, their action came within the express terms of s. 97(1)(c) of the Act and the strike was illegal.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 323 of 1955.\n\nAppeal from the judgment and order dated July 2, 1953 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Application No. 159 of 1953.\n\nr1 R.J. Kolah and A.G. Dave, for the appellant.\n\nH. R. Gokhale, K. R. Ghaudhury and M. R. Rangaswamy, for respondent No. 2.\n\n1956. October 31. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGOVINDA MENON J.-On July 20, 1954, the High Court of Judicature at Bombay granted a certificate of fitness under Art. 133(l)(c) of the Constitution\n\nOctober 3/,\n\nRaja Bahadttr Motilal Poona Mills v.\n\nTttkara1n Piraji\n\nJf.lasale\n\nGotJinda Mcno1~ J.\n\nthat the judgment of that court dated July 2, 1953, .passed in Special Civil Application No. 159 of 1953, was a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court as it involved a substantial question of law, and it is in pursuance of such certification that the above appeal is now before this court. A brief resume of the facts and circumstances, which led to the application for a writ of certiorari in the High Court, becomes necessary for a correct appreciation of the question of law involved and may, therefore, be shortly stated.\n\nThe appellant which may hereafter, for the purpose of convenience, be called \"The Mill\", is a limited company owning and possessing a Cotton Textile Spinning and Weaving Mill situated in Poona, employing a large number of workmen who have a union of theirs.\n\nThe first respondent is a workman employed by the Mill and the second respondent is the\n\nPoona Girni Kamagar Union of which the first respondent is a member.\n\nRespondents 3 to 5 were formally added as parties in the first instance, but their names were struck off as unnecessary at the time of the hearing. The appellant was running 580 looms, for working which one weaver had been allotted at the rate of two looms; and when things were in that state on August 29, 1951, the Management issued a notice to the effect that from September 1, 1951, it was desired to carry on an experiment of four looms to a weaver for a period of 2 months, on 16 looms. If at the end of that period or before the expiry of the same it was found that the working was successful, the Management would introduce the scheme after giving the notice of change required under the Act. The object of this notice was ostensibly to introduce rationalization or rather efficiency system of work, if and when the suggested experiment proved successful.\n\nAs a resut of this notice on September 4, 1951, the Secretary of the Union wrote to the Manager of the appellant Mill intimating that under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act the Management could not legally introduce any change in the existing system of working without first giving notice of the change\n\nin the prescribed form to the representatives of the Union and workers and without going through the .other procedure prescribed by the Act; and the Management were further informed that if they insisted in carrying on the change illegally, the work- • men would be free to move the proper courts. The notice also stated that the introduction of the new system would affect the workers' wages and cause great hardship; and that if anything untoward happened, the blame would be wholly on the management, as it would be impossible for the Union to control the workers in the matter.\n\nFour workers volunteered to work the experiment and started working accordingly on the 16 looms on September 6, 1951, whereupon the other workmen raised an objection and the four loyal workmen were prevented from continuing with the experimental work. But the Management did not withdraw the notice and none except the 4, was required by the Management to take part in the experiment. The second shift among the workmen also refused to work with the result that there was a complete strike in the Mills between the 6th and the 26th of September, 1951.\n\nOn September 10, 1951 the appellant filed an application under sections 78 and 97 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (Born. XI of 1947), praying that the strike resorted to by the weavers working on both the shifts commencing on September 6, 1951, and continuing till the presentation of the application be declared illegal being in contravention of the provisions of the said Act. On September 16, 1951 the Vice-President of the Mill Mazdoor Sabha filed a written statement in answer to the above complaint stating that the workers did not strike work in contravention of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act and that the weavers never refused to do their proper and usual work but refused only to do the illegal work insisted on them by the employers; in other words, they were agreeable to have two looms per weaver and not to work the attempted experiment.\n\nWithin three days of the filing of the 11, bove written\n\nRaja Balladur\n\nMotilal Poona Mills v.\n\nTttkaratn Piraji\n\nMasale\n\nGovifJda Menon J.\n\nRaja Bahadur Motilal Poona\n\nMills v.\n\nTukaram Piraji\n\nMasale\n\nGovinda Menon J.\n\nstatement, two of the workers filed an application under sections 78 and 98 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act before the same Labour Court against the Management praying for a declaration that the action of the Management had resulted in an illegal lockout in contravention of the Act, and, therefore, • the Management should be ordered to withdraw the said illegal change.\n\nThe appellant filed a written statement countering the allegations contained in the application for the declaration of an illegal lockout and stated that their action was not in contravention of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, as it did not constitute an illegal change.\n\nThe Labour Court at Bombay heard both the applications together and by a combined order dated September 26, 1951, held that since the Management had not compelled any one to accept any work, their action could not be considered ari illegal lockout. At the same time, it held that the workers did not create a situation amounting to an illegal strike.\n\nThe result of these findings was the negation of the grant of the prayers contained in the respective applications, but in addition the court declared that the action of the Management was an illegal change and, therefore, the notice whereby the experiment was attempted to be tried, should be withdrawn.\n\nThe workers were content with the outcome of their application but the Management ha.;, ing been aggrieved by the declaration that their action amounted to an 'illegal change' filed an appeal before the Labour Appellate Tribunal at Bombay (Appeal No. 293 of 1951) upon which the learned Judges of the Labour Appellate Tribunal took the view that the strike by the workmen was illegal. They also concluded that there was no lockout on the part of the Management. That being the case, the order of the Labour Court declaring that there was an illegal change was set aside with the declaration that the strike in question was illegal with the necessary consequences.\n\nIn order to get the saidorder of the Labour Appellate Tribunal quashed, an application for a writ\n\n....\n\nof certiorari under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitu- 7956 tion was filed by the two of the workers before the , R . 8 h d High Court of Bombay where Chagla C.J. and Dixit ;:traz°P;:; J., took the view that since the decision of the Appel- Mills late Tribunal was erroneous, the same should be v. quashed, with the result that the decision of the Tukaram Piraji Labour Court was upheld. It is this judgment that Masale is under appeal before us as a result of the certificate Govinda Menon J. granted by the High Court of Bombay.\n\nA reading of the relevant portions of the statute is necessary to find out whether the order appealed against is justified or not. The Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 was enacted to regulate the relations of employer and employees, to make provisions for the settlement of industrial disputes and to provide for certain other purposes. This statute repealetl the Bombay Trade Disputes Conciliation Act, 1934 and the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act, 1938.\n\nSection 3(8) defines \"change\" as meaning an alteration in an industrial matter and sub-s. (15) contains a definition of 'illegal change' as meaning an illegal change within the meaning of sub-ss. (4) & (5) of s. 46 which are in the following terms:-\n\n\" (1) ............................................... .\n\n(2) ............................................... .\n\n(3) ............................................... .\n\n(4) Any change made in contravention of the provisions of sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) shall be illegal.\n\n(5) ]'ailure to carry out the terms of any settlement, award (registered agreement or effective order or decision of a Wage Board), (a Labour Court or the Industrial Court affecting industrial matters) shall be deemed to be an illegal change\".\n\nSection 42 which speaks of change may also be quoted so far as it is relevant for our purpose:-\n\n\" (1) Any employer intending to effect any change in respect of an industrial matter specified in Schedule II shall give notice of such intention in the prescribed form to the representative of employees. He shall send a copy of such notice to the Chief Conciliator, the Conciliator for the industry concerned for the\n\nRaja Bahadur Motilal Poona\n\nMills\n\nTukaram Piraji\n\nMa sale\n\nlocal area, the Registrar, the Labour Officer and such . other person as m .. y be prescribed. He shall also affix a copy of such notice at a conspicuous place on the premises where the employees affected by the change are employed for work and at such other place as may be directed by the Chief Conciliator in any particular case.\n\n\" Govinda Menon J. 'Industrial matter' has also been defined in the Act in s. 3(18) in the following words:\n\n\" 'Industrial matter' means any matter relating to employment, work, wages, hours of work, privileges, rights or duties of employers or employees, or the mode, terms and conditions of employment, and includes:- ( a) all matters pertaining to the relationship between employers and employees, or to the dismissal or non-employment of any person;\n\n(b) all matters pertaining to the demarcation of functions of any employees or classes of employees;\n\n(c) all matters pertaining to any right or claim under or in respect of \"()r concerning a registered agreemerit or a submission, settlement or award made under this Act;\n\n(d) all questions of what is fair and right in relation to any industrial matter having regard to the interest of the person immediately concerned and of the community as a whole;\".\n\nSchedule II, para 4 mentions \"rationalization or other efficiency system of work\" and therefore when any such rationalization is introduced, it is obligatory upon the employer to give notice of such an intention in the prescribed form to the representatives of the employees.\n\nWe may also refer to s. 3(35-A) defining 'stoppage' in the following terms:-\n\n\" 'Stoppage' means a total or partial cessation of work by the employee in an industry acting in combination or a concerted refusal or a refusal under a common understanding of employees to continue to work or to accept work, whether such cessation or refusal is or is not in consequence of an industrial dispute;\".\n\n- •\n\nS.C.lt.\n\nSUPltEME COUltT REPORTS 945\n\nSub-section (36) defines 'strike' as follows:-\n\n\" 'Strike' means a total or partial cessation of work by the employees in an industry acting in combination or a concerted refusal or a refusal under a common understanding of employees to continue to work or to accept work, where such cessation or • refusal is in consequence of an industrial dispute\".\n\nChapter XIV of the statute concerns itself with illegal strikes and lockouts of which s. 97 deals with illegal strikes, whereas s. 98 deals with an illegal lockout. According to s. 97(1)(c), a strike shall be illegal if it is commenced or continued only for the reason that the employer has not carried out the provisions of any standing order or made \"an illegal change\".\n\nIn considering whether the strike in question was illegal, the learned Judges of the High Court )lave expressed the opinion that there is a common law right for an employee to stop work and that it is only by statutory prohibition that certain strikes have been made illegal in the interest of labour relations.\n\nIn the present case since there had been no 'illegal change\" effected by the employer, the High Court took the view that on the very finding of the Appel- ' late Tribunal that the change was a legal change, the strike in question did not come within the ambit of s. 97.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellant has pressed two arguments before us with regard to the construction of s. 97(1)( c) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946.\n\nHis first argument is that the High Court was in error when it held that there was any such right as a common law right of an employee to go on strike ._\"\"' and s. 97 constituted an inroad on that right. Learned counsel has submitted that under s. 97(l)(c) a strike shall be illegal if it is commenced or continued only for the reason that the employer has not carried out the provisions of any standing order or has made an illegal change; if a st.rike is illegal when it is commenced or continued only for the reason that the employer has made an illegal change, a fortiori it must be illegal when it is commenced or continued for a legal change. The contention of learned counsel is\n\nRaja Bahadt1r\n\nMotilal Poona\n\nMills\n\nTttkaratn Piraji\n\nMasnl.:\n\nGovinda Menon J.\n\nthat by necessary implication cl. (c) condemns a strike which is commenced or continued for a change which Raja Bahadur MotitatPoona is not illegal. The second argument of learned counsel\n\nMills is that the true scope and effect of cl. (c) is this: the v. word 'only' occurring in the clause goes with the word Tukaram Piraji 'reason', and if the strike is commenced or continued Masate for the only reason that the employer has made an Govinda Me, onJ. illegal change, it shall be illegal. The test is not whether there was a legal or illegal change in fact but what was the reason for which the employees went on/strike, and if the employees commenced or continued a strike only for the reason that the employer had made an illegal change, the strike would be illegal within the express terms of the clause.\n\nIn our opinion it 'is unnecessary to decide in this case whether the first argument of learned counsel for the appellant is correct or not; because we are clearly of the opinion that the second argument with regard to the construction of s. 97 ( 1) ( c) is correct and should prevail. In this c'ase the workmen themselves came to court with the plea that the action of the employer amounted to an illegal change. In their application to the Labour Court, they said: \"That for the above-mentioned reasons it is prayed that this Honourable Court be pleased to declare the said lockout by the opponent Mills as illegal being in contravention of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, and the opponent be ordered to withdraw the said illegal change\". It is obvious, therefore, that the workmen in this case struck work only for the reason that the change or experiment made by the appellant employer was an iflegal change. The action of the workmen, therefore, came within the express terms of s. 97(1)(c) of the Act. The learned Chief Justice did not consider this aspect of the case, and reached a conclusion with regard to the legality of the strike on a reasoning which did not give full effect to the words used ins. 97(1)(c). In our view, the true test was to find out the reason for which the strike was commenced or continued, and it was unnecessary to consider or decide whether there was a common law right of the workmen to go on strike or whether the workmen had the right to go on strike as a means of collective bargaining against a change which they did not like.\n\nMr. Gokhale appearing for the workmen has taken us through the different provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, and has contended that the workmen have the right to go on strike as a means of collective bargaining against any measure adopted by the employer which the workmen may consider to be detrimental to their interests, provided the strike does not come within the prohibited ambit of s. 97. Even assuming that Mr. Gokhale is right in his contention, it is clear to us that if the wol\"kmen commence or continue a strike for the only reason that the employer has made an illegal change, they come within the express terms of s. 97 (1) ( c). It is immaterial whether the change is subsequently found by the Labour Court to be a legal change. It is worthy of note that there is a separate provision for imposing a penalty on an employer who makes an illegal change. The relevant consideration, however, with regard to s. 97(1)(c) is the reason fo:t which the strike is commenced or continued. That reason in this particular case is clear enough. The workmen themselves said that they commenced and continued the strike because the employr had made an illegal change. That being the position, the strike was illegal within the express terms of s. 97(1)(c) of the Act.\n\nWe are, therefore, of the opinion that, on a proper interpretation of s. 97(1)(c) of the Act, the strike which was commenced and continued from September 6, to September 26, 1951, was clearly illegal.\n\nThe appeal is, accordingly, allowed and the order of the High Court dated July 2, 1953, is set aside. The result, therefore, is that the order of the Labour Appellate Court dated September 4, 1952, stands, with the declaration that the strike in question was illegal with its usual consequences.\n\nIn this case, the appellant had agreed, while asking for a certificate from the Bombay High Court for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, to pay the taxed costs of the respondents in one set. Learned\n\nRaja Bahadur Motilal Poona\n\nMills v.\n\nTukaram Piraji\n\nMa sale\n\nGovinda MenonJ.\n\nRaja Bahadu,.\n\nMotilal Poona\n\nMills v.\n\nTukaram Piraji\n\nMa sale\n\nGovinda Menon J,\n\nNovember 1.\n\ncounsel for the appellant himself has drawn our attention to the agreement. In view of that it is n9t necessary for us to decide in this case whether it was open to the Bombay High Court to pass any order about costs in this Court while granting a certificate of fitness under Art. 133(l)(c) of the Constitution, and we direct that the appellant should pay to the respondents the costs of this appeal in one set and bear its owncosts thereof.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nDW ARKA DASS BHATIA v.\n\nTHE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR.\n\n[JAGANNADHADAS, B.P. SINHA and J&FER IMAM JJ]\n\nPreventive Detention-Grounds based on alleged illicit smtigglina of three categories of essential goods to Pakistnn-Two categories found not to be essential goods-Whether order of detrntion bad- Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, Wll, ss. 8(2)\n\nand 12(1).\n\nThe petitioner was detained by virtue of an order of detention passed by the District Magistrate, Jammu, under s. 3(2) of the Ja.mmu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011 and tbat order was'confirmed and continued by an order passed by the Government of the State of Jammu and K\"shmir under s. 12(1) of the Act after taking the opinion of the Advisory Board.\n\nThe order recited tl!at it was necessary to detain the petitioner vdth a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community and was based on the ground of alleged illicit smuggling by the petitioner of essential goods such as shaffon cloth, zari and mercury to Pakistan. It was '- found that shaffon cloth and znri were not essential goods.\n\nIt was not established that the smuggling attributed to the petitioner was substantially only of mercury or that the smuggling as regards shaffon cloth and zari was of an inconsequential nature.\n\nHeld, that the order was bad and must be quashed. The sub jective satif:; faction of the detaining authority must be properly based on all the reasons on which it purports to be based.\n\nIf some out of those reasons are found to be non-existent or irrelevant, the Court cannot predicate what tbe subjective satisfaction of the authority would have been on the exclusion of those rea&ons.", "total_entities": 85, "entities": [{"text": "939\n\nRAJ A BAHADUR MOTILAL POON A MILLS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 37, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAJA BAHADUR MOTILAL POONA MILLS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "TUKARAM PIRAJI MASALE", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Tukaram Piraji Labour Court", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 111, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. K. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 132, "end_char": 141, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.K. DAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "GovINDA MENON JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 146, "end_char": 163, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GovINDA MENON JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 315, "end_char": 352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 97(1)( c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 374, "end_char": 386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946", "statute": "Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "s. 97(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 392, "end_char": 403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946", "statute": "Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 411, "end_char": 448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 97(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1337, "end_char": 1348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946", "statute": "the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "R.J. Kolah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1579, "end_char": 1589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "r1 R.J. Kolah and A.G. Dave, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "A.G. Dave", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1594, "end_char": 1603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "r1 R.J. Kolah and A.G. Dave, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "H. R. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1625, "end_char": 1638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokhale, K. R. Ghaudhury and M. R. Rangaswamy, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "K. R. Ghaudhury", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1640, "end_char": 1655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokhale, K. R. Ghaudhury and M. R. Rangaswamy, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "M. R. Rangaswamy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1660, "end_char": 1676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. R. Gokhale, K. R. Ghaudhury and M. R. Rangaswamy, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "GOVINDA MENON", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1763, "end_char": 1776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGOVINDA MENON J.-On July 20, 1954, the High Court of Judicature at Bombay granted a certificate of fitness under Art.", "canonical_name": "GovINDA MENON JJ."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1802, "end_char": 1836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nGOVINDA MENON J.-On July 20, 1954, the High Court of Judicature at Bombay granted a certificate of fitness under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 133(l)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1876, "end_char": 1890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "GotJinda Mcno1~", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1992, "end_char": 2007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "133(l)(c) of the Constitution\n\nOctober 3/,\n\nRaja Bahadttr Motilal Poona Mills v.\n\nTttkara1n Piraji\n\nJf.lasale\n\nGotJinda Mcno1~ J.\n\nthat the judgment of that court dated July 2, 1953, .passed in Special Civil Application No."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2150, "end_char": 2163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "159 of 1953, was a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court as it involved a substantial question of law, and it is in pursuance of such certification that the above appeal is now before this court."}}, {"text": "Poona", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2727, "end_char": 2732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant which may hereafter, for the purpose of convenience, be called \"The Mill\", is a limited company owning and possessing a Cotton Textile Spinning and Weaving Mill situated in Poona, employing a large number of workmen who have a union of theirs."}}, {"text": "Poona Girni Kamagar Union", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2888, "end_char": 2913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first respondent is a workman employed by the Mill and the second respondent is the\n\nPoona Girni Kamagar Union of which the first respondent is a member."}}, {"text": "August 29, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3254, "end_char": 3269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was running 580 looms, for working which one weaver had been allotted at the rate of two looms; and when things were in that state on August 29, 1951, the Management issued a notice to the effect that from September 1, 1951, it was desired to carry on an experiment of four looms to a weaver for a period of 2 months, on 16 looms."}}, {"text": "September 1, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3326, "end_char": 3343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was running 580 looms, for working which one weaver had been allotted at the rate of two looms; and when things were in that state on August 29, 1951, the Management issued a notice to the effect that from September 1, 1951, it was desired to carry on an experiment of four looms to a weaver for a period of 2 months, on 16 looms."}}, {"text": "September 4, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3852, "end_char": 3869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a resut of this notice on September 4, 1951, the Secretary of the Union wrote to the Manager of the appellant Mill intimating that under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act the Management could not legally introduce any change in the existing system of working without first giving notice of the change\n\nin the prescribed form to the representatives of the Union and workers and without going through the .other procedure prescribed by the Act; and the Management were further informed that if they insisted in carrying on the change illegally, the work- • men would be free to move the proper courts."}}, {"text": "September 6, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4812, "end_char": 4829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Four workers volunteered to work the experiment and started working accordingly on the 16 looms on September 6, 1951, whereupon the other workmen raised an objection and the four loyal workmen were prevented from continuing with the experimental work."}}, {"text": "26th of September, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5240, "end_char": 5263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second shift among the workmen also refused to work with the result that there was a complete strike in the Mills between the 6th and the 26th of September, 1951."}}, {"text": "September 10, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5269, "end_char": 5287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 10, 1951 the appellant filed an application under sections 78 and 97 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 (Born."}}, {"text": "sections 78 and 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5329, "end_char": 5347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5355, "end_char": 5392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "September 16, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5661, "end_char": 5679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 16, 1951 the Vice-President of the Mill Mazdoor Sabha filed a written statement in answer to the above complaint stating that the workers did not strike work in contravention of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act and that the weavers never refused to do their proper and usual work but refused only to do the illegal work insisted on them by the employers; in other words, they were agreeable to have two looms per weaver and not to work the attempted experiment."}}, {"text": "Mill Mazdoor Sabha", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5706, "end_char": 5724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 16, 1951 the Vice-President of the Mill Mazdoor Sabha filed a written statement in answer to the above complaint stating that the workers did not strike work in contravention of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act and that the weavers never refused to do their proper and usual work but refused only to do the illegal work insisted on them by the employers; in other words, they were agreeable to have two looms per weaver and not to work the attempted experiment."}}, {"text": "GovifJda Menon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6259, "end_char": 6273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Within three days of the filing of the 11, bove written\n\nRaja Balladur\n\nMotilal Poona Mills v.\n\nTttkaratn Piraji\n\nMasale\n\nGovifJda Menon J.\n\nRaja Bahadur Motilal Poona\n\nMills v.\n\nTukaram Piraji\n\nMasale\n\nGovinda Menon J.\n\nstatement, two of the workers filed an application under sections 78 and 98 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act before the same Labour Court against the Management praying for a declaration that the action of the Management had resulted in an illegal lockout in contravention of the Act, and, therefore, • the Management should be ordered to withdraw the said illegal change.", "canonical_name": "GovINDA MENON JJ."}}, {"text": "Govinda Menon", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6340, "end_char": 6353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Within three days of the filing of the 11, bove written\n\nRaja Balladur\n\nMotilal Poona Mills v.\n\nTttkaratn Piraji\n\nMasale\n\nGovifJda Menon J.\n\nRaja Bahadur Motilal Poona\n\nMills v.\n\nTukaram Piraji\n\nMasale\n\nGovinda Menon J.\n\nstatement, two of the workers filed an application under sections 78 and 98 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act before the same Labour Court against the Management praying for a declaration that the action of the Management had resulted in an illegal lockout in contravention of the Act, and, therefore, • the Management should be ordered to withdraw the said illegal change.", "canonical_name": "GovINDA MENON JJ."}}, {"text": "sections 78 and 98", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6415, "end_char": 6433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Labour Court at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7019, "end_char": 7041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Labour Court at Bombay heard both the applications together and by a combined order dated September 26, 1951, held that since the Management had not compelled any one to accept any work, their action could not be considered ari illegal lockout."}}, {"text": "September 26, 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7109, "end_char": 7127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Labour Court at Bombay heard both the applications together and by a combined order dated September 26, 1951, held that since the Management had not compelled any one to accept any work, their action could not be considered ari illegal lockout."}}, {"text": "Labour Appellate Tribunal at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7876, "end_char": 7911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ing been aggrieved by the declaration that their action amounted to an 'illegal change' filed an appeal before the Labour Appellate Tribunal at Bombay (Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Arts. 226 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8463, "end_char": 8480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chagla", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8594, "end_char": 8600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8 h d High Court of Bombay where Chagla C.J. and Dixit ;:traz°P;:; J., took the view that since the decision of the Appel- Mills late Tribunal was erroneous, the same should be v. quashed, with the result that the decision of the Tukaram Piraji Labour Court was upheld."}}, {"text": "Dixit", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8610, "end_char": 8615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8 h d High Court of Bombay where Chagla C.J. and Dixit ;:traz°P;:; J., took the view that since the decision of the Appel- Mills late Tribunal was erroneous, the same should be v. quashed, with the result that the decision of the Tukaram Piraji Labour Court was upheld."}}, {"text": "Tukaram Piraji Labour Court", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8791, "end_char": 8818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8 h d High Court of Bombay where Chagla C.J. and Dixit ;:traz°P;:; J., took the view that since the decision of the Appel- Mills late Tribunal was erroneous, the same should be v. quashed, with the result that the decision of the Tukaram Piraji Labour Court was upheld.", "canonical_name": "Tukaram Piraji Labour Court"}}, {"text": "Masale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8856, "end_char": 8862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is this judgment that Masale is under appeal before us as a result of the certificate Govinda Menon J. granted by the High Court of Bombay."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8952, "end_char": 8972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is this judgment that Masale is under appeal before us as a result of the certificate Govinda Menon J. granted by the High Court of Bombay."}}, {"text": "Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9110, "end_char": 9147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "This statute repealetl the Bombay Trade Disputes Conciliation Act, 1934", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9317, "end_char": 9388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Industrial Disputes Act, 1938", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9397, "end_char": 9433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 3(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9436, "end_char": 9448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act, 1938", "statute": "the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act, 1938"}}, {"text": "s. 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9645, "end_char": 9650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act, 1938", "statute": "the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act, 1938"}}, {"text": "Section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10206, "end_char": 10216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act, 1938", "statute": "the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act, 1938"}}, {"text": "Schedule II", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10401, "end_char": 10412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act, 1938", "statute": "the Bombay Industrial Disputes Act, 1938"}}, {"text": "s. 3(18)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11091, "end_char": 11099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule II", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11927, "end_char": 11938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(35-A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12225, "end_char": 12235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13081, "end_char": 13086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 98", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13123, "end_char": 13128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 97(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13173, "end_char": 13184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13945, "end_char": 13950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 97(1)( c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14058, "end_char": 14070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14078, "end_char": 14115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14279, "end_char": 14284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946", "statute": "the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "s. 97(l)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14363, "end_char": 14374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946", "statute": "the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "s. 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15936, "end_char": 15941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 97(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16686, "end_char": 16697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17682, "end_char": 17687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Gokhale appearing for the workmen has taken us through the different provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946", "statute": "Gokhale appearing for the workmen has taken us through the different provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "s. 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17921, "end_char": 17926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Gokhale appearing for the workmen has taken us through the different provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946", "statute": "Gokhale appearing for the workmen has taken us through the different provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "s. 97(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18212, "end_char": 18223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Gokhale appearing for the workmen has taken us through the different provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946", "statute": "Gokhale appearing for the workmen has taken us through the different provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946"}}, {"text": "s. 97(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18537, "end_char": 18548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 97(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18632, "end_char": 18643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 6, to", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18706, "end_char": 18721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are, therefore, of the opinion that, on a proper interpretation of s. 97(1)(c) of the Act, the strike which was commenced and continued from September 6, to September 26, 1951, was clearly illegal."}}, {"text": "July 2, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18838, "end_char": 18850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal is, accordingly, allowed and the order of the High Court dated July 2, 1953, is set aside."}}, {"text": "September 4, 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18943, "end_char": 18960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The result, therefore, is that the order of the Labour Appellate Court dated September 4, 1952, stands, with the declaration that the strike in question was illegal with its usual consequences."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19141, "end_char": 19158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this case, the appellant had agreed, while asking for a certificate from the Bombay High Court for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, to pay the taxed costs of the respondents in one set."}}, {"text": "Raja Bahadur Motilal Poona", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19264, "end_char": 19290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned\n\nRaja Bahadur Motilal Poona\n\nMills v.\n\nTukaram Piraji\n\nMa sale\n\nGovinda MenonJ.\n\nRaja Bahadu,."}}, {"text": "Tukaram Piraji", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19302, "end_char": 19316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned\n\nRaja Bahadur Motilal Poona\n\nMills v.\n\nTukaram Piraji\n\nMa sale\n\nGovinda MenonJ.\n\nRaja Bahadu,.", "canonical_name": "Tukaram Piraji Labour Court"}}, {"text": "Govinda MenonJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19327, "end_char": 19342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned\n\nRaja Bahadur Motilal Poona\n\nMills v.\n\nTukaram Piraji\n\nMa sale\n\nGovinda MenonJ.\n\nRaja Bahadu,.", "canonical_name": "GovINDA MENON JJ."}}, {"text": "Art. 133(l)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19717, "end_char": 19731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19959, "end_char": 19972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[JAGANNADHADAS, B.P. SINHA and J&FER IMAM JJ]\n\nPreventive Detention-Grounds based on alleged illicit smtigglina of three categories of essential goods to Pakistnn-Two categories found not to be essential goods-Whether order of detrntion bad- Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, Wll, ss."}}, {"text": "B.P. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19974, "end_char": 19984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[JAGANNADHADAS, B.P. SINHA and J&FER IMAM JJ]\n\nPreventive Detention-Grounds based on alleged illicit smtigglina of three categories of essential goods to Pakistnn-Two categories found not to be essential goods-Whether order of detrntion bad- Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, Wll, ss."}}, {"text": "J&FER IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19989, "end_char": 19999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[JAGANNADHADAS, B.P. SINHA and J&FER IMAM JJ]\n\nPreventive Detention-Grounds based on alleged illicit smtigglina of three categories of essential goods to Pakistnn-Two categories found not to be essential goods-Whether order of detrntion bad- Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, Wll, ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 8(2)\n\nand 12(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20249, "end_char": 20268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20382, "end_char": 20389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20408, "end_char": 20446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 12(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20567, "end_char": 20575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011", "statute": "Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011"}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20976, "end_char": 20984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order recited tl!at it was necessary to detain the petitioner vdth a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community and was based on the ground of alleged illicit smuggling by the petitioner of essential goods such as shaffon cloth, zari and mercury to Pakistan."}}]} {"document_id": "1956_1_948_956_EN", "year": 1956, "text": "Raja Bahadu,.\n\nMotilal Poona\n\nMills v.\n\nTukaram Piraji\n\nMa sale\n\nGovinda Menon J,\n\nNovember 1.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1956]\n\ncounsel for the appellant himself has drawn our attention to the agreement. In view of that it is n9t necessary for us to decide in this case whether it was open to the Bombay High Court to pass any order about costs in this Court while granting a certificate of fitness under Art. 133(l)(c) of the Constitution, and we direct that the appellant should pay to the respondents the costs of this appeal in one set and bear its owncosts thereof.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nDW ARKA DASS BHATIA v.\n\nTHE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR.\n\n[JAGANNADHADAS, B.P. SINHA and J&FER IMAM JJ]\n\nPreventive Detention-Grounds based on alleged illicit smtigglina of three categories of essential goods to Pakistnn-Two categories found not to be essential goods-Whether order of detrntion bad- Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, Wll, ss. 8(2)\n\nand 12(1).\n\nThe petitioner was detained by virtue of an order of detention passed by the District Magistrate, Jammu, under s. 3(2) of the Ja.mmu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011 and tbat order was'confirmed and continued by an order passed by the Government of the State of Jammu and K\"shmir under s. 12(1) of the Act after taking the opinion of the Advisory Board.\n\nThe order recited tl!at it was necessary to detain the petitioner vdth a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community and was based on the ground of alleged illicit smuggling by the petitioner of essential goods such as shaffon cloth, zari and mercury to Pakistan. It was '- found that shaffon cloth and znri were not essential goods.\n\nIt was not established that the smuggling attributed to the petitioner was substantially only of mercury or that the smuggling as regards shaffon cloth and zari was of an inconsequential nature.\n\nHeld, that the order was bad and must be quashed. The sub jective satif:; faction of the detaining authority must be properly based on all the reasons on which it purports to be based.\n\nIf some out of those reasons are found to be non-existent or irrelevant, the Court cannot predicate what tbe subjective satisfaction of the authority would have been on the exclusion of those rea&ons.\n\n- ~\n\n...\n\nuphold the order on the remaining reasons would be to substi tute the objective standards of the Court for the ilubjective satisfaction of the authority. The Court must, however, be satisfied that the vague or irrelevant grounds are such as, if excluded, might reasonably have affected the subjective satisfac1ion of the authority.\n\nKeshav 'l.'alpade v. The King Emperor ([1943] F.C.R. 88), Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya's case ([1951] S.C.R. 167), Dr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj v. The State of Delhi ((1953] S.C.R. 708) and Shibban Lal Saksena v. The State of U.P. ([1954) S.C.R. 418), relied on.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petition No. 172 of 1956.\n\nUnder Article 32 of the Constitution for a writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus.\n\nS. N. Andely, amicus curiae, for the petitioner.\n\nPorus A. Mehta, T. M. Sen and R.H. Dhebar, for the respondent.\n\n1956. November 1.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJAG.ANNADHADAS J.-This is an application under article 32 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus against the State of Jammu and Kashmir by the petitioner who was under detention by virtue of an order dated the 5th September, 1956, isRued by the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir under sub-section (2) of section 3 taken with sub-section (1) of section.12 of Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011\n\n(hereinafter referred to as the Act). The petitioner was first placed under detention by virtue of an order passed by the District Magistrate, J ammu, under subsection (2) of section 3 of the Act on the 1st May, 1956', and that order was confirmedand continued on the 5th September, 1956, under sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act by the Government after taking the opinion of the Advisory Board. The two orders of detention, one of the District Magistrate dated the 1st May, 1956, and the other of the Government dated the 5th September, 1956, recited that the petitioner is directed to be detained because it was necessary to make such an order \"with a view to preventing him\n\n19SIS\n\nDwarka Dass Bhatia v.\n\nThe State of Jammu and Kashmir\n\nDwarka Dass Bhatia v.\n\nThe State of\n\nJamniu and Kashmir\n\nJagannadhadasj.\n\nfrom acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community\". The grounds of detention as communicated to the petitioner' on the 31st May, 1956, by the District Magistrate, Jammu, are as follows:\n\n\"l. That you carried on smuggling of essential goods to Pakistan through the Ferozpur and Amritsar border, but since the tightening of said borders you have recently shifted your smuggling activities to Ranbirsinghpura Pakistan borders in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and are carrying on illicit smuggling of essential goods such as cloth, zari and mercury to Pakistan through this border (thus affecting the economic condition of the public in Kashmir State adversely). 2.\n\nThat for the said purpose of smuggling of goods to Pakistan you went to village Darsoopura on 7th April, 1956, and contacted Ghulam Ahmed son of Suraj Din resident of Darsoopura Tehsil Ran birsinghpura and one Ram Lal son of Frangi resident of Miran Sahib Tehsil Ranbirsinghpura and others who similarly are addicted to carrying on such a smuggling business and with their aid made arrangements for export ofShaffon cloth worth Rs. 2,500 t< Pakistan through Ranbirsinghpura Pakistan border. 3.\n\nThat on 11-4-1956, you booked 3 bales of silk cloth through Messrs Jaigopal Rajkumar Shegal of Amritsar to Jammu Tawi and got thege bales on address of yourself, and on the same day you got one package of Tila booked through S. Kanti Lal Zarianwalla of Amritsar and got this package also addressed \"To self\" for Jammu Tawi.\n\nThat after booking these packages as aforesaid you came over to Jammu and waited for their arrival and contacted Ghulam Ahmed and Ram Lal the above mentioned persons.\n\nThat on the 15th April, 1956, you tried to get the transport receipt from the Punjab National Bank but did not succeed in doing so as it was a public holiday.\n\nMeanwhile your activities leaked out and the goods\n\n. -\n\nwere seized by the Central Customs and Excise Depart- 1956 ment of India.\n\nPwarka Dass 2.\n\nThere are other facts also but those cannot Bhatia be given as I consider their disclosure would be against v. the public interest.\n\nThe State of That by resorting to the above activities you J~::~~,:id have been and are acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the supplies and services essential JagminadhadasJ. to the community\".\n\nIt will be seen from the above grounds that the reason for the detention is the alleged \"illicit smuggling of essential goods such as Cloth, zari and mercury to Pakistan through the border, thereby affecting the economic condition of the public in Kashmir State adversely\". From the particulars set out in paragraph 2 of the grounds, it appears that the cloth referred to in paragraph 1 is Shaff on cloth. The High Court of Jammu and Kashmir, to whom a similar application was filed by this petitioner along with a number of others similarly detained for illicit smuggling of goods, has in its. judgment dated the 21st June, 1956, held that Shaffon cloth is not within the category of an essential commodity as defined in the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Ordinance of Jammu and Kashmir. There is no indication in the High Court judgment whether zari is or is not an essential commodity in the same sense. But in answer to a qury from this Court, Shri Porus Mehta who appeared before us on behalf of the State of Jammu and Kashmir has stated, on instructions, that zari which is obviously a luxury article is not one of the commodities declared essential under the above Ordinance. The High Court, when it dealt with the batch of applications, of which the application of the petitioner before us was one, set aside the detention of number of others on the ground that the smuggling attributed to the individuals concerned in those cases was not of essential goods. So far as this petitioner is concerned the High Court held as follows:\n\n\"The case of Dwarika Das Bhatia stands on &\n\nDwarka Dass Bhatia v.\n\nThe State of Jqmm1t and /{ashmir\n\ndifferent footing altogether.\n\nThe allegation against him is that he smuggled into Pakistan some goods such as cloth and zari along with a certain quantity of mercury.\n\nMercury is a non-ferrous metal and according to the definition of an essential commodity given in the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Ordinance, mercury is an essential commodity. This being so, Dwarika Das Bhatia's detention cannot be J agannadhadas J, challenged\".\n\nThe point raised before us is that since the detention is based on the assumption that Shaf!on cloth and zari as well as mercury; are all essential goods and since two out of the three categories of the goods with reference to the smuggling of which the detention has been directed, are found not to be essential goods, the entire order is illegal, although one of the items, viz., mercury is an essential commodity. In support of this contention, the cases of this Court in Dr. Ram Krishan Bhardwaj v. The State of Delhi('), and Shibban Lal Saksena v. The State of U. P.(') are relied upon. Learned counsel for the State of Jammu and Kashmir contends that the principle of these decisions has no application to the present case, and attempts to distinguish the same. In order to understand the principle underlying these two cases, it is necessary to examine them in some detail.\n\nIn Dr. Ram Krishan f3hardwaj's case (supra) the two points that were raised were (1) whether an order of detention is invalid if the grounds supplied in support thereof are vague, and (2) whether the vagueness of one or some of the various grounds vitiates the entire order. The argument advanced in that case was based on the view adopted by this Court in the decision in Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya's case('), viz., that the obligation cast on the detaining authority to supply grounds is for the purpose of enabling a detenue to make a fair representation to the authority concerned and to the Advisory Board, against the order uf detention.\n\nThe argument was that in a\n\n(1 ! [1953] S.C.R. 708.\n\n(21 [1954] S C.R. 418.\n\n13) [1951] S C.R. 167.\n\n- ·-\n\ncase where one or more of the grounds a.re vague, the 1956 petitioner is handicapped in making an adequate Du, arka Dass representation as regards that ground and his repre- Bhatia sentation even if effective in respect of the other v. grounds, may fail to carry conviction as regards the The State of ground which is vague and that this might result in Jammtt and the detention being confirmed. The Court stated that Kashmir that argument was not without force and held as J g -dh d sJ f 11 a anna a a • 0 ows:\n\n\"The question however is not whether the petitioner will in fact be prejudicially affected in the matter of securing his release by his representation, but whether his constitutional safeguard has been infringed. Preventive detention is a serious invasion of personal liberty and such meagre safeguards as the Constitution has provided against the improper exercise of the power must be jealously watched and enforced by the Court. . ....... We are of opinion that this constitutional requirement must be satisfied with respect to each of the grounds communicated to the person detained, subject of course to a claim of the privilege under clause (6) of article 22.\n\nThat not. having been done in regard to the ground mentioned, ........ the petitioner's detention cannot be held to be in accordance with the procedure established by law within the meaning of article 21\".\n\nShibban Lal Saksena v. The State of U. P. (supra) is a case where the question arose in a different form.\n\nThe grounds of detention communicated to the detenue were of two-fold character, i.e., fell under two different categories, viz., (1) prejudicial to maintenance of supplies essential to community, and (2) injurious to maintenance of public order. When the matter was referred to the Advisory Board, it held that the first of the above grounds was not made out as a fact but upheld the order on the second ground.\n\nThe question before the court was whether this confirmation of the original order of detention, when one of the two grounds was found to be non-existent by the Advisory Board, could be maintained. Their Lordships dealt with the matter as follows:\n\n1Ps6 \"It has been repeatedly held by this court that the power to issue a detention order under section 3 Dwarka Dass Bhatia of the Preventve Detention Act depends entirely v. upon the satisfaction of the appropriate authority Th, state of specified in that section. The sufficiency of the Jarnmuand grounds upon which such satisfaction purports to be Kashmir based, provided they have a rational probative value\n\nJagannadhadasJ and are not extraneous to the scope or purpose of the\n\n legislative provision cannot be challenged in a court of Jaw, except on the ground of mala fides.\n\nA Court of law is not even competent to enquire into the truth or otherwise of the facts which are mentioned as grounds of detention in the communication to the detenue under section 7 of the Act.\" Posing the situation which arises in such cases where one of the grounds is found to be irrelevant or unsubstantiated, the Court stated as follows:\n\n\"The question is, whether in such circumstances the original order made under section 3(1)\n\n(a) of the Act can be allowed to stand. The answer, in our opinion, can only be in the negative. The detaining authority gave here two grounds for detaining the petitioner. We can neither decide whether these grounds are good or bad nor can we attempt to assess in what manner and to what extent each of these grounds operated on the mind of the appropriate authority and contributed to the creation of the satisfaction on the basis of which the detention order was made. To say that the other ground, which still remains, is quite sufficient to sustain the order, would be to substitute an objective judicial test for the subjective decision of the executive authority which is against the legislative policy underlying the statute.\n\nIn such cases, we think, the position would be the same as if one of these two grounds was irrelevant for the purpose of the Act or was wholly illusory and this would vitiate the detention order as a whole.\n\nThis principle, which was recognised by the Federal Court in the case of Keshav Talpade v. The King- Emperor('), seems to us to be quite sound and applicable to the facts of this case\".\n\n(1) [19'13] F.C.R. SS.\n\nIn Keshav Talpade's case(1) the learned Judges stated as follows:\n\nDwarka Dass \"If a detaining authority gives four reasons for Bhatia detaining a man,\" without distinguishing between v. them, and any two or three of the reasons are held The State 0! to be bad, it can never be certain to what extent the 1;<::;,·~:; d bad reasons operated on the mind of the authority or whether the detention order would have been JagannadhpdasJ. made at all if only one or two good reasons had been before them\".\n\nThe principle underlying all these decisions is this.\n\nWhere power is vested in a statutory authority to deprive the liberty of a subject on its subjective satisfaction with reference to specified matters, if that satisfaction is stated to be based on a number of grounds or for a variety of reasons, all taken together, and if some out of them are found to be non-existent or irrelevant, the very exercise of that power 'is bad.\n\nThat is so because the matter being one for subjective satisfaction, it must be properly based on all the reasons on which it purports to be based. If some out of them are found to be non-existent or irrelevant, the Court cannot predicate what the subjective satisfaction of the said authority would have been on the exclusion of those grounds or reasons. To uphold the validity of such an order in spite of the invalidity of some of the reasons or grounds would be to substitute the objective standards of the Court for the subjective satisfaction of the statutory authority. In applying these principles, however, the Court must be satisfied that the vague or irrelevant grounds are such as, if excluded, might reasonably have affected the subjective satisfaction of the appropriate authority. It is not merely because some ground or reason of a comparatively unessential nature is defective that such an order based on subjective satisfaction can be held to be invalid. The Court while anxious to safeguard the personal liberty of the individual will not lightly interfere with such orders. It is in the light of these principles that the validity of the impugned order has to be judged.\n\n(1) [194JJJ F.C.R. 88.\n\nDwarka Dass Bhatia v.\n\nThe State of Jamm11and\n\nKashmir\n\nJagannadhadas J,\n\nNOf.lembet' 6.\n\nIn this case, the order of detention is based on the ground that the petitioner was engaged in unlawful smuggling activities relating to three commodities, cloth, zari and mercury of which two are found not to be essential articles. No material is placed before us enabling us to say that the smuggling attributed to the petitioner was substantially only of mercury ~- .~ and that the smuggling as regards the other two commodities was of an inconsequential nature. On the other hand the fact that the particulars furnished to the detenue on the 31st May, 1956, relate only to cloth and zari (we understand that tila referred to in paragraph 3 is zari) indicates.that probably the smuggling of these two items was not of an inconsequential nature.\n\nWe are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the order of detention in this case is bad and must be quashed. We have accordingly quashed the order and directed the release forthwith of the detenue on the conclusion of the hearing on the 29th October, 1956.\n\nPetition allowed.\n\nCENTRAL PROVINCES TRANSPORT\n\nSERVICES LTD. . v.\n\nRAGHUNATH GOPAL PATWARDHAN.\n\n[BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, s. K. DAS and GovINDA MENON JJ.]\n\nInd, istrial Dispute-Dismissal of Employee/or misconduct- Oriminal prosecutir)n-Acquittal-Applicaticn for reinstatlm.ent and • .- compensation-Maintainability-Dismissed Emp/(Jyee, Meaninq of- Dispute between employer and an individ1tal employee-Whether an industrial dispute-Central Provinces and_ Berar Industrial Disp'ldes Settlement Act, 1947 (0. P. and Berar XXIII of 1947), ss. 2(10),\n\n(12) and 16-Industrial Disputes Act (XIV of 1947), s. 2(k).\n\nIn June, 1950, goods blonging to the appellant company were stolen and as the result of an enquiry the respondent was dismissed on the ground of gross negligence and misconduct.\n\nHe was prosecuted on a charge of theft but was acquitted in March, 1952, and thereupon he made an application before the Labour Commissioner", "total_entities": 72, "entities": [{"text": "Raja Bahadu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 11, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raja Bahadu,."}}, {"text": "Art. 133(l)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 403, "end_char": 417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "DW ARKA DASS BHATIA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 587, "end_char": 606, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DWARKA DASS BHATIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 611, "end_char": 641, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 645, "end_char": 658, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JAG.ANNADHADAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B.P. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 660, "end_char": 670, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "FER IMAM JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 677, "end_char": 688, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SYED JAFFER IMAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 8(2)\n\nand 12(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 935, "end_char": 954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1068, "end_char": 1075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1094, "end_char": 1132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of the State of Jammu and K\"shmir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1202, "end_char": 1246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner was detained by virtue of an order of detention passed by the District Magistrate, Jammu, under s. 3(2) of the Ja.mmu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011 and tbat order was'confirmed and continued by an order passed by the Government of the State of Jammu and K\"shmir under s. 12(1) of the Act after taking the opinion of the Advisory Board."}}, {"text": "s. 12(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1253, "end_char": 1261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011", "statute": "Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011"}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1662, "end_char": 1670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order recited tl!at it was necessary to detain the petitioner vdth a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community and was based on the ground of alleged illicit smuggling by the petitioner of essential goods such as shaffon cloth, zari and mercury to Pakistan."}}, {"text": "[1943] F.C.R. 88", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2709, "end_char": 2725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2981, "end_char": 2991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. N. Andely", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3056, "end_char": 3068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Andely, amicus curiae, for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "Porus A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3106, "end_char": 3120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Porus A. Mehta, T. M. Sen and R.H. Dhebar, for the respondent.", "canonical_name": "Porus A. Mehta"}}, {"text": "T. M. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3122, "end_char": 3131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Porus A. Mehta, T. M. Sen and R.H. Dhebar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R.H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3136, "end_char": 3147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Porus A. Mehta, T. M. Sen and R.H. Dhebar, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "JAG.ANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3233, "end_char": 3247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJAG.ANNADHADAS J.-This is an application under article 32 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus against the State of Jammu and Kashmir by the petitioner who was under detention by virtue of an order dated the 5th September, 1956, isRued by the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir under sub-section (2) of section 3 taken with sub-section (1) of section.12 of Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011\n\n(hereinafter referred to as the Act).", "canonical_name": "JAG.ANNADHADAS"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3280, "end_char": 3290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3378, "end_char": 3404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJAG.ANNADHADAS J.-This is an application under article 32 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus against the State of Jammu and Kashmir by the petitioner who was under detention by virtue of an order dated the 5th September, 1956, isRued by the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir under sub-section (2) of section 3 taken with sub-section (1) of section.12 of Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011\n\n(hereinafter referred to as the Act)."}}, {"text": "Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3514, "end_char": 3558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nJAG.ANNADHADAS J.-This is an application under article 32 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus against the State of Jammu and Kashmir by the petitioner who was under detention by virtue of an order dated the 5th September, 1956, isRued by the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir under sub-section (2) of section 3 taken with sub-section (1) of section.12 of Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011\n\n(hereinafter referred to as the Act)."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3584, "end_char": 3593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3638, "end_char": 3686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "District Magistrate, J ammu", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3810, "end_char": 3837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner was first placed under detention by virtue of an order passed by the District Magistrate, J ammu, under subsection (2) of section 3 of the Act on the 1st May, 1956', and that order was confirmedand continued on the 5th September, 1956, under sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act by the Government after taking the opinion of the Advisory Board."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3863, "end_char": 3872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011", "statute": "Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011"}}, {"text": "1st May, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3891, "end_char": 3904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner was first placed under detention by virtue of an order passed by the District Magistrate, J ammu, under subsection (2) of section 3 of the Act on the 1st May, 1956', and that order was confirmedand continued on the 5th September, 1956, under sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act by the Government after taking the opinion of the Advisory Board."}}, {"text": "5th September, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3956, "end_char": 3975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner was first placed under detention by virtue of an order passed by the District Magistrate, J ammu, under subsection (2) of section 3 of the Act on the 1st May, 1956', and that order was confirmedand continued on the 5th September, 1956, under sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act by the Government after taking the opinion of the Advisory Board."}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4002, "end_char": 4012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011", "statute": "Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 2011"}}, {"text": "Ranbirsinghpura Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4955, "end_char": 4979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The grounds of detention as communicated to the petitioner' on the 31st May, 1956, by the District Magistrate, Jammu, are as follows:\n\n\"l. That you carried on smuggling of essential goods to Pakistan through the Ferozpur and Amritsar border, but since the tightening of said borders you have recently shifted your smuggling activities to Ranbirsinghpura Pakistan borders in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and are carrying on illicit smuggling of essential goods such as cloth, zari and mercury to Pakistan through this border (thus affecting the economic condition of the public in Kashmir State adversely)."}}, {"text": "Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5004, "end_char": 5021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The grounds of detention as communicated to the petitioner' on the 31st May, 1956, by the District Magistrate, Jammu, are as follows:\n\n\"l. That you carried on smuggling of essential goods to Pakistan through the Ferozpur and Amritsar border, but since the tightening of said borders you have recently shifted your smuggling activities to Ranbirsinghpura Pakistan borders in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and are carrying on illicit smuggling of essential goods such as cloth, zari and mercury to Pakistan through this border (thus affecting the economic condition of the public in Kashmir State adversely)."}}, {"text": "Darsoopura", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5309, "end_char": 5319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That for the said purpose of smuggling of goods to Pakistan you went to village Darsoopura on 7th April, 1956, and contacted Ghulam Ahmed son of Suraj Din resident of Darsoopura Tehsil Ran birsinghpura and one Ram Lal son of Frangi resident of Miran Sahib Tehsil Ranbirsinghpura and others who similarly are addicted to carrying on such a smuggling business and with their aid made arrangements for export ofShaffon cloth worth Rs."}}, {"text": "7th April, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5323, "end_char": 5338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That for the said purpose of smuggling of goods to Pakistan you went to village Darsoopura on 7th April, 1956, and contacted Ghulam Ahmed son of Suraj Din resident of Darsoopura Tehsil Ran birsinghpura and one Ram Lal son of Frangi resident of Miran Sahib Tehsil Ranbirsinghpura and others who similarly are addicted to carrying on such a smuggling business and with their aid made arrangements for export ofShaffon cloth worth Rs."}}, {"text": "Ghulam Ahmed", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5354, "end_char": 5366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That for the said purpose of smuggling of goods to Pakistan you went to village Darsoopura on 7th April, 1956, and contacted Ghulam Ahmed son of Suraj Din resident of Darsoopura Tehsil Ran birsinghpura and one Ram Lal son of Frangi resident of Miran Sahib Tehsil Ranbirsinghpura and others who similarly are addicted to carrying on such a smuggling business and with their aid made arrangements for export ofShaffon cloth worth Rs."}}, {"text": "Ram Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5439, "end_char": 5446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That for the said purpose of smuggling of goods to Pakistan you went to village Darsoopura on 7th April, 1956, and contacted Ghulam Ahmed son of Suraj Din resident of Darsoopura Tehsil Ran birsinghpura and one Ram Lal son of Frangi resident of Miran Sahib Tehsil Ranbirsinghpura and others who similarly are addicted to carrying on such a smuggling business and with their aid made arrangements for export ofShaffon cloth worth Rs."}}, {"text": "11-4-1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5732, "end_char": 5741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That on 11-4-1956, you booked 3 bales of silk cloth through Messrs Jaigopal Rajkumar Shegal of Amritsar to Jammu Tawi and got thege bales on address of yourself, and on the same day you got one package of Tila booked through S. Kanti Lal Zarianwalla of Amritsar and got this package also addressed \"To self\" for Jammu Tawi."}}, {"text": "Amritsar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5819, "end_char": 5827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That on 11-4-1956, you booked 3 bales of silk cloth through Messrs Jaigopal Rajkumar Shegal of Amritsar to Jammu Tawi and got thege bales on address of yourself, and on the same day you got one package of Tila booked through S. Kanti Lal Zarianwalla of Amritsar and got this package also addressed \"To self\" for Jammu Tawi."}}, {"text": "Jammu Tawi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5831, "end_char": 5841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That on 11-4-1956, you booked 3 bales of silk cloth through Messrs Jaigopal Rajkumar Shegal of Amritsar to Jammu Tawi and got thege bales on address of yourself, and on the same day you got one package of Tila booked through S. Kanti Lal Zarianwalla of Amritsar and got this package also addressed \"To self\" for Jammu Tawi."}}, {"text": "Jammu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6113, "end_char": 6118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That after booking these packages as aforesaid you came over to Jammu and waited for their arrival and contacted Ghulam Ahmed and Ram Lal the above mentioned persons."}}, {"text": "15th April, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6229, "end_char": 6245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That on the 15th April, 1956, you tried to get the transport receipt from the Punjab National Bank but did not succeed in doing so as it was a public holiday."}}, {"text": "Punjab National Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6295, "end_char": 6315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That on the 15th April, 1956, you tried to get the transport receipt from the Punjab National Bank but did not succeed in doing so as it was a public holiday."}}, {"text": "State of That", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6662, "end_char": 6675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of That by resorting to the above activities you J~::~~,:id have been and are acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the supplies and services essential JagminadhadasJ. to the community\"."}}, {"text": "JagminadhadasJ.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6835, "end_char": 6850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of That by resorting to the above activities you J~::~~,:id have been and are acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the supplies and services essential JagminadhadasJ. to the community\"."}}, {"text": "High Court of Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7281, "end_char": 7312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Jammu and Kashmir, to whom a similar application was filed by this petitioner along with a number of others similarly detained for illicit smuggling of goods, has in its."}}, {"text": "21st June, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7485, "end_char": 7500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "judgment dated the 21st June, 1956, held that Shaffon cloth is not within the category of an essential commodity as defined in the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Ordinance of Jammu and Kashmir."}}, {"text": "Porus Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7831, "end_char": 7842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But in answer to a qury from this Court, Shri Porus Mehta who appeared before us on behalf of the State of Jammu and Kashmir has stated, on instructions, that zari which is obviously a luxury article is not one of the commodities declared essential under the above Ordinance.", "canonical_name": "Porus A. Mehta"}}, {"text": "Dwarika Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8430, "end_char": 8441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as this petitioner is concerned the High Court held as follows:\n\n\"The case of Dwarika Das Bhatia stands on &\n\nDwarka Dass Bhatia v.\n\nThe State of Jqmm1t and /{ashmir\n\ndifferent footing altogether.", "canonical_name": "Dwarika Das Bhatia"}}, {"text": "Dwarika Das Bhatia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8889, "end_char": 8907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This being so, Dwarika Das Bhatia's detention cannot be J agannadhadas J, challenged\".", "canonical_name": "Dwarika Das Bhatia"}}, {"text": "State of Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9578, "end_char": 9604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned counsel for the State of Jammu and Kashmir contends that the principle of these decisions has no application to the present case, and attempts to distinguish the same."}}, {"text": "Ram Krishan f3hardwaj's", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9851, "end_char": 9874, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Dr. Ram Krishan f3hardwaj's case (supra) the two points that were raised were (1) whether an order of detention is invalid if the grounds supplied in support thereof are vague, and (2) whether the vagueness of one or some of the various grounds vitiates the entire order."}}, {"text": "Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10217, "end_char": 10240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The argument advanced in that case was based on the view adopted by this Court in the decision in Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya's case('), viz.,"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11760, "end_char": 11770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11966, "end_char": 11976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12845, "end_char": 12854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dwarka Dass Bhatia of the Preventve Detention Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12855, "end_char": 12904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13508, "end_char": 13517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Dwarka Dass Bhatia of the Preventve Detention Act", "statute": "Dwarka Dass Bhatia of the Preventve Detention Act"}}, {"text": "section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13758, "end_char": 13770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Dwarka Dass Bhatia of the Preventve Detention Act", "statute": "Dwarka Dass Bhatia of the Preventve Detention Act"}}, {"text": "Keshav Talpade", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14929, "end_char": 14943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Keshav Talpade's case(1) the learned Judges stated as follows:\n\nDwarka Dass \"If a detaining authority gives four reasons for Bhatia detaining a man,\" without distinguishing between v. them, and any two or three of the reasons are held The State 0!"}}, {"text": "Dwarka Dass", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14993, "end_char": 15004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Keshav Talpade's case(1) the learned Judges stated as follows:\n\nDwarka Dass \"If a detaining authority gives four reasons for Bhatia detaining a man,\" without distinguishing between v. them, and any two or three of the reasons are held The State 0!", "canonical_name": "Dwarika Das Bhatia"}}, {"text": "31st May, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17709, "end_char": 17723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand the fact that the particulars furnished to the detenue on the 31st May, 1956, relate only to cloth and zari (we understand that tila referred to in paragraph 3 is zari) indicates.that probably the smuggling of these two items was not of an inconsequential nature."}}, {"text": "29th October, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18151, "end_char": 18169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have accordingly quashed the order and directed the release forthwith of the detenue on the conclusion of the hearing on the 29th October, 1956."}}, {"text": "CENTRAL PROVINCES TRANSPORT\n\nSERVICES LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18191, "end_char": 18232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CENTRAL PROVINCES TRANSPORT\n\nSERVICES LTD. ."}}, {"text": "RAGHUNATH GOPAL PATWARDHAN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18240, "end_char": 18266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nRAGHUNATH GOPAL PATWARDHAN."}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18270, "end_char": 18278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, s. K. DAS and GovINDA MENON JJ.]"}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMA AYYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18280, "end_char": 18297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, s. K. DAS and GovINDA MENON JJ.]"}}, {"text": "s. K. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18299, "end_char": 18308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, s. K. DAS and GovINDA MENON JJ.]"}}, {"text": "GovINDA MENON", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18313, "end_char": 18326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, s. K. DAS and GovINDA MENON JJ.]"}}, {"text": "Settlement Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18658, "end_char": 18678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 2(10)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18712, "end_char": 18721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Settlement Act, 1947", "statute": "Settlement Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18736, "end_char": 18759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18775, "end_char": 18782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}]} {"document_id": "1956_1_956_966_EN", "year": 1956, "text": "Dwarka Dass Bhatia v.\n\nThe State of Jamm11and\n\nKashmir\n\nJagannadhadas J,\n\nNOf.lembet' 6.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1956]\n\nIn this case, the order of detention is based on the ground that the petitioner was engaged in unlawful smuggling activities relating to three commodities, cloth, zari and mercury of which two are found not to be essential articles. No material is placed before us enabling us to say that the smuggling attributed to the petitioner was substantially only of mercury ~- .~ and that the smuggling as regards the other two commodities was of an inconsequential nature. On the other hand the fact that the particulars furnished to the detenue on the 31st May, 1956, relate only to cloth and zari (we understand that tila referred to in paragraph 3 is zari) indicates.that probably the smuggling of these two items was not of an inconsequential nature.\n\nWe are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the order of detention in this case is bad and must be quashed. We have accordingly quashed the order and directed the release forthwith of the detenue on the conclusion of the hearing on the 29th October, 1956.\n\nPetition allowed.\n\nCENTRAL PROVINCES TRANSPORT\n\nSERVICES LTD. . v.\n\nRAGHUNATH GOPAL PATWARDHAN.\n\n[BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, s. K. DAS and GovINDA MENON JJ.]\n\nInd, istrial Dispute-Dismissal of Employee/or misconduct- Oriminal prosecutir)n-Acquittal-Applicaticn for reinstatlm.ent and • .- compensation-Maintainability-Dismissed Emp/(Jyee, Meaninq of- Dispute between employer and an individ1tal employee-Whether an industrial dispute-Central Provinces and_ Berar Industrial Disp'ldes Settlement Act, 1947 (0. P. and Berar XXIII of 1947), ss. 2(10),\n\n(12) and 16-Industrial Disputes Act (XIV of 1947), s. 2(k).\n\nIn June, 1950, goods blonging to the appellant company were stolen and as the result of an enquiry the respondent was dismissed on the ground of gross negligence and misconduct.\n\nHe was prosecuted on a charge of theft but was acquitted in March, 1952, and thereupon he made an application before the Labour Commissioner\n\nfor reinstatement and compensation under s. 16(2) of the Central 7956 Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 194 7.\n\nIt was contended for the appellant that the application was not main Ce1ttral Prnvifices tainable because (1) the respondent was not an employee on the Tra1tsj; ort Senices\n\ndate of the application, having been dismissed Jong prior thereto Ud. and (2) his dispute was an individual and not an industrial dispute. v. , Raghtmath 6opal .Held, (1) that the definition of \"employee' in s. 2(10) of the Pattt'ardhcm Act includes one who has been dismissed alld has ceased to be in service, and that the inclusive clause therein was inserted ex abun danti cautela to repel a possible contention that employees discharged under ss. 31 and 32 of the Act would not fall withins. 2(10), and cannot be read as importing an intention generally to exclude dismissed employees from that definition.\n\nWestern India Aittomobile Association v. Industrial Trib11nal, Bombay ([1949] F.C.R. 321), relied on.\n\n(2) that a dispute between an employer and an employee who bas been dismissed and who makes a claim for ieinstatement and compensation, would be an industrial dispute within the meaning of s. 2(12) of the Act, and s. 16 enables the employee-to enforce his individual rights against an order of dismissal, discharge, removal or suspension.\n\nQiiaere, whether a dispute simpliciter between an employer and a workman would be an industrial dispute within s. 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7 (XIV of 194 7).\n\nC1v1L APPELLATE JuRISDIOTION: Civil Appeal No; 320 of 1955.\n\nAppeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 19, 1954 of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India at Bombay in Appeal No. 76 of 1954.\n\nH.J. Umrigar, E. J. Muharir and Rameshwar Nath, for the appellant.\n\nS. W. Dhabe and R. A. Govind, for the respondent.\n\n1956.\n\nNovember 6. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR J.-The Central Provinces Transport Services Ltd., Nagpur, was, at the material dates, a public limited company, and the respondent was employed as a mechanic therein. In June\n\n1950, goods belonging to the Company were stolen,\n\n1956 and suspicion fell on the respondent.\n\nThere was an\n\nC l P . enqui:ry into the matter, and that resulted in his dis entra rovince s • J Transport Services missal on une 28, 1950, on the ground of gross ua. negligence and misconduet. He was then prosecuted v. on a charge of theft, but that ended in his acquittal Raghunath Gopal on March 3. 1952. Thereafter, he applied to the Com-\n\nPatwardhan pany to be reinstated, and failing to get redress, filed\n\nVenkatarama on October 1, 1952, an application before the Labour Ayyar J.\n\nCommissioner under section 16(2) of the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act XXIII of 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act., for reinstatement and compensation. The Company resisted the claim on the ground, inter alia, that as the applicant had been dismissed on June 28, 1950, he was not an employee on the date of the application, that accordingly there was no \"industrial dispute touching the dismissal of an employee\" as required by s. 16, sub-ss. (1) and (2) of the Act, and that, in consequence, the proceedings under that sec tion were incompetent. The Assistant Labour Com missioner, before whom the matter came up for hear ing, agreed with this contention, and dismissed the application. The respondent preferred a revision against this order to the Provincial Industrial Court under s. 16(5) of the Act, and by its order dated February 5, 1954, that Court held that a dismissed employee was an employee as defined in s. 2(10) of the Act, that a dispute by such an employee was an industrial dispute within s. 2(12) oflhe Act, and that the application under s. 16(2) of the Act was therefore maintainable. In the result, the order of dis missal was set aside and the matter remanded for enquiry on the merits. Against that order, the Company appealed to the Labour Appellate Tribunal, which by its order dated October 19, 1954, affirmed the decision of the Provincial Industrial Court, and dismissed the appeal. The Company has preferred the present appeal against this order under Art. 136.\n\nPending the appeal to this Court, the Company went into liquidation and has been taken over by the State of Madhya Pradesh, and is now being run under the name of Central Provinces Transport Services (under\n\nGovernment ownership), Nagpur. On the application of the respondent, the record has been suitably amended.\n\nThe point for decision in this appeal is whether an application for reinstatement and compensation by a dismissed employee is maintainable under s. 16 of the Act. That section, so far as is material to the present question, runs as follows:\n\n\"(I) Where the State Government by notification so directs, the Labour Commissioner shall have power to decide an industrial dispute touching the dismissal, discharge, removal or suspension of an employee working in any industry in general or in any local area as may be specified in the notification.\n\n\"(2) Any employee, working in an industry to which the notification under sub-section (I) applied, may within six months from the date of such dismissal, discharge, removal or suspension, apply to the Labour Commissioner for reinstatement and payment of compensation for loss of wages\".\n\nThe argument of Mr. Umrigar for the appellant is that it is a condition prerequisite to the entertainment of an application for reintatement under this section that there should be an industrial dispute touching the dismissal of an employee, that there was none such in this case, because the respondent was not an employee on the date of the application, having been dismissed long prior thereto and further because his dispute was an individual and not an indust.rial dispute.\n\nIt will be convenient at this stage to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act, as they stood on the material dates.\n\nSection 2(10) defines an employee as follows:\n\n\"employee\" means any person employed by an employer to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for contract or hire or reward in any industry and includes an employee discharged on account of any dispute relating to a change in respect of which a notice is given under section 31 or 32 whether before or after the discharge\".\n\nSection 2(12) defines \"industrial dispute\" as meaning\n\nCentral Provinces Transport Serviced\n\nLtd. v.\n\nRaghunath Gopal\n\nPatwardlian\n\nV•11katarama\n\nAyyar J.\n\nCentral Provinces Tt'ansport Services\n\nLtd. v.\n\nRaghutiath Gopal Patwardhan\n\nVenkatarania\n\nAyyarJ.\n\n\"any dispute or difference connected with an industrial matter arising between employer and employee or between employers or employees\". Under s. 2(13), \"industrial matter\" means \"any matter relating to work, pay, wages, reward, hours, privileges, rights or duties of employers or employees, or the mode, terms and conditions of employment or refusal to employ and includes questions pertaining to (a) the relationship between employer and employee, or to the dismissal or non-employment of any person .... \"\n\nIt is not disputed that a question of reinstatement is an industrial matter as defined ins. 2(13) of the Act.\n\nThe controversy relates to the question whether it is an industrial dispute as defined ins. 2(12) of the Act.\n\nThe contention of the appellant is that it does not fall within that definition, because the further condition prescribed by s. 2(12) that it must be between an employer and employee is not satisfied. It was argued by Mr. Umrigar that when the respondent was dismissed on June 28, 1950, his employment came to an end, and that he could not thereafter be termed an employee, as that word is ordinarily understood, that it could not have been the intention of the legislature to include in the definition of an employee even those who had ceased to be in service, as otherwise there was no need for the further provision ins. 2(10) that discharged employees would in certain cases be employees; and that, in any event, the inclusive portion of the definition would, on the principle Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, operate to exclude all exemployees, other than those mentioned therein.\n\nThe question whether a dismissed employee is an employee as defined in s. 2(10) of the Act must be held to be practically concluded by the decision of the Federal Court in Western India Automobile Association v. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay('). There, the point for determination was whether a claim for reinstatement by a dismissed workman was an industrial dispute as defined in s. 2{k) of the Industrial Disputes Act XIV of 1947.\n\nIt was held that the definition ins. 2(k) including as it did, all disputes or\n\n(1) [1010) F.C.R. 321.\n\ndifferences in connection with employment or non- 1956 employment of a person was sufficiently wide to Central Provmces include a claim for reinstatement by a dismissed work- Transport Sertices man. Counsel for the appellant sought to distinguish Lttl. that decision on the ground firstly, that it was given v. on a statute different from what we are concerned Raghunath al the employer and a single employee and that the re-\n\nPatwardhan ference and the award were, in consequence, valid. 1• \"\"\n\nVenkatarama A similar decision was given by a Full BPnch of t.he AyyarJ.\n\nLabour Appellate T, ribunal in Swadeshi Cotton Mills Company Ltd. v. Their Workmen('). (Ill) A dispute between an employer and a single employee cannot per se be an industrial dispute, but it may become one if it is taken up by the Union or a number of workmen. That was held by Bose J., in Bilash Chandra Mitra v. Balmer Lawrie & Co.(\"), by Ramaswami and Sarjoo Prasad JJ., in New India Assurance Co. v. C-.ntral Government Industrial Tribunal(') and by Balakrishna Ayyar J.,. in Lakshmi Talkies, Madras v. Munuswami and others(') and by the Industrial Tribunals in Gordon Woodroffe & Co. (Madras) Ltd. v. Appa Rao(') and Lynus & Co. v.\n\nHemanta Kumar Samanta(').\n\nThe preponderance of judicial opinion is clearly in favour of the last of the three views stated above, and there is considerable reason behind. it. Notwithstanding that the language of s. 2(k) is wide enough to cover a dispute between an employer and a single employee, the scheme of the Industrial Disput.es Act does appear to contemplate that the machinery provided therein should be set in motion, to settle only disputes which involve the rights of workmen as a class and that a dispute touching the individual rights of a workman was not intended to be the subject of ' an adjudication under the Act, when the same bad not been taken up by the Union or a number of workmen. If that were the correct position, the respondent was not entitled to apply under s. 16(2) of the Act as the workmen in the industry had not adopted his dispute as their own and chosen to treat it as\n\n(1\\ [1915-~] l L.L.J. 757. \\8) A.I.R. 1958 Patn• S~!.\n\n(51 [1965] 2 L.L J. 541.\n\nI~) A.I.R. 1953 Cal. 613 Ii• [19M] 2 L.L.J. !177.\n\n(6) [1956) 2 L.L.J. 89.\n\ntheir casus belli with the Company. But then, we are 1956 directly concerned in this appeal not with the Indusc t\n\n1 P • . ctz ra rot\"tnces trial Disputes Act XIV of 1947 but with the Central Trnnsport Services Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Ltd.\n\nAct XXIII of 1947, and in the view which we take of v. the rights of the respondent under that statute, there Ragl111nath Gopal ' d fi 1 · th t' Putuardhan is no nee to express a na op1mon on e ques 10n whether a dispute simpliciter between an employer Venkatarama and a workman would be an industrial dispute within Ayyar J. s. 2(k) of Act XIV of 1947.\n\nNow, the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act XXIII of 1947 with which we are concerned, is not in pari materiawith Act XIV\n\nof 1947. It no doubt covers the ground occupied by that Act, and contains provisions relating to arbitration, adjudication, awards, strikes and lock-outs. But it contains more. It enacts in Ch. IV provisions which are intended to regulate the contract of employment between employer and workmen, a subject whic:h is covered by a distinct piece of Central legislation, Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act XX of\n\n1946. The object of that Act was, as appears from the preamble thereto, \"to require employers in industrial establishments formally to define conditions of employment under them'', whereas the object of the Industrial Disputes Act XIV of 1947 is, as set out in its preamble, \"to make provision for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes and for certain ot.her purposes\". Thus, even though the two ena(}tmehts are pieces of what is termed labour legislation, their objects and their vision are different.\n\nWhile Act XIV of 1947 may be said to be primarily concerned with disputes of labour as a class, Act XX of 1946 is directed to getting the rights of an employee under a contract defined.\n\nNow, as the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act\n\nXXIII of 1947 covers the ground occupied by both Act XX of 1946 and Act XIV of 1947, it would be proper to interpret the expression \"industrial dispute\"\n\ntherein in a. sense wider than what it bears in Act XIV of 1947, so as to cover not only disputes of workmen as a class but also their individual disputes.\n\nr955 And this view receives considerable support from other\n\nC I l-P 1 provisions of the Act. Section 41 enacts that an ap al the employer and a single employee and that the re-\n\nPatwardhan ference and the award were, in consequence, valid."}}, {"text": "Raghunath GoJ", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17948, "end_char": 17961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by Bhargava J., that an industrial dispute could come v. into existence even if the parties thereto were only Raghunath GoJ>al the employer and a single employee and that the re-\n\nPatwardhan ference and the award were, in consequence, valid.", "canonical_name": "RAGHUNATH GOPAL PATWARDHAN"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18087, "end_char": 18098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1• \"\"\n\nVenkatarama A similar decision was given by a Full BPnch of t.he AyyarJ.\n\nLabour Appellate T, ribunal in Swadeshi Cotton Mills Company Ltd. v. Their Workmen('). (", "canonical_name": "Venkataramti"}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18440, "end_char": 18444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That was held by Bose J., in Bilash Chandra Mitra v. Balmer Lawrie & Co.(\"), by Ramaswami and Sarjoo Prasad JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Ramaswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18503, "end_char": 18512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That was held by Bose J., in Bilash Chandra Mitra v. Balmer Lawrie & Co.(\"), by Ramaswami and Sarjoo Prasad JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Sarjoo Prasad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18517, "end_char": 18530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That was held by Bose J., in Bilash Chandra Mitra v. Balmer Lawrie & Co.(\"), by Ramaswami and Sarjoo Prasad JJ.,"}}, {"text": "Balakrishna Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18616, "end_char": 18633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in New India Assurance Co. v. C-.ntral Government Industrial Tribunal(') and by Balakrishna Ayyar J.,."}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19013, "end_char": 19020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19589, "end_char": 19597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Disputes Act XIV of 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20011, "end_char": 20035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ragl111nath Gopal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20243, "end_char": 20260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ctz ra rot\"tnces trial Disputes Act XIV of 1947 but with the Central Trnnsport Services Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Ltd.\n\nAct XXIII of 1947, and in the view which we take of v. the rights of the respondent under that statute, there Ragl111nath Gopal ' d fi 1 · th t' Putuardhan is no nee to express a na op1mon on e ques 10n whether a dispute simpliciter between an employer Venkatarama and a workman would be an industrial dispute within Ayyar J. s. 2(k) of Act XIV of 1947."}}, {"text": "s. 2(k)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20459, "end_char": 20466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Disputes Act XIV of 1947", "statute": "Disputes Act XIV of 1947"}}, {"text": "Settlement Act XXIII of 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20545, "end_char": 20573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21007, "end_char": 21050, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Disputes Act XIV of 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21276, "end_char": 21300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "While Act XIV of 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21580, "end_char": 21601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Settlement Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21827, "end_char": 21841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22248, "end_char": 22258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Settlement Act\n\nXXIII of 1947", "statute": "Settlement Act\n\nXXIII of 1947"}}, {"text": "Section 2(24)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22471, "end_char": 22484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Settlement Act\n\nXXIII of 1947", "statute": "Settlement Act\n\nXXIII of 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22924, "end_char": 22929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23033, "end_char": 23041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23065, "end_char": 23070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23208, "end_char": 23213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23636, "end_char": 23646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]} {"document_id": "1956_1_100_124_EN", "year": 1956, "text": "19S6\n\nFebruary 14\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nMUKTI LAL AGARWALA v.\n\n[1956]\n\nTRUSTEES OF THE PROVIDENT FUND OF\n\nTHE TIN PLATE CO. OF INDIA LTD.\n\nAND OTHERS. '\n\n[VIVIAN BosE, JAFER IMAM and CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nAIYAR JJ.)\n\nProvincial Insolvency Act, 1920 (V of 1920), s. 4-Insolvencv of employees of a company-Having certain amounts standing to their credit in the Provident Fund of the said company-Whether the •aid amounts were the properties of the insolvents over which they had di•- posing power and were thus available for distribution amongst the creditors-Pr<>vident Fund-R<1les-Oonstr1wtion-W ord \"property\" in the Insolvency Act-Meaning of.\n\nThe six employees in the Tin Plate Co. of India Ltd. were adjudged insolvents.\n\nThey were members in a Provident Fund of the said company, having certain amounts standing to their credit in the Fund.\n\nThe appellant-a creditor of the said employees-filed applies tions under s. 4 of the Insolvency Act against the company and Trustees of the Fund for orders that amounts standing to the ci:edit of the insolvents in the Provident Fun.d account were their proper- .ties and had vested in the court and were afailable for distribution amongst.the creditors and therefore should be brought into conrt.\n\nThe respondent pleaded in answer that the amount standing to the credit of ••oh insolvent in the Provident Fund represented the contributions of the company and of the employees and that the corpus was a trust fund in the hands of the trustees of the fund; so they were not properties of the insolvents over which they bad a disposing power and thaHhey were not debts due to the insolvents. It was said that according to the rules governing the Provident Fund the monies become payable to the employee or any other member of his fa.mily only on the happening of certain contingencies snch a.S retirement, discharge. dismidsal or death and that till then na right accrued to the in•olvent. It was further urged that the trustees could not be removed from the custody and control of the fund by the Official Receiver.\n\nOn a. construction of the Rules of the Provident Fond, -the Insolvency Court held in favour of the creditor. On appeal, the High Court held that under the rules of the Fund, the insolvents had no preaent disposing power over the monies standing to their credit and that the Fund had vested in the Trustee. On appeal to the Supreme\n\nCourt:\n\nHeld that it is reasonably clear from these rules that a snbscriber\n\n~.C.R: SUPREME COURT REPOJtTS 101\n\nhtJos a present interest in the Fund though the moneys may become payable to him, or his nominee or heirs only in the future. Even where there is a declaration about the nominee who is to receive payment after the subscriber's death, the fund would still be the property of the subscriber in the hands of the nominee for the satisfaction of his debts, as there is no present gift to take effect immediately.\n\nIt could not be maintained that the subscribers had no right, title or interest in the fund or that such interest as they may possess was dependent upon a possible contingency which may or may not occur. The amount standing to the credit of a subscriber even if payable in future would be a debt due by the company to him within the meaning of s. 60 of the Code and hence liable to attachment and sale.\n\nA person cannot enter into any arrangement or agreement by which his own title will cease in the event of bankruptcy for it would then be a fraud perpetrated on the Insolvency Law.\n\nThe liability of the estate to be attached by creditors on a bankruptcy or judgment is an incident of the estate, and no attempt to deprive it of that incident by direct prohibition would be valid.\n\nNotwithstanding the rules of the Fund in the present case, the subscribers have an interest in the moneys which can vest in the Official Receiver on their adjudication.\n\nThe word \"property\" in the Insolvency Act is used in the widest possible sense which includes even property which may belong to or-is vested in another but over which the insolvent has a disposing power which he may exercise for his own benefit; and this part of the definition has reference obviously to powers of ap pointment and the power of a Hindu father who is the managing member of a joint family.\n\nThe fact that on the. date of the adjudication the insolvent could not transfer the property does not militate against the view that he has a vested interest in the same.\n\nBanchharam Majumdar v. Adyanath Bhattacharjee, ([1909) I.L.R. 36 Cal. 936), . Dugdale v. Dugdale ([1888) 38 Ch. D. 176), Ex parte Dever. In re. Suse and Sibeth ([1887) 18 Q.B.\n\nD. 660), Hudson v. Gribble ([1903) 1 K.B. 517), D. Palai1/a v.\n\nT. P; Sen and another (A.I.R. 1935 Pat. 211), Secretary, Burma Oil Subsidiary Provident F?, tnd (IndiaJLtd. v. Dadibhar Singh (A.I.R. 1941 Rang. 256), Gajraj Sheokarandas v. Sir liukamchand Sarupchand and another (A.LR. 1939 Bom. 90), Anandrao alias Adkoba s/o Risaram-ji v. Vishwanath Watuji Kalar and others, (A.I.R. 1944 Nag. 144), Ismail J akaria if Co. v. Burmah Shell Provident Trust Ltd. (A.I.R. 1942 Sind 4 7), Bishwa Nath Sao v. The Official Receiver ([1936) I.L.R. 16 Pat. 60), and Sat Narain v. Behari Lal and Others ([1924] 52 I.A. 22), referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 123 to 127 and 135 of 1953.\n\nMukti Lal Agarwal a v.\n\nTrustees of the Provide11t Ftmd of the Tin Plate Co. of India Ltd. and others\n\n1956 On appeal from the judgment and decree dated the 12th May 1950 of the Patna High Court in Appeal MuktiLal f 0 Od N d Agarwala rom riginal r ers os. 266, 267, 268, 271, 274 an v. 280 of 1948 arising out of the Order dated the 26th Tn.steesof th• June 1948 of the Court of the District Judge, Purulia\n\np,.,,.; entFund of in Insolvency Cases Nos. 1/44, 13/46, 12/46, 10/46 and\n\nth• Tin \".'late Co. 44/41 respectively. of India Ud. ' and others S. C. Isaacs (P. K. Chatterjee, with him) for the appellant.\n\nBhabananda Mukherji, S. N. Mukherji and B. N.\n\nGhose, for the respondents.\n\n1956. February 14.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR J.-These appeals are by a creditor of six employees in the Tin Plate Co. of India Ltd. who had been adjudged insolvent@. The employees are members in a Provident Fund of the Tin Plate Co. and there were amounts standing to their credit in the said Fund.\n\nThe creditor, Mukti Lal Agarwala, filed applications under section 4 of the Insolvency Act for orders that the amounts standing to the credit of the insolvents in the Provident Fund account were their properties and had vested in the court and were available for distribution amongst the creditors. He sought a direction that the monies may be brought into Court.\n\nThe petitions were directed primarily against the Tin Plate Co. Ltd. and the Trustees of the Provident Fund. They pleaded in answer that the amount standing to the credit of each insolvent in the Provident Fund represented the contributions of the Company and of the employees and that the corpus was a trust fund in the hands of the trustees of the fund;\n\no they were not properties of the insolvents over which they had a disposing power and that they were not debts due to the insolvents. It was said that according to the rules governing the Provident Fund the monies become payable to the employee or any other member of his family only on the happening of certain contingencies such as retirement, discharge,\n\ndismissal or death and that till then no right accrued 1956 to the insolvent.\n\nIt was further urged that the Muktt Lal trustees could not be removed from the custody and Agarwa!a control of the fund by the Official Receiver. v.\n\nThe Insolvency Court, which was the court of the Trustees of the.\n\nDistrict Judge at Purulia, heard the petitions and Pro1Jient Fund 0f found on a construction of the rules of the Provident the[; n/'\":; d Co.\n\nFund that the monies standing to the credit of A & C\n\n0:~ :hers. accounts in the name of each insolvent was his property over which he had a disposing power and hence Clrandrasekhara\n\nthey were ava.ilable for distribution among the credi- AiyarJ. tors under the Insolvency Act.\n\nThe trustees of the Fund and the Tin Plate Co. carried the matter on appeal to the High Court at Patna and they were successful. The learned Judges\n\n(V. Ramaswami and Sarjoo Prasad, JJ.) held that under the rules governing the Fund the insolvents had no present disposing power over the monies standing to their credit and that the Fund was really vested in the trustees.\n\nAs the amount involved in the several petitions taken together was over Rs. 20,000, the High Court granted leave to the creditors to appeal to this court.\n\nTho main contentions urged by Mr. Isaacs on behalf of the appellants were three in number:- ( a) The monies standing to the credit of each insolvent in the Provident Fund are his property, though payable at a future date and the question of present disposing power arises only for bringing within the scope of the definition what may not otherwise be regarded as \"property\".\n\n(b) Though the .Provident Fund rules speak of a trust Fund and trustees, in reality, there was no transfer of ownership by the employees in favour of the trustees and that there is no trust as such.\n\n(c) In any event, even on the footing that a trust was created over the Fund, the beneficial interest continues in the employees and this interest would vest in the Official Receiver for the benefit of the creditors in insolvency.\n\nWe have to examine the soundness of these contentions.\n\n1956 The Provident Fund was started on the lst January, 1929. The rules and regulations of this Fund Mukti Lal\n\nAgaro; ala are found in the deed of trust dated the 15th July, v. 1930, marked as Exhibit I. These rules, as amended Trustees of the from time to time in certain respects by supple-\n\nPro•idntFund.0/ mentary deeds, are given in the appendix to this\n\nthe T\"' Plat• Co. judgment.\n\noflnd1aLtd. 0 th k\" f d f d\" d\" . h andoJhers n e ma mg o an .or er o a JU icat1on, t e whole of the property of the insolvent shall vest in Chandrasekhara the court or in a Receiver and shall become divisible\n\nAiyar J. among the creditors. (Section 28(2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act). The property of the insolvent for the purposes of vesting shall not include any property which is exempted by the Code of Civil Procedure, or by any other enactment for the time being in force from liability to attachment and sale in execution of a decree (section 28(5)). Section 2(d) of the Act states:\" 'Property' includes any property over which or the profits of which any person has a disposing power which he may exercise for his own benefit\". A person has a disposing power over property which he may exercise for his own benefit, such as a power of appointment conferred on him under a will or a settlement, or the power of a Hindu father who is the manager of a joint Hindu family to sell the shares of his sons in the family property in discharge of their pious obligation to pay off his debts.\n\nIn clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 38 of the English Bankruptcy Act, 1914, this power is specified in these words:-\n\n\"The capacity to exercise and to take proceedings for exercising all such powers in or over or in respect of property as might have b\"een exercised by the bankrupt for his own benefit at the commencement of his bankruptcy or before his discharge, except the right of nomination to a vacant ecclesiastical benefice;\".\n\nAll that we have to find out is whether the amounts standing to the credit of the several subscribers in the fund who have been adjudged insolvents are divisible among their creditors. If so, they would vest\n\nin the court or the Official Receiver and would become 1956 available for distribution. Whether they have any Mukt; Lal present interest in the monies is the primary ques- Agarwala ti on that falls to be considered. v.\n\nSection 60 of the Civil Procedure Code sets out Trustees of the what property is liable to attachment and sale and PrO Singh\n\nThe Stale of\n\nPr1\"fab and another\n\nBoseJ.\n\n(b) where appeals lie to a Civil and alsO' to a Revenue Court, such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Civil or Revenue Court according to the nature of the case or proceeding in connection with which the offence is alleged to have been committed\".\n\nThese provisions have given rise to much conflict in the High Courts. The controversy has centred round the word \"ordinarily\". One class of case, of which Wadero Abdul Rahman v. Sadhuram(') is a sample, holds that \"ordinarily\" means \"in the majority of cases\" and that it has no reference to the particular case in hand. We d-0 not think that is right because that gives no meaning to the proviso to sub-clause (3). If appeals lie to a particular Court, e.g., the District Court, in the majority of cases and to another Court, say the High Court, only in a few cases, then the inferior tribunal is a fixed quantity and so the need to choose between the inferior and the superior Court cannot arise. That makes sub-clause (a) to the proviso otiose; also, it does not necessarily follow that the appeal in the majority of cases will always lie to theinferior Court. Cases may occur in which the majority of appeals would go to the higher of two given tribunals; and in any case this interpretation has.the disadvantage that a Court may be compelled to call for and go into a mass of statistics to ascertain which of two Courts entertains the majority of appeals over a given period of time, as well as to determine what is the appropriate period of time.\n\nAnother view considers that the word means that the higher Court is the one to which there is an unrestricted right of appeal and so cannot apply when any restriction intervenes such as when the right of appeal is limited to a particular class of cases or is hedged in by conditions. This was the view taken in M. S. Sheriff v. Govindan(\").\n\nOther views are also possible but we do not intend to explore them. In our opinion, the matter is to be viewed thus. The first question to be asked is whether any decrees, orders or sentences of the original Court\n\n(1) (1930] 32 Cr. L.J. 1012.\n\n(2) A.I.I\\. 1961Mod.1060, 1061.\n\nare appealable at ail. If they are not, and the Court is a Civil Court, then, under section 195(3), the appeal against the order making or refusing to make a complaint will be to the principal Court of ordinary original civil jurisdiction. If, however, appeals from its various decrees and orders lie to different Courts, then we hive to see to which of them they \"ordinarily\" lie and select the one of .lowest grade from among them.\n\nIn determining the Court or Courts to which an appeal will ordinarily lie, we have to see which Court\n\nor Courts entertain appeals from that class of tribunal in the ordinary way apart from special notifications or laws that lift the matter out of the general class. Our meaning will be clearer when we turn to the case in hand and examine the Punjab Courts Act of 1918.\n\nApart from the Courts of Small Causes and Courts established under other enactments, the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 makes provision for three classes of Civil Courts, namely-\n\n(1) the Court of the District Judge,\n\n(2) the Court of the Additional Judge, and\n\n(3) the Court of the Subordinate Judge.\n\nAt the moment we are concerned with the Subordinate Judge. Section 22 enables the State Government to fix the number of Subordinate Judges after consultation with the High Court. The local limit of jurisdiction of each of these Judges is the district in which he is appointed unless the High Court defines a different limit (section 27). The pecuniary limits are set out in section 26:\n\n\"The jurisdiction to be exercised in civil suits as regards the value by any person appointed to be a Subordinate Judge shall be determined by the High Court either by including him in a class or otherwise as it thinks fit\".\n\nThese are what might he termed the ordinary powers and jurisdiction of these Courts. But sections 29 and 30 authorise the High Court to confer certain additional powers and jurisdiction on them. We will deal with that later.\n\n19$6\n\nK uldip Sing1'\n\nThe Stat~ of\n\nPunjab and another\n\nBose}.\n\nl{uldip Singh\n\nThe State of\n\nPtfnfab and another\n\nBoseJ.\n\nNext, we turn to the provisions for appeal. They are governed by section 39. In the absence of any other enactment for the time being in force, when the value of the suit does not exceed five thousand rupees the appeal lies to the District Judge, and in every other suit, to the High Court. But by sub-section (3) the High Court is empowered to direct by notification\n\n\"that appeals lying to the District Court from all or any of the decrees or orders passed in an original suit By any Subordinate Judge shall be preferred to such other Subordinate Judge as may be mentioned in the notification\" and when that is done\n\n\"such other Subordinate Judge shall be deemed to be a District Court for the purposes of all appeals so preferred\".\n\nThe High Court availed itself of this provision and provided that appeals lying to the District Courts from decrees or orders passed by any Subordinate Judge in two classes of case which are specified\n\n\"shall be preferred to the Senior Subordinate Judge of the first class exercising jurisdiction within such Civil District\".\n\nThere are thus three forums of appeal from the Court of the Subordinate Judge depending on the _ nature of the suit and its value.\n\nThe question is whether in each of these three classes of case the appeal can be said to lie \"ordinarily\" to one or other of these appellate tribunals.\n\nApplying the rule we have set out above, the appeal to the Senior Subordinate Judge cannot be termed \"ordinary\" because the special appellate jurisdiction conferred by the Notification is not the ordinary jurisdiction of the Senior Subordinate Judge but an additional power which can only be exercised in a certain limited class of case.\n\nIt is not a power common to all Subordinate Judges nor even to all Senior Subordinate Judges. Therefore, it cannot be said that appeals from the Courts of the various Subordinate Judges \"ordinarily\" lie to the Senior Subordinate Judge. Consequently, that Court is not one of the appellate tribunals contemplated\n\nby section 195(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code and its proviso.\n\nBut appeals do \"ordinarily\" lie either to the District Court or the High Court; and as the. District Court is the lower of these two tribunals that must be regarded as the appellate authority for the purposes of section 476-B of the Criminal Procedure Code.\n\nNow it is to be observed that vhis is a purely objective analysis and is not subjective to any particular suit.\n\nIn the present suit, the value of the suit was over Rs. 5,000, so the appeal would have lain to the High Court, but we are not concerned with that because section 195(3) does not say that the appellate authority within the meaning of that section shall be the Court to which the appeal in the particular case under consideration would ordinarily lie but generally\n\n\"the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the appealable decrees or sentences of such former Court\".\n\nIt would, however, be wrong to say that the nature of the proceedings in the case must be wholly ignored because sub-clause (h) to the proviso to sub-section\n\n(3) states that\n\n\"where appeals lie to a Civil and also to a Revenue Court, such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Civil or Revenue Court according to the nature of the case or proceeding\".\n\nTherefore, to that limited extent the nature of the proceedings must be taken into account, but once the genus of the proceedings is determined, namely whether civil, criminal or revenue, the heirarchy of the superior Courts for these purposes will be determined, first by the rules that apply in their special cases and next by the rule in section 195(~) which we have just expounded and explained.\n\nM. S. Sheriff v. The State of Madras and Others(1) was quoted but the present point was neither considered nor decided there.\n\nThe next question is whether the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge is the same Court as Mr.\n\nBarlow's Court, namely the Court of the Subordinate\n\n(1 l [1954] S. C. R. 1144, 1147. 18\n\nKuldip Singh\n\nThe State of\n\nPunjab and another\n\nBoseJ,\n\nK uldip Singh\n\nT, The Stat. of\n\nPtmjab an4 anolh~,.\n\nBoseJ.\n\nJudge of the first class.\n\nThat depends on whether there is only one Court of the Subordinate Judge in each district; presided over by a number of Judges, or whether each Court is a separate Court in its elf.\n\nThat turns on the provisions of the Punjab Courts Act.\n\nWe make it clear that our decision on this point is confined to the Punjab Act.\n\nWe understand that similar Acts in otl:ier States are differently worded so that what we decide for the Punjab may not hold good elsewhere.\n\nWe say this because rulings were cited before us from other parts of India which take differing views.\n\nWe do not intend to refer to them because it would not be right to examine the language of Acts that are not directly before us. Accordingly, we confine ourselves to the Punjab Act (Act VI of 1918).\n\nSection 18 of the Punjab Courts Act states that there shall be the following classes of Courts, namely\n\n\" (3) the Court of the Subordinate Judge\".\n\nSection 22 provides that\n\n\"the State Government may ........ fix the number of Subordinate Judges to be appointed\".\n\nSection 26, which has already been quoted, fixes the pecuniary limits of their jurisdiction. Then comes section 27 defining the local limits of their jurisdiction:\n\n\"(l) The local limits of the jurisdiction of a Subordinate Judge shall be such as the High Court may define.\n\n(2) When the High Court posts a Subordinate Judge to a district, the local limits of the district shall, in the absence of any direction to the contrary, be deemed to be the local limits of his jurisdiction\".\n\nFrom there we go to the Notification. It is High Court Notification No. 4 dated 3-1-1923. It makes four classes of Subordinate Judges with effect from 5-1-1923\n\n\"in respect of the jurisdiction to be exercised by them in original snits, namely:- Class I-Subordinate Judges exercising jurisdiction without limit as to the value of the cases;\n\nClass II-Subordinate Judges exercising jurisdiction in cases of which the value does not exceed Rs. 5,000;\n\nClass III-Subordinate Judges exermsmg jurisdiction in cases of which the value does not exceed Rs. 2,000;\n\nClass IV-Subordinate Judges exercising jurisdiction in cases of which the value does not exceed\n\nRs. 1,000.\n\nWhen a Subordinate Judge is appointed to any of the classes constituted by this Notification, he shall exercise the jurisdiction hereinbefore defined for the class to which he is appointed within the local limits of the ci vii district to which he may be posted from time to time\".\n\nThis gives rise to three points of view.\n\nAccording to one, there is only one Court of the Subordinate Judge for each district and every other Subordinate Judge is an additional Judge to that Court. This is based on the language of section 18, and the High Court Notification is, under that view, interpreted as dividing the Judges of that one Court into four categories but not as creating independent Courts. Section 26 is there read as empowering the High Court to include each Subordinate Judge individually on appointment into a given class within the one Court and not to turn him into a separate Court.\n\nAccording to the second view, there are four classes of Subordinate Judge's Courts in t.he Punjab because of the High Court Notification. The argument here runs that section 18 must be read with section 26, and as the High Court is empowered to divide Subordinate Judges in a di11trict into classes it must mean that each class forms an independent Court, for, according to this point of view, it would be anomalous to have Judges of the one Court invested with differing pecuniary jurisdic tions because that is always regarded as inherent to the Court. The position created by the Act, it is said, is not the same as the one that arises when work is administratively distributed among Additional Judges of the same\n\nKuldij> Singh\n\nThe State of\n\nPunjab and a not her\n\nBoseJ.\n\n795G\n\nKuldip Singh\n\nThe State oj\n\nPunjab tmd a'fOllJer\n\nCourt because the jurisdiction and powers of the Judges are unaffected by such distribution and there remains the one Court with one inherent and territorial jurisdiction despite the distribution.\n\nThe third view is that each Subordinate Judge is a separate and independent Court in himself and it is pointed out that section 27 'invests each Judge personally with a territorial jurisdiction and not the Oourt, and so also section 26.\n\nUnder section 33 the power of control (apart from the High Court) over all civil Courts within the local limits of a District Judge's jurisdiction is with him, and section 34 empowers the District Judge to distribute any civil business\n\n\"cognizable by .... the Courts under his control. ... among such Courts in such manner as he thinks fit\".\n\nThe Senior Subordinate Judge does not therefore appear to be vested with either administrative or judicial control over any other Subordinate Judge except in so far as he is a Court of appeal in certain specified classes of case.\n\nIn our opinion, the Senior Subordinate Judge who made the complaint had no jurisdiction to make it, either as the original Court which tried the suit, or as the appellate authority under section 476-B of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is not enough that he also had first class powers because he was not the same Court. That is not to say that a successor could not have been appointed to Mr. Barlow so as to establish continuity in the Court over which he presided. It is possible that one could have been appointed and indeed it seems to have been assumed that Mr. Augustine was his successor. But as Mr.\n\nAugustine did not take up this matter we need not decide that point. What we think is clear is that Mr. Pitam Singh was not a successor, especially as appeals lay to him from certain decisions of the Subordinate Judges in his district. It would be unusual to provide an appeal from one Judge of a Court to another single Judge of the same Court. It would be even more anomalous to have an appeal from the decision of a judge lie to his successor in office. Even\n\nin the High Courts, where there are Letters Patent appeals, the appeal is always heard by a Division Bench of at least two Judges; nor can this be treated as a case where a Court with inherent jurisdiction decides the matter as an origina.1 tribunal though, owing to territorial or other similar classificittion not affecting inherent jurisdiction, the case should hav:e gone to some other tribunal of co-ordinate or lesser authority. Section 193(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code imposes a definite bar which cannot be ignored or waived any more than the prohibitions under sections 132 and 197 and, just as the sanctions provided for in those sections cannot be given by any authority save the ones specified, so here, only the Courts mentioned in section 195(1)(b) and (c) can remove the bar and make the complaint.\n\nThis also appears to accord with the Punjab practice. The Rules and Orders of the Punjab High Court reproduce a Notification of the High Court dated 16-5-1935 as amended on 23-2-1940, at page 3 of Chapter 20-B of Volume t, where it is said in paragraph 2---\n\n\"lt is further directed the Court of such Senior Subordinate Judge of the first class shall be deemed to be a District Court, etc.\" This appears to regard each Senior Subordinate Judge as a Court in himself and not merely as the presiding officer of the Court of the Subordinate Judge.\n\nSection 39(3) of the Punjab Courts Act is also relevant. It states that-\n\n\"the High Court may by notification direct that appeals lying to the District Court from all or any of the decrees or orders passed in an original suit by any Subordinate Judge shall be preferred to such other Subordinate Judge as may be mentioned in the notification, and the appeals shall thereupon be preferred accordingly, and the Court of such other Subordinate Judge shall be deemed to be a Distrfot Court, etc.\" -Now this permits an appeal from one Subordinate\n\nJudge to another and the words the \"Court of such other Subordinate Judge\" indicate that the Subordi-\n\nKuldiP Singh\n\nThe State of\n\nPunjab and another\n\nBose J.\n\nKtllaip Singh\n\nTheStaU of\n\nP11njab and anothcf'\n\nBos Singh\n\nThe State of\n\nPunjab and a not her\n\nBoseJ.\n\n795G\n\nKuldip Singh\n\nThe State oj\n\nPunjab tmd a'fOllJer\n\nCourt because the jurisdiction and powers of the Judges are unaffected by such distribution and there remains the one Court with one inherent and territorial jurisdiction despite the distribution.", "canonical_name": "125\n\nKULDIP SINGH"}}, {"text": "section 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23306, "end_char": 23316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23411, "end_char": 23421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23430, "end_char": 23440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23588, "end_char": 23598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 476", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24186, "end_char": 24197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 193(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25506, "end_char": 25520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 132 and 197", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25646, "end_char": 25666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 195(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25821, "end_char": 25838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25973, "end_char": 25990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Rules and Orders of the Punjab High Court reproduce a Notification of the High Court dated 16-5-1935 as amended on 23-2-1940, at page 3 of Chapter 20-B of Volume t, where it is said in paragraph 2---\n\n\"lt is further directed the Court of such Senior Subordinate Judge of the first class shall be deemed to be a District Court, etc.\""}}, {"text": "16-5-1935", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26040, "end_char": 26049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Rules and Orders of the Punjab High Court reproduce a Notification of the High Court dated 16-5-1935 as amended on 23-2-1940, at page 3 of Chapter 20-B of Volume t, where it is said in paragraph 2---\n\n\"lt is further directed the Court of such Senior Subordinate Judge of the first class shall be deemed to be a District Court, etc.\""}}, {"text": "23-2-1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26064, "end_char": 26073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Rules and Orders of the Punjab High Court reproduce a Notification of the High Court dated 16-5-1935 as amended on 23-2-1940, at page 3 of Chapter 20-B of Volume t, where it is said in paragraph 2---\n\n\"lt is further directed the Court of such Senior Subordinate Judge of the first class shall be deemed to be a District Court, etc.\""}}, {"text": "Section 39(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26437, "end_char": 26450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ktllaip Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27140, "end_char": 27153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "-Now this permits an appeal from one Subordinate\n\nJudge to another and the words the \"Court of such other Subordinate Judge\" indicate that the Subordi-\n\nKuldiP Singh\n\nThe State of\n\nPunjab and another\n\nBose J.\n\nKtllaip Singh\n\nTheStaU of\n\nP11njab and anothcf'\n\nBos, rs C.j.\n\nSome of the mercantile nsages relating to a firm have, however, found their way into the law of partnership. Thus in keeping accounts, merchants habitually show a firm as a debtor to each partner for what he brings Into the common stock and each partner is shown as a debtor to the firm for all that he takes out of that stock. But under the English Common Law, a firm, not being a legal entity, could not sue or be sued in the firm name or sue or be sued by its own pa, rtner, for one cannot sue oneself.\n\nLater on this rigid law of procedure, however, gnve way to considerations of commercial convenience and permitted a firm to sue or be sued in the firm name, as if it were a corporate body (see Code of Civil Procedure, Order XXX corresponding to rules of the English Supreme Court Order XL VIII-A). The law of procedure has gone to the length of allowing a firm to sue or be sued by another firm having some common partners or even to sue or be sued by one or more of its own partners (see Order XXX, rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure), as if the firm is an entity distinct from its partners. Again in taking partnership accounts and in administering partnership assets, the law has, to some extent, adopted the mercantile view and the liabilities of the firm are regarded as the liabilities of the partners only in case they cannot be met and discharged by the firm out of its assets. The creditors of the firm are, in the first place, paid out of the partnership assets and if there is any surplus then the share of each partner in such surplus is applied in payment of his separate debts, if any, or paid to him. Conversely, separate property of a partner is applied first in the payment of his separate debts and the surplus, if any is utilised in meeting the\n\ndebts of the firm (see section 49 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932). In the Indian Income Tax Act itself a firm is, by section 3, which is the charging section, made a unit of assessment.\n\nIt is clear from the foregoing discussion that the law, English as well as Indian, has, for some specific purposes, some of which are referred to above, relaxed its rigid notions and extended a limited personality to a firm. Nevertheless, the general concept of partnership, firmly established in both systems of Law, still is that a firm is not an entity or \"person\" in law but is merely an association of individuals and a firm name is only a collective name of those individuals who constitute the firm. In other words, a firm name is merely an expression, only a compendious mode of designating the persons who have agreed to carry on business in partnership. According to the principles of English jurisprudence, which we have adopted, for the purposes of determining legal rights \"there is no such thing as a firm known to the law\" as was said by James, L. J. in Ex parte Corbett, In re Shand(1). In these circumstances to import the definition of the word \"person\" occurring in section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act, 1897into section 4 of the Indian Partnership Act will, according to lawyers, English or Indian, be totally repugnant to the subject of partnership law as they know and understand it to be. It is in this view of the matter that it has been consistently held in this country that a firm as such is not entitled to enter into partnership with another firm or individuals. It is not necessary to refer in detail tb those decisions many of which will be found cited in Jabalpur Ice ; Manufacturing AssoC'iation v. Oommissi6ner of Income-tax, Madhya\n\nPradesh(~) to which a reference has already be'en made.\n\nWe need only refer to the case of Bhagwanji Morarji Goculdas v. Alembic Chemical Works Co. Ltd and others(3), where it has been laid down by the Privy Council that Indian Law has not given legal personality to a firm apart from the partners. This\n\n(1) (1880] L.R. 14 Ch. 122, 126.\n\n(2) (1955] 27 I.T.R. 88.\n\n(3) A.LR. 1948 P.C. 100.\n\nDulichand Lakshminarayan v.\n\nThe Commissioner\n\nof Income Tax,\n\nNagpur\n\nDas C.J.\n\nDullchand Lakshminara yan v.\n\nview finds support from and is implicit in the observations made by this Court in the Commissioner of Income-Tax, West Bengal v. A. W. Figgies & Co. and others(').\n\nThe Co,,.missioner In Jai Dayal Madan Gopal(\"), Sulaiman C. J. of Income Tax, followed the Calcutta decisions and was not prepared Nagpur to dissent from the view that the word \"person\" in\n\nDas C.J. section 239 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 should not be interpreted so as to include a firm. The learned Chief Justice, however, expressed the view that it was difficult to say that there was anything in section 239 itself which .made the application to that section of the definition of \"person\" as given in General Clauses Act in any way repugnant. The learned Chief Justice, however, does not appear to have con- , sidered whether there was anything repugnant in the subject of partnership law, as it prevails in this country, which operates to exclude the application of that definition to the word \"person\" occurring in section 239 of t.he Indian Contract Act. In our opinion, the word \"persons\" in section 4 of the Indian Partnership Act, which has replaced section 239 of the Indian Contract Act, contemplates only natural or artificial, i.e., legal persons and for the reasons stated a.hove, a firm is not a \"person\" and as such is not entitled to enter into a partnership with another firm or Hindu undivided family or individual. In this view of the matter there can arise no question of registration of a partnership purporting to be one between three firms, a. Hindu undivided family business and a.n individual a.s a. firm under section 26-A of the Act.\n\nThe learned Advocate for the appellant then urges that at any rate the partnership was not illegal, for there was no legal impediment in the way of all the members of all the three constituent firms and the karta of the Hindu undivided family and the individual entering into an agreement and that, therefore, a valid partnership was constituted by the deed of partnership under consideration. Assuming that this contention is possible in view of the language which\n\n(1) (1954] S, O.B. 171; 1953 I.T.B. '05. {ii) (1933] I.T.B. 186.\n\nhas been used in this deed for describing the parties, the position of the appellant will not improve, for in order to be entitled o the benefit of registration under the Act, it will have to be shown that the shares of all individual partners are specified in the deed and that all the partners have personally signed the application for registration as required by section 26-A of the Act read with Rtule 2..\n\nThe deed specifies that each of the five constituent parties is entitled to an equal, i.e., I /5 share but it does not specify the individual shares of each of the partners of each of the three smaller constituent firms. :Further all the members of those three firms have not signed the application for registration personally. It is said that each of the three persons who executed the deed for the three smaller firms must be regarded as having the authority of their co-partners in their respective firms to sign the application for registration just as they had their authority to execute the deed itself for them. Even if they had such authority-as to which there is no evidence at all on the record-the section and rule 2 require that each partner (not being minors) must sign personally. That admittedly has not been done, and, therefore, the application wa11 not in proper form. In our judgment the answer given by the High Court to the question is correct.\n\nThis appeal must, therefore, be dismissed with costs.\n\nDulichand Lakshminara yan v.\n\nThe Commissiouer\n\nof Income Tax,\n\nNagp11r\n\nDas C.J.", "total_entities": 124, "entities": [{"text": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX,\n\nNAGPUR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 75, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, NAGPUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 133, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 135, "end_char": 143, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NATWARLAL HARILAL BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 174, "end_char": 201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 26A and 2( 6B)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 220, "end_char": 237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Indian Partnership Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 238, "end_char": 260, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 285, "end_char": 289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Partnership Act, 1982", "statute": "Indian Partnership Act, 1982"}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 713, "end_char": 718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Partnership Act, 1982", "statute": "Indian Partnership Act, 1982"}}, {"text": "Aof Indian In come Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 719, "end_char": 751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indian Partnership Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 788, "end_char": 810, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 818, "end_char": 822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Firm and partnership-Definitions of-Indian Partnership Act, 1982", "statute": "Firm and partnership-Definitions of-Indian Partnership Act, 1982"}}, {"text": "of Dulichand Lakshminarayan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1136, "end_char": 1163, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DULICHAND LAKSHMINARAYAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1216, "end_char": 1221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Firm and partnership-Definitions of-Indian Partnership Act, 1982", "statute": "Firm and partnership-Definitions of-Indian Partnership Act, 1982"}}, {"text": "Indian Income-Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1231, "end_char": 1258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "17th February, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1372, "end_char": 1391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In connection with the assessment for the assessment year 1949·1950 of Dulichand Lakshminarayan an unregistered firm, an application was made under s. 26 A of the Indian Income-Tax Act, 1922 before Income-Tax Officer, Raigarh, for its registration as a firm constituted under a Deed of Partnership dated 17th February, 1947."}}, {"text": "Dulichand Lakshminarayan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2155, "end_char": 2179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Income-Tax Officer rejected the application on the ground that Dulichand Lakshminarayan, constituted under the deed dated 17th February 1947, consisted of three firms, one Hindu undivided family business and one individual and that a firm or a Hindu undivided family could not as such enter into a partnership with other firms or individual.", "canonical_name": "Duliclland Lakshminarayan"}}, {"text": "17th February 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2214, "end_char": 2232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Income-Tax Officer rejected the application on the ground that Dulichand Lakshminarayan, constituted under the deed dated 17th February 1947, consisted of three firms, one Hindu undivided family business and one individual and that a firm or a Hindu undivided family could not as such enter into a partnership with other firms or individual."}}, {"text": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2547, "end_char": 2576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessee's appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was dismissed but it succeeded before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal who directed registration of the firm."}}, {"text": "s. 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2686, "end_char": 2694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2840, "end_char": 2845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2906, "end_char": 2919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal to the Supreme Court: 0/ Income Tax, Held that a perusal of the deed would indicate beyond any Nagpr1r doubt that the intention of the parties quite clearly was that each of the three constituent firms and not the particular member of each of the said three firms who had signed the deed for his respective firm was to be the partner in the bigger firm constituted under this deed."}}, {"text": "Section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3461, "end_char": 3471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2(6-B)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3631, "end_char": 3645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Partnership Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3772, "end_char": 3800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3803, "end_char": 3812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Partnership Act, 1932", "statute": "the Indian Partnership Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "Indian Partnership Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3820, "end_char": 3842, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4672, "end_char": 4676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Partnership Act, 1932", "statute": "the Indian Partnership Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "Indian Partnership Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4684, "end_char": 4706, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 239", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4727, "end_char": 4733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Partnership Act, 1932", "statute": "the Indian Partnership Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4741, "end_char": 4760, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5142, "end_char": 5147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lakshminarayan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5584, "end_char": 5598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and ot7\"rs ([1954] S.C.R. 171), and Lakshminarayan In reJai Dayal Madan Gopal, ([1933] I.T.R. 186), referred to.", "canonical_name": "Laxminarayan Chandulal"}}, {"text": "Commissioner\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5669, "end_char": 5711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nThe Commissioner\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal of Income Tax, No."}}, {"text": "Kirpa Ram Bajaj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5907, "end_char": 5922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kirpa Ram Bajaj, (Hardyal Hardy, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Hardyal Hardy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5925, "end_char": 5938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kirpa Ram Bajaj, (Hardyal Hardy, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5973, "end_char": 5984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India (G. N.\n\nJoshi and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "G. N.\n\nJoshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6014, "end_char": 6026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India (G. N.\n\nJoshi and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "R. H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6031, "end_char": 6043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India (G. N.\n\nJoshi and R. H. Dhebar, with him) for the respondent."}}, {"text": "DAS C.J.-This", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6139, "end_char": 6152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAS C.J.-This is an appeal from the judgment and order passed by a Bench of the Nagpur High Court on the 30th December, 1953 in Miscellaneous Civil Case No."}}, {"text": "30th December, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6244, "end_char": 6263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDAS C.J.-This is an appeal from the judgment and order passed by a Bench of the Nagpur High Court on the 30th December, 1953 in Miscellaneous Civil Case No."}}, {"text": "Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6401, "end_char": 6438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "35 ofl952, whereby the Bench answered in the negative the question that had been referred to them by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Bombay under section 66(1) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)."}}, {"text": "section 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6445, "end_char": 6458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6466, "end_char": 6493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Dulichand Laxminarayan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6604, "end_char": 6626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In connection with the assessment for the assessment year 1949/1950 of Dulichand Laxminarayan, an unregistered firm, an application was made under section 26-A of the Act before the Income Tax Officer, Raigarh for its registration as a firm constituted under a Deed of Partnership dated the 17th February\n\n1947.", "canonical_name": "Duliclland Lakshminarayan"}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6680, "end_char": 6690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Raigarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6735, "end_char": 6742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In connection with the assessment for the assessment year 1949/1950 of Dulichand Laxminarayan, an unregistered firm, an application was made under section 26-A of the Act before the Income Tax Officer, Raigarh for its registration as a firm constituted under a Deed of Partnership dated the 17th February\n\n1947."}}, {"text": "17th February\n\n1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6824, "end_char": 6843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In connection with the assessment for the assessment year 1949/1950 of Dulichand Laxminarayan, an unregistered firm, an application was made under section 26-A of the Act before the Income Tax Officer, Raigarh for its registration as a firm constituted under a Deed of Partnership dated the 17th February\n\n1947."}}, {"text": "Mangatrai Ganpatram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7298, "end_char": 7317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the opening paragraph of that deed the names and descriptions of the parties thereto were set out in the following words:-\n\n\"We, Dulichand Laxminarayan Firm, through Malik (partner) Laxmi Narayan son of Laljimal, Laxmi Narayan Chandulal Firm through Malik\n\n(partner) Chandulal son of Nanakchand, Mukhram Bholaram Firm through Malik (partner) Tekchand son of Bhola.ram, Jeramdas Hiralal Firm through\n\nMalik (partner) Beharilal son of Asharam and 7956 Mangatrai Ganpatram through Malik (partner) Dulichand Ganpatram son of Mangatrai, Agarwar Bani, aged Lakshminarayan 50, 40, 28, 25, 45 residing at Raigarh are partners in v. equal shares with effect from 5-1-1946 in the firm The Commissioner Dulichand Laxminarayan in whose name Importers' of Inconie Tax, Nagp .. r Licence of cloth is issued for Raigarh .State group- Raigarh, JaipurSaraigarh, Udeypur and SaktiState, on the following terms and conditions ....................... \"\n\nThen follow 15 clauses containing the terms on which the partnership business was agreed to be done.", "canonical_name": "Mangatrai Ganpatram"}}, {"text": "Laxminarayan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7977, "end_char": 7989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the foot of the deed signatures were appended in the following order one below the other:- Laxminarayan for Dulichand Laxmi Narayan.", "canonical_name": "Laxminarayan Chandulal"}}, {"text": "Dulichand Laxmi Narayan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7994, "end_char": 8017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the foot of the deed signatures were appended in the following order one below the other:- Laxminarayan for Dulichand Laxmi Narayan.", "canonical_name": "Duliclland Lakshminarayan"}}, {"text": "Beharilal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8020, "end_char": 8029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Beharilal for J airam Das Hiralal.", "canonical_name": "Beharilal"}}, {"text": "Laxminarayan Chandulal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8138, "end_char": 8160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandulal for Laxminarayan Chandulal.", "canonical_name": "Laxminarayan Chandulal"}}, {"text": "Laxminarayan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8234, "end_char": 8246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is common ground that out of the five constituent parties Dulichand Laxminarayan, Jairamdas Hiralal and Laxminarayan Chandulal are separate firms constituted under three separate deeds of partnership and that Laxminarayan, Beharilal and Chandulal, who signed the deed on behalf of those firms are partners in their respective firms.", "canonical_name": "Laxminarayan Chandulal"}}, {"text": "Jairamdas Hiralal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8248, "end_char": 8265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is common ground that out of the five constituent parties Dulichand Laxminarayan, Jairamdas Hiralal and Laxminarayan Chandulal are separate firms constituted under three separate deeds of partnership and that Laxminarayan, Beharilal and Chandulal, who signed the deed on behalf of those firms are partners in their respective firms."}}, {"text": "Laxminarayan Chandulal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8270, "end_char": 8292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is common ground that out of the five constituent parties Dulichand Laxminarayan, Jairamdas Hiralal and Laxminarayan Chandulal are separate firms constituted under three separate deeds of partnership and that Laxminarayan, Beharilal and Chandulal, who signed the deed on behalf of those firms are partners in their respective firms.", "canonical_name": "Laxminarayan Chandulal"}}, {"text": "Beharilal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8389, "end_char": 8398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is common ground that out of the five constituent parties Dulichand Laxminarayan, Jairamdas Hiralal and Laxminarayan Chandulal are separate firms constituted under three separate deeds of partnership and that Laxminarayan, Beharilal and Chandulal, who signed the deed on behalf of those firms are partners in their respective firms.", "canonical_name": "Beharilal"}}, {"text": "Mukbram Bholaram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8530, "end_char": 8546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is also no dispute that Mukbram Bholaram is the name of a business carried on by a Hindu undivided family of which Tekchand, who has signed for it, is the Karta."}}, {"text": "Tekchand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8621, "end_char": 8629, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is also no dispute that Mukbram Bholaram is the name of a business carried on by a Hindu undivided family of which Tekchand, who has signed for it, is the Karta."}}, {"text": "Mangatrai Ganpatrai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8694, "end_char": 8713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is also conceded that Mangatrai Ganpatrai is an individual.", "canonical_name": "Mangatrai Ganpatram"}}, {"text": "Dulichand Laxminarayan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8859, "end_char": 8881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Finding that Dulichand Laxminarayan constituted under the aforesaid Deed of Partnership dated the 17th February 1947 consisted of three firms, one Hindu undivided family business and one individual and taking the view that a firm or a Hindu undivided family could not as such enter into a partnership with other firms or individuals, the Income-Tax Officer held that the said D1dichand Laxminarayan could not be registered as a firm under section 26-A and\n\n!", "canonical_name": "Duliclland Lakshminarayan"}}, {"text": "D1dichand Laxminarayan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9222, "end_char": 9244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Finding that Dulichand Laxminarayan constituted under the aforesaid Deed of Partnership dated the 17th February 1947 consisted of three firms, one Hindu undivided family business and one individual and taking the view that a firm or a Hindu undivided family could not as such enter into a partnership with other firms or individuals, the Income-Tax Officer held that the said D1dichand Laxminarayan could not be registered as a firm under section 26-A and\n\n!", "canonical_name": "Duliclland Lakshminarayan"}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9285, "end_char": 9295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9965, "end_char": 9975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10026, "end_char": 10036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "5th August 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10176, "end_char": 10191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The result was that on the 5th August 1950 the Appellate Assistant Commissioner dismissed the appeal."}}, {"text": "12th June 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10663, "end_char": 10677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly on the 12th June 1951 the Tribunal directed registration of the firm."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10781, "end_char": 10795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the application of the Commissioner of Income Tax, Madhya Pradesh the Tribunal under section 66(1) of the Act drew up a Statement of Case and submitted to the High Court of Nagpur the following question of law, namely:- Whether on the facts of the Case the assessee is entitled to registration under section 26-A of the Income Tax Act?"}}, {"text": "section 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10815, "end_char": 10828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Nagpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10889, "end_char": 10909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the application of the Commissioner of Income Tax, Madhya Pradesh the Tribunal under section 66(1) of the Act drew up a Statement of Case and submitted to the High Court of Nagpur the following question of law, namely:- Whether on the facts of the Case the assessee is entitled to registration under section 26-A of the Income Tax Act?"}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11030, "end_char": 11040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nagpur High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11123, "end_char": 11140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reference came up for hearing before a Bench of the Nagpur High Court on the 30th December\n\n1953."}}, {"text": "High Court, Lakshminarayan", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11559, "end_char": 11585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view, however, of the importance of the Dulichand question involved in the reference the High Court, Lakshminarayan under section 66-A(2) of the Act, gave a certificate of v. fitness for appeal to this Court."}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11592, "end_char": 11602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11739, "end_char": 11749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12512, "end_char": 12522, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12683, "end_char": 12693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12703, "end_char": 12730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13311, "end_char": 13321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Duliclland Lakshminarayan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13493, "end_char": 13518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A perusal of the deed and par-\n\nDuliclland Lakshminarayan\n\nThe Commiasione,.", "canonical_name": "Duliclland Lakshminarayan"}}, {"text": "Das C", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13564, "end_char": 13569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Incotne Tax,\n\nNagpur\n\nDas C, J,\n\nticularly the portions hereinbefore set out indicate be:yond any doubt that the intention of the parties quite clearly was that each of the three constituent firms and not the particular member of each of the said three firms who had signed the deed for his respective firm was to be the partner in the bigger firm constituted under this deed."}}, {"text": "Section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14321, "end_char": 14331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(6B)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14558, "end_char": 14571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Partnership Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14700, "end_char": 14728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Partnership Act, 1932", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14859, "end_char": 14887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14899, "end_char": 14908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Partnership Act, 1932", "statute": "the Indian Partnership Act, 1932"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act, 1897", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16255, "end_char": 16280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 3(42)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16294, "end_char": 16307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "The General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16588, "end_char": 16597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "The General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16765, "end_char": 16774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "The General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "Indian Partnership Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16782, "end_char": 16804, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16872, "end_char": 16881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "The General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "General Clauses Act, 1897", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16889, "end_char": 16914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17065, "end_char": 17074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "section\n\n4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17171, "end_char": 17181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17313, "end_char": 17322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the General Clauses Act, 1897", "statute": "the General Clauses Act, 1897"}}, {"text": "Lindley", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17344, "end_char": 17351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As pointed out in Lindley on Partnership, 11th Edition, at page 153, merchants and lawyers have different notions respecting the nature of a firm."}}, {"text": "Nagpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17849, "end_char": 17855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In some systems of Jaw this separate perof Income Tt the object of the conspiracy had been to a large extent fulfilled. Hence it must be held that there is no substance in this contention also.\n\nAnother contention raised on behalf of the appellant was that the other accused having been acquitted by the trial court, the appellant should not have been convicted because the evidence against all of them was the same. There would have been a great deal of force in this argument, not as a question of principle but as a matter of prudence, if we were satiRfied that the acquittal of the other four accused persons was entirely correct. In this connection the observations of this Court in the case of Dalip Singh\n\nv. State of Punjab('), and of the Federal Court in\n\n(1) [196~) S.C.R. U6, 166.\n\nKapildeo Singh v. The King(1) are relevant. It is not 1956 essential that more than one person should be con- Bimbadhar victed of the offence of criminal conspiracy. It is Pradhan enough if the court is in a position to find that two v. or more persons were actually concerned in the crimi- The state of Oriua nal conspiracy. If the courts below bad come to the distinct finding that the evidence led on behalf of SinhaJ. the prosecution was unreliable, then certainly no conviction could have been bali!ed on such evidence and all the accused would have been equally entitled to acquittal. But that is not the position in this case as we read the judgments of the courts below.\n\nLastly, it was contended that the examination of the appellant by the learned trial Judge was not in full compliance with the requirements of section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure. Two points have been sought to be made in this connection. Firstly, it bas been contended that though the other accused who have been acquitted by the trial court were questioned with. reference to the conspiracy with the approver Pitabas Sahu, no such question was put to the appellant. It is true that the court questioned him about his \"conspiracy with the other accused persons\". Counsel for the parties before us did not agree as to the significance of the words \"in conspiracy with the other accused persons\". The contention on behalf of the appellant was that they referred only to the persons actually standing trial before the court, whereas counsel for the State contended that they had reference to all the accused persons named in the petition of complaint including the approver. A number of rulings of the different'High Courts as to what is the position of an approver, whether he continues to be an accused person even after the grant of pardon or whether he is only in the position of a witness on behalf of the prosecution, were cited before us. But we do not think it necessary in this case to pronounce upon that because we have, as already indicated, come to our conclusions\n\n(1) (1949-50] F.C.R. 834, 837, 838.\n\n1956 on the assumption that there is an omission in the charge in so far as the approver has not been specifi- Blmbadhar Pradhan cally named in the charge under section 120-B, Indian v.\n\nPenal Code. Secondly, it was contended that the Th• Slat• o/Ori .. a evidence of P.W. 27 who had been chiefly relied upon - in the courts below as corroborating the approver had Sinha/. not been specifically put to the appellant though the evidence of the approver Pitabas Sahu was pointedly put to him. In our opinion, it is not ordinarily necessary to put the evidence of each individual witness to the accused in his examination under section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure. The appellant was put the question \"Have you got anything to .say on the evidence of the witnesses?\" That, in our opinion, is sufficient in the circumstances of this case to show that the attention of the accused was called to the prosecution evidence. As to what is or is not a run compliance with the provisions of that section of the Code must depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In our opinion, it cannot be said that the accused has been in any way prejudiced by the way he has been questioned under that section.\n\n..--- \\\n\nAs all the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant fail, the appeal must stand dismissed .", "total_entities": 116, "entities": [{"text": "BIMBADHAR PRADHAN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 57, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Bimbadltar\n\nPradilan", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF ORISSA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF ORISSA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 96, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAFER IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 98, "end_char": 108, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SYED JAFFER IMAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AIYAR, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 131, "end_char": 141, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N. CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Distinction between-Crirninal Procedttre Code, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 639, "end_char": 690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 225 and 637", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 708, "end_char": 723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Distinction between-Crirninal Procedttre Code, 1898", "statute": "Distinction between-Crirninal Procedttre Code, 1898"}}, {"text": "Assistant Sessions Judge of Sambalpur", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1011, "end_char": 1048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant and f0ur others were placed on their trial before the Assistant Sessions Judge of Sambalpur for offences under ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 120B, 409, 477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1068, "end_char": 1086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Distinction between-Crirninal Procedttre Code, 1898", "statute": "Distinction between-Crirninal Procedttre Code, 1898"}}, {"text": "ss. 409 and 477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1772, "end_char": 1787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.120B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1882, "end_char": 1888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2058, "end_char": 2071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal by special leave to the Supreme Court the main question for consideration wa.s whether the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Topan Das v. The State of Bombay ([1955] 2 S.O.R. 881), governed the present case in view of the fact that the appellant was the only person out of the accused persons on trial who had been convicted of the offence of conspiracy under s. 120-B, !"}}, {"text": "s. 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2403, "end_char": 2409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 225", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3655, "end_char": 3661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3843, "end_char": 3849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3853, "end_char": 3858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3952, "end_char": 3958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3966, "end_char": 3992, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5101, "end_char": 5106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But such a repugnancy is not by itself a sufficient ground for quashing a conviction in India where the matter is gdverned by statutory law both as to the offence and the procedurefor bringing the offender to justice."}}, {"text": "[1955] 2 S.C.R. 881", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5402, "end_char": 5421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bimbadhar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5797, "end_char": 5806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bimbadhar\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "Bimbadltar\n\nPradilan"}}, {"text": "S. 0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6227, "end_char": 6231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R. Patnaik", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6241, "end_char": 6251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Isaacs, R. Patnaik and R. 0."}}, {"text": "R. 0. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6256, "end_char": 6268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Isaacs, R. Patnaik and R. 0."}}, {"text": "Porus A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6291, "end_char": 6305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "P. G. Gokhale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6310, "end_char": 6323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Gokhale, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6407, "end_char": 6412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSINHA J.-The main question canvassed in this appeal by special leave is whether the ruling of this Court iu the case of Topan Das v. The State of Bombay(') governs this case also, in view of the fact that the appellant is the only person out of the accused persons placed on trial, who has been convicted for the offence of conspiracy under section 120-B, Indian Penal Code.", "canonical_name": "Sinha/."}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6748, "end_char": 6759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6763, "end_char": 6780, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Assistant Sessions Judge ofSall!balpur for offences under", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6892, "end_char": 6949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The point arises in the following way: '['he appellant and four others were placed on their trial before the Assistant Sessions Judge ofSall!balpur for offences under sections 120-B, 409, 477-A and 109, Indian Penal Code with having committed the offences of criminal conspiracy, criminal breach of trust in respect of Government property, and falsification of accounts with a view to defraud the Government."}}, {"text": "sections 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6950, "end_char": 6962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6986, "end_char": 7003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sambalpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7252, "end_char": 7261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant wa.s the District Food Production Officer in Sambalpur and the other four accused persons were agricultural sub-overseers in charge of their respective areas under the appellant."}}, {"text": "Bargarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7445, "end_char": 7452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another such agricultural sub-overseer was Pitabas Sahu at Bargarh centre."}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9038, "end_char": 9049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9051, "end_char": 9068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9124, "end_char": 9136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Bimbadhar Pradhan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9430, "end_char": 9447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned trial Judge observed in the course of his judgment as follows:-\n\n\"Hence on a consideration of all the evidence as discussed above, I find that the prosecution have fully proved their case that the accused Bimbadhar Pradhan, the D.F.P.O. has conspired to embezzle the Government money."}}, {"text": "Pitabas\n\nSinha/.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9584, "end_char": 9600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They have also proved that he has got an active hand and in assistance of Pitabas\n\nSinha/.\n\n19S6 Sahu has embezzled Government money amounting\n\nBimbadhar to Ra."}}, {"text": "Sahu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9607, "end_char": 9611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They have also proved that he has got an active hand and in assistance of Pitabas\n\nSinha/.\n\n19S6 Sahu has embezzled Government money amounting\n\nBimbadhar to Ra."}}, {"text": "Pitabaa Sahu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9733, "end_char": 9745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4,943-4-0 and in that act he has also actively Pradhan helped Pitabaa Sahu in falsifying the Government ... records by making false entries.", "canonical_name": "Pitabaa Sahu"}}, {"text": "High Court of Orissa", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10775, "end_char": 10795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant went up in appeal to the High Court of Orissa."}}, {"text": "sections 409 and 477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10897, "end_char": 10917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10921, "end_char": 10938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11024, "end_char": 11035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "sections 409 and 477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11280, "end_char": 11300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11304, "end_char": 11321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11596, "end_char": 11607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11647, "end_char": 11658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12158, "end_char": 12169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "23rd or 25th September 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12344, "end_char": 12371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the charge of conspiracy under section 120-B, the High Court observed that the most important witness to prove the charge was the approver aforesaid (P.W. 25) who had given a full description of the conspiracy on the 23rd or 25th September 1947 between the appellant and other sub-overseers including himself for the purpose of showin'g bogus purchases and bogus distribution of large quantities of oil cake."}}, {"text": "Pitabas", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12640, "end_char": 12647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It also observed that \"Most of the witnesses examined by the prosecution to corroborate the evidence of Pitabas are themselves accomplices in the conspiracy\".", "canonical_name": "Pitabaa Sahu"}}, {"text": "Bimbadltar\n\nPradilan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13795, "end_char": 13815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is independent corro-\n\n1956 boration of his evidence which is inconsistent with the appellant being a mere negligent superior officer Bimbadltar\n\nPradilan who was deceived and defrauded by his dishonest sub- •· ordinates.", "canonical_name": "Bimbadltar\n\nPradilan"}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13947, "end_char": 13958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13968, "end_char": 13985, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "23rd and 25th September 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14176, "end_char": 14204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was then urged that in the charge under Tile State o/ o,;,.. section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, the date of the commission of the offence was stated to be the SinilaJ. month of October 1947, whereas according to the evidence of P.W. 5, the conspiracy took place at Bargarh between the 23rd and 25th September 1947."}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14379, "end_char": 14390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14394, "end_char": 14411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 409 and 477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14846, "end_char": 14866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15195, "end_char": 15206, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15208, "end_char": 15234, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16058, "end_char": 16063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bimbadhar The cases, The Queen v. Manning(9), The Queen v.\n\nPradhan Thompson(8) and The King v. Plummer(') were cited v. in support of the contention that where all the The State of Ori&sa\n\naccused persons except one are acquitted on a charge of conspiracy, the conviction of one only on that Sinha J. charge cannot be sustained. /", "canonical_name": "Sinha/."}}, {"text": "Blmbadhar\n\nPradhan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17866, "end_char": 17884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But in the instant case, as Blmbadhar\n\nPradhan already indicated, on the findings of the courts be-\n\n19$6\n\nv. low, apart from the persons placed on trial, there The State o/Orissa was the approver who implicated himself equally\n\nSinha].", "canonical_name": "Bimbadltar\n\nPradilan"}}, {"text": "28th June 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18425, "end_char": 18439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the first information report lodged on the 28th June 1948 the approver Pitabas Sahu, one of the agricultural sub-overseers, was named along with the other five accused as the persons concerned with the conspiracy."}}, {"text": "Pitabas Sahu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18453, "end_char": 18465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the first information report lodged on the 28th June 1948 the approver Pitabas Sahu, one of the agricultural sub-overseers, was named along with the other five accused as the persons concerned with the conspiracy.", "canonical_name": "Pitabaa Sahu"}}, {"text": "Pitabas Sahu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18609, "end_char": 18621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently Pitabas Sahu aforesaid was granted pardon on condition of his making a full and true statement of the facts of the case and was examined as an approver, on whose evidence mainly rested the case against the accused.", "canonical_name": "Pitabaa Sahu"}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19299, "end_char": 19310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hemchandra Acharya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19431, "end_char": 19449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The charge under section 120-B is in these terms:\n\n\"First, that you, on or about the month of October, 1947 in the district of Sambalpur agreed with Hemchandra Acharya and other accused persons to do or caused to be done an illegal act by illegal means and that you did some acts in pursuance of the said agreement to wit, the offence of criminal breach of trust under s. 409, I.P.C. and falsification of accounts under s. 477-A punishable with R. I. for more than two years and thereby committed an offence punishable under s. 120-B, I.P.C., and within the cognizance of court of Sessions\"."}}, {"text": "s. 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19651, "end_char": 19657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19659, "end_char": 19664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19702, "end_char": 19708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19807, "end_char": 19813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19817, "end_char": 19822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Pradhan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19940, "end_char": 19947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bimbadhat' It will thus appear from the words of the charge that Pradhan the approver was not specifically named as having .", "canonical_name": "Pradhan"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20374, "end_char": 20381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In England an indictment consists of three parts: (1) the commencement, (2) the statement of the offence, and (3) the particulars of the offence."}}, {"text": "Those rules have now been codified by the Indictments Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20609, "end_char": 20672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20714, "end_char": 20724, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Those rules have now been codified by the Indictments Act, 1915", "statute": "Those rules have now been codified by the Indictments Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Those rules more or less correspond to the rules laid down in Chapter XIX of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21050, "end_char": 21135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 221", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21159, "end_char": 21170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Those rules more or less correspond to the rules laid down in Chapter XIX of the Code", "statute": "Those rules more or less correspond to the rules laid down in Chapter XIX of the Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21172, "end_char": 21198, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21465, "end_char": 21476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Those rules more or less correspond to the rules laid down in Chapter XIX of the Code", "statute": "Those rules more or less correspond to the rules laid down in Chapter XIX of the Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21480, "end_char": 21497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 221", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21554, "end_char": 21565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21567, "end_char": 21593, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 222", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21760, "end_char": 21771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Bimbadhar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21934, "end_char": 21943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 222 of the Code requires that the particulars as to the time and place of the alleged offence, and\n\nSinha J.\n\n1956 the person (if any) against whom, or the thing (if Bimbadhar any) in respect of which, the offence was committed, Pradhan shall be stated.", "canonical_name": "Bimbadltar\n\nPradilan"}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22964, "end_char": 22975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22979, "end_char": 22996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bimbadhar Pradhan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23384, "end_char": 23401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It states:-\n\n\"That you, on or about the month of October 1947 in the district of Sambalpur, agreed with Bimbadhar Pradhan to do or caused to be done an illegal act by illegal means .................... \".", "canonical_name": "Bimbadltar\n\nPradilan"}}, {"text": "section 477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23863, "end_char": 23874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24072, "end_char": 24083, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Orissa", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24234, "end_char": 24249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the charge Bimbadhar under section 120-B had added the words \"and other Pradhan persons, known or unknown\", there would have been v. no ground for a grievance on the part of the appel- The State of Orissa lant."}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24328, "end_char": 24354, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24532, "end_char": 24543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24547, "end_char": 24564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25252, "end_char": 25263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Mathew", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25877, "end_char": 25883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the learned counsel for the appellant has invited our pointed attention to the observations of Mr. Justice Mathew at p. 243 of Queen v. Manning(1) that it is \"an imperative rule of law\" that \"in a\n\n(1) [1883) 12 Q.B.D. 241."}}, {"text": "Bimbadhar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 26109, "end_char": 26118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1956 charge for conspiracy in a case like this where there are two defendants, the issue raised is whether or not Bimbadhar\n\nPradha,.", "canonical_name": "Bimbadltar\n\nPradilan"}}, {"text": "Pradha", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 26120, "end_char": 26126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1956 charge for conspiracy in a case like this where there are two defendants, the issue raised is whether or not Bimbadhar\n\nPradha,.", "canonical_name": "Pradhan"}}, {"text": "Coleridge", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26278, "end_char": 26287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But Lord Coleridge, C. J., whose direction\n\nSinha}."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27154, "end_char": 27173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This aspect of the matter has been well discussed in a judgment of the Calcutta High Court delivered by Mr. Justice Mukerji in the case of I. G. Singleton v. The King-Emperor(')."}}, {"text": "Mukerji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27199, "end_char": 27206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This aspect of the matter has been well discussed in a judgment of the Calcutta High Court delivered by Mr. Justice Mukerji in the case of I. G. Singleton v. The King-Emperor(')."}}, {"text": ".Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30179, "end_char": 30185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Sinha].", "canonical_name": "Sinha/."}}, {"text": "section 477", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30628, "end_char": 30639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 409", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30852, "end_char": 30863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30865, "end_char": 30882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Kapildeo Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32294, "end_char": 32308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kapildeo Singh v. The King(1) are relevant."}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33116, "end_char": 33127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33129, "end_char": 33155, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Blmbadhar Pradhan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 34502, "end_char": 34519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1956 on the assumption that there is an omission in the charge in so far as the approver has not been specifi- Blmbadhar Pradhan cally named in the charge under section 120-B, Indian v.\n\nPenal Code.", "canonical_name": "Bimbadltar\n\nPradilan"}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34552, "end_char": 34563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34578, "end_char": 34588, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sinha/.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34756, "end_char": 34763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secondly, it was contended that the Th• Slat• o/Ori .. a evidence of P.W. 27 who had been chiefly relied upon - in the courts below as corroborating the approver had Sinha/. not been specifically put to the appellant though the evidence of the approver Pitabas Sahu was pointedly put to him.", "canonical_name": "Sinha/."}}, {"text": "Pitabas Sahu", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 34843, "end_char": 34855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secondly, it was contended that the Th• Slat• o/Ori .. a evidence of P.W. 27 who had been chiefly relied upon - in the courts below as corroborating the approver had Sinha/. not been specifically put to the appellant though the evidence of the approver Pitabas Sahu was pointedly put to him."}}, {"text": "section 342", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35016, "end_char": 35027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35029, "end_char": 35055, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]} {"document_id": "1956_1_223_247_EN", "year": 1956, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 223\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX AND\n\nEXCESS PROFITS TAX, MADRAS v.\n\nTHE SOUTH INDIA PICTURES LTD.,\n\nKARAIKUDI.\n\n[S. R. DAS, c. J., BHAGWATI and\n\nVENKATARAMA AYYAR, JJ.]\n\nIndian Income Tax Act, 1922 .(XI of 1922), s. 10-Whethsr money received by the Assessee in the accounting period-As a revenue receipt or capital receipt-On the facts and in the circumstances of the instant case.\n\nThe assessee-a. private limited company-carried on the busi ness of distribution of films. In some instances the assessee used to produce or purchase films and then distribute the same for exhibi tion in different cinema halls and in other cases the assessee used to advance monies to producers of films and secure the right of distri bution of the films produced with the help of the monies so advanced by the assessee.\n\nIn the course of such business it advanced monies to Jupiter Pictures for the production of three films and acquired the right of distribution of these three films under three agreements in writing dated the September 1941, July 1942 and May 1945.\n\nThe said agreements expressed in similar language contained similar pro visions.\n\nIn the accounting year ending 31st March 1946 and in the pre vious years the assessee had exploited its rights of distribution of the three pictures.\n\nOn 31st October 1945 the assessee and Jupiter Pictures entered into an agreement cancelling the three agreements relating to the distribution rights in respect of the three films and in consideration of such cancellation the assessee was paid Rs. 26,000, in all by the Jupiter Pictures during the accounting period as compensation. The question for determination was whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the sum of Rs. 26,000, received by the assessee from the Jupiter Pictures was a revenue receipt assessable under the Indian Income Tax Act.\n\nHeld, per S. R. DAS C. J. and VENKATARAMA AYYAR J., (BHAGWATI J. dissenting) that the sum received by the assessee was a revenue receipt (and not a capital receipt) assessable under the Indian Income Tax Act inasmuch as:-\n\n(i) the sum paid to the assessee was not truly compensation for not carrying on its business but was a sum paid in ordinary course of business to adjust the relation between the assessee and the pro ducers of the films;\n\nMarch 14\n\n(ii) the agreements which were cancelled were by no means agreements on which the whole trade of the assessee bad for all The Commissioner practical purposes been built and the payment received by the a.sessoj Income Tax and see was not for the loss of such a fundamental asset a.s was the ship Excess Profits Tax, managership of the aesessee in Barr Crombie cf Oo. Ltd. v. Oommis-\n\nMadras sioners of Inland Revenue ([1945] 26 T.O. 406); and v.\n\nThe South India\n\nPictures Ud.,\n\nKaraikudi\n\n(iii) one cannot say that the cancelled agreements constituted the framework or whole structure of the assessee's profit making apparatus in the sense the agreement between the two mar13arine dealers concerned in Van Den Berghs Ltd. v. Clark (L.R. [1935] A.O.\n\n431) was.\n\nIt is not ~!ways easy to aecide whether a particular payment received by a person is his income or whether it is to be regarded as his capital receipt.\n\nIncome is a Word of the broadest connotation and difficult and perhaps impossible to define in any precise general formula.\n\nThough in general the distinction between an income and .a capital receipt was well recognised and easily applied, cases did arise where the item lay on the border line and the problem bad to be solved on the particular facts of each case. No infallible criterion or test can be or has been laid down and the decided cases are only helpful in that they indicate the kind of consideration which may relevantly be borne in mind in approaching the problem.\n\nThe character of the payment received may vary according to the cir cumstances.\n\nBHAGWATI J. (dissenting): that in the instant case, the pictures, if produced by the assessee itself would have been capital assets of the assessee. What the assessee did was that instead of producing the pictures itself it advanced monies to the producers for the purpose of producing the pictures which it acquired for the purpose of distribution and exploitation. Nonetheless, the pictures thus acquired were capital assets of the assessee which it worked upon in carrying on its business of distribution and exploitation1 the monies it spent on the acquisition of the pictures were thus capital expenditure and whatever monies were realised by it by working these capital assets were its capital receipts except of course the commission which it earned by distribution and exploitation of the pictures which certainly would be its trading receipts. Having regard to the terms of these agreements it could certainly not be predicated of these pictures that they were its stock-intrade so as to constitute the payment in question a trading receipt of the assessee.\n\nCommissioner of Income-tax v. Shaw, Wallace & Co. ([1932] L.R. 59 I.A. 206; A.LR. 1932 P.O. 138; 6 I.T.O. 178), Roja Bahadur Kmnakshya Narain Singh of Ramgarh v. Commissioner of Income tax, Bihar and Orissa ([1943] 11 I.T.R. 513, 521; L.R. 70 I.A. 180), Short Brothers, Ltd. v. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue ([1927] 12 T. 0. 955), K.Zsall Parsons & Co. v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue ((1938] 21 T. C. 608), Glenboig Union Fireclay Co. Ltd. v.\n\nThe Commissioners a/Inland Revenue ((1922] 12 T.O. 427), Shadbolt\n\n(H. M. Inspector of Taxes) v. Salmon Estate ((1943) 25 T.C. 52), 1956 Johnson (H.M. Inspector of Taxes) v. W.S. Try, Ltd. ([1945) 27\n\nT.C. 167), Commissioner of Income Tax, Bengal v. Shaw Wallace The Commissionef' and Company (A.I.R. 1932 P.C. 138), Van Den Berghs, Ltd. v. Clark of Income Tax and (Inspector of Taus) (L.B. [1935) A.C. 431; 19 'l'. C. 390; 3 I.T.R. Excess Profits Tax, (Suppl.) 17) and Barr Crombie it Go.' Ltd. v. Commissioners of Inland Madras Revenue'([l945] 26 T.C. 406), referred to. v.\n\nThe South India The facts of the case as t11lllln of Income Tax and on the correctness or otherwise of that dec1s10n m Excess Profits Tax, this case. , Madras Having regard to all the circumstances adverted to v. h h f The South India above, it is, therefore, clear t at t e payment o Pictures Ud., Rs. 26,000 received by the assessee from the producers Karaikudi was in consideration of the surrender by the assessee of the capital assets which it had acquired from the Bhagu•atiJ. producers under the three agreements in question and constituted a capital receipt not liable to tax for the assessment year 1946-47. The answer given by the High Court to the referred question was, therefore, correct and I would dismiss the appeal with costs.\n\nORDER.\n\nBY THE CouRT:-In accordance with the Judgment of the majority, the appeal is allowed wjth costs throughout.\n\nVEMIREDDY SATYANARAYAN REDDY AND\n\nTHREE OTHERS\n\nTHE STATE OF HYDERABAD.\n\n[VIVIAN BOSE and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]\n\nCrime, perpetration of-A person present but not aiding or abetting-Whether principal or accessory-Corroboration of the statement of a single witness against accused-What the law requires.\n\nThere is no warrant for the extreme proposition that if a man sees the perpetration of a crime and does not give information of it to anyone else, he might well be regarded in law as an accomplice and that he could be put in the dock with the actual criminals.\n\nA person may be present, and, if not aiding and abetting, be neither principal nor accessory; as, if A, happens to be present at a murder and takes no part in it, nor endeavours to prevent it, or to apprehend the murderer, this course of conduct will not of Itself ren der him either principal or accessory.\n\nRussell on Crime, 10th Edition, p. 1846, referred to.\n\nMarch 14", "total_entities": 89, "entities": [{"text": "223\n\nTHE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX AND\n\nEXCESS PROFITS TAX, MADRAS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX AND EXCESS PROFITS TAX, MADRAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE SOUTH INDIA PICTURES LTD.,\n\nKARAIKUDI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 102, "end_char": 143, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE SOUTH INDIA PICTURES LTD., KARAIKUDI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. R. DAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 147, "end_char": 156, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHI RANJAN DAS*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 165, "end_char": 173, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 204, "end_char": 231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 247, "end_char": 252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Jupiter Pictures", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 892, "end_char": 908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the course of such business it advanced monies to Jupiter Pictures for the production of three films and acquired the right of distribution of these three films under three agreements in writing dated the September 1941, July 1942 and May 1945."}}, {"text": "31st March 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1200, "end_char": 1215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the accounting year ending 31st March 1946 and in the pre vious years the assessee had exploited its rights of distribution of the three pictures."}}, {"text": "31st October 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1324, "end_char": 1341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 31st October 1945 the assessee and Jupiter Pictures entered into an agreement cancelling the three agreements relating to the distribution rights in respect of the three films and in consideration of such cancellation the assessee was paid Rs."}}, {"text": "South India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2791, "end_char": 2802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd. v. Oommis-\n\nMadras sioners of Inland Revenue ([1945] 26 T.O. 406); and v.\n\nThe South India\n\nPictures Ud.,"}}, {"text": "Karaikudi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2819, "end_char": 2828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Karaikudi\n\n(iii) one cannot say that the cancelled agreements constituted the framework or whole structure of the assessee's profit making apparatus in the sense the agreement between the two mar13arine dealers concerned in Van Den Berghs Ltd. v. Clark (L.R. [1935] A.O.\n\n431) was.", "canonical_name": "Karaikudi"}}, {"text": "L.R. 59 I.A. 206", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5042, "end_char": 5058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L.R. 70 I.A. 180", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5219, "end_char": 5235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Karaikudi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6144, "end_char": 6153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Hon'ble The Chief Justice are shortly as Karaikudi follows:- The assesses is a private limited company.", "canonical_name": "Karaikudi"}}, {"text": "17th September 1941", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6796, "end_char": 6815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the course of such business it advanced monies to Jupiter Pictures for the production of three films and acquired the right of distribution of these three films under three agreements in writing dated the 17th September 1941, 16th July\n\n1942 and 5th 'May 1945."}}, {"text": "16th July\n\n1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6817, "end_char": 6832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the course of such business it advanced monies to Jupiter Pictures for the production of three films and acquired the right of distribution of these three films under three agreements in writing dated the 17th September 1941, 16th July\n\n1942 and 5th 'May 1945."}}, {"text": "5th 'May 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6837, "end_char": 6850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the course of such business it advanced monies to Jupiter Pictures for the production of three films and acquired the right of distribution of these three films under three agreements in writing dated the 17th September 1941, 16th July\n\n1942 and 5th 'May 1945."}}, {"text": "clause 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7359, "end_char": 7367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7496, "end_char": 7504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7774, "end_char": 7782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8045, "end_char": 8053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8216, "end_char": 8224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8597, "end_char": 8605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8721, "end_char": 8729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9185, "end_char": 9193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jupiter Pictures Karaikudi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9340, "end_char": 9366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Th• South India assessee was to submit to Jupiter Pictures a monthly statement\n\nPiclures Ltd., of e.ccountand show all books of account to Jupiter Pictures Karaikudi (clauses 11 and 12)."}}, {"text": "clause 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9486, "end_char": 9495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9643, "end_char": 9652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10094, "end_char": 10103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10349, "end_char": 10358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10758, "end_char": 10767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. Daphtary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12116, "end_char": 12127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Daphtary, Solicitor-Genera oJ n ia ."}}, {"text": "Madras Joshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12157, "end_char": 12169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madras Joshi and R.H. Dhebar, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R.H. Dhebar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12174, "end_char": 12185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madras Joshi and R.H. Dhebar, with him) for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Jupiter Pictures Ltd. of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12482, "end_char": 12513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "26,000 (rupees twentysix thousand) from Jupiter Pictures Ltd. of Madras (hereinafter referred to as Jupiter Pictures) pursuant to the ternis of an agreement between the assessee and Jupiter Pictures dated the 31st October 1945."}}, {"text": "1st April 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12841, "end_char": 12855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the course of the proceedings for the assessment of the assessee's income-tax for the year 1946-47 and the excess profits tax for the chargeable accounting period from 1st April 1945 to 31st March 1946, the followiJJ.g question arose:-\n\n\" Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "Jupiter Pictures Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13023, "end_char": 13044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "26,000 received by the aseessee from Jupiter Pictures Ltd., is a revenue receipt assessable under the Indian Income-Tax\n\nAct?\""}}, {"text": "26th August 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13627, "end_char": 13643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly on 26th August 1948 the Tribunal reversed the decision of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner."}}, {"text": "L.R. 69 I.A. 206", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 13786, "end_char": 13802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1956 Excess Profits Tax, Madras", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13840, "end_char": 13871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1956 Excess Profits Tax, Madras the Tribunal under sec-\n\nTh C I ."}}, {"text": "Indian Income-Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13924, "end_char": 13951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Karaikudi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14307, "end_char": 14316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Karaikudi [After stating the facts of the case which gave rise ·- Das C.]."}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14864, "end_char": 14874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income-Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income-Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14882, "end_char": 14909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Wright", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15083, "end_char": 15089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Income, said Lord Wright in Raja Bahadur Kamakshya Narain Singh of Ramgarh v. Commissioner of Income- Tax, Bihar and Orissa('),· is a word of the broadest connotation and difficult and perhaps impossible to define in any precise general formula."}}, {"text": "Macmillan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15317, "end_char": 15326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Macmillan said in Van DenBerghs, Ltd. v. Clark (Inspector of Taxes)(') that though in general the distinction between an income and a capital receipt was well recognized and easily applied, cases did arise where the item lay on the border line and the problem had to be solved on the particular facts of each case."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16451, "end_char": 16457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "d o1 ncome ax an\" confronts us has to be approac e eepmg m mm Excess Profits Tax, the different kinds of consideration taken into account Madras in the different cases."}}, {"text": "Karaikudi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16622, "end_char": 16631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nThe assessee before us is a company carrying on a The Sot1th bidia business and it received the sum in question in con- Pictttres Ltd., Karaikudi nection with that business."}}, {"text": "Van Den Berghs", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20647, "end_char": 20661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nor can one say that the cancelled agreements constituted the framework or whole structure of the assessee's profit making apparatus in the sense the agreement between the two margarine dealers concerned in Van Den Berghs\n\n{1) [1927) 12 T.C. 955, 973\n\n(2) [1945] 26 T.C. 406."}}, {"text": "South India Pictures Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21183, "end_char": 21208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The South India Pictures Ltd., Indeed the assessee's business of distribution of films Karaikudi proceeded apace notwithstanding the cancellation of these three agreements."}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21353, "end_char": 21356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das C.J.\n\nLearned counsel for the assessee has, as did the High Court, strongly relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Shaw Wallace's case (supra)."}}, {"text": "Shaw Wallace", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21480, "end_char": 21492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Das C.J.\n\nLearned counsel for the assessee has, as did the High Court, strongly relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Shaw Wallace's case (supra)."}}, {"text": "EJo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22408, "end_char": 22411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.\n\nCommissioner of Income Tax, Bengal(1) will show that Shaw Wallace and EJo."}}, {"text": "George Lowndes", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22937, "end_char": 22951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "31\n\n1956 by Sir George Lowndes towards the end of his judg-\n\nTh Com • ."}}, {"text": "Shaw Wallace and Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23697, "end_char": 23717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If Shaw Wallace and Co. had other distributing agencies similar to those of the two oil companies then it would be difficult to reconcile the decision in that case with the later decisions in Kelsall Parsons & Go."}}, {"text": "Kelsall Parsons & Go", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24841, "end_char": 24861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kelsall Parsons & Go.'"}}, {"text": "Rowlatt", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27342, "end_char": 27349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In our opinion, in the events that had happened, the amount was not received by the assessee as the price of any capital assets sold or surrendered or destroyed or sterilized but in the language of Rowlatt J. in Short Bros.' case (supra) the amount was simply received\n\n(1) (1922] 12 T.C. 427,\n\n1956 by the a!lllssee in the course of its going distributing\n\nThe Commi•sioner gency lWsiness from that .going b?siness."}}, {"text": "Barr Grombie", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27897, "end_char": 27909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "case or ran en ergh's case or Barr Grombie's case."}}, {"text": "section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27951, "end_char": 27961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27976, "end_char": 28003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Karaikudi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30090, "end_char": 30099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as requested by the producer ................ :- Karaikudi.", "canonical_name": "Karaikudi"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32168, "end_char": 32176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "realisation of the said picture in the manner herein- Karaikudi before set out on or before the expiry of one and a half Bhagwati J. years from the date of the first release of the said picture, the producer shall be liable to pay to the distributors whatever balance may be then due by them with compound interest at 12 per cent.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI"}}, {"text": "1-5-1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33320, "end_char": 33328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the event of the producer failing to deliver the said copies of the said picture duly passed by the Board of Censors as herein before provided before the said period, namely 1-5-1942, the producer shall become liable to pay to the distributors at the latters's option such amount as has been advanced by the distributors to the producer including monies spent by the distributors in respect of publicity with interest thereon at 12 per cent."}}, {"text": "1-7-1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33689, "end_char": 33697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on or before 1-7-1942 the distributors may at their option complete the picture at their own cost and in such oase the producer shall be liable to the distributors for all the expenses with compound\n\ninterest thereon at 12 per cent."}}, {"text": "16th July 1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34596, "end_char": 34610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said three agreements were dated 17th September 1941, 16th July 1942 and 10th May 1945, each having a period of five years to run ending with 16th September 1946, 15th July 1947 and 9th May 1950 respectively."}}, {"text": "10th May 1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34615, "end_char": 34628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said three agreements were dated 17th September 1941, 16th July 1942 and 10th May 1945, each having a period of five years to run ending with 16th September 1946, 15th July 1947 and 9th May 1950 respectively."}}, {"text": "16th September 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34684, "end_char": 34703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said three agreements were dated 17th September 1941, 16th July 1942 and 10th May 1945, each having a period of five years to run ending with 16th September 1946, 15th July 1947 and 9th May 1950 respectively."}}, {"text": "15th July 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34705, "end_char": 34719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said three agreements were dated 17th September 1941, 16th July 1942 and 10th May 1945, each having a period of five years to run ending with 16th September 1946, 15th July 1947 and 9th May 1950 respectively."}}, {"text": "9th May 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34724, "end_char": 34736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said three agreements were dated 17th September 1941, 16th July 1942 and 10th May 1945, each having a period of five years to run ending with 16th September 1946, 15th July 1947 and 9th May 1950 respectively."}}, {"text": "ss1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38516, "end_char": 38519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "17th September 1941, 16th July 1942", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42298, "end_char": 42333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These capital assets qua the agreemen.ts of the 17th September 1941, 16th July 1942 and 10th May 1945 were to endure up to 16th September, 1946, 15th July 1947 and 9th May 1950 respectively."}}, {"text": "16th September, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42373, "end_char": 42393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These capital assets qua the agreemen.ts of the 17th September 1941, 16th July 1942 and 10th May 1945 were to endure up to 16th September, 1946, 15th July 1947 and 9th May 1950 respectively."}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44150, "end_char": 44164, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "L.R. 59 I.A. 206", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 45160, "end_char": 45176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "L.R. 70 I.A. 180", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 45195, "end_char": 45211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Pict1wes Ud", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45732, "end_char": 45743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was The South India therefore a normal incident of the business such as Pict1wes Ud.,"}}, {"text": "Glenboig", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46819, "end_char": 46827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rowlatt, J. observed in Short Brothers, Ltd. v. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue\n\n(supra) at page 968 that the money was not received in respect of the termination of any part of the assessee's business nor was it received in respect of any capital asset as was the sum in the Glenboig's case(')."}}, {"text": "Fleming", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46844, "end_char": 46851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Fleming also emphasized this aspect of the matter in Kelsall Parsons and Go."}}, {"text": "Wrenbury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 48496, "end_char": 48504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Wrenbury also, at page 464 stated that \"the mining leases were capital assets of the company, the company's objects were to acquire profits by working the mines under and by virtue of the titles and rights which they hold under the leases and the payment was made to the assessee for abstaining from seeking to make a profit\"."}}, {"text": "Finlay", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49689, "end_char": 49695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice Finlay, whose judgment was ultimately restored by the House."}}, {"text": "ss1011", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49928, "end_char": 49934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Macnaghten", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 53238, "end_char": 53248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Justice Macnaghten, whose judgment in the King's Bench Division was the final judgment in Shadbolt (H. M.\n\nInspector of Taxes) v. Salmon Estate (supra) remarked at page 57 that \"it was not disputed that in the course of such a trade as this, the trade of building houses for sale, the land on which the houses were built was part of the stock-in-trade of the business and was not a capital asset."}}, {"text": "South India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 54826, "end_char": 54837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "wise, compensation for injurious affection must also, Th• South India in my opinion, be regarded as a trading receipt\"."}}, {"text": "Shaw Wallace & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 56417, "end_char": 56435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the facts of the case as set out in the above a.ppeal it does not appear to be clear whether the t.wo selling agencies there were the only selling agencies which had been acquired and worked by Shaw Wallace & Co., and it is debatable under the circumstances whether the authority of that decision is not shaken by the decisions in Short Brothers' case (supra) and Kelsall Parsons & Go."}}, {"text": "Short Brothers", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 56554, "end_char": 56568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the facts of the case as set out in the above a.ppeal it does not appear to be clear whether the t.wo selling agencies there were the only selling agencies which had been acquired and worked by Shaw Wallace & Co., and it is debatable under the circumstances whether the authority of that decision is not shaken by the decisions in Short Brothers' case (supra) and Kelsall Parsons & Go."}}, {"text": "Shaw\n\nWallace & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 56688, "end_char": 56707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is sufficient to observe that the agreements in the case of Shaw\n\nWallace & Co. were not deemed to constitute capital\n\nassets of the assessee and that aspect of the question 1956 was not at all considered by the Privy Council."}}, {"text": "VEMIREDDY SATYANARAYAN REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57756, "end_char": 57784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "VEMIREDDY SATYANARAYAN REDDY AND\n\nTHREE OTHERS\n\nTHE STATE OF HYDERABAD."}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BOSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57830, "end_char": 57841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[VIVIAN BOSE and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]"}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57846, "end_char": 57866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[VIVIAN BOSE and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]"}}]} {"document_id": "1956_1_247_255_EN", "year": 1956, "text": "S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 247\n\nassets of the assessee and that aspect of the question 1956 was not at all considered by the Privy Council. It Th c .. • . • e otn11usstone,. is not, therefore, necessary t? express any ?J.:>lllln of Income Tax and on the correctness or otherwise of that dec1s10n m Excess Profits Tax, this case. , Madras Having regard to all the circumstances adverted to v. h h f The South India above, it is, therefore, clear t at t e payment o Pictures Ud., Rs. 26,000 received by the assessee from the producers Karaikudi was in consideration of the surrender by the assessee of the capital assets which it had acquired from the Bhagu•atiJ. producers under the three agreements in question and constituted a capital receipt not liable to tax for the assessment year 1946-47. The answer given by the High Court to the referred question was, therefore, correct and I would dismiss the appeal with costs.\n\nORDER.\n\nBY THE CouRT:-In accordance with the Judgment of the majority, the appeal is allowed wjth costs throughout.\n\nVEMIREDDY SATYANARAYAN REDDY AND\n\nTHREE OTHERS\n\nTHE STATE OF HYDERABAD.\n\n[VIVIAN BOSE and CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.]\n\nCrime, perpetration of-A person present but not aiding or abetting-Whether principal or accessory-Corroboration of the statement of a single witness against accused-What the law requires.\n\nThere is no warrant for the extreme proposition that if a man sees the perpetration of a crime and does not give information of it to anyone else, he might well be regarded in law as an accomplice and that he could be put in the dock with the actual criminals.\n\nA person may be present, and, if not aiding and abetting, be neither principal nor accessory; as, if A, happens to be present at a murder and takes no part in it, nor endeavours to prevent it, or to apprehend the murderer, this course of conduct will not of Itself ren der him either principal or accessory.\n\nRussell on Crime, 10th Edition, p. 1846, referred to.\n\nMarch 14\n\nVe1nireddy Sat yanarayan\n\nReddy and three others v.\n\nThe State of Hyderabad\n\nIn the matter of corroboration of the evidence of a single witness against the accused what the law requirss is that there should be such corroboration of the material part of the story connecting the accused with the crime as will satisfy reasonable minds that the man can he regarded as a truthful witness. The corroboration need not be direct evidence that the accused committed the crime; it is sufficient if it is merely circumstantial evidence of his connection with the crime. The nature of the corroboration will depend on and vary according to the particular circumstances of each case.\n\nBez v. Baskerville (1916) 2 K.B.D. 658, referrsd to.\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeals No. 28 to 31 of 1955.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 11th February, 1953 of the Hyderabad High Court in Criminal Appeals Nos. 1260 to 1263 of 1951/1952 arising out of the judgment and order dated the 6th November, 1951 of the Court of the Sessions Judge at w,.rangal in Original Criminal Case No. 127 of 1950.\n\nH. J. Umrigar, for. appellant No. 1.\n\nK. R. Olwuilhry, for appellants Nos. 2 to 4.\n\nPorus A. Mehta and P. G. Golchale, for the respondent.\n\n1956. March 14. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRASEKHA.RA AIYAR J.-The four appellants and two others named Sheshaya and Pitchi Reddy, who are all communists, were charged with the murder of one V enka takrishna Sh as try who was a Congress worker or leader.\n\nThe appellants were convicted of the offence but the other two were acquitted by the Sessions Judge, Warangal, Hyderabad State, on the astounding ground that no overt acts were proved against them.\n\nThe appellants preferred appeals to the High Court at Hyderabad and there was the usual reference for confirmation of the death sentences imposed on them.\n\nThe appeals were heard by a Bench consisting of Deshpande J. and Dr. Mir Siadat Ali Khan J. and\n\nthey disagreed with each other. Deshpande J. held that the evidence did not establish the. guilt of the appellants and he acquitted them. On the other hand, Dr. Mir Siadat Ali Khan came to the conclusion that the prosecution had established its case beyond reasonable doubt. He confirmed the convictions but reduced the sentences to imprisonment for life. Owing to this difference of opinion, the matter was referred to a third Judge, Manohar Persbad J. and he agreed with the finding of guilty given by his learned brother Dr. Mir Siadat Ali Khan. We granted special leave to the appellants to come before this court.\n\nThe facts of the occurrence, as alleged by the prosecution, are these. On the evening of 19-1-1949, the deceased Venkatakrishna \"Shastry of the village of Maturpeta and five other persons, who were Congress workers like him, were returning to the village from a tank. One of the communist leaders called Nagabhushan Rao had been arrested a month or two previously and the communist party believed that\n\nVenkatakrishna Shastry was responsible for the arrest. So a large group of communists, about 25 or 30 in number including the accused, armed with guns and swords, paid a visit to Maturpeta to wreak vengeance against the Congress group led by .Venkatakrishna. Shastry. They ran into the Congress group as they were getting back to the village after the evening stroll. P. W. 14, a dhobi boy named Gopai was one of the camp followers of this communist group.\n\nVenkatakrishna Shastry and his co-workers were tied up with their own clothes and were led to the village chavadi over which a Congress flag was flying. A rope was brought from the house of P.W. 17 and the members of the Congress group were tied with this rope and led some distance away from the village to a red-gram field, and all of them were beaten by their enemies; except Shastry, the rest were driven away from the place.\n\nShstry was tied with the rope and taken in the eastern direction by Mangapaty (the dalam or troop leader) and the accused. P.W. 14 was following the group carrying a bundle of their clothes on his head. After a short halt at the village of\n\nVemireddy Satyanarayah\n\nReddy and three other$\n\nThe State of Hyderabad\n\nChandrasekharR\n\nAiyar J.\n\nVemireddy Satyanarayan\n\nReddy and three others\n\nThe State of\n\nHyderabad\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiyar J.\n\nSuknevedu, where some food was taken, the party went toward.s a mango-tope near a brook, four or five miles away leading Venkatakrishna Shastry as the captive. The deceased, Gopai (P.W. 14) and some of the accused remained on the hank of the brooklet.\n\nThe others went a little beyond and one of them came back with orders that Venkatakrishna Shastry should be fetched. Venkatakrishna Shastry was taken along and when the moon was at the meridian, the rope with which he was led was tied round the neck of the deceased into a noose. Two of the accused pulled one end of the rope and two others at the other end in opposite directions.\n\nVenkatakrishna Shastry was thus strangled to death. A pit was dug and the body of Venkatakrishna Shastry was buried in the river-bed. P. W. 14 saw all this from a distance of twenty yards in clear moonlight.\n\nTwo or three days later, after some wanderings in the jungle and mountain-dens P.W. 14 left the company of his masters who were implored by the boy's father P. W. 7 to permit him to take the boy away.\n\nNext morning a report was sent by P.W. 2 the police pate! about the abduction of Venkatakrishna Shastry and investigation was begun. On 8-2-1949, that is about twenty days after the occurrence, some bones of a human-body were discovered in the riverbed as the result of crows and vultures hovering round the place. The police Patwari (P. W. 10) sent a report about this discovery. The police arrived on the scene and exhumed the body which was identified as that of Venkatakrishna Shastry. This was on 9-2-1949. It was sent for post-mortem examination.\n\nThe condition in which the body was at the time of exhumation is stated in a panchnama that was then prepared. The results of the post-mortem examination are spoken to by the doctor P.W. 7.\n\nBeing the only witness for the commission of the crime, the dhobi boy (P. W. 14) was subjected to severe criticism by Mr. Umrigar who held the dock brief for the appellants. He described him as an accomplice and as an unmitigated liar and he asked us not even to look at his evidence. P.W. 14 does not satisfy the\n\ndefinition of an accomplice; he falls somewhat short of the requirements which would confer on him this status.\n\nAccording to the evidence, he left his parents' roof after a quarrel with his father and while wandering in the jungles he was picked up by the communists only 3 days before and taken as their servant on promise to give him food. His main duty appears to have been to go with the group carrying their bundles of clothes on his head. It was in this capacity that he was not only able to see the abduction of the deceased but also to witness the actual murder. He took no part whatever in the commission of the offence or in any active or passive preparations for the same. He was not a particeps crimines. After securing his release from his temporary masters, he went back with his father to the village.\n\nIt is true he did not divulge the secret of the murder to any one else except to his own father. But who would, in view of the. atrocities and terrorism that prevailed in that region during the relevant time?\n\nIt required a very courageous man to have proclaimed the truth, needless of consequences to himself, and we cannot credit the dhobi boy with so much of fearlessness. The learned counsel urged that if a man sees the perpetration of a crime and does not give information of it to anyone else, he might well be regarded in law as an accomplice and that he could be put in the dock with the actual criminals. There is, however, no warrant for such an extreme proposition.\n\nOn the other hand, the following short passage from Russell on Crime, 10th Edition, page 1846, will show its untenability:-\n\n\"But a person may be present, and, if not aiding and abetting, be neither principal nor accessory; as, if A, happens to be present at a murder and takes no part in it, nor endeavours to prevent it, or to apprehend the murderer, this course of conduct will not of itself render him either principal or accessory\".\n\nIndeed, there can be no doubt that the evidence of a man like P. W. 14 should be scanned with much caution and we must be fully satisfied that he is a witness of truth, especially when no other person\n\nVemireddy Satyanarayan\n\nReddy and three others v.\n\nThe State of\n\nHyderabad\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nMyarJ.\n\nVemireddy Satyanarayan Reddy and three others v.\n\nThe State of Hyderabad\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiyar }.\n\nwas present at the time to see the murder. Though he was not an accomplice, we would still want corroboration on material particulars in this particular case, as he is the only witness to the crime and as it would be unsafe to hang four people on bis sole testimony unless we feel convinced that he is speaking the truth. Such corroboration need not, however, be on the question of the actual commission of the offence; if this was the requirement, then we would have independent testimony on which to act and there would be no need to rely on the evidence of one whose position may, in this particular case, be . said to be somewhat analogous to that of an accomplice, though not exactly the same. What the law requires is that there should be such corroboration of the material part of the. story connecting the accused with the crime as will satisfy reasonable minds that the man can be regarded as a truthful witness. In the leading case. of Rex v. Baskerville(') it was pointed by Lord Reading C.J. that \"the corroboration need not be direct evidence that the accused committed the crime; it is sufficient if it is merely circumstantial evidence of his connection with the crime. The nature of the corroboration will depend on and vary according to the particular circumstances of each case. What is required is some additional evidence rendering iti probable that the story of the accomplice is true and that it is reasonably safe to act upon it.\n\nJudged by this test, we can say that the evidence given by P.W. 14 has been amply corroborated.\n\nIt was not disputed for the appellants that there is abundant evidence consisting of the testimony of several witnesses in support of the truth of the narrative given by P.W. 14 regarding the abduction of the deceased. This evidence was given not by mere onlookers but by men like P.Ws. 3, 4, 5, 6 and 9, who were with the deceased when the communist group came upon them and who were themselves badly beaten up by the gang before being released from impending death at the merciful intervention of\n\n(1) [1916) 2 K.B.D. 668\n\nsome one of them. They say that at the time of the release the accused retained the deceased withthem\n\nand took him away in the direction of Mulgupad.\n\nFrom this stage, P.W.14takes us to the rivQr bank where the deceased and he were allowed to sit. The accused went into the river bed and later on orders were issued by the appellant ; No. 1, the deceased was led by a rope from the bank by Muthyalu (4th appellant). The rope was tied round the neck of the deceased into a noose and pulled in opposite directions by two of the accused on each side and Shastry\n\nwas thus strangled to death. His body was buried in a pit dug in the river bed. The rope which was found round the neck of the dead body when it was exhumed is said to be the rope with whichP.Ws. 3 to 6 and 9 were tied up and as the one that the members of the gang brought from the house of Silam Brahma-. reddi (P.W. 17) earlier that evening when the village was raided and the Congress workers were marched to the Congress flag. .\n\nThere is also evidence that the party of the accused when they first encountered the party of the deceased asked who and where was Venkatakrishna.\n\nShastry. The assailants, who were armed to the teeth, indulged in threats to kill all of them. The deceased was a.. Congress leader and it is not surprising that he was singled out for terrific, punishment, while the others were let off with a good thrashing and admonitions that they should give up their Congress affiliations. It is but natural in the circumstances that they should take a.way the deceased to a distant place to do a.way with him. That he was so led by the group of the accused is also corroborated . by the evidence of Yesob (P.W. 12) who was watching his jawar crop on the night in question in a neighbouring field.\n\nLet us now turn J; o the exhumation of the dead body, the inquest report, the post-mortem certificate, and the evidence of the doctor (P. W. 7). The patwari of Sa.krivedu (P. W. 10) sent a report on the 8th February, 1949, that he had information that a dead body lay buried in the river-bed. The report has not\n\nVemireddy Satyanarayan\n\nReddy and three others v.\n\nThe State of Hyderabad\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiyar J,\n\nVetnircddy Satyanarayan\n\nReddy and three others\n\nThe Stale of\n\nHyderabad\n\nChaudrasckliara\n\nAiyar J.\n\nbeen filed but its purport about the condition of the body is given in the inquest report as unidentifiable.\n\nTwo police sub-inspectors and some constables reached the river-bed the same day and exhumed the body.\n\nIts then condition is described in these words in the inquest report:\n\n\"It was noticed that a rope of Chinna and Ambara was wrapped from neck to the waist. Both hands were missing and out of the two legs one was attached to the body with little flesh.\n\nThe bones of the other separated leg (the down part of the knee) and the bones of one hand were found in the pit.\n\nThere were some hairs in the head. The flesh of the face was rotten and decayed. Teeth are safe and sound. There is rotten flesh from the neck to the buttocks. It appears that this dead body is of a Hindu Brahmin\".\n\nThe panchnama is signed by two persons, one of whom HAS BEEN EXAMINED AS P.W. 16.\n\nHe, along with the witnesses who gave evidence as cosufferers with the deceased in the communist raid of that evening, have identified the body as that of Venkatakrishna Shastry. The doctor's post-mortem certificate is exhibit 2 and according to it the body was putrified and even the marks of strangulation could not be detected; both the palms had been cut out, the left hand was severed completely; there was only the left eye in a rotten condition; the right eye was not found, the right ear was not there. Examined as P.W. 7, the doctor has said that the face of the corpse could not be identified, as the scalp was eaten away by mud, and the bony structure of the face was present.\n\nIn the face of this evidence, the learned counsel for the appellants contended with much force that identification must have been impossible and that the witnesses who speak to the same should be disbelieved.\n\nTwo factors are, however, overlooked in this argument.\n\nThough the body was in an advanced state of decomposition and many parts of the limbs were missing and even the flesh in the face was gone, it would not have been difficult for close associates of\n\nVenkatakrishna Shastry to say that it was his corpse, from the general features form, outline, contour build of the body, and the appearance of such of the limbs as were available to see.\n\nHis friend Madhusudhana Rao, P. W. 15, was working with the deceased for some years in the Congress office and knew him well indeed.\n\nThere is his evidence about identification.\n\nMore important still is the identification of the rope round the neck of the body, the dhoti with the violet border that was on its waist, and the janjam or the holy thread. The rope was brought from the house of Brahma Reddy (P.W. 17).\n\nIt was the one which was tied in loops round each member of the Congress group as they were led from the village to the redgram field; it was the rope that was used to lead Venkatakrishna Shastry to the brooklet; and it was the rope that was found round the neck of the dead body when it was unearthed.\n\nThe bordered dhoti which was on the corpse belonged to Venkatakrishna Shastry. From these external marks, and the general features, friends of the deceased like P.Ws. 3 to 6 and 9 and P.W. 17 in whose house Shastry was living could say, we think, that the body buried in the waist-deep pit in the bed of the river was that of Venkatakrishna Shastry.\n\nWhether he is regarded as an accomplice or as the sole witness of the offence P.W. 14 has been corroborated in such a manner that his evidence about the steps taken by the accused immediately prior to the perpetration of the murder carries conviction to our minds. The connection of the accused with the crime must be held to have been made out.\n\nWe have also to accept that the dead body recovered was that of Venkatakrishna Shastry and no question of the absence of the body arises.\n\nFor this gruesome and revolting murder the appellants have got only imprisonment for life for which they must be thankful to the difference of opinion that arose among the learned Judges of the High Court.\n\nThe appeal fails and is dismissed.\n\nVemireddy Satyanarayan\n\nReddy and three other&\n\nThe State of Hyderabad\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiyar J.", "total_entities": 64, "entities": [{"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 334, "end_char": 340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madras Having regard to all the circumstances adverted to v. h h f The South India above, it is, therefore, clear t at t e payment o Pictures Ud.,"}}, {"text": "Karaikudi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 536, "end_char": 545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "26,000 received by the assessee from the producers Karaikudi was in consideration of the surrender by the assessee of the capital assets which it had acquired from the Bhagu•atiJ. producers under the three agreements in question and constituted a capital receipt not liable to tax for the assessment year 1946-47."}}, {"text": "VEMIREDDY SATYANARAYAN REDDY AND\n\nTHREE OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1044, "end_char": 1090, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VEMIREDDY SATYANARAYAN REDDY AND THREE OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF HYDERABAD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1092, "end_char": 1114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF HYDERABAD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BOSE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1118, "end_char": 1129, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1134, "end_char": 1158, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Ve1nireddy Sat yanarayan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1986, "end_char": 2010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 14\n\nVe1nireddy Sat yanarayan\n\nReddy and three others v.\n\nThe State of Hyderabad\n\nIn the matter of corroboration of the evidence of a single witness against the accused what the law requirss is that there should be such corroboration of the material part of the story connecting the accused with the crime as will satisfy reasonable minds that the man can he regarded as a truthful witness.", "canonical_name": "Ve1nireddy Sat yanarayan"}}, {"text": "State of Hyderabad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2043, "end_char": 2061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 14\n\nVe1nireddy Sat yanarayan\n\nReddy and three others v.\n\nThe State of Hyderabad\n\nIn the matter of corroboration of the evidence of a single witness against the accused what the law requirss is that there should be such corroboration of the material part of the story connecting the accused with the crime as will satisfy reasonable minds that the man can he regarded as a truthful witness."}}, {"text": "H. J. Umrigar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3108, "end_char": 3121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. J. Umrigar, for."}}, {"text": "K. R. Olwuilhry", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3146, "end_char": 3161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. R. Olwuilhry, for appellants Nos."}}, {"text": "Porus A. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3192, "end_char": 3206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Golchale, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "P. G. Golchale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3211, "end_char": 3225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Porus A. Mehta and P. G. Golchale, for the respondent."}}, {"text": "CHANDRASEKHA.RA AIYAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3308, "end_char": 3329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRASEKHA.RA AIYAR J.-The four appellants and two others named Sheshaya and Pitchi Reddy, who are all communists, were charged with the murder of one V enka takrishna Sh as try who was a Congress worker or leader.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ."}}, {"text": "Sheshaya", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3374, "end_char": 3382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRASEKHA.RA AIYAR J.-The four appellants and two others named Sheshaya and Pitchi Reddy, who are all communists, were charged with the murder of one V enka takrishna Sh as try who was a Congress worker or leader."}}, {"text": "Pitchi Reddy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3387, "end_char": 3399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRASEKHA.RA AIYAR J.-The four appellants and two others named Sheshaya and Pitchi Reddy, who are all communists, were charged with the murder of one V enka takrishna Sh as try who was a Congress worker or leader."}}, {"text": "V enka takrishna Sh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3461, "end_char": 3480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRASEKHA.RA AIYAR J.-The four appellants and two others named Sheshaya and Pitchi Reddy, who are all communists, were charged with the murder of one V enka takrishna Sh as try who was a Congress worker or leader.", "canonical_name": ".Venkatakrishna. Shastry"}}, {"text": "Sessions Judge, Warangal, Hyderabad State", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3611, "end_char": 3652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants were convicted of the offence but the other two were acquitted by the Sessions Judge, Warangal, Hyderabad State, on the astounding ground that no overt acts were proved against them."}}, {"text": "High Court at Hyderabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3765, "end_char": 3788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants preferred appeals to the High Court at Hyderabad and there was the usual reference for confirmation of the death sentences imposed on them."}}, {"text": "Deshpande", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3929, "end_char": 3938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeals were heard by a Bench consisting of Deshpande J. and Dr. Mir Siadat Ali Khan J. and\n\nthey disagreed with each other."}}, {"text": "Mir Siadat Ali Khan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3950, "end_char": 3969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeals were heard by a Bench consisting of Deshpande J. and Dr. Mir Siadat Ali Khan J. and\n\nthey disagreed with each other.", "canonical_name": "Mir Siadat Ali Khan"}}, {"text": "Manohar Persbad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4413, "end_char": 4428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Owing to this difference of opinion, the matter was referred to a third Judge, Manohar Persbad J. and he agreed with the finding of guilty given by his learned brother Dr. Mir Siadat Ali Khan."}}, {"text": "Mir Siadat Ali Khan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4506, "end_char": 4525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Owing to this difference of opinion, the matter was referred to a third Judge, Manohar Persbad J. and he agreed with the finding of guilty given by his learned brother Dr. Mir Siadat Ali Khan.", "canonical_name": "Mir Siadat Ali Khan"}}, {"text": "19-1-1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4687, "end_char": 4696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the evening of 19-1-1949, the deceased Venkatakrishna \"Shastry of the village of Maturpeta and five other persons, who were Congress workers like him, were returning to the village from a tank."}}, {"text": "Venkatakrishna \"Shastry", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4711, "end_char": 4734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the evening of 19-1-1949, the deceased Venkatakrishna \"Shastry of the village of Maturpeta and five other persons, who were Congress workers like him, were returning to the village from a tank.", "canonical_name": ".Venkatakrishna. Shastry"}}, {"text": "Maturpeta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4753, "end_char": 4762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the evening of 19-1-1949, the deceased Venkatakrishna \"Shastry of the village of Maturpeta and five other persons, who were Congress workers like him, were returning to the village from a tank."}}, {"text": "Nagabhushan Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4902, "end_char": 4917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the communist leaders called Nagabhushan Rao had been arrested a month or two previously and the communist party believed that\n\nVenkatakrishna Shastry was responsible for the arrest."}}, {"text": "Venkatakrishna Shastry", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5001, "end_char": 5023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the communist leaders called Nagabhushan Rao had been arrested a month or two previously and the communist party believed that\n\nVenkatakrishna Shastry was responsible for the arrest.", "canonical_name": ".Venkatakrishna. Shastry"}}, {"text": ".Venkatakrishna. Shastry", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5243, "end_char": 5267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So a large group of communists, about 25 or 30 in number including the accused, armed with guns and swords, paid a visit to Maturpeta to wreak vengeance against the Congress group led by .Venkatakrishna.", "canonical_name": ".Venkatakrishna. Shastry"}}, {"text": "Gopai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5397, "end_char": 5402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. W. 14, a dhobi boy named Gopai was one of the camp followers of this communist group."}}, {"text": "chavadi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5565, "end_char": 5572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Venkatakrishna Shastry and his co-workers were tied up with their own clothes and were led to the village chavadi over which a Congress flag was flying."}}, {"text": "Shastry", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5838, "end_char": 5845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A rope was brought from the house of P.W. 17 and the members of the Congress group were tied with this rope and led some distance away from the village to a red-gram field, and all of them were beaten by their enemies; except Shastry, the rest were driven away from the place.", "canonical_name": "Shastry"}}, {"text": "Shstry", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5890, "end_char": 5896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shstry was tied with the rope and taken in the eastern direction by Mangapaty (the dalam or troop leader) and the accused.", "canonical_name": "Shastry"}}, {"text": "Mangapaty", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5958, "end_char": 5967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shstry was tied with the rope and taken in the eastern direction by Mangapaty (the dalam or troop leader) and the accused."}}, {"text": "Vemireddy Satyanarayah", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6131, "end_char": 6153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After a short halt at the village of\n\nVemireddy Satyanarayah\n\nReddy and three other$\n\nThe State of Hyderabad\n\nChandrasekharR\n\nAiyar J.\n\nVemireddy Satyanarayan\n\nReddy and three others\n\nThe State of\n\nHyderabad\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiyar J.\n\nSuknevedu, where some food was taken, the party went toward.s a mango-tope near a brook, four or five miles away leading Venkatakrishna Shastry as the captive.", "canonical_name": "Ve1nireddy Sat yanarayan"}}, {"text": "Reddy", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6155, "end_char": 6160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After a short halt at the village of\n\nVemireddy Satyanarayah\n\nReddy and three other$\n\nThe State of Hyderabad\n\nChandrasekharR\n\nAiyar J.\n\nVemireddy Satyanarayan\n\nReddy and three others\n\nThe State of\n\nHyderabad\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiyar J.\n\nSuknevedu, where some food was taken, the party went toward.s a mango-tope near a brook, four or five miles away leading Venkatakrishna Shastry as the captive."}}, {"text": "ChandrasekharR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6203, "end_char": 6217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After a short halt at the village of\n\nVemireddy Satyanarayah\n\nReddy and three other$\n\nThe State of Hyderabad\n\nChandrasekharR\n\nAiyar J.\n\nVemireddy Satyanarayan\n\nReddy and three others\n\nThe State of\n\nHyderabad\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiyar J.\n\nSuknevedu, where some food was taken, the party went toward.s a mango-tope near a brook, four or five miles away leading Venkatakrishna Shastry as the captive.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ."}}, {"text": "Aiyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6219, "end_char": 6224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After a short halt at the village of\n\nVemireddy Satyanarayah\n\nReddy and three other$\n\nThe State of Hyderabad\n\nChandrasekharR\n\nAiyar J.\n\nVemireddy Satyanarayan\n\nReddy and three others\n\nThe State of\n\nHyderabad\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiyar J.\n\nSuknevedu, where some food was taken, the party went toward.s a mango-tope near a brook, four or five miles away leading Venkatakrishna Shastry as the captive."}}, {"text": "Vemireddy Satyanarayan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6229, "end_char": 6251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After a short halt at the village of\n\nVemireddy Satyanarayah\n\nReddy and three other$\n\nThe State of Hyderabad\n\nChandrasekharR\n\nAiyar J.\n\nVemireddy Satyanarayan\n\nReddy and three others\n\nThe State of\n\nHyderabad\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiyar J.\n\nSuknevedu, where some food was taken, the party went toward.s a mango-tope near a brook, four or five miles away leading Venkatakrishna Shastry as the captive.", "canonical_name": "Ve1nireddy Sat yanarayan"}}, {"text": "State of\n\nHyderabad\n\nChandrasekhara", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6281, "end_char": 6316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After a short halt at the village of\n\nVemireddy Satyanarayah\n\nReddy and three other$\n\nThe State of Hyderabad\n\nChandrasekharR\n\nAiyar J.\n\nVemireddy Satyanarayan\n\nReddy and three others\n\nThe State of\n\nHyderabad\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiyar J.\n\nSuknevedu, where some food was taken, the party went toward.s a mango-tope near a brook, four or five miles away leading Venkatakrishna Shastry as the captive."}}, {"text": "Gopai", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6502, "end_char": 6507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The deceased, Gopai (P.W. 14) and some of the accused remained on the hank of the brooklet."}}, {"text": "8-2-1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7511, "end_char": 7519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 8-2-1949, that is about twenty days after the occurrence, some bones of a human-body were discovered in the riverbed as the result of crows and vultures hovering round the place."}}, {"text": "9-2-1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7877, "end_char": 7885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was on 9-2-1949."}}, {"text": "Umrigar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8242, "end_char": 8249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Being the only witness for the commission of the crime, the dhobi boy (P. W. 14) was subjected to severe criticism by Mr. Umrigar who held the dock brief for the appellants."}}, {"text": "Russell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9985, "end_char": 9992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, the following short passage from Russell on Crime, 10th Edition, page 1846, will show its untenability:-\n\n\"But a person may be present, and, if not aiding and abetting, be neither principal nor accessory; as, if A, happens to be present at a murder and takes no part in it, nor endeavours to prevent it, or to apprehend the murderer, this course of conduct will not of itself render him either principal or accessory\"."}}, {"text": "Reading", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11765, "end_char": 11772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Rex v. Baskerville(') it was pointed by Lord Reading C.J. that \"the corroboration need not be direct evidence that the accused committed the crime; it is sufficient if it is merely circumstantial evidence of his connection with the crime."}}, {"text": "Mulgupad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12991, "end_char": 12999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They say that at the time of the release the accused retained the deceased withthem\n\nand took him away in the direction of Mulgupad."}}, {"text": "Muthyalu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13241, "end_char": 13249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, the deceased was led by a rope from the bank by Muthyalu (4th appellant)."}}, {"text": "Silam Brahma-. reddi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13703, "end_char": 13723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 to 6 and 9 were tied up and as the one that the members of the gang brought from the house of Silam Brahma-."}}, {"text": "Venkatakrishna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13977, "end_char": 13991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is also evidence that the party of the accused when they first encountered the party of the deceased asked who and where was Venkatakrishna.", "canonical_name": ".Venkatakrishna. Shastry"}}, {"text": "Yesob", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14533, "end_char": 14538, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by the evidence of Yesob (P.W. 12) who was watching his jawar crop on the night in question in a neighbouring field."}}, {"text": "Sa.krivedu", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14792, "end_char": 14802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The patwari of Sa.krivedu (P. W. 10) sent a report on the 8th February, 1949, that he had information that a dead body lay buried in the river-bed."}}, {"text": "8th February, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14835, "end_char": 14853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The patwari of Sa.krivedu (P. W. 10) sent a report on the 8th February, 1949, that he had information that a dead body lay buried in the river-bed."}}, {"text": "Vemireddy Satyanarayan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14945, "end_char": 14967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The report has not\n\nVemireddy Satyanarayan\n\nReddy and three others v.\n\nThe State of Hyderabad\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiyar J,\n\nVetnircddy Satyanarayan\n\nReddy and three others\n\nThe Stale of\n\nHyderabad\n\nChaudrasckliara\n\nAiyar J.\n\nbeen filed but its purport about the condition of the body is given in the inquest report as unidentifiable.", "canonical_name": "Ve1nireddy Sat yanarayan"}}, {"text": "Reddy", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14969, "end_char": 14974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The report has not\n\nVemireddy Satyanarayan\n\nReddy and three others v.\n\nThe State of Hyderabad\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiyar J,\n\nVetnircddy Satyanarayan\n\nReddy and three others\n\nThe Stale of\n\nHyderabad\n\nChaudrasckliara\n\nAiyar J.\n\nbeen filed but its purport about the condition of the body is given in the inquest report as unidentifiable.", "canonical_name": "Reddy"}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhara", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15020, "end_char": 15034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The report has not\n\nVemireddy Satyanarayan\n\nReddy and three others v.\n\nThe State of Hyderabad\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiyar J,\n\nVetnircddy Satyanarayan\n\nReddy and three others\n\nThe Stale of\n\nHyderabad\n\nChaudrasckliara\n\nAiyar J.\n\nbeen filed but its purport about the condition of the body is given in the inquest report as unidentifiable.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ."}}, {"text": "Vetnircddy Satyanarayan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15046, "end_char": 15069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The report has not\n\nVemireddy Satyanarayan\n\nReddy and three others v.\n\nThe State of Hyderabad\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiyar J,\n\nVetnircddy Satyanarayan\n\nReddy and three others\n\nThe Stale of\n\nHyderabad\n\nChaudrasckliara\n\nAiyar J.\n\nbeen filed but its purport about the condition of the body is given in the inquest report as unidentifiable."}}, {"text": "Chinna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15463, "end_char": 15469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Its then condition is described in these words in the inquest report:\n\n\"It was noticed that a rope of Chinna and Ambara was wrapped from neck to the waist."}}, {"text": "Ambara", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15474, "end_char": 15480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Its then condition is described in these words in the inquest report:\n\n\"It was noticed that a rope of Chinna and Ambara was wrapped from neck to the waist."}}, {"text": "Madhusudhana Rao", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 17381, "end_char": 17397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His friend Madhusudhana Rao, P. W. 15, was working with the deceased for some years in the Congress office and knew him well indeed."}}, {"text": "Brahma Reddy", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 17762, "end_char": 17774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rope was brought from the house of Brahma Reddy (P.W. 17)."}}, {"text": "Venkatakrishna Shastry", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 18146, "end_char": 18168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The bordered dhoti which was on the corpse belonged to Venkatakrishna Shastry."}}, {"text": "Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19195, "end_char": 19200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vemireddy Satyanarayan\n\nReddy and three other&\n\nThe State of Hyderabad\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiyar J.", "canonical_name": "Reddy"}}, {"text": "State of Hyderabad", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19223, "end_char": 19241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vemireddy Satyanarayan\n\nReddy and three other&\n\nThe State of Hyderabad\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiyar J."}}, {"text": "Chandrasekhara", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19243, "end_char": 19257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vemireddy Satyanarayan\n\nReddy and three other&\n\nThe State of Hyderabad\n\nChandrasekhara\n\nAiyar J.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRASEKHARA AIYAR JJ."}}]} {"document_id": "1956_1_256_266_EN", "year": 1956, "text": "March 15\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1956)\n\nRAMAN & RAMAN LTD. v.\n\nTHE STATE OF MADRAS AND ANOTHER.\n\n[VIVIAN BosE, JAGANNADHADAS, B. P. SINHA, JAFER IMAM and CHANDBASEKBABA AIYAB JJ.)\n\nRoad Ttan•port-PoJi.,. of the Stat. ao,,.,.,.,,..,., to IOI and• orders of 3Uburdinat. authoriti•&-High Court's pow., to int.rfer• bv writ of CBTtiorari-Motor Vehicle• Act (IV of 1989), as amended by the Motor Vehicle• (Madras Amendment) Act (XX of 1948), •· 64A -Oon•titulion of India, Art. 226.\n\nThe appellant and respondent No. 2 along with others applied for stage-carriage permits for two routes and the Regional Transport Authority granted a permit for one route to the appellant and for the other route to the respondent No. 2.\n\nBoth sppesled to the Central Road Traffic Board but the sppeals were dismissed. Neither the Regional Authority nor the Board recorded any finding as to which of them had the better facilities for transport operation or thst they were of equal merit.\n\nThey applied to the Stste Government under s. 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939 as amended by the Motor Vehicles (Madras Amendment) Act of 1948 and the State Government set aside the orders passed by the said subordi\n\nnate authorities and issued permits for both the routes to the res pondent No. 2 on the ground tbst he bad better facilities for opera tion and would serve the public better.\n\nAgainst this order of the Stste Government the appellant moved the High Court for a writ of certiorari snd a single Judge issued the writ.\n\nOn a Letters Patent appeal that decision was set aside.\n\nThe appellant contended that the State Government had acted in excess uf its powers under s. 64-A of the Act in setting aside the orders of the subordinate authorities and that the seetion itself was invalid.\n\nHeld, that the State Government was within its powers in passing the order it did and the appeal must be dismissed.\n\nThat it was within the competence of the State Legislature to insert s. 64-A into the Act and its legality could not be questioned and the clear intention of the legislation was to empower the State Government to decide the legality, regularity or propriety of any orders passed by the subordinate authorities in the interest of the general public. ·\n\nThat the State Government was the final authority to decide which of the rival applicants had the better facilities for operation of the bus service and where it bad come to a decision in favonr of\n\nan applicant, its decision conld not be interfered with under Ari. 226 of the Constitution merely because its view might be erroneous,\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1 of 1956.\n\nOn appeal from the judgment and order dated the 2nd/21st day of September 1955 of the Madras High Court in vVrit Appeal No. 65 of 1955 arising out of the order dated the 5th day of May 1955 of the said High Court in Writ Petition No. 158 of 1955.\n\nG. S. Pathak, R. Ganapathy Iyer and G. Gopalakrishan, for the appellant.\n\nM. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, B.K.B.\n\nNaidu and Naunit Lal, for respondent No. 2.\n\n1956. March 15. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nIMAM J.-This appeal comes before us on a certificate granted by the Madras High Court that the case was a fit one for appeal to this Court as it involved two important questions, n; i, mely, the powers of the Government under section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as amended by the Motor Vehicles (Madras Amendment) Act, 1948 for the State of Madras (hereinafter referred to as the Act), to interfere with the orders of subordinate Transport Authorities on the ground of propriety and the limits of judicial review which the courts have under article 226 of the Constitution of India.\n\nThe appellant and respondent No. 2 had applied for stage-carriage permits in the Mayuram Town Service for routes Nos. I and 2.\n\nThese applications, along with others, were considered by the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore.\n\nBy its order dated the 31st of M; ay, 1954, it granted a permit for route No. I to the appellant and for route No. 2 to respondent No. 2. Both the appellant and respondent No. 2 being dissatisfied appealed under section 64 ofthe Act to the appropriate authority, the Central Road Traffic Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board), but the appeals were dismissed by its order dated the 18th of August, 1954. As section 64-A conferred upon the State Government certain powers, which have\n\nRamanand RamanUd.\n\nThe State of Madras and - another\n\nRaman and RamanUd.\n\nThe State oj 1.fadras and\n\nanother\n\nlmt11n J.\n\nbeen described in this case as revisional powers, the appellant and respondent No. 2 filed representations thereunder before the State Government against the orders of the Regional Transport Authority and the Board. The State Government set aside the orders passed by the aforesaid authorities and directed that permits for both the routes Nos. l and 2 be issued to respondent No. 2.\n\nAgainst this order, the appellant filed an application under article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court for the issue of a writ of certiorari. The application was heard by a single Judge who issued the requisite writ. Against his decision there was a Letters Patent appeal by respondent No. 2, which was allowed and the decision of the single Judge was set aside.\n\nThe ground upon which the Regional Transport Authority granted the appellant and respondent No. 2 permits for routes Nos. 1 and 2 respectively was that they were experienced and were operating town buses at Kumbakonam. This opinion was approved by the Board which also thought that a certain amount of healthy competition was required in the Mayurarn Town routes. It also considered that the Regional Transport Authority was within its rights in not considering the aspect of sector coverage by muffassil buses of the appellant and respondent No. 2. It appears that respondent No. 2 was covering the entire route No. 1 and the appellant was covering a portion of route No.'2. The State Government in setting aside the orders of the' Regional Transport Authority and the Board passed the' following order: . \"As between the claims of Sri Raman & Raman Ltd. and Sri Sathi Vilas Bus Service, the Government consider that it will be in the interest of the public to grant both the permits to Sri Sathi Vilas Bus Servic!ol, Poryar, since he has better facilities fciioperation and will be able to serve the public better. The Government of Madras therefore sets aside as improper the order of the Central Road Traffic Board No.\n\nR 27792/A2/54 dated the 18th of August, 1954 in so far as it confirms the order of the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore granting one permit of route\n\nNo. 1 to Sri Raman & Raman Ltd. and directs that the two permits in question be granted to Sri Sathi Vilas Bus Service, Poryar\".\n\nBefore dealing with the submissions made on behalf of the appellant, it:would be desirable to make reference to certain provisions of the Act concerning . the grant of permits. Section 42 of the Act prohibits an owner of a transport vehicle from using or permitting it to be used in any public place save in accordance with the conditions of a permit granted by a Regional Transport Authority. Section 43 gives certain powers to the State Government to control road transport. Section 44 authorises the State Government to constitute a State Transport Authority as well as a Regional Transport Authority to perform certain functions mentioned therein. Section 47 sets forth certain matters which a Regional Transport Authority shall bear in mind in deciding to grant or to refuse a stage carriage permit. Section 64 enables a person aggrieved by the order of the Regional Transport Authority, with respect to matters mentioned therein, to appeal to the prescribed authority.\n\nSection 64-A states: \"The State Government may, of its own motion or on application made to it, call for the records of any order passed or proceeding taken under this Chapter by any authority or officer subordinate to it, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or proceeding and after examining such records, may pay pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit\".\n\nMr. Pathak, for the appellant, contended that having regard to the terms of section 64-A, there were two stages for the exercise of power thereunder by the State Government. The first stage was the condition precedent for assumption of jurisdiction for the exercise of that power. A collateral fact had to be decided, namely whether the order passed by any authority or officer subordinate to. the State Government was in fact illegal, irregular or improper. If the decision was in the affirmative, then and then only would the State Government have jurisdiction to revise the\n\nRaman and RamanUd,\n\nThe State of Madras and another\n\nImamJ.\n\nRaman and RamanUd.\n\nThe State of Madras and another\n\nImam}.\n\norder complained against. The decision of the State Government both with respect to questions of fact and law could be examined by a court in a proceeding for the issue of a writ of certiorari and such court in doing so could decide whether the order which was revised by the State Government was or was not illegal, irregular or improper. In the present case, there was no question of illegality or irregularity in the orders of the Regional Transport Authority and the Board. The only question was as to whether these orders were improper. The propriety of an order does not necessarily mean that it must be correct order.\n\nThere must be something extraneous to the order itself which made it improper. Merely because the State Government took a different view of the facts to that of the authority or officer subordinate to it would not make the order of such authority or officer improper. The second stage, namely, the passing of an order as the State Government thought fit, could only be reached after a decision had been arrived at on the condition precedent conferring jurisdiction on the State Governµient to revise an order. The substantial ground upon which the State Government revised the order of the authority subordinate to it was that respondent No. 2 had better facilities for operation and would, therefore, be able to serve the public better. The authorities subordinate to the State Government, however, had the representations of the appellant and respondent No. 2, as well as other applicants, which fully stated all material particulars in this respect and it could not be said that these matters were not considered by them. The orders of the subordinate authorities accordingly must be read to mean that as between the appellant and respondent No. 2 both had equal facilities for operation and that things being equal between them in every way, one permit should be _granted for one route to the appellant and another for another route to respondent No. 2.\n\nThere could be nothing improper in this. The condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction to revise the order was therefore absent and the State Government acted in excess of its\n\njurisdiction in revising the orders of its subordinate authorities.\n\nMr. Pathak further contended that there was an error on the face of the .record in the order passed by the State Government as it had refused to consider seniority or experience in motor transport as a factor for the granting of a permit and it thought that it could come to any conclusion it liked and reference was made to paragraph 8 of the affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government in the High Court. On\n\nthe!basis of that affidavit and that paragraph, it was also urged that the error on the face of the record was that the Government acted on an erroneous idea of its own jurisdiction.\n\nHe further contended that section 64-A was an in valid provision.\n\nIn the alternative, he urged that a court or authority, in the exercise of its revisional powers, cannot take a contrary view of the facts to that taken by the subordinate court or authority. Exercise of such revisional power could only be made in cases where the subordinate court or authority had taken a perverse view of the facts and had arrived at a conclusion which no reasonable person could have arrived at.\n\nIn support of his first contention, Mr. Pathak relied upon paragraph 116 at page59 ofHalsbury's Laws of England, third edition, Vol. ll.\n\nIt appears from an' examination of that paragraph and paragraph 117 at page 60 of the same Volume that there may be cases where the jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal may depend upon the fulfilment of some condition precedent or upon the existence of some particular fact.\n\nSuch a fact is collateral to the actual matter which the inferior tribunal has to try, and the determination of whether it exists or not is logically and in sequence prior to the determination of the actual question which the inferior tribunal has to try.\n\nIn such a case, in certiorari proceedings, a court can enquire into the correctness of the decision of the inferior tribunal as to the collateral fact and may reverse that decision if it appears to it, on the\n\nRaman and Raman Ltd. v.\n\nThe State o/ Madras anc.\n\nattother\n\nRa, nanand Ra1nanLtd. v.\n\nThe State of Madras and another\n\nInia1nJ.\n\nmaterials before it, to be erroneous.\n\nThere may be tribunals, however, which, by virtue of legislation constituting them, have the powers to determine finally the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction depends.\n\nWith respect to them, in such cases, their decision even if wrong on facts or law cannot be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In cases where the fact in question is a part of the very issue which the inferior tribunal has to enquire into, a court will not issue a writ of certiorari, although the inferior tribunal may have arrived at an erroneous conclusion with regard to it. In the present case, if there was at all any collateral fact to be decided, it was whether the appropriate authority had in fact passed any order in respect of which powers under section 64-A could be exercised. It is not disputed that in fact orders were passed by the Regional Transport Authority and the Board, authorities subordinate to the State Government, and that these orders existed when the appellant and respondent No. 2 moved that Government to exercise its powers under section 64-A.\n\nThe condition precedent and the existence of a collateral fact in that way for the exercise of powers under that section were therefore present when the State Government exercised its powers. In order to satisfy itself whether the order of an authority subordinate to it was legal, regular or proper, the State Government was not deciding the existence of a collateral fact but the issue itself as to the legality, regularity or the propriety of the order.\n\nThe satisfaction of the State Government in this respect would be an expression of its opinion and not the determination of a fact upon which depended its jurisdiction to exercise its powers under section 64-A.\n\nWhat is the nature of the functions performed under the Act by the Regional Transport Authority, the Board and the State Government in the matter of granting or refusing to grant a permit may now be considered. That they are not judicial is accepted, but, it is said, they are not administrative but quasijudicial and therefore amenable to the jurisdiction of\n\na court possessing the power to issue a writ of certiorari. In proceedings under sections 4 7, 64 and 64-A of the Act there is no determination of any individual's rights and from that point of view the functions of these authorities may be regarded as executive or administrative. On the other hand, it may be said that a person has the fundamental right to carry on his business of plying buses and therefore has the right to have the statutory functions of these authorities properly exercised in which case they would be quasi-judicial functions.\n\nAssuming this to be so, it has yet to be seen whether the State Government acted in excess of its legal authority.\n\nChapter IV of the Act contains provisions concerning the control of transport vehicles:· The Act authorises the State Government to constitute a State Transport Authority and Regional Transport Authorities, and under section 43, subject to its provisions, it can control road transport. In the first instance, the authority to grant or refuse to grant a permit is vested in the Regional 'I'ransport Authority, but its order is not final as a dissatisfied party can appeal against the order under section 64 to the appropriate authority.\n\nBefore section 64-A was inserted into the Aqt by an Act of the legislature of the State of Madras, it might have been possible to contend that the order of a Regional Transport Authority which had not been appealed against and the order of the appropriate authority under section 64, where an appeal had been made, were incapable of interference by the State Government for lack of statutory authority. By enacting section 64-A, the legislature clearly intended that that should not be so and that the State Government should have the powers to intervene, if it was satisfied that the order in question was either illegal, irregular or improper. In clothing the State Government with such power th~ legislature clearly intended the State Government to decide the issue as to whether any order in question was illegal, irregular or improper. It would not be open to a court exercising the power of certiorari to intervene merely because it might be of the opinion that the view taken\n\nRaman and Raman Ud.\n\n....\n\nThe State of Madras and\n\nanother\n\nlmamJ.\n\nRanian and Raman Ud.\n\nThe State of Madras and another\n\nImam]~\n\nby the State Government was erroneous.\n\nThe word \"propriety\" has nowhere been defined in the Act and is capable of.a variety of meanings. In the Oxford English Dictionary (Vol. VIII), it has been stated to mean \"fitness; appmpriateness; aptitude suitability; appropriateness to the circumstances or conditions; conformity with requil'.ement, rule or principle; rightness, correctness, justness, accuracy\".\n\nIf the State Government was of the opinion that respondent No. 2 had better facilities for operation than the appellant and their service to the public would be more beneficial, it could not be said that the State Government was in error in thinking that the order of the Board confirming the order of the Regional Transport Authority was improper.\n\nIt is to be remembered that under section 47 of the Act a Regional Transport Authority in deciding whether to grant or to refuse .a permit shall have regard, amongst other things, to the interest of the public generally and the advantages to the public of the service to be provided. Assuming that in the matter of experience there was nothing much to choose between the appellant and respondent No. 2, better facilities for operation of the bus service possessed by respondent No. 2, would be to the interest of.the public generally and an advantage to the public of the service to be provided and therefore was an overriding factor when other things were equal. As between the appellant and respondent No. 2 neither the Regional Transport Authority nor the Board recorded a finding as to which of thetn had the better facilities for transport operation or that such facilities as existed between them were of equal merit.\n\nThe State Government did not have, therefore, the advantage of knowing, on the face of the orders of these authorities, what view they took of this matter.\n\nEven if it is assumed that their orders meant that the facilities for operation as between the appellant and respondent No. 2 were of equal merit, still the State Govenment was not in a position to know on what material this opinion was based or that it was a reasonable view. In order to satisfy itself the State\n\nGovernment examined the materials available to it and came to the conclusion that respondent No. 2 had the better facilities, in other words, it would be unreasonable to hold that respondent No. 2 had not the better facilities. The learned single Judge of the High Court more than once held that he couldnot find that there was no material before the State Government to justify its finding that respondent No. 2 had the better facilities, and he further held that that was a factor which restricted the jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution.\n\nThat should have concluded the matter so far as the High Court was concerned. He, however, thought that it could not be said that the conclusion reached by the State Government was the only •Conclusion possible and a mere disagreement on the conclusions to be drawn from the available materials, wher~ either view was a reasonable one, was not enough to establish that the orders passed by the Board and the Regional Transport Authority were improper within the meaning of section 64-A. The State Government had therefore acted in excess of its jurisdiction. It seems to us, that the order of the State Government as it stands cannot be said to be in excess of its jurisdiction nor can .it be said that in recording a finding that respondent No. 2 had the bet.ter facilities for operation and would serve the public better, it went beyond its powers, in the absence of a finding to the contrary by the authorities subordinate to it. The interests of the public and the advantages to it of the service to be provided were very, if not the most, important factors to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting or refusing to grant a permit.\n\nIn the conflicting claims of the appellant and respondent No. 2 concerning the facilities available to them for operation of the bus service, the State Government was bound to decide, in the interests -of the public generally, which of these had the better facilities. It was within the scope of its authority to decide this and a court in certiorari proceedings ought not to interfere with that decision. To hold that the opinion of the Regional Transport Authority and the\n\nRaman and Raman Ud.\n\nThe State of Madras and\n\nanother\n\nImam}.\n\nRaman and RamanUd.\n\nThe State of Madras and\n\nanother\n\nImam}.\n\nBoard that the facilities for operation were equal as between these persons was a reasonable view would be to constitute the court as the final authority in a matter, in which, by the provisions of the Act, that function was accorded to the State Government. We are aot prepared therefore to say that the State Government acted in excess of its statutory authority.\n\nThere is no error on the face of the record so far as the order of the State Government is concerned and reference to paragraph 8 of the State Government's affidavit in the High Court does not establish any such thing.\n\nThat paragraph was in answer to paragraphs 13 and 14; of the appellant's affidavit and it set out the contentions of the State Government as to fts powers. There is nothing in that paragraph to establish that in fact the State Government had declined to consider seniority or experience in the matter of selection.\n\nNo substantial ground was put forward for supposing that section 64-A was an illegal provision. It was within the competence of the State Legislature to insert section 64-A into the Act. It was a reasonable provision in keeping with the entire scheme of the Act concerning transport vehicles and control of road transport.\n\nAs to the extent of powers of revision in a court or authority we do not intend to expre.ss any opinion in this case having regard to the view we take that the order of the State Government cannot be interfered with by the issue of a writ of certiorari. .\n\nAs regards the limits of judicial review which the courts have under article 226 which is one of the grounds on which the certificate was issued by the High Court, that question has since been considered in the various decisions of this Court, which do not .require recapitulation.\n\nIn our opinion, tQ.is is not a case in which it would be reasonable to hold that the State Government acted in excess of its jurisdiction.\n\nThe appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs to be paid to respondent No. 2. ·", "total_entities": 72, "entities": [{"text": "RAMAN & RAMAN LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 57, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAMAN & RAMAN LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF MADRAS AND ANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 63, "end_char": 94, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF MADRAS AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "VIVIAN BosE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 98, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVIAN BOSE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGANNADHADAS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 124, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B. JAGANNADHADAS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. P. SINHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 126, "end_char": 137, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHUVNESHWAR PRASAD SINHA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAFER IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 139, "end_char": 149, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SYED JAFFER IMAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 468, "end_char": 476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Central Road Traffic Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 738, "end_char": 764, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both sppesled to the Central Road Traffic Board but the sppeals were dismissed."}}, {"text": "Stste Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 988, "end_char": 1004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They applied to the Stste Government under s. 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939 as amended by the Motor Vehicles (Madras Amendment) Act of 1948 and the State Government set aside the orders passed by the said subordi\n\nnate authorities and issued permits for both the routes to the res pondent No."}}, {"text": "s. 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1011, "end_char": 1016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1026, "end_char": 1044, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1654, "end_char": 1659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1960, "end_char": 1965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "G. S. Pathak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2885, "end_char": 2897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Pathak, R. Ganapathy Iyer and G. Gopalakrishan, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "R. Ganapathy Iyer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2899, "end_char": 2916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Pathak, R. Ganapathy Iyer and G. Gopalakrishan, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "G. Gopalakrishan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2921, "end_char": 2937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. S. Pathak, R. Ganapathy Iyer and G. Gopalakrishan, for the appellant."}}, {"text": "B.K.B.\n\nNaidu", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3003, "end_char": 3016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, B.K.B.\n\nNaidu and Naunit Lal, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3021, "end_char": 3031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, B.K.B.\n\nNaidu and Naunit Lal, for respondent No."}}, {"text": "IMAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3116, "end_char": 3120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nIMAM J.-This appeal comes before us on a certificate granted by the Madras High Court that the case was a fit one for appeal to this Court as it involved two important questions, n; i, mely, the powers of the Government under section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as amended by the Motor Vehicles (Madras Amendment) Act, 1948 for the State of Madras (hereinafter referred to as the Act), to interfere with the orders of subordinate Transport Authorities on the ground of propriety and the limits of judicial review which the courts have under article 226 of the Constitution of India."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3184, "end_char": 3201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nIMAM J.-This appeal comes before us on a certificate granted by the Madras High Court that the case was a fit one for appeal to this Court as it involved two important questions, n; i, mely, the powers of the Government under section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as amended by the Motor Vehicles (Madras Amendment) Act, 1948 for the State of Madras (hereinafter referred to as the Act), to interfere with the orders of subordinate Transport Authorities on the ground of propriety and the limits of judicial review which the courts have under article 226 of the Constitution of India."}}, {"text": "section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3342, "end_char": 3352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3362, "end_char": 3386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3458, "end_char": 3473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nIMAM J.-This appeal comes before us on a certificate granted by the Madras High Court that the case was a fit one for appeal to this Court as it involved two important questions, n; i, mely, the powers of the Government under section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as amended by the Motor Vehicles (Madras Amendment) Act, 1948 for the State of Madras (hereinafter referred to as the Act), to interfere with the orders of subordinate Transport Authorities on the ground of propriety and the limits of judicial review which the courts have under article 226 of the Constitution of India."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3667, "end_char": 3678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3686, "end_char": 3707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mayuram Town Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3791, "end_char": 3811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 had applied for stage-carriage permits in the Mayuram Town Service for routes Nos."}}, {"text": "Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3900, "end_char": 3937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These applications, along with others, were considered by the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore."}}, {"text": "section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4152, "end_char": 4162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "18th of August, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4328, "end_char": 4348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 being dissatisfied appealed under section 64 ofthe Act to the appropriate authority, the Central Road Traffic Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board), but the appeals were dismissed by its order dated the 18th of August, 1954."}}, {"text": "section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4353, "end_char": 4363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ramanand RamanUd", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4430, "end_char": 4446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As section 64-A conferred upon the State Government certain powers, which have\n\nRamanand RamanUd."}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4453, "end_char": 4468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Madras and - another\n\nRaman and RamanUd."}}, {"text": "article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4997, "end_char": 5008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kumbakonam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5515, "end_char": 5525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 and 2 respectively was that they were experienced and were operating town buses at Kumbakonam."}}, {"text": "Mayurarn Town", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5650, "end_char": 5663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This opinion was approved by the Board which also thought that a certain amount of healthy competition was required in the Mayurarn Town routes."}}, {"text": "Raman & Raman Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6145, "end_char": 6163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As between the claims of Sri Raman & Raman Ltd. and Sri Sathi Vilas Bus Service, the Government consider that it will be in the interest of the public to grant both the permits to Sri Sathi Vilas Bus Servic!ol, Poryar, since he has better facilities fciioperation and will be able to serve the public better."}}, {"text": "Sathi Vilas Bus Service", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6172, "end_char": 6195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As between the claims of Sri Raman & Raman Ltd. and Sri Sathi Vilas Bus Service, the Government consider that it will be in the interest of the public to grant both the permits to Sri Sathi Vilas Bus Servic!ol, Poryar, since he has better facilities fciioperation and will be able to serve the public better."}}, {"text": "Sathi Vilas Bus Servic!ol,", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6300, "end_char": 6326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As between the claims of Sri Raman & Raman Ltd. and Sri Sathi Vilas Bus Service, the Government consider that it will be in the interest of the public to grant both the permits to Sri Sathi Vilas Bus Servic!ol, Poryar, since he has better facilities fciioperation and will be able to serve the public better."}}, {"text": "Poryar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6327, "end_char": 6333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As between the claims of Sri Raman & Raman Ltd. and Sri Sathi Vilas Bus Service, the Government consider that it will be in the interest of the public to grant both the permits to Sri Sathi Vilas Bus Servic!ol, Poryar, since he has better facilities fciioperation and will be able to serve the public better."}}, {"text": "Government of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6429, "end_char": 6449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of Madras therefore sets aside as improper the order of the Central Road Traffic Board No."}}, {"text": "Section 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6994, "end_char": 7004, "source": "regex", "metadata": 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